RICHARD J. SAMUELS EDITOR

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
UNITED STATES
NATIONAL SECURITY

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RICHARD J. SAMUELS EDITOR
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

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A DWJ BOOKS Reference Work

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Richard J. Samuels is Ford International Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he is also director of the Center for International Studies. Additionally, he is the founding director of the MIT Japan Program. In 2001, he became chair of the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission, an independent federal grant-making agency that supports Japanese studies and policy-oriented research in the United States.

Professor Samuels served as chair of the MIT Department of Political Science (1992–1997) and as vice-chair of the Committee on Japan of the National Research Council until 1996. In 1992, he was elected a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Dr. Samuels's most recent book, *Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan* (2003), won the 2003 Marraro Prize from the Society for Italian Historical Studies and the 2004 Jervis-Schroeder Prize for International and Historical Studies from the American Political Science Association. His 1994 study, *Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan,* won the 1996 John Whitney Hall Prize of the Association of Asian Studies and the 1996 Hiromi Arisawa Memorial Prize of the Association of American University Presses. His book, *The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective* received the Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Prize in 1988. In 1983, he published *Politics of Regional Policy in Japan*.

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Preface

Security is like the air we breathe. We take it for granted until there is too little of it, at which point getting enough of it is all that matters. Aside from December 7, 1941, and September 11, 2001, the United States has been blessed in that most of its citizens have rarely felt an urgent need for national protection. Still, Americans have fought a great many wars and have suffered the loss of millions of its soldiers and civilians. And today, since the tragic events of 9/11, we know that the topic of national security has never been of broader concern to all Americans. Rarely have we felt as threatened as we do in the current security environment.

Ironically, most Americans feel vulnerable despite the fact that the United States is the largest military power the world has ever known. Annual U.S. defense spending is larger than the total defense budgets of the next 25 nations combined, and the budget of the U.S. Marine Corps alone (the smallest of the four U.S. military branches) is larger than that of the entire military of the United Kingdom.

The U.S. military has rarely been idle—even in peacetime. In the relatively peaceful quarter-century from the April 1975 evacuation of Saigon until the February 2001 Operation Desert Focus in Kuwait, U.S. forces were deployed in nearly 90 separate missions abroad. Today, of course, we are used to news about U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq, but thousands of U.S. soldiers, sailors, pilots, and marines are engaged in active deterrence, combat, or peacekeeping operations in other countries as well—from Colombia to the Philippines, from Bosnia to Korea.

Interest in (and the need for informed discussion of) national security has never been more pressing. As a result, the *Encyclopedia of United States National Security* is written by specialists with a broad audience in mind. Our goal is to encourage curiosity about international affairs and, in particular, about the long list of issues that affect our national security. Our hope is that the design of the *Encyclopedia* will help enlighten everyone from high school and college students who need reliable information for a term paper to postgraduate students who demand better information to make more-informed choices at a time when the air seems to be getting thin again.

—Richard J. Samuels
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Introduction

The 17th-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) famously argued in *Leviathan* that "the condition of man . . . is a condition of war of every one against every one." Hobbes pointed out that when there is a war of all against all there is no room for commerce, for the generation of knowledge, or for culture. "Worst of all," he wrote, there is "continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." Hobbes's solution to this paralyzing insecurity was for individuals to surrender some independence to their state and thereby gain the protection that only a social existence can provide.

Hobbes was not alone, of course, in tying security to the state, nor was his solution the only one offered by political and social theorists. Still, there has long been a consensus among national security professionals, evidenced by numerous articles in the *Encyclopedia of United States National Security*, that even if Hobbes was not entirely correct, it is dangerous to bet against his view of human behavior. Alas, we humans often do need protection from one another, and the state—although costly to maintain—is one effective source of social order and public welfare, the very warp and woof of security.

Many of the analyses in the *Encyclopedia* reflect this view, and we invite the reader to wander about its pages. Encyclopedias are great places in which to do this. Like whole libraries and websites, they link ideas and information in unexpected ways—often with unanticipated results. Encyclopedias have been around since classical times—more than 1,000 years longer than websites. Their purpose has always been to provide summaries of existing scholarship in an accessible language for nonspecialists and to provide educed starting points for further investigations of ideas. Although the Internet certainly makes connections across topics and ideas easy, it often lacks the authority that a single peer-reviewed source of information, such as a carefully compiled encyclopedia, can provide.

Each of the nearly 700 entries in this *Encyclopedia of United States National Security* has been reviewed thoughtfully by its editors—scholars of equal standing in the field. The entries are presented in traditional format—alphabetically—and most are cross-referenced to numerous other entries to enable fuller contextual learning. But this volume is more than an A to Z list of ideas. In addition to presenting historical facts and analyses of weapons systems, treaties, and international conflicts, it is designed to also provide a comprehensive introduction to some of the more complicated and abstract questions concerning world politics and national security.

The conceptual basis of national security comprises more than an arithmetic sum of wars multiplied by strategic choices and divided by force structure. Indeed, as readers of the entries in this encyclopedia will discover, national security involves much more than grand strategies, military doctrines, and strong states to carry them out. The use of force is but one way to protect oneself and one's community. Economic and diplomatic tools are ready alternatives that receive the attention of security analysts, as one can see, for example, in the entry on "Economic Sanctions."

Readers also will be introduced to the competing paradigms in international studies—the alternative ideas that inform and frame questions about security policy. Perhaps the most influential approach is *realism*, which focuses on how states react to the structure of the international system. According to this approach, security is scarce in a world without binding international law, and it is the balance of power under conditions of anarchy that most affects security policy. For realists, when the central structural feature

of international politics changes—as it did after the end of the Cold War—the central challenges to national security—and even the rules for its provision—must be reformulated, as the reader will learn, for example, in the entry on "New World Order."

Although they are not all of one mind, most realists find it convenient to assume that states are not only rational actors but unitary ones as well. Some of their critics point out that there is more than structure, balance, and anarchy at work in world politics. Perceptions, misperceptions, and every variety of domestic politics intervene to affect policy, as can be seen in the entries on "Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)," the "Armed Services Committees," "Defense Budgeting," the "Antiwar Movement," and "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." Others note the rise in ethnic violence and of the new salience of economic power and suggest that the very nature of international conflict may have changed. This is illustrated in such entries as "Guerrilla Warfare," "Ethnic Cleansing," and "Human Rights."

Some realists suggest that states balance against threat, not against power. Still others stress that grand strategy depends upon external factors, such as the technological characteristics of weapons—that is, offense versus defense dominance. In short, realism is actually a diverse family of theories that emphasizes material factors of power and power shifts derived from wealth, technology, and resources as the most important issues in international politics. However, because they take those core assumptions in very different directions, realists often disagree vigorously among themselves, as evidenced, for example, in the entry on "Realism."

The realist debate hardly exhausts the possibilities for understanding the dynamics of international politics, or of security affairs in particular. Realists are challenged by liberals who are not convinced that authority, morality, and law must necessarily be subordinated to power. Many believe that international politics is a potential community of peaceful, cooperative states. By their account—following the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) more closely than Thomas Hobbes—interests are not defined by states, but by individuals. Individuals share interests that are distorted by states. There are moral imperatives in international society, just as in domestic society. State survival is not the only objective of elites.

Liberal analysis is not mere theory. Liberals are less impressed by anarchy as the defining feature of world order than by the extent to which states limit themselves through rules, norms, and institutions.

They note that even in big power rivalries, patterned behavior generates converging expectations, conventional behavior, and norms. States are by no means the only key actors on the world stage. In this view, international institutions and norms intervene between state interests and state actions in international politics. Multilateral institutions and norms matter as much as states because in important cases and in significant ways they precede and constrain state action. Transnational forces and nongovernmental actors are also critical units of analysis, as can be explored in the entries on "Collective Security," "Democratic Peace," "International Criminal Court," "Interdependence," and "Multilateralism."

International law is an important element of strategy. Although states do live in an anarchic world, there have long been supranational organizations such as the United Nations and international treaties that have tried to constrain behavior. The 1909 London Naval Conference led to significant reductions in naval forces in the Pacific. Likewise, the 1992 Treaty on the Conventional Forces in Europe eased the transition from Cold War confrontation to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion and dramatically reduced tensions in Europe after the end of the Cold War. Of course, many other treaties and international organizations have been less than successful. Whereas the most intriguing failure was perhaps the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which renounced war as an instrument of national policy, the most spectacular failure was the League of Nations, which was formed, in Woodrow Wilson's words, to "create mutual guarantees of the political independence and territorial integrity of States, large and small equally," and which was crippled by the military aggression of imperial Japan in 1931 in Manchuria, the colonial expansion of fascist Italy in East Africa in 1935, and Nazi Germany's 1939 invasion of Czechoslovakia and Poland. Each of these treaties and international organizations is examined in these volumes. There are also the Geneva Conventions, which addressed torture and the treatment of captured combatants in ways that became central to the U.S. national security debate during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Readers will find entries describing each of these treaties and organizations in the *Encyclopedia*.

Some scholars question the conventional dimensions of state power and national interest altogether. Constructivists reject the assumption shared by realists and liberals that the principal animating feature of international politics is material. Rather than accepting

the means-end assumptions of economics, they draw instead on anthropology and sociology to argue that fundamental structures of international politics are social and cultural and that actors' identities and interests are fluid rather than fixed. State behavior is shaped by changing identities—not by fixed material conditions in an anarchic world. Constructivists argue that state interests can be created by shared understandings, expectations, or knowledge. They are more apt to study "epistemic communities" than state policy and alliance politics.

Thus, the debate has been engaged. After the Cold War ended, some imagined that dialogue would be more possible and more prophylactic than before. "Deterrence" would be replaced by "reassurance" as a central principle of grand strategy. Transparency and confidence-building would become more effective security instruments than threats and arms races. (See the entries on "Deterrence," "Arms Control," and "Containment.") Still others suggest that nontraditional issues—such as poverty, disease, refugees, and the environment—have entered the security domain. There is no consensus, but there is a common denominator in post–Cold War thinking about security. It holds that we are in the midst of a transition from the state-centered model that has dominated security thinking. The world system is being transformed, and with the state no longer the singular actor in international politics, it is no longer the central object of study, as can be gleaned from the entries on "Al-Qaeda" and "Drug Cartels."

An encyclopedia such as this, focusing as it does on providing information related to the use (or threat) of force—particularly military force—and on the foreign policy of states—particularly the United States—cannot capture all the nuance and sophistication of these alternative approaches to the study of international security. However, it can, and does, call attention to each of them and introduces the reader to the options. Each of the approaches mentioned previously, and each of the theorists and concepts, are explained within these covers.

Each of the entries is presented as the complexity of the subject demands and space permits. Some, such as those on the Berlin crises and the Chemical Weapons Convention, are brief; others, such as the analyses of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Middle East conflicts, are more detailed. Numerous sidebar features appear throughout the *Encyclopedia* as well, providing excerpts from treaties, speeches, and other primary sources ("Reflections"), portraits of individuals

involved in national security issues ("Public Portraits"), and overviews of such newsworthy events as scandals and breaches of national security ("Secrets Revealed").

Much has changed in every area of U.S. national security—even its history. History and scholarship change not because facts change but because revised interpretations of events are enabled as new facts are discovered. History—conflicts won and lost, policies successful and failed—brings us to our present circumstances. It shapes the sorts of weapons we use, the strategies we pursue, the laws we enact, and the personalities we elect. Consequently, many of the historical entries in this volume ("Truman Doctrine," "Vietnam War") take pains to connect the past to the present.

The *Encyclopedia* focuses on the full range of contemporary weapons systems, including conventional, strategic, and nonconventional weapons. Since the events of September 11, 2001, much attention has focused on nonconventional weapons and on asymmetric warfare in particular. Thus, this reference work is brimming with explanations of air, sea, and land warfare; ballistic missile defense; space weapons; stealth technology; antisubmarine warfare; and biological weapons—among many others.

National security is not simply a matter of bombs and rockets—the things that go bang in the night. The entries herein also review many of the strategic choices made by U.S. security policy planners and presidents. Strategy comes in a variety of forms. Although it is associated most often with weapons systems, military strategy is normally guided by political and economic interests. It is for this reason that elements of economic and political strategy are examined alongside military strategy in these volumes. (See, e.g., the entries on "Energy Policy and National Security." "Monetary Policy," "Dual-Use Technology," and "Transnational Threats.")

The *Encyclopedia of United States National Security* would be incomplete if it did not provide readers with a close look at the individuals who had the greatest impact upon U.S. national security. Some generals have made choices that tipped the balance of history in ways that have had lasting consequences for global security, which is the reason why whole weapons systems are named after some of these men. For example, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz inspired the Nimitz Class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers that form the centerpiece of the U.S. Navy's global forward presence, deterrence, crisis response, and war fighting capabilities. (See the entry on "Aircraft Carriers.") The Bradley Fighting Vehicle that provides mobile

protected transport for infantry soldiers to critical points on the battlefield is named after World War II General Omar Bradley who was known as the "GI General." (See the entry on "Tanks.") General John J. "Black Jack" Pershing, commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Force in Europe during World War I, inspired the highly mobile, nuclear-armed missile system that became a significant tool of U.S. power and a focus of antiwar activism in Europe during the Cold War. (See the entry on "Tactical Nuclear Weapons.")

Finally, no account of U.S. national security would be complete without including our leaders and thinkers in mufti as well. George Kennan and Paul H. Nitze were U.S. Foreign Service officers whose thinking about the correlation of forces after the end of World War II shaped U.S. security policy for the next half century. Thus, the *Encyclopedia* includes biographical sketches of Kennan and Nitze, as well as of other influential strategists of the American century, such as Fred Iklé, Hans Morganthau, Herman Kahn, and Henry Kissinger.

The authors and editors invite our readers to browse and delve more deeply into the material assembled on these pages. The result, we hope, will be a better-informed and more secure public.

—Richard J. Samuels

A

ADVANCED SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEM
See AEGIS WEAPON SYSTEM

AEGIS WEAPON SYSTEM

An area defense system for U.S. naval battle groups that is capable of simultaneous engagement on air, surface, and subsurface fronts. The AEGIS weapon system's wide altitude range allows it to target submarines and aircraft flying at speeds from subsonic to supersonic. The system also has all-weather capabilities and can function in chaff and jamming conditions.

Recognizing the increased threat of modern antiship missiles, the U.S. Navy designed the Advanced Surface Missile System (ASMS) during the late 1960s. In 1969, the navy changed the name of the system to AEGIS (named for the shield carried by the Greek god Zeus). The complex systems of the AEGIS required special operations and management in mechanical and electrical systems, maintenance and repair, computer programs, personnel records, and tactical operation documentation. This led to the formation of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA PMS-400) in 1977, which unified the AEGIS multimission surface combat groups.

The nucleus of the AEGIS system is the AN/SPY-1 radar. This multifunctional phased-array radar can automatically detect and track more than 100 targets simultaneously. The radar's high-powered missile guidance capabilities allow destroyers and cruisers to assume a greater role in the defense of the battle group while fighter aircraft focus on outer air battles. In addition, the AEGIS system's high level of accuracy decreases the overexpenditure of other tactical assets. As of 2005, the total cost of the AEGIS system was $42.7 billion, which includes $22.2 billion for operations and support.

See also Ballistic Missiles; U.S. Navy

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Controversial policy adopted by governments, businesses, and schools to consider factors such as race, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or veteran status when making decisions about admitting, employing, or promoting an individual.

Affirmative action dates to the 1960s. At that time, the government began to acknowledge that members of certain groups were subject to discrimination, and it took steps to protect their interests. The policy was explicitly designed to change how government contracts and employment, private employment, and school admissions were allocated among the population. President John F. Kennedy's executive order 10925 (issued in 1961) and President Lyndon B. Johnson's executive order 11246 (1965) prescribed "affirmative action" in federal contracting. The former also created the body that became the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

The definition of affirmative action and practice, however, remain hotly contested. Affirmative action has been variously described as positive discrimination, reverse discrimination, a quota system, equal opportunity, or

as a means of choosing between equally qualified candidates for jobs or school admissions. Some view it as a legitimate, equalizing force; others regard it as an illegitimate imposition of social conscience on business and education systems.

In settings closely related to national security, according to a 2002 article published by the National Center for Policy Analysis, the U.S. Army "has been generally viewed as a model of successful racial integration." The article noted that, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, African American officers were promoted at rates equal to, and sometimes greater than, those of white officers. Nevertheless, in 1993 the Army adopted a policy of providing "equal opportunity instructions" to its officer selection boards. The instructions stated that the goal was to "achieve a selection rate in each minority and gender group . . . that is not less than the rate for all (eligible) officers." In 2002, a U.S. District Court struck down the guidelines as unconstitutional, citing the overall strong record of minority promotion within the Army.

In business settings, affirmative action is used primarily to ensure that members of underprivileged groups are not underused or ignored in the workplace. In the college admissions process, affirmative action is used to increase the diversity of the student body. Schools also use it to balance race- and gender-related factors in admission. For example, white males tend to perform better than women and certain minorities on the standardized tests that are important in gaining entrance to college. Affirmative action policies allow schools to give greater weight to factors other than test scores when evaluating applicants for admission.

Those who support affirmative action say that the policy is absolutely necessary to create true equality. They assert that the nondiscrimination mandated in the Constitution and the Civil Rights Acts do not go far enough to ensure equality of opportunity. They argue that so-called color-blind (or gender-neutral) policies subtly discriminate against protected groups. Affirmative action levels the playing field so that members of protected groups have a fair chance at obtaining the contracts, jobs, or admission to college that historically they have been denied by the regular selection process. Affirmative action helps to achieve greater diversity and compensates for past injustices, present discrimination, and prejudice.

Opponents of affirmative action contend that merit alone should be the deciding policy for admissions and jobs and that no special attention should be given to statuses such as race or disability. They argue that affirmative action effectively discriminates against those who are not members of protected groups. Further, they add, it may result in individuals obtaining jobs or places in college that should be filled by more qualified applicants. Some argue that affirmative action actually hurts those it is trying to help because it stigmatizes those who could have gained admission or employment without the policy.

More than 40 years after its introduction as government policy, affirmative action still stirs controversy. Although it has opened up otherwise closed avenues of opportunity for many Americans, it also has generated great resistance and resentment among others. Legal challenges to affirmative action have grown in recent years, but it remains a potent force in shaping the professional and educational landscape of the United States.

AFGHAN WARS

Series of wars that swept through Afghanistan from 1979 to 2001. A Marxist coup in Afghanistan in 1978 initiated waves of battle and turmoil, including a Soviet invasion, and set the stage for the rise of the Taliban and that group's eventual defeat by American forces following the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001.

A communist revolution in the Afghan city of Kabul in 1978 installed a Marxist government in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union had privately funded and directed communist networks at Kabul University and in the Afghan army for nearly two decades before this political takeover. The communist coup was an immediate response to the arrest of communist leaders in Kabul, on order of Afghan president Mohammed Daoud, following a protest in April 1978. Daoud was shot just days afterward.

With the death of Daoud and the installation of a Marxist regime, the Soviet Union now had a cooperative communist government in Afghanistan. However, the political takeover by the communists did not correlate to physical control of the entire country. Anticommunist factions operated throughout the countryside, and in the city of Herat, an Afghan army captain emboldened by the Iranian Islamic revolution called for a *jihad*, or holy war, against the communist invaders during the spring of 1979. Afghan army officers in the city of Jalalabad followed suit, and desertions from the communist-led Afghan army multiplied. Soon, Muslim fighters from

around the world traveled to Afghanistan to take part in the holy war. The Soviet Union soon determined that without its military intervention, the communist Afghan government faced annihilation.

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 and supported the communist regime against the battling *mujahideen* (an Arabic term that identifies the practitioners of jihad). Within two days of the invasion, the Soviet forces secured Kabul and installed a new government, which requested the continuing presence of some 85,000 Soviet troops, a mixture of airborne and motorized infantry personnel. The jihadists, however, proved formidable, and the Soviets—the second most powerful military power in the world—eventually resorted to using napalm, poison gas, helicopter gunships, and land mines against the rebels. Victory proved elusive, however, and the Soviet Union's experience in Afghanistan began to be widely compared to the American experience in Vietnam. By 1982, the mujahideen controlled 75% of Afghanistan. The United Nations condemned the Soviet invasion in January 1980, but a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Soviet forces was vetoed by the Soviet Union, which was a permanent member of the Security Council.

The Soviet Union ultimately found itself in a quagmire and could not transform military force into political legitimacy for the Marxist regime. By February 1989, the Soviets had completely withdrawn from Afghanistan, and the communist regime fell by April 1992, initiating a wave of transnational war in the war-torn country.

The unity among the Afghan people that had ultimately defeated the superior military might of the Soviet Union quickly dissolved as factions fought for control of the Afghan capital, Kabul. The beneficiary of the factious fighting proved to be the Taliban, which emerged as the faction capable of gaining control of the capital. The Taliban consisted of antimodernist religious extremists from the Pashtun ethnic group. Backed by Pakistan, where the Pashtuns wielded military and political control, the Taliban seized control of Kabul in September 1996. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan hosted religious zealots from other countries, including al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. In September 2001, bin Laden assassinated the Afghan leader of the anti-Taliban forces, Ahmad Shah Massoud, and then carried out attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the United States on September 11, 2001.

As a result of those attacks, a third wave of war swept Afghanistan in the fall of 2001—attacks by the far superior American military power. On Thursday, September 20, 2001, U.S. president George W. Bush addressed the people of the United States before a joint session of Congress. Bush publicly declared an ultimatum that had been given privately, stating that the Taliban had to act immediately and hand over the al-Qaeda terrorists or they would share their fate. The president also asked every nation to join the United States in its declared fight against terrorism.

President Bush approved military plans to attack Afghanistan on September 21 and October 2 in meetings with General Tommy Franks of the U.S. Central Command and other advisers. The plan for the operation was named Enduring Freedom. The United States soon launched military action in the region, as well as in neighboring Uzbekistan and Pakistan. Air strikes and special-operations attacks on key al-Qaeda and Taliban targets began on October 7, 2001. Agents of the Central Intelligence Agency and special-operations forces also moved in to work with major Afghan factions fighting the Taliban.

The northern Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif fell to Afghan and American forces on November 9, 2001. The Taliban fled Kabul four days later. By early December, Afghan and American forces controlled every major Afghan city. Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun leader from Kandahar, became the chairman of Afghanistan's interim government on December 22, 2001, while Afghan and U.S. forces continued actions against al-Qaeda fighters in the cave complex of Tora Bora along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The largest engagement of the war took place in the mountainous Shah-i-Kot area south of Gardez in March 2002. This three-week battle was largely successful: Almost all of the remaining al-Qaeda forces were forced to retreat to Pakistan's lightly governed frontier provinces. However, Osama bin Laden escaped, and in the aftermath of the war, he has remained an elusive and wanted figure in the international war on terrorism.

See also Afghanistan, War in; Bin Laden, Osama; Taliban; Terrorism, War on International

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In Afghanistan, U.S. soldiers from the Second Battalion of the 25th Infantry Division of the 35th Infantry Regiment. The soldiers move through a valley in Afghanistan during the operation to defeat Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorist forces after the start of the U.S.-led military intervention in that country. The intervention was launched one month after the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States.

Source: U.S. Army.

AFGHANISTAN, WAR IN

American-led military campaign against Afghanistan's ruling Taliban movement and the terrorist organization al-Qaeda, which was allied with the Taliban. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington DC, President George W. Bush gave the Taliban an ultimatum to surrender al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, who was America's most wanted individual because of his role as mastermind of the terrorist attacks. Faced with a stark refusal by the Taliban, the United States and Great Britain began launching air strikes against the Taliban in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. The newest in a long succession of Afghan wars had just started.

The last foreign military to invade Afghanistan was the Soviet army, which, for more than a decade in the 1980s, bitterly fought an assortment of Islamic guerilla groups backed by Muslim countries and, covertly, by the American Central Intelligence Agency. With the withdrawal of the Soviets at the beginning of 1989, a new kind of fighting erupted in Afghanistan, this time among the formerly allied guerillas.

After years of relentless violence and bloodshed, a particularly devout Islamic faction, the Taliban, emerged as the most powerful actor on the Afghan political stage. The Taliban (a Pashtun word meaning "students") soon seized control of most of Afghanistan and introduced strict social and religious laws and customs. From the mid-1990s on, the Taliban provided sanctuary to Osama bin Laden, head of the terrorist al-Qaeda network and a former anti-Soviet ally.

In 1998, accusing bin Laden of masterminding the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the United States launched a series of cruise missile attacks against several Afghan locations that were believed to host terrorist camps. When the September 11, 2001, attacks occurred, bin Laden was once again named the prime suspect, and the Taliban was asked to deliver him immediately for trial.

Afghanistan's Taliban rulers, however, demanded proof of bin Laden's involvement in the September 11 attacks and refused to hand him over to the United States. As a result, on October 7, 2001, less than one month after the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington DC, U.S. and British air forces attacked Afghanistan.

NEW ALLIES

The strikes began on a Sunday night and targeted the Taliban's air defenses, airports, suspected terrorist camps, and electricity grids. Dubbed Operation Enduring Freedom, the air campaign proved to be extremely efficient in terms of annihilating the Taliban's airpower. Simultaneous with the bombing, U.S. planes also dropped packages of food and medicine for the Afghan people, with whom the United States had no quarrel.

Looking for allies on the ground, the United States established close contacts with the anti-Taliban resistance (the Northern Alliance), which had been opposing the Taliban fundamentalists for more than half a decade. Before Operation Enduring Freedom, the resistance had been slowly losing the battle against the Taliban army, but with its capabilities bolstered by the United States, the Northern Alliance began to make steady military gains.

The Taliban progressively relinquished control of strategic locations, and, on November 9, 2001, the crucial town of Mazar-e Sharif was captured by the opposition. Caught between U.S. air raids and the ground advance of the Northern Alliance, many local Taliban commanders switched allegiance and joined the anti-Taliban forces.

The Taliban continued to be rolled back as the Northern Alliance opened a series of new fronts. Unable to maintain the capital city of Kabul, the Taliban forces fled to the cities of Kunduz (in the north) and Kandahar (in the south), leaving behind a pocket of al-Qaeda fighters, a number of whom were killed within 15 minutes of their engagement of the Northern Alliance military. At that point, the fighting stopped in most of the country, although there were still several regions where combined Taliban forces put up a fierce resistance.

PICKING UP THE PIECES

With their training camps laid to waste by precise U.S. and British bombing, around mid-November, al-Qaeda managed to regroup in Tora Bora, a mountainous region along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border replete with caves and ravines. Soon after, U.S. bombers began pounding the roughly 2,000 al-Qaeda fighters that had taken defensive positions in the area. Two hundred U.S. commandos were flown in to join the Northern Alliance forces besieging the cave complex.

The al-Qaeda forces were soon overpowered, and most fighters were either killed or captured. However, Osama bin Laden, who was thought to have been hiding in the region, could not be found. Meanwhile, in the Afghan city of Kandahar, bin Laden's former host, Taliban chief Mullah Omar pulled a disappearing act of his own, managing to elude the joint American–Northern Alliance forces.

Although all of Afghanistan's key cities were in allied hands by the end of 2001, elusive al-Qaeda and Taliban combatants continued to engage the opposition, making the best of the mountainous terrain, which had previously provided shelter to many of the same fighters during their struggle against the Soviet Union.

In early December 2001, under the supervision of the United Nations, the various anti-Taliban factions that now had control over Afghanistan met in Bonn, Germany, to discuss the sharing of political power. An Afghan Interim Administration was established, and Hamid Karzai, a former anti-Taliban dissident, was appointed as its chairman. A few months later, Karzai was elected interim president of Afghanistan by the traditional Afghani Grand Council (*Loya Jirga*).

Since the official end of the war, reconstruction projects have been set up in Afghanistan, and international donors have met repeatedly to help the fifth-poorest country in the world recover from 23 years of almost continuous warfare. Although the Afghanis are slowly rebuilding their country, American and allied troops are still roaming the mountains along the border with Pakistan in search of Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and their supporters. Military operations have been undertaken periodically, resulting in significant numbers of deaths on both sides. The armed violence in Afghanistan continues today.

See also Afghan Wars; Bin Laden, Osama; September 11/WTC and Pentagon Attacks; Taliban; Terrorism, War on International; Terrorists, Islamic

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AGENT ORANGE

Herbicide used by U.S. forces in Vietnam to defoliate and expose enemy positions, which has been linked to several severe medical conditions. Agent Orange is a reddish-brown liquid containing four chemicals: 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,5-T), 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4-D), cacodylic acid, and picloram. The compound took its name from the bright orange-striped barrels in which it was shipped.

Agent Orange spraying missions were conducted in Vietnam between January 1965 and April 1970. During this period, U.S. planes dumped an estimated 14 million liters of toxic weed killers such as Agent

Orange on Vietnam. The defoliant was effective at eliminating dense vegetation and exposing enemy positions. However, an estimated 2.6 million U.S. military personnel serving in Vietnam and adjacent waters may have been exposed to the toxin.

Many soldiers who returned from Vietnam began to exhibit medical conditions that were later linked to Agent Orange exposure. These conditions include chloracne (chemical acne), Hodgkin's disease, malignant bone and lymph tumors, liver dysfunction, skin lesions, respiratory cancers, soft-tissue tumors, degenerative nerve disease, prostate cancer, and adult-onset diabetes.

The Veterans Administration (VA) presumes that all military personnel who served in Vietnam and have one of these medical conditions were exposed to Agent Orange. The VA has received hundreds of thousands of claims for compensation from veterans and their survivors. In addition to the affected soldiers, children of Vietnam veterans who suffer from spina bifida—a congenital birth defect of the spine—are also eligible for monetary benefits, health care, and vocational rehabilitation.

In 1984, veterans' groups brought a class action suit against Dow Chemical and Monsanto, the manufacturers of Agent Orange. An out-of-court settlement in that case established a $180 million fund to compensate veterans and their families for disabilities caused by Agent Orange exposure. Subsequent litigation was successful in extending Agent Orange benefits.

In 1996, President Bill Clinton broadened benefits for veterans exposed to Agent Orange so that any soldier who served in Vietnam would be eligible for claims. In July 2001, the VA allowed claims by eligible veterans suffering from adult-onset diabetes. Citing a link between Agent Orange and chronic lymphocytic leukemia, the VA granted benefits to veterans with that disease in January 2003. The VA estimates that an additional 178,000 Vietnam veterans may qualify for compensation under these new rules.

Until very recently, only American military personnel and their dependents had sought or received compensation for exposure to Agent Orange. However, in February 2004, Vietnamese victims of Agent Orange also filed suit against Monsanto and Dow Chemical. The number of Vietnamese exposed to the chemical during the war is estimated to be in the millions.

See also Chemical Weapons; Veterans Administration; Vietnam War

AGREED FRAMEWORK

A 1994 agreement that stipulated the suspension of North Korea's nuclear program in return for increased energy aid.

In early 1994, North Korea threatened to convert 8,000 irradiated fuel rods from its nuclear facility at Yongbyon into enough plutonium to manufacture four or five nuclear weapons. This threat immediately triggered an international crisis. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the organization charged with enforcing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (also known as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), urged the UN Security Council to impose strict sanctions on North Korea. At the same time, President Bill Clinton instructed the U.S. Department of Defense to plan for an invasion of North Korea. When the North Koreans began unloading the fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor in April, war on the Korean peninsula appeared likely.

Members of the Clinton administration still hoped that the North Koreans were bluffing. The North Korean government had made similar threats to manufacture nuclear weapons in 1993 but relented when the United States agreed to discuss trade and security issues. Clinton and his advisers suspected that the North Koreans had trapped themselves; they did not want a war to commence, but they also could not tolerate the humiliation of capitulating to IAEA demands.

At the height of the crisis, former U.S. president Jimmy Carter accepted a long-standing invitation from North Korean president Kim Il Sung. With the consent of the Clinton administration, Carter traveled to North Korea and met with Kim on June 16, 1994. During their meeting, Kim argued that North Korea only wanted to generate nuclear energy. He stressed that the Korean peninsula should remain free of nuclear weapons and offered to close the Yongbyon facility if the United States agreed to supply light-water reactors to meet North Korea's energy demands. Carter was elated; he assured Kim that such an arrangement could be made if North Korea suspended its nuclear program and allowed the IAEA inspectors to remain in the country. This meeting formed the basis for the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea.

Formal negotiations between the two nations began on July 8 and the final agreement was signed on October 21, 1994. The document contained five

principles. First, the United States and an international consortium would build two light-water reactors in North Korea by 2003. In return, the North Koreans would freeze all activity at Yongbyon and allow IAEA inspectors to monitor the facility. Second, North Korea would submit to all IAEA inspections. Third, the United States would supply North Korea with 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually until the light-water reactors were completed. Fourth, the two nations would pursue normalized diplomatic relations. Finally, North Korea agreed to reopen a political dialogue with South Korea. The agreement offered the hope of sustained peace on the Korean peninsula.

In retrospect, the Agreed Framework was not the success it appeared at the time it was signed. The United States and North Korea failed to normalize relations with one another, and North Korea has periodically blocked the IAEA inspections. In October 2002, North Korea admitted that it had created a separate program designed to manufacture uranium-based nuclear weapons. The United States, in turn, suspended its heavy oil shipments and stopped construction on the light-water reactors. In retaliation, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, expelled all IAEA inspectors, and reactivated its plutonium program at Yongbyon. As a result, tensions remain high on the Korean peninsula, and the threat of nuclear war has not been eliminated.

See also Clinton, Bill (William Jefferson), and National Policy; International Atomic Energy Agency; North Korea Crises; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

AIR CAVALRY

Airmobile helicopter formations widely used by the U.S. Army during the Vietnam War to locate and assault enemy ground forces and transport U.S. troops into battle. The Vietnam War saw the first large-scale use of helicopters in a combat role. At this time, U.S. helicopter forces were divided into separate assault helicopter and air cavalry formations. The units shared similar force organizations but performed slightly different types of missions. Assault helicopter companies were mainly responsible for attacking enemy ground targets, but they also conducted aerial resupply of troops, medical evacuation, and fire support for troops in contact with the enemy.

Air cavalry missions typically consisted of making visual reconnaissance of enemy positions with several scout helicopters and helicopter gunships, then airlifting a platoon of infantry assigned to the air cavalry unit into battle against the enemy. Other air cavalry helicopters provided fire support to the assaulting platoon, much as assault helicopter companies provided support to ground units during combat assault operations. Air cavalry could also bring larger combat units into the battle if needed. In addition to such missions, air cavalry teams performed general reconnaissance missions and aerial assessment of bomb damage.

A typical air cavalry squadron consisted of three air cavalry troops (ACTs) and a headquarters troop. An ACT contained a platoon of six to eight troops carrying helicopters called "slicks" and a platoon of eight or nine gunship helicopters known as Cobras. Each ACT also had a scout platoon of eight or nine light observation helicopters, commonly called "loaches."

The first air cavalry unit to see duty in Vietnam was the First Air Cavalry Division, which arrived in Vietnam in 1965. A total of five air cavalry squadrons operated in Vietnam, the most famous of which was the First Squadron/Ninth Cavalry of the First Air Cavalry Division. In addition, approximately 20 ACTs served as part of various infantry, cavalry, and mechanized units. The last air cavalry troop departed Vietnam in early 1973.

See also Helicopters; Vietnam War

AIR WARFARE

The use of airplanes, rockets, helicopters, or other aircraft to attack enemy forces. Modern air warfare has its roots in the mid-19th century. In 1859, the French army first used hot air balloons for surveillance of Italian ground troops, a tactic that was subsequently adopted by Union soldiers during the American Civil War (1860–1865). Balloons were useful for observation, but the introduction of the airplane into combat during World War I ushered in the use of aircraft as tactical weapons.

WORLD WAR I

Early in the war, technical limitations still restricted airplanes to a reconnaissance role. Most military aircraft at

this time were not designed for combat; many were even unarmed, although their pilots usually carried sidearms. Rapid improvements in aviation technology during the war enabled aircraft to carry machine guns that were synchronized to fire through the plane's spinning propeller. This breakthrough ushered in a new kind of combat: air-to-air warfare between opposing pilots. Flying aces such as Germany's notorious Red Baron, Manfred von Richthofen, captured the public imagination. Yet despite the romance associated with flying aces, plane-to-plane combat had a limited effect on the outcome of the war.

World War I also saw the first use of aircraft to conduct aerial bombardment. Early bombing missions were very crude and typically involved a pilot dropping a few small bombs by hand. Later in the war, both sides built larger aircraft that were specifically designed to drop heavier bomb loads. The Germans also conducted long-distance bombing raids using rigid airships known as *zeppelins*.

DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN THE WARS

The experiences of World War I showed that airpower had the potential to be a significant part of armed combat. This potential came closer to realization during the 1920s and 1930s as great strides were made in aircraft technology. The new planes flew faster and higher, had greater ranges, and were able to carry more (and more powerful) weapons than ever before. Some nations, such as Germany and Great Britain, recognized the importance of military airpower. Others, including the United States, were slower to do so. For example, Britain and Germany established their air forces as independent service branches during World War I. Although the United States had an aeronautical division of the Army Signal Corps as early as 1907, it would be another 40 years before the creation of a separate U.S. air force.

One American who did take a keen interest in military airpower after World War I was Edward "Eddie" Rickenbacker, the leading U.S. ace of the war. Rickenbacker lobbied for the establishment of a strong U.S. air force when he returned from the war. Another key figure in the development of early U.S. airpower was William "Billy" Mitchell, who organized and commanded the American expeditionary air force during World War I. By the end of the war, Mitchell had risen to the rank of general.

After the war, Mitchell was appointed assistant chief of the army air service, a position he used to champion a large and independent airborne fighting force. Mitchell became the center of controversy when he demonstrated the potential of airpower by sinking several battleships in a series of highly publicized tests during the early 1920s. He later faced court martial when he criticized his superiors for failing to recognize the potential of airpower.

In 1926, Mitchell retired to the private sector but continued to advocate a separate U.S. air force. The author of two books on airpower, *Winged Defense* and *Skyways*, Mitchell theorized that future wars would be won by using strategic bombing to destroy the enemy's infrastructure, thus crippling its ability to wage war. Although Mitchell's ideas were largely ignored in his own country, the French, British, and Italians adopted them successfully during colonial wars in Africa, the Middle East, and India.

WORLD WAR II

The Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, stripped Germany of its air force. When Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933, he vowed to overturn the treaty and return Germany to its former glory. One part of his plan was the secret rebuilding of the German air force, known as the *Luftwaffe*. The end result of Hitler's ambitions, however, was another war that would be even more destructive than World War I. It would also be a war in which airpower proved to be a decisive weapon in modern warfare.

World War II began on September 1, 1939, when the German army invaded Poland and overran the country in a matter of weeks. The Germans would score similarly dramatic successes in Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France in 1940. Tactical air support—the use of airpower in close coordination with ground attacks—was one of the key elements of the success of Germany's rapid, mechanized warfare known as *blitzkrieg* (lightning war). The year 1940 also saw the first battle in history fought entirely in the skies. Germany planned to invade England after defeating France, but German forces needed to control the air over southern England to launch a successful invasion. During the ensuing Battle of Britain, German and British aircrews engaged in a bitter struggle for control of English airspace. The British Royal Air Force eventually prevailed, seizing control of the skies and ending the threat of invasion.

During the Battle of Britain, German bombers targeted British cities, ports, airfields, factories, and

other industrial facilities. The United States and Great Britain followed the Germans' lead and began to bomb similar targets in Germany. The Allied air forces would eventually conduct massive strikes, some involving more than 1,000 bombers, against German military and industrial sites. Although postwar studies found these bombing raids were not decisive in the final Allied victory, they did place severe constraints on Germany's ability to wage war.

Airpower also proved to be decisive in the Pacific theater during World War II. Japan demonstrated the devastating might of airpower by destroying much of the U.S. fleet in a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The attack, which brought the United States into the war, foreshadowed the importance of aircraft carriers in the Pacific conflict. The long U.S. effort to retake territory seized by the Japanese relied heavily on the use of carrier-based aircraft. It was also airpower that eventually brought the war to an end as U.S. atomic bomb attacks on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki forced the Japanese to surrender.

Air warfare truly came of age during World War II. Almost every important battle of the war involved the use of tactical airpower. Airplanes were used for bombing, attacking naval and merchant ships, disrupting communication and supply lines, surveillance, and ground support of land and sea troops. By the end of the war, many nations had come to see airpower as perhaps the most important aspect of military might.

POST–WORLD WAR II

Important developments in air warfare after World War II included the introduction of helicopters, jet-propelled aircraft, and missiles. The helicopter, with its greater agility, lower operating altitude, and ability to hold a position in the air, became an important element in protecting ground troops, communication, and supply lines. Helicopters were also used for rapid deployment of troops to forward positions and evacuation of wounded soldiers from the front lines to field hospitals, greatly reducing casualties. The U.S. Army used helicopters even more extensively in the Vietnam War. Heavily armed helicopters carried out raids on enemy positions and supported ground troops with devastating firepower.

Jet power is perhaps the most significant breakthrough in aviation technology since the beginning of powered flight. Although the fastest propeller aircraft are unable to reach speeds of 500 mph in level flight, the earliest jets easily surpassed this mark. The first jet

aircraft actually saw service during World War II, but jet technology was not fully developed until after the war. Within 10 years of the war's end, jet aircraft were capable of traveling faster than the speed of sound.

The dramatic increase in speed led to changes in air combat as well. The use of machine guns and cannons in air-to-air combat eventually gave way to reliance on guided missiles. Airplanes became so fast that it became increasingly difficult to track and hit targets with gunfire. This led to the invention of heat-seeking missiles that honed in on the heat from a plane's exhaust. These were later joined in military arsenals by radar-guided missiles. These weapons are still the main armaments used in modern air-to-air combat.

Since the 1980s, breakthroughs in computer and materials technology have once again changed the face of air warfare. These advances have introduced improvements such as airborne detection systems and stealth technology.

Airborne detection systems such as the Airborne Warning and Alert System (AWACS) allow military commanders to monitor virtually all activity on and above a battlefield and to communicate this information immediately to friendly troops. AWACS-equipped aircraft are also used to detect and track enemy aircraft and to notify friendly aircraft of their position. Platforms such as AWACS further extend the ability of airpower to dominate a battlefield.

Stealth planes were introduced during the Gulf War of 1991. The nontraditional shape of stealth aircraft makes them extremely difficult to detect by radar. In addition, stealth planes are made of nonmetallic materials that absorb radar signals instead of reflecting them. According to the U.S. Air Force, the F-117A stealth fighter appears on radar to be about the size of an insect. The United States currently possesses both fighter and bomber aircraft that use stealth technology. The ability of stealth aircraft to evade radar detection is a major advance in an environment in which radar-guided missiles are the main defense against air attack.

In addition to tactics and technology, the role of air warfare has also evolved since World War II. The threat of air strikes has become a powerful negotiating tool in preventing potential wars. During the 1999 Kosovo crisis, for example, Yugoslavia granted independence to Serbia and Montenegro rather than face the superior airpower of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) forces. The U.S. Air Force has also played a key role in U.S. nuclear policy, from the establishment of early-warning and intercontinental

ballistic missile sites during the 1950s to the current development of the Star Wars defense system.

Although their vision of airpower was ultimately proven correct, even early proponents such as Jimmy Doolittle and Billy Mitchell would be amazed by the growth and evolution of air warfare. Airpower dominates the modern battlefield in a way that they could barely imagine. As programs such as Star Wars increasingly project airpower into outer space, the future of air warfare may be just as unimaginable to today's air warriors.

—Will Hughes

See also Airborne Warning And Control System; Carpet Bombing; Doolittle, Jimmy; Dresden, Bombing of; F-117A Stealth Fighters; Fighter Aircraft; Helicopters; Kosovo Intervention; Missiles; Naval Aviation; Science, Technology, and Security; Space-Based Weapons; Strategic Bombing; Surface-to-Air Missile; U.S. Air Force; Vietnam War; World War I; World War II.

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AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM (AWACS)

An airborne platform for military command and control and distant early warning, sometimes referred to as "the eye in the sky." The first AWACS jets, manufactured by Boeing, were put into service in 1977. Currently, two types of AWACS planes are used by the U.S. Air Force, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Saudi Arabia.

The E-3 AWACS is a militarized version of the Boeing 707-320B commercial jetliner. Production of these AWACS jets ended in May 1991. Later that same year, Boeing began to use a militarized version of the larger 767-200 commercial jetliner as the AWACS platform. The 767 has much more floor space, can carry larger payloads, has a greater range, and flies at higher altitudes than the E-3.

The AWACS surveillance system is housed in the large rotating dome above the plane's fuselage, which gives the aircraft its unique profile. The dome contains the system's radar antenna and identification friend or foe and data-link fighter-control antennae.

Flexible, multimode radar allows AWACS to separate and track marine and airborne targets and to distinguish targets from ground and sea clutter. This is a strategic advantage over other radar systems. The system's "look down" radar, which has a 360-degree view of the horizon, can detect and track targets more than 200 miles away when operating at appropriate altitudes. Computers on the AWACS aircraft can separate, manage, and display these targets on individual screens.

The AWACS jets can detect, track, and intercept hostile aircraft operating at low altitudes over all types of terrain while identifying and controlling friendly aircraft in the same airspace. Since 1995, AWACS planes have been equipped with electronic support measures (ESM), a passive listening and detection system that can detect, identify, and track electronic transmissions from ground, airborne, and marine sources. Using ESM, AWACS mission specialists can determine the type of radar and weapon systems being used by hostile forces. Another improvement completed in 1994 was an improved communication system providing secure, antijam radio contact with other AWACS, friendly aircraft, and ground stations.

The AWACS are extremely mobile and can be deployed rapidly in any combat situation. Tactically, the planes provide quick-reaction surveillance and command-and-control functions necessary to manage tactical and defensive fighter forces, including F-15, F-18, and F-22 squadrons.

The newer 767-based AWACS are capable of speeds of more than 500 mph. The jets are operated by a two-person flight crew with a complement of 19 AWACS mission specialists. The plane has a range of 5,600 nautical miles, which can be extended through in-flight refueling. The AWACS jets operate with a service altitude of 34,000–40,100 feet.

The United States, NATO, Saudi Arabia, France, and the United Kingdom currently operate 66 E-3 AWACS aircraft worldwide. Japan has also contracted with Boeing for four AWACS jets. Boeing is currently building 767-based replacements for the E-3 fleet.

The AWACS fleet is viewed as a significant deterrent for aggression and an "eye in the sky" during conflicts or potentially explosive situations. They have been successfully deployed in Europe, the Far East,

and the Middle East. During the first Gulf War (1990–1991), 11 U.S. and five Saudi Arabian AWACS jets were deployed and played an integral part in surveillance, directing air strikes, interdicting Iraqi airplanes, coordinating refueling, and protecting aircraft conducting intelligence and ground surveillance. Nearly 850 AWACS sorties were flown over Iraq, and the planes were instrumental in downing all of the 41 Iraqi aircraft shot down during the war.

The E-3 AWACS jets deployed by NATO played a key role in the Balkan region during the mid-1990s, giving the United Nations the ability to monitor and enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the Iraq War of 2003, AWACS jets played a crucial role in coordinating the so-called Shock and Awe bombing runs on Baghdad during the run-up to the war, as well as the actual invasion of Iraq shortly thereafter.

See also Gulf War; Iraq War of 2003; U.S. Air Force

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AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Modern warship that launches and recovers aircraft. Carrier-based aircraft can attack targets well beyond their normal flying ranges or the range of a ship's guns. This ability to project military power makes aircraft carriers a central element in the military and national security strategy of developed nation-states. Aircraft carriers are also significant political symbols in today's world.

The first recorded launching of an aircraft from the deck of a ship occurred in 1910. During World War I, the British successfully launched a squadron of aircraft from a ship to attack a German zeppelin base. However, these early efforts were made using conventional ships that had been modified to accommodate airplanes. Ships designed specifically to launch aircraft were not developed until after World War I.

Aircraft carriers first came into real prominence during World War II. The Japanese fleet that attacked Pearl Harbor was composed of six aircraft carriers that launched more than 400 planes. Shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack, the United States responded with a carrier-based attack on Japan led by Lieutenant Colonel Jimmy Doolittle. In the so-called Doolittle's Raid, the U.S. carrier *Hornet* launched a squadron of medium bombers that flew 800 miles to attack targets in and around Tokyo. Although the raid was militarily insignificant, it inflicted a psychological defeat on the Japanese and provided a major morale boost to the Americans. A few months later, the United States and Japan fought perhaps the single greatest confrontation between carrier-based fleets at the Battle of Midway. Despite being badly outnumbered by Japanese forces, U.S. carrier-based aircraft sank four Japanese carriers against the loss of just one American carrier. The Battle of Midway devastated Japanese naval capabilities and shifted the balance of power in the Pacific.

As a result of their performance in World War II, aircraft carriers replaced battleships as the centerpiece of modern navies. Since that time, they have played crucial roles in virtually every major war and many minor ones. For example, the aircraft carriers HMS *Hermes* and HMS *Invincible* helped lead the British military forces to victory in the Falklands War. Carriers were also used in recent conflicts in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan. During the Iraq War of 2003, aircraft carriers provided platforms for air strikes when neighboring countries refused to allow basing rights for U.S. aircraft.

Modern aircraft carriers come in two basic configurations. The first is a flat-top configuration that launches planes from a steam-powered catapult and recovers them using a hook-and-cable system. The other configuration has a ski jump on the front of the carrier, from which vertically launched aircraft such as the Harrier take off and then land on the remainder of the carrier. Aircraft carriers come in various types, including assault carriers, which are capable of carrying and deploying troops; antisubmarine (ASW) carriers, which manage helicopter squadrons; fleet carriers, which serve in traditional roles; and supercarriers, which perform multiple roles. Earlier aircraft carriers were driven by steam turbines, but modern carriers are powered by nuclear reactors. Today's largest carriers are more than 300 meters long and can cost more than $5 billion.

Despite their ability to project enormous military power, aircraft carriers are just as vulnerable as other ships to air and sea attack. To protect aircraft carriers from attack, they are grouped with other ships in formations called *battle groups* or *strike groups*. These carrier groups are generally composed of an aircraft carrier, two guided missile cruisers, a guided missile

The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise returning to port at the Naval Station Norfolk (Virginia) after naval exercises in the summer of 2004. Aircraft carriers are the most strategic vessels in the U.S. Navy. Their vast range, spanning the world's oceans, and their fighting power—often they carry more than 100 attack aircraft and 5,000 on-duty personnel—make them a formidable force.

Source: U.S. Navy.

destroyer, a destroyer, a frigate, two submarines, and a supply ship. Supporting ships provide a screen around the carrier that searches for enemy ships or aircraft and prevents them from successfully attacking the carrier.

Currently, only nine nations maintain aircraft carriers: the United States, Great Britain, Russia, France, India, China, Thailand, Brazil, and Italy. The United States has the largest force of aircraft carriers, currently grouped in 12 carrier battle groups. Despite the limited number of navies that boast them, aircraft carriers are likely to continue to play a major role in military operations in the future. The aircraft carrier's preventive and coercive presence and its ability to project power and influence military operations make it one of the key weapons in modern military arsenals.

See also Naval Aviation

AIR-LAND BATTLES

Military doctrine developed during the 1970s that changed the U.S. Army's focus from a defensive mentality to an active-defense mind-set. This doctrine eventually found expression in the 1991 Gulf War, in which U.S. and coalition forces defeated Iraqi military forces.

Air-land battle was the post–Vietnam War change in U.S. Army military doctrine, based on the Army's notion of "active defense." It recognized a change in military operations: that the modern battlefield is multidimensional and therefore requires a doctrine that supports that reality. This doctrine was expressed in the 1982 edition of the *Army Field Manual 100-5*, which emphasizes offense, a high degree of mobility, and "deep strikes" far into enemy territory behind the frontlines of battle.

Active defense emphasized that U.S. and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) forces should meet advancing Soviet forces, force them to deploy, and then retreat after the Soviet forces were weakened. When Soviet forces were sufficiently weakened, massive counterattacks would be launched that would result in the destruction of the invading forces. The concept included using airborne units, together with deep-strike air and artillery strikes, to enable NATO forces to defend forward areas without retreating and, at the same time, prevent Soviet second-echelon forces from entering the battle.

Air-land battle doctrine recognized that the U.S. Army faced a number of challenges in the 1980s and must be equipped to fight, according to the Army Field Manual, "light, well-equipped forces such as Soviet-supported insurgents or sophisticated terrorist groups. The Army must also be prepared to fight highly mechanized forces typical of the Warsaw Pact or Soviet surrogates in southwest or northeast Asia (the Middle East or Korea). In the areas of greatest strategic concern, it must expect battles of greater scope and intensity than ever fought before. It must anticipate battles fought with nuclear and chemical weapons."

The key to air-land battle is to seize the initiative and disrupt the opponent's fighting capability with deep attack, firepower, and maneuver. The doctrine, components of which NATO adopted in 1984, was expected to use chemical and nuclear weapons to strike deep into enemy territory to destroy infrastructure and logistical support. By extending the battlefield and integrating conventional, nuclear, chemical, and electronic means, forces can exploit enemy vulnerabilities anywhere.

The doctrinal change generated some protests from political groups in Europe throughout the 1980s. However, these protests died out with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Air-land battle facilitated future changes in U.S. Army and military doctrine, and the same elements proved important in other post–Cold War conflicts.

See also Military Doctrine

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AIRLIFT

Act of transporting items or individuals by air from one point to another. The airlift has played a critical role in military, aid, and relief operations since the development of large aircraft capable of traveling long distances. Transport aircraft have played a key part in the rapid transfer of cargo, equipment, and ammunition. During the latter half of the 20th century, large aircraft replaced ships as the primary means of delivering troops, and airlift operations have been enlisted to evacuate casualties and drop paratroopers.

A distinguishing feature of the airlift is that it usually occurs in crisis or combat situations. The counterpart to the airlift is the use of freight aircraft to transport goods. For the most part, however, air freight is carried in the holds of commercial passenger aircraft.

The virtues of the airlift include speed, efficiency, and the ability to cross boundaries that may be impassable over land or water. Specialists can be airlifted into crisis situations to provide medical care, distribute food, or provide other types of assistance. Alternatively, individuals can be lifted out who would be forced to remain if they were dependent on other types of transportation. These include disaster victims, refugees, or civilians caught in military crossfire.

THE BERLIN AIRLIFT

In the aftermath of World War II, Germany was partitioned into four sectors managed by the four Allied powers: the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Although the capital city, Berlin, lay within the eastern Soviet sector, it was also partitioned because of its social, economic, and symbolic importance. In June 1948, the Soviet Union attempted to take control of Berlin by cutting off the city from road and rail transportation to the rest of Germany. In response, the United States initiated a relief operation to deliver food and other materials to the residents of West Berlin.

Warm wartime relations between the United States an the Soviet Union quickly deteriorated given the absence of a common enemy and the ideological conflict between communism and capitalism. On June 18, 1948, the Western Allies announced the institution of currency reform as the first step in the formation of a West German government. This was the immediate provocation for the blockade, which began on June 24. Other events taking place that same year, such as the founding of the state of Israel and the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, added to the growing Cold War tensions.

The United States, Great Britain, and France had never actually bothered to obtain a guarantee of their rights to overland transportation across the Soviet sector to Berlin. The Soviets now rejected the claim that use of these links in the years after the war justified the assumption of free access. The Berlin airlift began as an almost immediate response on June 28 and continued for the next 324 days.

The United States was primarily supported by Great Britain, which conducted 87,841 flights and nicknamed the airlift Plain Fare. The United States conducted 189,963 flights and nicknamed the airlift Operation Vittles. The French contributed 424 flights, and crews also came from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Canada. The airfields of Tempelhof, Tegel, and Gatow were used, and at the height of the operation, a plane landed nearly every minute. A total of 2,236,406 tons of cargo consisting of food, coal, and other supplies were ultimately delivered.

Although the Soviets finally lifted the blockade on May 12, 1949, the "airbridge" was continued until the

An MH-60 Knighthawk helicopter, assigned to a helicopter antisubmarine squadron, transferring supplies. Such airlifts of supplies are an important function of U.S. military helicopters. They not only move supplies to places they are needed but also help to remove troops from danger. At times, they have also proved vital in getting supplies to or evacuating civilian populations.

Source: U.S. Navy.

end of September because the Allies wanted to ensure against another blockade. The operation succeeded, however, in demonstrating the determination of the Western governments and effectively humiliating the Soviets. The Federal Republic of Germany was founded only 11 days after the end of the blockade on May 23, 1949, and became a sovereign state six years later.

Though the airlift resulted in about 80 U.S., British, and German casualties, the Soviets never interfered with the airlift. At first, they believed it would be ineffective; however, even once they realized it was working, they acknowledged that shooting down a plane would constitute an act of war. Thus, there was a vital strategic and diplomatic difference between blocking land access and preventing access from the air. The Berlin airlift is a landmark example of the unique role played by air-based operations in relief and combat situations.

OTHER AIRLIFT OPERATIONS

The organizer of the Berlin airlift, Lieutenant General William H. Tunner, was also responsible for organizing an airlift supply operation in Southeast Asia during World War II. The operation was conducted in support of the Kuomintang, the Nationalist Chinese forces led by Chiang Kai-Shek, against the Japanese, as well as the Flying Tigers. The Flying Tigers were an air force organized by a retired U.S. Army Corps major who recruited American pilots to fight as mercenaries for the Chinese. The Flying Tigers and Chiang Kai-Shek were supplied by U.S. Air Force pilots flying over "The Hump," the eastern end of the Himalayan mountains separating India and China. This airlift continued until the opening of the Ledo Road in 1945.

Other airlift and relief operations conducted by the U.S. Air Force during World War II ranged from food drops into occupied Holland to the transportation of Greek soldiers and other displaced persons from Munich to Athens. Relief operations conducted after the war included vaccines flown to Egypt in 1947 to counter a cholera epidemic and emergency and medical supplies flown to India in 1950 to deal with a cholera and typhus plague.

Airlifts also functioned for purposes of disaster relief. In January 1953, an airlift evacuated flood victims from the east coast of England and provided emergency supplies of food and clothing. A similar operation took place in the Netherlands a month later, when dikes were breached by high tides and gale-force winds. Airlifts supplied Red Cross medical supplies to Turkey after an earthquake a few months later.

Other operations conducted that same year were more esoteric: During the summer of 1953, the U.S. Air Force undertook Operation Kinderlift to bring children from Berlin to spend their vacations in West German and American homes. Later that month, three tons of mushrooms were flown from Germany to the University of Michigan as part of a project to develop a serum for tumors.

The popularity of airlift operations has also increased among nongovernmental organizations in recent decades. Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières), founded in 1971, is an important example of how civilians with expertise lacking in a region may be brought in to provide immediate, necessary relief. Doctors Without Borders and other organizations operating on the same principle take tremendous risks by being airlifted into war zones and crisis situations to provide vaccinations, famine relief, and emergency medical supplies.

The United Nations has also led international airlift efforts in crisis situations. When fighting broke out in the former Yugoslav republics in 1992, the United Nations deployed a Protection Force that spent four years working to bring an end to the fighting and assisting in humanitarian relief. An important part of these initiatives was Operation Provide Promise, an airlift of aid and supplies. An interesting point of comparison, however, is that in three and a half years, Operation Provide Promise delivered around 180,000 tons of cargo into Sarajevo. That same amount was delivered in one month, March 1949, during the Berlin airlift.

—William de Jong-Lambert

See also Berlin Airlift; Humanitarian Aid

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SECRETS REVEALED

Project Mule Train

Throughout much of 1962, the U.S. Air Force sent unofficial missions of C-123 aircraft to provide tactical and airlift support to South Vietnamese ground troops in Vietnam. The purpose of this airlift was to give the South Vietnamese forces an assault capability through air drops. The mission, known as Project Mule Train, also gave logistical support, providing daily delivery of supplies to remote sites in Vietnam.

While hauling troops and supplies, the Mule Train crews usually operated independently with little air traffic control. They flew in and out of small airfields located in steep mountainous areas of the country using aircraft, the C-123, that were slow, ugly, and uncomfortable. Nevertheless, the C-123 were solid performers, capable of carrying 60 fully armed troops or up to eight tons of cargo.

Project Mule Train, authorized by President John F. Kennedy in November 1961, was officially a "classified training mission" rather than official support for troops in South Vietnam at a time when the United States was not officially involved in the conflict. Nevertheless, there was no pretense that the Mule Train was a South Vietnamese cargo operation, nor was there any training of Vietnamese for the task. Instead, all the flight crews were Americans.

At first, Project Mule Train was assigned only for moving cargo. However, by the summer of June 1962, the C-123s were also dropping paratroopers and carrying troops for armed assaults within South Vietnam. The establishment of a more formal and regular airlift system in the fall of 1962 led to a phase-out of Project Mule Train, and the operation was officially ended on December 8, 1962. Although officially ended, the innovative spirit of Project Mule Train influenced Vietnam War air cargo operations for the remainder of the war.

AL-QAEDA

Global, revolutionary Islamist organization dedicated to establishing true Islamic governments and societies in Muslim nations and combating Western influence on the Muslim world. Al-Qaeda has gradually evolved into a multinational organization. Many of its leaders were originally part of the Afghan Service Bureau, which was created to repel the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

Once the Soviets retreated from Afghanistan, the leadership of al-Qaeda sought an ideologically worthwhile mission for the former *jihadis,* or holy warriors. The organization turned to other projects, sending reinforcements to other conflicts in which Muslims were resisting oppression, such as those in Chechnya and Kashmir. Gradually, the focus shifted to resisting the oppression of Muslims worldwide. Those to be resisted were wealthy Western capitalist nations, including the United States; Israel; and corrupt, secular Muslim regimes, such as those in Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION

Al-Qaeda was established in 1988. Dubbed a terrorist group by most of the international community, al-Qaeda has become a highly secretive organization. It is unique among Islamist groups in that it outwardly rejects peaceable solutions to conflict. The organization asserts that action and sometimes violence are necessary to establish Islamic governments that operate independently of infidels and Western hegemony. It is unique among terrorist groups for its global reach in both its operations and membership.

The organization is well run and organized, and there are many reasons for its success, most notably its structure, mobility, membership, and capacity. Structurally, it is neither one group nor a coalition of groups; it is a modern, multifaceted organization that operates on its own and through or with other groups to achieve its ends. Al-Qaeda has infiltrated Islamic nongovernmental organizations, some of which now act as fronts and serve as recruiting centers for the organization.

In the past, al-Qaeda has received tacit or overt governmental support from the Sudanese government and from the Taliban government of Afghanistan, among others. The group has also allied itself with Islamic political groups and Islamist organizations around the world, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria, and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines. With such a broad base of support, al-Qaeda has gained access to and, in some cases, control of military, political, terror, and humanitarian structures.

Al-Qaeda has little central command; rather, there is coordination among regional offices, or cells. The horizontal network allows each of these regional cells to plan, raise its own funds, and advance the aims of the organization in a regionally effective way. Although central command structures are limited, al-Qaeda tends to establish them in weak or failing Muslim states, such as Afghanistan and the Sudan. These nations are strong enough to offer the protection of sovereign borders but weak enough so that the organization can operate with freedom and impunity.

The organization is highly mobile, and its substantial financial endowments allow members to travel with ease. Further, if a cell is discovered and dislodged from one particular nation, it can regenerate in another relatively quickly. This kind of removal may actually help al-Qaeda; when it is forced to leave, it retains its friendly contacts in the first nation while establishing new ones in the second.

IDEOLOGY AND ACTIVITIES

Al-Qaeda's members are numerous and highly dedicated. The organization's broad-based ideology attracts a diverse membership among Muslims—Sunni and Shia, highly educated and poorly educated, rich and poor. Those who join fully embrace the ideals of the organization. Its ideological success should not be underestimated—al-Qaeda was the first organization to institutionalize suicide terrorism, a feat that could not have been achieved unless members truly believed in their culture of martyrdom.

Those in al-Qaeda who maintain operations rather than conducting them embrace the secrecy the movement requires. Communication among cells is based on one-to-one contact, which is difficult to detect and effective for secrecy purposes. Within the cells, too, organization and communication are highly compartmentalized. No person knows more than necessary, so the capture or death of any individual will not undermine the organization.

The capacities of the organization are enormous. Financially, leader Osama bin Laden's personal wealth and donor funds provide huge sums for the organization. Operationally, with cells in more than 60 countries, the movement is widespread and capable of launching attacks anywhere on land, at sea, and from the air. Any operations it conducts, too, are often likely to be successful: One of the organization's strengths is planning. Al-Qaeda's surveillance and reconnaissance systems for gathering information about potential targets are highly evolved. The organization is willing to take months or years to analyze the data it gathers to ensure that its goals are accomplished.

Consistently, al-Qaeda does not claim responsibility for its attacks. Rather, generally speaking, it is understood that the organization wishes to avoid publicity and detection as much as possible. Nevertheless, it has been identified as the culprit behind the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the suicide bombing of the USS *Cole* in Yemen in 2000, and most notably, the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. The organization also has been linked to the assassination attempt on Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and other fatal attacks.

The United States remains vulnerable to more attacks by al-Qaeda despite the vigilance of its intelligence organs and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Ironically, the very freedoms that the United

States strives to protect—freedom of speech and assembly, for instance—also allow those who threaten the country to operate within its borders with relative ease. Moreover, the United States is home to numerous high-profile targets symbolic of Western liberalism, including but not limited to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the White House.

See also Bin Laden, Osama; Terrorism, War on International; Terrorists, Islamic

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AL-KHOBAR, ATTACK ON U.S. TROOPS AT (1996)

Terrorist attack in which a tanker truck bomb exploded in front of the Khobar Towers, a Saudi Arabian complex in Dhahran that housed U.S. and allied forces supporting the coalition air operation over Iraq. The explosion killed 19 Americans and wounded 372.

The Khobar Tower, an eight-story building used to house U.S. Air Force personnel from the 4404th Fighter Wing, was part of the Al-Khobar housing complex built by the Saudis in 1979 near the city of Dhahran in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia. During the Gulf War of 1990–91, coalition forces moved into the complex, including service members from the United States, Saudi Arabia, France, and the United Kingdom.

At about 10:00 p.m. on June 25, 1996, a car entered the parking lot outside the northern perimeter of the Al-Khobar residential complex, some 80 feet from Building 131, where Americans were housed. A bomb-laden tanker truck and another car followed shortly after. The men parked the tanker truck, loaded with at least 5,000 pounds of plastic explosives, and left in the third vehicle.

Sergeant Alfred R. Guerrero of the U.S. Air Force Security Police was stationed on the roof of Building 131. He alerted security to the presence of suspicious

vehicles and began evacuating the building, probably saving dozens of lives—many of the evacuees were in the stairwell at the back of the building when the bomb went off. Another factor that minimized damages was the security fence of poured concrete barriers, which deflected the blast from the lower floors of the building, preventing its collapse.

The bomb, twice as powerful as the bomb used to destroy U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, destroyed or damaged six high-rise buildings in the complex, shattered windows in every other building in the compound, and left a crater 85 feet wide and 35 feet deep. The blast was even felt in the state of Bahrain, some 20 miles away.

On June 28, 1996, U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin appointed retired general Wayne Downing, the former commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command, to conduct an assessment of the facts surrounding the Khobar Tower bombing. A few days later, on July 2, Louis Freeh, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), traveled to Dhahran to meet with senior Saudi officials. The Saudis welcomed the investigation, although they initially denied access to evidence and witnesses, fearful of a possible U.S. retaliation against Iran, which was suspected of aiding the bombers.

The FBI eventually was granted access to witnesses and those whom the Saudis had arrested. Nearly five years after the bombing, on June 21, 2001, an indictment issued in the U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Virginia, brought terrorism charges against 14 individuals. They included 13 members of the pro-Iranian Saudi Hezbollah and an unidentified 14th person linked to the Lebanese Hezbollah, an Islamic and terrorist organization that received financial support from Iran.

According to the indictment, the attack aimed to expel Americans from Saudi Arabia. The indictment also traced the attack to 1993, when Ahmed Al-Mughassil was head of the military wing of the Saudi Hezbollah. In 1995, Al-Mughassil ordered members of the Saudi Hezbollah to begin surveillance of Americans in Saudi Arabia. This operation produced reports that were also provided to officials in Iran. By late fall of 1995, Al-Mughassil had decided that Hezbollah should attack the site in Dhahran.

In 2004, the 9-11 Commission, which had been established to investigate the circumstances surrounding the September 11 terrorist attacks and to provide recommendations to guard against future attacks, issued other findings about the Al-Khobar bombing. The commission noted that Osama bin Laden, leader

of the terrorist group al-Qaeda, may have aided the Al-Khobar attackers, possibly by helping to obtain explosives with assistance from Iran.

See also Bin Laden, Osama; Terrorists, Islamic

ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

Program of assistance for Latin American countries launched by President John F. Kennedy in March 1961. The *Alianza para el Progreso*, as it is known in Spanish, consisted of a proposed 10-year, $500 million package that Latin American countries could use to implement major economic and social reforms. This included needed reforms in the areas of land distribution, education, food provision, human resources training (including military forces), and cultural exchange. Democratic governance and political stability were prerequisites for countries to be eligible to benefit from the initiative, which was commenced at a time when the United States' interest was to prevent communism from penetrating Latin America.

Since the late 1940s, Latin American governments had been requesting financial aid from the United States on terms similar to those of the Marshall Plan implemented in Western Europe after World War II. Leaders of the region believed that only external financial aid could help them overcome their economic and social difficulties. The United States had a different approach to the question, believing that private capital and enterprise, with little government intervention, should be at the center of economic and social prosperity, as it had been in its own case. As a result, the United States hesitated at that time to provide the assistance requested.

By the late 1950s, Latin Americans started to show frustration with the inability of their governments to address their most basic needs. The resource base available to governments in the region was limited to a few export products and highly susceptible to international trade fluctuations, leaving insufficient resources available for social programs. This situation, coupled with Cuba's increasingly hostile attitude toward the United States and the cheerful welcome that many Latin Americans were giving to Fidel Castro's revolutionary regime, sent the United States a signal that it might not take long before the Cuban model was imitated by others in the region.

Thus, in the midst of the Cold War, many leaders in Washington realized the potential risks of leaving Latin America unattended. This led the Kennedy administration to seriously consider proposals for more aid to Latin America as a means to ensure the necessary reforms that would guarantee the strengthening of democratic governments in the region.

In March 1961, President Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress, which contained an implicit reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine (1823) and placed strong emphasis on democratic governance and U.S. military assistance, in part through the establishment of the Peace Corps. The initiative also called for economic and social reforms, and it incorporated a shared-responsibility approach in which Latin American governments would commit to mobilize domestic resources to accomplish the established goals.

The alliance's results in certain areas became apparent. It is estimated that between 1958 and 1970, the United States generated $15 billion of external financial assistance. However, the dynamics and politics of the Cold War era had a decisive impact on the alliance's effectiveness in contributing to the improvement of the quality of life in Latin America. Although the initiative failed to deliver more stable democratic governments, the United States, under President Lyndon B. Johnson, who had assumed the presidency in 1963 after Kennedy's assassination, found itself in the paradoxical position of acquiescing to authoritarian governments while stating the nation's commitment to democracy and to combating communism.

See also Kennedy, John F., and National Policy; Latin America and U.S. Policy

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ALLIANCES

Agreements made between groups or states for purposes such as defense or increasing power capabilities. Alliance formation occurs during both peacetime and wartime.

Scholars have identified four alliance-formation behaviors: balancing, bandwagoning, hedging, and tethering. States may form more than one type of alliance at a time. For example, a state might form a tethering alliance with one state and a balancing alliance with another, as Russia did in the Triple Entente alliance, which it formed with Britain and France.

Arguably one of the most commonly observed alliance formations is the *balancing alliance*. These alliances are formed to create or maintain a balance of power within the international system. For example, a state, reacting against a perceived external threat, may form an alliance with another state to counter this threat. Threats are often identified as states that are potential military rivals. A state would be most threatened by a state whose power is comparable to its own and would seek to ally itself against this state. Alliances are then made against the potential rival, creating a balance of power. It has been argued that a lack of balance in the international system causes international instability that often culminates in war. Some scholars argue that states are more likely to form balancing alliances than any other type of alliance. World War I is one of the strongest illustrations of state-balancing behavior.

The second type of alliance-formation behavior, *bandwagoning*, occurs when a state chooses to make an alliance with a threatening state rather than balance it. To scholars who believe balancing is the normal state behavior, bandwagoning, when it has occurred historically, is an exception to the rule. Some scholars have argued that the decision to balance or bandwagon is based on the level of the threat. The preponderance of balancing behavior throughout history, which has caused scholars to view alliance behaviors such as bandwagoning as a deviation from the norm, is instead the result of limited periods of time in which there was a high enough threat level to cause bandwagoning.

Unlike the high level of commitment made between allies in balancing and bandwagoning alliances, *hedging* is an alliance in which there is a low level of commitment between the parties. This type of alliance allows a state to keep its future alliance options open, should it wish to strengthen an alliance or align itself with another state or states. For example, a state might form an agreement with opposing sides in a conflict. Additionally, hedging behavior encourages opposing sides to sometimes offer greater rewards to the hedging state to strengthen the alliance. The alliances between Germany and Russia and between Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1873 and 1881 are good examples of hedging.

Tethering, a fourth type of alliance, describes an alliance in which states in conflict form alliances with each other for the purpose of mediating the conflict. States that tether hope to increase interstate cooperation, lessen the chance of conflict between them, and perhaps create a relationship that might allow trust to grow. Alliances such as the Leagues of the Three Emperors, formed in 1873–1878 and 1881–1887 by Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, were made to try to manage conflicts, such as the one over the Balkans. Arguably, the failure of many tethering alliances lies in the high level of internal conflict and lack of an external one. Although a strong tethering alliance may be beneficial to its members, the more successful a tethering alliance is, the more threatening it may seem to those outside it. For example, the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance clearly threatened many other states. Elements of tethering also can be found in alliances that, on the surface, appear to be balancing, such as the pre–World War I Triple Entente. The 1939 Nazi–Soviet Pact is another historical example of tethering behavior. In this case, the attempt to decrease the likelihood of conflict between the two states was not successful. However, in other cases, the success has been more long lasting.

Threats from within an alliance may occur in all types of alliances, not just with tethering. Alliance strength is arguably dependent on the similarity of goals of the member states. States within an alliance often fight among each other. Therefore, alliances with weak or no internal cohesion often collapse once an external threat is removed, as in the conclusion of a war. For example, at the end of World War I, the alliance among the Allied powers ended with the elimination of the Axis power threat. At this point, the enemy within the alliance became the primary threat and, as a result, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact were formed.

Wartime alliances, as opposed to those made during peacetime, are primarily dictated by an external threat. Internal problems caused by divergent interests of the alliance partners are put aside for the most part to deal with a larger outside threat. A primary problem that occurs during wartime is the logistics of multilateral war fighting, as no state wants to give up control over how their troops are used.

Alliances are critical strategies whereby states can increase their power, help defend against threats, and

manage conflict. With whom states choose to ally themselves affects the future shape of that state's internal realm and the alliance decisions of other states. Still, although there is no lack of scholarship on the subject, scholars continue to disagree on numerous aspects regarding appropriate alliance behavior.

See also Bipolarity; Multipolarity

—Rebecca Perkins

ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

Military forces composed solely of volunteers, without resorting to a military draft. The United States adopted an all-volunteer force during the Vietnam War in response to protests and complaints by its population, particularly members of the antiwar movement. Since 1973, the United States has relied on volunteers to fill the ranks of all branches of its armed forces.

HISTORY OF THE DRAFT

The draft has been a contentious issue among Americans since the very founding of the nation. During the American Revolution (1775–83), commander in chief George Washington requested that the central government be given the power to conscript soldiers, a power that, at the time, was reserved for the individual colonies. Despite the clear need for troops, the colonial legislatures turned down Washington's request. During the Civil War (1861–65), President Abraham Lincoln imposed a draft, a move that provoked riots in New York and other cities.

The country's first peacetime draft took place in September 1940. The draft supplied two-thirds of the American service members who fought in World War II and remained in effect until 1947. The draft was allowed to lapse for a period of 15 months before it was reinstated as a result of mounting Cold War tensions and the military's inability to meet its recruitment goals.

The draft became a casualty of its own unpopularity during the Vietnam War (1954–75). Although draftees made up only a small percentage of the U.S. military, they accounted for more than half of the army's battle deaths. Meanwhile, more than half of the men who reached draft age between 1964 and 1973 never served, and the number of conscientious objectors was unprecedented. Colleges and graduate schools were widely employed as acceptable methods of avoiding the draft, and an estimated half-million U.S. citizens evaded the draft illegally. Of the latter group, only about 4,000 ever served prison time for their failure to register.

In 1968, President Richard Nixon ran for reelection, promising to end the draft. Ending the draft was part of Nixon's goal of advancing what he called "a full generation of peace," a response to the antiwar movement and its focus on the draft. In March 1969, Nixon established the Commission on an All-Volunteer Force (also known as the Gates Commission), which released a report in February 1970 recommending an end to the draft. On July 1, 1973, the draft law expired in the United States when Congress refused to extend it.

THE U.S. MILITARY WITHOUT THE DRAFT

The first extended mission conducted by the post-Vietnam all-volunteer force was the Gulf War of 1990–91. The success of U.S. forces in that conflict was widely interpreted as proof that a draft was unnecessary. Military leaders cited factors such as morale, motivation, and longer-term service as proof of the superiority of a military in which those serving have volunteered as opposed to having been conscripted. Other factors also made volunteer forces seem more desirable than a draft force. For example, draftees are required to serve only two years, whereas those who volunteer stay in uniform much longer on average. According to military officials, this enables the armed forces to focus on improving training and quality of life for service personnel. In addition, military service is now considered to be an asset in the job market once a soldier returns to civilian life.

However, the all-volunteer force is not without drawbacks. The extended conflict in Iraq has required the extension of active-duty troops, as well as members of the National Guard and Army Reserves. As a result, some troops have been prohibited from leaving the military or have been called back into service after completing their tours of duty. In addition, some observers claim that there is an "economic draft," that is, those serving tend to come from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. These concerns raise the issue of whether the United States does in fact have an all-volunteer force or whether the draft has simply become more complex.

In response, advocates of the all-volunteer force point out that the draft does not necessarily make the military more representative or spread the burden of sacrifice. They point to the fact that most draft-eligible young men never served in Vietnam, as well as the fact that the percentage of women in the military is higher in an all-volunteer force. In addition, the percentage of college-educated African Americans is higher in the military than among those who do not serve. This raises the question of whether it is actually desirable, much less possible, that military personnel reflect the demographics of the civilian population.

See also Military Draft; Selective Service; Vietnam War

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AMNESTY

Political pardon for an individual or group that provides an exemption from prosecution for past actions. The word "amnesty" comes from the Greek and is linked to the word *amnesia*, meaning "forgetfulness." The Greeks, in declaring victory over an opponent, agreed not to recall the misfortunes of the past or seek revenge. The modern concept of amnesty is similar: Governments agree to extend political forgiveness and to "forget" offenses committed by their citizens. In granting individual or blanket (for groups) amnesty, a government agrees not to try persons for their real or supposed crimes.

Amnesty is less controversial when it is sought or granted for prisoners of conscience—those imprisoned or exiled because of their political or religious beliefs. Watchdog groups or individuals may lobby governments to grant amnesty to such persons (for example, the watchdog group Amnesty International got its start in this way). Governments are generally applauded for granting amnesty in such cases, and there are few political repercussions.

However, amnesty may be highly politically charged. It became a hot issue at the end of the Vietnam War, for example, when large numbers of Americans evaded or failed to register for the draft, deserted, or left the army with less than honorable discharges. President Gerald Ford issued a limited clemency proclamation, and President Jimmy Carter eventually issued many pardons. In doing so, however, Carter upset many who thought he had done too little and others who thought he had done too much.

Amnesty has been used effectively in the past and in recent times for the purposes of national rebuilding. After the Civil War, for example, President Abraham Lincoln issued pardons to individuals who had served in the Confederate army to prevent internal strife and to bring the country back together. More recently, as South Africa transitioned from minority to majority rule, the South African government granted individual amnesty to those who had committed politically motivated human rights abuses in exchange for full disclosure of the truth. Their revelations helped South Africa to understand its past and pave the way for reconciliation between white and black South Africans.

Amnesty also may be used to simultaneously reconstruct a nation and destabilize its internal foes. In the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, for example, the Iraqi interim government offered amnesty to low-ranking insurgents. It was hoped that this move would diminish the ranks of the opposing forces and bring more people to the side of the newly emerging Iraqi government.

See also Civil Liberties; Vietnam War

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

The use of a combination of land and sea units to undertake tasks such as attacking or defending a military objective, withdrawing troops, or creating diversions for enemy forces. In the U.S. military, amphibious warfare is a joint operation involving naval vessels and personnel in an amphibious task force (ATF). The task force is often under the protection of an aircraft carrier battle group, as well as Marine Expeditionary Units and, on occasion, Army units. An ATF typically consists of command ships,

Two U.S. Navy Special Warfare Rigid-Hull Inflatable Boats deployed in the Arabian Sea to pick up Navy Seals during Operation Enduring Freedom, the war in Afghanistan that began in October 2001. The two boats were launched from the amphibious warship USS *Shreveport*. Such amphibious support is a crucial element of modern warfare.

Source: U.S. Navy.

assault ships, transport ships, landing ships, and smaller landing craft.

HISTORY OF AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

Amphibious warfare has been practiced for centuries. Early forms of amphibious combat can be traced back to the ancient Greeks. In 490 BCE, the Greeks defeated a Persian amphibious landing at Marathon, and in 415 BCE, the Athenians launched an amphibious assault on the Sicilian city-state of Syracuse. In 1066, the Norman king William the Conqueror led a large amphibious invasion of England. Shortly after landing, William's forces defeated the Saxon king Harold at the battle of Hastings, and the Normans seized control of England.

The first amphibious landing by U.S. troops occurred in the Bahamas during the American Revolution (1775–1783). The U.S. Marines conducted significant amphibious invasions at Veracruz, Mexico, during the Mexican-American War (1846–1848) and at San Juan, Puerto Rico, during the Spanish-American War (1898). During World War II, U.S. forces participated in some of the largest and bloodiest amphibious operations in military history. In the Pacific theater, the first U.S. offensive

amphibious operations took place at Guadalcanal Island in August 1942. This was the first step in an allied "island hopping" campaign that witnessed bloody, prolonged, yet ultimately successful assaults at Tarawa (1943), Saipan (1944), Iwo Jima (1945), and Okinawa (1945). These attacks cut off the Japanese mainland from supply and isolated Japanese garrisons on outlying islands.

The European theater of World War II, however, was the scene of the largest amphibious invasion in history. On June 6, 1944, more than 150,000 Allied troops landed at Normandy, supported by 6,000 ships, 13,000 aircraft, and several elite airborne divisions. The invasion was the first major step in the liberation of Europe from Nazi control. The so-called D-Day landings, known as Operation Overlord, remain a textbook example of a joint operation that successfully combined land, sea, and air forces.

FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE PRESENT

Amphibious strategy was employed by the United States at Inchon in 1950 during the Korean War, by the French and British during the Suez Crisis of 1957, by the United States during the Vietnam War, and by the British in the retaking of the Falkland Islands in 1982. Of these, the landing at Inchon in September 1950 was by far the largest and most daring use of amphibious forces since World War II.

Conceived by General Douglas MacArthur, the Inchon landing placed some 70,000 American troops behind North Korean lines, taking the North Korean forces completely by surprise. Before the landing, North Korean troops had allied forces trapped in the city of Pusan. The landings forced a North Korean retreat that relieved the allied forces and averted a potential North Korean victory.

Modern amphibious warfare doctrine in the United States has changed significantly since the invasion at

Inchon. Current U.S. doctrine, known as *Operational Maneuver From the Sea* (OMFTS), evolved as a result of changes in weapons technology since the Korean War. Concerned about the threat to an invasion fleet from antiship cruise missiles, U.S. military planners concluded that future amphibious assaults should be launched from "over the horizon." That is, landing craft would be launched well out of range of coastal defenses (as far as 25 miles from shore) to reduce the exposure of naval vessels to attack. Instead of trying to capture a port as quickly as possible to resupply invading troops, supplies would be brought to the troops by fast carrier-based transport helicopters. Reinforcements would also arrive by helicopter, with carrier-based conventional and VTOL (vertical takeoff and landing) aircraft providing air support.

The military has had few opportunities to test the soundness of the OMFTS doctrine. The United States has not staged a large-scale amphibious invasion since Inchon, in part because of the technological changes that gave rise to OMFTS. Small-scale amphibious operations (involving no more than about 2,000 troops) largely have given way to airmobile helicopter operations. Modern helicopters are able to deliver troops much more quickly with less exposure to enemy fire than amphibious vessels. Airmobile operations are also much more flexible: Landing craft must come ashore at a beach, whereas helicopters can deliver troops virtually anywhere.

Despite these advantages, airmobile operations are unable to replace conventional amphibious operations completely. In its recent major conflicts, the United States has not needed to conduct large-scale amphibious operations because it has had the advantage of land bases adjacent to its opponent's territory. However, if the need arose to assault a heavily defended target solely from the sea, there would be no alternative to an amphibious attack. Thus, amphibious operations will remain a potential weapon in the U.S. military arsenal for some time to come.

See also Cruise Missile; D-Day; Doctrine; Guadalcanal, Battle of; Helicopters; Inchon Landing; Joint Operations

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ANARCHY

The lack of a supreme authority in the international system of states. One of the central concepts in the realist theory of international relations is the concept of *anarchy*. Unlike its common usage in reference to chaos, in international relations, anarchy simply refers to the fact that within the international system of states, there is no governing power above the level of the state.

From this understanding of the international system as anarchy, realist theories of international relations understand state behavior as inherently competitive. States in the international system are continually vying for power and trying to ensure their survival because there is no higher authority that can be expected to help any individual state persevere. The idea that states can rely only on themselves for security in the international system is known in realist theory as the principle of *self-help*. Self-help is the only form of help that can be relied on in an anarchic system.

Although the modern system of states is supplemented by many suprastate institutions such as the United Nations, realists contend that anarchy still defines the international system of states. Because the authority of a suprastate institution is limited, it depends on the cooperation of states to engage in military action, and certain powerful states (such as the United States) have the ability to supersede the decisions of the United Nations. These factors suggest that the United Nations is, in fact, not a true authority above the level of the state.

See also Realism; United Nations

ANTHRAX

Disease caused by *Bacillus anthracis* that can be used as a biological weapon. The anthrax bacillus can be contracted by inhalation, ingestion, or though cuts in the skin; the inhaled form of the bacteria is the most

dangerous. In its spore form, the bacteria can be spread by means of an aerosol spray. Anthrax spores are highly stable and can survive in many environments. However, the disease is not infectious and can be treated successfully with antibiotics such as ciprofloxacin or doxycycline. Other support treatments may also be needed to combat the bacillus.

Anthrax symptoms usually appear within one to six days of infection. Initial symptoms include fever, chills, fatigue, cough, and mild chest discomfort. Symptoms of anthrax infection in its later stages are severe respiratory distress and meningitis, followed by septic shock and death within 24 to 36 hours if untreated. Although a vaccine for anthrax does exist, currently it is only used by the U.S. military.

Although the anthrax bacillus is readily available and easy to produce, the spores used to create the weaponized form of anthrax are much more difficult to manufacture. Nevertheless, anthrax was used in several terrorist attacks along the eastern seaboard in 2001. Letters containing what were claimed to be anthrax spores were delivered to several businesses and government offices at that time. In response to the 2001 attacks—as well as previous anthrax threats against abortion clinics—the U.S. government has developed guidelines to cope with an anthrax attack. The guidelines include bagging the package containing the spores, decontaminating the affected area and victims with bleach, and beginning antibiotic treatment.

See also Biological Weapons and Warfare; Bioterrorism

ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) TREATY (1972)

U.S.–Soviet agreement to limit antiballistic missile defense systems. On May 26, 1972, U.S. president Richard Nixon and Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev, meeting at the Moscow Summit, signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems. This agreement emerged from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) held in 1969–72.

The Antiballistic Missile Treaty banned both nations from generating, testing, and deploying antiballistic missile (ABM) systems launched from the air, sea, land, and outer space. It permitted the United States and the Soviet Union to have two ABM systems each: one to protect each nation's capital (Washington, DC,

and Moscow) and one to defend an intercontinental ballistic missile field at another site. The treaty specified that each location was to include no more than 200 antiballistic missiles, and these systems were to be constructed according to the treaty's strict guidelines. The treaty permitted the United States and the Soviet Union to withdraw from the treaty following six months' notice. It also mandated that both parties review the treaty once every five years.

The leaders of both the United States and the Soviet Union were amenable to negotiating an ABM treaty because ABM systems, which had emerged during the 1960s, were extremely costly and rapidly escalating the arms race. Because ABM systems were intended to destroy offensive intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), each nation was motivated to build up its arsenal of offensive nuclear weapons to ensure that at least some missiles launched during an attack would not be destroyed when counterattacked by the opponent's ABMs. This dynamic created a situation in which each nation believed that it must increase its number of defensive ABMs to offset the additional offensive missiles, thus escalating the arms race.

The ABM ban reinstituted the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD), in which both nations had confidence that they possessed the capacity to destroy the other. The logic of MAD rested on the premise of mutual deterrence, in which each superpower could be assured that its opponent would never risk launching an offensive nuclear attack because to do so would result in an annihilating counterattack.

At the time the ABM treaty was signed in 1972, the Soviet Union had more ICBMS, SLBMs, and long-range bombers carrying nuclear weapons than the United States (2,547 to 2,160). Yet the United States possessed more nuclear weapons on each missile, which translated into more than a 2:1 advantage in total warheads (5,700 to 2,500). The U.S. superiority came from its arsenal of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). At that time, each MIRV, when attached to a ballistic missile, could hold up to 10 warheads. The MIRVs were not included in the treaty, and, consequently, the United States and, to a limited extent, the Soviets persisted in producing them. The arms race continued, although ABM systems were effectively disengaged.

The ABM Treaty was signed during the peak of the détente, or relaxation of Cold War hostilities, which was engineered by President Nixon and his national security

advisor, Henry A. Kissinger. The success of the SALT I talks ushered in a new era of arms control. The U.S. Senate overwhelmingly approved the ABM Treaty in August 1972, and it went into effect two months later.

At a second Moscow Summit in July 1974, Nixon and Brezhnev reduced ABM systems even further. They agreed to allow only one ABM site for each country, with 100 ABMs at each location. The Soviet Union decided to maintain its Moscow site, and the United States chose to retain its ABMs in North Dakota.

In 1983, President Ronald Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly known as Star Wars. This elaborate, multilayered ABM system was designed to provide the United States with an impenetrable nuclear shield and, according to its proponents, to make nuclear war obsolete. Critics assailed the plan because of its exorbitant cost and its violation of the ABM Treaty. The plan for SDI never progressed beyond the planning stages.

The ABM Treaty remained in effect until June 13, 2002, when President George W. Bush announced the withdrawal of the United States. From the beginning of his administration, Bush had vowed to protect the United States from what he described as an increasing missile threat, particularly the so-called rogue nations of North Korea and Iraq. The president, his advisers, and U.S. military leaders had concerns that the United States was not keeping up with rapidly advancing nuclear weapons technology and needed to update its nuclear arsenal. Although Russian leaders strongly objected when Bush made the official announcement of withdrawal in 2002, they have since quelled their protests. Since the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty, 10 land-based missile interceptors have been placed in silos at Fort Greely, Alaska. Ten more were scheduled to be ready at that site by 2005.

See also Arms Control; Arms Race; Bush, George W., and National Policy; Détente; Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs); Mutually Assured Destruction; Nixon, Richard, and National Policy; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)

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ANTINUCLEAR MOVEMENT

Organized effort to ban the manufacture, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons, to shut down nuclear power plants, and to protest the disposal of nuclear waste. The first protest against a nuclear weapon occurred in July 1945 in New Mexico after the detonation test of the first atomic bomb during World War II. A small group of scientists from the Manhattan Project, the project responsible for developing the bomb, appealed to President Harry S. Truman to discontinue the mission to build atomic bombs. Although this effort was unsuccessful, several antinuclear groups emerged after the war.

THE ANTINUCLEAR WEAPONS MOVEMENT

In the aftermath of World War II, the Atomic Scientists of Chicago (mostly scientists from the Manhattan Project), the Federation of Atomic Scientists, and the United World Federalists (a group supporting the United Nations) joined forces to pressure the U.S. government to cease the production of atomic bombs and to educate the public about the dangers of nuclear war. As would happen many times during the Cold War, however, this coalition of antinuclear groups collapsed when increased Soviet aggression caused the United States and its citizens to become preoccupied with the threat of communism and fearful of the Soviet Union.

Antinuclear activity in the United States resurged in 1954 following the U.S. test of a hydrogen bomb on Bikini Atoll in the central Pacific Ocean. When 23 Japanese fishermen who were exposed to radioactive fallout from the blast suffered from radiation sickness, Americans became alarmed. Concerns about the health effects of radioactive fallout from nuclear tests dominated the news at that time and galvanized citizens in questioning the safety of nuclear testing.

In 1957, upon receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, the noted missionary doctor and humanitarian Albert

Schweitzer urged people around the world to work toward nuclear disarmament. At this time, many popular and influential Americans, including former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, joined the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), which became a leading antinuclear organization.

As SANE grew during the late 1950s and early 1960s, it pressured the U.S. government to enact a comprehensive test ban treaty, which was pursued by Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy with the Soviet Union and Great Britain. When the Limited Test Ban Treaty was ratified in 1963, it was the rallies, demonstrations, picketing, and letter-writing campaigns of thousands of antinuclear activists from SANE, Women Strike for Peace, and other grassroots groups that were instrumental in creating the public outcry necessary to enact change. However, once the treaty reduced fears about fallout from nuclear testing, the public's interest in the antinuclear movement waned.

The next surge in antinuclear activism occurred during the early to mid-1980s. With the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan in 1981, the U.S. public was exposed to his administration's determination to increase the nation's nuclear arsenal. As U.S. relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated during this period, thousands of activists organized the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (NWFC), a project that culminated in 1982 with the largest peace crusade in the history of the American peace movement. Nuclear freeze proponents advocated a multilateral halt to all nuclear weapons manufacture and testing.

Nuclear freeze activists urged the United States to cease weapons production and testing. In addition to using the antinuclear tactics of the 1950s and 1960s, freeze supporters aggressively lobbied members of Congress and launched referenda campaigns in communities across the nation, especially in the Northeast and California. "Freeze Walks" were also popular in 1982 as thousands of activists took to the streets to raise funds and educate the public about nuclear disarmament.

The majority of Americans supported a nuclear freeze in the early 1980s: A 1981 Gallup poll found that 72% of all Americans were in favor of such a freeze. The peak of the nuclear freeze movement occurred in 1984, when the NWFC and thousands of other antinuclear organizations boasted 10 million members, making it one of the largest mass movements in U.S. history. As the Reagan administration and Soviet leaders agreed to negotiate arms treaties, the nuclear freeze campaign lost much of its momentum.

Later in the 1980s, the NWFC merged with SANE and, in 1993, renamed itself Peace Action. Although antinuclear activists were a less potent force during the 1990s, their continued efforts kept the pressure on the administrations of Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton to continue arms negotiations. The campaign had some success: The U.S. nuclear arsenal decreased from 23,000 weapons in 1990 to 15,000 weapons in 1997. In 2001, Project Abolition, an organization that gathered veterans from the NWFC, other disarmament workers, and antinuclear power activists, joined forces with Peace Action.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST NUCLEAR POWER

American activism against nuclear power began during the late 1960s following the construction of nuclear power plants at sites throughout the country. Most of the protests involved the picketing of plant sites. During the mid-1970s, antinuclear power organizations were established, though they remained small compared with antinuclear arms groups. At this time, protesters were largely concerned with human health and safety, nuclear pollution, and the safe disposal of nuclear waste.

An accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in March 1979 shocked Americans and provided impetus to the antinuclear energy movement. The accident occurred when a cooling mechanism failed to operate properly, causing the reactor core to overheat. Although the problem was corrected before temperatures rose out of control, the overheating could have led to a nuclear meltdown. The full extent of the damage and the amount of radiation released was not known for some time, yet public passions ran high.

In the wake of the Three Mile Island accident, antinuclear rallies took place in Washington, DC, San Francisco, and other major U.S. cities. The spike in antinuclear activism led to proposals for a ban on nuclear power plants in a number of states. In October 1979, approximately 300,000 people rallied in New York City to protest nuclear power. After the accident at Three Mile Island, no new plans for U.S. nuclear power plants came to fruition.

The nuclear accident at Chernobyl in the Soviet republic of Ukraine in April 1986 rekindled interest in antinuclear power protests. During the 1990s, activists

focused on demands for evacuation plans in the event of nuclear power plant accidents. They also protested nuclear-waste dumps and the manufacturing of plutonium, a highly radioactive substance.

In the first decade of the 21st century, the two branches of the antinuclear movement—those against nuclear weapons and those protesting nuclear power—began joining together to collaborate on issues of interest to both groups. Chief among these issues is the call for an end to the production of plutonium, which is used in both nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons.

See also Arms Control; Arms Race; Atomic Bomb; Atoms for Peace; Manhattan Project

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ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW)

Warfare designed to combat submarine threats and to maintain naval dominance. Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) comprises both technology and tactics used in combating enemy submarine power. The U.S. Navy historically has focused a great deal of its resources on developing innovative ASW to respond to the continual challenge of new enemy submarine technology.

During World War I, the submarine was able to menace merchant vessels. The first ASW strategy against German submarines was to ship supplies in a convoy. Following the war, to prevent submarine attacks, active sonar was developed by the British. When coupled with depth charges, active sonar provided the navy with the capacity to destroy enemy submarines.

During World War II, however, German submarines began attacking on the surface, often as a group using "wolf pack tactics" to counter ASW tactics. As both the ASW sonar technology and the tactic of shipping by convoys proved ineffective for the Allies, long-range aircraft were outfitted with radar and used as escorts. In addition, new electronic and communications intelligence was able to protect the convoys by locating German U-Boats (submarines). New technological developments, such as sonobuoys, acoustic homing torpedoes, magnetic anomaly detectors, and microwave radar, also played a significant role in combating the submarine threat during World War II.

Technological developments were not limited to ASW. At the start of the Cold War, Soviet advances in submarine technology represented a serious threat to U.S. naval power. These advances, coupled with submarine technologies adopted from the end of the war, allowed the submarine to travel longer underwater, thereby evading detection.

The ASW policy during the Cold War differed from previous policy in that emphasis was placed on developing countermeasures before the enemy could develop its own technological advancements. Therefore, in anticipation of new submarine developments on the Soviet side, the United States placed an unprecedented focus on ASW. Not only were improvements made to existing ASW, but also a new ASW submarine (SSK) was developed, along with the passive acoustic array.

The later emergence of the Soviet nuclear submarine provided another challenge to ASW strategy. Developments in U.S. nuclear submarines illustrated the danger that would exist when the Soviet Union adopted the new technology. However, the new nuclear submarines did have a weakness: the amount of noise they produced. Therefore, research and development worked to create quieter submarines and better sonar to solve and exploit the problem.

The focus was placed on passive sonar, which was most effective against the nuclear submarine. By the mid-1980s, however, the Soviets had developed a quiet nuclear submarine. In response, the U.S. Navy had to rethink its focus on passive sonar and explore other avenues. Fortunately for the United States, the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 meant that the United States had been given a reprieve from the battle between these new, quieter subs and ASW efforts.

Although the Cold War has ended and Cold War antisubmarine warfare was effective, there are new challenges to meet in the future. The current posture of the U.S. Navy is different from its previous strategy—control over the seas and ASW are no longer its top priorities. However, new nonnuclear submarines have been developed that do not have the same weaknesses

as previous submarines and for which ASW tactics and technologies already exist. The increasing ease of obtaining these technologically advanced submarines will most likely present a significant post–Cold War challenge to antisubmarine warfare policy and strategy.

See also Submarine Warfare; Submarines

ANTITANK MISSILES

Medium- or long-range missile whose primary purposes are to destroy armed vehicles and protect ground troops. An antitank guided missile (ATGM) can be directed to a target by several different guidance systems, including laser guiding, laser marking, television camera, or wire guiding. The most advanced units, such as the U.S. Javelin, are "fire and forget" missiles, meaning that once the ATGM is launched, it directs itself toward the target using digital-imaging chips. A soldier sights the target through an optical or infrared viewer attached to the missile's launch tube. Once fired, the missile's cameras take new images of the target, compare those images to what is stored in its memory, and guide the ATGM to the target. In addition to tanks and other armored vehicles, the ATGM can be used against fortified positions or low-speed aircraft.

The Javelin missile replaces the second generation of semiautomatic antitank missiles, such as the TWO2, which used a wire to guide itself to the target. The fire-and-forget technology of the Javelin removes the threat of detection for ground forces firing the missile. Soldiers firing earlier generations of ATGMs or antitank weapons without guidance systems exposed themselves to return fire from the targets. The newest generations of ATGMs can operate at ranges of 60–1,500 meters or more.

Several nations possess ATGMs, including Israel (SPIKE and Orev missiles), Russia and other republics of the former Soviet Union (AT Swatter, Sagger, and Kornet missiles), China (Hongjian-8 missile), Pakistan (Anza and Bakar Shikan missiles), and the Palestine Liberation Front (which uses a version of the Hongjian-8).

Most ATGMs deployed since the early 1980s are very accurate (up to 90% accuracy). The United States has deployed ATGMs effectively against Soviet-made tanks used in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq in its wars with those two nations. During the Iraq War of 2003, two U.S. Abrams M1 tanks, the so-called queens of the battlefield because of their high survivability, were destroyed by Iraqis using Soviet-built Kornet ATGMs.

U.S. Javelin and Gill ATGMs have had battlefield success in Iraq as well. Although the Kornet requires a crew to guide the missile to the target using a laser, it shares the dual-warhead design with the Javelin and Gill that is effective against the toughest battlefield armaments. Most of the new generation of ATGMs fly at high arcs and are able to attack their targets from above, avoiding detection and piercing the armament at the weakest point.

Recently, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued an advisory for a potential terrorist threat in which terrorists might use ATGMs against trucks or trains hauling nuclear waste or other toxic materials. Thus, the power of ATGMs also may be used effectively against the United States in the war on international terrorism.

See also Afghanistan, War in; Iraq War of 2003; Missiles; Tanks; Terrorism, War on International

ANTIWAR MOVEMENT

Domestic protest movement (1965–73) that formed in opposition to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Not only was the Vietnam War the longest war fought in U.S. history, it also produced the largest and most successful American antiwar movement. The antiwar movement forced the U.S. government to deal with public opinion about the war at home at the same time it was prosecuting military action overseas. The movement also established connections with other initiatives for social change and transformation such as the civil rights movement.

The antiwar movement began in 1965 as a result of increased bombing of North Vietnam by the United States. Widespread protests and increasingly intense public opposition forced the United States to halt the bombing briefly. Meanwhile, those seeking to frame their support for the war as "support for our boys in Vietnam" found their position increasingly undermined by the behavior of the troops themselves. Soldiers began displaying peace symbols, in addition to more serious acts such as demonstrating, deserting, and even murdering commanding officers.

The movement soon became a serious problem for President Lyndon B. Johnson, who sought to undermine it using the legal system to restrict the activities

of demonstrators. By 1967, however, the antiwar movement had become part of a broad spectrum of social change concerning attitudes toward sex, race relations, gender roles, and the use of illegal drugs. A counterculture of young people rebelled against the war as part of a general rejection of the values and expectations of the generations preceding them. The counterculture and its slogans, such as "Give Peace a Chance," became an inseparable part of the antiwar movement. The term "new left" was attached to increasingly radical groups such as Students for a Democratic Society and the Chicago Seven.

Counterculture youth were not the only ones opposed to the war. Opposition became increasingly mainstream, and public opinion polls revealed that barely a quarter of the country supported President Johnson's policies. Acts of protest and civil disobedience demonstrated the increased power and influence of the antiwar movement. These culminated in a march on the Pentagon in 1967 organized by the National Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam.

In 1968, North Vietnamese forces launched a major attack known as the Tet Offensive. The unexpected size and strength of the attack led many Americans to conclude that Johnson had vastly oversold the progress of the U.S. military in Vietnam and that the war was a very long way from being over. As a result of these military and public opinion setbacks, Johnson decided not to run for reelection in 1968. He was replaced on the Democratic ticket by his vice president, Hubert Humphrey. The subsequent Democratic National Convention in Chicago was marred by antiwar demonstrations consisting of pitched battles between police and protesters.

During the presidential campaign, Republican candidate Richard Nixon promised to eliminate the draft and end the war. After winning the election, however, it became increasingly clear that Nixon was actually prolonging the war instead of seeking to end it quickly. The U.S. invasion of Cambodia in May 1970 gave further momentum to antiwar sentiment. That same month, Ohio National Guardsmen shot and killed four students during an antiwar protest at Kent State University. The killings set off a wave of university protests across the nation, with more than 150 colleges going on strike.

In December 1970, President Nixon announced the first large-scale troop withdrawal, which brought 50,000 U.S. troops home from Vietnam. After 1970, attendance at antiwar rallies declined significantly. Nixon later implemented a policy of deescalation and "Vietnamization," in which South Vietnamese troops were to gradually take over the duties being performed by U.S. forces. In 1973, a peace treaty was signed that recognized the independence of both North and South Vietnam.

The antiwar movement received a great deal of the credit (some would say blame) for U.S. disengagement from Vietnam. Many people blamed the movement for fostering defeatist and anti-American sentiment at home. Many others, however, praised it for forcing the government to acknowledge the futility of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and saving American lives. The movement created a significant social divide among the U.S. public that continues to echo to the present day.

See also All-Volunteer Force; Vietnam War; Vietnam War Protests

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ANZUS SECURITY TREATY

A mutual security treaty established among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS) in San Francisco on September 1, 1951. The agreement, which entered into force on April 29, 1952, binds the three signatories to recognize that an attack on any member would endanger the peace and safety of all members of the ANZUS alliance.

In the case of an attack, the members of the ANZUS alliance are committed to consult when threats arise against them, to meet the danger by respective constitutional processes, and to maintain and develop sufficient defense capability on an individual and collective level.

There is no integrated defense structure within ANZUS. However, following the suspension of U.S. treaty obligations to New Zealand in 1986, Australia and the United States have continued to conduct joint military exercises. The two nations also maintain joint

defense facilities in Australia and seek to standardize equipment and operational doctrine wherever possible.

HISTORY OF ANZUS

To understand the background of the ANZUS Security Treaty, one must understand something about the Cold War and its manifestation in Asia. At the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950, Australia and New Zealand contributed troops to Commonwealth forces out of concern for regional security. At that time, both nations saw the potential diplomatic and security benefits of an alliance with the United States, and this perception influenced the decision to send troops to defend South Korea.

For the United States, an alliance with Australia and New Zealand would provide a secure foothold in the Pacific in its efforts to contain any further communist aggression in Southeast Asia. These mutual diplomatic and security needs led to the signing of the ANZUS Security Treaty in 1951. Although the treaty did not explicitly guarantee military support in the event of attack on a member, it did stipulate consultation if an attack on one of the three countries occurs.

The first 50 years of the ANZUS Security Treaty passed without invoking the provisions for assistance if a member state should come under attack. Nevertheless, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States fought alongside one another in three large-scale conflicts during that period. Besides the Korean War, in which Australia and New Zealand contributed troops, air, sea, and land units from both of these countries served with distinction during the Vietnam War and during the Gulf War.

The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, prompted the first use of the ANZUS Security Treaty provisions for assistance in response to an attack on a member state. Australia came to the aid of its longtime ally by dispatching more than 1,000 troops, as well as sea and air units, to Afghanistan in October 2001 to support the U.S. attempt to overthrow the Taliban and root out Islamic terrorists harbored by them. In fact, Australia was one of the first nations to send troops to Afghanistan to fight the Taliban and members of the terrorist organization al-Qaeda.

However, the dispatch of Australian Special Air Services troops and naval units during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 sparked large-scale protests in Australia. As a result, domestic protest may make future deployments in support of American-led military operations prohibitively expensive for Australian politicians.

SCOPE OF THE TREATY

To fully understand the scope of the ANZUS Security Treaty, one also must examine diplomatic relations among the three allies. The ANZUS Council of Foreign Ministers, which includes representatives of the three member nations, met annually from 1952 to 1984 to discuss common security threats and cooperation.

However, following New Zealand's 1984 refusal to give nuclear-powered and nuclear-weapons-capable U.S. Navy ships access to its ports, the United States suspended its defense obligations to Auckland in 1986, pending restoration of port access. Since 1985, bilateral Australia–U.S. ministerial meetings have been held, alternating locations between the United States and Australia. Defense ministers and secretaries from each country often participate in these meetings, and lower-level officials of the two nations also consult on a regular basis.

Australian troops have fought alongside their American allies in every major military conflict since World War II. Australia's rush to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan in 2001 further cemented and reinforced the importance of the 50-year alliance between the two nations. The relationship between the United States and New Zealand has been more shaky, however.

Despite New Zealand's 2003 dispatch of a small number of support troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, as of 2004, the Labour government of Prime Minister Helen Clark has shown little interest in reviving its security alliance with the United States. Add to this the unpopularity of the Iraq War in both Australia and New Zealand, and it becomes evident that the future of the ANZUS Security Treaty and alliance is far from certain.

Despite the common security threats posed by global terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, military downsizing in Auckland, New Zealand, and street protests in Sydney, Australia, represent significant domestic obstacles to future security cooperation with the United States.

See also Afghanistan, War in; Iraq War of 2003; Korean War

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ARAB OIL EMBARGO

Decision by oil-producing Arab nations to cut off the supply of oil to the United States in retaliation for U.S. support of Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The Arab oil embargo was the first oil-supply disruption to lead to major price increases and a worldwide energy crisis. The embargo caused the United States and Western European nations to reassess their overdependence on Middle Eastern oil. It also led to far-reaching changes in domestic energy policy, including increased domestic oil production in the United States and a greater emphasis on improving energy efficiency.

On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israel on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur. The Arab forces made early gains across the Suez Canal and Golan Heights, but Israel quickly turned the tide, and within a few weeks, Israeli troops had pushed forward into enemy territory. In an attempt to pressure Western countries to force Israel to withdraw from seized lands, Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced sharp production cuts and then banned the sale of oil to the United States. Until that time, OPEC, which had been formed in 1960, had kept a relatively low profile. It was mainly involved in negotiating with international oil companies for better terms for member countries—often developing nations that felt they were being exploited by the large petroleum companies.

Enmity among OPEC members had risen in the years preceding the embargo as a result of moves made by President Richard Nixon to boost the sluggish U.S. economy. For example, Nixon ordered the release of the dollar from the fluctuating gold standard that had been in place since the end of World War II. The resulting devaluation of the dollar led to financial losses on the part of oil-producing nations, whose revenues consisted largely of U.S. dollars. That move, in addition to Nixon-imposed price controls in 1971, contributed to oil shortages and the closure of many U.S. gas stations even before the embargo. Enormous increases in Western oil consumption—doubling over the previous 25 years or so—also set the stage for the crisis, as people in the developed world had become accustomed to cheap gasoline and relatively stable prices.

After the imposition of the embargo, the price of a barrel of oil quadrupled by 1974. As a result, the United States experienced its first fuel shortage and increase in gas prices (in real terms) since World War II. In response to the embargo, the U.S. government imposed fuel rationing and lowered speed limits to reduce consumption. Recently released documents indicate that President Nixon seriously considered military action to seize oil fields in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi as a last resort. However, negotiations in Washington led to the lifting of the embargo in March 1974.

The embargo had a far-ranging impact on the psyche of American citizens, who realized that events in the Middle East, coupled with U.S. energy dependency, could have major implications at home. Some analysts, however, feel that those lessons have been short-lived. For example, in recent years, fuel-economy ratings for American-made vehicles have begun to decrease after decades of improvement. In addition, the United States now imports a larger percentage of oil today than it did at the time of the embargo. Many observers are convinced that it will take another shock similar to the embargo to wean Americans from their dependence on imported oil.

See also Arab-Israeli Conflict; Oil and National Security; OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)

ARAB AMERICANS

Citizens and permanent residents of the United States who trace their ancestry to or immigrated from Arabic-speaking countries in the Middle East. Although it is estimated that three million Arab Americans live in the United States, the exact numbers are unclear because some Arab Americans identify themselves as Middle Eastern, others identify themselves as having more than one ethnicity, and still others did not participate in recent censuses.

The first wave of Arab immigration to the United States took place between 1875 and 1920 after an economic downturn in Lebanon and Syria. Early immigrants hailed mainly from those nations and were predominantly Christian. Another wave began after 1940, influenced by the Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine and civil war in parts of the Middle East. Many of these immigrants were Muslims and brought to America a religion still unknown throughout much of the United States.

Most Arab Americans today are native born, and approximately 90% live in cities. Although they are spread throughout the country, roughly one-third of all Arab Americans live in three states: California, Michigan, and New York. Although Arab Americans speak Arabic as a common language (excluding descendents of original immigrants and others who may no longer speak the language) and often share a common culture, they do not all practice the same religion. Current stereotypes paint all Arab Americans as Muslims; however, most are actually Catholic or Orthodox Christians. Similarly, only approximately 12% of Muslims worldwide are Arabs. Another source of confusion has been the status of Iranian Americans, who are not Arab Americans. Iran, once part of the Persian Empire, differs in language (Farsi instead of Arabic) and culture from Arabic countries in the Middle East.

See also Arab-Israeli Conflict; Middle East and U.S. Policy

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Decades-old dispute between the state of Israel and its Arab neighbors over issues emerging from competing claims over the territory of the Middle East region of Palestine. The Arab-Israeli conflict has claimed thousands of lives, and efforts to achieve a durable compromise have been frustrated time and again by outbreaks of violence, suicide bombings, and breaches of agreements and treaties. The clash between the Palestinian Arabs and Israel has global implications; given the wide-reaching religious, economical, and geopolitical dimensions of the conflict, many other countries have a direct interest in seeing the dispute settled.

THE CREATION OF ISRAEL

In its present form, the Arab-Israeli conflict began in 1948, when Israel declared its statehood. However, the roots of the dispute go far back into the troubled history of the region.

After World War II and the horrors of the Holocaust—in which millions of people, including six million Jews, were tortured and slaughtered by the Germans—thousands of European Jews migrated to Palestine, responding to earlier Zionist calls to rebuild the ancient state of Israel. Since 1920, Great Britain had been controlling the region under a mandate granted by the League of Nations. As early as 1917, Great Britain issued the Balfour Declaration, in which it declared its support for the establishment of a Jewish state in the historical region of Palestine.

By 1946, a year after the German surrender in Europe, there were approximately 680,000 Jews in Palestine. Meanwhile, new Arab countries, including Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, were being created in the region. The young United Nations, seeing an urgent need to regulate the competing claims over Palestine, decided in 1947 to partition the territory into a Jewish state and an Arab state. The fiercely disputed city of Jerusalem was to become an international city. The Arab community, however, refused to accept that solution. In keeping with the UN decision, Israel immediately declared itself a sovereign state. The stage was set for a bloody conflict, which continues to this day.

THE FIRST WARS

As soon as Israel declared its statehood, Arab forces from Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq invaded the new nation. Jordan established its control in the Arab-populated areas of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and Egypt did the same in the Gaza Strip. Two successive UN-brokered armistices did not manage to stop the fighting for more than one month at a time. By the time the combatants finally adopted a more solid truce, Israel had succeeded in rolling back the Arab advance and, in its view, to establish its threatened security, took control of a significant stretch of territory that had not been awarded during the UN partition.

This situation created an immense refugee problem among the Arab-Palestinian population, with tens of thousands forced to leave their former homes in the new Israeli state. The status of these refugees has become one of the most pressing issues of contention between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

The uneasy armistice that characterized the period between 1949 and 1956 was by no means devoid of

bloodshed. By the end of 1956, the Israelis were convinced of an imminent threat from Egypt, and thus launched what Israel called a preemptive strike into Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. Israel occupied the territory for several months and withdrew only after a UN peacekeeping force arrived in the region to monitor the situation.

GUERILLA WARFARE AND PREEMPTIVE STRIKES

In 1964, several Palestinian Arab groups fighting a guerilla war against Israel united under the name of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The goal of the organization was the annihilation of Israel and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The PLO found support among the Arab states. Meanwhile, violent conflicts between Jewish and Arab forces continued to kill dozens of people, both fighters and civilians, on a regular basis.

A third, full-scale conflict between the two sides broke out in 1967, when Israel, once again alarmed by what it perceived to be Egypt's belligerent intentions to annihilate the Israeli state, launched a massive air attack that destroyed the Egyptian air force. Within six days, the Sinai Peninsula was again occupied by Israel, as were the West Bank and East Jerusalem (formerly under Jordanian control), the Gaza Strip (previously controlled by Egypt), and Golan Heights (formerly Syrian territory). The United Nations responded to the events by passing Resolution 242, which called for Israeli withdrawal from all of these areas. Israel refused to pull back, citing security concerns about its existence, and it began building settlements in the newly acquired territories.

BAD NEWS, GOOD NEWS

The Arab response came several years later in 1973, when Egypt and Syria attacked Israel from the west and north, respectively. The Arab offensive took place on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur (hence its frequent designation as the Yom Kippur War). Israel sustained heavy losses before it was able to push back its attackers.

The cycle of violence continued unabated and, in 1978, in an attempt to crush PLO guerillas under the leadership of Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat, Israel invaded southern Lebanon. The same year, however, the world received some good news when Egypt and

Israel signed the Camp David Accords, in which Egypt finally recognized the Jewish state and reestablished its control over the Sinai Peninsula. This good news did not last long, however.

Over the following years, Israel officially annexed East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, further infuriating its Arab neighbors. A new Israeli invasion of Lebanon took place in 1982, and the PLO was forced to flee that country. The organization, however, continued to gather fierce support in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

It was in these two areas, five years later, that hundreds of young Palestinians clashed with the Israeli army in what came to be known as the first *intifada* (an Arabic word that means "shaking off"). This Palestinian revolt did not come to an end until 1993, when the PLO and the Israelis signed the Oslo Accords, in which the PLO finally recognized Israel's right to exist and received limited autonomy over the areas of Jericho and Gaza.

NO END IN SIGHT

A year after the signing of the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority was created and Yasir Arafat arrived in Gaza to take charge of the new administrative body. In October 1994, Jordan became the second state to sign a peace treaty with Israel. The next few years were characterized both by continued negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel and by numerous guerilla attacks against the Jewish state, often in the form of suicide bombings that killed countless civilians. The attacks were followed by fierce Israeli retaliations.

A second intifada began in 2000 after Israeli politician Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, a holy site in Jerusalem that is the location of the al-Asqa Mosque and the Jewish temple of King Solomon. Sharon's visit was perceived as a provocation by the Palestinians, and it ignited the new revolt. Numerous attempts were made to bring about a ceasefire and an end to the intifada, to no avail. The cycle of violence proved to be virtually impossible to break, and the Israelis and Palestinians continued to strike out against each other.

The death of Yasir Arafat in 2004 and a climate of change in the Middle East as a result of the Iraq War of 2003 seems to have changed the dynamic of the Israeli-Palestinian problem. As of early 2005, Israel and the Palestinians were taking cautious but firm

steps toward resolving their problems and ending the cycle of violence that has continued for decades. If the Palestinian issue is resolved, the larger Arab-Israeli conflict also may begin to move toward a positive conclusion.

See also Hamas; Intifada; Middle East and U.S. Policy; PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization)

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ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES

Congressional committees charged with overseeing the armed services of the United States. The U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services and the House Armed Services Committee were both created as a result of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 following World War II. That act contained a number of initiatives to enhance and institutionalize congressional oversight, best indicated by the fact that it was the first statute to ever use the word "oversight."

As established by the Legislative Reorganization Act, the standing committees of the House and Senate were directed to maintain "continuous watchfulness" of the administration of laws and programs over which they had jurisdiction. The act was also the first in U.S. history to authorize permanent professional and clerical staff for committees. Thus, the establishment of the congressional armed services committees may be understood as part of the broader expansion of the federal government following World War II and the evolving role of the U.S. Congress in the federal bureaucracy.

PRECEDENTS FOR THE COMMITTEES

The roots of the armed services committees can be traced as far back as the American Revolution, when the Continental Congress created special subcommittees to supervise issues ranging from hospitals to cannons to muskets. These subcommittees were merged into the Board of War and the Marine Committee, although they were purely investigative and wielded no authority. The first congressional committee specifically devoted to military affairs was organized to investigate the defeat of General Arthur St. Clair by the Miami Indians in 1782.

The jurisdiction of both the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services and the House Armed Services Committee is based largely on the powers granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. That article gives Congress responsibility to provide for the "common defense," raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, and oversee other actions involved with regulating, organizing, arming, and disciplining the military, as well as to exercise exclusive legislative authority over all property purchased for forts, arsenals, dockyards, and buildings of military use.

THE COMMITTEES

The Senate Committee on Armed Services consolidated the responsibilities of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee and the Senate Military Affairs Committee, both of which were established in 1816. The Senate committee has legislative oversight of the country's military. Its responsibilities include the Selective Service System; military benefits, pay, promotion, retirement, and the education of civilian and military dependents; military research and development; nuclear energy (as a matter of national security); aeronautical and space activities related to military operations or the development of weapons systems; the common defense; and the U.S. Department of Defense.

The Senate Committee on Armed Services is divided into six subcommittees. Each subcommittee is chaired by a member of the majority party in the Senate, who is not permitted to chair the full committee. Each subcommittee also has a ranking opposition leader. The Subcommittee on Airland has jurisdiction over Army and Air Force operations, bases, and appropriations. The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, established in 1999, focuses on "nontraditional threats," such as international and domestic terrorism. The Subcommittee on Personnel deals with matters relating to active-duty and reserve military personnel, including pay rates, benefits, training

programs, and military justice. The Subcommittee on Seapower oversees the U.S. Navy and Navy Reserve. The Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support oversees military preparedness, logistics, environmental issues, business operations, real property maintenance, working capital funds, base realignment and closure, military construction, the Armed Forces Retirement Home, readiness and procurement, and depots and shipyards. The Subcommittee on Strategic Forces oversees legislation relating to nuclear weapons, national defense, and nuclear deterrence.

The Senate Committee on Armed Services, along with the House Armed Services Committee, is considered one of the most important and powerful of the congressional committees, a reputation that is based in part on the size of the defense budget. Although committee members are responsible for reviewing requests to fund new and existing weapons programs submitted by military officials and the Pentagon, they are also largely responsible for determining the size, strength, and capabilities of the armed forces. The committee does not possess complete control of defense spending, however. The overall limit on the amount available for defense spending is set annually by the Senate Budget Committee, whereas the amount for individual programs is set by the Senate Appropriations Committee. However, the armed services committees play a central role in determining how that funding will be spent.

The Senate Committee on Armed Services, in cooperation with the House Armed Services Committee, was responsible for some of the most important legislation during the Cold War, particularly the National Security Act of 1947. That act created the Defense Department by merging the U.S. Department of War with the U.S. Department of the Navy. The National Security Act also transformed the existing U.S. Army Air Corps into the U.S. Air Force and created the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve as military advisers to the president. The Office of Strategic Services became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as a result of the National Security Act, and the National Security Council was created as well. With this and other legislation, the armed services committees played a fundamental role in shaping U.S. policy during the Cold War, in concert with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

HISTORICAL APPROACHES

Congress formally has the authority, subject to presidential veto, to create, alter, or eliminate any office,

program, or activity undertaken by the Pentagon. Historically, though, the armed services committees have taken a more detached approach with regard to the authorization of military equipment and the draft and recruitment of military personnel. In 1959, however, Congress passed the so-called Russell Amendment, which required annual program authorization of appropriations for the purchase of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels. At the time the legislation was passed, this accounted for only 2 percent of defense activities, a figure that has since risen to 100 percent.

In addition to legislative initiatives, the armed services committees also have played an important role in making presidential appointments and nominations. For example, during the 83rd Congress (1953–55), the committee required President Dwight D. Eisenhower's choice for secretary of defense, General Motors president Charles E. Wilson, to sever his financial ties with the General Motors Corporation before favorably reporting his nomination to the Senate. Of even greater significance was the role of the armed services committees in the hearings held jointly with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to investigate President Harry S. Truman's removal of General Douglas MacArthur as commander of the UN forces in Korea in 1951.

During the 1970s, major changes occurred in the armed services committees with the arrival of a small number of liberal democrats opposed to the war in Vietnam. These members of Congress became outspoken critics of the typically conservative, prodefense majority of the armed services committees, as well as what they felt to be wasteful overspending. They were outnumbered, however, and as a result, rarely influenced committee decisions. The impact of the liberal agenda was further undercut by the Republican takeover of the Senate in 1981, which coincided with the pro-defense presidency of Ronald Reagan. This led not only to a massive military buildup, but also to a hard-line policy in international affairs, particularly toward the Soviet Union.

In fiscal year 2003, Congress agreed to authorize $393 billion for defense spending, the largest increase since Reagan's presidency. The armed services committees have conducted hearings on topics ranging from sexual harassment in the military to military unionization to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

—William de Jong-Lambert

See also Defense Budgeting

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ARMS CONTROL

Term that typically refers to nuclear disarmament but also may be used to describe a broad array of concepts, proposals, and policies meant to decrease the incidence of violent conflict. Arms control may also refer to small arms, in which case the term "gun control" is used. Aside from the issue of scale, the basic difference between the regulation of guns and the regulation of nuclear weaponry is that the former is usually negotiated in terms of citizens' rights to possess such weapons within a given society, and the latter is typically determined internationally.

EARLY ARMS CONTROL

Attempts at arms control extend back to the Middle Ages, when the church attempted to ban the use of crossbows in warfare among Christians. The failure of this early attempt to prohibit a specific weapon that has since become militarily obsolete demonstrates the complexity of the arms control agenda.

A famous example of early arms control, which had important implications for military development and conquest, was the limitation on gun production in Japan during the 17th century. Guns were first introduced in Japan in 1543 by two Portuguese men carrying harquebuses (a type of gun) who arrived on a Chinese cargo ship. Gun technology and production expanded rapidly and, by 1600, the Japanese had surpassed the Europeans both in terms of ownership and the superiority of their weaponry. However, guns were regarded unfavorably by the Samurai, for whom the sword was vital both symbolically and as a means of subjugation. Prejudice against guns was also accentuated by the general rejection of all things foreign to Japan during the 1600s. It was not until the 19th century that the Japanese recognized the necessity of gun manufacture for sovereignty and survival.

Arms control has frequently been a matter of victors imposing restrictions on the defeated in the aftermath of a conflict. The Romans sought to disarm the Carthaginians in the aftermath of the Punic Wars. Napoleon also sought to impose arms limitations on Austria and Prussia following his victories in the 19th century.

THE MODERN ERA

The buildup of arms and maintenance of standing armies are among the frequently cited causes of World War I, an outcome confirming the belief preceding it—that major wars are inevitable amid the unlimited stockpiling of munitions. Thus, the concept of disarmament became enshrined as one of President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points during the peace talks at Versailles. The resurgence of German militarism under the Nazis during the period between the wars, however, demonstrates the problematic nature of arms control as part of the conditions of peace.

The use of poison gas by both sides during World War I led to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The Geneva Protocol referred to the use of chemical and biological weapons, but it said nothing about their stockpiling or production. However, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction, issued in 1972, was more comprehensive. The Biological Weapons Convention was the first multilateral disarmament treaty to ban an entire category of weapons. This was followed in the 1990s by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction. The United States rejected the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001 and continues to maintain a stockpile of chemical weapons.

Both Germany and Japan were disarmed after World War II, and the use of the atomic bomb by the United States at the end of the conflict set the stage for the best-known subject of arms control agreements,

nuclear weapons. Widespread concern over nuclear weapons was first expressed in terms of the health consequences of fallout as the United States conducted numerous tests in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Fear of the consequences of the development of nuclear weapons increased further as the Soviet Union began production and testing of nuclear weapons, and the subsequent arms race was a central feature of the Cold War.

In response to such concerns, in 1961, the U.S. Congress established the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which was later integrated into the U.S. Department of State. Today, the undersecretary of state for arms control and international security oversees the Bureau of Arms Control, the Bureau of Nonproliferation, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, and the Bureau of Verification and Compliance.

The Bureau of Arms Control is responsible for U.S. policy with regard to international agreements on strategic forces and conventional, chemical, and biological weapons. The Bureau of Nonproliferation is concerned with the spread of chemical, biological, nuclear, and conventional weapons. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs reconciles diplomatic efforts with national security, and the Bureau of Verification and Compliance oversees all matters relating to verification and compliance with international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments.

MODERN ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS

The first major nuclear arms agreement—the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963—dealt specifically with the potential dangers of nuclear testing and fallout. This was followed in 1968 by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which sought to limit the possession of nuclear weapons to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the only five states to possess nuclear weapons when the treaty was adopted. Several states have declined to sign the treaty, including India, Israel, and Pakistan, all of which currently possess nuclear weapons.

The first of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) resulted in the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, signed by U.S. president Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in 1972. The ABM Treaty limited systems used in defending against missile-delivered nuclear weapons, and the purpose was to limit the development of defense systems that might provoke a war. Experts argued that peace and stability require the concept of mutually assured destruction—that is, it is illogical for one side to launch a nuclear attack against the other because the consequences of retaliation are too severe. The ABM Treaty expired in 2002 after the withdrawal of the United States.

The SALT II talks, begun in 1972, focused on the limitation and eventual reduction of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. Progress was stymied by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the United States refused to abide by the agreement after President Ronald Reagan accused the Soviets of violating their own commitment to it. The concept of mutually assured destruction has been complicated by U.S. interest in developing a space-based missile defense system, popularly known as Star Wars.

Other major treaties of the era of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union were the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement of 1987 and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks of 1991. The last major step toward nuclear arms control was the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty of 1996, which the U.S. Senate refused to ratify in 1999.

Other important arms control agreements include the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (1976) and the Wassenaar Agreement (1996). The former prohibited the hostile use of environmental modification techniques, and the latter was directed at dual-use technologies, nonweapons systems such as computers and electronics that could be used for offensive purposes.

ARMS CONTROL AFTER THE COLD WAR

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the focus on nuclear weapons changed from the reduction of arsenals to the problem of nuclear proliferation. The collapse of the Soviet Union raised troubling questions about the security of nuclear weapons stockpiled in Russia, and North Korea's potential development of nuclear weapons makes the possibility of their use by a rogue state more likely than ever before. The current war on terrorism has shifted concern to weapons of mass destruction and smaller-scale weapons that could be used to attack civilian populations. The U.S. invasion

of Iraq in 2003 was, in essence, a war of disarmament, demonstrating that attempts to eliminate arms supplies may, in the future, be as likely a cause for conflict as their buildup.

—*William de Jong-Lambert*

See also Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; Arms Race; Nuclear Deterrence; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Nuclear Proliferation; Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; Nuclear Weapons; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT); Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START); Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT)

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ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY (ACDA)

Federal agency responsible for formulating, advocating, negotiating, implementing, and verifying arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament policies, strategies, and agreements. The agency was founded in 1960 as the U.S. Disarmament Administration, and it existed under that name until 1961. Today, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) is known as the Bureau of Arms Control; it is currently a division within the U.S. Department of State.

The ACDA has four divisions that are critical to national security: arms control, nonproliferation, political-military affairs, and verification and compliance. It is also responsible for negotiations, policy making, and the implementation of disarmament agreements. One example of the negotiations led by the Bureau of Arms Control is the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). The treaty, signed on May 24, 2002, by U.S. president George W. Bush and Russian president Vladimir Putin, calls for the United States and Russia to place limits on the number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed by each nation. The SORT is the most significant arms control pact to be enacted between the two countries.

In addition to the SORT, the Arms Control Bureau has overseen negotiation of the long-standing but not yet ratified Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START III) since 1991. At that time, the treaty was known as START I. The current START III calls for the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads, limits on tactical nuclear weapons, and restrictions on strategic warheads. Treaties such as SORT and START are intended to control the proliferation of weapons that threaten U.S. national security.

The agency is also responsible for preparing reports for the president and Congress on matters relating to arms control. These include the president's Annual Report to Congress on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements, verifiability assessments for all nonproliferation agreements, and compliance reports required by U.S. Senate resolutions of ratification. For example, agency reports might discuss compliance of various nations with the Chemical Weapons Convention, a treaty regulating the development, production, stockpiling, use, and destruction of chemical weapons.

The Bureau of Arms Control is also involved in efforts to regulate the international arms trade and to destroy excess weapons stockpiles. In this capacity, the bureau has been assigned the task of removing land mines from former battlefields. In addition, it is charged with protecting U.S. soil and interests from the results of overseas incidents that are chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear in nature.

Another aspect of policy development that takes place under the auspices of the Bureau of Arms Control concerns policies related to confidence and security-building measures. These measures are acts aimed at dispelling distrust between rival nations. They typically involve mutual agreements to increase the transparency of arms acquisitions and other military activities by both sides. The Open Skies Treaty, for example, establishes the conduct of U.S. observation flights over Russian territories and Russian observation flights over U.S. territories.

Dealing with weapons proliferation, however, is not the only responsibility of the Bureau of Arms Control. The head of the bureau also advises the undersecretary of state for arms control and international security on issues such as nuclear testing and missile defense. In recent years, such activities have been a focus of criticism of the agency. Critics have even accused the bureau of obstructing efforts at arms control. The bureau has received international criticism for its handling of weapons searches in Iraq, its

failure to oversee U.S. weapons sales to nondemocratic countries such as Pakistan, and its inability to reduce the large stockpiles of U.S. nuclear weapons.

See also Arms Control

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ARMS PROCUREMENT

Process by which an organization (usually a government) acquires an entire range of weapons and military technology for the purposes of defense against perceived threats or as part of a wider war-preparation operation. Arms procurement is a natural by-product of human conflict: When confronted with a threat, people tend to seek to protect themselves by amassing weaponry, from spears and arrows in ancient times to nuclear technology today.

Throughout history, all governments have been involved in some way or another in arms-procurement processes, whether through domestic production of weaponry or acquisition from abroad. The extent to which countries engage in arms procurement depends on many factors, such as threat perceptions, national security doctrines, historical precedents, financial prowess, domestic stability, technological development, and domestic policies. In addition, major world events, such as the two world wars, the Cold War, and the September 11 terrorist attacks, greatly influence the manner in which the world's states conceive of and execute the production and acquisition of weaponry.

THE COLD WAR

The Cold War was responsible for perhaps the most intense arms race in history. Both sides—the Eastern bloc, led by the Soviet Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), led by the United States—continuously sought to acquire sophisticated weaponry that would allow them to protect their territories and exert influence on the world stage.

Within this overarching Cold War, smaller "hot" conflicts were frequently fought between rival countries and military organizations in Asia and Africa. Each of these contenders also sought to acquire the arms it needed to protect its interests. Often, these rivals aligned themselves ideologically with either the Soviet Union or the United States, simply to establish arms-procurement links with the superpowers. As a result, during the Cold War, most of the world's countries became more militarized than ever, and the weapons industry developed at an extremely rapid pace.

The thousands of nuclear missiles that the United States and the Soviet Union built to deter each other during the Cold War cost both nations trillions of dollars. As much as half of the Soviet Union's gross domestic product (GDP) was spent on defense, ultimately provoking an implosion of the communist regime. More than a decade after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia and the United States (as well as other countries) continue to spend billions of dollars simply securing, maintaining, or destroying parts of the nuclear arsenal built during the Cold War.

REORGANIZATION

The end of the Cold War drastically changed the international defense climate and, with it, the arms-procurement processes undertaken by most of the world's countries. Both the international supply of and demand for weapon systems were affected by the political transformations to which the fall of the Soviet Union gave rise.

For one, the end of the dizzying arms race between Russia and the United States resulted in governments devoting less funds to the research and development operations of the military industry. This, in turn, triggered a decrease in the production of weapons by these states. On the other hand, the administrative and political chaos that engulfed the former Soviet Union after 1992 allowed numerous enterprisers to commercialize parts of the immense military arsenal deposited throughout that country. As a result, many Soviet weapon systems (from simple rifles to complex missile technology) found their way to countries with aspirations of becoming military superpowers.

The demand part of the arms-procurement process also witnessed a series of fluctuations. Although the countries of the former Eastern bloc and NATO made significant cuts in their defense budgets (in the United States, for example, defense spending fell from 6.5% of GDP in 1985 to 5.3% in 1992), other countries (such as China and the Arab nations) saw an opportunity to

make their presence felt on the international stage and markedly increased their arms-acquisition efforts.

THE WAR ON TERRORISM

The current war on terrorism, undertaken by the United States and its allies as a result of the September 11 terrorist strikes, has reinvigorated the arms industry. Faced with the need to sustain extensive military operations in areas from Afghanistan and Iraq to Georgia and the Philippines, the United States has drastically increased its defense budget since the 1990s. In February 2005, President George W. Bush requested $419.3 billion from Congress for the Department of Defense. That sum represents an increase of approximately 5% over the 2004 budget and a 41% increase over the 2001 budget. The increased funding will contribute to the ongoing process of developing America's military capabilities.

A considerable portion of the proposed 2006 defense budget—$78 billion—is set aside for procurement purposes. According to the president's plan, that number is slated to increase every fiscal year until at least 2011. Arms procurement remains a thorny political issue, as various interest groups (including politicians, the military, the weapons industry, and human rights groups) disagree with regard to both the amount of money that should be spent on arms and the kinds of arms that need to be developed, produced, and purchased.

See also Arms Control; Arms Race; Cold War; National Power, Determinants of; Science; Technology and National Security; War Planning

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ARMS RACE

Competition for military superiority involving the development and stockpiling of weapons. There have been a number of arms races throughout history as technology has advanced and states have felt pressured to remain competitive with their adversaries. One of the primary causes of World War I was an arms race, or buildup of munitions, that took place among Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom during the decades leading up to the war. As a result of that arms race, Europe became a powder keg that required only a minor incident—the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo—to explode.

MOBILIZING FOR WORLD WAR I

The outbreak of World War I is a cautionary tale that illustrates the potentially disastrous outcome of an unchecked increase in munitions. The issue of mobilization, the rate at which states could actually prepare their militaries for combat, was also an important factor. Although speedier mobilization implies greater vigilance and preparedness, it also undermines possibilities for the peaceful resolution of misunderstandings.

Before World War I, the ability to move quickly in response to a perceived threat was considered vital, and states prepared elaborate plans to respond. Czar Nicholas II of Russia, defending Slavic nationalism in the face of Austrian demands on Serbia, decided on a partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary. However, the war plan developed by the Russian military was premised on a war with both Germany and Austria-Hungary. Afraid to deviate from the circumstances for which that had prepared, the Russians opted for full mobilization against both powers.

Meanwhile, Germany mobilized under the Schlieffen Plan, which envisioned a two-front war against Russia and France. Thus, according to plan, Germany responded to Russia's aggression by declaring war on France as well. In addition, part of the Schlieffen Plan involved marching through Belgium, and the subsequent violation of Belgian neutrality brought Great Britain into the war. The best-laid plans brought a disaster exacerbated by the arms race that had preceded it.

BEGINNING OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE

Though the arms race leading up to World War I serves as a prime example of how weapons help to create conflict, the nuclear arms race that began after World War II vividly demonstrates how weapons buildup may become self-rationalizing and self-perpetuating.

The arms race for nuclear weapons was structured by different arguments during different periods. Until the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union was based on the idea of *massive retaliation*, otherwise known as *nuclear utilization theory*. However, once it became conceivable that a nuclear arsenal could survive a first strike and still deliver a devastating counterstrike, the balance of power was maintained according to the doctrine of mutually assured destruction.

THE COLD WAR

Fears concerning a nuclear arms race date back to the end of the Manhattan Project in 1945. For several decades following the end of World War II, international relations were defined by the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Union was well behind the United States in developing nuclear weapons, the necessity of securing the Soviet Union against a first strike by the United States led to a massive buildup of nuclear arms by the 1950s.

The development of nuclear weapons had begun several decades earlier, however, with a series of technological advances directed toward implementing the energy produced by nuclear reactions for military purposes. The potentially destructive power of the atom was well known to both sides at the outbreak of World War II. In a sense, the first nuclear arms race took place between the Axis powers and the Allies as each side worked to perfect a nuclear device. The United States was finally successful after the defeat of Germany, and it dropped two atomic bombs on Japan to provoke surrender.

The use of nuclear weapons against Japan by the United States is the sole instance in which the power of the atom was unleashed for offensive purposes. Though the destruction of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains controversial, part of the motivation for dropping the bombs was probably to intimidate the Soviet Union. Perhaps the most important long-term outcome, then, was the impact of the atomic bomb on postwar relations between the two emerging superpowers.

The Soviet Union conducted its first successful test of a nuclear weapon in 1949. Both the United States and the Soviet Union produced fission bombs early in the arms race, but by the end of the 1950s, both sides had successfully developed a fusion device. Fission bombs, better known as atom bombs, derive their power from nuclear fission. Fusion bombs, better known as hydrogen bombs, are based on nuclear fusion. Modern nuclear arsenals combine both types of weapons.

During the early period of the arms race, the United States maintained a policy of massive retaliation, basing national defense on the nuclear arsenal. Recognizing the overwhelming numerical superiority of Soviet ground forces, this doctrine reflected the United States' willingness to use nuclear weapons if driven to do so by necessity.

Technological advances soon made the prospect of actually using nuclear weapons in a conflict less likely. Early nuclear weapons were so large and cumbersome that they could only be delivered by large bombers such as the B-52 Startofortress. By the middle of the 1950s, however, lighter and smaller weapons were being developed that could be transported by small fighter bombers. Missile technology, propelled by the space race, altered the dynamics of nuclear brinkmanship. Now a nuclear strike could be delivered from afar, and the question of mobilization became more immediate.

The advent of the nuclear submarine completely transformed the dynamics of nuclear warfare because it made weapons mobile. Thus, it created the possibility of a survivable nuclear force, able to deliver a strong counterattack to any nuclear launch by either side in the Cold War.

HOT POINTS
DURING THE COLD WAR

The development of the nuclear submarine not only provides an example of how the arms race was transformed by technological advancement, it also demonstrates how the competition for nuclear arms created pressures that, in themselves, could be reason for war.

The utility of the nuclear submarine was vividly demonstrated in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which was the closest the United States and the Soviet Union ever came to military confrontation in the history of the arms race. The incident was provoked by the Soviet Union's attempt to base nuclear weapons in Cuba, a response to the placement of missiles in Turkey by the United States.

The crisis demonstrated the quick timing in which events could play out in a nuclear war. Because the response to events was so potentially devastating for both the United States and the Soviet Union, the

Cuban Missile Crisis showed the mutual vulnerability of a nuclear standoff.

Though there were numerous points of tension between the two principal competitors in the arms race throughout the Cold War, the use of nuclear weapons was rarely an issue. In this sense, it could be argued that the development of massive nuclear arsenals actually had a deterrent effect, keeping conflicts such as the Berlin blockade, the Hungarian Revolution, or the crushing of the Prague Spring from escalating into confrontation.

THE MAD DOCTRINE

Because nuclear weapons are so devastating, the nuclear arms race was initially a matter of seeking to stockpile more weapons. Both sides soon possessed more than enough weapons to eliminate a potential enemy several times over, and the development of more efficient delivery systems caused a transformation of nuclear policy.

In response to the Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara formulated the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD). With this new doctrine, the point of the arms race became the maintenance of a "balance of terror" that would keep both sides from ever actually using their weapons. Deterrence was the operative concept.

The buildup of a credible system to deter nuclear attack began in the United States during the early 1960s with the development of a strategic triad consisting of bombers, nuclear submarines, and underground missile silos. Each part of the triad had its strengths and weaknesses, and the strategic flexibility of the triad made it easier to avoid conflict.

The bombers had a slower reaction time, which meant that they did not have to be committed irrevocably to an attack. Instead, they could be kept on quick alert prior to becoming airborne, providing a credible counterstrike threat in the aftermath of an attack. The submarine ballistic missile force was even less vulnerable to a first strike because it would be virtually impossible to destroy an entire fleet of nuclear-armed submarines on short notice. However, the maintenance of two-way communications without revealing the location of the submarine remained a problem. The land-based missile systems were the easiest to command and allowed for the greatest accuracy, but they were easily targetable and irretrievable after they were launched.

The necessary balance provided by mutually assured destruction was eventually upset by technological advances that had the potential to undermine an opponent's ability to retaliate. By the late 1960s, for example, both the United States and the Soviet Union were developing antiballistic missile systems that had the ability to destroy incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles. The development of such systems led to a series of peace agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, beginning with the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I) from 1969 to 1972.

PEACE AGREEMENTS

The SALT I negotiations took place in the context of lowered tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. This détente resulted from the intractability and cost of the Vietnam War on the part of the United States and from the concerns of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev over the expense of the arms race. Although SALT I focused on offensive nuclear weapons, SALT II (1972–1979) focused on the production of nuclear arms.

The progress of the SALT talks was followed by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), signed in 1991; START II (1993); and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996). Other important treaties meant to slow the stockpiling and development of nuclear weapons systems include the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, signed in 1972, and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987. Negotiations on nuclear weapons and weapons proliferation continued even in the aftermath of the Cold War with the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions of 2002 between the United States and Russia.

The development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) during the Reagan presidency raised the stakes of the arms race even further. The system, known as Star Wars, was to be designed as a deterrent to nuclear attack, and the technology developed in creating Star Wars was to be shared with the Soviet Union as a ploy to negating a preemptive strike. The SDI initiative, however, was concurrent with attempts by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to fundamentally reform the Soviet system, an effort that ultimately tore the Soviet Union apart. Many experts recognize that the pressures of the arms race were among the factors in the downfall of the Soviet Union and the ultimate failure of the communist system in Russia.

NUCLEAR ISSUES AFTER THE ARMS RACE

The Cold War ended the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, but it presented a host of new challenges. One of these was the problem of nuclear proliferation as the Russian Federation worked to account for an arsenal spread out across the former Soviet republics. The emergence of the United States as the sole remaining superpower has also shifted the focus of international concern away from the arms race and toward combating terrorism.

The use of nuclear weapons by a terrorist group is among the more nightmarish scenarios projected in the war on terrorism, which began after terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. Terrorists' use of a "dirty bomb," a weapon that would spread radioactive contamination after detonation, is a commonly stated fear of many Western leaders and experts.

The potential development of nuclear weapons by certain hostile states, such as North Korea and Iran, is also a matter of growing international concern. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was justified by the supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, by former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Although no such weapons turned up in the aftermath of the Iraq War, the fear of a terrorist nuclear attack remains.

—*William de Jong-Lambert*

See also Arms Control; Nuclear Proliferation; Terrorism, War on International; Weapons of Mass Destruction

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ARMS TRADING

The global buying and selling of military and defense equipment and services among countries, governments, private corporations, militant outfits, and other groups. Historically, nations have accepted international arms trading as legitimate and necessary for the maintenance of national security. Because of its intimate relationship with national security, arms trading has always received unique treatment compared to trade in other commodities.

The international arms-trading system has passed through four broad phases from the end of World War I to the breakup of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War. Each era was marked by changes in the availability of arms, major suppliers and purchasers, methods of financing the arms trade, and the level of effort devoted to limiting or regulating the trade.

THE POST–WORLD WAR I ERA (1920–45)

The issue of arms trade as a global phenomenon first received widespread notice after the start of World War I. During this era, the acquisition of arms was thought to be directly linked to negative political consequences and the outbreak of conflict. This era, also known as the "merchants of death" era, lacked any controls on private arms manufacturers that exported their wares without considering the economic, political, and military effects of their actions.

During these years, the arms trade was driven by market economics; private arms firms and their subsidiaries dominated the system. This was a period of rapid technological change in which Western Europe and the United States were the world's dominant arms suppliers. Large arms firms typically granted licenses to smaller manufacturers, which in effect paid for the right to produce the arms locally. Attempts at disarmament during this era were visible but ineffective.

THE POST–WORLD WAR II ERA (1946–66)

With the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, arms trading became linked to the political and ideological struggle between capitalism and communism. National governments—primarily the United States and the Soviet Union—became the world's largest suppliers. The main purchasers of arms were newly independent nations and pre–World War II powers who were rebuilding their military capabilities. The United States and Soviet Union supplied these nations with large quantities of armaments in the form of direct military aid. In fact, grant aid became the predominant mode of payment for arms at this time. Military aid helped to cement political relationships between the superpowers and their allies.

Significant control of arms exports existed at the unilateral or national level during this time, but there were still no effective multilateral or international systems in place to prohibit or limit arms transfer.

EXPANSION PHASE (1966–80)

By the 1980s, a slight decrease in the intensity of the U.S.–Soviet rivalry opened the way for smaller countries to increase their share of the arms market. Decolonization in Africa and Asia and the rise of oil states in the Middle East provided more customers for arms traders. The acquisition of arms during this period was often a matter of political prestige. Many newly formed countries considered a potent military to be a sign of their legitimacy. This meant that the threat of armed conflict was no longer a prerequisite for receiving or exporting modern military equipment.

The increased cost of advanced military technology created additional incentives to export munitions. Arms transfers increased 400% during this period, and the ratio of exports to production increased drastically. The principal suppliers remained national governments, but multinational corporations and multinational production began to emerge at this time. Cash and credit became the dominant mode of payment, although third-world recipients usually licensed the production of arms from manufacturers. Finally, the negative effects of the arms trade became apparent as the trade expanded and the politics surrounding it became increasingly complex. For example, many recipients resisted the notion of any multilateral control, viewing it as a major threat to maintaining their national security. Arms embargoes were attempted during this period to prevent the flow of munitions, but they proved ineffective as a means of multilateral control.

ERA OF DECLINING BIPOLAR TRADE (1980–92)

The 1980s witnessed a decline in the scope of the arms trade to levels similar to those of the 1970s. This occurred partly as a result of a steady easing of U.S.–Soviet tensions during the period of détente. The list of main arms suppliers expanded to include major Western European powers. Their primary customers were third-world nations involved in regional conflicts, most in the Middle East. Second-tier suppliers providing low- to mid-level technology armaments also appeared during this time. Private and multinational firms became major actors in the system, making the arms trade more commercial and leading to more creative forms of financing. Illegal arms traders reentered the international system, and unilateral and multilateral arms trade control measures continued to be difficult to achieve.

RECENT TRENDS AND OFFSETS

Since the early 1990s, the value of global arms trading in military goods and services has declined dramatically. Between 1991 and 1995, the annual value of the arms trade averaged less than half of its 1985 value. Although the total value of the arms trade rose slightly in the mid-1990s, it was still far smaller than in the previous decade.

The end of the Cold War was a major reason for the drastic contraction in arms sales. However, the end of the Cold War also reduced the political presence of the superpowers in many countries, allowing regional and civil tensions to surface more readily. These tensions frequently evolved into active conflicts. Thus, although the trade in large weapons declined during the 1990s, trade in small arms and light weapons rose.

Economic motivations behind the arms trade have become all important, and the arms market has developed into a bazaar with a variety of more advanced weapons available to anyone who can pay. The black market in arms trading also continues to grow in importance. Nevertheless, a very small number of countries still account for a majority of global arms sales. At the end of the 1990s, the United States accounted for almost half of the worldwide exports in arms. Between 1991 and 1995, six countries—the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and China—made up 86% of the arms deliveries to the world.

One of the most important recent developments in the arms trade has been the increasing use of *offsets* as an integral part of arms-transfer arrangements. Offsets are arrangements that either reduce the amount of currency needed to buy arms or provide some way of creating revenue to help pay for them. Offsets may take several forms. The supplier may coproduce, subcontract, or license all or part of the weapons system in the recipient country. This means creating jobs in the recipient country that in earlier times would have stayed in the supplier country. Increasingly, offsets involve transfers of technology that aid industrial development in the recipient country. Offsets may also

involve the extensive use of an instrument known as *countertrade*, in which the supplier agrees to market goods produced in the recipient country in exchange for the purchase of military equipment.

The complexity of today's international arms trade points out the urgent need for an international or multilateral arms control mechanism. The task is enormously complex because it requires addressing all of the elements of world politics at the same time—national ambitions and insecurities, intrastate conflict resulting from religious and ethnic motivations, regional alliances, and international economic competitiveness. However, history is filled with examples in which every party involved in the arms trade cycle has been hurt directly or indirectly. Thus, it is vital that arms suppliers and recipients commit themselves to reducing the buildup, export, and transfer of arms.

See also Arms Control; Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Arms Race

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ARTILLERY

A group of weapons and weapon platforms designed to attack enemy forces from a distance. Modern artillery is designated to be an indirect weapon system, meaning that it does not need to see the target at which it is firing.

Artillery has long been a component of ground forces and often has been decisive in battle. The earliest forms of artillery were siege machines such as the catapult and trebuchet, which hurled stones at targets over great distances. The use of such weapons dates back more than 2,000 years to the days of the Roman Empire. The advent of gunpowder, however, provided the impetus for the development of modern artillery. Early gunpowder artillery was crude and limited in range, but steady improvements in military technology have dramatically increased its effectiveness. Artillery eventually earned the title "King of Battle," and over time it has accounted for more battlefield deaths than any other type of weapon.

Shooting artillery involves many elements, including calculating firing data, observing and adjusting fire, and firing the guns, howitzers, or missiles. Firing data take into account factors such as the rotation of the earth, weather conditions (including atmospheric pressure), the elevation of both the weapon and the target, and the range to target. It also involves determining the right type of charge or explosive, the right type of explosive shell, and the proper fuse for the explosive and the selected target.

Artillery systems are generally composed of three parts: forward observers, fire direction and operational centers, and howitzer or missile systems. Forward observers (also called forward observation assets or fire support teams) are responsible for locating targets and adjusting fire to the target. Targeting often also includes the use of target-locating radars. Fire direction and operational centers make the technical and tactical decisions about firing, such as determining which targets should receive highest priority, while the howitzer or missile systems deliver the firepower requested by forward observers and approved by fire direction centers.

Modern artillery platforms are classified as either howitzers or missiles. U.S. Army howitzers include towed artillery such as the M119A2 105mm weapon and the M198 155mm weapon. The former has a range of approximately 12 km, whereas the latter can reach targets 30 km away using rocket-assisted projectiles. Lighter howitzers are transportable by motorized vehicles, armored vehicles, helicopters, and military transport aircraft. The Army also deploys self-propelled artillery such as the 155mm M109A6 Paladin, which has a range of 22 km (30 km with rocket-assisted projectiles).

Missile systems used by the Army include the M270A1 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and the ATACMS missile system. The MLRS missiles carry dual-purpose warheads and have a range of 31 km, and ATACMS can strike targets as far away as

165 km. Planned technological improvements to the ATACMS system will extend its range to as much as 400 km. More advanced warheads are also being developed for both MLRS and ATACMS.

A unique feature of artillery is its all-weather, 24-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week capability to provide "steel on target." Bad weather may ground all forms of aircraft and helicopter, but artillery is unaffected by rain, sleet, snow, or storms. Artillery has also proven itself to be an all-terrain weapon, used not only in the deserts of Kuwait and Iraq but also in the mountains of Afghanistan and Korea, the jungles of Vietnam and Panama, and the islands of Grenada and Haiti. Artillery also allows for the engagement of targets far beyond the immediate range of ground forces. With increased advances in targeting—such as laser-guided munitions and miniaturized computer-guidance systems—that capability is likely to increase and remain relevant.

As an effective method for delivering firepower at a distance, artillery has withstood the test of time despite constant changes in military technology. Because of its unique advantages and capabilities, it is likely to be a critical element of the combined arms teams of ground forces in most nations for the foreseeable future.

See also Missiles; Mortar

ASEAN (ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS)

Organization of 10 Southeast Asian nations designed to sustain regional stability and encourage economic cooperation among its members. In September 1963, Great Britain gave independence to its colonial territories in Southeast Asia. After the British withdrawal, these territories were incorporated as the new nation of Malaysia.

The presence of a new, large nation in the region destabilized the area and threatened the military dominance of Indonesia, the region's most powerful nation. In response, Indonesia's leader, Sukarno, launched a policy of regional disruption known as *Konfrontasi*. Under this policy, Indonesia supported rebel groups within Malaysia and tried to suffocate Malaysia's economy by blocking imports to that nation and forcefully persuading other Southeast Asian nations to refuse Malaysian exports.

FORMATION OF ASEAN

The policy of Konfrontasi, however, severely disrupted Indonesia's economy and caused public unrest. In 1967, a military coup overthrew Sukarno, and General Suharto replaced him as Indonesia's leader. Suharto renounced Konfrontasi and advocated the creation of a regional organization to peacefully resolve the tensions among Southeast Asian nations. Consequently, on August 8, 1967, representatives of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines met in Bangkok and formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Bangkok Declaration that formed ASEAN expressed two goals for the organization: to ensure stability in the region and to foster economic cooperation among member nations. To increase their security, the ASEAN nations decided to advance a collective stand against communism. First, all the countries worked to improve employment and public services within their individual economies, thereby diminishing the major societal problems that turned impoverished, disgruntled citizens into communist insurgents. Second, the nations agreed to strengthen their diplomatic relations and to share military intelligence with one another to prevent the spread of communism. Finally, the ASEAN members attempted to isolate themselves from the external pressures of the Cold War.

This last resolution proved to be the most contentious. Indonesia wanted to eventually expel all foreign military powers from the ASEAN nations. However, Thailand and the Philippines were also members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and both nations housed large American military bases. Eventually, the ASEAN nations agreed to designate all foreign military bases as temporary. No time limit was specified in the Bangkok Declaration for the removal of these bases, and it was understood that Thailand and the Philippines could maintain the American bases as long as they desired.

REASSERTING CLOSE TIES

As the Vietnam War intensified and spilled into Laos and Cambodia, the ASEAN members found themselves increasingly drawn into the conflict. In November 1971, therefore, the foreign ministers from all ASEAN nations gathered in the Malaysian city of Kuala Lumpur and crafted the Declaration on a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). This

declaration reasserted the close relationship among ASEAN members first described in the Bangkok Declaration and announced that the member nations would work to prevent the interference of any outside powers in their affairs.

Like the Bangkok Declaration, however, ZOPFAN offered only an ideal. Although it claimed that the ASEAN nations would cooperate to form a zone of peace, the declaration failed to specify how such a zone would be implemented. Once again, Thailand and the Philippines refused to expel the growing number of U.S. forces that were stationed in their nations because, realistically, these forces provided much more security for their host nations than any measures that ASEAN could enact.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Economic cooperation among the ASEAN nations was also mostly superficial. Trade polices were based on the Indonesian traditions of *musjawarah* and *mufukat*. Under the philosophy of musjawarah, the leading member of any group refuses to command other group participants; instead, the leader makes suggestions and attempts to build a consensus among the fellow members. When a consensus is reached, a state of mufukat is achieved in which calmness prevails within the group. However, in their trade relations, the ASEAN nations commonly achieved mufukat by avoiding the most contentious issues.

An attempt to strengthen economic ties among the ASEAN nations was made at the Bali Conference in 1976. At this conference, the members issued the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. The declaration announced that member nations would increase the trade of basic commodities, including food products. It also said that members would create multinational industrial projects, such as energy plants, that could serve more than one nation. The ASEAN members also agreed to sharply reduce tariffs among themselves and to adopt a common trade policy toward nonmember nations.

Like ASEAN's earlier goals, however, these remained largely unfulfilled. Tariffs were reduced, but only on products that played, at best, marginal roles in the member nations' economies. For instance, tariffs on the importation of snowmobiles were eliminated, hardly a prevalent product in the tropical climate of Southeast Asia. The tariffs on many agricultural products were reduced, but many of these products were not even grown in the member nations. Several large industrial projects were started, but funding for them expired, and they were never completed.

Economic cooperation among ASEAN nations during the 1970s and 1980s was not greater because the member nations individually profited from large influxes of foreign capital during this period. Until the United States disengaged from Vietnam, it flooded the noncommunist Southeast Asian nations with huge amounts of foreign aid to help them withstand communist insurgencies within their borders. Then, during the 1980s, Japan purchased the raw materials needed to fuel its booming economy from many of the ASEAN nations. Again, ASEAN members were not forced to cooperate more closely with one another.

TOWARD THE FUTURE

When civil war erupted in Cambodia during the late 1980s, ASEAN finally assumed a significant role in Southeast Asia. Acting as a unified group, diplomats from the ASEAN nations, aware that the civil war threatened the region's stability, led the negotiations between the opposing parties. After this successful intervention, the ASEAN nations realized they could no longer isolate themselves from the rest of Southeast Asia. In 1995, the association retreated from its anticommunist origins and invited Vietnam to join its ranks. After Vietnam's smooth integration into ASEAN, the association willingly added Laos, Myanmar, and, finally, Cambodia.

The expansion of ASEAN made it a much more active organization. When members meet now, they often address issues that formerly were ignored, such as women's rights, AIDS prevention, drug abuse, and education. In 1992, ASEAN finally enacted a substantial plan for economic cooperation. The following year, in 1993, a free trade zone for all nonagricultural products was established for a 15-year period. Greater economic cooperation also allowed the member nations of ASEAN to weather the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s.

Although the ASEAN nations still frequently retreat from issues on which they do not universally agree, the organization has clearly provided an arena in which the nations can easily communicate with one another. More important, the expansion of ASEAN and the creation of a free trade zone has given its members a collective, international influence that they would lack as individual nations.

See also Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.S.–Philippine Alliance; U.S.–Thailand Alliance; Vietnam War

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ASSASSINATION, U.S. EXECUTIVE ORDER AGAINST

Executive order originally issued in 1976 by President Gerald Ford to outlaw political assassination following allegations revealing that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had made attempts to assassinate Cuban president Fidel Castro. Ford's executive order was the first of a series of three executive orders that included assassination bans. In 1978, President Jimmy Carter included the ban in an executive order issued to reshape the U.S. intelligence structure. In 1981, President Ronald Reagan reiterated the assassination prohibition, which remains in effect today. The president may modify or rescind the assassination ban by executive order. Congress also may legislate to modify or repeal it.

The first prohibition—executive order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 19, 1976—prohibited any member of the U.S. government from engaging or conspiring to engage in any political assassination anywhere in the world. This ban was superseded by executive order 12036, issued by President Jimmy Carter on January 26, 1978. Section 2-305 of that order stated that "[n]o person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination." The order thus expanded the ban to include not only individuals employed directly by the U.S. government but also any individuals acting on the behalf of the government. President Reagan's executive order 12333, issued on December 4, 1981, reiterated the ban using the same language as the Carter order. Reagan was the last president to address the topic of political assassination.

None of the presidential executive orders define the term "assassination." In general, an assassination is the intentional killing of a targeted individual for political purposes. It is worth noting that only the Ford order referred to "political assassination," whereas Carter and Reagan used the term "assassination" only.

It is unclear whether this change in language indicated any change in the scope of the ban.

The scope of the term "assassination" is the subject of differing interpretations and depends on whether the killing takes place during a time of war or peace. For example, in his Special Message to the Congress, delivered on February 18, 1976, which accompanied the executive order, President Ford indicated that he would "support legislation making it a crime to assassinate or attempt or conspire to assassinate a foreign official in peacetime."

However, the ban did not prevent the Reagan administration from bombing the house of Libyan leader Mu'ammar Gadhafi in 1986 in retaliation for a bombing attack at a Berlin discotheque in April 1986. Moreover, in 1998, President Bill Clinton ordered the firing of cruise missiles at training camps in Afghanistan after the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa.

Three days after the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress passed joint resolutions authorizing the president to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001." Although there was no explicit reference to the assassination ban, the breadth of the joint resolutions could be sufficient to authorize actions that otherwise would be prohibited under the executive orders banning assassination.

See also Carter, Jimmy, and National Policy; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Espionage; Ford, Gerald R., and National Policy; Reagan, Ronald, and National Policy; Terrorism, War on International

ASSAULT RIFLES

Military rifles capable of controlled, fully automatic operation, employed to provide fire support at ranges up to 200 yards by ordinary troops. Assault rifles are not to be confused with assault weapons, which include various types of pistols, rifles, and shotguns. Most assault rifles share common features: They are lightweight, possess selectable fire rates, have large, removable magazines, and have simplified operation.

Features of the modern assault rifle began to appear in armaments at the end of the 19th century. Self-loading rifles were developed at that time, and in

1905, the Italian Cei-Rigotti rifle featured selective fire rates for a 6.5mm medium-power cartridge. The Russian Federov Avtomat, a rifle developed in 1916, met most of the specifications of the modern-day assault rifle, including selective fire, short recoil, and a 6.5mm round of intermediate power.

Despite such early developments, the concept of the assault rifle as a specialized weapon did not emerge until the 1930s. At that time, military leaders in Europe and the United States were searching for an infantry weapon of intermediate power and weight. They considered submachine guns too weak and limited in range, and rifles were too awkward to operate and recoiled too strongly in full automatic mode.

During World War II, the armies of the world went into battle with the precursors of modern-day assault rifles. These included the M1 and M2 carbines used by American troops and the Italian MAB 38 rifle, manufactured by Beretta. The German StG 44, which entered production in 1944, is considered the first modern assault rifle. This weapon met the German need for a gun more powerful than the submachine gun but smaller in size and with less recoil. The StG 44 performed well on the battlefield, but it did not prove to be a decisive factor in the war.

During the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact powers of Eastern Europe continued to develop assault rifles. Early examples included the British Enfield EM-2 and the U.S. M-14 rifle, which was used by many American troops in Vietnam. A major drawback of the M-14 was that its recoil was too powerful for effective fire at full automatic setting. As a result, the Army developed the AR-15 and its improved successor, the M-16. Designed by Eugene Stoner of the ArmaLite Company, these assault rifles incorporated elements of the StG 44, such as the carrying handle, and they fired a 5.56mm round. The Soviet counterpart of the M-16 was the Soviet AK-47, which was designed by Mikhail Kalashnikov in 1947 and entered into production in 1949. Firing a 7.62mm round, it is extremely rugged and easy to use yet has the drawback of a lower muzzle velocity than the M-16 because of its larger round.

Although modified over the years, both the M-16 and AK-47 continue to be the main assault rifle of their respective armed forces, and the weapons have served in military operations worldwide. The AK-47 in particular is also widely used by paramilitary, guerrilla, and terrorist groups because of its low cost, ruggedness, and ease of use. Other assault rifles in service today include the Israeli Galil, related in design to the AK-47, and the Swiss SIG 550.

To assess the future of assault rifles is to peer into the future of warfare itself. Modern militaries possess the means to eliminate adversaries from afar using cruise missiles and pilotless aircraft known as drones. Meanwhile, peacekeeping and nation-building missions have accelerated the development of new classes of nonlethal weapons for crowd-control purposes. These developments suggest a more limited role for assault rifles in the future. However, there likely will always be a need for soldiers on the ground, and for them, assault rifles will continue to serve as an effective and reliable means of defense.

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Military tactics used by a small force to target the specific weaknesses of a larger force. Asymmetric warfare includes actions such as sabotage, guerilla warfare, and attacks on civilian populations. It also involves studying an opponent's military doctrine—one's assumptions about war and how it should be fought—and adopting tactics that the doctrine does not anticipate. Using asymmetric warfare allows an attacker to inflict damage on a significantly stronger opponent. For this reason, it is a favored strategy of terrorist organizations and revolutionary groups that do not have the troops or equipment to take on a country's conventional armed forces.

Asymmetric warfare is not a recent development, according to Philip Wilkinson, professor of military history at King's College, London. Wilkinson points out that the English army used classic asymmetric warfare tactics in defeating the much more powerful French forces at the battle of Agincourt in 1415. The French possessed the world's finest cavalry, which was the medieval equivalent of today's main battle tank. The military tactics of the day featured a charge by mounted knights in armor to rout the opposing infantry. At Agincourt, the English had many fewer mounted knights than the French. However, their archers were equipped with longbows, which could penetrate steel plate armor at long ranges. As a result, when the French cavalry charged, the English archers devastated them from a distance. The smaller force of English knights then charged the weakened and confused French and routed them in one of history's most celebrated battles.

Perhaps the most dramatic recent example of asymmetric warfare was the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Using nothing more sophisticated than knives, a handful of individuals successfully seized several airliners and crashed one into the ground in Pennsylvania, missing its target of the White House, and others into buildings in New York and Washington, DC, killing and injuring thousands of civilians. The terrorists who conducted the attacks studied security procedures at airports to find weaknesses and to determine the best way to carry out the hijackings. They also chose a method of attack that was unexpected and difficult for conventional military forces to prevent.

A 1998 report by the Emergency Response and Research Institute (ERRI), "Asymmetric Warfare, the Evolution and Devolution of Terrorism; The Coming Challenge for Emergency and National Security Forces," argues that most of the conflicts the United States will face in the near future will be asymmetric. The report expresses particular concern about the possibility of cyberattacks against the computer infrastructure of the United States. The U.S. government and military depend heavily on computerized information-processing and battlefield-management systems to give them a technological edge in combating opponents. Attacks on the computers and support structures (such as phone lines) that control these systems could seriously impair the ability of the United States to respond to national security threats.

The ERRI report offered several recommendations for responding to the use of asymmetric warfare. It urged that U.S. military doctrine, which still focuses on preparing to fight conventional wars against other nations, be changed to recognize the greater threat posed by nonstate actors such as terrorist groups, armed independence movements, and violent drug cartels. Because few future conflicts will feature battles between large armies, the military should concentrate on forming small groups of highly trained and equipped units to monitor, infiltrate, and destroy terrorist groups. The report suggested that small, flexible forces such as these, operating within the groups they target, are much more effective than conventional military forces in combating asymmetric threats.

—John Haley

ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Alliance formed as a result of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949. The Atlantic Alliance provided the basis of what is now commonly referred to as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in the aftermath of World War II to form an alliance that would come into play only against armed attack. As stated in Article 5 of the treaty, such an attack "against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." However, due to the anti-imperialist position of the United States, attacks on colonies of member states would not qualify as an attack against a member state. The original purpose of the Atlantic Alliance has been described as a "program for keeping the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." On May 14, 1955, with the signing of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union formed its own alliance to counterbalance NATO.

There were 12 original signatories to the alliance treaty: the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal. In 1952, Greece and Turkey became members of the alliance, and West Germany joined in 1955. Later, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain would join NATO. As of 2005, there were 26 member countries in the alliance.

The NATO alliance comprises both political and military branches. The North Atlantic Council, which consists of high-level representatives of each country, heads the political side of NATO. At the head of this body is the secretary-general. The Defense Planning Committee (DPC) heads NATO's military structure. The DPC is made up of permanent representatives from all members of the alliance except France, which in 1966 chose to remove itself from the military arm of NATO. Additionally, each member country's defense ministers meet twice during the year. There are two Supreme Allied Commanders: the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, headquartered in Belgium, and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, headquartered in Virginia. The first person to hold the latter post was U.S. general Dwight D. Eisenhower. Alliance military forces remain under their respective country's control until otherwise assigned by the council.

The presence of a communist superpower defined NATO's role during the Cold War. Tasked with

protecting Europe from Soviet attack, NATO strategy evolved with changing military and political developments. At first, NATO relied on nuclear deterrence, but with the testing of the atomic bomb by the Soviets in August 1949 and the subsequent buildup of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, NATO lost its nuclear advantage. In 1957, NATO adopted a strategy of massive retaliation in the case of Soviet aggression. This later changed to a more flexible, graduated response instead of the limited option of massive retaliation.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War raised questions about the future of NATO in the new political environment. However, NATO soon proved that it still played a viable role in the post–Cold War era. This role was exemplified by NATO involvement in ending the conflict in Kosovo during the late 1990s. Clearly, one possible role for NATO in the future will focus on conflict resolution, humanitarian efforts, and regional security.

Responding to the changing world, NATO also has made an effort to open the door to new members, many of which are former communist states and Warsaw Pact members. The Partnership for Peace, begun in 1994, fosters a closer relationship with countries that are not NATO members but are working together with NATO to perform peacekeeping operations in places such as Bosnia. To respond in the new security environment, NATO has worked to create more flexibility in its command structure. This led to the creation of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), which decreases European states' reliance on U.S. military power. The NATO leaders also have focused on developing rapid deployment forces and moving away from more conventional forces.

Despite the many problems that the Atlantic Alliance faces, such as overcoming the separate interests of each of its members, it has lasted far longer than any other alliance in history, proving that it is capable of adapting to changing security environments. Even after the fall of the Soviet Union, it is clear there are still battles that NATO can fight and, with some adaptation, it can still play a role in ensuring the stability of the post–Cold War environment.

See also Cold War; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Warsaw Pact

ATLANTIC CHARTER

Joint declaration issued by British prime minister Winston Churchill and U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt on August 9, 1941, setting out a set of common principles directed against Nazi aggression and aimed at creating a better future for the world. Because Roosevelt had been a member of the presidential administration of Woodrow Wilson, many observers considered the Atlantic Charter to be Roosevelt's version of the Fourteen Points, a doctrine put forward by Wilson to promote international peace.

In August 1941, Churchill and Roosevelt convened a meeting aboard the U.S. naval cruiser *August*, anchored off the coast of Newfoundland. The declaration set out two main goals: the destruction of Nazism and the subsequent establishment of a "one world" system in which nations would work to disarm themselves and move toward a peaceful society. At the time of the meeting, the United States had not entered into World War II; it would not do so until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Roosevelt nevertheless issued the joint statement to demonstrate U.S. solidarity with its ally Great Britain and to appeal to the American public for greater support for the war through idealistic and purposeful language.

The Atlantic Charter was intended to garner broad international support for the fight against Nazism, but the Soviet Union ultimately refused to sign because of differences over specific language in the charter. Despite this setback, the charter served as a guiding document for the Allies' grand strategy during and immediately following World War II.

See also Roosevelt, Franklin D., and National Policy; World War II

ATOMIC BOMB

Powerful weapon of mass destruction that harnesses the energy created by nuclear fission (the splitting of the nucleus of an atom). The result creates an explosion of tremendous force.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE BOMB

In December 1938, German physicist Otto Hahn became the first person to perfect the process of nuclear fission. In his experiments, Hahn bombarded uranium atoms with slow-moving neutrons, causing the uranium nuclei to split in two and release more neutrons. Physicists later discovered that the fission of one atom could cause a chain reaction by triggering the fission of surrounding atoms.

Pioneering theoretical physicists such as Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, and Robert Oppenheimer realized the enormous possibilities of this research and quickly alerted the British and American governments to the German discoveries. These physicists were aware that the fission of a single atom releases a million times more energy per pound than dynamite. A country that is able to harness such energy could produce an unimaginably powerful weapon. Many of these scientists were also European refugees who had fled to the United States because of the anti-Semitic policies of Nazi Germany. Terrified of the prospect of the Nazis possessing a workable atomic bomb, they were determined to develop one first.

By 1941, with Great Britain struggling to fight off the Nazis and prospects for Allied victory dim, the development and production of the atomic bomb was turned over to the Americans. President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved a feasibility study in October 1941, and the project to build the bomb—code-named the Manhattan Project—was finally launched in December of that year. The scientists of the Manhattan Project developed a highly enriched form of uranium called U-235 for use in a working nuclear bomb. They also tested predictions about the capabilities of the newly discovered element plutonium for use in an atomic bomb.

USE OF THE BOMB

The motivation behind the American and British work on the atomic bomb was to develop it before the Nazis did, and they succeeded. In the end, however, Germany surrendered before the Allies had successfully tested their nuclear device. That first test, code-named Trinity, took place in the New Mexico desert on July 16, 1945. Originally designed for use against Germany, the bomb was ultimately used against the Japanese.

The first atomic weapon ever used against a live target was the enriched-uranium bomb named "Little Boy." It was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6, 1945, from a B-29 bomber named *Enola Gay*. The second (and, so far, last) atomic bomb dropped in anger was "Fat Man," which used enriched plutonium as its power source. Three days after Little Boy destroyed Hiroshima, the bomber *Bock's Car* delivered Fat Man to the city of Nagasaki. Each atomic explosion incinerated everything within a half-mile radius, caused fires to break out in the area immediately outside that zone, and created radioactive rainfall. Together, the bombs

killed about 150,000 people immediately, and many thousands more died of wounds and radiation sickness in the following weeks and months. The second atomic attack convinced the reluctant Japanese army to surrender, bringing an end to World War II.

Although the atomic bomb ended World War II, it did not, as the scientists who created it had hoped, demonstrate the necessity for an end to all war. Instead, the dawn of the nuclear era created new rules in warfare. Although firebombing (the most deadly form of combat prior to the atomic bomb) had been used extensively against civilians during World War II, never before had a single weapon killed hundreds of thousands of people at once. The United States had unleashed an unheard-of destructive force that made it the most powerful nation in the world and caused its friends, rivals, and enemies to recalculate the possibilities for future relations.

THE COLD WAR AND THE BOMB

The atomic bomb also created new kinds of conflict with a new level of consequences—the potential destruction of all or part of a civilization. This understanding shaped the Cold War that immediately followed World War II. The development of the atomic bomb also helped to spur an arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, the sole remaining superpowers after the war. America continued to refine its nuclear technology, and the Soviets finally acquired the bomb in August 1949.

The development of the Soviet bomb changed the rules of international conflict yet again. All countries, whether allies or enemies of one of the superpowers, were now indirectly threatened with annihilation, although none more so than the superpowers themselves. This realization led to the development of the principle of *mutually assured destruction* (MAD). This principle stated that if one superpower attacked the other, the second country would immediately launch a devastating counterattack. During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the two superpowers came dangerously close to fulfilling the doctrine of MAD. This close call affirmed the atomic bomb's position as the ultimate weapon of deterrence.

In an attempt to slow the arms race during the 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union entered into the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I and II). These bilateral talks produced agreements that set limits on the manufacture of atomic weapons. During

the 1980s, the concept of a "nuclear freeze"—mutual cessation of atomic bomb production—became popular among antiwar advocates in the United States. President Ronald Reagan, however, initially favored developing the capability to intercept nuclear attacks through the Strategic Defense Initiative, also known as Star Wars. Later, however, Reagan participated in arms limitation discussions such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START I and II).

THE BOMB IN THE POST–COLD WAR ERA

Today, the United States and Russia are two of nine countries that admit to possessing nuclear weapons. The other declared nuclear powers include Great Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, and, most recently, North Korea. Israel, although it admits to possessing nuclear weapons, refuses to declare itself a nuclear power. Iran and Libya are also widely suspected of seeking nuclear capacity.

By contrast, some countries have actually given away their nuclear arsenals. For example, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan all rid themselves of their warheads after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. South Africa also developed nuclear weapons but later voluntarily relinquished them and signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The renunciation of nuclear arms arises partly from practical considerations and partly from doubts about the morality of using the bomb that began to surface immediately after the attack on Hiroshima. From a practical standpoint, nuclear weapons are expensive to maintain, and aging warheads pose a potential hazard for countries that do not have the ability to maintain them properly. The United States addressed such concerns after the fall of the Soviet Union by offering financial incentives for former Soviet republics to dismantle their nuclear arsenals.

Moral reservations about the atomic bomb grew out of President Truman's controversial decision to use the bomb against Japan. That decision has been criticized both on its own merits and in light of the implications it raised for future warfare. Some people praised Truman's decision because it ended the war quickly and prevented a land invasion that many military experts estimated would have cost more than one million American and Japanese lives. Others criticized Truman for taking civilian lives rather than selecting a purely military target. People still debate the ethical value of using a weapon that can not only kill tens or hundreds of thousands instantly but also harm the next generation by causing radioactivity-related birth defects. These debates are likely to continue as long as nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the world's military.

See also Cold War; Cuban Missile Crisis; Manhattan Project; Mutually Assured Destruction; Nuclear Deterrence; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Nuclear Weapons; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT); Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

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ATOMS FOR PEACE

Plan enunciated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in a speech to the United Nations that proposed a framework for putting atomic energy to peaceful uses. On December 8, 1953, Eisenhower presented his "Atoms for Peace" speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York City. Delivered at the dawn of the Cold War, at a time when both the United States and the Soviet Union were drastically improving their nuclear weapons technology, the speech is considered Eisenhower's attempt to slow down the pace of the escalation of nuclear arms.

From the time the United States first tested an atomic weapon to his election as president in 1952, Eisenhower became increasingly concerned about the rapid rate at which nuclear weapons technology was advancing. Furthermore, the arms race drove the United States and Soviet Union to design even more explosive weapons than before, including a U.S. program to develop a hydrogen bomb, which was successfully detonated in November 1952.

Within the climate of this ongoing arms race, President Eisenhower looked to impede its rapid growth and pursue new ways to use nuclear energy. At the invitation of UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld, President Eisenhower traveled to New York City to address the United Nations. The president began his speech at the United Nations by

describing the remarkable speed with which atomic weapons had developed. He acknowledged, however, that the capability to build such weapons was not in the hands of a select few; rather, increasing numbers of nations, including the Soviet Union, were developing this technology.

Eisenhower cautioned that the abundance of nuclear weapons and their potential use would lead to devastating consequences for the world. Therefore, he proposed a set of initiatives to not only reduce the use of atomic technology for military purposes but also to engage that same technology in peaceful endeavors. Specifically, he proposed giving the world's scientists and engineers access to adequate amounts of fissionable material that they could use to study, research, and test to develop peaceful uses of this material.

To this end, Eisenhower recommended the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to oversee and regulate the use of this fissionable material. This agency would function under the auspices of the United Nations. Eisenhower envisioned that the IAEA would employ experts to apply atomic energy technology to fields such as agriculture and medicine. Furthermore, the IAEA would be responsible for the storage and protection of the fissionable material stockpile.

Today, the IAEA's mission continues to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Located in Vienna, Austria, the IAEA coordinates intergovernmental efforts to further scientific research to advance peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, the IAEA has taken on an additional function as well: monitoring and investigating member states for possible violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a treaty in which signatories agree to not pursue nuclear technology for military purposes but reserve the right to pursue nuclear programs for peaceful purposes. In conjunction with the United Nations, the IAEA inspects countries to ensure that they are fulfilling the mandate of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In addition to the IAEA, Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech also prompted the establishment of the domestic Atomic Energy Commission, which has a mandate to develop American atomic energy programs for peaceful purposes. One of the first initiatives of the Atomic Energy Commission was the development of a nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania. This plant was developed in part with private industry support to attract long-term private investment for civilian nuclear power. Through the continued work of the Atomic Energy Commission and private industry investment, the expansion of nuclear reactors in the United States increased significantly by 1962. Eisenhower's vision thus helped to refocus nuclear research, at least partly, on peaceful purposes that could benefit rather than harm humankind.

See also Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy; International Atomic Energy Agency; Nuclear Proliferation; United Nations

AUM SHINRIKYO

Doomsday Japanese cult infamous for its 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system. Led by a self-proclaimed messiah, at its height, Aum Shinrikyo boasted some 10,000 adherents, mostly Japanese and Russians, seeking salvation in the cult's combination of yoga, Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, and Christianity. The cult claims that an upcoming Armageddon will destroy the world, and the only people left unharmed will be Aum's members, who subsequently will form the basis of a new, enlightened civilization. Since the conviction of its founder in connection with the subway attack, the group has reorganized under a new name with a greatly reduced following.

In its heyday during the early 1990s, Aum was a highly complex enterprise with profitable businesses, considerable real estate holdings, chemical and biological laboratories, and even a political party of the same name. Following the Tokyo subway terrorist attack, which left 12 people dead, Aum Shinrikyo was officially disbanded and many of its leaders were convicted of murder.

Aum Shinrikyo was founded in 1985 by the charismatic, partially blind Asahara Shoko (born Chizuo Matsumoto). A student of acupuncture, yoga, and traditional Chinese medicine, Asahara built his movement with promises of mystical enlightenment, levitation, mind reading, and teleportation.

Following a trip to the Himalayan Mountains in 1987, Asahara began to claim his status as the reincarnated Jesus Christ, able to perform miracles and protect his followers from the imminent destruction of the world that he predicted was coming. Asahara's assorted systems of belief grew to include the prophecies of Nostradamus, selected Hindu deities, and Tibetan notions of reincarnation. "Aum" is a Sanskrit word that refers to the universal powers of destruction and creation, and "Shinrikyo" is Japanese for "teaching of the supreme truth."

Having expressed a desire to rule Japan as early as his childhood years, Asahara first attempted to gain power in 1990 by running for the Japanese Parliament. However, Japanese voters failed to take him or his fellow Aum candidates seriously, and the group was soundly defeated in the elections. That experience embittered Asahara, who subsequently modified his spiritual message from isolation and self-purification to deliverance of the world by any means necessary, including the annihilation of the cult's perceived enemies.

Aided by substantial financial resources and a large contingent of highly educated Japanese doctors, engineers, and scientists, Aum was able to build an array of chemical and biological facilities. In 1993, the cult began producing highly dangerous substances, including sarin gas, botulism toxin, and anthrax. After a number of apparently failed attempts to use chemical agents on targets, including judges' houses, the Japanese Diet (Parliament), and other government buildings, Asahara ordered his followers to mount a more complex terrorist attack.

During the morning rush hour of March 20, 1995, several members of Aum Shinrikyo boarded seven subway trains in Tokyo and used the sharpened tips of umbrellas to pierce plastic bags full of deadly sarin. Twelve people were killed and more than 5,000 were injured by the poisonous vapors. All seven trains were traveling toward Tokyo's center, carrying government workers whose annihilation seems to have been the purpose of the attack.

Hundreds of Aum members, including Asahara Shoko, were subsequently arrested and put on trial. The charges covered the subway assault as well as several other serious offenses, such as the newly revealed murders of dissident cult members and other enemies. In February 2004, Asahara Shoko was sentenced to death for ordering the subway attack.

Since Asahara's conviction, Aum Shinrikyo's members have regrouped under the name Aleph (meaning "to start anew"). Fumihiro Joyu, a senior leader of the group under Asahara, is the official head of Aleph. Upon reforming, the group announced a change in its beliefs, stating that it no longer followed Buddhist doctrines that were seen as justifying murder. The group also apologized to the victims of the sarin gas attack and established a fund to compensate them. Despite these moves, the Japanese government continues to monitor Aleph as a possible terrorist organization.

See also Anthrax; Chemical Weapons

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AUSTRALIA GROUP

Informal association of 34 nations that works to prevent the exportation of chemical and biological weapons and the materials used to produce them. In April 1984, many Western nations became increasingly alarmed by reports that Iraq was extensively using chemical weapons in its war with Iran. A special commission established by the UN secretary-general subsequently discovered that Iraq had purchased both the ingredients and the manufacturing equipment for its chemical weapons from corporations based in countries such as West Germany, Great Britain, France, and the United States.

The lack of uniform export controls among developed Western nations had quietly but steadily led to the proliferation of chemical weapons among less developed nations such as Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. Some nations, such as West Germany, possessed very soft export laws. West German corporations had served as Iraq's primary supplier because the West German government cursorily oversaw their shipments. But even nations that exercised much stricter export controls, such as the United States, had allowed chemical weapons components to be shipped to Iraq because of poor enforcement of existing laws, an insufficient number of customs inspectors, and confusion over the legality of shipping materials that could be used for alternative purposes such as agriculture.

In June 1985, therefore, Australia initiated a meeting among Western industrialized nations and proposed that these nations institute uniform export controls over the materials used to produce chemical weapons to stem their proliferation. At a meeting in Brussels at the Australian embassy, Australia, the 12 members of the European Community, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Norway, Austria, Switzerland, Finland, and the United States formed an unofficial organization known as the Australia Group. Although the members

were not bound by any international law, they agreed to share confidential information and improve their individual controls on chemical exports.

Initially, however, the members could not agree on which materials should be universally prohibited. The United States, for example, wanted to ban the exportation of eight key chemicals, whereas many of the European nations placed the limit at five. But in 1989, the group's members learned that Libya had constructed a major chemical plant at Rabta with the assistance of several German firms and supplies from other group members. Clearly, the Australia Group's efforts had not succeeded.

In response, the group devised an expanded list of chemicals that it would refuse to distribute. By 1990, the list included 14 core chemicals and 50 precursor chemicals that could be altered into weapons. The group also engaged in lengthy discussions with the newly liberated Eastern European nations, hoping to deter them from selling their chemical weapon stockpiles to stabilize their shaky economies. In 1992, the Australia Group agreed to control the export of biological agents that could be converted into biological weapons.

By 2004, the Australia Group had expanded to 34 members. Although the group retains its unofficial status, all members are required to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. By sharing intelligence and discussing how to institute multilateral export controls, the Australia Group has stunted the proliferation of chemical weapons.

The group's success, however, has been limited. The unofficial organization cannot levy sanctions or other punitive measures against nations that acquire chemical weapons or even against group members that choose to ignore the organization's controls. Additionally, many third-world nations, to boost their economies, have begun to supply the raw ingredients to nations seeking chemical weapons. Unfortunately, the Australia Group lacks the means to intercede in these transactions.

See also Biological Weapons and Warfare; Biological Weapons Convention; Chemical Weapons; Chemical Weapons Convention

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AUTARKY

Economic system instituted by the fascist regimes in Germany and Italy during the 1930s, which strove for national self-sufficiency. In 1933, the German economy languished in a severe depression. Inflation increased unchecked, and the rate of unemployment steadily increased. In an attempt to alleviate this depression, the Nazi regime installed Hjalmar Schacht as economics minister. Adolf Hitler, the Nazi leader at the time, instructed Schacht to pursue a policy known as *autarky*. Under this policy, the German economy would become as self-sufficient as possible.

Schacht did not believe that autarky would become Germany's permanent economic policy. Once the economy was stimulated, he believed that a system of open capitalism would be reinstated. Therefore, the government did not assume control of the nation's major industries but allowed them to operate freely within Germany. Instead, Schacht worked to limit foreign imports by erecting strict import controls. To compensate for the shortage of imports, the government established a private company that extended credit to German corporations. The government encouraged private corporations to focus on producing synthetic fuels, textiles, and raw metals. Schacht also urged changes in the public's consumption habits, recommending that personal income be spent only on necessities. To assist the unemployed, Schacht instituted price ceilings on agricultural products, but he also increased farm subsidies to protect farmers and their families.

At first, Schacht's policies strengthened the German economy. However, in 1934, Hitler made the momentous decision to rearm the German military. From that point forward, Hitler declared all major industries would work to rebuild the German war machine. Hitler's declaration caused great consternation across Europe. In October 1935, the League of Nations passed strict sanctions that virtually eliminated all trade with Germany. After these sanctions were enacted, autarky became a policy of total self-sufficiency.

In response to the sanctions, Hitler devised his Four-Year Plan in 1936. Under this plan, Germany would be completely self-sufficient and ready for war within four years. To advance his plan, Hitler solidified his alliance with Italy and its dictator, Benito Mussolini. Italy also had instituted economic autarky and had been punished with international sanctions.

After the Four-Year Plan was introduced, the Nazi government gradually assumed control of all major German industries. For example, when German steel producers complained about labor shortages and the low quality of their raw materials, the government seized the industry. Workers from other industries were forced to switch to steel production and the government-controlled steel factories used whatever materials were available. Under Nazi control, property rights were revoked, bank accounts were frozen so that capital could not be removed from the country, and all workers' rights were suspended.

Understandably, Hitler's policy of autarky was unsustainable. Living standards in Germany during World War II sank to sordid levels as all portions of the economy were channeled into the war effort. Ultimately, armed forces had to be withdrawn from the front to maintain Germany's faltering industries. Thus, autarky eventually crippled both the German military and German industry. Not surprisingly, when the new nation of West Germany was founded after the war, its government did not even consider a return to autarky.

See also Economic Sanctions; World War II

AWACS
See AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM

AXIS OF EVIL

Term used by President George W. Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address to describe the countries of Iran, North Korea, and Iraq. The president asserted that "states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger."

The term met with widespread international and domestic criticism. Critics asserted that the three countries mentioned by President Bush were not sufficiently linked to warrant the formation of an "axis"—a term that harks back to the Axis powers of World War II, which included Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and imperial Japan.

The administration defended the use of the term. On February 18, 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated on ABC's *This Week* program that Iran, Iraq, and North Korea warranted being called an axis because of certain similarities and links. She described these links as their opaque and repressive characteristics, harshness toward their people, and aggressive commitment to the acquirement of weapons of mass destruction.

See also Bush, George W., and National Policy; Terrorism, War on International

B

BA'ATH PARTY

Arab political party and movement that promotes a mixed ideology of Arabic unionism, anticolonial struggle, and socialism. The Ba'ath Party—*ba'ath* is Arabic for renaissance—currently dominates Syrian politics and was the most powerful party in Iraq until the 2003 overthrow of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, who was secretary-general of the Ba'ath Party in Iraq.

The constitution of the Ba'ath Party asserts that "the Arabs form one nation [which] has the natural right to live in a single state and to be free to direct its own destiny." The party maintains branches in some of the other Arab countries in the Middle East but does not wield much influence in their internal politics.

Since its inception in the early 1940s, Ba'ath Party ideology has rested on three principles: unity, freedom, and socialism. The first principle, unity, speaks to the party's desire to see the entire Arab community (22 countries currently comprising about 280 million people) come together in a united Arab state. The second principle, freedom, refers to the party's belief that Arabs cannot and should not be led or dominated by foreigners. The Ba'ath believe that "colonialism and all that goes with it is a criminal enterprise."

The third principle of Ba'ath ideology, socialism, refers to a general belief in social and economic equality rather than socialism in the conventional political and economic senses of the word. The party's founders rejected both Marxism and communism, the latter primarily due to its political monopolization by the Soviet Union. In recent years, Syria has taken active steps to stimulate private enterprise after decades of government monopoly of the country's key industries. Thus, the only remaining state led by the Ba'ath Party seems to be pushing socialism even further into the background.

The Ba'ath Party was founded by three French-educated Arab intellectuals in the early 1940s in the Syrian capital of Damascus. The party's pan-Arabic ideology began to spread outside of Syria after 1948, when the establishment of the state of Israel was attributed, in part, to the lack of Arab unity. In 1953, the Ba'ath Party merged with the Syrian Socialist Party to form the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party. This party became active in Iraq the following year, and, in 1968, it took over that country's government.

Under Saddam Hussein's dictatorship, Ba'ath Party membership reached an estimated 2.4 million Iraqis. However, its ranks were largely confined to Iraq's minority Sunni Muslim population. Wary of losing power to the majority Shi'a Muslims, Saddam used the Iraqi Ba'ath Party as an instrument of repression against his political opponents. Following the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Hussein's Ba'ath Party was outlawed by the victorious coalition and the party's former members were banned from all government and military positions. This latter policy was abandoned in April 2004 due to a dire necessity for skilled professionals.

The Ba'ath Party is presently the governing party of Syria, with an estimated membership of more than 1 million people in that country. The party's secretary-general, Bashar al-Assad, is also Syria's president. He remains firmly in control of Syria's internal and external politics. Among the most controversial of Assad's policies is Syria's military occupation and political

domination of its neighbor, Lebanon. The United States has named Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism and claims that Assad, in association with Iran, secretly funds the anti-Israeli terrorist group known as Hezbollah. The United States has also accused Syria of serving as a base for foreign terrorists supporting the postwar insurgency in Iraq. These many areas of contention have raised concerns about the possibility of war between the United States and the current Syrian government.

See also Arab-Israeli Conflict; Axis of Evil; Iraq War of 2003; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Terrorists, Islamic

BALANCE OF POWER

Political theory stating that, in the absence of a central authority, states will tend to form balanced networks or coalitions. As the fortunes of nations rise and fall, so do their international political and military influence. Such changes often upset the existing distribution of political power among states, making some relatively more powerful than before and rendering others weaker. The history of political relations between states is marked by a continuing concern to maintain a balance of power to prevent the rise of a single dominant state or coalition.

THEORY

Political theorists who subscribe to the principle known as realism endorse the view that survival has been the main concern of states or polities in any period in history. They further argue that states act rationally and will make sensible decisions that increase their chances of survival. The realist sees states operating in a system that lacks laws or norms to prevent states from attacking one another. Each state must fend for itself, without expecting assistance if it is attacked because all other states are quiet rivals if not active foes.

GREAT AND SMALL POWERS

If a state's capabilities are especially large compared to others, that state can be considered a great power. Such a power has the ability to threaten or conquer smaller, weaker states and take control over their resources. At a minimum, the strong state may exert an influence over the weaker state's behavior. If a state is not powerful, however, it needs to find a method to protect itself from threats by stronger powers. To do so, it may ally with another strong state or a larger coalition of smaller states, although both options have drawbacks. A strong ally may have the power to impose its will on its partners, or even turn against them. However, most small states have very limited armed forces capabilities, which could render even an alliance of many small powers militarily weak.

Great powers, however, have some capacity to defend themselves and to protect their interests. They rarely risk alliances with other strong states that might ultimately attack them or injure their interests. Those states with the most power will *necessarily* oppose one another because great powers are the only states that can pose significant threats to other great powers. Instead, great powers typically form alliances with smaller powers with which they share either mutual interests or a common foe. Thus, the balance among the leading powers directly touches many small powers as well. The nature of that power balance determines whether international relations will be characterized by conflict, cooperation, or détente.

Whether strong or weak, states are always concerned about their relative capabilities and position in the international system. States with roughly equal power positions are not concerned about their principal opponent acquiring a large number of weapons. They are, however, disturbed when an opponent obtains a greater number of weapons than the state possesses in its own arsenals. One state's gain is perceived by all the others as a loss.

Fundamentally, however, a balance of power is a safety mechanism. The Western European powers, in the 19th century in particular, believed that a proper balance of power provided stability and therefore security, and they promoted it actively. A balance of power raises the costs for an individual nation to act aggressively toward another because doing so risks retaliation by not only the target state but also its allies.

FORMS OF POLARITY

Political theorists characterize power balances as either bipolar or multipolar, depending on the number of centers of power that exist. Some scholars suggest that a type of unipolar balance exists when one state acts

as a hegemon and dictates the actions of all other states. Such a state, sometimes called a hyperpower, has the potential to keep smaller disputes in check by virtue of sheer force, and thus to provide worldwide stability. Most balance-of-power theorists reject this proposition, however. They argue that states tend to reject overt hegemony and, in such a case, would form an alliance against the hegemon to create a more equal balance of power.

Bipolarity is an international system in which there are two principal superpowers with approximately equal capabilities. In this system, the *only* significant threat to the power of one great power is the other. Thus, the two states will always be fearful of one another and will always be enemies. Bipolarity itself is a sufficient condition for an intense great power rivalry. Bipolarity characterized the period following World War II known as the Cold War, in which the United States and the Soviet Union formed two opposing centers of world power. Bipolar structures are sometimes seen as more stable than multipolar ones because the two dominant powers know that costly, devastating war could result from upsetting the delicate balance, and they will go to extraordinary lengths to prevent its outbreak. Bipolar rivals, however, often engage in arms races because each attempt to increase power on the part of one state will be matched by the other. The Cold War was characterized by a massive buildup of both conventional and nuclear arms on both sides to maintain the balance of power.

Multipolarity is a system in which there are three or more great powers with roughly equal capabilities. The goals of a state in a multipolar system are to maintain cordial, if wary, relations with the other great powers, while attempting to drive wedges between relations of the other powers and prevent those states from forming an overwhelming alliance against it. In a multipolar system, the number of powers can be more fluid and alliances are more prone to shifts. This means that great power rivalries are less likely to endure and arms races less likely to occur. Like bipolarity, multipolarity is thought to reduce the incidence of conflict by raising the costs of war—both sides know they are unlikely to prevail quickly and the possibility for a costly stalemate is high.

HISTORICAL BALANCES OF POWER

Balance of power has been a common model of international relations since ancient times. The city-states of Athens and Sparta formed a bipolar balance of power in Greece during the 400s and 300s BCE. During the early 19th century, England and Russia acted together to balance the ambitions of Napoleonic France. The century before Word War I was marked by shifting multipolar rivalries among Germany, France, England, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. In most cases, balance-of-power politics preserve peace for a time. Ultimately, however, one side feels itself at a disadvantage and seeks to regain the balance through military means.

The aftermath of most serious conflicts includes an effort to restore a workable balance of power among the remaining great powers. The Concert of Europe, created in 1815 following the Napoleonic Wars, served to reduce the severity of conflicts in Eastern Europe. After a dozen years of war in which France sought to dominate continental Europe, the defeat of Napoleon drove Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, France, and Austria to cooperate to reduce the probability of war among them in the future. The agreement worked partly because the two strongest remaining powers, Great Britain and Russia, were both engaged outside of continental Europe and lacked the resources to pursue aggression close to home.

World War I presents a classic example of how balance-of-power politics can set the stage for war. The rapid rise of Germany as a great power during the late 1800s was seen as a threat by many European states, particularly Germany's neighbor France. German industrial development and productivity caused its power to grow substantially relative to that of the other European powers. Furthermore, the multipolar system of the time featured an intricate system of alliances. Each state, striving to regulate its relations with potentially hostile neighbors, sought allies for mutual defense. These alliances meant that if one member of an alliance went to war, the rest were obligated to follow. When Austria attacked Serbia in 1914, Germany was obliged to declare war on Serbia as well. Serbia's ally Russia was then compelled to declare war on Austria and Germany. France had a separate alliance with Russia that now required her to declare war on Germany and Austria as well. The system of alliances meant to maintain peace by preserving the balance of power ended up dragging Europe into war.

Balances of power have sometimes been implemented preemptively. In the 19th century, for example, Russia cultivated relationships with the Balkan states, which were still under the rule of the

Turkish Ottoman Empire. The Russians sought to gain political influence in the region in the event that those states gained independence from the Ottomans. Balkan allies near the strategic waterway called the Dardanelles would be a valuable asset to the Russians. Russia had long sought control over the Dardanelles to gain access to the Mediterranean Sea. In response to these Russian moves, Britain and Austria rushed to support the declining Ottoman Empire. They specifically sought to protect the Dardanelles, which was vital to trade for both countries and a valuable strategic asset for the British Royal Navy.

MODERN BALANCES OF POWER

The classic example of the balance of power in modern times is the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lasted for more than 40 years. During that period, disintegrating postwar relations, mutual mistrust, strong ideological differences, and the enormous, roughly equal military capabilities of the two nations contributed to a tense, traditional, bipolar system. The Cold War featured an intense arms race, in which each side tried to build a nuclear arsenal and the capability to use the weapons against a distant enemy.

Both sides also actively tried to recruit, retain, and coerce allies for their camps. U.S.-led economic development in Western Europe after World War II brought those countries into its sphere of allies. Soviet threats or inducements brought the countries of Eastern Europe into its sphere. From the 1950s to the 1970s, the United States and Soviet Union carved out spheres of influence among the newly independent countries in Africa and Asia. Conflicts remained limited to small-scale wars outside of the homelands of each superpower: The Cold War was characterized by a high aversion to full-scale conflict. Instead of direct confrontations, the two major powers fought so-called proxy wars in which they faced one another's allies, or in which their allies fought one another. The Vietnam War, pitting U.S. and South Vietnamese forces against the Soviet-backed North Vietnamese, was the largest of the proxy wars fought during this period.

During the Cold War, foreign policy expert Henry Kissinger actively promoted the growth of a multipolar structure to advance U.S. interests. As national security advisor and later secretary of state under President Richard Nixon, Kissinger engaged in negotiations with both the Soviet Union and its off-and-on ally China. Although a communist state generally hostile to U.S. interests, China was also wary of Soviet power and eager to be recognized as a an equal with the two superpowers. Kissinger took advantage of the dissension between the two nations and attempted to forge positive U.S. relations with both countries. He was well aware that a Sino-Soviet alliance could prove very problematic for the United States, so he sought to drive a wedge between them.

More regionalized political balances of power exist that involve states who wield significant influence in a particular region of the world. Nuclear rivals India and Pakistan, for example, have carved out a highly charged, bipolar balance in South Asia. A U.S.-Israel alliance in the Middle East forms a political balance against neighboring Arab states hostile to Israel. Other balance-of-power arrangements are just forming. In Central Asia, newly independent states created by the fall of the Soviet Union are in the process of building political relations with Russia, China, and the United States that may alter the existing balance of power in that region.

In the modern era, international law, norms regarding the appropriate use of force, globalization and the intense trade that it brings, and regional security organizations have all contributed to diminishing interstate conflicts among the developed great power nations. Competition is increasingly economic rather than military in nature. To adjust to these new realities, nations have formed regional trade agreements that can help adjacent countries—often former rivals—balance economic might in other regions. The European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are examples of such organizations. Balance-of-power politics thus endures in the modern era, even if it finds different forms of expression than in the past.

See also Arms Race; Bipolarity; Cold War; Deterrence; Eastern Bloc; European Union; Great Power Rivalry; Hegemony; Multipolarity; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Realism; Superpower; Warsaw Pact

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The Danger of an Imbalance of Power

So long as the world was bipolar, the United States and the Soviet Union held each other in check. With the crumbling of the Soviet Union, no country or countries can presently restore a balance. . . . Balance of power theory leads one to predict that other states, if they have a choice, will flock to the weaker side, for it is the stronger side that threatens them. . . . The powerful state may, and the United States does, think of itself as acting for the sake of peace, justice, and well-being in the world. But these terms will be defined to the liking of the powerful, which may conflict with the preferences and the interests of others. In international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads others to try to balance against it. With benign intent, the United States has behaved, and will continue to behave in ways that annoy and frighten others.

—Kenneth Waltz

Excerpt from "America as a Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective," in *PS: Political Science and Politics*, December 1991, pp. 667–670.

BALI, TERRORIST BOMBING IN

Terrorist attack involving the detonation of two bombs at a busy tourist site on the Indonesian island of Bali. On October 12, 2002, half an hour before midnight, a bomb exploded in Paddy's Bar, a Bali locale frequented by foreigners, especially Australian youth with whom Indonesian tourist resorts are immensely popular. The bar's patrons, some hurt from the explosion, evacuated into the street. Within seconds, another, more powerful bomb exploded in the vicinity of Paddy's. A total of 202 people were killed in the blasts. Most of the victims were Australian (more than 80 people); Indonesian (more than 35 people); and British (26 people). A third bomb exploded in front of the U.S. consulate on the island of Bali, but nobody was injured in that attack. A week later, Indonesian police arrested the first of more than 30 people suspected of planning and executing the Bali bombings.

THE GROUP BEHIND THE BOMBINGS

The complex investigations that followed the terrorist attack—investigations undertaken not only by the Indonesian authorities, but also by Australian and British task forces—identified the terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Group) as responsible for the Bali bombings. Suspected of having carried out several other terrorist attacks in the past, Jemaah Islamiyah was also linked by the Indonesian government to al-Qaeda, the international terrorist network founded and financed by Osama bin Laden.

In the wake of the Bali bombings, the U.S. State Department designated Jemaah Islamiyah as a foreign terrorist organization. The group had been founded in the late 1960s with the aim of propagating fundamentalist Islamic precepts, mainly throughout Indonesia but also in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. In the 1990s, Jemaah Islamiyah organized itself as an al-Qaeda-supported terrorist organization, engaging in sporadic violence and logistical support for Muslim militants throughout Southeast Asia. Although the group had been under observation by Indonesian and international authorities for many years, it truly burst on the international terrorist scene only after the 2002 Bali bombings.

THE ARRESTS

A week after the Bali attacks, Indonesian police arrested Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Ba'ashyir, the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah and one of its founders. He was apprehended in connection with a different series of terrorist attacks, but was suspected of involvement (at least as an instigator) in the Bali bombings as well. Ba'ashyir's trial appearances have been followed closely by millions of Indonesians. More than 30 other people suspected of participating in the Bali attacks were arrested in the following months throughout Southeast Asia.

The planner of the Bali terrorist operation, Imam Samudra, was arrested in November 2002 and sentenced to death a year later. He confessed his involvement in the attacks and gave 13 reasons for attacking the Balinese tourist spots. All of the reasons are presented within the fundamentalist ideological framework of a Muslim's religious duty to fight the infidels (primarily Christians and Jews). Since 2002, many Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda operatives, indirectly connected with the Bali bombings, have been arrested throughout the world. The Indonesian government is currently involved in combating Jemaah Islamiyah and its supporters.

See also Islamic Fundamentalism; Suicide Bombing; Terrorism, War on International

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BALLISTIC MISSILES

A rocket propelled, self-guided type of strategic weapons system that can be used to perpetrate a chemical, biological, or nuclear attack. The operation of a ballistic missile can be compared to shooting a gun: A shotgun shell receives a short and definitive initial powerful force from gunpowder, sending it through the gun's barrel. Likewise, a ballistic missile receives an initial thrust (or force) from a rocket and continues to accelerate as it leaves its launching tube. Although the missile carries its own propellant, it follows a pre-determined course that cannot be changed after the missile has burned its fuel.

There are several different types of ballistic missiles. The United States categorizes them by range, which is the maximum measured distance between the missile's launching point and its point of impact. There are four U.S. range classifications: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which travel more than 5,500 km; intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs,), which travel 3,000 to 5,500 km; medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), which travel 1,000 to 3,000 km; and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), which travel up to 1,000 km. These specific classifications, however, are not used universally among all countries possessing this brand of weapon.

Further, there are land-based ballistic missiles and sea-launched ballistic missiles. By the early 1990s, the land-based ICBMs outnumbered other missile types in the U.S. arsenal. Long-range missiles were developed around the time of World War II. In the postwar years, focus turned to the development of long-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The advantages of these missiles include accuracy, a relatively low cost, and easy maintenance. Additionally, due to its extremely long range, the ICBM can theoretically hit a target anywhere on earth. Its main disadvantage is its vulnerability to destruction by powerful first-strike weaponry.

A Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) being launched from the Aegis cruiser, the U.S.S. Lake Erie. The launch of this rocket-powered ballistic missile was part of the testing for the Ballistic Missile Defense System under the auspices of the Missile Defense Agency. Ballistic missiles such as this and its predecessors have been a vital component of the U.S. weapons arsenal since the period of the Cold War.

Source: U.S. Navy.

The United States also has an extensive arsenal of sea-launched ballistic missiles, known as SLBMs. These missiles are effective due to their high degree of invulnerability, even to some antisubmarine warfare. This leads some political theorists to believe that SLBMs are an effective form of deterrence against enemy strikes.

Ballistic missile weaponry, particularly the defense of them, has led to much political division and controversy. It had an especially significant role in the technological facet of the Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union from the 1960s to the late 1980s. By the mid 1940s, the United States had no defense against ballistic missile attack.

Devices such as radar, however, made tracking and locating missiles possible. In turn, this could lead to the interception and destruction of missiles in flight. These activities were hindered at the time by great difficulty and expense. Two decades later, difficulty was no longer an issue, but expense remained a problem with creating ballistic missile defense. By 1983, this defense became possible and affordable, leading the United States to start the development of an antiballistic defense, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, popularly known as Star Wars), at the direction of President Ronald Reagan.

The development of SDI was halted amid much partisan controversy surrounding its cost and underlying strategic theories. Contemporary missile threat is perceived differently than it was during the Cold War Era due to changing strategic logic. According to the administration of President George W. Bush, the leaders of other countries perceive such weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice, not weapons of last resort, thereby creating the necessity of restructuring the defense capabilities of the United States. As a result, interest in creating a missile defense system like SDI has arisen again.

See also Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; Bush, George W., and National Policy; Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM); Reagan, Ronald, and National Policy; Missiles; Strategic Defense Initiative

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BASE CLOSURE

Approach to saving money in the defense budget by closing obsolete, underused, or redundant military bases. The Defense Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 called on the Department of Defense (DoD) to identify military bases that could be closed to address the growing costs of the nation's defense budget. In response to the act, the DoD defined four priorities to be given consideration in choosing which bases would be directly affected. These priorities included the impact on operational readiness of the nation's total fighting force, availability and condition of the facilities, ability of each base to accommodate total force requirements, and the cost and manpower implications of closing each base. Other factors taken into consideration were cost-effectiveness, the economic impact on the surrounding community, the ability of local communities to support a military base, and local environmental impact.

One of the more complex issues surrounding base closures is the impact of a closure on the local communities. Military bases have a tremendous impact on the economic development and culture of the communities in which they reside. Closing a base may mean the economic ruin of the surrounding communities that have grown to depend on the business generated by the base. It was this kind of interdependent relationship between business and national defense that led President Dwight D. Eisenhower to speak in his farewell address of the development of a "military industrial complex." Eisenhower warned of the political, economic, and spiritual impact of the growth of the military on communities in the United States, stating that "Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society."

The issue of base closings is not only a significant domestic issue, but also of international importance in light of the realignment of U.S. defense priorities at the beginning of the 21st century. The shifting of military bases overseas in response to the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the global "war on terror" are two recent manifestations of the international impact of base closures.

See also Military-Industrial Complex

BASE FORCE THEORY
See BASE CLOSURE, BOTTOM-UP REVIEW, FORWARD BASING

BAY OF PIGS

Failed invasion of Cuba by U.S.-backed Cuban exiles in April 1961. On April 17, 1961, an armed force of about 1,500 Cuban exiles landed in the Bahia de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) on Cuba's southern coast to

overthrow Fidel Castro's communist regime. The insurgent force had been armed by the United States and trained by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) since May 1960.

The covert military operation had the approval of the administration of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, which had sanctioned several earlier CIA attempts to kill or remove Castro from power. In many ways, the Bay of Pigs invasion represented a last-ditch effort by the lame duck administration to accomplish the strategic goal of eliminating Castro before the administration of President-Elect John F. Kennedy took office.

BACKGROUND TO INVASION

On January 3, 1961, just 17 days before Kennedy was inaugurated as president, the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba. This signaled the implementation of the final stages of a CIA plan, approved by Eisenhower in March 1959, and titled A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime. The plan included establishing a new Cuban regime composed of exiles residing outside of the country; a massive anti-Castro, anticommunist propaganda offensive; creation of a covert intelligence and military force inside Cuba controlled by the exile opposition; and creation of a paramilitary force outside of Cuba to conduct guerrilla warfare against the Castro regime. The goals of the plan, funded by a secret budget of almost $50 million, were to be carried out so as to avoid the appearance that the United States was intervening in Cuba.

Shortly after the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba, CIA planes—some piloted by Americans—began bombing raids on Cuban sugar cane fields. By the time Kennedy took office on January 20, 1961, he had made commitments to Cuban exiles living in the United States to overthrow Castro and other communist governments. Although Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy and other high-ranking U.S. officials publicly denied plans to attack Cuba, on October 31, 1960, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa provided the United Nations General Assembly with evidence that the CIA was recruiting and training Cuban exiles for an invasion.

The original Bay of Pigs plan called for the rebels to land during the day at Trinidad, a city on Cuba's southern coast. Kennedy thought the original plan was too bold and would expose the role of the United States in the plot to overthrow Castro. Kennedy favored a night invasion at the Bay of Pigs, which featured a suitable airstrip on the beach. Shortly before the rebels landed at the Bay of Pigs, CIA operatives placed in Cuba were to blow up key bridges and commit other terrorist acts to make it appear that the Cuban peasants were rising up against Castro. Once the Bay of Pigs was secured, a provisional government would be set up by the CIA and immediately recognized by the United States. The new government would request U.S. military support, which would be immediately forthcoming.

There were two major flaws in the plan. First, the nighttime invasion would not allow the "popular" uprising against Castro that the exiles and the United States believed would occur. Second, the Bay of Pigs location was extremely exposed, and the rebels, if confronted by the Cuban army, would be unable to retreat into the Escambray Mountains.

THE INVASION

Despite continuing assurances from Kennedy to the press that the U.S. forces would not invade Cuba, the counterrevolutionary force, known as Brigade 2506, assembled at an airport on the west coast of Guatemala on April 12. Two days later, six ships carrying the invaders departed from Nicaragua's Puerto Cabezas. The Cubans were aware of the invasion but did not know exactly when and where the attack would occur.

On April 15, U.S. bombers piloted by Cuban exiles and painted to resemble Cuban Air Force planes launched simultaneous attacks on four separate Cuban airfields. They intended to destroy the Cuban air force on the ground, but the Cubans were prepared. They camouflaged and hid their actual planes and left obsolete or unusable ones on the airfield runways.

The invasion began shortly after midnight on April 16 when six battalions of rebels under the command of Manuel Artime landed in the Bay of Pigs. Two battalions came ashore at Playa Giron and one at Playa Larga. Razor-sharp coral reefs, misidentified by U.S. spy planes as seaweed, delayed the landing long enough to expose the troops to Cuban air attacks. Things became unraveled when some of the CIA operatives failed to destroy their objectives and Castro's air force seized control of the skies above the Bay of Pigs. Cuban planes sank the invasion's command ship, Maropa, as well as a supply ship.

The desperate situation was compounded by Kennedy's decision to cancel air support for the invasion. Shortly before the invasion Kennedy had received an angry letter from Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who denounced the Bay of Pigs plan, pointed the finger at U.S. involvement, and urged President Kennedy to stop the invasion before it led to war between the superpowers. Faced with Khrushchev's ultimatum, Kennedy had no choice but to abandon the rebels to the Cuban air force.

AFTERMATH

Several hundred rebels were killed and 1,189 were captured as a result of the attack. Mass public trials of those who were captured fueled anti-American feelings in Cuba as well as the rest of the third world. Each rebel was sentenced to 30 years in prison. After 20 months of negotiations, all of the rebels save two were released to the United States in exchange for $53 million in food and medicine.

In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Kennedy fired longtime CIA director Allen W. Dulles and two deputy directors at the agency and ordered an investigation by the inspector general's office. The controversial report concluded that ignorance, incompetence, and arrogance on the part of the CIA were responsible for an episode that not only resulted in a diplomatic disaster for the United States but also set the stage for the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

After this embarrassment, Kennedy became obsessed with eliminating Castro. The President's brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, launched a plan code named Operation Mongoose, which called for the elimination of Castro by any means. Some CIA plots launched against Castro under Operation Mongoose included hiring Mafia hit men to kill the Cuban president and sending Castro a poisoned scuba suit. These plots were no more successful in ending Castro's rule than the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs.

See also Central Intelligence Agency; Covert Operations; Cuban Missile Crisis; Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy; Kennedy, John F., and National Policy

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BERLIN AIRLIFT

American and British effort, 1948–49, to supply West Berlin with food and other necessities by air after the Soviet Union blockaded all surface routes.

When the Allied forces occupied Germany at the conclusion of World War II, they divided Berlin, the nation's capital, into four sections. The United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union each controlled a section of the city. However, the Soviet Union had also gained control of Germany's entire eastern portion. As a result, they occupied the area surrounding Berlin and controlled all land and water routes into the city.

By 1946, it was evident that the Soviet Union intended to permanently partition Germany and establish East Germany as a communist satellite state. However, in Berlin's municipal elections that year, the Social Democratic Party easily defeated the communist candidates. In response, communist mobs attacked the new city assembly when it gathered and forced the mayor to appoint communist officials to key positions. The defiant assembly removed the mayor but purposely left the position vacant to frustrate the Soviets. In rousing speeches, leaders of the assembly vowed to prevent Berlin's fall to communism.

The United States and Great Britain also sought to frustrate the Soviet ambitions. To balance the Soviet Union's increasing control over eastern Germany, they united their own regions of western Germany into a single entity. Soviet officials then withdrew from the Allied Control Commission, the body established to coordinate the Allied occupation. Then on June 18, 1948, Great Britain and the United States introduced a new currency, the deutsche mark, into their sections of Berlin. The currency had two purposes. It crippled the black market and the accompanying crime that had plagued Berlin since the end of the war, but it also signified that Berlin was not under Soviet control. The Berlin assembly brazenly adopted the currency.

The Soviet response was instantaneous. The next day the Soviets blocked all land and water routes into the city and halted the electric supply to the western

portion of the city. The Soviets believed this action would force the other Allies to surrender all of Berlin to Soviet control. Because West Berlin barely possessed enough supplies to last a month, it appeared the Allies would have to comply with Soviet demands.

Great Britain and the United States frantically searched for a way to supply West Berlin. In 1945, the Soviets had signed an agreement that created three 20-mile wide air corridors into Berlin to be used only by British and American commercial aircraft. Seizing the opportunity, British and American forces improved the two Berlin airports, Tempelhof and Gatow, which they controlled. Within three months, American forces also built a new airstrip at Tegel. Finally, the British used their Sunderland flying boats to land on Lake Havel.

The British and Americans immediately started sending supplies via air to West Berlin. During the 462 days of the blockade, 277,264 flights were made and more than 2 million tons of supplies were delivered. At the height of the effort, planes landed in West Berlin every 90 seconds and left to retrieve new supplies within six minutes. The citizens of West Berlin carefully rationed their supplies and limited themselves to four hours of electricity per day.

The Soviet Union ended the blockade on May 12, 1949, after establishing a separate government for East Berlin. In this sense, the city was politically divided. This division was physically reinforced with the construction of the Berlin Wall. But the airlift had succeeded and West Berlin remained a defiant symbol of anticommunism during the Cold War.

See also Berlin Crises; Berlin Wall; Cold War

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BERLIN CRISES (1958–1961)

Cold War conflicts between the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the future of the divided German city of Berlin. In 1948, when the Soviet Union's blockade of Berlin prevented Western access to that city, the United States and Great Britain responded by initiating the Berlin airlift to keep food and supplies flowing to West Berlin and to maintain its connection to the West.

After the Soviet Union lifted the blockade in 1949, the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union maintained the status quo in Berlin, whereby each of the former World War II allies governed their own sector and had free access to all other sectors. The free city of West Berlin, surrounded by the communist German Democratic Republic (East Germany), was a Cold War crucible for the United States and the Soviet Union, in which both superpowers repeatedly asserted their claims to dominance in Europe.

On November 7, 1958, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev demanded that the United States and its allies relinquish their occupation roles in Berlin. He also declared that if they did not sign an agreement to this effect within six months, the Soviet Union would no longer honor their postwar agreement and would enter into a separate Berlin treaty with East Germany.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower refused Khrushchev's demands, insisting that their Berlin agreement still held. On November 27, the Soviet Union announced that it rejected the postwar agreements concerning the occupation and governance of Germany and West Berlin. Khrushchev also proposed that Berlin become a free city. Although Khrushchev did not indicate that the Soviet Union would use military force if the United States did not comply, the United States understood that the Soviet Union intended to back up its threat.

The United States and Britain refused to agree to the Soviet demands, arguing that a free Berlin, with no guaranteed access to the West, would soon be controlled by communist East Germany. Multiple attempts to find a diplomatic solution were fruitless. In 1959 and 1960, U.S.-Soviet talks took place in Geneva, Camp David, and Paris, but no agreement was reached.

With the new administration of President John F. Kennedy in 1961, the Berlin situation heated up. At the Vienna Summit in June 1961, Khrushchev reiterated his demand that if a Berlin agreement was not achieved by December, the Soviet Union would sign a separate treaty with East Germany. Kennedy made it clear that Berlin was of supreme strategic importance to the United States and free access to the city must be maintained.

On August 13, 1961, the East German government, backed by the Soviet Union, began to build a barrier

between East Berlin (the Soviet-occupied sector) and West Berlin, preventing refugees from escaping to the West and triggering the Berlin Wall crisis. The United States did not intervene because the Soviet Union was exercising control over its sector. When the December 1961 treaty deadline passed without incident, the conflict over the future of the city receded with no further Soviet agitation concerning a treaty.

A major outcome of the Berlin crises was a new understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union: The Soviet Union would continue to have dominance over its East European allies and East Berlin while the United States and its Western allies would claim Western Europe, West Germany, and West Berlin within their sphere of influence.

See also Berlin Airlift; Berlin Wall; Cold War; Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy; Kennedy, John F., and National Policy; Khrushchev, Nikita

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BERLIN WALL

Partition wall built between East Berlin and West Berlin in 1961, with the aim of preventing citizens of communist East Germany from escaping to the West. Due to its position in the middle of a politically divided city, and, by extension, of a divided nation (East and West Germany), the Berlin Wall became one of the most significant symbols of the Cold War.

The dramatic story of "the two Berlins" and of the Wall between them began in 1945. Following the defeat of Nazi Germany, France, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union divided Germany among themselves into four occupation zones. Although located entirely in East Germany (dominated by the Soviet Union), Berlin was also partitioned, with its western half under the control of the United States, France, and Britain.

Not surprisingly, when the relationship between the Soviet Union and its former allies began to deteriorate in the postwar period, Germany's capital became the first "battleground" of the ensuing Cold War. Unable to compromise on crucial political and economic matters, the occupiers of Germany decided to make the division permanent. On May 12, 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) declared itself an independent state, followed a couple of weeks later by the establishment of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). The border between the two Germanies was sealed, and on August 15, 1961, soldiers in East Germany begin building a five-foot high wall separating the eastern and the western halves of the city of Berlin.

CROSSING THE WALL

The Berlin Wall became a truly impressive structure. The Wall was, in fact, an entire complex of obstacles, including 13-feet-high concrete slabs, electric and wire-meshed fences, alarm cables, and antivehicle ditches. It even had special ramps for guard dogs. The row of obstacles extended more than 103 miles, and it was watched over by 14,000 border guards and 600 dogs.

As early as 1957, the East German government had introduced the penal offense of fleeing the Republic, punishable by up to four years in prison. Border guards received the order to shoot trespassers on sight. It is estimated that between 1961, when the Wall was erected, and 1989, when it was torn down, more than 75,000 people were arrested trying to cross the border illegally. More than 800 others died in escape attempts, out of which 250 persons were killed at the site of the Wall.

No fewer than 5,000 people, however, did manage to breach the Wall; about a tenth of these were deserting East German border guards. Amazing stories of escape have become part of contemporary German folklore. These include the tunnel under the Wall, which, in October 1964, delivered 57 East Berliners to freedom; a handful of low sports cars, which raced under the horizontal barriers at checkpoints; and four men wearing home-made Soviet-like uniforms, who simply walked by the respectful border guards. Despite its formidable complex of obstacles, the Berlin Wall was never able to completely stop the constant trickling of refugees out of East Germany.

A demonstrator from West Berlin tearing away part of the Berlin Wall in Germany in November 1989 as East German border guards look on from above. The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning of the end for communist rule of East Berlin and East Germany. For the first time since the wall was built in 1961, East Germans could freely cross to the West. Demand for even more political changes led to the downfall of the East German communist government and the later unification of the two Germanies in October 1990.

Source: Corbis.

IN THE MIDST OF THE COLD WAR

Around the drama of individual East Berliners continuously challenging East German border guards, a wider crisis was unfolding. Alternating between suspicious appeasement and outright provocations, the two sides of the Cold War were fighting a daily battle in divided Berlin. Soviet and American intelligence agencies set up numerous million-dollar receivers and decoders on both sides of the Wall, as part of a deeply paranoid game of surveillance and espionage.

On June 26, 1963, U.S. President John F. Kennedy visited Berlin and observed the Wall from a high platform on the Western side. He then delivered a stirring speech to a crowd of 120,000 Germans, ending with the famous phrase, "Ich bin ein Berliner" (I am a Berliner). Over the next two decades, each successive U.S. president made a "pilgrimage" to West Berlin.

Nearly four decades after the Berlin Wall was built, on June 12, 1987, U.S. President Ronald Reagan also delivered a speech to the people of West Berlin and West Germany. Reagan took the extraordinary step of directly addressing, through the television cameras, the Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev, asking him to "tear down this wall!" It was the German people, however, who, two years later, demolished the barrier and symbolic division between East and West.

THE WALL COMES DOWN

Similar to the situation in other communist countries in the region, the living conditions of East Germans had progressively worsened throughout the 1980s. Infuriated at the lack of basic freedom—and, in no small measure, encouraged by the increasingly frequent anticommunist events in the rest of Eastern Europe—nearly 1 million East German citizens took to the streets of Berlin on November 4, 1989, demanding substantial political and economic reforms.

The East German government, afraid that the demonstration might snowball into a genuine popular revolt, decided to appease the protesters by granting them one of their main wishes: the right to travel freely. On the evening of November 4, one of the country's high officials announced at a press conference that East Germans were free to cross into West Germany. When the incredulous journalists wanted to know when the measure was to take effect, a confused communist leader uttered "immediately."

Within hours, a huge crowd of East Berliners had amassed at the various checkpoints along the Wall, demanding to be allowed to go through. The border guards, who were still under official orders to shoot anybody attempting to flee, did not know what to do. Finally, the officers in charge decided not to set themselves against the human tide and opened the gates wide. Exuberant East Berliners flooded through the checkpoints, greeting the thousands of Westerners who had come to the Wall to welcome them.

During the next three days, about 2 million East Berliners crossed into West Berlin to celebrate. Most of the Berlin Wall was soon torn down, piece by piece. On October 3, 1990, the people of "the two Germanies" voted to unite once more into a single nation, spelling the end of one of the most notorious symbols of oppression in modern history.

See also Berlin Crises; Cold War; Détente; Iron Curtain

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BIKINI ATOLL

A small island, formerly called Escholtz Island, in the West Central Pacific, part of the Ralik Chain of the Marshall Islands, which was used as a testing site for nuclear weapons from 1946 to 1958. Twenty-three atomic and hydrogen bombs were detonated after the residents were removed from Bikini to Rongerik in 1946. The islanders were then moved to Ujelang in 1947 and resettled on the islet of Kili in 1949.

On March 1, 1954, the United States conducted the largest nuclear test of the Cold War era at Bikini. During the test, code-named Bravo, a 15-megaton hydrogen bomb was detonated on the atoll, producing an atomic fireball and a 20-mile tall mushroom cloud. Gale force winds generated by the blast stripped coconuts and bark from trees and a small fleet of 33 ships including the USS *Saratoga* and the captured flagship of the Japanese fleet, the *Nagato*, were sent to the bottom. Fallout from the explosion drifted to neighboring islands including Rongelap, forcing their evacuation.

According to a 1946 *Newsweek* article, the tests had three major purposes: first, to see how ships should be designed for survival if they were to become targets for atom bombs or atomic mines; second, to demonstrate how ships should be spaced at sea and in port (the ships anchored in the lagoon at Bikini were closer together than task forces usually move at sea); and third, to show how many operating bases and repair yards would be needed, and whether they should be dispersed and made smaller.

The United States suspended testing in 1958. Bikini was declared safe in 1969, but a 1974 test showed high levels of radioactivity and 100 residents were evacuated again. Today, many Bikinians continue to suffer from long-term health problems associated with radiation exposure associated with the tests.

In 1969, a Nuclear Claims Tribunal was established under agreements between the United States and the Marshall Islands. Three decades later, in 1999, the tribunal awarded more than $500 million to the people of Bikini to complete the cleanup operations there. The Marshallese government, however, says that it would take $1.5 billion to $2.5 billion to complete the cleanup and fairly compensate the victims of the tests.

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BILATERALISM

A foreign policy strategy in which a sovereign state chooses to pursue its international interests and goals in concert with one other sovereign state. The vast majority of diplomatic relations take place at the bilateral level—nations open embassies in other countries; they exchange ambassadors and consular officials; they host state visits of other states' leaders and dignitaries; and they sign binding agreements pertaining to economic, environmental, and military cooperation.

Because only two nations are involved in bilateral negotiations, compromise and consensus are generally arrived at more readily than in a multilateral environment, and diplomats enjoy greater flexibility because they generally have to juggle fewer competing agendas. This is not to say, however, that bilateral agreements are necessarily easy to craft. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), for example, took nearly two years of round-the-clock discussions before it came to fruition in 1989.

While they may have the advantage of expediency, and though the international community typically

An awesome mushroom cloud from an atomic bomb explosion rises over Bikini Atoll in the South Pacific in 1946. A coral island in the Marshall Islands, Bikini was chosen to be the site of atomic bomb testing because of its relative isolation. The United States moved the people on the island before the testing. Allowed to return in 1968, they were relocated again in 1978 because of continued high levels of radioactivity in the island's soil. The people of Bikini receive financial compensation from the United States and hope to one day be able to return for good.

Source: Corbis.

specifically a series of "entangling alliances," was ultimately responsible for the outbreak of war. Following World War II, bilateralism also was held partially responsible for the rise of inflation and escalating tariffs. In each case, much of the world responded by embracing (if only temporarily) a new sense of multilateralism as embodied in such institutions as the League of Nations (post–World War I) and the United Nations (post–World War II).

United States bilateralism has a rich history. The United States and Canada, for example, not only established a recent free trade agreement (later subsumed by the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA), but they continue to cooperate bilaterally on issues pertaining to continental defense (for example, the North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD), environmental protection (issues such as acid rain and water quality), border management, and energy.

favors bilateral actions over unilateral ones, bilateral negotiations and agreements often generate foreign ire and precipitate complaints of illegitimacy. The ongoing war on terrorism represents an important example. The majority of forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2002 are either American or British, and the two nations (and their respective leaders, U.S. president George W. Bush and British prime minister Tony Blair) have cooperated almost exclusively with one another in planning and implementing the sustained military campaign. States such as France and Germany publicly voiced their opposition to this bilateral arrangement, arguing that the terrorism was a global problem demanding a multilateral response (for example, United Nations intervention).

Though bilateralism continues to be the norm of international diplomacy, the history of the 20th century provides two very significant critiques of its effectiveness. In the aftermath of World War I, world leaders and thinkers suggested strongly that bilateralism, and

In the early days of the Cold War, too, the United States augmented its series of multilateral mutual defense agreements (such as the Rio Treaty; the North Atlantic Treaty; the Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, or ANZUS, treaty; and the Southeast Asia Treaty) with a handful of critically important bilateral accords. These bilateral agreements included the Philippine Treaty (1951), the Republic of Korea Treaty (1953), the Republic of China Treaty (1954), and the Japanese Treaty (1960).

In comparison to multilateralism, bilateralism is generally more efficient and easier to manage. The heightened level of cooperation and dialogue between the two states involved in the relationship, however, often crowds out important input from other states.

See also Multilateralism; NORAD; Terrorism, War on International; Unilateralism

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REFLECTIONS

"We're Going to Canada Now"

In a radio address to the nation in 1985, President Ronald Reagan expressed how important Canada is to the United States.

We're going to Canada now for one simple reason: No country is more important to the United States. Sometimes we overlook that fact. Sometimes our friendship and cooperation may not seem to warrant as much attention as the serious problems we're dealing with in other areas. But certain facts about our Canadian neighbors, with whom we share the world's longest undefended boundary, must never be overlooked.

Canada and the United States are each other's most important trading partner. There is greater volume of trade between our two countries than between any other two countries in the world. We sold $45 billion in goods to Canada in 1984, which supported hundreds of thousands of jobs in the United States. Canada is our principal foreign supplier of natural gas and electricity, and Canada is the most important locale for our foreign investment. Walk around our cities and towns today, and you can see increased Canadian investment in real estate and many other parts of our economy.

Most important, the national security of the United States and of Canada are very closely interrelated. The commander in chief of the North American Aerospace Defense Command in Colorado Springs is from the States; his deputy is Canadian; and their staff is divided among U.S. and Canadian officers.

—President Ronald Reagan, 1985
Radio Address to the Nation

BIN LADEN, OSAMA (1957–)

Founder and spiritual leader of the international terrorist organization al-Qaeda and prime suspect in ordering the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. A member of one of the wealthiest families in the world, Osama bin Laden was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in 1957, the last son of 52 siblings. In 1968, his father, Mohammed bin Laden, died in a helicopter accident, and at the age of 10 Osama inherited around $80 million. Osama bin Laden's religious beliefs were shaped by the influences of his childhood. He spent his youth in a strictly conservative part of Saudi Arabia known as the Hejaz. His education was based on the Koran and Sharia law, the Muslim religious code for living.

At age 19, bin Laden enrolled at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to study management and economics. While there, he began attending meetings of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic organization that advocates the return to the precepts of the Koran. At this time, his faith was made even more radical by the influence of three Islamic scholars. The first two were historical influences: the medieval Islamic scholar Taqi al-Din Ibn Tammiyah and the early 20th-century Egyptian scholar Mohammed Qutb, who saw the Western civilization as corrupted and irreligious. The third influence was contemporary: Shaykh Abdullah Azzam, bin Laden's mentor and an advocate of an aggressive and militant Islam.

EARLY YEARS OF RESISTANCE

In early 1980, bin Laden went to Pakistan and began supporting the Afghan resistance fighters, known as mujahideen, who were struggling against the Soviet invasion of their country. He soon moved to Afghanistan and, in addition to providing financial and logistical support for the resistance, bin Laden participated in battles and was wounded in 1989.

During his years in Pakistan and Afghanistan, bin Laden probably developed his idea for an international insurgent organization beyond the Afghan mujahideen. He envisioned a group that could help Muslims in what he saw as their struggle against the infidel governments oppressing them in places such as Palestine, the Philippines, and Kashmir. This organization eventually became known as al-Qaeda, which means "the base."

After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia. While there, the Saudis restricted his passport for international travel because they feared, based on his activities in Afghanistan, that he would start a new jihad, or holy

war, in South Yemen. The following year, the Saudi government allowed U.S. troops to be stationed in Saudi Arabia in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Outraged by the presence of these infidel troops in the birthplace of Islam, bin Laden accused Saudi King Fahd of siding with the Jews and Christians against Muslims. Bin Laden's farm subsequently was raided and he was placed under house arrest for antigovernment activities. In 1991, bin Laden obtained travel documents for Pakistan and left Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government revoked his citizenship in 1991.

YEARS OF EXILE

After a brief stay in Afghanistan, bin Laden moved to the Sudan, where he lived until May 1996. In the Sudanese capital Khartoum, bin Laden established a series of businesses and developed al-Qaeda as an extensive international organization. Members of its terrorist network were involved in the Yemeni civil war, in financing Bosnian fighters, and in sponsoring or supporting terrorist attacks.

Bin Laden was suspected of having ties to the six terrorists convicted of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. He was also charged with training the individuals involved in the 1993 attack that killed 18 U.S. soldiers in Somalia. Furthermore, in 1995, his associates plotted to assassinate a number of world leaders, including Pope John Paul II, U.S. president Bill Clinton, and Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak.

By the mid-1990s, bin Laden had made a number of enemies. After surviving two assassination attempts, he left Sudan in 1996, officially expelled by the Sudanese government under pressure from the United States and Saudi Arabia. He returned to Afghanistan where the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban regime agreed to host him.

REFOCUSING ON AMERICA

In 1998, bin Laden refocused his terrorist activities on the United States and declared that Muslims should kill all Americans, including civilians, wherever they could find them. On August 7 of that year, two truck bombs exploded outside the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 people.

In response, on August 20, President Clinton ordered cruise missile attacks against suspected terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum believed to be producing chemical weapons. In February 2001, bin Laden praised the previous year's attack on the destroyer USS *Cole* in Yemen, although it is not clear whether he was involved in its planning.

AFTER THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, the U.S. government named bin Laden a prime suspect and demanded the Taliban regime hand him over. When the Taliban refused the demand, a U.S.-led multinational coalition declared war on Afghanistan in October 2001. A combination of ground troops and air bombing targeted al-Qaeda forces, training camps, and shelters in the mountains. In December, the Taliban government was forced from power but bin Laden was still at large. In March 2002, the battle intensified in the mountainous terrain of eastern Afghanistan, where reports said bin Laden was located and—according to some reports—directing troops.

Bin Laden maintained a low profile in the spring and summer of 2002 but made headlines again in the fall when Al-Jazeera, an Arabic news station, broadcast two audio tapes featuring his voice. In February 2003, Al-Jazeera broadcast another tape on which bin Laden urged Muslims and Islamic nations to fight against any U.S.-led attack on Iraq. In February 2004, after major operations began in Iraq, Al-Jazeera broadcast a new audiotape on which bin Laden claimed that the U.S. occupation of Iraq was the beginning of an occupation of Persian Gulf states to control their oil reserves. He reappeared on Al-Jazeera in October 2004, just days before the U.S. presidential election.

The U.S. government views Osama bin Laden as one of the greatest threats to American national security and it remains interested in finding him. The U.S. House of Representatives voted unanimously on March 18, 2004, to double the reward for bin Laden's capture to $50 million. Since then, both U.S. and Pakistani forces have intensified search operations on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Despite these efforts, all offensives to hunt down bin Laden have failed and his whereabouts remain unknown.

See also Afghanistan, War in; Al-Qaeda; Iraq War of 2003; Islamic Fundamentalism; September 11/WTC and Pentagon Attacks; Terrorism; Terrorists, Islamic; Terrorism, War on International

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REFLECTIONS

Manifesto of the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders

The ruling to kill Americans and their allies—civilian and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to.

—Osama bin Laden, February 1998

BIODEFENSE/BIOSECURITY

Short- and long-term issues related to maintaining a safe and habitable environment. Biosecurity refers to steps taken by a government to ensure the safety and health of its citizens and environment. Biodefense measures are steps taken to restore biosecurity in the face of environmental threat.

BIOSECURITY

Biological safety may be concerned with human health or the sustainability of the environments that humans depend on for survival. Biosecurity also has more generalized environmental implications, such as efforts to maintain biodiversity, the coexistence of all living things in a given area. It can also be focused on combating and containing global epidemics such as SARS or mad cow disease. Given the ease of modern long-distance travel, monitoring imports and regulating international borders becomes a fundamental part of maintaining biosecurity. Such defense measures are also part of the preventative response to biological warfare.

BIODEFENSE AND BIOTERRORISM

Questions of biodefense and biosecurity have become increasingly pertinent in proportion to fears concerning the possibility of bioterrorism. Biological warfare is considered a likely strategy for terrorist organizations, which lack formal government backing and the resources to carry out more extensive military operations. Because infectious diseases are easily spread, they are an even more attractive offensive option.

A bioterrorist attack would involve the use of biological hazards (biohazards)—living organisms that can cause severe illness or even death among humans exposed to them. These organisms include bacteria and viruses such as anthrax, smallpox, and salmonella. Anthrax and smallpox are most likely to be used by bioterrorists because they are highly communicable and relatively easy to manufacture.

Because anthrax can cause infection in three ways—though the skin, by swallowing, and by inhalation—it is a particularly flexible weapon for use in a terrorist attack. The fatality rate for victims who inhale anthrax is close to 100%, but lower for those who are exposed in other ways. Anthrax spores can survive severe heat and cold and don't require special handling procedures to survive, thus presenting severe challenges to biodefense. Measures to defend against anthrax include protecting the skin from infection through contact with superficial cuts or wounds; ensuring the security of food supplies against contamination; and creating public awareness of the appearance, effects, and symptoms of anthrax infection.

The best-known terrorist attack involving anthrax came in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks. Letters containing anthrax spores were sent to several U.S. government and business offices shortly after September 11. The victims were exposed through physical contact and inhalation, and several did not survive. Because of the attacks, public awareness of necessary biodefense measures increased dramatically, as did concern for biosecurity. The person or persons responsible for the anthrax attacks remains unknown.

Salmonella has the distinction of also having been recently used in a biological attack in the United States. In 1984, members of the Rajneeshee cult infected salad bars in a small town in Oregon. Some 900 persons became ill in an event that is considered the first instance of bioterrorism in U.S. history.

The Biological Weapons Convention, which went into force in 1975, outlaws the use of biological weapons. The convention was the first diplomatic agreement ever to ban an entire class of weapons. However, the convention failed to establish any system for verifying compliance; the lack of such a system has undermined its effectiveness. Negotiations to make the convention more comprehensive began in the 1990s, but in 2001 the Bush administration rejected the convention on the grounds that it would hamper legitimate biodefense activity.

The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for maintaining biosecurity in the United States. In addition, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention provide information on biodefense measures for private citizens. Both of these agencies thus occupy central roles in protecting the United States from bioterrorism and ensuring the future health of the environment.

See also Anthrax; Biological Weapons and Warfare; Biological Weapons Convention; Bioterrorism; Homeland Security, Department of

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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND WARFARE

Warfare waged with biological agents that have been placed in weapons. Biological warfare entails the use of pathogens, or disease-causing organisms or substances. These pathogens may be living organisms, such as the bacterium that causes anthrax; viruses, like the one that causes smallpox; or toxins that have been processed from microbes or extracted from plants, such as ricin from the castor bean. To be used effectively, these agents must then be weaponized, or designed into efficient delivery systems so that sufficient quantities are inhaled, ingested, or make surface contact in quantities that can incapacitate, injure, or kill.

USES OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Biological weapons can be used against an army or a civilian population, livestock or work animals, crops or jungle cover. Often the goal of biological warfare is not to cause large numbers of casualties, but to sow confusion and fear, and to cost the enemy significant time and resources. Creating mass casualties, but not fatalities, can force the enemy to spend precious time and resources in caring for the wounded.

Preparation for biological attacks—even those that never come—can degrade the overall fighting ability of troops and distract commanders' attention from other urgent tasks. Being "suited up" in protective gear makes even simple tasks, such as shouting a command, communicating by radio, or operating a computer, more problematic. The mere act of donning full chemical and biological warfare protective gear can cause a percentage of personnel to panic. The ensuing chaos and confusion can lead to the abandonment of positions and weapons, a lack of focus, and failures in communication and command structures. Therefore, even the threat of biological attack can be a very potent weapon.

Because of the nature of the threat of biological warfare, a nation-state as well as a small terrorist organization or religious cult armed with biological weapons can neither be trifled with nor ignored by other nations. Chemical weapons have been called a kind of "poor man's atomic bomb." The same can be said of biological weapons.

ACQUIRING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

In most cases, acquiring biological weapons requires both the purchase of the seed stock—the biological agent itself—and the subsequent development of the weapons from this agent. The initial outlay of infrastructure, equipment, and technology needed to develop biological warfare capability is relatively inexpensive and accessible. However, significant technical barriers must be overcome. A seed culture must be obtained. Some agents occur naturally, and can be extracted from the environment (such as anthrax). Other, better ways to secure the hardiest and most virulent strains of a given organism are to steal it from a research institute, public health facility, hospital or university laboratory, or to legitimately purchase it from a supplier. In addition, safety for workers requires some sort of physical protections against exposure to the

agent, though these protections need not be especially sophisticated.

Although many nations today are attempting to guard the stocks of potential biological warfare agents more closely, these rules are not consistently applied by all countries or suppliers. Until recently, for example, samples that could be used as seed stocks for organisms like anthrax, botulism, and gangrene, were still available on the open market from reputable suppliers. As late as 1998, British journalists were able to obtain a sample of botulism toxin for about $25 from a company in the Czech Republic.

WEAPONIZATION AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS

Once sufficient quantities of a biological agent have been produced, it is necessary to develop technology to process and deliver it effectively. This process is known as weaponization. Biological warfare agents must be capable of surviving storage and dissemination, which may include a flight at 30,000 feet and, in many cases, the heat and shock from an explosive dispersal. Ambient conditions, such as moisture and ultraviolet light, can also be a concern at the scene of the attack. For aerosol and other specialized modes of delivery, the agent must also have an acceptable particle size.

The two main delivery methods for biological agents in warfare are point-source dispersal, which makes use of munitions such as an artillery shell or a missile warhead, and line-source dispersal, which employs a sprayer system. Atmospheric conditions can heavily influence the overall effectiveness of an agent—there is a huge difference in the effect of an agent used on a windy battlefield or in an air-conditioned shopping mall. Delivery systems also must be designed to take into account how the agent reacts to wind, bright sunlight, rain, high altitudes, and other ambient conditions.

COVERT SUPPLIES AND PRODUCTION

It can be difficult for other nations to verify whether a country is operating a covert biological weapons program. Although biological proliferation is prohibited by international law, most technologies used to produce such weapons are dual-use. That is, they have legitimate uses in addition to their ability to produce biological weapons. It is therefore difficult to determine whether a given facility is legitimate or not. For example, a legitimate pharmaceutical or vaccine plant may use the same equipment as that used to produce biological weapons.

Biological weapons production is also easy to hide because large storage facilities are not needed.

Small amounts of a biological weapons agent seed culture can multiply into large quantities in as little as two weeks. Militarily significant amounts of biological weapons agents can be produced in a laboratory no bigger than a trailer home.

PROHIBITIONS AGAINST BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 (BWC) prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of biological warfare agents and the devices used to deliver them. However, defensive research into preventing biological weapons attacks is still permitted. Because many of the same processes, equipment, and infrastructure are used for offensive and defensive research, it can be impossible to determine the true intent of a given program. In addition, the BWC does not provide an extensive verification process. It is now known that the Soviet Union had an extensive biological weapons program. However, although the United States and other countries long suspected this, it was not until after the break up of the Soviet Union that the magnitude of the program became known.

HISTORY OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Biological warfare has a long history. As long ago as 400 BCE, Scythian archers dipped their arrows in feces and putrefying corpses before shooting at their enemies. Roman soldiers ran their swords into manure and rotting dead animals before battle, resulting in infections such as tetanus among those wounded. During the French and Indian War in North America, blankets and clothing contaminated with smallpox were given to the Indians by British traders.

Despite the number of modern nations that have conducted research into biological weapons, there have been few incidences of biological warfare against human populations since the 19th century. Perhaps the main reason for this is uncertainty about the ultimate consequences—small changes in meteorological conditions can inadvertently expose friendly forces or civilian populations to the infectious agent.

International outrage is another deterrent. One notable exception was Japan, which conducted an enormous biological weapons program in occupied Manchuria between 1937 and 1945. At least 10,000 prisoners died because of infection or experimentation during this program. Many thousands of Chinese civilians also died because of field testing and outright biological attacks by Japanese Army scientists.

See also Anthrax; Biodefense/Biosecurity; Biological Weapons Convention; Bioterrorism; Dual-Use Technology; Germ Warfare; Infectious Diseases; Offensive Biological Weapons Program, U.S.; Public Health and National Security

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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Treaty that bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, and maintenance of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, in types and quantities that are inconsistent with peaceful use. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of both poison gas and bacteriological/biological weapons in warfare. However, by the time of the 1932–37 Disarmament Conference, attempts were being made to create an agreement that would also prohibit the production and stockpiling of biological and chemical weapons. Strong differences arose, however, as to whether chemical and biological weapons should continue to be linked.

On November 25, 1969, U.S. president Richard Nixon declared that the United States unilaterally renounced the first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical agents and weapons and unconditionally renounced all methods of biological warfare. Nixon ordered the U.S. Department of Defense to draw up a plan for the disposal of existing stocks of biological weapons. He also announced that the future efforts of the U.S. biological program would be confined to research on strictly defined defensive measures such as immunization. A number of countries including Canada, Sweden, and Great Britain followed suit. However, others, such as the Soviet Union, continued to push for a comprehensive agreement covering both biological and chemical weapons.

On March 30, 1971, the Soviet Union agreed to a draft convention limited to biological weapons and toxins. On August 5th of that year, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted separate, but identical, texts of a draft agreement to the United Nations General Assembly. The resolution was approved by a vote of 110 to 0 on December 16, 1971.

Although the convention drew widespread support, not all countries fully approved it. France abstained from voting because of fears that the convention might weaken the Geneva Protocol ban on the use of chemical weapons. France enacted separate domestic legislation banning biological weapons the following year. The People's Republic of China criticized the convention for not including chemical weapons in its prohibition, and neither participated in negotiations nor signed the convention. Several other countries signed, but expressed reservations similar to those voiced by the Chinese.

The convention is officially known as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and is often called the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) for short. It was submitted for signature simultaneously at Washington, London, and Moscow on April 10, 1972. The U.S. Senate ratified the convention in December 1974 and President Gerald R. Ford signed it on January 22, 1975. In January 1976, all heads of federal agencies and departments certified to President Ford that they were in full compliance with the convention.

The absence of any formal verification regime to monitor compliance with the convention has limited its effectiveness. At a special conference in 1994, the nations that were parties to the convention agreed to establish the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the BWC to negotiate and develop a legally binding verification regime. Although progress has been made, differing views and positions on key issues mean that this work is still ongoing. In 2001, the states parties

adopted a final report that included a decision to hold annual meetings of the states parties and experts in the three years leading up to the next conference to review the convention in 2006.

See also Biological Weapons and Warfare; Geneva Conventions; Nixon, Richard, and National Policy; Treaties

BIOTECHNOLOGY

Any technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof to make or modify products or processes for specific use. Biotechnology is best understood as a group of affiliated disciplines, ranging from food production to bioterrorism alert sensors. Certain advances in biotechnology have important military applications and significant ramifications for national security.

Today's biotechnology revolution began in the 1970s, as scientists learned to alter the genetic makeup of living organisms by processes other than traditional selective breeding practices. Fundamental achievements in molecular biology over the last three decades have given significant growth to the multidisciplinary field of biotechnology. Scientific advances such as genomics have allowed investigators to map genes and identify their functions. Using the tools of genetic engineering, scientists are now able to transfer valued genes from one species to another. Analysts are agreed that applying 20th-century advances in chemistry and physics to life sciences will make biotechnology the science of the 21st century.

As a part of the recently launched war on terrorism, Sandia National Laboratories, whose main location is in New Mexico, is greatly expanding its efforts in biotechnology, particularly in such areas as the creation of new materials that might aid in the war on terrorism. Securing new energy sources is another field within biotechnology. The U.S. Departments of Energy and Agriculture have begun a national effort to create renewable energy sources with bioenergy, thereby lessening U.S. dependence on fossil fuels (the largest reserves of which are located in the Middle East).

The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) at the National Institutes of Health was established in March 2004 to provide advice to federal departments and agencies to minimize the possibility that knowledge and technologies emanating from biological research will be misused to threaten public health or national security. The NSABB is a critical element in current federal initiatives that promote biosecurity in life science research, and, as such, it monitors dual-use research, or biological research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biologic threat to public health or national security. In addition to new technologies or processes, dual-use research could encompass studies that yield information on how to increase a toxin's lethality, manipulate threat agents that might impair vaccine effectiveness, and enable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin.

See also Biodefense/Biosecurity; Bioterrorism; Dual-Use Technology

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BIOTERRORISM

Terrorism using biological agents or toxins. Actual incidences of bioterrorism or warfare involving biological agents have been extremely rare. The only documented case occurred during World War II, when Japan used plague bacteria against Chinese troops in Manchuria. During the Cold War (1945–90), several nations, including the United States and the Soviet Union, developed biological weapons programs. Suspicions that Iraq had secretly developed biological and chemical weapons, and might possibly pass related technology, material, or weapons to terrorist groups, was one of the stated reasons why the United States invaded Iraq in May 2003 and removed its dictator, Saddam Hussein, from power.

Biological agents and toxins have been used by terrorist groups four times in the last 25 years. In 1984, a religious cult in Oregon added salmonella bacteria to a local water supply and several restaurant salad bars, sickening more than 700 people in an attempt to depress voter turnout for an upcoming election. In the spring and summer of 1990, Aum Shinrikyo, a religious cult in Japan, made as many as 10 attempts to disperse biological agents in downtown Tokyo. Using an aerosol device, the group tried first to spread botulinum toxin,

and later, anthrax. No injuries or illnesses were reported. In the fall of 2001, cases of anthrax broke out at several locations in the United States. Nineteen people who were exposed to anthrax spores sent through the mail became infected, and five died. In the wake of this anthrax scare, as many as 10,000 people in the United States began a two-month course of treatment with the antibiotic Cipro. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is still investigating the attacks, although the source of the anthrax has been identified as the U.S. biodefense program.

In what looked like another wave of mail-related attacks, powder later identified as the toxin ricin was found in a mailroom at the office of Senator Majority Leader Bill Frist (Republican from Tennessee) in February 2004. At the time, the White House disclosed to the public that ricin had also been found in one of its off-site mail-sorting facilities in November 2003. No further information about this incident has been released to date.

TOP THREATS

Biological agents can come in one of two forms. Pathogens are disease-causing microorganisms, including bacteria, microplasmas, and viruses. They are living and can reproduce. Toxins, such as ricin, on the other hand, are poisons of biological origin. They are not living organisms and cannot reproduce.

U.S. health officials have categorized almost all known types of disease-producing biological agents and toxins. According to the Centers for Disease Control, Category A agents (which include anthrax, botulism, plague, smallpox, and viral hemorrhagic fevers) are of highest priority because they can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person and result in high mortality rates. These agents have the potential for major public health impact, and they might cause public panic and severe social disruption. Category B agents, such as ricin and Q fever, are also dangerous but not as potentially lethal or disruptive as Category A agents.

POTENTIAL RESPONSES

Vaccines exist for several major biological agents, including smallpox and anthrax, but further research and development is needed before they can be considered safe and effective. Anthrax and plague can be treated with antibiotics immediately after exposure.

Antiviral drugs can be used against several hemorrhagic fever viruses.

A major concern for U.S. homeland security is that a biological weapons attack by terrorists would require a response from bureaucracies that do not normally work together. Several pieces of federal legislation in the last few years, most notably the Bioterrorism Act of 2002, have laid out clearer roles and responsibilities for federal, state, and local agencies, and have sought to increase the ability of these agencies to coordinate a response to a terrorist attack using biological agents.

Incentives/Disincentives for Use

In addition to the fear factor, or ability to cause panic among large parts of the population, biological agents have a few advantages over conventional and other unconventional weapons. They are mobile and virtually invisible; the results are not immediately apparent; and the attack may not be traceable to a perpetrator or target. They are also self-perpetuating and cheaper to produce than nuclear weapons.

There are, however, both technical and motivational constraints to bioterrorism. Biological agents are difficult to develop and weaponize. A group interested in developing biological weapons must first experiment with deadly viruses, bacteria, and/or toxins, and then come up with a way to effectively disperse the agent among a target population. Most biological agents are sensitive to heat and other environmental conditions, and have to be either ingested or inhaled. Terrorist groups also face the serious danger of infecting themselves.

The possibility of tracing a biological agent back to its developers, the so-called return address problem, creates a major disincentive for state sponsorship of bioterrorism and makes it difficult for an individual or group to find safe haven after launching a biological attack. Finally, there is a risk of a backlash against the use of biological agents from a group's membership as well as its financial supporters and potential sympathizers.

While the consequences of a biological attack might be severe, most terrorists have, to date, preferred other methods of attacking their enemies. This is largely because such methods are based on proven technology or strategy and have a record of causing many casualties. Nevertheless, security experts are concerned that international terrorists are increasingly

interested in using biological agents to attack the United States and other populations.

Multilateral Efforts Against Biological Agents

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which prohibits efforts to develop, produce, or stockpile biological weapons, was signed by the United States, Russia, Britain, and 19 other nations in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. Today, there are 150 signatories to the Convention. Major criticisms of the Biological Weapons Convention are that it does not prohibit research and does not contain provisions to ensure compliance. For example, Russia and Iraq both signed the BWC, but they continued to develop biological weapons anyway. A working group was formed in the mid-1990s to develop a biological weapons protocol for ensuring compliance, but efforts were stalled when the United States refused to sign a draft protocol in 2001.

See also Anthrax; Biodefense/Biosecurity; Biological Weapons and Warfare; Biological Weapons Convention; Germ Warfare; Infectious Diseases

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BIPOLARITY

International political system in which a balance or distribution of power exists between two states acting as dominant centers of power. Political theorist Kenneth Waltz sees the international environment as an anarchical setting in which states behave in a self-interested and rational manner. In this context, states will act to maximize their relative power within the existing power structure. The existing structures may take one of three forms: unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar.

In a bipolar system, two dominant states achieve rough political and military equality with one another and the remaining states become relatively irrelevant as independent actors. When two states emerge as centers of power, the remaining states attempt to maximize their position by allying with one of the two dominant states. This behavior is commonly referred to as *bandwagoning*.

The most recent illustration of the phenomenon of bipolarity was the 20th-century Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Following the end of World War II, with Europe lying in ruins, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the world's dominant political and military powers. The United States represented the democratic and capitalistic Western nations while the Soviet Union was the leader of the communist world. The creation of two alliances—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact—institutionalized the bipolar nature of the international setting and the leadership of these two rival alliances by the United States and Soviet Union, respectively.

The member states in each alliance represented a sphere of influence for the power that led the alliance. The United States and the Soviet Union spent nearly a half-century attempting to expand their spheres of influence around the world in a series of proxy wars in Asia and Latin America. The adversarial relationship between the two superpowers also carried over into the newly created United Nations. The United States and Soviet Union were both members of the United Nations Security Council and both wielded veto power. Each frequently used this power to leverage their influence in the UN.

Militarily, the United States enjoyed a brief nuclear superiority, but pursuit of the nuclear bomb was not the only source of competition between the superpowers. Throughout the 1960s, both states were locked in a space race. The Soviet Union achieved an initial advantage with the first successful launch of an Earth-orbiting satellite (*Sputnik*) and by putting the first human into space. However, the United States space program eventually eclipsed that of the Soviets by landing a man on the moon.

The two superpowers faced off around the world, particularly in Germany, the dividing point between East and West. Both maintained large military contingents in their European spheres of influence. Although Europe was the most dreaded flashpoint throughout the Cold War, military conflict did not

occur on this front. Instead, the outlet for the tension between the United States and Soviet Union occurred in a series of proxy wars around the world.

Perhaps the most significant of these conflicts were the Vietnam War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In each of these conflicts, one superpower found itself engaged in a protracted conflict with indigenous fighters supported by the opposing superpower. These proxy wars became a way for one superpower to bleed the other without the danger of direct confrontation, which likely would have resulted in nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 demonstrated the potential for this nuclear threat to become a reality.

The bipolar power structure ended with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. While these events were heralded as a victory for freedom and democracy, little attention was paid to the implications of these developments on the international power structure. The United States stood alone as the sole superpower, unchallenged by any other state militarily, politically, or economically. It would not be until a decade later, in the wake of international terrorism around the globe, that nostalgia for the stability and predictability of a bipolar power structure would emerge.

See also Afghanistan, War in; Cold War; Cuban Missile Crisis; Multipolarity; NATO; Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy; Unipolarity; Vietnam War; Warsaw Pact

BLITZKRIEG (LIGHTNING WAR)

Form of brutal, decisive offensive warfare introduced by Germany in World War II and characterized by speed, surprise, technological superiority, and devastating force to overpower and demoralize enemies. On September 1, 1939, the Nazi forces of Germany launched a devastating mechanized military campaign against its neighbor, Poland. The country fell in only five weeks in a campaign that shocked the world. Similar campaigns were soon launched successfully against France and the Low Countries, and later against the Soviet Union (although that attack did not end in German victory).

These Nazi attacks, known in German as blitzkrieg, were initially regarded as a revolutionary form of warfare. In reality, the blitzkrieg was an innovative synthesis of existing tactics, technological developments, and

well-developed strategy (culled from studies by military experts of Germany's humiliating defeat in World War I). Nazi strategists realized that Germany's position in the European heartland meant that its forces potentially could be outnumbered by an alliance of hostile neighbors. Enemy numerical superiority meant inevitable defeat in a sustained, traditional conflict; thus, the Germans developed an effective new strategy based on speed and maneuverability.

The premise of the Nazi blitzkrieg was both simple and brilliant. It was, to some degree, a modern improvement on the classic divide-and-conquer strategy. The fundamental objective of blitzkrieg was to destroy both the enemy's capacity and will to fight by inspiring panic, confusion, and terror as a result of intensive and overpowering surprise attacks.

Most effectively, and most famously, Nazi forces launched the first blitzkrieg in Poland, where they amassed their forces at a precise location at the last moment. Precise aerial attacks from the German air force (Luftwaffe) neutralized initial defenses and disrupted enemy supply lines, communications, and command structures before Poles could respond to the onslaught. The Germans also attempted to destroy enemy air forces while they were still on the ground. Enjoying continued air support, the concentrated German forces on the ground—including armored tanks and well-armed, well-trained soldiers with antitank guns and artillery—then focused their attack on one main point (schwerpunkt) on the enemy front.

The use of these technologies in conjunction with each other allowed the Nazis to break through enemy defenses and encircle a pocket of enemy cavalry or infantry. Encircling was highly effective because it allowed the Nazi armies to use large amounts of force against small, disorganized, trapped enemy formations. Unlike merely pushing the enemy army back, encircling prevented the enemy from regrouping or re-forming fronts, making German victory quicker and easier and involving fewer casualties. Prearranged, well-organized logistics—supplies and reinforcements—allowed the advancing army to maintain its speedy momentum and continue its frightening attack.

Importantly, the blitzkrieg also had devastating psychological effects on those attacked—combatants and noncombatants alike. Inasmuch as the speed and technological force of the German assault was unprecedented, the Polish (and later, Belgian, French, and other) forces were unable to deal effectively with the onslaught. Thus, German aerial attacks affected

civilians just as much as the armed forces: Major population centers were shelled as well as defensive fortifications. The blitzkrieg thus blurred or eliminated both the physical and psychological distance from the front lines for both military personnel and civilians, creating fear, disorder, and panic. In its military brutality and its employment of total war tactics that refused to distinguish between military targets and civilians, the blitzkrieg proved to be far more destructive than traditional warfare.

See also Tactics, Military

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BOMBER FLEET *See* AIRCRAFT CARRIER, BOMBER GAP, F-117A STEALTH FIGHTERS, FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

BOMBER GAP

The perceived Soviet advantage in military air power that alarmed the United States at the start of the Cold War. In 1954, the Soviet Union displayed its newest long-range bombers at a military celebration in Moscow. The Soviets allowed Western diplomats and military officials to attend the celebration. To deceive these visitors, the Soviets repeatedly flew the same aircraft overhead. Their tactic worked; the visitors left Moscow concerned that the Soviets had grabbed a decisive advantage in the Cold War struggle for air power. This supposed advantage became known as the *bomber gap*.

To overcome this gap, the highest-ranking officers in the U.S. Air Force urged President Dwight Eisenhower to devote a huge portion of the nation's defense budget to the production of military aircraft. However, Eisenhower did not believe that the bomber gap existed. Based on his estimates of Soviet production capabilities, Eisenhower doubted that the Soviets

could have developed such a large fleet. He also distrusted the more covert intelligence that exaggerated Soviet air power. In addition, Eisenhower blamed the emerging "military-industrial complex" for the incessant drive to build more aircraft and other military hardware.

To appease the Air Force command, however, Eisenhower authorized the development of the U-2 spy plane. The U-2 was manufactured of aluminum and was extremely light, which allowed it to reach heights of 70,000 feet. It was equipped with enough fuel to travel 30,000 miles. Most importantly, it carried the most advanced spy cameras and over a mile of film. The Air Force began using the U-2 on spying missions against the Soviet Union on July 4, 1956.

The U-2 was nearly impervious to Soviet attacks because the Soviets did not possess any military aircraft capable of reaching the same altitude. Therefore, the plane could fly directly over the Soviet Union and closely monitor all Soviet air tests. Consequently, this advanced surveillance both stunted the Soviet Union's air program and demonstrated that the bomber gap did not exist. But more importantly, the U-2 lacked any offensive capabilities. Its use frustrated the Soviets, but it did not threaten them or push them into actions that were more aggressive.

Eisenhower's support for the U-2 both alleviated fears over the bomber gap and allowed him to concentrate on the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Eisenhower correctly assumed that the development of ICBMs was also a Soviet priority. He therefore ordered each branch of the military to develop its own design for a long-range missile, hoping that the competition among the branches would both spur a better design and also stifle the debate over which branch of the military would control the nation's expanding nuclear arsenal.

By discounting fears of the bomber gap, Eisenhower successfully kept pace with the Soviet Union in the Cold War's most important arena, the development of nuclear weapons. Because Eisenhower shifted the military's emphasis from the development of aircraft to the development of ICBMs, he prevented the Soviets from achieving an advantage in nuclear capability that they could have used against the United States to win the Cold War.

See also Air Warfare; Cold War; Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy; Military-Industrial Complex; U.S. Air Force; U-2 Spy Plane Incident

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BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

Efforts by the federal government to provide a level of border security and safety that adequately corresponds to terrorist threats from abroad while facilitating legitimate cross-border travel and commerce and protecting civil liberties.

THE BTS AND BORDER SECURITY

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, raised serious questions about the security of the nation's borders from terrorist attack. Several of the hijackers who flew airplanes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on that day were on lists of suspected terrorists. Government officials and the public alike wanted to know how they were able to obtain U.S. visas and entry into the United States despite being on terrorist watch lists. The attacks led to the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) tasked with coordinating government efforts to protect the nation from attack. In March 2002, the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security (BTS), a division of DHS, assumed responsibility for securing the nation's borders and transportation systems.

The BTS oversees more than 350 official ports of entry that connect the United States to the rest of the world. It also assumes responsibility for enforcing the nation's immigration laws. Divisions of the BTS include the United States Customs Service, the enforcement division of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and the Transportation Security Administration. BTS has oversight of all government infrastructure and relies on the Federal Protective Service to protect government buildings.

In addition to providing security to the nation's borders and ports of entry, the BTS is responsible for defending the U.S. transportation system. The recently created Transportation Security Administration, now part of the BTS directorate, has responsibility for security at the nation's airports. The BTS uses a wide array of methods to fulfill its duties including intelligence gathering, enforcement of regulations, and inspection, screening, and education of carriers, passengers, and shippers.

DEFENDING THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

The Department of Transportation is responsible for ensuring that the nation's transportation infrastructure is robust and efficient, and that it keeps pace with modern technology and the nation's demographic and economic growth. This mandate is threatened by the specter of terrorism and the vulnerability of the national transport system. The United States has a 7,500-mile land and air border with Canada and Mexico. More than 500 million people, including 330 million noncitizens, are admitted into the United States every year. Each year, 11.2 million trucks and 2.2 million rail cars cross into the United States and 7,500 foreign-flag ships make 51,000 calls to U.S. ports.

The principles of free and open trade, which have been responsible for the extraordinary prosperity and economic growth of the United States, are also at the heart of the transport system's vulnerability. Maritime trade is perhaps the most exposed link in the system. The maritime trade transport system is a major source of concern among world governments and global corporations. Particularly serious is the matter of container transport. The uniformity, speed, and anonymity of containerized traffic offer terrorists ample opportunity to inflict catastrophic damage to the commercial infrastructure of the United States. The system has already been the target of pirates and criminal organizations, which regularly traffic in contraband materials, weapons, illegal drugs, and bulk quantities of dangerous material. Terrorists have the ability to exploit weak maritime security to move material, funds, and human beings around the globe using legitimate commercial operations as fronts for their activity.

In addition to being open and free flowing, the global transport system is highly interdependent. The U.S. government estimates that a disruption in world trade because of an attack on several major seaports could cost the United States economy nearly $60 billion. The ripple effect of such an attack would have a

devastating impact on world commerce and perhaps trigger a global recession. Messages to and from al-Qaeda operatives around the world following the World Trade Center attacks revealed that the attacks were intended to inflict economic damage more than civilian loss of life. In *Al Ansar,* the main journal of al-Qaeda's thought, an author wrote:

> [W]e find that God has graciously enabled the mujahedin to understand the [American] enemy's essence and nature, and indeed his center of gravity. . . . [I]t is clearly apparent that the American center of gravity is the American economy. Supporting this penetrating strategic view is that the Disunited States of America are a mixture of nationalities ethnic groups and races united only by the "American Dream," or, to put it more correctly, worship of the dollar, which they openly call the "Almighty Dollar." Furthermore, the entire American war effort is based upon pumping enormous wealth at all times, money being as has been said, the sinew of war. . . . Aborting the American economy is not an unattainable dream.

POLICIES AND INITIATIVES

To counter these threats, the U.S. government has established several new agencies and programs. Examples of these efforts include the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which maintains a database known as TIPOFF. The database, compiled by State Department analysts, contains files on persons who may be considered terrorists. Such information may prove useful to consular and immigration officers when making decisions regarding visa issuance and admissions.

The Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) of the Immigration and Naturalization Service is a database maintained by the INS and the U.S. Customs Service that provides information to the federal inspection services. Through its National Automated Immigration Lookout System II (NAILS II), the INS and various other agencies supply information to IBIS. These agencies include the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), the International Crime Police Organization (INTERPOL), and the Department of Agriculture. Nearly 30 different agencies and 3,000 government employees have access to the system.

The Treasury Enforcement and Communications System (TECS II) serves as the centralized database for IBIS. Through TECS II, IBIS interfaces with many databases maintained by other state, federal, and international law enforcement agencies. IBIS contains approximately 5 million names and birth dates of individuals who may be inadmissible into the United States.

Despite these efforts, critics insist national security programs remain scattered and uncoordinated. Furthermore, in an increasingly interconnected world, meeting the challenges of national security may mean reassessing our position in the world and our relationship with other nations.

—Jack Jarmon

See also Border Policy; Homeland Security, Department of; Immigration and National Security; Transportation Security Administration

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PUBLIC PORTRAITS

Asa Hutchinson

Asa Hutchinson, former top official in the Department of Homeland Security, resigned his post in 2005 after twice being passed over for promotion to director of the department. In January 2003, the U.S. Congress approved the nomination of former Arkansas Congressman Asa Hutchinson as undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security at the Department of Homeland Security. In this position, Hutchinson headed an office with more than 110,000 employees and was responsible for protecting the nation's borders, transportation, and immigration systems.

As a congressman, Hutchinson served on both the House Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Judiciary Committee. In 2000, he was appointed as head of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), where he advocated both tough law enforcement policies and increased investment in drug treatment and education programs.

In announcing his resignation, Hutchinson expressed disappointment at failing to win the top post at the department and suggested that he may have future political ambitions.

BORDER POLICY

Laws and procedures for securing the nation's borders against terrorist threats while facilitating legitimate cross-border travel and commerce and protecting civil liberties. The U.S. government has established several federal organizations and programs to identify potential threats to the nation's borders. For example, the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research maintains a computerized database known as TIPOFF that contains files on potential terrorist suspects. Such information may prove useful to consular and immigration officers when formulating admission policies or making decisions about issuing visas.

The Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) provides similar information to federal inspection services. IBIS contains the names and birth dates of approximately 5 million individuals who should not be admitted into the United States. Through its National Automated Immigration Lookout System II (NAILS II), the INS and various domestic and international agencies supply IBIS with information about potential terrorists. Agencies that contribute data to NAILS II include the U.S. Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), the International Crime Police Organization (INTERPOL), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Nearly 30 different agencies and approximately 3,000 government employees have access to IBIS. Using a central database called the Treasury Enforcement and Communications System, IBIS can share information with databases maintained by other state, federal, and international law enforcement agencies.

Between 80% and 90% of world trade is seaborne, which means that maritime trade is probably the most exposed link in the border security system. The maritime transport system is a major security concern among world governments and global corporations, particularly the matter of container transport. In the United States, more than 7,500 container ships make 51,000 calls at 361 U.S. ports every day. Seven million containers are handled daily in the United States, but only about 2% to 7% of those containers are currently inspected. Although the current inspection system is clearly overwhelmed, the U.S. Commerce Department anticipates that container cargo traffic to the United States will increase to 30 million containers per day over the next 20 years. This represents an enormous opportunity for terrorists to strike at the United States and an equally enormous challenge for border policy.

To combat the threat of terrorist activity and the introduction of contraband via cargo ships, the U.S. government has instituted a number of voluntary security programs. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is a program to increase the security of containers shipped to the United States from around the world. Through this initiative, the world's largest ports are requested to host CSI teams of customs agents who will identify and inspect high-risk containers bound for the United States before they are loaded onto vessels.

Complementing CSI is the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT Program. This is a joint government-business initiative that aims to build a collaborative effort between government and the owners of the various parts of the nation's supply chain. Importers, carriers, brokers, warehouse operators, and manufacturers are requested to conduct a security audit of their operations. Each of these actors then develops, submits to the U.S. Customs Service, and implements a program addressing his or her operation's vulnerabilities. A "24-hour rule" demands that carriers electronically submit a cargo declaration 24 hours before loading cargo onto any vessel destined for the United States. This requirement links with the CSI program and offers participants an opportunity for self-policing (rather than suffering through customs verification), a reduced number of inspections, and eligibility for easier payment of customs duties. Failure to comply brings the risk of fines, audits, and the associated delays of processing documents.

Unfortunately, the necessary funding needed to adequately staff and operate these programs is lacking. Yet, despite the apparent lack of consequences for noncompliance and the onus of direct financial costs, participation actually is high from the largest ports exporting to the United States. The CSI program currently boasts 34 member ports, through which pass more than 60% of all container imports to the United States.

Despite such efforts, critics insist that national border security programs remain scattered and uncoordinated. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the nation has had an opportunity to extend its definition of national security to include security imperatives on the domestic front. However, the rupture between national security and homeland security became a chasm with the events of September 11. Rather than uniting the nations' resources and resolve, the calamity may have sharpened the bureaucratic, ideological, psychological, and budgetary divide.

This pessimistic assessment comes in the wake of a 2002 warning by the Council on Foreign Relations that the United States was unprepared to prevent and respond to a terrorist attack on its own territory. Since that time, almost no new safeguards or protective mechanisms have been put into place. As a counter-measure against U.S. vulnerability, the Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the United States (commonly known as the 9/11 Commission) recommended a new unity in the information sharing and intelligence community efforts. The recommendations led to the creation of a director of national intelligence position to coordinate intelligence-gathering capability across all federal agencies. However, border security remains the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security. Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies must find a way to overcome such bureaucratic divisions of authority to develop effective border policies.

See also Border and Transportation Security; Homeland Security, Department of; Immigration and National Security

BOSNIA INTERVENTION

Multilateral intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which took political, military, and humanitarian forms, and achieved mixed results. The Bosnian Intervention was a response to events following the breakup of the former communist state of Yugoslavia. Composed of quasi-autonomous republics divided along ethnic and religious lines, Yugoslavia was held together by the force of its ruler, Marshall Josip Broz, known as Tito. Upon Tito's death in 1980, the country began to fracture along sectarian lines, a development that would lead to a series of bloody conflicts in the Balkans.

THE END OF YUGOSLAVIA

In 1991, the Slovenian and Croatian republics unilaterally seceded from Yugoslavia. The following February, the Bosnian republic held a referendum on independence. The Croat and Muslim populations within Bosnia supported independence, but the Serbian population wished to remain part of Yugoslavia. The Bosnian Serbs boycotted the vote, and threatened to secede if the republic declared independence. Despite this threat, and encouraged by the support of the international community, Bosnia declared independence in April 1992.

The Yugoslav government in Belgrade did not want the country to fragment further, nor did it want to give up Bosnia. Belgrade was located in the former republic of Serbia and the central government was dominated by Serbs. They did not want to lose the Bosnian Serbs who identified with the Serbian portion of the former Yugoslavia.

BOSNIA AND SERBIA GO TO WAR

Soon after Bosnia declared her independence, fighting broke out with Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs on one side and Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims (known as Bosniacs) on the other. Serbian troops occupied large areas of Bosnia and subjected the Bosnian capital Sarajevo to a four-year siege that killed some 12,000 civilians. In the course of the fighting, thousands of civilian Bosniacs were killed, raped, and displaced by Serbian troops. The struggle turned into a genocidal conflict in which the Serbs attempted to kill as many Bosnian Muslims as possible. After a peace initiative led by the United States and Great Britain failed to stop the conflict in early 1993, Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs began fighting among themselves over the territory remaining under their control.

The international community had been only minimally involved in Bosnia prior to the outbreak of fighting. The United Nations, the European Community (EC), and the United States had each imposed arms embargoes against all Yugoslav republics by mid-1991 in an effort to curb armed combat in the region. This effort, intended to defuse the conflict, merely rendered it one-sided, however, as the Serbs—who were best able to circumvent the embargo—gained a decisive edge over their opponents. The United States and European Community attempted several times to negotiate the frequent differences that arose between the former Yugoslav states. Generally, however, the international community made little effort to intervene in the situation.

International Responses During The Conflict

The United States and European Community were the first to respond to the conflict in Bosnia, but their initial actions treated the crisis as a traditional humanitarian disaster rather than a genocidal war. The United

A U.S. soldier helping an orphaned boy take a picture of a landing helicopter during a volunteer mission of goodwill in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 2004. Between 1992 and 1995, Bosnia-Herzegovina was wracked by civil war in the aftermath of the collapse of communist Yugoslavia. Intervention by the United Nations and NATO finally helped to end the war and brought a measure of peace to the region.

Source: U.S. Army.

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was authorized to go to Bosnia in May 1992 to provide humanitarian relief. Germany, France, and the United States also organized airdrops when it became too dangerous for UN supply convoys to operate on the roads in Bosnia.

Nevertheless, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which had been active throughout former Yugoslavia, was not deployed for peacekeeping activities until June 1992. Even after its arrival in Bosnia, UNPROFOR took a cautious approach to its mandate because of a lack of consensus among UN member nations about when troops should intervene militarily and the appropriate level of force to employ.

By 1993, reports were circulating about genocide, atrocities in prison camps, and other acts of terror being committed by Serbian troops against Bosniac civilians. Still the international community refused to make a serious military commitment. Domestic issues in the United States and the European Community member states took precedence over participation in the Balkan conflict. The general lack of post–Cold War interest in the Balkans and a historical reluctance

by Western Europeans to become involved in Balkan politics were additional factors in their reluctance to get involved. The "equivalency" idea—the notion that each of the parties to the conflict were equally "guilty"—also eroded support for military intervention.

International organizations shied away from participation as well. The British, holding the presidency of the European Community at the time, largely shaped the EC response when much of the genocide and killing was taking place in the latter half of 1992. Britain advocated minimal, humanitarian-only involvement in Bosnia. Moreover, although the UN Security Council produced a great deal of legislation, there was little consensus on what was to be done. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, having mobilized UNHCR and UNPROFOR, also resisted further intervention in Bosnia.

A Change in Perspective

The fighting between Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs prompted UNPROFOR to declare certain areas of Bosnia as "safe areas" for Bosniacs seeking refuge from Serbian and Croat attacks. In 1994, in response to continued Serbian shelling of Sarajevo, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), issued an ultimatum that resulted later that year in NATO-launched air strikes against the Bosnian Serb Army, the first offensive military operation in NATO history.

In March 1994, the Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs signed a peace treaty that created a united state called the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A UN-sponsored cease-fire took effect in December 1994, though the situation remained unstable. In 1995, the situation further deteriorated, with little prospects for peace. On July 6 of that year, Bosnian Serbs mounted an offensive against

the designated safe haven of Srebrenica. They easily overwhelmed the small Dutch UN peacekeeping force and took control of the city. On July 11, the Serbs began a massacre of the Muslim population of the city, killing an estimated 8,000 unarmed men.

Despite the attack on Srebrenica, by August the Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs had seized the initiative, retaking most of western Bosnia from the Serbs. A cease-fire was implemented on October 5, 1995. Pressured by European diplomats and spurred by their losing effort in the war, the Bosnian Serbs subsequently agreed to start negotiations.

The Settlements

The final peace accord, known as the Dayton Agreement because it was negotiated under U.S. auspices in Dayton, Ohio, was reached on November 21, 1995. The agreement gave the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina control of 51% of Bosnia's prewar territory and the Bosnian Serbs the remaining 49%. The official agreement, the General Framework Agreement for Peace, was signed by the presidents of Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia, in Paris, in December 1995.

The peace agreement ended the fighting but left the warring armies intact and a fragile peace under NATO peacekeepers in place. The international community remains widely criticized for its slowness to act. While NATO intervention eventually put an end to the violence, it came too late to prevent widespread genocide, torture, and murder.

See also Ethnic Cleansing; Genocide; Interventionism; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; United Nations, The

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BOTTOM-UP REVIEW

Plan for restructuring the United States military after the Cold War and reducing military expenditures.

When Bill Clinton assumed the presidency in 1993, the United States had just emerged from the Cold War. For the first time in decades, the United States lacked an opponent who possessed an equal military strength. Because President Clinton had made the reduction of the federal deficit one of the cornerstones of his campaign, he viewed the Soviet Union's collapse as an excuse to downsize the United States military and reduce defense spending. In the spring of 1993, the Clinton administration proposed to abandon the traditional strategy of preparing for two simultaneous conflicts and to reduce force levels accordingly.

Several events in 1994 forced the administration to scuttle this proposal. Within a span of several months, North Korea threatened to build nuclear weapons, Iraq continued to resist inspections of its own weapons programs, and ethnic violence in the Balkans greatly increased. The Clinton administration admitted that the United States must remain prepared to confront two different hostile situations. Instead, the administration proposed to conduct a bottom-up review of the entire United States military.

After the review was completed, the Clinton administration released its key recommendations. Although the United States would retain the capability to fight in two theaters, the theaters themselves would be altered. Instead of preparing for a Soviet invasion of Europe, the United States would now concentrate on the Middle East. The United States would retain a strong presence in Asia, but the focus would be the Korean peninsula. The administration determined that a force of 1.45 million active-duty personnel would be needed to complete these missions. The United States would also maintain its forward presence in the Mediterranean Sea, the Western Pacific, and the Persian Gulf.

Additionally, the Clinton administration recognized the need to maintain a technological superiority over any potential rivals. Therefore, it promoted the development of new fighter jets, precision-guided munitions, advanced communication systems, and new attack submarines. The administration's unstated goal was to see the United States ensconced as the world's sole superpower. If the United States maintained a hegemonic position, the administration believed, other countries would refrain from seeking to ascend the international stage.

Many of the recommendations that resulted from the bottom-up review were insightful and advantageous to the United States and its national security.

The Clinton administration, however, failed to secure adequate funding for these initiatives and their implementation. Ultimately, the administration's desire to reduce the deficit and balance the budget outweighed its desire to fully enact the reforms suggested in the bottom-up review. Consequently, the size of the military was reduced during the Clinton administration and many of the programs recommended in the review were delayed.

This conflict between budgetary constraints and the need for a restructured military has persisted during George W. Bush's presidency. When the Bush administration began, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced his intention to reshape the military. Unfortunately, the War on Terror has intervened, leaving the goal of the bottom-up review only partially accomplished.

See also Bush, George W., and National Policy; Clinton, Bill, and National Policy; Rumsfeld, Donald

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BRANCH DAVIDIANS

Apocalyptic religious community that engaged in a 51-day standoff with police and federal agents in Waco, Texas. The confrontation resulted in deaths on both sides and sustained controversy about unconventional religious groups and appropriate law enforcement response to situations such as the one that arose in Waco. The Branch Davidians are a Seventh-Day Adventist splinter group that believe that people are living in end times—the era just before the Biblical apocalypse of Armageddon. Further, they believe that the biblical Book of Revelation holds clues about these end times, which, according to the Branch Davidians and some other groups, can be correctly interpreted by a true prophet or "chosen vessel."

Vernon Howell, a self-styled prophet who changed his name to David Koresh in 1990, became involved with a group of Branch Davidians near Waco, Texas, in 1981. After a succession struggle, Koresh eventually gained control of the group, which was housed in a compound called Mount Carmel. Koresh claimed (and his followers believed) that he was the last prophet, one who was able to correctly interpret the Bible. They also believed that he was the "Lamb" who would foretell the Second Coming of Christ and open the seven seals of the book of Revelation.

Koresh drew on the Bible to suggest that the person who ushered in the Second Coming would not be an immaculate divinity, but rather a "Sinful Messiah." Seeing himself as this messiah, he prepared for his prophetic role by engaging in sex with multiple women, who he considered his wives. Koresh fathered children with many of these women, some of whom were below the Texas age of consent for marriage or sexual relations.

Reports of Koresh's sexual activities (described by critics as child abuse) and his stockpile of weapons (considered illegal by some law enforcement groups) reached the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), which obtained a warrant for his arrest. The ATF anticipated that Koresh would not give himself up, and so it launched an operation known as Operation Trojan Horse on February 28, 1993.

Koresh and the Branch Davidians learned about the intended surprise operation before it occurred, and the ATF was aware that they knew. Nevertheless, the operation proceeded, with deaths on both sides. Some critics of the federal government have claimed that the ATF launched an intentionally deadly raid against the Branch Davidians.

The FBI took over the virtual siege of the Branch Davidian compound on March 1, opening negotiations that ultimately failed. While most Branch Davidians saw themselves as free moral agents happily ensconced in a religious community, the FBI saw them as cult members manipulated by Koresh. Because of these different views, the two groups talked past one another. Koresh's personal history, his "Bible babble," and his insistence that he was the "Lamb" did not impress the authorities. Meanwhile, Koresh and the Branch Davidians viewed the psychological techniques of the authorities, including the use of bright lights and loud noises focused on the compound, as evidence of an oppressive government at work. Disagreements about releasing children from Mount Carmel and the compound's access to food staples and the media worsened negotiations. Koresh produced a surrender offer on April 14, saying he

would surrender after completing his writings about the seven seals.

Unconvinced of Koresh's intention to surrender, and concerned that some were being held against their will, federal officials sent tanks to the compound on April 19, 1993; the tanks injected flammable CS (tear) gas into the building. Multiple fires set by the Branch Davidians started within the building, which burned within 25 minutes. Most of those in the compound (between 75 and 86 people) perished from fire-related causes or gunshots. Among these were Koresh and 23 children.

The questionable techniques used by law enforcement have led to numerous investigations and conspiracy theories, and the event and its tragic conclusion fueled various antigovernment activities, including the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. While the Justice and Treasury Departments have exonerated the members of the FBI and ATF who took part in the incident, public controversy remains over the appropriateness of federal actions at Waco.

See also Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

BRETTON WOODS CONFERENCE

Conference held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to create a stable post–World War II international monetary system. The conference resulted in the establishment of shared international financial policies and institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

Economic nationalism, uncontrolled currency fluctuations, and competitive currency devaluation in the period between World Wars I and II made the international monetary system of the time highly unstable. Desperate to avoid trade deficits, nations frequently reduced the value of their currencies in order to make their goods cheaper to export to other countries. To avoid unfavorable changes in exchange rates, many countries responded by trading only with nations with whom they shared a common currency. The result was significantly slowed international trade that worsened the effects of the Great Depression of the 1930s.

During World War II, economic experts and world leaders identified this lack of international monetary cooperation as a source of political instability that contributed significantly to the outbreak of war. As the war progressed and defeat of the Axis powers grew imminent, the victors were eager to develop a cooperative "new world order" that would avoid the economic mistakes of the past. From June 1 until June 22, 1944, delegates from 44 countries participated in a meeting that became known as the Bretton Woods Conference, for the New Hampshire town in which it took place. The officials met to institute "the ground rules for international trade and finance" and to create an economic system that would promote worldwide peace and prosperity. Most of the policies adopted at the conference had been discussed and largely agreed on prior to the meeting. The proceedings that took place at Bretton Woods did little more than formalize the outcomes of discussions and debates that took place in the years preceding the end of the war.

The goal of the Bretton Woods agreements was to "combine an international system with the maximum of national monetary independence." The participants were keen to establish a single currency with a fixed value as the standard against which all currencies could be valued. Since the United States was the overwhelmingly dominant economic power at the war's end, the dollar was chosen to be the international currency standard. The U.S. government agreed to fix the value of the dollar relative to gold at $35 per ounce of gold. Other nations would be allowed to vary the value of their currency relative to the dollar, but only within a limited range. The participants hoped these changes would lead to a more stable international monetary system that would encourage trade and reduce political tensions arising from economic rivalries.

To enforce restrictions on changes in currency values, the Bretton Woods participants created a currency stabilization mechanism called the International Monetary Fund, or IMF. Under the agreement, no nation could change the value of its currency without IMF approval. The IMF was thus designed to prevent the wild fluctuations in the value of currencies that were common between the wars. The IMF also functioned as a financial adviser that helped nations manage their national debt and avoid the need to devalue their currencies to offset trade deficits.

Another institution created at Bretton Woods was the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which became known as the World Bank. It was designed to finance the rebuilding of the countries devastated by the war from funds donated by the participating members at Bretton Woods. It also

U.S. delegates at the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944. The conference, held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, toward the end of World War II, was aimed at establishing an international monetary system that would govern monetary relations among nations. The global monetary system established by the delegates at the conference played a significant role in postwar economic recovery and in creating a sound global economy.

Source: Corbis.

acted as a source of loans for countries that could not obtain financing from private sources. The bank had initial funds of $10 billion and was authorized to make private loans and issue bonds to raise additional capital. Less formally, the Bretton Woods agreements also supported liberalization of international trade and capital flows, development projects that emphasized economic growth rather than poverty relief, and the unspoken understanding that the United States would take a lead role in supporting the new monetary order.

The Bretton Woods agreements served as the backbone of the international monetary system until the early 1970s, when a series of changes in international finance rendered the agreements obsolete. As Europe and Asia recovered from World War II, the United States lost the dominant economic position it once enjoyed. As foreign economies and currencies grew stronger, the dollar grew relatively weaker. However, because the dollar's value was fixed relative to gold, currency traders could always receive an ounce of gold for $35 regardless of its value relative to other currencies. As the dollar declined in strength, currency traders converted their dollars into gold, which steadily depleted U.S. gold reserves.

During the late 1960s, the cost of the war in Vietnam led to massive U.S. inflation and a large trade deficit that undermined the value of the dollar. As currency traders sold large amounts of dollars, the nation's gold reserves plummeted. In August 1971, U.S. president Richard Nixon made the dollar inconvertible to gold, severely restricting the sale of dollars. However, this action undermined the foundation of the Bretton Woods system—a stable dollar with a value fixed in gold. By March 1973, all of the world's major currencies were again free to set their own exchange rates.

See also International Monetary Fund; World Bank

BRINKMANSHIP

The policy of pushing a situation to the brink of disaster to gain the most advantageous position against an adversary. The practice of brinkmanship, which had emerged during the Cold War and the age of nuclear weapons, marked a significant change in the conduct of foreign policy. Whereas the interaction between states was previously predicated on the balance of power—largely based on a state's economic and military power and the desire to prevent any major shifts in the status quo—the advent of the nuclear weapon created an entirely new set of foreign policy tools with which a nuclear-armed state could work. Brinkmanship was one of these tools, characterized by aggressive, risk-taking policy choices driving the conduct and

interaction between states to the threshold of tolerance to obtain the maximum objectives.

The tense relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War were indicative of the changing face of foreign and diplomatic relations. Perhaps the most well-documented case of brinkmanship was the Soviet placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962 and the U.S. response, now referred to as the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet leader at the time, Nikita Khrushchev, was notorious for carrying out extreme policies and making bold decisions to secure the most advantageous bargaining position. Similarly, Khrushchev's calculation in Cuba had been to extend Soviet strategic power and gain a leveraged position with regards to the United States. The Cuban Missile Crisis, however, while precipitating to a point on the brink of nuclear disaster, finally concluded with President John F. Kennedy's successfully standing down the Khrushchev brinkmanship and forcing the Soviets to withdraw their missiles from Cuba.

See also Cuban Missile Crisis; Kennedy, John F., and National Policy

BRODIE, BERNARD (1910–1978)

Military strategist who was the main proponent of the strategies of nuclear deterrence. Known as "the American Clausewitz," Bernard Brodie shaped the American debate on national nuclear strategy for half a century.

Born in Chicago, Brodie received his Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Chicago in 1940. He served in the office of the chief of naval operations from 1943 to 1945, and, after World War II, he taught at Yale University, where he was an associate professor of international relations and director of graduate studies. In 1951, Brodie joined the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California, where he worked on defense and nuclear strategy until 1966. He joined the Department of Political Science at UCLA in 1963 and retired in 1977.

Although his first publications were on naval warfare (*Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy* in 1942 and *Seapower in the Machine Age* in 1943), Brodie became famous for his work on nuclear strategy. He was the first scholar of strategic studies to innovate the

field, revisiting concepts and theories of warfare in the light of the new nuclear context. In his 1946 book *The Absolute Weapon*, Brodie anticipated the concept of massive retaliation of the 1950s. He was also the first to recognize the strategic significance of nuclear weapons.

Other books of Brodie's dealing with nuclear strategy include *The Atomic Bomb and American Security* (1945), *Strategy in the Missile Age* (1959), *Escalation and the Nuclear Option* (1966), and *From Crossbow to H-Bomb*, which he wrote in 1973 in collaboration with his wife, Fawn M. Brodie, a prominent historian. In 1973, Brodie also published *War and Politics*, a volume on the relations between military affairs and statecraft. In it, he examined the history of World Wars I and II and the Korean and Vietnamese Wars, and looked at the changing attitudes toward war, theories on its causes, nuclear weapons, and the nature of strategy itself.

Brodie always kept a sense of proportion and humanity on war. He advocated a strong policy that enabled the United States to defend itself and deter aggression, but he opposed arms races and excesses in military technology expenses.

See also Nuclear Deterrence; Nuclear Weapons; RAND Corporation

BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW (1928–)

Under President Jimmy Carter, national security advisor who played key roles in the negotiations for the SALT II treaty and efforts to sustain the shah in Iran. Zbigniew Brzezinski was born in Warsaw, Poland, in 1928. His father was a prominent member of the Polish government who was appointed ambassador to Canada in 1938. When Soviet-backed communists overtook the Polish government in 1945, the family was stranded in Canada. After this event, Zbigniew Brzezinski harbored a deep opposition to communism and the Soviet Union.

The younger Brzezinski solidified his reputation as an anticommunist as a foreign affairs adviser to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. In 1970, he published his most recognized work, *Between the Ages*, in which he opined that the United States and the Soviet Union would eventually confront one another in the third world in a battle over

natural resources. After the book's publication, Brzezinski formed the Trilateral Commission, an organization that encouraged the United States, Japan, and the Western European nations to increase economic support for resource-rich third-world nations to secure their allegiance.

While working at the Trilateral Commission, Brzezinski met Jimmy Carter, then the governor of Georgia. Brzezinski served as Carter's foreign affairs adviser during the 1976 presidential campaign. When Carter won the election, he appointed Brzezinski as his national security advisor.

The Carter foreign policy team achieved several major successes. With Carter's approval, Brzezinski advocated a broad expansion of the SALT treaty with the Soviet Union, although the Senate ultimately refused to ratify it when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. In 1978, Brzezinski helped Carter renegotiate the Panama Canal Treaty and prepare for the eventual transfer of authority over the canal to Panama. Brzezinski also worked assiduously on improving the United States' relationship with China. Under his guidance, the United States opened its first official embassy in the Chinese capital since the communists had assumed power.

Brzezinski's tenure as national security advisor, however, is best remembered for his public disputes with the State Department and for one memorable miscalculation. Friction between Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance began during the negotiations over the SALT II treaty. Both Carter and Brzezinski envisioned a radically enlarged treaty in which the Soviet Union would drastically limit its intercontinental ballistic missiles and the United Sates would limit its cruise missiles. However, Vance was not informed of this offer until he reached the negotiations. When the Soviets initially refused, Vance was publicly embarrassed.

In 1980, the split between Brzezinski and Vance became irreparable. Brzezinski argued that the threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD) did not deter the Soviet Union and that the United States had to intimidate the Soviets by targeting weapons solely on the Russian population instead of the entire Soviet Union. Vance vehemently objected and when Carter agreed to this strategic revision, he resigned.

In 1979, Brzezinski made his greatest mistake when he steadfastly supported the shah of Iran. Even though American intelligence suggested the inevitability of an Iranian revolution and questioned if the shah could weather it, Brzezinski convinced Carter to reject the insurgents' demands and uphold the shah. Consequently, when the Iranian revolution succeeded, the United States had no contact with Iran's new religious leaders. This lack of diplomacy led directly to the Iranian hostage crisis, which strongly contributed to Carter's defeat in the 1980 presidential election. Brzezinski's fatal miscalculation made the United States appear vulnerable and constituted the lowest point in his service as national security advisor.

See also Carter, Jimmy, and National Policy; Iranian Hostage Crisis; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT); National Security Council

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BULGE, BATTLE OF THE

Surprise German counteroffensive in the Ardennes region (Belgium-Germany-Luxemburg) during December 1944. The attack threatened Allied forces with a strategic defeat before superior Allied air and ground power restored their previously dominant military situation.

After three disastrous months of retreats following the D-Day Invasion, the German army made a surprising recovery in September 1944. New reserves, replacements, and weapons flowed to the front, while the Allies struggled with long supply lines, transportation failures, and blocked ports. The Allied armies arrayed on the Western Front now faced another set of deliberate battles for the Rhineland. Allied commanders abandoned any hopes of winning the war by the end of 1944.

By November, U.S. forces had managed significant advances to the German cities of Aachen and Strasbourg and Germany's Saar industrial region, despite heavy resistance and worsening weather conditions. These advances left the Allied line thin in places as they set in for a wintry stalemate. Meanwhile, the Germans were embarking on a carefully concealed month-long buildup of troops. On December 16, 1944, these forces burst on the thin U.S. lines facing the Eifel Mountains in what became known as the Battle of the Bulge.

The Germans surprised the U.S. First Army in its thinly defended sector, where rough terrain normally discouraged offensive action. Exploiting this weakness and bad weather that grounded Allied air power, the Germans attacked with three armies hoping to pass through the worst terrain before any Allied reinforcements appeared. The immediate military objectives were the bridges of the Meuse River that controlled access to the region. Strategically, Hitler and other German leaders hoped for a deep penetration into Allied lines to capture the key port of Antwerp. If successful, the attack could destroy almost half of the Allied forces in the west and buy Germany time to gain a negotiated peace.

The German timetable, which aimed to reach Antwerp in two weeks, soon unraveled as overwhelmed U.S. forces made desperate stands in villages and ridges of the Ardennes. Although two unproven U.S. infantry regiments of one division surrendered, other U.S. divisions and detachments held on to vital road junctions at the towns of St. Vith and Bastogne. Meanwhile, the nearby armies of U.S. general George Patton and British field marshal Bernard Montgomery counterattacked to narrow the German penetration, hence producing a bulge into the Allied lines. The return of clear weather exposed the Germans in the bulge to ruthless punishment by the Allied air forces. U.S. reinforcements stopped and then counterattacked the German advance elements with devastating effectiveness. The supreme Allied commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, called off further counterattacks on February 7, 1945, in order to turn Allied attention to other fronts. The Allies suffered 81,000 casualties compared to 100,000 for the Germans.

The initial assault by German forces was devastatingly successful, but the Germans failed to move over to the defensive after the attack had run its course. The pounding endured by the exposed German troops left them too weak to properly defend the Rhineland and the Ruhr in the spring of 1945. The attack, meant to prolong the war, likely shortened it by exhausting Germany's last fresh reserves.

See also Patton, George; U.S. Army; World War II

BUNDY, MCGEORGE (1919–1996)

Special assistant for national security affairs from 1961 to 1966 who, following his career in government, served as president of the Ford Foundation from 1966 to 1979. An Army intelligence officer during World War II, Bundy was on the Harvard faculty from 1949 to 1961. In 1953, at age 34, he became the youngest dean of the university's Faculty of Arts and Sciences.

McGeorge Bundy graduated from Yale University in 1940 and became a junior fellow at Harvard University the following year. After naval service in World War II, he went to work for Secretary of War Henry Stimson. In 1949, he joined the faculty of Harvard as a lecturer in the Department of Government. Two years later, he accepted an offer to become Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences. In that position, he played a key role in the founding of Harvard's Center for International Affairs and its Center for Middle Eastern Studies.

At this time, Bundy had a casual friendship with Massachusetts senator John F. Kennedy. When Kennedy was elected president in 1960, he asked Bundy to serve as his national security advisor. Bundy was one of a number of Kennedy appointees with distinguished academic backgrounds. The group was affectionately known as the "eggheads" for their intelligence and scholarly pedigrees.

Bundy is best known for his influence in foreign policy during the administrations of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Bundy supervised the staff of the National Security Council under both Kennedy and Johnson and, from that position, played a major role in forming U.S. foreign policy during the 1960s. He served as an adviser to President Kennedy during the Bay of Pigs Invasion (1961) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). As national security advisor to President Johnson, Bundy was an early advocate of increased American involvement in Vietnam.

Despite his early support for escalating the war in Vietnam and bombing North Vietnam, he came to regret those decisions. By 1968, Bundy had changed his attitude and become an advocate of limiting American involvement in Vietnam. As one of the earliest members of the Johnson administration to renounce its Vietnam policies, he spent much of his later career trying to understand and explain how he and others had erred so grievously. Because of his central role in planning the war in Vietnam, Bundy has been accused of being a war criminal by antiwar activists who hold him responsible for the deaths of Americans and Vietnamese during the war.

See also Bay of Pigs; Cuban Missile Crisis; Johnson, Lyndon B., and National Policy; Kennedy, John F., and National Policy; National Security Council; Vietnam War

BURDENSHARING

American demand that its European allies assume a greater percentage of the financial cost of operating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). During the early 1950s, the United States government began to complain that its European allies were not paying a proportionate share of the costs of the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The federal government devised the overall-wealth-to-military-expenditure criteria: Because the European nations did not spend nearly as much as the United States to develop weapons or deploy forces, they could afford to fund a greater share of NATO's operating costs. This ongoing dispute between the United States and its allies became known as the *burdensharing debate.*

European allies such as West Germany and Great Britain responded that the United States received other benefits from its military investment. Most notably, the European nations created a crucial buffer between the United States and the Soviet Union. If war was to erupt, the Allies contended, their nations would be the most decimated. Additionally, the Allies claimed that the United States economy benefited from military expenditures because of the increased spending on the defense industry. The European nations received no such corresponding investment. Instead, they noted, they incurred the costs of housing the United States forces and weaponry. Finally, the Allies noted that the United States remained the chief authority within NATO. If the United States wanted the Europeans to bear a greater share of the costs of NATO, then it would have to grant them a greater role in the decision-making process.

The burdensharing debate periodically continued for nearly three decades, but it became most contentious during the 1980s. Increasing budget deficits compelled the United States federal government to restrain spending. Again, the United States demanded that its European allies increase their share of NATO funding. However, developments in the Cold War made the European nations even more hesitant to augment their contributions. Relations between the Soviet Union and Europe had greatly improved, a Siberian-European pipeline had been opened, and the European nations reached other trade agreements with the Soviet Union. Also, the European allies once more accused the United States of not sharing its leadership role within NATO. They argued that NATO was not given a significant presence at the Reykjavik summit in 1986 between the Soviet Union and the United States. The emergence of the European Union also strengthened the ties among the European nations and isolated the United States within the NATO alliance.

Events at the end of the decade, however, radically changed the burdensharing debate. In December 1991, the Soviet Union crumbled, ending the threat of an invasion across Europe. Consequently, the debate now evolved to a question of *burdenshedding* as the United States began to reassess the size of its military presence in Europe. In 1990, the administration of President George H. W. Bush appointed an Ambassador-at-Large for Burdensharing. The ambassador's sole purpose was to devise ways that the United States could reduce its military expenditures in Europe.

The European allies, however, still desired a strong United States military presence. Even though the Soviet Union had collapsed, uncertainty remained over the stability of the governments in both Russia and the former Soviet satellite nations. Consequently, the United States did not immediately recognize the hoped for "peace dividend," or a saving in expenditures from the Cold War.

The issue of burdensharing still has not been resolved. The administration of President George W. Bush frequently has cited plans to move troops out of Western Europe, even as NATO has expanded to include many of the former Soviet satellite nations. Debate still rages about how best to allocate the costs of NATO.

See also Cold War; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS (ATF)

Agency within the U.S. Department of Treasury between 1972 and 2003 responsible for enforcing federal law pertaining to firearms, explosives, alcohol, tobacco, and arson. The bureau also collected tax revenue on alcohol and tobacco products. As part of the executive branch, ATF enforced congressional actions regarding alcohol, tobacco, and firearms but had no power to write or amend a law. The bureau was split into two separate departments in 2003.

The ATF traced its lineage to the very beginning of the United States. The first U.S. Congress taxed imported spirits and gave the Department of Treasury responsibility for administering and collecting the customs duties. However, the bureau got its administrative start as part of the Office of Internal Revenue, which was founded in 1862 to collect taxes, particularly those on tobacco and spirits. In 1863, Congress authorized the Office of Internal Revenue to hire three detectives, giving the agency enforcement authority. By the end of the decade, the agency had its own lawyer as well.

In 1877, the Office of Internal Revenue became the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In 1886, it acquired its first laboratory to test the purity of butter. From this humble start, modern ATF laboratories have arisen that analyze alcohol, tobacco, and other products, and provide forensic expertise in explosives and arson and criminal evidence.

During the early 20th century, the ATF was called on to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment that gave rise to the Volstead Prohibition Enforcement Act of 1919. The Volstead Act outlawed the sale of alcoholic beverages in the United States. Bureau agents, known as revenuers, raided illegal alcohol production and storage facilities as well as underground bars known as speakeasies. They also battled organized crime gangs involved in the lucrative and violent trade in illegal alcohol.

With the repeal of prohibition in 1933 and the subsequent relegalization of alcohol, the bureau focused its efforts on regulation and collection of taxes on alcohol. Passage of the National Firearms Act of 1934 and the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 later added firearms control to the bureau's responsibilities. Tax collection was a component of this mission, just as it was for alcohol.

In 1952, the Bureau of Internal Revenue became the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which included a separate Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division. The 1968 Gun Control Act gave the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division's laboratory responsibility for explosives, and the division was renamed the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) Division.

At this time, it became clear to government officials that the ATF was more oriented toward law enforcement activities and did not fit comfortably within a tax-collecting agency such as the IRS. In 1972, the ATF was separated from the IRS, taking responsibility for alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and explosives. In the 1970s, the ATF also took responsibility for enforcing gambling laws, but it soon returned that duty to the IRS. The Anti-Arson Act of 1982, which made arson a federal crime, brought arson investigation under the ATF roof as well.

The ATF was the subject of considerable controversy because of enforcement operations it undertook during the 1990s. ATF raids on the Branch Davidian compound near Waco and the Weaver family home at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, resulted in multiple deaths and raised questions about the way the agency exercised its authority. The ATF was sometimes referred to by other law enforcement agencies as F-Troop, a slur referring to a comic cavalry troop on television. At the same time, it won praise for its work on the 1993 terrorist bombing in New York of the World Trade Center and the 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building.

With the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, the ATF split. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives moved to the Department of Justice, and the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau remained within Treasury. The split was effective March 2003.

See also Branch Davidians; Homeland Security, Department of; Ruby Ridge

BUSH DOCTRINE

National strategy proposed and adopted by U.S. President George W. Bush in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC.

The main principle of the Bush Doctrine is the use of preventive military force against new threats of terrorism and rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Doctrine also includes the principle of unilateralism, or the willingness to act alone if necessary, and a strong belief that the U.S. strategy of opening societies to democracy will bring peace and stability throughout the world.

President Bush initially formulated some key concepts of his doctrine in the wake of the September 11 attacks, when he declared that the United States would make no distinction between terrorists and those who harbor them. On September 20, 2001, in a televised address to a joint session of Congress, President Bush summed up this principle stating that "every nation, in

every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." As a consequence, in October 2001, Bush ordered the invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Taliban regime, which had failed to hand over Osama bin Laden, the leader of the terrorist organization al-Qaeda, who was suspected of being behind the September 11 terrorist attacks.

President Bush reiterated some of the principles of his doctrine during the Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism on November 6, 2001; in his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002; and in his remarks before the students of the Virginia Military Institute on April 17. On June 1, in front of the 2002 graduation class of the U.S. Military Academy of West Point, President Bush again proposed his doctrine, which later was fully articulated in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) policy document issued in September 2002.

THE THREATS

The rationale of the Bush Doctrine rests on a threat that, according to President Bush, "lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology," by which he meant political and religious extremism coupled with the relative availability of weapons of mass destruction. "The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations."

According to this doctrine, there are three main sources of threat: terrorist organizations with global reach, weak states that harbor and assist such terrorist organizations, and rogue states that do not abide by internationally accepted norms. Al-Qaeda and Afghanistan under the Taliban represent the first two types of threats. The final type, rogue states, are defined in the NSS as states that "brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers; display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology,

to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes; sponsor terrorism around the globe; and reject human values and hate the United States and everything it stands for."

The Bush Doctrine assumes that deterrence and containment do not work against these kinds of threats. This idea was already anticipated in President Bush's West Point speech in which he said, "Deterrence, the promise of massive retaliation against nations, means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. . . . Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies." Assuming that the new enemies of the United States cannot be deterred, the NSS states that "we cannot let our enemies strike first."

THE RESPONSE

In response to these new threats, the Bush Doctrine chooses what it calls a strategy of preemption. The definition of preemptive action in the NSS is quite broad: The "United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security," and given the potentially grave consequences of a policy of inaction against enemies prepared to strike first, "the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."

What the Bush Doctrine calls preemptive, however, is indeed preventive action because it requires the United States to act before a threat is fully formed. Condoleezza Rice, the national security advisor in the first Bush administration, embraced the idea of prevention when, in an interview in the *Financial Times*, on September 23, 2002, she stated that "we had no warning on September 11. When you're dealing with hostile states that are aggressive, that have highly asymmetric capabilities to your own, you may have no warning." Thus, according to this doctrine, the United States cannot wait to be attacked but must take action early to prevent something catastrophic from happening.

UNILATERALISM

Unilateralism is closely tied to the concept of preventive wars because of the difficulty of achieving consensus in the international community to support such actions. Despite this difficulty, the Bush Doctrine acknowledges that the United States will attempt to

build alliances to defeat the menace of global terrorism. However, should it be necessary, the United States will pursue unilateral military action to combat a threat when a multilateral solution cannot be found.

Due in part to this unilateralism, the Bush Doctrine is not in accordance with international law or the use of force as in the United Nations Charter, which assert that states can legally order preemptive strikes only when faced with an imminent threat.

DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM

Finally, the Bush Doctrine aims to promote democracy and freedom across the globe as a way to a more peaceful world. As President Bush stated in an address at West Point, "we wish for others only what we wish for ourselves—safety from violence, the rewards of liberty, and the hope for a better life."

The support of these values is indeed rooted in the American tradition of President Woodrow Wilson's democratic peace, which was echoed by President Clinton in his two NSS documents. Some experts and scholars see this as the core element of the Bush Doctrine. This concept assumes that democracy is not a product of certain historical circumstances, but that it can also be spread through the forced removal of a dictator. Moreover, once this removal is achieved in a specific country, such as Iraq, it will promote democracy and encourage political pluralism in neighboring countries, and it will therefore spread peace throughout the region. Thus, one could argue that the ultimate goal and intent of the Bush Doctrine is to make Americans safer by promoting democratic principles in the world, using military force if necessary.

See also Afghanistan, War in; Bush, George W., and National Policy; Iraq War of 2003; Preemptive War Doctrine; Preventive War; Terrorism, War on International; Unilateralism

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BUSH, GEORGE H. W., AND NATIONAL POLICY

Forty-first president of the United States (1989–1991), who served during the time when the collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a new era of global politics. The overall national security policy of President George H. W. Bush (1924–) was one of caution. In response to the rapidly changing world around him and the many crises that occurred during his four years, he preferred to react carefully and to strive to maintain the status quo. When using military force, Bush limited intervention to cases where there was direct American interest rather than interceding in strictly humanitarian cases.

George H. W. Bush became president at a period in history that saw radical changes in the international realm. The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union eliminated the threat of communist global domination that had occupied the national security concerns of his predecessors since World War II. Operating in this unfamiliar and potentially dangerous environment, Bush preferred a slow and cautious approach to policymaking, preferring to continue many of the policies adopted by previous presidents. At the beginning of his presidency, Bush's national security policy promised to be much like that of President Ronald Reagan, under whom Bush had served as vice president. However, events that were taking place in the world called for radically new policies.

One factor that limited Bush's ability to react to the changing international environment was lack of available funds. President Reagan had incurred huge debts to build up U.S. defenses during the 1980s, and Bush's Republican Party was hostile toward any move to increase taxes. Partly as a result, Bush took a generally passive role as change swept across Eastern Europe, instead of helping to rebuild the former communist countries as the United States had done with Germany and Japan after World War II.

What money was available Bush spent on other parts of the world, suggesting that Eastern Europe was not a high priority for him. The Bush administration sent foreign economic aid primarily to Israel, Egypt, and Central America. The war against drugs was another significant priority for Bush. Consequently, a great deal of funding and effort was also spent on this project.

In foreign policy, Bush pushed for a closer relationship to China, despite the Chinese government's highly criticized suppression of the 1989 student protests in Tiananmen Square. While publicly making statements criticizing the actions of the Chinese leaders, Bush worked secretively to maintain close ties with China.

Latin America was another major focus for the administration, with Bush continuing many of Reagan's policies toward the region. For example, Bush continued to support the contras—guerilla forces fighting the Nicaraguan government—and despite reconciliatory moves made by Nicaragua, he maintained an economic embargo on the country. Bush also continued to provide significant economic aid to many Latin American countries.

As a continuation of American policy of involvement in the region, the Bush administration interfered with the Panamanian government in 1989. After fraud marred the Panamanian elections, the Bush administration orchestrated an unsuccessful coup against Panama's head of state, General Manuel Noriega. This resulted in Panama declaring a state of war between itself and the United States. President Bush reacted to this declaration by sending a small military force into Panama to capture General Noriega. The Bush administration then oversaw the installation of a more pro-American government.

The United States remained heavily involved in the Middle East during Bush's term in office. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in late 1990, Bush worked to form a coalition of states to expel the Iraqis and regain the power balance in the region. The subsequent invasion of Iraq, known as Operation Desert Storm, devastated the Iraqi army and quickly liberated Kuwait. However, ever conservative and cautious, Bush limited the amount of risk involved in this action by using force only to push the Iraqi army from Kuwait. He decided not to drive on to the Iraqi capital of Baghdad and overthrow Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Bush was concerned that toppling Saddam would result in anarchy and civil war that would bog down occupying forces indefinitely.

During his presidency, it is clear that Bush's overall policy was to maintain the status quo. With the fall of the Soviet Union, a significant threat to the United States had been removed. Despite the changing international climate, Bush continued to support the high defense budget, as well as maintaining a forward NATO presence. He also remained involved in regions of the world where the United States was already active, such as Latin America and the Middle East. Given the rapidly changing global environment during his presidency, Bush made relatively few changes in U.S. national security policy.

See also China and U.S. Policy; Cold War; Gulf War; Latin America and U.S. Policy; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Multilateralism; Narcotics, War on; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Reagan, Ronald, and National Policy

BUSH, GEORGE W., AND NATIONAL POLICY

Forty-third president of the United States (2001–) who faced serious challenges to U.S. national security in the form of international terrorism. George W. Bush (1946–) served as president at the time of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the deadliest act of terror ever committed on U.S. soil. The psychological and political impact of the attacks profoundly shaped President Bush's national security strategy. It led directly to his declaration of a *war on terrorism* as the centerpiece of U.S. security policy. The attacks also prompted Bush to adopt a much more aggressive U.S. foreign policy, known as the Bush Doctrine.

PRE–SEPTEMBER 11 POLICY

When George W. Bush entered the White House in January 2001, terrorism was not at the top of his national security agenda. In its final years in office, the outgoing administration of President Bill Clinton had begun to place greater emphasis on international terrorist groups after a series of attacks between 1996 and 2000 that were attributed to the al-Qaeda terrorist network. However, the U.S. government was just beginning to understand the magnitude of the terrorist threat the country faced. In the transition to the new administration, terrorist matters were shouldered aside by other considerations, particularly President Bush's concern with the so-called axis of evil—the countries of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.

The Bush administration identified the axis-of-evil nations as the greatest existing threat to U.S. national interests. The Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein had

been under United Nations economic sanctions since the end of the Gulf War of 1991, and the United States and Great Britain enforced no-fly zones for Iraqi aircraft over much of the country. However, the Bush administration claimed that Saddam had active chemical and biological weapons programs and was trying to acquire nuclear weapons as well. In addition, many of the administration's top figures—including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice—had for years advocated a U.S. invasion of Iraq to depose Saddam.

The other members of the axis of evil seemed to pose just as great a threat as Iraq. Iran had been a bitter enemy of the United States since the 1979 revolution that toppled the pro-U.S. shah and installed an Islamic government in his place. The Bush administration accused Iran of supporting Islamic terrorists and suspected that Iran, too, had nuclear ambitions. North Korea was perhaps the most dangerous of the three. The North Koreans had already announced that they were working toward building a nuclear weapon, and diplomatic relations between North Korea and the West were almost nonexistent. The Bush administration considered North Korean dictator Kim-il Sung a dangerous and untrustworthy adversary.

THE WAR ON TERRORISM

The September 11, 2001, attacks by al-Qaeda caught the nation completely by surprise. Although the government was aware of al-Qaeda's existence and its activities over the previous decade, the daring and magnitude of the attacks were completely unexpected. The devastating strike showed how vulnerable the country was to terrorists determined to harm U.S. interests. In an address shortly after the attacks, President Bush announced the administration's intention to find and punish those responsible. He also called on other nations to join the United States in a war on international terrorism.

The war on terrorism had both a foreign and a domestic front. The foreign front opened when the United States called on Afghanistan's Taliban government, which had been providing shelter and support for al-Qaeda, to repudiate the group and turn over its leaders. After the Taliban refused the demand, U.S. troops invaded Afghanistan in November 2001. In a brief campaign, U.S. special forces supported by friendly Afghan tribesmen routed out Taliban and

al-Qaeda fighters and installed a new Afghan government. Al-Qaeda bases in the country were destroyed and the terrorists were forced to disband and flee. Allied forces captured many al-Qaeda members but failed to find the head of the group, Osama bin Laden, or his top lieutenant.

At home, meanwhile, serious concerns arose over the failure of intelligence and law enforcement officials to uncover the September 11 terrorist plot. Emergency reviews showed major security shortcomings at the nation's ports, airports, power plants, and other vital infrastructure. In addition, although authorities had information that might have helped them foil the plan, the bits of data were spread among various agencies and never properly integrated. To address these failures, the administration created a new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security to oversee a complete reorganization of security and emergency preparedness on U.S. soil. A new post of national intelligence director also was created to coordinate intelligence relating to possible security threats from disparate sources.

PREEMPTION AND IRAQ

Although the war on terrorism had captured the attention of the public, the Bush administration was also increasing pressure for an invasion of Iraq. Since the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam made repeated efforts to impede the work of UN weapons inspectors in Iraq. The Iraqi leader expelled inspectors for a time in 2001, but he then relented and allowed them back in the face of U.S. pressure. The Bush administration claimed that Saddam was still trying to sabotage the inspections and accused Iraq of secretly possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The United States called on the United Nations to condemn Saddam and intervene militarily to force him to comply with UN inspections.

Despite U.S. pressure, most UN member nations refused to authorize the use of force against Iraq. Nevertheless, the United States, supported by Great Britain and some 30 other nations, determined to invade Iraq with or without UN approval. The Bush administration argued that intelligence showed Iraq's WMD programs posed an imminent threat to U.S. security. Administration officials also claimed that Saddam was trying to acquire nuclear weapons and was an active supporter of Islamic terrorists, including al-Qaeda.

In March 2003, a U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq, and within six weeks had overrun the country and toppled Saddam's regime. The invasion was the first overt expression of what became known as the Bush Doctrine. Under this doctrine, the United States claims the right to conduct preemptive strikes against states or nonstate actors that the administration considers imminent threats to U.S. national security, without the need to consult other parties. Previous U.S. policy had focused on deterrence—preventing the outbreak of hostilities with the threat of massive retaliation. Under deterrence, the United States would use force only if it was attacked first. The Bush Doctrine, on the other hand, stated a willingness to use force to prevent a potential attack before it could occur.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS

After quick initial victories in Afghanistan and Iraq, both military campaigns ran into serious difficulties. More than three years after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden was still at large and al-Qaeda was still in operation. Since September 11, 2001, cells associated with the group have carried out spectacular bombings in Spain, Turkey, and Indonesia that have claimed hundreds of lives. Terrorist experts warn that the nature of the organization—a loose collection of largely autonomous cells receiving general guidance and inspiration from bin Laden—makes eradicating al-Qaeda difficult. This can be seen from the group's continued activity despite the loss of bases and government support in Afghanistan.

In Iraq, meanwhile, the jubilation of overthrowing Saddam quickly gave way to chaos and violence. Widespread looting and street violence began soon after U.S. troops captured the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. With the Iraqi police and army disbanded, and not enough allied troops to maintain peace and security, disorder broke out throughout the country. Unguarded offices, museums, supply depots, and even ammunition dumps were raided and their contents carried away. Violence erupted between majority Shi'a Muslims and the minority Sunni Muslims, who had long oppressed the Shi'a under Saddam.

In May 2003, an armed insurgency against the allied occupation arose throughout Iraq. The uprising was composed of a variety of groups, including former members of Saddam's Ba'ath Party, disaffected Sunnis unwilling to submit to majority Shi'a rule, militant nationalists who wanted foreign troops off Iraqi soil,

and anti-U.S. Islamic terrorists. The chaos caused by the resulting violence and lack of security has made Iraq an ideal breeding ground for terrorists. A Jordanian terrorist group led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi became active in Iraq in late 2003 and the following year al-Zarqawi declared his allegiance to al-Qaeda.

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY

An intensive search of Iraq in the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion turned up no signs of WMD nor any evidence of an Iraqi nuclear program. Claims that Saddam was in league with al-Qaeda also have never been substantiated. With a violent insurgency undermining U.S. efforts in Iraq, the Bush administration came under fire about the veracity of its stated motives for invading. Administration officials, however, pointed to the toppling of Saddam to justify their policy of preemption. They labeled the invasion of Iraq as the first step in a process of promoting democratic change in the Middle East. A 2005 move by Lebanese citizens to expel Syrian troops long stationed in their country seemed to support the administration's argument that the invasion of Iraq was a catalyst for change in the region.

Critics of the administration's policies say that the idea of promoting democracy is simply a way to justify the invasion in the absence of evidence of Iraqi WMD or terrorist connections. They argue that, despite the U.S. call for greater freedom in the Middle East, its allies such as Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia are some of the least democratic and most authoritarian states in the region. These critics also challenge the notion that democracy can be forced on a country from outside, and that western-style democracy is the most appropriate form of government for all societies.

Bush administration policies have also placed strains on U.S. relations with some if its allies. Many countries, including longtime allies Germany and France, feel that the United States has embarked on a unilateral foreign policy that ignores the wishes of the international community. They argue that if the United States claims the right to attack anyone it labels a threat, other states will adopt the same policy. Some leaders worry that this will undermine the system of deterrence and collective security that has prevented the outbreak of a major war for over half a century.

As of mid-2005, the Bush Doctrine was still officially in place, although it had not been applied since the

Iraq War of 2003. The administration continued to hold a hard line with regard to Iran and North Korea, especially in light of North Korea's April 2003 announcement that it had produced a nuclear weapon. According to the administration, however, the demands of the insurgency in Iraq will probably require a significant U.S. troop presence in that country until at least late 2006. This commitment likely will constrain U.S. military options in other parts of the world, including North Korea.

Meanwhile, the continued occupation of Iraq by U.S. troops fuels anti-American sentiment among Muslims and attracts recruits to the terrorist cause. The Bush administration's determination to establish pro-Western democracies in the Middle East is in deliberate opposition to the determination of Islamic fundamentalists to purge the region of Western influences. These issues have dominated George W. Bush's presidency and likely will present a challenge to his successor.

—John Haley

See also Afghanistan, War in; Al-Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Bush Doctrine; Cheney, Richard; Homeland Security, Department of; Iraq War of 2003; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Neoconservatism; Preemptive War Doctrine; Rumsfeld, Donald; Saddam Hussein; September 11, 2001/WTC and Pentagon Attacks; Taliban; Terrorism, War on International; Terrorists, Islamic; Weapons of Mass Destruction.

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CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

Accords agreed to by Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin on March 26, 1979, in Washington, DC, with U.S. president Jimmy Carter signing as a witness. The Camp David Accords addressed the control of the region of Palestine and outlined a framework for future negotiations between Israel and Egypt. Conflict between Jews and Arabs over this region has caused a series of wars since 1948.

In the agreement, Israel agreed to return Sinai to Egypt, and Israel transferred that power in 1982. In a joint letter, Egypt and Israel also agreed to negotiate Palestine's autonomy in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Progress on this issue, however, did not occur until the 1990s.

The accords were named for the location of the conference at which the agreement was formulated, the presidential retreat of Camp David, located outside Washington, DC. President Carter invited the Egyptian president and Israeli prime minister, along with their top advisers, to Camp David from September 5–17, 1978. The conference attendees were isolated within Camp David, and little information leaked out during deliberations. On September 17, however, news emerged that an agreement had been reached on two frameworks for future negotiations between Egypt and Israel regarding Palestine. The first framework consisted of the principles of an Egyptian–Israeli agreement regarding Sinai and peace between the two countries, which was to be completed within three months of the signing of the Camp David Accords. The second framework consisted of a format for negotiations regarding the establishment of an autonomous regime in the West Bank and Gaza.

Each party entered the negotiations with ultimate hopes and priorities. Prime Minister Begin wanted to avoid addressing any resolution of the Palestinian question with Sadat. President Sadat sought to avoid any subsequent charges that he had abandoned the Palestinian people by accepting a separate peace with Israel. President Carter served as a go-between to the two leaders; Begin and Sadat were kept apart and Carter shuttled between them as the negotiations unfolded. The Egyptian and Israeli delegations also sought proposals from the Americans.

Sadat and Begin received the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts. On October 6, 1981, Sadat was assassinated by Egyptian fundamentalists. In 1982, Begin invaded Lebanon to destroy military bases run by the Palestine Liberation Organization; he resigned from office in 1987.

See also Arab-Israeli Conflict; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Middle East Conflicts

CAPRA, FRANK (1897–1991)

Director, producer, writer, and editor of films in multiple genres over a prolific 50-year career. Capra was best known for his sentimental, idealistic, "little guy" films and for promoting the Allied effort during World War II through a series of patriotic films.

Born in Sicily in 1897, Capra came to the United States in May 1903 and came to love his adopted

country. He served in the U.S. Army in both World War I and World War II and was awarded both the Legion of Merit and the Distinguished Service Medal. He brought his patriotism to the silver screen during World War II with his *Why We Fight* series of U.S. Army films, in which he documented various battle-fronts for audiences at home. The "Capra touch" brought optimism to the United States during troubled times.

Despite his service record and his reputation for making films about the American dream, Capra was graylisted during the McCarthy era. Because several people with whom he collaborated on films were known communists, some of his activities and charitable contributions were seen as questionable. As a result of his suspected communist ties, Capra had difficulty getting work at this time. While seeking work on the Defense Department's top-secret Project VISTA during the Korean War, he was denied security clearance because of his disputed sympathies.

Deeply injured by accusations of disloyalty and striving to repair his reputation, Capra turned informant and gave the names of suspected communist sympathizers to the Army-Navy-Air Force Personnel Security Board and to the FBI. His guilt about informing on colleagues and acquaintances and the uncertain political climate in Hollywood at the time caused Capra to largely withdraw from movie making during the 1950s. His career never fully recovered.

Though Capra was best known for his heartwarming, sentimental films—frequently featuring the triumph of the "little guy" (referred to by his critics as "Capra-corn")—this was not the only type of movie he made. His early efforts included the *Our Gang* comedies (1924), tearjerkers, whodunits, and several films about subjects that were sensitive at the time, such as anti-Semitism. Later in his career, Capra produced educational and corporate documentaries. He also served as president of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences from 1935 to 1940.

Many of Capra's movies were nominated for and won Oscars. *It Happened One Night* (1934) was the first film to sweep the top five Oscar award categories: Capra won best director, and the film was also honored with awards for best picture, best actor, best actress, and best adaptation. He was named best director again in 1936 for *Mr. Deeds Goes to Town* and in 1938 for *You Can't Take It With You*, which also won best picture. Some of Capra's other enduring works include *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington* (1939), *Arsenic and Old Lace* (1944), and the Christmas classic *It's a Wonderful Life* (1946).

See also Cinema and the Military; Communism; Communism and National Security; Propaganda

CARPET BOMBING

Devastating aerial attack that treats multiple geographically separate targets as a single target. Article 51 of Geneva Protocol I prohibits carpet bombing, which is defined as bombardment that treats a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located within a city as a single military target.

Carpet or saturation bombing has its roots in the *scorched-earth warfare* practiced by the ancient Romans and others. Civil War general William Tecumseh Sherman of the Union Army is credited with changing modern warfare by extending the battlefield to the enemy's infrastructure. Sherman reasoned that the most effective way to win the war was to destroy the enemy's ability to wage war. Destroying railroads, tearing up communication lines, and burning factories, homes, and plantations not only crippled the South but also, in a psychological sense, weakened the will of the Confederacy to wage war.

During World War II, both the Allies and the Nazis rained bombs on enemy cities, destroying military and industrial sites, along with schools, churches, and homes. The United States used similar bombing strategies in Korea during the Korean War, incessantly pounding North Korean positions in the hopes of driving the Communists to negotiate.

With the advent of television, which allowed the media to report from both sides of the battle lines, carpet bombing became less accepted. The destruction inherent in such bombing may weaken the will of the enemy, but it also weakens the resolve of the nation prosecuting the battle. During the Vietnam War, President Richard Nixon ordered carpet bombing of North Vietnam as well as Cambodia, which was believed to be supplying the Vietcong. As civilian casualties mounted and media accounts of the destruction surfaced, public support for the carpet bombing diminished. Several nations complained about the U.S. raids.

Critics of the first Gulf War allege that bombing raids on Kuwait and Iraq constituted carpet bombing. Although the U.S. Air Force claimed great success for

its precision munitions and surgical accuracy, subsequent reports to the Geneva Convention indicated that almost 250,000 bombs were dropped during the war, with less than 10% of them precision munitions. About half of those precision munitions were antitank bombs (10,000) and 2,000 were radiation-guided anti-tank bombs. Critics claimed that the bulk of the assault on Iraq used conventional dumb bombs and that the sheer volume of those raids constituted carpet bombing.

Similar criticism has been leveled against the "Shock and Awe" campaign that opened Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Military strategists note that massive bombing raids are effective, but usually they are a prelude to ground invasions, as was the case in both Gulf Wars.

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CARTER DOCTRINE

Doctrine presented by U.S. president Jimmy Carter in his 1980 State of the Union address that returned the United States to its traditional policy of containment of the Soviet Union. President Carter adamantly declared that the United States would employ military force against any nation that attempted to gain control of the Persian Gulf region. This declaration, subsequently known as the Carter Doctrine, marked a dramatic shift in Carter's foreign policy. During the first three years of his presidency, Carter had focused on two foreign policy issues. First, he had vigorously promoted human rights around the globe. Second, he had advocated a policy of détente toward the Soviet Union in which the United States engaged its rival superpower and tried to increase diplomatic and economic contacts between the two nations. Carter hoped that his policy of détente would culminate with the signing of the SALT II Treaty.

In 1979, several events disrupted these two policies. The Islamic revolution in Iran and the ascension of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua created two new governments that were overtly hostile to the United States. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia destabilized Southeast Asia. But most important, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan under the pretense of supporting that country's crumbling Communist government.

The actual motive for the Soviet invasion was not entirely clear. Foreign policy advisers within the Carter administration speculated that the Soviet Union wished to prevent the spread of the Islamic revolution that had erupted in Iran and threatened to engulf the region. More alarming, the administration feared that the Soviet Union was returning to its earlier policy of expansionism. But an even more ominous possibility arose. Carter's security advisers suggested that the invasion of Afghanistan was the Soviet Union's first move in an attempt to control the Middle East's vast oil resources.

Carter apparently accepted this possibility, and therefore he issued his proclamation warning the Soviets against aggressive actions in the Persian Gulf region. But Carter was also succumbing to public opinion. Polls demonstrated that the American public was upset with the invasion of Afghanistan, felt that the invasion and other events of 1979 made the United States—specifically the Carter administration—seem weak and indecisive, and did not support the signing of the SALT II Treaty. As the 1980 general election approached, Carter recognized the need to assuage the public's unrest. Therefore, he abandoned his policy of détente and returned to the American policy of containing communism that had been developed at the start of the Cold War.

After his State of the Union address, Carter outlined the specific measures he wanted to take to fulfill his new doctrine. First, Carter announced that the United States would withdraw from the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow and would suspend grain sales to the Soviet Union. He withdrew the SALT II Treaty from Senate consideration. He recommended a 6% increase in the defense budget and created a Rapid Deployment Force that could be quickly dispatched to any combat zone in the world. Finally, Carter issued a presidential directive ordering the development of smaller nuclear weapons that could be used to strike specific targets. With this directive, Carter abandoned the policy of mutually assured destruction that had previously characterized the nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately for Carter, his new doctrine did not result in his reelection. Even if the Soviets had planned to push further into the Middle East, fierce Afghan resistance soon created havoc for the Soviet invaders. Carter's Republican opponent, Ronald

Reagan, supported the president's new doctrine but argued that Carter's overall foreign policy had failed miserably and had left the United States in a weakened position. Influenced by the continuing hostage crisis in Iran, the public agreed and dismissed Carter in the 1980 election.

The Carter Doctrine, however, has retained an important position in American foreign policy. Over the past two decades, the United States has ensured that its oil supply from the Middle East has remained unthreatened. Even after the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States proved that it would not accept any aggressive actions in the region, a policy demonstrated most clearly in the United States' leading role in the 1991 Gulf War.

See also Carter, Jimmy, and National Policy: Containment; Détente; Soviet Union, Former (Russia) and U.S. Policy; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)

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CARTER, JIMMY, AND NATIONAL POLICY

Thirty-ninth president of the United States (1977–81), who sought to make human rights issues a more important part of U.S. national security policy. James Earl "Jimmy" Carter (1924–) set the tone for his administration in his inaugural address on January 20, 1977: "We have already found a high degree of personal liberty, and we are now struggling to enhance equality of opportunity. Our commitment to human rights must be absolute, our laws fair, our natural beauty preserved; the powerful must not persecute the weak, and human dignity must be enhanced." Human rights became a cornerstone of the Carter administration's national policy.

FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE

As a born-again Christian, President Carter believed that American foreign policy should reflect the nation's highest moral ideals. At a time when the United States was struggling with issues of race relations and human rights, Carter bluntly advocated a human rights policy that held other countries to the highest standards—standards by which, he believed, Americans would want themselves to be judged.

Throughout his single term of office, Carter worked to establish human rights as a guiding principle of American foreign policy. He frequently criticized nations that violated basic human rights. His pleas on behalf of Soviet dissidents angered the Soviet government, which viewed these statements as intervention in its internal affairs. Despite these differences, in June 1979, Carter and Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) in Vienna, which set limits on the number of Soviet and American nuclear weapons systems. In spite of Carter's vigorous promotion of the treaty, however, it was not ratified by the Senate and eventually was placed on indefinite hold after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The invasion also prompted the Carter administration to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow.

Carter succeeded in concluding the long negotiations over the Panama Canal treaties by persuading the Senate to ratify them. Conservatives angrily criticized the treaties, believing that they abandoned vital American interests in Latin America. After Carter decided to inaugurate full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 1979 and end formal American ties with the Nationalist Chinese government of Taiwan, conservatives again heatedly denounced that decision as a desertion of America's anticommunist policies.

The highlight of Carter's foreign policy came on March 26, 1979, with the signing of a peace treaty by Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat at Camp David, Maryland. The Camp David Accords represented the high point of the Carter presidency, and many observers believed it a milestone in American Middle East policy. The Camp David Accords laid a foundation for the Oslo Agreement of 1993 between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel, as well as the Jordanian peace treaty with Israel signed in 1994.

Ongoing questions of national defense were a major concern during Carter's term, and the president attempted to maintain the nation's defense in light of his commitment to human rights. He decided not to support the development of the B-1 bomber or the

enhanced radiation neutron bomb, which was designed to kill enemy forces but leave most of the target area's buildings and infrastructure intact. Carter did, however, approve the development of the cruise missile as part of the nation's nuclear deterrent force. He also agreed to begin full-scale development of the MX mobile missile to counter the threat of the Soviet Union's capability to knock out U.S. land-based intercontinental missiles on a surprise first strike.

CRISIS IN IRAN

The most vexing problem that faced President Carter was the seizure of American diplomats and embassy employees in the Iranian capital of Teheran in November 1979. Iran, ruled since 1953 by the stern and autocratic shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, had been a long-standing American ally in the Middle East. On New Year's Eve 1977, President Carter toasted the shah at a state dinner in Teheran, calling him "an island of stability" in the troubled Middle East. The president ignored the fact that the shah and his government were facing increasing criticism from a growing opposition movement whose ideas were based on a strict interpretation of Islam.

As opposition to his repressive government mounted, the shah had his secret police, SAVAK, crack down on political dissenters and protesters, thus fueling more resentment. Within weeks of Carter's visit, a series of protests broke out in the religious city of Qom, denouncing the shah's regime as anti-Islamic. As the events of the Iranian revolution began to unfold, the Carter administration was torn between two possible responses. Carter's aggressive national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, wanted the shah to try to brutally suppress the revolution. State Department officials, however, recommended a more cautious approach, suggesting that Carter reach out to the Iranian opposition to smooth the transition to a new government.

The popular movement against the shah grew until January 16, 1979, when he fled to Egypt. Two weeks later, thousands of Muslims cheered as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, an Iranian Shia cleric and the political and spiritual leader of the Iranian opposition, returned to Iran after 14 years in exile in France. Khomeini and his followers set up an Islamic republic. The new Iranian government vilified the shah and the United States, which had supported him.

As the details of the shah's repressive policies became known, the exiled leader grew increasingly unpopular throughout much of the world and was forced to move from country to country. Word then spread that the shah had been stricken with a form of cancer that required sophisticated medical treatment. President Carter was reluctant to allow the shah entry into the United States, fearing reprisal against Americans still in Iran. Carter finally relented when the severity of the shah's cancer became known. As Vice President Walter Mondale recalled, "He [President Carter] went around the room, and most of us said, 'Let him in.'" "And he said, 'And if [the Iranians] take our employees in our embassy hostage, then what would be your advice?' And the room just fell dead. No one had an answer to that. Turns out, we never did."

AMERICANS HELD HOSTAGE

On November 4, 1979, radical Iranian students overran the American embassy in Teheran and seized more than 60 Americans. At first, it was not clear who they represented or what they hoped to achieve. The Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini, seizing the opportunity to consolidate his power around a powerful symbol of American prestige, issued a statement in support of the takeover. He called the American embassy a "den of spies." The students, with the support of the Iranian government, vowed not to release the American hostages until the United States returned the shah for trial. They also demanded billions of dollars that they claimed the shah had stolen from the Iranian people.

President Carter felt the plight of the hostages deeply, and he considered their safe return his personal responsibility. On November 11, he placed an embargo on Iranian oil. Deciding that military action was too risky, Carter tried to build pressure on Iran through economic sanctions and by freezing its assets in the United States. While Secretary of State Cyrus Vance led the official diplomatic effort, White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan spent thousands of hours working secret channels. For the first few months of the crisis, the American public rallied around Carter, who had clearly made freeing the hostages his number one priority.

As the months dragged on and negotiations failed to free the hostages, the increasingly frustrated American public demanded stronger action. First Lady Rosalynn Carter recalled, "No one can know how much pressure there was on Jimmy to do something. I would go out and campaign [on behalf of the

president's reelection] and come back and say, 'Why don't you do something?' And he said, 'What would you want me to do?' I said, 'Mine the harbors.' He said, 'Okay, suppose I mine the harbors, and they decide to take one hostage out every day and kill him. What am I going to do then?'"

Finally, with the Iranians showing no signs of releasing the hostages, Carter decided to take a risk. On April 11, 1980, he approved a high-risk rescue operation called Desert One that had been in the planning stages for several months. American forces slipped into the Iranian desert in an effort to storm the embassy and free the hostages. The odds were against the mission's success, and the president was devastated when he had to abort the operation because of three malfunctioning helicopters. While fleeing the desert, another helicopter crashed into a C-130 transport plane on takeoff. Eight servicemen were killed and three more were injured. The next morning, gleeful Iranians broadcast footage of the smoking remains of the failed rescue attempt, a stark symbol of America's inability to wield its power. The president took full responsibility for the debacle.

Little progress was made during the summer of 1980. In early July, the Iranians released one hostage who had developed multiple sclerosis. In the United States, the 1980 presidential campaign was in full swing. Constant media coverage—yellow ribbons, footage of chanting Iranian mobs, and daily television reports—helped to keep the hostage crisis a major issue in the presidential campaign. As Carter adviser and biographer Peter Bourne noted, "Because people felt that Carter had not been tough enough in foreign policy, this kind of symbolized for them that some bunch of students could seize American diplomatic officials and hold them prisoner and thumb their nose at the United States."

END TO THE CRISIS

Finally, in September, Khomeini's government decided it was time to end the stalemate, believing there was little more to gain from further anti-American, antishah propaganda. In addition, the ongoing economic sanctions were adversely affecting the Iranian government's attempts at economic recovery.

Despite rumors that President Carter might pull off an October surprise and get the hostages home before the November presidential election, negotiations with the Iranian government dragged on for months, even

after Republican Ronald Reagan's landslide victory. Carter's all-night effort to bring the remaining 52 hostages home before the end of his term fell short. As a personal insult to President Carter, the Iranians released the hostages minutes after Reagan was inaugurated on January 20, 1981.

Carter's insistence on American leadership in the protection of human rights around the world called attention to the plight of the people in communist and other dictatorial regimes. His unwavering commitment to human rights eventually led to similar initiatives during the 1980s and 1990s.

Today, the legacy of President Carter's dedication to human rights is furthered by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor within the State Department. The bureau is responsible for developing and implementing U.S. policy on democracy, human rights, labor, and religious freedom. It works with foreign governments to build partnerships with multilateral organizations to reach global consensus in support of democratic rule and universal human rights. It also provides financial support for democracy and human rights that is used to prosecute war criminals, promote religious freedom, monitor free and fair elections, and support workers' rights.

See also Brzezinski, Zbigniew; Camp David Accords; Carter Doctrine; Iranian Hostage Crisis; Islamic Fundamentalism; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Neutron Bomb; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)

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CENTCOM

Acronym for the U.S. Central Command, the portion of the U.S. military responsible for protecting American security interests in an area stretching from the Horn of Africa to Central Asia. The region monitored by CENTCOM encompasses 25 countries, including Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and northern Red Sea, the six Horn of Africa nations, and the five republics of Central Asia.

The U.S. military divides the globe into nine areas of responsibility. Each of these areas of responsibility is under the jurisdiction of a unified combatant command, such as CENTCOM. A unified combatant command comprises two or more branches of the armed services. A command's objectives are "to enhance regional stability and demonstrate a steadfast commitment to regional security." The commander of each command reports directly to the secretary of defense. MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, is home to CENTCOM headquarters.

President Ronald Reagan first stood up CENTCOM on January 1, 1983, as a permanent replacement for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. It is not a permanent war fighting unit; rather, CENTCOM is composed of five component commands. These units come from each of the four armed services, as well as the joint Special Operations Command. It is CENTCOM's function to organize and coordinate these services into a war-fighting institution. Since its inception, CENTCOM has been responsible for several operations, including two recent conflicts between the United States and Iraq: Operation Desert Storm and Operation Enduring Freedom.

The region for which CENTCOM is responsible contains some of the most economically depressed and politically unstable areas in the world. It is also the site of a great deal of terrorist activity and home to many terrorist organizations. As a result, CENTCOM has taken a lead role in combating the emerging threat posed by international terrorism while continuing to pursue peaceful engagements through humanitarian operations.

See also Counterterrorism; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Rapid Deployment Force

CENTRAL FRONT IN EUROPE

The chief zone of contention between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact alliances on the inter-German frontier. When extended to the Swiss frontier, the borderland took on the designation *central front.*

The division of Germany into eastern and western zones of occupation in 1945 presaged the further division of Europe and the evolution of the Cold War. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the chief zone of contention between NATO and the Warsaw Pact alliances lay on the inter-German frontier. For half a century, the critical operational area for the contending armies and air forces and the focus of strategic and force planning was the anticipated crucial opening battles of any east–west confrontation.

The particular challenges of the central front had few parallels in contemporary history. By 1956, the opposing alliance systems were arrayed, and the central front was occupied by the forces and key nations that made up the balance of power in Europe. West of the inter-German frontier lay the industrial and population centers of West Germany, the Rhine River, the Low Countries, English Channel, Baltic approaches, and France. In the opposite direction were the traditional invasion routes into Russia, including the Warsaw-Smolensk-Moscow highway. The forces deployed on each side included the largest ready ground unit of each nation: the sole elite army level formation of the Soviet Union, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG), as well as the British Army of the Rhine, the U.S. Seventh Army, and the French First Army. By the mid-1980s, standing forces of 26–58 divisions and 1,800–4,000 combat aircraft opposed each other on the central front.

Distance made the reinforcement of the central front far easier for the Soviet Union than for the NATO alliance. The Warsaw Pact held a second echelon in Eastern Europe and a third echelon from the white Russian and Ukrainian military districts of the Soviet Union. However, the United States eventually established equipment sets in German depots and planned a massive airlift program promising 10 divisions in 10 days, which, combined with the French, British, and West German mobilization schemes, made ground defense feasible for NATO. The airpower of NATO was generally presumed to be superior in its quality of equipment, ordnance, and command and control, promising at least air parity and sustaining hopes for air superiority in NATO–Warsaw Pact combat.

What worried NATO planners most about the central front was the feasibility of an attack without warning from the east using only the GSFG, Czech, and East German forces to effect a breakthrough that would unhinge the NATO mobilization and concentration plans. Most war planning on the NATO side assumed a few days of warning, sufficient to initiate national mobilization of reserves and the U.S. air bridge. The critical and largely unknown factor in the calculus remained the tactical nuclear weapons available to each side. Experts acknowledged that either force, faced with disaster, would opt for nuclear fire support to extricate and preserve its operational capability.

In addition to the ground and air picture, the locally available nuclear weaponry of the NATO alliance and the Soviet Union experienced an upgrade during the 1980s. As a result, a NATO conflict could easily degenerate into a regional exchange of ballistic and cruise missile strikes coupled with the already potent long-range aircraft nuclear strike capability, such that the damage would far exceed the combat zone of the opposing armies. The U.S Army and Air Force openly embraced such concepts with their Air-Land Battle Doctrine and tactics for striking far behind the opposing field armies.

Although diplomatic efforts to keep the central front "cool" generally succeeded during the Cold War, the vital condition of the front for the opposing alliances caused each to place the maximum priority on the preparation of forces for such a conflict. Thus, for decades, the central front defined the operational, technical, and tactical characteristics of the organization, training, equipping, and defense programming of the major powers of the two alliances.

See also Air-Land Battles; Airlift; Atlantic Alliance; Cold War; Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; Cruise Missile; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Nuclear Weapons; Prepositioned Equipment; War Planning

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Government agency created in 1947 to research, analyze, develop, and deploy technology for intelligence-gathering purposes related to the national security needs of the United States.

During World War II, the armed forces, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS) were responsible for U.S. intelligence-gathering activities. At the end of the war, U.S. policymakers made plans to create a single agency to take over these various intelligence functions. They were aware that effective intelligence-collection capabilities would play a key role in the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CIA

The development of a permanent foreign intelligence system was set in motion with the creation of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in January 1946 by the administration of President Harry S. Truman. Despite strong opposition from the military, the State Department, and the FBI, the CIG was assigned a dual mission: to provide strategic warning of hostile enemy activities through intelligence gathering and to conduct clandestine operations. Unlike the OSS, the CIG had access to intelligence from all branches of the military and government, giving it a larger and more comprehensive view of the global political and military situation.

The CIG functioned under the direction of the National Intelligence Authority (NIA), which was composed of a presidential representative and the secretaries of state, war, and the navy. Its first director was Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, a deputy chief of naval intelligence. In 1947, Congress reorganized the nation's intelligence-gathering apparatus with the passage of the National Security Act. This legislation dismantled the CIG and NIA and created two new bodies: the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA was assigned the task of coordinating the nation's foreign intelligence activities. Intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination of information related to national security from other countries became its main role. In addition, the CIA was given responsibility for executing other intelligence-related duties as directed by the NSC.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The director of central intelligence, as head of the U.S. intelligence community, acts as the principal intelligence adviser to the president. In addition to its role in the executive branch of government, the CIA consults with and briefs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Armed Services Committees in both houses of Congress, and individual members of government on matters of national security. Protecting intelligence sources and methods is the responsibility of the director.

In fulfilling its responsibilities, the CIA has traditionally been prohibited by law from engaging in law enforcement activities or domestic surveillance or intelligence gathering. The CIA carries out its responsibilities subject to various directives and controls of the president and the NSC. In practice, the CIA obtains and evaluates information about foreign governments, corporations, and individuals and reports its findings to the various branches of the U.S. government.

The CIA maintains a vast covert military apparatus, which the agency has often used for clandestine activities against foreign governments, leaders, and citizens. It includes surveillance satellites of the National Reconnaissance Office, the signal-interception capabilities of the National Security Agency, and the surveillance aircraft of the various branches of the U.S. armed forces. In the past, the CIA operated its own fleet of U-2 surveillance aircraft.

For security reasons, the specific activities of the CIA are largely undisclosed. The National Security Act permits the CIA to employ secret methods of operation and exempts it from many of the usual limitations and restrictions on the use of federal funds. The act also exempts the CIA from having to disclose certain information about itself, including its "organization, functions, officials, budget, and numbers of personnel employed." These final provisions have drawn fire from the CIA's critics, who charge that they violate the U.S. Constitution, which requires that the federal budget be openly published.

Congress is responsible for providing oversight of the CIA. The nature of this regulatory relationship, however, has varied throughout the CIA's existence. Today, the CIA reports regularly to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Also providing oversight are the defense subcommittees of the appropriations committees in both houses of Congress.

Despite such oversight, the activities of the CIA have caused considerable political debate, both in the U.S. and in other countries. Alleged and proven CIA operations in states considered friendly to the United States have drawn controversy. Among the allegations against the CIA are claims that the agency has encouraged, funded, planned, and even conducted political assassinations and coups in many countries. Covert CIA collaboration with repressive regimes throughout the world has led to charges that the agency is more supportive of dictatorships than democratically elected governments.

CIA OPERATIONS

The CIA has been involved in controversial operations since its early existence. An early covert operation that had far-reaching effects in the Middle East was the joint Anglo-American exercise known as Operation Ajax, which deposed Mohammed Mossadeq as prime minister of Iran in 1953. In place of the popularly elected Mossadeq, promonarchist forces in Iran and British and U.S. intelligence forces formally reinstated Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi as leader of Iran. The shah became a strong U.S. ally in the Middle East over the next 25 years, but he was widely feared and hated within Iran. Popular resentment of the shah's rule culminated in the 1979 Islamic revolution, which deposed the shah and installed an anti-U.S. Islamic theocracy under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

During the 1950s, the Cuban Revolution and emergence of Communist parties in Latin America brought the Cold War to the Western Hemisphere. In 1961, the CIA planned an invasion at Cuba's Bay of Pigs, with the goal of overthrowing the Cuban Communist government under Fidel Castro. The failure of the invasion was an embarrassment for the CIA, which devised many schemes over the following years to assassinate Castro. These schemes included ideas as outlandish as sending Castro exploding cigars and a poisoned wetsuit, none of which was successful.

The CIA has a long history of intervening in Latin American politics. The agency helped to orchestrate a 1956 coup in Guatemala that overturned the existing government. The new government—a right-wing dictatorship—was more strongly opposed to communism and more closely allied with U.S. business interests. In 1972, a CIA-led coup toppled Chile's socialist president, Salvador Allende, in favor of the military rule of General Augusto Pinochet. Like the shah of Iran, Pinochet's brutality and repression of his own people made him a hated figure and gave the United States a bad reputation in the minds of many Chileans.

The 1980s saw the CIA attempt to destabilize another socialist Latin American state, the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. The CIA funded and armed an opposition army known as the *contras* in the hope of replacing the leftist Sandinistas with a right-wing, pro-U.S. regime. Nicaragua eventually sued the United States and the CIA in the World Court for the illegal attempt to subvert the Nicaraguan government. The United States agreed to pay reparations to Nicaragua. In 2003, Venezuela's socialist president, Hugo Chavez, accused the CIA of involvement in a failed coup attempt aimed at his government.

The CIA was also quite active in the Middle East during the 1980s. Between 1979 and 1989, it assisted Islamic mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan in their guerilla struggle against Soviet invading forces. The Afghans' 1989 victory over the Soviet Union was

followed by a period of civil war, and, in 1996, the mujahideen were ousted by the rival Taliban. Members of the disaffected mujahideen remained in Afghanistan to form the core of the al-Qaeda terrorist network. The equipment and training that the mujahideen fighters received from the CIA would later be put to use against the United States as al-Qaeda began to target American interests during the mid-1990s.

FAILURES AND CRITICISM

Throughout its history, the CIA has been accused of being a rogue agency, acting outside the law to achieve its objectives, even at the expense of U.S. allies. The agency has also been accused of participating in the illegal drug trade in Laos, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua to raise money and to cultivate contacts in those countries. The agency's involvement in assassination attempts, coups, and even a secret 13-year-long undeclared war in Laos while the United States was engaged in Vietnam have brought calls to reform or even abolish the CIA.

More recently, a different and perhaps more devastating criticism has been leveled against the CIA: incompetence. The discovery of several highly placed Soviet spies in the agency during the late 1980s and early 1990s raised questions about security at the agency. Meanwhile, the CIA failed to foresee the demise of the Soviet Union during this time. The agency was convinced of the strength of the Soviet state right up to the fall of the communist government in 1991. It also failed to coordinate available information about terrorist activity that may have prevented the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

The CIA has recently drawn heavy fire for its performance during the period leading up to the Iraq War of 2003. With few contacts inside the Iraqi regime, the agency relied on defectors and regime opponents for much of its information about Iraq's military capabilities. Several of their sources claimed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including chemical and biological weapons, and that the country was actively seeking nuclear technology. Many of these informants, however, had not been in Iraq for years, and their information was out of date. Others had political ambitions in Iraq that could only be realized if they could convince the United States to topple Iraq's leader, Saddam Hussein.

The United States built its case for war on the threat posed by Iraq's WMD. As it turned out, however,

no chemical or biological weapons have been found in Iraq since the end of conventional military operations in May 2003. Although then-CIA director George Tenet proclaimed the case that Iraq was pursuing nuclear technology "a slam-dunk," that claim has also proven groundless. The documents on which the CIA based its argument that Iraq was trying to purchase uranium from the country of Niger proved to be forgeries. In the wake of these discoveries, Tenet resigned as CIA director in 2004 and was replaced by Porter Goss.

EVALUATING THE CIA

Some critics say that the CIA's poor performance stems less from incompetence than from political pressure to shape its results to fit certain conclusions. They claim that the Bush administration made it clear that it wanted the intelligence agencies to produce evidence that would support a rationale for attacking Iraq. George Tenet was called a "lapdog" for going along with the administration rather than insisting on the independence of his agency's judgment. He was also accused of downplaying information that disagreed with the administration's point of view while placing disproportionate emphasis on any information that supported it.

The intelligence failures prior to September 11 and the Iraq War motivated Congress to call for a restructuring of the nation's intelligence-gathering apparatus. Although the CIA remains an independent agency that retains all of its previous functions, it must pass all of its intelligence on to the newly created national intelligence director, who is responsible for coordinating intelligence gathered by all federal agencies and ensuring that bureaucratic divisions and rivalries between agencies do not prevent them from sharing vital national security information.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the future of the CIA has become the subject of close scrutiny and debate. The 21st-century challenges of global terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and international drug trafficking in an age of rapid transportation and instant communication will require innovative and flexible solutions. At the same time, budget constraints have forced cutbacks even in CIA funding. For example, in 1993 the agency was forced to significantly scale back its spy satellite program. Despite calls for stronger regulation or abolition of the CIA, the international political situation dictates that the CIA will

continue to be a significant element of U.S. national security.

—Jack A. Jarmon

See also Afghan Wars; Al-Qaeda; Bay of Pigs; Cold War; Covert Operations; Espionage; Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Iraq War of 2003; Latin America and U.S. Policy; Middle East and U.S. Policy; National Security Act, 1947; National Security Council; Political Assassination; Satellite Reconnaissance; September 11/WTC and Pentagon Attacks

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Devices that use chemicals to inflict death or injury. Chemical weapons can be dispensed using bombs, artillery shells, aircraft sprayers, or missiles carrying hundreds of small bomblets that are spread over a large area when they are ejected from canisters. Chemical weapons have typically been used in large-scale warfare by organized armies. However, the prospect of the use of chemical weapons by terrorists against civilian populations raises new problems and fears.

THE USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS IN WARFARE

Like their biological counterparts, chemical weapons have a long history. Early historians documented the use of smoke and incendiary chemicals against cities during the Greek and Roman eras. The first large-scale use of modern chemical agents in warfare took place during World War I, when the German Army launched a surprise attack with chlorine gas against French troops in 1915. The effects were immediate and horrendous as thousands of troops choked in the deadly green cloud. The attack touched off an immediate round of

measures and countermeasures, and soon the French and their British allies were using gases of their own against the Germans. Chemists manufactured weapons such as mustard gas (so named because of its faint odor), which burns and blisters any tissue exposed to it, and phosgene, a deadly choking gas. By the time the war ended in 1918, chemical warfare had caused more than 100,000 deaths.

Most military planners regarded chemical weapons with distaste because they did not mesh well with the traditional codes of arms and warfare. After World War I, the general revulsion felt by many leaders toward the use of chemical weapons was reflected in the Geneva Convention of 1925, signed by all the World War I combatants except Russia. This treaty banned the use of chemical or biological agents in warfare, but it did not ban the manufacture or possession of these weapons. Many nations continued to keep them stockpiled for possible use and to deter their use by others.

Italy used chemical weapons in Ethiopia during the mid-1930s, but these weapons were not used on a large scale in World War II, with the exception of the Nazis' use of poison gas at extermination camps such as Auschwitz-Birkenau to murder most of the Jewish population of occupied Europe. The Japanese also conducted experiments with chemical and biological weapons on prisoners of war. Most experts believe that it was only fear of massive retaliation in kind that kept these weapons from being used on a large scale in World War II.

Egypt used chemical weapons in Yemen during the 1960s, and Iraq used them against Kurdish dissident groups in its own territory and in the Iran-Iraq War during the early 1980s, but these weapons do not appear to have been used extensively in warfare or the suppression of dissidents since that time.

In 1993, most nations signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons (CWC). This represented a major advance because, unlike the 1925 Geneva Convention, the CWC requires nations to destroy their existing stockpiles under rigorous international control. The CWC signatories are now engaged in that process.

TERRORISTS AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Treaties are signed by nation-states, not by terrorist groups. In 1995, a Japanese terrorist group known as

Aum Shinrikyo, or "Supreme Truth," attacked the Tokyo subway system with sarin, a deadly nerve gas. Twelve people were killed in the subway system, and thousands more were panicked by the possibility that they had been exposed to the deadly gas fumes. Although this attack did not kill large numbers of people, it succeeded in frightening the population and disrupting normal business. It also alerted the world to the potential of terrorist attack with chemical weapons.

The chemical weapons used by Aum Shinrikyo were produced in a small laboratory using commercially available equipment, but the group was limited in its ability to produce the quantities of the agent required to inflict damage on a large population. The synthesis of nerve gas is a complex chemical process involving a series of chemical reactions using toxic precursor chemicals that are difficult to handle. Synthesizing this compound requires highly competent chemists and unusual safety precautions. Such a requirement will always pose major obstacles that terrorist groups would have to overcome. High explosives that are readily available on the international market, or an improvised explosive such as the one used in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, seem much more practical to a typical terrorist group.

However, the terrorists themselves need not manufacture chemical weapons; the weapons also may be obtained with the cooperation of rogue states. For example, the U.S. government believed that Iraq might voluntarily supply chemical weapons to terrorist groups. Nations that have signed the CWC are in the process of eliminating their chemical weapons and their stockpiles, and the incineration facilities used to destroy them are heavily guarded. Although small quantities of chemical agents might be stolen or obtained through bribes, it seems unlikely that terrorists could obtain the large quantities needed to attack a large area and cause mass casualties.

TERRORIST ATTACKS ON CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES

Terrorists do not have to master advanced science to employ chemicals as weapons. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, showed that terrorists could use hijacked airliners as missiles to attack a large city. Terrorists also could use this method to attack a large chemical plant and cause the release of toxic materials on a large scale. An accident at the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal in central India in 1984 killed 4,000 people and devastated the vicinity. Railroad accidents involving shipments of tank cars of liquefied chlorine and other chemicals have forced the evacuation of surrounding areas. Large tanker trucks carrying toxic materials have overturned with similar consequences.

Until recently, chemical plant and railroad managers devoted most of their safety planning efforts to accident prevention. Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, however, these industries now devote more resources to protecting their systems and have begun to conduct more careful screening of personnel. Authorities have begun taking a closer look at security in the myriad small airports and flight schools in the United States; the same suicidal attack technique used on September 11 could conceivably be used to attack a chemical facility near a large metropolitan area. If initial fires and explosions are not contained, they could spread rapidly through the facility and cause the catastrophic release of toxic material.

In the absence of terrorist threats, traditional measures of industrial efficiency usually lead industries to build large plants to obtain economies of scale. These plants are usually located near population centers that can provide the thousands of employees needed to operate them. The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States may force planners and risk managers to reconsider the benefits of scale and location in light of the potential costs. The possibility of a major release of toxic material must be recalculated to account for a possible terrorist attack.

Water supplies would be difficult to attack with chemical agents because the immense volumes of water in reservoirs would dilute a relatively small quantity of agent, making it almost undetectable. Underground aquifers are not readily accessible. Smaller quantities of water, such as supplies contained in rooftop water tanks on many large city buildings, may be easier to attack and may yield more immediate results, but they would not cause large numbers of casualties. Although even a small attack on water supplies would generate panic and disruption, most terrorists would probably prefer to focus on targets that are easier to attack and whose failure would have wide repercussions, such as electric power-generation stations serving metropolitan areas.

Food supplies are also subject to attack by chemical terrorists. Contamination of animal feedstock and other grain supplies with chemical carcinogens would

disrupt food-supply chains and produce economic disorder and panicked reactions far out of proportion to the actual amount of damage.

What is the probable future of chemical terrorism? It is not very likely that terrorists could make or dispense the large quantities of chemicals needed to cause mass casualties. Nor are they likely to have access to the weapon-delivery platforms (artillery, aircraft, and missiles) available to organized military units. However, attacks with smaller quantities of chemical agents could still cause wide disruption, as evidenced by the 1995 Tokyo attacks. The anthrax letter attacks during the fall of 2001 in the eastern United States caused effects that were far out of proportion to the size of the attacks or the casualties they produced. This suggests that the release of chemical agents, with the result of even a few deaths or injuries in any large metropolitan subway system, would cause a chain reaction of events that would slow and disrupt commerce and other activities.

See also Aum Shinrikyo; Biological Weapons and Warfare; Bioterrorism; Chemical Weapons Convention; Weapons of Mass Destruction

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Treaty that bans the use, production, acquisition, and stockpiling of chemical weapons and requires the destruction of chemical weapons by all member nations. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons, also known as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), was entered into force in April 1997; as of April 2004, 162 countries were parties to the convention.

The organization responsible for implementing the provisions of the CWC is the Hague-based Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The OPCW is charged with maintaining a working group to verify the destruction of chemical weapons and to prevent their reemergence. The verification arm is a central component of the CWC and includes comprehensive data reporting and detailed on-site inspections. Compliance is ensured through two main types of inspections. Routine or systematic inspections verify member nations' compliance at facilities that have

been declared to possess precursors to chemical weapons. Short notice or "challenge" inspections are employed at a member nation's request and seek to confirm compliance at any location, declared or not. Investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons also can be requested.

In addition to inspections, the OPCW seeks to facilitate cooperation in the peaceful use of chemicals among signatory states. In contrast to the Biological Weapons Convention, the CWC makes a clear distinction between chemical research for defensive purposes and prohibited offensive purposes. Chemical weapons are categorized into types, such as blistering agents, blood agents, choking agents, and nerve and psychotomimetic agents (substances that produce symptoms of psychosis such as delusions or hallucinations). All such agents are expressly prohibited by the convention.

The CWC describes and categorizes general types of toxic chemicals and their precursors (substances used in the creation of chemical weapons) according to their possible applications, manufacture, or commercial use. The CWC's definition of toxic chemicals includes all chemicals that can seriously harm humans. There is general agreement that law enforcement has the right to deploy riot control agents, such as tear gas, in instances of domestic rioting. However, the CWC strictly prohibits the use of riot control agents in warfare. Other nonlethal chemical weapons, such as the opiate-based substance used by terrorists who seized hostages in a Moscow theater in October 2002, are also prohibited by the convention.

Despite the ban on such agents, some parties to the treaty continue to conduct research into nonlethal chemical weapons. According to the U.S. government, at least 16 nations are known to have active chemical weapons programs. During the 1980s, Iraq was known to have used chemical agents both in its war with Iran and against Kurdish civilians. North Korea began developing chemical weapons during the 1980s and has stepped up its research into chemical agents and delivery mechanisms.

The OPCW stresses the need for a renewed commitment to eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles. The OPCW's experts assisted the United Nations in the destruction of chemical agents in Iraq and, most recently, completed an inventory of Libya's chemical weapons program. At present, the destruction of chemical weapons in signatory states has been delayed in

some countries. Both the United States and Russia have been given extensions to complete the destruction of their stockpiles. Of further concern, only 40% of the signatory states have adhered to the CWC requirement to adopt laws aimed at reducing the proliferation of chemical weapons. Many experts consider potential terrorist acquisition or fabrication of chemical agents to be a significant threat.

See also Biological Weapons and Warfare; Biological Weapons Convention; Chemical Weapons; Treaties; United Nations

CHENEY, RICHARD (1941–)

Current vice president of the United States, former member of Congress, and public servant under four presidents. A conservative Republican, Cheney has strongly promoted the use of force to protect the strategic interests of the United States. Although he did not support the use of ground troops in the Bosnian conflict because he believed the security of the United States was not threatened by conflict in the Balkans, Cheney strongly advocated the liberation of Kuwait in January 1991, the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001, and the overthrow of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in 2003. Although Cheney reduced the military budget during his term as secretary of defense under President George H. W. Bush, he subsequently supported military budget increases.

Born in Lincoln, Nebraska, Cheney entered federal service in 1969 as special assistant to the director of the Office of Economic Opportunity. In 1971, he became a White House staff assistant during the administration of President Richard Nixon. He was deputy assistant to President Gerald Ford from 1974 to 1975 and then White House chief of staff until President Jimmy Carter took office in January 1977.

In November 1978, Cheney was elected as Wyoming's representative in the U.S. House of Representatives. Reelected for five additional terms, he served several years on the House Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Budget Subcommittee. He became the House minority whip in 1988.

Cheney remained in Congress until 1989, when President George H. W. Bush appointed him secretary of defense, a post he held until 1993. During Cheney's four years as defense secretary, the total budget of his department declined from $291.3 billion to $269.9 billion, and the number of troops in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines declined as well.

Despite budget reductions and troop decreases, Cheney made full use of U.S. military might. He approved the use of U.S. jets to stop the coup against Philippine president Corazon Aquino in November 1989. One month later, he sent 24,000 troops to Panama to drive Panamanian president Manuel Noriega from power. In January 1991, he oversaw Operation Desert Storm, which routed Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and in December 1992, he dispatched the first of 26,000 troops to Somalia to crack down on the looting and extortion that prevented food from getting to thousands of starving locals.

Just before Cheney left office as secretary of defense in 1993, he released a defense strategy paper for the 1990s that emphasized the importance of strategic deterrence and defense, the presence of U.S. troops on the ground, and crisis response. The paper also added science and technology and infrastructure and overhead to the traditional pillars of military capability: readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure.

When President Bill Clinton took office in January 1993, Cheney left the Pentagon and joined the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC, as a senior fellow. In October 1995, he became president and chief executive officer of the oil services Halliburton Company in Dallas, Texas.

In 2001, Cheney was elected vice president to President George W. Bush. Extremely close to the Bush family, Cheney is considered one of the most influential vice presidents in recent American history, particularly in the areas of national security, the economy, and energy policy. At the same time, however, his relations with Halliburton have remained in question with Democrats, who have criticized the way Cheney helped to develop the administration's energy policies.

Cheney was one of the Bush administration's most forceful advocates for toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq as part of the fight against terrorism. He repeatedly argued that Hussein had ties with the international terrorist group al-Qaeda and that Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction that posed a serious threat to the security of the United States and other nations. Cheney was reelected vice president in November 2004, when President George W. Bush won reelection.

See also Bush, George H. W., and National Policy; Bush, George W., and National Policy

CHINA AND U.S. POLICY

The complex, multifaceted U.S. policies toward the People's Republic of China (PRC) implemented after Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power in October 1949. Beginning with a policy of containment shortly after the CCP took power and shifting toward the establishment of limited diplomatic relations in 1972, the PRC currently enjoys *most-favored-nation status* with the United States, ensuring nondiscriminatory trade opportunities. The varied policies of the United States since 1949 may be attributed to U.S. support for regional allies and shifts in the global balance of power.

POLICY OF CONTAINMENT (1949–1972)

Toward the end of World War II, the CCP attempted to build relations with the United States. However, as a result of America's resolutely anticommunist policies, Washington preferred to lend support to the pro-American Nationalist Party of Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek. When civil war erupted in China during the summer of 1946, the United States openly backed Chiang Kai-shek and eventually assisted his party supporters when they fled to Formosa (Taiwan) in December 1949 after the Communists took control of China.

The United States declined to recognize the communist government led by Mao Zedong as the legitimate government of the newly established People's Republic of China. Instead, it acknowledged Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of China. Historians and scholars refer to America's refusal to recognize the PRC after the Chinese civil war or to establish formal diplomatic relations with it as America's "lost chance" in China. The result of America's lost chance was the institution of a U.S. containment policy toward the PRC that lasted until 1972.

Soon after Chiang Kai-shek moved his government to Taiwan, the United States began lending military and economic support to Taiwan in an effort to contain mainland China. In 1950, President Harry S. Truman sent the Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait and thwarted any plans that Mao had to invade Taiwan. By 1954, the United States and the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwanese China) had signed a mutual defense treaty. The treaty reinforced the United States' growing offshore ring of economic and military alliances, which included Japan and South Korea. In addition, the United States blocked the PRC's entry into the UN Security Council and successfully petitioned for the ROC to take China's seat.

When war broke out in Korea in June 1950, the Western powers gained a UN mandate to carry out military action on the Korean peninsula. Mao was ready to fight the United States if it threatened the China–North Korea border. Before the war, Mao seemed prepared to accept a cease-fire along the 38th parallel. However, General Douglas MacArthur's landing at Inchon in September 1950 put U.S. troops in a position close to the Chinese border. Unofficial Chinese military volunteers poured over the border into North Korea to help the army of the Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, force back U.S troops and prevent a possible invasion of China. The U.S. forces were eventually pushed back 200 miles. Mao's military volunteers had successfully prevented the positioning of U.S. troops along the Chinese border. Their efforts helped to establish the PRC as a significant military power in the region. However, the conflict on the Korean peninsula and the surreptitious role of the Chinese military in the war eliminated any prospect of improving relations between the United States and the PRC.

To counterbalance U.S. economic and military presence in East Asia, Mao signed a formal alliance with the Soviet Union in 1950. China's relations with the Soviet Union had been stable from the 1940s through the mid-1950s, and the PRC relied on the Soviet power for its security concerns and for public support in the international arena.

By 1960, however, Mao refused to placate Moscow and accused the Soviet Union of social imperialism. The Soviets, in turn, terminated aid to China and increased their forces in the Soviet Far East and Siberia from 12 divisions to 25. As Sino-Soviet relations continued to diminish, Mao decided to go forward with the development of nuclear weapons without Soviet assistance. In October 1964, China tested its first nuclear weapon, again proving to the world the strength of its military capabilities.

The U.S. backing of Taiwan, coupled with Soviet and American support of India during the 1962 Sino-India War, alerted the Communist Chinese to their strategic, geopolitical, and economic vulnerabilities. The U.S. containment policy had succeeded in driving a wedge between China and the Soviet Union, and Mao concluded that China would have to go it alone. As a result, Beijing began to implement strong isolationist policies such as the *Great Leap Forward*, which

employed plans to establish self-sufficient communes and to collectivize labor for economic security. The plans were an economic disaster.

Tensions between the United States and China increased during the early 1960s, when the United States stepped up military involvement in South Vietnam. China had been content with a divided Vietnam, so long as it was free from foreign military influence. But U.S. involvement in Vietnam would again position U.S. troops near the Chinese border and reinforce U.S. containment of China. Fearing a victory by U.S. forces in Vietnam, the PRC, along with the Soviet Union, became dedicated to assisting the North Vietnamese against the United States. However, after the United States began pulling troops out of Vietnam in 1970, China expressed opposition to Soviet influence in Southeast Asia and did not welcome any attempt by the foreign adversary to "encircle China."

NORMALIZATION OF U.S.–CHINA RELATIONS (1972)

The containment policy of the United States culminated in 1972, when U.S. president Richard Nixon went on a diplomatic visit to China. The visit, which had been negotiated in advance by Nixon's national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, marked the beginning of normalization of U.S. relations with China.

The change in U.S. policy was a reflection of the realist strategies of the Nixon administration and an important shift in the global balance of power. China's alignment with the United States tipped the balance of power in favor of the West and frustrated any attempts by the Soviet Union to exploit the United States' defeat in Vietnam. Moreover, cooperation between Washington and Beijing enabled both countries to devote more resources to opposing Soviet power.

The shift in diplomatic policy and strategic cooperation was not easy for either country. The countries would have to find a way to compromise on certain issues, particularly on Taiwan. If the United States was to have diplomatic relations with the PRC and recognize the CCP as the government of China, it would have to limit its military and economic support to Taiwan. In return, China would have to agree to eliminate its isolationist polices and become a participant in the international community as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

On February 27, 1972, President Nixon and Chinese premier Zhou Enlai signed a U.S.–China joint communiqué. The communiqué included an intentionally ambiguous statement inserted by the United States that acknowledged, "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China." Although the communiqué laid the foundation for U.S.–China cooperation, the PRC opposed the statement and refused to establish formal diplomatic relations as long as the United States maintained contacts with the Republic of China in Taiwan.

The United States finally met China's conditions for normalization in 1978, when U.S. president Jimmy Carter agreed to recognize the PRC as "the sole legal government of China" and abrogated the Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty. However, the United States was able to maintain its ambiguous position on the international status of Taiwan. To minimize the appearance of duplicity, the Taiwanese embassy in Washington was closed, and ROC representatives were no longer treated as official diplomats.

Concerned about Carter's unilateral withdrawal from the Taiwan treaty, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in April 1979, which codified the U.S. commitment to sell defense weapons to Taiwan despite the PRC's vehement opposition. Negotiations over Taiwan would continue so long as the United States maintained informal security commitments and arms sales to the Republic of China.

After Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping, a former comrade of Mao, gradually emerged as the leader of the PRC. Under Deng, China's relations with the West and its economy improved. Deng relaxed the PRC's sluggish, inefficient, Soviet-style planned economy and began a series of economic decentralization programs.

Deng's improvement of diplomatic relations with the United States, along with moves toward constructing a market-oriented economy, continued through the Reagan administration. As cultural ties grew between the two countries, Chinese scholars came to study in the United States, and contacts between Americans and Chinese increased. Washington granted the PRC most-favored-nation trade status, which opened up the United States for the import of Chinese goods. The United States soon became China's largest export market, as well as a chief source of investment for the Chinese economy.

THE POST–COLD WAR ERA

The democratic movement and events leading up to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 coincided with the

People's Liberation Army crackdown on student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. The incident revealed that China's economic reforms had not led to political reforms. Although the PRC had been effective at increasing trade, at the same time, it had aggressively squashed any moves toward democracy.

The outrage in the United States over the Tiananmen Square protests politicized the China issue, linking violations of human rights to U.S.–China trade policy. Moreover, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, cooperation with the PRC was no longer considered a strategic imperative. The Clinton administration threatened to withdraw China's most-favored-nation status if the Chinese government did not improve its record on human rights. The plan failed, however, when the Chinese leaders showed more concern for political stability than for their most-favored-nation status. The Clinton administration realized the negative effects that imposing sanctions on China would have on U.S. interests.

Unable to affect China's human rights policies, the Clinton administration decided to delink U.S.–China trade policy from human rights. In 1996, President Clinton adopted a new policy of "constructive strategic dialogue towards the twentieth century," which refocused U.S.–China negotiations on mutual conflicts of interest and the influence of those interests on domestic politics.

The strategic dialogue brought the Taiwan issue back to the forefront of negotiations and remains the most dangerous flashpoint in U.S.–China relations. After the death of Deng in 1997, the new Communist leadership under Jiang Zemin maintained China's firm policy against Taiwan's independence and stated that any declaration of independence by Taiwan would lead to war. Although maintaining the peace is considered to be in the best interests of the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the two governments nonetheless remain locked in an uneasy standoff. After Jiang's retirement in 2002–03, the incoming Communist Party general secretary and president, Hu Jintao, continued to assert China's sovereign authority over Taiwan.

The United States remains concerned about the implications of China's growing dependence on foreign oil to fuel its economic growth. Since the early 1990s, China has shifted away from being a net exporter of oil to importing almost half of its oil and a fifth of its natural gas. Its dependence on foreign oil is expected to double over the next decade. As a result, China has been competing with the United States to establish political and military influence in areas outside Asia. In trying to secure energy sources in the Middle East, for example, China may have offered arms and sensitive technologies in exchange for access to oil and gas. Such relations also may extend to regimes that the United States suspects of sponsoring terrorism.

Finally, the U.S. endorsement of China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) remains essential to U.S.–China trade policy. For 15 years, the PRC pursued WTO membership. Chinese leaders believed that entry into the WTO would attract foreign direct investment and foster continued economic growth through increased exports. Since its entry into the WTO, the PRC has instituted economic reforms, sustained economic growth, and gained legitimacy and prestige. Growth and prestige are essential if China is to achieve its aims as a regional and global power.

—Nicole Jentzen

See also Cold War; Korean War; Mao Zedong; Taiwan Relations Act

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REMARKS BY REP. STEPHEN J. SOLARZ (D–NY) IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JUNE 22, 1989

A few weeks ago we adopted a resolution calling on the leaders of China to resolve the crisis in their country through peaceful means and in a way which was compatible with the democratic aspirations of their people. They ignored that resolution. After they decided to crack down with force on the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, resulting in the deaths of perhaps thousands of innocent Chinese, we adopted another resolution condemning the killings and saying very clearly to the Chinese that a deepening of the repression in their country would have adverse conditions for the relations between our two countries.

They now appear to have ignored that resolution as well. Now, in a call from the heart, we call upon the

Chinese leadership to at least have the decency to refrain from snuffing out the life of those who wanted nothing more than to live a life somewhat greater than they have in the past enjoyed in the People's Republic. Let no one be under any doubt whatsoever, if the Chinese leaders continue on this course of action, if they continue to execute those who were involved in the democracy movement—and there is every indication that they plan to continue along that path—it will have serious consequences for the relationship between our two countries. Indeed, I expect next week when we resume our deliberations of the foreign aid bill, to offer an amendment, with broad bipartisan support, and I hope the endorsement of the administration as well, making it very clear to China that we will not continue to conduct business as usual, so long as they continue on this course of repression.

—From "For the Record," *The Washington Post*, June 28, 1989

CHURCH, FRANK (1924–1984)

Democratic senator from Idaho who played a key role in civil rights legislation, the anti–Vietnam War movement, welfare for the elderly, and wilderness preservation. By opposing gun control legislation, supporting local agricultural interests, and fighting efforts by southwestern states to export Idaho's water, Church's liberal foreign policy position was not a serious limitation to his election as senator of a conservative state for four terms. Church also favored legislation in the area of environmental protection. He played a major role in the passage of federal legislation that created the National Wilderness System in 1964 and in the creation of Idaho's River of No Return Wilderness in 1980.

Church enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1943 and served as a military intelligence officer in China, Burma, and India. Discharged in 1946, he returned to Stanford University to complete his degree. Soon after, Church was diagnosed with cancer and was told that he had one year to live. He defeated the cancer, however, and this second chance led him to later reflect that "the only way to live is by taking great chances." In 1950, Church graduated from Stanford Law School and returned to Boise, Idaho, to practice law.

After returning to Boise, Church became an active Democrat in Idaho. He made an unsuccessful bid for the state legislature in 1952 but then won a U.S. Senate seat in 1956, becoming, at age 32, the fifth-youngest member to sit in the U.S. Senate.

In 1959, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Church to the Foreign Relations Committee. A year later, in 1960, Church received additional national exposure when he gave the keynote speech at the Democratic National Convention. In 1962, he became the first Democratic senator in Idaho history to win a second term in office.

Despite his vocal opposition to the Vietnam War, Church was reelected to the Senate in 1968. In 1970, he coauthored the Cooper-Church Amendment, which prohibited President Richard Nixon from sending troops or advisers to Cambodia without the consent of Congress. The amendment passed in the Senate, but the House rejected it. The Cooper-Church Amendment was the first limitation on presidential power during a war situation. Church also sponsored an amendment to prohibit the use of U.S. ground troops in Laos and Thailand.

In the spring of 1976, Church sought the Democratic nomination for president. After winning primaries in Nebraska, Idaho, Oregon, and Montana, he withdraw in favor of Jimmy Carter. In 1979, Church was appointed chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where he led the debate for the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty. He lost reelection for a fifth term in 1980 by less than 1% of the votes in Idaho. After his defeat, Church practiced international law in Washington, DC, specializing in Asian issues. Church died of cancer at his home in Bethesda, Maryland, on April 7, 1984.

See also Civil Liberties

CINEMA AND THE MILITARY

Role of the film industry in U.S. national security efforts. In 1898, the day Congress declared war against Spain, Vitagraph began filming *Tearing Down the Spanish Flag*, a film that portrayed U.S. Army troops seizing a Spanish government installation in Havana, an event that did not occur in real life until several weeks later. The popularity of the film and its ability to muster public support for the war effort was not lost on the film industry or the military.

THE WORLD WAR I ERA

When the United States entered World War I in 1917, the film industry had blossomed with new technology and unprecedented skill in storytelling. That year, American filmmakers churned out a number of anti-German propaganda films. The director Cecil B. DeMille alone produced three films—*Joan the Woman, The Little American,* and *Till I Come Back to You*—that vilified the German Huns as barbaric, sadistic and hell-bent on violating America's sweetheart, actress Mary Pickford. Other studios took their cue from DeMille, and, by the time U.S. soldiers had returned home in November 1918, Americans had enjoyed dozens of films justifying and celebrating U.S. intervention in the Great War. Audiences cheered battle scenes and the vanquished Huns, perhaps participating vicariously in America's shining moment.

With the invention of talking pictures and the onset of the Great Depression, the cinema grew exponentially, concentrating its production in Hollywood, California. Hard times contributed to the success of the relatively new medium, an inexpensive way to escape the hardscrabble existence of everyday life. It is estimated that by 1930, 80 million people were attending the movies each week to enjoy westerns, comedies, horror films, action adventures, and other genres of film. During this period, Hollywood occasionally presented a sobering vision of war, as in the film *All Quiet on the Western Front*. But most movies of the post–World War I era tended to be escapist or lavish epics such as *Gone With the Wind*.

WORLD WAR II CINEMA

During the early 1940s, the war in Europe was brought closer to American shores largely through radio broadcasts and newspaper headlines. Although an occasional film took aim at the "evil Huns," Hollywood continued on its escapist course. In early 1940, a battle erupted between isolationists in the U.S. Senate and some Hollywood producers. Many senators alleged that Hollywood was glorifying war, pushing public opinion toward involvement in what was then viewed as a European problem.

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, a massive mobilization permeated all levels of American life and culture. President Franklin D. Roosevelt made special note of Hollywood, claiming that the motion picture was the most effective medium to inform the nation and make it ready for war. The result was a number of war films aimed at stoking American patriotism.

Films such as *Sahara, Bataan, Flying Tigers, Guadalcanal Diary,* and *Wake Island* used classic film techniques to glorify war and the brave soldiers fighting it. Other films dealt with the home front, where consumer goods were scarce and the economy was dedicated to the war effort. The film *Joe Smith, American* was the story of an everyday factory worker who was captured and tortured by Nazi agents but refused to divulge information. In *Saboteur*, another factory worker thwarts a Nazi foe, and the film *Pittsburgh* celebrated the steel industry's role in the war effort.

The Office of War Information (OWI), established in June 1942, was given oversight of Hollywood, which churned out film after film glorifying war, the men who served, and the people at home who supported the war effort. The OWI recommended that filmmakers consider seven questions before making a movie, including the following: Will this picture help to win the war? What war information problems does the film clarify, dramatize, or interpret? If it is an escapist picture, will it harm the war effort by creating a false picture of America, its allies, or the world we live in?

The classic film *Casablanca* is an example of an OWI-acceptable picture, with its attempt to inform the audience of the causes and reasons for the war. Other films were less acceptable but became popular nonetheless because of their racist or simplistic representation of Germans and Japanese. The film *Little Tokyo, USA* (1942) dealt with Japanese internment, making the claim that all Japanese were loyal to the Japanese emperor. Ultimately, the OWI cracked down on Hollywood, and, by the end of the war, the agency had extensive control over film production.

Hollywood performed a secondary propaganda function during World War II by offering diversion from the harsh reality of war. Films such as *Stage Door* and *Hollywood Canteen* celebrated the war effort with musicals, whereas other musicals, such as *Yankee Doodle Dandy,* paid homage to patriotism and American values without any direct mention of events in the Pacific or Europe.

Films such as *Meet Me in Saint Louis* and *Life With Father* were more subtle, depicting turn-of-the-century America and conveying the important message that people must make sacrifices to preserve the American ideal presented on the screen.

Hollywood was a good citizen in participating in the war effort. A number of high-profile stars publicly joined the military or launched USO tours. Actor Clark Gable flew a B-17 mission over Europe, and Jimmy Stewart was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. Other actors such as Bob Hope and Bing Crosby flew to combat zones to entertain the troops, a tradition that Hope continued for close to half a century.

FILM IN THE POSTWAR YEARS

Though the heavy hand of the OWI ended with World War II, Hollywood continued to advance the national security agenda during the 1950s and 1960s, especially after the House Un-American Activities Committee began to focus on alleged communist infiltration in the film industry. Hollywood responded by blacklisting most offenders, often on the flimsiest of evidence. It was not until the Vietnam War and the rise of the antiwar movement that the film industry sought to distance itself from Washington's strategic goals.

—Will Hughes

See also Capra, Frank; Propaganda; World War I; World War II

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CITIZEN-SOLDIER
See ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

CIVIL AIR PATROL

Nonprofit organization whose volunteers provide search-and-rescue, disaster-relief, counterdrug, and homeland security missions at the request of federal, state, and local agencies as part of the Air Force Homeland Security Directorate.

The brainchild of aviation advocate Gill Robb Wilson in the late 1930s, the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) was founded on December 1, 1941, by New York City mayor Fiorello La Guardia to provide civilian air support to the military. The CAP was established days before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and, shortly thereafter, the CAP insignia began appearing on civilian aircraft everywhere. The CAP was initially charged with providing liaison and reconnaissance flying, but the group's mission expanded during the early days of World War II, when German U-boats sank several ships off the East Coast of the United States. The CAP planes were armed with depth charges and bombs later in the war.

The CAP pilots are credited with saving a tanker off of Cape May, New Jersey, early in the war when unarmed planes dived in mock attacks, forcing the German U-Boat to break and run. The pilots flew 24 million miles during the war, found 173 enemy submarines, attacked 57, and sunk 2. Sixty-four CAP aviators lost their lives during World War II.

In 1943, the CAP became an auxiliary to the Army Air Corps, and when the U.S. Air Force was established in 1947, the CAP was designated as the air force's civilian auxiliary the following year. Over the years, the Civil Air Patrol has provided an important service to the air force by testing new technology, such as personal locator beacons, night vision, infrared imaging, digital satellite communications for transmitting video and photos, and real-time video for search-and-rescue missions.

Although the CAP has long been identified with search-and-rescue operations (95% of inland searches of the continental United States are conducted by the CAP after being assigned by the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center), its 62,000 members are also involved in drug interdiction, disaster relief, and homeland security. The CAP owns a fleet of more than 550 single-engine aircraft and has one of the largest communications networks in the United States, operating around the clock. The national headquarters of the Civil Air Patrol is located at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, but the organization has planes based around the country and available for CAP pilots.

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the CAP, which flew relief efforts in New York, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania, was placed under the Air Force Homeland Security Directorate. The CAP provided security for the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, as well as flights over NASA space launches.

Some 27,000 young people participate in the Civil Air Patrol's cadet program, in which they are mentored

by members and receive aerospace education and flight training. The CAP provides more than $200,000 in scholarships each year. Approximately 10% of each year's freshman class at the Air Force Academy is composed of former CAP cadets.

CIVIL LIBERTIES

Basic freedoms guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution that have, on occasion, been abridged by the government in times of war or national crisis. An emphasis on civil liberties for the individual is ingrained in the U.S. national identity. Active measures to ensure and preserve those liberties are woven into American history, dating back to the first days of the nation. The new nation was founded by individuals seeking new economic opportunities and, more important, religious freedom and independence from harsh rulers who infringed on the rights of the individual.

Although the settlers had varying ideas about the degree of influence that government and religion should have on its constituents and each other, there was universal agreement that the new state should be based on respect for civil liberties to an extent that had not been recognized in their homelands. This broad consensus allowed for the very deliberate inclusion in the nation's founding documents of guarantees that individual rights would always be prioritized when it came to the way the new nation was run, despite the divergent opinions held by the various states on many other fundamental matters. In the two centuries to come, these principles would be tested and revisited often, particularly during times of concern about national security. The perfect balance between civil liberties and national security is an elusive goal, particularly given the subjectivity inherent in gauging threats to national security.

THE BILL OF RIGHTS

The signing and ratification of the Constitution represented a victory for the new nation's federalists. The federalists initiated and fueled the movement for a new document that would establish a robust central government to unite and strengthen the new nation. They by no means enjoyed a strong majority and were not confident, until the final moments before signatures were laid down, that the Constitution would be accepted by state legislators.

Antifederalists were opposed to the document on several fronts. The newly strengthened central government's ability to tax relatively heavily was reminiscent of the British monarchy's ruling practices, some claimed. Others predicted that a strong federal government would be prone to the same civil rights abuses that had been perpetrated by the rulers they had left behind. They were concerned that the Constitution left the federal government relatively unchecked and made no specific provisions for the protection of the individual.

After its ratification, both federalists and antifederalists called for an addendum to the Constitution that would list the specific and immutable rights to which individuals were entitled. The Bill of Rights was the result. Its 10 amendments listed rights granted to individuals that could not be infringed upon by the government. These rights constitute the foundation of Americans' understanding of civil liberties, to which they are entitled as citizens.

The First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments are perhaps the most familiar. The First Amendment ensures freedom of religion, speech, and the press and the right to assemble and to hold the government responsible for its actions. The Fourth Amendment protects the public from unreasonable search and seizure. The Fifth Amendment ensures due process for individuals charged with a crime and guarantees that no individual will be forced to testify against himself or herself in a criminal case.

STRIKING A BALANCE: NATIONAL SECURITY VERSUS CIVIL LIBERTIES

Throughout American history, members of society have agreed—sometimes reluctantly—that in times of war or other threats to national security, the government may curb some civil liberties. The degree to which the public accepts this tightening of security typically depends on the severity of the threat, its duration, and the nature and extent of its impact on individual rights. For example, in 1919, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer came into possession of a list of proposed bomb attacks against prominent public and political figures in the United States. He considered the existence of the list to be an indication that anarchists and communists were planning to overthrow the U.S. government.

Palmer raised the specter of the recent Russian Revolution, in which communist revolutionaries had

toppled the Russian government just two years earlier. He used the fear of a communist uprising to enable him to arrest, detain without trial, and deport thousands of aliens, suspected anarchists, and left-wing activists. Criticism of Palmer's raids quickly escalated, and in the next year, his political career was abruptly cut short.

The government has drawn criticism on a number of occasions for disregarding civil liberties in the pursuit of national security. Examples include the internment of Japanese Americans after the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, government blacklisting and public persecution of suspected communists during the McCarthy era of the 1950s, and secret surveillance of leading figures in the civil rights and antiwar movements of the 1960s and 1970s.

SEPTEMBER 11 AND BEYOND

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were the most devastating attacks on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor and a national security challenge of immense proportions. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, a shocked public was initially supportive of the Bush administration's aggressive domestic and international response to the attacks. However, several factors eroded the near-unanimous support for the administration's antiterrorism policies and generated criticism of its tactics.

Perhaps of greatest concern to most citizens were provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, passed in October 2001 to bolster the government's ability to fight terrorism. The act relaxed rules for wiretapping individuals who were suspected of terrorist activity and for the detention of suspected terrorists. It allowed the government to arrest suspects without requiring it to file formal charges, notify anyone of the subject's whereabouts, or even reveal whether the suspect was being held. Many people felt that such powers too drastically overstepped the boundaries that protect American civil liberties.

Immediately following the September 11 attacks, the FBI and other law enforcement bodies conducted nationwide sweeps during which hundreds of Muslim American men were detained for months, frequently without probable cause, access to attorneys, or the right to trial. Many were eventually released, but others were deported who were found to be residing in the United States illegally.

Other issues that have aroused sharp criticism from civil libertarians in the wake of September 11 are the increased use of the "crime fraud" exception to attorney–client privilege. This exception gives the government authority to wiretap visits between a suspect and his or her attorney if it has reason to believe that the attorney has knowledge that the suspect has committed a crime or is planning to do so.

Another lightning rod for criticism has been the government practice of indefinite detention without trial and access to counsel. In a case touching on this issue, two American citizens, Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi, who were suspected of complicity in terrorist activity, were designated as "enemy combatants" by the government. According to the government, this designation stripped Padilla and Hamdi of the protections afforded other U.S. citizens charged with crimes.

Such instances of the government apparently overstepping its boundaries are being met with resistance from American citizens, as well as foreign governments. It seems that at least some of these protests are having an effect. In the case of Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi, for example, the Supreme Court agreed to hear complaints brought by both men against the government for their prolonged and unorthodox detentions.

The nature of the terrorist threat to the United States has introduced new complexities to the discussion of balancing civil liberties and national security. Civilians were willing to relinquish certain liberties during wartime, confident that those freedoms would be restored at the conclusion of the conflict, defined as the point at which the shooting stopped. The war on terrorism, however, does not have a clearly identifiable ending condition. Not only is the end of that war impossible to foresee, it likely may be nonexistent. For this reason, the public may be less willing to accept a large-scale abridgement of civil liberties in the name of national security than it was in the past.

See also Constitution of the United States; House Un-American Activities Committee; Japanese Internment; McCarthyism; Terrorism, War on International; September 11/WTC and Pentagon Attacks

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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The relationship between a state's civilian political leaders and its military officers, as well as the influence that relationship exerts on the creation of foreign and defense policies. Civil-military relations describe how the armed services of a state interact with civilian authorities and with the larger civil society.

Civilian control of the military is a characteristic of democratic states. Civilian control means that there is a clear distinction between political and military duties and that there is clear subordination of the military to the civilian leadership. Democratic theory and tradition hold that the military should not interfere in politics and that the armed forces should not influence the making of national policy. Excessive military influence over foreign and defense policy is considered an erosion of civil-military relations and a threat to democratic values. Military activity is meant to support political objectives, which are defined by the elected civilian leaders of a state. The incompatibility between military professionalism and political participation and the belief that military influence over national policy is a threat to democratic values form the core of the concept of civil-military relations.

Formal institutional arrangements govern the civil-military relationship in the United States. These arrangements include the separation of powers and the division of civilian control over the military found in the Constitution. The nation's founders were concerned with the potential for excessive, arbitrary, and unchecked military power. The framers of the Constitution saw the danger in having the power to both declare and wage war concentrated in a single branch of the government. As a result, the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare war and to raise and support military forces (Article I, Section 8), whereas the president, as commander in chief of the nation's armed forces, has the power to conduct military operations and wage war (Article II, Section 2).

Two important pieces of legislation have shaped civil-military relations since World War II: the National Security Act of 1947 and the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act (also known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act). The National Security Act of 1947 established the U.S. Department of Defense and mandated that the secretary of defense be a civilian. The secretary of defense reports directly to the president and wields command authority over the armed forces on behalf of the president. The Goldwater-Nichols Act greatly strengthened the role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and named the chairman as the principal military adviser to the president, the National Security Council, and the secretary of defense. Many observers felt that the powers vested in the chairman of the JCS by this act greatly increased the power and influence of the military.

Civil-military relations are also defined by the attitudes of the military with respect to their civilian leaders. Throughout the course of U.S. civil-military relations, the armed forces historically have assumed an ethical and moral obligation to exercise self-restraint and to subordinate themselves to the civilian leadership. The attitudes that the military and civilians adopt toward each other are important in establishing the balance of civil-military relations. Many of the military services make explicit references in their doctrine manuals to their subordination to civilian authority. Ineffective civilian leadership and weak civilian control of the military can be a threat to balanced civil-military relations. Lack of military knowledge and expertise on behalf of civilian leaders also may contribute to a deterioration in civil-military relations.

Military coups throughout much of the third world during the 1960s and 1970s left a legacy of weak states and strong military influence in government. In developing countries, as well as in countries that are still undergoing democratic transitions, the military continues to play an important, often dominant role in politics, threatening to tip the civil-military balance in favor of the armed forces. Civil-military relations tend to be more balanced in countries that have stronger and more established democratic traditions.

See also Constitution of the United States; Doctrine; Military-Industrial Complex

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CLASSIFICATION

The process of identifying and protecting from public disclosure information that is deemed by the U.S. government to be vital to protecting national security. Information is classified for purposes of national security if its disclosure could cause damage to foreign relations, operations, or innovations. Information that may be secured includes, but is not limited to, diplomatic information, military or defense plans, intelligence, and scientific discoveries. However, intentional concealment of information by the government is generally viewed to be inconsistent with the fundamental democratic principle of holding the government accountable to society. As a result, a framework of classification was developed after World War II to guide classification procedures and to avoid unnecessarily classifying information.

In general, there are two broad types of information: subjective information and objective information. *Subjective information* is unique information and relates to how a government directs its affairs. Also referred to as "operational information," subjective information typically has five characteristics. First, it is compact, usually short, and easy to transmit or steal. Second, the information is universally understood, requiring little or no expertise to understand. Third, the information cannot be independently discovered. The only way for an adversary to obtain the information is to steal it. Fourth, the information is subject to change. Finally, it is short-lived and need only be kept secret for a limited time. An example of subjective information is a government's military plans for an invasion.

By contrast, *objective information* is information that is discovered, developed, or controlled by a government. It is generally scientific information that can be independently discovered by others. Objective information also has five characteristics. First, the information is wordy and usually large, collated compilations of scientific facts, making it unusually difficult to transmit. Second, generally only a scientist or technical specialist can understand the information. Third, it is not arbitrary information. Any person can discover it if they choose to investigate. Fourth, the information is generally not subject to change. Fifth, the information is long-lived. However, the information is kept secret so as not to advance the efforts of an adversary to discover the information.

Within these two major types of information, there are three categories of classified information: restricted data (RD), formerly restricted data (FDR), and national security information (NSI). The RD and FDR classifications are also referred to as "classified atomic energy information" and are "born classified." That is, the information is automatically authorized to be classified under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 once it is determined that the information meets the definition of RD and FDR. All other information is identified as NSI and is currently authorized for classification under executive order 12356, which was issued on April 2, 1982, by President Ronald Reagan. NSI is "originally classified," requiring a government employee with classification authority to take affirmative action to classify a document. Information deemed NSI is classified for a limited period of time, whereas the duration of classification for RD and FDR is indefinite.

Under executive order 12356, there are three levels of classification for both NSI and atomic energy information. The primary factors in determining the level of classification are the degree of the total damage that could be caused if the information were disclosed and the immanence of that damage. Information becomes declassified or downgraded when an authorized government employee determines that it no longer meets the classification requirements. The lowest level, *confidential*, safeguards information that could cause damage to national security. For example, information used for military training is considered confidential. The next level, *secret*, applies to information that could cause serious damage to national security if it were disclosed. Secret information includes significant intelligence operations and scientific developments relating to national security. The highest level, *top secret*, protects the unauthorized disclosure of information that could cause exceptionally grave damage to national security. Examples of top secret information are national defense plans and cryptological communications.

See also Intelligence and Counterintelligence

CLIENT STATE

A nation supported politically, economically, and militarily by another nation. The United States supported a number of client states in return for their allegiance against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

As World War II ended, the United States was stunned by the aggressive efforts of the Soviet Union

to install communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe. Alarmed by this rapid spread of communism, the U.S. government soon adopted a so-called policy of containment, formulated by political analyst and diplomat George Kennan. Under this policy, the United States would attempt to contain the spread of Soviet power by preventing the conversion of any additional nations into communist states.

To achieve this goal, the United States recognized that a reversion to the isolationist policies that had preceded World War II was not possible. Instead, the United States needed to develop an active presence in all areas of the world and defend its presence with force if necessary. Therefore, the United States worked to form regional alliances throughout the world. These alliances, it was argued, would increase the level of cooperation between the Unites States and its allies, intimidate the Soviet Union by showing it a united front, and provide the United States with an advantage in the recently created United Nations.

Among these alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the most crucial because it prevented the further spread of communism across Europe. But the United States also orchestrated other alliances throughout the world. In Latin America, the United States helped to form the Organization of American States. The Baghdad Pact created an alliance among Middle Eastern nations, and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was formed to combat communist uprisings in Southeast Asia. The goal of these alliances was to include as many nations as possible. Provided that an individual nation openly refuted communism, the United States was willing to support and protect it. This willingness led to the creation of American client states.

American allies such as Great Britain obviously possessed strong economies, military forces, and an overall high standard of living. But many of the United States' new allies throughout Latin America, Africa, Asia, and even Europe were impoverished, lacked stable governments, or were militarily defenseless. Consequently, the United States frequently provided these nations with economic and humanitarian aid, financial assistance, generous trade agreements, political consulting, and even the use of American military force to suppress insurgencies. In return, these client states were only required to support the United States in the effort against communism.

The client-state arrangement ultimately offered serious drawbacks, however. Client states could easily manipulate the United States in return for their nominal support against communism. For example, Portugal threatened to withdraw from NATO if the United States opposed its continued exploitation of its African colonies. Furthermore, the United States often supported corrupt or repressive governments. In Greece, the United States sustained a military dictatorship, but when the dictatorship was overthrown, Greece weakened its ties with the United States. Finally, the United States was drawn into conflicts that it otherwise might have avoided. The Vietnam War was the most glaring example. Determined to protect the crumbling South Vietnamese government, the United States entered a bloody war that strained relations with allies around the world and caused extreme civil disturbance at home.

Over time, the United States has come to feel justified in its struggle to defeat communism. But its insistence on creating and supporting allies, no matter what the cost, often had a debilitating effect on this struggle. The United States gained many allies in name only, and although these client states did not maintain communist governments, many of them failed to adhere to democratic principles.

See also Cold War; Communism and National Security; Containment; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)

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CLINTON, BILL (WILLIAM JEFFERSON), AND NATIONAL POLICY

Forty-second president of the United States (1993–2001), who presided over a period when Cold War tensions were disappearing and new threats to U.S. national security were emerging. William Jefferson Clinton (1946–) took office during a time of enormous political changes overseas. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 eliminated the major foreign threat to U.S. national security and left the United States as the world's sole remaining superpower. Clinton was a major supporter of Russian president Boris Yeltsin, although the two had disagreements over Russia's

conduct of the war against its rebellious province of Chechnya. Although Clinton managed to avoid U.S. involvement in a major war, his tenure as commander in chief was marked by military engagements in Somalia and the Balkans and the emergence of al-Qaeda as a major threat to U.S. national security.

PEACEKEEPING AND NATION BUILDING

The fall of communism in Russia and Eastern Europe proved to be a mixed blessing for the people of those regions, as well as for their neighbors and the United States. Many of the new nations that arose from the defunct Soviet empire were torn by ethnic and religious rivalries. At home, the old Soviet leadership had kept peace between such groups by force but never discouraged their age-old hatreds. Squabbling subject peoples were easier to control because they were less inclined to join forces to resist Soviet rule. In the Balkans, Josip Broz (known as Tito) used similar principles to unite Yugoslavia's many ethnic and religious minorities into a single state. When communism fell, so did the power that kept a lid on these repressed conflicts.

By the start of Clinton's first term, the provinces of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia had seceded from Yugoslavia. Bosnia, however, contained a large ethnic Serbian minority who were opposed to secession (Yugoslavia was dominated by ethnic Serbs, and its capital was located in the province of Serbia). This led to war between Bosnian Serbs, who were supported by Serbian troops, and Bosnia's ethnic Croats and Muslims.

Like his predecessor, George H. W. Bush, President Clinton at first declined to intervene in the conflict. He backed a peace plan submitted by the outgoing Bush administration, which the warring parties ultimately rejected. The United Nations sent a small peacekeeping detachment to the region, but by 1994, it had become clear that the Serbs were determined to forcibly reunite Bosnia and Yugoslavia. Stronger measures were needed to end the conflict, and at this point military forces from of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were ordered into Bosnia. These forces included U.S. ground and air units. The Bosnian intervention marked the first time NATO troops had ever been deployed in combat.

By 1996, the presence of NATO troops proved decisive in forcing an end to the conflict. They did not, however, prevent additional conflicts from erupting. After Bosnia won independence, militants in several smaller Balkan states, including Kosovo and Montenegro, took up arms to achieve independence. These conflicts have required the continued presence of NATO troops to restore peace and maintain order in what is still a very volatile region.

President Clinton also inherited a troublesome situation in Somalia, where the government had collapsed, leaving the country in a state of anarchy. Somalia was no longer a viable state; it was a lawless region ruled by rival warlords that served as a safe haven for international terrorists, drug traffickers, and illegal arms dealers. Somalia's troubles were compounded by an ongoing famine that had claimed millions of lives. International relief agencies sent aid, but most of it was seized by warlords and resold for huge profits. The crisis had grown so acute that President George H. W. Bush dispatched a small contingent of marines to Somalia shortly before leaving office.

The marines' primary mission was to make sure aid workers were safe and that aid got into the hands of the people who needed it. However, they were also ordered to locate and capture Mohammed Farah Aideed, the most powerful of the Somali warlords. In March 1993, the marines received information about Aideed's whereabouts and sent a force of soldiers supported by helicopter to capture or kill him. However, the marines had been led into a trap. Ambushed in the middle of the Somali capital of Mogadishu, several marines were killed, and their Somali attackers shot down a U.S. Black Hawk helicopter.

The "Black Hawk Down" incident prompted Clinton to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia. It also sparked a debate about the wisdom of using U.S. troops for civilian peacekeeping missions. Some members of Congress even suggested the possibility of pulling U.S. forces out of the Balkans. The furor over how and when to commit U.S. troops to a foreign crisis influenced some of Clinton's later decisions in dealing with terrorist attacks.

THE WAR ON TERROR

Although Middle Eastern terrorism was by no means a new phenomenon by the time Clinton took office, it began to take a new form during his presidency. Up until this point, most terrorist groups were local or regional groups operating against Israeli interests and targets. In the early 1990s, Osama bin Laden, a former soldier in the Afghan War against the Soviet Union, founded a new terrorist group called al-Qaeda.

The son of a wealthy Saudi Arabian family, bin Laden had joined the call for Muslims to resist the

1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. After the Muslim victory, he applied the training and experience he received during that 10-year struggle to a campaign to rid the Muslim world of Western influence. He and other former Afghan freedom fighters formed al-Qaeda, a terrorist group that targeted Western (and in particular, American) interests. Bin Laden considered the United States to be the deadliest enemy of Islam and one that must be dealt with immediately.

Between 1993 and 2000, al-Qaeda, and other Islamic terrorist groups with ties to al-Qaeda, conducted a series of attacks against U.S. targets. In 1993, a group headed by Ramzi al-Youssef detonated a bomb in the basement of New York City's World Trade Center, killing six and injuring more than 1,000 others. Three years later, al-Qaeda exploded a bomb outside a building housing U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 and wounding several hundred. In August 1998, the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya were also victimized by al-Qaeda bombings. Just a month before the 2000 U.S. presidential elections, the destroyer USS *Cole* was the target of a bomb attack in Yemen that claimed the lives of 17 U.S. sailors.

Intelligence information showed that Afghanistan's ruling Taliban regime was allowing al-Qaeda to use the country as a base for operations. Clinton considered several responses to the attacks, but his options were limited by the reluctance of Congress and the American public to commit troops to ground combat. When the Taliban refused a U.S. request to expel al-Qaeda from its territory, Clinton ordered cruise missile strikes against suspected al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan.

On several occasions, U.S. intelligence believed it had pinpointed bin Laden himself, but no action was taken. In some of these cases, the intelligence was not considered solid; in others, international political considerations convinced the administration that a strike would be too risky. By the end of his presidency, Clinton had belatedly come to realize the serious nature of the al-Qaeda threat, but the incoming administration of George W. Bush had other priorities, and the window of opportunity for neutralizing bin Laden had passed.

OTHER INITIATIVES

Until the late 1990s, al-Qaeda was not at the top of Clinton's Middle East agenda. That spot was occupied by U.S. engagement in the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. In 1993, Clinton brokered peace talks in Oslo, Norway, that led to what appeared to be a historic peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian people. The Oslo Accords established an internal government known as the Palestinian Authority to act as the formal representative of the Palestinians living in Israel and the occupied territories. It called for the eventual establishment of a separate Palestinian state, which would officially recognize Israel's right to exist and would, in turn, be recognized by Israel as a legitimate nation.

Despite an encouraging start, full implementation of the Oslo Accords stalled over issues such as the disposition of Israeli settlements and the final boundaries of the Palestinian state. The 1995 assassination of Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, who had negotiated the Oslo Accords, was a severe blow to the process. Israeli–Palestinian relations further deteriorated after the 1996 election of Benjamin Netanyahu, a fierce Israeli nationalist who opposed the accords, as prime minister. The Oslo process ground to halt amid the outbreak of fresh violence in Israel in the spring of 2000.

One of Clinton's most significant domestic national security initiatives was his vow to end the exclusion of homosexuals from military service. Just days after the 1992 election, a political fight ensued after a federal court ruling that brought the topic onto the public agenda. The controversy knocked the administration off balance politically at the very outset of its first term.

Ultimately, President Clinton proposed a policy of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," under which the military agreed not to pursue investigations into the sexual orientation of service personnel who did not openly reveal their homosexuality. A soldier who admitted to being gay, however, could still be dishonorably discharged. The solution satisfied few people: Gay rights advocates complained that it avoided the issue of discrimination in the service while forcing gay service members to stay "in the closet." Conservative members of Congress showed their disapproval by overriding the administration's executive directive and inserting a more restrictive antigay policy into a defense spending bill.

Bill Clinton entered the presidency hoping to realize a "peace dividend" as a result of the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet threat. However, the instability triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union contributed significantly to a host of national security problems faced by his administration. Many of these problems, particularly the ongoing struggle against international terrorism, would continue to plague the United States after Clinton left office.

See also Al-Qaeda; Bosnia Intervention; Don't Ask, Don't Tell; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Peacekeeping Operations; Somalia Intervention; Soviet Union, Former (Russia) and Foreign Policy

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REFLECTIONS

Hope and History

When I visited Ireland last year, I met with Seamus Heaney, the Nobel Prize-winning poet, a man who has chronicled Ireland's long struggle and his own fight against cynicism and defeat. I was particularly moved by some words he had written, which I quoted in my speeches to the Irish people. Later, he was kind enough to write them out for me. That piece of paper now hangs in my study at the White House, and I look at it often. One line always leaps out at me—the moment when "hope and history rhyme."

I believe that America today stands between hope and history—at the edge of a moment when these two powerful forces are as one, when we can embrace the dawn of the new century, drawing strength and guidance from our past, filled with confidence that in this new age of possibility, our best is yet to come.

—President Bill Clinton, from *Between Hope and History* (1996)

COALITION BUILDING

Creation of an alliance and subsequent sharing of resources to achieve a defined goal. Unlike some alliances, coalitions are temporary in nature, lasting only long enough to achieve their defined purposes. Coalitions can be built in a variety of areas, such as internationally among states, within governments, and among domestic interest groups.

There are many benefits that can be achieved by building coalitions. One of the most obvious is that the combination of resources allows coalition members to exercise greater power than they could individually. The less powerful members within a coalition are also able to further their interests or simply defend them using greater resources that were previously unavailable. Additionally, coalitions can often provide greater legitimacy of action than could be achieved if individual members acted alone.

To convince others to join a coalition, it is necessary to provide them with solid incentives. These incentives may include outlining compatible goals and demonstrating that, by creating a coalition, these goals have a better chance of being achieved. Additionally, it is important for potential members to be persuaded that the benefits that can be achieved by joining outweigh the potential costs. The cost that might be incurred by not joining may be alienation or the implementation of other penalties such as economic sanctions. Those who do join can be promised political and economic benefits, as was done in the 2003 U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.

There are also many difficulties that can come in building and maintaining coalitions. In coalitions, there are often different political goals and strategies. These differences may strain the alliance. Additionally, there may be a struggle for leadership within the coalition. Most countries are reluctant to provide forces without having any input into how they will be used.

Another area in which coalitions run into difficulty is in the matter of resources. In an ideal situation, each member's resources would be compatible with those of other members. However, there are often incompatibilities in organizational structure, technology, and even culture that make it difficult for members to work together effectively.

There have been several episodes in the recent history of the United States when the president has chosen to build a coalition to achieve a goal. The willingness to join coalitions in the interest of national security has generally meant that the United States has played a central role in the decision-making process of the coalition. As is the case in most coalitions, the weaker powers are generally left to follow the strongest power's lead.

One of the clearest examples of U.S. coalition building is the coalition that President George H. W. Bush built during his presidency. During the first Gulf War, President Bush managed to convince an impressive number of countries to join a coalition for the purpose of removing Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Several countries in the region that became members were able to provide useful resources for the effort. For example, Saudi Arabia's allowance of U.S. troops

into the country provided a valuable staging point for the invasion and helped to pay for the costs of the war. The inclusion of a large number of players, many of whom had not been close allies, gave the action global legitimacy. Arguably, this coalition was a success story that illustrates the benefits of coalition building.

A more recent example of coalition building occurred in 2003, when President George W. Bush decided to build a coalition for the stated purpose of invading Iraq to remove Hussein, to enforce the 17 UN resolutions that had been made, and to remove weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from Iraq. In general, the United States did not increase its military strength by this alliance because many of the

A Defender Class Response Boat, attached to the U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Safety and Security Team, keeping watch over passenger vessels and the Statue of Liberty in New York Bay. The Coast Guard is responsible for providing law enforcement, military readiness, and safety in all waters under U.S. jurisdiction. Since the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard has been one of the first lines of defense in guarding the nation's ports, coastlines, and inland waterways.

Source: U.S. Navy.

resources of the various members of the coalition were not equal to those of the United States. In this case, one of the benefits for the United States of building a coalition was the potential for added legitimacy that it could give to U.S. actions.

In bringing this coalition together, the United States used many different methods of persuasion. In addition to arguing the case for shared interests in eliminating WMD, for example, the United States also used the carrot-and-stick approach, offering incentives and threatening possible repercussions. However, how large a role the economic incentives and political pressure played in convincing others to join has been the subject of much controversy. Still, the coalition has come under pressure as a result of domestic opposition within several countries and has resulted in members dropping out because they perceived the costs to outweigh the benefits.

In all areas in which coalitions are formed, there have been both success stories and failures. Even if there are strong incentives for members to join, that does not mean that they will be able to work together. Therefore, for a coalition to have a better chance of

success, not only does the goal need to be clear, but also it is important for each member to remain aware of interests that impact other members' decisions.

See also Alliances; Collective Security

COAST GUARD, THE, AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Federal agency now under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security that consists of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard and is responsible for overseeing shipping in U.S. coastal waters. There is no Naval National Guard because of a constitutional provision against states maintaining ships of war during peacetime, although New York and Maryland have naval militia units. During wartime, the Coast Guard becomes a part of the U.S. Navy.

The U.S. Coast Guard is the smallest armed service in the United States and the fifth smallest of the seven uniformed services (U.S. Army, Navy, Air

Force, Marines, Coast Guard, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Corps, and Public Health Service Commissioned Corps). Known originally as the Revenue Marine and then the Revenue Cutter Service, the Coast Guard was founded as part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury on August 4, 1790, eight years before the U.S. Navy. At that time, the Coast Guard functioned as the sole military naval force in the United States, and it was authorized by Congress to protect the collection of federal revenue, prevent smuggling, and enforce tariff and trade laws. Its responsibilities later came to include the enforcement of slave laws, piracy interdiction, environmental protection, charting of coastlines, and the exploration of and law enforcement in Alaska.

In 1915, an act of Congress merged the Revenue Cutter Service with the Life-Saving Service, at which point the Coast Guard received its present name, along with an expanded role in maritime safety and defense. The nation's lighthouses became the responsibility of the Coast Guard in 1939, as did the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation in 1946. The Coast Guard later became part of the U.S. Department of Transportation and then, in March 2003, part of the Department of Homeland Security.

See also Border and Transportation Security

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CODETALKERS

Native Americans speaking their own dialect as American soldiers in wartime, effectively using their native languages as a code. The codetalkers provided the U.S. forces with fast communications over open radio communications nets without any chance that enemy eavesdropping would succeed.

During World War I and World War II, members of the Navajo, Comanche, and Choctaw tribes served as most of the codetalkers. However, experts believe that approximately 19 tribes contributed such wartime services in the 20th century. All saw action primarily in World War II, during the infancy of tactical voice radio, which remained vulnerable to interception and exploitation by all sides.

The first known official use of codetalkers occurred in October 1918, when eight Choctaws serving in a battalion in France were put to use as telephone communicators during the Meuse-Argonne offensive. Their use of native dialect denied the Germans any use of telephone tapping. Too little time remained in the war for this improvisation to be studied and exploited on a larger scale, but the potential of codetalking had at least received official notice. During World War II, Navajo missionary Philip Johnston approached the Marine Corps with a proposal to use the Navajo language as a foolproof code for radio and telephone transmissions. The Native American dialects have no alphabet, and their unique syntax and tonal qualities would defy any attempt by an enemy to intercept and exploit information being transmitted by voice. After field testing the concept on the West Coast, the Marine Corps initiated its employment of the Navajo codetalkers with its first cohort of 29 recruits in May 1942. They served in all of the marine divisions and their major campaigns. By the end of the war, the Marine Corps had taken in 540 Navajos for service, 375 to 420 of whom were trained as codetalkers.

The U.S. Army also employed codetalkers in Europe, including 13 Comanche codetalkers who were assigned to the Fourth Infantry Division when it landed at Normandy in June 1944. Navajo codetalkers continued to be used after World War II; much less is known about their use then, a factor that undoubtedly delayed the public recognition of their wartime exploits.

Although simple in concept, the employment of codetalkers required much innovation. Native American dialects contained few military terms, and these had to be improvised or drawn up in an official lexicon that was promulgated during the war. About 450 military terms made up this lexicon, such as: *besh-lo* (iron fish) for "submarine," *dah-he-tih-hi* (hummingbird) for "fighter plane," and *debeh-li-zine* (black street) for "squad." Public recognition of the wartime codetalkers occurred only in the 1990s, although the U.S. Army and Marine Corps had recorded the basic factors surrounding codetalkers in their earlier published official histories.

See also World War II

COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

The ability to alter another state's behavior using means short of war. The broader definition of coercion refers to any efforts to alter the behavior of a target state through the manipulation of costs and benefits. This may involve threats, sanctions, or violence.

The goal of coercive diplomacy is to achieve security or wealth through forceful persuasion without suffering the costs of war. Coercive diplomacy may involve deterrence or its counterpart, *compellence.* Deterrence means preventing a state from acting through the use of threats and promises. Compellence refers to causing another state to do something that it would not otherwise do. Most analysts focus on coercive diplomacy as a form of compellence.

Political scientist Alexander L. George offered a restrictive definition of coercive diplomacy: "efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action." George conceded that this definition only covers *defensive* uses of coercive diplomacy; it leaves out more offensive aims. Nonetheless, his emphasis on defensive applications is not accidental. Advocates of coercive diplomacy believe that states may achieve their goals without resorting to war, which is inherently uncertain and dangerous.

A number of factors influence the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy. One important variable is the perceived credibility of the coercing state, or the target state's belief that the coercing state will make good on its threats. The coercing state must carefully balance threats of punishment, rewards for cooperation, and reassurance that cooperation will be reciprocated. States have little reason to comply with coercive demands if they do not believe that they will be rewarded for doing so. Another factor is the balance of interests; coercive diplomacy is unlikely to work when the target state believes that vital interests are at stake. The character of the target state also matters—how willing its leadership is to accept risk, whether it cares about protecting its civilian population, and so on.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is frequently cited as an example of successful coercive diplomacy. After discovering that the Soviet Union had secretly placed nuclear missiles in Cuba, U.S. president John F. Kennedy used coercive diplomacy to convince Moscow to remove them. Kennedy ordered a naval blockade of Cuba, which not only prevented the Soviets from delivering more missiles but also sent the Soviets an implicit threat of military confrontation. Kennedy also secretly offered to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey if the Soviets cooperated. After a tense standoff, the Soviet leadership finally dismantled the missile installations on the island.

Coercive diplomacy can also have offensive goals. In 1960–61, for example, the United States used a combination of military threats and economic sanctions to engineer a regime change in the Dominican Republic. By placing an embargo on Dominican sugar exports, Washington undermined the economic and political base of the Dominican dictator, Raphael Trujillo. The U.S. actions emboldened local opponents of Trujillo, who killed the dictator and forced his family to flee the island. Scholars continue to argue whether economic sanctions or military threats were more important to the final outcome. Whatever the case, the Dominican affair demonstrates that coercive diplomacy is not limited to preserving the status quo.

Concerned about finding ways to combat international terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, the U.S. actively sought Middle Eastern nations as partners in the war on terror. However, after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Muslim nations in the Middle East have been reluctant to provide bases for American forces engaged in antiterror operations. The Bush administration turned to coercive diplomacy to find a solution to the dilemma. It offered cash-strapped former Soviet republics in central Asia access to economic assistance in exchange for the use of airfields and bases in their countries. In 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Tajikistan to discuss the use of Tajik bases for U.S. operations in neighboring Afghanistan.

Tajikistan is willing to base U.S. troops even though the decision is generally unpopular among most Tajiks, who are Muslim. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups have shown an ability to exploit such internal divisions to strike at governments that assist their enemies. Thus, coercive diplomacy in today's political environment cannot be planned solely with the target state in mind but also must consider the possible actions of nonstate actors, such as al-Qaeda.

See also Compellence; Cuban Missile Crisis; War on Terrorism, International

COLD WAR

Worldwide conflict from 1945 to 1991 between the capitalist democracy of the United States and the

communist Soviet Union. The rivalry between the two nations dominated global political and military developments until the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.

After suffering widespread devastation and more than 30 million deaths during World War II, the Soviet Union's primary postwar goal was creating a buffer of friendly states around its borders, particularly in Eastern Europe. The United States was equally determined in its mission, stated by President Harry S. Truman in the Truman Doctrine, to contain communism and halt its spread into Western Europe and the rest of the free world. Although the Cold War did not involve direct, armed hostilities between the world's two superpowers, the struggle did entail a half-century of tense diplomatic negotiations, hostile actions and incursions, nuclear and conventional arms races, and wars between small nations allied with the United States and the Soviet Union.

ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

Although they had been allies during World War II, the two superpowers' cooperation crumbled during the late 1940s. In the United States, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan (1948), which allocated funds to rebuild the war-torn nations of Western Europe, were the first steps in a campaign to check the spread of Soviet communism into Western Europe. In 1949, the formation of a Western military coalition, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), further strengthened Western Europe's ability to resist Soviet aggression.

A divided Germany was the site of hostilities between the Soviet Union and the United States throughout the Cold War. Because the West German city of West Berlin was located in Soviet-controlled East Germany, the city was a focus of Soviet aggression. In 1948, the Soviet Union initiated a blockade to prevent the West's access to the city. The United States and Britain responded by airlifting tons of supplies to bypass the blockade and fly in much-needed supplies, thereby maintaining a vital link to the West. The Berlin Blockade and the Berlin airlift signaled that both sides were willing to take strategic actions against one another but were reluctant to go to war.

When Communists led by Mao Zedong took over China in 1949, the United States became concerned that communism would spread throughout the rest of Asia. These fears seemed to be confirmed the following year, when Communist North Korea invaded South Korea. In response, the United States and more than 50 other member countries of the United Nations rushed to defend South Korea. The first armed conflict of the Cold War, the Korean War lasted three years and cost 37,000 U.S. lives.

THE ARMS RACE AND CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Early in the Cold War, the United States enjoyed a monopoly on nuclear weapons, a significant advantage that it used to offset Soviet conventional military might. However, the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in 1949, spurring the United States to accelerate the development of its nuclear weapons program. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Union and the United States created a host of newer, more sophisticated, and more powerful nuclear weapons and delivery systems. No longer did the nuclear threat consist simply of atomic bombs dropped by plane. Nuclear devices now could be delivered using intercontinental ballistic missiles and sea-launched ballistic missiles. Each nation came to possess the ability to destroy the other at half an hour's notice.

During the early 1960s, the tiny island of Cuba became a flash point in the Cold War nuclear rivalry. Shortly after the Communist regime of Fidel Castro took power in Cuba, the United States began to formulate plans to topple it. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his successor, John F. Kennedy, felt that a communist state so close to the United States was a serious threat to America's national security. In 1961, the United States launched a covert invasion at Cuba's Bay of Pigs in an attempt to overthrow the Castro regime. The failed invasion increased hostilities between the United States and the Soviets, who counted Cuba as a valuable ally.

Tensions came to a head in 1962, when the Soviets began construction of secret missile sites in Cuba. When spy satellite photos revealed the presence of missiles on Cuban soil, U.S. president John F. Kennedy placed an embargo on the island. The action infuriated Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, who threatened military action. For several tense days, the world stood poised on the brink of war. In the end, the Soviets backed down and removed the missiles, narrowly averting an armed conflict. The resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis made it clear that the United States would not tolerate the further spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere.

VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH

The U.S. policy of containing communism led the nation into the Vietnam War, the second armed conflict of the Cold War. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the United States worked closely with the non-communist South Vietnamese government, which was resisting a forcible union with North Vietnam. These efforts eventually led to a war between North and South Vietnam (1965–73), during which the United States deployed hundreds of thousands of military personnel and spent more than $130 billion. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, provided economic and military assistance to the North Vietnamese. Despite its huge investment, the United States failed to stop the North Vietnamese from overrunning South Vietnam and creating a unified Communist Vietnam.

After the arms race of the 1960s and the shooting war in Vietnam that followed, the 1970s marked a period of easing hostilities and a slowdown of the arms race. This period is formally known as the era of *détente*. From 1969 to 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union participated in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I). This led the parties to negotiate a treaty banning antiballistic missiles, as well as the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which aimed to halt the proliferation of nuclear arms for five years. In May 1972, President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed both treaties. The success of the SALT I talks led to further discussions at the SALT II negotiations.

Although several treaties emerged from the SALT II talks and were signed by the leaders of both nations, increasing tensions between the two countries during the 1980s prevented Congress from ratifying those agreements. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 triggered a new buildup of the U.S. military during the 1980s as President Ronald Reagan renewed the U.S. commitment to contain communism. The Reagan administration sent U.S. funds to assist anticommunist guerillas in Central America and covert aid to mujahideen rebels combating the Soviets in Afghanistan. Reagan also ordered U.S. troops to the Caribbean island of Grenada in 1983 to forestall a communist takeover of the nation's government.

FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION

The Soviet war in Afghanistan proved to be an overwhelming failure for the communist superpower, bringing the nation to the brink of bankruptcy. The death of Brezhnev and his succession by Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signaled a new era in U.S.–Soviet relations. Gorbachev realized that the Soviet Union was in dire economic straits and could not afford to continue the costly arms race. The Soviet Union resumed arms negotiations with the United States, leading to a 1987 agreement banning intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Arms talks continued under Reagan's successor, George H. W. Bush, into the late 1980s.

Gorbachev's encouragement of reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern European nations encouraged anticommunist forces in the satellite states to press for the dismantling of their communist governments. Beginning in 1989, one Eastern European nation after another replaced its communist government with capitalist and democratic institutions. Germany, divided since the end of World War II, finally reunited in 1990. By the end of 1991, the government of the Soviet Union was in disarray, prompting the republics that composed the nation to form their own independent governments. The rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union and the wholesale abandonment of communist philosophy by the nations that emerged brought a swift conclusion to the Cold War.

The bipolar world that existed for nearly half a century after World War II has been replaced by one in which the United States is the sole dominant superpower. Although relations between the United States and Russia (the former Soviet Union) have been much closer since the end of the Cold War, the two still have differences and areas of conflicting interest. Like many other nations, Russia is concerned about how the United States will use its unrivaled power. The U.S. policy in the Middle East is especially worrisome to Russia, which has a large Muslim population and is surrounded by many majority-Muslim states that were once part of the Soviet Union. For its part, the United States is worried about the authoritarian policies of Russian president Vladimir Putin. The U.S. leaders are wary of a return to dictatorship in Russia that could mean a return to Cold War rivalry. Although the old Cold War has ended, both powers must work to prevent its repetition in the future.

See also Arms Race; Atlantic Alliance; Berlin Airlift; Berlin Crises; Berlin Wall; Communism and National Security; Containment; Containment and the Truman Doctrine; Cuban Missile Crisis; Détente; Domino Theory; Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy; Iron Curtain; Johnson, Lyndon B., and National Policy; Kennedy, John F., and

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COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Security arrangements established between two or more states to provide for mutual self-defense in the face of aggression. Collective security historically has been an important tool for maintaining peace and preserving national security.

Collective security agreements often take the form of treaties. Parties to such a treaty generally agree that if one party is attacked, one or more of the other signatories is obliged to come to its aid and repel the attacker. States bound together by such treaties are obliged to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their allies and, in turn, receive protection from allies if attacked.

The principle of collective security is advantageous because it allows states to "borrow" the military capabilities of other states in times of threat or emergency. As a result, states gain additional protection and feel more secure. Collective security is particularly beneficial for small states that value autonomy but whose military capabilities are limited. Through collective security arrangements, states may obtain the benefits of greater firepower without the loss of sovereignty that may accompany other sorts of alliances. Moreover, defensive efforts that states make on behalf of their allies gain international legitimacy through collective security treaties or agreements.

Collective security also has the effect of enforcing some limits on the use of force. Because the world has no overarching government above that of the nation-state, states theoretically may engage in any kind of hostile action they please. To combat this, a collective security arrangement establishes rules and normalizes the appropriate uses of force, which are usually restricted to defensive purposes. In this way, collective security serves to limit attacks between nations and acts as an enforcement mechanism for the rules against hostility.

Collective security also has a less military dimension. By embracing collective security, states imply a commitment to resolving disputes among themselves by means other than force, such as mediation or negotiation. This can promote regional peace and allow the states involved in the agreement to devote fewer resources to military or national defensive. Further, it also may foster information sharing as nations join together to fight terrorism, deter aggression, or cooperate on economic or social welfare initiatives.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATIES

The United Nations Charter, which was intended to promote international peace and security, contains various provisions for collective security. The charter was written following World War II, and its authors sought to limit the occurrence of interstate war and unilateral attacks by raising the costs of aggressive offensives. According to the UN Charter, states (UN members or otherwise) that attack a UN member state face armed force from other members, who are obligated to help repulse the attack. Articles 42, 43, and 51 of the charter authorize the United Nations to direct members' armed forces to defend the invaded country under such circumstances. However, the authorization of force is directed by the Security Council, and disagreement among its members may prevent an effective collective response.

The North Atlantic Treaty, the founding document of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), also contains provisions for collective security. According to the NATO treaty, an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. The NATO members are committed to pledging forces in accordance with UN principles, and they are required to cease military actions once the United Nations intervenes in a conflict. Under the terms of the treaty, collective defense may be initiated if there is a sudden attack against an ally, its citizens, or its national interests. However, these terms do not include attacks on colonies held by signatory states. The treaty also comes into force if there is a perceived threat to international peace and security.

RECENT USES OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

A recent example of the use of collective security occurred in August 1990, when the international community came together to deal with aggression in the Middle East. Iraq, which had long claimed the neighboring nation of Kuwait, invaded its wealthy neighbor as the first step toward annexing it as part of Iraq. Soon after the invasion, a U.S.-led coalition of 26 countries repelled the Iraqis and pushed them out of Kuwait in a joint military operation known as Operation Desert Storm.

Collective security was broadly invoked during the genocidal conflicts in the former Yugoslav republics from 1990 to 1996 and to combat drastic instability in Somalia during the early 1990s. These events triggered collective security mandates because they represented a threat to international peace and security. Armed forces were sent into both the former Yugoslav republics and Somalia under the auspices of the United Nations.

THE UNITED STATES AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

In the United States, there are potential legal difficulties involved in enforcing collective security agreements, including those incorporated in the UN and NATO charters. Under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, only Congress has the power to declare war. If Congress refuses to do so, U.S. participation in a collective security action could be ruled unconstitutional. According to international law, however, treaties supercede domestic laws, and a nation is obliged to fulfill a treaty to which it is party. In such a case, the U.S. government would be forced to choose between violating international law or violating the U.S. Constitution.

Further complicating the issue is the existence of a constitutional "gray area" regarding the powers of the legislative and executive branches to authorize armed force. The Constitution gives power to the Congress to declare war, but it makes the president commander in chief of the armed forces and authorizes the president to conduct war. In an instance when the United States is called on to defend an ally, Congress may explicitly authorize the use of force. However, it also may simply allow the president to unilaterally authorize temporary forces without comment. Congress also may pass a law forbidding the president from compliance or refuse to fund an operation.

There is little danger that the United States will violate UN Security Council mandates because, as a member of the Security Council, the United States has a great deal of input into the wording and structure of such agreements. Moreover, the United States has veto power as a member of the Security Council, so any mandate that passes the UN General Assembly would necessarily require the approval of the U.S. government. Thus, although the United States is an active member of several collective defense systems, it is bound to collective security only to the degree that the government chooses to be bound.

See also Multilateralism; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Treaties; Unilateralism; United Nations

COLONIALISM

Form of imperialism in which a stronger nation gains territorial, political, and economic control and establishes substantial social and psychological influence over a weaker territory. Throughout history, nations have established colonies as a way to enhance security by boosting their home economies and projecting power outside national borders.

FORMS AND PURPOSES OF COLONIALISM

In its original sense, a colony consisted of a group of permanent settlers who moved from one region to establish residence in another territory. During the "age of exploration" from the 15th to the 17th centuries, European nations attempted, with varying success, to establish colonies throughout the Americas. However, traditional colonies were fragile and typically required a great deal of support, patience, and luck on the part of the founding nation to prosper. The first English colonies in North America fought desperately simply to survive. By the eve of the American Revolution some 150 years later, England was still struggling to make its North American colonies pay for themselves.

In some instances, strong states have established colonies by exerting military and political control over the indigenous population of a territory rather than trying to settle their own people there. This was typical of the pattern of European colonization in Africa and Asia during the 19th and early 20th centuries. This

colonial strategy required a minimum commitment of manpower and money from the colonizing power. It was designed to create colonies that were self-supporting and could turn a rapid profit for the controlling power. The European powers used their military and technological superiority to establish control over existing local states and then passed laws and implemented discriminatory social practices that rendered the local population politically and economically powerless.

Indigenous peoples often attempted resistance to forceable colonization, but most such attempts failed. The colonizers brought superior weaponry and infectious diseases that devastated local populations, and they exploited local tensions by pitting rival indigenous groups against one another. All of these factors undermined the effectiveness of local resistance.

Although economic factors motivated much of the colonial enterprise, colonies also had strategic political and military value. Overseas colonies served as bases from which European powers could expand their national territory without coming into direct conflict with rival nations. They also occasionally served as distant theaters of war for continental armies that might otherwise fight in Europe. For example, France and Great Britain engaged in a series of colonial wars in North America and the Caribbean during the mid-1700s. These conflicts often pitted French regular army forces and their native American allies against British troops and militia formations composed of English colonists. Great Britain's colonies also served as a series of permanent naval stations from which to defend and expand its maritime empire.

ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF COLONIALISM

Virtually all of the benefits of the colonial system flowed to the colonizing power, which profited from extracting the natural resources of the colony. Because the colonizer set wages and controlled extraction costs, it could obtain resources cheaply. This, in turn, often spurred economic development in the colonizing nation. For example, the cheap cotton that Great Britain obtained from its colonies during the 18th and 19th centuries stimulated the growth of the British textile industry, which developed the earliest factories to keep up with the demand for cloth. This not only helped Great Britain overtake the Netherlands as the world's leading textile producer but also ushered in

the industrial age, with the British at its forefront. Colonial gains translated into relative gains in power, greater economic stability, and (by extension) greater military security.

However, the colonial system failed to benefit colonies, whose economies were arranged to suit the needs of the mother country. In many cases, colonial powers seized property without compensation, leaving many people with no livelihood who were then compelled to work for poor wages at colonial enterprises. Local economies were restructured to serve the needs of the colonizing country. Small farmers were urged or forced to give up their traditional planting and engage in single-crop production of goods to be exported for sale by the colonial power. Unable to grow their own food and poorly paid for their crops, many farmers fell into poverty. Repeated planting of the same crop also tended to deplete the soil, forcing farmers to work harder while growing less. Rural poverty caused an exodus to towns, whose populations exploded, creating widespread disorder, crime, and disease.

The European powers defended colonialism politically and morally with claims that Christian influences would civilize the "savage" people who were conquered. It was the "white man's burden" to govern the inferior races. The colonizers stressed to their colonized populations that Europeans were ethnically, linguistically, and spiritually superior to them. White people were portrayed as more intelligent, more advanced, and capable of higher achievement. The language of the colonizers became the official language of the educated and the elites. Christianity was taught and missionaries actively proselytized to local populations. Ideals and values from the colonizing power were also carried to the colonies, where they were adopted—sometimes willingly and at other times reluctantly—by the colonized.

COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

Not all colonizing powers governed alike, and the attitude of the colonial government toward the indigenous culture greatly influenced administrative structures. Local culture was sometimes regarded as fixed, meaning that efforts on the part of the colonizers to enlighten the colonized people would be fruitless. In other instances, the indigenous culture was viewed as an obstacle that could be obliterated through further education.

The British system of indirect rule and the French policy of assimilation epitomized these two different schools of thought. With Britain's indirect rule, a small British elite was in charge of administration at the highest level of the colony and reported to superiors in the mother country. Meanwhile, chiefs and traditional leaders who were willing to cooperate with senior colonial administrators were allowed to govern local affairs. Indirect rule thus linked local governance and colonial governance without drastically changing local authority relationships.

In contrast, the French policy of assimilation attempted to create a new ruling class by educating a small number of indigenous people in the French language and French modes of administration. These individuals became lower-level functionaries who assisted the French cadre of higher officials. The French hoped to create an indigenous class of bureaucrats with strong political ties to France, thus reducing the need to send additional French administrators to the colonies.

DECOLONIZATION

By the mid-20th century, the colonial system was in serious trouble. Between the late 18th and early 19th centuries, nearly all of the European colonies in the Americas had achieved their independence. Those colonies that remained—India, virtually all of Africa, and most of Southeast Asia—were becoming more expensive to administer and defend against rival colonial powers and indigenous groups calling for independence.

The combined economic and political shocks of World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II dealt fatal blows to colonialism. By the end of World War II, the European colonial powers were physically devastated, economically crippled, and had little energy or money to devote to colonial matters. In addition, many Europeans found it hard to defend the idea of owning overseas colonies after fighting a bloody war to liberate their own nations from foreign domination. Sensing this change in political and economic fortunes, scores of former colonies demanded and achieved independence between the late 1950s and mid-1960s. This process was not always easy or peaceful. For example, France fought savage colonial wars in Indochina (Vietnam) in the 1950s and Algeria in the 1960s before abandoning its holdings there.

Although few formal colonies remain, not everyone agrees that the colonial era is over. In many instances, colonial powers still exert substantial political, economic, and social influence over their former colonies. Local economies are often still geared to export raw materials to be turned into more profitable finished products in the former colonial power. Often, the former colony also serves as a principal market for these finished products. The constitutions in numerous former dominions still resemble those of the colonial masters and colonial languages, religions, and cultural ideas persist. This continuing colonial influence, known as *neocolonialism*, is a sign of the continuing dominance of traditional powers in the postcolonial world.

See also Development, Third-World; Imperialism

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

The readiness of a military unit to engage in combat based on behavioral, operational, and leadership considerations. Combat effectiveness measures the ability of a military force to accomplish its objective.

The effectiveness of a military unit to perform its mission depends on its capabilities (including equipment and personnel) and its ability to use those capabilities, which involves indoctrination, training, and leadership. Soldiers must be instructed in the use of their weapons, as well as in the battlefield tactics needed to fight as a coordinated team. They also must be trained to follow orders and to make difficult decisions under intense pressure. Indoctrination and leadership play key roles, as a soldier must know his or her role and be willing to perform it. Officers must be able to bring out the best in their troops and know how to motivate them to become an effective fighting force.

Thus, simply having a large or well-equipped force does not guarantee success on the battlefield. Rather, it is the combination of advanced technology, comprehensive training, experienced leadership, and proper military indoctrination that produces an effective military. Military planning also plays an important role in combat effectiveness. Identifying the adversary and developing a strategy that combines the most appropriate weapons, unit types, and combat plan to implement against that particular adversary enhances military effectiveness.

Contemporary studies of military effectiveness have evaluated the behavior of a state's armed forces based on leadership, training, experience, and flexibility.

These studies have identified considerations such as fortifications, vulnerability, mobility, weapons sophistication, command and control, and intelligence as important indicators of how well a military will function in the event of a war.

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

State established as the successor to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) after the fall of the Soviet Communist government. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established by treaty on December 8, 1991, in Minsk, Belarus. It was expected to function as a central authority for the republics of the former Soviet Union, which became independent nations after the Soviet collapse. In that respect, it was modeled on the European Economic Community, now called the European Union. The treaty gave the CIS authority to establish a common economic sphere and to coordinate foreign policy, environmental protection efforts, and immigration and crime control.

The original signatories to the treaty that created the CIS were the heads of state of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan joined as members shortly thereafter. Georgia became the last of the former republics to join, entering into the agreement in 1993. By this time, all former Soviet Republics were members of the CIS, with the exception of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which permanently abstained. The newly formed authority assumed ownership of all former Soviet state facilities following the formal disbandment of the USSR. The United States recognized the independence of the signatory republics, and subsequently all states attained separate United Nations membership by 1992. The CIS still maintains a headquarters in Minsk.

From the outset, however, the CIS was characterized by internal strife and a disregard for written declarations. Although its charter called for recognition of the sovereign equality of all members, ethnic and regional hostilities erupted into a series of wars in the former republics. In Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the North Caucasus area of Russia, regional conflicts occurred on a continual basis. During the Soviet era, the central government had kept a lid on ethnic tensions, but in the absence of a strong state authority, these divisions erupted into violence.

Fundamental disagreement also surfaced among the republics over the goals and purpose of the CIS. The main point of contention was a disagreement over integration with Russia. Russia and Kazakhstan visualized the CIS as a vehicle for closer economic and political assimilation. However, Ukraine and other states that were less receptive to integration with Russia regarded the CIS as an organization whose purpose was to assist individual republics in the transition to full independence.

In 1993, Kyrgyzstan ignored written CIS procedure and issued its own currency. This prompted other states to abandon the Russian ruble as their common currency. That same year, the CIS joint military command was abolished. Russia gained control over strategic weapons by taking possession of the nuclear launch codes, thereby redefining the military mission of the CIS.

At present, all CIS nations have their own currencies, and members have taken turns expressing public disapproval of Russia for its slow implementation of the CIS agreements. For reasons of their own, Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova have been relatively inactive in the alliance. Armenia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia, in contrast, have accepted Russia's protection under a joint defense system, even though Georgia seeks the ultimate removal of Russian forces from its territory.

The CIS is not a state with supranational powers, but it is more than a purely symbolic organization. It coordinates the powers of its member states in the realms of trade, finance, lawmaking, and security. It also seeks to promote cooperation on democratization and cross-border crime. Perhaps the most significant challenge facing the CIS in the near future is the creation of a free trade zone or economic union modeled on the European Union and intended as an economic counterweight to Europe and the United States.

See also Soviet Union, Former (Russia) and U.S. Policy

COMMUNISM

A 20th-century social theory and political movement based on Marxist philosophies and the collective control of society. Fundamentally, communism is a theoretical economic system that calls for the collective

ownership of property and the organization of labor for the common advantage of all members. The movement was a reaction to the extreme poverty of the lower classes in Europe and a rejection of capitalism in the 18th and 19th centuries.

ROOTS OF COMMUNISM

The modern capitalist system was a product of the Industrial Revolution, which many social critics blamed for the appalling environment of the working-class poor. The low wages, long hours, and horrid working conditions that prevailed under early capitalism gave rise to modern communism. As social unrest grew, a broad span of protest theories emerged to challenge the status quo. In the early 19th century, ardent opponents of industrial society aroused a host of critics and idealistic revolutionaries. In Germany, France, and Italy, revolutionary societies burst forth to call for the overthrow of established governments and the formation of a new society that would reject the notion of private property in favor of collective ownership for the public good. It was in the context of these movements that the terms "communism" and "socialism" were used initially. At first vague and often times interchangeable, socialism became associated primarily with the notion of a strong state as the owner of all means of production, whereas communism stood for the abolition of all private property.

In 1848, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels published *The Communist Manifesto,* which outlined the theory of communism. With its publication, Marxist doctrine took its place among unique political thought, and its sociopolitical views unleashed the greatest upheavals of the 19th and 20th centuries. *The Communist Manifesto* assumes the inevitability of a communist society. Marxism states that in every stage of history, the productive forces of the prevailing economic system determine social relationships. These social relationships are divided along class lines, which are drawn according to whether members of a particular class are exploited or responsible for the exploitation. Inherent in Marxism is the concept that history moves in one direction toward full communism, and as it moves, it sheds its imperfections until it reaches a historical stage unimpeded by class differences and formal organs of the state. The final stage of full communism is a stateless, classless society.

During the mid-19th century, Marxist theories and programs came to dominate left-wing thought.

Although *The Communist Manifesto* was written for the Communist League (the first international communist organization), the Marxist movement went forward under the name of socialism. Communism applies to the movement that calls for the end of the capitalist order through revolution rather than evolutionary means. In this sense, communism is to be distinguished from socialism, which (as the term is commonly understood) seeks similar ends but without the chaos of revolt. The Marxist-Leninist version of communist doctrine advocates the overthrow of capitalism by the revolution of the proletariat, the working class. The contribution of Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin to Marxist doctrine seems to defy Marx's own cautionary tone and words: "Man makes history, but not of his own choosing."

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

Modern communism developed in 1903 when the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party split into two factions, the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, advocated the immediate and violent overthrow of the Russian czar (emperor) to bring about the downfall of capitalism and the establishment of a socialist state. The Bolsheviks' eventual success over their less radical Menshevik rivals culminated in the 1917 Russian Revolution, which toppled Czar Nicholas II. The Communists renamed the country the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR; a *soviet* is a Russian worker's group), whose leadership was dominated by the Bolsheviks.

Driven and encouraged by their triumph, the revolutionary socialists in Russia broke completely with the moderate majority and formed the Third International, or Comintern, in 1919. Under the Comintern, Communist leaders called for the uniting of all the workers of the world for the inevitable world revolution and the establishment of a "dictatorship of the proletariat." However, the Communists were unable to find success outside Russia. Communist uprisings in Germany and Hungary shortly after World War I failed to gather popular support and were eventually repressed.

Despite its belief in the eventual fading of the state, the Communist Party structures were organized along a strict hierarchical basis. Cells, whose members were considered the elite, made up the party's broad base. Party officials approved candidates for membership in cells only after deeming them reliable, active, and devoutly loyal to party rule. Communist parties were

formed in countries throughout the world and were particularly active in trying to win control of labor unions and in fomenting labor unrest.

STALINISM

Ignoring the original Comintern rallying cry for world revolution, the Soviet Communist Party under Joseph Stalin adopted the theory of "socialism in one country." This new theory argued that a true communist system could only be built in a single country. Stalin used the theory to justify his decision to press forward with a program of forced industrialization and collectivization at the expense of the agricultural sector. At the same time, Stalin undertook a radical purge of the party membership, ordering the deportation or execution of thousands of opponents, along with their friends, families, and political allies.

These policies, known as *Stalinization,* had the effect of intertwining Communist Party and Soviet state policy more closely. Only those privileged to belong to the party would have a say in determining the future of the USSR. It was becoming evident that, in practice, communism did not create a worker's paradise. Instead, it was forging a giant totalitarian state that dominated every aspect of life and denied the ideal of individual liberty in the USSR.

Stalin cemented his control of the Communist Party and the USSR by leading his country to victory over Nazi Germany in World War II. The United States and the Soviet Union became reluctant allies during the war to defeat a common enemy, but hopes for continued cooperation afterward were short-lived. Both sides feared and mistrusted one another, and Stalin lived in fear of an attack from Western Europe. Russia had experienced repeated invasions from the West, and it now sought some measure of protection against another. The USSR, which had seized most of Eastern Europe during the war, imposed communist regimes in those countries, creating a buffer zone to protect its western border from invasion. Soviet influence thus extended to a ring of national governments kept in place by Moscow and modeled on the Soviet Communist plan.

In 1950, communists took control of China and installed a communist government in North Korea as well. As hostilities between the communist People's Republic of Korea and the democratic Republic of Korea erupted in June 1950, the world was nearly brought to the brink of global warfare once again.

Throughout the 1950s, communist-inspired uprisings provoked violence in Malaya, Laos, the Middle East, Africa, Cuba, and Vietnam. In many of these countries, communism offered the allure of alternatives to a perceived Western imperialism, with varying degrees of failure and success.

During the 1960s and 1970s, ideological differences between Chinese and Soviet communists became increasingly hostile. China saw its role as third-world champion in opposition to the United States and the Soviet Union, which it viewed as imperialist superpowers. However, by the early 1970s, China's own fear of isolation, the Soviet Union's stumbling economy, and the drain on U.S. resources from military and inflationary policies cleared the way for an era of eased international tensions, known as *détente*.

For the next two decades, communism clung to life in the USSR. Throughout this time, the USSR and its satellite states were exposed to ever-increasing degrees of Western cultural influence. Images of a vibrant and prosperous capitalist West contrasted with economic and social malaise in the USSR to produce a groundswell for change. Peaceful political revolts in Poland and East Germany replaced the former communist governments in those countries with democratic ones.

In 1991, Communist Party conservatives tried to reverse political and economic reforms enacted in the USSR during the previous few years by staging a coup against the government of Mikhail Gorbachev. The coup failed, sweeping the Communists from power completely and leading to a democratically elected government led by President Boris Yeltsin. Rather than wither away, the state disappeared from the world map with one stroke, and in its place arose the Commonwealth of Independent States.

In the wake of alternating periods of heightened Cold War alert and rapprochement, the legacy of communism is mostly a string of failed and repressive regimes. However, in a world where convulsions and crises persist, communism's ideals of equality can still serve to provide a perspective from which to analyze how fairly the current global system distributes the fruits of labor.

Karl Marx

Karl Heinrich Marx was born in Trier, Germany, on May 5, 1818, into a comfortable middle-class home.

The son of a lawyer, Marx undertook the study of law at the University of Bonn.

After a brief career in journalism, at the end of 1843, Marx moved to Paris, where he met Friedrich Engels (1820–1895). Marx was expelled from Paris at the end of 1844 for preaching radical ideas; he and Engels subsequently moved to Brussels, where Marx devoted himself to an intensive study of history. It was there that he formulated what came to be known as the materialist conception of history. Marx traced the history of the various modes of production and, based on his research, predicted the collapse of capitalism as well as the coming of communism. At an 1847 conference of the Communist League in London, Marx and Engels presented a succinct declaration of their position. Their ideas, published as *The Communist Manifesto* in 1848, helped to ignite a wave of revolutions in Europe. Marx devoted the rest of his life to explaining and defending his economic theories. The three-volume work, *Das Kapital* (*Capital*), was part of that broad effort, but at the time of his death the work was left unfinished. Its completion was placed in the hands of Engels, who devoted the balance of his life to the final two volumes. More scholarly than the *Manifesto*, this grand statement of principles provided an inheritance of economic theory for future generations.

Although many scholars consider Marx one of the greatest economic theoreticians and the founder of economic history and sociology, the Marx family lived in poverty for most of his life. Only three of his six children survived him. Marx wrote weekly articles as a foreign correspondent for the *New York Daily Tribune*, but his major source of income was Engels, who relied on the income from a family business in Manchester. Sadly, the anguish of the deaths of his eldest daughter and wife haunted his final years. Marx died on March 14, 1883.

Friedrich Engels

Friedrich Engels, born in 1820, was the son of a German textile manufacturer. Although he depended on his wealth as a bourgeois factory owner, his sole historical legacy was as the staunch companion and disciple of Karl Marx. A brilliant linguist and intellectual in his own right, he collaborated with Marx to produce *The Communist Manifesto*. This 12,000-word pamphlet influenced social thought, politics, and, ultimately, world power alignments for nearly a century and a half.

It was because of Friedrich Engels's generosity that Marx and his family were able to survive. He not only supplemented Marx's income with direct contributions but also arranged for other sympathizers to make donations. The two men believed fervently in the ideals of communism and the dream of a classless society. Marx died in extreme poverty and was survived by Engels by 12 years. Engels continued to edit and translate his friend's writing, publishing several of his works posthumously, including the second volume of *Das Kapital* (1885). Engels used Marx's notes to write the third volume of *Das Kapital* (1894). Engels died in London on August 5, 1895. He willed his property to Marx's children.

—Jack A. Jarmon

See also Communism and National Security; Cold War; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; World War I; World War II

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COMMUNISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Link between the threat of communist expansion and the formulation of U.S. national security policy. The containment of communism was the main determinant of U.S. national security policy from the end of World War II through the period of the Cold War until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The United States employed overt as well as covert political, economic, technological, cultural, and psychological measures to fight the worldwide expansion of communist ideology during the Cold War era.

COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY

Many socialist and communist political groups developed throughout Europe and the United States following the Industrial Revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries. Idealistic opponents of industrial society protested the wages and dismal factory work conditions of the new urban working class. Some groups espoused revolutionary means to establish a new society devoid of private property and organized around the collective good.

Modern communism—a theory of socioeconomic organization in which private property is abolished and the means of production are collectively owned and shared, characterized by the organization of labor for the common good of all members of society—was fundamentally articulated by German thinkers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the *Communist Manifesto* (1848) and *Das Kapital* (1867). The theory was later modified by the Russian revolutionary Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916). Marxism declared that the history of the world had hitherto been the history of class struggle and that this struggle would continue until the final revolution, when the working class would overthrow their capitalist exploiters and organize a fair and just classless society based on the common good. Because the state served only to safeguard the interests and property of the capitalist class, it would eventually become superfluous and wither away.

Lenin expanded the notion of the proletarian revolution and applied it to the international context. World War I was seen as a war between imperial powers seeking to export their surplus capital by colonizing more territory and exploiting the people. Lenin believed that capitalism, in its ultimate form, became imperialism and that the world would be constantly engaged in struggles for economic expansion. Colonies and less developed countries were now considered as ripe for revolution as more industrialized nations with large working classes.

THE SOVIET UNION AND WORLD WAR II

The autocratic and repressive rule of Russian Czar Nicholas II, combined with military setbacks, poverty, and food shortages during World War I, created an increasingly unstable and revolutionary climate in Russia. In February of 1917, amid workers' riots and military insubordination, the czar was forced to abdicate the throne, and a moderate yet weak and unpopular provisional government was installed in Russia. Unable to establish legitimate rule and not willing to withdraw from World War I, the provisional government was overthrown by the revolutionary group known as the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin and Leon Trotsky, in the October Revolution of 1917.

The Bolsheviks, the more radical wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party, led by Lenin, had always advocated violent revolution to bring about the destruction of capitalism and the creation of an international socialist state. In 1918, the Bolsheviks became the Russian Communist Party under the leadership of Lenin. Private property and private trade were abolished, banks and industries were nationalized, church lands were confiscated and redistributed, worker control was implemented in factories, and a supreme economic council was set up to direct the economy. The *Cheka* (secret political police) was formed to destroy political opposition, and periodic purges within the Communist Party were carried out to silence internal dissidence. Russia negotiated its way out of World War I with the humiliating Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918), signed with the Central powers, in which it ceded lands to Germany. By the end of the Russian Civil War (1918–20), Russia was war torn and devastated, and the Bolsheviks had destroyed their opponents and consolidated Communist rule under Lenin. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was formalized and came into existence in 1922.

As it was practiced in the Soviet Union after the Bolshevik revolution, the Marxist-Leninist version of communism became a system of government in which the Russian state planned and controlled the economy and the authoritarian Communist Party held exclusive power over the entire country. The Third, or Communist, International (Comintern) was established after the Russian Revolution, with the expressed goal of fostering world revolution. Under Lenin's leadership, the Comintern called for the union of the world's exploited workers and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. The Comintern was replaced by the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) after World War II.

After Lenin's death in 1924, Joseph Stalin emerged as leader of the Communist Party and head of the Soviet Union. Stalin's ruthless purges of dissidents and perceived opponents decimated Russian society—and especially the Communist Party—during the 1930s and confirmed U.S. opinion of the repressive and authoritarian nature of the Soviet dictatorship. Stalin's totalitarian reign of terror emphasized nationalism, consolidated the power of the Communist Party, and glorified the role of the state. Disdain for internationalism and distrust of Western Europe and the United States led Stalin to focus on creating "socialism in one country"—Russia—as opposed to spreading revolution abroad. President Franklin D. Roosevelt granted diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union in

1933, but relations between the United States and the Soviet Union remained limited until World War II.

The Nazi invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941, despite a nonaggression pact signed between Germany and the USSR in 1939, moved Stalin to join the United States and the Allies in defeating Nazi Germany in World War II. President Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston Churchill, and Stalin met for a series of important wartime conferences to discuss strategy and to plan the shape of postwar Europe. In the course of the conferences, Stalin was able to obtain from the Western powers the recognition of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.

In terms of postwar political and territorial questions, the Yalta Conference (February 1945) provided for the postwar division of Germany into four occupation zones under Allied control; confirmed the Soviet acquisition of part of eastern Poland and provided for temporary Soviet provisional governing authority over all of Poland as a basis for a future Polish government; and established the Declaration on Liberated Europe, binding the Allied countries to respect the principles of self-determination and democracy in the areas liberated from Nazi Germany.

The United States would later be criticized for appeasing the Soviets to allow them to enter the war against Japan. The lack of more specific terms and arrangements regarding the future status of the Eastern European countries under the Soviets was denounced in the United States and, during the Cold War, led to accusations that at Yalta Eastern Europe had been abandoned to communism by the West.

Harry S. Truman became president after Roosevelt's death in April 1945. Surrounded by U.S. and British forces to the west and Soviet armies to the east, Germany surrendered in May 1945 and the war in Europe was over. The Potsdam Conference (July–August 1945) between Truman, Churchill (later replaced by Clement Attlee), and Stalin dealt with the postwar administration of Germany, European territorial issues, and the continuing prosecution of the war against Japan. The Soviets had been tightening their hold on occupied territories in Eastern Europe, and Truman feared that Stalin would not abide by the principles of self-determination the Allies had agreed on at Yalta. On the eve of the Potsdam Conference, July 16, 1945, the United States completed the successful detonation of the first atomic device in New Mexico. Shortly thereafter, Truman ordered atomic bombs dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9 to hasten a Japanese surrender, as well as to issue a show of force to warn the Soviets against postwar communist expansionism. Japan surrendered on August 14 and the war was over.

The only communist countries in existence prior to World War II had been the Soviet Union and Mongolia. After the war, however, the Soviets quickly established communist governments in the Eastern European countries that the Red Army had taken from Germany during the war. Albania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and East Germany became Soviet satellite countries with communist governments directed from Moscow. A communist government was also established in Yugoslavia under Marshall Tito, but his independent policies soon led to the country's expulsion from the Cominform. Communist threats also were being directed at Greece and Turkey. In a famous speech in Fulton, Missouri, in 1946, Churchill described the "iron curtain" that had descended across Europe. Fearing Soviet hegemony and expansionism, Churchill and Truman warned of the growing communist menace that threatened the Western free world. After World War II, Europe and much of Asia lay in ruins, a Soviet sphere of influence had been firmly established and threatened to expand, and the United States had emerged as a major power in the world.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE COLD WAR

Although the West feared Soviet ideological and territorial expansionism, the Russians harbored equally strong fears of Western influence and interventionism. Thus, the stage was set for the Cold War. The postwar devastation in much of Europe and Asia was viewed as especially dangerous by President Truman because it provided a fertile breeding ground for communism. U.S. foreign policy in the postwar period was driven by a strong fear of communism as antithetical to Western values and liberal economic and democratic principles.

American diplomat George Kennan's famous 1946 telegram from Moscow to the State Department and his article "The Sources of Soviet Conflict" (which he penned anonymously for *Foreign Affairs* in 1947 under the name "X") articulated the policy of containment of the Soviet Union. Kennan recommended that the United States adopt a firmer stance toward what he observed as a hostile and expansionist Soviet ideology. Kennan advocated using economic and political,

but not military, means of containing the expansion of communism and Soviet power. Through containment, the West would accept the already established Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe but would apply countermeasures to prevent the spread of communism to other areas of the world. The logic behind containment was to keep the communist states within their current borders, prevent them from spreading their ideology and revolution, and hope that internal divisions, contradictions, or evolution would soon end their threat and force them to liberalize.

The Truman Doctrine, enunciated in 1947, committed the United States to the containment of Soviet expansionism and supplied immediate economic and military assistance to Turkey and Greece to prevent them from falling to communism. In his doctrine, Truman explicitly cited the communist threat to U.S. and Western values and national security and pledged to help countries in repelling communist-led aggression and subversion. Truman spoke of an ideological struggle between two ways of life—one free and the other totalitarian. The Truman Doctrine marked U.S. acknowledgement of the beginning of the Cold War and initiated the use of U.S. aid to halt the spread of communist influence and Soviet expansionism.

Fear of the rise of communism in war-torn Western Europe led the United States to inaugurate the European recovery program known as the Marshall Plan (1948–52), named for its architect, Secretary of State George C. Marshall. This reconstruction and rehabilitation plan was based on massive U.S. economic aid and was designed to help rebuild Europe and restore prosperity and stability so that the continent would not be susceptible to communist influence and subversion. The Marshall Plan was highly successful and helped strengthen and stabilize Western Europe.

The Soviet blockade of the Western sector of Berlin in 1948, a protest against a plan to unify the western zones of Germany into one state, prompted the U.S.-led Berlin airlift operations (1948–1949), in which the U.S. airlifted supplies into the city for almost a year. This challenge of the West by the Soviet Union contributed to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, in which the United States and 11 other Western nations formed a collective security alliance aimed at defending Western Europe against Soviet-led communist aggression. The NATO alliance was formed to dissuade— and, if necessary, to defeat—a Soviet military attack on Western Europe using the combined conventional forces of its members and the deterrent of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The alliance reinforced the U.S. commitment to the defense of Western Europe and the containment of Soviet-led communist expansion.

The Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in August 1949, and the situation grew more complex as both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed the capability for mutually assured destruction. In 1955, the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe formed the Warsaw Treaty Organization, known as the Warsaw Pact, as a collective security counterbalance to NATO.

A communist revolution led by Mao Zedong seized power in China in 1949. The Soviet Union provided economic and technical assistance to China for the construction of modern industrial plants and railroads. Land-reform programs, agricultural collectivization, and nationalization of industry were implemented under Mao as the Chinese Communist Party consolidated its government. The United States refused to recognize the Communist government in China and continued to maintain close ties with the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek, which had been forced out to Taiwan when the Communists took over. The most populous nation in the world had turned communist and threatened the stability of Asia and the security of the United States.

A communist regime installed by Moscow under Kim Il Sung had existed in North Korea since the end of World War II. The Korean War (1950–53) resulted from the communist North Korean invasion of democratic South Korea. U.S. troops fought with UN and South Korean troops to successfully repel the Soviet-equipped and -trained North Korean forces from South Korea. Mistakenly assuming that Communist China would not enter the war on the side of North Korea, Truman expanded the war objective to include the liberation of the communist north and the reunification of Korea under democratic rule. The Chinese army launched a massive offensive that inflicted heavy casualties on U.S. and UN troops and forced them to retreat south. After heavy fighting, an unbreakable stalemate, and much UN negotiation with the Chinese and the Soviets, a truce was finally reached in July 1953.

The death of Stalin in 1953 and the threat of newly elected U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower to use nuclear weapons to force an end to the conflict are considered by many experts to have helped bring about the end of the Korean War. The 38th parallel

division line between North and South Korea remained, and the United States retained substantial military forces in South Korea to protect the country from the communists. The Korean War confirmed U.S. fears of communist aggression and expansionism. In its aftermath, the domino theory—the idea that if one country falls to communism then neighboring countries will eventually be toppled and succumb to communist expansionism—was regularly cited as the rationale for U.S. involvement in Asia and, later, in Latin America.

CHANGING U.S. POLICIES

The extreme threat posed to U.S. national security and to the Western free world by the perceived Soviet-led communist drive for world domination—in the context of the existence of Soviet nuclear weapons—was clearly and forcefully articulated in a 1950 report on the revamping of U.S. defense policy known as NSC-68, which was undertaken by the State and Defense departments at the request of President Truman. The report's assessment of the Soviet threat to Western security remained a central tenet of U.S. strategy through the end of the Cold War. The report advocated massive U.S. military buildup to counter Soviet expansionism and the growing Soviet nuclear threat.

President Eisenhower would later cut defense spending through his New Look defense policy, in which conventional military forces were reduced as more emphasis was placed on the buildup of strategic and tactical nuclear forces to contain Soviet expansionism. The idea of massive retaliation with nuclear weapons was intended to serve as a deterrent to communist aggression and was a less expensive alternative to conventional military forces, especially in light of the superior strength and numbers of the Soviet armed forces.

The fear of the communist threat to national security was deeply felt at home in the United States. The Republican senator from Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy, made unsubstantiated accusations in 1950 that the State Department had been infiltrated by communists. A Senate committee soon cleared the State Department and declared the charges fraudulent after McCarthy refused to produce any evidence to support his claims. McCarthy continued to exploit the American public's fear of communism from his position as chairman of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, and the domestic "Red Scare" ensued. Widely publicized hearings were held from 1952 to 1954, in which many Americans were indiscriminately labeled "communist subversives" and were interrogated and accused on the basis of weak evidence.

Meanwhile, Cold War hostilities continued between the United States and the Soviet Union. The brutal Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 was evidence of the difficulty the Soviet Union had in dealing with the continual resurgence of nationalist sentiment in the communist bloc countries of Eastern Europe. The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia was another instance of the brutal reaction of the Soviet regime to challenges to its domination. Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev promoted leftist "wars of liberation" in the developing world while, at the same time, publicly describing a possible state of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist countries of the West. The Berlin crisis (1958–1962) prompted Khrushchev to build the Berlin Wall to halt the flow of East Germans into the western sector of the city.

Communism soon appeared in the U.S. backyard when the leftist revolutionary guerrilla movement led by Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara seized power in Cuba from the U.S.-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista in January 1959. Castro soon imposed totalitarian control over the island, expropriated U.S. property, and reorganized economic and political life modeled on the Soviet state, leading the United States to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1961. Castro announced his alignment with the Soviet Union that same year.

In April 1961, President John F. Kennedy ordered the invasion of Cuba's Bay of Pigs by U.S.-backed and -trained Cuban exiles to overthrow the Castro regime. The covert operation was planned by the CIA and was based on the equipping and training of Cuban exiles for a guerrilla infiltration into Cuba. The invasion failed because of Castro's knowledge of the operation and the lack of final and total military support by the United States. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Cuba strengthened its ties to the Soviet Union. Cuba was heavily dependent on economic and military aid from the Soviet Union from 1961 through the 1980s. Cuba played an active role in sponsoring guerrilla movements in underdeveloped countries in Latin America and Africa, prompting the United States to intervene heavily in the third world to contain the further spread of communism.

Major reliance on nuclear weapons and massive retaliation to deter the Soviet expansionist threat soon led to criticism that the United States was pursuing an

unrealistic and dangerous strategy that wasted the deterrent capacity of conventional forces and left no alternative but nuclear war and mutual destruction. President Kennedy soon adopted the strategy of "flexible response," which called for a more balanced mix of conventional and nuclear forces to respond more effectively to local or limited conflicts without having to escalate the conflict and resort to the use of nuclear weapons.

The flexible response doctrine was put into practice during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. The Soviet Union had initiated a major arms buildup in Cuba by mid-1962, including the installation of offensive nuclear-armed ballistic missiles that, once operational, could be launched at targets throughout North and South America. President Kennedy demanded the dismantling of the missiles and ordered a naval blockade of Cuba to prevent further buildup of Soviet weapons on the island.

The U.S. military was placed on high alert, but the option of direct military action was put on reserve because it could lead to an escalation of war. Kennedy openly stated that any missile launched from Cuba would result in a full-scale retaliatory attack by the United States against the Soviet Union. Tensions grew and U.S. nuclear forces were placed on a heightened state of alert for the first time in history, ready to strike targets within the Soviet Union. Russian ships carrying missiles to Cuba turned back (on October 24), and Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles and dismantle the missile sites in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. The two superpowers came to the brink of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

COLD WAR CHALLENGES

By the mid-1950s, an ideological rift had developed between the Soviet Union and China. The termination of Soviet economic aid to China in 1960 and the withdrawal of technicians and advisers negatively affected China's economy and political system. There were large military buildups and border clashes along the Soviet Union–China border. The Sino-Soviet alliance was broken and, at times, was deepened by the intermittent thawing of Soviet tensions with the United States.

The containment of communism in Southeast Asia, support for the collective security agreement of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and a desire to prevent the domino theory from being fulfilled led to

U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War starting in 1961. The United States backed South Vietnam against North Vietnamese attempts to reunify the country under a communist government. North Vietnam received a steady supply of military supplies and aid from the Soviet Union and China. At the peak of its commitment, U.S. troops numbered 540,000 in 1969. The long and difficult conflict resulted in the North Vietnamese defeat of U.S. forces and the reunification of Vietnam in 1975 under communist control. Communist governments were also installed in Cambodia and Laos that same year. In all, U.S. troops saw more than 55,000 killed and more than 300,000 wounded. North and South Vietnamese casualties were in the hundreds of thousands. The U.S. containment policy in Southeast Asia was considered a failure.

In 1968, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev announced that a threat to socialist rule in any of the Eastern European states of the communist bloc constituted a threat to all, and therefore would warrant the attention of all socialist states. This Brezhnev Doctrine was used to justify the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Despite the rhetoric of communist expansionism, President Richard Nixon was shifting U.S. national security policy on the communist bloc toward accommodation. The thawing of Cold War tensions during the period of détente was evident at the 1972 Moscow Summit between Nixon and Soviet leader Brezhnev, at which the leaders signed the SALT I arms control agreement. Nixon also made a historic trip to China in 1972 and initiated U.S.–China relations. Nixon and Brezhnev engaged in summit diplomacy and fostered closer economic, social, and cultural ties that increased cooperation among the superpowers.

The United States and the Soviet Union clashed again over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet Union also continued to actively support Marxist regimes in Africa. Meanwhile, Cuba supported Soviet foreign policy and the intervention in Afghanistan and sent large numbers of troops to Angola to fight alongside the Soviet-armed government forces in the civil war there. The U.S. support of authoritarian regimes and "friendly dictators" throughout Latin America and Africa during the 1970s and 1980s continued, with the goal of containing communism.

During the Chilean presidential election of 1970, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) funneled large sums of money to opposition parties to prevent the victory of Socialist Party candidate Salvador Allende. When Allende won the election, the United States

sought to prevent the consolidation of Allende's government by exerting strong political pressure and harmful economic sanctions and by using the CIA to encourage a Chilean military coup. General Augusto Pinochet seized power in a military coup in September 1973, and Allende was killed in the struggle.

Renewed Cold War tensions were evident during the 1980s. President Ronald Reagan dubbed the Soviet Union the "evil empire" and increased defense spending in what became a renewed arms race between the two superpowers. Under the Reagan Doctrine, the United States supported a group known as the *contras* in Nicaragua who were fighting the leftist Sandinista government. The United States also supported the pro-Western UNITA forces in Angola and the mujahideen guerrillas against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

END OF THE COLD WAR

Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union in 1985 and gradually began to implement a series of political, economic, and social reforms under the themes of *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring). Gorbachev's liberalization programs unleashed strong reform movements in the Soviet Union and across Eastern Europe. Reagan and Gorbachev met for a series of summit talks that greatly improved relations and led to the landmark Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty on nuclear arms limitations. Gorbachev's political liberalization reforms made it clear that the Soviet Union would no longer intervene to maintain satellite communist governments. As a result, the Eastern European states of the Soviet bloc—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary—all collapsed under domestic pressures in 1989 and 1990. The Berlin Wall was dismantled in November 1989, and German reunification was achieved by October 1990.

In the United States, President Reagan was credited with putting increasing military, political, and economic pressure on the Soviet Union, forcing it to adopt reforms. The Soviet economy worsened amid Gorbachev's reforms, and ethnic and nationalist tensions turned into political and social unrest as many Soviet republics and the Baltic states demanded independence. Communist Party control over the Soviet government officially ended in 1990.

Many hard-liners in the Soviet Union were troubled by Gorbachev's reforms and the deterioration of the Soviet empire and the Communist Party. In January and February of 1991, the Soviet Union cooperated with the United States to force Iraq out of Kuwait in the Gulf War. In August of that year, an unsuccessful coup attempt was made by hard-line senior military officials and KGB leaders against Gorbachev. Popular resistance to the coup, led by the president of the Russian republic, Boris Yeltsin, returned Gorbachev to power, although de facto control over the Soviet Union lay in the hands of Yeltsin.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was banned and later dissolved after the August coup. Yeltsin recognized the independence of the Baltic states, and the Ukraine and an increasing number of Soviet republics soon declared themselves independent from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Commonwealth of Independent States was formed on December 8, 1991, marking the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The threat of communism would no longer determine U.S. national security policy as the United States emerged as the sole superpower in the world.

At the beginning of the 21st century, communist governments still held power in China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam. Many of these communist dictatorships, especially China, have been gradually introducing economic reforms and reducing state control of the economy to stimulate growth. Political liberalization, however, has not accompanied economic reforms. Furthermore, Communist parties remain politically important in Russia, Eastern Europe, and many of the nations that emerged from the former Soviet Union. These parties do not seem to constitute a threat to U.S. national security, however. Post–Cold War transnational threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have replaced the threat of communism.

—Florence Segura

See also Cold War; Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); Communism; Containment; Soviet Union, Former (Russia) and U.S. Policy; Transnational Threats

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COMPELLENCE

The ability to coerce another state into action, usually by threatening punishment. Scholars of international relations have traditionally focused on the compellent effects of force, but others have argued that the promise of reward is equally important. The economist Thomas Schelling coined the word *compellence* in his seminal 1966 book, *Arms and Influence*. Schelling described compellence as "a threat intended to make an adversary do something." He distinguished this from deterrence, which is "a threat intended to keep him from starting something."

Scholars have long argued about the most effective way to compel action. Schelling's work, though groundbreaking, is not without its critics. Schelling focused on the threat of escalating violence against civilian targets, but political scientist Robert Pape contends that compellence depends on making enemies feel that their *military* forces are vulnerable. Other scholars argue that carefully targeted economic sanctions can influence the behavior of other states. In these cases, nonmilitary tools of statecraft assist national security objectives.

Compellence and deterrence are both forms of coercion. Many scholars believe that it is more difficult to compel than to deter, although measurement issues make it difficult to be sure. First, deterrence is less provocative because the deterring state need only set the stage for action. It incurs little cost by making the threat. Indeed, costly actions are precisely what deterrence is supposed to prevent. Compellence, on the other hand, requires some form of costly action or a commitment to act. Second, the state that is the target of compellence may fear for its reputation if it complies with a threat. The targets of deterrent threats find it easier to "save face" because they do not have to act to comply. They can simply stay put and pretend that the deterrent threat had no impact on their behavior. Third, forcing states to act is difficult because states are large, complex bureaucracies. They move more slowly than individuals, and slowness may be confused with reluctance to comply.

There are two basic forms of compellence: diplomacy and demonstration. Diplomatic compellence involves verbal threats and promises. Shows of force also assist this kind of coercion; realist scholars note that most diplomacy is underwritten by the unspoken possibility of military action. Demonstrative compellence involves a limited use of force coupled with the threat of escalating violence to come if demands are not met. This kind of compellence is what Schelling referred to as the "diplomacy of violence." A state does not unleash its full military potential; instead, it wages a limited campaign while instituting pauses to make the adversary consider the consequences if it does not comply.

Controversies over methodology and measurement plague studies of compellence. For example, it is sometimes difficult to tell the difference between demonstrative compellence and war. In addition, targets of compellence rarely acknowledge having been compelled; they don't want to admit that they responded to bullying. This makes it difficult to identify successful cases.

Some contemporary scholars argue that compellence involves more than threats alone. States may be afraid of punishment, but promises help to sweeten the rewards for cooperation. Moreover, compellence often requires some combination of threats and reassurances. Threats are more effective when target states are offered credible guarantees that they will avoid punishment if they comply. Without such reassurances, they have less incentive to cooperate with the demands of the compelling state. The appropriate balance of threats, promises, and reassurances depends on the character of the target state and the nature of the stakes.

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COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (1996–)

Global agreement prohibiting the testing of all nuclear weapons. From the Eisenhower administration in 1957 to the end of the Clinton administration in 2001, the United States has repeatedly pursued negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty. Following decades of limited nuclear arms agreements, in 1993, President Bill Clinton aggressively sought negotiations for a comprehensive test ban, making it a focal point of his foreign policy.

In October 1992, President George H. W. Bush signed a bill that declared that the United States would stop the testing of nuclear weapons, a move that paved the way for a U.S. mission to achieve a sweeping test ban. In January 1993, as Bush prepared to leave office, the United States and Russia signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), which specified that each nation agreed to decrease its long-range nuclear weaponry to approximately one-third of its present levels. (According to the earlier START I agreement, the United States and Russia had consented to decrease strategic offensive weapons by approximately 30% over a period of seven years.) All of these events created a positive climate for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) talks to begin.

Clinton and Russian president Boris Yeltsin consented to engage in negotiations for a comprehensive test ban at a summit meeting on April 4, 1993, in Vancouver, Canada. In December 1993, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution in favor of negotiations among its member nations for a comprehensive test ban, and in January 1994, talks began, with representatives from 38 nations participating.

From the outset, the advantages of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests were apparent. A total ban would stop the construction of new nuclear weapons in nations already possessing nuclear arms. As a result, countries without nuclear weapons would have no need to create nuclear arsenals. All nations would derive an economic benefit from diminished military expenditures.

During the two and a half years of negotiations, the United States asserted its national security priorities. The U.S. delegates pushed for an option whereby any nation could withdraw from the treaty in the case of a calamitous event. The United States also insisted on a provision that would enable participating nations to conduct on-site inspections of any other nation suspected of detonating a nuclear weapon or conducting outlawed nuclear tests. The United States pushed for a provision that would allow treaty nations to use spy satellites to gather information about other nations' nuclear activity. All of the U.S. proposals were accepted into the treaty.

The treaty also called for the establishment of an International Monitoring System (IMS) consisting of highly sensitive nuclear-detection equipment located at monitoring sites throughout the world. Should the IMS detect nuclear activity in any participating country, on-site inspections would be conducted. In this regard, the treaty indicated that the most advanced technology would be used for the IMS. The IMS is used to monitor seismological data, underwater sound, and atmospheric infrasound and has equipment that can detect radionuclides, or radioactive atoms.

The UN General Assembly sanctioned the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on September 10, 1996. On September 24, the United States and 145 nations signed the treaty in New York City. President Clinton submitted the treaty to the Senate for approval in 1998. Fierce bipartisan discussion caused gridlock in the Senate, delaying a vote until October 1999.

Senate Republicans and the U.S. military argued that the treaty is unenforceable because there is no mechanism to prevent any nation from testing its weapons. Second, the treaty has no bearing on the behavior of nonparticipating nations, such as North Korea and (at that time) Iraq. Given these facts, the United States would be at a disadvantage, prevented from testing the reliability of its weapons and developing new weapons. The Senate voted to oppose the treaty 51–48.

When President George W. Bush entered office in 2001, he had already made it clear that his administration would not support the CTBT. His administration also called for and succeeded in withdrawing the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Bush and his advisers have held that U.S. national security depends on a nuclear arsenal that is sound, reliable, and technologically sophisticated, a set of priorities that Bush maintains cannot be upheld while adhering to the dictates of the CTBT.

As of 2003, 101 nations had ratified the CTBT and 167 countries had become signatories. Of the signing nations, 44 of the so-called nuclear-capable states, that is, those nations that already possess nuclear weapons, must ratify the CTBT before the treaty can go into effect. Only 31 of the 44 nations have ratified the treaty. In addition, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are the three nuclear-capable states that have neither signed nor ratified the treaty.

See also Arms Control; Arms Race; Bush, George W., and National Policy; Clinton, Bill, and National Policy

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COMPUTER SECURITY

The practice of preserving and protecting computer-related resources and information from theft or attack. These resources range from individual computer files and e-mail messages to software programs and hardware such as data storage devices and servers.

Like professionals in most modern endeavors, national security personnel rely heavily on computers and computerized data to perform their jobs. Thus, protecting the safety and integrity of government computer hardware, software, and data is a key component of safeguarding national security. The federal government and military were among the first to employ computer security standards. The Computer Security Act of 1988, signed into law by President Ronald Reagan, was the first comprehensive effort to establish guidelines for security and privacy in government computer systems.

Security practices can be classified as reactive or preventive. *Reactive* measures are taken in response to a problem—for example, issuing an emergency software update in response to a computer virus. *Preventive* security seeks to act before a problem arises. Examples of preventive security practices include making backup copies of data files, designing firewalls (programs that block unauthorized files or users from gaining access to a computer), and controlling access from untrusted or unknown users or computer networks.

Most computer security measures involve the use of passwords and data encryption. A password is a secret word given to users of a system or program that allows them access but disallows others. Data encryption involves the substitution or alteration of information so that it can only be read with a key that decodes the information. The Clinton administration briefly banned the export of certain types of encryption programs out of a concern that terrorists or criminals would use them to send hard-to-decipher messages. The computer industry opposed the restrictions, arguing that they would hamper U.S. competitiveness. This view finally prevailed, and the ban was lifted in 1999.

Two of the most common computer problems are viruses and worms. A *virus* is a software program designed to damage the computer that runs it. Viruses can cause serious damage to a computer by erasing its memory, corrupting its operating system, or destroying certain files. Experts estimate that there are more than 60,000 different computer viruses in existence. *Worms* are programs that are similar to viruses but have the ability to replicate themselves, making them very difficult to eliminate. In 2004, the cost of viruses and worms to the worldwide economy was estimated at more than $35 billion.

Computer vulnerabilities also may be exploited by unauthorized and malicious individuals known as *hackers* and *crackers*. The term "hackers" refers to individuals who are adept at computer programming, but it has come to mean someone who gains illegal or unauthorized entry into a computer system or network. An individual who seeks entry into private information or a computer system to cause damage is more properly referred to as a cracker. During the Gulf War of 1991, Dutch crackers broke into U.S. defense computers and supplied intelligence to Iraq. Although some cracking is done for personal enjoyment, crackers also can serve to point out security flaws in computer systems. This may help computer systems experts to design better and more secure systems.

The trend toward increasing the use of computers and electronic databases to coordinate national security efforts calls for better and more comprehensive forms of computer security. As more countries develop their computer expertise, protecting sensitive government information from foreign rivals and terrorists will become even more challenging. In the coming years, computer security will likely become as important as physical security in protecting vital U.S. interests.

See also Computer Viruses; Cryptology; Information Warfare

COMPUTER VIRUSES

Small, executable software programs that replicate themselves using another program as a host. Just as biological viruses pass from person to person through contact, computer viruses pass from computer to computer. These viruses typically do damage (delete files) or cause infected computers to function inappropriately (send out messages automatically). In addition to their method of infection, computer viruses share other characteristics of their biological namesake, specifically ubiquity, difficulty of avoidance, and expense in terms of damage and lost productivity.

Computer viruses are distinguished from other damaging code (called malware), such as Trojan horses and computer worms. Trojan horses are computer programs that claim to do one thing but in fact do something altogether different. In a Trojan horse attack, an unsuspecting person might download software that claims do something benign, only to fall prey to a malicious attack, such as having his or her hard drive erased. Typically, a Trojan horse might silently allow others back-door access to the infected machines, at which point passwords and other sensitive data can be collected without the user's knowledge.

Computer viruses spread through contact with infected files, whereas computer worms, which also cause significant damage, are unique in that they replicate on their own through networks by scanning for security holes. The first computer worm, the Internet Worm, made its appearance in 1988. Written by a Cornell PhD student, the worm contained a bug that caused infected machines to automatically create more copies of itself, eventually bringing many of the Internet's computers to a halt. Computer viruses became a part of the popular culture during the 1970s through science fiction, although they first proliferated at the advent of personal computing during the 1980s and had become fixtures in the modern consciousness by the late 1980s.

Although computer viruses were first spread through personal disk sharing, the bulk of today's viruses are delivered through the Internet as attachments. Viruses that infect applications through file transfer have been superceded by macro viruses and others that use computer scripting languages, primarily those of Microsoft. The Melissa and Love Bug viruses are two examples of macro viruses, both of which were estimated to have done tens of billions of dollars worth of damage. In the Microsoft Windows operating system, attachments or executable programs received through the Internet with extensions such as *.exe*, *.vbs*, *.com*, and *.bat*, among others, could be viruses and should be treated with caution.

Antivirus software is a critical part of computer security. However, the best defense is ensuring that the person or file server sharing an application is trustworthy. The U.S. government has several entities that deal with computer security. One of those entities, US-CERT, is a partnership between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the public and private sectors. Established in 2003 to protect the nation's Internet infrastructure, US-CERT is the operational arm of the National Cyber Security Division at the Department of Homeland Security. As such, it coordinates defense against and responses to cyberattacks.

The Computer Security Division of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is charged with improving information systems security for consumers and federal government systems. With the signing of the National Security Decision Directive in 1984, the National Security Agency (NSA) was made responsible for computer security throughout the United States. The 1987 Computer Security Act gave NIST responsibility for the security of nonclassified, nonmilitary government systems, but since then a power struggle has ensued between the NSA and NIST. In addition to government agencies, Carnegie Mellon University's Computer Emergency Response Team is a federally funded frontline defense and research organization dedicated to discovering and containing security vulnerabilities.

See also Computer Security; National Security Agency

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CONFLICT-RESOLUTION THEORY

A set of principles or rules used to analyze the nature of disagreements and suggest methods for ending conflicts. Conflict-resolution theory argues that conflict

stems from a variety of causes, so there is not a single best method for dealing with it. Instead, one must attempt to determine the root causes of conflict and find the solution that best addresses them. Analyzing the root causes of conflict is the goal of conflict-resolution theory. Many of the basic ideas of conflict-resolution theory are drawn from the principles of conflict theory.

CONFLICT THEORY

According to conflict theory, conflict between parties arises when one party is dissatisfied enough with the status quo (current state of affairs) to seek to change it. This typically occurs when the parties have (1) different perspectives on the situation, (2) different belief systems and values, or (3) different goals and interests. Determining which of these differences is the main cause of a conflict is key to resolving it effectively. For example, parties who see a situation from different perspectives must find some way to reconcile their differing views before they can begin to work toward a solution. In contrast, parties who agree on the facts of a situation but have competing goals can explore solutions that allow each side to achieve some of its goals.

Most conflicts can be categorized according to their root causes. The five basic types of conflicts are relationship conflicts, value conflicts, data conflicts, interest conflicts, and structural conflicts. Personal feelings and beliefs can play a central role in both relationship and value conflicts. Relationship conflicts arise when the parties have strong negative emotions toward or stereotypes about one another. Such conflicts are fueled by poor communication and miscommunication between groups, common factors in ethnic and racial violence. Value conflicts occur when one party tries to force its personal values or beliefs on another. Such conflicts may result when a government attempts to impose a state religion (as in modern Iran) or outlaw religious expression entirely (as in the former Soviet Union).

The other three types of conflicts arise from external forces or goals rather than from personal feelings or beliefs. Data conflicts are caused when parties are misinformed about the facts of a situation, have different information about a situation, or disagree on how to interpret the information they have. Competition over differing needs (or perceived needs) can lead to interest conflicts. Such conflicts can occur over substantive issues, including money, food, or natural resources, or psychological issues, such as a desire by one party to be treated with greater fairness, trust, or respect by the other. Structural conflicts are caused when outside forces create tension between parties. For example, a situation in which some citizens have better access to social services than others may create tension between the two groups even if neither group has direct control over the situation.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Once parties have identified the cause of the conflict, they can work toward an effective resolution. A good starting point is to identify any areas of agreement that exist between the parties. Both sides in a dispute probably agree on at least some matters and likely share some interests in common. Identifying these areas of common ground forms a foundation on which to build a broader solution. Each side also should be made to understand that neither can impose a solution on the other without risking serious consequences.

The appropriate conflict-resolution strategy varies depending on the nature of the conflict. For example, if the conflict is not critical, parties may simply employ denial and refuse to acknowledge that the situation exists. They also may choose to smooth over difficulties rather than confront them. These strategies can be helpful when preserving the relationship between the parties is more important than confronting the problem. Most conflicts, however, cannot be easily ignored and require more active conflict-resolution efforts.

Two of the most common conflict-resolution strategies are negotiation and collaboration. Negotiation involves a series of mutual compromises in which each party agrees to give up something to reach an agreement. Negotiation works well when dealing with conflicts over limited resources or in situations where coming to a quick resolution is important. However, it encourages parties to ask for much more at the beginning of negotiations because they know they will be forced to give up some of their demands as the talks proceed. In collaboration, all parties agree to recognize one another's interests. Each party's interests, intentions, and desired outcomes are thoroughly explored, and parties are expected to modify their original views as they work toward a resolution of the problem. Although collaboration produces optimum results, it can take a long time to achieve success. In

addition, it is often very difficult to persuade parties to change strongly held views.

Sometimes the only effective resolution to a conflict is to apply force. This includes not only the use of arms to defeat a military opponent but also nonviolent political action. For example, the majority party in a country may use its power at the ballot box to pass laws forcing its will on the minority. Applying force, though often necessary to settle a conflict, has serious drawbacks. It produces losers who may not support the final decision and creates resentment that can cause the conflict to flare up again in the future.

Choosing the appropriate strategy increases the chances of reaching a peaceful resolution to a conflict but does not guarantee it. For negotiation or collaboration to succeed, both sides need to be willing to work together and to compromise to achieve a mutually acceptable outcome. However, for those willing to make the effort, conflict-resolution theory can help adversaries discover effective and enduring solutions to their disagreements.

—John Haley

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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT

Agreement signed between the U.S. government and a foreign nation that is easier to enact than a formal treaty but contains many more restrictions.

Although both treaties and congressional-executive agreements are international agreements that are signed with foreign nations, the two have significant differences. For instance, congressional-executive agreements cannot address issues outside Congress's enumerated powers (those powers specifically granted to Congress in the U.S. Constitution), whereas treaties can. In addition, according to the U.S. Constitution, a treaty can be approved only if at least two-thirds of the Senate votes in favor of it. By contrast, congressional-executive agreements require a simple majority in both houses of Congress to pass.

For this reason, the U.S. government has regularly chosen to use a congressional-executive agreement rather than a treaty as the appropriate mechanism for gaining approval for controversial agreements. Examples of contentious proposals addressed in the form of a congressional-executive agreement include the North American Free Trade Agreement and U.S. entry into the World Trade Organization. This kind of instrument is often chosen when proponents of an agreement believe that it will be difficult to attract the necessary votes in the Senate to pass as a treaty. Congressional-executive agreements should not be confused with executive agreements, which the president alone can approve.

Some critics claim that congressional-executive agreements are unconstitutional because they ignore the treaty process mandated in the Constitution. Federal courts, however, have recognized that some international agreements do not take the form of treaties. They also have held that congressional-executive trade agreements can be seen as grounded in the Constitution on the basis of Congress's power to regulate tariffs and impose commerce duties and the president's power to conduct the nation's foreign affairs.

See also Executive Orders; North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Treaties

CONSCRIPTION/VOLUNTEER FORCE

Compulsory military service typically used to raise troops during time of war or national emergency. Conscription stands in opposition to the notion of a volunteer military force, in which troops choose to serve of their own accord.

The U.S. tradition of volunteer military service dates to the very founding of the country. Many of the troops who fought during the American Revolution were volunteer state militia, and the rebels resisted a draft even during the lowest points of the war. Before the late 1940s, the United States resorted to conscription only in severe crises, and each time the draft generated controversy and debate.

President Abraham Lincoln instituted a draft during the Civil War because of critical manpower shortages in the volunteer Union Army. Thousands of men in New York City rioted in protest. When the United

States resorted to a draft during World War I, opposition to the idea was so severe that Congress enacted laws that forbade speaking against it. Even in World War II, there were opponents of conscription.

Opposition to the draft persisted throughout the Cold War even as escalating tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union led to the only peacetime draft in American history. In 1956, Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson proposed ending the draft, whereas President Dwight Eisenhower called for making the draft universal. In 1964, Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater proposed an end to the draft, but the military opposed the idea.

In the 1960s, academics such as Alan Greenspan and Milton Friedman joined politicians in calling for an all-volunteer force. Friedman, a conservative economist, noted that a compulsory draft produced inequity, waste, and denial of freedom. A universal service plan such as Eisenhower's would be worse than a draft because it would regiment all, not just the military. John Kenneth Galbraith, a liberal economist, agreed.

The Vietnam War generated the largest antidraft protests since the Civil War. It also raised questions about the quality of a draft-based military force. Republican presidential candidate Richard Nixon made an all-volunteer force a campaign issue in 1968. Opposition to the idea arose from Democratic candidate Hubert Humphrey and the military. After Nixon was elected president, he named Thomas Gates to head a commission that recommended the end of the draft. In 1973, Congress ended the draft; the last American to be drafted entered the service on June 30, 1973. Although the draft itself was abolished, young men were still required to register with the Selective Service.

No longer able to call up draftees as needed, the armed forces had to recruit and retain the forces they required. However, the military remained unpopular in the aftermath of Vietnam, and reenlistments were as low as 10%. The all-volunteer force started slowly, with poor pay and benefits, and it looked as if an all-volunteer military was a bad idea.

Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan saved the all-volunteer force by increasing pay by a total of 25% to 30% during their terms in office and by improving the education and vocational benefits the military offered. In exchange, enlistment commitments were lengthened to five years, producing better-trained soldiers. The value of the improvements made during the late 1970s and 1980s were demonstrated by the U.S. military's outstanding performance in the 1991 Gulf War.

Despite its showing in Iraq, opposition to the all-volunteer force continued. Proponents of conscription argued that a draft would advance social equity and provide an opportunity for everyone to serve the country. Critics countered that the draft would lower the quality of the military while making it more expensive to maintain. Defining the military as a profession, they argued that only a volunteer has the commitment and pride to be a professional.

Opponents also noted that the Cold War era draft required only a two-year term. They claimed that the modern military is so sophisticated that the draftee would not be able to master the new skills and disciplines in such a short time. The expense of training, outfitting, and paying unskilled draftees would divert funds that the military needed to preserve its technological edge.

A leading advocate of the draft, Northwestern University sociology professor Charles Moskos has argued that the underrepresentation of the upper classes in the military allows ruling elites to decide on military action with less concern about the human costs than they would if their offspring were required to serve. Moskos and others have noted that the all-volunteer force is creating a "warrior caste." The military has a different set of values than does the general population, and, according to Moskos, it may develop a culture that is at odds with the values of most Americans. His critics have noted that the military is subordinate to the civilian power, so it doesn't matter whether their values are the same. Besides, many of those volunteer recruits will return to the civilian world rather than become career soldiers. Advocates of the all-volunteer force claim that proponents of the draft would sacrifice efficiency and morale for social goals.

Draft advocates such as U.S. Representative Charles Rangel have noted that the all-volunteer force is not really voluntary for many, especially the lower classes, who have limited economic choices. Advocates of the volunteer force respond that demographically, the military is almost the same as working-class America. The military is 63% white, and the civilian population is 70% white; median household income for white recruits is slightly below the national average, whereas that of black recruits is slightly higher. Advocates of conscription argue that even the difference between 63% and 70% supports their contention that the lower class is overrepresented. They also note that although white recruits take a pay cut, black recruits fare better financially.

However, personnel totals for the all-volunteer force include National Guard units, whose members are more likely to be white and wealthier than those in the regular army. African Americans make up about 30% of the enlisted force compared to about 20% of the overall population. Hispanics, by contrast, are slightly underrepresented compared to their share of the civilian population.

Draft advocates argue that the all-volunteer active force is too small and that pressure on the National Guard and reserves is too great. These complaints have grown louder as the occupation of Iraq has stretched the U.S. Army to its limits. Some military leaders claim that the war in Iraq has "broken" the army, and they raise the idea of the draft as a way to restore U.S. military strength.

Finally, draft proponents argue that a draft is in the great American tradition of homogenization. It erases class and color lines, allows conscripts to broaden themselves, and gives them a better understanding of the diversity of their society. The shared experience generates pride and loyalty and patriotism rather than the disgruntlement the all-volunteer proponents claim. It also gives the future leaders of the United States a greater sense of what they are risking when they take the country into war. Opponents say that the draft is incompatible with liberty and that the military, having tried both ways, prefers the greater professionalism, efficiency, and morale of the all-volunteer force. The debate continues.

See also All-Volunteer Force

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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

The founding document of the United States, which enumerates the powers mandated to the three branches of the federal government. To determine matters of national security, the Constitution delegates authority primarily to the legislative and executive branches. However, a close examination of the written document reveals much ambiguity, requiring some powers to be implied where the text is vague or silent.

CONGRESS VERSUS THE PRESIDENT

A first review of the text of the Constitution suggests that the power to address issues concerning national security is very much in favor of the legislative branch. For example, Article I empowers Congress to "declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water." Congress is also mandated to support an army, provide a navy, and supervise the militia, which it may call on "to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." To implement security laws, Congress is further authorized to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper" to execute the powers it has been granted under the Constitution.

In contrast, Article II of the Constitution grants the president more modest powers. The most authoritative duty afforded the president is the designation of commander in chief of the armed forces. However, the president may command the armed forces only when "called into the actual Service of the United States." He also may be allocated further national security powers when mandated to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." The president shares the authority to enter into treaties and receive ambassadors and ministers with the legislative branch.

Despite the apparent dominance of the legislature in the text of the Constitution, the modest powers granted to the president subsequently have been construed more broadly to accord the president more authority over matters of national security. The president's veto power and mandate to make recommendations to Congress "as he shall judge necessary and expedient" confer on him national security policymaking authority. As commander in chief, the president is also implicitly delegated all military powers not reserved by Congress. Moreover, the "take care" clause allows the president to respond to emergencies independent of the legislature and use the funds that he would otherwise be required to appropriate from Congress.

Even though the most obvious delegation of national security power—the authority to declare war—is textually assigned to Congress, the vague definition of what constitutes war and how war is declared has left the door open for multiple interpretations. Should small, limited skirmishes be considered

war? How many troops need to be committed and for how long before an armed conflict is considered a war? Must Congress formally declare war? Or may a declaration be implied when funds are appropriated toward an armed conflict? The Constitution is also vague about which branch has the authority to end an armed conflict or sign a peace agreement. Thus, even though a two-thirds majority in the Senate is required when entering into a treaty, there is no indication that the Senate's consent is required to sign a peace treaty.

THE POWER OF THE PURSE

Congress still retains one of the most important national security powers—the power of the purse. By controlling defense appropriations, Congress is able to direct the course of national security. Allocating funds to programs it finds beneficial or withholding funds from those it opposes gives Congress oversight of the president's dealings and the ability to regulate the security of the country.

In sum, the allocation of national security powers cannot be discerned without an in-depth analysis of the Constitution. Because the text is vague on some national security issues and silent on others, the enumerations of powers to provide for the "common defense" of the country often are implied. Ambiguity, combined with the desire to respond quickly to attack, has permitted a broader interpretation of the Constitution and expanded the national security powers afforded to the president.

See also Executive Orders; First Amendment; Supreme Court, Role of U.S.; War Powers Act

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REFLECTIONS

Vietnam and the Declaration of War

The war in Vietnam provided an example of the ambiguities found in the Constitution regarding the declaration of war. The war against Vietnam was never formally declared despite heavy military engagement for 20 years (1955–1975) and 58,000 U.S. military fatalities. The continued prosecution of the Vietnam War by Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon, despite ruinous costs, impelled Congress to try to restrict the president's power to wage war without congressional approval. As a result, Congress passed the War Powers Act in 1973 to try to limit the president's power to deploy the U.S. military to hostile areas.

CONTAINMENT

Foreign policy doctrine that formed the basis for U.S.–Soviet relations in the post–World War II period and remained in effect for much of the latter half of the 20th century. As a strategy, the policy of containment sought to restore the balance of power in Europe, curtail the projection of Soviet power, and modify the Soviet conception of international relations.

In 1947, an anonymous article appeared in the journal *Foreign Affairs*. Its author's name was simply given as "X." The subject of the article was a policy option for dealing with the Soviet Union and limiting its expansion. This policy became known as *containment,* and its impact on international relations would be felt for the rest of the 20th century and perhaps beyond.

Although known only as X, the author of the article was George Kennan, a political analyst and a member of the U.S. diplomatic corps. In his article for the July 1947 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Kennan wrote, "The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union, must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."

Kennan predicted that the Soviet Union would eventually fall apart if it could not "find outlet" for its authoritarian rule—a prediction that proved to be prescient, as the Soviet Union crumbled in 1991.

Kennan believed that the Soviet Union's fixed ideology and aging and sclerotic state apparatus constrained the system and held it captive. Thus, despite the Soviet threat to U.S. national security, Kennan viewed the Soviet system as fragile, and he predicted that if anything happened that disrupted "the unity and efficacy of the [Communist] party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from

one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies."

In outlining a policy of containment, Kennan never advocated direct military conflict to meet the Soviet threat or to accomplish a rollback of its geopolitical territory. Rather, he proposed psychological warfare using such weapons as overt propaganda, covert operations, and even economic assistance. Additionally, Kennan's containment theory advised the United States to identify and defend only its most vital spheres of interest, which included Western Europe and Japan. Kennan opposed the idea held by President Harry S. Truman of a "domino theory," which required the United States to draw geographic lines against Soviet expansion not just with respect to the centers of U.S. strategic interest, but in the peripheral world as well.

Kennan maintained that the active defense of nonvital territories was not in the U.S. interest. He believed that expanding the theater of conflict beyond Western Europe and Japan would commit the United States to innumerable conflicts in which it had no real political stake, causing an incalculable drain on U.S. resources and its treasury.

Meanwhile, Kennan believed that the Soviets were acting in their own national interests as well. Those interests required the Soviet Union to have an adversarial relationship with the West so that it could demand sacrifice and allegiance from the Soviet people at the cost of personal liberties and a demilitarized economy. Kennan believed that this constant, fortress-like mentality would push the Soviet system to the brink at a far lesser cost to the United States if containment were put into play. Built into the strategy, too, were opportunities to allow the Soviets an honorable way out of the struggle rather than confine them to the sole option of warfare.

The policy of containment inspired as much controversy as appeal. A group of policy analysts known as *idealists* felt that containment did not go far enough in meeting the Soviet challenge. The idealists complained that losing peripheral interests meant the loss to Western industry of production-supply clients in the developing world. These losses also represented psychological defeats in the ideological struggle between communism and capitalism.

As a result of such criticism, containment underwent intellectual revision in the form of a document known as NSC-68, an official report written at the State Department in 1950. The NSC-68 report called for massive militarization on the part of the United States. Believing that the Soviets understood only raw force, the idealists claimed that aggression by the Soviet Union must be countered on a worldwide basis with military might, no matter what the cost.

Indeed, as the Korean conflict emerged and escalated during the late 1950s, the Marshall Plan for rebuilding Europe was terminated, and many social programs in the United States were postponed to finance U.S. military and defense activities. As a result, Kennan's original proposal of selected, strategic containment was transformed into an open-ended policy of U.S. military counter-force on a global scale.

The debate over whether the original principles of containment might have served U.S. interests better than military buildup will perhaps never be settled. The proponents of NSC-68 and military might point to the fall of the Soviet Union as proof of their assessment. Nonetheless, military buildup and superpower confrontation was a very dangerous policy that placed the world on the brink of nuclear holocaust over nonessential interests. It also cleared the way for the excesses of McCarthyism and the creation of the military-industrial complex—the very hazard that President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against in his presidential farewell speech in January 1961.

See also Kennan, George; Nitze, Paul H.; NSC-68 (National Security Report); Soviet Union, Former (Russia) and U.S. Policy

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CONTAINMENT AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

U.S. Cold War policy of limiting the expansion of Soviet influence by challenging the Soviet Union with all means short of military confrontation. In 1947, an anonymous article appeared in the journal *Foreign Affairs*. Its author's name was listed simply as "X,"

but it was later revealed that the author was George Kennan, a diplomat, historian, and political analyst. The subject of the piece was a policy option for dealing with the Soviet Union and limiting its expansion. Kennan wrote, "The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union, must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." This policy became known as *containment,* and its impact on international relations would be felt for the rest of the 20th century and perhaps beyond.

Before the article appeared, Kennan had served four tours of duty as a diplomat and ambassador in Moscow. He was familiar with Soviet political ideology and psychology, and he possessed a keen insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system. He believed that Soviet society and government could not last indefinitely within the rigid communist ideology and state apparatus that silenced dissenting views, constrained the social system, and held its population captive. Despite the Soviet threat to U.S. security, Kennan viewed the Soviet system as fragile and predicted that if anything happened that disrupted "the unity and efficacy of the [Communist] party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies."

Although Kennan was aware of the of the Soviet system's inherent weaknesses, he did not underestimate the ambitions of its leadership. Kennan had analyzed the Soviet Union's expansionist tendencies and described its political action as "a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power."

PRINCIPLES OF CONTAINMENT

Although he urged a firm stance against Soviet expansion, Kennan advocated neither direct military conflict nor an attempt to recover the territorial gains the Soviet Union had made after World War II. Rather, he proposed that the principle weapon against the Soviet Union should be psychological warfare through overt propaganda, covert operations, and even economic assistance.

Containment theory also advised the United States to identify and defend only its most vital spheres of interest. In the mid-20th century, these included the major centers of capitalist industrial power, Western Europe and Japan. Kennan maintained that active defense of nonvital territories was not in the best interest of the United States. Expanding the theater of conflict beyond Western Europe and Japan would commit the United States to innumerable conflicts in which it had no real political stake and would cause an incalculable drain on resources and the treasury.

Meanwhile, Kennan believed that the Soviets were acting in their own interests as well. Those interests required the Soviet Union to have an adversarial relationship with the West. To demand sacrifice and loyalty from the Soviet people, who enjoyed few personal liberties under its militarized economy, the state needed a military and ideological enemy. The United States, whose political and economic systems contrasted so dramatically with those of the Soviet Union, filled that role perfectly. Kennan believed that this constant, institutional fortress mentality would push the Soviet system to the brink of collapse at a far lesser cost to the United States if containment were adopted instead of a policy of active military confrontation. Containment policy also offered the Soviets an honorable way to avoid warfare. Kennan proposed that the United States should offer the Soviet Union disarmament treaties and financial assistance if they would agree to adopt democratic forms of government.

OPPOSITION AND
THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

The idea of containment generated a great deal of controversy. A group of policy analysts known as *idealists* felt that containment did not go far enough in meeting the Soviet challenge. These foreign policy elites complained that losing peripheral interests meant that Western industry would lose production and supply markets in the developing world. Losses such as these also represented psychological defeats in the ideological struggle with communism.

As a result of the idealists' reservations, containment theory underwent intellectual revision in 1949. In that year, members of the National Security Council (NSC) drafted a document in response to President Harry S. Truman's request for a comprehensive analysis of U.S. and Soviet military, economic, and political capabilities. The document, known as NSC-68, called for a policy of massive U.S. militarization. The idealists believed that the Soviets understood only raw force; they argued that Soviet aggression anywhere in

the world had to be countered with a military response, at any cost. This position became known as the *Truman Doctrine*.

A key part of the Truman Doctrine was Truman's conception of the *domino theory*. He argued that failure to prevent communist takeover of a country would inevitably lead other countries in the same area to fall under Soviet domination. He compared the countries to dominoes lined up in a row: If one domino is pushed over, it knocks down the next, which topples into the one after, and so on until all have fallen. Kennan disagreed with the domino theory, but Truman was determined to protect not just the center but all of the periphery as well. By the end of the Korean War in 1953, the policy of containment had given way to an open-ended policy of U.S. military counter-force on a global scale.

Historians debate whether containment, if implemented as it was originally conceived, might have served U.S. interests better than the Truman Doctrine. The proponents of NSC-68 point to the fall of the Soviet Union as the ultimate proof of the effectiveness of the Truman Doctrine. On the other hand, Kennan was correct in seeing that the internal political and economic weaknesses of the Soviet Union would ultimately cause its collapse. The Soviet Union fell even though U.S. and Soviet troops never fired a shot at one another. Internal economic and social upheaval, not external military pressure, spelled doom for the Soviet Union.

See also Cold War; Communism and National Security; Kennan, George; Truman Doctrine; Truman, Harry S., and National Policy; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE TREATY (1990)

Treaty hailed as a landmark arms control agreement concluded between the former enemies of the Cold War. The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) was signed in November 1990 by 22 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact countries. The treaty grew out of discussions held between 1986 and 1989 as part of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (the predecessor to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe).

Security analysts viewed the CFE as a key element in ensuring military stability and predictability in the chaotic years following the collapse of communism. The CFE established equal ceilings for NATO and Warsaw Pact land-based forces in the area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. The limits for each side were 20,000 battle tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters.

Because the former Eastern bloc had a vast numerical superiority in ground forces, the treaty effectively meant large-scale downsizing for the Soviets and for the central and Eastern Europeans; NATO, on the other hand, had to make only small cuts in its forces. These developments assuaged fears in the West of a massive Soviet attack of conventional forces. Since the treaty came into force in 1992, more than 50,000 pieces of heavy military equipment have been destroyed. Some critics, however, regretted the treaty did not go far enough and call for larger cutbacks.

Experts have praised the CFE's mandated verification procedures and information exchanges as a significant step toward increased transparency among Europe's military forces. These procedures have included thousands of unprecedented site inspections to verify the destruction or decommissioning of over-the-limit weaponry.

Historical events quickly outpaced the CFE treaty, however, as the Warsaw Pact dissolved and the Soviet Union collapsed, leading to the inclusion of the former Soviet states as additional signatories. The new map of Eastern Europe and central Asia generated new concerns about the CFE limits, particularly among Russia and Ukraine, which resulted in some changes to the treaty during the late 1990s, including the Flank Agreement of 1996. The Adaptation Agreement, signed at the Istanbul Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Summit in November 1999, amended the CFE to adjust to new geostrategic realities. Since the conclusion of the treaty, NATO has also accepted many former communist countries as members, beginning with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999.

See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Warsaw Pact

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CONVERSION, DEFENSE
See Defense Reorganization Act

COOPERATIVE SECURITY

An agreement entered into by parties with similar political, military, or economic goals on a local, regional, or global level to aid each other in the achievement of those goals and in the countering of enemy threats. Also, a framework for the maintenance of peace and security on a local, regional, or global level by ensuring the cooperation of a group of parties interested in similar goals.

At the end of World War I, there was a tangible sense in the domestic spheres of the victors that the citizens of those states, who had sacrificed a great deal to fight and win the war, were ready to collect their spoils. The constituencies wanted retribution, if not vengeance, and state leaders were quite aware of the domestic pressure to deliver. They impressed this on the diplomats they sent to Versailles in 1919 to create the treaty that would set the terms for the postwar world.

There was another prominent dynamic setting the tone and the goals to be achieved globally following what was known as the Great War. It was a growing sense that the war had been too costly in terms of lives and money to chance allowing another one to spiral out of control as, in many ways, had World War I.

Thus, leaders embarked on creating a framework for global security that would ensure that no such calamity was repeated. This atmosphere was a fertile ground for American president Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points proposal, which laid out a plan for the creation of an international system of cooperation among friendly states and espoused a similar worldview and morality to be applied to the rule of peoples and international political, military, and economic affairs.

The idea for such a cooperative council was embraced, ironically, by the international community but not by Wilson's own Congress. The League of Nations, of which the United States would never become a member, was created.

The League of Nations was founded on the principle of cooperative security, whereby all members agreed to address budding conflicts and acts of aggression perpetrated by or against one of its own members, with the goal of suppressing or diffusing such conflicts. It sought to prevent the escalation of conflicts through various means, starting with diplomacy, before they became drastic and unmanageable. Its intent was to create a body of parties with a collective interest in maintaining world peace, thereby guaranteeing that the mutual recognition of this goal would lead to cooperation toward ensuring its maintenance.

Evidenced by the occurrence, not 30 years later, of World War II, the League of Nations was a failed enterprise. There were a number of reasons for this, not the least of which was the United States' lack of participation. Other, more practical reasons included the lack of credibility of the organization, which suffered because of its inability to deal successfully with conflicts arising form Italy's invasion of Ethiopia and Japan's invasion of Manchuria, for example.

Part of the system's failure has often been attributed to the fact that unanimity was not required in the organization's decisions. This resulted in weak edicts being issued and weakened the organization's efforts to take a stand. For example, the organization could issue a reprimand or call for sanctions against a state that had perpetrated an act of aggression without the unanimous support of all parties. These resolutions held little water when only some of the parties supported them, and when only some member states enforced sanctions against the subject of the resolution while others continued to conduct business as usual. In fact, this would hurt the economies of the states that participated and benefited those that eschewed the organization's edict.

The United Nations, which is often seen as the second attempt at creating an organization that would ensure the maintenance of peace and security, is based on a system of collective security and attempts to correct some of the League of Nations' shortcomings. For example, all resolutions passed by the United Nations must be enforced by all members.

Although the League of Nations failed to secure world peace, the concept of cooperative security lives on and plays an important role in contemporary world affairs, as it did during the Cold War. The Helsinki Accords, which established European borders after World War II, are based on the cooperative security

model enshrined in the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which later became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

In the post–Cold War and post–September 11 world, cooperative security plays a major role in fighting terrorism, arms and nuclear proliferation, drug and human trafficking, and many other problems that traverse state borders. Examples of cooperative security can be seen in agreements between the United States and the central and Southeast Asian states, whereby those states identify common goals and work together to achieve them.

See also Alliances; Collective Security

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

Plan developed by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar to assist Russia and other former Soviet states in dismantling and disposing of their nuclear weapons. In August 1991, a military coup nearly overthrew Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The possibility of the Soviet Union's vast nuclear arsenal falling under the control of an unstable military government greatly alarmed U.S. officials. Consequently, the federal government suggested that it work with the Soviets to secure their nuclear weapons. However, before such an agreement could be completed, the Soviet Union collapsed on December 25, 1991.

At this time, the Soviet Union possessed approximately 30,000 nuclear missiles, 40,000 tons of chemical weapons, and a large biological weapons program. When the Soviet Union collapsed, these weapons were spread among four newly independent nations: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. This situation raised two critical concerns. First, could these newly formed governments be trusted to harbor such dangerous weapons? Second, were these new nations even capable of safeguarding the weapons?

To ease these concerns, in 1991, Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar cosponsored the National Defense Authorization Act. The act originally provided U.S. funding for either the elimination of nuclear weapons or their removal to carefully guided sites, storage of nuclear material obtained from decommissioned missiles, and efforts to prevent the sale or illegal dispersal of destructive weapons. The act proposed that the United States spend roughly $400 million per year to achieve these goals.

By 1994, with the assistance of the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine transferred all of their nuclear arsenals to Russia, thereby eliminating fears about the security of weapons in these three nations. The focus of the United States' efforts then turned primarily to Russia. In addition to eliminating and storing nuclear material, the United States provided funding to improve communications between the American and Russian militaries, to convert Russian defense industries into peaceful civilian industries, to ensure the environmental safety of former nuclear sites, and to provide new employment for former Russian nuclear scientists and other military personnel. The U.S. Departments of State, Defense, and Energy all worked to attain these objectives.

Overall, the Nunn-Lugar legislation was highly successful. Between 1992 and 1997, all nuclear materials were returned safely to Russia. U.S. officials oversaw the dismantling of a significant portion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and subsequently confirmed that the leftover material from these weapons had been either safely stored or disposed of. Furthermore, relations between the former Cold War adversaries, the United States and Russia, were immensely improved.

However, opposition to the act did exist in the U.S. Congress. Some members strongly denounced the conversion of Russia's defense industries into civilian industries and the use of funding to employ former employees of the Soviet defense establishment. This funding, they argued, constituted subsidies to the Russian economy and did not actually promote U.S. security. Distrust bred during the Cold War also lingered; some members of Congress feared that Russia was using the funding for military purposes, such as the war against separatist rebels in Chechnya.

Consequently, in 1997 the act was revised to cover only the three original principles formulated in 1991. Still, the Nunn-Lugar Act undeniably contributed to the peaceful resolution of the Cold War and the prevention of the unwanted spread of Soviet nuclear and chemical weapons.

See also Cold War; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Nuclear Waste Disposal; Nunn, Sam

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COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Nongovernmental, nonprofit, and nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to adding value to the public debate on international affairs, energizing foreign policy discussions nationwide, identifying and nurturing new foreign policy leaders, and providing clear, reliable information on key international issues facing the United States and its citizens.

Founded in 1921, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) began as a small group of lawyers, bankers, and businesspeople intent on keeping the United States fully engaged in world affairs at a time when new calls for isolationism were becoming more prevalent throughout the nation. Since that time, membership in the CFR has grown to more than 4,000 members, and the organization holds regular meetings in New York, Washington, DC, and other American cities. Senior government officials, global leaders, and prominent thinkers come together frequently with CFR members to debate and discuss contemporary foreign policy issues.

The CFR is also a highly respected think tank, and CFR fellows produce articles and books analyzing foreign policy issues and making strategic policy recommendations. In addition, the CFR publishes *Foreign Affairs*, a leading U.S. academic journal that covers international affairs and American foreign policy. Nearly every U.S. president since the Great Depression has been a member of the CFR.

Despite its considerable reputation and esteem, the CFR has endured a good deal of controversy. The council's harshest critics maintain that the CFR represents the interests of American elites, conducts its deliberations in great secrecy, and functions as a tremendously influential power broker within policy-making circles. In contrast, proponents maintain that the crafting of foreign policy is a highly specialized enterprise that is enhanced by CFR's ability to foster an ongoing, spirited dialogue among civic, corporate, and academic leaders.

See also Think Tanks

COUNTER-FORCE DOCTRINE

In nuclear strategy, the targeting of an opponent's military and industrial infrastructure with a nuclear strike. The counter-force doctrine is differentiated from the countervalue doctrine, which targets the enemy's civilian population and cities. The counter-force doctrine assumes that a nuclear war can be limited and that it can be fought and won.

The counter-force doctrine was formalized in the context of the flexible response strategy articulated by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara during the Kennedy administration. In response to the 1950s strategy of massive retaliation, which maintained that the United States would respond to Soviet aggression with an all-out nuclear attack, flexible response sought to give the United States more options in countering communist threats. Counter-force targeting was developed with the idea of limiting damage and protecting cities in the event of a nuclear war. The "city avoidance" principle was the driving force behind counter-force targeting, and the hope was that both the United States and the Soviet Union could establish some ground rules to be followed in the event of a nuclear exchange. The idea was to create rules for a limited nuclear exchange to prevent escalation to an all-out, general nuclear war.

The Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 created the sense that nuclear war with the Soviet Union was a real possibility. The United States wanted to be able to minimize costs and limit damage should deterrence fail. The idea was to reassure the Soviet Union that the United States would not target its cities and to give the Soviets an incentive to refrain from striking American cities. For counter-force to work, the United States would have to convince the Soviets that they would both benefit from fighting a nuclear war in these limited, structured terms. This implied a mutual understanding. The counter-force doctrine was also seriously considered in the context of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The United States wanted to be able to respond to a conventional attack against Europe (extended deterrence).

The main problem with the counter-force doctrine lay in its inevitable association with a preemptive first strike. A first strike aimed at an opponent's military facilities and weapons systems could effectively disarm the enemy. Counter-force presupposed that adversaries would agree to strike only certain restricted military targets to protect those forces needed for an effective retaliatory second strike (necessary for deterrence to work). The logic was that the country that absorbed the first attack would have enough military force intact to allow it to respond and strike at the enemy's military facilities. This would create a limited nuclear exchange.

The United States assured the Soviet Union that it had no intention of launching a first strike, but these assurances were not enough. Counter-force continued to be associated with an offensive first strike, not a defensive doctrine. It was hard for the Soviets to believe that the United States intended counter-force to be used only in a second strike. And for counter-force to work, the United States had to successfully convince the Soviet Union that it would not launch a first strike.

Another issue with counter-force targeting was that incredible surgical strike precision of missiles would be needed to accurately target and hit only military and industrial installations. However, collateral damage would be unavoidable because many military bases and missile installations were located in close proximity to cities, both in the United States and the Soviet Union.

However ideal the counter-force doctrine seemed, it continued to be regarded by many in the United States and in the Soviet Union as synonymous with a preemptive first strike. The Soviets ultimately rejected the idea of the counter-force doctrine. Many in the United States and in Congress also had doubts about the possibility of a limited nuclear exchange and saw any such conflict inevitably degenerating into a major nuclear war.

See also Military Doctrine

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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
See ESPIONAGE

COUNTERTERRORISM

Measures taken to combat terrorist groups and reduce the threat of terrorist attacks. Many of the military and diplomatic options that a country uses to deal with rival nations also can be effective in combating terrorist groups. However, there are key differences in the structure and political organization of nations and terrorist groups. These differences require governments to adapt their national security strategies to combat terrorism successfully.

EVOLUTION OF U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM

Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States had no coordinated counterterrorism strategy. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, the congressional committee that investigated the September 11 attacks, criticized Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton for their failure to appreciate the nature and scope of the terrorist threat. The commission's final report noted that terrorism was not a top security concern for the U.S. government before September 11, 2001. Even though the Soviet Union had collapsed a decade earlier, U.S. national security policy continued to focus on Cold War concerns. Hostile states such as Iran and North Korea were still considered the main threats to U.S. security. According to Richard Clarke, former White House coordinator for counterterrorism policy, in early September 2001, the government was still trying to answer the question, "Is al-Qaeda a big deal?"

The commission's report found serious weaknesses in U.S. counterterrorism capabilities and strategy. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had limited ability to gather information about foreign terrorists. In fact, between 1995 and September 11, 2001, the CIA produced no National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism. Domestic intelligence gathering also suffered from a lack of resources and poor coordination. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents who were assigned to counterterrorism matters worked separately from other agents, which limited their ability to share information with FBI colleagues. Information sharing among agencies was also poorly coordinated. Often, knowledge possessed by one agency was never communicated to others. Vital clues to the September 11 attacks were missed because different agencies held separate pieces of the puzzle and never put them together.

The report characterized military efforts to deal with terrorists prior to September 11 as outdated and ineffective. For example, U.S. air strikes against al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in 1998 did little to

disrupt terrorist training. Before September 11, the U.S. government was reluctant to invade Afghanistan with conventional troops, but the military had few paramilitary or Special Forces units, which are better suited to attack specific targets in remote areas. Even after the United States invaded Afghanistan in response to the September 11 attacks, it still relied heavily on local Afghan forces to locate and capture terrorists there.

The United States' attempts to use diplomacy to combat terrorism were also plagued by difficulties. Despite economic sanctions and the threat of U.S. military action, the Afghan government refused to expel terrorist leaders or stop terrorist activities within Afghanistan. The United States was also unsuccessful in persuading its allies in the Middle East to help combat terrorist groups. For example, although al-Qaeda had extensive financial dealings in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi and U.S. governments never coordinated efforts to track and disrupt terrorist finances there. The September 11 attacks highlighted the disjointed nature of U.S. counterterrorism efforts and led to sweeping changes in counterterrorism policy.

CURRENT POLICIES AND STRATEGIES

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the United States has crafted a national counterterrorism strategy that incorporates lessons learned from past failures. It includes developing new military doctrines, improving intelligence-gathering and -sharing capabilities, strengthening homeland defenses, and adopting creative approaches to diplomacy and foreign aid.

The use of military force is still a key element in U.S. counterterrorism policy. The United States remains committed to locating and destroying terrorist camps and has shown its willingness to use military force against nations that harbor or assist terrorists. For example, the 2003 U.S invasion of Iraq was justified partly by the claim that Iraqi president Saddam Hussein was providing assistance to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. However, the structure of terrorist groups makes it unlikely that military action alone will be sufficient. As the commission report noted, terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda often do not depend on a single leader or group of leaders for directions. Instead, they consist of separate cells that plan and execute acts of terror largely independently of one another. Their leadership acts more as a source of inspiration and financing than a source of command or control. Because of this structure,

even the largely successful U.S. military effort to drive al-Qaeda from its bases in Afghanistan has not succeeded in destroying the organization.

Reorganization of U.S. homeland defenses and intelligence-gathering services has dominated post–September 11 counterterrorism policy. In response to the attacks, a new U.S. Department of Homeland Security was created to coordinate efforts to protect the country against future attacks. The department's responsibilities include introducing tougher security procedures at seaports and airports, working with the Border Patrol to prevent foreign terrorists from slipping into the country illegally, increasing security for vital infrastructure such as power plants and the nation's transportation system, and developing emergency response plans for urban areas.

At the urging of the commission, the Bush administration also approved sweeping changes in the way the CIA, FBI, and other law enforcement agencies gather, share, and analyze intelligence. A new national intelligence director position was created that reports directly to the president. The director is responsible for ensuring cooperation and coordination between the nation's various intelligence agencies. By centralizing all intelligence-gathering functions under one person, the government hopes to more effectively monitor and disrupt terrorist activities.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks concluded that the threat facing the United States is not simply terrorism, but the use of Islam by terrorists to justify and gain support for their actions. Leaders of al-Qaeda, for example, defend their attacks as a response to U.S. support for undemocratic secular regimes throughout the Islamic world. They portray Western culture as hostile to the ideals of Islam and urge their followers to wage war on non-Muslims. Their use of religious ideology introduces a cultural dimension to the terrorist threat that cannot be addressed by military force or heightened physical security.

One of the commission's main recommendations for fighting terrorism was to make a much stronger effort to "communicate and defend American ideals in the Islamic world." This includes pressuring U.S. allies in the region to grant their citizens greater political freedom. The commission suggested that foreign aid to U.S. allies in the Middle East, which historically has been directed to defense and security, should be focused more on education and increasing the economic openness of the receiving countries. Along with renewed diplomatic efforts in Islamic nations, the commission

also stressed the need to develop a comprehensive, global strategy to combat terrorism. This involves greater diplomatic cooperation with countries throughout the world to share information about terrorists and to coordinate efforts to fight terrorism. Because terrorist groups are not based in a single nation or even a single region of the world, it is highly unlikely that a unilateral approach to security will be effective.

The commission accused the government of a "failure of imagination" prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks. Its recommendations were based on the notion that fresh thinking is needed to deal with the uniquely new form of national security threat represented by terrorism. The counterterrorism policies adopted in response to those attacks represent an attempt by the U.S. government to apply its imagination to the challenge of global terrorism.

—John Haley

See also Intelligence and Counterintelligence

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COUNTERTHREAT

Aspect of deterrence in which a defender's potential to retaliate with a blow equal to any that it may receive neutralizes an enemy's ability to strike first. The need for nations to maintain counterthreat capabilities is often cited as the driving force behind arms buildup. Combined with mutual mistrust between rivals, counterthreat poses one of the greatest obstacles to arms control and disarmament efforts. Disarmament in particular is incompatible with the counterthreat principle: For the disarmament process to be effective, rivals must agree to give up arms that they believe give them a military advantage or at least act as an equalizer to their rival. Similarly, although it is easier for a state to agree to eliminate weapons they deem less militarily significant, doing so also represents less of an achievement for disarmament negotiators.

The importance of maintaining counterthreat capabilities drove the military aspect of the Cold War, both in terms of conventional and nuclear weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a heated nuclear arms race, each party working to ensure that its rival never achieved a significant edge. Simultaneously, the respective military alliances led by the United States and the Soviets—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact—saw a conventional arms buildup of drastic proportions in pursuit of the same strategy of military parity. Both of these arms races were the primary subjects of scholarly military, defense, and political science analyses and debate for decades.

The counterthreat principle applies on a basic level as much as it does on the grand scale of the Cold War. That is, the principle is employed at the battlefield level as armies struggle to develop military hardware that is technologically equal or superior to that of its rivals. As each new generation of combat weapons becomes more complex, more accurate, and more efficient than the last, a modern army must constantly improve and update its equipment to remain competitive. A combat soldier armed with inferior weapons has minimal counterthreat capability and thus is much more vulnerable.

Indeed, the superiority of the U.S. military stems from its technologically superior capabilities, which means that no current army represents a significant counterthreat to it. It has been argued that this seemingly insurmountable superiority in conventional military power leads desperate nations to strive for nuclear capabilities as the only way to achieve a counterthreat to the U.S. military. An example of this is North Korea's determination to create nuclear weapons in the face of what it sees as U.S. aggression against its economic and political interests.

See also Arms Control; Arms Race; Cold War; Deterrence

COUNTERVALUE

In nuclear strategy, the targeting of an enemy's cities and civilian population with a nuclear strike. The goal of countervalue targeting is the destruction of an adversary's socioeconomic base. Countervalue doctrine is differentiated from counter-force doctrine, which targets the enemy's military-industrial infrastructure.

The targeting of civilian populations is associated with the condition of mutually assured destruction in that it destroys vulnerable "soft" targets and can wipe out entire populations. The targeting of cities with nuclear weapons and the possession of a secure second-strike aptitude are the requirements for mutually assured destruction and make up the core of the theory of *deterrence*. The theory of deterrence holds that neither side in a conflict can be expected to rationally initiate a nuclear war because both are vulnerable to retaliation and destruction of their civilian populations.

Countervalue targeting provides an effective deterrent to nuclear war if both sides have a secure second-strike capability. This means that both sides must have intact, operational nuclear forces after having absorbed a surprise nuclear attack, and both must be able to launch a retaliatory strike. This requires assuring protection of one's nuclear forces and launch sites and convincing an adversary that a sufficient amount of one's forces can successfully withstand an attack and still be able to retaliate.

Countervalue doctrine was emphasized in U.S. defense policy after counter-force targeting fell out of favor in the 1960s. Because a relatively small nuclear arsenal is sufficient to strike an adversary's civilian population, both the United States and the Soviet Union attempted throughout the 1960s and 1970s, with varying degrees of success, to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Countervalue targeting was seen as providing the most stable nuclear deterrent because its only possible outcome is suicide.

See also Deterrence; Military Doctrine

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COVERT ACTION

Tactics that are more proactive than diplomacy but more secretive than overt military action. Covert action is initiated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), undertaken by the CIA or a subcontracted party, and intended to advance U.S. foreign policy goals abroad.

According to the National Security Act, which set up the National Security Council (NSC) and the CIA in 1947 under President Harry S. Truman, covert action is defined as "an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly." The rationale behind the use of covert action is that policymakers and U.S. leaders need a third option when diplomacy is insufficient to achieve a goal and when military intervention is inappropriate.

Planning of covert action is generally done by leaders in the intelligence community, usually in the CIA and the NSC, then approved by the president, who issues a *presidential finding* to commence the activity. According to the National Security Act, to justify a covert action, the president must deem that "such an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the United States."

Covert action is controversial for many reasons. For one, the inherently secret nature of the activity is a moral issue raised by many of its detractors, who believe that all government activity should be public and question how the actions fit into the causes, standards, and morals supported by the United States. Although the National Security Act requires that the president inform Congress, or at least the heads of congressional committees overseeing the intelligence community, when covert action is undertaken, the act also makes provisions for occasions on which this requirement may be waived. More often than not, it is the case that Congress is not immediately informed of ongoing covert activity.

Another point of controversy is the belief that any infiltration by U.S. government–sponsored actors into the borders of another state, particularly when the goal is to influence the economic, political, or military conditions within that state, is tantamount to military action. Some believe that taking action of such consequence should be a matter of public debate, not a decision made quietly by the president and his advisers.

Further, cost is a central issue because covert operations can go on for longer periods of time, and it is generally difficult to know at the commencement of an activity what its duration will be. The risk of exposure

is another issue, as is failure of the operation, which can cost human lives and cause political crises if uncovered.

Finally, the argument has been advanced that past operations are too often neglected when determining whether covert actions are appropriate because of the nature of bureaucracy and its focus on short-term goals. A great deal can be learned from past failed or misguided covert actions, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, the overthrow of Chilean president Salvador Allende in 1973, and the Iran-Contra affair of 1986.

See also Intelligence and Counterintelligence

COVERT OPERATIONS

Military or political activities undertaken in a way that disguises the identity of the perpetrator or permits the perpetrator to deny involvement with those activities. Covert operations are not a new phenomenon; the ancient Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu described the basic principles of covert warfare in his classic book *The Art of War*. Nations including the United States have long used covert tactics against opponents when open warfare was politically or militarily risky. Since World War II, however, covert operations have become a major part of U.S. national security policy.

TYPES OF COVERT OPERATIONS

The term "covert operations" covers a wide variety of both military and political actions. These may include paramilitary activities, political and economic subversion, propaganda and disinformation campaigns, and assassinations and coups d'état. Covert operations are not only undertaken against one's enemies, they are often directed at allies to secure their support or to influence their domestic or foreign policy.

In a paramilitary operation, a nation trains, supports, or advises military forces in another country. Sometimes a nation will provide this kind of assistance to the military forces of one of its allies. In other cases, a nation may train and arm forces in the hopes of overthrowing the government of one of its foes. The 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion is an example of the latter type of paramilitary operation. After the Communist guerilla leader Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba in 1959, the

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) developed a plan to arm and train a force of Cuban exiles to overthrow Castro. The invasion took place in April 1961, but the Cuban army easily defeated the inexperienced and poorly equipped exile forces. Because the U.S. government did not wish to reveal its part in the operation, U.S. naval and air forces that might have changed the outcome of the battle were not allowed to support the invasion.

Political subversion involves efforts to weaken the government of a rival state or the political opponents of a friendly government. In one of its first covert activities after World War II, the United States provided substantial amounts of money and advice to middle-of-the-road Italian political parties in 1948. At the time, the Soviet Union was offering similar assistance to Italian Communists, and the U.S. government feared that the Communists would take power in the Italian elections that year. Throughout the Cold War, the CIA gave a great deal of money to politicians in places such as Iran, Chile, and Zaire (present-day Democratic Republic of Congo) who were friendly to U.S. policies.

The goal of economic subversion is to undermine a rival state by weakening its economy or currency. During World War II, Nazi Germany hatched a scheme to destroy the Western Allies' economy by attacking the British currency, the pound. The Germans planned to print millions of counterfeit £10 notes, the most widely used banknote in the world. By flooding the market with fake notes, they hoped to destroy confidence in Britain's currency, which was the strongest in the world at the time. Had the plan succeeded, the Allied powers would have faced extreme difficulty financing their military efforts during World War II.

Propaganda is the use of written, spoken, or visual communication to support or attack a person, group, or idea. It is one of the oldest tools of national security policy, and its use dates to the earliest civilizations. Propaganda can be found on the walls of the temple of King Ramses II, who ruled Egypt from 1279 to 1213 BCE. Images on the walls tell the story of the battle of Kadesh, in which Ramses faced the army of the rival Hittite kingdom. Although the Hittites surrounded Ramses and nearly wiped out the Egyptian army, the two sides eventually fought to a draw and Ramses escaped. The temple walls, however, tell a much different story, describing the battle as a glorious victory for Ramses. King Ramses was aware that only the soldiers who survived really knew what happened that

day, and they weren't about to dispute his version of the story.

Disinformation is similar to propaganda in that it involves using information to gain an advantage over an opponent. In a disinformation campaign, false information is planted with the hope that it will lead a person or group to take a desired action. For example, prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the U.S. government produced a document that seemed to show that Iraq had attempted to purchase uranium from the country of Niger. President George W. Bush cited this document as evidence of Iraq's intention to acquire nuclear weapons. It was later discovered, however, that the document was a forgery. Some intelligence experts suggested that the document may have been planted by exiled opponents of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein to increase U.S. support for an invasion of Iraq.

ISSUES REGARDING COVERT OPERATIONS

The United States has pursued literally thousands of covert operations since the end of World War II, and few in government have questioned the need for such activities. However, some observers have raised questions about the necessity, legitimacy, and effectiveness of covert operations. Some question whether covert activities such as the assassination of political opponents or the arming of rebel fighters are morally acceptable. Others point out that many covert operations fail to produce the desired results, and even those that achieve their objectives often produce unintended negative consequences.

One example of such unintended consequences occurred in Iran. In 1953, the CIA staged a coup d'état against the elected Iranian government of Mohammed Mossadeq, replacing him with Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Under the shah, Iran became the strongest U.S. ally in the Muslim world. However, the shah ruled Iran as a dictator, crushing all dissent and opposition to his rule. During the 1970s, Iranian students began to call for the overthrow of the shah. Led by the exiled religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the students deposed the shah in 1979 and set up an Islamic government. The new Iranian government became a bitter foe of the United States because of the part it had played in bringing the shah to power. Short-term failures such as the Bay of Pigs invasion and longer-term failures such as the overthrow of

Mossadeq raise the question of the effectiveness of covert operations.

In the past, Congress has made attempts to reform the way covert operations are carried out. Bills introduced during the late 1980s proposed limits on how funds for covert operations may be spent, required fuller reporting of covert operations to Congress, and prohibited any actions that involved violating U.S. law. However, the U.S. administration still has great freedom to engage in covert operations with little oversight. Some critics fear that this secrecy promotes the use of covert operations to pursue policies that would be unpopular with the American public. In the words of Lee Hamilton, former chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "When covert actions are contemplated that will have profound effects on our security interests, the balance, in our democracy, must be struck in favor of prior consultation. In the long run it will serve us best."

—John Haley

See also Covert Action

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CRUISE MISSILE

Guided missile that flies at low altitudes to evade enemy defense systems. The cruise missile's ability to pinpoint a target hundreds of miles away and strike almost without warning makes it one of the most widely used offensive weapons in modern military arsenals.

A cruise missile consists of a powerful explosive warhead mounted in a missile that is equipped with an on-board computer guidance system. Before launch, the location of the target is programmed into the missile's computer. The on-board computer stores maps of the missile's routes, including topographic data that

One of five BQM-74 test drone cruise missiles being launched from an amphibious assault ship, the USS *Essex*, in early 2004. These drones are remote controlled, GPS-guided cruise missiles used to simulate threat aircraft and missiles for weapons system testing, evaluation, and training. Traveling at speeds ranging from 200 to 540 knots, they can reach an altitude of 40,000 feet and travel for 520 nautical miles.

Source: U.S. Navy.

enable the cruise missile to follow the contour of the terrain. This makes the weapon virtually impossible to detect. A modern cruise missile can fly for 2,000 miles at altitudes as low as 50 feet and at speeds over 600 mph.

The first operational cruise-type missile was the German V-1 rocket, which was developed late in World War II as a long-range weapon to attack Great Britain. This early cruise missile, however, was unguided and had only a crude system to regulate its range. As a result, many overshot or fell short of their targets. The V-1 was also quite slow; most Allied fighters could catch it easily and either shoot it down or tip it off balance by striking its stabilizing fins with a wingtip. Despite its limitations, the V-1 inspired work that led to the development of the first modern cruise missiles in the 1970s.

The V-1 was launched from a long, stationary ramp, whereas modern cruise missiles can be launched from aircraft, ships, ground installations, or hand-held launchers. They can deliver conventional and even nuclear payloads. The newest generation of guided missiles, called Shadow Storm or Scalp missiles, have an enhanced ability to deliver precision attacks in all weather conditions using the Global Positioning System (GPS) and laser or infrared guidance systems. Britain, France, Greece, Italy, and the United Arab Emirates are currently purchasing Storm Shadow cruise missiles.

The most widely used cruise missile in the U.S. arsenal is the sea-launched Tomahawk missile. The U.S. Navy used Tomahawk cruise missiles to deliver conventional payloads accurately from hundreds of miles offshore during the Gulf War and the Iraq War of 2003. The U.S. Navy is currently testing new warheads for its Joint Standoff Weapon, an updated cruise missile manufactured by Raytheon Corporation, which also makes the Tomahawk.

See also Missiles

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CRYPTOLOGY

The science of protecting, disguising, or encrypting communications. Cryptology is widely used by the military and federal security and law enforcement agencies to protect sensitive communications from being intercepted or read by unauthorized persons. The dramatic increase in computer use by government agencies in recent years has increased the use of electronic

cryptography to protect computerized data that are vital to national security.

The first recorded use of cryptography was in ancient Greece, where the Spartans employed a system of encoded military communications. The Roman ruler Julius Caesar invented a system of letter substitutions to encrypt messages so that they could only be read by someone who also knew the code. Medieval Arab scientists were the first to study and systematically describe the principles of cryptography and cryptanalysis. Some of the techniques developed by the Arabs are still in use today.

World War II presented unique opportunities for cryptographers working with both old and new encryption technology. One decidedly low-tech but astoundingly effective effort was the use of Navajo codetalkers in the Pacific theater. Navajo Indians working for the U.S. Army used their language to send secret messages through radio broadcasts. The Navajo language was ideal for the job because it has no written alphabet (which meant the messages had to be verbal), and even within the Navajo tribe, very few people at the time still spoke or understood the language. Despite their best efforts, the Japanese never broke the code.

On the high-tech end of developments in cryptography was a mechanical revolution: For the first time, machines took over the majority of cryptographic work. The most notable example was the Enigma machine, a mechanical encrypting device employed by the German navy. With the help of Polish code breakers, a remarkable team of mathematicians broke the Enigma machine's code at Bletchley Park in England in the late 1930s. Prominent among that group of code breakers was Alan Turing, considered by many to be one of the fathers of modern computing.

In today's world, cryptology is closely interwoven with computer science and implemented in hardware and software. Sophisticated software programs are used to encrypt and decode electronic communications, and high-powered computers have been developed specifically for the purpose of data encryption and decryption. In the United States, this technology is considered a weapon and covered by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations under the control of the president. Software or hardware with enhanced cryptographic capabilities cannot be sold to a foreign national without government approval. Concern that terrorists or criminals would use encryption to send undecipherable messages led to an effort by the administration of President Bill Clinton to ban the export of so-called strong-encryption technology. Although implemented for a brief period, the ban was lifted in 1999.

Continued rapid increases in computing power have led some experts to predict that the balance between cryptography and cryptanalysis will soon shift in favor of cryptographers. At the same time, however, more powerful computers will also allow for faster, large-scale decryption. This presents a major challenge to those charged with protecting sensitive U.S. national security information.

See also Codetalkers; Computer Security; Espionage; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); National Security Agency; World War II

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Tense political showdown between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1962, sparked by the Soviet decision to base ballistic missiles in Cuba. Many historians believe that the Cuban Missile Crisis marked the closest the world has ever come to engaging in a nuclear war.

BACKGROUND

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the culmination of a series of events that transformed Cuba from a reliable U.S. ally to an implacable foe. The first of these events was the success of the 1959 Cuban Revolution, which swept pro-U.S. strongman Fulgencio Batista from power and installed a communist regime led by Fidel Castro. The administration of U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower, which was ideologically committed to fighting the spread of communism, planned an invasion to topple Castro. The resulting 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, approved and launched by Eisenhower's successor, John F. Kennedy, proved to be an embarrassing failure.

Following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Castro turned to the Soviet Union for economic aid, as well as military support against any further aggression by the United States. Part of the Soviet military support for Cuba included the secret introduction of intermediate-range ballistic missiles into the island in 1962. This move had two goals: to protect Cuba against U.S. military threats and to offset the recent basing of similar U.S. missiles in Turkey, close to the Soviet border.

THE CRISIS

The construction of missile bases in Cuba began secretly in the summer of 1962. By mid-September, the Soviets had begun shipping nuclear-tipped missiles to the island. Although U.S. spy planes had photographed construction of the missile sites, intelligence analysts at first believed they were to be used for antiaircraft missiles. However, photos taken on October 14 clearly showed the presence of offensive ballistic missile sites. A week later, President Kennedy publicly revealed this information and announced a naval blockade of Cuba. All ships headed for Cuba would

Bay of Pigs Invasion
Source: Corbis.

be stopped and searched by the U.S. Navy; any ships that refused to stop would be sunk. Kennedy demanded that the Soviets dismantle the bases and withdraw any missiles in Cuba.

Both Castro and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev initially refused the U.S. demands and denounced the blockade as illegal. In a series of letters over the next several days, Khrushchev argued that Cuba needed the missiles to protect itself against a possible repeat of U.S. aggression. Kennedy, however, refused to accept the presence of offensive nuclear weapons poised so close to U.S. soil. For several days, with Soviet ships carrying missiles sailing ever closer to the blockade zone, the two nations stared one another down. Many people feared that the confrontation would result in a nuclear war between the superpowers.

On October 26, Khrushchev wrote to Kennedy and offered to withdraw the missiles in exchange for a U.S. promise not to invade Cuba. However, the following day the Soviets announced a different offer over the radio: They would remove the missiles from Cuba if the United States would withdraw its missiles from Turkey. Kennedy publicly accepted the deal Khrushchev offered in writing but privately accepted the second offer—the handful of U.S. missiles based in Turkey would be removed. The Soviet ships returned home, and on October 28, Khrushchev ordered Soviet missiles removed from Cuba. Three

weeks later, satisfied that the missiles were indeed gone, Kennedy ended the naval blockade of the island.

AFTERMATH

Despite the removal of U.S. missiles from Turkey, the Cuban Missile Crisis resulted in a strategic defeat for the Soviet Union. The United States retained potential missile bases in Western Europe that were close to Soviet soil. With their capitulation in the missile crisis, the Soviets had no comparable bases in the Western Hemisphere. Backing down in the face of U.S. military pressure also dealt a serious blow to Soviet prestige, and the political damage likely contributed to Khrushchev's fall from power in 1964.

In contrast, the crisis proved to be the one of the high points of Kennedy's brief tenure as president. By successfully standing up to Khrushchev and the Soviet Union, he showed that the United States was willing to confront communist expansion and Soviet aggression regardless of the risks. Khrushchev, who before the crisis had considered Kennedy inexperienced and naive, gained a much greater respect for his U.S. counterpart afterward. As a result of the crisis, Kennedy enjoyed increased prestige that helped to advance his political initiatives, such as the Peace Corps, the U.S. program to land on the moon, and support for U.S. military intervention in Vietnam.

In the end, though, Castro was the only leader involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis who survived long past its end. Kennedy was assassinated almost exactly a year after lifting the embargo, and in 1964, the Soviet Politburo ousted Khrushchev as premier of the Soviet Union. With the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, Castro's regime outlived even that of his former protector. As for the United States, entering the 21st century, its attitudes, policies, and enmity toward the Castro regime have remained largely unchanged since the days of the missile crisis.

—John Haley

See also Bay of Pigs; Communism and National Security; Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy; Kennedy, John F., and National Policy

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CYBERLAW

The area of legal practice concerned with the Internet and applications of computer technology. Cyberlaw is a broad area of the law covering commerce on the World Wide Web, as well as the uses, abuses, and ownership rights of computer technology. Cyberlaw is a rapidly growing area of practice because traditional legal specialties such as contracts, intellectual property, trademarks, and copyrights are limited in their ability to deal with Internet commerce and computer storage and transmission. Recent technological innovations have extended Web access to cell phones and television receivers, further broadening and complicating this area of law.

Although cyberlaw can encompass everything from domain name protection to the digital distribution of music and other intellectual property, most cases involve commercial transactions negotiated through the Internet. Issues such as jurisdiction and enforcement are central to this aspect of cyberlaw practice. Say, for example, that the buyer of an item sold on the Web resides in New York, the seller resides in California, and the company that operates the Web site is located in Missouri—which state's laws govern the transaction? In what court would the case be heard if one of the parties reneged on his or her part of the contract? New York, California, or Missouri? What liability does the Web site, for example, have in the successful completion of the contract negotiated at that site?

Litigation is another fast-growing area of cyberlaw practice. Cases surrounding securities fraud (stocks and other financial instruments sold on the Web) and the uses and abuses of software are among the most common types of cases. For example, if a software company sells a product developed for a specific use to another company and that other company then finds additional uses for the software or adapts it for other purposes, is the software company entitled to additional compensation? Does the company that adapted the software own the new product?

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, the federal government has focused more intensely on Internet and e-mail traffic as a source of communications for terrorist groups. Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act passed after the attacks allow the government greater access to personal information stored on computer networks and servers in pursuit of possible terror investigations. Civil libertarians have challenged these provisions as violations of the constitutional right to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. However, given the generally ambiguous legal atmosphere surrounding the Internet, defining what is permissible and what is not remains a difficult proposition.

See also Computer Security; Computer Viruses; Cryptology

CYBERWEAPONS
See Computer Viruses

D

DARPA

See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DAYTON ACCORDS

Peace treaty agreed on in 1995 by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which ended a bloody three-year-long Bosnian conflict. Drafted after 21 days of intensive negotiations, the lengthy Dayton Accords reflected the incredible complexity of a peace plan designed to bring some measure of order in a region inhabited by three mutually hostile ethnic groups.

Established in 1946, postwar Yugoslavia was the brainchild of communist leader Josip Tito, who created and subsequently managed a unique state formation consisting of six largely autonomous republics: (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina) and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina). Given the new state's immense ethnic diversity, this intriguing constitutional arrangement was designed to provide each national group with the ability to manage its own economic and social affairs.

By the end of the 1980s, however, order began to break down in Yugoslavia, as competing national interests began to find increasingly violent avenues of expression. Following the 1989 explosion of anticommunist movements across Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia held its first democratic elections in all of its six republics. In every one of them, nationalist parties took power. As a result, the provocations between the varying ethnic groups quickly escalated, and the stage was set for a violent multiparty conflict.

THE BOSNIAN WAR

The first decisive steps on the path to Yugoslavia's disintegration were taken by the republics of Slovenia and Croatia, which declared their independence on June 25, 1991. Slovenia's secession did not meet with too much opposition—the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav National Army attempted to halt it but soon gave up. In Croatia, however, similar moves encountered stiff resistance from both a considerable Serbian minority and from the republic of Serbia (Serbia proper).

Inspired (and instigated) by Serbia's nationalist leader, Slobodan Milosevic, the Serb minority in a third republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, began to mobilize for war. In April 1992, civil war broke out in Bosnia between the Muslim majority and the Serbian minority, which sought to establish its own independent state. By late 1992, a whole string of ethnic and political factions joined the Bosnian war, and the complexity of the conflict henceforth was enough to baffle any historian. Muslims (making up 44% of the Bosnian population), Serbs (31%), and Croats (17%) played a ferocious game of musical chairs, establishing alliances against one another that varied maddeningly throughout Bosnia's different regions. Large-scale *ethnic cleansing* became rampant, and the international community was unable to find a solution that would end the bloodshed.

THE ROAD TO DAYTON

As early as February 1, 1992, the United Nations had sent a Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to the former Yugoslavia, at first to work out a cease-fire in Croatia, and then to protect civilians in Bosnia. The UN troops, however, were utterly inadequate for this latter task, and in the summer of 1995, American-led NATO airplanes begin to pound Bosnian Serb forces in an effort to stop their progressive takeover of Bosnia.

A few months later, after more than three years of war, all parties agreed to a cease-fire, and American-brokered peace talks began at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. Representing the Bosnian Serbs was the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic. Croatian president Franjo Tudjman represented the Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian leader Alija Izetbegovic headed the Muslim delegation.

On November 21, 1995, the three men finally adopted a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The ensuing Dayton-mandated division of Bosnia, however, was complicated, just as was the constitutional organization of Yugoslavia under Tito. Under the Dayton agreement, Bosnia was partitioned into two roughly equal entities—a Muslim-Croat Federation and a Serb state (*Republika Srpska*). The agreement also created a Bosnian central government run by a three-member presidency (a Muslim, a Serb, and a Croat), although the real political power was held by the local governments of the two entities.

CHALLENGES

Following the signing of the Dayton Accords, NATO sent a 60,000-strong implementation force (IFOR) on the ground, with the purpose of acting as a buffer between the Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims. The previously disputed capital city of Sarajevo was declared open to all ethnic groups, and everyone agreed to provide for the safe return of Bosnia's 2.2 million refugees. All parties also consented to free and fair elections at the local and national levels.

Another crucial provision of the Dayton Accords referred to the responsibility of both the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska to collaborate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (established in 1993 by the United Nations). The provision was to prosecute war criminals.

Numerous drawbacks of the Dayton Accords soon became obvious to every international observer. In spite of all official pronouncements, Bosnia remained a severely divided country, hardly ever acting as a unitary state. Partly for that reason, no important war-crimes suspects were delivered to the International Court for many years. Another significant shortcoming of the accords was the legitimacy that the agreement gave to Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, who fashioned himself as a regional peacemaker. That reputation, however, was shattered during the late 1990s, with the outbreak of the Kosovo War.

Considering the administrative, political, and economic chaos that had engulfed the former Yugoslav Republic after 1989, one would have to concede that any peace plan was bound to be riddled with flaws. The Dayton Accords were undoubtedly seriously deficient in many respects. But putting a stop to a conflict that had claimed a quarter of a million human lives remains a remarkable feat.

See also Bosnia Intervention (1993–95); Ethnic Cleansing; International Peacekeeping and Overseas Deployment

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D-DAY

Beginning of the invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944, during World War II. The term *D-day* remains standard military parlance for the first day of the military operation, as does *H-hour* for the time the operation begins. D-day began Operation Overlord, the long-anticipated invasion of the Atlantic coast of German-held Europe by the Allies. The decisive battle that followed lasted two months and ultimately decided the fate of Germany in the west.

With its entry into World War II, the United States brought a determination to land Allied armies in Western Europe and invade Germany by the most direct means possible. The British, having been ejected from France in 1940 and further routed from Greece and Libya in 1941, had less interest in fighting the German army on the old battlefields of World War I.

They therefore sought alternative strategies based upon the Mediterranean theater of operations.

Although the viability of the American invasion plans for 1942 and 1943 remains doubtful to this day, there was no denying that conditions were right in 1944 for a cross-channel attack. The German U-boat offensive had been defeated in the Battle of the Atlantic, sufficient landing ships and craft filled British ports, Allied air superiority was established, and sufficient troops had been ferried to Great Britain for the Normandy Invasion.

United States general Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, had directed a planning effort of more than two years for this invasion. Under it, Allies placed two field armies ashore at Normandy in a few days, using five invasion beaches, over-

American troops in landing craft going ashore on one of four beaches in Normandy, France, during the D-day invasion of 1944. The D-day invasion, launched on June 6, 1944, was part of an all-out Allied assault on northern France. It marked the beginning of a sweep through Europe that would finally end with the defeat of Nazi Germany in the spring of 1945. The D-day invasion, which involved a flotilla of more than 10,000 ships, was the largest amphibious operation in history.

Source: Corbis.

whelming naval and aerial bombardment, and key airborne attacks. The number of beach assaults was raised from three to five with the expectation that at least one would fail, but only the assault on the beach code-named *Omaha* proved to be a close event. A successful deception plan, using false units, radio traffic, and decoys, kept many German forces oriented to the Pas de Calais beaches until too late.

The defeat of weak German counterattacks against the landing area owed much to the successful air interdiction campaign, which made armored movement in daylight almost suicidal for the Germans. The decisive battle to break out of the beachhead required the efforts of two army groups and twice the time originally planned. The British and Canadians finally cleared Caen, and, after heavy combat, U.S. forces broke out at Saint-Lô. However, the extended campaign also produced the annihilation of the German Seventh Army and the decimation of most German army forces on or near the Normandy front.

By taking on the Germans in set-piece inland battles, the Allies demonstrated that they held the essential operational skills required to fight and win in Western Europe. As a result, the Germans could not mount another defense until falling back on their old Rhineland lines of 1939 and the Albert Canal Line in the Low Countries. After breaking out of the Normandy region, the British-led 21st Army Group and the more easterly U.S. 12th Army Group marched across northern France, and the old World War I battlefields remained undisturbed.

In the meantime, a U.S.–French Sixth Army Group landed in southern France on August 15, 1944. After opening the port of Marseilles, it advanced up the Rhône Valley to force the withdrawal of German forces that had remained south of the river Seine. In this post-invasion breakout and pursuit phase, the Allied armies demonstrated that they had grasped the same tenets of combined arms warfare that the German army had alone demonstrated

in 1940 in their blitzkrieg against the Low Countries and France.

The effort made to land the armies at Normandy exceeded in size most other military exploits in history: it utilized easily the largest armadas of aircraft and ships ever assembled, and, although it required much less distance from port to shore than most others, it was the most extensive amphibious operation in history.

See also Amphibious Warfare; Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy; U.S. Army; U.S. Navy; World War II

DE GAULLE, CHARLES
(1890–1970)

French statesman and general, leader of the French government in exile during World War II, and president of France from 1958 to 1969. De Gaulle was a political and military maverick known for his commitment to a strong French state to balance the political and military power of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Charles de Gaulle was born on November 22, 1890, in Lille, France, to a family of strong intellectual leanings. His grandfather was a historian, his grandmother was a writer, and his father was a professor in private Catholic schools and later founded his own school. Political debates were frequent in the de Gaulle home, and Charles's father initiated him into politics at a young age.

De Gaulle decided early on a military career and began training at age 19. While serving as an army captain during World War I, he was wounded and captured by the Germans. He tried seven times to escape but was recaptured each time. After the war, he was assigned to the French Military Mission to Poland during the Poland–Russia War (1919–20). De Gaulle remained in the military but advanced in rank slowly because of disagreements with his superiors about army tactics and strategy. De Gaulle was a proponent of mechanized warfare using tanks and aircraft, whereas the French general staff were still obsessed with fortresses and other forms of static defensive warfare.

During the German invasion of France in May 1940, de Gaulle was the only French commander to score any battlefield successes. He was rewarded with a promotion to temporary brigadier general and named undersecretary of state for war. When French forces surrendered in June 1940, members of the

French government formed the so-called Vichy regime, which collaborated with Germany. De Gaulle, who was in England conferring with British military leaders at the time of the surrender, refused to cooperate with the Vichy leaders. On June 18, he announced the formation of a Free French government in exile. De Gaulle was recognized as a legitimate leader of that government by the British and, as the war progressed, by the French citizenry, as well.

After the liberation of Paris from the Germans in July 1944, de Gaulle was the first in the parade down the Champs-Élysées, and he proclaimed himself head of a provisional French government. After the war, he was elected president of the provisional government in November 1945. The legislature that elected him, however, was deeply divided along party lines and it would not give him the degree of executive authority he wanted. He resigned his post in January 1946. During the following dozen years, the French government would struggle with political unrest both at home and abroad. In France, the Communist Party made significant inroads, winning representation in both national and local governmental bodies. Overseas, colonial wars led to French withdrawal from Indochina (present-day Vietnam) and a bloody uprising in Algeria.

On May 15, 1958, de Gaulle issued a public statement saying that he was willing to take power. On June 1, he assumed emergency powers from French president René Coty, and on December 21, de Gaulle was formally elected as the new French president. De Gaulle immediately took control over drafting a new constitution that gave broad powers to the executive branch. This situation did not rest well with legislators (and caused problems later), but de Gaulle proved that a democratic republic with a strong executive could function effectively in France.

De Gaulle was determined to return to France a measure of the glory and respect it had enjoyed prior to World War II. This determination was exemplified by France's pursuit of nuclear weapons, which resulted in the development of a French atomic bomb by 1960. It also found expression in the fact that, although allied with the United States, de Gaulle often adopted policies that were at odds with U.S. interests. For example, de Gaulle offered diplomatic recognition to communist China in 1964, a step the United States refused to take until 1972. In 1966, de Gaulle withdrew French military forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in part to protest what he considered U.S. dominance of the alliance.

A wave of student protests, strikes, and violence in May 1968 challenged de Gaulle's ideas, authority, and legitimacy. Elections in June of that year, however, were a resounding success for de Gaulle and his party. Emboldened by the victory, de Gaulle tried to push through reforms that would turn the French senate into an advisory body with no official powers and give more power to regional councils. When a national referendum on the issue in April 1969 was soundly defeated, de Gaulle resigned immediately. He died the following year.

Charles de Gaulle was one of the giant figures of French political history. His steadfast leadership of French forces in exile during World War II made him an icon for generations of French citizens, and his leadership as president of France inspired much national pride among French patriots. De Gaulle's confrontational style and refusal to compromise were both his greatest political assets and, in the end, his greatest liabilities.

See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); World War II

DECLARATIONS OF WAR

Formal announcements by which a national government declares itself to be at war with another country. The official declaration of war is an institution that has long been recognized by international law, by virtue of its contribution to building a fence around the chaos of war. By officially declaring war, a government also implicitly binds itself to the laws of war, thereby minimizing the potential for senseless violence and destruction. It is precisely because of this embedded commitment, however, that declarations of war have been largely brushed aside by the countries of the world in the wake of World War II. As a result, most present-day armed conflicts begin without a formal announcement of hostile intent, despite the numerous critics who see this development as an unfortunate return to a primitive state of unregulated warfare.

GOALS OF WAR DECLARATIONS

Traditionally, a declaration of war aims to fulfill several goals, depending on its intended audience. First of all, the declaring government informs its own citizens about the immanency of armed conflict, thus preparing them for the sacrifices that a war requires. The declaration also plays an important political role, as it usually will contain some justification for the need to go to war—a justification that, if accepted by the population, will earn the leadership the legitimacy it needs to effectively prosecute a war. In terms of the international community, a formal declaration of war informs other nations of the beginning of hostilities, thereby compelling them to clarify their own positions on the conflict. The legitimizing function of declarations of war applies in the international context, as well, because the declaring government has a chance to present its case for war to potential allies.

LIMITATIONS OF SUCH DECLARATIONS

Up until World War II, the advantages of formally declaring war had been seriously taken under consideration by the governments of the world. Subsequent to that conflict, however, developments in both military strategy and international law weakened the institution of war declarations. The element of strategic surprise, for one, became so important in conducting warfare as to make governments unwilling to betray their belligerent intentions by issuing a formal announcement. In addition, the increasing complexity of international law made definition of concepts such as *war* and *combatants* a murky affair. The use of such terms afforded states the opportunity to prosecute warfare unofficially—that is, without calling a war by its name and without recognizing enemies as legitimate opponents covered by certain protections under international law.

WHO DECLARES WAR?

Besides the question of whether declarations of war are useful diplomatic tools, governments traditionally have grappled with the problem of precisely whom to entrust with the power to issue such declarations. The framers of the 1787 U.S. Constitution, most notably, were fully appreciative of the important role that an official declaration of hostilities can play in the subsequent prosecution of war. As such, the issue of which state institution should be assigned the war-making powers generated a considerable amount of debate.

The framers eventually decided that the legislative body of the United States—Congress—would be the one institution that has the right to declare war, to raise and support armies, and provide and maintain a navy. The executive branch—the president—would be commander in chief of those military forces. For more

than a century, these provisions were interpreted in roughly the same way by all quarters of American society. Around the early 1900s, however, a succession of presidents began to question the nature of Congress's monopoly on war-related decisions. These leaders began to advocate the prosecution of police actions and of defensive warfare—activities not covered explicitly by the Constitution. As a result, the debate over war-making powers resurfaced.

THE COMPROMISE

How much power did the framers think the president of the United States should have? Should the president be able to decide when and how a war should be waged, or should he ask for permission from the Congress at every step of the way? The debate soon became an issue of legal wrangling, with both sides able to make a logical case in favor of their positions.

A rather shaky compromise was eventually reached. Congress would retain the exclusive power to declare war, but it would seriously consider a president's request for resolutions granting him the power to employ U.S. armed forces deemed necessary in response to a specific threat. The architects of this solution argued that the compromise allows a president the flexibility to prosecute a modern war without the need to invest the nation's leader with near-dictatorial powers.

Numerous critics have pointed out that a resolution giving the president a virtual blank check with regard to the prosecution of an armed conflict is tantamount to surrendering Congress's constitutional exclusive right to decide whether and how the country should enter into war. In the wake of the post–September 11, 2001, attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, the issue of war-making powers has come once again to the forefront of public deliberations. Although official declarations of war may now be near extinction, the perennial issues surrounding them continue to cause impassioned debates within the United States and around the world.

See also Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; Korean War, Entry Into; Vietnam War; War Powers Act

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DECOLONIZATION

The process of removing the political, economic, social, and cultural dominance of colonizing nations, and of building a new nation, within former colonies. At their height, the European and other colonial empires and powers—Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany, and Japan—controlled huge areas of land and governed millions of people in other parts of the world. Starting with the independence of South Africa in 1910, and continuing to the present, these nations gradually granted sovereign status to their territories. The bulk of the former colonies gained independence around 1960, as colonial empires collapsed after World War II. Other, less overtly imperial nations—including the United States and the Soviet Union—likewise possessed colonies, most of which also were granted independence.

Political decolonization, or independence, was often attained only after years of violent struggle (as in the French colony of Algeria). Decolonization efforts were strongly underpinned by ideologies, such as nationalism, communism, and liberation theology, which helped form the backbone of pro-independence political parties and movements.

In the end, independence was the end product of all kinds of efforts, including armed conflict, political mobilization, protests (violent and nonviolent), conferences, manifestos, and lobbying from the colonies. Domestic postwar political and economic woes, and public and international opinion, helped to convince the colonizers to withdraw. Although most of the globe is now self-governing, political decolonization remains incomplete because some areas, such as Bermuda, are still classified as territories.

Political decolonization means more than just sovereignty, however. Its meaning and significance have been highly specific to the country in which it took place because each country had to grapple with the repercussions of independence. Some countries faced unique political challenges, such as facing three separate colonial legacies (Cameroon), partition (India and Pakistan, and later Bangladesh), and severe, continuing

impacts of great-power politics (Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Many had to struggle with the very existence of their borders, which had been established by the colonizers with little regard for historical or ethnic boundaries.

Economic decolonization is less easily defined and less complete than political liberation. Many ex-colonies retain a colonial economic structure—they produce a few cash crops such as cotton, peanuts, bananas, and soybeans for export to the (former) mother country. Their prosperity continues to depend significantly on these markets. Moreover, these countries often develop trade deficits, as they sell inexpensive raw materials and foodstuffs to the former colonizers and import expensive finished goods, such as cars.

Overall, former colonies around the world are faced with the challenges of nation building. They often face substantial obstacles, such as enormous international debt, interethnic hostilities, poverty, low levels of education, and lingering colonial ties. Nevertheless, these countries are in the process of decolonizing, creating functioning and legitimate sovereign governments, uniting multiple ethnic groups within their borders, creating or reshaping institutions and infrastructure, and forging a solid national identity.

See also Colonialism; Imperialism; Nationalism; Nation Building; Sovereignty

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DECOYS

Devices used to draw the attention of an enemy away from a more important target. Active decoys are the principal method of self-defense for military aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Passive decoys, or dummies, are used to deceive visual intelligence such as photo reconnaissance.

The main threats to modern military aircraft are anti-air missiles, which travel faster and maneuver better than the best jet fighters. Heat-seeking missiles are designed to follow heat sources such as the jet exhaust of a modern aircraft. To elude heat-seeking missiles, a jet may release decoys called *flares,* which are tubes containing magnesium, a highly flammable element that burns with an intense white heat. Because flares initially burn hotter than jet exhaust, they may confuse the missile by offering it several hot targets, giving the aircraft a chance to escape.

Radar-guided missiles use radar to locate their targets, so flares are useless against them. However, radar is vulnerable to a type of decoy known as *chaff,* tiny strips of aluminum foil that the aircraft releases in large bunches. These metallic clouds of chaff appear as separate targets to the missile's radar. As with flares, the idea is to confuse the missile long enough for the aircraft to escape.

Although ICBMs travel much faster than aircraft, they too are vulnerable to interception. An antiballistic missile (ABM) is designed to target an incoming ICBM and destroy it high in the atmosphere before the ICBM can deliver its warhead. To counter ABMs, most ICBMs carry multiple fake or *dummy* warheads as decoys. The dummy warheads separate from the ICBM at the same time as the real warhead. They are designed to jam the radar that the ABM uses to track the real warhead and to confuse the ABM by offering it several targets.

Active decoys work by fooling systems that sense unseen properties of an object, such as the heat it puts out or its ability to be detected on radar. By contrast, passive decoys work by fooling the eye. Most of the visual intelligence information gathered today comes from aerial photographs taken by spy satellites and reconnaissance aircraft. Aerial reconnaissance is an efficient way to gather large amounts of data, but one can fool the camera by creating dummy tanks, planes, guns, and trucks. Items that appear obviously phony up close can look real enough in an airborne photo to deceive even trained analysts.

Dummy troops and equipment played a key role in the Allied invasion of France in 1944. The Germans expected the Allies to invade at Calais, the closest point in France to the English coast. The Allies, however, decided to invade much farther west, in Normandy. To disguise their intentions, the Allies created a fake army in the area of England closest to Calais. The so-called First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) consisted of thousands of cardboard dummy tanks and airplanes, fake troop barracks and supply dumps, and enough humans to give the appearance of great activity. Even after the actual invasion had begun, the Germans were convinced that FUSAG was still going to invade at Calais and they refused to send reinforcements to

Normandy. By the time the Germans realized they had been deceived, the Allied forces were well established in France.

The use of dummies continues today, even though aerial photography has become much more detailed and analysts are much better at spotting fakes. As recently as 1992, the U.S. Army released a report on the need for two- and three-dimensional dummies to confuse enemy photographic reconnaissance. The report even recommended the purchase of human dummies and mannequins to simulate ground troops. In an age of high-technology warfare, low-tech solutions such as dummies remain effective.

—John Haley

See also Ballistic Missiles

DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (DARPA)

Government agency charged with maintaining the U.S. lead in military science and technology. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was established in 1958 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in response to the launch of the Soviet satellite *Sputnik.* The *Sputnik* launch, which put the world's first artificial satellite into orbit, fueled fears among U.S. leaders that the Soviets were pulling ahead in the race for technological superiority.

The early work of DARPA focused on satellites, space science, nuclear test detection, and ballistic missile defense. It later branched out into materials technology and other forms of advanced research. DARPA research laid the foundations for some of the most important tools of U.S. national security, including the Global Positioning System (GPS) and the stealth technology used by the F-117A fighter aircraft. DARPA is perhaps best known for its efforts in the field of information technology. In 1969, the agency (at the time known simply as the Advanced Research Projects Agency, or ARPA) developed the world's first computer network, known as ARPANET. The precursor to today's Internet, ARPANET was created to enable researchers in U.S. universities and government agencies to share information and ideas instantaneously. Aware of the tremendous importance of scientific research for military and national-security matters, the government wanted to ensure the freest possible flow of ideas within the U.S. scientific establishment. The technologies that went into the creation and perfection of ARPANET became the backbone of today's Internet.

More recently, DARPA researchers have worked on two controversial information-technology projects related to the nation's increased focus on terrorism and national security: FutureMAP and Total Information Awareness (TIA). FutureMAP was conceived as a marketplace for speculating on the probability of terrorist activities. Experts would be asked to invest in virtual shares of stock representing the likelihood of different types of terrorist activity. The more shares of a particular activity the experts bought, the more likely they felt the activity would be to occur. By studying which activities attracted the most investment, government officials hoped to anticipate probable terrorist targets. The program was canceled in July 2003 under increasing pressure from many members of Congress.

Total Information Awareness was a program first conceived in 1984 during the administration of President Ronald Reagan. The program encompassed an ambitious and controversial effort to create a massive database, populated with a wide variety of information on individuals and their transactions, that could help capture the information signature of potential terrorists. In 2003, the program changed names to Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA). Concerned about possible invasion-of-privacy issues with the program, Congress terminated TIA in 2003.

Other ongoing and noteworthy DARPA efforts include extreme miniaturization research (nanotechnology), automated robotic vehicles, chemical and biological weapons sensors, advanced armor, an atomic clock, and many other cutting-edge projects. These initiatives continue the original mission of ARPA to maintain U.S. technological superiority over rivals. Nevertheless, many of DARPA's efforts, such as the Internet and GPS, have provided substantial nonmilitary benefits for all nations.

See also Department of Defense, U.S.; Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy; Global Positioning System; Nanotechnology; *Sputnik*

DEFENSE BUDGETING

Process by which allocation of funds to national defense and related issues is determined. Under the

current federal budget process, the president submits his annual budget request, including the annual defense budget, to Congress in February of the preceding year.

The defense-budget request is prepared by the White House, the Department of Defense (DoD), and other executive-branch agencies, and reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the executive-branch agency charged with preparing, coordinating, and administering the overall federal budget. The defense-budget request sets forth in detail the administration's proposed policies, programs, and funding levels for national defense.

Once the defense budget is submitted, Congress reviews budgetary requests through a complicated system of subcommittees and committees. The main committees involved in defense budgeting are the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee. The committees commonly hold hearings, consider changes to the budget, and finally mark up and approve their own versions of the request. This request is the main legislative vehicle through which Congress shapes overall defense policy. It covers specific programs as well as a wide variety of legislative provisions requesting specific items of action by the DoD or reports to Congress. It also sets strength levels and pay-increase rates for military personnel.

Once expenditures are approved by the committees, the budget request is submitted to the floor of the House and Senate for passage by the entire body. Each chamber passes its own version of the Congressional Budget Resolution, and a conference of representatives from each chamber's budget committee meets to resolve any differences. The resulting conference bill is then resubmitted to each chamber for a final vote. Finally, the approved bill is sent to the president to be signed into law as the Defense Authorization Act. The president also may veto the bill.

The Defense Authorization Act does not actually provide any funding. Three House and Senate appropriations subcommittees—Department of Defense, military construction, and energy and water—decide on detailed, line-by-line funding allocations. Each bill is voted on by the entire appropriations committee, which then sends the approved bill to the full House or Senate for a vote. Again, when there are discrepancies between the House and Senate versions of the appropriations bill, a conference meets to resolve these differences. Finally, the compromise conference report is voted on by the full House and Senate, and sent on to the president for signature. In all cases, the

appropriations bills set the maximum amounts of funding that may be provided for defense programs.

The national defense-budget function technically lies with the Department of Defense (further subdivided into military personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement, research and development, military construction, and family housing). It also lies with defense-related activities in the Department of Energy and defense-related activities in other federal departments—such as civil defense, the Selective Service, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

The national-defense budget technically does not include areas such as veterans affairs, international affairs/assistance, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), some Coast Guard activities, or defense-related spending in agencies such as the Department of Transportation, the Department of State, and the Department of Justice. It also does not include interest payments attributable to past debt-financed defense outlays. Taking these areas into consideration, estimates reveal, would almost double the current estimates of annual defense spending.

Understanding various budgeting concepts is crucial for understanding federal spending on defense. The original numbers released are known as *budget authority* or *obligational authority*. These amounts are the maximums that Congress allows the various agencies to commit for various purposes and programs in the upcoming fiscal year (the fiscal year for the federal government runs from October 1 to September 30).

Outlay refers to the money actually paid out in a given year. Sometimes the budget-authority numbers and outlays match fairly well, such as in the case of salaries. Or the budget authority may be very large for a given year whereas the outlays will be stretched over a number of years, such as in the case of an aircraft carrier. Money may be paid out of funds made available in appropriations bills enacted for that fiscal year, out of funds appropriated and obligated in an earlier fiscal year, or under a multiyear obligational authority.

Items in the defense budget can be roughly categorized as two types: uncontrollable costs and controllable costs, or those that are required versus those that are discretionary. Costs required by prior contractual obligations, such as interest on the public debt, are uncontrollable. Other uncontrollable costs include those required by legislation, such as Social Security, medical care programs, veterans benefits, and other

unemployment insurance. Although uncontrollable programs can be changed over time by legislative activity, this change cannot be achieved quickly.

Controllable costs are also referred to as *discretionary spending programs.* These are any programs that live year to year and that must be approved annually by the congressional Appropriations Committee. Most weapons development and construction, for example, are theoretically controllable costs.

Between fiscal years 2001 and 2004, the annual defense budget increased by 26%, the largest increase in defense spending since the administration of President Ronald Reagan. These increases included expenditures associated with the war and continuing activity in Iraq and Afghanistan, pay raises for military personnel, increased research and development programs, and a doubling in investments in missile defense systems. The proposed defense budget for fiscal year 2005 continued this trend. It provided for a $401.7 billion base budget for the Department of Defense, which would be a total increase of 35% since 2001, and a 7% increase over the budget for fiscal year 2004.

See also Armed Services Committees; Defense Contractors; Department of Defense, U.S.

DEFENSE CONTRACTORS

Civilian firms that build and supply military equipment and provide services to a country's armed forces. Although many defense contractors produce weapons, not all arms manufacturers are defense contractors. For example, many U.S. companies produce firearms, but only a few sell their products to the military. The term *defense contractor* denotes a firm whose goods and/or services are used in the context of national security.

THE CONTRACTING PROCESS

The business of contracting with companies to equip and service the armed forces is part of the U.S. budget process. Each year, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) submits an estimate of its physical, logistical, and administrative expenses and also submits a detailed budget to Congress that outlines these costs. The budget is a request for funds to purchase vehicles, weapons, ordnance, communications gear, and other assorted combat equipment, as well as all of the supplies necessary to keep the armed forces functioning. Congress reviews the budget and, typically after negotiation between legislators who want to spend more on defense and those who want to cut defense spending, approves a final defense budget.

Once the budget has been approved, the DoD solicits bids from civilian companies to produce the equipment or provide the services outlined in the budget. Most bids are competitive—that is, several companies may submit bids for the project. After receiving project specifications from the DoD, each potential contractor draws up a proposal. This document makes a case for choosing the company to handle the project and includes a cost estimate. The DoD selects the company whose product or service seems best suited for its needs, taking into account the cost. Although the best option may be too costly, the least expensive one may not fill all of the DoD's needs.

In some cases, the DoD awards noncompetitive, or no-bid, contracts, simply choosing a company to take on a particular project. This usually occurs when the DoD needs a specialized product or service that can be provided effectively by only one firm. For example, after the 1991 Gulf War, the DoD awarded firefighter Paul "Red" Adair a no-bid contract to put out hundreds of oil-well fires started by Iraqi troops retreating from Kuwait. Adair, with decades of experience extinguishing oil-well fires, was considered the only person capable of organizing the effort successfully.

More recently, oil-field services provider Halliburton has been the focus of attention for the large no-bid contract it was awarded to rebuild Iraq's oil industry following the Iraq War of 2003. Some observers see favoritism at work in the selection of Halliburton, a company for which Vice President Dick Cheney served as chief executive officer just prior to taking office in the administration of President George W. Bush. The DoD argued that Halliburton's Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) subsidiary was the only firm with the size and experience to handle the job. Two years after the end of combat, the effort to restore Iraq's oil industry was still lagging well behind schedule; additionally, Halliburton had been cited for overbilling for some of KBR's work.

MAJOR DEFENSE CONTRACTORS

The U.S. defense budget for 2004 was more than $355 billion. That money went to literally hundreds of companies, but a few companies received a much larger share than others. Twenty-four companies received DoD contracts worth more than $1 billion in

2004, and seven firms received more than $5 billion in contracts.

The largest U.S. defense contractor is Lockheed Martin Corporation, which manufactures combat aircraft and missiles for the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy. In 2004, Lockheed Martin won DoD contracts totaling $20.7 billion. The second-largest defense contractor, with contracts worth more than $17 billion, is another aerospace firm, Boeing. In fact, the top five U.S. defense contractors for 2004 all were aerospace companies or corporations with aerospace subsidiaries. The third-largest was Northrup Grumman ($11.9 billion), followed by General Dynamics ($9.5 billion) and the Raytheon Company ($8.5 billion). Halliburton was the sixth-largest DoD contractor, with just under $8 billion in contracts for 2004.

Many U.S. firms that are well known for consumer products are also sizable defense contractors. FedEx Corporation billed nearly $1 billion worth of work for the DoD in 2004. Tire manufacturers Goodyear and BFGoodrich each had contracts worth more than $350 million. Procter & Gamble, one of the largest makers of household goods in the United States, contracted to provide $233 million of products for the armed forces.

THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Clearly, the DoD represents a major client for hundreds of large and small companies in the United States. The growth of the defense budget, and the military's increasing reliance on technology, has spawned an entire industry devoted solely to providing the tools for the nation's defense. In such a situation, reduced defense spending can lead to economic disruption, as large numbers of defense workers are laid off. Politicians thus are pressured to increase defense spending to provide jobs for their constituents.

The rise of this large and politically powerful defense industry has been a cause for concern since the beginning of the Cold War. In his farewell address upon leaving the presidency in 1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower warned the nation about the dangers of a "military-industrial complex" in which business interests and national security become inextricably intertwined. Many people fear that Eisenhower's vision came to pass during the next 30 years as the country focused on its Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 offered hope that both sides could drastically reduce defense spending and invest the resulting peace dividend into social, economic, and cultural development. However,

Cold War rivalries were supplanted by ethnic and religious rivalries springing from the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. Aggressive moves by rogue states, such as Iraq, which invaded Kuwait in 1990, also reminded U.S. policymakers of the need for a strong military. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the rise of international terrorism provided yet another reason for continued spending on defense.

The Iraq War of 2003 and the subsequent U.S. occupation were seen by many defense contractors as a potential windfall. Not only would the United States need to replace arms and ammunition used during the war, it would also need to refit and repair vehicles; feed, clothe, and house soldiers in the field; and rebuild a shattered Iraqi economy. However, the war has been a mixed blessing for contractors so far. Most of the money spent in the first two years of occupation went for protection and security rather than to provide goods or services. Several U.S. contractors working in Iraq were kidnapped and killed by insurgents. And many contractors, like Halliburton, have come under fire for failing to provide the services for which they were contracted.

These difficulties notwithstanding, defense contracting remains a significant segment of the U.S. economy. The war on terrorism announced by President George W. Bush following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon promises to be an open-ended conflict that could last many years. Similarly, the U.S. military may remain in Iraq for quite some time. As a result, the nation will continue to depend on U.S. defense contractors to provide the military with the supplies it needs to meet its global commitments.

See also Arms Procurement; Arms Race; Arms Trading; Defense Budgeting; Department of Defense, U.S.; Dual-Use Technology; Science, Technology, and Security

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DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEM AGENCY (DISA)

Agency in the Department of Defense responsible for designing, creating, acquiring, installing, and supporting

computer information systems used by the United States government and military. Military commanders and national-security agencies rely heavily on computers to gather and analyze information, communicate with one another, and coordinate military and intelligence operations. The Defense Information System Agency (DISA) is charged with determining how best to use computer technology to accomplish those tasks and providing that technology to the agencies that need it.

The official DISA mission statement lists the agency's five core mission areas as communications, information assurance, combat-support computing, joint command and control, and joint interoperability support. The communications mission involves providing voice, data, and video information to the president, the secretary of defense, and military commanders using both military and commercially owned satellites. It also includes code breaking and cryptography to eavesdrop on opponents' communications while protecting the secrecy of U.S. communications. The goal of information assurance is to protect U.S. communications from cyber-attacks against computer systems and physical attacks against support infrastructure such as phone lines and satellites.

Combat-support computing uses technology to deploy, command, coordinate, and supply troops more quickly and effectively. Information about the identity and positions of enemy units gathered via satellite can be sent instantly to commanders who are in radio and computer contact with troops on the battlefield. This information can be used to plan and direct troop movements more effectively in a fast-changing battlefield environment. The DISA also employs computers to monitor the food, fuel, and ammunition needs of military units so that it can supply troops with the equipment they need in a timely fashion. Computers are even utilized to manage the evacuation and treatment of injured soldiers.

Joint command and control and joint interoperability support deal with using computers to coordinate the activities of different agencies. The goal of joint command and control is to ensure effective communications between the various branches of the military—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines—to facilitate joint (shared) military operations. Joint interoperability support develops common standards for computer technology across all agencies and branches of the military. These common standards ensure that the computers and other communications equipment in one agency will work smoothly with those in other agencies.

The DISA was founded in 1960 as the Defense Communications Agency (DCA), responsible for managing communications for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Starting with a staff of 450, the DCA gradually took over the communications functions of several other agencies. By 1991, the DCA had grown to 12,000 employees and was providing many more services than simply coordinating military communications. In that year, the agency's name was changed to DISA to reflect its greater role in managing information. Although the agency currently employs only about 8,000 people, it envisions a greatly expanded future role for computer technology in information gathering and communications. It is working toward a seamless, real-time communications grid linking all top military commanders and government leaders, although this goal is still years from realization.

—John Haley

See also Computer Security; Department of Defense, U.S.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA)

The United States' primary gatherer and producer of foreign military intelligence. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), established on October 1, 1961, by direction of the secretary of defense. It was envisioned that the DIA would fulfill a need for a central intelligence manager for the Department of Defense and also would support the requirements of the secretary of defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, policymakers, force planners, and ultimately the United States.

Headquartered in the Pentagon, the DIA has more than 7,000 military and civilian employees worldwide. The director of the agency is the main adviser to the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters related to military intelligence, such as the number of deployed forces, assessments, policy, and resources. The DIA plays a major role in providing intelligence on foreign weapons systems for weapons systems planners and for the entire defense community.

Following World War II, efforts for the collection, production, and distribution of military intelligence were scattered and uncoordinated. The three military departments—Army, Navy, and Air Force—managed their intelligence needs individually. This type of organizational structure resulted in duplication, unnecessary

costs, and inefficiency, because each branch of the armed services provided its estimate to the secretary of defense or to other governmental agencies.

Therefore, in 1958, Congress passed the Defense Reorganization Act, which was intended to correct these problems. Yet, despite the legislation, intelligence responsibilities remained unclear and the coordination of intelligence was difficult. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, realizing the need for systemization of these intelligence operations, would later appoint a Joint Study Group in 1960 to find better ways for organizing the nation's military intelligence activities.

These efforts carried over into the administration of President John F. Kennedy. In February 1961, Robert S. McNamara, secretary of the Department of Defense, made formal his decision to establish a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). He gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff the job of developing a concept plan that would integrate all the military intelligence of the Department of Defense. The assignment was completed and published as DoD Directive 5101.21 ("Defense Intelligence Agency") on August 1, 1961, and made effective on October 1 of the same year.

According to the plan, the new agency's mission was to focus on the continuous collection, processing, evaluation, integration, production, and distribution of military intelligence for the DoD. Under Directive 5101.21, the DIA united intelligence and counterintelligence activities and reported to the secretary of defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to avoid adding administrative layers within the defense intelligence community

Air force lieutenant general Joseph F. Carroll, the first director of the DIA, soon faced a major test during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Later, the Vietnam War would pose another test of the newly formed agency's ability to produce accurate, timely intelligence. The DIA's attempts to claim a place for itself as the DoD's central military intelligence organization was not without opposition. The military service branches continued to resist the agency's mandate during the early days of its existence.

The war in Vietnam increased the DIA's involvement in national security. China's detonation of an atomic bomb (October 16, 1964) and the launching of its cultural revolution (1966); increasing unrest in Africa; and fighting in Malaysia, Cyprus, and Kashmir during the 1960s severely challenged the resources of the entire intelligence community. Later that decade, the Six-Day War between Egypt and Israel in 1967, the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and North Korea's seizure of the

USS *Pueblo* put pressure on U.S. intelligence offices to anticipate and respond to unfolding world events. In the mid-1970s, at the conclusion of the Vietnam War, the DIA took an active role in U.S. efforts to account for American service members missing or captured in the Vietnam conflict.

As part of the U.S. intelligence community, the DIA is a combat support agency designed to provide military planners, policymakers, and combat participants with timely intelligence. Currently, it and other intelligence agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), are political targets because of the failure to predict and respond to the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, as well as failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

Because of the post–Cold War reality of new national-security threats and an aging workforce in the intelligence community, many critics argue that the Defense Intelligence Agency must increase its recruitment efforts in coming years. The agency usually hires about 400 new people each year, but according to its own public announcements, that figure will increase by 25% in coming years. Officials at the DIA plan to add 500 new personnel in 2005, most of whom will probably be analysts and intelligence specialists with a focus on the regions of south Asia, east Asia, and the Middle East.

See also Central Intelligence Agency; Intelligence and Counterintelligence

DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT

Also known as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, a law that authorized the most significant changes within the Defense Department since the National Security Act of 1947. Sponsored by Arizona senator Barry Goldwater and Representative Bill Nichols of Alabama, the act streamlined the military's operational chain of command from the president to the secretary of defense to the unified commanders. The act passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 383 to 27 and the Senate by a vote of 95 to 0. President Ronald Reagan signed the bill into law on October 1, 1986, noting, "It is a milestone in the long evolution of defense organization since our national security establishment was created in 1947."

The Defense Reorganization Act came about after interservice rivalry in the 1970s and 1980s caused

major problems, including a lack of communication among the Army, Navy, and Air Force during U.S. military operations. These problems emerged in full force during the Vietnam War, contributed to the failure of the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue mission, and continued during the 1983 invasion of Grenada in the Caribbean.

Under the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, operational authority of the military was centralized in the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, rather than divided among the chiefs of each branch of service. The chair was designated as the principal military adviser to the president, the National Security Council, and the secretary of defense. The act also established the position of vice chair of the Joint Chiefs. The Goldwater-Nichols Act simplified the chain of command, increased the ability of the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct overall military strategy, and provided far greater power to "Unified and Specified" field commanders.

The first successful test of the Defense Reorganization Act was the 1991 Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm), where it functioned exactly as planned. The provisions of the act allowed U.S. commander general Norman Schwarzkopf full control over the Army, Air Force, and Navy without having to negotiate with the commanders of the individual services.

Implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act is ongoing. Two programs within the Department of Defense—Joint Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2020—detail the necessary steps to fully achieve the integration of the nation's military. These two programs emphasize the need to be fully joined—intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically—to be effective. The joint force stipulated under the act must be flexible and responsive, and will remain the key to success of future military operations.

See also Department of Defense, U.S.; Joint Chiefs of Staff; Reagan, Ronald, and National Policy

DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

Department of Defense agency charged with protecting America and its allies from the threat of weapons of mass destruction. In the post–Cold War environment, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) combats the threats posed by chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive weapons—the emerging threats of the 21st century.

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency was established on October 1, 1998, with the mission of safeguarding America's interests from weapons of mass destruction by controlling and reducing the threat and providing quality tools and services to the military. It was also established to oversee and implement the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.

To achieve its mission, the DTRA performs four essential functions: combat support, technology development, threat control, and threat reduction. To satisfy the combat-support function, DTRA performs three basic duties. The first is to use Joint Service Balanced Survivability Assessments to protect the homeland from an attack by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and formulate better preparations against such a strike. Second, the agency provides operational and analytical support to the Department of Defense on nuclear and WMD issues. Third, the DTRA coordinates the emergency response to a radiological or WMD incident.

The technology development function requires the DTRA to provide the Department of Defense with systems to counter WMD and their proliferation. It also develops sensors and weapons to destroy WMD production facilities; determines the lethality of both conventional and nonconventional weapons; and assumes responsibility for research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDTE). The agency develops training and technologies to protect U.S. personnel against terrorist attacks, especially those involving WMD.

The functions of threat control and threat reduction are components of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act. This act was renamed the Cooperative Threat Reduction program in 1993 and was responsible for helping the countries of the former Soviet Union in the destruction of their nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction, as well as all related infrastructures associated with these weapons. The CTR was to develop and implement verification safeguards to protect against noncompliance and future proliferation. The CTR has offices in Moscow and Kiev to fulfill its mandate of cooperative threat reduction in the states of the former Soviet Union.

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, with its emphasis on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, will play an integral role in the nation's future defense against these emerging threats and their employment by terrorists.

See also Cooperative Threat Reduction; Department of Defense, U.S.

DEMILITARIZED ZONE (DMZ) IN KOREA

Strip of land bisecting the Korean peninsula at roughly the 38th parallel, which separates North and South Korea. Following World War II, the demilitarized zone (DMZ) was considered the unofficial boundary between the Soviet-occupied northern portion of Korea and the American-occupied south. The DMZ is about 150 miles long and varies in width from 1.2 to 2.4 mi. Largely devoid of human settlement, it has become home to a variety of rare flora and fauna.

The DMZ boundary became a permanent boundary as a result of the 1953 cease-fire ending the Korean War. At that time, troops from North and South Korea and the United States, as well as a small contingent of UN observers, were stationed in the border village of Panmunjom, and tens of thousands of troops were stationed along both sides of the DMZ.

Korea was a Japanese colony from 1910 to the end of World War II. In 1945, Japanese forces north of the 38th parallel surrendered to the Soviets, whereas those south of this point surrendered to the United States. Because the Allies planned to reunite the Korean peninsula under an elected government, the parallel at that time served as a temporary border. The Soviets, however, refused to allow people in the North to participate in the 1948 UN-sponsored elections. Instead they handed power over to the North Korean Communist Party under Kim Il Sung. The South, however, participated in the elections and elected Syngman Rhee as its leader.

On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces stormed across the 38th parallel in an attempt to reunify Korea under communist rule. Although the North Korean forces initially met with swift success, U.S. and South Korean forces eventually repulsed the invasion. Fighting continued for three years until a cease-fire in July 1953 established the DMZ along the 38th parallel. Although this was considered a temporary solution at the time, a permanent peace was never realized. As a result, South Korea and North Korea still eye each other with suspicion across the demilitarized zone.

Although the DMZ and the surrounding area have not witnessed large-scale conflict since the 1953 cease-fire, subsequent years have seen continued high tension and suspicion as well as cross-border incidents that have claimed hundreds of Korean and U.S. lives. Among the most well known of these incidents were the North Korean capture of the spy ship USS *Pueblo,* the 1969 attack on a U.S. Navy EC-121 reconnaissance plane off the North Korean coast, and the 1974 attempt by North Korean commandos to assassinate then–South Korean president Park Chung Hee. In addition, in the 1970s and 1980s, American and South Korean forces discovered tunnels that the communists had dug under the DMZ to allow North Korean forces to infiltrate the South. As of 2004, firefights and border incursions across the DMZ were still occurring nearly every year. Fifty-plus years of rancor and suspicion continue to stand between reconciliation and reunification on the Korean peninsula, and the DMZ remains the dividing line between the two regions.

See also Korea, North and South; Korean War; Korean War, Entry Into

DEMOCRACY, PROMOTION OF, AND TERRORISM

Belief that the encouragement of democratic institutions (for example, the rule of law, free speech, private-property rights, and religious tolerance) within developing nations will help to undercut significantly the growth of international terrorism.

For as long as the United States has been a global power, U.S. presidents and other American leaders have struggled with the questions of where, when, and how the foreign-policy strategy of democratization should be employed. Many believe that the United States, as both a hegemonic power and the oldest and largest democracy in existence, has a moral responsibility to help other would-be democracies around the world repel tyranny and promote democratic virtues. Others are far more skeptical of the approach, because it falsely presumes that democracy is the only legitimate model of human progress and that all nations aspire to and ultimately are ready for democracy.

Although it is certainly a question of ideology, the principle of democratization also raises a number of important pragmatic concerns for the United States, chief among them the nation's inherent need to balance its array of economic, military, and security priorities. President George W. Bush took office in 2001 with intentions of scaling back many of the policies of democratic nation building associated with his predecessor, Bill Clinton. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, the Bush administration and its allies embraced the need to build a

strong foothold for democracy in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and the Palestinian territories. This change of course, outlined in the *National Security Strategy* report of September 2002, asserted that the promotion of democracy was to be a key component of the administration's broad foreign-policy doctrine of using preemptive means to combat terrorist threats.

In addition to its democratization efforts in Iraq and other potential terrorist hotspots around the globe, the Bush administration actively pursued its policies by being an integral part of the community of democracies (CD), a transnational movement fostering democracy, and its establishment of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a program in which foreign-aid funds are directly linked to a beneficiary nation's efforts in the areas of democratic governance, human rights, and economic development. The Seoul Plan of Action, adopted at the 2002 meeting of the community of democracies, contained a series of actions to counter terrorism and other emerging threats through the promotion of democracy both domestically and abroad. In 2003, the Bush administration requested $1.3 billion for the Millennium Challenge Account, a figure equivalent to 15% of the nation's total foreign-aid spending that year.

Critics maintain that the U.S. preoccupation with fighting terrorism, rather than being a boon for the promotion of democracy, has actually had the opposite effect. They argue that, given the paramount importance they place on security issues, Bush administration officials have been far more willing to cooperate with repressive regimes than they otherwise would be. Washington's dealings with the leaders of Pakistan, the former Soviet republics (particularly Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan), post-Taliban Afghanistan, Southeast Asia (particularly Indonesia and Malaysia), and even world powers such as China and Russia are often cited as evidence of its support of nondemocratic governments.

See also Democratization; Hegemony; Nation Building; Neoconservativism

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REFLECTIONS
No Clash of Civilizations

America stands for more than the absence of war. We have a great opportunity to extend a just peace, by replacing poverty, repression, and resentment around the world with hope of a better day. Through most of history, poverty was persistent, inescapable, and almost universal. In the last few decades, we've seen nations from Chile to South Korea build modern economies and freer societies, lifting millions of people out of despair and want. And there's no mystery to this achievement.

The 20th century ended with a single surviving model of human progress, based on non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women and private property and free speech and equal justice and religious tolerance. America cannot impose this vision— yet we can support and reward governments that make the right choices for their own people. In our development aid, in our diplomatic efforts, in our international broadcasting, and in our educational assistance, the United States will promote moderation and tolerance and human rights. And we will defend the peace that makes all progress possible.

When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women, there is no clash of civilizations. The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world. The peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation. And their governments should listen to their hopes.

—President George W. Bush 2002
Commencement Address, U.S. Military
Academy, West Point

DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Thesis that suggests liberal democratic states do not go to war with one another. Democratic peace has gained much support in the past two decades. However, the thesis makes no hypothesis about whether democratic states are less likely to go to war with nondemocratic states.

The reasons for the maintenance of peace among democratic states are varied. Some suggest that peace is maintained because in democratic states the people have a larger say in whether to go to war, and, they

argue, the people en masse are less likely to decide to go to war. Others emphasize that what really prevents democratic states from going to war is that they are, on average, wealthier states, and, as such, are less likely to risk losing this wealth through war.

Alternatively, some suggest that it is not the shared tradition of democracy that prevents democratic states from going to war with one another, but rather the fact that most democratic states are on good terms with one another. They are friends, and this is what prevents the outbreak of war between them. Still others suggest that the norms and values of democratic states are such that conflict is usually resolved through peaceful means. Finally, some suggest that the increased transparency within the operations of democratic governments make states more secure in their knowledge of what other states are doing. Thus, they are less likely to harbor the sorts of suspicions that lead to war.

Democracy researcher Michael Doyle has attempted to empirically test the democratic-peace thesis. His findings suggest limited evidence in support of the democratic-peace thesis. During the past 200 years, democratic states have been much less inclined to go to war with one another, although democratic states are slightly more inclined to behave aggressively toward nondemocratic states. Critics question this empirical research, citing many concerns about sample size and the difficulty of defining a democratic state.

Regardless of the validity of the democratic-peace thesis, it has been critical in shaping U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy. Beginning most notably with the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after World War II, U.S. policies generally have pushed quite strongly for the establishment of liberal democracies in postconflict states and developing nations. Currently, establishing democracy in Afghanistan, Iraq, and, potentially, China is seen as a critical project for U.S. security and global peace, a testament to a belief in the democratic-peace thesis.

See also Democracy, Promotion of, and Terrorism; Democratization

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (NORTH KOREA)

Country of 22 million people in east Asia, notorious for its Stalinist-style, totalitarian regime and its relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons. Since its official establishment in 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) has been run by only two men—Kim Il Sung and his son, Kim Jong Il.

The founder of communist Korea, Kim Il Sung, developed over the course of almost half a century a monstrous personality cult, with virtually every activity in North Korea ideologically connected to him and his political philosophy. Since his death in 1994, his son, Kim Jong Il, has built his own personality cult, maintaining strict totalitarian control over all state affairs in North Korea.

The division of Korea into two, North and South, occurred in 1945 with the defeat of the Japanese troops by the Allies at the end of World War II. Already reflecting the different political perspectives that subsequently led to the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union each occupied half of Korea, establishing separate, ideologically likeminded regimes.

In 1950, subsequent to the South's declaration of independence, the North invaded South Korea, setting off the Korean War, which ultimately took more than 2 million lives. The Korean conflict expanded to include other nations, with America and China committing thousands of troops to the armed dispute. The war ended in a stalemate, and no peace treaty has been signed between the warring parties to this day. South Korea and North Korea are currently separated by the demilitarized zone (DMZ), in effect the most heavily fortified international border in the world.

THE PEOPLE'S PRISON

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is probably the most isolated and tightly controlled country on the globe. The end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, and China's political reforms have left the DPRK largely without its former political allies. Although the 1960s brought heavy industrial growth, three decades later North Korea became a country of starvation and poverty, with an estimated 2 million people dead from hunger since the mid-1990s.

Surrounded by contrasting luxury, the extravagant dictator of the DPRK, Kim Jong Il, is depicted by official North Korean propaganda as an intellectual genius, despite his evident inability (or lack of desire) to feed and clothe his own people. The gulaglike isolation of North Korea is largely justified through its

official ideology (called *Juche*) of Marxism-Leninism combined with heavy emphasis on self-reliance in all matters, social, political, and economic.

The government watchdog group Reporters Without Frontiers calls North Korea the world's worst violator of press freedom. Political dissent within the country is swiftly punished by hard labor. Therefore, no political opposition exists openly in the DPRK, leaving the Korean (Communist) Worker's Party (with an estimated membership of at least 3 million people) and its general secretary, Kim Jong Il, as the unchallenged masters of the political system. The North Korean army is one of the largest in the world, with millions of people involved in some capacity or another in military affairs.

THE NUCLEAR THREAT

Condemned by its own isolationist mentality, postwar North Korea probably would have become increasingly ignored by the world's power brokers, were it not for its ever-developing nuclear capabilities. Confronted by the United States, the DPRK agreed in 1994 to freeze and subsequently dismantle its nuclear-weapons installations in exchange for international food and energy relief. Over the next seven years, however, North Korea played a game of hide-and-seek with the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which demanded hard proof that the nuclear programs had indeed been disassembled.

In October 2002, U.S. officials accused North Korea of developing precisely such programs, in complete violation of the 1994 agreement. All efforts by South Korea (one of America's strategic partners in the region) to engage the northern leadership in productive dialogue on the nuclear issue were shattered, as the DPRK adopted a defiant attitude toward the unanimously disapproving international community.

In February 2005, North Korea openly declared it possessed nuclear weapons. Given the country's paranoid secrecy, independent observers have found it impossible to verify that claim. What is believed to be true is that the DPRK possesses, at the very least, the means to produce various ingredients for nuclear weapons. Since 2003, representatives of the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea have met with North Korean leaders on different occasions to negotiate the DPRK's renunciation of its nuclear-weapons program. However, North Korea pulled out of the talks at the beginning of 2005, citing dissatisfaction

with the American position on the issue. The DPRK remains a highly unpredictable state, ostensibly preparing itself for a violent showdown with the United States.

See also Axis of Evil; Korean War, Entry Into; North Korean Crisis

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PUBLIC PORTRAITS

Kim Jong Il

North Korea's current Stalinist leader, Kim Jong Il, is the son of the country's communist founder, Kim Il Sung. Although Jong Il was born in exile in Siberia in 1942, official North Korean history places his birth on a sacred Korean mountain peak.

Following the surrender of the Japanese forces that had occupied Korea during World War II, Kim Il Sung returned with his family from Russia (where they had fled from the Japanese) and gradually took charge of North Korea. Little is known about Kim Jong Il's childhood years, but he officially arrived on the political scene in 1980 as his father's formally designated successor. Since taking power in 1994, Kim Jong Il has ruled as absolute leader of North Korea. According to the few foreigners who have spent time with him, he is a short-tempered egomaniac with a keen eye for female beauty and gigantic architecture.

DEMOCRATIZATION

The process through which a political system becomes democratic. One of the goals of U.S. foreign policy is promoting democratization in other countries. Democratic nations historically have not engaged in war with one another; thus, spreading democracy is seen as one way to increase national security. Since World War I, the United States and its allies have attempted to impose democracy on several formerly authoritarian countries. However, the nation's history

of promoting and sustaining true democracies abroad is uneven.

THEORIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION

The term *democracy* comes from the Greek words *demos* ("people") and *kratos* ("government"), and means "government by the people." Although every democracy has its own laws and procedures, all share certain basic features. These include regular election of leaders by the public; universal voting rights for adults; the acceptance of certain basic political rights including the right to vote, the right to run for office, and the right to organize political parties; and the rule of law. This last feature of democracy is particularly important. *Rule of law* means that the laws are written down and apply to all citizens equally, regardless of position. The opposite of the rule of law is the rule of men, in which the current leaders decide what is legal or illegal and pass or suspend laws as they see fit. These basic features define the political conditions necessary for democracy.

Scholars also have argued that certain social and economic conditions must exist before democracy can develop. Classical democratization theory suggests that democracy is more likely to develop in nations with liberal social ideas and capitalist economic systems. This notion is based largely on the experience of the United States and Western European countries where liberalism, capitalism, and democracy have developed together over the past 300 years. Nevertheless, capitalist economic systems have existed in a number of authoritarian states. For example, despite being an autocratic state ruled by a kaiser (emperor), pre–World War I Germany boasted a flourishing capitalist economy.

Nor does capitalism necessarily ensure the spread of democracy. Nineteenth-century Britain, the world's foremost capitalist power, was racked by political struggles over the question of suffrage, or who was eligible to vote. At the time, the only British subjects who could vote were adult males who owned a certain minimum amount of property. This requirement denied the vote to the majority of citizens, even though Britain considered itself a liberal democracy. Wealthier British subjects tended to mistrust the poor; they believed that only those with a monetary investment in society were qualified to determine how the government should be run. They also feared universal suffrage would lead to mob rule that would sweep aside the privileges of property and wealth.

Despite these and other examples to the contrary, theories of democratization until quite recently have emphasized the link between economic organization and democracy. One of the most influential post–World War II theories, known as *correlates of democracy,* focuses on the role of the middle class in promoting democratization. Correlates-of-democracy theory argues that industrialization gives rise to a middle class that develops its own economic and political interests separate from those of the nation's leadership. Unlike the poorer masses, however, the middle class has economic power that it can use to force change. This produces clashes between the interests of the middle class and the leadership and spurs the middle class to demand political liberties and democratic rights. The pressure for change eventually overwhelms the existing autocratic government, which is replaced by a democracy based on middle-class interests.

Correlates-of-democracy theory came under fire in the 1980s and 1990s. At the time, a wave of democratization swept across many parts of the world. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created more than a dozen new countries, most of which opted for democratic forms of government. It also brought democracy to the former communist states in Eastern Europe. South Africa dismantled its apartheid regime and gave full rights to its black majority. Dictators were overthrown in countries from Thailand to Haiti to Kenya. Some of these nations, such as South Africa and several Eastern European countries, had relatively large middle classes. In others, such as Haiti and Thailand, there was almost no middle class to speak of. Correlates-of-democracy theory did not envision the growth of democracy in such vastly different circumstances.

A current idea gaining popularity is the political-process theory, which rejects any connection between a nation's economic system and its potential for democratization. Its supporters point out that capitalism emerged in Western Europe and North America long before the appearance of modern states. By the time organized states arose, the capitalist class was already established and the state had a limited ability to control or dictate its actions. This environment allowed the growth of parliaments, elections, and the other features of liberal democracy.

By contrast, in many areas of the world, colonization by Western nations prevented the growth of a capitalist class and destroyed local political institutions. When these areas emerged from colonialism, they

lacked both a capitalist class and legitimate government structures. Yet some developed into democratic nations, some fell into dictatorships, and others established governments that combined authoritarian and democratic principles.

IMPOSING AND EVALUATING DEMOCRATIZATION

The United States and other Western democracies have attempted on a number of occasions to impose democracy in other countries through military intervention. These efforts have had mixed results, leading to the question of whether it is possible to impose a successful democracy by force. Both defenders and critics of that idea can cite examples that support their positions.

When the Allied powers defeated Germany in World War I, they forced the kaiser to abdicate the throne and institute a democratic system of government. However, the new German government was weak and had little popular support. In addition, the victorious Allies did little to help the new government succeed. For example, the peace treaty that ended the war imposed harsh financial penalties on Germany and forced it to accept blame for the war, conditions most Germans found humiliating. In 1933, German voters elected Adolf Hitler chancellor based on his promise to lead the country back to respectability. Within a few years of taking power, Hitler had dissolved the parliament and become dictator. The failure of this early attempt to impose democracy led directly to World War II.

Those who claim democracy can be imposed by force point to the aftermath of World War II to support their argument. Once again, the western Allies deposed a German dictator and set up a democratic form of government. However, this time the Allies handled the situation much differently. Instead of immediately forming a new government, they placed Germany under military rule for several years while the country recovered from the war. When a democratic government was finally established in western Germany, the Allies provided it with substantial economic and political support. The resulting West German state grew into one of the world's most prosperous and successful democracies.

These examples suggest that it may be possible for one state to impose democracy successfully in the proper situation. However, every country has its own unique history and circumstances that may affect its

readiness and ability to foster democratization. Anyone who would impose democracy on a country must attempt to understand and adapt to that country's circumstances to have any hope of success.

—*John Haley*

See also Democracy, Promotion of, and Terrorism; Democratic Peace; Interventionism; Marshall Plan; Nation Building

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DENIAL

Defensive strategy used to make it prohibitively difficult for an opponent to achieve a military objective. A denial strategy can be distinguished from a deterrence strategy or a compellence strategy.

In a deterrence strategy, a protagonist threatens to punish an opponent for taking a particular undesirable action. In a compellence strategy, a protagonist threatens continued punishment unless a particular undesirable action is ceased. For both deterrence and compellence, the protagonist aims to change an opponent's mind about pursuing a certain course of action. By contrast, a denial strategy does not seek to change an opponent's mind. Rather, the protagonist simply puts the opponent's objective beyond the reach of the opponent, regardless of whether the opponent chooses to pursue it.

A physical wall exemplifies a denial strategy. For example, the primary objective of the barrier that Israel has been constructing around the West Bank has the goal of preventing Palestinian suicide bombers and other attackers from penetrating into Israeli population centers. By resorting to this strategy, Israeli defense planners have expressed uncertainty about whether they can alter the motivations behind suicide bombings and other such attacks on Israelis. Thus, the barrier has been erected with the understanding that such attacks may continue but they will be much less likely to succeed. Insofar as a national missile defense system attempts to create an impenetrable barrier to

foreign ballistic missiles, it too is based on a denial strategy (analogous to a wall).

In another type of denial strategy, a protagonist attempts to disable an opponent, often by exploiting an opponent's weaknesses. Possible weaknesses the protagonist might exploit include military production facilities or rear combat support functions vulnerable to air strikes. For example, the Allied aerial bombing of German military production facilities during World War II sought to disable the Nazis' ability to continue the war.

The success of a denial strategy sometimes depends on the opponent's strategy. The vulnerabilities of a modern mechanized military force are different from those of a guerrilla force. Modern forces, for example, rely heavily on logistical support and communication. By targeting and disrupting logistical flows, a protagonist can disable an opponent. In contrast, such an approach may be less effective against guerilla forces, which do not rely on military logistical lines for supplies but rather on local populations. Consider, for example, the futile efforts of the United States during the Vietnam War to bomb the supply lines of the Vietcong, who were not dependent on logistical supplies.

The relative usefulness of denial strategies, compared to deterrence or compellence, is a regular subject of debate among military strategists. Denial strategies are usually costly and rather extreme. The examples mentioned previously from Israel, Germany, and Vietnam have proven to be devastating for the target populations and have involved significant costs to the protagonists, either politically or in terms of resources. Ultimately, a denial strategy is reflective of the most pessimistic estimation of an opponent's motivations.

See also Compellence; Deterrence

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, U.S. (DOD)

Executive branch of the U.S. government responsible for coordinating and supervising the agencies and functions of the government relating to military affairs and national security. Based in the Pentagon,

the Department of Defense (DoD) is the U.S. government's largest agency, employing more than 2 million people and maintaining a budget of $400 billion. The Department of Defense includes the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and other, noncombat agencies such as the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. In wartime, the Department of Defense also has authority over the Coast Guard; in peacetime, that agency is under the control of the Department of Homeland Security.

One of the world's largest employers, the Department of Defense has 1.4 million active-duty military personnel, 698,000 civilians, 1.2 million people in reserve forces, and more than 2 million retirees and families receiving benefits. It operates some 600,000 buildings and structures in more than 6,000 locations in more than 146 countries.

With its fiscal-year 2005 budget of $400 billion, not including supplemental funding for war, the Department of Defense is also a major economic force. In its budget request for 2005, the department stated that its spending priorities included $35 billion over seven years to restructure the army into lighter, more deployable warfighting units; $2.1 billion over six years to increase chemical and biological protection for troops; $4.1 billion for special forces, adding 200 civilian and 1,200 military personnel; $1.4 billion to convert 6,400 military positions into jobs that can be done by civilians or contractors; and $1.9 billion to begin to close bases recommended by the upcoming Base Realignment and Closure Commission. President George W. Bush has asked for a nearly 5% increase for the department's fiscal-year 2006 budget to $419.3 billion.

Additionally, the Department of Defense is a chief contributor to the U.S. economy, paying thousands of companies for research, development, testing, and evaluation of equipment. In 2004, the department paid its top 100 contractors almost $30 billion for products and services. Among its largest contractors are Lockheed Martin Corporation, Boeing Corporation, Northrop Grumman Corporation, Raytheon Company, and General Dynamics Corporation. It also funds research at many U.S. universities, including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Johns Hopkins University.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DOD

The National Security Act of 1947 created the predecessor to the Department of Defense, the National

Military Establishment, by combining the Departments of War and Navy and the newly created Department of the Air Force. The department was formed under President Harry S. Truman in order to reduce interservice rivalry, which was believed to have reduced military effectiveness during World War II.

The National Security Act mandated a major reorganization of the foreign-policy and military establishments of the U.S. government. The National Military Establishment became the Department of Defense when the act was amended in 1949. The amendment to the act also made the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force—who were made cabinet members by the act of 1947—subordinates of the secretary of defense. The act, as amended, stipulates that the secretary of defense, a presidential appointee and cabinet member, supervises the entire military.

CHALLENGE AND CHANGE

The spread of nuclear weapons, the Korean War (1950–53), and the beginning of the Cold War were the first major tests for the new Department of Defense. Nuclear weapons meant a new military mission in preparing for, coping with, and avoiding the consequences of a possible nuclear exchange. The Korean War was the first test of the services working together under one umbrella organization, and the Cold War obligated the United States to assist diverse, far-flung allies. These new commitments, along with rapidly changing technology, forced the U.S. military to change its objective from being able to deliver the massive retaliation needed in World War II to a more flexible force structure able to move quickly throughout the world.

In 1958, Congress passed the Defense Reorganization Act. The act recognized the need for unity of operational command at the mission level by increasing the authority of the secretary of defense and reorganizing combat commands along regional lines. The belief was that mission commanders were the people best situated and motivated to plan operations and to determine the size and composition of the forces required to accomplish their assigned combat missions and to carry them out.

The department became more centralized in the 1960s under Secretary Robert S. McNamara (1961–68). Secretary McNamara continued the ongoing consolidation of command functions under the office of the secretary. He also started combining military budgets by establishing or activating a number of new agencies. By creating the Defense Supply Agency in 1961, for example, he began combining military supply budgets.

Partly in response to the Bay of Pigs incident in 1961, the Defense Intelligence Agency was established, which consolidated DoD intelligence functions. Also in 1961, the Defense Communications Agency was born, with the mission of centralizing communications between the military branches. The Defense Contract Audit Agency was founded in 1965 to lower operating costs, to provide contractors with consistent advice, to institute uniform procedures, and to exercise close contract supervision. These changes continued the unification of the services and lowered spending.

Responding to a request from President Kennedy, Secretary McNamara issued Defense Department Directive 5160.32 on March 6, 1961, which gave the air force responsibility for space-development programs and projects. The air force rapidly consolidated all research, development, and procurement of space and aircraft weapon systems under the Air Force Systems Command.

The pace of change at the Department of Defense slowed dramatically during and after the Vietnam War (1965–73). It was not until 1977 that more major internal change took place. Secretary Harold Brown (1977–81) redesigned the roles and responsibilities of those who reported to the secretary. The biggest of these changes was the creation of a single deputy secretary who acted as the principal assistant and alter ego to the secretary in all areas of defense management. By redesigning the department's organization, Secretary Brown reduced the number of offices that directly reported to the secretary and assigned the oversight responsibilities to undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. This allowed for the secretary to focus on big-picture issues.

Overseeing the largest military buildup in history and huge increases in defense spending, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (1981–87) added a number of assistant secretary positions and new agencies. By September 1985, as many as 42 officials, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may have reported to the secretary. Meanwhile, Congress, which was concerned about the soaring defense budget and rapidly rising deficit, added two oversight offices during the same period—an independent inspector general and the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, both of which reported directly to Congress.

Under pressure from Congress for change, more accountability, and a larger role for the Joint Chiefs, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12526 in April 1986. The order brought changes in national-security planning and budgeting, improvements in communication between the secretary of defense and the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, increases in the authority of combatant commanders, as well as changes in the organization of defense acquisitions. The order made the chair of the Joint Chiefs the "principal uniformed military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense" and placed the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the president's exclusive direction. It also created a single, unified command for land, sea, and air transportation.

A REORGANIZATION

In September 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. The act reiterated the intent of Congress to strengthen civilian authority in the Defense Department, to improve military advice to higher authority, to increase the stature and authority of unified commanders, and to improve joint officer management policies. The act formally established the Office of the Secretary of Defense, whose function was to assist the secretary in discharging his or her duties and responsibilities. The act also solidified the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It proscribed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be made up of a chairman; a senior military officer; the heads of the Army, Air Force, and Navy; and the commandant of the Marine Corps. It also added a vice chairman position.

Although the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the several Chiefs of Staff are responsible for readiness of the U.S. military and serve as the president's military advisers, they are not in the chain of command. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is by law the highest-ranking military officer in the United States.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act also defined the command structure of the Department of Defense. The chain of command as defined by the act runs from the president of the United States, through the secretary of defense, to the regional commanders who oversee all military forces within their area of operation.

Regional responsibility is separated among nine commanders, five with geographic responsibility and four with worldwide responsibility. The five geographic regions are the Northern Command (NORTHCOM), European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM). NORTHCOM includes North America; EUCOM includes Europe, Greenland, the Russian republics, and most of western and southern Africa; CENTCOM includes the Middle East; SOUTHCOM includes South America and Central America; and PACOM includes the Far East and Australia. The four worldwide commands are Transportation Command, Special Operations Command, Strategic Command, and Joint Forces Command. Transportation Command provides air, land, and sea transportation; Special Operations Command provides counterparamilitary, counternarcotics, guerilla and psychological warfare, civil education, and insurgency capability; Strategic Command controls U.S. nuclear forces, operates satellites, and attempts to deter attacks against the United States; and the Joint Forces Command defines and tests joint war-fighting concepts, requirements, strategies, and capabilities.

The fall of communism brought comprehensive changes for the Department of Defense, including base closures, reductions in forces, and lowering of budgets. It also meant a shift in focus from countering the former Soviet nuclear threat to confronting regional conflicts, countering terrorism, and running peacekeeping operations.

The Department of Defense is headquartered at the Pentagon, one of the world's largest office buildings. Approximate 26,000 civilian and military employees work in the pentagon-shaped building, which was completed on January 15, 1943, and covers 29 acres of land. The building has five floors, and each of those has five ring corridors. Despite its 17.5 miles of corridors, it takes a maximum of seven minutes to walk between any two points in the building. On September 11, 2001, at 9:37 a.m. local time, a hijacked American Airlines flight crashed into the western side of the Pentagon, killing 125 people, including 64 passengers and crew, and destroying more than 400,000 square feet of the building. The building was restored to a fully functional state as of spring 2003.

Under President George W. Bush, and in reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States attacked Afghanistan in October 2001, overthrowing the governing Taliban regime. In March 2003, the United States attacked Iraq and had control of the government within a month. President Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld consider these

military operations against terrorists and terrorist states a consistent theme for Department of Defense operations since the 9/11 attacks.

—Eric Watnik

See also Defense Budgeting; Defense Reorganization Act; Pentagon; U.S. Air Force; U.S. Army; U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Navy

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, U.S.

Cabinet department created in 1977 to focus on governmental authority and responsibility for energy programs. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the United States was a growing industrial power that was consuming ever-larger amounts of energy every year. The introduction of cheap, mass-produced automobiles in the 1920s further increased the nation's appetite for energy. During World War I and especially World War II, national energy resources were diverted to wartime efforts. In World War II, gas was rationed in the United States and American automakers suspended the manufacture of passenger cars to produce tanks, trucks, and other military vehicles.

The end of World War II released a huge pent-up demand for energy in the United States. Car sales skyrocketed as millions of soldiers returned home, gas rationing ended, and automakers reentered the civilian car market. The rise of car ownership and a postwar economic boom dramatically increased U.S. energy needs—needs that the nation could not supply domestically. By the late 1960s, the United States was importing most of the oil it needed to keep its economy running.

The supply and demand for oil collided in the 1970s when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a group of the major oil-producing nations, placed an embargo on the sale of oil to the United States. The embargo was largely in retaliation for U.S. support of Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The embargo resulted in huge energy shortages in the United States, sending gas prices sky high and bringing a return to limited gas rationing.

Lack of coordinated energy planning and organization clearly contributed to the ineffective U.S. response to the embargo. Although the administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford had identified the need to better coordinate energy policies, neither developed any concrete plans. When the United States was hit by a natural-gas shortage in 1977, the energy issue came to the fore as an immediate concern. Then-president Jimmy Carter worked intensely to address this most pressing issue, crafting a National Energy Plan that proposed significant changes to strengthen energy coordination in the United States. Among the most important proposals was the establishment of the Department of Energy to bring all relevant energy programs under one large umbrella organization.

In June 1977, Congress passed legislation to establish the Department of Energy (DOE). President Carter selected James R. Schlesinger, a former director of Central Intelligence and secretary of defense, as the first secretary of energy. Secretary Schlesinger was charged with bringing all federal bodies dealing with matters related to energy—some 20,000 employees and a budget of $10.4 billion—under the unified guidance of the Department of Energy.

By 2004, the Department of Energy had an overall budget of $23 billion and employed more than 100,000 government and contracted personnel. The DOE is divided into two main departments—the Office of Nuclear Security and the Office of Energy, Science and Environment. The undersecretary for nuclear security holds a dual title, as he or she also is administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration. This office is responsible for maintenance of all U.S. nuclear-weapons stockpiles, international nonproliferation efforts, and oversight of all nuclear laboratories in the United States.

The Office of Energy, Science and Environment oversees the rest of the Department of Energy's varied programs. A major responsibility for this division is providing continued research and development on science and environmental issues. Furthermore, it is the government agency tasked with maintaining diverse energy supplies and the delivery of affordable and environmentally sound energy. On the environmental

side, the Department of Energy also looks to identify permanent disposal sites for U.S. radioactive waste. Currently, a major effort is underway to store this waste in Yucca Mountain, Nevada. On July 9, 2002, the U.S. Senate approved using Yucca Mountain as a nuclear-waste repository—a deep underground-storage facility. The repository's purpose is to store highly radioactive waste for at least 10,000 years.

The Oil Embargo of 1973 brought home to U.S. leaders the central importance of energy security in maintaining effective national security. The strength of the United States lies not only, and not even primarily, in its military forces but also in the economic power it wields, a power that depends on a free flow of affordable energy. This makes the Department of Energy a key player in ensuring the national security of the United States.

See also Energy Policy and National Security; Environment and National Security; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Middle East Conflicts; Nuclear Proliferation; Nuclear Waste Disposal; Nuclear Weapons; Oil and National Security; OPEC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.

Executive branch of the U.S. government responsible for U.S. foreign affairs and international diplomacy. The mission of the State Department is to "create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community." The State Department is involved in activities that promote these ends in the political, economic, social, health, security, and educational spheres. Its primary responsibility is serving the president by helping to develop and implement foreign policies, but it is engaged in a number of related functions, as well.

CREATION AND STRUCTURE

The executive branch (and, to some extent, the legislative branch) has constitutional responsibility for U.S. foreign policy. Although the president and Congress have the primary duties, the Department of State assists by helping to develop foreign policy and implementing it on the ground. Famous secretaries of state include Thomas Jefferson, William Jennings Bryan, and Henry Kissinger.

The State Department grew out of various groups that existed during the Revolutionary War. The Committee of Correspondence became the Committee for Foreign Affairs in 1777; Congress then replaced it with a Department for Foreign Affairs in 1781, which lasted through the period when the nation was governed by the Articles of Confederation. The modern Department of State was established on September 15, 1789, in an act ratified by Congress and signed by President George Washington.

The Department of State was the first executive department created under the U.S. Constitution. As the senior cabinet officer, the secretary of state became next in the line of succession to the presidency if the president and vice president are incapacitated. Although no secretary of state has gained the presidency this way, some former secretaries of state have been elected president.

The primary responsibility of the secretary of state is to serve as the president's foremost foreign-policy adviser. In this role, the secretary has the responsibility for consolidating information from the entire State Department to help develop cogent policies and diplomatic strategies. The secretary's second duty is the management and administration of the department. The third major task is that of representing the U.S. government abroad. A fourth role (intertwined with the second) is that of representing the State Department's interests within the government.

The secretary is assisted by a deputy, a chief of staff, and an undersecretariat. Six undersecretaries are charged with management of the department's main bureaus. The Bureau of Political Affairs is divided regionally and is responsible for developing bilateral and regional polices and relationships. The Bureau of Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs advises the secretary on international economic issues and policy, handling issues as diverse as trade and aviation. The Bureau of Arms Control and International Security is concerned with issues of nonproliferation (preventing the development of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction), arms control, and political-military affairs. The Bureau of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs handles domestic and international outreach. The Bureau of Management handles internal management, including "right-sizing" the department and training personnel. The Bureau of Global Affairs covers diverse areas of worldwide interest, including technology, human rights, and ocean policies. There are also numerous bureaus and offices that report to

the secretary directly, such as the Counterterrorism Office. Another such office is that of the Inspector General, which acts as the State Department's internal monitoring organ.

FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT

Unlike similar ministries in many foreign governments, the State Department handles both domestic and international functions. Its primary responsibility is leadership in the development and implementation of U.S. foreign policy, in coordination with the president and with other government agencies involved in foreign activities. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research acts as the information-gathering arm of the Department of State and gives each bureau of the six undersecretaries independent assessment of events in the world. The State Department also works to improve other countries' stability and their rapport with the United States by working closely with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), an affiliated agency, in implementing economic, political, and social development projects. The U.S. envoy to the United Nations is also affiliated with the State Department.

The State Department also helps facilitate international travel for U.S. citizens, as well as foreign citizens coming to the United States. The department maintains accurate information about foreign-entry requirements and provides travel warnings, informing Americans that some areas may not be safe for travel. Each U.S. embassy and consulate around the world can help Americans traveling abroad by providing emergency support (such as reissuing lost passports, repatriation, crime-victim help, and logistical help in case of detention abroad). Each embassy or consulate also has the power to issue visas to foreign citizens wishing to visit the United States and can provide them with up-to-date immigration information.

Approximately 260 U.S. embassies and consulates in foreign countries help sustain diplomatic relationships. These offices, run by Foreign Service officers, are responsible for on-the-ground implementation of U.S. foreign policy. They might be engaged in activities as varied as research, negotiations for hostages, and establishing relationships with local government officials at a local holiday celebration.

Foreign Service officers work in management, consular, political, economic, and public-affairs functions to build rapport with foreign nations and assess how both the needs of those countries and the interests of the United States might be simultaneously met. In the course of these functions, the State Department is involved in influencing perceptions abroad about the United States, trade, domestic political issues, diplomacy, and effective management of its own resources. One of its major tasks in an embassy is providing discriminating on-the-ground feedback to help develop policy and assess policies that have been implemented.

As it is charged with foreign relations, the agency also has substantial responsibility for national security. The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was integrated into the State Department in 1999, giving it intelligence-gathering capacity. The USIA and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research allow the State Department to process information and coordinate with other agencies, such as the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), regarding potential threats to U.S. interests.

Issues of transnational security are of concern to the State Department. Problems related to human rights and refugees are part of its operations, and the department also monitors potential political and economic crises in other parts of the world. The State Department is also very active in traditional security issues of arms control (including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons), in conjunction with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which is an attached organ of the department. The State Department also handles nonproliferation issues. It is engaged in fighting transnational crime in areas such as international trafficking in narcotics, contraband, and human beings; international organized crime; and money laundering.

The State Department has primary responsibility for U.S. counterterrorism efforts. It is the agency in charge of designating which groups should be classified as terrorist organizations. The Counterterrorism Office, headed by a coordinator, chairs the Interagency Working Group on Counterterrorism and has the lead in developing, coordinating, and implementing counterterrorism efforts.

The State Department has a highly professional diplomatic corps. Despite its professional orientations, however, the State Department also has a number of weaknesses. One is the lack of an effective lobby for the department in Congress and the press. Other weaknesses include slow reaction time and having State Department advice ignored by Congress or the president. Nevertheless, the State Department

continues to review its activities and institute reform when necessary.

See also Kissinger, Henry; Powell, Colin; U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

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DÉTENTE

Easing of Cold War tensions among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the early 1970s. The impetus for détente was the surprise visit of U.S. president Richard Nixon to China in 1972. Nixon's visit was conceived as a move to outflank the Soviet Union, but the resulting political thaw between China and the United States convinced Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to seek closer relations with the United States.

The foundations for détente were laid during the latter years of the Vietnam War, which had placed a terrible strain on both the U.S. military and its economy. At the same time, the Soviet Union was stumbling economically and felt its society falling behind, both militarily and in terms of its quality of life. In addition, developments around the globe indicated that the world order was shifting from one dominated by the United States and Soviet Union toward a system of emerging and competing regional powers. The U.S. difficulties in Vietnam, the growth of China as a regional power in Asia, and the dramatic recovery of Western Europe from World War II indicated that the superpowers no longer totally dominated the international stage.

Against this backdrop, the administration of President Richard Nixon saw an opportunity to recast the future of international power alignments. Within the administration, the prevailing view held that U.S.–Soviet negotiations had reached a decisive moment. An easing of superpower relations was in the national interests of both countries, but only if discussions concerned concrete issues of mutual benefit. In a departure from previous administrations, the Nixon White House sought to improve U.S.–Soviet relations based on the recognition of specific issues rather than on an objective to create an environment of general goodwill. Groundwork for improved relations, or *détente,* would be established in areas where U.S. and Soviet national interests intersected.

However, the larger diplomatic effort rested on a foundation of *triangular linkage.* This triangular diplomacy acknowledged the ascendancy of the People's Republic of China as a world power and recognized that a rift in relations between China and the Soviet Union could introduce a new dynamic to superpower competition. Convinced of an approaching multipolar world order, White House policymakers sought to leverage relations with one country as a way of gaining concession from another. China's counterweight in this model would provide the elements needed for a new balance of power. The theory assumed that the United States was moving from a position of dominance to one of partnership, but one in which it could still maintain its vast global commitments despite declining capabilities.

The Soviet Union, for its part, was facing challenges not only from the People's Republic of China but also from within its more immediate sphere of influence. Rumblings in Eastern Europe had not fully silenced since the quelling of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The so-called Prague Spring had unleashed various underground movements during a bleak period of repression, and the Soviet leaders at the Kremlin in Moscow were now hearing the stirrings of discontent at the doorstep.

Meanwhile, despite U.S. failure in Vietnam, the Chinese were impressed by the might and determination of the United States' military commitment there. China's leaders were concerned over their isolation in the world and over mounting hostility with the Soviet Union. The Chinese also realized that their nation was not on a strategic parity with either Washington or Moscow. With these various conditions established, the case for détente seemed well assembled by events and the national interest of all parties.

Détente produced dramatic results in a relatively short time. In 1971, the United States offered an olive branch to China by supporting the PRC's entry into the United Nations (UN). In October of that same year, China became a member of the United Nations. The following February brought President Nixon's surprise visit to the PRC. This visit led to the May 1972 Moscow Summit between Nixon and Brezhnev,

at which the United States and the Soviet Union signed the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). On his return from the summit, Nixon announced to his cabinet that a fundamental shift in the world balance of power had taken place. He went on to say that the decision by both sides to displace their differences with common interests had accomplished the feat.

Despite its impressive results, détente's record was brief. Within a short time, the United States and the Nixon administration were embroiled in the Watergate scandal, which would force Nixon's resignation in 1974. The fallout from Watergate led to a shift in the domestic political scene within the United States that removed the architects of détente from power. Soon the world would be engulfed in a global recession caused by the oil crises in the Middle East. The fragile web of superpower alignments was coming apart, and by 1980, Ronald Reagan was president and the United States had set out on a path to rearm. International relations, by that time, reverted to the strictest traditions of the Cold War, and détente was over.

See also Bipolarity; China and U.S. Policy; Cold War; Multipolarity; Nixon, Richard M., and National Policy; Reagan, Ronald, and National Policy; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

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DETERRENCE

The use of threats to dissuade a state or a person from taking an action by convincing that party that the costs of the action would outweigh its benefits. Deterrence rests on the commitment to retaliate or to punish the other side if it undertakes an undesired action.

DETERRENCE THEORY

Deterrence is mainly focused on preventing undesirable behavior. Although scholars and policymakers alike disagree about the necessary and sufficient conditions for successful deterrence, they do concur on the most important requirements. The party using deterrence must be seen to act rationally. It must also possess both the political will and the military capability to retaliate. It must issue a credible and unambiguous threat to that effect. The threat must be clearly communicated to the opponent, and the costs suffered by the adversary after retaliation must outweigh the benefits it will gain if the action is carried out.

There are circumstances under which deterrence may break down. These include a situation where the challenger feels nothing will be lost, where the party using deterrence cannot convince the challenger that it has the will and the capabilities to follow through on the threat, and when the challenger would be better off despite the effects of retaliation.

Rational deterrence theory assumes that the target of deterrence is able to calculate the benefits of an action versus the costs of retaliation, as well as the likelihood of retaliation. The assumption of rationality has been among the most contentious aspects of the theory. Critics argue that decision makers, especially in crisis situations, do not behave rationally. They rarely have the time to explore alternative strategies, and even when they do, decision makers are often prone to misperceptions and miscalculations regarding the intentions and capabilities of their opponents.

DETERRENCE DURING THE COLD WAR

As the basis of U.S. defense policy, deterrence aims to convince potential enemies that an attack on the United States is not worth attempting because it would be followed by devastating retaliation. The logic of deterrence simply posits that states would refrain from action when the costs of this action outweigh its benefits.

Deterrence theory gained prominence in 1946 with the publication of *The Absolute Weapon,* a classic work by U.S. military strategist Bernard Brodie. Although Brodie does not use the term, the main logic of deterrence is clearly expressed in the book: "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them." The idea is that in deciding whether to act or not, the adversary will calculate the costs and benefits of its actions and will find the costs prohibitive. Later on, economists, mathematicians, historians,

psychologists, and political scientists analyzed the dynamics of deterrence relationships in realms other than military strategy, including interstate trade wars, competition for market shares among firms, and interpersonal disputes.

Deterrence was the cornerstone of the U.S. Cold War strategy of containment. Although deterrence is often credited with helping the United States win the Cold War, its success is difficult to establish because the result of successful deterrence is by definition a nonevent. Furthermore, in order for one party to know if one has successfully deterred aggression by another, the first party must know whether the second intended to attack in the first place. The intentions of adversaries are very difficult to know, and even when one knows them, one may not know whether a threat to retaliate plays a role in changing an adversary's intentions.

During the Cold War, deterrence raised some acute problems as to the use of threats of military force. For example, under what circumstances would threats be successful and hence the use of force avoided? Under what circumstances would threats be self-defeating or provocative, and hence lead to war rather than reconciliation? Deterrence was criticized both as a theory of behavior and as a strategy of crisis management.

As a theory, opponents argued, deterrence was psychologically poorly informed and did not conform to the behavior and the thinking of foreign-policy decision makers. Critics pointed to empirical evidence indicating that decision makers, especially in crisis situations, do not behave rationally. This evidence argued against the logic of deterrence theory, which does not sufficiently consider the nonrational determinants of the decision-making process. Insights from cognitive psychology emphasized that misperceptions, miscalculations, and various biases are widespread in foreign-policy decision making.

As a strategy, critics claimed, deterrence may often backfire and may actually provoke the very same crises it is designed to prevent. This occurs partly because deterrence is focused mainly on threats, whereas positive inducements and reassurances seem to be more central for successful crisis management. Critics argue that deterrence policies may have actually exacerbated and prolonged the Cold War by leading to exaggerated threat assessments, a sense of insecurity, and an arms race spiraling out of control. For example, the military buildup that President John F. Kennedy initiated in 1961 in the name of deterrence may have actually provoked the Soviet Union into deploying missiles in Cuba, thus initiating the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

DETERRENCE IN THE POST–COLD WAR WORLD

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991—and especially after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon—deterrence strategies have again come under attack. Many policymakers and scholars alike believe that deterrence cannot be used to deal with the new security threats facing the United States. President George W. Bush expressed severe doubts about the efficacy of deterrence in his 2002 speech at West Point, when he stated, "New threats also require new thinking. Deterrence means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. . . . We must . . . confront the worst threats before they emerge. . . . And our security will require . . . preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives."

This speech marked an important policy shift from reliance on deterrence to reliance on preemption, or attacking a perceived foe before it has a chance to strike first. Similar doubts about the efficacy of deterrence are expressed in the National Security Strategy of the United States, which states that "traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness."

See also Bush Doctrine; Bush, George W., and National Policy; Cold War; Containment and the Truman Doctrine; Doctrine; Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD); Nuclear Deterrence; Preemption; Preemptive War Doctrine; Terrorism, War on International

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DEVELOPMENT, THIRD-WORLD

The process by which a less-developed nation—particularly a former colony—modernizes its economy and polity and raises the standard of living for its population.

Development includes a number of processes that can occur quickly or slowly, evenly or unevenly. It most often comes about through projects in which a country identifies specific objectives (such as raising agricultural yields in a particular region or establishing voting booths in all precincts) and attempts to realize them. The central governments of third-world nations are not the only sources of such projects; development projects in the third world can arise from several different sources. Often, the most effective projects stem from the initiative of citizens (or local governments) within a country who understand local needs and take steps to meet them.

Development may come from outside, as well. Nongovernmental organizations often partner with third-world governments or local communities to develop and carry out smaller projects. The United Nations (particularly its Development Programme) also takes an active role. Organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund may support development projects, too; these, however, tend to be top-down development plans that the organizations design and implement with less citizen participation. Historically, these kinds of externally induced development projects have had very low success rates, but both organizations are increasingly soliciting local input.

Individual governments may also support development projects in other countries. The United States, for example, works through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to help reduce poverty, facilitate disaster relief, and promote democratic reforms in developing countries. Foreign government–led development projects may be helpful, but such efforts may also be subject to allegations of neocolonialism or neoimperialism.

Development is a complex process that includes growth and improvement in numerous domains. Though the word is often used to signify economic development, true development implies the evolution of the economic, political, health, infrastructure, and educational spheres. In the past, aid agencies and governments of developed countries tended to focus their attention on either economic or political development,

with little success. All aspects of development are interrelated, and efforts to improve one area must coincide with efforts to improve others.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Economic development is usually regarded as the most important area because growth of the economy helps support development in other areas. Economic development is not a complete measure of development, however, because gross domestic product (GDP) and other measures of prosperity do not describe how wealth, goods, and services are distributed. Nevertheless, economic development is important because a diversified, stable economy helps maintain and improve existing living standards.

The prevailing wisdom of the Washington Consensus (agreement among important economic policymakers that advocates free global markets) says that liberalization is most likely to create prosperity. As a result, developing countries are encouraged to reduce barriers to trade, reduce government intervention in commerce, promote entrepreneurial activity, and support a free market economy. The introduction of a market system helps the developing country integrate into the global economy (increasing trade) and creates a greater availability of goods within the domestic market.

Economic development also implies the creation of structures that help sustain the market economy, such as a comprehensive banking system and transparent financial institutions. Supported by the creation of private-property rights, implementing Washington consensus–type reforms will attract foreign investment capital to the country, which will generate growth, jobs, and money that the government can use for social goods and development in other areas. In some cases, variants of this model of economic development have been extremely successful—for example, in Southeast Asia. It has been less successful in Africa.

Economic development is not purely policy oriented (driven by changes in laws, bureaucratic structures, or procedures); it also involves on-the-ground projects. In the case of food crops, for example, development implies the use of farming techniques, fertilizers, and seed varieties that will improve yields. More generally, development often involves cultivating or harvesting previously unused or underused natural resources, such as timber, minerals, and oil. Once obtained, such resources may be sold or used in the production of finished goods. A common problem for individuals who wish to participate in such projects, however, is access

to capital; less wealthy individuals are unable to obtain loans at regular banks. One popular development technique that enables many individual citizens to gain access to loans is microcredit lending, which involves small loans at reasonable interest rates from community-based institutions resembling credit unions. Microcredit is used in rural areas as well as villages and bigger towns. It is often utilized for small-business development, particularly for women.

Broadly, economic development is also commonly understood to mean modernization. It suggests making a transition from a manual-labor economy to an industrialized one, using machinery and technology to improve production levels and efficiency. It also means shifting from an economy based on natural-resource extraction to a diversified economy (a mix of agriculture, manufacturing, financial sector, etc.) with a strong private sector. Most significantly, economic development means increasing a nation's economic independence, reducing its dependency on foreign goods, freeing the country from its debt burden, and finding multiple markets for its goods abroad so it is not dependent on selling its goods to only a few countries.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Political development has two primary meanings: the development of a participating, democratic citizenry and codified law. Democracy is the current standard of excellence in government. Many third-world countries have embraced democratic governance—some fully, some only ostensibly. Democracy is, however, something to which third-world countries aspire as they seek acceptance in the world community.

To gain recognition as being developed, a country must permit the creation of political parties, some of which should be opposition parties. It must establish a legitimate central government, one that has been granted power by a majority vote in a free and fair competitive election. It needs to ensure political freedom, making certain that those who wish to participate in political actions (everything from voting to protesting) are free and able to do so. Participation by citizens is viewed as crucial, because it ensures that the government in power has a mandate and that the voices of the people are heard. Underlying these political freedoms are rights that, although enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, are not always supported in the third world: the rights to free speech, to freedom of assembly, and to petition the government.

Codified law helps to clearly establish the rights and responsibilities of citizens, and also to promote equal treatment and justice under the law. The rule of law helps prevent government abuses of citizens that sometimes occur in the third world, abuses such as arbitrary arrest, the taking of political prisoners or the arrest of dissidents, disappearances, and torture. It also helps to formalize structures such as courts and government hierarchies, and principles such as ownership. In third-world countries, property rights are usually some of the first laws made explicit. Property rights include laws governing business ownership, land ownership and use, private property and home ownership, and zoning. They also include regulations governing governmental and business contracts, and intellectual property rights, such as copyrights and patents. Enforceable property rights also encourage economic development, making foreign investors feel more secure about establishing businesses or investing capital.

SOCIOPOLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Although a country that is politically developed may render all persons equal before the law, certain groups may not be equal in practice. Sociopolitical development involves the protection of those who may suffer from discrimination in fact though not in law, and it implies safeguards for the underprivileged. Women, for example, have significantly lower status in many third-world societies and may require special protections if they are to take advantage of their political rights. Fair treatment of ethnic minorities is also part of sociopolitical development. Many third-world countries were established within the borders of former colonies, with little or no consideration for the traditional boundaries of ethnic homelands. This method of border creation often resulted in countries with highly diverse ethnic compositions. In numerous instances, ethnic minorities (such as the Diola people in Senegal) have historically been the subjects of discrimination by their neighbors and require protection within the modern national borders. Religious minorities, too, require civic and social respect and the freedom to practice their religion without fear of persecution.

INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

Development of infrastructure is substantially tied to economic development. It includes the creation of physical infrastructure: building roads or paving them,

building bridges and dams, creating electric grids in remote locations without electricity, building airports, and other engineering projects that improve travel and communication. Infrastructure development means not only creating buildings for things such as banks and hospitals but also creating bureaucratic structures to support and manage them. Infrastructure also incorporates less tangible forms, such as technical and institutional knowledge. These kinds of knowledge not only help a country create new transportation and communication networks, but maintain and repair them, as well.

HEALTH DEVELOPMENT

Development in the health sector includes preventing unnecessary morbidity and mortality and ensuring the physical well-being of all citizens. Because there is often a high mortality rate for children in developing countries, special attention must be given to child health, particularly neonatal health. Lowering mortality rates also includes providing vaccinations to those who need them. Ensuring overall health includes educating people about sanitation, nutrition, and communicable disease. Overall, there must be efforts to provide the population with access to clean drinking water, sufficient food, and health centers (projects strongly related to infrastructure development).

EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT

Development in education is likewise multifaceted. True development means providing the entire population with access to basic education: Schools with competent teachers should be available, even in the most remote regions. These schools should at least ensure that children become literate and numerate. Educational development also means taking steps to ensure that children are able to go to school—making school affordable and ensuring that parents do not keep their children at home to help the family economically. It also includes ensuring equal access to education for both girls and boys, and for ethnic or other minorities. Education also includes adult education, ensuring that adults are literate and numerate, and aware of their rights.

THE ENDS OF DEVELOPMENT

Third-world-development thinking focuses strongly on the establishment of modern structures—financial,

legal, technological, sanitary, and educational. These structures are extremely important, but development is not an end in itself. Development is a means to an end: improving lives and living standards. It is intended to reduce third-world citizens' vulnerability to disorder, disaster, disease, poverty, and powerlessness. It is designed to promote freedom, giving all citizens opportunities to live their lives.

See also Colonialism; Imperialism; Peace Corps; Sustainable Development; U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

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DIEN BIEN PHU

Military base in North Vietnam, 18 miles from the Laotian border, where the nationalist Vietminh troops defeated French colonial troops after a 56-day siege in the spring of 1954. Dien Bien Phu was the last great battle between the French and the Vietminh in the former French colony of Indochina.

The French took Dien Bien Phu, a remote mountain outpost, in 1953 after a successful airborne assault. French occupation of the base prevented the army of North Vietnamese communist leader Ho Chi Minh from driving into Laos, and it enabled the French to support native, anti-Vietminh forces in Laos. However, the French position was unstable, because the base could be supplied only from the air and was the target of incessant guerrilla attacks.

Colonel Christian de Castries, commander of 13,000 allied French troops in Vietnam, hoped to engage the Vietminh in an open battle, confident that his superior weapons, stronger field positions, and massive air support would carry the day. In March 1954, nearly 50,000 Vietminh troops under the command of General Vo Nguyen Giap surrounded the base. The first Vietminh attack occurred on March 13, 1954. The French countered with relentless bombing raids on the Vietminh positions. By the end of April,

de Castries' position had been reduced to a little more than 2 square miles. French pleas for U.S. intervention were unsuccessful, and the base fell to the Vietminh on May 7, 1954.

The fall of Dien Bien Phu signaled the end to a century of French colonial rule in Vietnam. The French sought peace with the Vietminh in July 1954, shortly after their defeat at Dien Bien Phu.

See also Ho Chi Minh; Vietnam War

DIRTY BOMB

Conventional explosive device outfitted with radioactive material. A dirty bomb is not a nuclear bomb, because its detonation does not involve the complex process of nuclear fission. Its discharge mechanism is based on a nonnuclear explosive material such as dynamite. However, instead of spewing out metal shrapnel subsequent to the blast, a dirty bomb releases radioactive material in the form of a gas or a powder.

As opposed to nuclear bombs, dirty bombs (also known as *radiological dispersal devices,* or RDDs) are not likely to cause large numbers of human deaths. According to most scientists, the main danger associated with the use of a dirty bomb is not radioactive contamination but rather the panic the bomb produces among its intended targets. In addition, cleaning up a radioactively infected area is extremely costly, potentially causing serious economic problems. Because of the primarily psychological effects of a dirty bomb, terrorism experts do not generally refer to an RDD as a weapon of mass destruction but rather as a *weapon of mass disruption.*

ACQUIRING THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

The expertise necessary to build a dirty bomb is the same as that required for the assembly of a conventional explosive device. The real difficulty behind the crafting of an RDD is acquiring and handling the radioactive material—the one thing that earns the bomb the adjective *dirty.* As a rule, the higher the quality of the radioactive material (and hence, the more human fatalities it is likely to cause), the harder it is to obtain on the international market.

There is no scarcity of nuclear material in the world; it is used extensively in medicine, agriculture, and industry. However, the potency of a radioactive source used in, for example, a cancer therapy device is limited and does not make for a powerful dirty bomb. The truly damaging radioactive materials are those that have been manipulated as part of a nuclear program, be it industrial or military. Although such material is generally well guarded throughout the world, terrorism experts point to the region of the former Soviet Union, where weaponry-related radioactive sources have been found lying around unprotected in the mountains.

Numerous governments (including those of Russia and the United States) are currently taking steps toward keeping all radioactive materials out of the hands of terrorist organizations. No dirty bombs have been detonated yet, but the terrorist network of al-Qaeda is widely believed to be attempting to build an RDD.

EFFECTS OF A DIRTY-BOMB BLAST

The number of human deaths that a dirty bomb could cause depends on the bomb's sophistication (that is, the quality of the radioactive material), wind conditions in the area of detonation, and the rapidity with which that area is evacuated by authorities. Experts estimate that the death toll in the event of a dirty-bomb blast would not be higher than a few dozen fatalities, most of them caused by the conventional explosion itself and not by radioactivity.

However, the specter of an unseen, silent radioactive killer is likely to cause panic among people in the vicinity of the blast. That panic might even cause more deaths (from trampling, car accidents, and so on) than the detonation itself. In the event of a RDD explosion, U.S. authorities will advise people to minimize their time of exposure to the area's atmosphere, go as far away from the blast site as possible, and move away in such a manner as to place several buildings between them and the bomb location.

After evacuation is complete, another difficult task begins: the decontamination of the site. Radioactivity cannot be eliminated by scientific means; it can only be transported from one setting to another. Thus, a contaminated land surface would literally need to be shaved off and trucked away to a place where the radioactive material could remain for the hundreds of years it takes for radioactivity to decay naturally. Because of its perceived effectiveness as a psychological and economical weapon, the dirty bomb continues

to be sought after by terrorist organizations around the world.

See also Biotechnology; Terrorism, War on International

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DISARMAMENT

Policy aimed at minimizing the probability or destructiveness of armed conflicts. When states or groups disarm, they reduce the size, quality, or destructive capacity of their military capabilities. States or groups may be compelled to disarm or may negotiate disarmament through bilateral or multilateral agreements.

There are three general types of disarmament. First, at the interstate level, disarmament may pertain to the terms of strategic surrender at the end of major wars. Second, also at the interstate level, disarmament may involve the cooperative removal of military capabilities, such as weapons of mass destruction. Third, disarmament may refer to measures at the intrastate level that have been employed after civil wars to reduce the likelihood that groups at the local level will return to violence.

FORCED DISARMAMENT

Forced disarmament resulting from the terms of surrender at the end of major wars occurs when the victorious state imposes restrictions on the military capabilities of the defeated state. In the 20th century, forced disarmament has most notably been imposed on Japan and Germany at the end of World War II. After the countries surrendered, the Allied powers imposed limitations on German and Japanese military forces. The Allied powers disbanded the Axis powers' armed forces, seized their naval fleets, and strictly prohibited them from developing nuclear weapons. The objective of forcing Germany and Japan to disarm was to prevent them from being a future threat to security.

COOPERATIVE DISARMAMENT

Cooperative disarmament seeks to eliminate certain classes of weapons from states' military arsenals that are deemed needlessly destructive. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which went into force in 1970 and currently has 189 state signatories including the United States, is a key instrument for cooperative disarmament. Article VI of the NPT requires that "each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Other international agreements, such as the 1975 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC), the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the 1999 Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention (Mine-Ban Convention) also endeavor to eliminate specific weapons by prohibiting states from developing, transferring, or deploying the weapons.

A state may also choose to voluntarily disarm based on principles similar to cooperative disarmament. By unilaterally disarming, a state may effectively demonstrate that it is no longer a threat to its neighbors. For example, South Africa's decision to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear weapons program in 1993 was motivated by its desire to be a cooperative member of the international community. The case of South Africa has often been cited in the years since, to encourage other nations to follow suit, including Israel, India, and Pakistan.

At the intrastate level, disarmament is considered one step toward implementing peace agreements to end civil wars. The other two steps are demobilization and reintegration. These three steps are oftentimes referred to collectively as *DDR* (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration). Disarmament programs obligate competing combatants to turn in weapons. Demobilization removes junior members of rebel groups and brings them under the control of the government. Former combatants are then encouraged to reintegrate with society or join the national army.

DDR programs were implemented to settle civil wars in Mozambique in 1992, Cambodia in 1991, and Laos in 1962.

The term *disarmament* is sometimes used interchangeably with *arms control.* However, the terms do differ. Disarmament starts from the assumption that the existence of certain weapons leads states to perceive threats to their security. If a state feels threatened, it is more likely to go to war to protect its security. If the weapons are eliminated, so the argument goes, then states will have no cause to go to war.

By contrast, arms control presupposes that conflict will occur and that the roots of conflict may not be eliminated. Arms control, as described by the scholar Harald Muller in his 1994 book *Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order,* endeavors to prevent an arms race, which "may indeed lead to war in the event of a crisis in which war might have been avoided if the antagonists had chosen different postures." Thus, arms control seeks to limit which weapons are used in a conflict, whereas disarmament attempts to avoid conflicts aggravated by the existence of certain classes of weapons.

See also Arms Control; Biological Weapons and Warfare; Biological Weapons Convention; Chemical Weapons Convention; Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Kellog-Briand Pact; Nonproliferation; Nuclear Weapons; Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)

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DISSENT

Refers to the act of disagreement with official or government policy. Acts of dissent may be physical—for example, marching in protest or resisting arrest—or they may be verbal, as expressed by chanting slogans or giving speeches. Acts of dissent may also include theatrical performances and the production of art. They may be active or passive, and they may involve mass participation or they may be individual. Dissent may involve the active decision to do something, or it may be the refusal to do something. Dissent can be expressed both personally and politically.

In some societies, the consequences of dissent are severe. Different nations during different historical periods have been accused of resorting to arrests, beatings, imprisonment, and even execution in order to stifle disagreement with official policy. The development of media technology has served to pressure governments in how they respond to dissent, and certain televised acts of dissent have become symbolic. The confrontation between a lone Chinese student and a tank in Tiananmen Square has come to represent the bravery of disagreement.

The history of dissent in the United States extends across a variety of social movements and has included war protests, claims for civil rights, and opposition to racial or sexual discrimination. The United States is itself a country founded on the concept of dissent, with origins as a British territory populated by subjects who ultimately chose to resist colonial rule. In *Democracy in America,* Alexis de Tocqueville defined American democracy as having to do with protecting the individual from the "tyranny of the majority," that is, the right to dissent.

A corollary to dissent is the concept of *repressive tolerance,* which insists that power structures tolerate certain levels of dissent in order to appear democratic. In this context, dissent is simply a way in which authorities convince subjects of the legitimacy of their own rule. The concept of repressive tolerance was very prevalent at the height of the anti–Vietnam War movement in the United States.

The social and political history of the United States may be described in terms of dissent. The Industrial Revolution entailed corresponding movements for workers' rights, strikes, and the development of labor unions. The question of states' rights versus the role of the federal government ultimately found focus in the slavery issue during the Civil War. The women's suffrage movement for equal rights was a product of the Progressive Era, a time underpinned by the belief that human nature could be fundamentally improved by better living and working conditions. The Progressive

Era resulted in important reforms, such as child labor laws and production standards in factories, as well as ultimately failed social experiments such as Prohibition. The ending of Prohibition was in itself a product of dissent, because its unpopularity, exacerbated by the problem of noncompliance, led to its repeal.

The movement to gain equal rights for women was joined in the second half of the 20th century by two other broad movements of dissent in the United States: the civil-rights movement and the antiwar movement. All of these movements shared adherents as well as strategies for presenting their agendas through acts of dissent.

One of the central concepts to this process was the notion of nonviolence, with origins in Mohandas Gandhi's movement for independence from British colonial rule in India. This approach was imported into the United States and adapted by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and involved peaceful acts of protest, such as the occupation of whites-only lunch counters, the boycotting of bussing systems that forced blacks to sit in the back, and nonviolent marches. Malcolm X articulated a contrasting approach, with slogans such as "By any means necessary." Both men were assassinated for being dissidents.

The protests against Vietnam also involved acts of violence as well as nonviolence. The 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago was highlighted by angry protests and street fighting. Other forceful acts of dissent were the activities of the Students for a Democratic Society and the Weather Underground. Among the more vivid and disturbing approaches to dissent during this period were acts of self-immolation, occurring both in Vietnam, by Vietnamese, and in the United States by protesters. A more peaceful approach was expressed by the hippie slogan "Tune in, turn on, drop out," implying that the most effective act of resistance was to simply refuse to participate. The youth culture of the 1960s was defined by the idea of dissent, expressed through fashions—such as the peace symbol, faded jeans, and long hair on males—and particularly in rock music. The *generation gap* was pinpointed by the rejection of, and dissent from, the values and expectations of different age groups.

Dissent in the women's movement is closely intertwined with socialism and labor rights because, aside from the issue of reproduction, equal pay and status in the workplace have been central concerns. Celebration of the first Women's Day in 1910 came in the wake of demonstrations and strikes for better working conditions for garment workers. Since then, the right to control over birth choices, the *glass ceiling* blocking women's success at the executive level, and the *double-shift* forced on working mothers have all become important focuses. Dissent, in terms of women's rights, has acquired new resonance in the international community, with the focus on the subjugation of women in Islamic states.

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DISTANT EARLY WARNING (DEW) LINE

A series of radar installations, built in the Arctic Circle in the 1950s, that were meant to serve as a warning system and deterrent to a nuclear attack by the communist Soviet Union against the United States and Canada.

The DEW Line—*DEW* is an acronym for Distant Early Warning—was a series of 63 integrated radar and communications systems stretching 3,000 miles from the northwest Alaskan coast to the eastern shore of Baffin Island near Greenland. Built roughly along the 66th parallel, most DEW Line installations were about 200 miles north of the Arctic Circle, some 1,400 miles from the North Pole.

These sites, built on remote Arctic tundra, were manned around the clock to detect any approach by Russian bombers or intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The DEW Line was coordinated with several similar operations, such as the Pinetree Early Warning Line, the Mid-Canada Line, and the Navy's Atlantic and Pacific Barrier, as well as air and sea patrols and radar stations in Iceland, Great Britain, the Faeroe Islands in the North Atlantic, and Greenland.

The DEW Line and other early-warning installations were effective deterrents against Soviet aggression during the Cold War period. The Soviets were

cognizant that any air strike launched by them would be detected early enough so that the United States could destroy most of their bombers or ICBMs. The Soviets were aware they would suffer considerable retaliation by the U.S. Strategic Air Command, whose airborne nuclear-armed bombers were coordinated with the Early Warning System and various strategic assigned targets within the Soviet Union.

The DEW Line grew out of a study in the early 1950s by scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), who found that the United States and Canada were vulnerable to a Soviet air attack from across the North Pole. The U.S. communications company AT&T was awarded the contract to build the line, an effort that involved more than 25,000 people to construct radar sites, roads, towers, airplane hangars, residences, and antennae in the most sparsely populated region of North America.

Construction began in December 1954 using military and civilian airlifts, sealifts, and rail to transport workers and material to build the radar installations as well as the permanent settlements adjacent to each of the main sites. Construction of all 63 installations and their communication network, known as *White Alice,* was completed on July 31, 1957, and the system was turned over to the U.S. Air Force. The main stations included self-contained communities, complete with electricity, water, heating facilities, houses, work buildings, recreation areas, roads, and airstrips.

By the mid-1980s, aging facilities, improved technologies (such as the Airborne Warning and Control System, or AWACS), and advanced detection systems, together with the diminished threat of Soviet aggression in the waning years of the Cold War, led to the demise of the older early-warning systems, such as the DEW Line. In 1985, the DEW Line system was replaced by the North Warning System, and many of the original DEW Line sites were abandoned. By 2008, the Canadian Department of the Interior is expected to complete a $250 million cleanup project of its former DEW Line sites with an eye toward recycling the material used to build the sites and developing Arctic tourism.

See also Airborne Warning and Control System; Nuclear Deterrence

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DIVISION/BRIGADE/BATTALION

Designations applied to military ground formations of varying sizes. A division, one of the basic units in the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, typically contains between 10,000 and 20,000 troops.

The smallest formation in the U.S. Army is the fire team, consisting of four enlisted soldiers. Two to three fire teams make up a squad, and two to four squads (30 to 40 soldiers) make up a platoon. Platoons are arranged into groups of three to five known as *companies.* There are typically two to five companies in a battalion and three to five battalions (1,500 to 3,500 troops) in a brigade. Each division contains three to six battalions, and two or more divisions together constitute a corps. As of 2005, the U.S. Army contained four corps. When several corps are organized into a single fighting force during wartime, the resulting formation is called a *field army.*

The size of a division—or almost any other military formation—varies over time and according to its mission. For example, specialized units, such as engineer battalions or mountain divisions, are often smaller than regular infantry divisions. Their members also contain a different mix of combat skills and weapons in order to deal with the unique nature of the tasks they perform. Army infantry and armored units are typically larger and more heavily armed than their Marine Corps counterparts. Because mobility is one of the hallmarks of the marines, their formations are designed to be lighter and easier to deploy quickly to trouble spots.

The name of a formation does not always indicate the types of units it will contain. For example, an infantry division is composed of far more than just foot soldiers. Those troops are supported by artillery and often armored units, as well. Engineers and other specialized units may also be included in the force. Similarly, although an armored division is marked by its heavy concentration of tanks, it also contains self-propelled artillery and ground troops for support.

Other nations with large armed forces, such as Russia, China, and the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have armed-force structures very similar to that of the United States. The terminology in some armies is slightly different, however. For example, British divisions are made up of *regiments,* a designation that the U.S. Army has replaced with the term *battalion.* Although these terms

do not convey an exact sense of the strength of specific units, they do serve as a general guide to assessing comparative force strength between nations.

See also Order of Battle; U.S. Army

DOCTRINE

Underpinning for a belief or policy that may refer to religious dogma or a principle of law. In the context of American politics, however, the term is used to refer to axioms or positions meant to apply across a broad spectrum of circumstances.

Doctrine is intended to guide actions in a general way, without detailing specifics. Doctrines are usually associated with, and named after, a specific leader—for example, the Monroe Doctrine or the Truman Doctrine. The two most common types of doctrine are policy doctrine and military doctrine, although the former almost always has implications for the latter.

Many different doctrines have underpinned U.S. foreign policy, and they read as a timeline of important events in U.S. diplomatic history. The Monroe Doctrine, issued by President James Monroe in 1823, asserted U.S. influence over the Americas. The doctrine was a response to continued European designs on colonial territories in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean. The Monroe Doctrine became relevant again during the Cold War and was invoked in response to attempts to establish communist power in the Western Hemisphere. The two most important instances were the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the Soviet Union attempted to place nuclear weapons in Cuba, and U.S. interference in Nicaragua during the 1980s.

The administration of President Ronald Reagan funded the contras, a guerilla group that was attempting to overthrow Nicaragua's socialist government. This funding of the contras led to the Iran-Contra affair, in which it was revealed that the administration sold arms to Iran against U.S. law and used the money to fund the contras. The Iran-Contra affair was the most serious scandal of the Reagan presidency.

The energy with which the U.S. government worked to undermine communism during this period was partially based on the Kirkpatrick Doctrine. Jean Kirkpatrick, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations during the 1980s, argued that right-wing authoritarian regimes were more likely than left-wing totalitarian regimes to evolve into democracies. This doctrine was used to rationalize support by the United States for right-wing dictatorships in Guatemala, the Philippines, and Argentina, as well as rebel groups attempting to overthrow left-wing governments.

Resistance to the spread of communism was the focus of a series of U.S. Cold War doctrines. The Truman Doctrine, issued in 1947 by President Harry S. Truman, indicated that the United States would support governments resisting communism. The Eisenhower Doctrine, expressed in 1957 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, reiterated this position, with specific reference to the Middle East. The Carter Doctrine was issued in 1980 by President Jimmy Carter in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and warned the Soviets against interference in Iran.

The Soviets, in turn, justified their 1979 invasion of Afghanistan with the Brezhnev Doctrine, named after Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. Originally issued prior to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, this doctrine stated that the Soviet Union considered the fate of socialism and socialist regimes on their borders to be their direct concern. Years later, Mikhail Gorbachev established what was half-jokingly described as the Sinatra Doctrine, named after singer Frank Sinatra. The name referred to the singer's hit song "My Way," and the doctrine itself signaled greater autonomy for the socialist countries in the Eastern bloc.

Another famous Cold War doctrine was the Hallstein Doctrine in West Germany, under which the Federal Republic of Germany considered itself to be the sole legitimate German nation. The practical implication of this doctrine, named after German politician Walter Hallstein, was that West Germany refused to engage in diplomatic relations with countries recognizing the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), except for the Soviet Union. This policy was later dropped as relations between East and West Germany improved.

The post–Cold War era has seen its share of new doctrines, as well. The Powell Doctrine, issued after the first Gulf War and named for U.S. general Colin Powell, was essentially a rearticulation of the Weinberger Doctrine. President Reagan's defense secretary, Caspar Weinberger, had declared in the mid-1980s that the military should be committed only when vital U.S. interests were at stake, when other options were exhausted, when the objectives were clearly defined, and when there was a viable exit strategy. The Weinberger Doctrine was issued partly to justify the

removal of U.S. Marines from Lebanon after more than 200 were killed in a 1982 suicide bombing in Beirut, Lebanon.

Current U.S. strategic thinking is driven by the Bush Doctrine, a response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC. This doctrine, named for President George W. Bush, justifies the use of preemptive war and indicates that the United States will make no distinction between terrorists and the countries that harbor them. It also expresses the willingness of the United States to act unilaterally to defend its perceived interests if multilateral solutions cannot be found. The Bush Doctrine represents a profound reversal of direction from the long-standing U.S. reliance on deterrence and collective security to address imminent threats. It has been met with resistance by both foes and allies, who suggest that it increases the likelihood of conflict and reduces chances for peaceful solutions to international crises.

See also Bush Doctrine; Collective Security; Containment and the Truman Doctrine; Deterrence; Monroe Doctrine; Multilateralism; Preemption; Preemptive War Doctrine; Unilateralism

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DOMINO THEORY

Political theory, espoused by the U.S. government during the Cold War, asserting that the communist takeover of a country would cause neighboring states to fall like dominoes under communist control. United States president Dwight D. Eisenhower first cited the domino theory to justify armed intervention abroad in preventing the spread of communism. The theory was later espoused by supporters of the U.S. role in the Vietnam War.

President Eisenhower first articulated the domino theory at a news conference on April 7, 1954. Focusing on the dangers of increasing communist power in Asia, the president claimed that the conquest of Indochina by the Soviet Union would result in the loss of Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. He argued that these conquests would give the Soviet Union a strategic geographical advantage in Southeast Asia. This, in turn, would allow the Soviet Union to take over Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Eisenhower stated, "The possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable to the free world."

The origins of the domino theory are unclear, but it may well have been inspired by the emergence of the Soviet-dominated Eastern bloc following World War II. After the war, the Soviet Union installed friendly communist regimes in the Eastern European nations it occupied. This included the eastern portion of occupied Germany, as well as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The Soviets tightly controlled the governments of these states, which formed a defensive barrier between the Soviet Union and its foes in Western Europe.

Developments in Asia may also have played a role in shaping the domino theory. In 1949, communist forces under Mao Zedong defeated China's pro-Western nationalist government after years of civil war. The following year, communist North Korea invaded South Korea with tacit Soviet and Chinese support. Only a U.S.-led United Nations military intervention and a bitter three-year war saved South Korea from conquest.

In the final analysis, the domino theory proved to be incorrect. The communist takeover of South Vietnam in 1974 did not lead to the spread of communism throughout Southeast Asia. Neighboring Cambodia endured the reign of the communist dictator Pol Pot, but none of the other countries that Eisenhower saw as dominoes fell to communist revolution. Ironically, the only country that Vietnam invaded was its communist neighbor, Cambodia. The Vietnamese deposed Pol Pot in 1978 and occupied Cambodia until 1991. A peace settlement that year led to the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and free elections in which Cambodia chose a democratic form of government. Vietnam remains the only communist country in the region.

Recently, the label *domino theory* has been applied to foreign-policy doctrine under the administration of President George W. Bush. The modern domino theory asserts that the United States can institute a wave of political reform (like a cascade of dominoes) in the Middle East by forcibly imposing democracy

on undemocratic regimes. The Iraq War of 2003 and the subsequent occupation of that country is seen as the test of the theory.

Supporters of President Bush point to popular calls in Lebanon in 2005 for the resignation of the pro-Syrian prime minister and for the removal of Syrian troops, as evidence that the policy is working. Critics argue that the United States seems willing to pressure its foes in the region only to institute democratic change. They point out that many close U.S. allies in the Middle East—including two of the most influential Arab nations, Egypt and Saudi Arabia—have very repressive, unrepresentative governments. Yet so far the Bush administration has not pressed for reforms in either of these countries.

See also Bush Doctrine; Bush, George W., and National Policy; Cold War; Communism; Communism and National Security; Containment; Democracy, Promotion of, and Terrorism; Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy; Interventionism

DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL

The military policy toward homosexuals (gays and lesbians) in the military since 1993. According to the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy, if gays and lesbians in the military remain silent about their sexual orientation, their commanders will not try to discover what it is. Those who flaunt or reveal their homosexuality are subject to discharge.

The United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Israel, and most countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have abandoned exclusionary policies toward homosexuals with no deterioration in readiness. Most also implemented strict policies against sexual harassment in the military. The United States, however, has had a policy of excluding homosexuals from the military service for more than half a century.

In November 1992, President-Elect Bill Clinton announced that he intended to lift that ban against gays in the military because he believed that sexual orientation should not bar a person from serving his or her country. Opposition formed immediately, however, including from Joint Chiefs chair Colin Powell and the powerful senator Sam Nunn (Democrat of Georgia), who was chair of the Armed Services Committee.

For six months, debate raged over the issue. Liberals wanted Clinton to lift the ban completely,

whereas conservatives opposed such action, fearing the impact on military readiness, morale, and discipline. In July 1993, a compromise was reached—the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. According to the policy, lesbians and gay men could serve if they kept quiet and did not engage in homosexual conduct, and military commanders would not try to find homosexuals within the ranks. Homosexuality in itself would no longer mean an automatic exit from the service.

Clinton said that the compromise would end the witch hunts that had often been conducted against homosexuals in the military. His supporters said that it was the best they could do to preserve readiness while protecting the rights of gays. Although supporters of the policy promised to investigate abuses, advocacy and civil-rights groups were not convinced. In fact, violations of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy increased during the decade after it was implemented.

Opponents of the policy, and of gays serving in the military in general, usually believe that homosexuality is wrong and that allowing gays to serve puts the federal government in a position of endorsing immorality. Society at large has not yet come to terms with its gay minority, they argue, and the military should not be expected to go beyond society, especially because military culture is so much more conservative. The counterargument is that the army managed to integrate African Americans into its ranks when society was not yet prepared to do so.

Discharges of gays from the military rose almost every year of the Clinton administration. In 1994 the total discharged was 617, and by 2000 the number doubled to 1,231. More received honorable discharges than was the case prior to the policy. Nevertheless, between 1994 and 2001, more than 7,800 men and women were discharged for revealing their sexual preference. The cost of recruiting and retraining replacements for the thousands discharged has been estimated to be more than $200 million.

Prejudice and harassment of gays in the military remain common. Antigay remarks and jokes are still routine, and military officials are at best passive in their responses to these situations. Homosexual soldiers have found it difficult to report harassment or abuse without revealing their orientation and thus risking discharge.

In 2003, Human Rights Watch requested that President George W. Bush end the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy and that Congress repeal the 1993 law. According to the organization, the policy led to discriminatory

discharge. Moreover, by ignoring skills, training, and commitment to the service, while supporting an irrational heterosexual stereotype and fear, the policy was hampering military preparedness. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, for example, the army discharged 10 trained linguists, seven of them Arabic specialists, because they were gay.

See also Gender Issues

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DOOLITTLE, JIMMY (1896–1993)

A noted aviator who combined pioneering air exploits with engineering genius and military prowess in a near-legendary life. Born December 4, 1896, at Pebble Beach, California, Jimmy Doolittle studied at the California School of Mines before enlisting in army aviation in World War I and becoming a skilled pilot and instructor. His most famous exploit, the Tokyo Raid of 1942 during World War II, actually paled in significance with his other military activities.

Doolittle remained in the army after World War I, becoming a first lieutenant in 1920. He earned a doctorate in aeronautical engineering from MIT in 1925 and continued to rack up an enviable record as an aviator and test pilot until resigning in 1930 to head the aviation department of Shell Oil Company. Among his several accomplishments were the first complete flight on instruments, a Florida-to-California flight in less than a day, and winning several air races and prizes. At his urging, Shell gambled on production of 100-octane aviation gasoline long before the requirement emerged, enabling American aviation to achieve significant performance levels. After 1937, the Army Air Corps would buy only the 100-octane fuel.

Doolittle was recalled to duty during World War II. His first important mission was to train and lead 16 medium-bomber crews in an unprecedented takeoff from aircraft carrier *Hornet,* which had brought his squadron within extreme range of Tokyo for a reprisal raid against the Japanese capital on April 18, 1942. This bold action, conceived as a morale booster and riposte for the Pearl Harbor attack, required specially modified bombers to be flown off carrier decks with fuel and bomb overloads, using special piloting techniques developed by Doolittle and imparted by him to his volunteer aircrews. Doolittle and his crew bombed Tokyo and three other cities, with most of the aircraft making crash landings in China. Although it caused negligible damage, the exploit aroused the spirit of the American public.

Decorated with the Medal of Honor and promoted from lieutenant colonel to brigadier general for his role in this exploit, known as *Doolittle's Raid,* Doolittle next served in numerous command positions in Germany. He formed the 12th Air Force in the Mediterranean theater and eventually led the 8th Air Force as a lieutenant general in its decisive 1944–45 strategic-bombardment operations from England against the Germans. Although an opponent of terror bombing, he nevertheless carried out his instructions with great effectiveness.

At the end of the war, Doolittle took the Eighth Air Force to Okinawa and was slated to command the strategic air forces for the invasion of Japan. But the war ended before the invasion became a reality. After the war, Doolittle resumed corporate leadership at Shell Oil and took advisory positions in both the public and private sectors, remaining active in the aerospace industry after retiring in 1959. He received the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1989.

See also Air Warfare; Carpet Bombing; Strategic Bombing; U.S. Air Force; U.S. Army; World War II

DOOMSDAY MACHINE

Theoretical device that automatically triggers the nuclear destruction of an aggressor nation or the entire global population. Herman Kahn, a U.S. nuclear physicist who participated in the design of the hydrogen bomb in the early 1950s, was working as a nuclear theorist for the RAND Corporation, a U.S. national-security think tank, during the early 1960s. In 1961, while brainstorming with RAND nuclear strategists, he developed a concept that he called a *doomsday machine.*

In its original conception, Kahn's doomsday machine was designed to ensure the annihilation of the world's population. As such, he reasoned, a doomsday

machine could be the ultimate nuclear deterrent. He postulated that if the United States had an operative doomsday machine in place, no enemy nation would risk launching a nuclear attack or any other large-scale assault, for fear of destroying the world.

Critics assailed Kahn's conception as he described it in his book *On Thermonuclear War* (1961). A major problem with Kahn's doomsday machine was the total lack of control that government and military leaders would have over the machine once it was activated. Kahn argued that this feature was part of what made the doomsday machine an unexcelled deterrent. He maintained that the lack of human intervention inspired an even greater fear in potential aggressors, making it even less likely that they would resort to a nuclear strike on the United States. Kahn also believed that it would be advantageous for U.S. leaders to appear as if their reactions to a nuclear crisis might be irrational, again boosting the machine's deterrent capability.

Kahn's theories inspired British film director Stanley Kubrick to make the classic 1964 film, *Dr. Strangelove, or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.* In this film, an insane U.S. Air Force colonel sets in motion a doomsday scenario that generals and government leaders are powerless to stop.

Although the United States has never constructed a doomsday machine of the ilk Kahn envisioned, the U.S. nuclear strategy of mutually assured destruction (MAD) mimics the concept of a doomsday machine. At the time MAD was first developed, in the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union were building their nuclear arsenals so that each nation would have the ability to annihilate the other and, via the resultant massive radioactive fallout, would be capable of destroying the entire world's population. The MAD strategy postulated that the United States, by ensuring the Soviet Union's doom with multiple nuclear attacks, would deter the Soviet Union from launching a nuclear attack on the United States.

In 1993, U.S. and British newspapers reported on the discovery of Russia's top-secret doomsday machine, created by Soviet scientists in the 1970s. The automated system, known as *the dead hand* in Russia, becomes operative when Russia has suffered a nuclear attack and its government leaders and military are unable to respond. Although U.S. and foreign analysts believe that Russia still has the dead-hand system in place, Russian leaders neither confirm nor deny its existence.

See also Arms Control; Arms Race; Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD); Nuclear Deterrence; Nuclear Weapons

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DRESDEN, BOMBING OF

Allied bombing raid that became a symbol of the *terror bombing* campaign against Germany in World War II. Dresden was one of the largest cities to be almost totally destroyed by strategic bombing in World War II. The city is the capital of the German region of Saxony and was a noteworthy European cultural center before the war, but it also had industry of some military value.

British prime minister Winston Churchill had called at various times (particularly in September 1941) for increased British air raids against the population centers of Germany in order to swamp German authorities and services, particularly transportation, with hordes of refugees. As the various armies closed in on the Third Reich in 1945, such targets became more feasible because of the air superiority and improved navigation techniques of the Anglo-American bomber force.

Accordingly, the U.S. Eighth Air Force hit the city center of Berlin, not its industrial targets, on February 3, 1945. Dresden, which had never been attacked in the war, offered increased value for terror bombing against an inexperienced population. On the night of February 13, the British Bomber Command hit Dresden with an 800-bomber air raid, dropping some 2,700 tons of bombs, including large numbers of incendiaries. Aided by weather conditions, a firestorm developed, incinerating tens of thousands of people. The U.S. Eighth Air Force followed the next day with another 400 tons of bombs and carried out yet another raid by 210 bombers on February 15. Perhaps 100,000 persons died in Dresden in the air attacks, and much of the beautiful city was reduced to ashes.

After the war, the German and Russian authorities considered leveling the Dresden ruins to make way for new construction. But local leaders forced a compromise for rebuilding part of the city center and placing

the modern construction outside, in effect encircling old Dresden with a newer city. After reunification, Germany undertook the extensive reconstruction of the inner city over a period of years as a moral and political objective, unveiling the new works at various stages with much fanfare in an effort still ongoing.

Thus, Dresden has returned to its former grandeur as a center for art and culture. The bombing continues to rank as a historic benchmark in the power of conventional bombardment and the use of airpower against targets containing large numbers of civilians. However, its military value, critics say, did not justify its near destruction, and the city could have been spared, like Rome, Paris, Kyoto, and other cities in enemy territory during the war.

See also Air Warfare; Carpet Bombing; Strategic Bombing; U.S. Air Force; World War II

DRUG CARTELS

An illicit consortium of independent organizations formed to limit competition and control the production and distribution of narcotic drugs. Drug cartels are extremely well organized, well financed, efficient, and ruthless. Since the 1980s, they have come to dominate the international narcotics trade.

The current U.S. war on drugs began under the Nixon administration. Following his victory in the 1968 presidential election, Richard Nixon declared that drug abuse was "public enemy number one." Under Nixon, efforts to stop the flow of illegal drugs into the United States became increasingly focused on curtailing foreign production of marijuana and heroin. It was during the 1970s, however, that a growing U.S. demand for cocaine led to the creation of the earliest drug cartels.

COLOMBIAN DRUG CARTELS

The Medellín drug cartel of Medellín, Colombia, began in the mid-1970s when Colombian marijuana traffickers began smuggling small quantities of cocaine into the United States. As the trade grew, a diverse group of entrepreneurs became involved, ranging from well-respected individuals with backgrounds in ranching and horsing to petty criminals. The growing demand for cocaine soon prompted the expansion of the trade beyond small amounts tucked into suitcases. The cartel purchased private planes to carry its shipments, constructed more sophisticated drug laboratories, and even purchased a small island in the Caribbean for refueling its aircraft.

Violence, lapses in organization, and competition from the emergent Cali cartel (centered in Cali, Colombia) fractured the Medellín cartel in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Pablo Escobar, leader of the Medellín cartel, became one of the most wanted men in the world and was forced into hiding. A special Colombian police task force found and killed Escobar in 1993, leading to the primacy of the Cali cartel.

The Cali cartel had a more subtle style and sophisticated approach than the Medellín cartel. The members of the Cali cartel quickly reinvested their drug profits into legitimate businesses. They deliberately undermined the Medellín cartel as it became increasingly unpopular and violent. The Cali cartel went so far as to help Colombian police and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) track down Pablo Escobar. Though many leaders of the Cali cartel were arrested in the 1990s and are currently serving 10- to 15-year prison sentences, it is widely believed they are still running their business from jail cells, with the cooperation of the Colombian government.

OTHER DRUG CARTELS AND NARCO-TERRORISTS

In the 1960s and early 1970s, Mexico was known primarily as a supplier of marijuana. However, as U.S. efforts in Colombia slowed the flow of drugs from South America, Mexico emerged as a source of cocaine and heroin to meet U.S. demand. The Arellano-Felix cartel, based in Tijuana, Mexico, has been responsible for the shipment of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine into the United States since the 1990s.

Organized-crime groups in Asia, Africa, Italy, and the former Soviet Union have also been linked to the sale and production of illegal narcotics. Israeli, Russian, and west European drug traffickers are primarily responsible for the sale and distribution of MDMA (Ecstasy). Criminal groups in Southeast and southwestern Asia use New York City as a hub to move heroin into the United States. From there it is distributed up and down the eastern seaboard and into the Midwest. The sale and distribution of marijuana from Southeast Asia is generally limited to the West

Coast, but marijuana also enters the United States from Canada.

The end of the Cold War and a new focus on terrorism have altered the terminology of the drug war. The *narco-terrorist organization* has emerged as a new threat, defined as an organized group that participates in drug trafficking in order to fund politically motivated terrorist activities. The DEA claims that Afghanistan under Taliban rule was a preeminent example of a state funded by the illicit production of opium. However, regional experts argue that opium production was essentially wiped out by the Taliban's strict Islamic rule. Since the U.S. invasion in 2002 and the overthrow of the Taliban regime, production of Afghan opium has risen steadily.

Leaders of drug cartels are being retroactively defined by the DEA as having been narco-terrorists. For example, the career of Pablo Escobar, leader of the Medellín cartel throughout the 1980s, is now described as having consisted of "terrorist activities," such as the bombing of a commercial airliner in 1989. Escobar also ran for political office, campaigning for policy changes such as prohibiting the extradition of Colombian citizens to the United States. Escobar also was responsible for the assassination of politicians, presidential candidates, police officers, journalists, and Colombian supreme court justices.

Groups typically defined as terrorist groups, including Hezbollah, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), the Shining Path in Peru, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) in Spain, are now also being described in terms of their involvement in narco-terrorism. Most of these groups began as Marxist, socialist organizations and were defined as such until the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. In this instance, the Cold War, the war on drugs, and the war on terrorism merge indistinguishably.

The connection between drugs and terrorism is made even more explicit in UN Security Council Resolution 1373. The resolution, adopted in the immediate wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, remarks on "the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials" and emphasizes the "need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, sub-regional, regional and international levels to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security."

See also Afghanistan, War in; Narcotics, War on; Taliban; Terrorism, War on International

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DRUG WAR

See Narcotics, War on

DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY

Devices, processes, or techniques that may have both military and civilian uses. Closely related to dual-use are the *spin-off* and *spin-on* concepts. Spin-offs are technologies developed by the military that find commercial success, whereas spin-ons are technologies developed in the commercial sector that find military application.

EXAMPLES OF DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY

Throughout the 20th century, commercial and military developments have played off each other, both to the detriment and advantage of society. For example, developments made in commercial chemistry at the turn of the 20th century served the global community by helping to eradicate pests and disease. However, they also led to the production of toxic chemical agents such as chlorine gas, some of which were used against soldiers in World War I.

Other technologies, such as rocketry, have bounced back and forth from military developers to civilian enthusiasts and commercial industries. Computers also found early use and success in military applications, such as the development of artillery firing tables. The investment made by the U.S. military in systems such

as ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer) furthered computer engineering as a discipline, ultimately making massive contributions to the information age. The Internet and the Global Positioning System (GPS) were both born under the auspices of the Pentagon, revolutionizing communications and navigation for the world as a whole.

From nuclear reactors to chemical pesticides, from lightweight hardened materials to communication and navigation systems, dual-use technologies pervade the modern world. Although dual-use technologies abound, they are not free from controversy. Nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons are classic examples of the dilemmas of dual-use technologies. The same skills used to harness the atom for peaceful means might also be employed to divert nuclear materials to clandestine weapons programs. Currently, many policymakers are concerned that developing countries are relying increasingly on nuclear power for their energy needs. This trend has given rise to fears that nuclear proliferation could increase in the 21st century.

MONITORING DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY

In each technology sector, defining peaceful use from what is potentially harmful has become the domain of governmental departments, international bodies, and treaty organizations. In the arena of nuclear energy, the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves to investigate potential covert-weapons development programs while increasing the peaceful role of atomic power worldwide. Founded in 1957 as Atoms for Peace, the IAEA works with its member states and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure, and peaceful nuclear technologies. The IAEA's mission is three-pronged: (a) safety and security, (b) science and technology, and (c) safeguards and verification.

Dual-use industrial chemicals are monitored by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which implements the provisions of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The OPCW is charged with maintaining a regime to verify destruction of chemical weapons and with preventing their reemergence. The verification regime is a central component of the CWC and includes comprehensive data reporting and detailed on-site inspections.

In the United States, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity at the National Institutes of Health monitors dual-use research in the life sciences.

The board plays an advisory role in biological research that has legitimate scientific purposes but that may also pose a threat to public health and/or national security. The U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) oversees exports and technology transfer from the United States to other nations. The BIS is responsible for regulating the export of sensitive goods and technologies, enforcing export control, and cooperating with and assisting other countries on export control and strategic trade issues. In addition, BIS helps U.S. industry to comply with international arms-control agreements.

The United States participates in four multilateral control regimes that govern dual-use technologies. These include the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an informal voluntary association of countries that share the goals of nonproliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The MTCR also coordinates national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing missile proliferation. The Wassenaar Arrangement promotes transparency in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. The Nuclear Suppliers Group seeks to control exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology by its 30 member states. The Australia Group is an informal arrangement among exporting or transshipping countries aimed at minimizing the risk of assisting chemical and biological weapon (CBW) proliferation.

CHALLENGES FOR DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY

Budget reductions at the end of the Cold War forced a systemic reckoning of U.S. defense expenditures. In addition to reduced budgets, the need for maintaining technological superiority is an often-cited reason for government-supported dual-use research and development. As the reality of post–Cold War spending cuts set in, politicians and industry executives sought means to maintain research and development efforts. Dual-use was considered a highly promising initiative, and the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton both launched dual-use programs and policies to encourage technological and price competition.

Despite such efforts, the Technology Reinvestment Program (TRP)—the flagship of Department of Defense (DoD) dual-use technology strategy—was eliminated by the 1994 Republican Congress. The TRP emphasized the role of dual-use projects in revitalizing

the defense industry and was an attempt at creating a single industrial base for technology and defense. Critics of these initiatives maintained that the Clinton administration was imprudent in dismantling impediments to export and technology transfer, suggesting that some U.S. technologies should not fall into foreign hands.

Current U.S. government efforts are aimed at partnering with industry to jointly fund the development of dual-use technologies. The Department of Defense oversees the Dual Use Science and Technology Program (DUST) within the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The program links the military and civilian research and development communities, allowing the services to leverage scarce research funds by forming partnerships with private industry and universities. Other programs include NASA's Dual Use Technology Development Program and the navy's Office of Research and Technology Assessment (ORTA). Chartered under the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, ORTA is charged with transferring federally owned technologies and facilities to state and local government, educational institutions, and private industry.

Throughout the 20th century, U.S. military superiority was based on technological advantage. In the 21st century, experts agree, technology will prove even more critical to maintaining security. Dual-use technology programs aim to leverage the advanced technologies and efficient production capabilities of commercial industries wherever possible, thereby decreasing the operational-cost burden while continuing to strengthen overall military capability. However, differentiating between military and civilian uses has become so difficult that some analysts believe the concept of dual use is passé. Commercial-sector developments have become critical to armed forces worldwide, and multinational corporations and technology-transfer initiatives have allowed high technology to flow across borders.

See also Atoms for Peace; Biotechnology; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); Global Positioning System; Nanotechnology; Science, Technology, and Security

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DUCK AND COVER

Preparedness measure in the United States, followed and practiced in the 1950s and 1960s, in case of a nuclear attack. Following the conclusion of World War II, the United States found itself locked in a Cold War with the Soviet Union. Once the Soviet Union achieved a nuclear capability, American citizens began to prepare for a nuclear attack against the homeland. Among the domestic-preparedness measures undertaken by the United States were the construction of fallout shelters and the implementation of air-raid drills in schools and the workplace.

Duck and cover emerged as the battle cry of the American domestic-preparedness effort during those years. This public-awareness campaign reached the American public, particularly schoolchildren, in the form of a short film depicting a turtle practicing the duck-and-cover emergency response to a Soviet attack. As the bombs fell, the turtle "ducked and covered" by withdrawing into his shell. Likewise, children practiced taking refuge either under their desks or in a designated location in the school when the air-raid sirens sounded.

The duck-and-cover campaign remained a standard response to potential nuclear attack throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s. Eventually, it waned, however, partly because of thaws in U.S.–Soviet relations. Despite its eventual demise, the policy remains one of the most pervasive and successful homeland-security initiatives in American history.

See also Cold War

E

EARLY WARNING

Surveillance, identification, and assessment that enable the government and military leaders to respond effectively to threats in a timely manner. Having learned an important lesson from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States after World War II planned to develop an early warning system that could provide surveillance of the North American airspace. The system, however, was difficult to develop because of the size of the United States, the short range of existing radar, and the lack of radar systems in North America.

By 1950, however, the U.S. Air Force had developed the Lashup medium-range radar network at 43 sites located near major urban areas throughout the country. In 1951, the United States and Canada began the joint Pinetree Radar Line project, which consisted of 33 stations located along the United States-Canadian border. The project was completed in 1954. By 1957, the system known as the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line project became operational.

The DEW Line consisted of a series of 58 radars along the Arctic Circle from Alaska to Greenland. After a series of upgrades to the system, the North Warning System became operational in 1985. The North Warning System currently consists of 10 long-range radars (AN/FPS-117), 36 short-range radars (AN/FPS-124), and a developmental site in northern Canada.

The backbone of the U.S. early warning system is the Joint Surveillance System (JSS), which is a jointly operated network of long-range surveillance radars in Canada, Mexico, and several South American countries. Primarily operated in the United States by the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) and the U.S. Air Force, the JSS collects data from various points throughout North American and feeds it to command, fusion, and intelligence centers where it is collated and monitored.

The information provided by the JSS heightens the capability of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to effectively defend North American airspace in the event of a missile or air attack. Similar early warning systems to alert the United States and its allies of a possible attack have been put in place in other countries, including Iceland and Norway.

Early warning systems have also recently been implemented to assess domestic threats, such as the increased risk of famine, natural disaster, or civil war. For example, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has a Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS) that measures changes in land vegetation. FEWS uses satellites to collect photosynthetic activity data and infrared data on rainfall. The system evaluates a country's or a region's vulnerability to environmental changes to better inform authorities so that they can manage famine risks through timely intervention.

See also Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)

EASTERN BLOC

Eastern European countries—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania—which remained under

heavy Soviet influence during the Cold War. At the conclusion of World War II, the Soviet Union sought to establish permanent communist control over Eastern Europe. The Soviet efforts initially focused on five nations: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. These nations, governed by communist regimes largely subservient to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, comprised the Eastern bloc.

Because Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania had supported Germany during the war, Soviet forces occupied these nations after the war's conclusion. At first, each nation was permitted to elect its own representative government. However, by 1948, the Soviet Union had dissolved each government and outlawed all political parties except the communists. Past political leaders were deported and many were sent to prison camps in the Soviet Union. Even communist leaders who were not considered loyal to the Soviet Union were removed. Although the United States and Great Britain opposed the Soviet aggression, they were too consumed with the reconstruction of Western Europe to intervene.

In Czechoslovakia, the Soviets withdrew their forces in 1945 after the local communist party won the national elections. The communists in Czechoslovakia were fiercely loyal to the Soviet Union, so further military occupation was unnecessary. The opposite was true in Poland. The pro-Soviet Lublin group that had assumed control during the war appeared likely to lose the upcoming election. Therefore, Soviet forces were dispatched to crush the opposition.

Once these nations were firmly under communist control, their economies became inextricably linked to that of the Soviet Union. Bulgaria and Romania were converted into predominantly agricultural nations; their produce was intended to sustain the communist empire. Farmland was collectivized and individual ownership was virtually eliminated. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland became centers for large industrial developments. Many of the major companies were nominally owned by both the Soviet Union and the home nations, but the profits were frequently funneled back to the Soviet Union.

As the Cold War unfolded, contact between the Eastern bloc and Western European nations was increasingly forbidden. Trade with nations outside the bloc was prohibited, and any deviation from the communist program issued in Moscow was quashed. In 1948, when Czechoslovakia asked to be included in the Marshall Plan, the U.S. program of aid to rebuild *Western Europe*, the Soviets quickly installed a new regime.

For nearly a decade, the Eastern bloc remained separated from the rest of Europe. When Soviet leader Joseph Stalin died in 1953, the Eastern bloc nations briefly regained a measure of autonomy. Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin's successor, released many of the political prisoners from the Eastern bloc nations and reduced the amount of Soviet troops stationed in these nations. More importantly, in 1956 he denounced Stalin as a failed leader. If Stalin was misguided, the leaders of the Eastern bloc reasoned, then many of his policies were also flawed. Khrushchev's amicable policy towards Yugoslavia reinforced this rationale. Stalin had belittled Yugoslavia for its refusal to enter the Eastern bloc. When Khrushchev recognized Yugoslavia, it indicated that a communist country could successfully exist outside the repressive Eastern bloc.

The increasing disillusionment with Stalinist communism soon led to open revolt in Poland and Hungary. Soviet efforts to transform the two countries into heavily industrialized states caused a great economic upheaval for their respective populations. In 1956, Polish workers violently protested their low wages and the high rate of inflation. The new Polish leadership openly disagreed with Soviet policy and refused to quell the revolt. The Soviet Union considered dispatching the Soviet Army to subdue the protestors but feared that the entire country would offer resistance.

At the same time, political protests erupted across Hungary. In October 1956, the Hungarian prime minister allowed noncommunist parties to participate in the government. Soon after, under immense pressure, he announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Faced with the dissolution of the Eastern bloc, the Soviet army quickly invaded Hungary and brutally suppressed the insurgent government. Khrushchev repealed the reforms he had introduced and once again distanced the Soviet Union from Yugoslavia. However, after these events, the Soviet Union never regained its complete dominance over the Eastern bloc.

When the Soviet communists overthrew Khrushchev in 1964, the Eastern bloc began to gradually crumble. Eastern bloc leaders distrusted the new leadership that emerged in Moscow. Furthermore, the split between the Soviet Union and China again illustrated that forms of communism different from the Soviet Union's could exist. Under these conditions, the Eastern bloc nations initiated trade relationships with their Western European counterparts.

In Hungary, the government loosened its control of the economy and allowed greater cultural freedom for

its citizens. Romania attempted to industrialize its economy rather then relying solely on the Soviet Union's agricultural policy. Although Romania remained in the Warsaw Pact, its leaders adopted a more conciliatory stance towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Still, the Soviet Union was unwilling to allow its communist empire to disintegrate. In 1968, an economic depression in Czechoslovakia caused sharp civil unrest. Although the Czech government reaffirmed the nation's role in the Warsaw Pact and still prevented noncommunist parties from participating in the government, concessions were made to ease the dissent. Government controls over the media were loosened and other political parties, though not allowed to enter government, could legally form and protest. In response, the Soviet Union sent its forces to crush the protestors. Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, introduced a new doctrine: If a communist government appeared ready to collapse, another communist government could intervene to stabilize it.

Although it failed, the Czech uprising stirred similar protests in Poland. In 1970, the Polish government opened the nation's economy to western investment in an attempt to modernize it. However, by 1976, the Polish economy had sunk into a severe depression. By 1980, strikes, organized by Lech Walesa and his Solidarity union, had erupted across the nation. At first, the Polish government allowed Solidarity to exist if it discussed only economic issues. But when the union called for freedom of the press and democratic elections, the Soviet Union urged the Polish government to abolish the union and even threatened to send Soviet troops into Poland. The invasion was dismissed, however, when members of NATO warned they would boycott all Soviet and Eastern bloc products.

The Polish government declared a state of emergency and then finally outlawed the Solidarity union in 1982. But the movement had a profound effect on both the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union. The Eastern bloc nations no longer recognized the Soviet Union as a controlling authority. In 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced his reform program, known as *perestroika*, which was designed to radically improve relations with the West.

Within three years, as the Soviet Union slowly crumbled, the Eastern bloc was officially dismantled. In 1989, all five Eastern bloc nations replaced their governments with freely elected ones. Over the next 15 years, the Eastern European nations were quickly assimilated into a reunited Europe. Stunningly, NATO was expanded to include these former communist adversaries, and in 2004, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia (which had comprised Czechoslovakia) joined the European Union (EU).

See also Cold War; Communism; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Perestroika; Stalin, Josef; Warsaw Pact

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ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE

The use of covert means to gather intelligence that helps one's own economy or undermines the economy of another country. Since the end of the Cold War, economic competition has grown to challenge military competition as the main focus of international rivalries. As a result, many countries have begun to employ government intelligence agencies to help domestic businesses compete more effectively against foreign firms. The economic espionage they perform includes stealing the secrets of others, protecting one's own secrets, bribery, and even corporate sabotage.

In the business world, access to accurate information about market conditions or the plans and secrets of rivals can afford a company a substantive competitive advantage. Major international firms have long recognized the importance of such information. Perhaps the first truly international banking firm, the House of Fugger, compiled extensive and detailed information from its offices and agents throughout Europe as early as the 1300s. This included information about commercial and political developments that could affect business in different places on the continent. The data was summarized and distributed to the bank's leading officers to help them make better business decisions.

Like the House of Fugger, many modern firms go to great lengths to acquire valuable information, even to the extent of breaking the law. Many have enlisted the help of government agencies to aid them in stealing

secrets from foreign competitors. One of the most widely publicized examples of government-aided corporate spying was the 1981 IBM-Hitachi case, known as Japscam. The case centered on a former IBM employee who had stolen a highly classified IBM design workbook and passed it along to an employee of the Japanese electronics firm Hitachi. Investigators discovered that the former IBM employee sent instructions for meeting the Hitachi representative through the Japanese consulate in San Francisco. The Japanese government's official commercial representative at the consulate personally transmitted the messages to Hitachi. The two companies eventually settled the case out of court, with Hitachi paying IBM a $300 million penalty.

A 1987 CIA report titled *Japan: Foreign Intelligence and Security Services* found that the Japanese government is very interested in technological and scientific developments in the United States, as well as in U.S. trade and monetary policy in Asia. The report claimed that 80% of Japan's government intelligence-collecting efforts were directed at the United States and Western Europe. The report highlighted what it said was the critical intelligence-gathering role of Japanese government organizations such as the Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Japanese External Trade and Research Organization (JETRO).

Japan is not the only nation using its intelligence services to gather sensitive technical and commercial information from the United States. In 1992, then-CIA director Robert M. Gates testified before Congress that the agency saw a significant shift in the activities of many foreign intelligence services from gathering political information to gathering economic information. He identified the United States as their primary target. According to Gates, at least 20 foreign countries at the time were involved in intelligence activities that were detrimental, at some level, to the nation's economic interests. Since that time, government analysts say that the number has risen.

It is no secret why other nations are interested in American economic and technological information. According to the CIA, U.S. companies are responsible for about one-quarter of the world's investment in scientific research. Such information has enormous economic as well as political value for anyone who can acquire it.

Concern about the growth of economic espionage led Congress to pass the Economic Espionage Act in 1996. Before that time, there were few federal laws concerning the theft of trade secrets or other confidential commercial information. Those laws that existed applied to a limited number of individuals or situations. For example, a federal trade secrets act passed in 1948 covered only the disclosure of information by federal employees. For the most part, economic information was protected under a variety of state and local laws. The patchwork nature of these statutes offered many opportunities to skirt the law. The 1996 act aimed to close loopholes in the current laws by making a single federal law to cover all cases of economic espionage.

The Economic Espionage Act provides a comprehensive definition of trade secrets that expands on existing definitions. It also covers all forms of information written or stored in any form, including electronically stored data and even information simply memorized by an individual. The law makes it a federal offense to knowingly steal or obtain a trade secret by deception; to copy a trade secret in any way without authorization; to convey a trade secret to an unauthorized person; or to buy or receive a stolen trade secret. Individuals convicted under the act face a prison sentence of up to 15 years and a maximum fine of $500,000. A company or organization can be fined up to $5,000,000 for violating the law.

Not everyone is convinced that the Economic Espionage Act has been effective in deterring the theft of trade secrets. By broadening the definition of a trade secret, the act makes it easier for companies to prosecute industrial spies. However, companies are reluctant to report economic espionage to law enforcement officials for fear that the publicity will negatively impact the price of their stock. No law can address or compensate a company for the effects of such negative publicity. According to official U.S. Department of Justice figures, as of November 2004, only 28 cases had been prosecuted under the act.

The relatively low number of federal prosecutions for economic espionage suggests that the U.S. government and U.S. businesses need to focus more seriously on the threat. In an article titled "Industrial Espionage Today and Information Wars of Tomorrow," Paul Joyal, the president of a company involved in information security, outlines steps that foreign companies and countries are taking to protect themselves from economic competitors. He describes a French government initiative to instruct French firms how to protect their own information and to provide them with competitive intelligence gathered from other countries. He also cites efforts by the German

electronics firm Philips to create an information gathering and analysis group to help with strategic planning. According to former CIA director Gates, similar efforts at home will be vital to assure the United States' future economic strength.

See Also Espionage; Intelligence and Counterintelligence

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ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT
See ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Punitive trade or investment policies pursued by one nation against another in an effort to change the target nation's policies. The United States uses economic sanctions to foster several national security policy goals. The objectives most often pursued through economic sanctions include promoting democracy and human rights; ending civil wars; and combating drug trafficking, terrorism, and weapons proliferation.

The United Nations has also used sanctions frequently. Chapter VII of the UN Charter allows the Security Council to apply measures such as the complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, as well as the severance of diplomatic relations. Economic sanctions sponsored by the United Nations throughout the 1980s contributed to the fall of South Africa's racist apartheid regime in the early 1990s.

HISTORICAL USE OF SANCTIONS

Economic sanctions are one of the oldest nonmilitary tools for applying political pressure against an opponent. As far back as 432 BCE, Athens imposed a trade ban on the city-state of Megara. Throughout most of the second millennium (1001–2000 CE), Muslim caliphs would close Middle Eastern ports to Christian commerce in response to political or religious disputes. During the Napoleonic Wars (1800–1815), the British Empire fought France primarily by imposing a naval blockade on French-dominated Europe. The Northern naval blockade of Southern ports during the American Civil War deprived the Confederacy of needed supplies. It also helped prevent the British from interfering in the conflict by convincing them that the South could not win the war.

However, it was only after World War I that economic sanctions became widely perceived as an effective alternative to the use of force. U.S. president Woodrow Wilson was a leading advocate of the use of economic sanctions to impose one nation's will on another state. The growth of international business and finance after World War II made nations more dependent on one another's business and fostered trade and cross-border investment. This growing interdependence made sanctions a more effective weapon than ever before. Countries could no longer think of isolating themselves economically from their neighbors. Economic penalties also could now be as devastating to a nation's power and national security as military ones.

The 1990s are commonly referred to as the *sanctions decade,* given the widespread imposition of sanctions during this time. Perhaps the most noteworthy and punitive economic measures taken during this period were imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War. To prevent Iraq from rebuilding its armed forces and developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the United Nations imposed a strict oil-for-food sanctions program. Under this program, the United Nations administered all the proceeds from sales of Iraqi oil and used them to purchase food supplies for Iraq's citizens. This ensured that the money would not be used for the development of arms or WMD.

Iraq is just one of several countries targeted by U.S. economic sanctions in recent years. The United States has imposed sanctions on Iran, accusing the country of seeking to acquire nuclear weapons technology. Sanctions are also in place against North Korea in an attempt to end that nation's production of nuclear weapons. The success of these efforts has been mixed. In the case of Iraq, the sanctions appear to have been successful in preventing Iraqi rearmament and WMD

efforts. The Iraqi army crumbled quickly in the Iraq War of 2003, and postwar inspections revealed no evidence of active Iraqi WMD programs. But as of 2005, North Korea, refuses to renounce its nuclear arsenal and Iran continues to assert that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.

THE CUBAN EMBARGO

One of the most controversial cases of economic sanctions is the long-standing U.S. economic embargo against Cuba. In 1959, communist guerilla leader Fidel Castro successfully overthrew Cuba's U.S.-backed dictator, Fulgencio Batista. Castro immediately established diplomatic relations with the United States's archrival, the Soviet Union. The following year, Castro confiscated all American-owned oil refineries in Cuba and nationalized foreign-owned property in the country.

These moves led the administration of U.S. president John F. Kennedy to announce an embargo against Cuba on February 7, 1962. Kennedy banned all Cuban imports to the United States, as well as the reexport of U.S. products to Cuba from other countries. The United States also cut off aid to countries that provided assistance to Cuba. The U.S. action was intended to increase the costs to the Soviet Union of maintaining Castro in power. The United States also hoped to undermine popular support for the Castro regime by creating widespread poverty and hardship under his rule.

Later in 1962, U.S. officials discovered that the Soviet Union was constructing intermediate-range missile sites in Cuba. In response, President Kennedy imposed a complete naval blockade—all ships entering Cuban waters would be stopped and searched by U.S. Navy vessels. Any ships that refused would be sunk. After a tense standoff, Kennedy ended the blockade after the Soviets agreed to withdraw their missiles from Cuba. The agreement that ended this Cuban Missile Crisis also lifted some of the embargo conditions, but U.S. citizens were still forbidden to travel to Cuba or conduct financial and commercial transactions with Cuban firms. The following year the United States imposed new economic sanctions by freezing all Cuban assets in the United States.

The U.S. embargo succeeded in impoverishing Cuba and draining Soviet financial resources. The Soviet Union spent about $6 billion each year to support Cuba's economy and military. Meanwhile, although Cuba sank deeper into poverty, Castro's popularity remained largely unaffected. Average Cubans saw the U.S. embargo as an act of imperialism; they resented the attempt by their powerful neighbor to interfere with Cuban affairs. The state-controlled media painted a picture of Castro as a national hero, standing up to the U.S. bully.

The 1990s saw a ratcheting up of the economic pressure on Castro's regime. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 eliminated Cuba's main source of financial aid. In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act, which penalized foreign corporations that invested in property confiscated by the Cuban government. The following year, however, U.S. president Bill Clinton suspended the right to sue foreign companies investing in Cuba. Clinton pointed to the progress made under the U.S.-led multilateral initiative to promote democratic change in Cuba.

As of 2005, the embargo on Cuba is still in place, despite calls by many for an end to the sanctions. Critics point out that more than 40 years of sanctions have had no effect in bringing about political change in Cuba. Castro remained in power, seemingly as popular as ever, and American citizens and companies have successfully found ways around the ban on visiting and doing business with Cuba. Observers point out that the ones who have suffered the most have been average Cubans, who have no control over their political situation.

A different opinion comes from proponents of democratization theory, who argue that economic openness is much more effective at bringing political change than are sanctions. They suggest that free trade brings in new influences that undermine autocratic rulers, who derive strength from controlling the ideas to which their people are exposed. By contrast, cutting a nation off from the world allows its leaders to portray the country as the victim of a foreign plot and helps rally popular support for the government. The example of Cuba seems to support their argument, although successes in South Africa and Iraq suggest that the effectiveness of sanctions cannot easily be predicted.

See also Arab Oil Embargo; Democratization

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EISENHOWER DOCTRINE (1957)

Policy affirming the U.S. intention to dispense economic and military assistance to Middle Eastern nations to contain communism. From the early days of his administration, President Dwight D. Eisenhower recognized the need to develop a policy that would limit Soviet influence in the Middle East and protect U.S. oil interests.

The rise of Arab nationalism in many Middle Eastern nations in the 1950s was of great concern to the United States, as various Arab nationalist leaders were poised to overturn established governments. Eisenhower believed that new nationalist regimes would destabilize the Middle East and invite Soviet intervention.

Eisenhower was deeply concerned about the stability of Iran in 1953. The Iranian nationalist Mohammed Mossadeq was in power and had nationalized the oil industry, wresting control from a British-owned oil company. Although a British problem, Eisenhower was alarmed because the left-leaning Mossadeq was responding to overtures by the Soviet Union. Eisenhower feared that the Soviet Union would support the Mossadeq government, eventually closing off the Iranian oil supply to Great Britain, the United States, and its allies.

As a result, the United States supported a covert, CIA-backed overthrow of Mossadeq's government and the establishment of General Fazlollah Zahedi as the prime minister, with the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, reinstated as the head of state. The United States sent $45 million to bolster the new pro-U.S. government. Eisenhower was satisfied with the success of this mission and believed that the United States must assert itself throughout the Middle East to stake its claim to the region's oil supply.

Egyptian nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser, who ousted British colonial rulers from Egypt and became the leader of Egypt in 1954, also concerned Eisenhower. Nasser exerted power not only in Egypt but also was influential throughout the Arab world. When the U.S. officials learned that Nasser had agreed to a covert weapons deal with the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain attempted to woo him by offering to help fund his mission to build the Aswan Dam on the Nile River, a huge modernization project. When Nasser gave diplomatic recognition to the Communist People's Republic of China and entertained offers from the Soviet Union to finance the Aswan Dam, the United States recanted its offer.

In 1956, Nasser nationalized the British- and French-controlled Suez Canal in an effort to fund the Aswan Dam project. Diplomatic means of resolving the conflict failed when Britain bombed Egyptian military bases on October 31. The UN General Assembly called for Britain, France, and Israel to cease fire, and on November 7, all three nations laid down their arms.

Eisenhower immediately acted to stabilize the Middle East. Most of all, he hoped to stop the Soviets from gaining influence in the region. With Egypt besieged, the Soviet Union had come to its defense during the Suez crisis. Eisenhower wanted to make sure that the Soviets gained no further ground.

The last of the British and French troops left the Suez on December 22, 1956. The next month, on January 5, 1957, Eisenhower proposed his Eisenhower Doctrine to Congress, in which he asked that U.S. economic and military assistance be given to any Middle Eastern government attempting to resist communist or Soviet encroachment. Congress approved the Eisenhower Doctrine in March.

Later that spring, Eisenhower sent funds and the U.S. Sixth Fleet to boost an effort by King Hussein of Jordan to prevent a takeover by his Nasser-inspired army officers. While the U.S. effort to keep King Hussein in power was successful, the plan to counterbalance Soviet influence in pro-Soviet Syria was not. In January 1958, however, the immediate threat of a Soviet alliance with Syria ended when the latter nation agreed to ally itself with Egypt and become part of the United Arab Republic.

Meanwhile, in Iraq, King Faisal II, Crown Prince Abdulillah, and the prime minister were all killed in a brutal coup in Baghdad in July 1958. This news alarmed Eisenhower who feared that the loss of Iraq to pro-Soviet Iraqi nationalists could mean the end of U.S. influence in the Middle East. When Lebanon's leader asked for U.S. support to withstand a coup, Eisenhower agreed. With congressional support, the United States sent 7,000 troops to Lebanon. In his request to Congress, Eisenhower made his purpose clear. The deployment of troops was to signal the

involved presence and strength of the United States in the Middle East, not to cause hostilities.

By the end of 1958, the Eisenhower administration was reconsidering aspects of the Eisenhower Doctrine, particularly its rejection of Arab nationalism. Although U.S. priorities to maintain stability in the Middle East, protect U.S. access to the oil fields and refineries, and contain communism would not change, the antagonism toward Arab nationalist governments would be modified.

See also Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Middle East Conflicts

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EISENHOWER, DWIGHT D., AND NATIONAL POLICY

Thirty-fourth president of the United States (1953–1961), whose administration began to deal in earnest with the challenges of the Cold War. The national security policy of the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) was based on the belief that the United States must contain communism and stop its spread. To accomplish this goal, President Eisenhower relied on powerful U.S. air and naval forces, a superior nuclear arsenal, and the maintenance of strong relationships with U.S. allies and third-world nations.

CONTAINING COMMUNISM

As the former commander of the Allied forces in World War II, commander of the U.S. postwar occupation of Germany, and supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Eisenhower entered the presidency with more foreign policy experience than most of his predecessors. He began planning his national security strategy before he was inaugurated. Once in office, he gathered numerous national security policy specialists to hammer out his New Look policy, which he endorsed in October 1953.

As was true of President Harry S. Truman's national security strategy, Eisenhower announced his purpose to contain communism in Europe, in the Far East, the Middle East, and in the rest of the third world. Unlike Truman, Eisenhower stated that his government would strive to limit the federal budget as well. He stated that he would trim defense spending by reducing the nation's need for ground troops. Instead of maintaining a massive infantry, the United States would rely on its air and naval power as well as its nuclear arsenal. To avoid becoming embroiled in another lengthy, costly war like the Korean conflict, the United States would seek to deter military confrontations.

During the Truman administration, Eisenhower had been concerned about the ever-escalating U.S. military budget. Truman had come close to quadrupling the defense budget to finance the Korean War and to create and develop nuclear weapons, causing the federal budget to record a $14 billion deficit in January 1952, a huge sum for that era. Eisenhower was convinced that to contain communism, the United States had to be strong at home. A major component of that strength, he believed, was a balanced budget and a strong economy. Without this foundation, Eisenhower insisted, the United States was vulnerable should any international crisis occur. It was this conviction that spurred Eisenhower to run for president as a Republican in 1952.

DETERRENCE

Because a crucial component of the New Look policy was the use of deterrence to prevent costly wars and conflicts, Eisenhower recognized the U.S. need for strong allies capable of participating in their own defense and eager to cooperate with the United States in preventing or defusing Soviet aggression.

To help its U.S. allies, the Eisenhower administration upheld the NATO alliance by contributing economic aid to NATO nations and fostering sound trading relationships with them. Eisenhower's national security policy also reflected his conviction that all free (noncommunist) countries, including those in the developing or third world, needed economic health so that stable, effective governments could take root and so that their citizens would be strong enough to resist communist propaganda and infiltration.

For the deterrence strategy to be effective, Eisenhower realized that the United States must maintain technologically superior nuclear weapons. During his administration, he agreed to expand the nuclear arsenal, but only to the extent that it would be perceived as a deterrent to the Soviets. Although Eisenhower supported a nuclear weapons buildup, he also recognized that, to balance the budget and control defense spending, the United States had to make efforts to limit the arms race.

Eisenhower was horrified by the specter of nuclear devastation. From his earliest speeches as president, he made clear his wish to avoid a nuclear confrontation at all costs. Although he communicated these thoughts to the Soviets, and although the two superpowers engaged in arms talks during his administration, it was not until the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963 during the administration of President John F. Kennedy that any formal agreement would take place.

COVERT ACTIONS

Eisenhower was a firm proponent of the use of covert action, or clandestine operations, to contain communism. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), formed in 1947, had become an important instrument of U.S. foreign policy by the time Eisenhower entered office. In 1954, Eisenhower's national security policy specified that the CIA was to covertly undermine the procommunist political groups in noncommunist nations threatened by the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China.

Eisenhower did not only expect the CIA to engage in missions to hinder communist and leftist organizations, he also intended the agency to undertake clandestine operations that would encourage foreign governments and their citizens to look favorably on the United States and its allies. Covert action had many advantages: Unlike full-blown military missions, secret operations were comparatively less costly and were unlikely to be discovered to be connected to the United States.

Eisenhower approved numerous CIA-backed covert missions during his administration, the most successful being the overthrow of the Iranian procommunist nationalist leader Mohammed Mossadeq in Iran, which allowed the shah of Iran to regain power. The least fruitful covert mission was the attempt to overthrow and assassinate Cuban leader Fidel Castro and his supporters in Cuba, a plan that culminated in the fiasco known as the Bay of Pigs invasion, which

occurred at the beginning of President John F. Kennedy's administration in 1961.

ALLIANCES AND THE NSC

Although the United States resorted to covert operations to contain communism throughout Europe during Eisenhower's administration, it is accepted that Western Europe was rescued from Soviet aggression because of U.S. economic assistance and the powerful collaboration of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

A strong defender of the NATO alliance, Eisenhower strove to build similar alliances in the Far East and the Middle East. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was established in 1954 to halt the spread of communism in Southeast Asia after France withdrew from Indochina in 1954. The Baghdad Pact, formed in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan (with support from the United States), sought to prevent Soviet incursions into these nations that bordered the Soviet Union's southwest provinces.

Perhaps the most unique feature of Eisenhower's national security policy among Cold War presidents was his intensive use of the National Security Council (NSC) and the elaborate, highly organized bureaucracy his administration maintained to determine the course of national policy.

See also Containment; Covert Action; Covert Operations; Deterrence; Truman, Harry S., and National Policy

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ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Any use of the electromagnetic spectrum, or tactics related to the use of the electromagnetic spectrum, as strategy in a military conflict. The most commonly practiced types of electronic warfare are *jamming,*

which falls under the category of electronic counter measures (ECM), and eavesdropping on enemy communications, which goes by the term signals intelligence gathering (SIGINT).

The purpose of jamming is to limit an opponent's ability to exchange information by overriding radio transmissions or sending signals to deny radar detection or substitute false information. The use of intelligence gathering has grown more significant in direct relation to the increased technical complexity of modern warfare and has recently come to play an important role in determining whether states go to war in the first place.

The strategic response to electronic counter measures are electronic protective measures, the purpose of which are to undermine attempts to deny use of the electromagnetic spectrum. A common method is to quickly switch frequency channels according to a prescribed pattern, known only to the transmitter and the receiver. This is known as frequency-hopping spread spectrum.

The counterpart to signal intelligence gathering is electronic support measures (ESM) to gain intelligence about the enemy. The information gained from electronic support measures may be used as the basis for ECM or electronic counter-counter measures (ECCM) and threat recognition, avoidance, targeting, and homing.

Strategies and tactics related to electronic warfare have played an important role in modern conflicts. The jamming of Voice of America broadcasts impacted U.S. propaganda during the Cold War. Even before that, failure to adequately protect communications was central to the Russian defeat at Tannenberg during World War I, a defeat so significant that news of it was censored from the British Press. A better-known example was the interception of the Zimmerman telegram, which played a central role in bringing the United States into World War I. The cracking of the Nazi Enigma code by a group of top British mathematicians and amateur problem solvers was also an important and dramatic subplot determining the outcome of World War II.

The development of the Internet and government attempts to regulate it has led to a new type of electronic warfare, whereby activists override e-mail monitoring systems by deliberately sending numerous messages containing words or phrases that such systems are put in place to pick up. Similarly, computer viruses have emerged as a new method of electronic warfare as weapons systems become increasingly reliant on software and programming. Computer viruses function similarly to biological viruses in that they are contagious and capable of self-reproduction. The computer virus has gone from being a theoretical concept, to an oddity, to a common problem in a very short period, highlighting the concomitant nature of technological advancement with technological challenge.

Computer viruses have become an increasingly popular method of electronic warfare for a number of reasons, including their size, operational ability, and persistence. The amount of program code required for an effective virus is vastly disproportional to the amount of damage it can do. At the same time, viruses require little to no information about the program they are infecting and may attack a wide variety of functions. The ability of some viruses to replicate themselves makes the job of eradication itself crippling from the standpoint of time consumption. It also raises the level of complexity and threshold of assurance that the problem has actually been neutralized.

The so-called war on terrorism and its attendant notions of an elusive, stateless enemy, organized by communication networks that direct isolated strikes, guarantees that issues related to electronic warfare will continue to play an ever-increasing role in the practice of conflict in general.

See also Computer Security; Computer Viruses

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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

The process of preparing, preventing, responding to, and recovering from natural and man-made disasters and emergencies. Throughout the 19th century, the U.S. Congress enacted more than 100 separate acts to provide local assistance in response to various natural disasters. In the first half of the 20th century, federal disaster assistance remained scattered among various federal agencies, such as the Bureau of Public Roads and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. It was not

until a series of disasters in the 1960s and 1970s—including several severe hurricanes and a number of devastating earthquakes—that Congress enacted legislation to expand the role of the federal government in disaster aid.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created through Executive Order 12148, signed by President Jimmy Carter in 1979. FEMA organized into a single agency several emergency management programs, including the Federal Insurance Administration, the U.S. Fire Administration, the National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program, and the Federal Preparedness Agency. FEMA is concerned with both natural hazards (including floods, hurricanes, thunderstorms, winter storms and extreme cold, earthquakes, volcanoes, landslides and mudslides, tsunamis, and fire) and technological hazards (such as household chemical emergencies, nuclear power plant emergencies, terrorism, chemical and biological emergencies, and nuclear and radiological attack).

Emergency planning is usually divided into four areas—evacuation, shelter, mitigation, and recovering from disaster. Evacuation involves removing people from the immediate area of a disaster. This can be complicated by obstacles such as downed power lines or washed-out bridges and roads, as well as by panic, confusion, or the refusal of some individuals to abandon their homes and possessions. Providing shelter is also a challenge, especially if the disaster is large in scale or duration. A hurricane, for example, may require finding short-term shelter for thousands of people who have been evacuated. It may also mean providing longer-term shelter for those left homeless after a disaster.

Managing water supplies can be the most important issue during a period of longer-term shelter needs, and knowing how to decontaminate water is critical to the health of those staying in a shelter. Managing food supplies to avoid illness is also important. The American Red Cross and the Salvation Army, assisted by community and other disaster relief groups, often work with local authorities to set up mass care shelters in schools, municipal buildings, and churches; and provide food, medicine, and basic sanitary facilities.

Mitigation entails measures taken to minimize the damage to people and property in the case of a disaster. Mitigation may also include calling out the National Guard to assist local and state police in maintaining law and order, preventing looting, and directing evacuation. Ideally, mitigation measures are implemented before a disaster strikes. However, even after a disaster, there are actions that can be taken to avoid or reduce the impact of the next disaster. Building sea walls to reduce the impact of future hurricanes and reengineering a river levee to prevent future flooding are examples of post-disaster mitigation.

Recovery includes cleaning up after a disaster and providing long-term help to rebuild communities hit by disasters. FEMA distributes emergency relief funds to any area designated by the president as a federal disaster area. These funds are used to repair basic infrastructure (such as roads, water and power facilities, and telecommunications), rebuild public buildings, and help local citizens and businesses severely affected by the disaster get back on their feet.

In March 2003, FEMA was placed under the authority of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the DHS was created to coordinate an *all-hazards approach* to national security. This gave it responsibility for responding to disasters of all types, whether natural or man-made. This move reflects a more comprehensive definition of national security since the September 11 attacks, a definition that includes restoring order and normal functioning in the wake of disaster.

See also Bioterrorism; Early Warning; Federal Emergency Management Agency; First Responders; Homeland Security; Homeland Security, Department of; Public Health, National Security and; Threat Advisory Levels

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ENEMY COMBATANTS

Extraordinary status conferred by the United States on detainees suspected of terrorism. The term is used to designate individuals the United States considers to be operating outside standards of acceptable conduct during wartime and who are thus not entitled to protections offered by U.S. or international law.

Enemy combatant became a prominent term following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC. The United States retaliated the

following month by invading Afghanistan, whose government was harboring the terrorist group al-Qaeda, which launched the attacks. Many of the fighters captured by U.S. troops were irregular forces—either al-Qaeda members or supporters of the Afghan's Taliban government. These prisoners were classified as enemy combatants to distinguish them from prisoners of war—uniformed military personnel guaranteed certain rights under the Third Geneva Convention of 1949.

Military commanders have the authority to determine whether an individual is considered a prisoner of war or an enemy combatant. The administration of President George W. Bush asserted that those classified as enemy combatants may be held indefinitely without being accused of any crime. It has also determined that the government may detain enemy combatants without revealing their whereabouts, and that it may transfer them to the custody of countries that practice torture. U.S. law forbids such treatment of ordinary citizens or prisoners-of-war.

A significant number of enemy combatants in the war on terrorism have been detained at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Guantánamo's exceptional legal status—its location on Cuba excludes it from any U.S. judicial district—has allowed for ambiguous detention periods and eased requirements to hold individuals. The detention of these individuals, known simply as the *detainees,* has spurred extensive legal and public debate about the president's wartime powers and how to prosecute enemy combatants in the war on terrorism.

See also Afghanistan, War in; Al-Qaeda; Geneva Conventions; Guantánamo; Prisoner of War (POW); Taliban; Terrorism, War on International

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ENERGY DEPENDENCE
See ENERGY POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

ENERGY POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The impact of U.S. energy production and consumption policies on national security. Since the early 20th century, the U.S. economy has been fueled mainly by petroleum products. By the late 1920s, automobiles had largely replaced the horse and oil-fired engines supplanted steam engines in most U.S. industries. At that time, the United States produced enough oil to meet its domestic demands. In the 1930s, American oil companies were awarded a concession to drill for oil in Saudi Arabia, where vast deposits had been discovered in the previous decade.

Following World War II, it became clear that the U.S. economy was growing beyond the nation's ability to fuel it. Foreign oil sources, particularly in the Middle East, were becoming vitally important to the United States at the very moment that France and Great Britain were withdrawing from the Middle East as part of the larger process of decolonization. This left the United States as the dominant Western power in the region and led to close cooperation with Saudi Arabia.

U.S. Middle East policy since that time has focused on ensuring an unimpeded flow of oil to the United States. The necessity of maintaining a steady supply of energy from the region has been complicated by a history of political crises and conflicts, which have posed increasingly severe challenges to U.S. national security.

MIDDLE EAST OIL SHOCKS

U.S. support for the nation of Israel has been at the root of many of the difficulties the United States has encountered in the Middle East. After Israel's founding in 1948, the United States soon became the primary guarantor of the country's existence against repeated Arab aggression. Between 1948 and 1973, the Israelis fought three wars with their Arab neighbors. The U.S. role in the third of those wars led to an oil embargo against the United States in 1973.

The 1973 Yom Kippur War pitted Israel against a coalition of Egypt and Syria. Although the United States took no active role in the conflict, it and its Western European allies supported Israel. In response, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—a group of the world's leading oil producers—announced it would no longer ship oil to the United States and Western Europe. The member states, most of which were Arab nations, also agreed to a fourfold increase in oil prices. This produced an economic crisis in the United States, where 6% of the world's population consumed one-third of the world's energy.

The impact of the embargo was immediate. The price of gasoline in the United States rose by nearly

50% and gas rationing was instituted. Long lines for gasoline became a symbol of the era. Concern for energy consumption led to the implementation of a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit on the nation's highways, the imposition of daylight savings time, renewed interest in alternative energy sources such as solar power, and a new market for fuel-efficient automobiles.

The effect on relations between the United States and its allies was also dramatic. Western Europe, which was even more dependent on Middle Eastern oil as a percentage of its supply than the United States, began to question the wisdom of unconditional support for Israel. Since the 1970s, the United States has often disagreed with Europe about Arab-Israeli issues. The embargo also demonstrated the power of oil-producing nations to alter the behavior of the United States and other advanced industrial nations. Although the embargo was lifted in 1974, the impact on the U.S. economy continued throughout the 1970s, resulting in severe price inflation.

A second major energy crisis took place in the wake of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Iranian students forced the U.S.-supported shah to flee the country and paved the way for Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to take power. The revolution released an anti-U.S. backlash among Iranians who had long suffered under the shah's rule. Islamic militants seized the U.S. embassy in the Iranian capital of Tehran and held U.S. diplomats hostage for 444 days before finally releasing them.

The Iranian revolution led to a massive reduction in oil exports to the United States; once again, gasoline prices rose and long gas lines reappeared. U.S. president Jimmy Carter referred to the oil crisis as the "moral equivalent of war," and attempted to promote energy conservation. Simultaneous energy and hostage crises caused by events in the Middle East accentuated U.S. feelings of vulnerability in the region.

GULF WARS

The signing of the U.S.-sponsored 1980 Camp David peace agreement between Israel and Egypt helped ease tensions between the United States and the Arab world. During the 1980s, both sides worked to maintain a stable flow of oil and ensure mutual political stability. Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait threatened this mutually profitable balance. Having quickly conquered oil-rich Kuwait, Saddam put himself in immediate striking distance of oil fields in Saudi Arabia. Given the immense reserves already existing in Iraq, such a move would give him a monopoly on the world's petroleum supply. A U.S.-led multinational coalition soon forced Saddam to retreat and surrender.

Although beaten and hemmed in by economic and military sanctions, Saddam still loomed as a threat according to many in the U.S. government. As early as 1992, members of a group called the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) criticized president George H. W. Bush for failing to depose Saddam. They called repeatedly for the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, petitioning President Bill Clinton to attack and remove Saddam.

Many of the members of PNAC joined the administration of President George W. Bush in 2001, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, the Bush administration argued that Saddam Hussein supported Osama bin Laden, whose al-Qaeda organization carried out the attacks. Although a congressional commission that investigated the attacks found no evidence of a working relationship between Saddam and bin Laden, the Bush administration used the alleged connection as one pretext for attacking Iraq in 2003.

In contrast to the Gulf War of 1991, the United States had little support for its 2003 invasion. More damagingly, it met with fierce opposition in Muslim and Arab countries. Many people in the Middle East considered the attack simply an excuse to remove a hostile government and ensure U.S. control over Middle Eastern oil supplies. The invasion and subsequent armed resistance to the U.S. occupation severely damaged Iraq's oil industry. Although U.S. leaders hoped to pay for the occupation using Iraqi oil revenues, Iraq pumped much less oil after the war than it pumped before the war.

In addition to the uncertainly of foreign oil supplies, the United States faces the challenge of growing energy demand in the developing world. The rapid growth of China's economy and its growing demand for oil is of particular concern. As of early 2005, oil prices were at record highs due to the difficulty of keeping up production to meet growing world demand. Even with the opening of the Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Reserve to oil exploration in March

2005, domestic oil supplies will still fall far short of total consumption. This combination of rising demand and dwindling supplies has rekindled efforts to explore alternative sources of fuel. Since no nation can maintain its security without adequate energy supplies, it is critical that the United States develop national policy to provide energy security for the 21st century.

See also Arab Oil Embargo; Arab-Israeli Conflict; Economic Sanctions; Gulf War; Iraq War of 2003; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Middle East Conflicts; Oil and National Security; OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries); Terrorism, War on International

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ENLISTED PERSONNEL

Below the rank of officer, military personnel who make up most of the armed forces and fulfill the primary missions of the military. Enlisted personnel comprise 85% of the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. The remaining 15% consist of officers who are responsible for the leadership and management aspects of the military. There are currently 1.2 million active-duty enlisted personnel in the United States.

Enlisted personnel are classified by rank as well as by their individual military occupational specialties (MOS). Specialties are selected at the beginning of enlistment and divided into 12 occupational groups. These include administrative; combat; construction; electronic and electrical equipment repair; engineering, science, and technical occupations; health care; human resources development; machine operator; media and public affairs; protective services; transportation and material handling; and vehicle and machine mechanics.

Enlisted personnel enter the armed forces by signing an enlistment contract, committing for a period of four to eight years. Recruits must possess at least a high school diploma or an equivalency degree (GED). On entering into an enlistment contract, an individual is assessed and given the option to select an MOS. The recruit then enters basic training for a period of six to twelve weeks learning all aspects required of an enlisted service member. This includes military traditions, physical fitness, and further fundamental skills such as marksmanship, orienteering, close-order drill, weapons and survival training, and military discipline.

After basic training, enlisted personnel enter advanced individual training to focus on their MOS. This individualized training program varies in duration from specialty to specialty. Following completion of this training, the enlisted members are sent out to a military unit either in the United States or abroad. There they perform the basic duties that enable the military to meet its goal of defending U.S. national security.

At the end of the contract, an enlisted person can leave the service with the benefits promised by the military, which include assistance toward further education. Many soldiers, however, choose to extend their contracts, or *re-up.* The highest enlisted rank an individual can attain in the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps is Staff Sergeant; in the U.S. Air Force, it is Chief Master Sergeant; and in the U.S. Navy, it is Master Chief Petty Officer. Many enlisted personnel make a career out of the armed services, retiring with a full government pension before beginning careers in civilian life.

See also All-Volunteer Force; Conscription/Volunteer Force

ENTERTAINMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY
See CINEMA AND THE MILITARY

ENVIRONMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The ways in which environmental factors impact national security issues. Beginning with the 1987 *Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development*, prominent world leaders—including Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, Premier Rajiv Gandhi of India, and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney

of Canada—have urged that traditional national security concepts consider environmental elements that impact virtually all human existence. These elements include management of natural resources such as soil, water, forests, grasslands, and fisheries as well as natural and man-made climatic disruptions, specifically those related to greenhouse, gases, a byproduct of unsustainable development globally.

The rationale for linking the environment to national security is simple. If a nation's ecosystem is degraded (by drought, for example), then its economy will decline, causing social and political destabilization that can result in conflict—either internal disorder or aggression against neighboring nations that may have an abundance of the needed resource, such as potable water.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the primary watchdog of national security in the United States, began utilizing its vast resources to monitor the environment in 1992. Since then, a team of civilian environmental scientists have been paired with CIA personnel to use agency resources—such as satellites, spy planes, and submarines—to investigate, among other things, the impact on national security of greenhouse gases, the thickness of polar ice, ocean temperatures, shifting forest and desert boundaries, and the availability of water and other resources.

Various environmental data—such as the date of the first polar snow melt and ocean temperatures—are routinely collected by the CIA and other national security agencies, providing valuable information to scientists studying global warming and other environmental impacts. Spy satellites that once tracked the license plates of Soviet officials during the Cold War could easily be redirected to monitor the growth or shrinkage of forests and deserts. The agency's advanced Kennan satellites provide photographic resolution measured in inches, far above the quality of instruments used in the best civilian laboratories. Additionally, the intelligence community has been keeping detailed records of climate events for decades, allowing scientists to track historic changes and the rate of these changes to the environment.

Other national security technology—such as the Global Positioning System and a vast array of undersea listening devices deployed by the Navy to track hostile submarines—provide similar research opportunities for environmental scientists. These devices are easily adapted to monitor various environmental conditions, ranging from ocean salinity to the migration of whales.

The CIA's environmental monitoring program drew criticism from third-world nations at the 1992 Rio de Janeiro summit. Some small nations charged the CIA with spying on their climates. Yet, these same nations may also be those most likely to go to war with neighbors over natural resources or face internal collapse from the social, economic, and political turmoil caused by shortages of natural resources.

See also Natural Resources and National Security

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION
See NATURAL RESOURCES AND NATIONAL SECURITY

ESPIONAGE

The practice of obtaining secrets from political, military, or economic rivals. A person who engages in espionage is called a spy. Although private persons or organizations may hire a spy, the term is usually applied to an individual employed by a state to obtain secrets from its perceived enemies.

Spies perform two basic types of espionage activities: intelligence gathering and counterintelligence. Intelligence gathering is the traditional occupation of most spies—discovering and obtaining information that is not freely available. Counterintelligence involves spying on spies, that is, making sure that one's own spies are not actually working for one's rivals. In some cases, a spy is discovered and *turned,* that is, secretly used to spy on his or her original employer. Several high-profile U.S. counterintelligence failures in the 1980s and 1990s were revealed by turned agents.

HISTORY OF ESPIONAGE

The use of espionage is a practical application of the old adage, knowledge is power. Leaders have long known that advance information about rivals' plans or intentions is invaluable in devising effective strategies of one's own. Ancient records show that the Egyptian pharaohs established an extensive spy system more than 4,000 years ago. Then as now, spies served as a country's eyes and ears in places where it lacked

official access or where accurate information was difficult to obtain.

Spies figured prominently in the folklore of the early United States. One of the most notable early American spies was Benedict Arnold, a general in George Washington's Continental Army during the American Revolutionary War. Arnold, commander of a vital U.S. fortress at West Point, New York, secretly plotted to surrender West Point to British troops. However, his plan was uncovered and foiled before he could put it into action. Arnold, who escaped capture and subsequently commanded British troops during the war, became a symbol of treachery to Americans.

The American Civil War produced some of the most colorful and daring U.S. spies. Confederate spy Belle Boyd operated out of her father's hotel in West Virginia before being arrested by Union forces in July 1862. She was exchanged a month later for a Union spy held in the South, returned to espionage, and was arrested again for spying in June 1863. Released after a short time due to her poor health, Boyd left the United States for England. She later attempted to return to the Confederacy aboard a Southern blockade runner. Once again she fell into Union hands, but the U.S. Navy captain who captured her ship fell in love with Boyd and let her escape to Canada. He later married Boyd in England after being discharged from the Navy for neglect of duty.

Boyd, though a romantic and dramatic figure, was in many ways typical of spies prior to the modern era. Unlike today's spies, who generally are state employees advancing the official interests of a nation, spies of an earlier era were rarely part of organized and systematic government espionage programs. Often they were private citizens with unique access to highly placed individuals. Sometimes they were themselves government officials passing information to rival states. Their existence was tacitly recognized but not officially acknowledged, and they could expect to be repudiated by their employers if caught.

DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN ESPIONAGE

The origins of formal state espionage systems gradually emerged in Europe during the late 1700s and early 1800s. In the 1760s, King Frederick II of Prussia pioneered systematic state espionage to gather military intelligence about foreign adversaries. Many historians credit Joseph Fouché, French minister of police from 1800 to 1802, with developing the first modern political

espionage network. Fouché created a system of government agents to gather information about domestic political opponents of the ruling Consulate.

By the early 1900s, all of the major European powers employed extensive spy networks. During World War I, the infamous German spy Mata Hari used seduction to gain classified military information from French politicians. Such activities led the United States to pass the Espionage Statute of 1917, which made spying for a foreign government a crime punishable by death. Despite the perceived threat of foreign agents, the United States had no official government espionage agency of its own. Each branch of the military undertook its own intelligence-collection activities, with little or no interagency cooperation.

The accomplishments of Allied spies in the early years of World War II convinced U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the value of coordinated espionage activities. In late 1939, a Polish agent smuggled a copy of the top-secret German Enigma encoding machine to England, where British scientists eventually broke the German codes. U.S. military intelligence broke some of the most secure Japanese naval codes at around the same time. In June 1942, six months after the United States entered the war, Roosevelt created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to foster more systematic U.S. intelligence activities.

The main missions of the OSS were to collect and analyze strategic information for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to conduct intelligence operations not assigned to other agencies. For example, the OSS trained and supplied partisan groups fighting behind enemy lines in both Nazi-controlled Europe and the Japanese empire. Recipients of OSS assistance in Asia included Mao Zedong—leader of the communist forces in China—and Ho Chi Minh, whose Vietminh guerillas fought Japanese occupation in French Indochina. After the war, the United States broke relations with both resistance leaders due to their communist political philosophy. The OSS also supplied the president and other decision makers with estimates of enemy political and military strengths and weaknesses.

Despite its wide-ranging mandate, the OSS never had jurisdiction over all foreign intelligence activities. Each branch of the military continued to collect and analyze its own intelligence and strongly resisted ceding to the OSS any of its historical responsibilities. After the war, with the immediate threats of Germany and Japan removed, the OSS was disbanded. Its functions were transferred to the Departments of

State and War and its personnel were assigned to the Strategic Services Unit (SSU).

Soviet communism, however, soon replaced German Nazism and Japanese imperialism as a threat to U.S. national security. In driving back the invading German armies during World War II, the Soviets had occupied all of Eastern Europe. After the war, they installed client communist governments throughout the region, turning east Europe into a Soviet-dominated buffer zone against future invasions and an exclusive sphere of Soviet economic influence. These moves, combined with the threat of communist takeover in China—the world's most populous nation—caused U.S. leaders to rethink the nation's existing national security apparatus.

In 1947, Congress passed the National Security Act, which reorganized the direction and administration of U.S. national security. The act created the Department of Defense (replacing the War Department) to centralize U.S. military decision making and established the country's first permanent peacetime intelligence agency, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA assumed the responsibilities shouldered by the OSS during World War II, principally the task of collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence. However, it too failed to displace all other intelligence agencies. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the various branches of the military all retained separate intelligence-gathering functions.

ESPIONAGE DURING THE COLD WAR

Over time, the CIA has become the subject of extensive folklore, praise, criticism, and condemnation. Supporters credit it with many of the successes that helped the United States win the Cold War against the Soviet Union. Critics have called the agency's activities unconstitutional and antidemocratic and blame it for much of the anti-American sentiment in foreign countries. Political analysts and historians point out that the politics of the Cold War shaped CIA activities, as did the efforts of the agency's Soviet counterpart, the Committee for State Security (KGB). Superpower struggles for ideological and economic influence led to extensive CIA and KGB involvement and interference with the internal affairs of other nations.

The rapid development of military technology during and after World War II led both the CIA and KGB to concentrate on obtaining intelligence about technical and military advances made by the other side. In the 1940s, KGB agents planted inside Western government agencies smuggled out plans that allowed the Soviet Union to build its first atomic bomb in 1949. During the 1950s, the CIA developed high-altitude spy planes to gather photographic intelligence on Soviet military capabilities. In the 1960s, it pioneered the use of intelligence collection using orbiting satellites.

The CIA also aggressively combated the spread of communism during the 1950s and early 1960s. The agency supported successful coups that replaced the governments in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954) with regimes more favorable to U.S. policies. However, it was much less fortunate in the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco. That operation, an attempt to overthrow the communist regime of Cuba's Fidel Castro using U.S.-backed Cuban rebels, resulted in a spectacular and embarrassing defeat for the United States.

During the Cold War, the CIA obtained a reputation for undermining foreign governments considered unfriendly to the United States. In 1972, the CIA engineered a coup that overthrew Chile's democratically elected president, Salvador Allende. The socialist-leaning Allende was replaced by General Augusto Pinochet, an authoritarian ruler who supported U.S. political and economic policies in Latin America. Under the administration of President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, the CIA sponsored rebels, known as the contras, who were fighting to overthrow the socialist government of Nicaragua.

While some CIA operations were clearly successful and others were patent failures, several were apparent triumphs that later came back to haunt the United States. For example, the CIA apparently played a role in the 1963 coup that brought the Ba'ath Party to power in Iraq. Saddam Hussein, who later emerged as leader of the Ba'ath Party, continued to receive CIA support until Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. That action led to war with the United States and a decade of U.S. economic and military sanctions against Iraq. In 2003, further friction between Saddam and the U.S. government led to a U.S. invasion that toppled the Ba'ath party that the United States helped install 40 years earlier.

The CIA also seemed to perform well in assisting forces resisting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. The agency provided arms, training, and logistical support to the Islamic fighters, or mujahideen, who fought a decade-long guerilla war against the Soviets. When the Soviet Union pulled its troops out of Afghanistan in 1989, the CIA was applauded for its role in the conflict. However, the same mujahideen who drove out the Soviets later formed the core of the

al-Qaeda terrorist network that would fight U.S. occupation of and influence in the Middle East in the early 21st century. The mujahideen effectively turned their CIA training and weapons against the nation from which it obtained them.

POST–COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 removed the main object of U.S. espionage efforts since the end of World War II. New threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the emergence of international terrorism as a significant security threat, began to take on greater importance within the agency. At the same time, revelations about high-level security breaches and major failures of analysis exposed serious weaknesses in U.S. espionage activities.

In 1994, the U.S. government arrested CIA agent and analyst Aldrich Ames on charges of spying for the Soviet Union. Ames had apparently enlisted as a double agent for the KGB in 1985 for purely monetary reasons, and had been passing along classified information ever since. At about the same time, declassified documents from the former Soviet Union showed that the CIA's estimates of Soviet economic performance and military readiness in the 1970s and 1980s were grossly exaggerated. These estimates led the United States to believe that the Soviet Union was much more powerful than was the actual case. They also were the main reason that the CIA completely failed to foresee the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon brought fresh criticism of U.S. intelligence. Neither the CIA nor any other U.S. intelligence agencies had uncovered the plot, which had apparently been conceived as early as 1996. The attacks brought calls for an overhaul of U.S. intelligence gathering and analysis. These calls eventually led to the creation of a new cabinet-level director of national intelligence, charged with coordinating intelligence gathered by various U.S. agencies and military services.

More recently, the U.S. intelligence community has been criticized for its faulty information regarding Iraqi WMD programs and terrorist connections prior to the 2003 Iraq War. Prewar intelligence assessments suggested that Saddam Hussein had large and active biological and chemical weapons programs and was working actively to develop nuclear weapons. The CIA also claimed that Iraq supported the al-Qaeda

terrorist network that carried out the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States. The intelligence about Saddam's WMD and terrorist ties was offered as a primary reason for invading Iraq in 2003. In the aftermath of the war, however, these claims were proven false.

The Iraq episodes illustrate some of the difficulties associated with conducting foreign espionage. Lacking agents on the ground in Iraq, the United States relied heavily on reports from Iraqi defectors whose reliability was often disputed by foreign intelligence services. Detractors claim that U.S. intelligence was not critical enough in their assessment of these sources, many of whom had vested political or economic interests in toppling the exiting Iraqi regime. The possibility of receiving false intelligence is one of the hazards of relying on a single source or a few related sources of information.

The recent overhaul of the U.S intelligence-gathering apparatus is intended to address the problem of drawing conclusions based on limited or fragmented evidence. By coordinating the collection and analysis of data from many different sources, U.S. officials hope to be able to compile a more comprehensive and accurate picture of foreign activities that impact U.S. national security. Espionage will continue to play a part in this process, one the government hopes will be better integrated than in previous years.

See also Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Cold War; Covert Operations; Defense Intelligence Agency; Economic Espionage; Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Office of Strategic Services; Operations Other Than War; World War II and Espionage

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SECRETS REVEALED

Project VENONA

In the darkest days of World War II for the Allies, the American OSS and British intelligence service MI5 were collaborating on a top-secret project to

decode the radio messages of a dangerous foe. The enemy was not Germany or Japan, but the Soviet Union, which at the time was allied with the United States and Great Britain. The operation, known as Project VENONA, used the deciphered messages to uncover the presence of Soviet operatives in high positions throughout the U.S. and British military and political establishments.

Project VENONA began because of an error by Soviet radio operators. For a short period in late 1941 and early 1942, the Soviets sent messages to their foreign operatives using old ciphers that they had previously employed. Allied cryptanalysts—experts on cracking codes and ciphers—recognized the old cipher and used it to decode thousands of Soviet messages sent during this time. Although the Soviets discovered their error and changed ciphers in the spring of 1942, the Allies had intercepted and decoded enough messages to get a good picture of the Soviet espionage effort in the West.

The radio traffic intercepted by VENONA referred to Soviet spies by code names but also included enough background information about each that the Allies could work out the identities of many of the spies. Among those named as spies on the basis of VENONA intercepts included Alger Hiss and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, all of whom were tried and executed in the 1950s for passing information that allowed the Soviets to build their first atomic bomb.

Contemporary public opinion was and remains split on the guilt of the Rosenbergs, particularly on the part of Ethel. Many people felt that the evidence against the couple was weak and that the verdict was influenced by the extreme anticommunist sentiment in the United States during the late 1940s and early 1950s and the fanaticism of McCarthyism. However, the VENONA intercepts were kept a secret from the public at the time because the Allies did not want to reveal to the Soviets that they had broken the codes. The first release of the transcripts of the VENONA intercepts was made in 1995. The coded messages showed that Julius was guilty of active spying for the Soviet Union and that Ethel at least had knowledge of his activities.

Some observers argue that the VENONA intercepts show that the post–World War II Red Scare was not the irrational witch hunt it has been portrayed as being. They point out that the messages revealed Soviet spies in virtually every U.S. agency or department dealing with national security. Critics of this position counter that the identities of many of the spies could not be positively identified from the information in the intercepts. For example, Alger Hiss fit some aspects of the profile of a spy code-named ALES in the intercepts, but not others. Nevertheless, U.S. intelligence officials were convinced that Hiss was ALES.

The VENONA intercepts did show, however, that many fears of the time about Soviet penetration of the U.S. government were based in fact. Whether those fears constituted a reasonable basis for some of the excesses of the period, such as the blacklisting of entertainers and writers suspected of communist ties, remains a matter of debate.

ETHNIC CLEANSING

The elimination of an ethnic or religious population by mass slaughter or forced expulsion. The term ethnic cleansing was first used during the Bosnian conflict in 1991 to refer to the killing and forced migration of Bosniacs, or Bosnian Muslims, in the newly independent nation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Serbians and Bosnian Serbs. In response to the crisis in Bosnia, the UN General Assembly in 1992 announced its position that ethnic cleansing would be considered a form of genocide.

Although the phrase ethnic cleansing was not used prior to the 1990s, the phenomenon was not new. The genocide of six million European Jews during World War II is the most glaring example of ethnic cleansing in the 20th century, though not the first. Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, episodes of ethnic cleansing have occurred in southeastern Europe, Asia, and Africa.

After Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence from Yugoslavia and was recognized by the European community and the United States, Serbia and the Bosnian Serb minority launched a massive attack on the Bosniac majority. During this assault, a million Bosnians were forced from their homes and more than 100,000 Bosniacs were slaughtered. The goal of Serbia was to remove the Bosnian Muslim population from Bosnia. The United Nations was able to dispense humanitarian aid, but it was ineffective in bringing about a peaceful settlement. The United States and the European community, through their NATO alliance, decided not to become involved. President George H. W. Bush was also reluctant to intervene, declaring that the Bosnian conflict was strictly a European concern.

President Bill Clinton in the summer of 1999 with an Albanian refugee girl who fled ethnic cleansing by the Serbs. Clinton had been visiting refugees while at an economic summit meeting in Europe. During the strife that raged in the Balkan region of Kosovo in the late 1990s, the Serbs engaged in numerous instances of ethnic cleansing, or mass killings, against ethnic Albanians. Bosnian Muslims also experienced ethnic cleansing at the hands of the Serbs earlier in the decade.

Source: Getty Images.

President Bill Clinton did not involve the United States in the Bosnian conflict during his first two years in office (1993–1994), although several times he threatened to order U.S. bombings of Serbian positions to halt the bloodshed. In August 1995, however, Clinton ordered air strikes following Bosnian Serb attacks in July on two UN-established refuges that killed 17,000 Bosniacs. In November, the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, an uneasy truce between the warring parties in the region, led to a U.S. commitment to send 20,000 troops to lead a NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia.

During the height of the U.S.-Bosnian intervention, President Clinton declared that the United States must become involved, if only to a limited extent, to prevent the Bosnian conflict from developing into a larger war. On another occasion, Clinton stated that the United States would intervene in cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing throughout the world.

In practice, however, the United States did not uniformly adhere to this policy. In 1994, in the African nation of Rwanda, the United States did not become involved when approximately 800,000 Tutsis were slaughtered by the Hutu-dominated Rwandan army. President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright later admitted that they regretted the decision not to become involved.

In 1999, the United States did not step in when Indonesian militants killed thousands of people in East Timor, in yet another case of ethnic cleansing. While the bloodshed in East Timor was ongoing, the United States was responding to a crisis in the Serbian province of Kosovo, in which the Serbians were killing and forcing ethnic Albanians from their homes.

The United States intervened to stop the ethnic cleansing occurring in Bosnia and Kosovo primarily because Europe is and has always been vital to U.S. national interests and national security. Since World War II, the United States has been Europe's peace-keeper, protector, and top trading partner. Although the United States frequently has urged European nations to tend to their own problems, the United States continues to remain involved in European affairs through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its trade with Europeans. Rwanda, much of the rest of Africa, and East Timor, on the other hand, were not critical to U.S. national interests or security, and it is the belief of many Americans that the United States cannot afford to be the world's policeman.

In 1998, when Slobodan Milosevic, the leader of Serbia, directed the Serbian military to attack ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, the United States attempted to avoid becoming involved militarily. However, as the crisis escalated, President Clinton, in cooperation with NATO, ordered air strikes on Serbian positions in March 1999. The air campaign succeeded in forcing Milosevic to abandon Kosovo.

The United States intervened in this crisis because the NATO alliance agreed that the stability of south-eastern Europe and Europe at large was threatened.

Furthermore, NATO members agreed that human rights in Kosovo were grossly violated, requiring NATO's response. After Milosevic retreated from Kosovo, the United States committed troops to the NATO peace-keeping force for a brief time, with the understanding that they would soon be withdrawn. Kosovo became administered by the United Nations later in 1999.

Secretary of State Albright declared in 1999 that U.S. involvement in Kosovo was due not only to the fact that Europe is important to U.S. national security. She stated that the United States will seek to inter-vene wherever it sees a violation of its moral values, in this case, the violation of human rights. Yet, it is clear from the record of the Clinton administration that, as important as human rights are to Americans, international humanitarian interests have often remained secondary to U.S. national security and national interests.

In 2004, the United Nations declared that the Sudanese government's mission to murder tens of thousands of non-Arab black residents and drive them from their homes in the Darfur region of Sudan is another example of ethnic cleansing. In the United States, Congress has declared that the crisis is a case of genocide. President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell pressured the Sudanese govern-ment to halt its support of the Arab militia, known as Janjaweed, who are assaulting the people of Darfur. Powell threatened U.S. action if peace was not returned to the region. Because the United States does not ordinarily intervene in conflicts in Africa, analysts have pondered which U.S. national security issues are at stake there, concluding that Sudanese oil and, per-haps more importantly, Sudan's connection to Islamic terrorists and terrorism are prompting U.S. concerns over that region.

See also Bosnia Intervention (1993–1995); Genocide; Humanitarian Aid; Humanitarian Intervention; Kosovo Intervention; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

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EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY (ESDP)

Formerly known as the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), a plan to establish a military and peacekeeping force to defend the member nations of the European Union (EU) and protect their mutual national interests throughout the world. The impetus for European nations to provide for their common defense had its origins in the European Defense Community (EDC), a failed initiative of the early 1950s, and in the Western European Union (WEU), which was drawn up in 1955. A major function of the WEU was to oversee the rearmament of West Germany.

In 1992, according to the Maastricht Treaty, the leaders of the European Union expressed their interest in transforming the WEU into the European Union's military department. In December 1998, British and French leaders declared that the European Union must have the military capability to launch its own military actions in crises when the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decline to become involved. After this announce-ment, the ESDP was more than a concept: It became a concerted, specific plan for action. In Helsinki, Finland, in December 1999, the European Union took control of the WEU and specified that by 2003, the ESDP would call for the European Union to have a military force of 60,000 troops available for military actions.

In building a stronger and more secure Europe, the ESDP has goals to encourage more integration among EU nations and develop a unified foreign policy for all of Europe. It also urges each EU nation to modernize its military, work toward achieving a stronger voice in NATO, and employ the European Union's military to respond to crises that are either too small or beyond the scope of NATO's mandate.

From the beginning of the NATO alliance in 1949, the United States has declared its wish that the nations of Europe would contribute to their own defense, thereby reducing the financial burden on the United States, which has carried the weight of European defense since World War II. During the decades of the Cold War and through the 1990s, the United States encouraged European leaders to explore new ways to plan for their mutual defense.

During the first year of the presidency of George W. Bush, the U.S. attitude toward the ESDP changed.

The Bush administration expressed concerns that the European Union was becoming too independent and perhaps was influencing European nations to move away from the NATO alliance. Although EU leaders emphasized that their nations were as loyal to NATO as ever, the White House was not convinced. The Bush administration wanted NATO, rather than an EU military force, to respond to all military crises confronting the European Union.

The European Union supported the United States after the September 11 attacks in 2001 and endorsed its reprisals on terrorist strongholds in Afghanistan in the aftermath of those attacks. Yet the European Union's relationship with the Bush administration faltered in 2003 when President Bush engaged the United States in a war to remove Saddam Hussein, the dictatorial leader of Iraq. Because of the Iraq War, U.S. relationships with its European neighbors deteriorated to the extent that the European Union was emboldened to move forward with its ESDP plans for an EU military force, regardless of U.S. objections. Despite the friction, the European Union continued to profess strong ties to NATO.

In NATO meetings in 2003, the United States removed its objections to the European Union's proposed military force. The demands of fighting the Iraq war made it necessary for the United States to withdraw its troops from NATO forces in the Balkan countries, to make them available for deployment in Iraq or to be stationed in NATO nations closer to the Middle East. This removal of U.S. troops from Europe opened the door for the European Union to maintain its own peacekeeping force in Bosnia late in 2002 and in Macedonia beginning in 2003. The United States sanctioned this development, and the transition was a positive one for both the European Union and the United States.

In 2003, the European Union also sent 1,400 troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to stabilize a region besieged by civil war and to secure it so that humanitarian aid could reach the starving population of the nation. The United States was also satisfied with this deployment of EU troops, because the crisis occurred in a part of Africa that is not closely tied to U.S. national interests, although it is linked to those of France, Belgium, and a number of other EU nations.

In July 2004, EU foreign ministers announced a major development in the evolution of the ESDP—the formal establishment of the European Defense Agency (EDA). First agreed on in 2003, the European Union created the EDA to support EU nations in the development of their individual defense capabilities. Expected to become fully operational in 2005, the EDA will foster cooperation and collaboration among EU nations in military planning and in the acquisition of new armaments. The agency will also support research in weapons technology, including nuclear arms, and work with the defense industry so that it produces the armaments that the European Union most needs.

Although this development reflects the kind of European collaboration that the United States favors, the United States has expressed concerns that the EDA will support the European Union's acquisition of arms that duplicates weaponry in the U.S. arsenal. Military leaders in the United States would prefer to advise the European Union on its defense expenditures, so that it can purchase weaponry that will also fill gaps in NATO's armory.

After eight nations from the former Eastern bloc were admitted to the European Union in May 2004, the Bush administration expressed greater confidence in the efforts of the European Union to set up its own military force. This is especially the case now that the United States has been reassured that EU member nations value their commitment to NATO and their close relationship with their chief ally, the United States.

See also Bush, George W., and National Policy; European Union; Iraq War of 2003; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

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EUROPEAN UNION (EU)

An economic organization now taking on political, social, and diplomatic functions as a united Europe. The economic and political integration of Europe after Word War II on functional and, later, federal bases has not produced a supranational organization but rather has strengthened the once-battered nation states of the region. Previous attempts at European unification happened by force—the Continental System of Napoleon Bonaparte and the New Order of Adolf

Hitler. However, postwar Europe rebounded out of the weakness and devastation wrought by World War II and forged the most successful economic union yet seen in the modern world.

ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The movement toward European cooperation after World War II centered first on matters of security and economic recovery in Western Europe. The war left Europe crippled in terms of industry and infrastructure, and it was producing only half of its prewar agricultural output. Eastern Europe was lost to Soviet occupation and the accompanying conversion of local governments to a communist system. The Western powers, including the United States, feared Soviet aggression, but Western Europe would have to depend on the United States in the immediate future for economic and military support.

The motives favoring European cooperation varied, but security concerns and economic stagnation remained common to all. The United States encouraged the spirit of cooperation by tying its Marshall Plan aid to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (now the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), which had 17 member nations. At the same time, the Benelux nations (Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg) had forged a customs union based on wartime plans of the governments in exile. However, more ambitious discussions of federalism in Europe foundered when it became clear that nations would not abandon their sovereignty, and none of the statesmen involved in these discussions could agree on a likely model for future European cooperation.

As a result, early European integration focused on discrete areas of mutual concern. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became the focus of cooperative defense, while a weak Council of Europe provided an early ministerial forum for intergovernmental cooperation. Then, economic impetus took hold. A man named Jean Monnet, who served as planning commissioner in France under President Charles de Gaulle, advocated not just cooperative schemes among nations, but a fusion of interests among all Europeans. His initiatives bore fruit with the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952.

Originally launched as a Franco-German scheme to improve economic planning, reduce German postwar revenge tendencies, and improve French competitiveness, the ECSC was embraced as well by the Benelux countries and Italy. The Treaty of Paris founded the ECSC and eliminated trade barriers on coal, steel, and iron ore. In addition, it established supervisory and regulatory administrations, such as the Council of Ministers, the European Assembly, the Court of Justice, and various consulting and coordinating committees.

Such imposing institutional names belied the fact that the nations involved in these organizations retained full sovereignty, and the intergovernmental organizations remained weak. The resulting pattern of upgrading cooperation in specific sectors of economic and political activities extended over the ensuing half century, accounting for periodic difficulties experienced by the European integration movement in promoting truly democratic and federal programs.

On the heels of the striking success of the ECSC (a 42% increase in steel production over five years), came an early failure—the European Defense Community (EDC). Proposed in 1952 by the ECSC, the EDC sought a European method of rearming West Germany, strongly advocated in the burgeoning Cold War, and a pooling of defense resources. After the French government rejected the treaty, a benign Western European Union (WEU) provided for the entry of West Germany into NATO. Thus, some measures of unification or consolidation proved too advanced for the time, and the WEU (and other entities) would not gain significance until several decades had passed.

CONTINUED EVOLUTION

The development of the ECSC into a formal customs union saw deliberations in 1955 and the first of many probes by the United Kingdom into the process of European integration, but the British soon withdrew when the project became too supranational in scope. The European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) treaties were signed in Rome in March 1957. The EEC treaty carried ECSC institutions beyond mere functionality, for it proclaimed the intention in its preamble "to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe."

The EEC brought the six member nations into a true customs union, a *common market*, and facilitated common policies of economic and other forms of

development. Its psychological value alone promoted the idea that European technocrats, or supranational policymakers, could collaborate above and beyond mere market forces to achieve a common prosperity. The free movement of goods, services, labor, and capital clearly enhanced the market forces that brought the so-called *economic miracle* of the 1950s and early 1960s to Western Europe, with the EEC nations leading the way in average annual growth.

Even after the economic boom leveled off, it was clear that the integration movement had capitalized on many general conditions in a highly effective manner. New investment, initially from the United States, had been injected in a planned and cooperative manner toward European reconstruction, which itself had spawned full employment and high demand for goods of all types. Trade was strengthened, not only among EEC members but also externally, because tariffs remained much lower than in the decades before World War II.

The psychological boost to European economic confidence redoubled growth in the EEC as consumer spending rose among the populations. New capital goods, modern corporative management, and rapid modernization of industrial sectors all benefited from an easier migration of technology through exchanges, licensing, and joint research and development. Industries reorganized for diversity, in contrast to the narrowly focused business cartels of former times, and formed even larger and more profitable concerns. Finally, the era of cheap labor and power facilitated much of the favorable reconstruction.

MIDLIFE CRISES

With the falling-off of the boom years, the EEC entered a period of relative stagnation. The return of Charles de Gaulle as president of France in 1958 augured poorly for the federalist aspects of the European integration movement. France opposed any increases in the authority of the existing EEC hierarchy, which by 1963 had assembled some 3,000 bureaucrats in Brussels. However, with de Gaulle's departure as French president in 1969, further strengthening of the EEC as a customs union proceeded, the French opposition to the entry of the United Kingdom was lifted and it entered the EEC in 1972, along with Ireland and Denmark.

Ironically, the admission of its first new members seemed to stall progress in the EEC for a decade. The recession following the 1973 oil crisis did not set a proper atmosphere for further integration initiatives. The new doctrine for integration emerged in the single European market (SEM) system, which offered the culmination of many of the hopes set out in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The lifting of internal border restrictions, establishment of a common currency, and tightening of fiscal discipline all required considerable policy changes on the part of national governments, as did the reinforcement of EEC institutions to make up for the loss of internal controls.

Another French technocrat came to the fore in this important stage. Jacques Delors, a former socialist finance minister, was equally adept at selling the SEM to trade unions as to the heads of state. The momentum for EEC expansion rejuvenated as first Greece (1981) and then Spain and Portugal (1986) joined the EEC, making an even dozen member nations. The intergovernmental negotiations yielded the essential agreements to opening borders, economic union, and a European Monetary Union (EMU).

With the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1991), the EEC took the form of the European Union (EU) in fact, if not in law. Numerous technicalities, such as the expiration of the ECSC in 2002 and other problems of nomenclature, keep the name European Community technically correct. Essentially, the European Union retains the character of an economic union, with separate components introduced to maintain foreign policy and security cooperation, as well as the judicial and police cooperation made necessary by the dropping of most border protocols.

As in other earlier accords, there are options for individual countries to opt out of common provisions, such an option made necessary as far back as in the Euratom agreement in the Treaty of Rome. Not all countries share in the most liberal border protocols (embodied in the 1995 Schengen Agreement), and the stringent economic criteria set up for admission to the 1999 *euro zone* of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has prevented even some of the more willing EU members from joining the EMU.

MATURITY AND EXPANSION

The Maastricht Treaty introduced a new flurry of energy in Europe, not all of it positive. German reunification, the end of the Cold War, and the emerging problems of central and southeastern Europe posed

new challenges. A new wave of *euroskepticism* greeted the preparation for establishing the common currency, the euro.

While the European Union has yet to have a defection in its ranks, both Ireland and Denmark have provided temporary halts to new treaty implementations. The rejuvenation of the WEU as a viable security agreement, with permanent assignment of military forces and command echelons, inaugurated new discord with the United States and new questions over the future of the NATO alliance, which the United States still dominates.

Still, the European Union grew to 15 members with the entry of Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995. In addition, the new currency, the euro, saw a highly successful launching in 1999 with 11 participating nations. The same year saw the European Parliament's representatives elected directly, a departure from the previous practice of appointment by member nations. In 1999, the European Union accepted Turkey as a candidate for future membership, extending the concept of EU membership in theory to the traditional European boundary of the Urals in the east.

Successive treaties set by the Nice Accord of 1999 settled the institutionalization of expansion of the European Union and the way opened for the rest of Europe to begin the process of integration. The resulting rush to membership by most of Europe reflects the end of the Cold War divisions, the collapse of viable alternative alignments—although the European Free Trade Association still has a tenuous existence—fear of isolation or future changes to membership criteria, as well as the desire for access to EU markets, resource transfer, and investment.

Practical limitations to further EU expansion include the heavy administrative burden of extending EU regulations, which almost paralyzed the EU structure for the decade after the admission of the United Kingdom, owing to its extensive exemptions. Similar problems may emerge from the latest expansion, in 2004, of 10 new member nations adding 20% population but only 6% gross national product (GNP) to the union. The new additions are the most disparate group yet accommodated in the scheme: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus, the latter two still split into separate Greek and Turkish enclaves.

As of 2004, one could characterize the European Union as having three unofficial tiers of membership, creating stark divisions among the 25 nations:

the euro zone (such as Germany and Spain), the non-Euro members (Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Sweden) of longer standing, and the 10 new members. These distinctions likely will remain for the foreseeable future and pose a considerable integration problem for the European Union.

The European Union has its own budget, which has existed independently of the public finances of member nations since 1970. The financial sources of this budget are import duties from nonmember states and a proportion of the national value-added tax (capped at 0.5% GNP in 1999). Spending at first centered on the so-called farm subsidies (Common Agricultural Policy—80% in 1970, declining to 46% in 2000), but infrastructure contributions (15.5% in 1988, 36% in 2000) have increased proportionally, as EU roads, communications, and other programs have multiplied. EU foreign aid and conversion funding complete the major categories. Conversion refers to the additional aid to members with per capita GNP falling under 90% of the EU average (initially Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland) to promote additional growth intended to prepare them for entry into the monetary union.

The infrastructure funding supports the regional policy of assisting underdeveloped regions (such as the region of Cantabria in Southern Italy) in the European Union, not member states. This is done to promote conversion of obsolete industry, combat unemployment (in concert with the European social fund), introduce agricultural and fishery improvements, and assist underpopulated regions.

The most ambitious and contentious program comes with the political and diplomatic coordination arm of the European Union. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has many proponents and detractors within the member states, especially when it conflicts with NATO alliance issues. Cumbersome and complex, the CFSP and a reinvigorated WEU continue to rely on NATO infrastructure for support and operations, such as in the Balkans, without having attained the confidence, commitment, and dedication that NATO has erected.

The European Union has encountered considerable difficulties with the CFSP, reflecting national conflicts of interest large and small. The most sensitive of these are so-called out-of-area policies, such as problems in the Middle East. However, even EU-centered questions, such as the admission of Turkey, the movement for a European Union Constitution (replacing the more than 600 regulatory codes that have accumulated), and

the perceptions of reduced value and benefits of EU membership for the newest members, have brought seemingly endless debate.

Notwithstanding the many obstacles and bureaucratic burdens to economic and political cooperation, the European Union has achieved a great deal and has brought considerable prosperity and confidence to the continent. While not approaching seriously the more utopian notions of early advocates for a united states of Europe, the mature European Union certainly acts as an economic unit capable of measuring up to the other economic powers, most notably the United States and Japan. However, its political divisions and unwieldy security arrangements will restrict its activities to the economic realm for the foreseeable future.

—*Kenneth W. Estes*

See also Alliances; Cold War; Collective Security; European Security and Defense Policy; Interpol; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Trade and Foreign Aid; Treaties

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SECRETS REVEALED

The Brussels-Strasbourg Convoy

The European Parliament costs an additional 200 million euros per year in operating expenses because it physically moves between sessions in Brussels and Strasbourg several times each year. On an almost monthly basis, the working parliament moves to Strasbourg for a four- or five-day official session for formal voting in the lavish building built for the parliament by France. Overnight, more than a hundred articulated trucks move the files and other necessary materials between Brussels and Strasbourg by convoy, setting up the administrative apparatus for the parliament in each site. Politicians and citizen groups alike have decried the waste, but the prestige of France and the selection of Strasbourg as the seat of the European Parliament have not obscured the fact that the real

business conducted by the European Union remains in Brussels where the ministries and other important sections of the union are located.

EX PARTE QUIRIN

A 1942 Supreme Court decision that allowed the military, instead of civil courts, to try foreign nationals from enemy countries caught entering the United States to commit destructive acts. The case of *Ex Parte Quirin* stemmed from a failed 1941 plan, known as Operation Pastorius, in which a German submarine intended to put two teams of infiltrators ashore to commit sabotage against the United States. All of the men had been born in Germany, lived in the United States, and then returned to their homeland. However, before the saboteurs could strike, one of the participants foiled the plot by revealing the details to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The saboteurs who had already entered the United States were subsequently arrested.

In a unanimous, but highly debated decision, the Supreme Court ruled that that the detainees did not have a right to a trial by jury. Some legal scholars claim that the ruling in *Ex Parte Quirin* ran counter to an earlier court decision that prohibited military court hearings from trying enemy nationals if civilian courts were available. The Germans were convicted and six were hanged; the others served almost six years in prison before being deported to Germany.

During the U.S.-led war against terrorism, members of the administration of President George W. Bush have invoked *Ex Parte Quirin* to validate the government's right to use military tribunals to try foreign nationals suspected of terrorism. Many legal scholars have labeled the *Ex Parte Quirin* decisions as one of the Supreme Court's failures to uphold civil liberties in times of war, along with the decision to uphold the constitutionality of interning Japanese Americans during World War II.

See also Civil Liberties; Supreme Court, Role of U.S.

EXECUTIVE ORDERS

Legally binding decrees issued by the head of the executive branch of government. Executive orders can

be issued by a state governor, but those that affect national security are issued by the president of the United States. Presidents of the United States have issued executive orders since 1789, even though the U.S. Constitution does not expressly grant this power to the president. The nation's chief executives have derived this authority from the grant of "executive power" given in Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution and the statement "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" in Article II, Section 3.

Executive orders have legal force unless in conflict with a law passed by Congress or a court decision. The president may retract an executive order at any time or may issue an executive order that supersedes an existing one. Incoming presidents may choose to follow the executive orders of their predecessors, replace them with new ones of their own, or revoke them completely.

Most executive orders are directed to the federal administrative agencies or to the departments of the executive branch to help those agencies fulfill their responsibilities. Other executive orders, called proclamations, serve a ceremonial purpose—such as declaring new holidays. For example, in 1916, Woodrow Wilson proclaimed June 14 as Flag Day. Other executive orders, known as national security directives or presidential decision directives, deal with national security and defense.

Executive orders received little public attention until the early 1900s, being seen only by the agencies to which they were directed. However, in the early 1900s, the Department of State began documenting executive orders. Starting with Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation of 1862, the department retroactively began numbering executive orders. Today, only executive orders dealing with national security are kept from the public.

Because of the Constitution's lack of specificity concerning the president's use of executive orders, for years no rules or guidelines outlined the scope of presidential authority under an executive order. However, in 1952, the Supreme Court invalidated an executive order from President Harry S. Truman, which placed all steel mills in the country under federal control. The court ruled that the order was unconstitutional because it attempted to make law rather than clarify a law passed by Congress. Since that decision, presidents have been careful to cite the specific laws they are addressing when issuing executive orders.

To date, the courts have overturned only one other executive order. In 1996, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia overturned an executive order issued by President Bill Clinton barring the federal government from contracting with companies that hire permanent strikebreakers. Congress may also overturn an executive order by passing legislation or by not approving funding to enforce it. Because the president retains the power to veto such a decision, Congress has not exercised that authority. The unwillingness of the judicial and legislative branches to intervene has freed presidents to issue orders on a vast range of subjects.

Policy changes with wide-ranging effects have been passed into law through executive order. Notable examples include the integration of the armed forces in 1948 under Harry S. Truman and the desegregation of the Little Rock, Arkansas, public schools in 1957 under Dwight D. Eisenhower. In 1970, Richard Nixon established the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) with a 398-word executive order.

Most significantly, executive orders have greatly broadened the scope of presidential power, especially during wartime or other national emergency. During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln issued an executive order suspending the writ of habeas corpus. In the early 20th century, with the threat of European war looming, President Woodrow Wilson expanded on Lincoln's use of executive orders. To protect the nation, Wilson issued a series of executive orders preparing for the country's eventual entry into World War I. Wilson's executive orders empowered the federal government with unprecedented control over the nation's economy during wartime.

Upon his inauguration in March 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt immediately began using his executive authority. In response to the Great Depression, he declared a national emergency, closing the country's banks and proclaiming a national bank holiday. He based his action on the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act, which had been passed by Congress to support President Wilson's wartime powers. Although the act was specifically designed for wartime emergencies, Roosevelt likened the calamity of the Great Depression to war and used wartime measures. Congress supported him unanimously. His use of this statute greatly expanded the definition of national emergencies. A few days later, Roosevelt issued an executive order reopening the banks once they were proven financially secure.

As World War II threatened the country, Roosevelt again turned to executive orders to ready the nation.

For example, his 1939 neutrality order also declared a state of national emergency and called for "the strengthening of our national defense within the limits of peace-time authorizations." A 1940 executive order called the National Guard to active service. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the Congressional declaration of war the next day, Roosevelt continued to issue executive orders to facilitate the conduct of the war.

Roosevelt's executive orders touched on all aspects of American life—from the creation of the Office of Civilian Defense to the control of radio stations. On February 19, 1942, Roosevelt issued executive order 9066, which authorized the internment of Japanese Americans in the name of national security. Roosevelt believed his use of executive orders was a trust he received from the people, which in turn led to his duty to defend the country. Roosevelt noted that when the crisis was over, "the powers under which I act automatically revert to the people—to whom they belong."

Recent presidents have furthered the growth of presidential power through executive orders. President George H. W. Bush issued an executive order to call up Army reservists in response to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As the crisis deepened, Bush issued a series of additional executive orders, ranging from preventing economic transactions with Iraq to designating the Persian Gulf area as a combat zone.

As ethnic tensions flared in the Balkan Peninsula in the 1990s, the United States and its NATO allies became determined to act. On June 9, 1998, President Bill Clinton issued executive order 13088 calling for blocking property of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, and the Republic of Montenegro, and for prohibiting new investment in the Republic of Serbia because of the situation in Kosovo. Through subsequent executive orders, Clinton designated Yugoslavia a war zone, called up troops, and imposed economic sanctions on the Yugoslavian government. As his predecessors had done, Clinton claimed war-making presidential authority through his constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations as commander in chief and as chief executive.

President George W. Bush's response to the war on terror significantly increased presidential powers. President Bush has conducted much of the war on terror through executive orders. For example, soon after September 11, 2001, Bush issued an executive order freezing assets of terrorists and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism. His executive orders have called up Army reservists, declared Afghanistan a combat zone, established the Office of Homeland Security (which formed the basis of the Department of Homeland Security, as established by Congress), and mandated that military tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to individuals held as enemy combatants.

Many people oppose executive orders as being an unconstitutional, even a potentially dictatorial, application of power. Although Congress may intervene and restrict a president's use of executive orders, it has not yet exerted its authority in this area. Ultimately, it appears that the Supreme Court will determine the limits, if any, of executive orders.

See also Constitution of the United States; Japanese Internment; Legal Ramifications of National Security; War Powers Act

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F

F-117A STEALTH FIGHTERS

World's first operational jet aircraft using low-observable stealth technology. The F-117A Nighthawk is coated with a secret, radar-absorbent material. The unique design of the single-seat, twin-engine F-117A gives the aircraft exceptional combat capabilities. The jet is equipped with sophisticated attack and navigation systems that are integrated with state-of-the-art avionics. It can deploy a variety of weapons, which are virtually undetectable by enemy air defense systems. The F-117A is capable of high subsonic speeds, and its range is unlimited with air refueling.

The Lockheed Martin Corporation delivered the first F-117A to the U.S. Air Force in 1982. The Air Combat Command's only F-117A unit, the 445th Tactical Group, became operational in October 1983 and became known as the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing in 1989. The stealth fighter was first shown publicly in April 1990.

In 1992, the F-117A Nighthawks were based at Holloman Air Force Base in Florida under the auspices of the 49th Fighter Wing, which maintains and operates the aircraft. Once a Nighthawk pilot completes training, he or she is assigned to the Eighth Fighter Squadron (Black Sheep) or the Ninth Fighter Squadron (Flying Knights). The F-117A first saw action in December 1989 during Operation Just Cause in Panama.

Stealth fighters attacked the most heavily fortified targets during Operation Desert Storm (January–February 1991) in Iraq, and they were the only coalition aircraft allowed to operate inside the Baghdad city limits. The Nighthawk, which usually carries two 2,000-pound GBU-27 laser-guided bombs, was effective in destroying or crippling Iraqi electrical power stations, military headquarters, communication sites, air defense operations centers, airfields, ammunition bunkers, and chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons development facilities.

Thirty-six Nighthawks were deployed to Iraq during Operation Desert Storm and conducted more than 1,250 sorties. Although more than 3,000 antiaircraft guns and 60 surface-to-air missiles protected Baghdad, the F-117A controlled the skies over Iraq and remained unscathed by enemy fire.

As part of the NATO forces during Operation Allied Force (1999), Nighthawks conducted more than 400 sorties against the integrated air defense system of Serbia, eliminating 90 targets in Serbia and Kosovo. One stealth fighter was lost over Serbia on March 27, 1999. A U.S. search-and-rescue team rescued the pilot several hours later. In April 1999, an additional 12 stealth fighters were deployed to NATO's Allied Force, bringing a full complement of 36 F-117As to that operation. The F-117A Nighthawks were also used as effective tactical weapons in Afghanistan in 2001 and during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. The U.S. military currently has 54 F-117A Nighthawks.

See also Stealth Technologies

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Within the U.S. Department of Justice, the agency responsible for dealing with violations of federal law.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) originated from a force of special agents created in 1908 by Attorney General Charles Bonaparte during the administration of Theodore Roosevelt. Both Bonaparte and Roosevelt were Progressives, and they shared the conviction that efficiency and expertise, not political connections, should determine who could best serve in government. After Roosevelt appointed him attorney general, Bonaparte used Progressive methods to create a corps of special agents. At the time, the corps of 34 agents did not have an official name. In 1909, Attorney General George Wickersham, Bonaparte's successor, named the force the Bureau of Investigation.

Today, most Americans take for granted that the nation needs a federal investigative service, but in 1908, the establishment of this type of agency at the national level was controversial. During the 1800s, Americans usually relied on local governments to fulfill most government responsibilities. At the dawn of the Progressive Era in the early 20th century, however, the American people looked to the federal government to produce justice in an industrial and increasingly urban society.

EARLY YEARS

When the FBI was established, few crimes had been designated federal offenses. The bureau primarily investigated violations of law involving national banking, naturalization, antitrust, and land fraud. The first major expansion of the bureau's jurisdiction came in June 1910 with the passage of the Mann Act, which made it a crime to transport women over state lines for immoral purposes. This law provided a means by which the federal government could investigate criminals who violated state laws but had no other federal violations.

Because the early bureau provided no formal training, previous law enforcement experience was considered desirable in new hires. Over the next few years, the number of agents grew to more than 300. Field offices were located in major cities and a special agent in charge, who was responsible to Washington, DC, headed each office. Several field offices were located near the Mexican border, where agents concentrated on investigating smuggling and neutrality violations and collecting intelligence.

After the United States entered World War I in April 1917, the bureau's work increased again. The bureau acquired responsibility for the Espionage, Selective Service, and Sabotage acts, and assisted the U.S. Department of Labor by investigating enemy aliens. In October 1919, the passage of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act gave the bureau another tool by which to prosecute criminals who evaded the law by crossing state lines.

THE PROHIBITION YEARS

Crime soared between 1921 and 1933 as gangsterism and public disregard for Prohibition, which made it illegal to sell or import intoxicating beverages, grew. Because of its narrow jurisdiction, the bureau had limited success in investigating the criminals of the gangster era. For example, it investigated gangster Al Capone as a fugitive federal witness. Federal investigation of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), a terrorist white supremacy movement, also required creativity. The bureau used the Mann Act to bring Louisiana's philandering KKK leader to justice. Through these and other investigations, the Bureau of Investigation slowly gained stature and its role grew more important.

In 1924, Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone selected J. Edgar Hoover to head the Bureau of Investigation. Hoover followed the Progressive tradition, and his appointment ensured that the bureau kept to that tradition. When Hoover took over, the bureau had approximately 650 employees, including 441 special agents who worked in field offices in nine cities. Hoover immediately fired agents he considered unqualified and proceeded to turn the bureau into a professional, highly trained law enforcement organization. For example, Hoover abolished the seniority rule of promotion and introduced uniform performance appraisals. In January 1928, Hoover established a formal training course for new agents and instituted regular inspections of field offices.

In the early days of his directorship, Hoover established an Identification Division. Tracking criminals by means of identification records had been considered essential since the 19th century; matching fingerprints was considered the most accurate method. By 1922, many large cities had already started their own fingerprint collections. By 1926, law enforcement agencies across the country were contributing fingerprint cards to the Bureau of Investigation.

THE DEPRESSION AND THE NEW DEAL

The 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression brought hard times to the United States. Hard times, in

turn, fostered more criminal activity. To combat crime, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Congress to expand federal law enforcement jurisdiction. Hoover noticed the widespread media interest in the war against crime, and he used the media to carry the message of FBI work to the American people. For example, in 1932, the first issue of the FBI *Law Enforcement Bulletin*—then called *Fugitives Wanted by Police*—was published.

During the 1930s, several decisions and new laws solidified the bureau's position as the nation's leading law enforcement agency. Responding to the kidnapping of the son of famed aviator Charles Lindbergh in 1932, Congress passed a law making kidnapping a federal crime. In May and June 1934, as gangsters such as John Dillinger evaded capture by crossing state lines, Congress passed a number of federal crime laws that enlarged the bureau's jurisdiction. Later, Congress gave bureau agents statutory authority to carry guns and make arrests. The Bureau of Investigation was renamed the United States Bureau of Investigation on July 1, 1932. The bureau's name was permanently changed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1935.

The bureau established its Technical Laboratory in 1932. Originally, the small laboratory operated for research purposes. Later, it included specialized microscopes and extensive reference collections of guns, watermarks, typefaces, and automobile tire track designs. In 1935, the FBI's National Academy was established to train agents and police officers in modern investigative methods. The National Academy trained police officials throughout the United States and, starting in the 1940s, from all over the world. The legal tools given to the FBI by Congress, as well as bureau initiatives to upgrade the professionalism of the agency, resulted in the arrest or death of most major gangsters in the United States by 1936. By that time, fascism in Nazi Germany and Italy, as well as communism in the Soviet Union, threatened U.S. democratic principles. With war looming, a new set of challenges faced the FBI.

WORLD WAR II ERA

As war threatened, Europe's fascist parties had supporters in the United States. At the same time, labor unrest and racial disturbances presented an opportunity for the U.S. Communist Party to attract new members. The FBI was alert to these fascist and communist groups as threats to U.S. national security. In 1936, President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the FBI to investigate these groups. A 1939 presidential order strengthened the FBI's authority to investigate subversives in the United States, and Congress reinforced it by passing the 1940 Smith Act, which outlawed advocating the violent overthrow of the government.

With the outbreak of war in 1939, the FBI's responsibilities increased. Subversion, sabotage, and espionage became major concerns of the bureau. At least one agent trained in defense-plant protection was placed in each of the FBI's 42 field offices. The FBI also developed a network of informal informational sources. With leads developed by these intelligence networks, as well as through their own work, special agents investigated potential threats to national security.

Beginning in 1941, the FBI focused its internal security efforts on potentially dangerous German, Italian, and Japanese nationals, as well as native-born Americans whose beliefs and activities aided the Axis powers. The FBI's Technical Laboratory cooperated with engineers, scientists, and cryptographers in other agencies to enable the United States to penetrate and sometimes control the flow of information from the warring powers.

Sabotage investigations became another FBI responsibility. In June 1942, an unsuccessful sabotage attempt was made on the United States as two German submarines let off four saboteurs at Amagansett, Long Island, and Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida. The Nazi German military had trained these men as saboteurs; they were also trained to blend into American surroundings. However, afraid of capture, one saboteur turned himself in—and then helped the FBI locate and arrest the rest of the team. The swift capture of these Nazi saboteurs helped to calm the nation's fear of Axis subversion and strengthened Americans' confidence in the FBI.

Immediately after the United States declared war on Japan on December 8, 1941, the FBI arrested hundreds of previously identified aliens who were believed to threaten national security and turned them over to the military or to immigration authorities. Near the beginning of the war, Japanese nationals and American citizens of Japanese descent from the West Coast were evacuated and sent to internment camps farther east. Because the FBI had arrested the persons whom it considered security threats, FBI director Hoover believed that the evacuation was unnecessary. President Roosevelt and the attorney general, however, supported the military's assessment that evacuation and internment were essential to national security. The

FBI then assumed responsibility for arresting evacuation violators.

During the war, one group of FBI agents held unique responsibilities. Kept separate from the rest of the bureau, these agents composed the Special Intelligence Service (SIS) in Latin America. Established by President Roosevelt in 1940, the SIS was created to provide information on Axis activities in South America and to destroy Axis intelligence and propaganda networks there. Several hundred thousand Germans or German descendants and numerous Japanese lived in South America. Many of them were pro-Axis and provided cover for Axis communications facilities. In every South American country, the SIS played a key role in reducing support for the Nazis.

POSTWAR AMERICA

After World War II ended in August 1945, the FBI faced several new challenges. The United States had abandoned its traditional policy of isolationism and, economically, had become the world's most powerful nation. The U.S. Communist Party appeared to be gaining popularity, and overseas the Soviet Union strengthened its grasp on the countries of Eastern Europe. In a February 1946 speech, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin indicated that future wars were inevitable until communism had replaced capitalism worldwide.

Events in Europe and North America convinced Congress that Stalin was achieving this goal. By 1947, plentiful evidence existed that pro-Soviet individuals had infiltrated the U.S. government. In June 1945, the FBI raided the offices of the magazine *Amerasia* and discovered a large number of classified State Department documents. Several months later, 22 people were arrested in Canada for attempting to steal atomic secrets. Immediately after the war, Americans had felt secure because of the nation's monopoly on the atomic bomb, but the fear that the Soviets would create an atomic bomb quickly came to dominate American thinking. This fear was realized in 1949, when Soviets detonated their own atomic bomb.

Counteracting the communist threat became a principal focus of the U.S. government at all levels, as well as in the private sector. While U.S. foreign policy centered on defeating communist expansion abroad, many U.S. citizens sought to confront the communist threat at home. The U.S. Communist Party often worked through so-called front organizations and tried to influence other Americans who agreed with their propaganda. Such communist sympathizers were known as "fellow travelers."

The bureau had been investigating suspected acts of espionage and sabotage since 1917, but under President Roosevelt, the FBI was authorized to carry out investigations of threats to national security as well. This role was clarified and expanded under Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Any public or private agency or individual with information about subversive activities was urged to report it to the FBI. During this time, the FBI's authority to conduct background investigations on present and prospective government employees also expanded dramatically.

The 1946 Atomic Energy Act gave the FBI responsibility for determining the loyalty of individuals who had access to restricted information about atomic energy. Later, executive orders from Presidents Truman and Eisenhower gave the FBI the additional responsibility of investigating allegations of disloyalty among federal employees. Many suspected and convicted spies, such as Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, had been federal employees. Therefore, background investigations were considered essential to national security. On March 14, 1950, the FBI began publishing its Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list to increase law enforcement's ability to capture dangerous fugitives.

THE VIETNAM WAR ERA

U.S. involvement in Vietnam divided the nation. Most Americans objecting to the Vietnam War or to other policies wrote to Congress or carried peace signs in orderly demonstrations. Idealism characterized the years from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. However, the time was also marred by increased urban crime and a tendency for some groups to resort to violence in challenging the establishment. In 1970 alone, an estimated 3,000 bombings and 50,000 bomb threats occurred in the United States. Opposition to the Vietnam War brought together several antiestablishment groups and gave them a common goal.

The convergence of crime, violence, and national security issues ensured that the FBI played a key role during this troubled period. Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon, FBI director Hoover, and many Americans believed that some groups who opposed the nation's policies in Southeast Asia posed a potential danger to national security. As Hoover observed in a 1966 *PTA* magazine article, the United

States was confronted with "a new style in conspiracy—conspiracy that is extremely subtle and devious and hence difficult to understand . . . a conspiracy reflected by questionable moods and attitudes, by unrestrained individualism, by nonconformism in dress and speech, even by obscene language, rather than by formal membership in specific organizations."

Neither the administration nor Congress had developed guidelines for FBI agents covering national security investigations. Such guidelines were not issued until 1976. Thus the FBI addressed the threats from militant groups in the same manner as the threats from communists in the 1950s and the KKK in the 1960s. It used both traditional investigation techniques and counterintelligence programs—known

President Lyndon B. Johnson meeting with FBI director J. Edgar Hoover shortly after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in November 1963. The FBI, the nation's main federal law enforcement agency, was charged with investigating Kennedy's assassination. The FBI is under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Source: Corbis.

as *cointelpro*—to counteract domestic terrorism and to conduct investigations of individuals and organizations that threatened terrorism and violence. Wiretapping and other intrusive techniques were discouraged by Hoover in the mid-1960s and eventually were forbidden completely unless they conformed to the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968. Hoover formally ended all cointelpro operations on April 28, 1971.

AFTER VIETNAM

J. Edgar Hoover died in 1972 after 48 years as FBI director. The following year, President Richard Nixon appointed Clarence Kelley as Hoover's successor. Kelley, who was the Kansas City police chief when he received the appointment, had been an FBI agent from 1940 to 1961. As director, Kelley sought to restore public trust in the FBI and in law enforcement, which had deteriorated during the Vietnam and Watergate eras. He instituted new policies that improved the training and selection of FBI and law enforcement leaders, established new procedures of

intelligence collection, and began to prioritize criminal programs.

Kelley also responded to concerns expressed by Congress and the media about whether FBI methods of collecting intelligence in domestic security and counterintelligence investigations infringed on constitutional rights. Previously, the FBI had used its own criteria for intelligence collection, based on executive orders and authority granted by attorneys general. After congressional hearings, Attorney General Edward Levi established detailed guidelines for the first time. The guidelines for FBI foreign counterintelligence investigations went into effect on March 10, 1976, and those for domestic security investigations on April 5, 1976.

Kelley's most important management innovation, however, was implementing the concept of "quality over quantity" investigations. He directed each field office to set priorities based on the types of cases that were most important in its region and to concentrate resources on those priority matters. To strengthen this concept, the FBI established three national priorities—foreign counterintelligence, organized crime, and

white-collar crime. During Kelley's tenure as director, the FBI made significant efforts to develop a force with more women and one that better reflected the ethnic composition of the United States.

INTERNATIONAL CRIME

In 1978, William H. Webster replaced Kelley as FBI director. A few years later, in 1982, following an explosion of terrorist incidents worldwide, Webster made counterterrorism a fourth national priority. Throughout the 1980s, the illegal drug trade also severely challenged U.S. law enforcement. To ease this challenge, in 1982 the attorney general gave the FBI concurrent jurisdiction with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) over narcotics violations in the United States. The additional Department of Justice attention to drug crimes resulted in the confiscation of millions of dollars in controlled substances, the arrest of major narcotics figures, and the dismantling of important drug rings.

In 1984, the FBI acted as the primary agency for the security of the Los Angeles Olympic Games. The FBI unveiled the Hostage Rescue Team, a domestic force capable of responding to complex hostage situations, such as the tragedy at the 1972 games in Munich. Perhaps because of the bureau's emphasis on combating terrorism, such acts within the United States decreased dramatically during the 1980s. In 1986, Congress expanded the FBI's jurisdiction to cover terrorist acts against American citizens outside the nation's boundaries. Three years later, the Department of Justice authorized the FBI to arrest terrorists, drug traffickers, and other fugitives overseas without the consent of the foreign country in which they resided.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The dismantling of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 presented new challenges to national security. As world leaders redefined their foreign policies and national security guidelines, the FBI responded in 1992 by reassigning 300 special agents from foreign counterintelligence duties to violent crime investigations across the country. It was an unprecedented opportunity to intensify efforts to control growing domestic crime problems—and at the same time, to reconsider the FBI's national security programs in counterintelligence and counterterrorism.

The FBI laboratory also helped to change violent criminal identification during the 1990s. Its breakthrough use of DNA technology enabled genetic crime-scene evidence to positively identify—or rule out—suspects by comparing their particular DNA patterns. This unique identifier made possible the creation of a national DNA Index, a database similar to the fingerprint index that had been implemented as a means of identification in 1924.

In the post–Cold War years, the FBI reassessed its strategies for defending national security, now no longer defined as the containment of communism and the prevention of nuclear war. By creating the National Security Threat List, which was approved by the attorney general in 1991, the bureau changed its approach from defending against hostile intelligence agencies to protecting the nation's information and technologies. The bureau identified countries—not just hostile intelligence services—that pose a continuing and serious intelligence threat to the United States. It also defined expanded threat issues, including the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons; the loss of critical technologies; and the improper collection of trade secrets and proprietary information. President Bill Clinton noted in 1994 that U.S. national security now also meant economic security.

Louis J. Freeh was sworn in as director of the FBI in 1993. Freeh had served as an FBI agent from 1975 to 1981. Director Freeh worked to respond to deepening crime problems, both at home and abroad. During the summer of 1994, determined to forge strong international police partnerships, Freeh led a delegation of high-level diplomatic and federal law enforcement officials who met with senior officials of 11 European nations to discuss international crime issues.

On July 4, 1994, Freeh officially announced the opening of an FBI Legal Attaché Office in Moscow, the old seat of Russian communism. Consequently, the bureau increased joint efforts against international organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism, and it expanded its training of international police in investigative processes, ethics, leadership, and professionalism. The bureau also expanded its international presence by opening 21 new Legal Attaché Offices overseas.

As computers and access to the Internet became commonplace in homes across the United States, the FBI began to put in place measures to address crime in cyberspace. It created the Computer Investigations

and Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center to respond to physical and cyberattacks against U.S. infrastructure. In 1991, the FBI's Computer Analysis and Response Teams began to provide investigators with the technical expertise necessary to obtain evidence from suspects' computers.

In 1998, the FBI's National Infrastructure Protection Center was created to monitor the dissemination of computer viruses, worms, and other malicious programs and to warn government and business computer users of these dangers. To prepare the FBI for both domestic and foreign lawlessness in the 21st century, Freeh spearheaded law enforcement efforts to ensure public safety and national security in the face of telecommunications advances.

IN THE 21ST CENTURY

On September 4, 2001, Robert S. Mueller III was sworn in as FBI director, with the directive to upgrade the bureau's information technology infrastructure, address records management issues, and enhance analysis of foreign counterintelligence. However, the September 11 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon changed the scope of FBI responsibilities.

In the aftermath of the attacks, Director Mueller led massive investigative efforts in partnership with all U.S. law enforcement agencies, the federal government, and allies overseas. On October 26, 2001, President George W. Bush signed into law the USA PATRIOT Act, which granted new authority to the FBI to address the threat of international and domestic terrorism and to protect the American people against future terrorist attacks.

On May 29, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued revised investigative guidelines to assist the bureau's counterterrorism efforts. To support the bureau's change in mission and to meet the new strategic priorities, Director Mueller also called for a reorganization of the FBI's structure and operations to closely focus the bureau on preventing terrorist attacks, countering foreign intelligence operations against the United States, and addressing cybercrime attacks and other high-technology crimes.

Thus, as the 21st century unfolds, the FBI remains committed to its mission: "Protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats; uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States; and provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners."

—Darrell J. Kozlowski

See also Antiwar Movement; Communism and National Security; Computer Security; Hoover, J. Edgar; Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Japanese Internment; Law Enforcement and National Security; Narcotics, War on; Organized Crime; Terrorism, U.S. (Domestic); Vietnam War Protests

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FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA)

Federal agency charged with planning for, recovering from, and mitigating disasters; part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency, which became part of the Department of Homeland Security in March 2003, can trace its beginnings to the Congressional Act of 1803. That law, the first legislative act to respond to a disaster in the United States, provided assistance to a New Hampshire town that was destroyed by fire. During the 19th century, more than 100 subsequent acts were passed by Congress to provide relief from hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and other natural disasters. It became incumbent on the federal government to assist localities recovering from damage caused by natural disasters. Congress took several steps during the 20th century to facilitate such relief.

In the 1930s, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was given authority to make disaster loans for the repair and reconstruction of certain public facilities following an earthquake or other disaster. In 1934, the Bureau of Public Roads was given authority to fund repairs to highways and bridges that had been damaged or destroyed by natural disasters. About the same time, the Flood Control Act charged the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers with implementing flood control

projects. This piecemeal approach to disaster response required greater coordination at the highest level of government, and it led to the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration being established within the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

During the 1960s and 1970s, a series of hurricanes (Carla in 1962, Betsy in 1965, Camille in 1969, and Agnes in 1972) and earthquakes (Alaska in 1964 and southern California in 1971) served to focus attention on natural disaster response. This led to new legislation, including the National Flood Insurance Act (1968) and the Disaster Relief Act (1974), which established the process of presidential disaster declarations. At about that time, more than 100 agencies became involved in emergency and disaster activities, as well as in regulating nuclear and conventional power plants and transporting hazardous and toxic waste.

In 1979, at the behest of the National Governors Association, President Jimmy Carter issued an executive order merging many separate disaster-related responsibilities into a single agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). In addition to consolidating several agencies—including the Federal Insurance Administration, the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration, the National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program, and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration—FEMA also took on civil defense responsibilities. FEMA developed an all-hazards approach that included direction, control, and warning systems for emergencies ranging from local storms to war.

The new agency soon faced a spectrum of challenges, ranging from toxic waste pollution (Love Canal), to the Cuban refugee crisis, to the nuclear accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in 1979. The Loma Prieta earthquake (1989) and Hurricane Andrew (1992) brought increased national attention to the agency. In 1993, President Bill Clinton appointed James L. Witt to be the director of FEMA. Witt, who formerly had been a state emergency manager, streamlined disaster relief and recovery operations and emphasized preparedness and mitigation.

In 2001, President George W. Bush appointed Joe M. Allbaugh as FEMA director, and within months of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, FEMA was given responsibility for training and equipping first responders to deal with weapons of mass destruction.

In March 2003, FEMA was one of 23 agencies that were merged into the new Department of Homeland Security, headquartered in Washington, DC. The agency has about 2,600 full-time employees supplemented by more than 5,000 standby disaster reservists. The agency's duties include advising on building codes and flood plain management, disaster education, equipping and training state and local agencies, coordinating the federal response to disasters, supporting the national fire service, and administering national flood and crime insurance programs.

See also Emergency Preparedness and Response; First Responders; Homeland Security

FEDERAL RACKETEERING STATUTE (RICO)

A U.S. law providing for extended penalties for criminal acts that are performed as part of an ongoing criminal organization. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.

In 1970, the U.S. Congress exercised its broad power under the commerce clause and enacted RICO as part of the Organized Crime Control Act, a law that included the Illegal Gambling Business Act. Like the Illegal Gambling Business Act, RICO was intended to eradicate organized crime by attacking the sources of its revenue, such as syndicated gambling or bookmaking. The law imposes both criminal punishment (imprisonment ranging from 20 years to life, depending on the racketeering activity involved) and civil liability (including treble damages, costs, and attorneys' fees) for those who engage in certain prohibited acts.

A number of prohibited activities are specified under RICO. Most important, however, under RICO it is unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt to use or invest any part of that income, or the proceeds from it, to acquire any interest in or to establish or operate any enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.

The RICO Act established a threefold prohibition aimed at stopping the infiltration of racketeers into legitimate organizations. The statute makes it unlawful to invest funds derived from a pattern of racketeering activity or collected from an unlawful debt. It also forbids acquiring or maintaining an interest in an enterprise that affects commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity or through the collection of an

unlawful debt. Third, it forbids participation in the affairs of such an enterprise through those means. Whether the action is criminal or civil, a RICO violation requires proof of the existence of an enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt and proof that the enterprise is engaged in or affects interstate commerce.

In essence, RICO was an aggressive initiative that supplemented old methods for fighting crime and provided new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault on organized crime and its economic roots. In large part, RICO was the U.S. Congress's response to the financial infiltration of organized crime into legitimate business operations that affect interstate commerce. Congress wanted to remove the profit motive from organized crime and separate the racketeers from their revenue sources.

Interestingly, the RICO statue does not specifically mention organized crime. Instead, Congress chose to target racketeering activity. The provisions of RICO, it has been argued, demand a liberal interpretation to effectuate this broad congressional intent. Several courts have interpreted RICO as legislation that ensures marketplace integrity.

In its interpretation of the act, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the argument that a pattern of racketeering activity requires proof of multiple illegal schemes. The Court noted that a pattern of racketeering activity requires two-pronged proof of a relationship between the offenses and the threat of continuing activity. A relationship is established when the conduct amounts to a pattern that embraces offenses having the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission or are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not merely isolated events.

Continuity is found when the offenses amount to or pose a threat of continued conduct. The Court held that because Congress was concerned with long-term activity, continuity may be demonstrated by a series of offenses over a substantial period of time, rather than a few weeks or months with no threat of future conduct. Continuity may also be shown by a few offenses within a short period of time, with the threat of the acts extending indefinitely into the future.

The RICO statute has been used in approaches by prosecutors beyond those traditionally considered. For instance, RICO has been applied to cases involving corporations, as the most recent round of corporate scandals indicate. In addition, Section 801 of the USA PATRIOT Act amends the RICO statute to include certain terrorism statutes within the definition of "racketeering activity."

This allows multiple acts of terrorism to be charged as a pattern of racketeering for RICO purposes. In this way, the act expands the ability of prosecutors to prosecute members of established, ongoing terrorist organizations.

—John Becker

See also Law Enforcement and National Security; Organized Crime

FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTERS (FFRDCs)

Organizations sponsored by government agencies; administered by colleges and universities, other non-profit institutions, and industrial firms; and charged with assisting the U.S. government with scientific research and analysis, development and acquisition, and systems engineering and integration.

Federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) address complex, long-term problems, objectively analyze technical questions, and provide creative and cost-effective solutions to government problems under the sponsorship and guidance of their sponsoring governmental agency. Sponsoring agencies include the U.S. Departments of Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Transportation, and Treasury; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); the National Science Foundation; and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

FFRDCs operate as long-term strategic partners with their sponsoring agencies; however, in an effort to ensure the highest levels of objectivity, they are organized as independent entities with limitations and restrictions on their activities. Because of the unique position of FFRDCs, the 1984 Competition in Contracting Act (which provides federal executive branch agencies with policy and procedures for the conduct of contracting activities) specifically authorized agencies to use noncompetitive procedures as needed to establish and maintain FFRDCs. This is an exception to the general rule requiring the use of full and open competition. As a matter of general practice, most federal agencies that sponsor FFRDCs do not use competitive procedures to maintain their FFRDCs on expiration of the contract terms.

The FFRDCs have a special relationship with the government organizations they serve. They have

access, beyond what is common in a normal contractual relationship, to government and private data, including sensitive and proprietary information, as well as to federal employees and facilities. The FFRDCs are prohibited from manufacturing products, competing with industry, or working for commercial companies, allowing industry and government to confidently provide them with sensitive information.

As private entities, FFRDCs have greater flexibility than the government in recruiting and managing a highly skilled technical workforce. Long-term relationships between the government and FFRDCs are encouraged to provide the continuity that will attract high-quality personnel to the FFRDC. Therefore, the FFRDCs are able to support their government sponsors with a full spectrum of planning and concept development, research and development, and systems acquisition. Sponsors conduct comprehensive reviews of their FFRDCs every five years to ensure the quality, efficiency, and appropriateness of the work program. The practical results of the FFRDCs' work is made available to the public through methods such as cooperative research and development, technology licensing, open-source participation, and contributions to industry standards.

See also Science, Technology, and Security

FIFTH COLUMN

Term that refers to any clandestine group or faction of subversive agents who attempt to undermine a nation's solidarity from inside its own borders. A fifth column is a group of secret sympathizers or enemy supporters that engage in espionage or sabotage within national borders.

Soviet revolutionary leader Leon Trotsky originally used the term *fifth column* to describe his Fifth Army, an elite military unit that operated during the Russian Civil War. But it is Emilio Mola Vidal, a Nationalist general during the 1930s Spanish Civil War, who is generally credited with coining the term. Mola's army, which comprised four columns, moved on Madrid. As they did so, the general referred to his militant supporters within the capital as his fifth column, intent on undermining the loyalist government from within. The term itself was popularized by writers such as Ernest Hemingway, who used the term in his book *The Fifth Column and Four Stories of the Spanish Civil War*.

During the Cold War, communist sympathizers in the United States were frequently termed a "fifth column." More recent conflicts have had their own fifth columns. These include Cuban rebels during the Bay of Pigs invasion and Iraqi insurgents in the aftermath of the Iraq War of 2003. The term has also been extended to a number of modern U.S. domestic issues—for example, in the debate over abortion, it has been argued that the "right-to-life" movement has established a fifth column among freedom-of-choice advocates.

See also Covert Operations; Espionage

FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

Combat aircraft whose primary mission is to destroy opposing aircraft. Since its introduction during World War I, the fighter has evolved to carry out other roles as well, including reconnaissance and ground attack. Today, its main goal is securing air superiority by eliminating enemy threats on land, sea, and air.

EARLY HISTORY

The fighter made its debut in World War I, the first conflict in which aircraft were used as weapons of war. Improvements in aeronautical engineering and materials during the 1920s and 1930s dramatically increased the performance, durability, and deadliness of fighters. By the start of World War II, fighters had become sophisticated machines capable of performing a wide variety of roles.

World War I

When World War I began in 1914, the airplane was still in its infancy. Nevertheless, many military leaders immediately grasped its potential as a weapon of war. Hot air balloons had been used for decades as a way to observe enemy troop positions, so using the airplane for reconnaissance was merely a logical extension of that practice. The mission of reconnaissance planes was to report on enemy troop movements, not to engage in combat.

Commanders on both sides soon realized the value of observation planes and decided they needed a way to attack enemy aircraft. However, mounting guns on

early airplanes presented a challenge. The wood-and-fabric construction of the planes made their wings too light to support guns. The only place to mount a machine gun powerful enough to shoot down another plane was over the engine. However, this meant shooting through the spinning propeller of the aircraft, and the technology to do this safely did not yet exist. The advent of the true fighter aircraft would await this development.

Some pilots tried to solve the problem by bolting steel plates on the backs of their propeller blades. This way, any rounds fired that struck the propeller would bounce off harmlessly. Although clever, the device was not terribly practical, and it wasted a great deal of ammunition. It was not until 1915 that a workable solution to the problem was discovered with the invention of the synchronizing gear. This gear was a device that could be connected to both the propeller shaft and the machine gun and interrupted the firing of the gun when a propeller blade passed in front of it.

The synchronizing gear revolutionized aerial combat by enabling the design of aircraft specifically intended to shoot down enemy planes. This soon led to a second important role for fighters: protecting one's own observation aircraft. The presence of enemy fighters made solo reconnaissance missions much more dangerous, so friendly fighters were dispatched to defend escort observation planes. This led to the birth of the plane-against-plane "dogfight" between fighters escorting observation flights and those trying to intercept them.

By the end of World War I, fighter "aces" (those who had at least five victories in aerial combat) had become the most romantic figures of the conflict. Often referred to as "Knights of the Air," fighter pilots were seen as living a dashing and exciting life that was far removed from the mud and blood of the trenches on the ground. However, for all their glamour and renown, fighters played a relatively minor role in the war. They were valuable mainly as a way to counter enemy reconnaissance efforts, but they contributed little else to the overall military effort.

Interwar Developments

Despite its limited military role, the fighter's romantic appeal helped to popularize aviation among the general public. After the war, the peacetime uses of aircraft multiplied rapidly with the establishment of the first commercial airmail and passenger services. This burst of interest in aviation was accompanied by increased investment in aviation technology. The decade following the end of World War I saw technological improvements that enabled the fighter to emerge as a formidable weapon of war.

Perhaps the most important of the technological advances in aircraft design at this time was the use of metal to replace wood and fabric in airplane construction. This was made possible by the design of more powerful engines that could lift a heavier metal craft into the air. The metal wings of the new generation of aircraft were strong enough to carry additional machine guns and cannons. In addition, fighters could now be fitted with a limited number of bombs, allowing them to fill a new fighter-bomber role.

The other main aeronautical advancement during this time was the switch from biplane (two-wing) to monoplane (single-wing) design. Monoplanes were not unknown during World War I. In fact, the first successful fighter of the war was the single-wing German Fokker Eindecker. However, because of the lightweight construction of early aircraft, biplanes were much more stable and durable than monoplanes such as the Eindecker. Thus, most of the fighter aircraft of the time were of biplane design. The advent of the rugged metal airframe spelled the end of the biplane as a principal fighter design.

Even with a heavier frame, these new fighters were much faster than their World War I predecessors. The fastest World War I fighters had a top speed of perhaps 125 mph (slightly over 200 km per hour). Fighter aircraft designed in the late 1920s and early 1930s routinely reached speeds over 300 mph (500 km per hour). Combined with their heavier armament, longer range, and ability to fly at higher altitudes, the aircraft designed between the wars revolutionized the role of the fighter.

Some of the best-known and effective fighters of World War II were designed during the early 1930s. These included the German Messerschmidt (Me) 109 and the British Supermarine Spitfire. These aircraft formed the backbone of their nations' fighter forces throughout World War II. Despite the introduction of newer fighters later in the war, both the Me-109 and the Spitfire remained the principal fighters in the German Luftwaffe and British Royal Air Force (RAF) until the end of the war.

World War II

During World War II, the fighter came of age as an integral part of the modern military arsenal. From the

outset, Nazi Germany used fighter aircraft in close support of ground attacks. German fighters strafed enemy troops and attacked tanks, trucks, and other military vehicles to reduce enemy resistance to the German army. The Germans also introduced a new type of aircraft—the fighter-bomber—that had much of the speed and maneuverability of a fighter but also carried bombs to hit targets that were too large for standard fighters. The combination of ground forces supported by aerial bombardment from fighters and fighter-bombers enabled the German army to roll to easy victories in the early years of the war.

By late June 1940, Great Britain stood alone against Germany, and the German victory over France had driven British troops from continental Europe. The only way for Great Britain to strike at Germany was through long-range strategic bombing of Germany's industry and civilian population. The bombers of the day, although heavily armed to defend against fighters, were still extremely vulnerable. The larger, slower, and clumsier bombers needed fighter escorts to protect them from being shot down by experienced German fighter pilots. However, most targets in Germany were beyond the range of any fighter at that time. Fighters could protect the bombers for a couple hundred miles, but then were forced to return home for lack of fuel. For most of their flight, the bombers lacked fighter escorts.

Unescorted daytime bombing proved to be a disaster for British bombers. Losses were so high that the RAF quickly changed to a night bombing campaign. Although it was much more difficult to hit targets accurately at night, the RAF could not sustain the losses it would suffer in a daylight campaign. The needs of night bombing led to the invention of improved radar that allowed British bombers to locate targets at night using radar and radio signals. The Germans responded by developing "night fighters," that is, fighters and fighter-bombers with equipment to detect the radar emissions from Allied bombers. The nighttime war between fighters and bombers over Germany during World War II hastened the development of sophisticated airborne radar.

The Allies solved the dilemma of daylight bombing in late 1943 with the introduction of the U.S. P-51 Mustang fighter. This outstanding aircraft was not only faster and more maneuverable than any other fighter, it could carry additional fuel that allowed it to escort Allied bombers deep into Germany. The Mustang made daylight bombing raids possible and

swept the skies of German fighters in the months leading up to the D-Day invasion of France in 1944. During and after the invasion, Mustangs and other Allied fighters and fighter-bombers pounded German positions and cut German supply lines. Fighters thus made an invaluable contribution to the ultimate defeat of Germany.

Fighters also played an important role in the fighting in the Pacific theater against Japan. In a war that was fought over millions of square miles of ocean, aircraft carriers were the main instruments of military power for both sides. Fighters guarded the precious carriers from air attack and provided air support for amphibious invasions. American carrier-based fighter bombers served as airborne artillery to hit Japanese positions on islands that were too small to accommodate large artillery units. On both fronts, World War II was a conflict whose ultimate outcome rested heavily on air superiority.

MODERN FIGHTERS

The Mustang P-51 was the last U.S. propeller-driven fighter aircraft produced in large quantities. By the end of World War II, the first jet aircraft were being put into service. During the 1950s, advances in jet technology and dramatic improvements in rockets and missiles significantly changed the nature of the modern fighter.

Jet Technology

The world's first jet fighter was the British Gloucester Meteor, which flew in early 1944. However, the first jet to see widespread operational use was the German Messerschmidt 262, which debuted against Allied bombers in late 1944. These early jets were of limited use because of mechanical problems and, for the Germans, a lack of jet fuel late in the war.

After World War II, the United States rapidly developed and deployed its first jet fighter, the P-80 Shooting Star. This was replaced by the much more advanced F-86 Sabre Jet in the early 1950s. The Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain were also designing and producing their own jet fighters by this time. By the mid-1950s, the much faster and more maneuverable jet aircraft had replaced propeller-driven fighters in every major air force. Jets were first widely used in combat during the Korean War (1950–53). By the time of the Vietnam War (1964–74),

jets dominated the skies, and the fastest jet fighters could reach speeds well in excess of 1,000 mph (1,660 km per hour).

Missile Technology

A second major change in fighters since World War II has been the evolution of their armament. The main weapons of propeller-driven aircraft were machine guns and cannons. However, the much faster speeds of jet aircraft make hitting a moving target with a bullet or cannon shell extremely difficult. During the 1950s, technological advances caused missiles to replace guns as the principal weapon on modern fighters. The most important of these advances was the invention of better guidance and target-tracking systems.

Since the 1950s, fighter aircraft have relied primarily on heat-seeking and radar-guided missiles to destroy airborne opponents. Heat-seeking missiles contain sensors that detect and hone in on the heat created by an aircraft as it moves through the air. Radar-guided missiles are guided to their targets by a radar beam emitted by the pilot of the attacking aircraft. Both kinds of missiles can track and destroy targets at a much greater distance than guns or cannons.

Modern fighters performing in a fighter-bomber role also make significant use of missile technology. Although they still drop conventional iron "dumb bombs," fighter-bombers are also equipped with computer-guided "smart bombs" and cruise missiles to destroy larger targets. Both of these weapons use on-board computerized maps to locate and destroy targets hundreds of miles away from the firing aircraft.

Air Superiority

The U.S. military typically describes the role of modern fighter aircraft as "air superiority." That is, the fighter's job is to ensure that friendly ground, naval, and other air forces are able to operate free of enemy interference. The development of supersonic jets and the evolution of advanced missile and radar technology has made that job easier than it was for earlier generations of fighter aircraft. The latest breakthrough in aviation technology, the development of stealth technology that allows planes to evade radar detection, means that today's fighters can deal with a greater range of targets more effectively and safely than their predecessors.

However, modern fighter technology does have its drawbacks. The cost of a single modern fighter can run to hundreds of millions of dollars. Modern fighters' advanced technology requires highly trained personnel to service and maintain them. As technology continues to move ahead, fighters will become obsolete and require replacement more frequently. These factors have led the U.S. armed services to explore the creation of a single all-purpose fighter to reduce cost and simplify maintenance requirements. The so-called Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is meant to serve all branches of the military in both a fighter and fighter-bomber role.

The JSF reflects the dramatic evolution of the fighter over less than a century of history. From a fragile and primitive craft meant to deny the enemy access to battlefield information, the fighter has become a tool for dominating the airspace above the battlefield. The wood-and-fabric crates that bobbed over the trenches of World War I gave birth to today's nearly invisible stealth fighters, which drop laser-guided bombs on targets beyond the horizon. Once a novelty among military hardware, the fighter is now a key component of U.S. national security.

—John Haley

See also Air Warfare; Cruise Missile; F-117A Stealth Fighter; Joint Strike Fighter; Missiles; Naval Aviation; Precision-Guided Munitions; Radar; Smart Bomb; Stealth Technologies; World War I; World War II

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FIRST AMENDMENT

A statement of fundamental constitutional principles of the United States, which includes the ideas of

separation of church and state, freedom of worship, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the persecution of religious minorities and the establishment of a national religion. It allows the press to criticize the government and it gives citizens the right to organize. The U.S. Supreme Court may void acts of Congress that are incompatible with the First Amendment.

The First Amendment is one of 10 amendments that compose the Bill of Rights, which was adopted on December 15, 1791, to guarantee individual liberties and limit the power of the federal government. The First Amendment, articulated by founder James Madison, was added because the original Constitution—signed only four years earlier—did not contain adequate guarantees of religious and political freedom.

The First Amendment reads, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

The principles enshrined in the First Amendment are subject to limits. For example, federal and state laws restrict certain forms of expression, such as slander and obscenity. For reasons of national security, it is illegal to disclose state secrets despite the guarantee of freedom of speech. Additionally, to secure public safety, it has been construed that the First Amendment does not allow an individual to sound a false fire alarm in a crowded theater.

The interpretation of First Amendment rights has led to controversy when it comes to certain issues, such as flag burning, tobacco advertising, and hate speech. The U.S. Supreme Court has determined, for example, that an individual cannot invoke freedom of speech to refuse to testify before a congressional investigating committee. Based on the First Amendment, the Court has also ruled against school-sponsored prayer in public schools and against the display of the Ten Commandments in public buildings.

Issues involving First Amendment rights have become particularly important in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. Defense lawyers for suspected terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui, for example, cited the First Amendment in arguing that relevant court documents should not be kept secret, as demanded by the government on national security grounds.

Despite the controversies surrounding its interpretation, the First Amendment remains a blueprint for individual freedom and a cornerstone of U.S. democracy.

See also Civil Liberties; Constitution of the United States; Dissent; Moussaoui, Zacarias; Supreme Court, Role of U.S.

FIRST RESPONDERS

Term used to describe emergency response professionals who are first to arrive at the scene of a crisis situation. First responders include members of security, health, transportation, communication, and law enforcement agencies. Specifically, first responders include the police, fire department, hazmat (hazardous materials) teams, SWAT teams, public health officials, and emergency medical services. The role of the first responder is to assess a crisis—whether it is a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other large-scale emergency—and respond with the appropriate expertise to stabilize the situation.

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the importance of first responders to homeland and national security grew significantly.

New York firefighters helping with rescue efforts after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Firefighters are among the groups known as *first responders*, that is, emergency personnel who are the first to respond to a crisis. Other first responders include police, emergency medical services, bomb squads, and SWAT teams. Since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the nation's first responders have been on the front lines of protecting the population.

Source: Corbis.

The heroic efforts of firefighters, police officers, and emergency medical technicians at the time of the attacks were widely documented, but they also underscored the importance of these first responders to the nation's security.

In the United States, there are more than 11 million state and local first responders. Although they still perform their traditional roles as police, firefighters, and emergency medics, the mission of the first responders has evolved since September 11. Their new mission requires additional training to respond to chemical and biological attacks. Many of the first-responder organizations in the United States are coordinated under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the cabinet-level department whose mission is to provide domestic defense to the United States.

See also Emergency Preparedness and Response

FIRST STRIKE

Attack on an enemy's nuclear arsenal that prevents the victim from retaliating effectively against the attacker.

Throughout most of the Cold War, the two superpowers—the United States and Soviet Union—practiced a nuclear strategy known as mutually assured destruction (MAD). This strategy involved the threat of massive retaliation against a nuclear attack. Both nations maintained huge arsenals of nuclear weapons so that either could survive a nuclear attack by the other and still launch a devastating counterstrike. This policy maintained a nervous balance of nuclear power, with neither side willing to risk the consequences of starting a nuclear conflict.

First-strike theory argues that it is possible to launch a disabling attack against an opponent, even one that possesses a large nuclear arsenal. According to the theory, an effective first strike would target an opponent's nuclear-launch facilities and the supply sites that support them. A successful first strike would cripple enemy missiles that are ready to launch and prevent the opponent from readying others for a counterstrike. However, despite several periods of heightened superpower tension during the Cold War, neither side was prepared to take the risk of launching a first strike. The NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) nations formally renounced a first-strike policy, but the Soviet Union refused to go that far.

During the 1980s, the decision of U.S. president Ronald Reagan to develop a space-based missile defense system raised concerns among those who felt that MAD was an effective means of preventing nuclear conflict. The system, dubbed "Star Wars," threatened to enable the United States to knock out Soviet missiles en route to their targets. This would give the United States a serious first-strike capability because it would not need to worry about Soviet retaliation. The system, however, has been plagued by technical difficulties that have prevented its deployment. As of 2005, the Star Wars system was still having difficulty locating, tracking, and destroying practice targets much cruder than their real-world counterparts.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended the intense nuclear rivalry of the Cold War. Many of the new nations established in former Soviet republics agreed to scrap their nuclear weapons in return for cash payments from the United States and NATO. Russia, which retained most of the former Soviet nuclear capability, also destroyed many of its aging warheads. Current Russian nuclear capability is so far reduced from its heights under the former Soviet Union that the United States likely could launch a successful first strike. However, the fact that Russia does not pose a serious threat greatly reduces the need for or value of a U.S. first-strike policy.

See also Ballistic Missiles; Cold War; Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles; Mutually Assured Destruction; Nuclear Deterrence; Nuclear Utilization Theory; Nuclear Weapons; Reagan, Ronald, and National Policy; Soviet Union, Former (Russia) and U.S. Policy

FISSILE MATERIAL

Substances whose nuclei can be split to produce a nuclear fission reaction. Fissile materials are the fuels that supply the power generated by nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors. The most commonly used fissile materials are forms of uranium and plutonium.

URANIUM

Uranium is a radioactive metallic element that is deposited in rocky ores and found in very small amounts in plants and animals. Although it is softer than steel and easily molded into different shapes, uranium is

extremely dense. It was first discovered by the German chemist Martin Heinrich Klaproth in 1789 and named after the recently discovered planet Uranus. Over 100 years later, in 1896, French physicist Henri Becquerel found that uranium was radioactive. In fact, it was Becquerel's work with uranium that led him to discover the phenomenon of radioactivity. The radioactive and fissile properties of uranium led to its use in the world's first atomic bomb.

Naturally occurring uranium is found in three main forms or *isotopes* (an isotope is an atom with an electromagnetic charge). The most abundant is U-238, which makes up more than 99% of all natural uranium; the other isotopes are U-235 and U-234. Uranium isotopes can be separated from one another in a process called *enrichment*. This increases the concentration of one isotope relative to the others. Enriched uranium is the most widely used fuel in nuclear power plants. Reactor-grade enriched uranium contains 3% to 7% U235, compared to less than 1% in naturally occurring uranium. Weapons-grade uranium, which is used in nuclear weapons, contains more than 90% U-235.

PLUTONIUM

Like uranium, plutonium is a metallic element that is pliable but extremely dense; plutonium is slightly denser than uranium. It is a much more "recent" element than uranium, having been discovered in 1940 by a team of U.S. scientists at the University of California, Berkeley. The researchers bombarded uranium atoms with a heavy isotope of hydrogen called deuterium, and the reaction produced a radioactive substance they called plutonium. The newly discovered element proved critical to the Manhattan Project, which was launched by the United States at about this time to develop the world's first atomic bomb. The U.S. government built large nuclear reactors to produce plutonium, which fueled one of the two bombs developed by the Manhattan Project. All of the plutonium used in nuclear reactors and weapons is produced in such reactors, called *breeders*.

The main isotopes of plutonium are P-238 and P-239. Both are extremely radioactive and small amounts of either actually feel warm to the touch; slightly larger amounts can boil water. The P-238 isotope is often used as a power source for space probes because a very small amount can generate electricity for many years. Before the development of lithium-based heart pacemakers in 2003, P-238 was commonly used for that purpose. In contrast to these peaceful applications, the P-239 isotope has become the element most commonly used in nuclear weapons. Early tests showed that plutonium-based nuclear devices could produce more powerful explosions than uranium-based ones. Like uranium, plutonium must be enriched before it can be used in nuclear weapons. Weapons-grade plutonium consists of about 90% P-239 isotopes.

During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union produced and stockpiled tons of P-239. In 1982, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated that the two superpowers combined had generated some 300,000 kilograms (660,000 pounds) of plutonium. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the IAEA has been concerned about trafficking in stolen fissile materials. Rogue states and terrorist groups that cannot afford to develop their own nuclear programs are very interested in acquiring such materials, and the cash-poor states of the former Soviet Union offer many potential sellers. Controlling the spread of fissile materials has thus become a recent focus of U.S. national security efforts.

See also Arms Race; Atomic Bomb; International Atomic Energy Agency; Loose Nukes; Manhattan Project; Nuclear Proliferation; Nuclear Weapons

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FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS

Defense strategy based on a country's ability to resort to a wide range of political, economic, and military weapons to deter an attack at any level perpetrated by an enemy state. Adopted by the Kennedy administration as official national security policy in 1961, the flexible deterrent options approach (also known as flexible response) aimed to reassess the strategic relationship between the United States and its nuclear rival, the Soviet Union.

Instead of relying heavily on a devastating nuclear assault to fight potential Soviet military provocations,

under the flexible deterrent options, the United States would be able to meet each hostile action with a proportional reaction. A Soviet-financed communist insurgency in Asia, for example, could be opposed with conventional (nonnuclear) U.S. or allied troops without the risk of escalating the conflict to a full-fledged nuclear war or being forced to give up fighting the insurgency.

The strategy was quite expensive, however, because developing and maintaining top-notch conventional and unconventional weapons, as well as various kinds of military personnel, required considerable expenditures. In the cutthroat environment of the Cold War, flexible response ended up contributing to both the avoidance of nuclear conflict and the proliferation of limited yet vicious military clashes.

THE NEW LOOK

By the early 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union were fighting a Cold War that permeated the furthest reaches of the world and affected billions of people. Both sides possessed a large number of nuclear bombs, and the means to deliver them by intercontinental bomber jets to any location on the globe were becoming rapidly available.

The United States did not yet have a comprehensive military strategy that would regulate the use of both conventional and unconventional weaponry. Nuclear proliferation required the elaboration of such a strategy, however, and the task fell to the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was sworn in as president in 1953. In October of that year, Eisenhower approved a top-secret National Security Council policy paper that officially inaugurated a new "grand strategy" called the "New Look." According to this document, in the event of an attack by the communist powers (the Soviet Union and China), the United States reserved the right to respond with nuclear missiles, even if the provocation did not involve such weaponry.

The strategy centered around the idea of the asymmetrical response, whereby communist provocations would be met with overwhelming force at a time and place of America's choosing. A powerful response, it was argued, would cut U.S. defense costs by making the fomenting of local conflicts a very risky business for the Soviets. Indeed, throughout Eisenhower's presidential term, U.S. defense spending declined steadily in terms of the percentage of gross national product it represented. By 1960, however, U.S. public opinion was turning against the New Look. The strategy's perceived heavy reliance on nuclear weapons and its failure to respond to communist-inspired third-world revolutions made many feel that a new, more flexible approach was needed.

REASSESSMENT

Campaigning against Eisenhower in the spring of 1960, Democratic candidate John F. Kennedy systematically criticized the administration's handling of foreign affairs. Almost as soon as he moved into the White House, President Kennedy instructed his advisers to begin drafting a new strategy to safeguard the U.S. role in the world.

The new administration strongly believed that the United States should be able to resort to a wide variety of military and nonmilitary responses to communist provocations. They also believed that the economy was strong enough to sustain increased defense-related expenses. In March 1961, Kennedy presented to Congress an outline of a strategy that would come to be known as *flexible deterrent options*.

According to the new policy, America was to build an array of lines of attack that would make Soviet life a nightmare, should that nation decide to create trouble. The lines of attack included diplomatic measures (pursuing strong relations with potential allies while being ready to withdraw embassy personnel on short notice), political measures (increasing the dialogue with the press and releasing frequent public policy statements), economic measures (increasing or canceling American aid to other countries) and, perhaps most important, military measures (such as modernizing the U.S. missile fleet, increasing conventional capabilities, and intensifying training for special forces).

The newly crafted flexible response was soon busy at work around the world. Like most Cold War strategies on both sides, this one yielded mixed results. Although the combination of diplomacy, economic sanctions, and a threatening military posture solved the Cuban Missile Crisis, the same combination failed to bring about a positive resolution to the war in Vietnam, which was to become the biggest military nightmare the United States had faced. Initially designed to fight the communist powers more effectively, the strategy of flexible deterrent options has become a fundamental principle of American military thinking.

See also Cold War; Communism and National Security; Eisenhower Doctrine; Military Doctrine; War Planning

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FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION (FAO)

Organization within the United Nations, founded in 1945, to raise nutrition levels, improve the productivity of agriculture, improve conditions for rural populations, and promote economic prosperity by contributing to the growth of the world economy.

Since its establishment, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has become one of the largest UN agencies, with 180 member countries. The activities of the FAO are organized according to four main areas: information, expertise, building common understanding, and bringing knowledge to the field.

To achieve these goals, the FAO enlists professionals and specialists—including agronomists, foresters, nutritionists, and fishery and livestock experts—to collect, consolidate, and disseminate data. It works with member countries to develop agricultural policy that will establish sustainable development and to bring developed and underdeveloped nations together to reach agreement on issues affecting food production. The FAO also administers agricultural development projects and works with humanitarian relief agencies in crisis situations.

HISTORY OF THE FAO

Since its founding, the FAO has undertaken a variety of initiatives to focus attention on global hunger and the role of environmental protection in food production and distribution. In 1960, the FAO launched the Freedom from Hunger campaign to focus attention and resources on the persistent problem of famine in the third world and to mobilize the support of nongovernmental organizations.

In 1963, the FAO, along with the World Health Organization, established the Codex Alimentarius Commission to coordinate and develop international food standards to protect the health of consumers and ensure fair trade. This work has been expanded by conferences on world food security, which have the goal of ending hunger. The first World Food Day was held in 1981, and annual celebrations focus on environmental issues related to sustainable agriculture.

In 1986, the FAO established a database, AGRO-STAT (now called FAOSTAT), that serves as a resource for those seeking agricultural information and statistics. A few years later, in 1991, the FAO sponsored the International Plant Protection Convention for the purpose of controlling the spread of pests that are harmful to plant products and have the potential to seriously damage food production.

FOOD FOR ALL

At the World Food Conference, organized by the FAO in 1974, the attending governments proclaimed that "every man, woman and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger and malnutrition in order to develop their physical and mental faculties." The goal of adequate nutrition as a human right—quite far from being universally met—was reexamined at the World Food Summit 22 years later. The outcome of the summit was the Rome Declaration, which set forth seven commitments for attaining sustainable food security, and a plan of action intended to make the idea of "food for all" a realizable objective.

The goals of the FAO, however, have also been used to promote controversial outcomes. For example, in 1995, the Japanese government used the FAO's International Conference on Sustainable Contributions of Fisheries to Food Security as a platform to encourage the relaxation of bans on commercial whaling. The Japanese government was accused of pressuring for hasty approval of an FAO study on the relationship between whales and fish production. The stated purpose of the study was to justify commercial whaling in terms of the culpability of whales in fishery depletion. Thus, even seemingly apolitical goals such as alleviating poverty and hunger are subject to controversy and accusations of manipulation.

The FAO's support of the use of biotechnology has also been controversial. Although it may be capable of vastly increasing agricultural productivity, biotechnology presents risks as an experimental approach. It has been argued that food production is not the problem, but rather it is distribution and political factors affecting access to nutrition. The separation of the global community on either side of this issue is indicative of the

problems posed by the role of technology in aid and development.

See also Biotechnology; Development, Third-World; Sustainable Development

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FORD, GERALD R., AND NATIONAL POLICY

Thirty-eighth president of the United States (1974–77), who came into office under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as a result of the Nixon Watergate scandal. While in office, Republican president Gerald Ford (1913–) faced strong opposition and mistrust from a Democrat-dominated Congress and an angry public that viewed his pardoning of Richard Nixon to be the result of a deal. Such challenges made it difficult for Ford to be very effective in bringing about new policies. Nevertheless, Ford was quickly pressed to address issues of national security that had been hovering over the administration before his inauguration.

One of President Ford's first steps in dealing with these issues was to sign the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, which abolished the Atomic Energy Commission. The Atomic Energy Commission had been responsible for the development and production of nuclear materials, safety regulations for civilian usage, and, most important, the production of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons production had grown to such an extent that the Atomic Energy Commission could not handle so many tasks. The act split the commission into two agencies, putting the U.S. Department of Energy in charge of nuclear weapons and power and giving the Nuclear Regulatory Commission responsibility for regulatory concerns.

The production of nuclear weapons was only one aspect of national security protection dealt with by the Ford administration. For example, national security was considered to be protected on many fronts, not only by Ford, but also by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which recently had participated in many so-called covert operations abroad in the name of national security. These operations led to many deaths abroad and were denounced internationally for undermining the sovereignty of other countries. These covert CIA operations became publicly reviled within the United States as well. At the same time, Ford was confronted with the tail end of a chaotic and bloody war in Vietnam, where the CIA still played a significant role. This motivated Ford to fight for greater presidential war powers and better oversight of the CIA.

In 1975, as part of his power struggle with the CIA, President Ford issued executive order 11828, which established a commission on CIA activities within the United States. Consequently, hearings by the Church Committee (named after Senator Frank Church of Idaho) investigated CIA misconduct. The published reports of the hearings noted extensive abuses by U.S. intelligence agencies, including attempts or participation in the assassination of foreign leaders such as Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, and Fidel Castro of Cuba, among others. In an effort to enforce reform, President Ford instituted tighter controls over the CIA that were finalized under executive order 12333. The most notable part of this order was a CIA ban on political assassinations. Ford hoped to create the perception that U.S. interventions abroad were civil and appropriate.

Foreign policy has always been inextricably linked to national security. Before Ford came into office, national security was typically judged by U.S. relations with its two greatest threats abroad—communist China and the Soviet Union. Yet, during the Ford administration, these threats appeared to shift. Discussions were opening with China, and, for many in the United States, the Cold War was now viewed as a thing of the past.

That did not mean, however, that the United States did not face any more security threats from the international field. One of the most tragic security threats of the period came from Cambodia's Khmer Rouge regime. In 1975, Cambodians seized a U.S. merchant ship, the *Mayaguez*, in international waters. The merchant seamen aboard were soon released, but the event cost the lives of 41 marines who had been dispatched to rescue the crew but landed on the wrong island and fought the Khmer Rouge.

As the containment of communism was no longer seen as an effective justification for military grant aid and other security assistance requests, President Ford began to depend more on money earned from arms exports as a supplement. The increase made arms export controls an important issue in national policy, particularly after criticisms from the media, the public, and Congress drew attention to human rights violations in Latin America as evidence of the effects of unrestrained arms exports. Passage of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act in 1976 prohibited arms transfers to nations deemed to be systematically violating human rights.

Another issue that faced President Ford was a World War II–era policy regarding Japanese internment camps. Japanese Americans pressured President Ford to remove the wartime internment orders from law. In 1976, Ford ceremoniously addressed the violation of citizens' rights in the name of wartime national security by officially terminating the executive order that had authorized the internment of Japanese Americans. In doing so, the president stated, "I call upon the American people to affirm with me this American Promise—that we have learned from the tragedy of that long-ago experience forever to treasure liberty and justice for each individual American, and resolve that this kind of action shall never again be repeated."

Overall, although President Ford's time in office did not introduce many drastic changes to national security policy, he did make important adjustments with regard to the oversight of nuclear weapons production and tightened controls over CIA conduct. Ford's concession to greater arms export controls, though it restricted his attempt to supplement income for national security measures, served to decrease international anger against U.S. interventions. The president's continued progress concerning U.S. relations with China and the Soviet Union was also an important step toward further minimizing threats to U.S. national security.

See also Arms Trading; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Church, Frank; Japanese Internment; Mayaguez Affair; Nixon, Richard, and National Policy

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FOREIGN AID

Monetary, technical, military, or other assistance, most often sent to developing or struggling areas to help them gain greater self-sufficiency.

Foreign aid comes from and goes to many sources. Governments, the United Nations, international organizations, and church groups are all possible donors. Recipients may include national, provincial, city, or village governments; village inhabitants; domestic nonprofit organizations; and other church groups. These groups may donate to countries in times of emergency, such as natural disasters or humanitarian crises.

Donations may also be given under normal circumstances to promote development or to advance social welfare. Aid may be highly related to security. It may be given to help the beneficiary arm itself effectively against hostile neighbors (such as U.S. aid to Israel) or to help the donor nation increase its security (for example, if it gains access to a military base in exchange for its assistance).

Foreign aid has been an issue in international politics since the end of World War II. At that time, the United States launched the Marshall Plan to give aid to reconstruct Western Europe and helped to create the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which continue to help countries attain economic self-sufficiency today. This reconstruction effort was successful, but subsequent aid projects during the Cold War era had numerous flaws.

Early thinking about aid insisted that growing a country's economy was the best way to spur development. Although economic growth is helpful, it does not necessarily imply that aid money reaches those who need it most. Subsequent movements focused on debt reduction in the receiving country, job creation, rural development, deregulation of state industries, and reform of the recipient's monetary or economic policies. Current trends in foreign aid make aid conditional on democratic reform and demand that the recipient account for all donated funds.

During the Cold War, aid was often linked to the interests of the superpowers and not necessarily to the

needs of beneficiaries. This has not changed greatly since the fall of the Soviet Union. Donor countries may want alliances, favorable terms of trade, permission to open a military base within the recipient country, or otherwise donor-friendly policies. These conditions tend to pertain more to financial aid rather than other forms of aid.

Countries may assist one another in ways beyond giving money—aid may also include technical or military aid. Technical assistance may take the form of technical know-how, such as sending engineers to rebuild infrastructure damaged during a war. It also may be economic expertise—the IMF, for example, helps countries develop reliable, legitimate banks and institute sound financial practices. Technical assistance may also mean civic education: For example, in many countries, UN volunteers provide information about voting and democratic systems.

Military aid may be given to countries directly or indirectly. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union helped to arm allied nations against communist and capitalist threats, respectively. Today, however, military aid is often provided in the forms of peacekeeping or peacemaking operations, such as those in the former Yugoslav republics.

The most significant and contentious form of aid, however, is monetary—how and why countries receive such aid is the focus of the debate. Today, would-be beneficiaries may have to make efforts to meet donors' expectations before receiving aid. Nonemergency foreign assistance is increasingly based on contingencies that individual countries (and the IMF) create. Often, countries must prove that they are creating a civil society—reducing corruption, expanding rights, and establishing responsible government—and a strong market economy before they qualify for aid.

Some view the linkage of foreign assistance and domestic policies and practices as a leap forward in development thinking. They argue the fact that countries have to "earn" the assistance creates accountability for the money and ensures it will be spent responsibly. They insist that these programs encourage countries to develop good practices and will help them become self-sufficient faster.

Others insist that this linkage is detrimental. Countries that desperately need relief may not have the means to establish new policies and practices to qualify for aid. Taking a humanistic approach, critics argue that individuals may suffer because of government failures that they did not cause. Some add, too, that forcing countries to conform to outsiders' standards is a violation of that country's sovereignty. Others go still further and add that the practice is tantamount to neocolonialism.

Linkage of aid and policy is not the only major debate regarding foreign assistance. Many policymakers are opposed to the idea of giving foreign aid at all. One argument is that giving aid to developing countries creates a culture of dependency; recipient countries assume that others will look to their needs and feel no need to develop their own capacities. Another argument—"trade not aid"—insists that developing a country's markets will do more for its economy than direct foreign assistance. Still another argument is that countries receiving foreign aid are subject to the dictates of the donor nation, which may inflict inappropriate policies on them.

In spite of these arguments, most policymakers continue to support direct foreign aid because of real human need in the recipient countries, the necessity for seed money to start certain kinds of projects (such as local credit unions), or donor-country interests. Questions remain, however, regarding how long agencies and governments should continue aid and under what circumstances aid could (or should) stop. The largest question, in a world of scarce resources, is which countries or regions are most deserving of the limited aid funds available, and that question drives much of the debate.

See also Humanitarian Aid; Income Disparity, Global; International Monetary Fund; Trade and Foreign Aid; U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); World Bank

FOREIGN DEPENDENCY

Global power structure in which weaker states are economically reliant on stronger states.

Some experts regard foreign dependency as a new form of colonialism in which capitalism actually feeds underdevelopment and dependency. In this view, advanced industrial nations directly shape and exploit the economies of less-developed countries. Many of these less-developed nations are former colonies whose economies were once geared to produce raw materials to benefit the industries of their colonial owners.

Upon achieving independence, few colonies had modern industrial economies or trained workforces

that could compete in the global marketplace. They continued to export cheap raw materials to former colonial powers, which used the materials to make manufactured goods. The industrial countries then sold the finished goods back to their former colonies at a profit. This system has remained largely unchanged.

Dependency is a complex phenomenon that implies that one country can exercise significant control over economic behaviors in another country. Trade is one way to exercise such control, but there are other ways that less-developed economies come to depend on wealthier nations, including financial aid, capital, and policy formulation. Dependency not only influences the shape of state-to-state relations, but also the growth, stability, and autonomy of developing nations.

Dependency on foreign aid plays a significant role in shaping the economy of the recipient nation. Foreign aid can have positive economic and political impacts, such as increasing political participation and local public expenditures on social programs in developing countries. However, donor nations often use promises of aid (or threats of stopping aid) to pressure recipient nations into adopting political or economic policies that are favorable to the donor. In addition, significant amounts of foreign aid may undermine local financial responsibility in recipient countries. It also may diminish the power of the recipient country to make independent economic decisions.

The latter problem is particularly important with regard to loan acceptance. A country that obtains loans from the World Bank, for example, must agree to adjust its economic structure, liberalize its economy, and increase its international financial accountability. Moreover, paying off the debt from loans often leads to balance-of-payments difficulties for the recipient, further sustaining and deepening its economic dependency.

Much of the financial capital available in a developing country arrives from outside its borders. Capital inflows from other countries' lending institutions may be substantial, but these nations carry the obligations to please the lenders. This capital may take the form of foreign aid or foreign direct investment (FDI), which includes activities such as hosting foreign firms that provide jobs, increase domestic capital flows, and generate tax dollars. However, FDI also may generate problems. Foreign firms from developed nations typically dominate the local market, preventing or discouraging the development of local industries. Moreover, the administration of the host country may

be asked to provide tax incentives to keep the foreign company in the country.

Economic dependency may emerge when the economic policies of a developing nation are substantially influenced by decision makers in advanced industrial countries. Policies that favor industrialized nations may include agreeing to sell products at lower prices to ensure a market for them. Developing countries also may relax workplace or environmental regulations to induce foreign multinational corporations to establish or maintain businesses there. Power dependency may take a more subtle form. Decision makers in developing nations are often educated in the West, and thus inclined to adopt capitalist economic policies such as encouraging free trade.

All of these forms of dependency rob governments in developing nations of a great deal of their autonomy in decision making. Policy formulations that are made to suit the interests of the core may inhibit domestic growth, create uneven development, speed environmental destruction or, even worse, create temporary growth that precludes sustainable development and economic independence. It also can threaten a nation's economic and political sovereignty, and thus its political stability and survival.

See also Colonialism; Decolonization; Development, Third-World; Foreign Aid; International Monetary Fund; Trade and Foreign Aid; Trade Liberalization; World Bank

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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

FORWARD BASING

During peacetime, U.S. overseas military presence in strategic regions of the world, established to support international security objectives and national interests. *Forward basing* refers to the equipment, U.S. armed forces, and military facilities that are stationed in a foreign country or deployed at sea during peacetime.

The more general term *forward presence* encompasses noncombat overseas U.S. military activities and includes, but is not limited to, bases, fixed and rotational deployments, access agreements, foreign military assistance, training of foreign armed forces, joint training exercises, intelligence sharing, and military-to-military contacts.

The goal of forward basing is to promote U.S. security and national interests. A visible U.S. overseas military presence is intended to project U.S. power, deter potential adversaries, stabilize potentially volatile regions, and shape the international environment to make it receptive to U.S. economic and political interests. Forward basing is used to support the U.S. defense policy goals of assuring allies and friends, dissuading future military competition, deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests, and, if deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.

According to the *Quadrennial Defense Review* of the U.S. Department of Defense, the presence of U.S. forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitment to allies and friends. American overseas presence is intended to create favorable balances of military power in critical areas of the world to deter aggression or coercion. Moreover, the U.S. military is expected to play a key role in shaping the international security environment by deterring aggression and coercion in key regions of the world on a day-to-day basis through the peacetime deployment of U.S. military forces and by preventing the development of power vacuums and instability.

Forward basing fulfills logistical needs as well as broader strategic objectives. The forward presence of U.S. military personnel and equipment in key geographical regions allows for rapid response in the event of a conflict, should deterrence fail. The positioning of U.S. military assets abroad substantially reduces the time needed to transport equipment and forces to an area of conflict, should the United States have to engage in the use of force. The Department of Defense emphasizes the logistical necessity of having an expansive network of forward bases in strategic and potentially volatile regions of the world and being able to produce employable forward-stationed and deployed forces that are capable of immediately and swiftly defeating an enemy's military and political objectives with only slight reinforcement.

The Department of Defense also believes that the ability of the United States to project power allows the nation to influence, deter, and respond even when the United States has no permanent presence or only a limited infrastructure in a region. If necessary, this allows the nation to fight its way into a denied theater or to create and protect forward-operating bases. Forward basing thus allows the United States to move rapidly and concentrate military power in distant corners of the world.

An overseas peacetime military presence has always been an important element of U.S. foreign policy. After World War II, the United States dismantled many of its wartime bases but maintained an important military presence in Europe and Asia in an effort to contain the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War brought about more restructuring of the nation's global presence.

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Department of Defense has been working on a global posture-realignment process that focuses less on a large overseas concentration of U.S. troops, equipment, and facilities and more on the ability to quickly deploy forces into areas that may be distant from the basing location. The proposed changes in forward-basing posture are intended to address the complex and asymmetric threats of the post–Cold War world more effectively and flexibly.

In recent years, more attention has been given to the potential cultural and political sensitivities of host countries to U.S. military presence, especially with regard to U.S. troops in the Middle East. However, the Department of Defense has emphasized that the United States will continue to maintain its critical bases in Western Europe and northeast Asia, which may serve the additional role of hubs for power projection in future contingencies in other areas of the world.

See also Prepositioned Equipment

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FREE TRADE

The unimpeded flow of goods, services, and ideas across international borders; specifically, an international trade principle noted for its commitment to eliminating barriers to trade such as tariffs, quotas, and quantitative import restrictions.

The philosophical origins of the idea of free trade are found chiefly in the work of economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) demonstrated the power of free trade and competition at a time when government monopolies, protection, and industrial subsidization were the norm. Ricardo's *The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (1817) introduced the concept of competitive advantage: the rationale by which two nations can benefit from trade even if one can produce every kind of good more cheaply than the other.

Although the late 20th and early 21st centuries may be a heyday for the expansion of international free trade, the political roots of free trade extend as far back as the Napoleonic period in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. At that time, the French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, in his desire to embargo Great Britain, established a so-called continental system by removing barriers to trade between France and nearby nations.

In the post–World War II era, Western European nations were once again at the forefront of trade liberalization. Beginning with the formation of the European Economic Community in 1957 and its subsequent expansion to the European Community in 1967, European nations eventually came together as the European Union under the terms of the 1991 Maastricht Treaty. Since the European Union removed all remaining barriers to trade in 1993, more than $1 trillion of new wealth and 2.5 million jobs have been created among the member nations.

Although it took longer for the idea of free trade to take hold in the Western Hemisphere, it is safe to say that free trade is now a paramount concern there. From the signing of the 1965 Canada–U.S. Auto Pact to the passage of the 1989 Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the two largest industrialized nations in North America have enjoyed increasing levels of unimpeded trade. Beginning in 1994, the FTA was expanded to include Mexico under the terms of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), with nearly all remaining trade impediments on the continent phased out by 1999. Serious high-level discussions continue about the eventual formation of a hemisphere-wide free trade zone—which would include North, Central, and South America—to be known as the Free Trade Area of the Americas. At the same time, the United States has established bilateral free trade agreements with a handful of other nations, including Jordan, Israel, and Singapore.

Economic proponents of free trade insist that the opening up of markets worldwide has brought about sustained job and income growth and will continue to do so. Political proponents maintain that free trade is generally accompanied by a rise in interdependence, thus greatly reducing the chances for armed conflict among trading nations.

In the United States, organized labor groups are most fiercely opposed to free trade, arguing that international competition, at best, puts downward pressure on domestic wages and, at worst, leads to the elimination of domestic jobs. American critics also suggest that free trade widens the gap between the rich and poor as the United States increasingly specializes in industries for which large amounts of education and training are required. Meanwhile, critics of free trade in developing countries assert that free trade stunts economic growth and transforms domestic economies into little more than peripheral branch plants that see little or none of the reward for their contribution to transnational production.

Labor groups are not alone in their struggle against free trade. Environmental, human rights, and cultural communities all fear the adverse effects of free trade. When productivity and efficiency become a nation's overarching concerns, these groups suggest, little attention is paid to other, more important environmental, human rights, and cultural factors.

—Bryan M. Baldwin

See also European Union; Interdependence; North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Trade and Foreign Aid; Trade Liberalization; Trade Wars

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REFLECTIONS

Free Trade and the Global Division of Labor

Free trade and the division of labor might mean that in the United States more workers are employed writing computer software, creating new pharmaceuticals in research laboratories, running wheat farms with giant planting and harvesting equipment, or operating advanced machines in a highly automated textile

mill. It might mean that in less developed countries more workers are employed assembling computer keyboards, plowing fields with small tractors, or using low-tech sewing machines to stitch collars onto shirts.

Low-wage workers in less developed countries generally do not have the educational background or practical experience to discover new medicines or write new software. They usually do not have access to the capital equipment necessary to farm thousands of acres in a season. And Americans would be foolish to replace a dozen individuals working a handful of huge combines with hundreds of individuals using hand plows to produce the same amount of crops. In either case of misallo-cated labor, the total amount of wealth created would be less than that created with division of labor and free trade. Hundreds of men hoeing a field would mean hundreds of men not producing other goods and services.

—Edward Hudgins, CATO Institute, from
The Myth of the Race to the Bottom

What Is Industry, and How Did It Develop?

Industry—from converting raw materials into the things people want to providing services people need—is the center and foundation of our social life. The capitalists who own and control the natural resources, and the equipment and facilities necessary to transform raw materials and to provide these ser-vices, form the much smaller of the two classes in society. The workers, who gather raw materials, transform materials into usable goods, and provide services society needs, are the other, and much larger, class. The interests of these two classes are opposed. This fact shapes the entire social life of the world. The business or capitalist class is eager to stay in con-trol and keep the privileges that come from having that power. To make that control secure, it seeks to gain or keep control of all social institutions. It wants to write and administer the laws. It wants the schools to teach respect and obedience to the privileged few. It wants the press, television and Internet to shape our thoughts and feelings to serve its interests. And where it cannot get rid of the organizations labor has built, it wants to control them too.

—International Workers of the
World (IWW), from *One Big Union*

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (1967)

A federal law outlining the process by which citizens may request government records. The powers of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) were expanded in 1974 to improve the public's access to government documents that track individuals.

A landmark piece of legislation, the FOIA operates under the assumption that records in the possession of agencies and departments of the executive branch of the U.S. government should be accessible to the people. Before the FOIA was enacted in 1967, the burden was on the individual seeking information to establish a clear need to examine government records. No statutory guidelines existed concerning access to information, and those who were denied access had no obvious judicial recourse.

Since the FOIA was enacted, those seeking informa-tion are no longer required to demonstrate a clear need for the information; instead, they are granted the auto-matic right to know and to access. Moreover, should an agency of the government feel that there is merit for a set of records to remain secret or inaccessible to the public, it becomes the responsibility of the government to demonstrate just cause for maintaining secrecy.

Government entities subject to the FOIA include the cabinet departments (for example, the U.S. Departments of Commerce, and Health and Human Services), military departments (for example, the Department of the Navy), government corporations (such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), government-controlled corporations (such as Amtrak), and independent regulatory commissions (for example, the Federal Trade Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission). The FOIA does not apply to elected officials of the federal government, White House staff whose sole function is to serve and advise the president (such as the White House chief of staff), the federal judiciary, private companies, persons who receive federal contracts or grants, private organiza-tions, or state and municipal governments.

According to the law, an initial response to a request for information under the FOIA must be given within 10 working days. Stiff penalties are assessed on agencies that fail to meet that deadline, fail to respond to a request, or attempt to impede the public's access to information.

There are nine important exemptions to the release of information under the FOIA. These include national security information, internal agency rules, information governed by other statutes, proprietary business information, internal government memos subject to attorney–client privilege, documentation concerned with strictly private matters, information pertaining to law enforcement investigations, records of financial institution regulation, and geological or geophysical information pertaining to the location of oil wells. Each of these exemptions pertains to matters of personal sensitivity, corporate privacy, or national security. If individuals seeking information feel that an exemption is unwarranted, they may file a lawsuit for its release. At any time, however, the president of the United States may, by executive order, decree that a piece of information is exempt from the FOIA for purposes of national security or safety; there is no appeal process pertaining to the issuance of executive orders.

Since the passage of the FOIA, citizens, civil liberties groups, and public interest organizations have remained highly suspicious of the law's exemptions. Suspicion has grown even more intense in the period since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Many officials in the executive branch of the government insist that new terrorist threats mean that more information must be kept secret for national security reasons. Critics, however, maintain that the public's right of access to government information constitutes an important check on political and administrative power and that such a check is an essential component of a healthy American democracy, even in a time of increased security threat.

In March 2002, the administration of President George W. Bush took the controversial step of reducing access to public information through FOIA by directing federal agencies to safeguard records regarding weapons of mass destruction and other information that could be misused to harm the United States. Critics claim that by not defining the specific terms for classification and secrecy, the Bush administration greatly undermined the principle of the public's right to government information.

—*Bryan M. Baldwin*

See also Classification; Privacy Act

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REFLECTIONS
Strengthening Democracy

For more than a quarter century now, the Freedom of Information Act has played a unique role in strengthening our democratic form of government. The statute was enacted based upon the fundamental principle that an informed citizenry is essential to the democratic process and that the more the American People know about their government the better they will be governed. Openness in government is essential to accountability and the Act has become an integral part of that process. In the thirty-three years since its adoption, FOIA has become interwoven into the fabric of American life. Citizen advocacy groups use FOIA almost daily to gain information about the issues they care about. FOIA enables these groups to learn about the serious adverse effects of drugs, of chemicals present at hazardous waste sites, and of nuclear power plant accidents and mishaps, to name a few. Efforts to organize and lobby on health and safety issues and to serve as a government watchdog fundamentally depend upon the ability to obtain access to government information. FOIA is also frequently used by individuals who wish to learn about issues affecting their families, schools, and neighborhoods. Finally, FOIA enables citizens to access information the government has gathered about themselves.

—President Bill Clinton, 2003

FULDA GAP

A key invasion route to the post–World War II American occupation zone in Germany from the eastern sector occupied by the Soviet Union. The Fulda Gap offered the shortest route from the inter-German border to the Rhine River at Frankfurt. Geographically, it is the plain beginning with the Erfurt–Eisenacht axis in former East Germany, crossing the old inter-German border through Bad Hersfeld, and then through either Fulda or Giessen to the Frankfurt zone. The use of Fulda to name it tactically probably stems from the presence of the Fulda River between Bad Hersfeld and Fulda, where the first line of resistance could have been formed facing the east.

The region of the Fulda Gap played an important role in both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact planning, and it drew the presence of important elements of the U.S. Seventh Army, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and

their respective German allies during the Cold War. Both sides viewed Germany as a favorable location for a short war to decide the fate of Europe in an east–west confrontation. The "gap" is not devoid of terrain to assist the defender and primarily serves to bypass industrial and urban sprawl. Yet it remains filled with woods, hills, farms, and recreational zones that could serve as key terrain to plan a defense.

The Fulda Gap also served equally for invasion into the east, and it served the U.S. Third Army in its 1945 drive from Frankfurt to Leipzig into the German heartland. The alternative route between former East Germany and the Rhine—the north German plain between Berlin and Cologne—covers twice the distance as the Fulda route to the Rhine and the river itself is twice as wide at Cologne. Thus, it merited the focus of planning, surveillance, and continuous alerts that both sides practiced for more than 40 years until the reunification of Germany.

See also Central Front in Europe; Cold War; Grand Strategy; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Warsaw Pact

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM

A mixed group of weapons systems connected to one another and to soldiers in the field by advanced communications. The future combat system represents the U.S. Army's response to the changing nature of combat and the increasing importance of accurate information and rapid communications in warfare.

The planned backbone of the U.S. Army's future combat system is called Warfighter Information Network Tactical, or WIN-T. It will consist of 18 individual weapons systems linked to one another and to soldiers in the field. These systems will include manned and robotic fighting vehicles, ground sensors, unmanned aerial reconnaissance drones, and new "smart" munitions. Soldiers connected to these systems will have access to data that can provide a much more accurate picture of what is happening around them.

The heart of the future combat system is a sophisticated communications network that links weapons and soldiers into a single coordinated unit. Unmanned reconnaissance aircraft will transmit information that allows commanders to locate enemy troops long before they can attack friendly forces. Non-line-of-sight systems, such as robotic fighting vehicles, will substantially increase the range at which the military can strike opponents. These weapons are referred to as "non-line-of-sight" systems because they allow soldiers to target and destroy enemy units that they cannot see.

The future combat system represents a dramatic change in U.S. military doctrine. Instead of large formations of troops accompanied by tanks and other heavy vehicles, the future combat system is designed to be small, light, and flexible. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, one objective of the future combat system effort is to develop lightweight forces in which no individual element weighs more than 20 tons. This would permit two full systems to be transported aboard a C-17 cargo aircraft. These lighter forces could be transported to battlefields or crisis spots more quickly and easily than conventional heavy-armored or infantry units. They also could be supported and supplied more easily than larger military formations.

Ultimately, the Army envisions the future combat system will develop into a fully integrated battlefield control system. In addition to robotic reconnaissance vehicles and sensors, it would include tactical mobile robots; mobile command, control, and communications platforms; networked fire support from futuristic ground and air platforms; and advanced, three-dimensional computerized targeting systems operating on land, in the air, and in space. However, the entire concept rests on a network of sensors, platforms, and command points linked by reliable high-speed communications, all of which are still under development. The systems must then be tested and refined before they can be put into operation. The Army is scheduled to equip an experimental battalion with WIN-T in 2008 and hopes to have all 18 systems online by 2014.

—John Haley

See also Combat Effectiveness

G

GAS PROTOCOL OF 1925

International treaty signed by most of the world's countries banning the use of chemical and biological weapons. The Gas Protocol was drafted at the 1925 Geneva Conference as part of a series of measures designed to avoid repetition of the atrocities committed by the belligerents in World War I.

Building on several treaties that had ended World War I (notably the 1919 Versailles Treaty between the Allies and Germany), the Gas Protocol specifically prohibited the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and all kinds of bacteriological agents. The protocol did not ban the development, production, or stockpiling of such weaponry, however. For that reason, the protocol was later supplemented by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.

BACKGROUND OF THE PROTOCOL

The widespread use of asphyxiating gas during World War I ushered in a new era of human-inflicted mass destruction and greatly alarmed the international community. The peace treaties that the victorious Allies signed with defeated Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary signaled a strong recognition of the immense danger that chemical and biological weapons represented.

The 1925 Geneva Conference, organized by the League of Nations, the predecessor to the United Nations, took those treaties one step further. At the initiative of the United States, France, and Poland, the participant countries at the conference drafted what came to be known as the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

The Gas Protocol was signed and ratified by many countries in the years before World War II. The United States, however, did not officially ratify the protocol until 1975, although it considered itself bound by the ban throughout the war and abided by the signatories' call for the protocol to become "part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations."

LIMITATIONS

Since its inception in 1925, the Gas Protocol has become an important piece of international legislation, and most countries in the world have officially recognized it—including all nations that have a known capability to produce chemical and biological weapons.

The limitations of the protocol, however, became evident soon after the Geneva Conference. At the time of its signing, several great powers (including the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union) explicitly reserved the right to use the forbidden weapons for retaliatory purposes. In other words, should a state decide to use chemical or bacteriological weapons against another country, in full defiance of the stipulations of the protocol, the country under attack would legally be allowed to respond in kind.

The 1925 document also failed to address the production, storage, testing, and transfer of the forbidden weapons, a failure that allowed countries such as the

Soviet Union and the United States to amass large supplies of chemical and bacteriological agents. Despite its obvious inadequacies, the protocol remains the legal foundation for a long series of multilateral treaties dealing with the horrific threat that weapons such as mustard gas and anthrax represent.

See also Biodefense/Biosecurity; Chemical Weapons; Chemical Weapons Convention; Disarmament; Geneva Conventions

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GENDER ISSUES

Societal concerns regarding equality and discrimination based on sex. Feminism and the women's movement were a response to the recognition that gender discrimination exists even in societies that are supposed to be democratic. The focus on gender issues reflects the realization that notions of social justice must be expanded beyond economic or racial differences to account for a prejudice that has been documented across social groups, gender bias.

SEX VERSUS GENDER

The term *sex*, which typically refers to whether one is male or female, is distinguished from the term *gender*, which generally refers to the behavioral traits associated with one sex in a given culture. Therefore, unlike sex, which is a biological category, gender is often arbitrary.

Although gender roles are sometimes transformed under different cultural pressures, they often reflect stereotypes, such as the idea that women are more emotional than men or that men are more apt to think logically than women. Referring to gender issues means citing the impact of these preconceived notions on opportunities for women to succeed or instances in which men may be prejudged to their disadvantage. However, gender roles in most societies traditionally have been structured to prevent women from attaining the same level of economic success and professional status as men. For this reason, gender bias is, in most cases, a reference to discrimination against women.

NATURE VERSUS NURTURE

Gender issues are often debates over whether a given attribute is associated essentially with a given sex, as opposed to the possibility that the attribute is simply a reflection of culture. As a result, debates over gender issues are typically structured in terms of nature versus nurture.

One example is the question of whether men are naturally more talented than women at math or science. Numerous standardized tests have indicated that men are generally more mathematically inclined; the debate is over what accounts for this obvious discrepancy. Analyses range from test bias to education bias to biological arguments that seek to correlate weakness in mathematical reasoning with attributes that are supposedly essential to the perpetuation of the human race. The actual reasons for the ability gap, however, remain uncertain.

Bias in education is another example of a gender issue, one that is related to the impediments to women's achievement that are said to be embedded in the structure of schooling and the practice of teaching. Studies have indicated that boys are called on more frequently than girls in the classroom. This is said to be the result of subconscious biases possessed by the teacher, compounded by the possibility that male students may be more aggressive in seeking the teacher's attention (which is itself a gender bias). Stereotypes concerning professional goals may also persist, wherein young women are encouraged to understand that a man's career is always more important than a woman's. This may be implied according to the self-perpetuating rationalization that men earn more or because of the frequent possibility that women must take time away from the workplace to give birth. The fact that the teaching profession is itself relatively low paying and generally regarded as having a relatively lower social status than other professions is often attributed to the fact that it is regarded as a women's profession.

Another bias is reflected in English language usage. The term *man*, for example, is often used to refer to every living being, whether male or female. Similarly, job titles such as chairman, fireman, or policeman reflect the fact that for a long time, such positions were reserved for males. According to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, sexist language usage not only

reflects gender biases, it reinforces them, and therefore eliminating such practices by observing gender-neutral speaking practices is essential to eliminating discrimination. Others refer to such arguments as examples of political correctness.

GENDER AS POLITICAL

The feminist concern with gender issues is not just about social theory; it also has important political implications. The continued failure of the women's movement to amend the Constitution to guarantee equal rights for women exemplifies the degree to which both men and women in the United States are uncomfortable with the concept of gender equality. Gender issues that have a very clear impact on women's lives include reproductive rights, maternity leave, equal pay, sexual harassment, and domestic violence.

Because gender issues are typically considered liberal concerns, certain topics cause dissension among competing agendas. For example, the practice of female circumcision in some cultures is often regarded as oppressive mutilation. However, the fact that it is a common cultural practice in parts of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East causes some to contend that opposition to female circumcision is simply a product of Western chauvinism. In this instance, concerns for Western bias and gender bias collide.

MALE GENDER ISSUES

Gender issues are less commonly presented from the male perspective. However, in the early 1990s, a vocal movement did coalesce around the publication of the poet Robert Bly's *Iron John*. Bly's redefinition of masculinity, which rejected the extremes of aggressive violence or 1960s-era sensitivity, was very popular and inspired stereotypes of tree huggers and drum beaters seeking self-realization.

The concern with gender issues from the male perspective, however, often overlaps with gay rights and prejudice against homosexuality. These arguments frequently highlight the same topics as feminism—sexual stereotyping and gender roles—but present the disadvantages that they inflict on men. From this perspective, gender issues are inextricably linked with heterosexism, that is, the belief that the only socially, politically, and legally acceptable relationships are those that occur between men and women. However,

attempts to account for gender-rationalized instances of discrimination against men are often criticized as attempts to hijack or undermine the unrealized goals of the women's movement.

GENDER ISSUES AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Women served in separate branches of the military—the Women's Army Corps, Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service, and Women in the Air Force—until the mid-1970s. As women's participation in the armed services has become more common, the issue of sex discrimination has become more prominent. The most well-known example of sex discrimination in the military was the Tailhook scandal, in which 83 women claimed to have been molested at an air force convention in 1991. The previously all-male service academies have also been the battleground for various legal challenges to sexual discrimination. An important, if yet only anticipated, gender issue relating to national security is the possibility of women being drafted into the military. Women have never been subject to previous military drafts, and the likelihood that they would be included were the draft reinstated has made the prospect more controversial. A final question is whether women are less supportive of military spending and the use of military force for any reason.

See also Homosexuals and Military Service

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GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT)

Agreement formed in 1947 to reduce barriers to merchandise trade. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was later absorbed into and eventually

replaced in 1995 by the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The GATT was established at the Bretton Woods Conference after World War II, the same conference at which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were also founded. All three institutions were intended to ensure free trade and a stable global economic environment, and they remain officially committed to international economic cooperation.

The purpose of GATT was to reverse protectionist measures that had existed since the early 1930s. Following World War II, conventional wisdom held that the cause of the Great Depression of the 1930s was a decline of world trade that brought about irresponsible trade and monetary policies. Seeking to ensure a favorable balance of trade, nations frequently devalued their currencies to make their own goods cheaper in other countries, thus increasing exports.

Other nations retaliated against such measures by devaluing their own currencies, making imported goods more expensive. This vicious circle eventually slowed trade to a trickle because nations feared running trade deficits with their neighbors. Reducing barriers to trade and capital flows, it was reasoned, would generate a cycle of economic growth and a sustained attack on poverty.

After World War II, Great Britain and the United States submitted proposals for an international trade body to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. This body was to be known as the International Trade Organization (ITO). The GATT was originally part of a draft charter for the ITO.

As part of its charter, the ITO included not only the GATT, but also rules relating to employment, commodity agreements, restrictive business practices, international investment, and services. Because of opposition in the U.S. Congress, the ITO charter was never ratified. However, the GATT survived as a separate agreement.

Although the GATT succeeded in lowering tariffs significantly, it was always provisional. That is, the participating nations were not bound by a formal accord. To make the provisions of the GATT permanent and binding, the WTO was created in 1995. The WTO is a permanent institution with offices in Geneva, Switzerland. Despite its wider agenda and greater powers of enforcement, it is markedly different from its sister organizations, the IMF and the World Bank. Unlike these other two institutions, the WTO does not lend money or stipulate conditions for its use. It deals with trade negotiations, monitors trade agreements, and tries to ensure that member nations abide by negotiated trade agreements.

Two basic principles that underlie the GATT are *most-favored-nation status* and *nondiscrimination*. Most-favored-nation status requires that a country cannot selectively restrict or promote imports of certain goods. All imports of all countries must receive the same treatment. Nondiscrimination rules demand that once a good has entered a country, it must be treated no differently than similar goods produced domestically.

Since its inception, the GATT has conducted eight rounds of negotiation, and, by the time the WTO was created in 1995, it had expanded its original group of 23 contracting parties to 128 nations. The substance of the GATT negotiations has dealt primarily with tariff reduction and the struggle to produce rules governing international trade. Among the most notable negotiations were the Kennedy Round and the Tokyo Round.

In the Kennedy Round (1964–67), GATT members reached an agreement on antidumping policies. This agreement forbids countries from selling their products at artificially low prices overseas to eliminate competition. The Tokyo Round (1979) further reduced tariffs on manufactured goods and reduced nontariff trade barriers as well. The most recent and comprehensive GATT round, the Uruguay Round, lasted from 1988 to 1994. The Uruguay Round concluded with the signing of the Final Act on April 15, 1994, and the creation of the WTO.

See also Bretton Woods Conference; International Monetary Fund; Monetary Policy; Trade Liberalization; Trade Wars; World Trade Organization

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GENEVA CONVENTIONS

Series of agreements formulated at several international conventions held in Geneva, Switzerland,

which established rules for the treatment of prisoners of war, the sick, and the wounded, and for the overall conduct of war between warring states.

The notion of regulating war has been around as long as wars have been recorded. As early as the sixth century BCE, Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu, in his book *The Art of War* (often considered the oldest military treatise in the world), referred to the necessity of putting constraints on the conduct of war. However, an attempt to codify a set of rules on war that would be applicable worldwide or to establish an organization to implement such rules did not take place until the Geneva Conventions in the mid-1800s.

THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION

The signing of the first treaty at a Geneva Convention took place not long after the founding of the Red Cross by Henri Dunant in 1863. Dunant called for international recognition of the Red Cross and the protection of medical services administered on the battlefield.

Responding to Dunant's call for action, the Swiss government sponsored a convention in Geneva in 1864, at which representatives from 12 nations agreed on an international treaty on humanitarian law, the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded of Armies in the Field. In signing this treaty, the signatories agreed to care for all sick and wounded soldiers, regardless of nationality. They also agreed to recognize during wartime the neutrality of medical personnel, ambulances, and hospitals, all of which would be identified by the symbol of a red cross on a white background. The signing of the 1864 Geneva Convention marked the beginning of a body of rules that would eventually grow to encompass not only combatants, but everyone involved in all aspects of military conflicts.

During World War I, the Red Cross focused some of its attention on banning the use of poisonous gases, which it called a "barbarous innovation." The Red Cross also organized an International Prisoners of War Agency, which received lists of soldiers captured by various countries that could be used to inform families about their loved ones and to organize relief shipments. In addition, the Red Cross began to receive requests for information about civilians who were missing during the war. From this effort emerged a new awareness of the necessity of accounting for the rights of civilians during wartime.

OTHER CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOLS

Three other Geneva Conventions followed, with the purpose of expanding and amending the original agreements. The Second Geneva Convention, held in 1906, extended the principles agreed to at the first convention to include wars held at sea, and the Third Geneva Convention (1929) dealt with prisoners of war. The Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) revised the agreements and rules established by the first three conventions and added a fourth dealing with the treatment of civilians during wartime. It is this fourth set of conventions that is usually referred to by the general term "Geneva Conventions."

The Fourth Geneva Convention was held in the context of attempts to develop a comprehensive and enforceable definition of war crimes in the aftermath of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials held after World War II. Accusations of violations of the Geneva Conventions are brought before the International Court of Justice (also known as the World Court), the judicial organ of the United Nations. Since the Fourth Geneva Convention was established in 1949, other conferences have added provisions prohibiting certain kinds of warfare and addressing the issue of civil war. There are also two protocols that were adopted by the Geneva Convention signatories in 1977.

PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOLS

The First Geneva Convention, adopted in 1864, deals primarily with the humane treatment of participants in land-based combat. It also provides rules regarding the identification and treatment of dead bodies, the protection of medical equipment and personnel from interference or attack, hospital zones, and the display of the Red Cross and the expected treatment of those bearing it.

The regulations of the First Geneva Convention apply even if a state of war does not exist, if there is no armed resistance, or if one of the parties in a conflict is not a signatory to the convention. The humane treatment of combatants is also covered by the First Geneva Convention, which prohibits the torture, mutilation, and murder of combatants and bans adverse treatment on the basis of race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth, or wealth. The First Geneva Convention also prohibits the taking of hostages and outlaws, "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating or degrading

treatment." The "passing of sentences" or "carrying out of executions" is also not allowed without the consent of a "regularly constituted court." Furthermore, combatants may not be subjected to scientific experiments or deliberately exposed to infectious diseases.

The Second Geneva Convention, "For the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea," applies all the protections of the First Geneva Convention to warfare at sea and to members of naval forces.

In addition to extending the Geneva regulations to sea warfare and naval combatants, the Second Geneva Convention extends the principles for the humane treatment of combatants to prisoners of war. Captives must be protected against "insults and public curiosity," and, when questioned, prisoners are required to provide only name, rank, date of birth, serial number, or "equivalent information." The use of coercion and torture to gain further information is prohibited by the Second Geneva Convention.

The Second Geneva Convention also stipulates that arms and military equipment not used for defensive purposes (such as gas masks) may be taken from prisoners, but prisoners must not be stripped of their identity documents or items of sentimental value. Currency may be taken from captives only by order of a commanding officer, and captives must be given a receipt for any money taken from them. Prisoners also must be allowed to correspond with relatives and to receive parcels. They may not be forced to do labor that may injure their health, and they must be compensated for any work they do perform. The convention stipulates that prisoners of war may not be housed in quarters that are inferior to those of their captors, and they must be repatriated immediately if they fall ill. As soon as hostilities cease, captives must be released, and their money and other valuables are to be returned to them.

The Third Geneva Convention, "Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War," outlines the rights and privileges of enemy combatants taken captive during a conflict. The convention specifies that prisoners are to be considered captives of the detaining power rather than the specific individuals who captured them. It also specifies that captives may not be transferred to the custody of another power that does not observe the Geneva Conventions. In the event that the power to whom prisoners are transferred fails to observe the rules of the Geneva Conventions, responsibility lies with the power that transferred the prisoners.

The Fourth Geneva Convention, "Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War," concerns noncombatants in military conflicts. It stipulates that the same expectations of humane treatment that apply to combatants must also apply to civilians. It requires safety zones to be set aside for the ill, aged, or wounded, as well as children under 15 years old, pregnant women, and mothers of children under seven years of age. Noncombatants must be allowed to exchange personal information and provide information about other family members dispersed by the conflict. Families must not be separated, if possible, nor may civilians be used as human shields.

Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions extends protections to victims of wars against racist regimes, alien oppression, and wars of self-determination. Protocol II extends protection to victims of internal conflicts within nations. Protocol I prohibits the use of weapons that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and methods of warfare that are meant to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment. Signatories to the conventions are also required to affirm that newly developed weapons do not in any way violate the Geneva Conventions. The protocol prohibits combatants from faking a desire to negotiate or surrender, pretending to be wounded or sick, posing as a civilian or noncombatant, or using the signs, symbols, or insignia of the United Nations or other neutral parties to convey protected status. The protocol does not, however, prohibit "ruses of war," which include the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations, and misinformation.

THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS TODAY

As with any set of laws or regulations, interpretation of the Geneva Conventions has changed over time. In the First, Second, and Third Geneva Conventions, journalists were treated as civilian members of the military, became prisoners of war when captured, and were entitled to the same protections as combatants. At the time those conventions were signed, journalists commonly wore military uniforms when serving as war correspondents. If captured, their notebooks and film could be confiscated, but they did not have to respond to interrogations.

The additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions reflect the fact that, during the Vietnam War, journalists began to see their role in covering the war differently. This changed attitude also may be observed in

altered attitudes on the part of the military with regard to press coverage. Journalists in war zones are now considered civilians rather than civilian soldiers. They have a responsibility to distinguish themselves from combatants by not wearing uniforms or openly bearing arms. New protections under the Geneva Conventions require that journalists not be detained, deliberately targeted, or otherwise mistreated.

A number of organizations consider the Geneva Conventions to be the primary criteria for determining whether human rights violations have occurred, and these organization take responsibility for documenting abuses. These groups include Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Coalition for an International Criminal Court, Doctors Without Borders, People on War, the World Justice Information Network, and the International Law of War Association.

Although egregious violations of the Geneva Conventions have occurred in numerous wars, violations also have been cited in a number of recent conflicts, including the war in Bosnia during the early 1990s and the genocidal conflict in Rwanda during that same decade. Each situation resulted in the creation of a special international criminal tribunal to investigate abuses. In 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established to try individuals for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. In many ways, the ICC is a product of the end of the Cold War: The precedents set by its predecessor, the International Military Tribunal (which was responsible for administering the Nuremberg trials that followed World War II), were neglected in the context of rising tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States after World War II.

U.S. military involvement in Iraq since 2003 has once again raised questions with respect to the Geneva Conventions. One question concerns journalists covering the conflict. During the Iraq War, the Pentagon embedded journalists with military units as part of a strategy of improving relations and controlling access to information. At the same time, however, there have been accusations that independent journalists have been deliberately targeted for harassment by U.S. military forces.

Other questions have been raised by the scandal involving the treatment of Iraqi prisoners by Americans in the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad. Allegations of abuse at Abu Ghraib seem to indicate that the soldiers running the prison were not apprised of the detainees' rights according to the Geneva Conventions. Similarly, the ambiguous status of prisoners labeled as terrorists and held by the United States at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba continues to arouse controversy and raises questions about possible violations of the Geneva Conventions.

In response thus far, the U.S. Department of Defense maintains that terrorists fall outside the definition of enemy combatants and therefore are not eligible for the rights and privileges guaranteed by the Geneva Conventions. Defense Department officials cite numerous violations of the Geneva Conventions that took place in Iraq under Saddam Hussein as justification for treating these prisoners differently. These debates and others make it clear that the Geneva Conventions must continually be adapted to changing international conditions.

—William de Jong-Lambert

See also Enemy Combatants; Genocide; Guantánamo; Human Rights; Iraq War of 2003; Prisoner of War; Terrorism, War on International

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GENOCIDE

Term that generally refers to the killing of members of a specific ethnic, racial, religious, or national group with the intent of annihilating that group. In 1946, as the international community grappled with the horrors of the Holocaust, the United Nations drafted the first international convention on genocide.

On December 9, 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The convention defined genocide as "[a]ny act committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. This might include killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to group members; deliberately creating conditions calculated to bring about the group's physical

destruction; imposing measures to prevent births within the group; or forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."

As of 2002, 135 nations had signed the convention, indicating broad international support for the punishment and prevention of genocide. However, the practical issue of confronting and ending genocide has proved much more controversial than official support for the UN convention. The international community has been slow to intervene to stop some of the most horrific acts of genocide in the latter half of the 20th century, leaving many to question just what the international community can and should do to prevent and punish genocide.

The 20th century has witnessed several genocides. Some of the most notable include the 1915–1917 genocide of nearly one million Armenians; the genocide of more than six million Jews during the Holocaust; the deaths of more than two million Cambodians during the Khmer Rouge regime; the killing and/or rape of several hundred thousand Bosnian Muslims during the Bosnian conflict; and the deaths of 800,000 Rwandans, most of these Tutsis, during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Although the death toll in each of these genocides varies, what defines these atrocities is the objective of the aggressors—the total annihilation of a particular group of people.

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND GENOCIDE

Some in the international community have voiced concerns that intervening to stop genocide will occur only so long as the international community has a material interest in doing so. Supporters of this position often reference the lack of intervention in the 1994 Rwandan genocide (nearly one million dead in 100 days). Despite evidence that genocide was occurring in Rwanda during the spring of 1994, UN troops withdrew from the area, and the United States and Europe failed to intervene. The lack of intervention during the Rwandan genocide is often juxtaposed with the intervention in the genocide of Bosnian Muslims during the early 1990s. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States, and several European nations intervened to stop the genocide of the Bosnian Muslims through arms embargoes, economic sanctions, and, ultimately, NATO air strikes against the Serbian aggressors. This genocide, with is geographic proximity to Western Europe, arguably held more material interest for the international community than did the Rwandan genocide.

DEFINING AND RECOGNIZING GENOCIDE

Despite a concise definition of genocide within the UN convention on genocide, there remains significant difficulty in actually recognizing genocide when it occurs. Heavy violence and death occur in many ethnic, religious, and national conflicts, but genocide, as it is defined by the United Nations, has the distinction of being motivated by and planned to exterminate an entire ethnic, religious, or national group. Demonstrating that this is the actual intent of aggressors is often challenging, as perpetrators of genocide are often secretive about their intent to commit genocide.

Certainly this was an issue in the genocide of the Bosnian Muslims. Serb leaders consistently described the violence in the Balkans as a civil war during their interactions with the international community. Outside Serbia, Serb leaders rarely mentioned their plan to cleanse the region of all Bosnian Muslims. Thus, the difficulties of identifying genocide have inspired some in the international community to suggest that the criteria for recognizing genocide be relaxed from the difficult-to-prove "specific intent" to a more realistic measure of "purposive action" to destroy an ethnic, religious, or national group.

SPREADING EFFECTS OF GENOCIDE

Genocide, in addition to creating horrors within a particular ethnic, religious, or national group, often spills beyond the immediately afflicted region. This spillover may take many forms. Two of the most common include the targeting of individuals outside the conflict zone and the problem of refugees.

Although most acts of genocide are concentrated in a single state (the Holocaust, perpetrated by Germany in numerous countries, being the most notable exception), ethnic, religious, and national minorities residing in other states have also been targeted. This occurred during the Rwandan genocide, when Tutsis residing in Burundi became the target of Hutu violence.

The other form of spillover is the large flow of refugees that typically occurs during and after genocide. Most nations in close proximity to Bosnia, including Macedonia, Albania, and Greece, experienced these refugee flows. Large numbers of refugees can cause economic and cultural strain on countries that are suddenly inundated with fleeing genocide survivors.

MANAGING THE POSTGENOCIDE SOCIETY

Another issue facing the international community when dealing with genocide is the management of a postgenocidal society. Whether intervening to stop genocide (as in Bosnia) or restraining itself from involvement (as in Rwanda), the international community has played a large role in helping these societies to pursue justice for the perpetrators of genocide, as well as to rebuild their states. The commission of gross violations of human rights, combined with the devastation of the state and society, requires international assistance on several levels.

Dating back to the Nuremberg trials following World War II, the international community has relied on ad hoc war crime tribunals to try individuals accused of crimes against humanity, including genocide. War criminals in Rwanda and Bosnia, including former Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, have been tried in such tribunals.

However, many within the international legal community have voiced concern over the efficacy of such tribunals in achieving postgenocide justice. The tribunals are often terribly backlogged and understaffed, and, in some cases (such as the genocide of more than two million Cambodians during the 1970s), such a tribunal is never formed.

These concerns have led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC is a permanent court with the ability to try individuals for genocide, in addition to other crimes. The ICC is an important tool in the condemnation of genocide, but its establishment still faces significant resistance (from the United States, among other nations).

Although ad hoc tribunals, and potentially the ICC, play an important role in postgenocide justice, the maintenance of peace and the rebuilding of society require sustained commitments from the international community. This may involve peacekeeping troops, humanitarian and economic aid, and assistance in the design and establishment of a democratic government. These tasks are complex, time-consuming, and expensive, leaving some in the international community hesitant to fully commit to postgenocide nation building.

GENOCIDE AS A FUTURE GLOBAL ISSUE

There is no doubt that genocide has been a significant issue in the past. Since the 1940s, nearly 50 ethnic and religious minorities have been the targets of genocide, leaving more than 16 million dead. Yet, genocide also must be seen as a security threat for the 21st century. Currently, there are nearly 60 violent, ethnically based conflicts under way across the world. Although it is unlikely that all of these conflicts have the potential to turn into genocide, the situations in Rwanda and Bosnia during the 1990s clearly demonstrated to the international community that genocide is an ever-present threat to which they must be ready to respond.

See also Bosnia Intervention; War Crimes; World War II

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GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE

Assessing a nation's regional and international power potential, as well as its territorial objectives, through the acquisition of information relating to its geographic location, natural resources, and natural and unnatural borders. The information gathered as a result of geopolitical intelligence is used to project how states are likely to interact in attaining and defending their territorial interests, thereby enabling the end user to more effectively respond to changes and events.

A geopolitical intelligence assessment of a state might consider, for example, whether the state has access to waterways that would allow it to increase its force-projection capabilities and require the state to expend resources to secure shipping lanes. It also might be important to examine a state's indigenous sources of energy and ascertain whether that state must rely on energy imports to sustain its energy needs. In addition, border disputes for reasons of nationalist irredentism—a desire to expand to capture resources such as oil or fresh aquifers—also would be included in a geopolitical intelligence assessment.

Geopolitical intelligence can be contrasted with political intelligence and economic intelligence. Political intelligence considers a state's political leadership, population, history, religion, culture, language, and current developments. Economic intelligence

examines a state's economic stability, income, employment, banking sector, and trade policies.

See also Intelligence and Counterintelligence

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GEOPOLITICS

The study of the complex relationships between geography and international affairs, that is, between spatial realities and the quest for political power by states and transnational organizations. The term "geopolitics" traditionally has been used to label various 19th- and 20th-century theories of politicomilitary strategy, but lately it has come to describe the nature of most kinds of international relations. Crudely understood, geopolitics postulates the necessity of including geographical considerations (such as distances, climate, and type of relief) into any theoretical approach to war and global dominance.

Some of the most famous historical geopolitical theories have provided academic support to explicitly imperialist political visions, such as the Nazi theory of *Lebensraum* (living space) during World War II. Consequently, geopolitics has become a loaded word, always in need of ideological clarifications.

GEOPOLITICS AND SOCIAL DARWINISM

The term "geopolitics" was coined in 1899 by Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén, who sought to bring geography to the forefront of the study of interstate relations. This was a time of rapid global change, spurred by the rise of the United States as an important economic power and by the intense competition between European states for imperial domination. Most of the world had been charted out by the Europeans, who were becoming increasingly aware of the urgent need to secure control over as much land and as many resources as possible.

These economic and political factors, as well as an arguably unprecedented development of technology (in the fields of transportation, cartography, and the military, to name a few), created the proper environment for the emerging academic preoccupation with the intersection of geography and international politics.

The idea of the strategic value of space, however, was not new. Indeed, Kjellén's treatment of geopolitics was indebted to a 1897 book, *Political Geography*, by German scholar Friedrich Ratzel. Ratzel likened nation-states to animal organisms, which are perpetually faced with a Darwinian choice of development or extinction. Strong states, Ratzel argued, constantly seek to expand their geographic borders to acquire more living space—a term that was later adopted by German leaders and used to legitimize their territorial conquests.

THE CRUCIAL HEARTLAND

Building on the body of geopolitical literature developed by Kjellén and Ratzel, in 1904 British geographer Halford Mackinder produced what is arguably the most important work in the geopolitical tradition, an essay called "The Geographical Pivot of History." In his text, Mackinder predicted an end to the period of unremitting European expansion and military preeminence. The European powers, Mackinder contended, had been able to dominate the rest of the world by virtue of their naval might. Maritime power, however, was losing the battle against land power, and countries (notably Russia) that controlled a lot of territory (and, with it, considerable resources) were increasingly asserting their influence internationally.

Mackinder developed what is said to be the first cohesive geopolitical worldview. He argued that, in the struggle for international ascendancy, the state that manages to acquire control over the region comprising all of Eastern Europe (including the Ukraine and Russia) is in a position to dominate the rest of the world militarily. Mackinder called this critical region the "Heartland," and he warned his fellow Britons against the possibility of their country coming under the control of either Germany or Russia, or an alliance of the two. The incipient science of geopolitics was quickly asserting its relevance to world affairs.

GEOPOLITICS AND IDEOLOGY

Mackinder's theory of the Heartland did not go unnoticed in the one country whose military potential he feared most: Germany. Pursuing a policy of territorial conquest, Germany went into World War I with the double goal of building up its power in Europe and

acquiring colonial possessions. The German strategy of *Drang nach Osten* (drive to the East) particularly resonated with the conclusions of Mackinder's geopolitical analysis. Although the Germans were defeated in the war, the imperialist ambition soon resurfaced as Adolf Hitler rose to power.

Throughout the 1920s, the geopolitical theories advanced by Kjellén, Ratzel, and Mackinder were adopted by the German geographer and former army general Karl Haushofer. Convinced that Germany was destined to lead all of Europe (and from that position, all of the world), Haushofer provided the politicians of Germany's Third Reich with an academic framework for their expansionist intentions. Ratzel's concept of Lebensraum—that is, a nation's need for (and right to) an ever-increasing living space—was further developed.

Geopolitics was once more not only providing scholars with ideas to contemplate, but also functioning as an ideology for imperialistic ambitions. By the end of World War II, with Germany once again defeated, the concept of geopolitics received a brand new treatment from what came to be known as the *Hérodote* school.

Grouped around French political geographer Yves Lacoste, the contributors to the journal *Hérodote* sought to detach the discipline of geopolitics from ideology while maintaining its notable scholarly value. The success or failure of their enterprise is a matter of some dispute for historians and political scientists. For its part, however, the term "geopolitics" has continued to develop seemingly on its own, currently incorporating many more meanings than its creators intended.

See also Grand Strategy; Natural Resources and National Security

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GEOSPATIAL MAPPING

Type of mapping that reveals the location and characteristics of objects, such as roads, bridges, buildings, and military bases, as well as natural formations such as forests and lakes. Produced in the form of maps and nautical charts, as well as aerial and satellite imagery, geospatial mapping has numerous uses, including intelligence information for the military and homeland security community and responses to natural disasters.

In 1996, the U.S. Congress, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the U.S. Department of Defense combined several defense and intelligence agencies into the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to oversee mapping and imagery analysis. Renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) as part of the 2004 Defense Authorization Bill, the agency has a mission "to provide timely, relevant, and accurate geospatial intelligence in support of national security." Based in Bethesda, Maryland, the NGA is a Department of Defense combat support agency.

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States, concerns were raised that extremist groups and others could exploit publicly available geospatial information to launch further assaults. A 2004 study by the RAND Corporation, however, concluded that less than 1% of this information was not available elsewhere and therefore was easily accessible to enemies of the United States. The government has now restricted access to several geospatial information databases that were deemed to have potentially harmful information. The terrorist attacks also increased efforts to use geospatial data to map current infrastructure to assess national vulnerabilities and prepare emergency responses.

GERM WARFARE

The use of any disease-causing organism (bacteria or virus) or toxin found in nature, as a weapon to harm, kill, or defeat an enemy; also known as biological warfare or, more recently, bioterrorism. Examples of diseases that have been considered for use as weapons or are known to have already been made into weapons include cholera, pneumonic plague, Ebola virus, anthrax, and smallpox.

Germ warfare was banned as part of the Geneva Conventions by the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed in 1925. This was later supplemented in 1972 by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological

U.S. Marines from the Second Battalion, Fourth Regiment at Camp Pendleton in California participating in exercises to protect themselves during nuclear, biological, or chemical warfare. Although germ warfare has a long history, the recent war on terror has raised the specter of such attacks against civilian populations, as well as armed forces fighting in foreign theaters of war. The hooded gas masks and other gear worn by the marines are designed to protect them against all known forms of chemical compounds.

Source: Corbis.

(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, which has the distinction of being the first ban on the production and use of an entire category of weapons. This ban was, in turn, augmented by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, signed in 1993 and administered by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

HISTORY OF GERM WARFARE

Germ warfare dates back to ancient times, when the Carthaginian leader Hannibal used poisonous snakes against his enemies. Later, during the Middle Ages, catapults were employed to fling corpses infected with the Black Death over castle walls. Other early examples of biological warfare include the infection of the Aztec population by the Spanish conquistador Hernán Cortes and his troops and the smallpox blankets given to Native Americans by European and American troops.

Incidents of germ warfare were also recorded during the American Civil War. The use of biological weaponry became increasingly popular during World War I, although livestock were the primary targets. During World War II, biological experiments were conducted on human beings in Nazi concentration camps, and Unit 731 of the Japanese Imperial Army conducted similar work. Meanwhile, in 1942, the British began conducting anthrax experiments on Gruinard Island off the coast of Scotland, rendering it uninhabitable for nearly 50 years.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union conducted extensive research into biological weaponry during the Cold War era. A great deal of this research was done by the Soviets on an island in the middle of the rapidly shrinking Aral Sea, which is bordered by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Pressured by the unpopularity of the Vietnam War, President Richard Nixon terminated the offensive biological warfare program of the United States in 1969. In 1972, the United States signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; however, because no enforcement mechanism exists, it has not been possible to ensure compliance.

The United States is rumored to have conducted chemical weapons research in Utah, and the administration of President Ronald Reagan successfully pressured the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to take part in biotechnology research for biological weapons. In 2001, the administration of President George W. Bush decided to reject the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and launched a preemptive strike against Iraq on the basis of Saddam Hussein's supposed possession of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Though it is widely known that Iraq had possessed such weapons in the past, none were found after the invasion.

Although the production of biological weapons is considered to be relatively simple, their actual implementation is complicated by several factors, particularly self-infection by the attacker. A means of infecting a large number of people is another complicating factor, as biological agents are usually dispersed by an inhaled or ingested aerosol spray. The particles must be exactly the right size to avoid being filtered by the respiratory system.

Among the most well-known incidents of the use of biological weapons in recent history took place in the United States shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks. Exposure to anthrax resulted in 19 infections and five fatalities. Though it has been suspected that these incidents were related to the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, a definite link has never been established.

See also Biodefense/Biosecurity; Biological Weapons and Warfare; Biological Weapons Convention; Bioterrorism

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GLASNOST

Cultural and social policy instituted by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev during the late 1980s that called for greater openness to new ideas and policies. On his assumption of the leadership of the Soviet Union in 1985, Gorbachev initiated policies of openness, or *glasnost*, and restructuring, or *perestroika*. These two issues were designed to engage Soviet society in public discussions about current and historical problems and to serve as blueprints for reform of the system.

Under the banner of glasnost, Gorbachev and his supporters exposed and condemned the brutality of the Stalin era and the corruption and stagnation of the Brezhnev era, and they called for greater openness in cultural, political, and social matters. After decades of rigid dogmatism and unwavering devotion to the Communist Party line, Soviet leaders eventually became more receptive to criticism by Soviet citizens, the media, and foreign leaders. As a result, a new opportunity for détente opened between East and West. Gorbachev hoped the candidness ushered in by glasnost would accelerate his overall programs for reform.

Thanks to glasnost, whole periods of Soviet history were open to revision. Past Soviet leaders, including Joseph Stalin, Leonid Brezhnev, and Konstantin Chernenko, were unmasked as brutal oppressors. Only Vladimir Lenin, one of the founders of the Soviet Communist state, remained untouchable. In the aftermath of these revelations, Soviet history books were recognized as more propaganda than fact. Such changes, however, were not totally accepted by either radical reformers or Communist hard-liners. The reformers were never satisfied with the pace and direction of change, whereas Communist Party hard-liners tried to retain their hold on high office and the public's consciousness.

Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, glasnost allowed open discussion of issues despite attempts to control the public discourse by many of those in power. For the first time in the history of the Soviet Union, facts about the creation and probable legacy of the Soviet state came to light. As the truth spread, so did the outrage against communism and its adherents.

By 1989, glasnost had broken free from its masters and gained a foothold throughout the Soviet Union. At the same time, its creator, Gorbachev, came under attack from hard-line Communists. In 1991, after a failed coup by Communist Party conservatives, the Soviet Union fell and the state disappeared from the world map. The single-party rule of the Communist Party was ended after more than 75 years. Ideas that previously had been only dreams now emerged. Glasnost allowed for an open discussion of past facts and present realities.

See also Gorbachev, Mikhail; Perestroika; Soviet Union, Former (Russia) and U.S. Policy

GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS)

A network of 24 satellites that beams location and time data to ground-based receivers, providing precise

coordinates on a position in three dimensions. Stationed high above the atmosphere, 11,000 miles beyond the earth's surface, the satellites of the Global Positioning System (GPS) are managed by the U.S. Department of Defense.

In the 1960s, the U.S. Navy developed two satellite forerunners to the GPS, Transit and Timation. An alternative system was designed by the U.S. Air Force. In 1973, the Department of Defense began work on a system that benefited from the strengths of the air force and navy satellites. By the early 1980s, what we know of as the GPS, also called the NAVSTAR system, was in place. The Rockwell International Corporation played a key role in the development of the GPS for the Pentagon.

In addition to serving civilian and military positioning needs, GPS satellites monitor nuclear explosions. During the first Gulf War, the GPS proved to be a critical technology, allowing for accurate positioning of soldiers and munitions. Since the first Gulf War, GPS receivers have been deployed with troops and equipment at an expanding rate.

The GPS receivers calculate the signals from three satellites, giving users two-dimensional data on their latitude and longitude. This method of calculation is called *triangulation*. To triangulate, a GPS receiver measures the distance from a satellite using the travel time of radio signals. To measure travel time, GPS receivers track the time it takes to receive data from extremely accurate atomic clocks aboard each satellite. Receiver clocks are not as accurate as satellite clocks, but an extra satellite measurement reduces timing discrepancies.

In addition to distance, GPS receivers need to know exactly where the satellites are in space. This is achieved through careful monitoring of the satellites. Because the satellites are in high orbit, they can be tracked with greater ease and predictability than if they were in atmospheric orbit. Corrections must be made for any delays the signals experience as they travel through the atmosphere. With close calculation of distance from three or more satellites and a few other calculations, a position can be triangulated.

The signals produced by GPS satellites are transmitted in what is called pseudorandom code, which resembles random noise but is actually a highly complicated digital signal. Each satellite employs a different code, allowing all the satellites to use the same frequency without data corruption. By measuring the time it takes to receive the code and multiplying that time by the speed of light, the receiver is able to calculate the distance to the satellite. The GPS satellites emit signals, including the private access code and civilian access code, which allow receivers to perform triangulation.

The military reserved the highest-quality P code for itself. For civilians, errors were purposefully introduced to degrade data quality. This is called selective availability and was developed to reduce the likelihood of combatants and terrorists employing U.S. satellites for precision targeting. Selective availability was turned off in 2000, partially in response to studies by the RAND Corporation and the National Research Council that predicted serious financial and technological failings would result from its continued use. However, replacement technologies demonstrated by the military continue to enable the United States to degrade the GPS signal on a regional basis.

Russia developed its own GPS-like network of satellites, called GLONASS, primarily for military functions. Moreover, the Energy and Transport Directorate of the European Commission is currently funding the development of Europe's own network of 30 GPS-like satellites, called Galileo. The satellites will be under civilian control and are to be interoperable with both GPS and GLONASS. Four Galileo satellites are to be launched in 2005–06.

See also Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); Department of Defense, U.S.; U.S. Air Force; U.S. Navy

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GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The effect of growing worldwide economic, political, and social interconnectedness on U.S. national security. According to political scientists David Held and Anthony McGrew in the *Oxford Companion to Politics*, globalization is marked by four types of change. First, it involves a stretching of social, political, and economic activities across international boundaries. Second, it is marked by an increasing

intensity in the flow of exchanges such as trade, investment, migration, and culture. Third, it is characterized by a faster pace of global interactions and processes as new transportation and communication capabilities hasten the spread of ideas, goods, information, and people. Fourth, these interactions have a great impact on distant as well as local events.

The end of the Cold War marked an end to the superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and its appending power alignments. In its place emerged the notion of *globalism* to fill the vacuum of a collapsed, bipolar political world.

The concept of globalism, or globalization, quickly gained new application and wide acceptance as a state of world affairs that implies concrete processes and structures. The post–Cold War realignment of power relations set into motion a transformation of multilateral institutions, a new role for civic society, a redefinition of the concept of governance, and a shift in the arena of conflict.

During the period of the Cold War, countries across the globe fell mostly within one of two orbits. National regimes felt secure in the knowledge that their administrations would be propped up politically, economically, and, if need be, militarily as a client state of either the United States or the Soviet Union. Despite hostilities in some areas of the globe, the superpower rivalry created geopolitical stability in others. The conclusion of the superpower hostilities, however, left behind a string of failed states.

POLITICAL UPHEAVAL

Tensions roiled in the southern Caucasus, parts of Africa, Yugoslavia, central Asia, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Up to this time, these struggles had been suppressed and immersed in the greater theater of conflict. Yet, after the fall of communism, for many regimes there came a day of reckoning as calls for the redress of past grievances were sounded by restive populations. The leaderships of these regimes had regarded themselves as immune from the consequences of abuse of power because of their strategic positioning within the existing power blocs. However, once the aegis of mutual assistance programs, treaty organizations, and military pacts was tossed aside, new tensions grew.

Local animosities erupted almost immediately. Revanchist claims, ethnic tensions, and age-old hatreds that had been simmering for generations came to a boil in various parts of the world. Romanians, Afghans, Tamil separatists, and Indonesians resorted to rioting, assassination, and execution. Mayan populations in Mexico; Hutus and Tutsis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Chechens in the former Soviet Union all engaged in violent activity as perpetrators and victims of brutality and massacre.

Fueling the fire was the rise of fundamentalism. Although the ideological schism between East and West was closing, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe coincided with an increase in religious fervor around the world. Ethnic and religious ardor in the former Yugoslav republics mingled to produce political figures such as Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia.

In the Middle East, Kurdish uprisings in Turkey and Iraq left a trail of reports and evidence of atrocities. Violence between Israel and the Palestinians was heightened, and instability grew throughout the Muslim world. Fundamentalism found a place for itself in all regions, as its relationship to globalization is often conflict based. For better or worse, globalization aims to unite the world technologically, economically, and politically, whereas fundamentalism fragments the world culturally. Events in the Balkans and among the states of the Middle East, as well as the terrorist attacks on U.S. territory all provided evidence of an emergent and dangerously unstable era.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

Across this shifting terrain were the developments in the world economy. During the early 1970s, the world financial system underwent drastic change. The U.S. government's financing of the Vietnam War and the cost of the Johnson administration's Great Society program took their toll on the U.S. economy.

To compensate for the inflationary policies of the 1960s, in 1971 the United States abandoned the gold standard and rescinded the promise to holders of U.S. currency that their assets could be redeemed in gold. This action effectively transformed the world's monetary system, which had been organized by the Bretton Woods agreements and had operated successfully since 1947. The 1971 decision by the administration of President Richard Nixon to permit the dollar to float rather than anchor exchange rate adjustment effectively dismantled the Bretton Woods system established in 1944.

In place of these agreements arose a "reference range" system managed by finance ministers and central bankers of the so-called G7 countries. These officials meet periodically and privately to determine a consensual exchange rate based on the interests of their governments and private-sector demands.

MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS, LIBERALIZED TRADE, AND GLOBALIZED MARKETS

In the closing days of World War II, at the Bretton Woods Conference, the agreements reached created a system of international economic institutions. The primary institution was to be known as the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, which later became known as the World Bank. The World Bank Group's original mission was to provide long-term project loans for poor countries. Two of its five agencies were the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The GATT was provisionally formed to reduce barriers to merchandise trade. It was later absorbed into and eventually replaced in 1995 by the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is now a permanent institution with greater enforcement powers and a broader agenda. The IMF's function was to oversee cross-border monetary flows and to provide reserve credit to countries with temporary foreign payment problems. However, the IMF's role has change since the world's financial system of fixed rates was abandoned. To accommodate the new systematic demands, the IMF now provides recipient countries with intermediate-term aid and funds for the purposes of currency stabilization.

During the 1980s, the World Bank and the IMF underwent changes in leadership as well. In the United States and the United Kingdom, the experience of economic recession during the 1970s catapulted political parties to power whose campaign slogan was "less government regulation and more business." As Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan assumed office, developmental economists at the World Bank began to depart. At this time, free trade advocates took over control of policy. These free trade advocates became known as *neoliberals* because of their belief in liberal trade policies and disdain for intervention into economic affairs by national governments.

Neoliberals firmly believed in the efficiency of the market. They scorned developmentalist theories, which they claimed had encouraged protectionist policies and placed the world economy at risk. The conventional wisdom that the cause of the Great Depression and World War II was the decline of world trade brought about by "beggar-thy-neighbor" trade policies became a guiding principle in the international political economy. Reducing barriers to trade and capital flows, it was reasoned, would generate a cycle of economic growth and a sustained attack on poverty.

As the world witnessed the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the failure of the Communist Party trumpeted proof for neoliberals that governments were fallible and the market was not. Urged on by these events, the World Bank and the IMF blanketed the developing world with template programs known under the rubric of "structural adjustment."

Under structural-adjustment policies, states that received IMF loans had to follow a set of strict economic prescriptions. These prescriptions called for monetary stabilization, but at the cost of allowing local governments the ability to manage their economy through monetary policy. Hence, the greatest onus for reforming the economy was placed on the private sector. Local industries were hastily subject to competition from abroad and conventional lending practices.

The effort was intended to force the private sector to respond to market signals. However, local firms were often in the developmental stages and were not prepared to meet the demands of global competition. Furthermore, particularly in the case of the transition economies of Eastern Europe, indigenous banking systems were not yet sufficiently organized to deal with the pace and turbulence of global financial markets.

These policies unleashed powerful economic forces. As a result, developed and developing countries alike became subject to the whims of an expanding international financial market and events taking place in distant locales. As the global financial market expanded, so did the network of interdependence of economic life among all countries. Market failures, rate adjustments, currency reevaluations, loan defaults, and political change occurring in any part of the world radiated in varying degrees through the financial system.

Until 1971, the international monetary system of fixed rates had provided domestic policy autonomy and monetary stability. As it changed, so did the dynamic of relationships of the international political economy. Although the market and the financial system were more tightly linked, the interests of the

stakeholders grew more widely apart. Governments of developing nations preferred fixed exchange rates to ensure price stability and as a defense against capital flight. On the other hand, liberal economists and money center banks typically welcome flexible rates. The latter benefit because the new convention facilitates the movement of financial capital by putting countries in a competitive situation for financial capital, and it forces their governments to discard the thought of currency controls even more purposely.

Apart from these events, the world was also undergoing a major oil crisis during the early 1970s. A scarcity of oil, high inflation, and sluggish economy created a worldwide global recession. Stagnant economic growth engulfed the world even as petrodollars flooded the system, seeking an outlet for investment. A backdrop to these conditions was the technological advancements and deregulation in the communications industry. What resulted was a system that, despite its stagnancy, required structures and mechanisms to accommodate a massive increase in the scale and velocity of global financial flows. It was a system that was also inherently unstable.

Compounding these elements was the matrix of a globalizing economy, which not only required the free movement of capital, but also was driven by a dependence on the internationalization of production. The result has altered the notion of global governance. State, corporate, and civil-sector actors were gradually being forced into different and additional roles under the prevailing conditions and interplay of global change. Some even longed for the certainties of the Cold War era.

IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Capital-market liberalization did not always yield the desired fruits. The ceaseless movement of financial capital, the demands for tight credit controls, and the condition that local industry be exposed to free trade policies and foreign competition from exports systematically wrought unemployment and poverty in many underdeveloped areas of the world. As a result of these austerity measures, many economies that had received large financial assistance packages suffered harshly rather than prospered. For many third-world countries, the situation developed into what has been described as a "debt trap." Some experts estimate that as much as 50% of some governments' revenues go toward debt service. In some cases, this could represent one-fifth to one-quarter of the export earnings in a national budget.

In 2000, the World Bank reported that one-sixth of the world's population received 80% of global income. Within that statistic lies the fact that 57% of the world's population shares in only 6% of total global income. Recent data show the chasm between the rich and the poor is widening. As a result, globalization is spawning a migratory trend. As the IMF and World Bank impose structural-adjustment programs, the effects on the economies of less-developed countries are often bankruptcy, currency devaluation, and the reduction of public services. Consequently, many residents of impoverished states are lured to industrialized nations as caretakers, unskilled workers, nannies, and prostitutes for survival and for the sake of the financial maintenance of families left behind.

Such conditions contribute to the security threat at the regional, national, and global levels. Intrastate warfare has been the most recurrent form of conflict since the end of the Cold War, and poverty's causal relationship with this development is becoming increasingly apparent.

Much has been written on the impact of globalization in recent years. The term "globalization" often figures prominently in justifications of free trade. Often, however, it is a central point in arguments against the expansion of market power. Consistent with this conclusion is that markets, left to their own devices, tend toward neither economic equilibrium nor political democracy. The big winners of globalism are transnationally mobile capital in trade, industry, and finance, as well as domestic firms that are positioned to enter into a strategic alliance with overseas partners. Add to the list beneficiaries of "crony capitalism" and those with rent-seeking agendas who pursue government policies that give advantage to their special interests.

As the power alignments of the Cold War era have given way to new spheres of authority, a new regionalism has been created. What drives this view is that, although globalization offers many benefits to some, it also creates a clash of social and economic interests. This syndrome includes a spasmodic association of cultural divides, which can end in resentment and rebellion. The spread and deepening of the market is not without varied implications and consequences, but many in government, business, and academe have written that because no one is in charge, the system is unstable and cannot be sustained in its present form.

The difficulties wrought by religious fundamentalism, terrorism, and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, which has been a worldwide source of lethal material, further complicates an already tremulous environment. Nevertheless, rapid global economic integration is overwhelming the structures of national states. Policy decision making and enforcement in the global era will likely find its habitat under the panoply of governance, which is yet to be established. Until new spheres of authority form, national security issues will prevail. Whether the current conditions are a temporary derailment of a system that is undergoing transition or a harbinger of an emergent, more permanent epoch is a question that has been neither fully analyzed nor resolved.

—Jack A. Jarmon

See also Bretton Woods Conference; International Monetary Fund; Monetary Policy; Trade Liberalization; World Bank

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GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT

Act passed by the U.S. Congress in 1986 that is considered a milestone in the reform of the armed forces. Intended to improve some of the failures made evident by the Vietnam War and general shortcomings in communication, interservice rivalry, and unclear hierarchy, the Goldwater-Nichols Act aimed to transform the individual services (the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) into joint institutions within the U.S. Department of Defense.

Before the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the armed services often did not work jointly, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff worked as a mere corporate body that furnished the National Command Authority with collective guidance. Responding to this situation, the Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated greater cooperation and interoperability among the military's services. It strengthened the position of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who assumed a near cabinet-level post as the chief military adviser to the president, the secretary of defense, and the National Security Council. It also created the position of vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

In an attempt to force the various services to work jointly, this landmark legislation created interservice operational commands such as the Special Forces Command, which unified all of the special forces units scattered throughout the military. Other articles of the act instituted policies aimed at developing officers with experience and education in more than one service. Along those lines, all officers with the rank of brigadier general or rear admiral must have served a joint duty assignment.

The reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols Act initially met with criticism from those in the military who wanted to keep the status quo and preserve the control of individual services over all of their assets. Now, however, most believe the act to be a resounding success. The United States now fights wars much more efficiently, with a chairman who truly oversees all of the services in times of conflict, backed up by unified and efficient operational commands. Some analysts, for example, feel that the changes brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act contributed greatly to the success of the United States during the first Gulf War. For the first time in a major conflict, the field commander had genuine control over the varied forces, as did the other interservice operational commands. In the aftermath of intelligence failures surrounding the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States, some have called for reform of the intelligence community based on the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY

Policy introduced by President Herbert Hoover and expanded by President Franklin D. Roosevelt indicating that the United Sates would no longer intervene in the affairs of Latin American nations but would instead cooperate with them.

In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt revised the Monroe Doctrine, the long-standing policy that prevented American interference in the affairs of Latin American nations. Roosevelt's approach, termed the Big Stick policy, expressly allowed the use of diplomatic, economic, and military force in Latin American nations when U.S. interests were involved.

Later, President Woodrow Wilson altered the policy to include the "good men" clause: The United States would actively oppose any Latin American leaders who were believed to be corrupt, who had obtained their offices illegitimately, or who presumably threatened U.S. security. In 1914, Wilson refused to acknowledge the presidency of Victoriano Huerta, a Mexican general who had assumed the presidency of Mexico during a coup. During this period, American forces were sent to Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama to ensure that these nations adhered to U.S. demands.

By 1928, most Latin American nations openly resented the forceful meddling of the United States. Disturbed by this hostility, the newly elected president, Herbert Hoover, eschewed the Big Stick policy. The United States, President Hoover asserted, would be a good neighbor toward the Latin American nations. Military involvement would be abolished, and the United States would recognize the sitting governments of all nations, regardless of how they had attained power.

When Franklin D. Roosevelt became president in 1932, he embraced the good neighbor policy and converted Hoover's promises into formal agreements. First, Roosevelt rescinded the Platt Amendment, legislation that permitted American troops to intervene in foreign affairs. He then withdrew U.S. troops stationed in Cuba, Panama, and the Dominican Republic. Next, Roosevelt formally recognized all existing Latin American governments. Finally, in 1936, at the Inter-American Conference in Buenos Aires, Roosevelt's secretary of state, Cordell Hull, signed a document renouncing the United States' right to interfere in any Latin American nation.

Roosevelt noted three specific goals for his policy: First, he hoped to encourage free trade throughout the Western Hemisphere. Second, he wanted to ensure peaceful relations between the United States and the Latin American nations. Finally, with the prospect of World War II looming large on the horizon, Roosevelt wanted to maintain the security of the entire region.

The good neighbor policy succeeded in attaining these objectives. By 1941, the United States had signed 13 different trade agreements with various Latin American nations. Disputes between Latin American nations, especially border disputes in South America, were peacefully resolved. Most importantly, in 1940, the United States and all Latin American nations declared that any attack on a Western Hemisphere nation would be construed as an attack on all of the region's nations. By 1942, every country in the Western Hemisphere, except Argentina and Chile, had severed relations with Germany and Japan. When the United States entered World War II, Latin American nations supplied much of the raw materials for the U.S. war effort. In return, the United States slashed its tariffs and provided generous loans to sustain the Latin American economies.

Ultimately, the good neighbor policy eased the tensions that had arisen between the United States and Latin America at the beginning of the 20th century. Although Roosevelt's political opponents sharply, and even justifiably, criticized his recognition of even the harshest Latin American dictatorships, the policy undeniably helped the United States to win World War II and ensured future cooperation with Latin American nations. This cooperation was most evident in the formulation of the Organization of American States in 1948.

See also Latin America and U.S. Policy; Organization of American States; Roosevelt Corollary; Roosevelt, Franklin D., and National Policy

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GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL (1931–)

Soviet leader whose policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* opened the Soviet Union to reform and contributed to the ultimate demise of the Soviet Communist state. A Nobel Prize winner in 1990, Gorbachev is credited with helping to end the Cold War.

Born March 2, 1931, Mikhail Gorbachev hailed from a peasant family in the village of Privolnoye, located in the southern Russian region of Stavropol. Gorbachev studied law at Moscow State University, where he joined the Communist Party in 1952, the

same year that he completed his law degree at the university.

During the early 1960s, Gorbachev returned to the Stavropol region to become head of the agriculture ministry. By the end of the decade, he had risen to top of the party hierarchy in the region, and, in 1978, he was back in Moscow. Under the guidance of Yuri Andropov (one of his predecessors as Soviet leader), Gorbachev began his rise in the ranks of the Kremlin hierarchy. With the deaths of Andropov and his successor, Konstantin Chernenko, Gorbachev was elected general-secretary of the Communist Party in March 1985 at the age of 54.

From the beginning, Gorbachev was openly reform-minded and critical of Communist Party excesses. After his relatively unsuccessful stewardship of Soviet agriculture, the rising star had come to realize that the communist collective system was fundamentally flawed. More outspoken than many of his peers, he quickly built a reputation as an enemy of corruption and a proponent of change.

As head of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev began to put his ideas into action. With a call for systemic democratization and an end to inefficiency, he launched his signature programs *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring) soon after becoming Soviet leader. Aware of the financial toll that the arms race with the United States was taking on the Russian economy and society, he also became a staunch advocate of weapons reduction.

Gorbachev saw the end of the arms race and the militarization of space—which the United States had inspired through its Strategic Defense Initiative—as another way of easing the burden on a weak Soviet economy. To this end, he opened a dialogue with Western leaders, emphasizing the shared benefits of discussing missile reductions. In a series of summit talks, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union improved. An Intermediate Nuclear Forces arms limitation treaty was signed in 1987. By 1989, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan ended, and the communist monopoly on political power in Eastern Europe had drawn to a close as well. For his contributions to reducing East–West tensions, Gorbachev was awarded the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize.

Winning the Nobel Prize did not improve the situation for Gorbachev in Russia, however. By 1990, his perestroika program was failing. Significant upgrades to the economy had not materialized, and political and social control was eroding. Moreover, in response to Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, Soviet republics were demanding independence, and in many regions of the vast Soviet territory, latent ethnic and national tensions began to erupt.

As the reform drive in the Soviet Union stalled, both reformers and conservatives roiled in discontent. In trying to reform the Communist Party, Gorbachev had drawn the ire of party hard-liners, who bemoaned the loss of their empire. On the other hand, he also drew fire from reformers, who found him guilty of appeasing the old regime.

In 1991, a cabal of conservative Communists hatched a coup d'état and kidnapped Gorbachev. However, the attempt to overthrow the government unleashed massive street protests in Moscow. A lack of support for the coup from the military, and the plotter's own incompetence, allowed political rival Boris Yeltsin to intercede, and Gorbachev was reinstalled in power.

With a few short, thunderous strokes, power had shifted away from the central authority toward the Russian Republic, which was led by Yeltsin. After driving back the plotters, Yeltsin established himself as popular leader. Gorbachev's leadership, on the other hand, was irreparably damaged. On December 25, 1991, he resigned as president of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Commonwealth of Independent States was established and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was dissolved.

Since 1992, Gorbachev has headed international organizations, written several books, and run unsuccessfully for the Russian presidency (in 1996). The founder of Green Cross International, an organization concerned with converting military bases to civilian use, Gorbachev is involved in remedying the effects of nuclear contamination (particularly on children) and destroying stockpiles of chemical weapons in an environmentally responsible way.

Criticism that Gorbachev underestimated the depth of the economic crisis in the Soviet Union and the full force of ethnic problems is valid. That he hastened the downfall of the Soviet Union is an issue that is open for debate. However, for most observers, it is an irrefutable fact that Gorbachev will be remembered as a central figure in helping to end the Cold War.

See also Glasnost; Perestroika; Soviet Union, Former (Russia) and U.S. Policy

GRAND STRATEGY

A state's most complex form of planning toward the fulfillment of a long-term objective. The formulation and implementation of a grand strategy require the identification of a national goal, a thorough assessment of the state's resources, and, ultimately, the marshalling of those resources in a highly organized manner to achieve the set goal. Although a grand strategy is concerned with national affairs both in times of war and peace, national strategies historically have operated under the assumption of the existence of an enemy that needs to be overcome. To that end, policymakers attempt to develop the best possible way of coordinating military prowess, political leverage, diplomatic ability, and economic might to achieve a cohesive national strategy. To this day, the vocabulary of grand strategies is one of conflict, with politicians vowing to enable their country to fight against all perceived opponents.

The label "grand strategy" is a notoriously elusive concept because scholars, politicians, and generals tend to define it in considerably different ways. Most people do, however, agree with the assertion that the formulation of a grand strategy is an extremely complex operation incorporating a wide array of political, economic, military, and even psychological dimensions. A strategy is said to become "grand" when it is concerned not only with winning a war, but also with securing a comfortable, lasting peace. A grand strategy is a vision for the future and a precise plan for the fulfillment of that vision.

Achieving the goals of a grand strategy presupposes more than the successful prosecution of a war or the economic development of a nation. It also requires a concerted effort on the part of a significant segment of the society. In other words, on its formulation by policymakers, a grand strategy requires a measure of countrywide consensus or, at the very least, the absence of a general resistance to its goals. In addition, a grand strategy needs to exhibit considerable flexibility. Dramatic events such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks can inflict unpredictable changes in the political and economic environment, and a solid grand strategy needs to be able to adapt to such developments.

Formulating an effective grand strategy is a matter of balancing means and ends, setting realistic goals

for one's state, and then devoting all the necessary resources to achieving those goals. When drafting a national strategy, a state's decision makers need to carefully consider a series of historical and psychological factors, such as the country's foreign policy traditions and the nation's tolerance for different levels of confrontation. For example, a strategy that relies heavily on creating multilateral defense alliances is arguably more easily implemented by a country that has a history of internationalism than by one that has sought isolation or political neutrality.

Those who attempt to devise a grand strategy also have to identify, with a high degree of accuracy, the number and quality of the country's available resources. If, for example, a state is to run its affairs in accordance with a strategy that relies on the prosecution of war, the state's leaders need to know how much money they can devote to the armed forces, as well as the exact situation of available manpower and weaponry. In terms of military choices, the makers of a grand strategy have to decide between such things as offensive versus defensive operations, wars of attrition versus surprise attacks, and regional conflicts versus global conflicts.

Throughout the historical process of its transformation from a collection of British colonies to the world's only superpower, the United States has adopted a series of grand strategies. The first is said to have been forged in the 1770s and early 1780s during the Revolutionary War era. The objective of that strategy—achieving independence from Great Britain—relied primarily on military operations, but it also had a diplomatic component.

A second grand strategy was arguably put in place in the period between the American Revolution and the American Civil War. This phase was characterized by a policy of isolationism, in which the United States sought to build up its economy and kept its dealings with the outside world to a minimum. From a military point of view, with the notable exception of the U.S.–Mexican War (1846–1848), the United States was committed to a defensive stance within its borders.

The period following the Civil War was one of relative peace, so the outlines of a grand strategy are somewhat more difficult to discern. The overriding concern in this period, however, was arguably economic and military development within a peaceful political environment.

Because of its unprecedented scale, World War I can be said to have dramatically changed every

country's existing grand strategy. Diplomatically, the war refocused U.S. strategy on foreign alliance and extensive alliance making. The period following the war was one of reconstruction, with the United States emerging as the world's premier economic power but again seeking political isolation.

World War II required a "total war" strategy similar to that of the previous conflict, which once again called on the United States to forge strong foreign alliances. The post–World War II period was characterized by a strategy of containment of communist expansion during the Cold War. At this time, U.S. objectives also included maintaining the balance of power in Europe and preventing nuclear war.

The Cold War strategy became obsolete with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. It was replaced by a strategy of global economic dominance secured by a credible threat of devastating military force.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks ushered in a new strategic phase characterized by an all-out global war on terrorist-designated groups and the countries perceived as harboring them. The current U.S. grand strategy continues to be defined by the stated goal of fighting worldwide terrorism by any means necessary.

—*Razvan Sibii*

See also Cold War; Geopolitics; Terrorism, War on International

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GREAT POWER RIVALRY

Prevalent form of major-power interaction that shapes international relations for major and minor powers and defines the scope and incidence of major conflicts. Great power rivalries have existed throughout history, from the ancient rivalries between Athens and Sparta and between Rome and Carthage to the superpower rivalry that existed during the Cold War era between the United States and the Soviet Union.

ORIGINS OF GREAT POWER RIVALRY

In an unregulated international system, states are concerned primarily with their own security. Those with the greatest resources—which includes the so-called great powers—seek to protect themselves from those with comparable resources (other great powers) that could pose a legitimate threat. In such an environment, states attempt to protect their current advantages, develop additional ones, and exploit the weaknesses of others. As one great power ascends relative to another, the other state will often attempt to reverse these gains. This creates a rivalry between the powers, and the two powers will increasingly come into conflict over the appropriate distribution of power in the world system.

Rivalries are created and fueled by changes in the relative capabilities of great powers in the international system. When one state suddenly acquires great power status, it disturbs the existing power structures. Other states, feeling threatened by this change, may enter into conflict or competition with the newcomer. An existing great power that increases its capabilities may gain a significant, power-shifting advantage over its rivals. The perception of the threat by other powers may lead them into conflict with the upstart power, or it may spur retaliatory military spending. True rivalries exist when the threat or use of military force is a real and ever-present possibility and the rival poses a serious threat to others.

Such rivalries have substantial implications for the powers themselves, as well as for small states and the system as a whole. Strong states must commit a substantial part of their resources to ensuring that their power remains at least constant. In situations of intense rivalry, part of this expenditure must be directed toward ensuring the security of smaller allies. These smaller allies, in turn, may lose some autonomy in charged or unstable situations. They will frequently act as a balance against a threatening power by allying with the rival to allay immediate security concerns. In the process, however, they become subject to the security constraints of their new ally.

EFFECTS OF GREAT POWER RIVALRY

Great powers enter into significant disputes over issues such as security policies, arms development, military actions, territory, transit, commercial access, trade balances, spheres of influence, and other areas

that determine their military and economic power relative to other great powers. The great powers thus form a security complex: The security of each state in the great power system is crucially linked to the security policies of other, equally strong states. Decisions made by one state in these areas will necessarily have a great impact on the decisions of the other states. Within this complex system, however, there may be a great deal of insecurity.

To preserve their status and power, major states may engage in multiple strategies. Security (and related territorial) concerns frequently develop into arms races as each great power attempts to develop more efficient and effective weaponry and produce more arms. Moreover, the great powers will attempt to pursue new strategies in warfare (such as lightning wars versus wars of attrition) to gain advantages. Rivalries may result in threats or use of force.

Less belligerently, major powers may attempt to ally against another state to balance power. At a minimum, great powers will attempt to deter attack from others by gaining sufficient prowess to ensure that the cost of attacking would outweigh the benefits. With regard to economic issues, states will attempt to develop competitive advantages over others. For example, the ability to produce certain goods better, cheaper, and faster than another state leads to a favorable trade balance, increased revenues, growth in the economic base, and, ultimately, the ability to support a larger or more advanced military.

When rivalries become sufficiently intense, great power conflict is common. A substantial change, such as a shift in the number of great powers, a change in the military capabilities belonging to one of the powers, or a reversal in the power hierarchy, may engender conflict. Such conflicts may be large in scale and costly in terms of financial resources and lives because the warring parties almost invariably have the most up-to-date weaponry. Rivalries that involve political alliances among states may plunge more countries into regional wars (great power rivalries are most often found among contiguous states). Great power rivalries have also generated both world wars and the Cold War.

Although shifts in power balances among great powers can cause wars, there is some dispute as to whether certain types of power balances (bipolar or multipolar balance-of-power systems) are more likely to result in conflict. Traditional political theory affirms that bipolar systems are inherently more stable: The two rivals represent the other's only true threat, but each must be constantly occupied by this threat.

Other theories posit that multipolar systems are more stable. Supporters of this view argue that bipolar systems inherently include nearly equal power and high costs to maintain this power. As the costs of maintenance increase and become unbearable, one side will attempt to terminate the détente. The two evenly matched powers will engage in conflict, and, when the costs again become too high, the states will rebalance and repeat the pattern. It seems that unstable balances are a necessary but not sufficient condition of war.

GREAT POWER RIVALRIES IN CONTEXT

Political realists—people who believe that power politics governs international relations—affirm that great power rivalry is inherent in the world system. They maintain that it is only the names and numbers of players that change over time. Great powers may rise and fall, the international system may shift between bipolar and multipolar structures, but the rivalry structure persists. Realists note that history is permeated with examples and that similar rivalries can be traced to the ancient Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta. Major rivalries also existed between Rome and Carthage and, later, among colonizing European kingdoms (Spain and Portugal) and adjacent empires (the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires).

In the 20th century, great power rivalries took on truly a global dimension. In the years prior to World War I, German military power was gaining in relative strength, France was declining in comparison, the power of the Ottoman Empire was diminishing, and powerful Russia was growing increasingly unstable internally. The uneasy balance of power (internally and externally) in Europe, the shifts in relative power, and the intricate system of mutual-defense alliances made the situation ripe for conflict. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, triggered a chain reaction that plunged much of the world into war.

World War II also was largely attributable to great power rivalry and attempts to dominate Europe. Under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, Germany had rebuilt its military, leading to a relative decline in power among its nearest neighbors and rivals, particularly Poland and France. Reinforced by ideological struggles

(between fascism and liberal democracy), the war brought rivalries among Germany, Japan, France, Britain, Italy, and Russia to the fore. Shifts in internal circumstances and power during the war caused Italy and Russia to change sides and balance with Britain and France against Germany and its allies. Great power rivalry in the World War II period also resulted in active combat outside the immediate region, such as in Africa.

When World War II ended, most of Western Europe was devastated, and the two powers whose infrastructures remained largely intact were the United States and the Soviet Union. Antagonism between these two nations over spheres of influence, the rebuilding of Europe, and economic and political ideologies grew and spawned the bipolar Cold War. The Cold War conflict was intense in its early phases, at least in part because it represented a shift in the shape of the international system. As the freeze deepened, the two superpowers devoted huge amounts of resources to developing superior nuclear arsenals, training their military forces, and recruiting allies from among smaller states, particularly as new states emerged following decolonization in the 1960s.

GREAT POWERS AND SMALL STATES

Great power rivalries often play a large role in determining small-state sovereignty and security. Before World War II, the Soviet Union and Germany concluded a pact to divide Poland and destroy its sovereignty. As the Cold War deepened, the United States and the Soviet Union consolidated their spheres of influence. The United States took control of Western Europe, actively rebuilding those nations and reshaping them according to its notions of free trade. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, sought to increase its security and power in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. The Soviets assisted in installing pro-Soviet governments in several Eastern European countries in the postwar years, diminishing local control over political affairs.

Rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union also caused a massive escalation of engagement in local conflicts, the most notable involving Korea and Vietnam. As each local or regional dispute began to have balance-of-power overtones, the great powers frequently committed troops, funds, or moral support to the faction sharing their ideology. Great power rivalry prolonged civil wars (as in the case of Greece in the late 1940s) and fueled fighting in Korea, the Congo, and Vietnam.

The great powers tend to balance one another, and the smaller powers tend to align themselves with stronger allies. As a result, the shape of great power rivalries affects the nature of the international system. The rivalries are also shaped *by* the international system. The presence of a bipolar or multipolar system affects the degree and kind of competition that great powers experience, and changing from one type of system to another may deepen rivalries or cause conflict.

See also Bipolarity; Cold War; Multipolarity

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GREEN BERETS

Name given to the U.S. Army Special Forces, for the color of their headgear. Founded by Colonel Aaron Bank in 1952, the Green Berets are trained for unconventional warfare and special operations.

The Green Berets are an elite unit of soldiers skilled in hand-to-hand combat, stealth tactics, the use of explosives, amphibious warfare, rock climbing, and mountain and ski fighting. The Special Forces are organized into teams of 12 soldiers, with two experts in every specialty. They must volunteer and undergo a difficult training. All should speak at least two languages and have at least a sergeant's rank. They must be willing to work behind enemy lines, in civilian clothes if necessary. Their official motto is *De opresso liber*: "to liberate the oppressed."

The Green Beret headgear was originally designated in 1953 by Special Forces Major Herbert Brucker. Soon it spread throughout all the Special

Forces troops, although the Army did not authorize its official use. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy, on a visit to Fort Bragg, headquarters of the Special Forces, encouraged all troops to wear their berets for the event. After the visit, the president sent a message saying that the green beret would be a mark of distinction in the trying times ahead. Since then, the green beret has been the official headgear of all U.S. Army Special Forces.

The Green Berets became famous during the conflict in Vietnam, where they were initially involved in training South Vietnamese troops in counterinsurgency and transforming tribal and minority native groups into anticommunist combatants. During the early years of the Vietnam War, different Special Forces teams were involved in advising the South Vietnamese. In February 1965, the Fifth Special Forces Group established its permanent headquarters in Nha Trang, and Vietnam became its exclusive operational province until 1971, when the group returned to Fort Bragg.

Some Special Forces troops remained in Thailand, where they launched secret missions into Vietnam until the end of 1972. The Green Berets eventually established 254 outposts throughout Vietnam. The Special Forces fought in numerous battles against the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese army. During their presence in Vietnam, the Fifth Special Forces Group won 16 of the 17 Medals of Honor awarded to the Special Forces in Vietnam.

Back home after the Vietnam War, the Green Berets had to cope with controversial reactions to their role in the conflict. Three Special Forces groups were inactivated, and there was an attempt to expand the skills of the remaining troops. Through a program called SPARTAN, the Fifth and Seventh Special Forces groups worked with Native American tribes in Florida, Arizona, and Montana to build roads and medical

An honor guard from the First Special Forces Group (the Green Berets) transporting the flag-draped coffin of a fellow soldier who was killed during the war in Afghanistan in 2002. The Green Berets are specially selected and trained soldiers who go deep behind enemy lines to disrupt enemy communications and supply lines and to blow up military targets. They are trained to fight anywhere in the world—in mountains, desert, the arctic, or jungle.

Source: U.S. Army.

facilities. However, the Green Berets also were deployed in Central and South America, conducting clandestine operations against guerrilla forces (mainly Marxist and communist ones). In 1968, the Green Beret Special Forces were involved in tracking down and capturing Marxist revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara in the Bolivian forest.

After President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, the Special Forces were deployed in Central America. From El Salvador and Honduras, the Special Forces prevented the civil war in neighboring Nicaragua from spreading beyond its borders. In December 1989, the Special Forces served alongside conventional army units in the Operation Just Cause invasion of Panama. More recently, they have operated in Afghanistan and Iraq. Aaron Bank, the founder of the Green Berets, was commended by President George W. Bush in 2002 for developing the unconventional warfare programs and techniques that were used to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001.

See also Special Forces; U.S. Army; Vietnam War

GRENADA INTERVENTION

U.S. intervention on the small Caribbean island of Grenada. On October 25, 1983, U.S. forces invaded the island of Grenada (one of the smallest in the eastern Caribbean), which was immersed in chaos after a bloody coup brought the People's Revolutionary Army to power. The Grenada invasion, called Operation Urgent Fury, marked the first U.S. military incursion overseas since the Vietnam War.

Operation Urgent Fury involved 5,000 U.S. Marines, Army Rangers, Navy Seal commandos, and elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, as well as 300 troops from a number of Caribbean states. By mid-December, all military targets had been secured and were under close American control, and an Interim Advisory Council governed Grenada until December 1984. In the parliamentary elections held that year, Herbert A. Blaize, from the pro-America New National Party, was elected as the new prime minister of the island.

PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

Frustrated with the authoritarian and corrupt administration of Grenada prime minister Sir Eric Gairy, a group of young members of the leftist New Jewel Movement (NJM) launched a coup that deposed Gairy in 1979. Gairy had served as prime minister of the island since it became independent from British rule in 1974. Gairy was known as a despotic and egotistical leader, and his secret police—called the Mongoose Squad—suppressed all political dissent on the island.

After the 1979 coup, the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) was created, and a charismatic leader, 34-year-old Maurice Bishop, became prime minister. Bishop's revolutionary government favored relations with socialist countries, particularly Cuba, and it promoted policies to create a popular socialism.

Within the NJM, however, were elements that were even more radical than Bishop and his collaborators. Among them was a group led by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard. In early 1983, Coard's faction began to push for a power-sharing arrangement to counter the economic decline that the revolutionary government was facing. Disagreements over the arrangement created a power struggle between radical and moderate factions within the NJM.

The NJM's internal strife culminated with Bishop's arrest on October 19, 1983, a move some interpreted as a military coup masterminded by Coard. After crowds of supporters—by some accounts 10,000 people, nearly 10% of Grenada's population—rallied in the streets against the arrest, Bishop was freed, only to be assassinated the same day by members of the People's Revolutionary Army. Dozens of protesters and some cabinet members were also massacred.

A Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) seized power at this time, but its involvement in Bishop's killing attracted severe criticism, isolating the new rulers from internal and external support. Coard and other members of the RMC were found guilty of the killing of Maurice Bishop and are still in prison (they are known as the Grenada 17). October 19, 1983, has become known in Grenadan history as "Bloody Wednesday."

U.S. INVOLVEMENT

Six days after the killing of Maurice Bishop, on October 25, 1983, U.S. President Ronald Reagan announced to the nation that U.S. forces were being deployed in Grenada. In his words, the invasion was launched to "protect innocent lives, including up to 1,000 Americans . . . to forestall further chaos . . . and to assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions to the island."

Many of the Americans in Grenada at the time were medical students. The RMC had closed access to the only airport on the island and declared an all-day and all-night curfew for four days, preventing the students from leaving Grenada. President Reagan added that U.S. actions were also a response to the request by some members of the newly established Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, plus Jamaica and Barbados, which had asked for help to restore order in Grenada.

The rationale and circumstances surrounding the U.S. invasion of Grenada were discussed at length in the aftermath of the intervention, particularly in light of the strategic interests that an island about twice the size of Washington, DC, with less than 100,000 people, could represent for American foreign policy. However, fears about the spread of communism in the Caribbean basin and the increasingly influential role of Cuba in Grenada were crucial factors in the decision to invade.

The government of Maurice Bishop and his New Jewel Movement had been a source of concern for the

White House since the administration of President Jimmy Carter, given Grenada's Marxist-Leninist policies and close ties to Cuba. It has been suggested that plans for the invasion were well under way before Bishop's assassination in October 1983.

In 1979, ousted Prime Minister Eric Gairy was granted asylum by the Carter administration, marking the unsympathetic nature of his policy toward Grenada's PRG. President Reagan's administration adopted a more hostile approach by systematically denying assistance from international financial institutions to the island and criticizing its ties to Cuba. In April 1983, military exercises involving more than 120,000 troops took place on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico. The maneuvers in this exercise are said to be the same used during Operation Urgent Fury.

The United States' hostility toward Grenada grew amid concerns that a new airport that was under construction could be used for military purposes—an unacceptable strategic advantage to the Soviets in the Caribbean. In March 1983, President Reagan referred to the "Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada" and questioned the need for a 10,000 foot runway, noting that Grenada did not even have an air force. Indeed, ties between Grenada and Cuba were strong. Most of the workers in the new airport project were Cubans, and the Cuban government had sent teachers, doctors, and trainers to the island. By October 1983, there were approximately 800 to 1,000 Cubans working in Grenada.

Bishop and his supporters, meanwhile, claimed that the new international airport was vital for his government's efforts to reactivate the tourism industry. With no financial support from Washington, Bishop turned to Libya, Syria, Canada, Iraq, the European Economic Community, the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) Fund, and Cuba to finance the project.

INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO U.S. ACTION

Disregarded by President Reagan as anti-American sentiment, criticism of the invasion of Grenada was fierce worldwide. The invasion put into question the United States' regard for international law and the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of states.

The United Nations Security Council never condemned the invasion because the United States had vetoed the resolution in which such condemnation was contained. The UN General Assembly, however, adopted a resolution, which was supported by an overwhelming majority, deploring the armed intervention in Grenada, which it considered a flagrant violation of international law.

Nearly 70 countries publicly condemned the U.S. invasion, including President Reagan's closest ally, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain, who said in an interview that "if you are going to pronounce a new law that wherever communism reigns against the will of their people, the United States shall enter . . . then we are going to have really terrible wars in the world."

See also Interventionism; Latin America and U.S. Policy

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GUADALCANAL, BATTLE OF (1943)

Epic naval and land battle during World War II for control of the island of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands in the southwest Pacific Ocean. The air-sea-land battle at Guadalcanal, a seven-month campaign of attrition, established the U.S. Navy as a first-rate fighting force and presaged the coming of age of the U.S. Marine Corps.

The alarming spread of Japanese detachments south and east of Rabaul, New Britain, in 1942 threatened the vital sea lanes supporting Australia and the bases from which the U.S. Southwest Pacific Command wished to launch its campaign to recover the Philippines. Pacific Fleet forces landed most of the First Marine Division in the Guadalcanal–Tulagi area on August 7, 1942, to take the nearest Japanese advance air and seaplane bases and block any further advance. The islands seized would later serve as jumping-off bases for the planned reduction of Japanese positions at Rabaul and the northern coast of New Guinea.

The Japanese response was fast and violent. A Japanese cruiser force defeated the Allied covering force two days later, on August 9, at the Battle of Savo Island, narrowly missing the Allied transports, which were still unloading the supplies and equipment of the division. The precipitous naval withdrawal stranded the marines with minimal supplies and no reinforcements for about two months while Japanese army forces concentrated for a final battle in September.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy fought the Japanese in pitched surface actions around Guadalcanal and carrier battles nearby, gradually gaining the upper hand. Both sides suffered serious losses in ships and aircraft, but Japan could not replace its losses before the war's end. On land, the Japanese first attacked the U.S. Marines on Guadalcanal with insufficient forces brought south from Rabaul in increasingly perilous naval convoy efforts.

The first attacks against the Marine Corps positions were easily repulsed. However, by late October, the Japanese actually had a slight margin of superiority in troops ashore, and, with Japanese naval bombardments causing damage to the vital airfield, the First Marine Division and a reinforcing army regiment made a decisive stand.

Japanese supplies sufficed only for the single effort, and they were soon reduced to starvation rations by the American assault. The Japanese Navy effected an undetected evacuation, and U.S. forces reached their empty end of the island on February 9, bringing the campaign to an end.

The doctrine, tactics, and procedures developed by the U.S. Navy during the Guadalcanal campaign left it practically unassailable thereafter in both surface and carrier warfare for the rest of the Pacific war. Although the Marine Corps had gained the measure of its enemy, the unopposed nature of the Guadalcanal landings meant that the marines still had several harsh lessons to learn in amphibious warfare.

See also Amphibious Warfare; U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Navy; World War II

GUAM

Largest and most populated of the Mariana Islands, acquired by the United States as a prize of war from Spain in 1899. Guam functioned as an advance base of increasing importance for the U.S. Navy as Japan figured more prominently in war planning in the years and months immediately prior to World War II. Guam remained unfortified and vulnerable under the 1922 Washington Treaty. Easily taken by Japan in 1941, Guam formed part of the island barrier chain that defended the Japanese Empire from the Allied counteroffensives of 1944.

As would happen so many times in the Pacific during World War II, no sooner had U.S. forces oriented to a new set of operational challenges than the situation changed. From attacking isolated Japanese garrisons on coral atolls, the III and V Amphibious Corps of the Marine Corps turned, in mid-1944, to confronting large units of the Japanese army, defending large Pacific islands that presented all possible variations of terrain.

The Mariana Islands formed the inner island defense barrier of Japanese strategy for the Pacific war, and a decisive battle fought on land, at sea, and in the air settled the fate of the Japanese Empire. Although U.S. Navy submarine and air interdiction prevented Japanese reinforcements and key fortification materials from reaching the islands in the early part of 1944, the garrisons already in place boasted reinforcing artillery, tanks, and other arms, including naval infantry.

The U.S. invasion force, the largest yet assembled in the Pacific, targeted three large islands for Operation Forager: Saipan and nearby Tinian in the northern archipelago and Guam in the south. The III Amphibious Corps landed on Guam with the Third Marine Division and the First Provisional Marine Brigade, with the Army's 77th Infantry Division, held initially at Hawaii, in reserve.

The parallel assault on Guam began July 21, 1944, a few days before the V Amphibious Corps hit Tinian. The landing force benefited from the delays imposed while the Fifth Fleet fought off the Japanese Navy in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. In addition, better reconnaissance information and aerial photography had reached the unit commanders. A 13-day naval and air bombardment, the longest of the Pacific war, softened Guam's defenses before Major General Roy Geiger's III Amphibious Corps began its storm landing. The clearing of Guam took 20 days, and the 77th Division reinforced the Marine Corps units after the main landings occurred.

After the recapture of Guam from the Japanese, the United States rebuilt and expanded its military facilities

on the island as the forward command and logistical center for the western Pacific. It also served as the base for the last amphibious assaults against Japan in 1945, including the planned invasions of the home islands.

Since the end of World War II, Guam has remained the major western Pacific outpost of the U.S. Navy and, with the abandonment of bases in the Philippines, the U.S. Air Force as well. By the end of the 20th century, the United States had experienced significant losses in access to or use of overseas bases in other countries, so the relative importance of Guam redoubled as the sole U.S. sovereign territory in the western Pacific.

See also Amphibious Warfare; Washington Naval Treaty; World War II

GUANTÁNAMO

U.S. detention facility on Cuban territory used to hold enemy combatants apprehended in the war on terrorism. The Guantánamo facility, located at Guantánamo Bay, has been a U.S. naval base since 1903, and it is the oldest overseas U.S. base still controlled and operated by the United States.

The U.S. base at Guantánamo has remained occupied by the United States despite the communist regime in Cuba led by Fidel Castro. However, since the rise of communism and Castro in Cuba during the late 1950s, relations have been strained between the two countries, creating some tense situations on Guantánamo. The most tense situation involving the United States and Cuba was the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. This dangerous standoff between the United States and Soviet Union over Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba led to the evacuation of Americans from Guantánamo until the missiles were removed in December 1962.

Initially used as a coaling station for ships, Guantánamo has evolved through the years. After Fidel Castro took power in 1959, his purge of the Cuban elite caused many to flee to Guantánamo for refuge and possible asylum in the United States. Consequently, Guantánamo became a refugee processing location that handled not only Cuban but Haitian refugees as well. Beginning in January 2002, Guantánamo assumed its latest primary mission—to hold and interrogate enemy combatants seized in the ongoing war on terrorism. Selected because of its unique position as a U.S. base on foreign territory, Guantánamo does not fall under any U.S. legal jurisdiction. The federal government has used this status as a rationale for holding enemy combatants for indefinite time periods and outside standard judicial review. The responsibility of holding enemy combatants was given to the U.S. military under the Joint Task Force Guantánamo, whose mission is to detain individuals and support the interrogation of enemy combatants for intelligence purposes.

The detention of enemy combatants at Guantánamo has been vigorously debated in the public and in legal circles in the United States and elsewhere. The status of detainees being held as enemy combatants has been challenged against the prisoner-of-war principles of the third Geneva Convention of 1949.

See also Geneva Conventions; Terrorism, War on International

GUERRILLA WARFARE

A style of war in which groups of fighters harass their enemies instead of confronting them in great battles. With few exceptions, guerrilla groups are smaller than their adversaries; therefore, guerrilla tactics rely on surprise attacks and the ability to evade detection. Guerrilla strategists stress the importance of propaganda to secure public support because sympathetic civilians provide refuge and supplies. Most campaigns follow a strategy of protracted war, which slowly erodes the enemy's military strength and will to continue.

TACTICS AND STRATEGIES

"The ability to run away," wrote Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong, "is the very characteristic of the guerrilla." Evasion is a core principle of guerrilla fighting, for two reasons. First, it prevents larger enemies from amassing forces effectively. Guerilla forces cannot expose themselves for long without risking destruction. Second, it keeps the enemy off balance. As long as the location of guerilla units is unknown, guerillas can choose from enemy weak spots in emplacements and supply lines.

Guerrillas traditionally operate in rural areas, where it is easier to hide. They historically have used themes of land redistribution to gain support in the

A soldier surveying the area just outside Camp Delta in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The U.S. Army and members of other services are charged with guarding the Camp Delta facilities, where detainees in the war against terrorism are being held. The camp, constructed in 2002 to hold suspected terrorists captured during the war in Afghanistan, houses several hundred prisoners. Allegations of abuse against prisoners have led to controversy over the camp in recent years.

Source: U.S. Army.

countryside. Advocates of urban guerilla warfare point out that increasing urbanization makes this tactic less useful. When guerillas operate within cities, the line between unconventional warfare and terrorism becomes blurred because urban attacks almost invariably produce civilian casualties.

At the strategic level, guerrillas tend to prefer protracted campaigns. This is unsurprising, given their asymmetric disadvantage. Guerrillas avoid direct confrontation with the enemy because they are usually numerically inferior. To overcome conventional weaknesses, they inflict small amounts of pain over a long period. This has two purposes. In some cases, protracted warfare gradually wears away the enemy's strength and sets the stage for the destruction of its army. Mao Zedong, who, among other things, is probably the most famous theorist of guerrilla warfare, argued that the final stage in a protracted campaign is the destruction of the enemy.

In other cases, guerrilla fighting aims to reduce the will of the larger force to continue fighting. This assumes that the enemy can replenish its forces indefinitely, but not his political resolve. The U.S. experience in Vietnam is illustrative. After North Vietnam conducted the Tet Offensive in January 1968, the United States responded with a devastating counteroffensive. However, despite this battlefield success, the war was becoming unpopular at home. Irregular fighters called the Vietcong were able to hide, regroup, and continue fighting for several more years. The conflict seemed interminable, and mounting public dissent gave U.S. leaders a strong reason to withdraw.

Protracted wars are extremely painful for guerrillas, who endure prolonged deprivation. Thus, they depend crucially on the relative balance of interests; if guerrillas have much more at stake, then they may expect to reach a favorable settlement. To conduct this kind of warfare over long stretches, guerrillas require fairly sophisticated organization to maintain supplies and strategic coherence. They also need good intelligence about enemy weak points, or else attacks may prove disastrous.

Not all guerrilla wars are protracted. Some guerrilla warfare theorists do not expect to fight for long stretches, especially if their opponents are disorganized or if they believe that broad revolutionary sentiment is bound to erupt once combat begins. The Cuban Revolution (1953–59), for example, succeeded largely because the Batista dictatorship was corrupt and inefficient. Indeed, estimates of the total fighting force of Cuban revolutionary Fidel Castro ranged between only a few hundred and a few thousand fighters.

ORIGINS OF GUERILLA WARFARE

The origins of guerrilla warfare are as varied as their modes of combat. Guerilla groups often rebel against foreign occupation. The French faced such violence in

Vietnam and Algeria during the dying days of its empire. Guerrilla groups also wage war against corrupt domestic regimes, as in Cuba.

Sometimes secessionist movements wage guerrilla warfare. The American Revolution, for example, relied heavily on guerrilla strategies. After the northern theater fell into a stalemate, the British turned their attention to conquering the southern colonies. Despite British advantages in numbers and experience, American partisans continually harassed British forces while recruiting volunteers. These tactics broke from the European tradition of conventional arms; even General Washington felt that partisan war was somewhat undignified. Despite his unease, colonial commanders such as Nathaniel Greene successfully coordinated guerrilla raids with conventional field maneuvers. Without the work of partisans, who harassed the British at weak points and made it difficult for them to resupply, the conventional effort probably would have failed.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The effective use of guerrilla tactics by colonial revolutionaries was an important reason for their victory over the British and their resulting independence. Since then, the United States has usually found itself on the other side of guerrilla insurgencies. The war in the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century, and the later war in Vietnam, are two prominent examples. Because of the vast American experience with guerilla warfare, modern analysts have devoted a great deal of time to the problem of counterinsurgency.

Current U.S. foreign policy stresses the need to expand the sphere of democracies worldwide, by force if necessary. Aggressive efforts to spread democracy mean that U.S. troops abroad are likely to encounter considerable antioccupation sentiment. Also, given the superiority of U.S. conventional forces, committed opponents are likely to adopt guerrilla tactics. Currently, U.S. forces face a nascent guerrilla war in Iraq, where insurgents are trying to rally broad support for an unconventional war.

See also Tactics, Military

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GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION (AUGUST 7, 1964)

U.S. congressional joint resolution (HJ RES 1145) made on August 7, 1964, that authorized President Lyndon B. Johnson to begin the American escalation of the Vietnam War. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was a reaction to two attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the USS destroyers *Maddox* and *C. Turner Joy* in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and August 4, 1964.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorized the president, as commander in chief, to take "all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." It stated that the United States was prepared to "take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was approved overwhelmingly by both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate.

THE GULF OF TONKIN ATTACKS

The incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin that led to the resolution involved two different U.S. operations. Since July 31, 1964, the American destroyer USS *Maddox* had been in a DeSOTO patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin, the northwest arm of the South China Sea between Vietnam and China. DeSOTO patrols were reconnaissance missions carried out by specially equipped U.S. ships in international waters outside communist countries such as China, the Soviet Union, North Korea, and North Vietnam. In the case of the *Maddox*, the patrol aimed to intercept radio and radar signals emanating from North Vietnamese coastal defense stations.

Around 3:40 p.m. on August 2, 1964, three North Vietnamese high-speed boats fired torpedoes and

machine guns at the *Maddox*. The North Vietnamese believed, incorrectly, that the destroyer had supported South Vietnamese raids on the nearby islands of Hon Me and Hon Ngu the night before. Responding to the attack, and joined by aircraft from the aircraft carrier USS *Ticonderoga*, the *Maddox* destroyed one of the attacking North Vietnamese boats and damaged the other two. The *Maddox*, only hit by one heavy machine gun shell, retired to South Vietnamese waters, where she was joined by another destroyer, the USS *C. Turner Joy*. This was considered the first attack.

On August 4, the *Maddox* and *C. Turner Joy* began a new DeSOTO patrol along the North Vietnamese coast. At 7:40 a.m., the latter ship reported an imminent attack by unidentified vessels. For roughly two hours, the ships fired on radar targets. The *Ticonderoga* launched fighter aircraft to assist the *Maddox* and the *C. Turner Joy*. This was the second attack.

The exact details regarding the two incidents are still controversial. Although evidence suggested that the first attack did happen, it is unclear whether the second actually occurred. On August 2, the USS *Maddox* was fired on, and the crew retrieved a North Vietnamese shell fragment from the deck, which was sent to the U.S. secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, and verified. However, McNamara claimed in the second edition of his memoir, published in 1996, that the second event did not occur. Instead, he claimed that he had learned of the attack during a 1995 meeting with retired Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giap, who denied that the North Vietnamese had attacked the U.S. destroyers on August 4. In 2001, it was revealed that President Johnson, in a taped conversation with McNamara several weeks after passage of the resolution, also expressed doubt that the attack had ever occurred.

Squadron Commander James Stockdale, one of the U.S. pilots flying overhead on August 4, later declared that he "had the best seat in the house to watch that event, and our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets. There was nothing there but black water and American fire power." Visibility in the area at the time of the alleged attack was very limited, and the sonar men may have misread the signals because of malfunctioning as a result of heavy seas. In fact, Capitan John J. Herrick, the commander aboard the *Maddox*, quickly began to doubt that an attack had occurred. A few hours after the attack, he sent a message to Honolulu and Washington, DC, saying that a

review of action made "many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful."

WASHINGTON REACTION

Believing that the first attack possibly had been an initiative of a local commander rather than a senior official, the Johnson administration decided not to retaliate. Instead, the president sent a message of warning to the North Vietnamese, advising them that unprovoked attacks would not be tolerated.

After the second alleged attack, however, the National Security Council gave approval for an air strike. On August 5, the air strike was launched from the USS *Ticonderoga* and the USS *Constellation*, targeting primarily a North Vietnamese oil storage facility in the town of Vinh. The president announced the action on television and sent a message to Congress asking for a resolution expressing the determination of the United States to support freedom and protect peace in Southeast Asia.

On August 6 and 7, the Congress debated the resolution. On August 6, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara went before a joint executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees to testify about the incidents. He denied that the U.S. Navy was supporting South Vietnamese military operations. Despite the fact that doubts were mounting in the White House about the second attack, he also claimed that there was unequivocal proof of an unprovoked second attack against the USS *Maddox*.

As a result of McNamara's testimony, on the afternoon of August 7, the House and Senate passed the joint resolution known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. It authorized all necessary measures to repel attacks against U.S. forces and all steps necessary for the defense of U.S. allies in Southeast Asia.

The resolution granted vast power to the president, but Congress believed that it would be consulted if the war escalated, particularly if ground troops were to be used in South Vietnam. However, both Presidents Johnson and Richard Nixon used the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as a justification for escalated involvement in Vietnam. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was repealed on January 2, 1971, and replaced by the War Powers Act of 1973, which is still in place today.

See also Johnson, Lyndon B., and National Policy; McNamara, Robert; Nixon, Richard, and National Policy; Vietnam War; War Powers Act

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GULF WAR (1990–1991)

The 1990–91 conflict between Iraq and an American-led international coalition organized under UN auspices, which ostensibly settled the issue of the Iraqi seizure of Kuwait on August 2, 1991. The Gulf War inaugurated the permanent introduction of U.S. ground and air forces in a region frequented only by naval forces. Thus, U.S. foreign policy became more entangled with the relations and problems of Islamic states than ever before.

BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS

Known in the region as the Second Gulf War, the 1991 Gulf War originated from the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–88 (the First Gulf War). Both conflicts began with a surprise attack by Iraqi forces ordered by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.

In the aftermath of the fall of the shah of Iran in 1979, the time looked perfect in the eyes of Saddam Hussein for a quick, crippling strike against Iran. Hussein no doubt thought that such a strike would settle various border issues and quell any incipient revolt among Iraq's large Shia Muslim population, which might rally to the new Iranian fundamentalist faction.

The Iran-Iraq War went badly and consumed much blood and resources on both sides, each of which resorted to chemical weapons to avert military collapse. In July 1988, Iran agreed to a UN-sponsored truce, and both sides ceased hostilities. Less than two years later, however, Iraq seized Kuwait, partly out of a need to recover financially from the ravages of the First Gulf War.

Kuwait had loaned Hussein's government $14 billion during Iraq's conflict with Iran, and the country was loathe to forgive any of the loan, as Hussein had requested. Encouraged by quarrels with Kuwait over borders and drilling into the Rumelia oil fields, Hussein determined to settle the issue by outright conquest.

Following the Iraqi seizure of Kuwait, U.S. President George H. W. Bush ordered the U.S. Central Command to reinforce and defend Saudi Arabia and the lower Persian Gulf states, in concert with a growing coalition of nations determined to resist and ultimately expel the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In doing so, President Bush responded to the urging of British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, who had taken a similar tough stance against the Argentine seizure of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in 1982.

Thanks to international support from the United Nations and material and military contributions to the coalition effort, the United States led a defensive effort to safeguard the remaining Arab states of the Persian Gulf region from Iraq. The United States, despite an announced defense cutback at the end of the Cold War, benefited immensely from major military infrastructure in the region, particularly in Saudi Arabia, that had been built to defend the area against Soviet invasion.

Air and naval bases, storage facilities, barracks, and operations centers had all been built by Persian Gulf states and U.S. contractors. The U.S. Central Command had been formed in the aftermath of the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and had received most of the planned reinforcements, equipment, and exercises in the American defense establishment since then. Thus, deployment plans made for defending the Persian Gulf against the Soviet Union sufficed, with minimal changes, to set massive forces and support in movement for the Gulf.

INITIAL MOVES

On August 8, 1990, U.S. aircraft reached Saudi Arabia, followed by U.S. Army Airborne and Marine Corps ground units backed up by naval aviation from offshore aircraft carriers and supporting land bases. Within a month, enough forces had been established in Saudi Arabia to block any Iraqi moves against that country. The U.S. forces dubbed the defensive buildup Operation Desert Shield, an operation aimed at limiting Iraqi aggression into the Kuwaiti territory already seized and protecting Saudi Arabia.

From Riyadh, the Saudi capital, the commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Army General Norman H. Schwartzkopf, and the largely titular Arab coalition commander, Saudi Prince Khalid, began planning offensive moves to expel the Iraqis from Kuwait. They were supported by parallel diplomatic deliberations in the United Nations. On October 31, 1990, President Bush authorized doubling the U.S. forces in preparation for an offensive.

The U.S. diplomatic efforts ran into complex problems on several levels, however. Arab states sending forces to the coalition would fight only under Arab commanders, and some, such as Syria, disliked the change in mission from the defense of Saudi territory to an assault on Iraqi forces. The Iraqi threat that it would respond against Israel if attacked by the coalition introduced further problems to the Arab–Western coalition. Moreover, the Russians, longtime military patrons and suppliers to Iraqi forces, saw their considerable investments at stake and urged a diplomatic solution, even offering to help broker a last-minute settlement short of war.

The Iraqis had little hope of resisting the coalition of U.S., British, French, Saudi, Egyptian, and Gulf state contingents on the ground, let alone the overwhelming air and naval armadas that included even more national contingents. However, Israel warned that it would not ignore Iraqi attacks, and Iraq hoped to unhinge the Arab–Western alliance by bringing Israel into any outbreak of fighting. The United States could not ignore the possible breakdown of Arab support by seeming to take the side of Israel against Iraq, so American diplomatic and military assurances pressed the Israelis to resist the impulse to strike back at Iraqi attacks. The U.S. forces were deployed to set up defensive missile batteries for the Israelis while other forces were sent to the western Iraqi desert, where Iraq could launch bombardment missiles against Israel.

The U.S. deployment to the Persian Gulf region exceeded any similar undertaking since World War II. More than 500,000 troops, including a major mobilization of national guardsmen and reservists, were deployed to the Gulf region during a six-month period, and other major deployments from the United States replaced units detailed to the region. Not only were multiple divisions of U.S. ground forces sent to Saudi Arabia, but also bases in all of the Gulf states, from Bahrain to Oman, received U.S. naval and air forces and the growing logistic structure necessary to support them.

The U.S. logistics support units struggled with long supply lines and harsh desert conditions to maintain the forces already present and arriving, as well as to amass and store the 60 days of supplies required by the commanders. In the end, an entire logistics support base system for the ground combat force was excavated in the Saudi desert a short distance from the Kuwaiti border, almost under the noses of the Iraqis. Aviation units worked hard to provide their aerial sorties under stiff maintenance and operating considerations,

knowing that they would likely open the combat phase of the campaign long before any troops trod on Kuwaiti soil.

LIBERATING KUWAIT

After Iraq resisted UN and U.S. calls to abandon Kuwait, the United Nations authorized the use of all means necessary on November 29, 1990. A little over a month later, on January 9, 1991, the U.S. Congress authorized the president to use force against Iraq. The offensive operation, dubbed Operation Desert Storm, began with an air campaign on January 17 that struck strategic and tactical targets in Kuwait and Iraq on a continuous basis through the beginning of the ground phase of the war.

On February 24, 1991, the First and Second Marine Divisions attacked in Kuwait, opening the coalition ground offensive by forcing their way through the Iraqi barriers and brushing aside the frontline resistance. Aided by corps made up of Arab contingents fighting on each flank, the attacking forces destroyed or captured whole brigades of Iraqi troops and swept through the burning oilfields toward the capital of Kuwait City. Artillery barrages and repeated strikes by coalition fighter bombers and attack helicopters supported the advance of the troops, halting only at night to prevent accidental combat among the allied and Marine Corps units.

Within the next 24 hours, a vast field army of mechanized, armored, and air assault divisions of the U.S., British, and French armies rolled across the Saudi Arabia–Iraq border. Brushing aside weak defenses, this army wheeled north and east to outmaneuver and destroy the main fighting forces of the Iraqi army and move along the Euphrates River, completing a massive encirclement of Kuwait and southern Iraq. This force maneuvered by day and night through sandstorms and other problems despite the challenge of distinguishing friend from foe. A few Iraqi counterattacks were beaten off with hardly any casualties. After 100 hours of combat, the coalition forces dominated Kuwait, and the Arab coalition forces cleared its capital of remaining Iraqis.

The enemy in this war either did not fight or lacked the skills necessary to inflict damage when they did. The Iraqi air force scattered, making only a few efforts to engage, with most aircraft voluntarily interned in Iran. Meanwhile, the small Iraqi naval forces withered under overwhelming air attacks. The elite Iraqi

Republican Guard ground corps, held in reserve from the immediate battle area, suffered catastrophic losses fighting the U.S. Army-led encirclement, and the slight Iraqi resistance in Kuwait melted away within the first 48 hours of the ground offensive.

The predicted Iraqi missile strikes against Israel came soon after the air campaign began; the first Iraqi ballistic missiles were launched on January 18, 1991. The U.S. antiaircraft missile batteries seemed to counter most incoming missiles, but later analysis demonstrated that many Iraqi missiles broke up while in flight. In any case, the missiles contained no chemical warheads (as was feared), and the much-feared Iraqi arsenal of chemical weapons played no part in this war. Moreover, coalition air and Special Forces strikes against Iraqi launch sites made unnecessary any Israeli participation that might have threatened the political cohesion of the coalition.

THE WAR ENDS

As the nature of the Iraqi collapse became apparent, President Bush accepted the advice of his staff to cease fire and halt what was emerging as a slaughter of ineffective Iraqi forces. On March 3, a hurriedly assembled armistice meeting on the Kuwaiti frontier allowed two Iraqi generals meeting with Prince Khalid and General Schwarzkopf to pledge Iraqi adherence to the various UN demands, as well as to arrange for prisoner exchanges and other military requirements.

As a result of the Gulf War of 1990–91, Kuwait was restored to its emir and Iraqi military power was crippled. The UN inspection teams certified the destruction of prohibited munitions and weapons, and allied (later Anglo-American) air patrols were established over the northern and southern sectors of Iraq. The no-fly zones established by these patrols were meant to deny the Iraqis the use of airspace from which they could threaten their minority populations and neighboring countries.

Although most coalition forces withdrew from the region in the aftermath of the war, some U.S. forces remained in several key bases, exerting diplomatic and military leverage whenever required. A permanent U.S. naval fleet established its headquarters in Bahrain, and air force units occupied Kuwaiti, Saudi, and Qatari bases. The U.S. Army, meanwhile, stationed air defense units in Saudi Arabia, trained rotating combat battalions and brigades in Kuwait, and established prepositioned equipment in Kuwait and Qatar. An American presence of no small importance thus remained in the Gulf region after the war.

During the ensuing decade, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and his government, anxious to assert independence and prestige despite UN sanctions and quarantines, made a number of threatening military moves and toyed endlessly with UN inspection teams. The purpose was, in part, to maintain an illusion of strength (which was later revealed to be a sham during the Iraq War of 2003).

Assessing its military performance after the Gulf War, the United States concluded that forces and equipment had performed well. However, the mobilization of personnel, strategic sealift and airlift, and elements of command, control, and doctrine—particularly for joint forces—needed improvement. Although the expenses of the 1990–91 Gulf War were touted as "covered" by $75 billion in contributions offered by coalition partners, the reality proved far from it. Only about $49 billion actually went to the United States, some of it in the form of goods and services. None of the contributions covered the immense material wear placed on U.S. and coalition hardware.

To some extent, phasing out older equipment as part of announced force reductions dissipated the need for overhauls. However, remaining aircraft and ground vehicles, in particular, had added 10–20 equivalent years of peacetime use, with no major overhaul yet scheduled or funded. Congress responded in the mid-1990s with generous funding that restored operational readiness to the military by the end of the decade. For many observers, however, the apparent utility of military forces that could deploy quickly, achieve a striking and cheap operational success, and return to U.S. bases left a powerful impression. War perhaps could be fought economically by the United States to advance national aims.

—Kenneth W. Estes

See also Biological Weapons and Warfare; Bush, George H. W., and National Policy; Economic Sanctions; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Multilateralism; Operation Desert Storm; Rogue State; Saddam Hussein

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PUBLIC PORTRAITS

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf

The commander in chief of the U.S. forces engaged in the Gulf War was born August 22, 1934, in Trenton, New Jersey, the son of a West Point graduate, Amy reservist, and state police official who was called to active duty in World War II. The younger Schwarzkopf lived briefly in Iran in 1946 while his father was assigned there. Graduating from West Point in 1956, Norman Schwarzkopf served with success as a career infantry officer, seeing combat duty in the Vietnam War as an adviser to South Vietnamese airborne units and later as a battalion commander. As commanding general of the 24th Infantry Division, he was made senior Army commander for the task force carrying out the intervention into Granada in 1983. He then commanded the I Corps and served as U.S. Army operations chief as a lieutenant general before being assigned to command the U.S. Central Command in the grade of general, in 1988. After the conclusion of the Gulf War, he retired, wrote his memoirs, and has remained out of public limelight. He has been considered an icon of dedicated service to the Army and the nation, but his nickname of "stormin' Norman" apparently related more to his temper than his tactical prowess.

SECRETS REVEALED

Gulf War Illness

Hundreds of thousands of veterans of the Gulf War suffer from mysterious illnesses that they believe are linked to their experiences in the war. Their symptoms include chronic fatigue, loss of muscle control, diarrhea, migraine headaches, dizziness, memory problems, and loss of balance. The syndrome is referred to as Gulf War Syndrome.

A recent study by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs determined that the Gulf War illnesses are linked to exposure to nerve agents, such as the nerve gas sarin, as well as to certain pesticides. According to the committee that reviewed the evidence, the studies conducted since the war have consistently indicated that psychiatric illness, combat experience, or other deployment-related stressors do not explain Gulf War veterans' illnesses in the large majority of ill veterans. Some observers have also suggested that depleted uranium weapons used in the war may be the cause of many unexplained cases of cancer among Gulf War veterans.

H

HAGUE CONVENTION (1907)

The second and more influential of the Hague Conventions, which marked the last heyday of The Hague as the diplomatic center of the world before World War I. The Hague Convention, held in The Hague, Netherlands, and the resulting convention, or protocol, reflected increasing fear over the pace of the arms race and technological improvements to weaponry.

Russian leader Czar Nicholas II had called for a peace conference in 1899, prompted by his reading of *The Future of War*. The book, written by the czar's chief adviser, Jan Bloch, foretold the collapse of the great powers under the technical, economic, and social demands of modern warfare. Although the Hague Convention failed to outlaw war or achieve disarmament, it did result in the First Hague Convention (1899), an agreement that delineated conditions of belligerence and rules for war at sea and banned the use of poison gas, expanding bullets, and weapons from balloons.

The Second Hague Convention, held from June 15 to August 8, 1907, was proposed by U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt and opened by Czar Nicholas II. Although it failed equally as a peace and disarmament conference, it gained acceptance for important conventions and agreements.

Among several important protocols of the 1907 convention were those prescribing the rights and obligations of neutral parties, the law of war on land, the use of naval mines, the status of merchant shipping of belligerents, shore bombardment by naval forces, and the use of international prize courts. Furthermore, the use of compulsory arbitration in international disputes was approved in principle, and the foundation was laid for continuing peace conferences at eight-year intervals. The 1899 protocol on the use of balloons to deploy weapons was reaffirmed, but not the strictures on gas warfare and expanding bullets. These protocols became controversial and the subject of wartime law violations and countercharges during World War I.

World War I ended the Hague Conventions. The city of Geneva, Switzerland, succeeded The Hague as the world diplomatic capital, especially after the creation of the League of Nations in January 1920. Several Geneva conventions and protocols amended the 1907 Second Hague Convention with respect to chemical warfare. The 1925 Geneva Protocol added prohibitions on chemical and biological warfare, with further conventions added in 1972 (biological) and 1993 (chemical).

Perhaps the most important impact of the Second Hague Convention was that it set the course toward international cooperation on collective security and the extensive application of international law to warfare. Although disarmament efforts failed at both Hague Conventions, they certainly presaged later efforts—from the Washington Naval Conference of 1922 to contemporary accords—on all kinds of conventional and strategic weaponry.

Succeeding conferences and agreements in the tradition of the Hague Convention have added numerous useful provisions prohibiting certain methods of warfare and introducing issues related to civil wars. Nearly all countries of the world are signatory nations, in that they have ratified these conventions.

See also Arms Control; Biological Weapons Convention; Chemical Weapons Convention; Disarmament; Geneva Conventions; International Law; League of Nations

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HALLIBURTON CORPORATION

Global corporation based in the United States that provides products and services to oil and gas industries. Created in 1919 as the New Method Oil Well Cementing Company by Erle P. Halliburton, the corporation has grown through internal development and mergers to become one of the world's largest providers of energy services. It is known principally for its vertically integrated oil and gas production. The company is involved in the production of these resources from research and development through operations to infrastructure.

As it has grown, Halliburton has diversified—the corporate giant is actually composed of two operating segment subsidiaries. The first, Halliburton Energy Services Group, includes Halliburton Energy Services, Landmark Graphics Corporation, Wellstream, and several joint venture companies. The second is an engineering and construction segment, Kellogg, Brown, and Root, which builds plants and oil pipelines. These subsidiaries are involved in infrastructure projects, logistics support, and research and development. Working in more than 120 countries, Halliburton has become a world force.

Halliburton has also been intensely involved in American technology throughout its history. It has a long-term commitment to innovation and technological leadership. The company and its subsidiaries have supported the space program with architectural engineering assistance. Halliburton engineers created a carbon dioxide removal system that assisted in the rescue of the Apollo 13 astronauts after that spacecraft malfunctioned. The company has created a number of industry-first technologies, processes, and products. It also has a long history of providing military support during World War II, Operation Desert Storm, and in peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslav republics.

Recently, Halliburton has been intensely involved in the reconstruction effort in Iraq after the U.S. invasion of that country in 2003. Granted more than $6 billion in government contracts, Halliburton has provided diverse services: rebuilding Iraq's oil business and infrastructure; assessing oil facilities; cleaning up environmental dangers; working on engineering projects, including infrastructure; putting out oil well fires; and providing meals, laundry, mail, Internet service, and housing for the U.S. troops stationed in Iraq. The company has also faced problems there, including the kidnapping of some of its personnel by Iraqi insurgents.

Halliburton Corporation has been the subject of scrutiny in the last several years. A continuing SEC investigation found that an unannounced change in accounting practices in 1998 affected the company's reported income, and there have been allegations of impropriety as well. Much of the recent controversy, however, stems from the company's part in the reconstruction of Iraq. The company has been accused of gaining preference for no-bid contracts through its political ties with U.S. vice president Dick Cheney (who formerly was chief executive officer of Halliburton), overcharging the government for its work in Iraq, and war profiteering.

See also Iraq War of 2003

HAMAS

Radical Islamic organization dedicated to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of a fundamentalist Palestinian state from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River. In addition to its armed struggle against Israel, Hamas is engaged in a wide range of charitable and sociocultural activities in the Gaza Strip and, to a lesser extent, the West Bank. The group's ideological hold on thousands of Palestinians, particularly disgruntled youth, guarantees its status as the single most powerful alternative to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

The name *Hamas* means "zeal" in Arabic and is an acronym for the Harakat al-Mqawama al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement). The organization was founded in Palestine in December 1987 by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin as the Palestinian branch of a pan-Islamic movement called the Muslim Brotherhood. A few months after its founding, following a popular revolt against Israel (called the *intifada*), Hamas published its Islamic Covenant, which presented the organization's ideology and goals in detail.

Filled with quotes from the Koran, the Islamic Covenant established a holy war, or *jihad*, for the liberation of all of Palestine as the religious duty of every Muslim. Hamas explicitly opposes all attempts to solve the Palestinian conflict through diplomatic compromise, denouncing all peace initiatives as a waste of time and an exercise in futility.

ORGANIZATION

Hamas is a complex movement that is made up of a number of loosely connected elements with extremely different activities and priorities. Run by an internally elected committee, the group is invested in practically every aspect of Palestinian life. Inside the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, it is particularly well-known for the establishment of a wide network of mosques, clinics, hospitals, and schools. Outside these territories, and particularly in the Western world, the movement is associated primarily with its militant branch, the Izz el-Din al-Qassam Brigades. This militant branch of Hamas has conducted numerous deadly attacks against all things associated with Israel, including military and civilian targets.

The number of Hamas members is unknown, but its supporters and sympathizers are thought to run in the tens of thousands. The 2004 killings of Hamas cofounders Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and Dr. Abdel Aziz Rantisi by Israeli helicopter rockets brought tens of thousands of Hamas supporters into the streets of Gaza in protest. In recent years, Hamas has seen an upsurge of popularity in the Palestinian-held territories as a result of their uncompromising stance on the Palestinian conflict with Israel.

The U.S. government estimates that Hamas has an annual budget of at least $50 million. Because of its support for social programs in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Hamas has received large amounts of money from a great variety of Islamic and Arab organizations, as well as from rich individuals. One of the basic tenets of Islam calls for every believer to give a portion of his or her income to charity, and Hamas benefits extensively from such donations coming from all over the world. Its main sources of funds, however, are Palestinian expatriates from Western Europe and North America and private benefactors from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. The government of Iran has also been said to be a major contributor to Hamas.

This constant flow of money is credited with Hamas's ability to maintain a high degree of political and social involvement in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, similar to that of the Palestinian Authority. Hamas refuses to participate in any political elections that underline the two-state solution agreed to by Israel and the PLO in 1993. It does, however, field candidates in administrative local elections (such as chambers of commerce and university boards), and the group enjoys strong political support from the Palestinian population.

TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Hamas was originally registered with the Israeli authorities as a nonprofit religious organization, but soon after its founding, it was banned because of its violent attacks against Jewish objectives. Immediately after the organization's inception, its militant branches began to engage in vicious intimidation of such "moral offenders" as drug traffickers, pornography peddlers, and religious heretics.

The establishment of the Izz el-Din al-Qassam Brigades in 1991 brought about a spate of kidnapping and killing of Israeli soldiers, attacks with mortars and firearms against military targets and civilian Jewish settlements, and, beginning in April 1994, suicide bombings that indiscriminately killed soldiers and civilians. Hamas has admitted to killing Palestinians whom it suspects of collaborating with the Israeli authorities, particularly with the Israeli intelligence services.

The Israeli government has blamed Hamas for more than 400 attacks killing 377 Israelis between 2000 and 2004. The U.S. government has labeled Hamas a Specially Designated Terrorist Organization because of its involvement in acts of violence that have disrupted the Middle East peace process and constitute a threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. In contrast, the European Union distinguishes the charitable and militant wings of Hamas, limiting its terrorist designation to the Izz el-Din al-Qassam Brigades rather than applying it to Hamas as a whole.

Hamas defends itself against accusations of terrorism by arguing that Israel is an occupying force and, as such, all Israelis, whether they are soldiers or civilians, are legitimate targets. Although a number of its attacks in Israeli-held territories have killed American citizens, Hamas has repeatedly given assurances that it does not target American interests. However, the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, along with the radicalization of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict since 2000, have attracted fierce Hamas condemnations of the United States, prompting fears that the organization may consider amending its enemy list to include Americans and the United States.

Hamas rejects the term "suicide bomber" for bomb-wielding Palestinians because the religion of Islam explicitly forbids a man to willingly "cast [himself] into destruction." The organization interprets the word "destruction" to mean "giving up the holy war,"

and it presents the bombings as the work of martyrs who are conducting what Hamas considers the only possible kind of warfare against a highly organized and trained Israeli army.

The Izz el-Din al-Qassam Brigades are made up of numerous highly secretive cells, which operate under the control of four or five autonomous geographic leaderships. The typical Brigade member is a young religious man, often a college student. Violent demonstrations against Israeli authorities yield a constant flow of potential martyrs, who are then heavily indoctrinated, provided with explosives and other logistical help, and eventually sent into the Israeli-controlled territories to attack specific targets. The families of the militants who are killed or arrested enjoy the full support of Hamas's charitable institutions.

Because of its impressive financial resources and its ability to present itself as the only viable alternative to a secular, corrupt Palestinian Authority, Hamas enjoys a solid base of support among Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Because of this support, it is probable that Hamas will continue to cause problems for the Israeli authorities and the pursuit of a peaceful solution in the Middle East.

See also Arab-Israeli Conflict; Intifada; Islamic Fundamentalism; PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization); Suicide Bombing

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HARM MISSILE

Supersonic air-to-surface tactical missile designed to seek and destroy radar-equipped air defense systems.

The HARM missile system can detect, attack, and destroy an enemy target virtually automatically. The missile hones in on enemy radar after detecting signals emitted from a ground-based threat. The missile can identify a single target from several ground-based emitters.

Propelled by a smokeless, dual-thrust rocket motor, HARMs can be deployed by F/A 18 and EA-GB navy and marine aircraft or the air force's F-16C. The AGM-88 HARM, which made many improvements over previous models, was first deployed in 1985. The missiles proved effective against Libyan targets in the Gulf of Sidra (1986) and during Operation Desert Storm (1991) and Operation Enduring Freedom (2003) in Iraq.

Manufactured by Raytheon, the 800-pound HARM is less than 14 feet long and only 10 inches in diameter. The missile has a range of more than 30 miles and can travel more than 760 mph. The U.S. forces have an inventory of about 20,000 HARM missiles, which have a unit cost of $284,000.

See also Missiles

HART-RUDMAN COMMISSION

Congressional commission established in 1998 to examine how to ensure U.S. national security in the first quarter of the 21st century. Officially titled the U.S. Commission on National Security/Twenty-First Century, it is better known as the Hart-Rudman Commission after its cochairs, Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman.

The commission recognized that both the domestic and international security environments had changed since the end of the Cold War. It attempted to identify emerging security threats, assess America's ability to respond to the changed environment, and make recommendations about the nation's responses to the new security environment. The commission made 12 primary assumptions that it believed would remain true throughout the 25-year scope of the study. The commission assumed that the United States would remain a dominant presence in the international community, that world energy consumption would continue to rely on fossil fuels, and that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction would continue.

Operating from these assumptions, the commission reached a number of conclusions. It determined, for example, that the United States would become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack within its own borders and that the U.S. military superiority

would not entirely protect Americans citizens. The commission also concluded that rapid advances in information and biotechnologies would create new vulnerabilities for U.S. security and that new technologies would divide the world as well as draw it together.

Another conclusion of the commission was that the national security of all nations would be increasingly affected by the vulnerabilities of the evolving global economic infrastructure. Part of that conclusion was based on the assumption that energy will continue to have major strategic significance. The commission also found that all international borders will become more porous, and the sovereignty of states will come under pressure but will endure.

Still another conclusion of the commission was that some nations will continue to fragment and even fail, creating destabilizing effects on neighboring states. The resulting foreign crises will be replete with atrocities and the deliberate terrorizing of civilian populations.

The commission also foresaw that U.S. intelligence would face more challenging adversaries in the future and that even excellent intelligence would not prevent all surprises. Moreover, the commission predicted that the United States would be called on to intervene militarily in a time of uncertain alliances and with the prospect of fewer forward-deployed forces. The commission concluded its finding by stating that the emerging security environment in the next quarter-century would require different military and other national capabilities.

The Hart-Rudman Commission issued its final report in February 2001. Only seven months later, many of the commission's conclusions were realized in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

See also Globalization and National Security; Homeland Security; New World Order; September 11/WTC and Pentagon Attacks

HAWK/DOVE

Names given to supporters and opponents, respectively, of the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War was not universally popular in the United States. As the administrations of Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and

Richard Nixon expanded the American military role, the American people divided over the appropriateness of the war. Those who supported it were called hawks; those who opposed it were called doves.

Hawks defined the conflict in Vietnam as a Chinese effort to extend control over Southeast Asia, thereby threatening both U.S. and world security. Doves argued that the war was an internal Vietnamese matter in which the United States should not interfere. The dispute between the doves and the hawks over the war divided the country during the 1960s. Hawks, who supported a strong military effort, saw their point of view win out in the early years of the war.

The hawks included many Southern Democrats and a majority of Republicans. They agreed that the effort to stop communism from spreading in Southeast Asia meant that the United States must provide assistance—including military assistance—to noncommunist governments, such as South Vietnam. The hawks wanted the U.S. Air Force unleashed to target economic and military targets in North Vietnam. They felt that the U.S. Army should intercept North Vietnamese supply movements and that the United States should train and equip the army of the Republic of Vietnam. However, the hawks had no adequate answer to the question of what the United States should do if the South Vietnamese proved unwilling or unable to defend themselves.

Even in the beginning, the doves questioned the war. Many regarded North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh as a nationalist rather than a Chinese or Soviet puppet. They felt that the Vietnamese people should be free to choose the form of government they wished, regardless of what form it took. The doves also had major doubts about the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese president, Ngo Dinh Diem. Although Ho Chi Minh seemed to have genuine support in North Vietnam, Diem came to power improperly and maintained his position through corruption, violence, and American aid.

The doves disagreed not only with the politics of the war, but also with the American strategy. The doves assumed that even a victory would come at too great a cost of lives and resources. Unlike the hawks, they did not believe that the war could be won, even if the United States devoted its entire military might to the effort. The doves wanted the bombing of North Vietnam to stop and a settlement to the war negotiated. Even the tendency of North Vietnam to use bombing lulls to increase its efforts in South Vietnam failed to

convince the doves that they should reconsider. The doves also tended to ignore the Soviet and Chinese role in supporting the North Vietnamese effort.

Some senators began to express support for dovish positions as early as 1964. The following year, the anti-war movement began, first with fairly low-key affairs such as college teach-ins. With the continued escalation of the bombing and violence in Vietnam, by 1968 the teach-ins gave way to mass demonstrations involving as many as 7 million students. As the war dragged on with no victory in sight, criticism grew, and the administrations of Johnson and then Nixon found themselves in the middle, attacked from both sides. By mid-1967, only about one-fourth of the people supported Johnson. Even the hawks were upset because they felt Johnson was restraining the Army and not letting it win the war.

The war turned many hawks into doves as they saw the lack of a will to win and increasing cost with no benefit. Johnson seemed demoralized in public, and the massive North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968, although a tactical failure, showed that U.S. efforts had not attained much. Not all hawks converted, though. After the war, a group of former hawks carried on the notion that the United States could use its military might to affect solutions to political problems overseas. This group eventually became known as the neoconservatives, or *neocons*.

With the election of President George W. Bush in 2000, the neocons moved into key positions in charge of U.S. national security. These included Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Their belief in the effectiveness of military action to force political change has driven the foreign policy of the United States under the Bush administration. The 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and veiled threats of force against Iran and Syria show that the hawk viewpoint is again playing a central role in U.S. national security policy.

See also Antiwar Movement; Bush, George W., and National Policy; Cheney, Richard; Johnson, Lyndon B., and National Policy; Neoconservatism; Nixon, Richard, and National Policy; Rumsfeld, Donald; Vietnam War

HEGEMONY

Domination of one state, region, class, or culture over others without the specific use of force. The concept of hegemony dates back to ancient times. Following the surrender of Athens to Sparta during the Peloponnesian War (431–405 BCE), Sparta came to dominate the region and emerged as the world's first hegemonic power. However, although Sparta exercised a considerable amount of political influence in both the domestic and international affairs of the conquered Greek city-states, it did not rule them in the same way that an imperial power administers its colonies. Instead of using force (coercive violence), Sparta ultimately achieved the compliance of lesser powers simply by establishing itself as the economic, political, military, and cultural leader of the region.

The history of the United States is marked by three distinct eras of hegemony—the immediate post–World War II period, the Cold War period, and the post–Cold War period. At the conclusion of World War II, the United States, as the world's dominant power, took the lead in organizing and constructing new sets of rules and institutions to govern the international market, coordinate relief and rebuilding efforts, and foster new diplomatic opportunities. By the early 1950s, U.S. hegemony (based on liberalism and capitalism) came into direct competition with a growing sense of Soviet hegemony (based on socialism and communism). For the next four decades, during the period known as the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union challenged one another for the position of supreme hegemon of the world. When Soviet hegemony began to crumble during the early 1990s, the United States once again became the world's only superpower.

Though no nation-state poses a genuine threat to U.S. hegemony at the current time, many feel that organized international terrorist groups possess the capabilities to significantly weaken American hegemony by disrupting its economy, threatening the security of its citizens, and identifying inherent hypocrisies in its foreign policies.

Critics of American attempts to exert leadership in the international arena insist that the United States is not so much a hegemon as it is an imperial power. From their perspective—the current war on terrorism notwithstanding—U.S. engagement abroad constitutes the unfolding of an aggressive, systematic plan for global domination at any cost and harkens back to the days of the imperial and colonial powers of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. Proponents of America's leadership style, on the other hand, insist that the American mission to make the world safe for democracy and free markets is virtuous and that these

political and economic ideals will usher in a new era of global peace and prosperity.

See also Colonialism; Imperialism

HELICOPTERS

Aircraft that use rotating blades to achieve lift and are characterized by vertical flight and the ability to hover, or remain stationary in the air. The first rudimentary helicopters saw action during World War II, but helicopter development accelerated greatly during the following decades. Today, helicopters are a critical component of U.S. military force and are used in a variety of roles, including ground attack, troop transport, and supply.

EARLY EVOLUTION

The first recorded examples of vertical flying machines are Chinese tops dating from the 400s BCE. They consisted of feathers mounted on the end of a stick, which, when twirled rapidly between the hands and released, took flight. The Italian Renaissance artist and inventor Leonardo da Vinci designed an "aerial screw" in 1483 that anticipated some of the principles of helicopter flight. However, he never built his machine.

For years, the main impediment to creating a workable helicopter was the lack of an engine powerful enough to lift an aircraft but light enough not to weigh the craft down. In the early 1900s, designers from many different countries attempted to build machines capable of vertical flight. Quite a few of these actually made short hops, but none was able to sustain flight for more than a minute or two. Russian designer Igor Sikorsky, considered the father of the modern helicopter, built several unsuccessful prototypes during this time. He stated that he had to await "better engines, lighter materials, and experienced mechanics."

In the 1920s and 1930s, Spaniard Juan de la Cierva designed the first working predecessor to the helicopter, a device called the *auto-gyro*. The early models were essentially airplanes with a rotating blade attached to enable near-vertical flight. Later models were closer in design and performance to a modern helicopter, but they still lacked the ability to hover.

THE FIRST MODERN HELICOPTERS

Work on the auto-gyro led to the development of more sophisticated vertical-flight aircraft during the mid- to late 1930s. In 1935, the French aviation pioneers Louis Breuget and Rene Dorand built a large craft that broke records for distance (44 km, or about 25 miles) and sustained flight (62 minutes) by a vertical lift machine. German aircraft designers also created workable helicopter models at this time, but both the French and German design programs were interrupted by the start of World War II.

Sikorsky, who had emigrated to the United States before the war, received a patent for a machine of his own in 1935, known to workers at his Connecticut factory as "Igor's Nightmare" because of its complexity. Despite the doubts of many of his own people, by 1941 Sikorsky had perfected a craft designated the R-4, which became the first helicopter to go into mass production. Two years later, Sikorsky introduced the improved R-5, several hundred of which saw service in World War II.

EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY

Helicopter technology and the use of helicopters by the military accelerated substantially after World War II. During the Korean War (1950–53), UN and U.S. forces used helicopters for reconnaissance, for evacuation of wounded soldiers from combat areas, and for small deliveries of supplies or troops. The mid-1950s saw the development of helicopters that were capable of carrying larger numbers of troops and supplies. The Sikorsky Company led the way in developing craft such as the Sky Crane, which was capable of lifting several tons of equipment, including vehicles such as trucks and artillery pieces.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Bell Company developed the first helicopters specifically designed for a ground-attack role. The UH-1 Huey and the AH-1W Super Cobra were widely used in Vietnam in a variety of roles. The Huey not only had 50 mm machine guns, a 20 mm cannon, and rockets for a ground-attack role, it was also capable of carrying a platoon of soldiers into combat.

The U.S. Army organized an attack helicopter unit from its First Cavalry Division, known as the Air Cavalry, which used Hueys to strike enemy positions and deliver troops to follow up the initial air assault. Hueys were also used extensively for medical evacuation

and supply drops. The Super Cobra served as a powerful weapons platform for attacking targets independently or in support of ground troops. Helicopters bore the brunt of much of the air warfare in Vietnam, and large flights of Hueys became one of the enduring images of the war.

By the 1960s, the helicopter had proven its value as a military weapon, but it had also revealed several limitations. Because of aerodynamic lift and propulsion limitations of the main rotor, conventional helicopters have a maximum flight speed of about 172 mph. The solution was a compound design that combines the vertical lift of a helicopter with the speed of a fixed-wing aircraft. That meant changing the basic configuration of the helicopter by adding small, fixed wings or additional propulsion systems.

One of the earliest compound helicopter prototypes was the McDonnell XV-1. In addition to a main rotor driven by a pressure jet, the XV-1 also had a wing and a pusher propeller. In 1954, it flew at speeds close to 200 mph. Other compound designs that flew successfully included the Sikorsky NH-3A, which achieved speeds of up to 230 mph, and a Bell UH-1 compound, which reached a speed of 275 mph in level flight. The idea of compound helicopters has recently been revived by some manufacturers, but no compound model helicopters are currently in production.

The helicopters that are now in widest use in the U.S. armed services are the Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk and the Boeing AH-64 Apache. The Black Hawk, in service since 1978, is designed as a troop carrier and logistical support aircraft, but it can be used for medical evacuation, command and control, search and rescue, armed escort, and electronic warfare missions. The Black Hawk can carry 16 laser-guided Hellfire antitank missiles and a total weapons payload of up to 10,000 pounds of missiles, rockets, cannons, and electronic countermeasures. The helicopter can also transport up to 11 fully equipped soldiers.

The Apache is an attack helicopter intended as a replacement for the Super Cobra. Like the Black Hawk, the Apache can carry up to 16 Hellfire missiles, as well as 76 aerial rockets for use against enemy personnel, lightly armored vehicles, and other soft-skinned targets. The Apache also boasts state-of-the art sensors that can identify targets in all types of weather during the day or night. Both the Black Hawk and the Apache played critical roles in ground attack, troop support, and supply during the Gulf War of 1991 and the Iraq War of 2003. The flexibility and firepower provided by modern military helicopters make them an indispensable part of the U.S. military arsenal.

See also Air Cavalry; Air Warfare; Antitank Missiles; Vietnam War

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HIROSHIMA

Japanese city destroyed by a U.S. atomic bomb on August 6, 1945. The bombing of Hiroshima and, three days later, Nagasaki, ushered in a new era of weaponry in which nuclear weapons had unprecedented destructive capacity. More than 140,000 people (out of a population of 350,000) died in Hiroshima immediately or within four months of the atomic bomb blast.

Founded in 1594 as a castle city in the southwestern part of the Japanese island of Honshu, Hiroshima became an important commercial and industrial center for manufacturing ships, vehicles, steel, rubber, furniture, and canned foods. The city grew in importance after the enlargement of its port, Ujina, in 1868 and the installation of rail connections to the cities of Kobe and Shimonoseki. Before and during World War II, Hiroshima was an important military center for the Japanese Empire.

Hoping to avoid an estimated million American casualties in an invasion of the Japanese homeland, President Harry S. Truman ordered one of the atomic bombs under development by the top-secret Manhattan Project dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. The massive blast from the bomb caused an estimated 80,000 deaths immediately. The bomb was exploded close to the center of the city and destroyed nearly 90% of its buildings.

Upon detonation of the bomb, an enormous fireball rose from Hiroshima. Temperatures on the ground exceeded 9,000°F. Powerful heat rays burned exposed human skin up to 2.2 miles from ground zero, the epicenter of the blast. Within about one mile of ground zero, people exposed to the blast received deep burns, not only to the skin, but also to their internal organs

and deep tissues. Almost all of these people died instantly or within the next few days.

A powerful shock wave was generated by the blast at the epicenter, generating winds of 1,000 mph. Thousands of people were killed as the winds hurled them through the air or as they were crushed by flying debris. The blast shattered thousands of windows, filling the air with glass projectiles that deeply penetrated victims' bodies. As recently as 1986, doctors reported removing glass from Hiroshima survivors who complained of mysterious pains.

Nearly all wooden buildings and most concrete structures within about 1.3 miles of the center of the blast collapsed. The intense heat emitted by the explosion caused wooden homes and anything combustible in the streets to burst into flames. Fires continued to burn for days after the blast. The extreme heat melted glass and metal.

The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima released a tremendous amount of radiation. Half the people who were out in the open and within about a half-mile of the blast died of radiation poisoning immediately. The effects of acute radiation exposure extended for four months after the bombing. These effects appeared in survivors and included the destruction of cells and organs, disorders in internal organs, diminished immune system capacity, and loss of hair.

About a half hour after the blast, a heavy black rain began to fall in areas northwest of ground zero. The rain contained large amounts of radioactive soot and dust, contaminating areas for tens of miles. Fish died in ponds and rivers. Birds fell dead from the sky. People who drank well water suffered from diarrhea for three months.

The radiation released by the blast remained on the ground for an extended period, perhaps years. Many who survived the blast, firestorms, and radioactive rain were sickened by radiation. Radiation disorders have continued to plague survivors for decades. For example, the incidence of leukemia among bomb survivors was found to be in direct relation to the amount of radiation in the blast. Beginning in 1960, doctors also began noting increases in thyroid, breast, lung, and salivary gland cancers. Researchers have reported a direct link between exposure to the atomic bomb and malignancy rates.

The bomb had serious impact on fetuses. Many were stillborn, and exposed fetuses born alive had much higher mortality rates than other children. In-utero survivors suffered an increased incidence of microcephaly, a syndrome characterized by a small skull and frequently accompanied by mental retardation.

The city of Hiroshima has been rebuilt, though a section destroyed by the bomb has been preserved as a "Peace City" to illustrate the effects of the atomic bomb. The city erected a monument to those who lost their lives as a result of the bombing, called the Atomic Bomb Memorial Dome. Since 1955, an annual world conference against nuclear weapons has been held in Hiroshima. Today, the city is once again an important industrial area.

See also Atomic Bomb; Manhattan Project; World War II

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HISS, ALGER (1904–1996)

U.S. lawyer and government official accused of espionage for the Soviet Union in the late 1940s and sentenced to five years imprisonment for perjury. Born on November 11, 1904, in Baltimore, Maryland, Alger Hiss attended Johns Hopkins University and graduated from Harvard Law School in 1929. Before joining the Boston law firm Choate, Hall & Stewart in 1931, Hiss served for a year as private secretary to Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. In 1933, he entered government service, working as an attorney for the New Deal.

Hiss later joined the U.S. State Department, where he served as special assistant to Assistant Secretary Francis Sayre on trade agreements. In 1941, he became assistant to Stanley Hornbeck, the State Department's political adviser in charge of Far Eastern affairs. In 1945, Hiss attended the Yalta Conference and was then named secretary-general of the San Francisco conference that set up the United Nations.

In 1946, Hiss left the government to serve as president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a foundation that became a leading supporter of the United Nations. He was serving as president of the Carnegie Endowment when, in August 1948, journalist Whittaker Chambers accused Hiss of being a communist. Hiss voluntarily appeared before the House Un-American Activities Committee, denying the charge. Initially, Hiss denied having ever known

Chambers, but he later identified Chambers as George Crosley, a man he had known 12 years earlier.

In October 1948, Chambers produced the so-called Baltimore Documents, which he hid in a dumbwaiter shaft in the bathroom of the home of his nephew's mother. The envelope contained four notes handwritten by Alger Hiss, 65 State Department documents, and five microfilms that Chambers said were given to him by Hiss for transmission to the Soviet Union.

The State Department documents, dated between January 5 and April 1, 1938, covered a wide variety of subjects, such as the U.S. intentions with respect to the Soviet Union, the Spanish Civil War, and Germany's takeover of Austria. Other documents included diagrams of fire extinguishers and life rafts.

Chambers turned over the documents to his lawyers but placed the microfilms into a hollowed-out pumpkin on his Maryland farm. On the evening of December 2, 1948, Chambers accompanied two investigators to the farm and gave them the hollowed-out pumpkin. The films included photographs of State and Navy Department documents. The press soon referred to the entire set of documents as the "pumpkin papers."

Hiss now faced charges of being a Soviet spy. Fortunately for Hiss, the statute of limitations on espionage was five years, and the incriminating documents were dated more than a decade earlier. The first trial against Hiss ended in July 1949 in a hung jury. He was convicted of perjury in a second trial in January 1950, although he continued to firmly maintain his innocence. Hiss served 44 months in prison before his release in November 1954.

Disbarred from the practice of law, Hiss became a salesman for a Manhattan printing firm. He continued to protest his innocence for the rest of his life. Based on information in official documents released during the 1970s that said the FBI hid evidence that would have helped to clear him, Hiss filed a petition of *coram nobis*, asking that the verdict be overturned because of prosecutorial misconduct. The petition was turned down in federal court, and subsequent appeals were unsuccessful. Hiss was readmitted to the bar in 1975.

Whether Hiss was in fact a Soviet spy remains controversial. Releases under the Freedom of Information Act many years later showed that the documents on the microfilm were not only unclassified, but dealt with topics such as life rafts and fire extinguishers, information that was easily obtainable from open sources. Hiss died at age 92 on November 15, 1996, still fighting for full rehabilitation of his reputation.

See also Espionage; House Un-American Activities Committee

HOBBES, THOMAS (1588–1679)

English philosopher who suggested surrendering some independence to the state to gain a greater degree of national security. The son of an English clergyman, Thomas Hobbes was brought up by a wealthy uncle. His father had engaged in a brawl outside his parish church and fled to London to escape prosecution. Under the tutelage of his uncle, the young Hobbes acquired a thorough education that was capped by study at Magdalen Hall, Oxford University.

In 1608, Hobbes left Oxford and assumed a position tutoring the son of William Cavendish, earl of Devonshire. Hobbes was released from his position when the earl died in 1626, but he found similar employment with Sir Gervase Clinton. Sometime after 1629, he returned to the service of the Cavendish family and remained there until 1640, when political turmoil in England caused him to flee to France.

During his years as a tutor, Hobbes made two shorter trips to the European continent in 1610 and 1629, and he made one extended excursion between 1634 and 1637. On the last of these trips, he made contact with a circle of natural philosophers and mathematicians in Paris. He also traveled to Florence to visit the Italian scientist Galileo Galilei, who was under house arrest after his condemnation by the Roman Inquisition. Hobbes thus acquired contacts with the major figures who were working on behalf of the movement that would eventually be called the scientific revolution.

When Hobbes returned to France in 1640, he became a close friend of Pierre Gassend, the French champion of epicurean philosophy. During these years in France, Hobbes published his major works on natural philosophy and political theory, including *De Cive* (*On the Citizen*) in 1642, *De Corpore* (*On the Body*) in 1650, and *Leviathan* in 1651.

Leviathan, Hobbes's theory of political absolutism, earned its author notoriety that lasted long beyond his lifetime. Hobbes developed his theory from two assumptions about human nature, both loosely derived from a mechanical, materialistic view of humanity. He

believed that people are moved (like matter) by two emotions: the desire for power and the fear of death. In the natural primitive state, the desire for power causes people to lead lives that are "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." But the fear of death leads them to join together by means of a social contract into a political society or commonwealth. Hobbes called this commonwealth a Leviathan, that is, an artificial machine (in contrast to the natural human machine).

Most social-contract theory had supported claims for representative government, but Hobbes turned the idea of the social contract on its head, using it to prove the necessity of undivided sovereignty (absolutism) in any state. In other words, political power should not be divided between king and parliament or between various factions in a republic. Instead, power should be concentrated in one individual to prevent the formation of warring factions and the outbreak of civil war.

Hobbes, of course, was reacting to the English civil wars, whose outbreak in 1640 had caused him to seek exile. He believed that a strong, central monarchy was the only political form that could guarantee peace and prosperity to his nation.

Hobbes's book provoked an outcry of criticism and revulsion. His call for absolutism had serious implications for the political and social structures in England and in all 17th-century states. When Hobbes stated that power could not be divided, he meant to exclude both the established Christian churches and various representative institutions (Parliament in England, estates in other countries) from any role in government. His position thus offended representatives of these powerful groups.

Moreover, Hobbes's theory disturbed the very centralizing monarchs who, it would seem, might have welcomed his arguments. Their dislike rested on the fact that Hobbes pointedly rejected the theory of the divine right of kings as a foundation of absolutism. Instead, he rooted his claims in human psychology and secular moral philosophy. To monarchs and their partisans, this seemed to weaken their ultimate claims to power.

Hobbes made a social contract—consent by the people—the basis of his system. True, the people gave up all their sovereignty to the absolute ruler, but what, it was wondered, might happen if they became displeased with their rulers. Hobbes's justification of absolutism seemed flawed on this point.

Hobbes challenged accepted ideas on other points as well. He pointed out, for example, that the distinction between religion and superstition was really a matter of political power and public policy: Beliefs that were publicly allowed were called religion, whereas those not allowed were called superstition.

Hobbes was one of the 17th-century philosophers whose position commanded attention during the Enlightenment. His materialist mechanical theory of human sensation appalled his contemporaries in its equation of man and beast and in its denial of a spiritual side to life. But it was his political theory, contained in *Leviathan*, that most preoccupied enlightened thinkers. The great founders and spokesmen of the political theory of the Enlightenment—including John Locke, Baron de Montesquieu, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau—all had an eye on Hobbesian theory as they developed their own ideas.

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HO CHI MINH (1890–1969)

Leader of the Vietnamese Communist movement and president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) from 1945 to 1969. Ho Chi Minh has been recognized historically for inflicting a brand of relentless guerilla warfare on both the French and the U.S. militaries, which were successively forced out of the country in 1954 and 1973, respectively. A dedicated communist, Ho combined communist ideology with anticolonialist nationalism as the best method for achieving a unified, independent Vietnam. His single-minded pursuit of that goal, despite horrific losses of North Vietnamese lives through many years of war, earned him an international reputation as a formidable enemy.

BEGINNINGS

Ho Chi Minh was born as Nguyen Sinh Cung on May 19, 1890, in the central Vietnamese region of Annam. At the time of his birth, his father was employed as a public servant at the court of the French-controlled Vietnamese emperor, but he later resigned from that position. In 1911, the young Nguyen—soon to assume the name Ho Chi Minh, meaning "one who enlightens"—left

Vietnam for France, where he worked different odd jobs and became active in the socialist movement.

In 1920, Ho became one of the founding members of the French Communist Party. Three years later, he traveled to Moscow, where he studied Marxism and received revolutionary training. He was then sent to the Far East to further the communist cause and recruit future militants. In June 1931, Ho Chi Minh was jailed by the British police in Hong Kong for revolutionary activities. Released in 1933, he went back to Moscow, where he remained for the next few years while he recovered from tuberculosis. In 1938, Ho returned to China, where he served as a guerilla training instructor for the Chinese Communist Army. Two years later, he was ready for his Vietnamese homecoming.

THE LEADER

In 1941, imperial Japan occupied Vietnam, only to find a burgeoning Communist national movement (the Vietminh) controlled by Ho Chi Minh. When the Japanese surrendered to the Allies at the end of World War II, the Vietminh took over and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with Ho as its president.

The French, Vietnam's former colonial masters, however, did not wish to see an independent Communist state, and war broke out in the region once again. Eight years later, in 1954, Ho's guerilla troops won a decisive victory over the French, who decided to pull out of Vietnam. Under the watchful eye of the great powers, the country was subsequently divided in two parts, with the Communists receiving control only over the northern half.

After a few years of uneasy tranquility, the American-backed South Vietnam and Ho's Democratic Republic of Vietnam began the conflict now known as the Vietnam War, which ultimately claimed almost 4 million lives. When U.S. troops came to the aid of their ally South Vietnam, they entered a military nightmare that ended in America's defeat and withdrawal in 1973 and the subsequent unification of Vietnam under the Communist banner.

Ho Chi Minh did not live to see his goal of a united Vietnam fulfilled, however; he died of a heart attack on September 3, 1969. In 1975, the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon was renamed Ho Chi Minh City in honor of the brilliant political and guerilla leader.

See also Communism and National Security; Dien Bien Phu; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; Vietnam War.

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HOLY ALLIANCE

Agreement intended to preserve political stability and the status quo in Europe, decided at the Vienna Congress following the Napoleonic Wars (1803–15).

The Holy Alliance was concluded on September 26, 1815, among Emperor Francis I of Austria, King Frederick William III of Prussia, and Czar Alexander I of Russia. It represented a conservative restoration of power after decades of upheaval following the French Revolution and the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte. The participants in the alliance declared that existing borders were inviolable, and they promised one another mutual assistance in the case of a foreign attack or domestic revolution. All of the European monarchies except Great Britain later signed the treaty.

The treaty had a distinctly religious tone, declaring that the actions of the signatories would be bound by the principles of Christianity. Liberals viewed the treaty as a reactionary merging of church and state and a step backward from the advances in science and rationalism of the previous century. Nationalists feared that that agreement would stall efforts to develop vibrant nation-states. Pope Pius VII did not sanction the alliance because of the participation of Protestant monarchs.

The Holy Alliance lasted roughly 40 years, until conflicts in the middle of the 19th century made clear that the signatories would not live up to the pledge of mutual assistance. In 1853, Great Britain and France attacked Russia, but Holy Alliance members Prussia and Austria remained neutral. Only a few years before, Russia had assisted Austria in putting down a Hungarian revolt in 1849. Such lack of concern for upholding the obligations of the alliance led to its eventual demise.

See also Alliances

HOMELAND SECURITY

Domestic defense and national security strategy that aims to prevent attacks on U.S. territory by terrorists

or rogue states. The concept of homeland security gained currency after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States.

ORIGINS OF HOMELAND SECURITY

A month after the September 11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush issued an executive order establishing the Office of Homeland Security in the White House. Headed by former Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge, the Office of Homeland Security was charged with developing and coordinating the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States against further terrorist threats. The office also coordinates efforts by the executive branch to detect, prevent, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States.

The same executive order established the Homeland Security Council, which was given responsibility for advising and assisting the president in all aspects of homeland security. The council aims to ensure the effective development and implementation of homeland security policies. Meeting at the president's direction, the Homeland Security Council comprises a dozen senior administration officials: the president, vice president, treasury secretary, defense secretary, attorney general, health and human services secretary, transportation secretary, director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, director of central intelligence, and assistant to the president for homeland security.

EXPANDING HOMELAND SECURITY

The concept of homeland security became firmly entrenched in U.S. public life when President Bush signed the Homeland Security Act in November 2002. This legislation granted the government new security and surveillance powers, including the right to monitor credit card transactions, telephone calls, academic transcripts, drug prescriptions, driving licenses, airline tickets, parking permits, banking records, e-mails, and Web site visits. The idea behind these new powers was to detect the presence of terrorists or potential terrorists within the borders of the United States.

In March 2002, the U.S. government adopted the Homeland Security Advisory System, based on a color-coded scale, to convey information about the level of terrorist threat to the nation. The system was criticized, however, for being vague in implementation and purpose. In response, the government introduced improvements to the threat advisory system to provide more specific guidance for citizens and local officials. Still, many consider the color-coded alerts to be politically manipulative. Critics argue that increases in alert levels seem to occur more in response to domestic political developments than to actual terrorist threats.

Congressional legislation passed in 2002 established a new cabinet-level agency called the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The creation of the DHS marked the most far-reaching transformation of the U.S. government in half a century. Intended to coordinate intelligence about terrorism and tighten U.S. domestic defenses, the DHS brought together 22 existing federal agencies, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Customs Service, Secret Service, and Coast Guard. The first head of the DHS was Tom Ridge.

The DHS initially introduced measures that strained U.S. relations with other countries. For example, the department imposed requirements for airlines to collect extensive information on passengers, a policy that was in clear violation of European privacy laws. After prolonged negotiations, the European Union and the United States reached a compromise on airline passenger data collection.

The DHS's US-VISIT program, which involves the fingerprinting and photographing of foreign visitors on arrival in the United States, aroused international outrage after its introduction in January 2004. However, it was gradually accepted as inevitable. In addition, many countries whose citizens do not need a visa to enter the United States faced difficulties meeting the October 1, 2004, deadline for issuing machine-readable U.S. passports.

In addition to creating some international disgruntlement, U.S. homeland security has met obstacles at home. Despite the ambitious government reform that created the DHS, U.S. antiterrorist measures have not yet been adequately streamlined. Terrorist watch lists still need to be integrated within the DHS electronic databases. Federal standards are still needed for issuing driver's licenses and birth certificates—documents that were easily obtained by the September 11 terrorist hijackers. Critical infrastructure such as ports, airports, power plants, oil and gas pipelines, and water treatment facilities remain vulnerable as well.

To respond to these challenges, the U.S. government plans an even more far-reaching reorganization

of the government's national security apparatus to secure the homeland. One future reform may involve a merger of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency. The new position of director of national intelligence has been created to oversee and coordinate the efforts of the entire intelligence community. In February 2005, President Bush named former U.S. ambassador John Negroponte to the post. Debate continues as to how much power should be accorded to this position.

Homeland security is commonly viewed as involving a balance between safety and liberty. Defenders of civil liberties charge that some U.S. homeland security measures invade the privacy of citizens by tapping their telephone calls, monitoring their use of libraries, and spying on their Internet use. The government, however, claims that its effort to secure the homeland makes Americans safer without making them less free.

See also Bush, George W., and National Policy; Civil Liberties; Homeland Security Act; Homeland Security Advisory System; Homeland Security Council; Homeland Security, Department of; Legal Ramifications of National Security; September 11/WTC and Pentagon Attacks; Terrorism, U.S. (Domestic); Terrorism, War on International

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HOMELAND SECURITY ACT (2002)

Legislation enacted in 2002 that established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) within the executive branch of the U.S. government and defined its primary missions and responsibilities. Following the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, coordinating the defense of the U.S. homeland rapidly emerged as a paramount priority for the government. To achieve that end, the U.S. Congress passed the Homeland Security Act, which President George W. Bush signed into law on November 25, 2002. This act created a new executive department, the DHS, and established a number of measures aimed at better protecting the national security of the United States.

Until the passage of the Homeland Security Act, the U.S. security apparatus had been dispersed across a wide range of federal agencies and the military. In addition to creating an entirely new federal government organization with its own mandate, a cabinet-level secretary, and more than 180,000 employees, the law also placed a number of existing agencies beneath the larger umbrella of the DHS. These agencies include the U.S. Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Secret Service.

The DHS has five core missions: information analysis and infrastructure protection; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and related countermeasures; border and transportation security; emergency preparedness and response; and coordination with other parts of the federal government, with state and local governments, and with the private sector. Former Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge was nominated by President Bush to be the first secretary of homeland security; after being confirmed by the U.S. Senate, he was sworn into office in January 2003.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 was not passed without criticism. West Virginia Democratic senator Robert Byrd, one of the most vocal opponents of the legislation, denounced it as "an irresponsible exercise in political chicanery" and "a bureaucratic behemoth cooked up by political advisers to satisfy several inside Washington agendas." Indeed, the Bush administration itself was initially lukewarm to the idea of establishing the superagency, and critics of the president publicly suggested that his change of heart suspiciously corresponded with the damaging testimony of FBI whistleblower Coleen Rowley about failures in FBI performance in the months leading up to the September 11 terrorist attacks.

The creation of the DHS represents the most comprehensive reorganization of the federal government since the Department of Defense was created in 1947. Although many credit the lack of a second major terrorist attack on the United States to its creation, others continue to vehemently oppose the new department on the grounds that its sweeping, Big Brother-like powers ultimately undermine the very democratic system it is charged with securing.

See also Homeland Security; Homeland Security, Department of; Terrorism, U.S. (Domestic); Terrorism, War on International; Threat Advisory Levels

HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM (COLOR-CODED ALERTS)

A color-coded scale adopted in March 2002 to inform the U.S. population about the current risk of a terrorist attack. Initially vague in its guidelines and purpose, the advisory system was improved but remains politically controversial.

The Homeland Security Advisory System rates the current threat level as green (low risk of a terrorist attack), blue (guarded risk), yellow (elevated risk), orange (high risk), or red (severe risk). In the first two years of its existence, the threat advisory level fluctuated between yellow and orange without ever reaching red, blue, or green.

Under all threat levels, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) advises citizens to develop and practice a family emergency plan and to store extra food and supplies. Other recommendations are added at each threat level. At the blue level, for example, citizens are advised to be alert and to report suspicious activity. At the yellow level, the DHS recommends developing alternative routes to and from work or school. At the orange level, citizens are advised to exercise caution when traveling, to pay attention to travel advisories, and to expect delays and baggage searches at public buildings. The DHS also suggests checking on neighbors who may need assistance during an emergency. At the red level, the DHS advises citizens to stay tuned to television or radio for information and instructions. The public should also be prepared at this level to "shelter in place" (seek shelter within the home or business) or evacuate.

Initially, the DHS applied the same threat level to the entire United States. However, local officials complained that the color-coded system was too vague and failed to provide them with specific guidance. Moreover, it was costly to keep the entire country on heightened alert. Other critics claimed that the administration was using the advisory system to manipulate popular anxieties for political gain. For example, a higher threat advisory level seemed to coincide with certain administrative initiatives, such as the decision to go to war against Iraq.

Responding to criticism, the DHS made the color-coded alerts more geographically specific. In January 2004, the DHS lowered the overall threat level in the nation from orange to yellow, but it kept the cities of New York, Los Angeles, Las Vegas, and Washington, DC, on orange alert. In August 2004, the homeland security secretary, Tom Ridge, made the alert even more specific, announcing evidence of threats to particular buildings in the financial districts of New York, northern New Jersey, and Washington, DC.

Despite such improvements, the Homeland Security Advisory System remains politically controversial. Critics continue to accuse the Bush administration of using the color-coded alerts to manipulate Americans into rallying around the president for particular policy initiatives.

See also Bush, George W., and National Policy; Homeland Security; Homeland Security, Department of; Terrorism, War on International

HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL

Body responsible for developing and implementing effective homeland security policies and coordinating the homeland security–related activities of U.S. executive departments and agencies. The Homeland Security Council was established by an executive order issued by President George W. Bush on October 8, 2001. The council has responsibility for advising and assisting the president in all matters pertaining to homeland security. Its members include the president, the vice president, treasury secretary, defense secretary, attorney general, health and human services secretary, transportation secretary, director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, director of central intelligence, assistant to the president for homeland security, and any other offices of the executive branch that the president designates.

The Homeland Security Council meets at the president's direction, but during his absence, the vice president may preside over council meetings. The assistant to the president for homeland security is responsible—again, at the president's direction—for determining the agenda, ensuring the preparation of necessary papers, and recording council actions and presidential decisions.

See also Bush, George W., and National Policy; Homeland Security; Homeland Security, Department of

HOMELAND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF

Cabinet-level agency charged with preventing terrorist attacks on U.S. territory. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in 2003 to coordinate the previously fragmented security apparatus of the United States. It has improved domestic intelligence and border safety, but it also has been criticized for infringing on civil liberties.

In June 2002, President George W. Bush proposed the establishment of the DHS to integrate domestic security resources under a single line of authority. The proposal reflected a change from the president's initial policy after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, which was to appoint a White House coordinator for domestic security rather than establish a new cabinet-level department. However, when faced with growing questions about government intelligence lapses, President Bush proposed consolidating 22 federal agencies under one cabinet-level department.

After receiving congressional approval in 2002, the DHS began operation in January 2003 as the 15th cabinet department. Its creation represented the most radical overhaul of the U.S. government since the 1940s. The DHS brought together the Secret Service, Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Coast Guard, among other agencies. With more than 180,000 employees, the new department was intended to eliminate duplication of effort and authority and to enforce the adoption of common standards among previously disparate security services.

FUNCTIONS

The DHS has three main priorities: to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, to reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and to minimize the damage from attacks that do occur. In the event of a crisis or disaster, the DHS is expected to ensure the continuity of government operations and essential functions. The DHS partners with state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector to strengthen the nation's ability to respond to emergency situations such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters.

The DHS is responsible for coordinating access to information about potential terrorist threats. It also identifies and assesses the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and key assets within the United States.

In addition, the DHS is responsible for the rapid and accurate dissemination of relevant information through public advisories and the Homeland Security Advisory System.

The department's other functions include enforcing trade and immigration laws and protecting against financial and electronic crimes, counterfeit currency, and identity theft. The department also includes the Secret Service, which is responsible for the physical safety of the president, vice president, and visiting world leaders. Finally, the DHS endeavors to improve the use of science and technology to counter weapons of mass destruction and to establish a comprehensive response-and-recovery system.

LEADERSHIP

The first head of the DHS was Tom Ridge, a former congressman and Pennsylvania governor. Before becoming DHS secretary, Ridge directed the Office of Homeland Security, established in the White House following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. As director of homeland security, Ridge developed and coordinated a comprehensive strategy against terrorist threats and attacks that formed the basis for the official *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. Under Ridge's leadership, the DHS was credited with improving border safety without unduly hindering the legitimate flow of people and goods.

CRITICISM

Despite its lofty and critical goals, the DHS has been criticized from the day of its inception. Critics charged that the reform should have incorporated the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency, two intelligence services that failed to share information about some of the September 11 terrorists.

Policies adopted by the DHS have also provoked international resentment by requiring foreign visitors to be photographed and electronically fingerprinted upon arrival in the United States. Domestic critics, meanwhile, have decried the department's annual budget of more than $40 billion as excessive and inefficiently allocated, given evidence of internal turf battles and numerous unfilled vacancies within the department.

The most controversial DHS program has been the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System,

established in 2002, which targeted male citizens from Muslim countries for mandatory personal registration. According to critics, the program discriminated against Arabs and Muslims, in addition to being ineffective and expensive. The DHS terminated the program in December 2003.

Civil liberties groups continue to warn against what they see as the department's invasion of civil liberties. Citing the biometric identification system that uses retinal scans for identification and the sharing of private information about U.S. citizens by government agencies, privacy activists have likened the DHS to an ominous Big Brother. It remains to be seen whether the department will manage to strike a delicate balance between improving America's safety and upholding the nation's civil liberties.

See also Civil Liberties; Homeland Security; Homeland Security Act; Homeland Security Advisory System; September 11/WTC and Pentagon Attacks; Terrorism, U.S. (Domestic); Terrorism, War on International

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HOMOSEXUALS AND MILITARY SERVICE

Homosexuals traditionally have been banned from serving in the armed forces of the United States. In the early 1990s, plans by President Bill Clinton to lift this ban sparked a debate over the idea of gays in the military, resulting in a compromise policy of Don't Ask, Don't Tell. Although the United States and some other Western countries are slowly beginning to tolerate homosexuality, the idea of homosexuality in the military service remains controversial.

The U.S. military traditionally has regarded homosexuality as incompatible with military service and detrimental to discipline, fighting spirit, and morale. Military commanders have feared that the presence of declared homosexuals in the military would undermine the mutual trust and cohesion among individuals that is required for teamwork in combat.

Opponents of the ban argue that it has impaired military effectiveness by dismissing valuable personnel, such as Arabic and Korean linguists. Furthermore, gay activists maintain that the armed forces, as America's largest employer, should not endorse or practice discrimination. According to civil rights groups, barring homosexuals from the military punishes them, but not heterosexuals, for engaging in consensual sex. Proponents of the antihomosexual ban, however, retort that the military cannot fully embody the democratic principles that it defends, insisting that the armed forces are necessarily an authoritarian organization that must aim for victory, not fairness.

Prior to World War II, U.S. military officers had discretion in deciding whether to discharge homosexuals. In the 1950s, however, policies against homosexuality were tightened as commanders became concerned that Soviet agents might blackmail U.S. military personnel by threatening to expose their homosexuality. As the Cold War progressed, homosexuals continued to be viewed as a security risk, and by the 1970s, they were automatically discharged from all branches of the military.

In 1982, the U.S. Department of Defense formalized previous antihomosexual policies into a directive that labeled homosexuality as incompatible with military service. Throughout the 1980s, the armed forces discharged an average of 1,500 service members annually because of homosexuality. This cost the military some $250 million of additional expenses annually, including the now-wasted costs of training, supplying, and paying discharged soldiers, as well as the additional expense of training their replacements.

Soon after winning the 1992 presidential election, President-Elect Bill Clinton announced plans to follow through on a campaign pledge to repeal the ban against homosexuals in the armed forces. However, congressional and military leaders, such as Senator Sam Nunn and General Colin Powell, strongly opposed lifting the ban.

Months of heated debate resulted in a compromise policy that allowed gays and lesbians to serve in the military as long as they did not publicly reveal their sexual orientation. Dubbed Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue, this new policy has been applied inconsistently since it was adopted, and the military has sometimes continued its witch hunt against homosexuals. Meanwhile, federal courts undermined the "don't tell" aspect of the policy by ordering the reinstatement of openly gay and lesbian service members.

Exclusion of openly gay and lesbian service members has damaged the military's relationship with many colleges and universities, which oppose any kind of discrimination based on sexual orientation. Some schools have withdrawn funding from the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and denied campus access to military recruiters because of the military's exclusionary policy.

Some countries have begun to change their policies about homosexuals in the military in recent years. Canada and Australia repealed their bans on homosexuals in military service in 1992. Twenty-four countries now allow open homosexuals to serve in the ranks. The Dutch military is under explicit orders to promote the integration of homosexuals, women, and minorities. In Germany, official policy does not exclude gays and lesbians from military service, but in reality, homosexual recruits there often face discrimination. Most other nations retain official bans on homosexuality in the military.

The issue of homosexuals in the military will undoubtedly remain contentious for some time to come. The debate raises fundamental questions about the extent to which the military should embody the democratic principles that it is called on to defend. Regardless of the official policy, most gay men and women serving in the armed forces continue to keep their sexual orientation secret to remain in uniform and to serve their country.

See also Civil-Military Relations; Clinton, Bill (William Jefferson), and National Policy; Don't Ask, Don't Tell

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HOOVER, J. EDGAR (1895–1972)

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from 1924 to 1972. In his nearly 50-year career, J. Edgar Hoover became a household name as head of the nation's top law enforcement agency. His innovations included establishing the world's first fingerprint index and crime laboratory.

EARLY LIFE AND CAREER

John Edgar Hoover was born in Washington, DC, on January 1, 1895. His father was a government printmaker who spent the last eight years of his life in an asylum. Hoover left school to take a position as a messenger in the Library of Congress to help the family's finances. However, he eventually returned to his studies by attending night school, and by 1917 he had earned both a bachelor's and master's degree in law.

After graduation, Hoover went to work for the U.S. Department of Justice as an assistant in the alien registration section. He was promoted to special assistant to Attorney General Alexander M. Palmer two years later and charged with monitoring alien radicals.

After World War I, Hoover created a massive index of 450,000 individuals with leftist political views. The index contained biographical data and detailed notes on 60,000 people whom Hoover considered dangerous and recommended for deportation. On November 7, 1919, more than 10,000 suspected communists were arrested in 23 different cities in the so-called Palmer Raids. However, most of those rounded up were U.S. citizens who soon were deemed harmless and set free. The Palmer raids marked the beginning of Hoover's lifelong crusade against communists and other radicals in the United States.

TAKING OVER THE BUREAU

In 1921, Hoover was made assistant director of the Bureau of Information, which was later renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In 1924, he was named director and made several institutional changes. He fired agents whom he considered unqualified or political appointees. He required background checks, interviews, and physical testing for new agents, favoring those with legal or accounting training. In 1926, Hoover established what would become the world's largest fingerprint file. Several years later, in 1932, he founded the FBI crime laboratory, one of his major efforts to apply science to police work.

Under Hoover in the 1930s, the bureau targeted violent criminals and gangsters. High-profile cases—such as the arrest of Alvin "Kreepy" Karpis, John Dillinger, and other public enemies—made Hoover and his "G-men," as FBI agents were called, a part of American culture.

Although Hoover never held a news conference, he was a master of leaking stories to the press. In 1931,

he undertook a massive law and order publicity campaign that ultimately turned him into a folk hero. Movies, books, radio dramas, and comic strips all publicized the FBI's efforts against gangsterism and other forms of lawlessness. Junior G-men clubs were established nationwide, and the FBI's Ten Most Wanted List provided innumerable headlines for newspaper and radio. Walter Winchell, the popular radio broadcaster, carried almost daily items on Hoover and his G-men.

In 1935, Congress established the Federal Bureau of Investigation, giving Hoover's organization jurisdiction throughout the United States. During the 1930s and 1940s, Hoover arranged for FBI agents to report on Americans who had fought in the Spanish Civil War, viewing such individuals as members of the international communist movement. Later, he persuaded President Franklin D. Roosevelt to expand the FBI's responsibilities to include combating foreign espionage in the United States. By 1945, Hoover was convinced there was a communist conspiracy to overthrow the U.S. government and that several senior U.S. officials were secretly members of the Communist Party.

HUNTING COMMUNISTS

By the early 1950s, Hoover had redoubled his anticommunist efforts. During this time, the FBI became a principal source of information for the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), led by Senator Joseph McCarthy, which was dedicated to finding and exposing communists in the government and the media.

Hoover was concerned about the political influence of the cinema and the emerging medium of television on the American public. He encouraged the HUAC to investigate the entertainment media and to blacklist artists with leftist views. By the late 1950s, more than 320 artists and writers had been blacklisted and were unable to find work in television and the cinema.

Under Hoover, the FBI conducted detailed investigations into any prominent person deemed to hold dangerous political views. These investigations continued well into the 1960s and included civil rights leaders such as the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X, antiwar activists such as Jane Fonda, and entertainers such as John Lennon. However, these activities were often unpopular, even among members of the government. As early as 1945, officials as prominent as President Harry S. Truman complained

that the FBI was not spending enough of its resources fighting crime.

HOOVER'S LEGACY

By the time of his death in 1972, Hoover had become perhaps the most feared person in the United States. The FBI under Hoover had collected information on all of the nation's top politicians and allegedly used these secret files to influence their actions. It was claimed Hoover had incriminating material on all eight presidents under whom he had served and that they were all too frightened to fire him.

Hoover ruled the FBI with an iron hand. He was said to be particularly critical of memoranda sent to him by subordinates, frequently inserting biting comments in the margins. Agents coined the phrase "four-banger" to describe Hoover's habit of filling all of the margins of a memo with comments. One agent supposedly submitted a memo with extremely narrow margins to avoid substantive comment by the director. Hoover reportedly complained loudly, saying "watch the borders." This allegedly resulted in an FBI crackdown on the Canadian and Mexican borders over the following two weeks.

Hoover died in office on May 2, 1972, at the age of 77. His longtime assistant, Clyde A. Tolson, had all of Hoover's private files destroyed. A 1976 Senate report on the late director was extremely critical of Hoover and accused him of using the FBI to harass political dissidents. Despite his anticommunist agenda, however, Hoover is credited with having made the FBI one of the most respected and technologically sophisticated law enforcement agencies in the world.

See also Communism and National Security; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Hiss, Alger; House Un-American Activities Committee; McCarthyism

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HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE (HUAC) (1938–1969)

U.S. congressional committee created in 1938 to investigate the nature and diffusion of un-American

propaganda that threatened America's national security. The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) became particularly significant during the late 1940s and early 1950s, when fears about the spread of communism were rife in the United States.

Originally created in 1938 as a temporary committee by House Resolution 282, the HUAC evolved into a powerful but controversial standing committee. Initially, it was responsible for investigating Nazi and communist movements and propaganda that represented overt security threats to the United States. During World War II, the committee investigated these two groups, as well as Japanese Americans, who were perceived as a security threat to the nation because of their supposed sympathy with the Japanese cause in the war.

After the war, the HUAC examined labor union proponents, government officials, and, perhaps most notably, communist-inspired influences and political activities in Hollywood. The specific mission of the HUAC was to examine the extent and character of un-American propaganda activities in the United States and the diffusion of subversive and un-American propaganda instigated by foreign countries or U.S. citizens that attacked the principles of government as guaranteed by the Constitution.

The HUAC was founded largely on the efforts of Representative Martin Dies, a Democrat from Texas, and John Garner, another Democrat from Texas who was a former Speaker of the House of Representatives and vice president under Franklin D. Roosevelt. Disenchanted with Roosevelt's pro-union New Deal, the two men (and their supporters in Congress) worked to disable it by creating an investigative body that would discredit the New Deal (and its officials) as un-American. Dies put a resolution to form the House Un-American Activities Committee before the House of Representatives in the spring of 1938, and it passed on May 26, 1938.

Findings both internal and external to the committee helped push the HUAC forward on the national scene. The committee's hearings began in August 1938. One of the early witnesses testifying before the committee was John Frey, a powerful leader in the American Federation of Labor. Frey gave thorough and reliable testimony regarding communist infiltration of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and communist front organizations associated with it. His statements provided a detailed picture of the extent of communist influence in U.S. labor unions at the peak of their strength. His pictures of communist infiltration did a great deal to focus public attention on the issue.

Intelligence obtained by War Department code breakers at the end of World War II gave further credence to the communist threat. Analyzing interembassy cables, the code breakers uncovered Soviet spies in America's government and atomic laboratories. These well-publicized discoveries fueled public and congressional support for an investigation of subversive or clandestine activities in the United States, particularly those of communist and leftist groups.

Congressman Martin Dies, the first chairman of HUAC, affirmed that the committee would respect the right of every U.S. citizen to express his or her honest convictions and enjoy freedom of speech. Nevertheless, the committee was frequently accused of acts of questionable constitutionality and unfounded or partisan accusations. Persons testifying before the committee, particularly Hollywood witnesses and activists, protested that the committee's investigations and accusations had violated their civil liberties, in particular their rights of free speech and free association. The political left often accused Dies and subsequent chairmen of using the committee as an anti–New Deal or antileft platform.

Despite criticism, Dies was very successful in rooting out so-called subversives. Under his leadership, HUAC was responsible for some prominent prosecutions, particularly that of Alger Hiss, a former State Department official who was convicted of perjury in relation to espionage activities in 1950. Famous ex-communists Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers testified at HUAC hearings that Hiss had been a Soviet agent. Their statements, and the persistence of Richard Nixon, a young Republican congressman on the HUAC, eventually led to Hiss's conviction.

The anticommunist aspects of the House Un-American Activities Committee diminished in importance during World War II as Russia became America's ally against Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany. The end of the war and the ascendancy of *realpolitik*, however, brought the HUAC and the anticommunist crusade back into the spotlight. In January 1945, John Rankin, a Democratic congressman from Alabama, suggested making the HUAC a permanent committee, and the motion to do so passed on the second vote.

McCARTHYISM (1950–1954)

Two of the permanent committee's most notorious ingredients were McCarthyism and the Hollywood investigations. Senator Joseph McCarthy, a Republican

from Wisconsin, was the foremost of the "Red hunters" in Congress. Lending his name to the so-called witch hunts, he was notorious for producing (often) reckless accusations of well-known public figures, including Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson.

Starting with a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, in 1950, McCarthy became a symbol of the HUAC crusade to root out communist infiltration in all facets of politics and public life. Ironically, his work began long after communist penetration of the government had declined, and membership in the Communist Party in the United States was likewise dropping.

Using sometimes outdated, cobbled-together, muddled, and distorted information, McCarthy became a vigorous, visible crusader against communism. He gained a great deal of prestige at the time for his ardor in the struggle against communism. Critics, however, stressed that his information was generally poor, and his tactics and methods involved dirty politics and lies. Moreover, McCarthy did not pursue any actual investigations until 1953, having done his fighting to that point from the Senate floor, where he was protected from libel.

McCarthy greatly distressed the Federal Bureau of Investigation, whose head, J. Edgar Hoover, asserted that McCarthy was actually impinging on the hunt for subversives in the country. Nevertheless, Hoover cooperated with the influential senator for practical reasons. Over time, however, as McCarthy's accusations grew more outlandish, investigations were undertaken in Congress to check the veracity of his claims. The Senate voted to censure him in 1954 because of his conduct in office.

HOLLYWOOD AND THE BLACKLIST (1947, 1951–1953)

Early in 1947, then HUAC chair J. Parnell Thomas sponsored an investigation of communist infiltration of motion picture unions. So-called friendly witnesses— often, but not exclusively, from the conservative elements of Hollywood—freely gave information to the committee about the activities of their colleagues. With this and additional information, the committee subpoenaed writers, directors, producers, and actors involved in leftist activities and unions.

Some of those subpoenaed gave information about themselves and others. Ten of the witnesses, known as the Hollywood Ten, were unfriendly witnesses who asserted their constitutional rights not to name names.

As a result, all were jailed for contempt of Congress. The Hollywood Ten, part of an estimated group of 200–250 people, were blacklisted in Hollywood. The careers of both friendly and unfriendly witnesses, as well as those named as communists or sympathizers, were often permanently damaged.

The content of Hollywood films was likewise affected by the HUAC activities and by McCarthyism. Frightened by the effects of the HUAC's investigations, producers shied away from the social problem–driven films of the early 1940s, such as *The Grapes of Wrath*. Instead, they produced films that followed a directive in the Screen Guide for Americans that said, "Don't Glorify Failure, Don't Deify the Common Man, Don't Smear Industrialists." As a result of the fears and paranoia that became characteristic of the time, films became more apolitical and less critical.

Following the McCarthy and blacklist periods, the HUAC diminished in both strength and credibility. In 1969, the committee changed its name to the House Internal Security Committee. This committee lasted only six years and was finally abolished in 1975.

See also Communism and National Security; McCarthyism

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT)

A type of intelligence gathering involving tracking, interviewing, psychological manipulation, or physical coercion of individuals to gain strategic or tactical information that is vital to policy making. The process of gathering and processing human intelligence is done most often on a national level. However, it also may be carried out by companies, a practice called *industrial espionage*.

An individual who engages in human intelligence (HUMINT) gathering and processing for a government may be an intelligence specialist, an officer in the military, or a field operations officer, commonly known as a spy or agent, for an intelligence agency such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Members of the intelligence community refer to HUMINT as having "feet on the ground" because this type of intelligence provides hard data to back up or supplant information gathered by the other intelligence disciplines, such as signal intelligence (SIGINT) or electronic intelligence (ELINT).

Nearly every nation has intelligence-gathering and processing agencies that rely, at least partially, on human intelligence—regardless of whether the actual existence of such organizations is recognized. Some of the better-known intelligence agencies are the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency in the United States, the Mossad in Israel, and the MI5 and MI6 in the United Kingdom. The KGB of the former Soviet Union, replaced by the Russian FSB in 1991, combined both intelligence-gathering and counterintelligence functions.

Spies have been employed to gain knowledge of adversaries for as long as peoples and nations have gone to war. The Chinese philosopher and strategist Sun Tzu emphasized the importance of intelligence gathering in military victory in his treatise *The Art of War*, written in the 400s BCE. Sun Tzu argued that success in war is based on the ability to deceive the enemy. The ancient Romans, whose power depended just as much on political and diplomatic influence as it did on military conquest, often employed spies disguised as diplomats to collect strategic information on friends and foes.

Since the second half of the 19th century, technological advances such as the telegraph and wireless radio have meant that information gleaned from the enemy can be transmitted at an ever faster pace, enabling national leaders to react quickly to military and diplomatic developments. This led the world's major powers to form civilian organizations to collect and organize human intelligence. At the beginning of World War I, the United States was the only one of the world's leading nations that lacked such a service.

During World War II, Britain's MI5 and the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) coordinated extensive human intelligence efforts. In the Pacific, Allied soldiers named *coast watchers* remained behind enemy lines on remote jungle islands to report on the movements of Japanese planes and ships. Their contributions were crucial to key victories, such as the Battle of Guadalcanal in 1942–1943. Espionage, often conducted by civilians in neutral and occupied countries, provided the British with information to locate and bomb German V-1 and V-2 rocket sites before the weapons could be unleashed.

The National Security Act of 1947 created a civilian intelligence service, the Central Intelligence Agency, out of the wartime OSS. With the United States and the Soviet Union eyeing each other with suspicion, human intelligence was employed extensively by agencies such as the CIA, the Soviet KGB, and the British MI5 and MI6 to gain information about the nuclear and conventional forces of the enemy.

During the 1950s, the United States was gripped by fears of communist spies infiltrating the government, the military, and the media. Although this fear of communist spies and sympathizers led to witch hunts and paranoia in U.S. society, intelligence agencies and diplomatic corps within both superpowers were, in fact, infiltrated by moles and double agents who betrayed secrets to the enemy. Among the most well-known alleged spies was Julius Rosenberg, who was accused of providing the Soviet Union with information that led to the development of the Soviet atomic bomb in 1949. Another infamous group of spies were the so-called Cambridge Five, British diplomats and Secret Service officers who passed on British and American diplomatic and military information to the Soviet Union.

The post–Cold War period marked the beginning of a new geopolitical environment and new challenges to the human intelligence community. With the arrest of spies such as CIA agent Aldrich Ames in 1994 and FBI agent Robert Hanssen in 2001, it became apparent that the new Russia was still using human intelligence to steal U.S. secrets. Some observers even regarded the end of the Cold War as a failure of human intelligence because Western intelligence services had completely failed to foresee the collapse and demise of the Soviet Union.

New threats emerged during the 1990s, including a nuclear-armed North Korea and international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, which attacked U.S. embassies in 1998, U.S. military facilities in 1999 and 2000, and the U.S. World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001. The end of the Cold War has not, in fact, decreased the need for human intelligence, and the threats to national security posed by nonstate actors now pose new challenges for agencies accustomed to gathering information on states and conventional military establishments.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States drove home the need for human intelligence to defend national security. Transnational terrorist groups pose a threat to many nations, and intelligence agencies such as the CIA are now stepping up the recruitment of officers with relevant language skills who can easily fit into a target country or area. Although disciplines such as imagery and signals intelligence play a key role in gaining strategic

and tactical information on security threats from state and nonstate actors, the feet on the ground that human intelligence provides will continue to be indispensable in defending national security in the 21st century.

—Daniel P. McDonald

See also Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; Espionage; Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Signal Intelligence; Terrorism, War on International

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HUMAN RIGHTS

The basic political, economic, social, and cultural entitlements of all individuals in a society by virtue of their humanity. Human rights are legitimate, justified, and valid claims on society to guarantees and safeguards that are essential to personal well-being and dignity.

Society is required to respect and ensure human rights regardless of sex, race, age, social class, national origin, ethnic or tribal affiliation, ideology, or other commitment. In organized societies, which constitute the majority of the modern world, human rights are generally safeguarded by law and institutions in a country's legal system. International human rights law and institutions aim to ensure that every national society safeguards the human rights of its inhabitants.

ANTECEDENTS

The modern idea of human rights was formulated and given content during World War II and its aftermath. It was expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, and in the numerous covenants and conventions derived from it.

However, the philosophical foundations of human rights predate this period and are derived mainly from the liberal Western democratic tradition. A detailed formulation of this philosophy as it applies to the specific problem of human rights can be found in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, written in 1789 during the French Revolution. The declaration is the most widely known proclamation of rights and had the most far-reaching consequences on the continent of Europe.

Other historic texts fulfilled similar roles elsewhere. England's Magna Carta of 1215 had among its provisions guarantees of freedom from imprisonment, dispossession of property, unlawful prosecution, or exile. The English Habeas Corpus Act and Bill of Rights were issued in 1689, assuring the supremacy of Parliament over the monarch, the right to free elections, freedom of speech, the right to bail, freedom from cruel and unusual punishments, and the right to trial by jury.

English colonists in North America inherited these and other legal traditions, which were incorporated into the U.S. Declaration of Independence in 1776. By 1789, two parallel and broadly similar currents of thought, American and French, together made up the philosophical and historical foundation for the modern idea of human rights. It is this same stream of thought that found expression in the Universal Declaration of 1948.

SLAVERY, HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND MINORITY RIGHTS

The first international literature relating to the human rights problem as it is understood in the modern world appeared long before World War II and the Universal Declaration of 1948. It touched on the issue of slavery, which until the end of the 18th century, was generally legal under national law. Slavery remained legal in the United States until 1863 and, in some other countries, until the 20th century.

Antislavery laws were the first major development in the effort to ensure basic human rights for all individuals. The first antislavery act was signed in Brussels in 1890 and later ratified by 18 nations, including the United States. It was the most comprehensive instrument against slavery until the outbreak of World War I. In 1926, under the auspices of the League of Nations, the International Convention on the Abolition of Slavery and Slave Trade was concluded. It aimed at the complete suppression of slavery in all forms and of the slave trade by both land and sea. More developments took place, which eventually made the prohibition of slavery and the slave trade the subject of established rules of international law.

The second development was the evolution of humanitarian law. The origins of humanitarian law can be traced back to the 19th century. During this period, the First Geneva Convention (1864) made notable transformations in the principles governing war and the treatment of military personnel and military hospital staff. The convention also created the International Red Cross for the purpose of protecting military staff and hospitals and caring for the sick and wounded.

The third development relates to the protection of minorities. Broadly, the various arrangements for the rights of minorities in international treaties and covenants provided for equality before the law with regard to civil and political rights, freedom of religion, and the right of minorities to use their own language and maintain their own religious and educational establishments.

THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION AND INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Until the late 1930s, the international political system and international law continued to maintain that the way a state treats its own inhabitants is a strictly internal matter. As World War II began and evidence of the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany against its own people mounted, the issue became a subject of international concern.

The Nuremberg Charter (1950), which charged Nazi leaders with war crimes as well as crimes against humanity, was the first formal assertion of the international law of human rights. A few years earlier, the Allies had drafted the Charter of the United Nations (1945), which declared the promotion of human rights to be its primary purpose. The charter founded an early commission on human rights, whose first major activity was the preparation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, approved and proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in 1948. This launched the international human rights movement.

The Declaration of Human Rights came to represent the human rights ideal in the 20th century. The declaration, which provided a catalog of rights in 30 articles, has been universally accepted as an authoritative definition of human rights. The declaration inspired and formed the basis of other covenants and commissions related to human rights, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, together known as the International Bill of Rights. The UN General Assembly approved both covenants in 1966, although they came into effect only in 1976 after receiving the minimum number of 10 ratifications each.

Both covenants began in identical terms with an article on the right to self-determination. The civil and political rights declared in Articles 1 to 21 of the Universal Declaration were included in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Among these are the right to life, liberty and security, equality before the law, freedom of association and expression, association and religion, and additional political rights and rights of minorities.

Two Optional Protocols were added later. The first addressed arrangements for individual communications to the Human Rights Committee, and the second was aimed at abolishing the death penalty. The First Optional Protocol came into effect in 1976 along with the covenants, and it now has more than 70 acceptances. The Second Optional Protocol was concluded in 1989 and came into effect in 1991. Currently it has more than 20 acceptances.

The second Covenant on Social and Economic Rights covered the right to work, just and favorable conditions of work, equal pay for equal work, the right to form trade unions and to strike, social security, and education. The Economic and Social Council within the United Nations is the keystone of the system of implementation for the Covenant of Social and Economic Rights. Neither covenant, however, includes the right to property, mainly because it proved impossible to reach agreement between countries of widely different political philosophies on a definition of this right.

Besides these two covenants, several of the special conventions sponsored by the United Nations have particular importance for human rights. These include the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination, the Convention on Discrimination Against Women, the Convention Against Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Another important international agency working for human rights is the International Labor Organization, which aims to improve labor and social conditions by preparing conventions and recommendations.

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND UNIVERSALISM

After World War II, specific areas of the world developed independent regional bodies to guarantee and

promote human rights. These organizations, which often modeled themselves on existing regional and UN systems, came to be characterized by some common features. In almost all cases, the general set of regional instruments included a general convention or charter that covered the whole range of political and civil rights. Examples include the European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953), drafted under the sponsorship of the Council of Europe, which was created in 1948; the American Convention on Human Rights in Latin America, otherwise known as the Pact of San Jose (1978); and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1986), which was ratified by 40 states, making it the most widely accepted regional convention.

To provide guarantees that promised rights would be protected, regional conventions, commissions, and courts of human rights were created in some regions as well. Examples include the Council of Europe and European Union, the Organization of American States in Latin America, the Organization of African Unity, and the League of Arab States. Most of the regional conventions borrow mainly from the UN Covenant on Political and Civil Rights. Many developing countries were also influenced by specific features of the European Convention and the U.S. Declaration of Independence.

In some cases, provisions for social and economic rights have been included in the same convention, as in Africa. In other areas, there is a separate instrument governing these rights, such as the European Social Charter (1961). In the case of Latin America, there is only a general undertaking in one article of the convention and no explicitly stated guarantees of social, economic, and cultural rights.

In the United States, the protection and realization of human rights is guaranteed primarily through the U.S. Constitution. Each state's legal system is subordinate to the Constitution, the U.S. Bill of Rights, and later constitutional amendments. The international human rights movement, born during World War II, owes much to the example of the United States, whose constitutional rights have been a principal source for international human rights law and a model for constitutional rights in many new national constitutions drafted since World War II.

UNIVERSALISM, OLD CHALLENGES, AND NEW REALITIES

Some observers have questioned whether regional arrangements are compatible with the human rights work of the United Nations or whether they are likely to diminish the value of that work and perhaps even undermine its effectiveness. Conventional wisdom says that if the universal and regional systems are formulated in such a way that they complement and reinforce each other, then they can and perhaps should coexist.

In different parts of the world, human rights issues emanating from the local environment have become increasingly important. Among these is the issue of women's rights in Islamic societies. Muslim states differ with regard to the legal status of women, and this fact has precipitated a wide-ranging debate about women in Islamic thought. In Russia and the former Soviet republics, privatization and the free market have resulted in the collapse of the social and economic rights guaranteed under the Soviet system. In addition, civil and political rights have not been sufficiently codified, and the judicial system is inadequate for dealing with violations of human rights.

Recently, there has been debate regarding whether differences in Asian and Western cultural values have been used to justify authoritarian Asian regimes. States such as Singapore, China, Malaysia, and Indonesia are the foremost advocates of the argument that their historical and cultural legacy is qualitatively different from that of the West. Some in those nations claim that the contemporary human rights laws and systems that the world has inherited are based on the Western notion and understanding of human rights issues, which differ from those of Asia.

Finally, in recent years, a new social reality and phenomenon has swept the world—globalization. The new world order created by globalization is threatening social and economic rights in both Western and non-Western countries. Ironically, in an era when consensus is emerging on the scope and substance of human rights, it is also being threatened by global forces against which both states and human rights activists are powerless. At the same time, however, there are some hopeful signs: As the world gains a greater visibility and understanding of the need for human rights, more and more people and groups are endeavoring to do something about it.

—Divya Gupta

See also Constitution of the United States; Geneva Conventions; Genocide; Globalization and National Security; Humanitarian Aid; Humanitarian Intervention; International Law; Japanese Internment; Peacekeeping Operations; UN Peacekeeping; United Nations

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REFLECTIONS

The Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789)

The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, one of the fundaments of the French Revolution, defined a set of individual rights and collective rights of the people in relation to the state. It was adopted on August 26, 1789, by the National Constituent Assembly, as the first step toward writing a constitution.

At the time the declaration was drafted, it was intended as part of a transition from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. France soon became a republic, but this document remained fundamental. The principles set forth in the French declaration, such as the ideas of individualism and the separation of powers, came from the philosophical and political principles of the Age of Enlightenment. The declaration also may have been based and modeled on the Virginia Declaration of Rights, developed by George Mason, and on the U.S. Declaration of Independence of 1776.

The French declaration contained the seed of a radical reordering of society. A mere six weeks after the storming of the Bastille in Paris and barely three weeks after the abolition of feudalism, the declaration put forward a doctrine of popular sovereignty and equal opportunity. It also proclaimed a number of entitlements that are now generally called civil and political rights. Its most famous borrowed concept appears in the second article, which states, "The aim of all political association is the conservation of the *natural and inalienable rights* of man. These are rights: liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression." The declaration and the philosophy that it enshrined inspired liberals throughout Europe.

HUMANITARIAN AID

Assistance provided to the victims of natural disasters, conflicts, or social unrest. Humanitarian aid typically includes essential goods such as food, fresh water, emergency shelter, medical supplies, fuel, and clothing. However, humanitarian aid may also represent preventive assistance to protect individuals from further catastrophes.

True humanitarian aid is seen as assistance that has no political context or conditions attached and must be provided without discrimination on any grounds. The sole mission should be to prevent or alleviate human suffering according to the needs of the victims. The United Nations is the leading organizer of humanitarian aid, sponsoring such efforts as the UN High Commission for Refugees, the UN Children's Fund, and the World Food Program. Other organizations such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and CARE also underwrite large-scale humanitarian aid missions.

During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union often used humanitarian aid programs to entice potential political allies. The promise of aid—or the threat of losing aid—could be a powerful tool to maintain influence over client nations. Since the end of the Cold War, the amount of humanitarian assistance provided by wealthy nations has increased dramatically, along with debates over how best to provide that assistance. Over the past decade, some aid organizations have attempted to create a system of standards to professionalize the aid industry and to make it more responsible and accountable to both donors and recipients, mainly in the area of disaster relief.

The best-known endeavor along these lines is the Sphere Project, which was launched in 1997 by a group of humanitarian nongovernmental organizations and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movements. The project includes a handbook with a humanitarian charter, a code of conduct, and list of minimum standards that should be met during the provision of aid. The charter is based on international legal principles and includes the right to a life with dignity, the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, and a prohibition on returning refugees to unsafe areas.

Some aid organizations, however, have criticized the Sphere Project for a variety of reasons. They contend

A U.S. Army officer of the 82nd Airborne Division (Chief Warrant Officer Henriquez) handing a box of humanitarian aid and rations to a child in central Iraq in April 2003. These supplies were part of a large humanitarian aid effort aimed at alleviating the suffering of Iraqi civilians during the 2003 Iraq War. Providing such humanitarian aid has always been a crucial component of military activities, both during and after armed conflicts.

Source: U.S. Army.

that different situations on the ground mean that universal standards are useless; that the humanitarian charter creates a right to assistance that is not supported by international law; and that the handbook stresses the technical aspects of aid provision far too much. These debates illustrate some of the complex issues involved in providing aid in times of war and disaster.

See also Foreign Aid; United Nations

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

The threat or use of force by an outside party to protect the citizens of a state from large-scale violations of their human rights. Humanitarian intervention has

supporters as well as detractors. Critics of humanitarian intervention argue that no state or international institution should have the right to interfere in the sovereign, domestic affairs of another state, no matter how far the internal situation seems to have deteriorated or how many innocent people face extermination. They consider sovereignty a basic building block of the international system that should not be compromised.

Supporters argue that because all legitimate states now support human rights and share similar norms regarding humane treatment, issues of sovereignty have become irrelevant. They feel that human rights have become internationalized and can no longer be ignored by governments.

United Nations actions since the end of the Cold War reflect a growing acceptance of the concept of humanitarian intervention. Although Article 2 of the UN Charter explicitly forbids the United Nations from acting "in the domestic jurisdiction of any state," in reality the situation has moved beyond that narrow definition. On several occasions, the UN Security Council has judged some humanitarian crises as so dire and so much a "threat to international peace and security" that missions have been approved even in violation of a nation's sovereignty.

Most legal scholars believe that the UN Security Council has a legal right, but not a legal obligation, to act in defense of human rights, even in a sovereign country. Although moral reasons may demand action, most scholars would argue that states or international organizations have no right to act *without* Security Council authorization. Some theorists have broadened the definition of sovereignty, saying that sovereignty does provide some guarantees against outside intervention, but also automatically translates into a responsibility to protect the rights of one's citizens.

Even if there is general agreement that the modern era has seen greater acceptance of humanitarian intervention, critics charge that the United Nations has often taken too long to come to consensus and launched actions too late. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda is a case in point: The international community became involved only after hundreds of thousands of people had been slaughtered. Others remain skeptical that political differences among the permanent members of the Security Council can ever be overcome to an extent that the nations will consistently agree on acts of humanitarian intervention. Two recent examples are Chechnya—where Russian offensives have led to considerable human suffering, but Moscow

has insisted that the war is an internal matter—and the 1999 conflict in Kosovo.

In the run-up to the Kosovo conflict, China and Russia indicated that they would oppose any UN Security Council resolution authorizing force against Yugoslavia. As a result, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the main Western alliance, felt compelled to act and began what it labeled a humanitarian campaign to protect the ethnic Albanians.

The 78-day-long NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo—which was unauthorized by the UN Security Council, lacked international consensus, and was based on controversial legal principles—is viewed as a watershed in the development of humanitarian intervention. Importantly, the West's most powerful military alliance had launched a large-scale campaign, with ostensibly no ulterior motives other than preventing the mass violation of human rights.

However, experts continue to disagree over the conditions that should trigger such intervention and the legitimacy of such actions in general. Although some activists have pushed for the United Nations to pass an agreement to define the conditions that warrant armed humanitarian intervention, or even a new UN charter, others disagree. They argue that it would be difficult for a code of rules to gain acceptance amid differing political interests and moral interpretations. Even some backers of humanitarian intervention believe that such a code would be counterproductive because governments would only be able to agree on a least common denominator that would prompt action—and even then consensus would be difficult to reach.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, some analysts have written that humanitarian intervention has now taken a backseat to the war on terror. They see humanitarian intervention as a luxury that threatened states can no longer afford in such a dangerous world. Pressed to defend vital security interests, the Western powers may feel less compelled to expend resources to intercede in a sovereign state to defend human rights. Still, even after September 11, various governments have launched humanitarian actions in Africa (Congo, Liberia, and Ivory Coast) that have received UN Security Council approval. The debate over the guidelines for humanitarian intervention and over sovereignty is thus likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

See also Bosnia Intervention; Genocide; Human Rights; Interventionism; Kosovo Intervention; Somalia Intervention; United Nations; UN Peacekeeping

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HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. (1927–)

Eminent political scientist, Albert J. Weatherhead III University Professor at Harvard University, and chairman of the Harvard Academy of International and Area Studies. A prolific and often controversial writer, Huntington has written extensively and been professionally involved with issues concerning national security and strategy, civil-military relations, the political and economic development of less-developed countries, and American politics and political development. During 1986–87, he was president of the American Political Science Association. During 1977 and 1978, he served in the White House as coordinator of security planning for the National Security Council. He was also the founder and coeditor of the journal *Foreign Policy* for seven years.

His principal books include *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (1957), *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (1961), *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968), *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (1981), *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (1991), and *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order* (1996). He coauthored *Political Power: USA USSR* (1964), *The Crisis of Democracy* (1975), and *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries* (1976).

Among these works, perhaps the most controversial was *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of the World Order,* in which Huntington's main argument or hypothesis was that the fundamental source of conflict in the new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. He argued that great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. It is this worldview and central theme that Huntington

has tried to propagate repeatedly through his writings and that, in turn, has influenced thinking on vital issues of global interest, such as terrorism.

Some liberals, such as Edward Said, have critiqued Huntington and his idea of civilization and cultural clashes as overly simplistic and vast abstractions lacking informed analysis. In his most recent book, *Who We Are: Challenges to American National Identity*, Huntington toes the same line, going one step further to talk about division within America resulting from a seemingly disturbing cultural influx caused by mass Hispanic immigration. He argues that it will divide America into "two peoples, two cultures and two languages"—another clash of civilizations, in effect.

Although Huntington's writings have tended to spark controversy, some intellectuals give him credit for bravery with the pen. Even as he continues to be severely criticized and imaginatively insensitive for coining such phrases as "Islam's Bloody Borders," in a time of heightened international terrorist activity, his ideas on culture have found credibility in some intellectual and political quarters. Whether it is by default or to provide legitimacy to certain foreign policy, immigration policy, or the like is an open question for debate. In the end, the phrase "you can love him or loathe him, but not ignore him" seems apt in describing this controversial figure and writer.

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HUSSEIN, SADDAM (1937–)

See SADDAM HUSSEIN

HYPERPOWER

A nation that has enormously greater economic, political, or military supremacy than any other nation. The term *hyperpower* surfaced at the conclusion of the Cold War. It found its way into the modern lexicon during the 1990s, thanks to usage by French diplomats and foreign affairs analysts. The introduction of this term is an effort to describe the post-Soviet era, as well as what replaced the superpower dominance of international relations.

In today's *realpolitik*, the United States has a military strength comparable to the combined military strength of the next largest 17 nations. In cultural spheres it is also dominant. Thus, some observers have termed this era as one of the hyperpower and the first such global instance in world history. This new realignment of power has two constituent issues: How must the United States learn to wield its power responsibly? How must other powers learn to deal with the United States?

Some noted scholars have remarked that, although the United States has an enormous military advantage over its rivals, armed supremacy is not enough in today's global structure. It is only a matter of time, many suggest, before nations such as India and the People's Republic of China will join or even surpass the United States economically and, eventually, militarily as well. The European Union is already emerging as the next most likely superpower, and by some economic standards and measurements, it has already surpassed the United States.

I

IKLÉ, FRED (1924–)

Prominent security analyst and a high-ranking official in the administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. From 1973 to 1977, Iklé headed the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He served as undersecretary of defense for policy from 1981 to 1988. In the late 1980s, he cochaired the bipartisan Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. In 1975 and 1987, Iklé received the highest civilian award of the Department of Defense, the Distinguished Public Service Medal.

Iklé is generally seen as a proponent of relatively hawkish and conservative policies and was a high-profile opponent of the expansion eastward of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after the fall of communism in the 1990s. Iklé was one of the founders of the Project for the New American Century, a neoconservative group that has pushed for the United States to be more willing to use military power to further its aims. Outside of government, his career has included stints as a professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as head of the Social Science Department of the RAND Corporation, and as a distinguished scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Iklé is the author of several influential books and numerous articles on defense, foreign policy, and arms control, including *Every War Must End* (1971) and *The Social Impact of Bomb Destruction* (1958). His 1964 book, *How Nations Negotiate,* is viewed as a pioneer work in the modern study of international methods of negotiation. Iklé is also known for a seminal 1961 article about arms control published in the journal *Foreign Affairs.* In the article, Iklé questioned the ability of the international community to police violators of arms-control agreements.

See also Arms Control; Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Neoconservative

IMF
See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The impact of immigration and border-control policies on the national security of the United States. The relationship between immigration and national security has become an increasingly important issue for the United States following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The fact that the attacks were carried out by foreign nationals residing in the United States called into question the ability of the U.S. government to secure the nation's borders against terrorist threats.

Although the United States takes pride in being a nation of immigrants, public sentiment regarding immigration has often been driven by other factors, most notably economics. In times of economic expansion, immigrants are seen as an inexpensive and flexible labor source. Conversely, in times of recession, immigrants are often viewed more negatively and perceived as taking jobs away from Americans.

United States Border Patrol agents arresting Mexicans attempting to enter the United States illegally in the hills between Tijuana, Mexico, and San Diego, California. Since the nation's founding, immigrants have come to the United States seeking greater freedom and opportunities. Although most have come legally, illegal immigration, particularly from Mexico, has proven to be a vexing and complicated problem that has challenged the resources of federal and local officials.

Source: Corbis.

The terrorist attacks of September 11 raised another aspect of immigration—the potential for immigration to be a threat to national security. Such a concern has not been so strongly felt since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Shortly after that attack, the U.S. government put thousands of Japanese immigrants and U.S. citizens of Japanese descent into internment camps because the government feared they were a threat to U.S. national security.

Following September 11, damaging information emerged that suggested that many of the terrorists had slipped through an inefficient immigration system. Some had entered the United States as students yet did not pursue their studies; some had overstayed their visas; and some were known to be connected to terrorist organizations yet were allowed entry. The administration of President George W. Bush, fueled in part by rising anti-immigrant sentiment among the American public, responded by making significant changes to U.S. immigration policy. Most notably, the administration moved oversight of immigration from the

Department of Justice to the newly created Department of Homeland Security, a clear signal that immigration was no longer merely a social or economic issue but critical to U.S. national security.

The main concern about the immigration system is the fear that immigrants, particularly those of Middle Eastern descent, may be establishing terrorist cells within the United States and planning to attack America again. Other concerns include the bureaucratic inefficiency in the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Critics contend that the INS has allowed hundreds of thousands of foreigners to stay past the expiration of their visas or to remain in the United States for reasons other than those specified on their visas. Additional security concerns include the difficulty of adequately staffing the border patrols at the Mexican and Canadian borders. As the government is unable to monitor all border activity, the possibility for unauthorized entry of terrorists remains. Criticism of the INS led to a reorganization of the agency into the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS).

The crackdown on U.S. immigration in the name of national security has had unfortunate consequences for many immigrants, even those who have no suspected connection to terrorist organizations. One of the most striking stories is that of Benamar Benatta. As reported in *The Washington Post,* Benatta arrived in the United States shortly before September 11. He was fleeing Algeria, where continued ethnic violence and an oppressive military made life unbearable. He arrived in the United States on a six-month visa but was able to find employment and stayed beyond the expiration of his visa.

The week before the terrorist attacks, Benatta decided to go to Canada and apply for asylum. At the

Canadian border, Benatta was detained and shortly thereafter was transferred to a detention center in New York City. There, in the aftermath and frenzy of the World Trade Center attacks, he was detained in solitary confinement without being charged and without access to a lawyer. As a Muslim from Algeria, with a career history that included avionics and technology, Benatta was suspected of having connections to Islamic terrorist organizations.

Benatta was the target of mistreatment by the staff of the prison where he was detained. Guards scrawled "WTC" across his cell door, refused his right to shower for weeks, and were physically rough during his transportation around the cell block. Although the FBI cleared Benatta on November 15, 2001, of any connections to terrorism, as of early 2005 he was still in prison, awaiting a deportation hearing, unable to post bond.

Benatta's experiences illustrate the delicate balance between tightening controls on immigration in an effort to enhance national security and the real potential of violating the rights of the majority of immigrants who have no connections to terrorism. The debate over this balance continues in discussions of the USA PATRIOT Act, which expands the authority of federal and local investigators and requires increased tracking of immigrants. Although the American government declares a continued openness to immigration, it is clear that both the government and the American public want better measures in place to prevent future terrorist attacks on American soil.

See also Border and Transportation Security; Border Policy; Civil Liberties; Japanese Internment; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Terrorism, War on International; Terrorists, Islamic

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IMMIGRATION POLICY

United States policy toward foreign visitors and those seeking residency and/or citizenship in the United States. Significant changes to immigration policy have occurred since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

Immigration policy in the United States has a historical tradition of managed openness. During the end of the 19th century and into the 20th century, the United States allowed nearly 1 million immigrants to enter every year. Although immigration rates declined during the interwar period, immigration has been steadily increasing since 1930, with current rates of immigration approaching 700,000 individuals entering per year.

SEPTEMBER 11 AND IMMIGRATION POLICY

The terrorist attacks of September 11 caused a dramatic shift in U.S. immigration policy, the most notable of which was the reorganization of the agency that oversees immigration, the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS). Prior to 2001, the INS was responsible both for providing services to immigrants and for enforcing immigration law. In 2003, the INS was restructured and became the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS). Oversight of the BCIS was also changed; whereas the Department of Justice was formerly responsible for overseeing immigration, the BCIS is now a bureau under the Department of Homeland Security.

In addition, the restructuring led to a splitting of responsibilities that meant the agencies were responsible for providing services for immigrants were separate from those entrusted with enforcing immigration law. This restructuring was overwhelmingly supported by U.S. legislators and the general public amid long-standing concerns about the inefficiency of the INS, as well as renewed fears about immigration as a security threat in the wake of the terrorist attacks.

Additional changes in policy continued after September 11, as immigration officials began a crackdown on foreigners who had overstayed their visas. Further, nearly 5,000 Muslim men were contacted and detained for questioning with the intent of gathering more information about possible terrorist activities.

The Department of Homeland Security also launched a program whereby all visitors from a list of predominantly Muslim nations were required to provide fingerprints upon entry into the United States. These individuals also were required to provide periodic updates about their whereabouts. Foreigners arriving on student visas were subject to stricter requirements in the application process for student visas, as well as a mandate that all students show evidence of enrollment at an American university prior to securing a student visa.

Other changes in immigration policy include the ability of local law-enforcement officials to enforce immigration laws, a task previously reserved for federal law-enforcement officials. Also, ongoing legal battles have emerged regarding whether the government has the right to closed courtrooms when engaging in deportation hearings.

THE PATRIOT ACT

The most significant piece of new legislation affecting immigration policy is the USA PATRIOT Act. The PATRIOT Act was passed 45 days after the September 11 attacks and significantly expanded the search, monitoring, and detention rights of federal law enforcement officials. Most notably, the FBI was granted access to citizens' medical and library records and gained expanded discretion in conducting secret searches, and federal law-enforcement officials now have the right to detain noncitizens for extended periods of time based on suspicion without formally charging them. Further, the PATRIOT Act redefined terrorism to include domestic terrorism, a change that allows for the increased surveillance of domestic political organizations.

IMMIGRATION POLICY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

Reactions to the changes in immigration policy have been mixed within the United States. In the initial period after the September 11 attacks, a study conducted by the Center for Immigration indicated that many Americans supported a temporary ban on immigration and were in favor of significantly tighter immigration controls.

However, there have been challenges to the new policies, with many feeling that the policies severely infringe upon civil liberties. The American Civil Liberties Union in particular has challenged practices of ethnic and racial profiling, the lack of proper judicial processes, the curtailing of speech protected under the First Amendment, and increased surveillance that infringes upon the privacy of individuals.

OTHER ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION POLICY

One final area of immigration policy that is receiving increased political attention involves managing the large number of emigrants, both legal and illegal, from Mexico to the United States. Prior to September 11, President George W. Bush and Mexican president Vicente Fox had been discussing an amnesty program for those undocumented Mexican workers who were already residing in the United States.

The terrorist attacks put a halt to these talks, but in January 2004, President Bush again raised the issue of granting so-called guest-worker status to these individuals. Guest-worker status would not be a general amnesty program but rather is designed to allow Mexican workers to obtain legal status in the United States on a temporary basis.

Debates surrounding this proposal are still heavily influenced by the anti-immigrant sentiment that followed the terrorist attacks, as well as the economic downturn that coincided with the attacks. Immigration remains a controversial and critical issue for the 21st century as the United States tries to balance national security, the economy, and civil liberties.

See also Civil Liberties; Immigration and National Security

IMPERIALISM

Formal or informal expansionist process in which a stronger state gains territorial, political, and economic hegemony or control over a weaker state. Imperialism has taken, and continues to take, many forms and can apply to political, economic, or cultural domains. In each case, the central notion is the creation of empire—the expansion of an already large sphere of influence. The stronger state feels the need to expand in order to control a large territory. Although this territory may be multiethnic and multinational, the peoples of conquered territories remain oriented toward the imperial nation and serve its interests.

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF IMPERIALISM

An imperialist nation is one that seeks to build an empire, gaining in national security, wealth, prestige, and power. The nation (known by political scientists as the *core)* looks outside its territory (to the *periphery*) to achieve these ends and uses force, typically in the form of military power, to realize its ambitions.

In some cases, this use of military force means invading another sovereign state. In other cases, the target of the expansion is not another nation—although

it may be occupied by a people (or many peoples) with their own institutions and societies. In this instance, the imperialist power may consider the territory unclaimed land because it has no formal government. Once a territory has been conquered, the imperialist power establishes a legal, military, political, and economic presence that results in the core nation's dominance.

Legally, the imperialist power formally claims the land as its own, gives it a name, delineates its boundaries, and takes responsibility for it on the international scene. The conquered land becomes part of the nation, and any threat to it by a hostile power is regarded as an attack on the nation itself. The people in the territory, however, may or may not be treated as full and equal citizens.

In some cases, the imperialist power may install a full administrative structure in the conquered state. This was the strategy adopted by France toward its African colonies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. However, the imperial power may merely send a trained group of administrators to the colony and allow cooperative local leaders to manage local affairs. The British adopted this strategy of l*imited rule* in their colonial holdings.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF IMPERIALISM

Economically, the imperialist relationship is inherently exploitative—the core power extracts one or several raw materials from the conquered territory for its own enrichment. Financial or structural investment in the territory is generally confined to obtaining these raw materials. It often does not include the development of infrastructure, such as financial institutions, roads, or transportation systems. Imperialism is often seen as *monopolistic capitalism* because the conquered territories are obliged to tailor their economic output to the specifications of the imperialist core.

Societal relations between the core and the periphery are likewise based on dominance and subordination. The people in the core consider themselves superior to the conquered peoples of the periphery. The core often tries to assert that people in the periphery lack the intelligence or ability to govern themselves properly. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, European imperialist powers went so far as to say that imperial rule actually served the interests of conquered peoples.

In all cases of imperialism, the core retains control over the foreign affairs of peripheral regions and demands at least nominal recognition of its dominance. It also controls money-raising and military endeavors. Nevertheless, some peripheral territories can gain substantial or total domestic autonomy and even constitutions (such as Canada under the British Empire). These quasi-colonies are still substantially influenced by the imperial core, and there is often a strong trade relationship between the two.

U.S. IMPERIALISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Historically, the term *imperialism* has been used to refer to the expansion of Western European nations within Europe and in other parts of the globe. However, beginning in the late 1800s, the United States also became an imperial power. As a result of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States gained control of former Spanish colonies in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. During the early 20th century, the United States acquired island holdings in parts of the Pacific and intervened actively in Latin American political affairs. The United States used its political and military might to back pro-American authoritarian regimes in several Latin American states.

After World War II, the threat of Soviet expansion led the United States to become more deeply involved in imperial politics. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) took part in overthrowing several foreign regimes considered unfriendly to the United States and replacing them with pro-Western rulers. This occurred in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1956, the Congo in 1960, and Chile in 1972, to name just a few examples. Although the United States never invaded or occupied these countries, it used its superior power to force them to conform to U.S. wishes. This form of imperialism guided both U.S. and Soviet policy during the Cold War.

Imperialist policies inevitably lead to resistance in the conquered territory, and often to revolution. The European colonial powers faced continual armed uprisings throughout their colonial rule in Africa. Following World War II, France refused to abandon its colonies in North Africa and Southeast Asia. As a result, the French fought two bitter colonial wars in Vietnam in the 1950s and in Algeria in the 1960s. In both cases, the conflicts ended in the colonies achieving independence only after much bloodshed.

When conquered territories overthrow their colonial masters, the new government often becomes a bitter foe of the former colonial power. Iran is a case in point. The U.S.-installed leader, Reza Shah Pahlavi, ruled Iran from 1953 to 1979, when he was deposed by Islamic militants. The Iranian government that replaced the shah has been an enemy of the United States since that time.

Since the end of the Cold War, economic and cultural hegemony have been described as modern forms of imperialism. For example, the prevalence of the ideas of free trade, capitalism, and liberal markets is sometimes regarded as economic imperialism by nations that believe these practices benefit rich nations at the expense of poorer nations. In addition, parts of the developing world today feel that the export of Western culture such as films, music, food, values, mores, and attitudes, is destroying indigenous cultures.

In the Middle East, the combination of Western cultural imperialism and political influence over local governments has produced an especially strong backlash. Islamic militants blame the United States and Europe for propping up corrupt and undemocratic Middle Eastern regimes while trying to force Western secular culture on the Islamic world. Much of the terrorism directed at the United States is a reaction to what Muslims see as American imperialism. For many Muslims, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 confirmed their suspicions that the United States wishes to subjugate the Islamic world.

As the example of the United States illustrates, a nation need not physically conquer and occupy a territory to pursue a policy of imperialism. The key is expanding the nation's influence and power, whether militarily, politically, or culturally. Just as importantly, resistance to imperialism does not arise solely as a reaction to a military presence. Indirect imperialism is today just as likely to arouse resentment and resistance as would military occupation.

See also Client State; Colonialism; Decolonization; Geopolitics; Hegemony; Sovereignty

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IN RE TERRITO (1946)

United States court case on the issue of prisoner-of-war status, which revolved around the capture of an American-born Italian who served in the Italian army during World War II. Gaetano Territo, an American-born Italian serving in the Italian army, was captured and taken prisoner by the U.S. Army. After his capture, he was transferred from a prison facility in Italy to a prisoner-of-war camp in California. At some point after his arrival in the United States, Territo filed a petition in which he claimed that, because he had been born in the United States, his imprisonment on American soil, without formal criminal charges, was contrary to law. He sought a writ of habeas corpus, charging that he was being held illegally as a prisoner of war.

Territo sought to have his case heard in a court in the United States. A U.S. appeals court ruled that "all persons who are active in opposing an army in war may be captured and except for spies and other non-uniformed plotters and actors for the enemy are prisoners of war." The U.S. government had, therefore, classified Territo as a prisoner of war, a category that took precedence over his American citizenship, and he could not seek legal redress in the manner of an American citizen. Territo was refused release and later deported.

In re Territo has taken on prominence in recent years, because it is one of the cases that the U.S. government has cited to allow it to jail, without trial, U.S. citizens allegedly connected with the Taliban or the terrorist network of al-Qaeda. Among these U.S. citizens was suspected terrorist Jose Padilla (Abdullah al-Mujahir), who was arrested in Chicago in May 2002 for his alleged role in a plot to detonate a so-called dirty bomb.

After his capture, the government classified Padilla as an enemy combatant and transferred his case to the Department of Defense from the Department of Justice. Some critics of U.S. actions have argued that American citizens, regardless of the situation, should be accorded the same rights as other citizens. They claim that detainees such as Padilla should at least be allowed an evidentiary hearing, as was Gaetano Territo, who was represented by counsel and allowed to testify on his own behalf.

See also Dirty Bomb; *Ex Parte Quirin*; Terrorism, War on International

INADVERTENT WAR

The possibility of entering accidentally, or inadvertently, into a military conflict. The term *inadvertent war* is typically used with reference to an unintended nuclear war.

The mass development and deployment of nuclear weapons during the arms race created a situation in which large numbers of missiles were set to be activated automatically in case of a first strike by an enemy. This situation could lead to a nightmarish scenario in which a rogue state launches a nuclear attack against a world power possessing large nuclear armaments. Such an attack would then provoke a response by another well-armed nation, setting off global catastrophe. The devastating impact and speed of modern weaponry has added to the gravity of such a scenario, as nuclear powers would need to react quickly if attacked. This leaves no time for confirmation of who the attacker is or what has motivated the strike.

An additional scenario is the accidental or deliberate initiation of a nuclear strike, due either to technical malfunction or the actions of a subordinate acting without orders. Once again, the highly technical nature of modern nuclear weapons makes this scenario problematic and, according to some experts, not entirely unlikely.

As the infrastructure of the former superpower Russia continues to deteriorate, alarm over the possibility of inadvertent war has grown. The most common suggestion for avoiding the possibility of such a situation is the de-alerting of nuclear weapons. This may be done in a variety of ways, ranging from storing warheads separately from their delivery systems, to removing the guidance systems. The problem of global terrorism has made the prospect of inadvertent war between established states even more immediate, as fears mount that a terrorist group might one day attempt to use a nuclear weapon.

See also First Strike; Nuclear Proliferation

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INCHON LANDING (1950)

Amphibious invasion of the South Korean city of Inchon by United Nations (UN) forces on September 15, 1950. The Inchon landing was intended to cut North Korean lines of supply and retreat and relieve the pressure on beleaguered South Korean forces in the city of Pusan. The operation was led by U.S. General Douglas MacArthur and conducted primarily by U.S. Marines. This daring assault on a target with difficult tides and high seawalls is considered one of the most successful amphibious landings in military history.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

At the end of World War II, the Korean peninsula was divided at the 38th parallel between a communist, Soviet-controlled North Korea and a capitalist, yet impoverished and poorly defended, South Korea. United States allies, including South Korea, were at the time under the protective security umbrella of the United States. In a January 1950 speech, however, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson excluded South Korea from this defensive perimeter.

Acheson's announcement served as a green light to North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, who was intent on reuniting the Korean peninsula under communist domination. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean People's Army stormed across the 38th parallel and overwhelmed the poorly equipped South Korean forces. United States troops in occupied Japan were quickly rushed to South Korea to stem the invasion. The North Korean army, however, pushed both South Korean and U.S. forces back to a defensive perimeter around the city of Pusan.

Less than a week after the North Korean attack, General Douglas MacArthur began planning an amphibious assault to retake Seoul, the capital of South Korea. United States Marine amphibious units, under the command of Army Major General Edward Almond, would spearhead the landing, supported by some South Korean and other international forces under the auspices of the United Nations. Clandestine scouting of the initial landing site was followed by naval and air bombardment two days before the September 15 invasion date.

THE INVASION

On September 13, 1950, U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers opened fire on North Korean targets in

Inchon Harbor, accompanied by aerial bombardment from four aircraft carriers. Two days later, elements of the U.S. Fifth Marine Regiment landed at 5:00 a.m. and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. The remaining troops of the Fifth Marines landed with the afternoon high tides. At the same time, the U.S. First Marine Regiment landed on its assigned beach with relatively few casualties.

By September 19, the Port of Inchon was firmly under the control of UN forces, which inflicted heavy losses on retreating North Korean troops. Seoul was captured eight days later. The Inchon landing shifted momentum in the war to UN forces, who immediately began a massive counterattack against the North Koreans. Led by U.S. units, UN troops drove the North Koreans back to the Yalu River, which forms the northwestern boundary between North Korea and China.

AFTERMATH

The rapid collapse of the North Korean army alarmed the Chinese, who feared it might lead to a U.S. invasion of China. As the UN troops arrived at the Yalu River, communist Chinese forces prepared to meet them. On October 19, Chinese troops swarmed across the river, sending the UN forces into their own headlong retreat. The Korean peninsula would witness two and a half more years of bloody seesaw fighting before the signing of a cease-fire between the combatants ended the conflict on July 27, 1953.

The Inchon landings did not win the war for UN forces, but they almost certainly prevented a North Korean victory. They also remain a textbook example of a successful, high-risk amphibious landing that played a decisive role in the outcome of a major conflict.

See also Amphibious Warfare; China and U.S. Policy; Korea, North and South; Korean War; MacArthur, Douglas

INCOME DISPARITY, GLOBAL

Refers to the increasing gap between the wealth of first-world nations (the wealthy industrialized nations) and the wealth of developing nations. *Global income disparity* can also refer to the increasing gap between individual incomes among the wealthy and the impoverished in a global context.

There is little debate that the income disparity has increased substantially in the last three decades. Until the early 1970s, the trend for individual incomes in developed, industrialized countries was one of both growth and increasing equality. In the mid-1970s, this trend of increasing equality was sharply reversed, however. Whereas in the mid-1970s, the average income of the wealthiest 5% of Americans was 7 times that of the poorest 40%, by 1995, the wealthiest 5% had incomes that were 10 times that of the bottom 40%. This pattern of increasing income inequality also occurred in the United Kingdom and, to a much lesser degree, in other Western European countries.

During the same period that individual income inequality was increasing, so too was the gap between wealthy states and developing states. The current ratio between the average income of wealthy nations and the average income in developing nations is 1:98, a notable increase from the 1:87 ratio of two decades ago. In simple terms, both within countries and between countries, the wealthy are getting much wealthier and the poor are getting poorer.

REASONS FOR INCREASING INCOME INEQUALITY

There are several opinions as to why global income inequality is increasing. Many experts cite the current organization of international trade. In the last two decades, developed countries have worked very hard to force open the borders of developing countries and decrease the system of tariffs and quotas that had previously made imports expensive in these developing nations. At the same time, Western countries have been slow in removing their own barriers to imports from these developing countries.

This dynamic has been particularly apparent in agriculture, as Western subsidies to domestic farmers make foreign imports of agricultural products unattractive to the domestic markets. Given that nearly 70% of developing countries rely on agricultural products as their main source of income, the difficulty in exporting agricultural products to the West has made economic growth difficult.

Other explanations for the increasing global income disparity emphasize the inability of the primarily unskilled labor force of developing nations to effectively capitalize on the rapid advances in productivity and technology. Most developing countries, with rapidly increasing populations and limited educational

opportunities, are incapable of developing their industries to be capable of the sort of global competitiveness necessary to increase their national wealth.

RESPONSES TO GLOBAL INCOME DISPARITY

The increase in global income disparity has been of particular concern for developing nations, the United Nations, and certain nongovernmental organizations (such as Oxfam) and labor organizations. Others in the international community, including developed countries, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), while recognizing the increase in global income disparity, have chosen to focus instead on the absolute income gains made by some developing countries, particularly in Southeast Asia.

As the perception of the implications of global income disparity varies among members of the international community, opinions on what, if anything, should be done in response also vary considerably. Developing nations, particularly in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, have pushed strongly for trade reforms. They wish to see reforms in the areas of developed-nation agricultural subsidies, as well as the abolishment of continuing restrictions on the import of textiles and other light-manufacturing goods. International labor organizations have focused on the harmonization of workers' rights and wages, arguing that global income disparity will be best reduced by preventing corporations from paying foreign workers pennies a day for their labor.

Although most developed countries and international economic institutions are less concerned with the widening relative income gap, they are nonetheless attempting to address the overall poor economic performance of developing countries and working to help the 60% of the world population that lives on less than $1 a day. Their recommendations generally focus on export-driven growth—that is, encouraging developing countries to produce products for export, trade them on the international market, and reinvest their earnings in domestic development. In order for this strategy to work, the international market needs to be significantly open to their exports. In particular, international economic institutions have encouraged developing nations to take the profits they earn through exports and reinvest them in domestic infrastructure and the creation of a skilled workforce.

GLOBAL INCOME DISPARITY AS A POLITICAL ISSUE

In addition to recognizing increasing global income disparity as an economic issue, it must be recognized as a political issue. Much political controversy over the increasing global income disparity has erupted in recent years. Protests against the WTO in Seattle, opposition to the expansion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the rest of Latin America, and, according to some, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, all trace their origins back to a global discontent at the increasing gap between the rich and the poor.

See also International Monetary Fund; North American Free Trade Agreement; World Bank

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INDIA–PAKISTAN RIVALRY

Rivalry that commenced in 1947 when Great Britain freed its vast colony on the Indian subcontinent, called the *Raj,* and divided it into two separate nations, the largely Hindu India and the predominantly Muslim Pakistan. Great Britain primarily used a religious division to draw the line of partition—the majority of Pakistanis were Muslims, whereas the majority of Indians were Hindus. However, the division between the two nations and its peoples was not absolute; millions of Muslims still lived in the large expanse now formally recognized as India.

At first, tremendous celebrations erupted across the subcontinent as both Muslims and Hindus embraced their newfound freedom. However, religious tensions, suppressed by more than a century of British control, soon erupted. Riots broke out across the Punjab, India's western region, soon after independence. Between August and November 1947, nearly 1 million people, mostly Muslim, were slaughtered, and more than 10 million refugees crossed over the new border, Hindus fleeing into India and Muslims retreating into Pakistan.

Even after this exodus, the region remained volatile because the British had made another crucial error

when they divided the region. Before British rule, India had not existed as an autonomous nation. Instead, numerous kingdoms had occupied the subcontinent throughout its history. At times, empires such as that of the *moguls* dominated the region; but individual kingdoms generally retained some degree of autonomy nevertheless. After partition, however, these various kingdoms were placed under Pakistani or Indian control. In most cases, the former kingdoms readily joined one of the two new nations. However, the situation in the border kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir remained unresolved.

The case of Jammu and Kashmir was unique. The kingdom featured a Hindu ruler, a mostly Muslim population, and a desire to keep its independence. However, the mountainous, beautiful region proved highly attractive to both Pakistan and India. In October 1947, Pakistani partisans crossed the border into India and captured the Kashmir valley. The kingdom's Hindu maharaja, fearing for his life, forsook the independence of his kingdom and gave control to India. Indian troops parachuted into the Kashmir capital of Srinagar on October 26, 1947, to defend the area from Pakistan.

Although war was never officially declared, the two sides fought back and forth for nearly a year. In late 1948, the United Nations arranged a cease-fire between the antagonists. Pakistan was granted control of the mountains around the Kashmir valley and the western end of the valley, and India kept control of the rest of the valley, as well as two roads providing access to it.

The United Nations, however, was unable to permanently resolve the conflict. India continued to claim that the maharaja had surrendered control of the entire kingdom. Pakistan, on the other hand, denied the maharaja's authority to make the surrender and argued that because of Kashmir's largely Muslim population, the region should be merged with Pakistan.

Resentment over the disputed region festered for the next 17 years, fueled by events such as Pakistan's supposed involvement in the assassination of the Indian leader Mahatma Gandhi. In January 1965, Pakistan invaded the Indian state of Gujarat, in a separate border conflict. A cease-fire soon ensued, but Pakistani troops next reentered Indian-controlled Kashmir. A brief war followed, but neither side was able to gain an advantage. Within two months, both sides had again accepted a tenuous cease-fire.

During the next three decades, no large-scale hostilities erupted between India and Pakistan, but the struggle within Kashmir continued. Insurgent Muslim groups, supported by the Pakistani intelligence service, conducted terrorist strikes against the Indian government in Kashmir. In return, the Indian military declared martial law in Kashmir and brutally suppressed the civil rights of the region's Muslim citizens. Anyone suspected of aiding the insurgents, even if such suspicions were unfounded, was imprisoned, tortured, or executed.

The rivalry between the two nations intensified in 1974, when India successfully tested a nuclear device. This test initiated a nuclear arms race between the two rivals and immediately gave the rivalry a greater international impact, as the arms race threatened to spill over into the volatile Middle East. Although Pakistan refused to acknowledge that it was developing its own nuclear program, observers around the world feared that one existed. Their fears were confirmed in 1998 when the Indian government again pressed the issue by testing an actual nuclear weapon. Pakistan soon responded with its own test, proving its nuclear capabilities and raising the threat of a nuclear war on the subcontinent.

Throughout this entire period, the United States had maintained a keen, but evolving, interest in the rivalry between the two countries. Relations between the United States and India were initially strained soon after the subcontinent gained its independence, because Indian troops had refused to participate in World War II. Consequently, the United States favored Pakistan when the conflict between Pakistan and India first developed.

The Indian government, for its part, had originally adopted a policy of international neutrality, but after the United States commenced diplomatic relations with Pakistan, India readily accepted aid from the Soviet Union and China despite its status as a democracy. In this manner, the Indian subcontinent became an early theater of the Cold War.

These affiliations changed, however, in 1962 after the outbreak of the Sino-Indian War. India asked the United States for assistance in its struggle against China. The United States responded with generous sales of military equipment. Pakistan, meanwhile, alarmed by the United States' apparent shift toward India, quickly allied itself with China, thereby reversing the Cold War relationships that had originally existed.

In 1979, the Cold War caused these allegiances to shift once again. On December 25, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to support that nation's crumbling communist government. To counter the Soviet invasion, the United States used the Pakistani intelligence service to funnel vast amounts of

weapons and financial aid to Afghan rebels. India, fearing that the United States had once again shifted its favor to Pakistan, resumed a warmer relationship with the Soviet Union.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the appearance of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent permanently altered the role of the United States in the region. As the world's only remaining superpower, the United States had a vested interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and fostering peace between the two rivals. Then the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, increased the United States' stake in the region.

In the aftermath of September 11, Pakistan became one of the United States' key allies in the effort first to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan, then to hunt members of the terrorist group al-Qaeda. At the same time, the United States declared its intent to foster democracy across Asia. As the largest democracy in the world, India quickly became a vital partner in this effort.

The United States' influence in the region was most evident in 2002. The conflict in Kashmir worsened once again that year, and both India and Pakistan amassed their forces along the border of the region. The threat of a nuclear war between the two nations seemed quite real. The United States, however, exerted extreme diplomatic pressure and forced both sides to retreat from the brink of a nuclear exchange. Although the conflict in Kashmir remains unresolved, Pakistan and India have recently resumed diplomatic relations and have pledged to find a peaceful solution to the dispute.

See also Cold War; Nuclear Proliferation

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INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE
See HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT)

INF TREATY

Agreement between the United States and Soviet Union, signed in 1987, that requires destruction of both nations' ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges from 300 to 3,300 miles (500 and 5,500 km), their launchers, and associated support structures and equipment. In the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union began replacing its older intermediate-range ballistic missiles with the new SS-20, which was mobile, accurate, and easy to move and conceal. It also carried three independently targetable warheads rather than the single warheads of earlier Soviet missiles. With a range of 3,000 miles (5,000 km), the SS-20 could hit targets in Western Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, most of Asia, Southeast Asia, and even Alaska.

In late 1979, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) responded with a strategy to counter the Soviet deployment of SS-20s. One part of the strategy featured negotiations with the Soviet Union to reduce intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) to the lowest possible levels. The second part involved deployment of more than 400 U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles and 108 intermediate-range Pershing II ballistic missiles in Western Europe, beginning in December 1983.

Despite initial resistance, the Soviet Union agreed to take part in discussions to limit INF, in the fall of 1980. The United States demanded that the agreement must (a) limit the size of U.S. and Soviet INF at an equal level; (b) exclude British and French missiles; (c) limit missile-system deployments on a global basis; (d) not compromise NATO's conventional defense capability; and (e) be verifiable. However, negotiations stalled over differences between the U.S. and Soviet positions, and the Soviets walked out of the talks on November 23, 1983.

In late 1985, the Soviet Union proposed an agreement that would permit some U.S. cruise missiles in Europe, along with SS-20 warheads equal to the sum of all warheads on U.S., British, and French systems combined. The Soviets also offered to freeze INF systems in Asia. The following October, U.S. president Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met in Reykjavik, Iceland, and agreed to a global limit of 100 intermediate-range systems apiece capable of carrying nuclear warheads. None of the systems would be deployed in Europe. The Soviet Union also proposed a freeze on shorter-range missile deployments and agreed to on-site verification.

In June 1987, after a series of offers and counteroffers, President Reagan proposed the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet shorter-range missile systems. On July 22 of that year, Gorbachev agreed to a *double global zero* treaty to eliminate both intermediate-range

and short-range missiles. The treaty was signed at a summit meeting in Washington, DC, on December 8.

After the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States sought to ensure continued compliance with the INF Treaty among the former Soviet republics. Six of those 12 states—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan—have INF facilities on their territory. All are active participants in the treaty except Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Because each of those countries has only one inspectable site on its territory, they play a less active role in the treaty, with the consent of the active parties.

See also Arms Control; Ballistic Missiles; Cruise Missile; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles; Nuclear Weapons; Reagan, Ronald, and National Policy; Treaties; Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy

INFECTIOUS DISEASE

Illness caused by microbes, or germs, including viruses, bacteria, and certain multicellular organisms. New and reemerging infectious diseases pose a rising global health threat and will complicate U.S. and global security in the coming years. These diseases endanger U.S. citizens at home and abroad, threaten U.S. armed forces deployed overseas, and exacerbate social and political instability in key countries and regions in which the United States has significant interests.

Infectious diseases are a leading cause of death, accounting for one-quarter to one-third of the estimated 55 million deaths worldwide in 2002. The spread of infectious disease results from human behavior—changing lifestyles and land-use patterns, increased trade and travel, and inappropriate use of antibiotic drugs—as well as from mutations in microbes.

In the past 30 years, 20 previously well-known diseases, including tuberculosis (TB), malaria, and cholera, have reemerged or spread into new geographic areas, often in more virulent and drug-resistant forms. During the same time period, at least 30 previously unknown disease agents have been identified, including HIV, Ebola, hepatitis C, West Nile virus, and hantavirus, for which no cures are available.

Four of the seven biggest killers worldwide—TB, malaria, hepatitis, and, in particular, HIV/AIDS—continue to spread. They are also increasingly becoming resistant to drugs, making treatment ever less successful. HIV/AIDS and TB are likely to account for the overwhelming majority of deaths from infectious diseases in developing countries by 2020. The other major killers—acute lower-respiratory infections such as pneumonia and influenza, diarrheal diseases, and measles—appear to have stabilized in most areas, although the infection rate remains high.

The risk from infectious disease remains comparatively low in the United States, but diseases originating outside U.S. borders are often introduced by international travelers, immigrants, returning U.S. military personnel, or imported animals and foodstuffs. West Nile virus is an example of a disease that originated outside the United States and within a few short years of its introduction has become endemic in large parts of the country.

The threat from a previously unknown pathogen remains very real in the United States. In addition, HIV/AIDS, hepatitis C, TB, and new, more lethal variants of influenza are threatening or continue to threaten larger segments of the population. Hospital-acquired infections and foodborne illnesses also pose a danger. A risk from bioterrorism also exists, as shown by the anthrax attacks following the September 11 terrorist attacks.

Development of an effective global surveillance and response system to detect infectious disease is probably at least a decade away. Reasons for this delay include inadequate coordination and funding at the international level and lack of capacity, funds, and commitment in many developing and former communist states. Although overall global health care capacity has improved substantially in recent decades, the gap between rich and poor countries in the availability and quality of health care continues to widen.

The relationship between disease and political instability is indirect but real. A persistent infectious-disease burden aggravates and, in some cases, may even provoke economic decay, social fragmentation, and political destabilization. These effects are of particular concern in developing nations that have been hardest hit by the increase in infectious disease, especially HIV/AIDS, and in some of the former communist countries.

The economic costs of infectious diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS and malaria, are already significant. Their increasingly heavy toll on productivity, profitability, and foreign investment will be reflected in growing economic losses, especially in some sub-Saharan African countries. Because HIV and its associated

diseases reduce life expectancy by as much as 30 years and kill as many as a quarter of some African countries' populations in just over a decade or less, tens of millions of orphans are left behind. Some of the hardest-hit countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and possibly in south and Southeast Asia, are facing a dramatic demographic upheaval as a result. The severe social and economic impact of infectious diseases is likely to intensify the struggle for political power to control scarce state resources.

Throughout history, infectious disease has killed more soldiers than combat during times of war. Even today, infectious diseases continue to account for more military hospital admissions than do battlefield injuries. United States military troops stationed overseas in developing countries are at particular risk for infection. In addition, infectious-disease burdens in other countries can weaken their contribution to peacekeeping and other mutual military endeavors, and increase the burden on the United States.

See also Anthrax; Bioterrorism; Chemical Weapons; Development, Third-World; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Germ Warfare; Public Health, National Security and

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INFORMATION ANALYSIS
See HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT)

INFORMATION WARFARE

A mode of warfare characterized by attacks on computing and communication systems. Offensive information warfare (IW) seeks to disable or deceive enemy operations by targeting electronic vulnerabilities. Defensive IW seeks to harden these systems against attack so that information flows freely among

policymakers, commanders, and soldiers. Information warfare has implications for military confrontations as well as for homeland security.

Because the concept of information warfare is relatively new, definitions are inconsistent and sometimes vague. Nonetheless, analysts have developed two basic conceptions of IW. The first focuses on tactics that aim to cripple or deceive information systems. Whereas conventional weapons cause physical damage to adversary assets, IW influences adversary perceptions. It does so by obstructing communications, limiting situational awareness, or disseminating false information.

The second definition, sometimes called *information-based warfare* or *information operations* (IO), is broader. Information operations include all activities that influence the course of war by affecting the flow of information. Along with directed attacks on enemy networks, IO includes battlefield psychological operations (PSYOPS) and public diplomacy. PSYOPS work on the emotions of soldiers and civilians, in order to coerce them without having to use excessive violence. Public diplomacy bypasses normal diplomatic channels by communicating directly with foreign publics, usually through radio or television broadcasts.

Information warfare has evolved concurrently with information technologies. In the 1980s and 1990s, the growth of electronic networks greatly improved the efficiency of communications. More powerful microprocessors increased the speed of computing, as well as the amount of information that could be shared. These increases helped businesses and government agencies become more efficient. They also helped military organizations gain more immediate and comprehensive knowledge of the battlefield.

However, technological progress also created new vulnerabilities. More dependence on networked systems meant that, in theory, individual IW attacks could cause significant damage. Military planners began to worry that instead of attacking U.S. soldiers, enemies would strike military databases and control centers. By attacking these crucial nodes, adversaries might be able offset the United States' overwhelming conventional advantage. China, for instance, has already made IW a part of its military doctrine.

In addition to offsetting military force, foreign adversaries could damage U.S. economic interests by targeting commercial networks. Hypothetical attacks

might also be lethal, such as an electronic assault on air-traffic-control systems. Some analysts worry that infrastructure networks are more vulnerable than military systems, because most infrastructure is owned and operated by civilians, who are less attuned to security threats. In addition, IT security firms work for private-sector clients and are not obligated to share information with the government. This arrangement means that security threats may go unnoticed by intelligence agencies.

The evolution of information warfare has created other dilemmas. Neither the Pentagon nor the intelligence community enjoys a well-developed method for IW threat assessment. Despite the horror stories that grab media attention, it remains difficult to gauge the effects of IW attacks. Consequently, it is hard to determine appropriate responses. Strategists also face an important trade-off between intelligence collection and IW. To illustrate this dilemma, suppose that U.S. signals intelligence collectors manage to tap an adversary's communications network. Information warriors might want to disable the network, but doing so would mean the loss of a potentially valuable source of intelligence.

As planners continue to grapple with these problems, they also seek ways to exploit the *offensive* potential of information warfare. Offensive IW offers unique possibilities to disrupt enemy command and control. Well-placed viruses, for example, could significantly upset enemy communications. Offensive IW could also aid tactical or strategic deception operations. By covertly entering enemy networks, information warriors would be able to rapidly spread misinformation.

See also Computer Security; Computer Viruses

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INNOVATION *See* TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Information and data collected from a variety of sources, then analyzed and provided according to the known or perceived requirements of consumers. Intelligence is often derived from sources or information that are concealed or not intended to be openly available. Counterintelligence is the process of identifying, understanding, and counteracting intelligence threats from foreign powers.

THE PROCESS OF GATHERING INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence gathering is considered an area of foreign rather than domestic policy. Executive Order 12333, issued by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, focuses the activities of the U.S. intelligence community almost exclusively on the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, persons, or their agents. The collection, retention, or dissemination of information concerning individuals in the United States is authorized only in very limited circumstances—for example, if there is reason to believe the person is involved in espionage or international terrorism.

Intelligence gathering involves five steps: (a) planning and direction, (b) collection or acquisition, (c) processing and exploitation, (d) analysis and production, and (e) dissemination. Together, these steps are intended to ensure not only that information is gathered effectively, but also that it is accurate and reliable.

Planning and Direction

The first step, planning and direction, is the management of the overall intelligence cycle, from identifying the need for given data, to delivering the final product. Planning and direction involves drawing up specific information-collection requirements under the guidance of public officials, including the president, his aides, the National Security Council, and other major

departments and agencies of government. The needs of these policymakers guide collection strategies and the production of appropriate intelligence products.

Collection or Acquisition

The second step, collection or acquisition, is the gathering of raw data from which finished intelligence is created. There are six basic intelligence sources from which data is collected: signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, human intelligence, open-source intelligence, and geospatial intelligence.

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is information obtained from the interception of signals from all communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). The National Security Agency (NSA) is the agency responsible for collecting, processing, and reporting SIGINT.

Imagery intelligence (IMINT) is information derived from images, including the representation of objects reproduced on film or electronically. Imagery can be obtained from visual photography, radar sensors, infrared sensors, lasers, and electro-optics. The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) is charged with managing all IMINT activities, both classified and unclassified, including requirements, collection, processing, exploitation, dissemination, archiving, and retrieval.

Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) is information gathered from technical sources other than imagery or SIGINT, such as nuclear, optical, radio frequency, acoustics, seismic, and materials sciences. It results in intelligence that locates, identifies, or describes distinctive characteristics of objects. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) manages all national MASINT matters.

Human intelligence (HUMINT) is information gathered from human sources. Despite the popular notion of espionage and clandestine activities, most HUMINT is actually performed by overt collectors such as diplomats and military attaches. HUMINT is primarily used by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of State, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It can be collected by clandestine acquisition of photography, documents, and other materials; overt collection by personnel in diplomatic and consular posts; debriefing of foreign nationals and U.S. citizens who travel abroad; and official contacts with foreign governments.

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is publicly available information appearing in print or electronic sources, including radio, television, newspapers, journals, the Internet, commercial databases, videos, graphics, and drawings. The major collectors of OSINT are the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and the National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC).

Geospatial intelligence is the analysis and visual representation of security-related activities on the Earth produced through an integration of imagery, imagery intelligences, and geospatial information. The NGA is responsible for all geospatial intelligence.

Processing and Exploitation

The third step in intelligence is processing and exploitation, otherwise known as *interpretation.* Processing involves the conversion of data to a form suitable for the production of finished intelligence. It includes translations, decryption, and interpretation of data stored on film and magnetic media through photographic and electronic processes. A substantial portion of intelligence resources is spent on converting raw data into a usable form, and on the secure telecommunications network that carries the data. All collection agencies in the intelligence community are engaged in processing, to one degree or another.

Analysis and Production

The fourth step, analysis and production, involves the integration, evaluation, and analysis of all the available data and the preparation of a variety of intelligence products. Analysis also includes taking incoming information and evaluating it to produce an assessment of the current state of affairs within a given field or area, and forecasting future trends or outcomes. Analysts must incorporate alternative forecasts in their assessments and look for possible developments overseas that might either threaten or provide opportunities for U.S. security or policy interests. Another part of analysis is the development of requirements for the collection of new information.

Analysts at the various intelligence-community organizations ordinarily work separately in their own areas of interest or on a particular common problem, such as an assessment of a country's weapons program.

However, during periods of international crisis or at times when intelligence support is critical to high-level negotiations, an interagency task force may be created. If the U.S. military is involved, the director of the DIA will establish an intelligence task force dedicated to 24-hour intelligence support for the operational and combat commands involved. Counterintelligence and counterterrorism analysts also provide strategic assessments of foreign intelligence and terrorist groups, and they prepare tactical options for ongoing operations and investigations.

Dissemination

The final step in intelligence gathering is dissemination. Dissemination is the delivery of products to consumers who request them. Although some intelligence information is self-explanatory and can be sent directly to the consumer, most needs evaluation, correlation with other information, and explanation from analysts. Reviewed and correlated information is called *finished intelligence.*

Examples of intelligence products include warnings of impending crises or threats; daily publications or briefings about current developments; biographic reports and psychological studies; assessments, briefs, and memoranda on specific subjects; technical analyses of weapons and weapon systems; formal estimates of specific international situations; video reports; comprehensive research studies; and serial publications and situation reports addressing specialized topics, key countries, or important foreign-policy issues.

There are five categories of finished intelligence available to the consumer. Current intelligence addresses day-to-day events and developments and short-term consequences and threats in the near future. Estimative intelligence makes projections regarding what might happen. Warning intelligence sounds an alarm or gives notice to policymakers of a critical development. Research intelligence involves in-depth studies of both basic intelligence and intelligence for support of military operations. Scientific and technical intelligence provides information on technical developments and characteristics and on the performance and capabilities of foreign technologies, including weapon systems.

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The various departments and agencies that constitute the U.S. intelligence community (IC) cooperate to fulfill the goals of Executive Order 12333. Members of the IC are federal-government agencies, services, bureaus, and other organizations within the executive branch that play a role in the business of national intelligence. Some have responsibilities concerned solely with intelligence; others are concerned primarily with missions other than intelligence but do have intelligence responsibilities. In these cases, only that part of the organization with intelligence responsibilities is considered to be a part of the IC.

Each branch of the U.S. military collects and processes intelligence relevant to their particular service needs. The U.S. Coast Guard also has an intelligence branch that deals with information related to U.S. maritime borders and homeland security. In addition, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provides military intelligence to those engaged in warfare, to policy-makers, and to force planners.

Federal agencies in the IC include the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which provides foreign intelligence on national-security topics to national policy- and decision makers, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which deals with counterespionage and data about international criminal cases. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) provides geospatial intelligence in support of national security. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) coordinates collection and analysis of information from airplane and satellite reconnaissance by the military services and the CIA. The National Security Agency (NSA) collects and processes foreign signals and intelligence information and protects critical U.S. information security systems from compromise.

Several cabinet-level departments of the federal government also engage in intelligence collection. The Department of Energy (DOE) performs analyses of foreign nuclear weapons, nuclear non-proliferation, and energy security–related intelligence issues in support of U.S. national-security policies, programs, and objectives. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) works to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the nation's vulnerability to terrorism, minimize the damage that might occur as a result of such attacks, and promote recovery from attacks that do occur. The Department of State is concerned with information affecting U.S. foreign policy. The Department of the Treasury collects and processes information that may affect U.S. fiscal and monetary policy.

HISTORY OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND THE CIA

The history of the nation's intelligence gathering can be traced at least as far back as the Revolutionary War. The Continental Congress used secret committees to conduct sensitive intelligence operations. It also employed spies, and it authorized paramilitary missions against the British. George Washington organized a secret intelligence bureau under Major Benjamin Tallmadge, sent spies behind enemy lines to assess his opponents' strength, and was involved in counterespionage schemes. According to his own accounting, Washington spent $17,000 on secret intelligence during the Revolutionary War.

Neither Washington nor his successors saw any reason for peacetime intelligence activities, however. Throughout the 19th century, U.S. intelligence operations took place on a sporadic, ad hoc basis, in response to immediate needs. Only in the 1880s, in response to increased American involvement in world affairs, did permanent intelligence units appear. In 1882 the navy created the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI); the Army established the Military Information Division (now known as the Military Intelligence Division, or MID) in 1885.

Although intelligence units, along with the U.S. Secret Service, had an important role in the Spanish-American War, an extensive intelligence system was not created until World War I. The MID, ONI, and State Department all played active roles in the war. After World War I, there was another period of decline in American intelligence. The intelligence budget and personnel were cut dramatically, although a complete dismantling of the system did not take place.

When World War II broke out, the need for intelligence grew. Five months before Pearl Harbor and the entry of the United States into the war, President Franklin Roosevelt appointed William J. Donovan to coordinate intelligence activities. Donovan's intelligence unit, known as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), was charged with collecting and analyzing information bearing on vital security interests. Donovan hired academics for research and analysis, and actors, lawyers, socialites, and soldiers for espionage and counterespionage missions. The methods and techniques of the OSS, and many of its personnel, later carried over into the CIA.

At the end of the war there was little support for such a large and secret organization to continue intelligence activities during peacetime. Recognizing the power that might be wielded by such an organization, President Harry S. Truman disbanded the OSS at the war's end and parceled out its components to the State Department and the Department of War. However, the realities of the Cold War soon caused Truman to reconsider his aversion to a peacetime intelligence organization.

In January 1946, an executive order issued by President Truman established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). The CIG operated under the National Intelligence Authority—the secretaries of war, state, and navy, and a personal representative of the president. It was intended to coordinate the work of existing intelligence units and to provide intelligence analysis to senior policymakers. The CIG quickly became an intelligence producer, however, with the authority to conduct independent research and analysis, and with clandestine collection capability.

The CIA was created by the National Security Act of 1947. As part of a general restructuring of the national defense establishment, the CIG became an independent department under the designation of the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA was placed under a National Security Council (NSC) and made responsible for coordinating, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence affecting national security.

The CIA was soon seen as an important offensive weapon in the Cold War. In December 1947, the NSC gave the CIA the authority to conduct covert psychological operations, and six months later, the NSC established a covert-action unit within the CIA. By 1952, clandestine operations claimed more than half the agency's personnel and budget.

The CIA flourished during the Cold War and was successful in staging coups in Iran and Guatemala during the 1950s. Its failures—with the possible exception of the 1961 Bay of Pigs debacle—were less publicized, and the CIA successfully fought off any attempts by Congress to gain tighter legislative control over its operations.

The CIA launched paramilitary operations throughout the 1960s in South America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. It was not until the trauma of the Vietnam War, and a decline in government credibility among the American public, that the CIA first came under intense, and often hostile, public scrutiny. When it became public knowledge that the CIA was involved in the Watergate scandal, congressional investigation ensued.

Reorganization and investigation plagued the CIA throughout the 1970s, as information about its activities continued to leak out. Several congressional committees and panels conducted investigations. In January 1975, the Senate established a select committee, under Senator Frank Church of Idaho, with a broad mandate to investigate the CIA. The Church committee looked into U.S. intelligence activities and the extent to which these activities might have been illegal, improper, or unethical.

The Church Committee concluded that the realities of world politics demanded an effective U.S. intelligence system. The committee recommended, however, that covert actions (which for the most part had been unproductive) be undertaken only in extraordinary circumstances. It suggested that the CIA return to its original mandate—to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence to policymakers. Unfortunately, these recommendations were never enacted into law. During the Reagan administration, new emphasis was placed on clandestine actions, and for the first time the CIA was given permission to conduct domestic covert operations.

The failure of the intelligence community to foresee the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington led to renewed calls for reform of U.S. intelligence. In 2004, Congress authorized a complete reorganization of the intelligence community. One of the major changes was the creation of the post of national intelligence director. The director's job is to coordinate the activities of the various U.S. intelligence agencies, which previously had not worked together efficiently. The goal of the reorganization is to make sure that information possessed by one agency is disseminated to the IC as a whole and made available to policymakers.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

In addition to collecting and processing intelligence about other foreign powers, the intelligence community is charged with the mission of counterintelligence—which involves identifying, understanding, prioritizing, and counteracting intelligence threats from foreign powers. Counterintelligence activities must protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassination conducted on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, and international terrorist activities.

The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) coordinates and supports national-level counterintelligence activities. The national operations security (OPSEC) program is another important component of the U.S. counterintelligence program. The OPSEC program identifies, controls, and protects unclassified information and evidence associated with U.S. national-security programs and activities.

—Laura Kittross

See also Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Covert Action; Covert Operations; Cryptology; Defense Intelligence Agency; Espionage; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Foreign Intelligence; Geopolitical Intelligence; Human Intelligence; National Counterintelligence Center; National Security Act, 1947; National Security Agency; National Security Council; Office of Strategic Services; Signals Intelligence; Spy Satellites; World War II and Espionage

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PUBLIC PORTRAITS

"Wild Bill" Donovan

The head of the wartime OSS was William Joseph Donovan, a former college football star and college classmate of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Donovan was a veteran of the 1916 campaign to apprehend Mexican bandit Pancho Villa, and he later organized and led a regiment of the U.S. Army in World War I. During the war, Donovan was awarded the Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, and three Purple Hearts.

After the start of World War II, Donovan traveled to Britain and Nazi-controlled Europe to gather information for Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and President Roosevelt. In June 1941, Roosevelt named Donovan coordinator of information (COI), making him the first overall chief of the United States intelligence community. The COI later became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and Donovan was returned to active duty in his World War I rank of colonel, although by war's end he would be a major general. The OSS was responsible for espionage and sabotage in Europe and in parts of Asia. Donovan received

the Distinguished Service Medal for his service in World War II.

After the war, President Harry S. Truman disbanded the OSS and Donovan returned to his private law practice. The OSS would later be revived in spirit in a civilian intelligence-gathering organization, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In the late 1940s, Donovan served as special assistant to chief prosecutor Telford Taylor at the Nuremberg Tribunal. Donovan died on February 8, 1959, and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery. President Dwight D. Eisenhower referred to him as "the Last Hero."

INTERAGENCY COOPERATION
See DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT

INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBMS)

Missiles with a range greater than 5,500 km that are capable of delivering biological, chemical, conventional, or nuclear payloads. The U.S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program was conceived after World War II as a deterrent against a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. United States Minuteman missiles, deployed in the early 1960s, were a dramatic improvement over the previous generation of liquid-fueled, remote-controlled, long-range missiles. The three-stage Minutemen were quick-reacting (utilizing an inertial guidance system), dependable, and survivable, and had a range of more than 6,000 miles.

These ground-based Minuteman missiles were dispersed in hardened silos to protect against attack and connected to an underground launch control. Other versions of the ICBM could be launched from ships and submarines. Later versions of the Minuteman missile were equipped with Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), which were capable of delivering multiple nuclear warheads simultaneously to separate targets.

As part of a modernization plan undertaken in 1983, the Strategic Air Command began to deploy Peacekeeper missiles in its silos. The Peacekeeper is a four-stage ICBM with a range of more than 6,000 miles. The Peacekeeper can carry up to 10 warheads that can be directed at separate targets.

To comply with the START II treaty with the Soviet Union, the United States removed MIRVs from all of its Minuteman III missiles. In 2002, the United States began a three-year program to decommission Peacekeeper missiles, the latest step in the reduction of the U.S. nuclear arsenal from 6,000 warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200, pursuant to a verbal agreement between President George W. Bush and Russian president Vladimir Putin.

Twenty-seven countries are believed to possess ICBMs. North Korea is developing the Taepo Dong 2 intercontinental ballistic missile, which could deliver a payload several thousands of miles. Iran has tested the Shahab 3, a long-range missile (with a range of about 1,300 km) based on the Taepo Dong, and is attempting to develop an even longer-range missile.

See also Cruise Missile; Missiles; Strategic Air Command; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT); Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

INTERDEPENDENCE

Multiple economic, social, and political links that lead countries to depend on one another. Modern weapons, rapid communications, and global financial markets have made it virtually impossible to guarantee the security and well-being of one state without also involving other states and ensuring that they prosper.

Although countries have always depended on one another, a particularly complex and far-reaching global interdependence began to emerge in the 1960s. The revolution in information technology greatly increased the number of channels for contact among societies. As these connections increased, trade and capital flows expanded, benefiting developed and developing economies alike. In addition, the third world attracted unprecedented levels of capital from private investment**.** In the 1990s, deepening economic interdependence both promoted and benefited from market reforms in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, as previously state-controlled economies liberalized to become more competitive.

Interconnectedness presents both risks and opportunities. In 1997, for example, financial instability in Asia threatened markets around the world because of global economic interdependence. Developing countries may collapse both politically and economically if investors from other countries withdraw their

capital. Developed industrialized counties like the United States can lose manufacturing jobs to other nations where workers earn lower wages. A river polluted by one country's factories can spoil the arable land of another nation downriver, and greenhouse gases produced in the industrialized world can endanger the entire planet. Interdependence and the increased cross-border movement of people have also facilitated the spread of HIV and AIDS and have the potential to facilitate the spread of other emerging or as yet unknown viruses and diseases.

Interdependence between countries can serve mutual interests, yet it can also become the source of tension. For example, both the United States and Japan benefit from their interdependence, but asymmetries in trade and security relations have caused difficulties in relations between Washington and Tokyo. Trade is advantageous for both sides, but persistent U.S. trade deficits with Japan infuriate U.S. politicians and business leaders. The military alliance between the two countries brings mutual benefits, including U.S. guarantees of Japanese security. In return, Japan subsidizes U.S. troops and provides a strategic position for the United States in east Asia. At the same time, security interdependence has generated accusations of free-riding on one side, and interference on the other.

Political scientists disagree on the effect that economic interdependence has on the probability of interstate warfare. According to some scholars, interdependent states are unlikely to attack each other because they stand to lose from the severance of trade. Economic interdependence can also create mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes. By contrast, other analysts argue that interdependent states feel vulnerable and are more prone to wage war, in order to guarantee long-term access to vital materials.

Before World War I, free capital flows and unprecedented economic and financial interdependence made it seem—misleadingly—that the major world powers would forever remain at peace. In fact, interdependence between those major world powers exacerbated rivalry and mistrust, contributing to an arms buildup that eventually erupted into devastating war.

Many activists have proposed so-called declarations of interdependence. The first of these, proposed by historian Will Durant in 1948, called for peaceful resolution of conflicts, for acceptance of human diversity, and for life in harmony with nature. As the web of economic and security interdependence continues to grow, the need also increases for global institutions to mitigate its risks and harvest its opportunities.

See also Realism

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REFLECTIONS

A Declaration of Interdependence

Therefore, we solemnly resolve, and invite everyone to join in united action

- To uphold and promote human fellowship through mutual consideration and respect;
- To champion human dignity and decency, and to safeguard these without distinction of race, or color, or creed;
- To strive in concert with others to discourage all animosities arising from these differences, and to unite all groups in the fair play of civilized life."

—Will Durant, Declaration of Interdependence, March 22, 1945

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

International organization created to oversee development of peaceful uses for nuclear technology. On July 29, 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was founded in Vienna, Austria. The creation of the IAEA was advocated by U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower in his "Atoms for Peace" speech in 1953. President Eisenhower called for the IAEA to oversee a bank of fissionable material that could be used by the world's top researchers and scientists to create peaceful uses for atomic energy. This idea was spurred by Eisenhower's concern over the fast pace at which nuclear weapons technology was advancing, and the IAEA, along with other programs to put atomic energy to peaceful uses, became one of Eisenhower's objectives.

The International Atomic Energy Agency's mission today is to promote the safe and effective use of atomic energy throughout the world. It is mandated by the United Nations to ensure that atomic energy is utilized safely and securely and to limit the potential effects of radiation exposure on both humans and the environment. In addition, the IAEA serves to support science and technology initiatives that explore the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The IAEA's science and technology division researches and develops the use of nuclear energy to address critical global issues. This contribution has included major efforts in the developing world against poverty, health, and environmental issues. The IAEA's nuclear and radiation technologies have facilitated improvements in water and agricultural areas. Further, electricity generation is another area where the IAEA is significantly involved and has contributed to global-development needs.

One of the IAEA's most visible roles is its safeguards and verification program. The IAEA regulates possession of nuclear weapons and prevents the proliferation of these weapons by inspecting nuclear facilities in more than 140 nations. They examine these facilities to ascertain whether or not the materials are used for military purposes. Its inspection powers result from the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was drafted at a time when more countries were seeking and acquiring nuclear-weapons technology. The issue of nuclear proliferation became a major global concern because these weapons were no longer in the hands of only the United States and Soviet Union, who maintained significant nuclear-deterrent stockpiles to discourage each other from launching an attack. Now the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries was creating an atmosphere in which the use of nuclear weapons was becoming more possible.

Thus the NPT sought binding commitments from nonnuclear states that they would not pursue nuclear-weapons technology. Furthermore, nuclear powers signing on to the NPT committed to not providing the technology necessary to develop those weapons. Subsequent clauses to the NPT have opened up the opportunity for nonnuclear states to seek nuclear technology for civilian, peaceful purposes.

The IAEA works closely to supervise this exchange of nuclear technology, and its inspection and verification branch monitors the civilian nuclear infrastructures of states pursuing a nuclear-energy component. From the 1990s through the early 2000s, the role of the IAEA has grown significant, as several civilian nuclear programs have come under suspicion of seeking a nuclear weapon. The IAEA continues to monitor and enforce the NPT to verify adherence to the treaty by signatory states.

The IAEA functions under the auspices of the United Nations, and it has 2,200 staff members from more than 90 countries. The agency is led by a director general, who is responsible for overseeing and managing the major departments of the agency, including the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, the Department of Technical Cooperation, the Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications, the Department of Nuclear Energy, and the Department of Safeguards.

See also Atoms for Peace; Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; United Nations

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Independent international court, established by multilateral treaty, with the capacity to prosecute the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Crimes of mass violence were prevalent in the 20th century. Ad hoc tribunals in Germany, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslav republics represented early attempts to punish the perpetrators of targeted, large-scale aggression. The international community, however, perceived that the establishment of a permanent court would end impunity and create accountability for such crimes, and enhance the security of all nations.

The Rome Conference, held under United Nations auspices, resulted in a treaty (the Rome Statute), adopted on July 17, 1998, that created the independent organization known as the International Criminal Court (ICC). The treaty was later ratified by a number of nations and came into effect on July 1, 2002. The ICC has the power to try individuals (rather than states, which are under the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice) for atrocities. Currently, there are 94 parties to the treaty, and 139 countries have signed it.

The International Criminal Court is composed of four major organs. The Presidency manages the administrative affairs of the entire court, excluding the Office

of the Prosecutor, and is composed of a president, first and second vice presidents, and their staffs. The Chambers consists of the Pre-Trial and the Trial and Appeals divisions; 18 judges direct the judicial affairs of the Chambers. The Office of the Prosecutor manages the prosecution of cases, including the collection of evidence. The Registry is responsible for nonjudicial functions, such as financial and logistical administration.

The ICC may prosecute three major crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Genocide is defined as killing or harming members of a specific group, or impairing its reproductive capacity. Crimes against humanity include extermination, slavery, torture, deportation, sexual and reproductive violence, persecution, and unlawful imprisonment. War crimes consist primarily of torture, infliction of unnecessary suffering or death, taking hostages, deliberate attacks on civilians, and hostile attacks on non-military targets, such as schools and hospitals. The Rome Statute also noted a crime of aggression, but the parties to the agreement have been unable to reach consensus on a definition of that crime, so its inclusion as a responsibility of the ICC is pending.

The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over persons age 18 and over who, in any capacity, knowingly commit or assist in the commission of the three crimes identified by the court. It may prosecute when the relevant state or states (the state in which the act has been committed, or the state of the accused) are unwilling or unable to prosecute.

Trials are to be fair and held publicly. The treaty states that a trial is to take place with the accused present and aware of the proceedings and that the accused is innocent until proven guilty. If convicted, sentences can include incarceration (up to a life sentence), fines, and the confiscation of personal property. There is no death penalty.

Many countries, including the United States, are not parties to the treaty because they perceive problems with the International Criminal Court. One frequently noted problem is that the ICC may violate a nation's sovereignty by infringing upon its right to monitor and police the behavior of its own citizens. The United States is particularly concerned about the ICC claiming jurisdiction over its military personnel as they act in fulfillment of their duties. There are also fears of abuses, such as fraudulent or frivolous cases being brought before the court.

See also International Law

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Body of law that governs relations between states and international organizations. Globalization—the phenomenon of growing worldwide economic, political, and social interconnectedness—has produced a need for internationally accepted norms to regulate the enormous amount of interaction across national boundaries. International law is an evolving body of treaties, conventions, customs, ideas, and protocols that govern state and nonstate behavior in international affairs.

There are two types of international law: public and private. Public law governs the relations between states or other entities, whereas private law governs specific, private transactions. These two types of law have been merging over time, forming the ever-growing institution of international law.

HISTORY AND ORIGINS

International law is generally recognized as having evolved over time, but most historians believe the Peace of Westphalia initiated the development of a formal body of international law. The end of the Thirty Years' War in 1648 saw the Western European powers free themselves from the political influence of the pope and the Holy Roman emperor. Before the war, European politics was dictated by the rivalry between pope and emperor. The kingdoms of Europe regularly lined up behind one or the other of these two powerful figures, who fought a seemingly endless series of wars for political dominance. After the Thirty Years' War, European states were free for the first time to set their own foreign policies. However, they lacked the security of the established order imposed by the papal-imperial relationship.

In the absence of an accepted set of rules for international conduct, European states sought a way to create a new political order that would establish norms of conduct and just action. The treaty known as the Peace of Westphalia, signed at the conclusion of the Thirty Years' War in 1648, was the first written statement of accepted conduct between sovereign nations. The treaty established moral, but secular, agreements—laws that were to be acceptable to all states, regardless of religion. This was a serious consideration in Europe, where Catholics and Protestants had fought for more than 100 years.

SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Peace of Westphalia and subsequent agreements built on a long history of ideas of justice and right action. Divine law (morals universally ordained by a deity) and principles of natural law (the idea that humans, by virtue of their humanity, have certain rights and obligations) were two schools of thought that influenced thinking about international relations. Greek, Roman, Jewish, and Christian thought and scholarship also contributed to the theoretical basis of international law.

The work of the 16th- and 17th-century Dutch thinker Hugo Grotius is particularly important. His 1625 work *De Jure Belli et Pacis* (On the Law of War and Peace) laid out ideas about international relations that both religious and secular states could accept. His ideas were pragmatic and practicable, treading a middle path between blunt realism and lofty idealism. Grotius is often called "the father of international law."

Historically, international law has drawn from religious and secular philosophical thought and existing custom. Contemporary international law expands on this existing base by incorporating modern writings and approaches. Common law (law based on tradition and precedent) is an important basis of international law and of states' understandings of appropriate behavior. The World Court, for example, recognizes written treaties, international custom (usual practice), general principles of law recognized by societies, and the judicial decisions of nations as valid sources of precedent for contemporary international law. Other possible sources include scholarly writings and UN resolutions. Of these, customs (customary law) and treaties are recognized as the strongest sources of international law; they tend to be acknowledged by most states on most occasions.

PRACTICALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Despite the enormous amount of theoretical support that international law enjoys, there are many who question its enforceability and, thus, its practicality. Critics maintain that international law is a system of voluntary self-restraint, and, as such, states or other international actors are not required to follow its dictates. It has often been observed that states do not always act morally and are often self-interested and likely to pursue their own ends even in the face of punishment.

Moreover, punishments for violations of international law (particularly for strong states) are often unenforceable because states are sovereign and need not answer to a higher authority. Penalties or sanctions may also be difficult to impose upon states because of geographical, resource-related, or political considerations. Further, nations may not react even to strong condemnation or sanctions from other states if they perceive that violation of the law was necessary to protect their own national interests.

Nevertheless, there is a strong case for the existence and applicability of international law. States may view laws as just, or law violations as unjust, and choose to regulate their own behavior. States less preoccupied with moral arguments may also have interests that are compatible with the law, or they may not wish to damage long-term relations with other states to pursue short-term gains obtained through violating international law. As a result, historically, most nations have observed the principles and obligations of international law. Also, states often amend their domestic laws to conform to international statutes. These are strong arguments for the real presence of international law.

APPLICATIONS OF THE LAW

International law includes agreements that govern state-to-state interactions, including all aspects of diplomatic relations. It also specifies where states have jurisdiction on issues as varied as extradition policies, technology regulations, and border disputes. International law describes states' rights in collective areas such as the sea, the air, and outer space. Statutes and tradition also regulate treaty formation and the fulfillment of treaty obligations, which affect all of the above areas. Significantly, international law also normalizes international arbitration in disputes, the use of force in conflict, rules of war, and treatment of prisoners.

International law also regulates areas that are not necessarily part of state-to-state interactions, such as conventions on human rights. Economic relations are another such area covered extensively in international law. For example, the 1983 Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) makes international commerce easier and more efficient, whereas the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, replaced by the World Trade Organization in 1995) links nations in a legal international trading body.

Both human-rights law and economic law include regulations on international and public health, as well as on the human environment. The natural environment has also come into prominence in international

law in recent years, particularly with the emergence of the Kyoto Protocol as a state standard for regulating the emissions of certain substances into the atmosphere. Other fields regulated by international law include peacekeeping and terrorism, which are increasingly important in modern times.

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN PRACTICE

In practice, most states usually obey the international laws, regulations, and conventions that are embodied in treaties, custom, and protocols. They voluntarily accept self-imposed limitations on their actions, although there is little to fear if they break the laws. Customary international law tends to be obeyed when strong international norms are present. One example of this tendency is the prohibition against assassination, which is reinforced by a prevailing moral idea that assassination is wrong.

Generally, international law is most relevant and effective in governing *low politics,* which refers to areas that do not directly encroach upon national security and survival. States readily accept laws in areas such as trade, diplomatic rules, and communication, where risks to states are relatively low and the need for cooperation and coordination is high. International law is less effective in the realm of *high politics*—areas that are directly related to state security, such as defense, legal jurisdiction over its citizens in foreign or international courts, territorial sovereignty, and war.

Official U.S. attitudes toward international law reflect this divide between low and high politics. The United States historically has been a leader in promoting international trade pacts, ratifying not only the CISG, GATT, and World Trade Organization, but also the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993. On the other hand, the United States has also refused to recognize the authority of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to claim jurisdiction over U.S. citizens. The United States also refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol, asserting that the treaty's provisions would seriously harm U.S. businesses.

MANIFESTATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

In the last century, the manifestations of international law have tended to be very precise and legalistic. One of the most prevalent trends involves *codification*— explicitly worded treaties and written agreements that define international relations. There has been a great increase in conventions, protocols, and treaties aimed at responding to humanitarian concerns and threats to people. Among these is the 1997 Ottawa Landmine Treaty, aimed at eliminating the use of antipersonnel mines. This is another treaty that the United States has not ratified, claiming that it would have a detrimental effect on U.S. defense capabilities.

Another trend has involved the establishment of international judicial institutions, such as the ICJ and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICJ was formally established as part of the original UN charter in 1945. It had its roots in the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), created by the League of Nations in 1920. The ICJ was established to resolve legal disputes between states, although states may sometimes represent one of their citizens in the court. The ICC, which was established in 1988, evolved from ad hoc tribunals established to try persons accused of war crimes and genocide. Individuals have standing in the International Criminal Court and may be punished for gross violations of the rules of war and crimes against humanity.

With the passage of time, many principles of international law have become integrated within the legal customs of most nations. Especially since the formation of the United Nations following World War II, international law has grown into a major contributing factor in interstate relations. Furthermore, as the world becomes increasingly interconnected and globalization becomes more important, it is likely that international law will continue to grow in importance.

See also Geneva Conventions; Globalization and National Security; Hague Convention; Law Enforcement and National Security; Legal Ramifications of National Security; United Nations

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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF)

An international organization that functions like a global bank from which member countries can borrow

money at low interest rates (subject to certain conditions) to deal with balance of payments and other economic crises. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established as a result of an agreement reached by representatives from 44 nations at the Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire in 1944.

The eventual decision about the design and structure of the IMF most closely resembled what had been proposed by the Americans at Bretton Woods, although the British, French, and Canadians had presented viewpoints, as well. The basic underlying rationale for its creation, however, was shared by all. The IMF was to serve as an organization that would promote international monetary cooperation, facilitate expansion of international trade to raise employment and incomes, and maintain and restore exchange-rate stability without involving the gold standard or destroying national independence in monetary and fiscal policies.

The membership of the IMF now numbers 182 countries. Membership is open to any nation that conducts its own foreign policy and is willing to adhere to the IMF charter of rights and obligations. All major countries are now members of the IMF, including most of the former Soviet republics. Members can choose to leave the IMF whenever they wish.

The IMF has a staff of about 2,600 people, headed by a managing director, who is also chairman of the executive board. By tradition, the managing director is usually a European or at least non-American (in contrast to the World Bank, whose president is traditionally a U.S. national). The international staff of the IMF comes from 122 countries and is made up mostly of economists and statisticians; research scholars; experts in public finance, taxation, financial systems, and central banking; and linguists, writers, and support personnel. Unlike executive directors, who represent specific countries, staff members are international civil servants responsible to membership as a whole in carrying out IMF policies and do not represent any national interests.

The IMF currently has 62 financing programs around the world, totaling $86.2 billion. Financial programming consists of a set of simple equations that relates the monetary sector of an economy to the balance of payments. Conceptually, the model tells the IMF what economic adjustments and financial assistance are needed to establish a country's balance-of-payment equilibrium.

There has been frequent questioning of whether the fund-supported programs of the IMF have been effective in achieving their objectives. No clear-cut answer has emerged, although several viewpoints exist in both support and rejection of the fund's policies and performance over the years.

The IMF has learned many important lessons since its founding, particularly during the 1990s. Some people have expressed the opinion that the IMF needs more representative and transparent decision-making processes to increase its resources and democratic legitimacy. They argue that this legitimacy is not necessarily contrary to the pursuit of sound policies or the purposes of the IMF. Regardless of whether any attention is paid to this view, the IMF and the content of its programs will be a matter of continuing debate.

See also Bretton Woods Conference; World Bank

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INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT

Overseas military presence by third parties or states, designed to alleviate human suffering and create conditions and build institutions for self-sustaining peace. Peacekeepers often have a direct impact on the political process. Traditional peacekeeping has been organized mainly under the United Nations (UN). In the United States, peacekeeping forces are intended by the Department of Defense (DoD) to work with the diplomatic and economic efforts of other government agencies to keep the peace and protect U.S. interests.

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

The body in charge of planning, preparing, managing, and directing UN peacekeeping efforts is the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The DPKO provides political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations and maintains contact with the UN Security Council, contributors of personnel and other resources, and parties to the conflict. The department is also in charge of administrative and logistical support for peacekeeping missions. In this

role it must deploy equipment and services, adequate financial resources, and well-trained personnel in a timely fashion in order for a mission to be successful. The DPKO must integrate the efforts of UN, governmental, and nongovernmental actors participating in peacekeeping operations. It also provides guidance and support on military, police, mine-action, and logistical and administrative issues to other UN political and peace-building missions.

Peacekeeping operations may consist of several components, including a military component, which may or may not be armed, and various civilian components encompassing a broad range of disciplines. Depending on their mandate, peacekeeping missions may be deployed for various reasons: to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spillover of conflict across borders; stabilize conflict situations after a cease-fire to create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement; assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements; and lead states or territories through a transition to stable government based on democratic principles, good governance, and economic development.

Traditional peacekeeping requires three prerequisites: the consent of the parties involved in the dispute, UN neutrality between these parties, and the use of force by the UN only in self-defense. Peace enforcement, by contrast, contemplates the active use of military force by the United Nations or other implementing agency.

In late 2004, the United Nations had ongoing peacekeeping efforts in 16 arenas around the world, including seven areas of Africa (Burundi, Sierra Leone, Western Sahara, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ethiopia and Eritrea); Haiti in the Americas; East Timor and India and Pakistan in Asia; Cyprus, Georgia, and Kosovo in Europe; and the Golan Heights and Lebanon in the Middle East. More than 100 countries had contributed nearly 64,000 military personnel and civilian police to these peacekeeping efforts. Each of these deployments has its own mandate, although they all share the aim of creating conditions and building institutions for self-sustaining peace.

From 1948 to the present, it is estimated that $31.5 billion has been spent on UN-led peacekeeping efforts. Although the United States pays more than a quarter of the bill for UN peacekeeping operations, historically the United Nations has organized all peacekeeping missions, and none has been under the control of the United States. Partially as a result, the United States

has not provided significant forces to UN peacekeeping activities since the 1993 mission in Somalia. The United Nations, in turn, has not provided forces to assist with the peacekeeping effort in Iraq following the U.S.-led invasion of that country in 2003.

UNITED STATES DEPLOYMENTS

There are five primary categories of U.S. military presence abroad. These include U.S. forces permanently stationed overseas; U.S. forces deployed abroad on a rotational basis; U.S. forces deployed temporarily for exercises, combined training, or military-to-military interactions; programs such as defense cooperation, security assistance, and international arms cooperation; and regional academic centers that provide training in Western concepts of civilian control of the military, conflict resolution, and sound defense-resource management for foreign military and civilian officials.

United States forces permanently stationed abroad are intended to prevent and put down any acts of aggression or violations of human rights, and to maintain visibility as a stabilizing presence in a region. In 2002, for example, a little more than 200,000 U.S. troops were deployed overseas, mainly in South Korea, Germany, and Japan. During the Cold War, the number of permanently deployed peacekeeping troops was almost double that at approximately 450,000.

Rotationally deployed forces are primarily naval forces. They are designed to impart a stabilizing effect through a navy aircraft-carrier battle group supported by battleships, submarine patrols, and Marine Amphibious Ready Groups. During the Cold War, the United States maintained an almost constant naval presence in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean, and in the 1980s added naval deployments in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, defense cutbacks limited the United States to maintaining a naval presence in only two and a half regions on a rotating basis.

Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, an average of 45,000 U.S. troops were deployed overseas in both combat and peacekeeping missions. These contingency operations were focused mainly in the Balkan region, the Persian Gulf, and the Taiwan Strait. By June 2003, more than half the Army's deployable troops were engaged in peacekeeping and stabilization operations around the world, including some 5,500 assigned to Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia,

Croatia, and the Sinai Peninsula. In addition, roughly 150,000 troops were dealing with the aftermaths of the conflicts in Afghanistan and especially Iraq.

A NEW CONSTABULARY PEACEKEEPING FORCE?

As a result of these massive deployments, it is widely acknowledged that the military capabilities of the United States are stretched thin and that a new solution may become necessary. One suggestion, put forth by senior officials in the administration of President George W. Bush, is to create a standing constabulary force made up of troops from a range of countries, but led and trained by the United States. This force would be distinct from a proposed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) rapid-response force and apart from the United Nations, which has provided peace-keeping missions for decades. Others have claimed that the difficulty the United States has had controlling the postwar violence in Iraq is evidence that the United States does not do peacekeeping particularly well. It is unclear how many troops the United States would devote to such a constabulary force, what overall size the force would be, or who would pay for it.

The notion of creating U.S. military units permanently assigned to peacekeeping was widely considered during the Clinton administration, when U.S. forces found themselves increasingly involved in non-military missions in places such as Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Upon taking office, President George W. Bush promised to pull U.S. peacekeepers out of the Balkans and to launch an immediate review of troop commitments in dozens of countries, with an eye to strictly limiting overseas deployments.

However, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, peacekeeping came to be viewed by many members of the U.S. Republican Party as more relevant to national security. Indeed, measured by the number of soldiers involved, peacekeeping is the fastest-growing mission of the U.S. military. Because of the fear of terrorism, U.S. forces can no longer be easily pulled out of otherwise sticky situations as they were, for example, in Somalia and Haiti in the 1990s.

See also Bosnia Intervention (1993–95); Humanitarian Intervention; Kosovo Intervention (1999); Nation Building; Overseas Deployment; Peacekeeping Operations; Police Action; Somalia Intervention (1992); UN Peacekeeping

—*Laura Kittross*

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INTERPOL

The largest international police organization. The International Criminal Police Organization, commonly known as Interpol, promotes cross-border cooperation among law-enforcement agencies.

Twenty countries initiated Interpol in 1923, under the leadership of Johann Schober, the police chief of Vienna, Austria. After an interruption during World War II, the organization relocated to France and enjoyed steady growth in membership. Headquartered in Lyon, France, Interpol currently has 181 member states representing all continents. Interpol's official languages are English, French, Spanish, and Arabic.

Interpol deals only with international crimes, defined as crimes involving two or more member countries. It does not investigate crimes planned and committed in a single state. Interpol's typical targets are drug smugglers, counterfeiters, and those who commit a crime in one country and hide in another. Interpol also has helped to gather intelligence about terrorists and freeze their assets. The organization's constitution prohibits Interpol from engaging in activities of a political, military, religious, or racial character.

Interpol stores, analyzes, and circulates criminal data through a global communications system. Participating police forces share crime-related information through five types of international notices. The red notice requests the arrest and extradition of criminals and is commonly honored as an arrest warrant. The blue notice helps trace criminals and witnesses. The green notice warns about offenders who are likely to repeat their crimes in other countries. The yellow notice helps locate missing persons, especially minors and those who suffer from memory loss. The black notice shares information about unidentified bodies.

Every member country in Interpol has a national central bureau that serves as a clearinghouse for communication with foreign police forces and with Interpol's central offices. Contrary to popular imagination, Interpol officers do not travel from country to country to investigate crimes and make arrests.

Instead, each member state employs its own officers to work on its own territory, according to its own laws.

See also Intelligence and Counterintelligence; International Law

INTERSERVICE RIVALRY

Competition between branches of the military over resources and the role each plays in U.S. national security. Rivalry between service branches of the military is not a new development. Friendly competitions such as interservice boxing matches and the annual Army–Navy football game have long been a way for soldiers to build camaraderie and express pride in their particular services. However, since World War II, a more corrosive form of rivalry has arisen, with each branch of the service competing for limited reserves of money and human resources.

During World War II, U.S. Army and Navy commanders frequently struggled with one another for overall leadership of major joint military operations. After the war, such rivalries were one of the factors that pushed the U.S. Congress to enact the National Security Act of 1947. That act created the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a combined body of top-ranking officers from each of the armed services that was responsible for overall coordination and planning of military strategy. Although the new group did help to unify military planning, it did not eliminate interservice competition for funding or questions of joint force command.

In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act addressed the latter issue by requiring individual services to cede power to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Critics of the Goldwater-Nichols Act contend that it was much less effective in unifying military administration. Its vehicle for coordinating military spending requests is a committee of the vice chiefs of each service. Former high-ranking defense officials say that the system is plagued by logrolling—members approve other services' priorities to ensure theirs are approved, as well.

Some observers, though, argue that interservice rivalries are not always bad. Harvey Sapolsky, a professor of military studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, points out that competition with the navy during Vietnam helped the air force improve its capabilities. After being outperformed by

the navy in Vietnam, the air force invested in smart bombs and new training, which have yielded dividends in recent U.S. military conflicts.

In spite of such views, the Department of Defense continues to look for ways to eliminate unnecessary rivalry and duplication of effort. In 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld created the Joint Forces Command, a mix of current and military retired officers, to develop joint force strategies and serve as a voice for regional combat commanders in the development of new weapons. Rumsfeld also pushed for a more coordinated strategy to develop and buy weapons. To achieve that goal, he asked Edward Aldridge, former undersecretary of defense for acquisition, to head a group that would have greater power to determine centrally the military's equipment needs.

See also Goldwater-Nichols Act; Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint Defense Planning; Joint Operations; Procurement; National Security Act of 1947

INTERVENTIONISM

Concept that addresses the characteristics, causes, and purposes of the act of interfering with another state's attitudes, policies, and behavior. Political or military intervention into another state's affairs, regardless of the motivation, is a highly volatile undertaking whose merits have long been debated by philosophers and politicians.

To be considered interventionism, an act needs to be coercive in nature. In other words, an interventionist act is, by definition, a threatening act that is not welcomed by the target of one's intervention. Aggressiveness is also central to the application of interventionism in foreign affairs: an interventionist action always operates under the threat of violence. However, not all aggressive acts on the part of a government are interventionist. Defensive warfare within one's legal jurisdiction is not interventionist in nature, even if it involves employing violence to alter someone else's behavior. One needs to both step outside one's boundaries and operate under the threat of force in order to be an agent of interventionism.

On the international level, a state can engage in a variety of interventionist activities, but the kind of intervention that takes the spotlight most often is military intervention. In turn, military interventions can

take many forms depending on their stated goals. A state may invade another country to overthrow a bad regime, although what constitutes a bad regime is also a traditional source of contention. It may also intervene to force a nation to change its domestic or foreign policies.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Alternatively, the emphasis of an intervention may be on the people of that country rather than its rulers or government. The concept of humanitarian intervention explicitly addresses the need to care for an entire community afflicted by some kind of misfortune—for example, civil war, government repression, or starvation.

The doctrine of humanitarian intervention, in one form or another, has as long a history as warfare itself. Since the earliest times, armies have been sent to occupy new territory under humanitarian justifications. Countless unprovoked military raids have been mounted with the purported aim of protecting foreign populations from the tyranny of their self-appointed leaders. Humanitarian intervention is part of the very logic of empires, as emperors and their military commanders would often argue that the conquered populations greatly benefited from changing leadership.

Because of its pervasiveness throughout human history, the concept of humanitarian intervention found a place in the international legal system that developed after World War II. Regulating interventionism, however, depended on the importance nations assigned to the concepts of sovereignty and human rights. In order for a state to justify its interference with another state's internal affairs on humanitarian grounds, it had to be able to make the case that human rights take precedence over sovereignty. This case historically has been somewhat difficult to make. Countries are extremely cautious in condoning border transgressions, regardless of the motivations of such measures.

One of the aims of the charter of the United Nations is to balance sovereignty and human rights. The charter prohibits the signatory countries from aggressively acting "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state"—a clear reference to the inviolability of sovereignty. However, the same charter goes on to identify two instances when sovereignty can (and should) be infringed upon: cases of self-defense and situations when the UN Security Council approves military measures that aim to maintain or restore international peace and security. It is the second instance that the supporters of humanitarian intervention usually invoke. They argue that a government that is oppressing its own citizens poses a threat to international peace and thus can be overthrown by force, should the Security Council agree with this judgment.

THE MORAL DILEMMA

However murky the legality of intervention may be, the issue of its morality is even murkier. Countless thinkers throughout history—and recent history in particular—have debated whether interfering with another country's internal affairs can ever be justified morally. As with any dilemma, the moral dilemma of interventionism also arises from the struggle between two competing principles. Opponents of interventionism argue that interfering with the policies and actions of a state can never be right, regardless of the aggressor's motivations, and that imposing one's will on another is an unjustifiable act of violence.

Conversely, one could also contend that defending the weak against the oppression of the strong is a moral duty that takes precedence over one's right to be left unmolested. Proponents of interventionism argue that a country has the moral duty to do whatever it takes to protect a population from aggression, even if the aggression is perpetrated by its own government. Evidently, both positions rest on strong moral arguments, which makes the interventionist debate traditionally passionate and, at times, strongly antagonistic.

To make matters even more complicated, people who agree on the necessity of intervention may disagree on details such as the origin, magnitude, purpose, and timing of the planned intervention. The Iraq War of 2003 is a good example of the differences of opinion that can arise even among governments that agree on the need for intervention. As early as 1990, the UN Security Council passed resolutions condemning the actions of the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein. Council members also agreed on the necessity to interfere with the regime's behavior and established a comprehensive economic embargo on Iraq. Saddam Hussein's transgressions of human rights continued throughout the 1990s, and the Security Council passed several more resolutions condemning the Iraqi regime. Stringent sanctions were imposed on the country—a clear indication that the international community had agreed that some form of interventionism was indeed needed in this case.

Although the members of the UN agreed on the need for intervention, they strongly differed as to the nature of that intervention, its timing, and even its purpose. The United States pushed for an immediate military invasion to remove Saddam from power, arguing that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that posed an imminent threat to the United States and its allies. Most countries disputed the need for military intervention. They wanted to continue the economic sanctions and give UN weapons inspectors time to continue their ongoing evaluation of Iraq's weapons program. Unwilling to wait, the United States launched an invasion supported by Great Britain and a handful of other nations. Few other countries, however, were willing to support or participate in the effort.

DOES INTERVENTION WORK?

Even if a government concludes that intervention is legally and morally legitimate, it still must evaluate whether intervention is likely to achieve its desired goals. The answer depends on the nature of those goals. If the goal of an intervention is defined as regime change, one can measure its success rather easily: Is the regime still in power after the intervention? If, however, the goal is defined as bringing relief to an afflicted population, success can be much more difficult to evaluate.

By virtue of its very nature, interventionism is an aggressive measure that hurts some people. The interventionist dilemma now includes the question of whether interference diminishes suffering or, on the contrary, increases it. However, with globalization rapidly becoming a phenomenon impossible to ignore, the debate over intervention is unlikely to subside. As each country's destiny seems more and more dependent (at least in part) on the actions of other states, the legal, moral, and utilitarian trappings of interventionism increasingly become a matter of global concern.

—Razvan Sibii

See also Cooperative Security; Humanitarian Intervention; Isolationism; Peacekeeping Operations; Regionalism; UN Security Council

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INTIFADA

Name given to two separate Palestinian uprisings against Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Both intifadas represent periods of escalating violence in a vicious cycle of reciprocal aggression in the two territories, which have been occupied by Israel since 1967.

The first *intifada* (an Arabic term that means "shaking off") lasted from 1987 to 1993 and catapulted the Palestinian–Israeli conflict to the forefront of global affairs. Both Israelis and Palestinians incurred heavy losses in human lives, economic opportunities, and international image during this period.

That first uprising officially ended with the September 1993 signing of the Oslo Accords, which reaffirmed Israel's right to exist and established the Palestinian Authority (PA). The PA is a semiautonomous Palestinian body that controls Palestinian cities both in terms of security and the management of domestic affairs. The Palestinian Authority is internationally recognized as the institutional representative of the Palestinian people, and it is perceived as the basis for a future independent Palestinian government.

The second intifada started in September 2000 and was still underway in 2004, with both sides engaged in a seemingly unrelenting spiral of violence. In late 2004 and early 2005, conditions improved, and it appeared as though the second intifada might be ending, as well, because Israel and the Palestinians embarked on a new round of talks to try to resolve the problems between them.

THE FIRST INTIFADA (1987–1993)

Against a background of sporadic acts of aggression on both sides, the killing of four Palestinians by an Israeli army truck on December 8, 1987, provoked an immense uproar in the Jabalya refugee camp in the Gaza Strip (north of Gaza City). The Israelis argued that the collision was an accident, but the Palestinians suspected an intentional action meant to avenge an earlier stabbing of a Jewish salesman by a Palestinian.

Within one day, both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank became battlefields, with hundreds of young Palestinians clashing with Israeli soldiers. In addition to street combat, large sections of the Palestinian population in the two territories engaged in civil disobedience, refusing to pay taxes and staging general strikes and economic boycotts. These actions were eclipsed, however, by much-televised images of Palestinian boys throwing rocks and petrol bottles at Israeli tanks and soldiers, images that considerably affected the international perception of the conflict.

The first intifada ended in 1993, after six years of intense street fights and clashes between Israeli troops and Palestinians. On September 13, 1993, the Israeli government and the Palestinians' political representative, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), signed the Oslo Accords, effectively ending the intifada.

The accords were the result of lengthy negotiations between PLO leader Yasir Arafat and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, negotiations initiated through the efforts of the Norwegian government. The Oslo agreements divided the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into three zones: a first zone that was to come under complete Palestinian control (civil and military), a second zone that was to be controlled domestically by the Palestinians and militarily by the Israelis, and a third zone that was to remain under full Israeli control.

THE SECOND INTIFADA

On September 20, 2000, Israeli politician Ariel Sharon, then leader of the opposition Likud Party, made a highly publicized visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, the site of the al-Aqsa Mosque, one of the most revered Islamic sites in the Middle East. The action was perceived by the Palestinians as an overt provocation. As a result, they again took to the streets and began provoking Israeli troops into open combat.

With the Palestinians better prepared militarily than during the first intifada, the conflict quickly acquired many distinctive traits of guerilla warfare. Disappointed by Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak's unsuccessful diplomatic efforts at ending the conflict, Israelis replaced him at the polls with Ariel Sharon on February 6, 2001.

After Sharon's election, violence in the streets continued to increase. In March 2002, Israel responded to a series of Palestinian suicide bombings, targeting both civilians and soldiers, with a massive invasion of the West Bank, resulting in the deaths of at least

75 people on both sides. Various countries and international organizations (including the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations) attempted to mediate between Israel and the guerillas.

A much-hailed 2003 "road map to peace," accepted in principle by both the Palestinian Authority and Israel, has failed thus far to bring about a decline in violence. The second intifada continued throughout much of 2004, with an Oslo-like solution nowhere in sight. However, the death of Yasir Arafat in November 2004 brought hopes that peace might be achieved. A tenuous truce, brought about by Ariel Sharon and the new Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas, holds out the promise of a possible end to the intifada and renewed talks on how to resolve the decades-old conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

See also Arab-Israeli Conflict; Middle East Conflicts; PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization)

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IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1985–1986)

Scandal during the administration of President Ronald Reagan that involved the sale of military equipment to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages. The money received from the sales of equipment to Iran was then used to illegally fund the group known in Nicaragua as the *contras.* After the scandal broke, the executive office, as well as Congress, launched an investigation into the affair. This investigation eventually led to the prosecution of 14 individuals implicated in the Iran-Contra affair.

The term *contra* was a name given to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance. This group, made up of Nicaraguan exiles, was supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the purpose of overthrowing the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The Reagan administration's support of the contras

was very controversial. The Sandinista government, which had come to power in Nicaragua in 1979, was perceived by the Reagan administration as being pro-Cuban and communist in character.

As a result, it was felt that, in the interest of national security, it was imperative to support and conduct paramilitary operations against Nicaragua and the Sandinistas. The publicly stated purpose of the Reagan administration's involvement in the politics of Nicaragua was to stop Cuban weapons trafficking taking place through Nicaragua and to force the Nicaraguan government to take a position that was friendlier to the United States.

In response to the aggressive stance that the Reagan administration was taking against the Sandinista government, the U.S. Congress passed two amendments—known as the Boland amendments—in 1982 and 1984. The first amendment banned the CIA from working to overthrow the Sandinista government. The second Boland amendment restricted the administration even further by being more specific, banning all U.S. agencies from supporting the contras, even indirectly. Furthermore, in December 1983, Congress decided to place a limit on the amount of funding that the CIA would receive to support their contra operations, thus setting in motion the creative financing arrangement of the Iran-Contra affair.

Around the same time, the Reagan administration was dealing with a crisis situation in the Middle East. In December 1983, the terrorist group Hezbollah, which had ties to the fundamentalist Shiite government of Iran, began kidnapping Americans working in the region in order to obtain the release of 17 suspected terrorists who had been arrested after the bombings of the French and American embassies in Kuwait. Working with Iran was seen as the best way to secure the release of the hostages.

The United States, however, had very little leverage with the Iranian government. The U.S. government had been publicly hostile toward Iran after the 1979 hostage crisis at the U.S. embassy in Tehran. The United States also had placed a ban on arms sales to Iran. With little direct U.S. leverage over the Iranian government, the U.S. State Department launched Operation Staunch in March 1983, the purpose of which was to put pressure on other governments to halt arms sales to Iran.

However, this policy unofficially changed after the Reagan administration received signals from Tehran indicating that Iran was interested in receiving arms from the United States in exchange for the release of the hostages. Consequently, in August 1985, the first shipment of U.S. weapons was sent to Iran via Israel. The next year, the CIA conducted these sales directly. These weapons sales violated not only a U.S. embargo on weapons sales to Iran but also the Arms Export Control Act, approved by Congress in 1968. This act required arms sales to have not only the authorization of the president but also congressional awareness of the sales. It was this latter requirement that was missing in the Iranian arms sales.

The two separate parts of the Iran-Contra affair—the arms sale and funding of the contras—both came to light within months of each other. In early October 1986, details about U.S. support for the contras emerged when a U.S. cargo plane that had been carrying supplies for the contras was shot down in Central America. The only survivor, Eugene Hasenfus, who had been captured and then released by the Sandinistas, admitted on television that the operation was directly supported by the CIA. The details of the arms sales to Iran were made public just a month later in a story published by *Al-Shiraa,* a Lebanese publication.

In response to these events, President Reagan held a press conference on November 25, 1986. At the conference, the president made public the connection between these two seemingly unconnected activities. However, he denied having full knowledge of the two operations. Several days later, Reagan ordered an investigation into the affair. Congress also ordered its own investigation.

In the first few months of 1987, two reports on the Iran-Contra affair were released, one issued by the Senate Intelligence Committee and another by the Special Review Board, or Tower Commission. Neither report found the president accountable for the operations. The Tower Commission's report was more detailed and laid the blame for the affair on the general ignorance of the president about the activities of his staff.

From May 5 to August 6 of that same year, televised hearings were held by the joint House and Senate panels on the Iran-Contra affair. However, these hearings were subject to a short deadline, unwillingness on the part of Congress to compromise, and a lack of access to a large portion of the evidence. Thus, the hearings were unable to bring definitive closure to the scandal.

New evidence continued to emerge following the hearings' conclusion. Although the report produced by

the hearings, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair,* concluded that more congressional oversight was needed for U.S. covert operations, few actual changes were made.

Following the conclusion of these hearings, independent counsel Judge Lawrence Walsh was given the task of investigating the prosecution of those implicated. Fourteen individuals involved in the affair were brought up on criminal charges, including Robert C. McFarlane, national security advisor; Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, deputy director for political military affairs for the National Security Council; John Poindexter, deputy national security advisor; Elliott Abrams, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs; and Caspar Weinberger, secretary of defense.

During his administration, President George H. W. Bush later pardoned five of those charged, including Weinberger, McFarlane, and Abrams, arguing that they had had good intentions. However, these pardons raised questions about the extent of Bush's own involvement in the affair. Oliver North was found guilty on three charges related to Iran-Contra, but he was given a suspended sentence, probation, and community service. The amount of blame assignable to President Reagan and other high officials in the administration for the affair and cover-up is still debated.

See also Iranian Hostage Crisis; Latin America and U.S. Policy; Reagan, Ronald, and National Policy

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IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS

Events following the forceful takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran, in November 1979, by a group of radical students. Sixty-six American citizens were captured during the takeover, and 52 of them were held hostage for more than a year.

Coming in the wake of the 1978 Islamic revolution that replaced Iran's ruler, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, with religious fundamentalist Ayatollah

Ruhollah Khomeini, the hostage crisis was the most dramatic expression of the decidedly tense relations between the United States (which had supported the shah) and Iran's new rulers. Originally intended to last for only three days (according to one of the captors), the 444-day-long hostage situation deeply affected both the Iranian political scene (where a host of postrevolution figures were vying for power) and that of the United States (where President Jimmy Carter is said to have lost his 1980 reelection campaign in part because of his treatment of the crisis).

For many decades before the Islamic revolution, the United States and Iran had enjoyed a particularly close relationship. The shah of Iran provided the Americans with a steady supply of oil, receiving substantial economic and military aid in return. In 1963, Iran embarked on the White Revolution, which was designed to modernize the country rapidly. The shah's reforms, however, drew heavy criticism from conservative quarters, particularly from Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic clerics.

The shah responded to such criticism by authorizing the repression of dissenters by his heavy-handed secret police (known as SAVAK), alienating more and more of his citizens in the process. The 1970s in Iran were riddled with strikes and mass demonstrations, and finally, in September 1978, the shah imposed martial law on the country. Four months later, the shah was forced to flee Iran, never to return.

The shah's place at the helm of the state was taken by Ayatollah Khomeini, a Muslim cleric who had quickly returned from exile in France. On April 1, 1979, a national referendum established the Islamic Republic of Iran. Encouraged by their new leaders, thousands of anti-American demonstrators soon began to gather regularly in front of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. When the Iranians learned that an ailing Shah Pahlavi has been admitted to the United States for medical treatment, anger swept the nation, culminating in the seizure of the American embassy by approximately 400 student militants on November 4, 1979.

NEGOTIATIONS

Sixty-six Americans were originally taken captive in the seizure of the embassy, and the captors demanded the extradition of the shah in exchange for their release. The U.S. government refused to comply with the Iranians' demand, and the hostage crisis began in earnest.

The prisoners were kept blindfolded and were threatened and interrogated by armed men on a daily basis. After a week of futile attempts to negotiate with the ayatollah and the militants, President Jimmy Carter banned all oil imports from Iran and froze $8 billion in Iranian financial assets in U.S. banks.

Looking to exploit the perceived atmosphere of discrimination and racism in the United States, the ayatollah ordered the release of 13 women and African American embassy personnel. Another hostage was released a few months later because of illness. The remaining 52 Americans, however, were kept hostage in Iran until the very end of the crisis.

During the first few months of the hostage crisis, the U.S. government, along with the United Nations, made several more unsuccessful efforts to obtain the hostages' freedom. The UN secretary-general met with the Iranian government several times during the crisis, but to no avail. A secret rescue mission by the United States in April 1980 ended prematurely in catastrophe, when American helicopters crashed in the Iranian desert, killing eight U.S. servicemen.

As the hostage crisis continued, the political scene in Iran was in full turmoil, as its citizens were in the process of electing a new government. In early 1980, newly elected Iranian president Abolhasan Bani-Sadr gave American envoys some measure of hope that the hostages would soon be released.

The ayatollah's clerics, however, retained formidable power, and under their influence, negotiations once again led to nothing. To make matters even more complicated, the militants in control of the U.S. embassy sent mixed signals with regard to their allegiance to either the new government or the ayatollah's religious representatives. Meanwhile, the crisis dragged on.

THE RELEASE

In the summer of 1980, the election of a new Iranian parliament, along with the death of the shah in Egypt, led to an easing of some of the tension between Iran and the United States, allowing negotiations to resume. The ayatollah announced a series of conditions for the release of the hostages, including a public U.S. apology for its past involvement in Iran's internal affairs. The U.S. government brushed the proposal aside, but the two sides were now closer to a compromise than ever before. At this point, the Iranians accepted the mediation of the conflict by Algerian envoys, and a convenient settlement was in sight.

The good news, however, came too late to save the reelection campaign of President Jimmy Carter, whose administration had been plagued by the lingering crisis. In November 1980, Carter lost the presidency to Ronald Reagan. Yet, in the few months between election day and the handover of the presidency, the Carter administration pushed for a resolution to the hostage situation. An agreement was finally drafted in Algiers and signed by the Iranian government on January 18, 1981. Soon afterward, the United States unfroze Iran's financial assets. One hour after newly elected President Ronald Reagan took his presidential oath of office, the 52 hostages were released and the crisis was finally over.

Although the crisis had ended, America's political environment would feel its manifold repercussions for many years to come. The nation's official policy against negotiating under threat had been brought into question by the recent events. More importantly, following the release of the hostages, Washington, DC, was engulfed in a wide-ranging conspiracy theory that suspected the new Reagan administration of political machinations to delay the release of the hostages until after the elections.

Whatever the undercurrents of the situation, the arrival of the 52 hostages in the United States was accompanied by a collective sigh of relief from the nation. Following the resolution of the crisis, the United States and Iran wanted no more to do with each other, and the relations between the two countries remain tense to the present day.

See also Iran-Contra Affair; Islamic Fundamentalism

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IRAQ WAR OF 2003

Unilateral U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 that produced vigorous debate in an already polarized diplomatic

and American political landscape. Although the military defeat of Iraq remained a foregone conclusion, the drawn-out political and diplomatic deliberations in the run-up to the war have defied most simplified analyses, and the ultimate outcome of the war remains unknown.

Many observers fear that Iraq has become a possible repeat experience of the Vietnam War for the United States, but one must look further back in time, to the Spanish-American War, for an example of a military victory so easily won, followed by a confounding insurrection of the apparently liberated peoples. The Iraq campaign of 2003 (the third Gulf War) nevertheless met the timely needs of the U.S. political leadership.

THE APPROACH TO WAR

The advisers to U.S. president-elect George W. Bush had already made clear before the 2000 national election that the Iraqi question required a termination in U.S. diplomacy. Maintaining the U.S.-led aerial reconnaissance of the northern and southern no-fly zones in Iraq from Turkish and Saudi bases—a sanction imposed on Iraq after the previous Gulf War (1990–91)—cost too much in funds, equipment, and increasingly scarce military manpower. The forces could be best used elsewhere.

Moreover, the erstwhile allies of the coalition that defeated Iraq in the earlier Gulf War had grown far less determined to continue UN sanctions and embargoes that followed the conclusion of that war. Several of these nations openly anticipated the resumption of trade relations, with an oil-rich marketplace beckoning customers not too tainted from the Gulf War of 1990–91.

Meanwhile, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had defiantly resisted and obstructed the efforts of UN weapons-inspection teams monitoring the disarmament clauses of the 1991 armistice. In a manner still unexplained to date, Iraq withheld remaining details of the creation and disbanding of its ballistic missile, chemical, and biological weapons programs, as well as its research in nuclear weapons. Also, Iraqi army exercises had presented threatening moves toward the Kuwaiti border several times in the 1990s, leading to more extensive U.S. deployments to provide for local dissuasion in the Gulf region.

Thus, with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against New York City and Washington, DC, the Bush administration had already begun its deliberations on how best to put an end to the seemingly endless defense drain posed by Saddam Hussein's regime. Even as the quick military campaign against Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 to destroy terrorist bases of operations took shape, U.S. deployments and war-planning efforts against Iraq could be discerned. In the eyes of the Bush administration, if a war on terrorism had begun, then states sponsoring terrorism or known to sympathize with terrorist acts could be added to the list of likely targets. Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defense, revealed publicly that the emphasis on Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction was hawked vigorously because the public would grasp it as a threat more easily than the other possibilities.

In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush spoke of an axis of evil and identified Iraq as part of it, thus setting the tone for a year of buildup of both policy and military readiness for a campaign against Iraq. The immediate objective was to overthrow Saddam Hussein and install a more friendly government that would ease tensions, isolate other opponents (such as Iran, also cited as belonging to the axis of evil) and permit greater U.S. influence in the region.

As laudable as these objectives remained with the public, the concept of unilateral military action, even with British forces participating, did not prove compelling in the United States or among the usual allies. However, extensive deployments of forces and supplies ensued through the summer of 2002, and it appears that President Bush overestimated his support and deployed forces to the region far faster than allies or the UN Security Council were willing to act. Arab allies that had supported the 1990–91 Gulf War also proved less motivated to participate in a showdown with Iraq. Although they viewed Saddam as at least a latent threat, the notion of a U.S.-sponsored invasion to accomplish regime change found little favor in the traditional autocracies of the Arab world.

Nevertheless, by late summer 2002, the United States had stationed several brigades of ground troops in Kuwait, moved at least five prepositioned equipment sets from other sites to Kuwait, and had more ships entering the Persian Gulf each week with shipments of general supplies and equipment. Some feel that President Bush had cued the U.S. forces to be ready to act against Iraq by November. However, the ongoing international diplomacy—in particular, British prodding to take the case to the United Nations

A meeting of the United Nations Security Council at United Nations (UN) headquarters in New York on March 26, 2003. This meeting, the first public one on Iraq since the U.S.-led invasion, was called by Arab and other nations for the purpose of allowing nonmembers of the Security Council to speak on the crisis in Iraq. The decision to go to war against Iraq was a controversial one in the United Nations, and the United States and its "coalition of the willing" eventually decided to proceed without UN support.

Source: Corbis.

in September—imposed delays. In the end, had Bush acceded to allied requests for more weapons inspections and more pressure upon Saddam to seek non-military solutions, he would have had to cancel the expensive buildup of the summer of 2002, return the troops to garrison, and wait until the fall of 2003 to invade.

THE INVASION

Instead, the Bush administration used the opening months of 2003 to lay the political groundwork for action against Iraq in the last weeks of feasible military campaign weather in the spring. United States air attacks began on Iraq on March 20, 2003, using tactical aircraft and cruise missiles. However, the evident weakness of Iraq—defeated in 1991 and embargoed since then—meant that neither a long air campaign nor an overwhelming buildup of forces was needed.

After only a day, approximately 150,000 U.S. and British forces began crossing into Iraq from staging bases in Kuwait. Dubbed Operation Iraqi Freedom by U.S. forces, the campaign was called Operation Telic by British forces and Operation Falconer by the Australian units involved. Although British and U.S.

troops isolated the major southern Iraqi city of Basra and the nearby al-Faw peninsula, the remainder of the U.S. forces thrust along the Euphrates River as far as al-Nasiriya, before splitting into two lines of advance.

Accompanied by heavy air support, the U.S. Third Mechanized Infantry Division, reinforced by a brigade, attacked through the city of Karbala and entered the Baghdad zone by capturing its international airport. In approximately the same time frame, the First Marine Division, with similar reinforcement, attacked north past the city of Kut into the southern approaches of Baghdad. On each approach, major Iraqi army forces attempted to hold their positions, but they were swept away by the firepower and maneuverability of the U.S. forces, which were equipped with the latest weapons, sensors, and communications equipment.

As the Iraqi government fled Baghdad, military resistance melted from all but die-hard factions, some of which required neutralization by U.S. divisions following the leading forces. The U.S. 4th Mechanized Infantry Division remained out of action, with its equipment aboard ships in the eastern Mediterranean, where Turkey had denied access to unload and passage to invade northern Iraq. Instead, allied special forces, used in record numbers, secured airfields at the Iraqi city of Kirkuk so that the 173rd Airborne Brigade could land and occupy the Kurdish northern provinces of Iraq.

By April 9, 2003, most of Baghdad remained clear of organized resistance, and the U.S. pursuit forces neared Tikrit, the tribal center of Saddam's regime. Meanwhile, the civilian population began looting in Baghdad, and the problem reached a peak by April 11. United States forces had not planned for much resistance, trusting defectors' claims that the population would welcome them as liberators. Accordingly, a sophisticated and small combat force had been

detailed to the job, not a manpower-intensive army of occupation.

By all accounts, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, undertaken in conjunction with British and Australian combat forces, had succeeded in its mission. Although the term *coalition of the willing* had been cited by U.S. spokespersons, only 5 of the 30 nations initially named had sent combat troops, and the small Polish and Romanian contingents took no part in the fighting.

President Bush proclaimed major combat operations at an end on May 1, 2003. However, in the months that followed, the war became a struggle of resistance by varied groups against the U.S.-led occupation of the country. Again, U.S. military planners had not taken serious account of the possibility of insurgents and a resistance movement, and even with the creation of a sovereign Iraqi provisional government in July 2004, there seemed no end in sight for the campaign to pacify Iraq.

RESULTS STILL PENDING

The U.S. invasion of Iraq stemmed from an overly enthusiastic and ambitious concept that had been reinforced, in unintended fashion, by the ease of victory in the 1990–1991 Gulf War. The deployment in that war of overwhelming U.S. and coalition forces in six months' time resulted in an aerial campaign of roughly 30 days and a 100-hour ground war that eliminated the Iraqi threat in the region and gave the United States a commanding presence there. The apparent ease of that victory influenced the more ambitious schemes of invading and occupying Iraq in 2003.

Some defense experts had argued for such use of American military superiority and international power as a useful and positive diplomatic doctrine since the 1960s. With the ending of the Cold War, and with U.S. defense spending far exceeding that of any other nation, such obvious military superiority could be used to advance U.S. interests on a global basis. Unilateral actions, it was thought, would dispense with any need for typically clumsy maneuvering in international bodies such as the United Nations, alliances such as NATO, with weak and strong members, and other aspects of multilateralism. Instead, U.S. forces, using dominant superiority in war-fighting technologies and doctrines, could act unilaterally or with key supporting allies to effect changes in regional governments and strike a new balance that favored the security of the Western states and their economies.

Unfortunately, the fortunes of war and the intrinsic play of chance against even the best-laid plans make the simplest things in war turn out to be difficult. A typical example of such oversimplification came when Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld called upon Iraq to surrender on the first day of ground operations. His action suggested that the game was up and there would be no need for a sovereign nation such as Iraq to attempt to defend itself, no matter how hopeless the odds.

As a result of such wishful thinking, and of harsh realities left unanticipated or miscalculated, the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq brought numerous problems for which few solutions remained at hand: Iraqi resistance, troop conduct, prisons and prisoner handling, rules of engagement, trial procedures, collaboration, and use of torture are among an endless list of concerns in the postwar period. Furthermore, the shortage in the United States of Arabic speakers and other knowledgeable experts forms a poor basis for establishing hegemony in a part of the world unfamiliar to American eyes.

—*Kenneth W. Estes*

See also Axis of Evil; Bush, George W., and National Policy; Cheney, Richard; Economic Sanctions; Gulf War (1991); Middle East and U.S. Policy; Neoconservative; Nation Building; Rogue State; Rumsfeld, Donald; Saddam Hussein; Terrorism, War on International; Unilateralism

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IRAQGATE

Media term for the scandal that emerged during the administration of President George H. W. Bush, in which it was alleged that U.S. agricultural loans made to Iraq during the previous administration were used to purchase weapons with the knowledge of the administration. No evidence was ever found to prove this allegation, however.

During the administration of President Ronald Reagan, the United States had decided that it needed to change its policy toward Iraq. In the early 1980s, wishing to have closer relations and more influence with that country, the United States normalized diplomatic relations with Iraq. In addition, the United States gave financial support to Iraq, which at the time was involved in a costly war with Iran. In 1983, as part of the U.S. plan to improve relations with Iraq, the country was added to the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) program, run by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. This program issued credit to nations for the purchase of U.S. agricultural products.

This friendly policy toward Iraq was reexamined by Congress in 1988, when the issue of sanctions against Iraq was brought up after the gassing of several thousand Kurds by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Despite congressional reevaluation, the Reagan administration continued to seek a closer relationship with Iraq, in hopes of the United States gaining greater influence in the region. In October 1989, National Security Decision Directive 26, signed by President George H. W. Bush, explicitly supported increased financial links with Iraq. This desire to improve relations would last until Iraq invaded neighboring Kuwait in August 1990.

The friendly Iraq policy came under intense media scrutiny because of a search conducted in August 1989 of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), an Italian bank with a branch in Atlanta, Georgia. The bank, specifically its branch manager Christopher Drogoul, was accused of having loaned or credited Iraq about $4 billion. It was discovered that this money helped Iraq purchase weapons illegally.

It was found that some of these funds were connected with the Community Credit Corporation program. There was no proof, however, that the Bush administration had knowledge of the branch manager's illegal activities. Specifically, what was reported in the media was that, as part of the CCC program, the Iraqis were buying U.S. agricultural products for less than the loan amounts they received. They then used these extra funds primarily for arms purchases.

The media also reported that, despite this corruption, the Bush administration had continued to provide funds to Iraq. Critics further argued that the granting of these loans was encouraged by the Bush administration, despite apparent credit problems of Iraq. Supporters of the administration argued that there had been no actual exchange of money involved, only a line of credit extended for agricultural purchases. Furthermore, some argued that Iraq had repaid a portion of the loans it had already been given and thus was a good risk.

The media dubbed the scandal *Iraqgate* as an allusion to the Watergate scandal that brought an end to the presidency of Richard Nixon more than a decade earlier. As a result of all the media attention on Iraqgate, numerous internal investigations were launched by Congress and the executive branch. The House Banking Committee, for example, examined whether there were possible problems with banking practices, and the Department of Agriculture launched a probe into its CCC program. Also, a special Senate committee on Iraqgate was created.

Four years were spent investigating Iraqgate. Although no one was indicted for any crime, there has never been a definitive conclusion to the affair. In the end, the blame was primarily placed on the BNL bank manager. Meanwhile, almost $2 billion remains to be paid by Iraq on the CCC loans. Although it can be argued that poor policy decisions were made over Iraq on the part of the Bush administration, it has not been proved that the administration did anything illegal.

See also Bush, George H. W., and National Policy

IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY

Several armed groups dedicated to ending British rule in Ireland. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is a nationalist group committed to the integration of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland as a whole and independent nation. It has its roots in the early 1900s, with remnants of rebel units that were organized by Irish nationalist Michael Collins but that were dispersed after British troops put down Ireland's Easter Rebellion in 1916. Originally composed of the more militant members of Collins's Irish Volunteers, the IRA became the military wing of the Irish political party Sinn Fein.

With the establishment of the Irish Free State (now the Republic of Ireland) in 1922, the IRA became a source of determined opposition to the separation of British-controlled Northern Ireland from the rest of Ireland. Since the early years of the Free State, the IRA has been responsible for many bombings, raids, and street battles in the Republic of Ireland as well as

in Northern Ireland. These activities led to condemnation by both Irish governments. In the mid-1950s, the IRA launched a series of bombing attacks in Belfast, in London, and at the Ulster border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State.

The bombings abated for a while until the late 1960s, when the terrorist arm of the IRA (known as the *provisionals*) began a systematic terrorist campaign in Northern Ireland. In 1974, these extremists exported their violence to England with the bombing of a pub in the city of Birmingham. Five years later, the IRA took credit for the assassination of the English noble Lord Louis Mountbatten, but it failed in its attempt to assassinate British prime minister Margaret Thatcher.

Hopes for peace finally emerged in 1994, when the IRA declared a cease-fire. Sinn Fein, the IRA's political arm, participated in negotiations with Great Britain the following year. However, Sinn Fein did not negotiate with the new Northern Irish government until 1999. Britain suspended the new government in 2000 and again in 2001 because of contention over IRA disarmament agreements. Since that time, a number of incidents have occurred that indicate the IRA has not completely abandoned paramilitary activity. However, in 2002 the IRA stunned sympathizers and enemies alike by offering "sincere apologies and condolences" to the families of its civilian victims. Today, the Irish Republican Army still considers itself an armed force opposing the illegal foreign occupation of Ireland, and various IRA splinter groups continue to engage in acts of terrorism.

See also Colonialism; Nationalism; Terrorism, War on International

IRON CURTAIN

Metaphorical term for the political and economic divide between Western and Soviet spheres of influence in Europe following World War II. For more than 40 years, the idea of an Iron Curtain represented the absolute ideological divide between the communist and capitalist worlds. This invisible barrier became an important psychological element in the national-security concerns of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

The first person to use the term *iron curtain* was Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels, who used the

term in a speech in late February 1945. Goebbels stated that "an iron curtain would at once descend," because he anticipated that the Soviet Union stood ready to secure its western borders. However, the term is more closely linked to one of Germany's most implacable enemies during World War II—Winston Churchill.

On March 5, 1946, former British prime minister Winston Churchill gave a speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. In his address, Churchill popularized the term *Iron Curtain* when he stated, "From Stetting in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent." In his speech, Churchill gave voice to the principles, beliefs, and ideas that would shape the story of the new postwar era.

During World War II, then–prime minister Churchill and U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt accepted and even encouraged a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. They recognized that the Soviet Union had legitimate security interests in the region and that the Soviet Red Army could balance Nazi power there. After the war, however, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was loath to relinquish control of Eastern Europe. Russia had been continuously threatened or invaded by the West over the previous centuries—by Napoleon in 1812 and by Germany in World War I and World War II.

Churchill and Roosevelt were eager to have Stalin's cooperation in stabilizing Europe and creating the United Nations after the end of the war. Thus, at the Yalta Conference of 1945, they agreed to Soviet control of Poland, specifically, and to Soviet influence over Eastern Europe as a whole. The Potsdam Conference, held later that year, confirmed these arrangements.

By June 1945, the United States and Soviet Union were the sole world superpowers. Over the next few years, they gradually consolidated their spheres of influence. In February 1946, Foreign Service officer George Kennan sent the famous *Long Telegram* to Washington—an 8,000-word document describing and interpreting the hostile foreign policy of the Soviet Union and urging a strong stand against it in the United States. Kennan's telegram signaled a decisive break from the period of alliance with the Soviet Union that had prevailed briefly during World War II. The United States had grown increasingly mistrustful, and the Soviets reciprocated.

Throughout 1946, negotiations about the forms of governments in Eastern Europe, the Soviet withdrawal from Iran, and, most important, the future of

Germany exacerbated tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States had begun unilaterally instituting democratic and economic reforms in those parts of Germany under its control, despite agreements to reintegrate and reunify the country.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, had extracted some $10 billion worth of industrial and agricultural equipment from Germany as war reparations. Looking toward the future, the Western occupiers (the United States, France, and Great Britain) were eager to invest in rebuilding Germany but not to maintain a permanent military presence there. The Soviets, in contrast, wanted to take as much of value from Germany as possible and planned to keep troops there to protect their Eastern European sphere of influence.

Despite the growing tensions, the United States and the Soviet Union remained officially on good terms for more than a year after Churchill's speech. In June 1947, the great powers convened at a Paris conference to negotiate European economic recovery. The Western powers supported multilateral aid arranged under the auspices of the United Nations. The Soviets, however, preferred a bilateral, lend-lease type of program. On July 3, the Soviets walked out of the conference because they disagreed with the aid structures and a U.S. provision that called for countries to share information about their economic conditions.

The Soviets warned the Eastern European countries against participating in the European Recovery Program, the U.S.-sponsored program for rebuilding Europe that was better known as the Marshall Plan. The Soviet Union then began consolidating its influence in the region by direct or indirect ideological and financial support of communist movements in Eastern European countries. Passage of the Marshall Plan, shortly thereafter, solidified U.S. material and political support for democratic Western European nations. The Russian foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, suggested that the de facto split of Europe that had emerged represented the real fall of the Iron Curtain—and signaled the beginning of the Cold War.

The new Soviet sphere of influence behind the Iron Curtain extended as far west as East Germany, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, where the Soviets used veiled threats and propaganda to install a legal but Moscow-influenced government. For a time, it also included parts of Austria. In 1949, the Soviets forcibly ousted a democratically elected government in Hungary and installed a Soviet satellite government. The Soviet Red Army also installed communist puppet governments in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. While Eastern Europe was falling under Soviet control, the Western (capitalist) sphere shaped Western Europe, re-creating its economy in a more liberal, capitalist mold.

The new loyalties created by the split in Europe were solidified during the Cold War. East–West tensions gave the Western powers an impetus to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to provide collective security for Western Europe and the United States. In response to West Germany's admission into NATO, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellite states created the Warsaw Pact in May 1955.

Europe remained bitterly divided into bipolar spheres during the nearly five decades of the Cold War. The metaphorical Iron Curtain became a solid barrier in 1961 with the Soviet-instigated construction of the Berlin Wall to separate the eastern and western sectors of the divided German capital. The Iron Curtain split central Europe and divided the West from the East until 1989, when the Berlin Wall was torn down and the Cold War dissipated. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 finally brought the Iron Curtain down for good.

See also Berlin Crises; Berlin Wall; Cold War; Communism and National Security; Kennan, George; Marshall Plan; NATO; Potsdam Conference; Warsaw Pact; Yalta Conference

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ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

Religious and political movement that urges Islamic societies to return to a literal interpretation of the Koran and to conduct their political and legal affairs in accordance with the prescriptions of Islam's holy book. Islamic fundamentalism stresses the duty of every Muslim to follow all Koranic tenets in their everyday lives.

The Islamic fundamentalist movement is based on the assumption that there is only one legitimate interpretation of the verses in the Koran. The movement posits that any critic of the fundamentalist interpretation, regardless of his or her specific beliefs, is considered, at the very least, severely misguided and, at the most, a dangerous heretic. From a political standpoint, Islamic fundamentalism seeks to replace secular regimes (often accused of having succumbed to Western influence) with governments that pass only laws that are in conformity with specific Islamic jurisprudence texts.

THE BASICS OF FUNDAMENTALISM

Islamic fundamentalism is not a unitary movement, either from the religious or from the political point of view. Indeed, fundamentalist groups often disagree with each other on the correct interpretation of the Islamic texts, as well as on the desired course of political action. They do tend to agree, however, on several basic tenets.

First, according to the fundamentalist doctrine, the Muslim world is currently in a state of moral decay brought about by ignorance and corruption. It is believed that the source of much of this evil is Western civilization, which has enslaved Islam for centuries and has no intention of releasing Muslims from its grip. Believers thus have a duty to resist Western influences (not necessarily through violent means) and take steps to build a society that conforms to the teachings of the Koran.

The fundamentalist movement does not call for a return to preindustrial times. It is not technological progress that the movements finds so corrupting about the Western world, but rather the moral relativism and lack of piety that seem to characterize many Western societies.

HISTORICAL BEGINNINGS

Islamic fundamentalism is a reaction to modernity, to the Enlightenment-driven, European secularizing influence on traditional Muslim societies. As such, it is, paradoxically enough, a consequence of modernity and not a movement with very deep historical roots. For the approximately three centuries of its existence, the Islamic fundamentalist program has undergone a series of transformations.

Given the ambiguousness of the term *fundamentalism,* one would be hard-pressed to identify the exact origin of the Islamic fundamentalist religious and political movement. One could easily, however, recognize that several historical Islamic figures had a tremendous influence on the shaping of contemporary Islamic fundamentalist thought. One of the most important of those figures was Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who led a religious and political movement in mid-18th-century Arabia aimed at purifying Islam of superstitions, idolatries, and other kinds of deviances. Currently, the Wahhabist interpretation of Islam is the official (and unique) religious ideology of Saudi Arabia.

THE BROTHERHOOD AND THE AYATOLLAH

The first major Islamic fundamentalist movement was the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in the late 1920s by Hassan al-Banna. The brotherhood sought to help Muslims break free of the corrupting influence of Western secularism.

Al-Banna believed that Islamic countries such as Egypt had lost their souls by becoming politically and economically dependent on the former colonial powers of the West. He advocated the restoration of the Muslim religious law (*sharia*) in an attempt to bring about a *re-Islamization* of Egypt. In 1949, al-Banna was assassinated, but the ideology he helped take shape continued to exert an ever-growing influence in the Muslim community.

Thirty years after al-Banna's death, the shah of Iran was overthrown by the followers of one of the most famous proponents of Islamic fundamentalism, Ayatollah Khomeini. A radical even by the standards of al-Banna's Muslim Brotherhood, the ayatollah created an Iranian republic based exclusively on what he believed to be the most pure form of Islamic law and custom. Khomeini died in 1989, leaving behind a country divided between a powerful conservative camp and a persistent reformist faction.

THE TALIBAN

An even more extreme version of Islamic fundamentalism was espoused by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Having seized power in 1996 after years of Afghan civil conflicts and a protracted war of resistance against a Soviet army of invasion, the Taliban sought to make Afghanistan into a pure Islamic state devoid of Western influence. To that end, the Taliban

outlawed music, television, sports, women's education, and many other things deemed un-Islamic.

The al-Qaeda terrorist leader Osama bin Laden, who is a militant supporter of Islamic fundamentalism, was hosted by the Taliban from 1997 to 2001, when the United States attacked Afghanistan in the wake of the September 11 terrorist strikes. It is probably largely a result of bin Laden's terrorist activities that the West has become increasingly concerned with the beliefs and practices of the Islamic fundamentalist movement. Feeding on the convulsions that characterize contemporary world politics, Islamic fundamentalism has become a formidable ideology with an ever-increasing number of supporters.

See also Afghanistan, War in; Hamas; September 11/WTC and Pentagon Attacks; Terrorism, War on International; Terrorists, Islamic

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ISOLATIONISM

A policy of political, economic, and cultural seclusion in international affairs. In essence, isolationism is a country's attempt to exclude, or at least minimize, political, economic, military, and cultural interactions with other nations. A country's ability to successfully maintain this kind of comprehensive isolation is based on its strength, the character of its neighbors, its ability to sustain itself with internal resources, and its geography. A country with an efficient military, a solid and internally oriented economic base, a small number of peaceable neighbors, and mountain or sea borders is in a good position to sustain isolationist policies because it is self-sufficient and safe from invasion. If any of these conditions do not hold, isolationism is much more difficult to execute.

Isolationism has a long-standing history in the United States. There are several potential reasons why this is the case. The geographic position of the United States, flanked on both coasts by vast oceans, makes it in some sense an island. Some observers assert that Americans simply do not feel tied to other countries because their geographical distance from the rest of the world creates a mental distance or an inward-looking mentality. They do not perceive their political or economic linkages with other nations or may not have much interest in them. Other theories emphasize the nation's go-it-alone spirit, or its unwillingness to participate in world affairs unless national security or great moral causes are at stake. This sense of isolationism was shaken when the United States became one of two superpowers at the close of World War II, and it has continued to diminish since.

POLITICAL ISOLATIONISM

Political isolationism often stems from a desire to avoid being drawn into others' conflicts. It is frequently a means of protecting a country's citizens from death in wars that are not their own. It implies not only not taking sides in third-party wars, but also not engaging in peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations. In some countries, such as Switzerland and Sweden, isolationism may be an expression of a policy of neutrality. Isolationism is often exercised as a safer option—protecting countries from the dangers of conflict, arms races, and security compromises. Frequently, it is a country's overt demonstration of its sovereign status.

Isolationism may also arise—intentionally or otherwise—from rogue-nation status in the international community. Modern North Korea is deliberately abstaining from interaction with large parts of the international community; in turn, many world nations refuse to maintain normal relations with it. As a result, North Korea faces diplomatic isolation, lack of recognition from the international community, extremely reduced trade, and possible ideological stagnation.

In the United States, political isolationism has been a part of the political spectrum since the country's beginning. George Washington's warning in his farewell address to avoid foreign entanglements has substantially shaped U.S. foreign policy in the two centuries that followed. Although the Monroe and Truman doctrines asserted the right of the United States to intervene, the country has tended to revert to isolated status for long periods. Domestic assertions of neutrality and isolation, for example, kept the United States out of World War I until 1917 and

helped keep the country out of World War II until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ISOLATIONISM

Economic isolationism may come from a protectionist philosophy, which means protecting domestic industry in preference to trading. Often, it includes severe restriction of imports to foster the growth of domestic entrepreneurialism and industry. A country may refuse to trade entirely, or create artificially high tariffs or duties that reduce others' willingness to trade. Protectionism may be encouraged to shield an economy from large shocks—particularly those that are externally created. It may also be invoked to help develop infant industries, such as new forays into manufacturing, and it may ensure protection from economic or political dependence on other nations.

Cultural isolationism springs from a desire to preserve customs, heritage, beliefs, and values. The move toward isolationism usually occurs if leaders feel the culture is threatened by foreign cultural or religious influences, or other outside forces, including globalization. Specific reasons for insulating a population vary. Isolationism may stem from a desire to prevent outsiders from penetrating the culture, such as occurred in 19th-century China. It may arise to prevent the decline of native culture. For example, several French organizations support the protection of the French language. It may also come from a desire to protect an ideology; theocratic states such as modern Iran reject the influx of Western secularism.

Historically, isolationism has rarely been ineffective. Because of geographical borders, in- and out-migration, economic interdependence, the international flow of ideas, and numerous other factors, countries are unable to entirely extricate themselves from interactions with others. In the modern era of the Internet and globalization, it is extremely difficult to prevent interchange among individuals and, by extension, societies.

Isolationism can be costly. It can lead countries to lose political influence or power, opportunities to influence international organizations and conferences, gains from trade, or access to innovations in technological, scientific, and other forms of thought. Short-term economic benefits, money saved from nonintervention in times of crisis, or quick-range sociocultural gains from isolation may ultimately lead to high costs of integration and change in the future.

See also Foreign Dependency; Globalization and National Security; Interventionism; Monroe Doctrine; Rogue State; Truman Doctrine; World War II

J

JACKSON COMMITTEE

Presidential committee established in 1953 to assess the Cold War activities of the Soviet Union and to evaluate the United States information campaign against communism. Originally known as the U.S. President's Committee on International Information Activities, the Jackson Committee was created by recently elected President Dwight D. Eisenhower at the suggestion of his former military adviser, Charles Douglas Jackson (better known as C. D. Jackson).

Jackson was a psychological warfare expert who advised then President-Elect Eisenhower of his concern for the status of the U.S. psychological warfare program and that of the Soviet Union. Just four days after his inauguration, President Eisenhower officially mandated the President's Committee on International Information Activities, with the mission of assessing U.S. information efforts and policies related to national security and foreign policy.

The President's Committee became known as the Jackson Committee not because of C. D. Jackson, but because the former deputy director of central intelligence, William H. Jackson, was appointed the committee's chair. Given its mandate, the Jackson Committee interviewed several hundred government representatives, including members of Congress, and evaluated classified documents to arrive at its conclusions and recommendations.

Among its conclusions, the committee report described Soviet ambitions for world domination and a communist world led by the Soviet Union. Given this pessimistic analysis, the Jackson Committee recommended continued military buildup until the Soviet Union was no longer considered a significant threat. The committee's recommendations for U.S. information programs spurred the establishment of the United States Information Agency in 1953.

The Jackson Committee's mission to assess Soviet activities came at the dawn of the Cold War, and its findings reflected the distrust of Soviet and communist intentions that pervaded the time period.

See also Cold War; Communism and National Security; Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy

JACKSON, HENRY (1912–1983)

The fabled "Senator from Boeing" who amassed an enviable reputation as a legislator, defense authority, and public servant while maintaining immense popularity in his home state of Washington. Henry Martin "Scoop" Jackson grew up in Everett, Washington, and practiced law after earning degrees from Stanford University and the University of Washington. After serving as a county prosecutor, he won a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1941. He served continuously in the House and then the Senate until his death in 1983.

Jackson served with distinction as a legislator, chairing the committees of Indian Affairs, Interior, and Energy. He became known for his advocacy of labor, civil rights, and defense issues. Jackson chaired the Democratic National Committee in 1960 and ran for president in 1972 and 1976. His fervent stance in favor of the Vietnam War and keeping peacetime

defense funding high placed him apart from other prominent Democrats, and he was appreciated by defense "hawks" in both parties.

A fervent anticommunist, Jackson nevertheless recognized problems of nuclear weapons and the need for international agreements to reduce the danger of war. Jackson contributed a great deal to the increasingly conservative tone of U.S. politics in the 1980s. Near the end of his career, he gained fame for his advocacy of Jewish emigration rights from the Soviet Union, and his Jackson-Vanik Amendment formed part of the decisive pressure on the Soviet Union to rationalize its relations with the West and end the Cold War.

At home in Washington State, Jackson's careful attention to the economic interests of the state earned him immense popularity. Opponents never seriously challenged his seat while he served in the House and Senate.

See also Arms Control; Hawk/Dove; Military-Industrial Complex

JAPANESE INTERNMENT

Forced relocation of thousands of Japanese Americans to detention camps during World War II. The internment of Japanese Americans has long been an issue of controversy, both for the racial inequality involved and the unprecedented disregard for civil liberties that it represented.

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the U.S. War Department became concerned that Japanese Americans might act as saboteurs, despite a lack of evidence to support this view. As a result, some leaders recommended rounding up Japanese Americans, particularly those living along the West Coast, and placing them in detention centers inland.

At the time, approximately 125,000 Japanese Americans lived in the United States. Some were first-generation Japanese Americans, known as *Issei*, who had immigrated from Japan. About 80,000 of them, however, were second-generation individuals born in the United States who possessed U.S. citizenship, a group called *Nisei*. While many Issei retained their Japanese character and culture, the Nisei generally acted and thought of themselves as Americans.

The voices of those who defended Japanese Americans were drowned out by others who expressed fears or hatred of all Japanese. Within the government, a power struggle erupted between the U.S. Department of Justice, which opposed moving innocent civilians, and the War Department, which wanted to detain Japanese Americans. John McCloy, the assistant secretary of war, remarked that if it came to a choice between the safety of the country and the Constitution, the Constitution should be regarded as nothing more than a scrap of paper.

RELOCATION

In early February 1942, the War Department created 12 restricted zones along the Pacific coast and established nighttime curfews for Japanese Americans within them. Individuals who broke curfew could be arrested immediately. The nation's leaders still debated the question of relocation, but the issue was soon decided. On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed executive order 9066, which gave the military authority to exclude any persons from the designated areas. Although the word "Japanese" did not appear in the executive order, it was clear that only Japanese Americans were targeted. Very few German Americans or Italian Americans—who might also be considered enemy aliens—faced detention during the war.

On March 31, 1942, Japanese Americans along the West Coast were ordered to report to control stations and register the names of all family members. They were then told when and where they should report for relocation to an internment camp. Japanese Americans were given from four days to about two weeks to settle their affairs and gather as many belongings as they could carry. In many cases, individuals and families were forced to sell some or all of their property, including businesses, within that short period of time.

Some Caucasian Americans took advantage of the situation, offering unreasonably low sums to buy possessions from those who were being forced to move. Many homes and businesses worth thousands of dollars were sold for only a few hundred dollars. Nearly 2,000 Japanese Americans were told that their cars would be safely stored until they returned. However, the U.S. Army soon offered to buy the vehicles at cutrate prices, and Japanese Americans who refused to sell were told that the vehicles were being requisitioned for the war.

After being evacuated from their homes, Japanese Americans were first taken to temporary assembly centers. From there, they were transported inland to the

internment camps. The first internment camp in operation was Manzanar, located in southern California. Between 1942 and 1945, a total of 10 camps were opened, holding approximately 120,000 Japanese Americans for varying periods of time in California, Arizona, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, and Arkansas.

LIFE IN THE CAMPS

Conditions at the camps were spare. Internees lived in uninsulated barracks furnished only with cots and coal-burning stoves. Residents used common bathroom and laundry facilities, but hot water was usually limited. The camps were surrounded by barbed-wire fences patrolled by armed guards who had instructions to shoot anyone who tried to leave. Although there were a few isolated incidents of internees being shot and killed, the camps generally were run humanely.

People at the camps tried to establish some sense of community. Residents were allowed to live in family groups, and the internees set up schools, churches, farms, and newspapers. Children played sports and engaged in various activities. Nevertheless, the internment took its toll on Japanese Americans, who spent as long as three years living in an atmosphere of tension, suspicion, and despair.

The roundup and internment of Japanese American citizens led to a few peaceful protests, as well as several legal fights. One legal battle, the case of *Korematsu v. United States*, led to a 1944 Supreme Court ruling that the evacuation and internment of Nisei was constitutional. Meanwhile, however, the government had begun to investigate Japanese Americans more closely and concluded that some were loyal Americans. Individuals certified as loyal were allowed to leave the camps, usually to take jobs in the Midwest or the East. Others were allowed to work as temporary migrant laborers in the western states, and some young Japanese Americans were even allowed to enlist in the Army.

On December 18, 1944, the government announced that all relocation centers would be closed by the end of 1945, and the relocation program ended the following year. The last of the camps was closed in March 1946. With the end of internment, Japanese Americans moved back to their homes and began reclaiming or rebuilding their lives.

It took many years for the U.S. government to acknowledge the wrong that had been committed against American citizens. In 1982, a presidential commission identified race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership as the underlying causes of the government's internment program. Several years later, in 1988, the U.S. Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act, which awarded more than 80,000 Japanese Americans $20,000 each to compensate them for the ordeal they had suffered. Congress issued a formal apology for the government's policy toward Japanese Americans.

Now recognized as a terrible mistake, the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II was the culmination of a long history of racist and discriminatory treatment of Asian immigrants and their descendants that had begun with restrictive immigration policies in the late 1800s. This mistreatment represents one of the nation's darkest hours in terms of civil liberties and constitutional rights.

See also Civil Liberties; World War II

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REFLECTIONS

An American Promise

In 1976, President Gerald R. Ford officially repealed executive order 9066, which had ordered the internment of Japanese Americans. He used that opportunity to express the nation's regret for that policy.

> February 19 is the anniversary of a sad day in American history. It was on that date in 1942 . . . that Executive Order 9006 was issued . . . resulting in the uprooting of loyal Americans . . . . We now know what we should have know then—not only was that evacuation wrong, but Japanese Americans were and are loyal Americans . . . . I call upon the American people to affirm with me this American Promise— that we have learned from the tragedy of that long-ago experience forever to treasure liberty and justice for each individual American, and resolve that this kind of action shall never again be repeated.

JOHNSON V. EISENTRAGER (1950)

Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that nonresident enemy aliens do not have the legal right to petition U.S. courts for writs of habeas corpus. (A writ of habeas corpus is a prisoner's petition requesting that the court determine the legality of his or her incarceration.) This landmark Supreme Court case has been reexamined in recent years in light of the detention of alleged al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

After the Japanese surrender at the end of World War II, the U.S. Army arrested and imprisoned 27 members of the German military. They were apprehended in China and charged with gathering and transmitting intelligence about the U.S. military to the Japanese in the months after the German surrender in May 1945.

U.S. Army officials transferred the German agents to Landsberg Prison in Germany, a prisoner-of-war camp maintained by the U.S. occupation forces. The German men were convicted of violating the terms of the German surrender, which had ordered that all hostilities toward the Allied forces end. One of those convicted, Lothar Eisentrager, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a U.S. district court on his own behalf and for 20 of his imprisoned colleagues (six of the men had been acquitted).

After a series of appeals and court hearings, the case was heard in the Supreme Court. Speaking for the 6–3 majority who ruled against the petitioners, Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson stated that the German prisoners were not permitted to petition U.S. courts because they were neither U.S. citizens nor situated on U.S. soil when they were arrested. Therefore, they could not receive the protection of due process as set forth in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Justice Jackson added that there had never been a case in any nation in which a writ of habeas corpus was recognized under these circumstances.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Hugo L. Black countered that an enemy alien imprisoned by the U.S. government during peacetime has the right to submit a habeas corpus petition, even if he or she is not in a U.S. territory and has never been to the United States. He argued that U.S. jurisdiction includes any place where the U.S. government is in command. In this case, U.S.-occupied Germany was indeed under the jurisdiction of the United States at the time.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the war in Afghanistan that followed, the administration of President George W. Bush authorized the arrest and detainment of a number of suspected terrorists. Most of the alleged al-Qaeda and Taliban members, both foreign nationals and U.S. citizens, were incarcerated at the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba.

On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court decided two cases—*Rasul v. Bush* and *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*—involving detainees in the war on terrorism. In their decisions, the Court reversed the ruling it had made more than 50 years earlier in *Johnson v. Eisentrager*. In a 6–3 decision, the Court held that U.S. courts may respond to the habeas corpus petitions of nonresident enemy aliens. The Court held that the U.S. government has the right to hold such individuals, but it must permit detainees to present their case to a judge in a U.S. court to determine whether they are being held legally and with just cause. Although the Court's decision referred only to the rights of detainees at Guantánamo, prisoners in Iraq and Afghanistan may now attempt to use the precedent set in *Rasul v. Bush* and *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld* to present writs of habeas corpus to U.S. courts to challenge their continued detainment without recourse to the courts.

See also Guantánamo; Supreme Court, Role of; Terrorism, War on International

JOHNSON, LYNDON B., AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The 36th president of the United States (1963–69), who assumed the presidency after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963, and faced the increasingly difficult challenge of the Vietnam War. Lyndon Baines Johnson (1908–73) was sworn in as president aboard Air Force One at Love Field Airport in Dallas shortly after President Kennedy was shot in that city.

During his first year in office, Johnson faced several obstacles, including the opposition of members of Congress who were reluctant to support Johnson's proposals, especially in the civil rights arena. Johnson used charm and strong-arm tactics to push through his new policies. In 1964, at Johnson's request, Congress passed a tax-reduction law and the Economic Opportunity Act, which was a part of Johnson's wider War on Poverty.

THE VIETNAM WAR

Johnson would have preferred to focus his attention on domestic issues, but his administration was quickly consumed by foreign policy, especially the Vietnam War. Inheriting a commitment to an independent, non-communist South Vietnam, Johnson steadily increased the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia. Under Johnson, the conflict expanded to a large-scale but still limited war against communist North Vietnam. Despite deploying more than 500,000 U.S. troops and spending huge amounts of money, the United States could not force North Vietnam to end its support for the communist National Liberation Front (NLF) of South Vietnam.

Personally, Johnson would have preferred that the United States not be in Vietnam, and he privately cursed the war. At the same time, however, Johnson believed that the United States could not afford to look weak in the eyes of the world. The war escalated between 1964 and 1968.

On August 2, 1964, in response to U.S. and South Vietnamese spying along the coast of North Vietnam, the North Vietnamese launched an attack against a U.S. ship in the Gulf of Tonkin. A second attack allegedly took place on August 4. (Years later, Robert S. McNamara, Johnson's secretary of defense, concluded that no second attack had occurred.) The Johnson administration used the supposed August 4 attack to secure a congressional resolution that gave the president almost unlimited war powers. The resolution, known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, passed both the House and Senate with only two dissenting votes. After passage of the resolution, Johnson initiated limited air attacks against North Vietnam.

Given Johnson's preference for addressing domestic affairs, his administration planned to fight the war with minimal noticeable impact on the nation at home. With this plan, the administration hoped that a limited war would control the mobilization of human and material resources and cause little disruption to everyday American life. However, the administration's goals were not realized. Ultimately, the Vietnam War had a major impact on American society, and the Johnson administration was forced to consider the domestic consequences of its decisions every day.

In late January 1968, North Vietnam and the NLF launched large-scale, coordinated attacks against major cities in South Vietnam. These attacks, known as the Tet Offensive, were intended to force the Johnson administration to begin peace talks. As the death toll mounted and U.S. troops continued to leave for Southeast Asia, antiwar sentiment grew in the United States. Protests erupted on college campuses and in major cities at first, but by 1968, it seemed as if much of the country had turned against the war.

Johnson's popularity declined to new lows, and student protesters chanted, "Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids have you killed today?" at antiwar marches on college campuses across the country. During the 1968 Democratic National Convention, hundreds of thousands of people came to Chicago to protest the U.S. presence in Vietnam, as well as to protest against the leaders of the Democratic Party, who continued the war effort.

In late March 1968, Lyndon Johnson shocked the nation when he announced that he would not seek the Democratic Party's renomination for president and hinted that he would go to the bargaining table with the North Vietnamese communists to end the war. Johnson began secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese in the spring of 1968 in Paris, France; soon the news of the peace talks reached the American public. Americans had new hope that an end to the long and costly war was near. Despite progress in Paris, the Democratic Party lost the 1968 presidential election to Republican challenger Richard Nixon, who claimed that he had a secret plan to end the war.

OTHER CRISES

Although it dominated Johnson's presidency, Vietnam was not the only area of international crisis during this time. In Panama, the administration confronted demonstrators in 1964 who demanded changes to the 1903 Panama Canal Treaty. More than 20 people were killed in the Panamanian riots. Johnson sent troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965 to head off the perceived threat of a communist takeover of that Caribbean country. The administration also defused a crisis in Cyprus that threatened to erupt into war between two of America's NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) allies, Greece and Turkey. Then, in June 1967, long-standing tensions between the Arabs and Israelis exploded in the Six-Day War, posing yet another challenge to the Johnson administration.

Following precedents set by President Kennedy during his last months in office, Johnson sought to ease tensions with the Soviet Union by attempting to negotiate consular agreements and cultural exchanges. Building on the foundation that Kennedy had laid

with the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Johnson took steps toward containing the nuclear arms race, negotiated a nonproliferation treaty in 1967, and initiated strategic arms limitation talks.

The Johnson administration also sought to change long-standing U.S. policy toward China. At the time, the People's Republic of China was still viewed as the nation's chief enemy. Some U.S. officials viewed the isolation and containment of mainland China as outmoded and advocated moving away from the nationalist government on Taiwan and opening contacts with Mao Zedong's communist regime. China's chaotic Cultural Revolution of the 1960s prevented any major steps toward easing tensions. However, Johnson continued secret talks with the Chinese that had begun during the Eisenhower years.

JOHNSON AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

When he assumed the presidency, President Johnson inherited Kennedy's top foreign policy advisers and his system for using them. But Johnson adapted Kennedy's system to his own management style. Aware of his lack of experience and expertise in foreign policy, and eager to continue his predecessor's policies, he retained Dean Rusk as secretary of state, Robert McNamara as secretary of defense, and McGeorge Bundy as assistant for national security affairs (now known as the national security advisor). Fearful about leaks and disagreements, he preferred small, intimate meetings of top officials, known unofficially as "the principals."

Nonetheless, Johnson's National Security Council (NSC) staff included about 48 people and performed the same functions as it had during the Kennedy administration. The NSC staff kept the White House informed of what was going on in other government departments and agencies, and it continued to be a message center for the White House. Bundy, as manager of the flow of information and watchdog of the federal bureaucracy, grew closer to the president than any cabinet officer. He was usually the first to see Johnson about an issue and the last to see him before a decision was made.

Walt Whitman Rostow replaced Bundy in early 1966 and gradually assumed even greater responsibility. He helped to prepare presidential speeches, arranged White House visits by foreign leaders, and regularly briefed journalists about the administration's

policies. Rostow's most important function was assisting in the decision-making process by ensuring that Johnson had full access to the latest intelligence so that the president could analyze those options. Like Bundy, Rostow was responsible for seeing that once presidential decisions were made, the necessary departments and agencies were informed of the decisions and followed up on the tasks assigned to them. Rostow served as assistant for national security affairs until the end of Johnson's term in 1969.

See also Bundy, McGeorge; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; Kennedy, John F., and National Defense; McNamara, Robert; National Security Council; Tet Offensive; Vietnam War

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Panel composed of high-ranking U.S. military officers who provide advice to the president of the United States or other civilian leaders on military matters. The Joints Chiefs of Staff (JCS) comprises the heads of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

This collective body of four-star generals is led by another four-star general, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who sets the agenda for and presides over meetings of the JCS. The chairman serves as the chief military adviser to the president and the secretary of defense. The responsibilities of the chairman include providing for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, their operation under unified command, and their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces. Famous generals who have served in this role include the first Joint Chiefs chairman, World War II hero Omar Bradley, and Gulf War leader Colin Powell.

A vice chairman, also a four-star general, assists the chairman with his duties and, in his absence, performs the chairman's duties. The chairman also has

Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff watching President George W. Bush address a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001. In his presidential address, held in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, President Bush announced the creation of a cabinet-level position with a sweeping mandate to oversee homeland defense. The Joint Chiefs, which include the highest-ranking members of each branch of the armed services, are responsible for the military aspects of protecting the nation and its interests at home and abroad.

Source: Corbis.

three assistants: one who focuses on international relations and political-military affairs, one for National Guard matters, and another for reserve forces. A group of staff officers, called the Joint Staff, also assist the chairman and the other members of the JCS with their primary duties. The Joint Staff is composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines (although in practice, the Marines make up about 20% of the Navy's joint staff personnel).

The JCS has its origins in World War II, when U.S. military leaders recognized the need for an overall command to coordinate the efforts of the various services. The United States adopted a "unified high command" in 1942, which eventually came to be known as the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. This first command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff worked on an informal basis throughout the war. After the war, the need for a formal structure of joint command was apparent, and the wartime Joint Chiefs offered a workable model. The National Security Act of 1947 formally established the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not lead the nation's combat forces, which are organized into combatant commands. Rather, the Joint Chiefs are seen as planners and advisers. They have no executive or leadership authority over troops in their services. In fact, a 1953 amendment to the National Security Act abolished any possible authority in that regard. In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act clearly defined the role of the combatant commanders in leading their respective forces. It also established the Joint Staff as a body specially educated and trained in joint operations.

See also Goldwater-Nichols Act; Joint Defense Planning; Joint Operations; National Security Act of 1947; War Planning

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JOINT DEFENSE PLANNING

Combined forces planning to employ the armed services for national security objectives. Joint defense planning has unified the command structures of all the major services—the U.S. Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. The experience of using the resources of all of these armed services components during World War II prompted the military services to unify their commands to achieve greater coordination.

The armed service branches were initially resistant to unifying the command structure because of concerns over ceding authority or becoming subordinate to another branch of the service. Nevertheless, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) was created by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1946 and outlined the organizational structure for a joint command. The UCP became the organizational directive on the command structure of the U.S. military. Early debates on dividing the armed forces into joint commands centered on geographic and functional groupings. The initial UCP divided U.S. forces into commands based on geography to preserve each service's primary roles and functions.

The management of joint defense planning today falls under the auspices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is composed of the top generals in each of the services—the chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force and Army, the commander of naval operations, and the commandant of the Marine Corps. The Joint Staff—officers

and enlisted personnel from all services—provides the personnel to support the Joint Chiefs of Staff's mission.

In October 2002, the revised UCP reorganized the unified combatant commands. It outlined eight unified commands—five regional and three functional commands. The regional commands continued as the Pacific Command (PACOM), which covers the entire Pacific region; the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which is responsible for Latin America; the European Command (EUCOM), which oversees both Europe and most of the African continent; the Central Command (CENTCOM), which is responsible for the Middle East and North Africa; and the Northern Command (NORTHCOM), which was created to support homeland security efforts in North America. The functional commands were outlined as the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), unifying all special-operations efforts; the Transportation Command (TRANSCOM); and the Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which integrated the Space Command into its structure.

See also Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint Operations; U.S. Central Command; U.S. Northern Command; U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Southern Command; Strategic Command, U.S.

JOINT OPERATIONS

Combined services operations conducted in support of national security objectives. Joint operations synchronize the complementary capabilities of the U.S. Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.

Following the major combined combat efforts of the armed forces during World War I and World War II, the U.S. defense establishment began to push for greater unity of effort among the different services. Beginning with the formalization of joint defense planning in the mid-1940s, the structure for how the U.S. military would jointly conduct operations was laid. The employment of joint operations for military missions unifies the efforts of the various services.

Joint operations are conducted under the joint force command structure. Joint force commanders take orders and planning guidance from the National Command Authority, headed by the president and secretary of defense, who authorize the constitutional authority to employ the armed forces.

During the last half-century, the United States has increasingly employed joint operations in major combat and peacekeeping missions. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States and the emerging threat of nonstate terrorist organizations, the conduct of military operations has relied heavily on special-operations units. In Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002, the United States employed joint special-operations teams to provide specific capabilities to that mission.

See also Doctrine; Interservice Rivalry; Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint Defense Planning

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

Multi-role fighter aircraft designed to meet the needs of all U.S. service branches. The goal of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program was to design a fighter with improved survivability, precision engagement capability, the mobility necessary for joint operations, and reduced maintenance and replacement costs.

A 1993 review of U.S. military needs determined that developing separate tactical fighters for each service was not affordable. As a result, Congress canceled the existing Multi-Role Fighter and Advanced Strike Aircraft programs. Wanting to maintain the military capability those canceled programs were to provide, military planners initiated the Joint Advanced Strike Technology effort to develop an affordable, next-generation weapons system.

The challenge for the new fighter would be to meet the requirements of all U.S. services in a single aircraft. To suit the navy's needs, the new plane had to have the ability to take off and land on an aircraft carrier. The Marine Corps wanted a plane with short- or vertical-takeoff and landing ability. The air force had fewer such technical requirements, but the new fighter had to be a significant improvement over its current multi-role fighter, the F-16.

In 2001, the U.S. Department of Defense selected the Lockheed Martin X-35 to fill the role of the JSF. The X-35 was chosen over the competing Boeing X-32 largely because of Lockheed's superior short takeoff and vertical landing design, which uses a powerful fan to assist in takeoff. Lockheed Martin developed four versions of the JSF to fulfill the needs of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force, as well as the United Kingdom's Royal Air Force and Royal Navy. The JSF will replace aging aircraft in the

U.S. arsenal, including the air force's F-16, the navy's F-18, and the Marine Corps's AV Harrier.

—John Haley

See also Air Warfare; Joint Operations; Naval Aviation; U.S. Air Force

JOURNALISM, ROLE AND IMPACT OF

Influence of the media on the formulation and implementation of U.S. national security policy. Since the end of World War II, changing national security objectives, improved communications technology, and centralized media ownership have changed the role and impact of journalism on U.S. security matters.

Freedom of the press as guaranteed by the First Amendment is not absolute, even in the United Sates. The government historically has sought to control the media during war or times of national crisis. Although U.S. journalists rarely have been overtly censored, the government has frequently achieved de facto censorship by withholding information, denying or limiting access to the news, or selectively leaking sensitive information or disinformation. In addition, journalists and media owners often have practiced self-censorship that has restricted the public's access to information about national security. The latter situation is especially true today, given that media ownership is now in the hands of just a few corporations.

WAR AND THE MEDIA

Wartime has presented several key challenges to the delicate balance between national security and freedom of the press. Technological advances such as photography, the telegraph, telephone, radio, television, satellite transmission, the Internet, and miniaturization have increased those challenges by allowing journalists to gather and disseminate information faster and from more places than ever before. During the Civil War era, reporters used the newly invented telegraph to transmit news of the battlefield rapidly to readers hundreds or thousands of miles away. The photographs taken by Civil War photographer Matthew Brady and others brought the drama and horror of that war to all who viewed them.

Many civil and military authorities at the time branded such reporting as irresponsible, arguing that it could compromise military secrets or spread defeatism among civilians. As a result, the War Department attempted to suppress the news and impose restrictions on press access. However, these efforts were ineffective with newspapers that were engaged in life-and-death circulation battles. No one wanted to hold something back, fearing that a competitor might publish it anyway.

World War I brought more serious attempts by the U.S. government to control the news. Foreign threats such as German U-boats operating off the shores of America's East Coast led Congress to pass the Espionage Acts (1917) and the Sedition Act (1918), probably the most significant impediments to freedom of the press in U.S. history. Negative war news; pro-German, pacifist, or socialist publications; and even German-language publications were censored under the Espionage and Sedition acts, and press content was regulated by a censorship board.

After World War I, radio and photo magazines emerged as new forms of mass media, greatly increasing the emotional impact of news on millions of people. During the 1920s and 1930s, mass media made the world smaller, bringing dramatic global events with ever-increasing rapidity to the eyes and ears of people around the world. In the United States, the line between freedom of the press and national security was clearly drawn in the 1931 Supreme Court case of *Near v. Minnesota*. The Court's ruling limited the government's ability to prevent the publication of news except when such publication presented a clear and present danger to national security (for example, giving the location of troops during wartime).

THE MEDIA COMES OF AGE

The media played a significant part in mobilizing U.S. opinion and manpower during World War II. People along the East Coast of the United States were able to hear the speeches of German leader Adolf Hitler on high-powered German radio stations. Live BBC broadcasts of bombs falling on London and photos of the devastation and the alarming militarization and mobility of Hitler's war machine brought immediacy to the war raging on the other side of the ocean. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, virtually everyone in America knew about it within hours because of the media coverage.

Classrooms and college dormitories were empty the next day as men streamed to recruiting offices, horrified and energized by what they had heard on the radio and read in newspapers.

One of the U.S. government's first acts after entering World War II was the establishment of the Censorship and War Information offices. These agencies were responsible for suggesting appropriate subject matter to journalists and filmmakers. American reporters in uniform were embedded with troops during the Normandy invasion and other major battles of the war. Newsreels reported on the heroic efforts of everyone from the average dogface to baseball's Ted Williams, actors Clark Gable and Jimmy Stewart, and those who sacrificed at home for the war effort. Even though censorship was voluntary during World War II, government controlled the flow of information and access. Reporters would have been remiss not to hold or kill a story that was considered "injurious to the war effort."

After the war, some news organizations railed against government secrecy and censorship. They charged that withholding information, specifically public records, was a violation of freedom of the press. The start of the Cold War and the anticommunist campaigns of Senator Joseph McCarthy during the 1950s created a growing rift between government and the press. Ever-increasing amounts of information were being hidden from public view in the name of protecting the American way of life from the global communist conspiracy. In this environment, the new medium of television grew dramatically, bringing worldwide events with increasing immediacy to the homes of tens of millions and then hundreds of millions of people.

DIVIDED GOALS—GOVERNMENT AND THE MEDIA

The divide between government and the press came to the forefront of American politics and culture during the Vietnam War. Television brought the death, destruction, and futility of the war to U.S. living rooms night after night, while another picture slowly emerged in the press: The government had, at the very least, misled America about the goals, success, and purpose of the Vietnam War. As antiwar activism increased at home, fueled by negative news stories, nightly news reports of war horrors, and images of flag-draped coffins, the military began to view the press as an enemy.

Beginning in the late 1960s, charges and counter-charges flew between journalists and government officials regarding misleading information and the withholding of information about the war. For the first time in more than 40 years, the government sought to stop a newspaper from publishing a story that it considered a national security risk. Daniel Elsberg, a former government employee, had obtained a report that showed the Johnson administration had misled the public during the early phases of the Vietnam War. President Richard Nixon attempted to prevent the *New York Times* from publishing the so-called Pentagon Papers, claiming that publication threatened national security. The Supreme Court, in its landmark *New York Times Co. v. United States* (1971) decision, permitted the publication of the Pentagon Papers, interpreting "national security" in very specific terms.

RECENT TRENDS

Although journalists have been effective in securing constitutional protections of the news, news-gathering activities have not been extended similar protections. Post–Vietnam War military leaders have limited press access to battlefields. During the first Gulf War, the movement of reporters was greatly restricted. The U.S. Air Force was especially adept at controlling and spinning stories. For example, video of a so-called smart bomb seeking a target with uncanny precision was released to the war-news-starved media, which showed it again and again. This perpetuated the idea that U.S. bombing raids were pinpoint accurate and that few, if any, civilians or civilian targets were being destroyed. It was only after the war that the public learned only a small percentage of the ordnance dropped on Iraq had hit its target with any degree of accuracy and that civilian casualties had been high.

Passage of the USA PATRIOT Act following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, presented serious challenges to freedom of the press. Limits on access to troops in the Iraq War of 2003, as well as government control of information about the terrorist suspects detained since September 11, is unprecedented in U.S. history. Critics contend that the U.S. government is using the terrorist threat as an excuse to classify or censor any information it wishes, regardless of whether such information actually affects national security. In the post–September 11 world, the debate between press freedom and national security is likely to grow even more contentious.

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JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF

Established in June 1870, a cabinet-level department with the attorney general as its head. The mission of the U.S. Department of Justice is to enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States; to provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans. Headquartered in Washington, DC, the Justice Department conducts much of its work in offices located throughout the country and overseas.

The Department of Justice comprises 40 separate components and its field structure. One of these components includes the U.S. attorneys, who prosecute individuals charged with federal offenses and represent the U.S. government in court. The department also oversees the major federal investigative agencies—the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF)—which prevent and deter crime and arrest criminal suspects. The U.S. Marshals Service, another branch of the Justice Department, protects the federal judiciary, apprehends fugitives, and detains persons in federal custody.

The Bureau of Prisons is the branch of the Justice Department that confines convicted offenders. The litigating divisions enforce federal criminal and civil laws, including civil rights, tax, antitrust, environmental, and civil justice statutes. The Office of Justice Programs and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services provide leadership and assistance to state, tribal, and local governments. Other major components of the Justice Department include the National Drug Intelligence Center, the United States Trustees, the Justice Management Division, the Executive Office for Immigration Review, the Community Relations Service, and the Office of the Inspector General.

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, reorganization efforts within the federal government have led to the transfer of much of the Immigration and Naturalization Service from the Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Justice has also found itself at the center of much controversy as a result of federal legislation, namely, the USA PATRIOT Act, passed after September 11.

The controversy has to do with changes in many rules on civil liberties to facilitate responses and reactions to terrorism. For example, the act provides for suspension of habeas corpus in most courts (but not federal courts), changes the rules to allow for more liberal electronic surveillance by the FBI, and institutes more federal crimes on money laundering and funding for terrorist organizations.

Many legal challenges to some of these changes have been put forth in the court system, and decisions have been somewhat mixed. Some courts have upheld parts of the law and others, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have ruled against it. Most of the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act are to expire in 2005, but the administration of President George W. Bush has supported extending the act's provisions beyond that date.

The Department of Justice is often in the news as a result of actions by its components or subordinate organizations, including the FBI, the DEA, and ATF. This is not surprising because these agencies are responsible for criminal investigation and prosecution. Controversies such as the sieges and shootouts at Waco and Ruby Ridge are representative of the debate surrounding the department's actions.

JUSTICE, MILITARY

Laws applicable to the conduct of members of the armed forces. The historical foundation for U.S. military

law is the 1774 British Articles of War. The U.S. Congress adopted similar codes, called the American Articles of War and Articles for the Government of the Navy, even before it drafted the Declaration of Independence. Today, military justice in the U.S. armed services is governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

The codes adopted during the Revolutionary War were amended and revised over the years but remained largely unchanged until World War II. Throughout most of this time, the U.S. peacetime army was quite small, and soldiers understood that they were entering a different system of justice with unique procedures and punishments. Because of the small number of soldiers, most of whom were professionals, there were relatively few court-martials up to this time.

During World War II, however, more than 16 million men and women served in the armed forces, and some 2 million court-martials were convened during the war. These resulted in some 80,000 convictions, or about 60 for each day the United States participated in the war. At that time, the military justice system did not offer accused sailors and soldiers the same protections afforded by the civilian courts. The system was foreign to many American citizens who objected to the way the military interpreted and applied criminal law.

Following the war, many organizations, including the American Bar Association, the American Legion, the Judge Advocates Association, and the New York Bar Association, made proposals to improve the military justice system. In 1950, the U.S. Congress enacted the UCMJ as a major revision of existing military law, one that provided service members with substantial guarantees of fair judicial process. The UCMJ is a set of criminal statutes that covers many aspects of civilian law (for example, murder, rape, drug use, larceny, and drunk driving), but also punishes conduct that undermines military order and discipline. Such crimes include desertion, absence without leave, disrespect toward superiors, failure to obey orders, dereliction of duty, misuse of military property, drunkenness on duty, malingering, and conduct unbecoming an officer. The UCMJ also includes laws that punish cowardice in combat, improper use of a countersign, misbehavior of a sentinel, misconduct as a prisoner, aiding of the enemy, and espionage.

The UCMJ has been amended several times, with changes to enhance the role of trial judges, set minimum qualifications for military judges, and require a licensed attorney as defense counsel in all courts-martial.

Under a 1984 revision, military rules of evidence became substantially the same as the rules used in the U.S. federal court system.

Although commanders have a significant role in the military justice system, extensive safeguards protect soldiers against abuse of authority. Many legal scholars argue that the UCMJ has actually established more safeguards to protect the rights of criminal defendants than the civilian justice system. In addition, a panel called the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice reviews the UCMJ yearly and recommends changes and revisions to the Congress.

JUST WAR THEORY

The principle that war is sometimes necessary and morally justifiable. The just war theory is the most universally recognized moral concept for evaluating the use of force. It has developed from a complex, varied heritage built on layers of philosophical, religious, historical, and social precepts. The theory's foundations lie in Christian beliefs and natural law, which subsequent secular philosophers and historical traditions and documents have interpreted and codified.

HISTORY OF THE JUST WAR THEORY

The early church father St. Augustine of Hippo is generally acknowledged as the first to present a thorough and critical analysis of warfare as a legitimate tool of the state. Writing in the fourth century CE, St. Augustine asserted that a just war may be preferable to an unjust peace. Using biblical references, he maintained that necessity sometimes requires the use of force in a nation's life, claiming that it is ordained by natural law.

For St. Augustine, a just war, or *justum bellum*, had to be fought for the right reasons and waged through rightful authority. The only justification for war could be a desire for promulgating and establishing peace, and such a war could be waged only by a recognized leader.

Centuries later, in the 13th century CE, Saint Thomas Aquinas, in his work the *Summa Theologica*, formulized many of the principles that St. Augustine had asserted. Aquinas developed and presented what became the just war theory. He developed justifications for war and the kinds of activities that are permissible in war. The requirements for a just war, as

laid out by Aquinas, included the following: the ruler commanding the war must possess the lawful authority to wage war, a just cause must exist, and those waging war must have the right intention of promoting good and avoiding evil. The lawful authority to wage war remains with the sovereign; private persons must vindicate their rights through the ruling power.

The Renaissance scholar Hugo Grotius, who is sometimes referred to as the father of international law, is credited with secularizing just war theory. His book *On the Rights of War and Peace*, published in 1625, examines the rights of nations to use self defense. Grotius established three basic criteria for a war to be considered just—the danger faced by the nation must be immediate, the force used must be necessary to adequately defend the nation's interests, and the use of force must be proportional to the threatened danger. Based on the writing of Grotius, the concepts of just war began to be institutionalized at an international level as these principles began to transcend the legal codes of individual nations.

Following Grotius, other historical developments furthered the transformation of just war theory into international law. The Hague Conventions, beginning in 1899, codified the just war theory. Then, following World War II, the Nuremburg Tribunal established just war theory as universally binding and customary law, and the Charter of the United Nations recognized each sovereign nation's inherent right to self-defense.

CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT

Contemporary theorists separate the commonly recognized elements of just war theory in a two-part classification that distinguishes between the rules that govern the justice of war (*jus ad bellum*) from those that govern just and fair conduct in war (*jus in bello*). A number of moral requirements have evolved as the principles of the justice of war. Such a war must have a just cause, be declared by a proper authority, possess the right intention, have a reasonable chance of success, and have an end that is proportional to the means used.

Possessing just cause is the first, and arguably most important, condition of the justice of war. Most theorists agree that initiating acts of aggression is unjust, and the targeted group has just cause to defend itself. However, "aggressive" acts often remain open to interpretation in each situation. A consensus has emerged that grants a targeted group just cause to resist physical force, and the aggressor can justify its actions only if it is vindicating a wrong previously committed or preempting an anticipated attack.

Most theorists concur that the second principle, which specifies that the proper authority must wage war, refers to the sovereign power of the state. However, sovereignty concepts often raise questions about what qualifies as sovereign power or the state.

The right intention principle—that a nation waging a just war is promoting justice and not acting out of self-interest—also raises questions. Defining what constitutes good intent remains illusory, and the point at which right intention separates from self-interest remains subjective in nearly every circumstance.

The principle of reasonable success is another necessary condition for waging just war. After gaining just cause and right intention, a just war must maintain a reasonable probability of success. The entity waging the war must weigh the moral and practical costs and benefits of its actions.

The final jus ad bellum principle is that the desired end should be proportional to the means used. The concepts of proportionality remain open to interpretation and subjective in every instance of warfare.

The rules of just conduct, or jus in bello, fall under the two broad principles of discrimination and proportionality. Discrimination distinguishes legitimate targets in war, whereas proportionality shows how much force is morally appropriate. Discrimination raises issues pertaining to noncombatants. Proportionality requires an application of morally permissible force, one that minimizes destruction and casualties.

On the whole, the principles offered by jus ad bellum and jus in bello are useful guidelines. Pragmatically, however, a host of difficulties arise because each principle is vague and inconsistent when it is applied in actual cases. The inherent subjectivity of these principles ensures that future scholars, theorists, and statesmen will continue to interpret texts, history, and contemporary political and social affairs to shape just war theory.

See also Preemptive War Doctrine; Use of Force, Authorizations for

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KAHN, HERMAN (1922–1983)

Celebrated physicist, mathematician, and nuclear strategist who began his career in the 1940s with the RAND Corporation, where he was hired as a physicist and nuclear strategist. After leaving RAND in 1961, Kahn founded the Hudson Institute, a think tank organization that attempts to forecast long-term trends and short-term solutions for government, business, and nongovernmental organizations. It was while connected with the Hudson Institute that Kahn conducted his most significant research into questions of national security and the future.

Applying such analytic techniques as game theory, systems analysis, and military theory to his research, Kahn produced a series of important essays, including *On Thermonuclear War* (1961), *Thinking About the Unthinkable* (1962), *On Escalation* (1965), *The Emerging Japanese Superstate* (1970), *The Future of the Corporation* (1974), *The Japanese Challenge* (1979), and *Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s* (1984). His work sparked much attention and controversy. The terms *massive retaliation*, *overkill*, and *mutually assured destruction* (MAD) are conceptual notions linked to Herman Kahn. Unlike conventional scholars and strategists, Kahn asserted that nuclear war was winnable. He reportedly was the model for the title character of the 1960s film *Dr. Strangelove*.

Kahn died in 1983, leaving behind a legacy as one of the most celebrated intellectuals of his era. President Ronald Reagan said, "Herman Kahn was a futurist who welcomed the future. He brought the lessons of science, history, and humanity to the study of the future and remained confident of humanity's potential for good. All who value independent thinking will mourn the loss of a man whose intellect and enthusiasm embraced so much."

See also Doctrine; Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD); RAND Corporation; Think Tanks

KAMIKAZE

Name given to Japanese suicide pilots during World War II. The word *kamikaze* means *divine wind* and refers to a 1281 attack on Japan by the Mongol ruler Genghis Khan, which was foiled when a typhoon swept Japan and destroyed the Mongol invaders.

With the fall of the island of Saipan in July 1944, the Japanese revived the kamikaze name and applied it to suicide missions by their air force. As observed by Vice Admiral Takijiro Onishi, commander of First Air Fleet in the Philippines, these missions had a practical logic because a single plane crashing into an enemy warship did more damage than 10 planes firing machine guns. Rather than rely on accidents to damage enemy ships, the Japanese decided to crash planes intentionally into ships.

Suicide as an official policy of war was unheard of in the West. Americans were taken aback by the kamikaze raids; they could not understand the mentality that would allow pilots to agree to such an act. The Japanese pilots, however, took it as compatible with their oath, which required utmost loyalty to Japan, propriety, valor, righteousness, and simplicity.

The Japanese especially esteemed the emperor and Japan. They came to believe that fighting for the emperor would bring on the kamikaze, just as it had in the 13th century. The call for pilots brought three volunteers for every available Japanese plane. The Japanese Air Force saved experienced pilots to train the young, inexperienced volunteers—most of whom were in their late teens. After just more than a week of training, the young pilots flew their kamikaze missions in modified Mitsubishi A6M fighters, known as Zeroes. Each Zero carried one-half ton of explosives to make it a more deadly weapon. Pilots aimed their planes toward the central section of a carrier or the base of the bridge on large warships. Because they flew low, the planes were vulnerable to antiaircraft fire.

The first Japanese kamikaze attacks took place in the battle for the Philippines in 1944, and continued thereafter. In April 1945, with the war obviously lost, Japanese Admiral Soema Toyoda initiated Operation Ten-Go, an onslaught of 1,400 kamikaze missions that sank 26 Allied ships. From April through July of that year, more than 2,000 kamikazes flew against the U.S. fleet. By then, however, the United States was ready for the attacks, and few kamikazes had success. The kamikazes persisted until the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

The kamikaze attacks sank 40 U.S. ships in the Pacific and another 16 enemy ships in the Philippines. Hundreds of young Japanese pilots died in their suicide missions. The divine wind did not come, and the emperor announced Japan's surrender in August 1945. When Onishi, the mastermind of the kamikaze missions, learned that Emperor Hirohito had surrendered, he committed suicide.

See also Suicide Bombing; World War II

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KANT, IMMANUEL (C. 1724–1804)

German philosopher whose ideas on freedom and morality helped to provide the basis for the notion of a social contract. The son of a saddler in Königsberg,

Immanuel Kant grew up in a home infused with the spirit and outlook of pietism. This form of Lutheranism had a profound impact on his moral philosophy, even though he rejected some of its outward forms, beginning with his education at a Pietist school in Königsberg. Kant's distaste for the school's strict regimen might have shaped his attitudes toward Pietist beliefs. The city, with its diverse population of various European nationalities, was to prove influential in Kant's intellectual development. He attended the university there and then left to spend a few years as a private tutor in eastern Prussia before resettling in 1755 in Königsberg. He offered private lectures in that city until 1770, waiting for a position at the university and rejecting positions at other schools until he finally received a professorship in logic and metaphysics there when he was 31 years old.

Kant's lectures became so increasingly popular that eventually people had to arrive hours before the presentation to get a seat. He remained in Königsberg for the rest of his life, receiving distinguished visitors from all over Europe, preparing lectures, and writing the various parts of his masterly synthesis of the philosophical traditions that had informed the Enlightenment.

Kant's intellectual life is divided into two periods: the precritical period and the critical period. The precritical period includes his work before 1770, the year when he rejected the philosophical tradition associated with Gottfried Leibnitz and Christian Wolff that he had learned at the university and began working out his new system.

Kant's critical period consisted of the years after 1770, when he published the systematic results of his critical inquiry into the foundations of reason and moral philosophy. These seminal works, which appeared in print between 1781 and 1797, include *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), *On Perpetual Peace* (1795), and *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797).

Kant was noted for his moral earnestness and devotion to duty, traits that probably resulted from his Pietist upbringing. He was not devoutly religious, and he rarely attended church services, except when necessary for some special occasion. He was committed to the cause of seeing republican forms of government established in Europe and enthusiastically welcomed both the American Revolution and the French Revolution. He longed to see peace established in Europe and

sketched out a plan for securing it in his book *On Perpetual Peace*. He also maintained a lifelong interest in natural history and science.

During his critical period, Kant devoted himself to examining and resolving two basic sets of tensions within the philosophical traditions of the Enlightenment. First, he focused on the tension between the contrasting views of knowledge offered by rationalism and empiricism. These tensions dated back to the Middle Ages, but assumed particular urgency during the Enlightenment. Second, he struggled to resolve the tension between the natural world described by science and the moral world of human action. This tension translated into an investigation of the relationship between determinism and freedom in human nature.

Kant could not accept the theory in John Locke's empirical psychology that all ideas derive ultimately from sensory experience. But he also rejected the opposing rationalist belief in innate ideas, present in the mind since birth. In spite of the latter position, Kant did believe that the operations of reason add something from within the mind to the elemental sensations received from the external world, Kant called these additions from the mind *a priori* (before facts) concepts and believed that they were produced by the formal structures of the mind.

David Hume also insisted that a priori ideas exist, but he ascribed their origins to the psychological habit of associating ideas. Kant rejected Hume's psychological explanation of origins and turned instead to reinvestigating the fundamental philosophical question with which the era had begun. What are the conditions in which the human mind produces knowledge?

Kant eventually developed the general notion of the a priori concept into a system of categories of the mind. These categories were divided into four groups: quantity, quality, relation, and modality (they can be found in the first chapter of the section of the *Critique of Pure Reason* entitled "Analytic of Concepts"). All sense data are given a special form, or set of internal relations, by these categories. As a result, nothing that we know about the world outside us is known as it actually is. All our sensory information was molded and transformed by these categories, and our minds are thus actively involved in creating knowledge.

Kant maintained that his new treatment of knowledge amounted to a Copernican revolution in epistemology. In a manner resembling Nicolaus Copernicus's transformation of astronomy, Kant claimed that he had thoroughly reversed the basic hypotheses at work

in epistemology, assuming not that our knowledge must conform to objects but that objects (in our perception) must conform to our knowledge.

Having spelled out this scheme of the operations of human reason, Kant proceeded to investigate three basic epistemological questions: How are pure mathematics and science possible? How are natural science and physics possible? and How is a true science of metaphysics possible? In the course of exploring these questions, Kant offered a proof of the validity of Isaac Newton's belief in the uniformity of nature. He also developed the concept of Transcendental ideas—ideas that lead into realism beyond the boundaries of human knowledge. We can assume their reality because facts point to them, but we can never completely prove or understand these ideas. For Kant, the three great transcendental ideas were God, freedom, and immortality.

The issue of freedom touched both on political theory and on moral philosophy. Kant, like many of his contemporaries, attempted to understand the origins of human morality. He did not believe in the existence of a natural morality; instead, he stressed that the highest morality consists in controlling natural desires and drives. The greatness of human beings resides in their freedom to choose whether to act in a moral manner.

Kant developed the concept of the categorical imperative to explain the origins and nature of morality. A *categorical imperative* is an unconditional command—one that must always be obeyed. Furthermore, it is universal, applicable to all human beings. Morality consists of categorical imperatives—commands to act at all times in certain ways. One famous categorical imperative consists of the command to never use another human being as a means to an end. The independence, integrity, and value of the other must always be recognized. Morality does not allow people to ask whether a specific action will bring a desired practical result in a given situation. Rather, morality requires us always to ask whether we would want a specific behavior to become a universal law.

During the Enlightenment, the question of morality was closely linked to the question of the human will. For Kant, goodwill was the only unqualified good thing in human nature. He insisted that happiness, another quality considered desirable by many enlightened thinkers, could be valuable only if it were linked with goodwill. Kant went further, however, and suggested that actions have moral worth only if they are performed out of a sense of duty. In other words, human

beings must consciously choose to act according to the moral categorical imperatives.

According to Kant, human nature is composed of two conflicting tendencies: The first is a natural drive to join in a society or community, whereas the second consists of the drive to live independently. The combination of these drives creates the *unsocial sociability* of human character and produces irresolvable conflicts that make the attainment of happiness impossible. Nevertheless, the unsocial sociability serves as the motor that drives human history forward, progressing from the early primitive state of nature to the ultimate state of culture in which reason will prevail. The tensions between nature and culture, or between reason and feeling, produce problems for civilization that will finally disappear when the artificial human culture becomes so strong and thoroughly ingrained that it is a second nature of humankind.

Kant was especially concerned with protecting what he believed was the one fundamental right of humankind—the right to freedom. However, he did not define freedom as the absence of restrictions, but rather believed that freedom can exist only within the context of a civil society structured by a system of public law. Rousseau's political theory—especially the concept of the *general will* derived from the *social contract*—provided Kant with a starting point. He conceived of the general will as a kind of idea that directs practical legislation, and he accepted the notion that society is based on an original contract. Society is thus composed of an assembly of individuals, each of whom possesses the capacity to make free decisions, but each of whom is also responsible to the general will. The central problem in social life lies in preserving freedom of actions while still recognizing the needs of others.

Kant provided one of the greatest 18th century statements of the positive content of the Enlightenment in his essay *"Was ist Aufklärung?"* But even his contemporaries such as Moses Mendelssohn recognized that he came to the Enlightenment as a destroyer. Kant denied the existence of a unitary source of knowledge, the possibility of proofs in metaphysics, natural morality, and materialism, yet he also provided one of the great systematic theories of reason, revealing both its limits and its potential. His work thus renewed aspects of the Enlightenment and formulated a series of major problems for modern philosophy. In the years immediately after his death, however, his ideas were either transformed by the Idealists—led by Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel—or abandoned by those German intellectuals who turned instead to the lure of romanticism.

KELLOG-BRIAND PACT

Signed in Paris on August 27, 1928, an international treaty renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. The initial signatories of the Kellog-Briand Pact, also known as the Pact of Paris, were the United States, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Japan, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Great Britain (and its Commonwealth allies). Thirty-nine other countries also ultimately agreed to adhere to the treaty.

In 1927, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aristide Briand, proposed the pact as a nonaggression treaty between France and the United States. U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellog suggested expanding it into a general pact against war, to include other nations as well.

The Kellog-Briand pact proved meaningless as early as 1931 with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, followed by Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. Nevertheless, the pact was important for introducing the notion of a *crime against peace*, which became the basis of the Nuremberg trials at the end of World War II. Interdiction against aggressive war was reaffirmed in the United Nations Charter, although it has been repeatedly ignored by a number of countries since the Kellog-Briand pact was introduced.

KENNAN, GEORGE (1904–2005)

Political analyst, adviser, and diplomat who played a critical role in developing U.S. national policy in the post–World War II period. Because of four tours of duty in the Soviet Union, including his experience as the U.S. ambassador in 1952, Kennan was regarded as an important authority on the Soviet Union.

Born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, George Kennan was educated at Princeton University. He embarked upon a diplomatic career in 1927 in Geneva, Switzerland, and Hamburg, Germany, and in 1933, he began his first tour of duty in Moscow following official U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union. Kennan served in Moscow until 1937.

Eventually reassigned to Berlin, Kennan was in that city when the United States declared war on Nazi

Germany, and he returned to the United States after several months of internment under the Nazis. Kennan retired from the Foreign Service in 1953, but was recalled into service by President John F. Kennedy in 1961. He then served two years of duty as ambassador to Yugoslavia.

As a foreign policy planner, Kennan gained reputation as the architect of U.S. Cold War policy. His call for containment of the Soviet Union in a famous article, which appeared anonymously in the journal *Foreign Affairs* in 1947, became the basis of the foreign policy of the administration of President Harry S. Truman. In the article, Kennan outlined a strategy for fighting the Cold War and keeping Soviet influence from expanding beyond its present geopolitical spheres of authority.

In the *Foreign Affairs* article, under which the author's name appeared simply as X, Kennan wrote, "The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." He added that "adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy" would counter Soviet force against Western institutions. Furthermore, Kennan predicted that such a policy would "promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power."

In other words, the core logic of Kennan's containment policy was that a consistent and concrete posture of opposition by the West would eventually force a response by the Soviet Union. This response, Kennan calculated, would be the gradual abandonment of oppressive, authoritarian policies at home and a reflection of these trends in foreign affairs. Kennan's principle weapons in the struggle against communism were psychological warfare though overt propaganda, covert operations, and economic assistance. He viewed the conflict as political rather than military.

From the beginning, Kennan's article and stance on relations with the Soviet Union were controversial. Some critics attacked Kennan's position for failing to distinguish between vital and peripheral interests. Others complained that such a policy was too defensive, and that an aggressive strategy of confrontation and liberation of Eastern Europe was the only correct path to take against the communist menace.

Within the Truman administration, policy-makers interpreted the term *counter-force* to mean military action and called for a drastic expansion of the U.S. military. This reinterpretation of Kennan's original work also included the expansion of the theater of conflict. Rather than major centers of industrial power, as Kennan had proposed, the revised strategic view called for the defense against Soviet incursion politically or ideologically on a worldwide scale. "A defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere" became a slogan for successive administrations during the period of the Cold War.

Despite the criticisms and policy setbacks, Kennan is regarded as one of the foremost architects of U.S. foreign policy. His prediction that the Soviet Union would eventually fall apart if it could not find an outlet for its authoritarian rule was prescient. His legacy also includes a distinguished career as a writer and educator. A member of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton, New Jersey, from 1953 to 1974, he won both the Pulitzer Prize in history and the National Book Award for *Russia Leaves the War* (1956). At age 85, Kennan received the Medal of Freedom.

See also Containment; Containment and the Truman Doctrine; Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy; Truman, Harry S., and National Policy

KENNEDY, JOHN F., AND NATIONAL POLICY

Thirty-fifth and youngest president of the United States who took office during one of the most turbulent times in U.S. history. When John F. Kennedy was sworn in as president in January 1961, the Cold War abroad was becoming dangerously belligerent, and racial tension within the United States was rising in the extreme. From the first moments of his presidency, Kennedy evoked a sense of security and a spirit of idealism that reassured Americans of their nation's strengths and inspired them to serve their country and the world. However, as Kennedy struggled with the complexities of foreign and domestic politics, the idealism sometimes fell short of the rhetoric.

THE NEW FRONTIER

Kennedy was elected president by a narrow margin and he lacked reliable majorities in Congress. As a

President John F. Kennedy displaying the combat flag of the Cuban landing brigade, which later took part in the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961. While displaying the flag, Kennedy declared to the audience that it "will be returned by this brigade in a free Havana." This was not to be, however, because Castro's army quickly stopped the invasion, and the Bay of Pigs fiasco became one of the greatest failures of the Kennedy administration.

Source: Corbis.

result, most of his domestic policies stalled in Congress. Nevertheless, Kennedy brought to the White House the dynamic idea of a New Frontier approach to deal with problems at home, abroad, and even in outer space.

While embarking upon the promised journey, the Kennedy administration had some notable achievements. Among them were the establishment of the Peace Corps—an idea that intended to send 10,000 young people to serve in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Kennedy argued that this practical, inexpensive, person-to-person program would plant trust, goodwill, and a capacity for self-help in the underdeveloped world.

Kennedy inspired many by promoting scientific and technological advancement during his term as president. In a speech before Congress in May 1961, he declared that it was "time for a great new American enterprise—time for this nation to take a clearly leading role in space achievement, which in many ways may hold the key to our future on earth." To this effect, Kennedy proposed a U.S. space effort greater than all previous efforts combined, which included putting an American space team on the moon within a decade. This effort became a reality in 1969, when the United States sent the successful lunar mission into space—Apollo 11—placing a man on the moon for the first time.

However, Kennedy had little success in persuading Congress to accept his plans in other areas, such as Medicare. Kennedy's proposals would have provided health coverage for persons aged 65 and older. Medicare was popular with the trade movement, but was vigorously opposed by private insurance companies. The president met with similar obstacles in his efforts to increase aid to education because these initiatives, among others, were stalled in Congress for one reason or another.

ECONOMIC POLICY

In the economic realm, Kennedy concluded that the central question of the time was about how to manage an industrial society to keep the great economic machinery moving ahead while bringing about growth and prosperity. The answer, according to him, lay in building up the ability to face technical problems at all levels. Some of his ideas were inspired by looking at the prosperity of Western European economies. The success of their economic model predisposed him toward combining decentralized decision making with national economic target setting.

When he took over as president, Kennedy faced investment deficiencies in education, in high technology, and in private investment. However, he also inherited a federal budget that was in balance even under recession conditions. Thus, Kennedy could find resources to finance seed projects in education and in

technology. Scholarships to remove financial barriers to higher education, federal funds for building new campuses and secondary schools, and expanded federal funding for current research and for expanding the pool of scientists and engineers made up part of the Kennedy administration's long-run growth policy.

Private investment was to be spurred on by reducing unemployment and achieving near-full capacity utilization. Accompanying this commitment to maintaining demand were policies to refocus business attention on investment, especially in machinery and equipment. Procapital policies included an investment tax credit, an exhortation that the Federal Reserve Board follow a policy of low interest rates, and a federal budget surplus that would play a constructive role of adding to national saving and making resources available for investment.

Kennedy also won some victories on minimum wage by managing to pass the first wage increase in years. In trade legislation, the president managed to convince Congress to pass the Trade Expansion Act, which enabled the president to lower tariffs, or taxes on imports, to compete with nations of the European Community (EC), which is now the European Union (EU).

Kennedy's economic policies were generally considered extraordinarily successful. Almost all the productivity gains during the period were fundamental improvements in underlying productivity. As his third year in office ended, Kennedy recommended an $11 billion tax cut to bolster the economy. The idea remained pending in Congress as his presidency ended abruptly.

CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION

The rise of racial tension in the United States coincided with the beginning of Kennedy's presidency. Despite constitutional assurances to the contrary, African Americans were treated as second-class citizens, frequently denied access to public facilities, prohibited from exercising their voting rights, and subjected to racist violence. Under leaders such as Martin Luther King, African Americans organized a movement demanding equal rights under the law.

For the first two years of his administration, President Kennedy ignored the call. The Democrats held a narrow majority in Congress, and many of the Democratic seats were held by southerners who opposed civil rights legislation. Because the president needed the white Southern vote to win reelection in 1964, he adopted a cautious approach to civil rights, emphasizing enforcement of existing laws over the creation of new ones.

Matters came to a head in May 1963, when racists attacked Freedom Riders traveling by bus from Washington, DC, to Birmingham, Alabama. The violence in Birmingham on May 3, 1963, left President Kennedy no choice but to alter his course. On the evening of June 11, just hours after federal marshals escorted black students to their dormitories at the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa, the president delivered a televised address to the nation. Speaking with conviction, Kennedy announced that he would send comprehensive civil rights legislation to Congress. "The heart of the question," the president said, "is whether all Americans are to be afforded equal rights and opportunities." The answer from those who opposed civil rights came later that evening, when segregationist Byron de La Beckwith shot and killed Medgar Evers, the Mississippi field secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).

Five months later, the legislation had not yet passed. It all remained unfinished business because Kennedy's life and political career ended shortly thereafter. While campaigning for reelection, the president was struck by an assassin's bullet in Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963. The young president died shortly thereafter.

The event shocked the nation and became an indelible and symbolic turning point in the minds and lives of millions of mourning Americans. In death, Kennedy became a cultural icon whose youthful charm, charisma, and political idealism left behind a legacy that is strongly remembered and felt to this day—even as the bright promise of the New Frontier remained tragically unfulfilled.

See also Bay of Pigs; Cuban Missile Crisis

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REFLECTIONS

The Torch is Passed

In his famous inaugural speech as the newly elected president of the United States in 1961, Kennedy began by saying, "Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans." And so he continued, striking notes of strength, conciliation, and hope. The burden of the "long twilight struggle" lay on this people and this generation. "And so, my fellow Americans—ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country." He concluded:

> My fellow citizens of the world: ask not what America will do for you but what together we can do for the freedom of man.

KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH (1894–1971)

Soviet communist leader, premier of the Soviet Union (1958–1964), and first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1953–1964). Nikita Khrushchev is perhaps best remembered for his program of de-Stalinization.

Born to a peasant family in the Ukraine in 1894, Khrushchev joined the Communist Party in 1918 while working in plants and mines. He went to Moscow for further studies in 1928 and became a member of the Soviet Central Committee in 1934. The following year, Khrushchev became first secretary of the powerful Moscow city and regional party organization.

Khrushchev was made first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1938. During his tenure as secretary, he supervised the purge of the Ukrainian party's ranks, as ordered by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. Khrushchev's success in the Ukraine earned him a full membership to the *politburo*, the ruling body of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and he became one of Stalin's closest associates.

When Stalin died on March 5, 1953, a collective leadership replaced the single ruler of the Soviet Union. After a brief power struggle, Khrushchev emerged as leader. He replaced several other top leaders, and in 1954, he initiated the so-called virgin lands program to increase grain production in the Soviet Union. The same year, Khrushchev headed a Soviet delegation to China.

At the 20th All-Union Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev delivered his famous report, "The Personality Cult and Its Consequences," in which he bitterly denounced Stalinism. Soon after, he began leading a charge for a program of *de-Stalinization*, sometimes also referred to as *the thaw*.

Under de-Stalinization, legal procedures were restored in the Soviet Union, the power of the secret police was limited, concentration camps and many forced labor camps were closed, and more public controversy was permitted. The new atmosphere of freedom was a radical departure from the days of Stalin. Despite the changing atmosphere, Khrushchev kept a close eye on the artistic community, and he was known to chastise writers who failed to profess loyalty to the Communist Party and the Soviet state.

The thaw was not without repercussions, however, especially in Eastern bloc countries. In 1956, the Soviet Union had to quell insurrections in Poland and Hungary through military action. These events, coupled with the abandonment of the sixth Five Year Plan, weakened Khrushchev's position. From the outset, Stalin's successors had three major problems: control of Eastern Europe, sustaining and promoting the world communist movement that spun on a strong relationship with China, and achieving a strategic balance with the United States.

In 1957, Khrushchev turned back a coup headed by three of Stalin's protégés—Georgi Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Lazar Kaganovich—and the three leaders were removed from important government and party posts. Meanwhile, Khrushchev consolidated his power as party chief and premier when he replaced Nikolai Bulganin in March 1958.

Khrushchev met with U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1959 during a tour of the United States, at which time he trumpeted the cause of peaceful coexistence with America and its allies. However, following the Soviet downing of an American U-2 spy plane in 1960, Khrushchev cancelled a summit conference slated for Paris and appeared before the United Nations, railing against U.S. imperialism.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev's domestic and foreign affairs policies increased tension with China, which viewed the Soviet Union as veering away from Marxism. In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis, culminating in the Soviets backing down and removing their nuclear warheads from Cuba, further weakened Khrushchev's status. These policy failures, along with shortfalls in domestic agricultural production (Khrushchev had

predicted that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in economic production), led to his removal from power in 1964.

Khrushchev lived the remaining years of his life outside of Moscow in relative obscurity until his death in 1971. Khrushchev was remembered as a jovial, shrewd, occasionally crude, pragmatic leader who successfully mixed belligerence with diplomacy.

See also Communism; Cuban Missile Crisis; Stalin, Joseph (1878–1953); Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

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KISSINGER, HENRY (1923–)

U.S. statesman, scholar, and author who played a key role in formulating U.S. foreign policy in the 1970s under President Richard Nixon. Kissinger was born Heinz Alfred Kissinger in Fürth, Germany, in May 1923, at a time when Jewish families like his were just beginning to feel the effects of Nazi persecution. His family left Germany for New York when he was 15 years old, and he made every effort to assimilate—including adopting the name Henry.

EARLY CAREER

Drafted into the U.S. Army in 1943, Kissinger's talents were recognized early and he was recruited for the Army Specialized Training Program. When the program was canceled the following year, he competed unsuccessfully for a spot in the medical training program. Instead, he was sent to a training camp in Louisiana, in which he gave fellow soldiers informal briefings about world events. While there, he met Fritz Kraemer, who became a sort of mentor and helped get Kissinger assigned to intelligence and administrative posts rather than combat after he was shipped to Germany.

Returning from the war, Kissinger attended Harvard University and began studying government and philosophy. While at Harvard, he actively courted influential people around the world and learned to play both sides of a rivalry. His doctoral thesis was on the creation of a stable balance of power in the world system—the key tenet of the political realist philosophy that informed his political and scholarly thinking.

The publication of a brilliant piece on national security policy in April 1955 won Kissinger admiration from the academic and policy communities. Offered a position on the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), he served as the study director of a group investigating nuclear weapons and foreign policy. He helped publicize, but not develop, the theory of *limited nuclear wars*.

Kissinger returned to Harvard between 1957 and 1968, finally becoming a tenured professor in 1959. He also worked part time as a consultant to Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York and to the Kennedy White House. He began his rise to prominence with trips to Vietnam in 1965 and 1966, serving as a consultant. In 1967, he began what became a career trademark—helping launch secret negotiations—as he enlisted two Frenchmen to serve as liaisons between the United States and North Vietnam.

KISSINGER AND NIXON

Although Kissinger had supported Nelson Rockefeller's bid for the 1968 presidential nomination, newly elected President Richard Nixon appointed him head of the National Security Council. In that capacity, Kissinger had unprecedented power to shape foreign policy, as both he and Nixon were eager to shift decision making and policy making from the Departments of State and Defense to the White House, supported by the National Security Council (NSC). In this capacity, Kissinger developed his famous *bombshell diplomacy*, in which successful results of secret negotiations were "dropped" unexpectedly on the public.

The first major challenge to Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy was management of the unpopular war in Vietnam, which Nixon had pledged to end as part of his presidential campaign. Kissinger was aware that the war was unsustainable, politically and practically. His primary concern was that America should not lose credibility and damage its superpower status or reputation in withdrawing from the conflict.

Both Kissinger and Nixon believed that cooperation with the Soviet Union was key to ending U.S.

involvement in Vietnam, and Kissinger's *linkage* theory and practice evolved as a result. This theory held that linking discrete issues tied to Soviet interests—such as the mutual arms limitation described in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)—would stimulate Soviet support for ending the Vietnam conflict. By introducing Kissinger's notion of diplomacy—posing risks and dangling benefits before the Soviets—the United States would save face, ease out of Vietnam, and promote détente (the easing of tensions) between the primary superpowers.

These strategies were used also in relation to Communist China. Sino-Soviet relations had soured and Kissinger, ever the realist, took advantage of the opportunity to play the Soviet Union and China off one another. His triangular diplomacy eventually led to improved relations with both countries and a general lessening of Cold War threats. Indeed, Kissinger was largely responsible for Nixon "opening" China because Kissinger conducted private negotiations with Communist Chinese leader Mao Zedong and, as ever, used his conspiratorial methods to gain political ends.

At first privately, then publicly, Kissinger helped negotiate the official end of the Vietnam conflict: the 1973 Paris Agreements. The agreements made provisions for the continued existence of an autonomous South Vietnamese administration and military, the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and a cease-fire. For his role in these agreements, Kissinger shared with President Nixon the title of *Time* magazine's Man of the Year. He was also awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973—shared with Le Duc Tho, the North Vietnamese representative at the talks—for arranging the agreements.

Kissinger also gained recognition for his role in advancing peace agreements in the Middle East. Traveling back and forth between Egypt and Israel, he encouraged a military stalemate that fostered a climate for negotiation. The strategy was successful—his so-called shuttle diplomacy helped the combatants reach a cease-fire following the Arab-Israeli (Yom Kippur) War in 1973 and opened the first peace talks since Israel achieved statehood.

SECRETARY OF STATE

The amount of recognition Kissinger received did not endear him to President Nixon. In September 1973, Kissinger became Nixon's secretary of state, but the president appointed him adviser more out of necessity than a real desire to do so. Similar political philosophies

made their relationship functional, but very rarely close.

Kissinger, who described himself as "largely oblivious" of the unfolding Watergate scandal, was nonetheless part of it in its opening phases. Having ordered wiretaps from his office and contributed strongly to the air of suspicion that permeated the Nixon administration, he was initially a target of press scrutiny. In the end, however, his connections among journalists, evidence that he had not been involved in the break-in, and his public stature ensured that he would be spared the embarrassment and indictments his colleagues faced.

After Nixon's disgrace and resignation in August 1974, Kissinger became Gerald Ford's secretary of state and served through the end of the Ford presidency. As secretary of state, he attempted to continue to manage the crises in Cambodia and Vietnam. However, without the fiscal support of Congress and popular support in the country, the missions were doomed to failure. Cambodia became engulfed in a bloody civil war, and South Vietnam fell to the North. Kissinger's historic and tumultuous service in government ended ambivalently.

Throughout his career, Kissinger has been a controversial figure. He excites respect from admirers for his brilliance, personal power, and scholarship. However, he incurs condemnation from his critics for his perceived emphasis on power politics over coalition building and interests over normative judgments. Nevertheless, Henry Kissinger remains one of the most influential consultants on international politics.

See also Nixon, Richard M., and National Policy

KOREA, NORTH AND SOUTH

Division of the Korean peninsula into two nations, a split that occurred when the Japanese occupation ended at the conclusion of World War II. From 1910 to 1945, Japan controlled the Korean peninsula. During this period, two separate insurgencies formed to oppose the Japanese occupation. In Manchuria, Korean communists launched guerilla attacks against the Japanese military. In Shanghai, an exiled nationalist Korean government, called the Singahoe, also plotted to expel the Japanese. Initially, these two groups

coordinated their efforts to defeat the Japanese. However, in 1931, the ideological disagreements between the two groups shattered the alliance, and each group sought independently to liberate Korea.

Their efforts were unsuccessful, although Japan's involvement in World War II raised hope among the insurgents for Korea's eventual freedom. In 1943, as Japanese forces suffered losses across the Pacific, Chinese, British, and U.S. leaders meeting in Cairo agreed to place Korea under a trusteeship, with the goal of preparing the country for independence after the war.

U.S. AND SOVIET INVOLVEMENT

The Soviet Union's entry into the Pacific theater threatened this arrangement, however. When the Japanese surrendered on August 15, 1945, Japan's governor-general ceded power to the Provisional Committee for Korean Independence (PCKI). Soviet troops marched into Pyongyang, becoming the first Allied forces to occupy the peninsula. The Soviets agreed to recognize the PCKI as Korea's official government on the condition that communists are appointed to fill half the committee's seats. The PCKI readily accepted the Soviet Union's demand, and assumed power under the title of the People's Republic of Korea (PRK).

The United States, however, did not accept this state of affairs. On September 8, 1945, American forces entered the city of Seoul in the central part of Korea. U.S. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, abiding by the Cairo agreement, established the United States Military Government in Korea (USMGIK) and denied recognition to all national groups, including the PRK. In response, Soviet representatives created the Five Provinces Administrative Bureau, a fledgling government for the area that eventually became North Korea and existed outside the influence of the USMGIK.

To resolve the situation, the United States and the Soviet Union formed the Joint American-Soviet Commission. However, in May 1946, the commission dissolved without achieving a compromise. Worried that the Korean peninsula faced a permanent division, the newly chartered United Nations established a commission in November 1947 to oversee the movement toward Korean independence.

A DIVIDED KOREA

Even as the UN commission worked on a resolution, however, the division in Korea became irreversible.

The North Korean Communist Party, under the leadership of Kim Il Sung, quickly gained control of the PRK and placed it under the trusteeship of the Soviet Union. With Soviet support, Kim Il Sung formed an army and instituted his Twenty Point Program to control the economy. On September 9, 1948, he proclaimed the existence of the independent Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea).

An indigenous government had also formed in the south. Under the guidance of the USMGIK, a National Assembly met in May 1948 and elected a president—Syngman Rhee. On August 15, several weeks before Kim's proclamation of the Democratic People's Republic, Syngman Rhee announced the formation of the Republic of Korea, generally known as South Korea. The new South Korean government, strongly backed by the United States, denounced the formation of a North Korean state. In this respect, the Korean peninsula quickly became an early venue for the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Not surprisingly, tensions between the two new nations rapidly escalated. In April 1950, Kim Il Sung received permission from both the Soviet Union and China to invade South Korea. His initial attack, which came on June 25, 1950, was highly successful. Within days, North Korean forces had captured Seoul. Afraid that the communists would soon dominate the Korean peninsula, U.S. president Harry S. Truman, on June 30, ordered United States forces to take action. Allies from the United Nations soon joined the U. S. troops in Korea, and the Korean War began. China responded to the presence of UN and U.S. forces by entering the war on October 25, 1950.

After months of battle, neither side could claim complete victory. By May 1951, Kim Il Sung recognized the impossibility of capturing the entire peninsula and suggested that armistice talks be held. These talks lasted for more than two years. The North Koreans repeatedly retreated from promises that they had already made, providing a preview of their future diplomatic strategy.

Finally, an armistice, not an actual peace treaty, was signed on July 27, 1953. The armistice created a border between North Korea and South Korea at the 38th parallel. A buffer, known as the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), separated the two nations. To secure South Korea, the United States signed the ROK-USA Mutual Security Pact and stationed more than 50,000 soldiers near the DMZ to deter future North Korean attacks.

CONTINUED TENSIONS
BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH

For the next four decades, relations between the two nations shifted violently between open hostility and tentative stabs at reconciliation. During this period, South Korea gradually became more democratic and fostered a capitalistic economy. North Korea, however, became more isolated and struggled as its economic policies, such as agricultural collectivization, continued to fail. Frustrated with its development, North Korea frequently threatened South Korea when its own fortunes were waning to prove that it remained a viable nation.

In 1963, for instance, the Soviet Union withdrew all economic and military aid to North Korea when that nation sided with China in its split with the Soviet Union. This loss devastated the already struggling North Korean economy. To cover this weakness, North Korea lashed out at South Korea. During January 1968, North Korean commandos attacked the presidential compound in South Korea, the North Korean navy seized the United States ship *Pueblo* off the coast of Korea, and North Korean guerillas harassed villages along South Korea's eastern coast.

However, even as these actions occurred, secret talks between the two nations were commencing. In 1972, the two countries issued the South-North Joint Communiqué. This document outlined conditions for a possible reunification of the two nations. The use of violence to initiate negotiations became a standard North Korean practice, however. In October 1983, for example, North Korean commandos bombed the Martyr's Tomb in Rangoon in Burma, killing 17 visiting South Korean officials. At the same time, North Korea was secretly negotiating a closer relationship with South Korea in talks that also included the United States.

OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

Talks occurred intermittently between North and South Korea until 1994, when North Korea threatened to develop nuclear weapons. Ultimately, the North retracted this threat and signed the Agreed Framework with the United States. With this assurance, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung launched his so-called Sunshine Policy, which was designed to solidify the relationship with North Korea through a series of reciprocal gestures. In June 2000, the two nations signed the South-North Declaration, guaranteeing economic and social cooperation.

Unfortunately, the declaration has not been implemented. After Kim Dae Jung left office, the South Korean government revealed that it had paid North Korea $500 million to sign the declaration. Then, in 2002, North Korea admitted that it had covertly continued its nuclear weapons policy. The threat of war once more loomed on the Korean peninsula, again diminishing the possibility of reconciliation and reunification. Although North and South Korea continue to make overtures for reconciliation, the division between the two countries remains and will no doubt continue for the foreseeable future.

See also Agreed Framework; Korean War; North Korea Crises, 1994–; Pueblo Incident; U.S.-ROK Alliance

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KOREAN WAR

Armed conflict that took place on the Korean peninsula from 1950 to 1953, precipitated by North Korea's attack on the South on June 25, 1950 and fueled by ideological differences. The Korean War involved several interested parties, including the United States and the Soviet Union, who backed South and North Korea, respectively.

At the Potsdam Conference of 1945, the Allied leaders agreed to split the Japanese colony of Korea at the 38th parallel into northern and southern regions. This division eventually came to be supported, militarily and politically, for years to come by the Soviet Union and the United States, and it laid the groundwork for one of the most prominent and resonant regional conflicts to be borne out of the conclusion of World War II.

The beginning of the 20th century saw the conquest of the Korean peninsula by the Japanese Empire in the Russo-Japanese War. Japan's defeat by the United States at the conclusion of World War II, and the later communist takeover of the peninsula, left the region's fate in Allied control.

The original idea to maintain the peninsula as a trusteeship, which surfaced at the Yalta Conference,

was set aside in favor of the eventual decision reached at the Potsdam Conference to split Korea into two states: the Russian-backed Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the U.S.-backed Republic of Korea.

With Cold War tensions already rising between the Soviet Union and the United States, and with the newly Communist China at the border of North Korea, the United States had no choice but to remain committed to the success and independence of South Korea, however warily.

The vast ideological divide that separated the governments and political systems of the two new states gave rise to tensions that increased with time. To exacerbate matters, each state believed that the other had been captured and soiled by an ideological enemy and that it had the right and duty to reunite the peninsula under its political system.

On June 25, 1950, North Korea launched a surprise attack on South Korea by crossing the 38th parallel and taking Seoul, the capital of South Korea, within three days. President Harry S. Truman approved military aid to be offered to South Korean forces the day after the attack. Yet initial resistance by South Korea was relatively weak because the North Korean army was larger and far more robust than what was essentially only a military police force on the South Korean side.

The day after the attack, the UN Security Council met and passed a resolution condemning the attack as an act of aggression and calling for an immediate cease-fire. Simultaneously, U.S. infantry and naval troops were committed by President Truman, pursuant to a visit by General Douglas MacArthur to the collapsing South Korean defensive lines. On July 8, the Security Council passed another resolution calling for states to contribute troops and acknowledging U.S. leadership over the bulk of United Nations forces. These forces came to be made up of 16 nations, including Australia, Great Britain, Canada, and the Philippines. The resolution was able to pass only because the Soviet representative, whose veto would otherwise have been guaranteed, was not present during the vote. The Soviets had been boycotting the council's meetings because it had refused to recognize China's new communist government in favor of continuing to offer recognition to the nationalist Chinese government in Taiwan.

The North Korean offensive continued until the end of August 1950, when UN forces finally managed

to take a stand at the southeastern city of Pusan, South Korea's major port. In what is widely touted as the crowning moment in his military career, General MacArthur opened a second front, launching an amphibious assault well behind North Korean lines. The attack forced North Korea to defend on two fronts, weakening North Korean forces and resulting in a retreat. Allied forces quickly recaptured Seoul.

As UN forces pushed the Korean People's Army (KPA) back to the 38th parallel, President Truman met with General MacArthur. Truman thought he had secured the general's guarantee that MacArthur would not push his advance any farther than the original border. However, MacArthur disobeyed orders (for what was not the first time in his career), presumably pressured into reuniting the Korean peninsula by South Korean President Syngman Rhee. South Korean and UN forces kept pushing until they nearly reached the Yalu River, which marked the border between China and North Korea.

At the beginning of November 1950, China launched a massive counteroffensive, successfully driving back UN and South Korean forces. By January 1951, the North Koreans had captured Seoul, and by March the border had returned to the 38th parallel. The next several months saw back-and-forth fighting in the difficult and mountainous terrain of North Korea. In April 1951, MacArthur's war strategy—which differed in many aspects from Truman's aims—coupled with the general's criticism of Truman's decision making, led Truman to replace MacArthur with General Matthew B. Ridgway.

Often-stalled negotiations that began in May 1951 and lasted for two years helped propel Truman's Republican challenger Dwight D. Eisenhower to victory in the 1952 U.S. presidential race. Eisenhower promised to end the Korean War, which had caused more than 54,000 American deaths, approximately 100,000 casualties, and more than 4 million civilian deaths in the Korean peninsula. On July 27, 1953, an armistice was signed between the warring sides, creating a formal Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea at the 38th parallel. Today, the DMZ remains the most heavily armored stretch of land in the world.

See also Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Korea; Korea, North and South; Korean War, Entry into (1950); MacArthur, Douglas (1880–1964); Pusan Perimeter; Truman, Harry S., and National Policy

KOREAN WAR, ENTRY INTO (1950)

Beginning of the first armed conflict of the Cold War period. In June 1950, U.S. President Harry S. Truman ordered U.S. military intervention in Korea to prevent the Communist People's Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) from taking control of the free Republic of Korea (South Korea).

At the end of World War II, following the surrender of Japan in August 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to divide Korea into two occupation zones. The Soviet Union occupied the Korean peninsula north of the 38th parallel, whereas the United States sent its troops to South Korea, south of the demarcation line. The Soviets planted a communist regime in North Korea, led by Kim Il Sung, a Korean nationalist determined to unify the country.

Right-wing Korean nationalist Syngman Rhee, leader of the exiled Korean government during World War II, traveled to Washington, DC, in 1946 to gain support for his plan to rule South Korea and eventually reunite the country. The United States agreed to back Rhee because it believed that he and his supporters were powerful enough to repel the North Koreans.

From 1946 to 1949, severe civil unrest between procommunist forces and right-wing elements left South Korea in chaos and resulted in a guerrilla war that caused the deaths of approximately 100,000 Koreans. The United Nations, strongly supported by the United States, monitored an election in South Korea in May 1948 to determine its government—a move the United States hoped would settle the unrest. The United Nations proposed having elections in North Korea as well, but the Soviets refused to participate, and none were held there.

On August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea was formed to act as the government of South Korea, with Syngman Rhee as its leader. One month after the Soviet Union established the People's Democratic Republic of Korea in North Korea in September 1948, the Soviets removed their troops from the peninsula. The following June (1949), the United States followed suit and withdrew its troops as well.

All through 1949, Kim Il Sung appealed to Soviet leader Josef Stalin for arms and support. Finally, in the early months of 1950, Stalin agreed to provide tanks, artillery, and air power to help the North Koreans attack the South, with the expectation that the newly established People's Republic of China (PRC), under the communist leadership of Mao Zedong, would provide troop support for the North Koreans.

In the late 1940s, U.S. foreign policy was largely focused on the precarious situation in Europe. U.S. president Harry S. Truman and his advisers expected that war might erupt at any moment over the crisis in Berlin. In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson publicly stated that South Korea was not among the nations that the United States planned to defend against Soviet aggression.

With the opening of Soviet government archives to scholars in the 1990s, it is now known that Stalin based his decision to support the North Koreans on the belief that the United States would not become involved in Korea. Although the United States had misgivings about its stance on South Korea before the North Korean invasion in June 1950, after the attack occurred, the United States dramatically shifted its policy toward the defense of South Korea.

On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops, supported by Soviet weaponry, crossed the 38th parallel in a surprise attack and invaded South Korea. By June 28, the South Korean capital of Seoul was in the hands of the North Koreans. When the United States learned of the initial attack, President Truman immediately consulted the UN Security Council, which met later that day. Because the Soviet Union was in the midst of a boycott of the UN, it was not present. The Soviet delegates were protesting the refusal of UN members to recognize the communist PRC as the legitimate successor to the government of Chinese general Chiang Kai-Shek, who was exiled to the island of Taiwan (then Formosa).

The UN Security Council resoundingly approved a proposal for a cease-fire in Korea and the removal of North Korean troops to lands north of the 38th parallel. When the North Koreans ignored the proposal, the United States presented a resolution to the Security Council on June 27, requesting that UN member nations come to the aid of the besieged South Koreans. President Truman also met with U.S. congressional leaders on that same day to notify them of the desperate situation in Korea and the importance of UN and U.S. intervention.

At this critical point, Truman, his advisers, and U.S. military leaders were convinced that the North Korean attack was the consequence of Soviet aggression and an example of the Soviet Union's resolve to spread communist rule not only to South Korea but

throughout the Far East. Acting according to the dictates of the Truman Doctrine, which the president had enunciated in a speech on March 12, 1947, Truman was adamant that the United States must contain communism at all costs to maintain international peace and freedom and to protect U.S. interests.

On June 30, 1950, Truman ordered General Douglas MacArthur to send U.S. troops to South Korea (U.S. air and naval forces were already committed in the region). The next day, U.S. troops arrived in South Korea, and U.S. involvement in the Korean War began.

See also Cold War; Korea, North and South; Korean War; Truman Doctrine; Truman, Harry S., and National Policy

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KOSOVO INTERVENTION

Led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States, a joint military move into Kosovo in 1999, which was intended to liberate Kosovo from allegedly oppressive Serbian rule and to end further conflict in the region. An Independent International Commission on the Kosovo intervention initiated by the prime minister of Sweden, Goran Perrson, submitted its report to UN secretary-general Kofi Annan on October 23, 2000. According to the report, the origins of the Kosovo conflict can be traced back to the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic, the new president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), withdrew autonomy from Kosovo (a part of Serbia), leading to a decade of discrimination and resentment among Albanian Kosovars. The result was the adoption of a predominant strategy of nonviolence chosen by Kosovars during the 1990s. This was challenged by a guerrilla army, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which gathered ammunition after the meltdown of authority in neighboring Albania in 1997 and garnered support from Kosovars in response to the increasing repression by the FRY.

ARMED CONFLICT BEGINS

An armed conflict between the KLA and FRY began in February 1998 and escalated in 1999. Although support for the KLA had expanded, the LDK party (Democratic League of Kosovo), led by Ibrahim Rugova, received an overwhelming majority of votes among Kosovars in March 1998 elections.

Between February 1998 and March 1999, approximately 400,000 Kosovars had been driven or fled from their homes. The massacre at Drenica in February 1998, in which 58 people were slain by FRY forces, prefaced nine months of bombings and burnings of villages, as well as disappearances and massacres of Kosovar civilians by the FRY. Not only did Serbian repression arouse greater sympathy among Kosovars for the KLA, but also the violence in Kosovo and attacks on ethnic Serbs there (as well as on FRY police) increased support for Milosevic in the FRY.

Milosevic called for a referendum (held on April 24, 1998) on proposed international mediation in Kosovo and elicited 95% support for his position against such mediation. The referendum was widely considered a sham and deliberately held under a repressive environment to ensure easy support.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the UN Security Council, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) considered in 1998 what had occurred and what was to be done. Diplomatic efforts by the UN-sponsored Contact Group led to an agreement between the U.S. Special Envoy, Richard Holbrooke (representing the Contact Group) and FRY President Milosevic in October 1998. This agreement authorized the introduction of unarmed OSCE monitors and the withdrawal of most of the FRY troops (as called for in UNSC Resolution 1199 on September 23, 1998). This deescalation allowed many Kosovars to go home, and it did reduce the level of violence temporarily. However, KLA units took advantage of the lull in fighting to reestablish their control of many positions vacated by the redeployed Serbian troops. Violence escalated again in December 1998 after Serbian forces reentered the province.

After unsuccessful negotiations between the FRY and the Kosovo parties (the KLA and LDK) begun by the OSCE in France in February and March 1999, the OSCE removed its monitors on March 19. NATO

began bombing military targets on March 24, 1999, and continued bombing in Serbia and Kosovo for 78 days before a truce was signed in June 1999 and FRY troops pulled out of Kosovo.

THE JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERVENTION

The Kosovo Commission concluded that during the whole duration of the conflict, Western diplomacy had been ineffective and had been sending mixed signals to the parties in the conflict. The Commission faulted the exclusion of Kosovo from the agenda of negotiations leading to the 1995 Dayton Agreement with the FRY and other governments, which had ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It also criticized the lack of international support for the Kosovar nonviolent movement, led by Ibrahim Rugova, which had created parallel institutions during the relevant period. However, the report also concluded that despite these weaknesses, it was impossible to determine whether a diplomatic solution could have ended the internal struggle over the future of Kosovo, concluding that the goals of the Kosovar Albanians and of Belgrade were irreconcilable.

During the period of the bombings, the Commission estimated that approximately 863,000 civilians fled, and (the great majority) were expelled by FRY-coordinated forces; 590,000 were internally displaced, and 10,000 civilians were killed—the vast majority (9,500) by FRY forces. The Commission also found evidence of widespread rape and torture, as well as looting, pillaging, and extortion, and it concluded that the huge expulsion of Kosovar Albanians was systematic and deliberately organized.

The Commission further stated that although the NATO air campaign did not provoke the attacks on the civilian Kosovar population, the bombing created an environment that made such an operation feasible. The Kosovo Report cited a report of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), which correlated refugee departure information with NATO bombing reports, supposedly demonstrating that refugee flow patterns did not correlate positively with either NATO bombings or mass killing patterns. The AAAS study concluded that the data did not support the analysis that the refugees fled, but was more consistent with an organized expulsion.

The Commission eventually concluded that the NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate. It was illegal because it did not receive prior approval from the UN Security Council. However, the Commission considered that the intervention was justified because all diplomatic avenues were exhausted and because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority population of Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule. But the Commission faulted NATO's mistaken expectations of a brief war, strategy, and failure to anticipate the risk to Kosovars from the FRY.

In the case of the Kosovo intervention, several commentators noted the general U.S. disinterest in the developing conflict and the lack of consideration of other options that could have only been used earlier to prevent the conflict. In light of this, the Commission on Kosovo did suggest future criteria for intervention based on just war theory, beginning with the need to close the gap between legality and legitimacy. Following from this was a framework that included three threshold principles that must be satisfied in any legitimate claim to humanitarian intervention. These principles include the suffering of civilians owing to severe patterns of human rights violations or the breakdown of government, the overriding commitment to the direct protection of the civilian population, and the calculation that the intervention has a reasonable chance of ending the humanitarian catastrophe. Many hope that this new suggested framework will counter the general and still prevailing wisdom that exists on prevention versus intervention—which is that, although the former is better, more effective, and cheaper it is also almost always ignored until too late.

See also Bosnia Intervention; Interventionism

L

LAND WARFARE
See Air–Land Battles

LAND MINES

An explosive device placed in or on the ground that detonates when triggered by a vehicle or person. Land mines are used to defend borders, military installations, and troop formations by restricting enemy movement in the mined area. Land mines are also referred to as *area denial munitions,* because they serve a purpose similar to barbed wire or concrete vehicle barriers by channeling the movement of troops and vehicles to give tactical advantage to defending forces. They are thus also known as *force multipliers,* which allow a smaller, organized force to defeat a larger attacking formation. Presently there are more than 100 million land mines buried in 70 countries across the globe.

TYPES OF MINES AND HOW THEY WORK

Land mines are divided into two types: antipersonnel and antitank. Antipersonnel mines are generally designed to injure, rather than kill, enemy troops. Such weapons are thought to have a demoralizing effect on members of the victims' units, and they tie up enemy resources in evacuating and providing medical care to casualties. Antipersonnel mines are usually triggered by the pressure of a soldier's foot, but tripwires also are used.

Antitank mines, which are larger in size and explosive force, generally are used to destroy enemy tanks and other vehicles. Most antitank mines employ a magnetic trigger, which will cause detonation even if the vehicle does not touch the device. Some advanced mines contain what is known as an *identify friend or foe* (IFF) system, which can differentiate between enemy and friendly vehicles.

Aside from the main trigger mechanism, whether activated by pressure or magnetically, many land mines also contain a touch trigger to prevent the enemy from defusing the device. Also, modern land mines use as little metal as possible in order to evade metal detectors. Modern plastic land mines are also cheaper to produce than were early metal variants.

The term *booby trap* refers to an antipersonnel mine placed in a building to deter entrance or describes a mine that often has "bait" for soldiers (such as documents of intelligence value). These weapons, often improvised from grenades or artillery shells, were used quite extensively against U.S. forces, with demoralizing effect, in the jungles of Vietnam during the Vietnam War. The 2003 war in Iraq and its aftermath witnessed use of the improvised explosive device (IED), commonly known as the *roadside bomb.* This weapon has been used by Iraqi insurgents with some degree of success against light-skinned versions of the Humvee.

Minefields are laid by several methods. Minelaying shells may be fired from artillery or dropped from cruise missiles, airplanes, or helicopters. Also, armored vehicles have been developed for the purpose of laying land mines. Primarily, however, minefields are laid by hand, with soldiers carefully placing the

After the war in Afghanistan, soldiers and a civilian explosive-ordnance expert using a military working dog to search for land mines and unexploded ordnance in an uninhabited area of Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Land mines and unexploded ordnance are among the greatest dangers faced by military peacekeepers and civilians after wars end. Today, 18 nations in Africa have between 18 and 30 million unexploded mines; East Asia has 15 to 23 million mines; and the Middle East has 17 to 24 million of the destructive devices.

Source: U.S. Army.

mines in the desired locations. This method ensures strategic placement and burial out of sight of an oncoming enemy.

HISTORY OF LAND MINE USE

The basic concept of the land mine has existed since ancient times. Roman soldiers placed sharpened spikes in small, well-covered holes in order to slow down and demoralize attacking forces. In the Middle Ages, devices known as *crow's feet,* which had four sharp prongs, were employed in combat.

The first land mine to actually employ explosive devices may have been the *fougasse,* which consisted of a bomb buried under gravel or scrap metal that would become shrapnel upon explosion. The first mechanically fused, mass-produced land mines were invented in Germany around 1912, and they were employed by every major combatant in World War I. Antitank mines also appeared at about that time to counter the offensive threat posed by the new vehicles.

World War II saw the deployment of some 300 million antitank mines by all combatants, as well as the use of advanced antipersonnel mines to prevent removal of antitank devices by enemy engineers. The *bouncing betty,* developed by the Germans at this time, was a well-known antipersonnel mine that exploded at waist height when pressure was applied.

Scatterable land mines dropped from the air were first employed in the Vietnam War. Often strategically dropped to prevent enemy units from returning to their bases, the BLU-43 and -44 scatterable land mines were the first mines to be employed as offensive weapons. However, it is estimated that up to a third of U.S. casualties in Vietnam were caused by these and other types of mines laid by the Americans themselves.

In the 1970s and 1980s, land mines, cheap to purchase and easy to manufacture, were widely used in local conflicts by military and paramilitary forces in countries such as Afghanistan and Cambodia. In recent years, these "dumb" mines have been replaced by "smart" devices that are tougher to detect due to low metal content and that can self-destruct after a predetermined period. Often, however, these smart land mines detonate after the fighting has ceased and civilians have returned to the area, often resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties.

EFFORTS TO BAN LAND MINES

More than 75% of land mine victims are civilians, many of whom are killed or maimed long after hostilities cease. Approximately 26,000 civilians are killed by or lose limbs to these weapons every year. In addition, maiming injuries from the weapons often cause great physical, psychological, and economic hardship for individuals and societies.

As a result, various grassroots campaigns, such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, successfully lobbied for the Ottawa Treaty of 1999, which outlawed the production, stockpiling, and trade of antipersonnel mines. Although the campaign won the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize for its work leading to the agreement, as of 2004, the United States, China, Russia, and India had yet to sign the treaty.

LATIN AMERICA AND U.S. POLICY

United States policy toward Latin America, which for more than the last half-century, created an unequal relationship marked by intense periods of preemptive U.S. interventionism in the name of U.S. national security. From the 1950s to the 1980s, the United States became engaged in Cold War proxy fights against the Soviet Union by way of its Latin American allies. The end of the Cold War saw a refocusing of U.S. security policy in Latin America, moving from anticommunism to efforts to end drug trafficking.

In the 1950s, the United States saw the Panama Canal as a crucial strategic asset, and tensions over its ownership grew between the United States and Panama. Panama desired full independence and sovereignty over the canal, which was built by the United States and was taken into its possession in 1903. The United States did not see it in its interests to cede control of the canal to anyone, for fear that the Soviet Union or its proxy, Cuba, might use it to threaten or attack the United States.

By 1964–65, tensions were about to boil over. The United States had already found its fears affirmed in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, during which the Soviet Union installed in Cuba clandestine ballistic missiles aimed at the United States. This crisis followed a failed U.S.-backed invasion of Cuba, known as the Bay of Pigs. One result of these events was that the United States grew increasingly resistant to Panama's demands.

President Lyndon Johnson viewed the Panama independence movement as a direct conspiracy run by Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Large-scale anti-U.S. riots erupted in Panama, including one riot that ended with 120 casualties. Irrespective of the riots, it was not until a 13–1 vote by the UN Security Council against the United States, with an abstention on behalf of Great Britain, that the

United States was persuaded to take Panama's demands more seriously, and the United States began a reluctant, years-long process of recognition.

United States national security policy viewed the Western Hemisphere in the context of the global East–West Cold War conflict for the better part of the following three decades. This viewpoint became particularly evident in 1982, in the U.S. response to the British-inspired Falklands/Malvinas War. By siding with its valued Cold War ally, Great Britain, rather than its inter-American partner, Argentina, in that war, the United States effectively renounced its enduring 150-year-old Monroe Doctrine, which argued that any foreign political or military advances into the Americas would be deemed a threat to U.S. national security. Overall, however, U.S. national-security policy took an increasingly aggressive turn in Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, the U.S. role in the region became marked by more active involvement, rather than the taking of sides.

COLD WAR INTERVENTIONS

United States administrations typically fought the perceived threat of communism by providing military aid and political support to Latin American political groups or parties that were construed to be anticommunist and pro-U.S. The United States looked for logistical sites in Latin America that could be used as possible attack launchpads and sought to control them.

For example, the United States viewed the Chilean coastline as a conceivable entryway for the Soviets and therefore fought to dominate Chilean politics by championing pro-U.S. military leaders. In 1954, 1968, and 1970, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) helped siphon funds into the hands of U.S.-friendly opponents to beat socialist candidate Salvador Allende in his bid for the Chilean presidency. Allende eventually won in 1970, but a CIA-supported coup d'état ended Allende's life and inserted a pro-U.S. military figure, General Augusto Pinochet, as Chilean leader. Pinochet was later accused by human-rights groups of the abduction, torture, and execution of thousands of political opponents during his 17-year rule.

During the administration of President Jimmy Carter, the United States continued to fight the perceived national security threat of communism by providing military aid and political support to the military in El Salvador, despite publicized human-rights abuses by the Salvadoran military on behalf of the

United States. The administration of President Ronald Reagan increased this support, citing in a 1981 white-paper document evidence of support to insurgents by Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union. The El Salvadoran military then did all it could to eradicate insurgents, resulting in indiscriminate murder squads and a war that lasted 12 years.

President Carter also began to see Nicaragua's Sandinista leaders as possible Soviet allies and therefore dangerous. Once the Sandinistas overthrew the notoriously corrupt regime of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, Carter responded by providing political support to anti-Sandinista elements.

United States support for the anti-Sandinistas, known as the *contras,* escalated under the Reagan administration once the Sandinistas began funneling military aid from Cuba to the insurgents in El Salvador. The CIA began covert training of the contras in Nicaragua to stop the flow of arms from Nicaragua to the insurgents. This support included alleged attacks conducted directly by the CIA, as the CIA deemed them too sophisticated for the Contras to undertake.

When Nicaragua asked the UN Security Council for a resolution condemning U.S. actions, the resolution was vetoed by the United States. The United States then imposed a trade embargo on Nicaragua similar to that against Cuba. The U.S. war against the Sandinistas was finally brought to an end by a conflux of variables, most notably the Iran-Contra affair, which brought to the public eye efforts by the Reagan administration to divert profits from an arms-for-hostages deal with Iran to the Nicaraguan contras.

The ire of the United States was next raised in 1983 by the Caribbean island of Grenada. The United States saw the tiny nation's growing relationship with Cuba as a threat to the regional balance of power. Suspecting a potential security threat, the United States froze all economic and political aid to Grenada. The island became included in what the United States termed the Communist *red triangle,* which included Cuba and Nicaragua.

This label was affirmed for the United States when Grenada signed an economic aid agreement with the Soviets and agreed to let Cuba build an airfield on its soil. The United States felt that Point Salinas, as the airfield was called, would be designed for hostile military aircraft to threaten the United States directly. The United States thus invaded Grenada on October 23, but the fighting ended after only three days. The U.S. government declared the invasion a success, despite a UN Security Council resolution denouncing the invasion, which the United States vetoed.

THE WAR ON DRUGS

The end of the 20th century marked the end of the Cold War. In terms of U.S. policy toward Latin America, it also marked the advent of *geonarcotics,* the concept that the international drug trade posed a significant threat to both regional stability and U.S. national security. United States officials also believed that the level of government corruption required to enable such an enormous scale of drug trafficking could be very disruptive for fragile Latin American nations. The vast extent of the drug trade—drugs were produced mostly in South America and shipped through Central America to the United States—prompted President Reagan to declare a "war on drugs."

Colombia was considered the number-one target for drug production in Latin America, and official corruption was rampant in that nation. Yet General Manuel Antonio Noriega, the president of Panama, was the first United States target in the war on drugs. Noriega was indicted for drug trafficking and money laundering in 1986, and President George H. W. Bush made it clear that the Panamanian president would soon be removed.

Noriega declared a state of war between Panama and the United States in December 1986. The following day, a U.S. military officer was murdered in Panama. The United States then invaded Panama on December 20, 1986. After a U.S. aerial bombing and the entrance of U.S. ground forces, Noriega surrendered and was subsequently imprisoned in the United States. The UN Security Council passed a resolution condemning the invasion, but once again the United States used its power to veto it.

Like the Cold War, the war on drugs has been a chess game of measures and countermeasures as the United States tries to inhibit the production and shipment of narcotics into the United States (which is the number-one consumer of illegal drugs). In 1989, the U.S. government introduced legislation, which was later revised into a 2001 law known as the *Andean initiative,* to provide aid to increase police and military enforcement of drug trafficking in Latin America, particularly in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.

The initiative has remained active. Its greatest role has perhaps been its support of the Colombian military in an antinarcotics campaign. Critics of the initiative

point to the murderous, decades-long civil war in Colombia that continues with the help of initiative funding, and in which the antinarcotics campaign and antiguerilla fight are often merged as one.

Most recently, however, the United States has placed the war on drugs in Latin America under the umbrella of the international war on terrorism. This move heralds the reduction of drug production as a significant issue in terms of homeland security.

See also Bay of Pigs; Cuban Missile Crisis; Iran-Contra Affair; Monroe Doctrine

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REFLECTIONS

Our Friends in Latin America

On March 19, 1984, during a meeting with Cuban-American leaders, President Ronald Reagan made the following comment, reflecting U.S. attitudes and policy toward U.S. neighbors in Latin America:

> If we don't give friends so close to home the means to defend themselves against Soviet-supported insurgents, who will trust us anywhere in the world, especially in the faraway Middle East and Europe?

LAUNCH ON WARNING

Military strategy that allows commanders to order nuclear strikes against an opponent as soon as warning sensors indicate the presence of an incoming enemy missile but before that missile actually strikes its target. Both the advantages and the disadvantages of the launch-on-warning strategy are quite serious. Should an enemy attempt to send nuclear missiles to destroy another nation's missiles, the launch-on-warning (LOW) strategy would allow the targeted nation to launch its missiles before their silos are hit. However, the strategy does not take into consideration the potential for false alarms—a glitch in the radar software or a human error in interpreting data might not be caught in time to avoid a retaliatory nuclear strike without real enemy provocation.

SAFEGUARDING MISSILES

The United States has never officially endorsed the launch-on-warning strategy, because of its potentially catastrophic effects. The concept, however, has been considered and debated by the Pentagon, Congress, and the White House, with a considerable number of people contending that U.S. nuclear strategy is indeed predicated on LOW, despite its evident drawbacks.

As soon as the Soviet Union began producing large numbers of nuclear missiles in the early 1950s, the U.S. military establishment sought to develop strategies that would allow the United States to target Soviet nuclear facilities and nuclear delivery systems. The Soviets, of course, followed suit, and by 1960, both countries had missiles aimed at each other's nuclear silos.

A frightening scenario was then born in the minds of military strategists on both sides: should the enemy launch a first nuclear strike, it would be possible to destroy all of the opponent's missiles in a matter of minutes, thereby preventing the possibility of an equivalent counterattack. One response to this security dilemma was the launch-on-warning strategy. Even if enemy missiles were aimed at one's nuclear rockets, the enemy would not be able to reach them before they were safely launched.

THE POTENTIAL FOR FALSE ALERTS

The major drawback of launch on warning is the potential for acting decisively (that is, launching nuclear missiles) based on faulty data. Even the most advanced early-warning technology allows commanders only 20 minutes, at best, to be informed of an incoming missile, transmit the order to launch a counterstrike, and then carry out the attack. That limited time period does not allow for extensive verification and confirmation of the existence of an incoming missile, thus leaving the door open for catastrophic mistakes.

Although sensitive nuclear-related information is kept highly classified by the U.S. military and the government, several false alerts are widely believed to have occurred on both sides during the Cold War. Fortunately, nuclear missiles were not launched as a result of these alerts, which would indicate that LOW was not the bedrock of either American or Soviet nuclear strategy.

To the present day, however, Russia and the United States each continue to maintain more than 2,000 nuclear warheads ready to be deployed "on warning"— that is, before an incoming enemy missile could actually reach its target. The potential for a nuclear disaster unleashed because of a mistake still exists, therefore, more than a decade after the end of the Cold War.

See also Arms Race; Cold War; First Strike; Flexible Deterrent Options; Limited Nuclear Option; Preemptive Force

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LAW ENFORCEMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The role of federal, state, and local peace officers in protecting the country from hostile nations or terrorist attacks. Historically, distinct divisions have existed between the responsibilities of civilian law-enforcement agencies and those of the military and other instruments of national security. However, laws passed since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States have blurred some of the lines between law enforcement and national security.

LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

The U.S. Constitution grants a limited number of powers to the federal government, including those necessary to "insure domestic tranquility" and "provide for the common defence." Among those powers are the ability to declare war, to raise armies, to maintain

a navy, and to call out the militia. Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended the federal government to have the ability to defend the nation against external threats. However, the Constitution also affirms that all powers not granted to the federal government are reserved to the states. That is, each state has the power to make its own laws regarding anything not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. This includes local policing and law enforcement.

The line between internal policing and external security remained firm until the Civil War. However, during that war and the Reconstruction period that followed, the government eased many of the restrictions on the use of the military for civilian policing. The southern states faced widespread lawlessness in the wake of the destruction caused by the war, and local authorities were often unable to cope with the situation.

During that period, federal troops were used extensively to restore order and keep the peace in many communities. By 1878, local law-enforcement agencies had been reestablished throughout the South and federal troops were no longer needed to keep order. In that year, the U.S. Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the use of the Army to enforce the laws of the United States, individual states, or U.S. territories.

NEW LAWS AND POLICIES

As lawmakers examined the conditions that allowed the September 11, 2001, attacks to take place, they noted a disturbing failure of communication and coordination between the nation's various law-enforcement and national-security agencies. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were criticized for failing to share information that might have led to the discovery of the attacker's plans.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States—the congressional committee that investigated the September 11 attacks—also found a lack of communication between federal agencies and local law-enforcement officials. Based on their findings, the commission recommended changes to the federal government's law-enforcement activities.

Acting on these recommendations, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which established a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. The law transfers several law-enforcement functions from other federal agencies to the Department of

Homeland Security. It also expands the federal government's involvement in the activities of local and state law-enforcement agencies.

Prior to passage of the 2002 law, a variety of federal agencies had responsibility for enforcing laws relating to transportation safety, immigration control, customs, and other issues seen as central to the struggle against terrorism. Under the law, a number of different agencies became part of the Department of Homeland Security. They include the Federal Transit Administration, which is responsible for ensuring the safety of air and rail travel in the United States; the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, which oversees matters concerning foreign nationals in the United States; the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which is responsible for securing the nation's land borders against illegal immigration and charged with combating smuggling; the U.S. Coast Guard, which patrols the nation's coastal waters and performs duties similar to the those of CBP; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), which enforces federal laws relating to the production, sales, and taxation of these substances; and the U.S. Secret Service, which provides personal protection for the president and other government officials.

The DHS also assumed some of the functions of federal agencies that remained independent. For example, it now oversees inspection of all agricultural products in the country, a task once performed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. In addition, the authority to grant or refuse U.S. visas to foreign citizens was transferred from the State Department to the DHS under the act. The sponsors of the Homeland Security Act believed that placing all of these agencies and functions under a single department would facilitate coordination between the people charged with protecting the country from terrorist threats.

Although some government agencies were unhappy with losing power or independence, their consolidation under the DHS was not strongly challenged. A more controversial aspect of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was its expansion of the federal government's role in dealing with local and state law enforcement. For example, the law allows federal officials much greater access to information gathered by state and local law-enforcement agencies during the course of their investigations.

This increased access has led to fears of *purpose creep,* in which information gathered for one purpose is used for another. For example, information gathered by a local agency investigating a crime might be used by the federal government to compile a list of people who hold certain political views. Opponents of the consolidation powers under the DHS also worry that the federal government cannot adequately safeguard the privacy of the information it collects.

Supporters of these laws argue that they are necessary to protect the country from the threat of terrorism. They claim that the changed national-security environment since September 11, 2001, requires a more comprehensive approach to ensuring the nation's safety. Opponents suggest that consolidation of security and law-enforcement functions will do little to increase national security, and they worry that changes in the law give the federal government too much power to interfere in the lives of citizens. The controversy over the new laws reflects the delicate balance between freedom and security in the struggle against terrorism.

—John Haley

See also Central Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Homeland Security, Department of

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Global intergovernmental organization created after World War I to provide a stable postwar order. Predecessor to the United Nations, the League of Nations largely failed in its goal, due in part to the unwillingness of the United States to become involved in the international organization.

WILSON AND THE FOURTEEN POINTS

In a speech to the U.S. Congress on January 8, 1918, near the end of World War I, President Woodrow

Wilson outlined Fourteen Points for a program for peace. In the speech, Wilson mentioned the idea of "peace without victory" and expressed his hopes for a postwar world order centered around an organized common peace. The causes of the war were believed to have been secret diplomacy and treaties, as well as the rivalries created by the balance-of-power system. Wilson outlined the idea of an international organization, a League of Nations, that would foster open diplomacy and mutual protection from external aggression.

Wilson's ideas appealed to both the Central Powers (Germany agreed to peace on the basis of these points) and the Allies (who sought a more stable order and national security). Moreover, it was believed that the League of Nations and its sister organization, the International Labor Organization (ILO), would represent a stabilizing response to an emerging communist threat.

Wilson presented the draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference on February 14, 1919. The document established provisions for protecting sovereignty, resolving disputes, administration of the Central Powers' colonies (which were taken from them at the end of the war), and defending fellow member states against aggression. These points became part of the final covenant, which was born out of the Treaty of Versailles (1919).

Although Wilson's idealism and zeal helped shape the League of Nations and bring it into being, the United States never became a member of the international organization. Facing opposition at home, led by Republican senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Wilson attempted to get the treaty ratified by Congress. Opponents, however, were wary of Article 10 of the League's covenant, which provided for joint protection from external aggression, believing that this provision might drag the United States into a future war. The motion for U.S. participation in the League was defeated in Congress on November 19, 1919.

THE LEAGUE CONVENES

The League of Nations first convened, without the United States, on January 10, 1920, in its new headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, a site that was chosen because of Swiss neutrality. The new organization consisted of three main organs. The Council, the main body of the League, consisted of five permanent members—France, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, and the United States (even though the United States never took its seat)—and four nonpermanent members (this number was later increased). Germany and the Soviet Union became permanent members of the Council for short periods during the life of the League. The second organ of the League was the Assembly, which represented all nations and functioned on a one-nation, one-vote principle. Both organs were supported by a Secretariat.

The new League of Nations did much to shape the postwar world and create precedents in international affairs. For example, a League resolution in 1920 created the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), or World Court, at The Hague in the Netherlands. With the World Court, nations now had an international judicial body that could resolve disputes. Although the PCIJ lacked jurisdictional and enforcement powers, it was a great step forward for the rule of international law.

The activities of the League of Nations also foreshadowed the decolonization efforts that occurred after the mid-20th century. Colonies taken from the Central Powers after their defeat in World War I were not distributed among the victors, which was the usual practice up to that time. Instead, the League held them under mandate and entrusted them to the former Allies to administer. The administrators were to send the League reports on the colonies and foster their movement toward independence.

The League of Nations also handled international crises. It passed motions that allowed minority groups to launch appeals through the PCIJ. It assisted in helping refugees in the postwar and post–Russian Revolution refugee crises, and it played a supporting role in the Corfu crisis of 1923, in which Italian troops occupied the Greek island of Corfu following the murder of an Italian general on Greek soil. The League also settled a territorial dispute between Sweden and Finland in 1920–21, and it later participated in financial bailouts for Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Greece.

The League represented several great innovations in international diplomacy. In Europe, the concert system had provided a forum for the great powers to discuss conflict, trade, and other matters. The League of Nations was an institutionalization of this system. The League was also the first intergovernmental organization with universal membership (however, although it included non-European countries, such as Japan, it excluded most of Africa and Asia). The League was also unique in that it was the first organization whose jurisdiction included most matters that affected international relations, rather

than only a select few issues. Likewise, it embraced liberal institutionalism rather than a realist balance of power. The League's underlying principle was that world opinion would buttress the organization: a new world peace would be born because no individual state would want to incur the anger of the others by acting aggressively.

LEAGUE FAILURES

Despite some successes, the League also encountered substantial failures, which led to its ultimate demise and replacement by the United Nations. It played only a minimal role in the Spanish civil war and failed to prevent or resolve that conflict. It failed to act on Japanese incursions into China in the 1930s, including the takeover of Manchuria in 1931 and the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932. It did speak out against Japanese aggression, but the Japanese withdrew from the League because they felt that their China policy was being slandered.

The League likewise took no action against Italian aggression in Ethiopia in 1935 (an issue that led to the Italian withdrawal from the organization). The League also did not respond to Hitler's takeover of the Sudetenland in 1939 or its absorption of Austria in 1938. (Germany had withdrawn from the League years before, but the League retained the right to act against nonmembers.) Ultimately, the League's commitment to organized peace failed, and the world was again plunged into global war with the outbreak of World War II. The failures to deter acts of aggression and conflict led to a breakdown in both the League's legitimacy and its effectiveness, and the organization became moribund after the beginning of World War II.

Historians and other scholars have cited many reasons for the failure of the League of Nations. Some argue that the League's covenant was embedded in the divisive Treaty of Versailles, which robbed it of legitimacy from the very start. Others blame the League's organizational structure, arguing that it was insufficiently robust and its enforcement provisions were too weak to allow the organization to react effectively to major crises. Still others say that the international system at the time was not developed enough to support an active League.

The League of Nations deteriorated slowly, operating in an insignificant way throughout World War II. After the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in late 1944, the acting secretary-general of the League was asked to transfer the organization's properties to the newly formed United Nations. The last formal meeting of the League of Nations was held in Geneva in April 1946.

See also United Nations

LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The effect of national-security laws and policies on the legal status and personal freedoms of Americans. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, significantly altered official American views on the balance between the rights of citizens and the responsibility of the government to safeguard the nation. The fact that a handful of largely untrained terrorists could cause so much destruction led the government to question the effectiveness of existing antiterror laws and procedures.

Changes in the laws since September 11 have expanded the ability of the federal government to gather information about possible terrorist activities and detain those suspected of being terrorists. However, many people feel that the new laws—in particular, the USA PATRIOT Act (2001)—give the federal government too much power to interfere in the lives of American citizens without adequately protecting their civil rights.

THE USA PATRIOT ACT

On October 26, 2001, President George W. Bush signed into law the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001—better known as the USA PATRIOT Act. The act changed a number of laws related to various areas of government activity, including criminal investigation procedures, wiretapping and electronic surveillance, computer fraud, money laundering, foreign intelligence, and immigration procedures. The PATRIOT Act and other new laws passed since the terrorist attacks of 2001 are intended to make it easier for the government to gather and act on intelligence about possible terrorist activities. They also give the government much more freedom to determine who is a terrorist and to suspend many of the constitutional freedoms for individuals accused of terrorism.

Some of the most controversial provisions of the act are those that significantly increase the government's

ability to obtain information about citizens without the need to obtain a warrant to do so. For example, prior to passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, government and law-enforcement agencies could wiretap a phone line or obtain certain personal information about an individual only as part of an investigation of a known crime.

Under the USA PATRIOT Act, however, such surveillance techniques can be used even when the government only suspects that an individual may be planning some terrorist activity. This includes searching legal records, as well as medical, financial, and e-mail records, and even records of books borrowed from public libraries. Another provision in the act allows officials to wiretap any phone a terrorist suspect might possibly use, rather than restricting them to tapping specific phone numbers.

The USA PATRIOT Act also makes it much easier for the government to detain and deport foreign citizens suspected of involvement with terrorism. Prior to passage of the act, the government had to file a formal criminal charge to detain an alien in the United States. Under the new law, foreign nationals can be detained without specific charges filed against them. The original version of the act also gave the government the right to hold suspected terrorists indefinitely without charges, but the period of detention was eventually shortened to seven days. The law also allows American citizens who are classified by the government as terrorists to be held indefinitely without charges or access to legal counsel.

REACTIONS TO THE PATRIOT ACT

Congress overwhelmingly approved passage of the USA PATRIOT Act when it was introduced. However, soon after passage of the act, a number of civil-rights groups and professional organizations began to express grave doubts about the new laws. For example, the American Library Association issued a statement saying that it considers warrantless searches of library records under the act to be a danger to the constitutional rights and privacy rights of library users. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has challenged several sections of the law in federal court.

In July 2003, Senators Lisa Murkowski of Alaska and Ron Wyden of Oregon introduced the Protecting the Rights of Individuals Act, which was intended to revise several provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act.

For example, under the USA PATRIOT Act, officials can track an individual's Internet use based merely on the claim that the information they gain will be useful to law enforcement.

The Protecting the Rights of Individuals Act requires that warrants issued to track Internet use be based on specific facts that provide reasonable evidence to indicate that crime has been, is being, or will be committed. In addition, the government must show that information likely to be obtained by such searches is relevant to the investigation of that crime.

In September 2003, Representative Dennis Kucinich, Democrat of Ohio, introduced a similar bill in the House of Representatives. The bill, the Benjamin Franklin True Patriot Act, calls for repeal of provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act that authorize warrantless library, medical, and financial record searches, and the detention and deportation of noncitizens without judicial review.

In 2004, federal courts declared several sections of the USA PATRIOT Act unconstitutional. These included Section 505, which allowed the government to obtain customer records from Internet service providers without first consulting a judge. Another provision that forbade individuals from offering expert advice and assistance to terrorist groups was struck down because the phrase "expert advice and assistance" was ruled to be too vague to allow the law to be enforced consistently. Legal challenges also have been mounted against several other provisions of the act, but few to date have been successful.

Reaction to the USA PATRIOT Act reflects two distinct attitudes toward national security. Some individuals believe that Americans must give up some of their civil rights in order to achieve security against terrorism. Others argue that giving up constitutional freedoms will not make the nation safer and instead represent a victory for terrorists. Balancing security and freedom has always been a difficult task, and the debate over the USA PATRIOT Act indicates that it remains a central issue in modern national-security policy.

—John Haley

See also National Security Strategy of the United States; National Security, U.S. Commission on

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LEMAY, CURTIS (1906–1990)

United States Air Force general, considered the father of the Strategic Air Command, who was responsible for changing the U.S. doctrine of high-altitude daylight precision bombing into strategic bombing. During World War II, LeMay commanded the air campaigns aimed at destroying Japan's economy through heavy nighttime and low-altitude bombing of factories, railroads, and cities.

Curtis Emerson LeMay was born in Columbus, Ohio, on November 15, 1906. Educated as a civil engineer, he joined the Air Corps in 1928. LeMay transferred in 1937 to bomber aircraft, where he demonstrated excellent abilities. In late 1942 he commanded the Third Bombardment Division, and in July 1944 he transferred to Pacific operations.

Promoted to major general, LeMay headed B-29 operations in the Pacific, including the massive incendiary attacks on more than 60 Japanese cities, including Tokyo. Although the Pacific campaign was successful, the decision to reverse three decades of U.S. airpower doctrine with incendiary attacks against Japanese civilians still raises questions of morality and legality.

After World War II, LeMay was transferred to the Department of Defense as deputy chief of air staff for research and development. In 1948 he headed operations for the Berlin Airlift after the Soviets blockaded the city. From 1949 to 1957, LeMay was in command of the Strategic Air Command, overseeing its transformation into a modern and efficient force. At the beginning, he demonstrated the Strategic Air Command's poor state of efficiency by a "bombing raid" on Dayton, Ohio, in which not a single aircraft carried out the mission as planned.

In July 1957, LeMay was appointed vice chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force; he was made chief of staff in 1961. A committed anticommunist, LeMay advocated a stronger engagement in Vietnam, often clashing with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and the "flexible response" strategy of Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman General Maxwell Taylor.

Although LeMay lost appropriation battles for new air weapons, such as the Skybolt missile and B-70 bombers, he successfully promoted strategic air campaigns over tactical strikes. During his command, the U.S. Air Force became disproportionately strong in strategic bombing operations. Carpet bombing of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia led to the deaths and maimings of hundreds of thousands of civilians. The massive bombing campaigns in Cambodia also turned the rural population of that country in favor of the communist Khmer Rouge.

LeMay retired in February 1965. He was selected as the vice presidential running mate for segregationist presidential candidate George Wallace in the 1968 election. LeMay died on October 3, 1990.

See also Carpet Bombing; Strategic Air Command; Strategic Bombing; Vietnam War

LEND-LEASE

Military and related economic aid extended to Great Britain and other allies in World War II as the United States eased out of its neutral posture in the conflict. A year before entering the war, the United States broke out of its neutrality in order to provide needed assistance to Great Britain, and later more than 40 other nations. After the reelection of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1940, the president was emboldened to appeal to the U.S. Congress for legislation authorizing the circumvention of elements of the Neutrality Act of 1939 and make American war materiel available to the Allies.

The Lend-Lease Act, passed by Congress on March 11, 1941, authorized the president to "sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend" any defense implement to any government considered vital to the defense of the United States. The act also provided for the use of U.S. shipyards by the same countries. The act should not be confused with an earlier, "destroyers for bases" deal (in September 1940), a violation of neutrality in which the United States provided 50 obsolete destroyers to the British Royal Navy in return for 99-year leases to British naval and air bases in the Western Hemisphere.

After passage of the Lend-Lease Act, President Roosevelt moved more aggressively to support the British by declaring the protection of sea lanes in the neutrality zone and the territory of Greenland a U.S. responsibility. Lend-lease was extended to the Soviet

Union on June 24, 1941, two days after the Nazi forces of German dictator Adolf Hitler had invaded that nation in violation of the German–Soviet nonaggression pact. Some 63% of the lend-lease program assisted the British Commonwealth, and 22% aided the Soviet Union.

The total amount of lend-lease during World War II approached $50 billion, and the ability of the United States to defer payment via gift, or to accept other compensation or exchange, also solved much of the problem of postwar debts. Lend-lease also provided a stimulus to the U.S. defense industry, already beginning to gear up for the war after the 1940 National Emergency legislation and various rearmament measures had begun.

The political ramifications of lend-lease were profound and remained the subject of vigorous debate, especially during the Cold War era. The safety of Great Britain in 1941 had been greatly assisted by the program, as British finances could no longer support the "cash and carry" concept enshrined in the 1939 Neutrality Act. However, Britain also incurred a heavy postwar debt, later adjusted to about $13 billion.

The case of the Soviet Union proved more problematic, because of false premises adopted by each side. The Soviet government limited the release of lend-lease information and did not acknowledge its details for decades. On the other hand, most materiel did not begin to arrive in the Soviet Union until 1942, and interruptions of the most direct convoy route, the dangerous Murmansk Run, continued throughout the war.

After the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942, the Soviets received more civilian-type supplies than military hardware under the lend-lease program. Essentially, the Soviets saved themselves in the decisive first year of the Russo-German War, while lend-lease supplies, when most plentiful, facilitated the vigorous counteroffensives of 1943–44, which shattered German hopes in the East. At the end of the war, the United States cut off lend-lease immediately and refused loans to the Soviet Union, a decision that contributed to the tensions leading to the Cold War.

See also Atlantic Charter; Cold War; Grand Strategy; Roosevelt, Franklin D., and National Policy; Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy; World War II

LEYTE GULF, BATTLE OF (1944)

The last major naval battle of World War II. The Battle of Leyte Gulf also qualifies as the largest naval battle

ever fought, although it can be broken into several independent engagements of the campaign to seize the island of Leyte as the first step in the recapture of the Philippines from the Japanese. This epic battle engaged some 200,000 men and 282 American, Japanese, and Australian ships over more than 100,000 square miles of sea.

Technically, the Battle of Leyte Gulf comprises four separate naval actions apart from the amphibious assault, which was relatively uneventful. The naval actions included the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea (October 24), the Battle of Surigao Strait (October 24–25), the Battle off Samar (October 25), and the Battle off Cape Engaño (October 25–26). Only when taken as a whole does the Leyte Gulf campaign exceed the Battle of Jutland (1916) as the greatest naval battle in history.

The Japanese detected the U.S. amphibious force approaching the island of Leyte in the Philippines on October 17. The Japanese responded by initiating Operation Sho-1, an all-out counterattack by all available fleet units. Four separate Japanese naval forces approached Leyte, one from the north and three from the west. The northern force—containing the only four Japanese aircraft carriers remaining in action, but now almost devoid of aircraft—approached the island of Luzon in order to draw the attention of the overwhelmingly superior U.S. carrier forces. The other three Japanese forces, which contained the last surface warships of the imperial navy, steamed toward Leyte, intending to arrive at Leyte Gulf through the San Bernardino and Surigao straits on October 25, with superior numbers to defeat the U.S. amphibious force.

United States air reconnaissance, however, detected all the Japanese groups with sufficient time to effect an all-day series of air strikes on the Japanese main force of battleships and cruisers crossing the Sibuyan Sea. The largest and most modern Japanese battleship was sunk, and several ships were damaged before the Japanese turned back to their base. However, after dark, this main force resumed course for the Leyte rendezvous.

Meanwhile, the two other Japanese surface forces approached the Surigao Strait and ran into a large and well-prepared Allied force of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo boats, which destroyed the Japanese in successive actions. As a result, no Japanese ship would enter Leyte Gulf from the south.

After striking the Japanese main force in the Sibuyan Sea, U.S. admiral William F. Halsey took his Third Fleet north to strike the Japanese carriers

force, leaving no units guarding San Bernardino Strait. The result was a curious and generally unsatisfactory end to an otherwise lopsided Allied victory. Halsey's fleet sank the Japanese carriers and closed in with surface ships for a final assault in the Battle off Cape Engaño.

At the same time, however, urgent messages filled the communications channels from three groups of U.S. small escort carriers stationed off the eastern coast of Samar Island to support the landings. The Japanese main force had reached this northern approach to Leyte Gulf with four battleships, six heavy cruisers, and a flotilla of destroyers, only a few hours from the clustered transport groups still unloading across the beaches of Leyte.

Halsey broke contact with the Japanese and rushed south, but the small carriers and their escorting destroyers saved the day, with a heroic fighting withdrawal that badly damaged the Japanese. The demoralized Japanese withdrew, losing only a single destroyer to Halsey as he rushed to the San Bernardino Strait too late to intercept. Ultimate victory was thus tinged with failure in this last battle. Nevertheless, it left the Japanese navy a mere shell of its prewar strength, its surviving ships fleeing to home ports or distant parts of the empire.

See also Amphibious Warfare; U.S. Army; U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Navy; World War II

LIBYA BOMBING (1986)

United States air strikes in 1986 on selected targets in Libya, launched in retaliation for that country's perceived terrorist activities. Ten days before the U.S. attacks on Libya in April 1986, a terrorist bomb exploded in a discotheque in West Berlin frequented by U.S. soldiers. Two hundred people were injured, and two U.S. Army personnel were killed. Based on a series of Libyan messages intercepted by U.S. intelligence, President Ronald Reagan blamed Libyan agents in East Berlin for the explosion, and he approved a retaliatory military action. On the night of April 15, 1986, the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi were bombed by U.S. aircraft.

THE AIR STRIKES

Approximately 100 American planes, some belonging to the U.S. Air Force and some to the U.S. Navy, played an active part in the air strikes against Libya. A part of this impressive air fleet was launched from carriers in the Mediterranean Sea, whereas other aircraft left hours before the raid from bases in England. The actual bombing lasted less than 12 minutes, during which more than 60 tons of munitions were dropped on Libya's capital, Tripoli, and its second-largest city, Benghazi.

The bombs were directed at five specific targets, all military in nature. In addition to targeting housing units of the Libyan army, several of the targeted areas were identified by U.S. intelligence as command centers for Libyan-coordinated international terrorism operations. The Libyan dictator, Colonel Mu'ammar Gadhafi, also lived with his family within the confines of one of the targeted military barracks.

EFFECTS OF THE BOMBING

Dubbed "Operation El Dorado Canyon," the air raid took the Libyan military completely by surprise. No effective measures had been taken to guard sensitive targets in Libya against a probable U.S. attack. No air raid alarms sounded at the time of the strikes, and the air defense systems of Tripoli and Benghazi were activated only after the U.S. fighter jets had completed their bombing runs.

Although focused on very specific targets, the missiles were not 100% accurate, and the mission caused the death of an estimated 30 civilian Libyans, including Gadhafi's adopted infant daughter. The colonel himself escaped unharmed, however. On the U.S. side, two pilots were killed when their fighter was downed over the Gulf of Sidra, east of Tripoli.

The U.S. air raid drew heavy criticism from all of the Arab countries, as well as the Soviet Union, France, and a number of other nations. From a historical viewpoint, Operation El Dorado Canyon was considered to be the first U.S. military action whose official primary justification was the fight against international terrorism and its sponsors.

See also Middle East and U.S. Policy; Preemption; Terrorism, War on International

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LIMITED NUCLEAR OPTION

Military strategy of the Cold War era that envisioned a direct confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers that did not necessarily end in massive destruction and the loss of millions of lives on both sides. The limited nuclear option (LNO) approach would allow a country's military commanders to shift the targeting of nuclear missiles from enemy cities to enemy army installations, thereby conducting a more limited war. It was argued that such a restrained conflict would be unlikely to escalate, with the belligerents maintaining open lines of communication at all times.

LIMITED WAR

The LNO strategy grew out of the concept of a limited war, which acquired widespread currency in U.S. political and military circles in the late 1950s. Limited war meant that the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union could be perceived as something other than a zero-sum game. In other words, the two countries could face each other on the battlefield—as many feared they inevitably would—without unleashing a nuclear Armageddon that would make a final victory largely irrelevant.

Political theorists such as Basil Liddell Hart, Robert Osgood, and Henry Kissinger claimed that an all-out war could not be used all that effectively even as just a threat. The Soviets were fully aware that no U.S. president could easily make a decision to drop a nuclear bomb on a heavily populated area simply because of communist provocations. It would serve U.S. interests better, it was argued, if its nuclear strategy allowed for a series of attack options that would constitute a credible threat to the Soviets yet also allow the two sides to fight a limited war, if it ever came to that.

OFFICIAL DOCTRINE

In January 1974, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger (in the administration of President Richard Nixon) publicly announced that U.S. nuclear doctrine had ceased to abide by the concept of assured destruction (in which a first strike by the Soviets would be met with a catastrophic nuclear counterattack). Instead, the country would adopt a "limited nuclear options" approach. The shift in policy was presented as a serious effort to ensure that a conflict between the two superpowers would not end up destroying the entire planet.

Critics, however, were quick to point out that the policy of assured destruction had made a nuclear strike into a taboo—a transformation that had now been reversed. It was now permissible, critics argued, for the superpowers to use small nuclear bombs in regions other than their own (such as in Western Europe). If one country did not expect a disastrous response from the enemy, both were then free to wage "little wars" that might not directly affect U.S. or Soviet civilians but would have a terrible impact on other populations. In spite of such pessimistic assessments, the Cold War eventually came to an end in the early 1990s, without the need for a nuclear war—either limited or total—to designate a victor.

See also Cold War; First Strike; Flexible Deterrent Options

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LIMITED STRIKE
See LIMITED NUCLEAR OPTION

LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY (1963)

Treaty that prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space. The treaty, formally known as the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, was signed in Moscow in July 1963, after six years of difficult negotiations and volatile U.S.–Soviet relations.

Concerns about the dangers of radioactive fallout had brought the first public demands for a nuclear test ban in the United States in 1954–55. As protests intensified, the government was pressured to respond. Although President Dwight D. Eisenhower had come to office with the desire to slow the pace of the nuclear arms race, he did not support a test ban until 1957. His

concerns about weapons testing were twofold: the economic cost of the escalating arms race and the health dangers of radioactive fallout. As early as 1956, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain had agreed that it was to their mutual benefit to ban atmospheric testing.

Test-ban negotiations among the three nations began in October 1958 in Geneva, Switzerland. In March of that year, the Soviets had initiated a moratorium on all nuclear-weapon testing. Although both the United States and the Soviet Union had tested weapons in 1957, the United States and Great Britain joined the moratorium.

The negotiations faltered on the issue of verification. The United States insisted that inspection procedures be instituted so that representatives of the participating nations could verify that the terms of the treaty were being upheld. The Soviet Union refused verification procedures, however, on the basis that inspections would encourage espionage. Although the negotiations continued, little progress was made.

In May 1960, the Soviet Union shot down an American U2 spy plane that was flying over Soviet territory, confirming its claim that it needed protection from U.S. espionage. As a result, the negotiations deteriorated further. Following the Berlin Wall crisis in August 1961, the hopes for a treaty diminished even more when the Soviet Union discontinued its moratorium and conducted nuclear tests in the atmosphere in September. Then, in January 1962, when the Soviets proposed a treaty without verification, the talks came to an impasse and did not reconvene at that time.

In the fall of 1961, President John F. Kennedy resumed U.S. underground testing of nuclear weapons, and in April 1962, atmospheric testing was resumed. However, the seriousness of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, which brought the United States and the Soviet Union close to nuclear war, changed the climate of the negotiations. Both nations were now more amenable to creating a treaty, although the Soviets still balked on the issue of verification.

In February 1963, the United States agreed to scale down its demands for verification, and in July the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain convened for talks in Moscow. Kennedy sent former U.S. ambassador Averell Harriman to the Soviet Union to speed the treaty to a conclusion.

When it became clear that agreement on a comprehensive, or total, test ban was not possible, negotiators moved toward a limited test ban that would enable each nation to conduct underground tests. On July 25, all parties agreed, and on August 5, 1963, the treaty was signed in Moscow. The United States Senate ratified the limited test ban treaty on September 24, 1963, and the provisions went into effect on October 19. Since then, more than 115 nations have signed the limited test ban agreement.

Although the limited test ban treaty eliminated the threat of nuclear fallout, it did not slacken the pace of the nuclear arms race. Following the treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union utilized underground testing to increase their testing programs.

See also Arms Control; Arms Race; Cuban Missile Crisis; Kennedy, John F., and National Policy; Nuclear Weapons; U2 Spy Plane Incident

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LINDH, JOHN WALKER (1981–)

A U.S. youth who, during the War in Afghanistan in 2001, joined the Taliban in its fight against the United States. Most Americans were baffled by the revelation of Lindh's journey from an average middle-class upbringing in California to militant Islamic fundamentalism.

Born in 1981, the son of a corporate lawyer and a commercial photographer, John Walker Lindh grew up in a suburb in northern California. Little distinguished him from other teenagers until, at age 16, he apparently was inspired to convert to Islam by the autobiography of Black Muslim leader Malcolm X and by Muslim Web sites. Adopting the name Suleyman, Lindh began to attend a mosque and to wear a long white robe and a turban.

In 1998, Lindh traveled to Yemen to study the Arabic dialect used in the Koran. He later enrolled at a *madrassa,* or religious school, in Pakistan. In May 2001, Lindh joined a paramilitary training camp organized by Kashmiri extremists in Pakistan, who wanted a separate Muslim state in the Indian region

of Kashmir. During the seven-week training, Lindh learned to use maps, weapons, and explosives. He also met with al-Qaeda terrorist leader Osama bin Laden and pledged to wage jihad, or holy war, against those identified by al-Qaeda as supposed infidels.

In late November 2001, two months after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, pro-U.S. Northern Alliance forces captured Lindh after the suppression of a prison mutiny near the Afghan town of Mazar-i-Sharif. He was among a group of Taliban who supported al-Qaeda terrorists. Wounded by a bullet in the right thigh, Lindh had been hiding for a week in the basement of a prison fortress as the United States waged war in Afghanistan against the Taliban.

Northern Alliance forces flooded the basement of the prison, prompting Lindh and other survivors to emerge and surrender. Lindh was handed over to CIA operatives, who initially refused him a lawyer and allegedly mistreated him during an interrogation to obtain intelligence about bin Laden's whereabouts. Lindh was later taken to the United States, where he was officially charged with conspiring to kill U.S. citizens and aiding al-Qaeda.

In July 2002, Lindh's lawyers reached a plea bargain with federal prosecutors. Lindh agreed to plead guilty to reduced charges and to drop claims that U.S. personnel had tortured him. A few months later, in October 2002, Lindh was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Dubbed "the American Taliban," Lindh baffled the U.S. public with his unlikely conversion to militant Islam. His case also foreshadowed problems in the legal prosecution of U.S. citizens and others in the war against terrorism.

See also Afghanistan, War in; Al-Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Islamic Fundamentalism; Taliban

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCES (1909, 1930)

Held in London, two international conferences that were noteworthy attempts at disarmament and arms control in the early 20th century. The major naval powers of the world—eight European nations plus the United States and Japan—sent representatives to the first London Conference, held December 4, 1908,

through February 26, 1909. The resulting agreement, known as the Declaration of London, largely collected already-existing international maritime law. However, not all of the signatories' governments ratified the agreement, negating its validity. During the early years of World War II, the still-neutral United States vainly pushed for adherence to the Declaration of London, which had provided solid protection for neutral vessels.

The second London Conference, held from January 21 to April 22, 1930, attempted to fill in the gaps recognized in agreements made during the postwar naval disarmament conference that had taken place in Washington, DC, in 1921–22. At that time, five naval powers—Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy—had agreed on a tonnage ratio, a ban on building new warships for a decade, and the destruction of 66 ships. However, some types of vessels, including light cruisers, remained outside the Washington provisions, leading to a continuation of the arms race.

At the 1930 London conference, the attendees (France and Italy were not signatories) pushed through a number of changes, including a readjustment of the battleship tonnage ratio among Great Britain, the United States, and Japan (from a ratio of 5:5:3 to 10:10:7). The participants also agreed to stop any major ship construction for five years; to institute limitations on total tonnage and armament for cruisers, destroyers, and submarines; to increase controls on submarine warfare; and to keep past restrictions on aircraft carriers in effect.

Incidents in the Pacific prompted another London Conference in 1935–36, but the talks led nowhere. In fact, Japan withdrew from earlier agreements after unsuccessfully pushing for parity in naval power with the United States and Britain. The other powers ended up initialing a weak agreement on tonnage, but within a few years, all five naval powers were constructing ships in violation of earlier disarmament agreements.

LOOSE NUKES

Nuclear weapons or materials that are missing or in the possession of unauthorized persons. Since the beginning of the atomic age, one of the challenges facing nuclear powers has been safeguarding their nuclear weapons and the materials needed to produce

them. Despite elaborate precautions, however, the threat of loose nukes ending up in the hands of rogue states or terrorist groups is a serious concern.

The threat of large-scale theft of nuclear materials increased significantly following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. During the Cold War, certain Soviet cities were chosen as sites for nuclear weapons production. These cities, closed to the outside world and focused solely on weapons production, were heavily subsidized by the state. For years they were some of the most prosperous areas in the Soviet Union.

With the demise of the USSR and the drying up of funds for nuclear weapons programs, most of these cities fell into dire poverty. In some cases, the desperate scientists who lived and worked in these cities turned to the illicit sale of nuclear materials to raise money. Although Russian authorities insist that their 30,000 nuclear warheads have remained under control at all times, much fissile material (radioactive elements used in nuclear weapons) from the former Soviet Union is unaccounted for.

Several former Soviet republics have had serious problems protecting stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium once used in nuclear weapons production. These materials were stored at more than 100 sites, some of which were almost completely unsecured by 1991. Upon the outbreak of the 1992 civil war in the former republic of Georgia, scientists armed with only sticks and rakes took turns guarding one facility. In 1997, Russian officials discovered that about 2 kg (4 to 5 lb) of highly enriched uranium had disappeared from another research center in the Georgian province of Abkhazia.

The incident in Abkhazia is so far the only recorded case of loose nukes, but there have been many more significant efforts to traffic in fissile material in the former Soviet Union. Most of those occurred in the early to mid-1990s. Since 1991, the United States has worked with Russia to safeguard its nuclear weapons and material. The United States has provided security equipment, helped to build storage facilities for fissile material, and paid to dismantle some 5,000 Soviet nuclear warheads. It has also tried to address the issue of weapons scientists being tempted by financial difficulties to sell nuclear materials, by establishing science and technology centers to provide civilian research opportunities. A 2001 study by the U.S. Department of Energy, however, found that these programs needed to be broadened in scope and more heavily funded.

Perhaps the greatest fear for U.S. officials is the possibility of a terrorist group obtaining enough nuclear material to build a "dirty bomb" or even a nuclear weapon. In the early 1990s, al-Qaeda supposedly searched the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan for fissile material. Because Kazakhstan has a substantial Muslim population, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden believed the country might be an ideal place to obtain loose nukes. In the end, the terrorist group failed to locate any fissile material. However, it apparently did not give up its search. On one occasion al-Qaeda operatives purchased what they were told was *red mercury,* supposedly a radioactive material suitable for weapons. It turned out that the material was nothing more than useless radioactive waste.

These incidents show that terrorist groups are actively pursuing the acquisition of nuclear material and that there seem to be many potential sources. The former Soviet republics in Central Asia are not only close to al-Qaeda's bases in Afghanistan but, like Kazakhstan, are also heavily populated by Muslims. Some of them are also ruled by autocratic regimes that may be willing to deal with groups such as al-Qaeda. These conditions make the region a prime source of concern for U.S. national-security planners.

See also Dirty Bomb; Nuclear Weapons; Terrorism, War on International

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LOS ALAMOS

Site of the laboratory that produced the first atomic bombs used during World War II and home of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the primary nuclear weapons research facility in the United States.

In 1942, General Leslie Groves, commander of the Manhattan Project (code name for the U.S. mission to produce an atomic bomb), was searching for a secure site for the bomb laboratory. The location needed to be safe from enemy attack, isolated because of the

project's top-secret status, and thinly populated in the event of a nuclear accident.

Several sites in the interior western United States were considered, but it was not until J. Robert Oppenheimer, the scientific director of the bomb laboratory, suggested Los Alamos, New Mexico, that the site was chosen. The site fulfilled the selection criteria, and Oppenheimer also was keen to locate the bomb production facility at Los Alamos, a secluded mesa in the hills 35 miles northwest of Santa Fe, New Mexico, because of its natural beauty. He had enjoyed summers in Los Alamos as a youth and believed the beautiful location would help the weapons team endure the arduous challenge ahead.

In April 1943, the scientists and engineers involved in the Manhattan Project began arriving at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, as it was then called. At its peak of production, in 1945, more than 5,000 scientists, engineers, technicians, and their families lived on the site.

On July 16, 1945, the Manhattan Project achieved its wartime mission with the detonation of a plutonium bomb at the Trinity test site at Alamogordo, New Mexico. The project's other two bombs were dropped on Japan the following month—a uranium bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima on August 6 and another plutonium bomb on the city of Nagasaki on August 9.

Following the Japanese surrender on August 14 and the conclusion of World War II, the manufacture of atomic bombs continued at Los Alamos. However, after the radiation deaths of two scientists in two separate accidents at Los Alamos in 1945 and 1946, the U.S. nuclear weapons program developed new safety guidelines that were rigidly enforced.

In the late 1940s and 1950s, the renamed Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) remained a prime U.S. nuclear weapons design post, although it shared top billing in the 1950s with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California.

Arms-reduction treaties in the 1970s and 1990s, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War in 1991 resulted in a diminished U.S. demand for nuclear weapons production. As a result, LANL, although still the chief nuclear weapons laboratory in the United States, shifted gears to become one of the largest scientific research sites in the world.

Today, LANL does not confine itself to nuclear physics. It has sponsored research in robotics and the AIDS virus and has cooperated on astrophysics projects with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). It has also studied data from U.S. spy satellite images to detect evidence of nuclear weapons testing around the world.

Among LANL's biggest challenges in the 1990s and 2000s has been its research designed to ensure the viability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Because the nation's nuclear weapons are aging and, in some cases, deteriorating, scrupulous technical vigilance is necessary to guarantee that the United States does not suffer from a diminished nuclear capacity.

See also Atomic Bomb; Manhattan Project; Nuclear Weapons; Oppenheimer, J. Robert

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LUGAR, RICHARD (1932–)

United States senator well known for his authorship of far-reaching foreign policy and agriculture legislature. A member of the Senate since 1976, Richard Lugar is one of the most experienced and respected contemporary U.S. statesmen. His most significant professional achievement remains the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, whose purpose is to help decommission Russia's poorly guarded nuclear, biological, and chemical arsenal.

AN IMPRESSIVE CAREER

Richard Lugar was born in 1932 in Indianapolis. After attending the city's public school system, he entered Denison University in Ohio, from which he received a degree in 1954. He then attended Oxford University in England as a Rhodes scholar, graduating in 1956.

Straight out of school, Lugar volunteered for the U.S. Army and began serving as an officer and, later, as an intelligence briefer for the chief of naval operations. Upon his return to Indianapolis in 1960, Lugar took up the family's food machinery manufacturing business together with his brother. Seven years later, he was elected mayor of Indianapolis, later winning a second term.

In 1974, Lugar ran a failed campaign for the U.S. Senate, representing the Republican Party. He later won election to the Senate in 1976. Since then, Lugar has been reelected four times (in 1982, 1988, 1994, and 2000). Lugar is the longest-serving senator in Indiana history. He is now serving as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and is a member (and former chairman) of the Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee.

SWORDS INTO PLOUGHSHARES

The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, sponsored by Lugar and Georgia senator Sam Nunn and enacted in 1991, has been hailed as one of the most important disarmament-related pieces of legislature signed and implemented after the end of the Cold War. To date, the Nunn-Lugar program has been directly responsible for the deactivation or destruction of more than 6,000 Russian nuclear warheads, 128 bombers, and 27 nuclear submarines.

The program has also been instrumental in denuclearizing the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which, after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, had become the third-, fourth-, and eighth-largest nuclear powers in the world. The number of nuclear warheads destroyed in these three countries surpasses the number of warheads currently owned by Great Britain, France, and China combined.

Since the Nunn-Lugar program became operational in 1991, it has occasionally faced two kinds of obstacles—Russian reluctance to permit access to selected nuclear facilities, and criticism in the United States about the funds that it receives from the Department of Defense. Senator Lugar remains in constant communication with Russian authorities and has been able to show his U.S. critics that the program is costing the United States much less than 1% of its annual defense budget.

In 2003, Congress approved legislation extending the Nunn-Lugar project to regions outside the former Soviet Union. Thanks to the program, as well as to numerous other pieces of legislation (in the fields of agriculture, the environment, and science), Senator Lugar is seen as a major figure of contemporary U.S. government.

See also Disarmament; Non- and Counter-Proliferation; Nunn, Sam

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MACARTHUR, DOUGLAS (1880–1964)

General of the Army and Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific during World War II, military strategist, and liberator of the Philippines. Douglas MacArthur was born on January 26, 1880, in Little Rock, Arkansas. He was the son of General Arthur MacArthur, a Civil War hero, and Mary Pinkney Hardy MacArthur, the daughter of a privileged southern family.

Douglas MacArthur grew up on various western military outposts. He was commissioned a lieutenant in the U.S. Army after graduating at the top of his class at West Point in 1903. From 1906 to 1907, he was an aide to U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt, who was a friend of MacArthur's father. Near the end of World War I, MacArthur became commander of the famed 42nd (Rainbow) Division. In 1919, he was appointed superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, later serving two tours of duty in the Philippines and Japan in the 1920s. He returned to the United States in 1925.

MacArthur became Army Chief of Staff in 1930, serving until 1935. His tenure as chief of staff was marked by a struggle to keep the service intact during a period of nationwide economic decline. Among his accomplishments were the development of plans for industrial mobilization, establishment of an Air Force headquarters, and oversight of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC).

In 1935, MacArthur was promoted to major general and became a military adviser to the Philippine government. He retired from active service in 1937, but continued as an adviser to the Philippine government. However, MacArthur was recalled to active duty in July 1941, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointed him commander of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East.

Following the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor, MacArthur was charged with the defense of the Philippines. After the Philippines fell, he was stationed briefly in Australia. Shortly thereafter, MacArthur was appointed Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific. A master strategist, MacArthur broke with the Navy's war plan, attacking Japan via New Guinea and the Philippines.

Making good on his famous "I shall return" promise, MacArthur waded ashore at Leyte Island in the Philippines on Oct. 30, 1944, and proclaimed, "I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God, our forces stand again on Philippine soil."

MacArthur was promoted to the newly created rank of General of the Army in December 1944 and received an unprecedented fifth star. He accepted the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945. As supreme commander of the Allied powers, MacArthur oversaw the disarmament, occupation, and economic reconstruction of Japan from 1945 to 1950. He was seriously considered as the Republican presidential candidate in 1948, but a poor showing in the Wisconsin primary discouraged his supporters.

Following the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in June 1950, MacArthur became supreme commander of U.S. and UN troops there. After driving the North Koreans back over the 38th parallel, MacArthur received permission from President Harry

S. Truman to invade North Korea, despite warnings that such an act might provoke the Chinese.

MacArthur engineered a successful amphibious landing at Inchon in September 1950 and drove the North Koreans back to the Yalu River, the border between North Korea and China. When Red Chinese forces began to pour across the river to aid the North Koreans, MacArthur ordered the Chinese to retreat, threatening to bomb Yalu River bridges.

MacArthur petitioned President Truman for permission to bomb Chinese bases in Manchuria, but President Truman and U.S. supporters in the United Nations warned against expanding the conflict into China, despite MacArthur's repeated public calls to attack selected targets within China. After the recapture of the Korean city of Seoul in March 1951, MacArthur was removed from command and ordered to return to the United States—where he received a hero's welcome and delivered a speech to Congress.

General Douglas MacArthur going ashore from the USS *Nashville* on October 21, 1944, shortly after the invasion of the Philippines during World War II. It was from this cruiser that MacArthur witnessed the invasion of the Philippines by the U.S. Sixth Army, which he commanded. MacArthur, one of the most brilliant and controversial American military leaders, played an important role in the victory over Japan.

Source: Corbis.

MacArthur was drawn into presidential politics in 1952, when presidential hopeful Senator Robert A. Taft enlisted the general's support to thwart General Dwight D. Eisenhower's bid for the Republican nomination. MacArthur retired from public life soon thereafter. He died on April 5, 1964.

Arrogant and controversial, MacArthur is remembered as a brilliant military strategist, whose amphibious campaigns were noteworthy for their low casualty rates. He was a leader who believed in meticulous planning and safeguarding his men.

See also Korean War; Truman, Harry S., and National Policy; World War II

MACHIAVELLI, NICCOLÒ (1469–1527)

Political philosopher, author, and noted statesman during the Italian Renaissance. Thought to be the father of modern political science, Niccolò Machiavelli was born in Florence to a poor but distinguished family. He was educated in the tradition of the Greek and Roman writers, as was the custom of the time. Machiavelli's father, a lawyer, also made sure his son received extensive training in the humanities.

Machiavelli became a political official of the Florentine Republic in 1498 at the age of 29 and was sent on sensitive diplomatic missions throughout Italy, France, and Germany. He was named defense secretary in 1506, replacing mercenaries with a citizen's militia. Machiavelli believed mercenaries had diminished Italy's military power. He was a keen observer of some of the most powerful people of his day: Cesare Borgia, Louis XII of France, Pope Julius II, the Medicis, and Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I.

When the Medicis returned to power in 1512, Machiavelli was deprived of his position and was briefly imprisoned for complicity in an alleged plot against them. Upon his release, he moved to his country estate where he wrote his chief works: *The Prince*

(1513), *The Discourses on Livy* (1516–1519), *The Art of War* (1520), and *The History of Florence* (1521–1525). He also authored several plays, poems, and stories.

His most famous work, *The Prince* (*Il Principe*) describes the means by which a prince, modeled on Cesare Borgia, can ruthlessly acquire and maintain power. It contains maxims and a theory of government that continued to influence political thinkers for centuries. *The Art of War*, although less well-known than *The Prince*, shows a clear appreciation of moral factors in warfare and attempts to define a system of strategy. Machiavelli is the first modern strategic theorist.

In November 1520, Machiavelli was made official historian of Florence by Cardinal Giulio de Medici and served in several government posts. He accompanied the Papal army in 1526, but returned to Florence following the sack of Rome in 1527.

He died in Florence on June 21, 1527, after failing to obtain a position in the republican government that replaced the Medicis. The adjective *Machiavellian* is a synonym for amoral cunning and for the justification of the use of power.

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MAJOR THEATER WARS

Strategic planning related to large-scale military operations. The planning and development of military force structure in the United States is a reflection of two main streams of thought. The first is the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a periodic Department of Defense (DoD) report that analyzes force-planning requirements and recommends changes to structure and force size. The other is the prevailing opinion of the current presidential administration's strategic thinkers. Among the main planning considerations are the character of the adversary, the environment a war could be fought in, and the technology required to defeat the enemy. Major Theater War planning stipulates the need for significant troop size.

Contemporary thinking on force planning has centered on a two–Major Theater War capability. The two–Major Theater War scenario sets certain guidelines to address adequately the requirements of fighting two wars simultaneously. This approach to military planning existed largely unchallenged until recently. However, critics argue that the two-war standard does not accurately prepare the U.S. military for today's evolving challenges, such as the threat of international terrorism or the proliferation of small-scale conflicts around the world. Critics have argued that today's military has to be prepared not only to fight a two Major Theater War scenario but also to respond to peacekeeping and humanitarian affairs missions throughout the world.

See also Doctrine; Military Doctrine

MANHATTAN PROJECT (1942–1945)

Code name of the U.S. military–civilian mission to produce an atomic bomb during World War II. The top-secret Manhattan Project involved the labor of 125,000 people and cost the United States about $2.2 billion.

In August 1939, on the eve of World War II, U.S. and British physicists had evidence that the energy released from nuclear fission could be used to produce explosive weapons. That same year, physicists Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard, immigrants to the United States from Europe, informed President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the military possibilities of nuclear fission.

In October 1941, when President Roosevelt ordered the U.S. government to fund atomic bomb research, the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was two months in the future. Roosevelt approved the funding while under the assumption that such weapons were needed to compete with the Nazis, whom intelligence sources indicated were well on the way to creating their own atomic weapons.

The attack on Pearl Harbor and the U.S. entry into World War II accelerated U.S. plans to proceed with atomic weapon production. The *Manhattan Project*, or *Manhattan Engineer District*, was officially instituted in June 1942 under the jurisdiction of the Army Corps of Engineers. In September of that year, U.S. General Leslie Groves became the director of the Manhattan Project. His first task was to order the construction of sites for the manufacture of uranium and plutonium for the bombs. In 1943, uranium production

was scheduled to begin in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and plutonium production in Hanford, Washington. In December 1942, Italian physicist Enrico Fermi and his colleagues produced the first nuclear chain reaction at the University of Chicago, a development that was essential to the manufacture of an atomic bomb.

Theoretical physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer was appointed to direct the actual bomb laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico. In 1943, 100 of the best minds in physics and engineering in the United States were recruited and gathered under the strictest secrecy to create the atomic bomb, then nicknamed "the gadget." In the months to come, thousands more scientists, engineers, technicians, workers, and their families would arrive in Los Alamos, a secluded mesa north of Santa Fe, New Mexico. In all, some 5,000 men and women worked at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory during World War II.

At first, the scientists were oriented toward constructing what were called *gun-type* bombs, in which fissile material was shot together to create the necessary chain reaction. The scientists faced a setback, however, when they learned that the gun method would work only for a uranium bomb. The scientists wanted to try using implosion for the plutonium bomb, in which nuclear material is compressed inward to create a nuclear explosion. Only after months of experimentation and struggle were Los Alamos scientists and engineers able to create the implosion weapon. Although they were certain that the uranium gun-type bomb (nicknamed "Little Man") would explode successfully without being tested, the implosion plutonium bomb (nicknamed "Fat Boy") required a dry run.

Shortly after dawn on July 16, 1945, the implosion bomb was successfully detonated at the Trinity test site, located in an area known as *Jornada del Muerto* (Journey of Death) in Alamogordo, New Mexico. The bomb proved to be equivalent to 21,000 pounds of explosives. President Harry S. Truman received the news that the Trinity test was a success while at the Potsdam Conference in Germany. After conferring with military leaders, he ordered the uranium bomb to be dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6, 1945, and the second plutonium bomb to be dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945.

Although the official mission of the Manhattan Project was completed, the Los Alamos laboratory produced two more nuclear bombs after World War II (in July 1946) for testing at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands of the central Pacific. These tests, dubbed Operation Crossroads, were the Manhattan Project's final acts. The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory was turned over to the newly formed Atomic Energy Commission on January 1, 1947. It was decided that the renamed Los Alamos National Laboratory would continue to conduct nuclear weapons research.

In addition to introducing the nuclear age, the Manhattan Project was significant for its successful collaboration between civilian scientists and the military, a continuing cooperation that proved crucial to the future of the development of nuclear weapons in the United States.

See also Arms Race; Atomic Bomb; Bikini Atoll; Hiroshima; Los Alamos; Nagasaki; Nuclear Weapons

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MANIFEST DESTINY

Term expressing the idea that the United States was destined to expand across the North American continent. First employed by journalist John Louis O'Sullivan in 1845 to justify the annexation of Texas, it later encompassed the entire westward expansion of the United States.

For individuals such as John O'Sullivan, the idea of Manifest Destiny embodied cherished beliefs about America's future. It expressed the feeling that American democracy was the greatest institution in the world. Consequently, many Americans felt it was their preordained mission to spread democracy across the globe. To those who believed firmly in Manifest Destiny, U.S. expansion across the continent was the crucial first stage of this mission.

The beliefs that Manifest Destiny encompassed had permeated the public dialogue for generations. In 1631, the Puritan settler John Winthrop described the Massachusetts Bay colony as a "shining city upon a hill," an example for other nations to emulate. The colonies' victory over the British in the American Revolution, the incorporation of the original 13 states,

and the ratification of the U.S. Constitution strengthened this sentiment. As the U.S. population and economy exploded during the 19th century, Americans viewed westward expansion as a necessary continuation of the nation's growth.

Three key events confirmed this view. First, Thomas Jefferson orchestrated the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. The acquisition of the entire Mississippi River valley from France doubled the size of the United States and provided an extremely fertile region to fuel the fledgling nation's development. The purchase also established a precedent for acquiring land across the North American continent. Second, the War of 1812, although a stalemate at best for the United States, showed that the United States was a viable nation. Finally, General Andrew Jackson forcefully occupied Spanish-controlled Florida in 1819. Spain, unable to defend its colony, ceded control of Florida to the United States in the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819.

Ultimately, however, two confrontations during the 1840s embodied the concept of Manifest Destiny. The first erupted in the Oregon Territory. Since 1818, the United States and Great Britain jointly occupied the territory but recognized the 49th parallel as the border between Canada and the United States. In 1844, however, proponents of expansion argued that U.S. territory extended up to the 54th parallel. The heavy influx of American settlers along the Oregon Trail exacerbated the situation and threatened another conflict with Britain. War was avoided, however, when anti-colonialists in the British Parliament and members of the Whig party in the U.S. Congress demanded a peaceful settlement to the dispute. The joint occupation was ended, the original border at the 49th parallel was accepted, and the Oregon Territory became part of the United States.

The period's second confrontation was not peacefully resolved. The Republic of Texas won its independence from Mexico in 1836, but the Mexican government still claimed Texas as part of its territory. Thus, when outgoing president John Tyler signed an 1844 resolution offering statehood to Texas, the Mexican government publicly objected to the annexation of the region by the United States.

In 1845, James Polk assumed the presidency. Polk, an ardent expansionist, was determined to annex Texas and acquire all the Mexican territory extending from the Southwest to the Pacific Ocean. In early 1846, Polk sent an army into Mexico, hoping to provoke a Mexican attack. His ploy eventually succeeded, and the resulting conflict ended with the capture of Mexico City by U.S. forces under General Winfield Scott in 1847. The following year, the two nations signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in which the United States gained the desired territories and paid Mexico some $18 million in war damages.

The victory over Mexico marked the zenith of U.S. claims of its Manifest Destiny. By 1848, the United States had rapidly expanded and now stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the 49th parallel in the north to the Rio Grande in the south. This expansion, however, exacted a heavy price. The nation instigated a dubious war with Mexico and displaced thousands of Native Americans as it pushed relentlessly westward. In addition, the acquisitions heightened the tensions caused by slavery, as abolitionists and slaveholders debated whether the new territories would permit or ban slavery. These tensions exploded a decade later with the commencement of the Civil War.

The concept of Manifest Destiny has often been resurrected in the United States. For example, it served as an essential reason for preserving the Union during the Civil War. It has been invoked to justify U.S. involvement in conflicts ranging from the Spanish-American War to World War II to Vietnam. Echoes of John O'Sullivan's original beliefs still can be heard in the latest ambition of the United States to promote democracy in turbulent regions of the world, such as the Middle East, Africa, and central Asia.

See also Imperialism; Propaganda

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MANPOWER PLANNING
See Officer of Personnel Policy

MAO ZEDONG (1893–1976)

Chinese leader who climbed to the head of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and controlled the People's Republic of China (PRC) from 1949 until his death in 1976.

The implacable U.S. hostility toward communism, as well as U.S. support for the nationalist Chinese state of Taiwan (the Republic of China, the ROC), made Mao a bitter foe of the United States. After Mao took power in 1949, the United States broke off diplomatic relations with China. The two nations did not recognize one another diplomatically until U.S. president Richard Nixon reestablished relations in 1971.

EARLY LIFE AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Mao Zedong was born on December 26, 1893, in the village of Shaoshan in China's Hunan Province. His father was born a peasant, but he used his meager savings to establish a loan business and to purchase a small farm. His father expected Mao to tend the farm and did not allow his son to receive an education. But at the age of 15, Mao fled the farm, attended primary school for one year, and then transferred to a middle school. During this period, Mao developed his permanent enmity for intellectuals and embraced the peasant class as the foundation of Chinese society.

In 1911, Mao joined the revolution that overthrew the Manchu dynasty, China's last ruling dynasty. However, when renegade generals seized control of the revolutionary movement, Mao abandoned it and enrolled in a teacher training school. As a teacher, Mao demonstrated his burgeoning affinity for communism by organizing a local branch of the Socialist Youth League and joining other Marxist societies. After participating in the initial congress of the CCP in July 1921, he was soon named secretary of Hunan Province. By 1923, Mao was elected to the Communist Party's central committee.

At this time, the communists shared power with the nationalist Kuomintang Party (KMT). But in 1927, the KMT betrayed the alliance and massacred thousands of communist officials. Mao fled his home in Shanghai and hid in the mountains of his native Hunan. While Mao retreated to Hunan, other communist leaders advocated an open confrontation with the KMT. Their strategy was severely misguided, however, and the KMT crushed the communist forces.

Mao next gathered a group of the surviving communists in the mountains of Jiangxi Province. In 1934, however, the KMT encircled the region, planning to eradicate the remaining communist forces. During a heated debate with his fellow leaders, Mao recommended that the 96,000 besieged communists gathered in the mountains make a daring escape and flee into the harsh, unsettled hinterlands of northwest China.

This escape, known as the Long March, lasted longer than a year, spanned 6,000 miles, and cost 88,000 lives. It also cemented Mao's control of the CCP. Before the march, two factions existed within the party. The first faction consisted of communists who had spent time in Europe or the Soviet Union and had embraced the basic tenets of Marxism. They believed that the Soviet style of communism should serve as a model for China. Mao, who led the second faction, disagreed. He did not believe that China should join in a Soviet-led, international revolution of the working class. Instead, Mao viewed the peasant class as the foundation of Chinese society and advocated a Chinese brand of communism that elevated this class.

The Long March settled the dispute. After its conclusion, Mao executed the few opponents who did not perish during the march. For the next 10 years, Mao oversaw the regeneration of the party. He did not allow his forces to participate in World War II, instead allowing the KMT and the United States to combat the Japanese as his army swelled to more than 500,000 soldiers. During this period, Mao was named chairman of the secretariat and the politburo, giving him undisputed control within the party.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC AND MAOIST THOUGHT

After World War II ended, Mao attacked the KMT. Exhausted from years of war with the Japanese and weakened by a devastated economy, the KMT rapidly crumbled. On January 31, 1949, Mao's People's Liberation Army marched into Beijing. In October of that year, Mao declared the beginning of the PRC.

As China's undisputed leader, Mao advanced his own form of communism known as *Mao Zedong Thought*. This philosophy eschewed the "four olds" of Chinese society: old thoughts, old culture, old customs, and old habits. Instead, Mao proposed that China experience a perpetual revolution in which the nation would continually develop. The one constant of this revolution was Mao's mantra to "Serve the People."

As always, Mao insisted that the peasant class was the foundation of Chinese society. He felt that enthusiastic, if uneducated, communist peasants contributed more to Chinese society than did their elite counterparts in Beijing. Therefore, Mao often sent powerful government officials to live in some of

China's poorest villages to work with peasants and learn from them. He also allowed provincial governments a good deal of autonomy to diminish the role of officials in Beijing.

To spur development, Mao initiated a series of massive public projects that included flood-control measures, new railroad construction, and the reconstruction of factories destroyed during the war. Between 1949 and 1956, Mao oversaw a massive land reform campaign. All landowners were required to stand trial. If a landowner's former peasants denounced the landowner, the landowner was executed immediately, and the estate was divided among the peasants. Mao estimated that the reform cost nearly three million lives.

MISSTEPS HURT CHINA

Despite this violence, China experienced an increasing prosperity during the first seven years of Mao's control. But during the next two decades, Mao, inflated by his unassailable position, introduced a series of campaigns that crippled China. These campaigns were designed to complement the perpetual revolution that Mao envisioned for China.

Mao's first campaign, which began in 1956, was known as the Hundred Flowers. Mao declared total free speech in China and even encouraged criticism. But when vast numbers of citizens actually exercised this newly granted right, Mao violently reversed his position and crushed all free speech. To stifle the unrest created by this suppression, Mao wanted to make China the preeminent industrial power in the world.

Under the Great Leap Forward program, all peasants were ordered to increase their crop production and to construct their own smelters to augment iron production. The campaign had the opposite effect. Farmers smothered their crops by planting them too closely together. To meet their iron quota, families melted all the scrap metal they possessed, thereby flooding Chinese factories with worthless materials. The Great Leap Forward induced a blight of starvation and poverty that cost 30 million lives.

MAO'S LATER RULE

In 1959, Mao retreated from public view, worried that he might lose control of China. But in 1965, he launched his final campaign, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Mao wanted to teach the new

generation of Chinese how to be proper communists. He thus designated hundreds of thousands of Chinese teenagers as the notorious Red Guards. These youths served Mao by killing many of the political opponents who emerged to challenge Mao after the debacle of the Great Leap Forward.

The Cultural Revolution lasted until 1971. By this time, Mao's health had severely deteriorated. During the last five years of his life, he gradually lost control of the party. Major decisions, such as the initiation of a political détente with the United States, were made without his consultation.

When Mao died in 1976, his successors quickly reversed his major economic policies. Mao Zedong had led China out of the ravages of World War II and had restored stability to the vast country. But his economic policies exacted a brutal cost that stunted China's development.

See also China and U.S. Policy; Communism; People's Republic of China

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MARINE BARRACKS, BEIRUT (1983)

Suicide bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps headquarters at Beirut International Airport on October 23, 1983. The worst single-day military death toll for the United States since World War II occurred in the suicide bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps headquarters at Beirut International Airport on October 23, 1983. The disaster curtailed the American peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon and caused a ripple of military reorganizations in the U.S. defense establishment.

U.S. Marines were dispatched to Lebanon twice in the early 1980s, in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of that country in 1982. The first episode was a brief operation to secure the evacuation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization leaders and combatants that had been trapped in the problematic siege of Beirut by the Israelis. However, after the September 1982 massacre in two Beirut refugee camps, which signaled a deepening civil war, the Marine Corps units, composed of the usual 1,600-man Marine Expeditionary

Unit (MEU) assigned to the U.S. Sixth Fleet, returned for peacekeeping duties as part of an international operation.

The first three rotations of MEU landed at Beirut Airport under benign administrative conditions, not even landing artillery and tanks until the second rotation. The third relief unit used its armor to render aid to civilians caught in a severe snowstorm in the Lebanese mountains. However, the fourth rotation in Beirut, the 24th MEU, began taking part in the conflict on orders of the national security adviser, Robert MacFarland—first with artillery support for the Lebanese troops and then exchanging fire with opposition groups on the airport perimeter. On October 16, the U.S. Marine ground commander moved his tanks to a more visible position, hoping to discourage other attempts to harass the Marine Corps lines. Quite unexpectedly, the next strike by the rebels came early on October 23 in the form of a terrorist suicide attack with a large truck bomb that flattened the ground unit headquarters building in the resulting explosion. Hundreds of people were trapped in the wreckage, and 241 U.S. servicemen died, as well as 58 French troops, when their contingent in the city was similarly struck a few seconds later.

Several terrorist groups claimed credit for the attacks, but the true actors remain unknown to this day. Despite U.S. and French remonstrations that nothing would change their policies, the days were numbered for the International Peacekeeping Force.

Into this fray came the replacement 26th MEU, fresh from its combat initiation in Granada. Fighting broke out between the marines and Lebanese rebel groups on several occasions in December, and this time all arms came into use, with a vengeance, with U.S. tanks and antitank missiles scoring several hits on rebel centers of resistance. However, the American withdrawal from Lebanon came all too quickly four months later—and with a bitter taste of disaster. The original mission remained unfulfilled, and the international communities seemingly lacked resolve to launch a major stabilization mission to save Lebanon.

In the resulting investigations, complaints arose over the civilian and military chains of command the Marine Corps unit had to serve simultaneously, the perplexing array of intelligence material that confused the tactical picture for the U.S. troops on the ground, and the preparation and training of U.S. troops for operations in the Middle East in the presence of terrorist organizations. The Goldwater-Nichols Act (Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986) formed part of the institutional response to the disaster, specifically in its reform of the national command structure and chain of command.

See also Arab-Israeli Conflict, Goldwater-Nichols Act, International Peacekeeping and Overseas Deployment, Peacekeeping Operations, Suicide Bombing

MARSHALL PLAN

Economic recovery plan instituted by the United States after World War II to rebuild Western Europe as a bulwark against Soviet expansion. At the end of World War II, much of Europe was devastated, its national economies were ruined, and millions were homeless and near starvation in much of the continent. Critical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, railroads, power stations, and communications facilities lay in tatters. The weakened condition of Europe led to U.S. fears of an expansion of Soviet influence into Western Europe. To forestall such an event, and to help revive the effectiveness of U.S. allies in Europe, Secretary of State George Marshall proposed a massive reconstruction plan for occupied Europe.

Marshall announced the plan, officially known as the European Recovery Program, at a speech on June 5, 1947. The following month, a meeting was convened in Paris to discuss specifics of the plan. The Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe were invited, but declined to attend. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin objected to the plan because it called for Europe to be rebuilt following capitalist economic principles. He also rejected U.S. insistence on coordinating the recovery efforts in Western Europe with those in Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe. The plan also met resistance from Republican members of the U.S. Congress, who favored a more isolationist policy toward Europe. However, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in February 1948 convinced Congress of the need for assistance to Europe. Domestic resistance to the idea collapsed, and President Harry S. Truman signed the Marshall Plan into law on April 3, 1948.

From 1948 to 1951, the United States provided more than $13 billion of economic and technical aid to 16 different European countries. These years saw the fastest period of growth in European history, as industrial output increased by some 35% and agriculture rebounded to surpass prewar production. Standards of

living rose dramatically and Western Europe entered a decades-long economic boom. By contrast, the Eastern European nations that did not take part in the Marshall Plan languished in poverty and industrial backwardness. The lack of prosperity in the communist world greatly reduced Soviet influence and the appeal of communism in Western Europe.

Early observers considered the Marshall Plan an unalloyed success, but criticism of the plan began to arise during the 1960s and 1970s. Some critics claimed that the plan was motivated by a desire for U.S. economic control over Europe rather than an altruistic desire to offer aid. Other historians have argued that the Marshall Plan was not the decisive factor in Europe's postwar recovery. They point out that many European countries experienced economic growth before the arrival of aid. They also note that economic recovery actually occurred more quickly among many nations that received less aid.

The current consensus is that although the United States was clearly acting in its own best interests when it instituted the Marshall Plan, the plan did have a significant effect on European recovery. Because of its success, the Marshall Plan is often cited as an example of the beneficial effects of economic assistance and generous postwar treatment of vanquished nations by the victors.

See also Containment and the Truman Doctrine; Eastern Bloc; Foreign Aid; Truman, Harry S., and National Policy; World War II

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MASS ARMY

Large-scale military force consisting of conscripts, as contrasted with a smaller professional force of highly trained troops. Mass armies typically rely on superior numbers to overcome their enemy's superior training and weaponry.

In most major wars, the United States has relied on a mass army created by the draft to defend the country and engage the enemy. The demise of the mass army in the United States is associated with the ending of the draft near the end of the Vietnam War. In 1975, Congress refused to extend the nation's draft law, and conscription ended on July 1 of that year. Since then, the U.S. armed forces have become an all-volunteer force, recruiting individuals with promises of education and training. This smaller professional force has emphasized the development of advanced weaponry and the efficient use of limited resources.

The replacement of mass armies by professional military forces has raised questions of ethics and social responsibility concerning modern warfare. For example, technological advances in military hardware allow an attacker to strike at unseen targets miles away, making the act of killing more abstract and thus easier to justify morally. In addition, civil participation in and respect for government institutions can be undermined in a society in which only a handful of paid professionals is responsible for defending the state. National security becomes less a part of the shared experiences of citizens and more the province of a faceless government.

See also All-Volunteer Force; Conscription/Volunteer Force

MASS MEDIA
See MEDIA AND NATIONAL SECURITY

MAYAGUEZ AFFAIR

Incident during the administration of President Gerald Ford, consisting of the taking of a U.S. merchant vessel by Cambodia and the subsequent rescue of the ship and crew. The fall of Saigon to the forces of North Vietnam in April 1975 reflected the ultimate failure of the Vietnam policy of the United States. Already demoralized by the divisiveness of the Vietnam War and the scandals of the administration of President Richard Nixon, the American public did not need the additional blow of the ignominious failure of their ally in South Vietnam.

In May 1975, Cambodian gunboats seized the *Mayaguez*, a U.S. merchant vessel sailing from Hong Kong to Sattahip, Thailand. (Cambodia was a communist country, as was Vietnam.) Acting quickly,

President Gerald Ford ordered U.S. forces to recover the vessel.

Although U.S. intelligence was unsure where the Cambodians had the crew of the *Mayaguez*, Ford ordered the bombing of Cambodia and an amphibious assault of Koh Tang Island, near the place where the *Mayaguez* was taken. Two days after the taking of the *Mayaguez*, U.S. forces retook the vessel and rescued all 39 members of the crew.

The mission cost the lives of 41 Americans. Critics argued that the rescue was overkill, an effort by Ford to improve his standing in the polls. Ford argued that the mission was an appropriate reaction to taking American hostages. The Mayaguez Affair, in particular its successful resolution, helped to boost the morale of the American people after the loss of Vietnam.

See also Ford, Gerald R., and National Policy; Vietnam War

MCCARTHYISM

Anticommunist crusade led by Wisconsin senator Joseph McCarthy (1908–1957) in the 1950s and characterized by extreme zeal and paranoia in searching for communist influences on American culture. McCarthy's campaign of slander gave rise to the term *McCarthyism*, which suggested a government witch hunt that sought to punish unpopular political stances.

McCarthyism was a product of the intense Cold War rivalry between the capitalist West, led by the United States, and the communist East, led by the Soviet Union. The political and military rivalry between these two superpower nations produced strong nationalist and anticommunist feelings in the United States. The U.S. government was concerned about the forcible spread of communism around the globe, and many Americans felt that communism represented a threat to their way of life. This led to a time known as the Red Scare.

The Red Scare was marked by active suppression of the Communist Party of the United States by the U.S. government. It also featured an intense effort to identify and remove suspected communists from positions in government, the military, and the media. The most ardent anticommunists, such as Senator McCarthy, felt that communism represented an immediate threat to national security and claimed the existence of a vast web of communist spies and sympathizers in powerful and influential positions in American society. He and his allies in the Congress soon began a campaign to root out communist influence in the United States.

In 1938, the House of Representatives had created the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), which was charged with monitoring disloyalty to the U.S. government. During the 1950s, this meant identifying and sanctioning individuals suspected of being communists. In one of its most infamous episodes, HUAC called hundreds of members of the film and television industries to testify before Congress and name colleagues who might have communist sympathies. Because of the hearing, dozens of writers, actors, directors, and other members of the broadcast industry were blacklisted and unable to work in their profession for years—some never again. The investigations created an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion that still stirs strong feelings among those who experienced or remember it.

In 1950, the U.S. Senate created a body called the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, which had the same mission as HUAC. McCarthy, a junior senator from Wisconsin looking to make a name for himself, managed to get an appointment to the committee. By 1953, he had become chairman and turned the committee into a personal platform, staging widely publicized hearings on communists in government. McCarthy's charges of a widespread communist infiltration of the U.S. government brought him regular newspaper headlines and radio coverage.

In 1954, McCarthy hoped to take advantage of the medium of television to bring his anticommunist crusade to Americans. He called a series of hearings on communist influence in the U.S. Army that were televised by the American Broadcasting Company (ABC). A new network, ABC hoped to attract daytime viewers with live coverage of the fiery McCarthy tearing into witnesses and raising the temperature of the Senate.

The hearings were a triumph for ABC, but a disaster for McCarthy. Most viewers perceived the senator as rude, mean-spirited, and angry—even dangerous. His attacks on uniformed officers offended American veterans who had only recently finished fighting two bloody wars. At about the same time, newspaper and radio reporters began to discover and publicize the many false charges that McCarthy had leveled against

former victims, which ruined hundreds of lives. On December 22, 1954, the Senate censured McCarthy for "conduct that tends to bring the Senate into dishonor and disrepute."

The term *McCarthyism* is no longer applied solely to anticommunism. For example, the suggestion that criticism of government policies is treasonous or un-American is still labeled McCarthyism. In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, many people felt that it was improper to question government responses, such as tightened airport security or the potential curtailing of certain civil liberties. However, others argue that the real test of democracy is whether the government respects civil liberties in times of crisis. They claim that the United States largely failed that test in the 1950s, and they fear a possible repeat of history a half-century later.

See also Civil Liberties; Cold War; Communism; Communism and National Security

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MCNAMARA, ROBERT S. (1916–)

Leading military and strategic policy figure of the U.S. political establishment from 1961 to 1968 and secretary of defense under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Born on June 9, 1916, in San Francisco, Robert McNamara graduated in 1937 from the University of California at Berkeley with a degree in economics and philosophy. He later earned a master's degree from the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration in 1939. After a year working, he returned in 1940 to Harvard to teach in the business school.

In early 1943, after a teaching stint at Harvard, McNamara entered the U.S. Army Air Forces as a captain, and he left active duty three years later with the rank of lieutenant colonel. In 1946, McNamara joined Ford Motor Company as manager of planning and financial analysis. He advanced rapidly through a series

of top-level management positions to the presidency of Ford in November 1960. The first company head selected outside the Ford family, McNamara received substantial credit for Ford's expansion and success in the postwar period. Less than five weeks after becoming president at Ford, he accepted an invitation by President John F. Kennedy to join his cabinet as secretary of defense.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE UNDER KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

In the broad arena of national security affairs, McNamara played a principal part under both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, especially during international crises. Although not especially knowledgeable about defense matters when he started, McNamara immersed himself in the subject, learned quickly, and soon began to apply an active role-management philosophy that would provide aggressive leadership.

The basic policies outlined by President Kennedy in a message to Congress on March 28, 1961, initially guided McNamara in the reorientation of the defense program. A major review of the military challenges confronting the United States initiated by McNamara in 1961 followed, and then came a decision to increase the nation's limited warfare capabilities.

The first crisis faced by the Kennedy administration—the Bay of Pigs—proved to be a disastrous embarrassment for the government. Much later (in 1968), McNamara supposedly told reporters that his principal regret about the Bay of Pigs incident was his recommendation to Kennedy to proceed with the operation, which McNamara should have recognized as an error. More successful was his participation in the Executive Committee, a small group of advisers who counseled President Kennedy to avert the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962.

The escalation of the Vietnam conflict during the administrations of Kennedy and Johnson came to claim most of McNamara's time and energy. During the Kennedy administration, the U.S. military advisory group in South Vietnam steadily increased, with McNamara's concurrence, from just a few hundred to about 17,000. Although he loyally supported administration policy, McNamara gradually became skeptical about whether the war could be won militarily. He traveled to Vietnam many times to study the situation firsthand, and he became increasingly reluctant to

approve the large force increments requested by the military commanders.

As McNamara's views grew more controversial after 1966, and his differences with President Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) over Vietnam policy became the subject of public speculation, frequent rumors surfaced that McNamara would leave office. Yet, there was great surprise when President Johnson announced on November 29, 1967, that McNamara would resign to become president of the World Bank. McNamara left office on February 29, 1968. For his dedicated efforts, President Johnson awarded McNamara both the Medal of Freedom and the Distinguished Service Medal.

ROLE IN DEVELOPING NUCLEAR STRATEGY

McNamara played a much larger role in the formulation of nuclear strategy than his predecessors. In part, this strategy reflected both the increasing sophistication of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and Soviet progress toward nuclear parity with the United States.

Central in McNamara's thinking on nuclear policy was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance and the U.S. commitment to defend alliance members from aggression. McNamara believed that principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on NATO, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of its civilian population.

To make this strategy credible, McNamara accelerated the modernization and expansion of U.S. weapon and delivery systems to improve U.S. deterrence posture and military capabilities. He also increased long-range airlift and sealift capabilities and secured funds for space research and development. After reviewing the separate and often uncoordinated service efforts in intelligence and communications, McNamara consolidated these functions in the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Communications Agency in 1961, having both report to the secretary of defense through the JCS. In the same year, McNamara set up the Defense Supply Agency to work toward unified supply procurement, distribution, and inventory management.

A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS APPROACH

McNamara's institution of systems analysis was the basis for making key decisions on force requirements and weapon systems. The most notable example of this was the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) instituted by the Department of Defense (DoD) comptroller, Charles J. Hitch.

McNamara directed Hitch to analyze defense requirements systematically and produce a long-term, program-oriented defense budget. PPBS evolved to become the heart of the McNamara management program. However, it was suspect in some quarters, especially among the military, because it was civilian-controlled and seemed to rely heavily on impersonal quantitative analysis. In spite of the criticism, however, the system persisted in modified form long after McNamara left the Pentagon.

McNamara also relied heavily on systems analysis to reach several other controversial weapon decisions and budget issues. He believed that although the United States could afford any amount needed for national security, it did not excuse the country from applying strict standards of effectiveness and efficiency to the spending of defense dollars. Acting on these principles, McNamara instituted a much-publicized cost-reduction program that reportedly saved $14 billion in the five-year period beginning in 1961. The savings included closing many military bases and installations that McNamara judged to be unnecessary to national security.

Evaluations of McNamara's long career as secretary of defense encompass both high praise and scathing criticism. McNamara himself has publicly examined and reexamined the effect of his public service. McNamara's tendency to consider military advice less often than previous secretaries contributed to his unpopularity with service leaders and members of Congress. In spite of differences, however, few could deny that he had had a powerful impact on the Defense Department and that much of what McNamara accomplished would be a lasting legacy.

McNamara served as head of the World Bank from 1968 to 1981. During that time, he tried to bring about macro changes in the institution. His leadership was credited with feeding thousands of poor and undernourished people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—made possible by the surplus food generated from the successful Green Revolution. McNamara was also chiefly responsible for the World Bank's major shift toward conducting informed research for the purpose of effective development.

See also Department of Defense, U.S. (DoD); Johnson, Lyndon B., and National Policy; Kennedy, John F., and National Policy; Vietnam War

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MEDIA AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The relationship between the media and the government as it relates to matters of national security. The right to a free press has been in conflict with the government's mandate to defend the nation from the very beginning of American democracy.

ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS

In late 18th-century America, a vocal and free press—as practiced by Thomas Paine, Ben Franklin, and others—spread revolutionary ideas throughout the colonies. However, the early U.S. government tried to muzzle the press on matters concerning national security. In 1798, the first efforts to restrain the press in the interest of national security took place in the U.S. Senate.

Federalists and Republicans (the major political parties of the day) were deeply divided over the French Revolution. The Republicans heralded the overthrow of the French monarchy, the end of aristocratic privilege, and a new constitutional government in Paris. The Federalists saw these developments as the degeneration of legitimate government into mob rule. Federalist concerns were heightened by revolutionary violence in France and the spread of revolution to Belgium, Switzerland, Holland, and on the Italian peninsula. Federalists were further alarmed by rumors of a possible invasion of America by a French army supported by 20,000 immigrants and American traitors. The crisis reached a fever pitch when a letter was found outside the home of President John Adams containing information about an alleged French plot to burn Philadelphia and massacre its citizens.

In the wake of these incidents, the Federalists passed four laws designed to prevent domestic subversion by foreign enemies. Two of the acts, the Alien Enemies Act and the Alien Friends Act, gave the president the power to deport immigrants who threatened national security. The other new laws, the Naturalization Act and the Sedition Act, were viewed as efforts by the Federalists to destroy the opposing Republican Party, which had strong support among the immigrant population. The Naturalization Act extended the residency requirement for citizenship from 5 to 14 years. The Sedition Act made it a crime to publish statements that opposed the government. In the Federalist view, Republican newspapers, which printed scurrilous statements, misrepresentations, or plain lies about President Adams and the Federalist Party, were guilty of seditious libel.

Almost immediately, prosecutions began under the Sedition Act. Benjamin Bache, the editor of the *Philadelphia Aurora* and a strident and vociferous critic of Adams, was arrested even before the Sedition Act was signed. Bache characterized Adams as "old, querulous, bald, blind, crippled, [and] toothless" and was charged with "libeling the President and the Executive Government in a manner tending to excite sedition and opposition to the laws."

Over the next two years, 17 people were indicted under the Sedition Act, and 10 were convicted. Most were journalists, but citizens were also targeted for criticizing the president in public. Congressman Matthew Lyon, a Republican from Vermont, was indicted by a federal grand jury after he wrote an article in the summer of 1798 lambasting Adams for his "unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation, and selfish avarice."

U.S. Supreme Court justices, sitting as circuit court judges, presided over the sedition trials. The judges, all Federalists, rejected the efforts of defendants and their counsel to challenge the constitutionality of the law and handed down tough sentences. Many of the editors spent three or four months in jail, although none received the two-year maximum sentence.

When Republican Thomas Jefferson was elected president in 1800, he pardoned all those convicted of violating the Sedition Act. The Federalists were soundly defeated in the Congressional elections of 1802, and the Alien and Sedition Acts were either repealed or expired. The Federalist effort to impose a one-party press and single-party rule in the interest of national security had failed.

CENSORSHIP AND SELF-CENSORSHIP

Although the states imposed restrictions on freedom of speech and the press under certain conditions, the Republican viewpoint prevailed. During the Civil War, efforts were made on both sides to restrain opposition publications, but overall the interests of national security

and rights of the free press coexisted without major conflict in the fledgling nation during the 19th century.

By the time of World War I, however, the government again sought to curb press freedom regarding issues of national security. In an effort to repress dissent and anti-war activity, Congress passed the Espionage Act in 1917. The act made it a felony to try to cause insubordination in the military or to convey false statements with the intent to interfere with the operation of the armed services. The Sedition Act of 1918 banned treasonable or seditious material from the mail. Under this provision, the mailing of many publications, including *The New York Times* as well as radical newspapers, was temporarily halted. The Sedition Act made it a crime to "willfully utter, print, write or publish any disloyal . . . or abusive language" about the government. Clearly, the Sedition Act turned the tide against the free press in the interest of national security.

In 1919, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on a free speech case for the first time in its history. The Socialist Party had mailed 15,000 leaflets opposing wartime conscription and the secretary of that organization was convicted of obstructing the operation of the armed services. Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who wrote the unanimous opinion upholding the conviction, agreed that there were times when speech could be limited. "The most stringent protection of free speech could not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing panic," said Holmes. At the same time, Holmes set up a judicial barrier to the government's ability to limit free speech. Speech could be limited, he wrote, only if it led to a "clear and present danger."

Later that same year, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of four Russian anarchists for distributing leaflets critical of President Woodrow Wilson and capitalism. In Holmes's dissenting opinion, he argued that the leaflets, which ended "woe unto those who will be in the way of progress," did not present a clear and present danger. Holmes, along with Justice Louis D. Brandeis, who usually joined him in dissenting opinions, would come to dominate judicial thinking on free speech and give it structure.

Throughout most of the 20th century, the media practiced considerable self-censorship on security matters, using the principles established by Holmes and Brandeis. For example, it was widely known in the press during the late 1950s that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was flying high-altitude U2 spy planes over the Soviet Union since 1956. However, this news was never reported until the Soviets shot down a U2 in 1960.

The Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 offered another instance of press self-censorship. In April 1961, *The New York Times* learned that anti-Castro forces, trained and supplied by the CIA, were preparing to invade Cuba. Although the plan itself was not secret, the timing of the invasion was unknown. On April 6, *Times* reporter Tad Szulc filed a story, declaring that invasion was "imminent." The paper prepared to go to press with a four-column headline trumpeting the imminent invasion. The top editors conferred and the word "imminent" was removed from the story, and the headline was shrunk to a single column. *The Times* editors reasoned that the story might have the effect of warning Castro that an invasion was about to incur.

THE PENTAGON PAPERS AND AFTERMATH

During the Vietnam War, correspondents routinely complied with military guidelines requesting that the movements of U.S. troops not be reported until they made contact with the enemy. However, that war also formed the backdrop for one of the most significant tests of press freedom in matters of national security. In 1971, Daniel Ellsberg, a former Marine Corps commander, RAND Corporation analyst, and Department of Defense (DoD) official, obtained a top-secret, 7,000-page archive on U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The archive, known as the *Pentagon Papers*, revealed that the U.S. government fabricated lies to justify its failures and military escalation in Vietnam. It also revealed that the administration of President Richard Nixon had little faith that the war could be won. Ellsberg leaked the Pentagon Papers to *The New York Times*, which subsequently published them.

The Nixon administration prosecuted Ellsberg and tried to destroy his reputation by ransacking the office of his former psychoanalyst. The White House also attempted to stop the publication of newspapers, claiming that the secret documents endangered national security. In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court ruled against censorship on national security grounds. The high court interpreted "clear and present danger" to mean that publication would put troops in immediate danger. The court ruled that publication of the Pentagon Papers, which dealt with the historical conduct of the military in Vietnam, did not meet this test.

The Pentagon Papers ruling did not stop the government from instituting policies intended to control media access to information touching upon national security. In the Gulf War, reporters complained of being denied access to troops and current information

about the military situation. During the 2002 invasion of Afghanistan and the Iraq War of 2003, reporters were embedded with military divisions. While their access was controlled by the deployment of their divisions, the lives of the embedded journalists were literally in the hands of their military hosts. Most reporters were willing to trade a measure of control over their stories in exchange for the privilege of being near the front lines.

CURRENT CONCERNS

Today, the conflict between national security and freedom of the press is in sharp focus. After the September 11 terrorist attacks against New York and Washington, DC, government officials feared that the unrestricted flow of information could be used against America by opportunistic terrorists. Information is a weapon of modern war. Terrorist groups monitor the Internet and U.S. media, so premature disclosure of a U.S. operation or other leaks in reporting could cost the lives of combat troops overseas. Several newspapers, including *The Washington Post*, claim they have limited the scope of their war coverage by withholding details that might cause a clear and present danger to the troops.

Domestic coverage, which is driven by the desire to scoop the competition, must also be viewed through the lens of national security. In addition to a concerned citizenry, the modern news audience might include opportunistic terrorists looking for insight into how best to cause death and destruction in America. The interests of homeland security must be weighed against the rights of a free and unrestricted press in the post–September 11 world.

The increasingly global scale of the mass media has created a new concern for American national security. Networks such as Middle East-based Al-Jazeera have sprung up with the intention of providing the Arab world with an important counterweight to U.S.-dominated news agencies. Not only do such enterprises have the resources to compete internationally, their perspectives are often diametrically opposed to stated U.S. policies and agendas. Al-Jazeera, for example, has been accused of being sympathetic to terrorist leader Osama bin Laden, and is regularly his network of choice for broadcasting new messages and calls to action around the world.

The rise of the Internet as a democratic means of mass communication also has implications for national security. One concern is the free availability of information on the Internet that can be of use to terrorists.

Various Web sites contain instructions for making homemade explosive devices and even the basic principles of nuclear weapons. Another concern is the ease with which a whistle-blower or disgruntled government employee could publish sensitive information over the Internet. Fears such as these have led to debates in Congress over ways to censor or control the flow of information over the Internet. However, the nature of the technology and the fact that no one entity controls the Internet makes censorship a difficult proposition.

See also Journalism, Role and Impact of; Pentagon Papers

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SECRETS REVEALED
The Lasswell Mass Media Model

While studying the effectiveness of war propaganda in the 1940s and 1950s, sociologist Harold Lasswell developed a basic model for understanding the mass media. Lasswell's model included five components that were to be interpreted as steps in a larger sequence: communicator, message, channel, receiver, and effect. Among the first of the so-called transmission models of communication theory, Lasswell's design has been widely criticized for being too linear and simplistic. Despite these objections, the Lasswell model continues to inform our broader understanding of how the mass media operate.

The Five Steps
of the Lasswell Model

Communicator: concerned primarily with the originator of the message. *Control analysis* helps to identify characteristics specific to the communicator, including personal history, political allegiance, and ability as a communicator.

Message: focuses on the particular ideas and meanings contained within the communication. *Content analysis* searches for consistent patterns within the message, such as ethnic representation or the use of particular words and phrases.

Channel: discovers the ways in which the message is designed to stimulate the five senses. *Media analysis* explores the extent to which given channels (or combinations thereof) are the most appropriate forms of communication.

Receiver: concerned primarily with the recipient of the message. *Audience analysis* reveals the specifics of how a given audience ultimately comprehends and interprets a particular message.

Effect: focuses on the response of the message's receiver. *Effects analysis* examines the degree to which a receiver, upon taking delivery of a message, takes action or provides feedback.

MERCOSUR

Also known as Mercosul (the so-called Southern Common Market), a trading zone among Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, which was founded in 1991. The purpose of the Southern Common Market, or MERCOSUR, is to promote free trade and movement of goods and peoples, skills, and money between and among those countries. The organization represents a total population of 190 million individuals, living in an area larger than Europe. In addition to the official four members, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Venezuela, and Mexico have associate member status in MERCOSUR.

Although officially founded in 1991, MERCOSUR's origins date back to the early 1960s. During that period, Latin America was taking its first steps toward regional integration. Created in 1960, the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC) provided for the formation of a free trade zone by means of periodic and selective negotiations between its member states. As U.S. government programs withdrew under the political pressures of domestic fiscal policy and free trade ideology, ALALC was replaced in 1980 with the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI). In March 1991, a new treaty was signed in Asuncion, Paraguay, creating a common market among the four participants, to be known as the Southern Common Market.

MERCOSUR has a number of major objectives. The first is the free transit of production goods and services among the member states, with the elimination of customs rights and lifting of nontariff restrictions on the transit of goods. The association also works to establish a common external tariff (TEC), adopt a common trade policy with regard to nonmember states or groups of states, and coordinate positions in regional and international commercial and economic meetings.

Another objective of MERCOSUR is the coordination of macroeconomic and sectorial policies of member states relating to foreign trade, agriculture, industry, taxes, monetary system, exchange and capital, services, customs, transport, and communications to ensure free competition among member states. The member states are also committed to making the necessary adjustments to their laws in pertinent areas to allow for the strengthening of the integration process.

The general aim of the MERCOSUR is to increase regional economic cooperation, but the common market was weakened significantly by the collapse of the Argentine economy in 2002. Many South Americans see MERCOSUR as an economic defense against U.S. commercial infringement in the region. According to critics of U.S. policy, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and bilateral treaties have encroached on Latin America's economic space. Many of these critics also believe the refusal of the administration of President George W. Bush to bail out Argentina was based on its desire to undermine MERCOSUR, which might pose a threat to U.S. economic and political interests in Latin America.

See also Latin America and U.S. Policy

MIDDLE EAST AND U.S. POLICY

U.S. policy toward and regarding the volatile region of the Middle East. The term *Middle East* is not geographically specific; it defines a region consisting of states with similar cultures, histories, and concerns. Among the countries considered part of the Middle East are Turkey, Iran, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Israel, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Qatar, and Bahrain. The disputed Israeli-occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip are also included.

POSTWAR ERA

The centrality of the Middle East in U.S. foreign policy dates from the post–World War II era, with the necessity of defending the sovereignty of Israel as well as guaranteeing a steady supply of oil from the region. The Cold War conflict with the Soviet Union made the Middle East as much a zone of conflict as any other part of the world and played an important role in shaping U.S. relations with local nation-states.

U.S. influence in the Middle East replaced centuries of dominance by other powers, including the Ottoman Empire, followed by the Europeans, who took advantage of the collapse of the Ottoman empire following World War I. Oil was discovered in the Middle East in the early 20th century, first in Persia (Iran) and later in Saudi Arabia. Ottoman dominance in the region was a product of geographic proximity, but the Europeans gained greater leverage in the region economically by financing modernization efforts underpinned by industrial revolution and political reform. The overall failure of these initiatives merely resulted in greater dependence. Meanwhile, oil wealth has often been considered complicit in the inability of states in the region to develop along the lines of Turkey, in which successful democratic reform moved the country toward greater parity, not to mention identification, with Western Europe.

The British and French retreated from the Middle East after World War II as part of a more general process of decolonization. Meanwhile, the persecution of the Jews by Nazi Germany gave greater urgency to the establishment of an Israeli state, which began in 1917 with the Balfour Declaration. The state of Israel was declared in 1948, resulting in the partition of Palestine.

THE COLD WAR AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The wartime goodwill between the United States and the Soviet Union consolidated into the Cold War. The Arab-Israeli conflict following the founding of Israel, as well as subsequent conflicts between Israel and its neighbors, demonstrated the vitality of U.S. interests in preserving Israel. These events also served to exacerbate the Palestinian question, a problem that has been complicated by U.S. interests in the region well after the conclusion of the Cold War.

Soviet support for Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Libya strengthened the power of despotic regimes in each of these states, as did U.S. support for equally undemocratic—yet prowestern—governments in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan, and the Persian Gulf Emirates. The Suez War in 1956 demonstrated not only that the British and French were no longer superpowers in the region but also that the United States considered its own relations with countries in the Middle East to be more important than promoting French and British interests.

The Six-Day War between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in 1967 was significant in expanding Israeli territory and reaffirming Israeli statehood. However, it also deepened the Palestinian refugee problem. Israel expanded its territory by seizing the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, and Jordan River, as more than a million Arabs were absorbed into their domain. Meanwhile, about one-third of the one million Palestinians in the region fled to Jordan to become a disaffected population, resentful of the United States for supporting Israel. Following a surprise attack on Israel by Syria and Egypt, the Arab states confronted Israel again six years later in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war (known as the Yom Kippur War).

IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS

The impact of U. S. policy in the Middle East was most keenly felt in the late 1970s by the 444-day siege at the American embassy in Tehran, Iran—an incident known as the Iranian hostage crisis. U.S. support for the despotic regime of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlevi of Iran led to crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations after the shah was overthrown in 1979 and replaced by the fundamentalist Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

The admittance of the shah into the United States for medical treatment provoked a seizure of the U.S. embassy in the Iranian capital on November 4, 1979, by a crowd of about 500 Iranian students. Diplomatic initiatives and economic pressures, such as an oil embargo and the freezing of Iranian assets in the United States, proved fruitless in resolving the crisis. A rescue attempt on April 24, 1980, ended in failure as well, and the crisis absorbed the presidency of President Jimmy Carter to the degree that it is often cited as an important factor in his failure to win reelection in 1980.

After the death of the shah and the start of the Iran-Iraq war in 1979, the Iranians became more receptive to resolving the crisis. The hostages were finally freed on January 20, 1981, the inauguration day of newly elected president Ronald Reagan, after the release of

Iranian assets and an agreement of immunity from lawsuits.

THE FIRST GULF WAR

Prolonged war between Iraq and Iran throughout the 1980s left Iraq with a devastated economy and tremendous debt. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein later attempted to pressure the neighboring state of Kuwait to forgive its loans, amounting to nearly half Iraq's war debt. The existence of Kuwait was considered by Arab nationalists in Iraq to be merely a product of British imperialism. The fact that Kuwait, with a population of about 2 million (compared with 25 million in Iraq) and measuring geographically only 124th the size of Iraq, had the same oil reserves exacerbated these tensions.

Saddam Hussein invaded and annexed Kuwait on August 2, 1990, after receiving ambiguous information about how the United States would respond. Throughout the Iran-Iraq war, the Reagan administration provided food and arms to Iraq, both to support the Iraqis as well as to undermine the impact of Soviet support. The administration of President George H. W. Bush expressed concern over Iraqi-Kuwait border tensions, but it had also indicated that it preferred not to get involved. Thus, it is probable that Saddam Hussein was surprised when the United States led a United Nations coalition of forces to push him back out of Kuwait.

Iraq easily overwhelmed the Kuwaiti military and established control of the country. The United Nations condemned the invasion and demanded the withdrawal of Saddam's troops. The Arab League condemned the invasion as well, but also warned against western intervention. A prominent fear was that Saddam would continue his drive into Saudi Arabia, giving him control over a tremendous amount of the world's oil supply. Militarily, the Saudis were as defenseless as Kuwait, and Saddam's regime was almost equally indebted to them financially. Soon after settling in Kuwait, the Iraqis began making strikes at Saudi Arabia and invoking the rhetoric of Arab nationalism, accusing the Saudis of being puppets for the United States.

On August 7, 1990, President George H. W. Bush announced Operation Desert Shield and began moving U.S. troops into Saudi Arabia. The United Nations gave Iraq a deadline of January 15, 1991, to withdraw from Kuwait. The multinational coalition soon grew to 660,000 troops, 500,000 of which were U.S. forces. One day after the UN deadline, the United States launched a massive bombing campaign of Iraq known as Operation Desert Storm. The Iraqi military responded by firing missiles into Israel to provoke them into joining the war, a temptation the Israelis ignored. The coalition forces easily and quickly achieved domination of Kuwaiti airspace.

On February 22, Iraq agreed to a Soviet-brokered cease-fire agreement, and two days later the United States launched the ground invasion of Kuwait, known as Operation Desert Sabre. The invasion of coalition forces was even more successful than anticipated, and Kuwait was declared liberated on February 27, 1991.

SEPTEMBER 11 AND OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Opposition to the first Gulf War in the United States was minimal. The slogan *No Blood for Oil* failed to resonate, and the fact that casualties were minimal (fewer than 400 coalition deaths) made the war relatively popular. After the war, the Kurds launched an uprising in Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein, believing they would be supported by U.S. troops. However, no aid was forthcoming, and the rebellion was brutally crushed.

Soon after the Kurdish rebellion, no-fly zones were established over parts of northern and southern Iraq to help protect Shiite and Kurdish minorities, and an embargo known as the oil-for-food program was established, along with weapons inspections. Saddam Hussein was left in power, however. The sufferings of the Iraqi people under the embargo, the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia, and continued tensions between the Arab world and Israel increased hostility toward the United States throughout the decade.

On September 11, 2001, Islamic terrorists flew planes into the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. The man responsible for planning the attack was a Saudi citizen, Osama bin Laden, and the majority of the hijackers were from Saudi Arabia. As a leader of the terrorist group al-Qaeda, bin Laden was protected by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which refused to surrender him to the United States. The United States responded by invading Afghanistan and overthrowing the Taliban in the fall of 2001.

U.S. President George W. Bush drew a link between Saddam's regime in Iraq and the events of

September 11 and accused the Iraqis of illegally harboring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). On March 19, 2004, the United States, in the face of overwhelming opposition from the United Nations as well as many traditional allies in Western Europe, launched Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Saddam's regime was quickly toppled, and major combat operations were declared over shortly thereafter, but no WMD were ever found. In addition, the United States has since struggled to consolidate its military victory by establishing a stable government in Iraq that is sympathetic to U.S. interests. That effort has been thwarted somewhat by continuing hostile action by insurgents in Iraq, and skirmishes continue. Far more American lives have been lost since the war was initially declared to be over than were lost throughout the entire conflict, and the outcome remains unclear.

See also Arab-Israeli Conflict; Gulf War; Iranian Hostage Crisis; Iraq War of 2003; Operation Desert Shield; Operation Desert Storm

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MIDDLE EAST CONFLICTS (1956, 1967, 1973)

In the Middle East, long-running conflict between Arab states and Israel on the existence of the state of Israel, its borders, and relations with neighboring Arab countries. The Arab-Israeli conflict has been the source of at least five wars and a large number of minor conflicts. It has also been the source of two intifadas, or popular Palestinian uprisings, against Israel.

THE SUEZ WAR (1956)

The first major Arab-Israeli war, the Suez War, took place in 1956 in Sinai, Egypt. The best synthesis of the roles of the various players in this conflict is probably found in the words of scholar Richard Neustadt. In his book *Alliance Politics* (1970), he wrote, "France, and later Israel, were London's partners, objects of American concern throughout, while Egypt set the stage, Russia played the 'heavy', and the United Nations furnished a Greek chorus."

Throughout 1956, tensions increased between Israel and Egypt. On July 26, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal, which was under British control. Nasser then closed the canal to Israeli shipping. In response to Egypt's nationalization of the canal, British prime minister Anthony Eden told U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower that Britain was contemplating the use of force.

U.S. policy, meanwhile, was largely dominated by the effort to solve the dispute by peaceful means. President Eisenhower did not want to facilitate Soviet penetration into the Middle East as a supporter of Arab independence. The Egyptian takeover of the canal also jeopardized French economic interest—48% of France's oil supply came through the canal. France also had an open dispute with Egypt because of Nasser's support for rebels in the French colony of Algeria in Africa.

In France on October 23, 1956, Great Britain and Israel drew up a military plan to attack Egypt. The British-Israeli campaign began on October 29, 1956, with Israel's invasion of the Sinai Peninsula. Using parachutists and moving with lightning speed, Israeli soldiers closed off the Gaza Strip and reached the Suez Canal in just four days.

Two days after the start of the Israeli invasion, dubbed Operation Kadesh, Anglo-French forces launched an attack called Operation Musketeer. The plan was to strike the Egyptian Air Force by bombing from the Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and Malta and from aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean Sea. Anglo-French forces successfully bombed Egyptian air bases, and parachutists entered Port Said, an Egyptian port on the canal.

The Eisenhower administration condemned the Israeli-Anglo-French military action against Egypt and tabled a United Nations resolution calling for a cease-fire. The resolution was vetoed by Great Britain and France in the UN Security Council, but it received Soviet support.

When British and French troops landed in Port Said on November 5, the Soviet Union threatened unilateral

An agitated Palestinian man speaking to Israeli soldiers during the intifada, the violent uprising of Palestinians against Israel, which has been a recurring element of the Middle East Conflict. (The word *intifada* means "uprising" in Arabic.) Throughout the intifada, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) played a lead role in orchestrating the insurrection, which led to the deaths of hundreds of Palestinians and Israelis. The most recent intifada began in September 2000.

Source: Corbis.

The Suez War of 1956 demonstrated that in case of actual need, France should not have to rely on the United States, which might pursue different objectives. Meanwhile, Nasser was able to promote his socialist and pan-Arab ideology through the successful nationalization of the Suez Canal, and his standing greatly improved in the Arab world.

THE SIX-DAY WAR (1967)

The next major conflict between Arabs and Israelis was the Six-Day War, also known as the June War, which was fought by Israel against a coalition of Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian forces. The war lasted only 132 hours and 30 minutes—less than six days. On the Egyptian front, the actual duration of the conflict was only four days, and on the Jordanian side, it lasted three days. Defeating Syria took Israel the full six days.

intervention. At this point, British prime minister Eden was under great pressure. His greatest miscalculation was that he was unable to enlist U.S. support.

On November 6, a cease-fire went into effect after the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution introduced by the United States condemning the Israeli, British, and French attack. The resolution proposed that UN forces be put in charge of the combat areas temporarily. Honoring the cease-fire, the Anglo-French troops stopped some 23 miles down the Suez Canal from Port Said. The invading armies were forced to withdraw from Egypt and the Suez in March 1957 under pressure from the United States.

The failed Middle East venture, opposition at home, and the disagreements with the United States, a traditional ally of Great Britain, led British prime minister Eden, who was in poor health, to resign. Eden's resignation marked the symbolic end of the British empire, although it had been in decline for decades. The crisis also marked the transfer of power from Britain and France to the new superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Six-Day War was a dramatic event for the Arab world, resulting in a humiliating Arab defeat. Arab weakness in this war, compared with the strength and efficiency of Israel, still influences the relations in the region. Also, the geopolitics of the area changed because of the war: Israel took the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, East Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria.

At the end of the 1956 Suez War, Israel had to withdraw its forces from the Sinai Peninsula because of U.S. diplomatic pressure. A UN peacekeeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), was stationed in the Sinai to keep the border between Egypt and Israel demilitarized. Meanwhile, however, no Arab state had recognized Israel's right to exist.

Several years after the Suez crisis, the tension moved to the Syria-Israel border. Syria periodically shelled Israeli villages in northeastern Galilee from the Golan Heights, a plateau in Syria overlooking

Israeli territory. On April 1967, a minor border incident escalated into a full-scale air fight over the Golan Heights, resulting in the loss of seven Syrian MiG fighter planes.

Border incidents between Israel and Syria multiplied in the days that followed, and numerous Arab leaders called for an end to Israeli reprisals. On May 17, 1967, Egyptian president Nasser began to remilitarize the Sinai after he asked and obtained the evacuation of UN peacekeepers from the peninsula. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union actively supported the military needs of the Arab states. On May 23, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran, which separates the Sinai from the Arab peninsula, blockading the Israeli port of Eliat in the Gulf of Aqaba.

On May 30, Egypt and Jordan signed a mutual defense treaty, stipulating that Jordan's forces were to be placed under the command of Egyptian general Abdul Moneim Riad. King Hussein of Jordan was at risk of popular insurrection if he had to decide to stay neutral in the Israeli-Syrian dispute, which he probably preferred. Israel called upon Jordan numerous times to refrain from hostilities. Moreover, Jordan controlled the West Bank, which was always seen as a serious threat to Israel's security.

Israel tried to address these developments through diplomatic means. It asked the United States and Great Britain to open the Straits of Tiran, as they guaranteed they would in 1957. Through the Jewish lobby in the United States, Israel also asked Jordan to refrain from hostilities. As requests for peace were unsuccessful, Israel claimed that the closing of the Straits of Tiran met the international criteria for an act of war. On June 3, the administration of U.S. president Lyndon Johnson gave its consent to an Israeli operation against Egypt.

On June 5, 1967, the Israeli Air Force launched a massive bombing attack against the Egyptian Air Force, which was the main threat to the Israeli military and to civilians. Egypt had the largest air force of any Arab state, with 385 Soviet-built aircraft. However, Egyptian defensive infrastructure was extremely poor, and the Israeli air attack was successful beyond expectation, destroying almost all airplanes on the ground and making runways unusable.

The complete air superiority that Israel achieved over Egypt became a main factor in winning the war on the ground. On the same day as the air strikes, an Israeli armored division under the command of Ariel Sharon attacked Egyptian divisions—consisting of about 100,000 troops and 1,000 tanks—first in the Gaza Strip and then in the Sinai desert. By the evening of June 7, Israeli troops had reached the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. During the fighting, more than 800 Egyptian tanks were destroyed, and thousands of Egyptian soldiers were taken prisoner. In the meantime, Israeli paratroopers captured the area of Sharm el Sheik in southern Sinai, which led to the breakup of the naval blockade of the Straits of Tiran. On June 8, Nasser accepted a cease-fire with the Israeli army.

Meanwhile, on the West Bank front, Israel was engaged with Jordanian forces, which included 60,000 troops with roughly 300 tanks. Israeli Central Command forces consisted of five brigades. President Nasser convinced King Hussein of Jordan that Egypt was victorious, claiming as evidence a radar sighting of Israeli jet fighters returning from bombing raids in Egypt, which Nasser claimed were Egyptian aircraft on their way to attack Israel.

Jordanian forces began to shell West Jerusalem on the morning of June 5. East Jerusalem, including the Old City, had been under control of the Arab Legion of Jordan since Israel's War of Independence in 1948. On June 6, the Israeli units counterattacked. Israeli paratroopers surrounded Jerusalem while one Israeli brigade pushed to the mountainous area of northwest Jerusalem. By evening, the brigade arrived at the West Bank town of Ramallah.

On the same day, the Israeli Air Force destroyed the 60th Jordanian Brigade on the road to Jerusalem, and other Israeli brigades captured western Samaria and the city of Jenin. On June 7, Israeli paratroopers entered the Old City of Jerusalem via the Lion's Gate and quickly pushed Jordanian forces from the West Bank across the Jordan River. That evening, the United Nations arranged a cease-fire between Israel and Jordan.

On the Syrian front, the Israeli Air Force destroyed two-thirds of the Syrian Air Force on the evening of June 5. The following day, Syrians began a massive shelling of Israeli towns from the Golan Heights. The Syrian army consisted of about 50,000 men grouped in nine brigades, whereas Israeli forces consisted of only four brigades.

Attacking the Golan Heights, a heavily fortified mountainous slope, would have been extremely costly for the Israeli troops massed near the border. However, when more troops could be gathered as the situation on the other battlefronts cleared up, Israeli leadership authorized an operation against the Golan

Heights. First, the Israeli Air Force bombed Syrian positions with all its firepower. By the evening of June 9, the four Israeli brigades reached the plateau. The next day, several additional units climbed to the Golan Heights from the south, only to find the Syrian positions mostly empty. Believing that the entire Golan had already fallen, driven by rumors of Israelis ready to use nuclear weapons, some 4,000 Syrian troops abandoned the area. Syria and Israel signed a cease-fire on June 10.

The Six Day War established Israel as the major military power in the Middle East. At the end of the war, Israel gained the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank of the Jordan River (including East Jerusalem), and the Golan Heights. It was an incredible military victory and it left 700 Israelis dead and more than 2,500 wounded. Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, lost almost all their air forces and much of their armed weaponry. Egypt lost about 11,000 troops, Jordan lost 6,000, and Syria lost 1,000. About 300,000 Palestinians fled the West Bank for Jordan.

On November 22, the UN passed Resolution 242, which called for Israel to withdraw from the so-called occupied territories. In return, Arab states would recognize Israel and guarantee secure borders between Israel and its neighboring Arab states. Events, however, did not follow the UN resolution. The Arabs and Palestinians declared their intention to continue fighting with Israel, and Israel refused to return the occupied territories under such conditions. As a result, Israel fortified the Sinai, West Bank, and Golan Heights—and Jewish settlers began to move in. This led to continued tensions, which eventually erupted in the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

THE YOM KIPPUR WAR (1973)

The Yom Kippur War, also called the Ramadan War (Ramadan is a Muslim religious holiday), was fought from October 6 (the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur) to October 22, 1973. The two-week war pitted Israel against a coalition of Egyptian and Syrian forces.

Between 1968 and 1970, Israel and Egypt fought a war of attrition—a limited war initiated by Egypt to make Israel's occupation of the Sinai as costly as possible. During these two years, nearly 1,500 Israeli soldiers were killed and more than 3,000 were injured. Some estimate that 10,000 Egyptians lost their lives in this limited conflict. The war of attrition ended with a cease-fire in 1970, signed between Israel and Egypt's

President Anwar el-Sadat, who had succeeded Nasser after Nasser's death in 1970. Israel, under pressure by the United States and fearing Soviet intervention in support of Egypt, accepted the cease-fire and the application of UN Resolution 242.

Sadat was a more moderate leader than his predecessor was. However, to improve his standing in the Arab world, he declared on several occasions that Egypt would go to war against Israel unless it unilaterally withdrew from all the territory conquered in 1967. The easy victory of the Six Day War made the Israeli leadership overconfident, however, and it never took Sadat's threats seriously.

The Israeli leadership miscalculated. Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a joint surprise attack on Israel on October 6, 1973. The Egyptians quickly penetrated the Sinai while Syrians attacked from the Golan Heights. Caught unprepared, Israeli troops suffered heavy casualties.

The Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal and advanced into the Sinai Desert, where Israeli air and land counterattacks were unsuccessful at repelling the Egyptians. A few days after the start of the war, on October 10, Egyptian forces destroyed an entire Israeli brigade and took its commander and hundreds of soldiers captive.

Meanwhile, in the Golan Heights, the Syrians attacked the Israeli defenses across the border. Over three days of fighting, every Israeli tank deployed on the Golan Heights was hit by enemy fire, and 250 tanks were destroyed. A single tank (the so called *Zvika force*) was the only obstacle between the Syrian attackers and the Israeli headquarters in Nafah, in the Golan Heights. After a panicky first three days, the Israeli Army was able to reorganize its forces, partly because of a large-scale U.S. airlift operation that supplied ammunition.

On October 15, an Israeli division led by General Ariel Sharon managed to breach the line between the Egyptian armies in the Sinai. Eventually, the Israeli army passed over the Suez Canal into Egypt and began advancing toward Cairo. Before the Israelis could reach the Egyptian capital, a cease-fire was negotiated between Egypt and Israel, following pressure from the Soviet Union and the United States. Israeli forces also contained the Syrian offensive on the Golan Heights. By October 11, the Syrians were pushed back beyond the 1967 frontier. Israel and Syria negotiated a cease-fire on October 22, which included a return to prewar borders between the two states.

Israeli confidence was severely shaken by the Yom Kippur War because Israel had been unprepared for the surprise attack. In Egypt and Syria, meanwhile, the Yom Kippur War was seen as a great victory. The Israeli Air Force suffered serious losses, and the myth of Israeli military superiority was challenged in both the Sinai and the Golan Heights.

CONCLUSIONS

These three main Arab-Israeli conflicts shaped the geopolitics of the Middle East region for decades, and they continue to affect the region today. In the early 1980s, Israel annexed East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, while both Jordan and Egypt eventually withdrew their claims to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In 1977, Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt on the basis of the Camp David Accords. Observation stations staffed by U.S. civilians in a UN-maintained buffer zone continue to separate the border between Egypt and Israel in the Sinai. The issue of the Golan Heights, however, is still open and controversial. Syria and Israel signed a disengagement agreement in 1974, and the UN Disengagement and Observer Force (UNDOF) was established as a peacekeeping force in the Heights.

In 1981, Israel annexed the Golan Heights, but this annexation has not been recognized internationally, and the Golan is generally considered Israeli-occupied Syrian territory by the United Nations. Syria still claims the area. Additionally, Lebanon claims a small portion of the Golan area known as Shebaa Farms. The great strategic value of the Heights, both militarily and as a source of water, further complicates the matter.

The Suez War, the Six-Day War, and the Yom Kippur War represent three critical moments in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although several peace accords have been signed between Israel and its Arab neighbors since 1979, a final and long-term resolution of the conflict remains elusive.

—Francesco Mancini

See also Camp David Accords (1979); Intifada; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Suez Canal Crisis (1956)

REFLECTIONS

Balfour Declaration/Right of Zionists

In November 1917, the British foreign secretary Arthur James Balfour wrote to Jewish leader Lord Rothschild to assure him that his government supported the Zionist plans for a Jewish nation in Palestine. The British hoped to win more Jewish support for the United States to enter World War I. The Balfour Declaration became the basis for international support for the founding of the modern state of Israel. Many Arabs viewed the declaration as a betrayal of Britain's undertakings to support Arab independence. The letter was published a week later in *The Times* of London, as reproduced here.

Dear Lord Rothschild:

I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet:

His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours,

Arthur James Balfour

—The Balfour Declaration.
UK Foreign Office, November 2, 1917

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MIDWAY, BATTLE OF (1942)

Possibly the most decisive sea battle of World War II, Midway was the second major carrier battle of the war. The U.S. Navy defeated the striking force of the Japanese fleet and established rough naval parity and sharply curtailed Japanese offensive power, enabling the Allies to accelerate their counteroffensives by several months.

Having been thwarted in their drive against Port Moresby, New Guinea, in May 1942, and unprepared to attack the weak allied positions in the Indian Ocean, the Imperial Japanese Navy now sought a decisive battle against the U.S. Navy to guarantee the defense of the conquered south Asia resource area for the foreseeable future. The island of Midway, guarding the strategic approaches to Pearl Harbor, became the immediate objective for an amphibious assault, which would force the U.S. Navy to give battle with its last operational aircraft carriers and major surface units.

The Japanese demonstrated—fatally—their penchant for divided operations consisting of many subunits of the main force detailed to diversions, subsidiary operations, and indirect approaches to the main objective. In this case, no fewer than eight separate naval forces headed for Midway and the diversion attacks aimed at the Aleutians. Allied codebreakers effectively used portions of the Japanese naval codes and traffic analyses to decipher most of their intentions. Thus, the three U.S. carriers and their escorts covered Midway from the northeast in two task forces, while the four carriers of the Japanese striking force approached Midway, unsupported by the vast armada that followed. The U.S. Navy achieved a favorable concentration of force at the initial point of contact.

Initial Japanese air attacks on June 4, 1942, against Midway's garrison and air base, decimated the defending aircraft, but proved inadequate for preparing the island for invasion. Thus, the Japanese strike force commander readied a second effort at the precise moment when his aerial reconnaissance detected the first of the U.S. carrier task forces. Thanks to Midway's reconnaissance and attack efforts, the U.S. Navy task forces launched effective air strikes first, sinking or mortally crippling three of the four Japanese carriers. The Japanese repost crippled a single U.S. carrier that would be sunk the next day by a submarine, but the overwhelming follow-on strike sank the last Japanese carrier of the striking force, which left the rest of the Japanese fleet spread out over thousands of sea miles—uncovered by the carriers sent to the Aleutians diversion.

Faced with its losses and the situation that now existed, the Japanese Navy canceled the operation and turned away from Midway the night after it lost the cream of its aircraft carriers and hundreds of key personnel and aircrews. Although a Japanese victory at Midway could not have won the Pacific war for Japan, the U.S. Navy's victory stripped the offensive power from the dominant navy of its day. The Japanese naval force never recovered, and the U.S. Navy—backed by hundreds of ships due to emerge from the shipyards in a year's time—began its ascendancy in the Pacific. In the dark days of 1942, the Battle of Midway was the first victory for the United States over Japan's navy. Also, aircraft carriers became the preeminent weapon in the Pacific war.

See also U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Navy; World War II

MILITARY DOCTRINE

The fundamental policies of war of various branches of the armed services. Military doctrines never detail exact procedures or attempt to account for all possible circumstances. Instead, their purpose is to outline a broad set of objectives. Because doctrines are meant to be flexible and adaptable to different conditions, military commanders are expected to use military doctrine as a guideline in decision making and in implementing policies, procedures, strategies, and tactics.

U.S. military doctrine is based on the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, a document prepared periodically by the executive branch of government that outlines the goals of the present administration in dealing with current, pressing security concerns. The Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible for formulating joint services doctrine, whereas individual service doctrines are published by the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Marine Corps Doctrine Division, and the Naval Warfare Development Command.

HISTORY OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

The source of modern military doctrine is typically cited as Helmuth von Moltke the Elder's *Instructions for Large Unit Commanders*, published in 1869. Moltke, a general in the Prussian army, was educated at the

Kriegsakademie (War College) in Berlin. At the time, the college was under the direction of Carl von Clausewitz, author of the classic military strategy text *On War*. In his book, Moltke stressed that only the broad strokes of military strategy could be planned beforehand. After armies met in combat, even the best-laid plans could falter.

Because of his belief that "no battle plan survives contact with the enemy," Moltke argued that although senior officers should give general orders, the junior officers at the scene of the fighting should determine how best to carry out those orders. Such an approach was necessary to account for the more mobile nature of late–19th century combat, compared with that of an earlier era. By contrast, under the French concept of *methodical battle*, senior commanders gave detailed instructions for movement and tactics, which subordinates were expected to execute regardless of the situation at hand. Such an approach completely failed to account for the evolving rapidity of mechanized warfare.

EARLY U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINE

The earliest clearly articulated U.S. military doctrine was the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which signified the distancing of the United States from Europe and served as the basis for the later U.S. isolationism. The Monroe Doctrine was a rejection of European colonization that presumed U.S. authority over political and military affairs in the Americas.

Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, the isolationist stance of the United States prevented the development of an overarching military doctrine. The vague idea of Manifest Destiny—the notion that the United States was destined to spread across North America—was probably the closest substitute for U.S. military doctrine in this era. The Spanish-American War and World War I involved the United States much more in world affairs and led to the articulation of new U.S. doctrines. The Stimson Doctrine, announced by U.S. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson in response to the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria, stated that the United States would not recognize territorial changes initiated by force.

COLD WAR DOCTRINE

In the aftermath of World War II, the U.S. position as one of the world's two superpowers forced it to take a more active part in international matters. Postwar doctrine focused on confronting the United States' main rival, the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine of 1947 committed the United States to broad support for nations attempting to resist any form of subjugation, but was understood to indicate support particularly for foreign governments resisting communism. In 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine was aimed specifically at the potential spread of communism in the Middle East, prompted by the threat of Soviet interference in the Suez Crisis of 1956. In 1980, the Carter Doctrine reaffirmed the U.S. intention to oppose with force any attempted takeover of the Middle East.

During the administration of President Ronald Reagan, the United States adopted several controversial doctrines. The Kirkpatrick Doctrine, announced by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeanne Kirkpatrick in the early 1980s, made a distinction between authoritarian versus totalitarian regimes to justify U.S. support of extreme right-wing, anticommunist dictatorships. Kirkpatrick argued that despite their shortcomings, right-wing authoritarian regimes had a better chance of evolving into democracies than left-wing totalitarian regimes. This was viewed by many critics as a convenient way to rationalize U.S. backing of antidemocratic governments in the third world.

The Reagan Doctrine, announced in 1985, was both a continuation of the Kirkpatrick Doctrine and a response to the Soviet Brezhnev Doctrine, which threatened Soviet military action against any bordering country that threatened the order of the communist bloc. The Brezhnev Doctrine, named for Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, was used to justify both the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968 and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. President Reagan effectively announced support for groups combating communism in the third world, a policy known as *rollback*. The Reagan administration used this policy to justify fighting a covert proxy war against the communist government of Nicaragua in the 1980s.

A third major doctrine adopted under President Reagan was the Weinberger Doctrine. The essence of the doctrine was that only the vital national interests of the United States or its allies justified the commitment of U.S. troops overseas. The only acceptable goal for U.S. forces in any conflict was victory, in combination with clearly defined and accomplishable political and military objectives. The forces committed should correspond to the desired objectives and be adjusted as necessary, and the commitment of Congress and the American people was essential.

Above all, the commitment of U.S. troops should be considered only as a last resort.

The immediate motivator of the Weinberger Doctrine was the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, in which 241 Marines perished. However, it also had roots in the Vietnam War, which demonstrated the dangers of hazily defined objectives in conjunction with weak public support. Announced in the immediate wake of President Reagan's decision to withdraw the U.S. Marines from Lebanon, the Weinberger Doctrine offered a justification for military retreat by a hawkish administration.

The Powell Doctrine, announced during the buildup to the Gulf War of 1991, was an extension of the earlier Weinberger Doctrine. It made the case that U.S. forces should be used only in cases vital to our national interest and with a broad level of support and commitment. The Powell Doctrine also stated that the use of force should be overwhelming and that the U.S. military should not remain in the field as peacekeepers.

POST–COLD WAR DOCTRINE

The Clinton Doctrine of the 1990s, named for President Bill Clinton, was a response to increasing regional conflict after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. It reversed parts of the Powell Doctrine by indicating U.S. support for intervention in foreign conflicts in which U.S. interests were perceived to be at stake. This doctrine included the use of U.S. forces in a peacekeeping role. The Clinton Doctrine came in for severe criticism after the failure of the 1993 UN peacekeeping mission to Somalia, in which a number of U.S. troops lost their lives.

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, the United States embraced a new, more aggressive military doctrine. The Bush Doctrine, formulated during the administration of President George W. Bush in response to the terrorist attacks, declared that the United States reserves the right to launch preemptive war against perceived threats to its national security. The Bush Doctrine has been widely criticized as nothing more than unilateralism disguised as national security policy. The new doctrine and its difficulties were exemplified by the U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003 despite opposition from most of the world. Although the invasion produced a quick military victory, the United States became bogged down in a costly occupation and received little international support or cooperation for its efforts in Iraq.

CONCLUSION

Formulating a new military doctrine is a difficult and controversial process. Established commanders who are used to operating under one doctrine might resist the adoption of new doctrines. Doctrines can also serve as the basis for civil-military conflict when a given doctrine is perceived as outdated or irrelevant to current political and military realities.

Additionally, a point that is reflected in both the Weinberger and Powell doctrines is that modern warfare conducted by a democracy requires the support of the civilian population for its success. For this reason, the war over public opinion on the home front further complicates the civilian-military conflict and removes the concept of military doctrine further from a purely military perspective. The centrality of civilian populations in the current war on terror might make this issue even more important in the creation of modern military doctrine.

—William de Jong-Lambert

See also Bush Doctrine; Civil-Military Relations; Containment and the Truman Doctrine; Doctrine, Grand Strategy; Monroe Doctrine (1823); Reagan Doctrine; Tactics, Military

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MILITARY DRAFT

The use of mandatory conscription to fill the ranks of the armed forces. The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress, "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that gives Congress the authority to draft U.S. citizens to be sent overseas and engage in foreign conflicts.

George Washington attempted to institute a draft during the American Revolution, but Congress and the courts denied him the authority. However, the draft initiated by President Abraham Lincoln during the

Civil War was justified on the basis of quelling a national insurrection.

On May 18, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson signed the first draft law to send soldiers to Europe to fight in World War I. The first peacetime draft took place in September of 1940, shortly before the United States got involved in World War II. The draft ended in 1947, but was quickly restored to ensure enough troops in response to the Cold War.

The Vietnam War provoked widespread dissatisfaction with the draft, partly because so many draft-eligible males could obtain exemptions. More important, however, was the unpopularity of the Vietnam conflict itself. President Richard Nixon ran for reelection in 1972 by promising to end the draft, and Congress allowed the draft law to expire in 1973.

Since the end of the Vietnam War, there have been periodic calls for a new draft to meet the military needs of the United States. Despite such calls for reinstating the draft, the United States now depends upon an all-volunteer military force, which many experts argue is superior to a conscripted force.

See also All-Volunteer Force; Conscription/Volunteer Force

MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Programs and policies initiated to prepare individuals for service in the United States Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, or other armed service branches. Military education and training consists of Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs on college campuses; the formal training program (or *boot camp*) that enlistees undergo in the armed services; military schools at the middle school, high school, and college level; and the four military service academies. The United States government also finances and participates in the education and training of soldiers of foreign allies.

ROTC, MILITARY SCHOOLS, AND THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT

The purpose of ROTC programs on college campuses is to recruit and train commissioned officers. ROTC is an elective that consists of skills useful to military service: leadership, planning, ethics, and problem solving. ROTC programs produce 60% of all officers

in the armed forces, mostly for the Army. Many students enroll to pay for college because merit-based ROTC scholarships often cover full tuition costs for college. Many ROTC programs were eliminated on college campuses during the Vietnam War.

Military schools are often state-supported. Although there is no requirement of service after graduation, many students do go on to join the military. Military schools at the precollege level are typically associated with severe discipline and often accept students who present discipline problems in less-structured environments.

Most college-level military academies—such as the Citadel in Charleston, North Carolina, or the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia—are not attached to universities. However, the Texas A&M University Corps of Cadets and the Virginia Tech Corps of cadets are military organizations that function as integral parts of civilian universities.

The Universal Military Training and Service Act was passed in 1951 at the outbreak of the Korean War, in response to the necessity of maintaining a prepared military. The Universal Military Training and Service Act replaced the Selective Service Act of 1948, lowered the draft age from 19 to 18-1/2, and extended the period of required service from 21 to 24 months. After Richard Nixon ended the draft in 1973, the United States came to rely on all-volunteer military and reserve forces that trained several weekends a year to maintain their skills. Since the United States launched the war in Iraq, reserve forces have played an increasingly vital role in military operations.

MILITARY SERVICE ACADEMIES

There are four military service academies in the United States: the Military Academy, the Naval Academy, the Air Force Academy, and the Coast Guard Academy. To be accepted into an academy, the potential student must receive an appointment from a member of Congress; the vice president of the United States, congressional delegates from Washington, DC, the Virgin Islands, and Guam; or the governors of Puerto Rico and American Samoa. Prospective students can receive a service-connected nomination as a son or daughter of enlisted personnel. Appointments are also available to children of service members killed in action, and sons and daughters of Medal of Honor winners who qualify do not require a nomination.

Also known as West Point, the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, New York, is distinct as the oldest continuously occupied military post in the country.

The U.S. Military Academy was founded in 1802, when President Thomas Jefferson signed legislation providing for its establishment. George Washington selected the site for the fort itself, and Tadeusz Kosciuszko, a Pole serving in the Continental Army, designed the fortifications. Washington chose the site for the monitoring of river traffic on the Hudson River.

The early program and code of conduct at West Point was modeled on the French École Polytechnique. Civil engineering was the cornerstone of the academic curriculum, and West Point graduates played a fundamental role in the construction of many of the nation's early roads, bridges, railway lines, harbors, and other vital elements of infrastructure. It was not until technical schools became a more common part of higher education in the United States that West Point expanded and emphasized other academic topics.

A major alteration to the curriculum at West Point was initiated by Superintendent Douglas MacArthur after World War I. Cadets were held to a higher standard of physical fitness, the academic program was diversified, and the honor system was formalized with the creation of the Cadet Honor Committee. Academic options have expanded further in recent years, allowing cadets to major in numerous fields in the sciences, social sciences, and humanities. Women were allowed to attend in 1976, when Congress authorized the admission of women to all military service academies.

The motto of the U.S. Military Academy is "Duty, Honor, Country." Graduates receive a bachelor of science degree and are commissioned as second lieutenants in the U.S. Army. They are required to serve a minimum of five years in active duty and three years in the reserves after having joined the *long gray line*.

Students at the U.S. Naval Academy, in Annapolis, Maryland, are referred to by their rank: they are midshipmen rather than cadets. Upon graduation, they are commissioned as ensigns in the U.S. Navy or second lieutenants in the U.S. Marine Corps. Initially, the academic program of the academy emphasized a long practicum period at sea. Study at the academy took five years, with the first and last year spent on campus, and the other three spent at sea. The period of study was later extended to seven years, with one additional year on campus added at the beginning and the end. In 1851, this program was altered to four consecutive years of study, interspersed with periodic practice cruises. Today's graduates receive a bachelor of science degree after completing a core curriculum in addition to their major field of study.

The U.S. Naval Academy was founded as the Naval School by Secretary of the Navy George Bancroft in 1845. The campus was built on the grounds of a former army fort, where it has remained—except for a brief hiatus during the American Civil War, when it was temporarily removed to Fort Adams in Newport, Rhode Island.

The U.S. Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut, was founded in 1915 with the merger of the Lifesaving Services and the Revenue Cutter Service. It grew out of the School of Instruction of the Revenue Marine Service and moved to its current location in 1932.

The U.S. Coast Guard Academy is the smallest of all the military service academies by far, graduating only 180 cadets each year (the other academies graduate more than 1,000 students annually). Graduates of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy are awarded a bachelor of science degree and are obliged to serve five years in the Department of Homeland Security.

The U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado, was founded in 1954. The academic program at the U.S. Air Force Academy also consists of a core curriculum, and a major is chosen in the third year. Graduates receive a bachelor of science degree and become officers in the U.S. Air Force.

Traditionally male institutions, military service academies have had widely reported problems of rape and sexual harassment since women were first admitted. According to a *New York Times* report in 2003, 12% of women at the Air Force Academy reported they had been raped. State-supported military academies such as the Citadel or the Virginia Military Institute began admitting women only recently after receiving court orders.

In addition to domestic military training, the United States government also finances military training in allied countries overseas. In fiscal year 2002, $70 million was spent on international military education to train foreign soldiers in countries such as Afghanistan, the Philippines, and former Soviet Georgia.

—*William de Jong-Lambert*

See also U.S. Air Force Academy; U.S. Military Academy (West Point); U.S. Naval Academy

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MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND (MSC)

Organization of the U.S. Navy that controls most of its resupply and transport ships. The Military Sealift Command (MSC) was founded in 1949 and grew out of the Military Sea Transportation Service (it acquired its present name in 1970). The part of the MSC most directly associated with supporting the navy is the Naval Fleet Auxiliary. A counterpart of the U.S. MSC is the Royal Fleet Auxiliary of Great Britain.

During a war, more than 95% of all equipment, fuel, supplies, and ammunition needed to maintain the military are carried by sea. The Vietnam War marked the last time that troops were transported by MSC troop ships. Since Vietnam, most troops have been transported by air.

Ships of the MSC are run by civilians and are formally *in service*, as opposed to being *in commission*. The distinction is important because the term *commission* implies the conferring of military rank or authority. The hull numbers of MSC ships begin with the prefix *T*-, followed by the hull number that a ship of the same type, commissioned by the U.S. Navy, would have. Some ships operated by the MSC are owned by the U.S. government, whereas others are chartered. Those owned by the government bear the prefix *USNS* (which stands for United States Naval Ship).

MILITARY TACTICS
See TACTICS, MILITARY

MILITARY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND (MTMC)

Army headquarters in charge of the global movement of combat units, military cargo, and the household goods and private vehicles of service members. Established in 1965, the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) was first known as the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service before changing its name in 1974. Renamed the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command as of 2004, the MTMC plays a critical role in troop deployment and military freight movement worldwide during peace and war. Since its founding, the MTMC has been involved in all U.S. military operations.

The MTMC is responsible for activities that include force movement to seaports, traffic management, coordination of loading and unloading of vessels, and acting as a liaison between the Department of Defense (DoD) and commercial freight carriers. Although it is one of the smallest major Army commands, it includes representatives from the other services as well as from the Coast Guard and the Canadian Armed Forces. As part of the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), MTMC acts at the port manager for the DoD, with a presence at 25 seaports worldwide. The command also oversees DoD highways and railroads. MTMC's motto is, "We deliver the power to the force, anytime, anywhere."

MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Term coined by President Dwight D. Eisenhower to describe the growing influence of the military on the U.S. economy and culture.

NATURE OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

In his farewell speech at the end of his presidency in 1961, Eisenhower warned of the dangers stemming from the close relationship between the military establishment and the arms industry. He predicted that this relationship could result in a misallocation of power and alter the structure of society, as more and more individuals and public institutions became involved in the process of armament. He foresaw the potential threat that this could pose to liberty and democracy.

The U.S. military purchases all its equipment from civilian firms that sign contracts with the government to provide everything from uniforms to cruise missiles. These civilian contractors are in business to make a profit, as well as to supply the military's needs. Critics charge that the relationship puts the financial and political interests of defense contractors, the military, and their allies in government ahead of considerations of national security. For example, members of Congress might push for development of a weapons system that would benefit defense contractors in their districts, whether or not the system was actually

necessary. Military leaders might also work with defense contractors to lobby for pet projects that may meet resistance in Congress. This relationship between defense contractors, the Pentagon, and the government is sometimes called the *iron triangle*.

GROWTH OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

The post–World War II era was a period of tremendous expansion for the military establishment in the United States. The Department of Defense (DoD) was created by the National Security Act of 1947, which consolidated the Department of War, the Navy Department, and the Department of the Air Force. It was during this period that the Pentagon itself was also constructed, becoming a symbol of the tremendous power and influence of the military on the domestic economy. The purpose of establishing the DoD, as well as building a structure great enough to house it, was to coordinate the work of the various branches of the armed services and help temper interservice rivalry.

The United States entered World War II with a military far smaller than it had at the close of the conflict. The devastating impact of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, combined with the sudden necessity of supplying combat missions in two separate theaters, set the stage for the development of a war economy. Factories were converted from the production of goods to supply a civilian economy to fulfill the needs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines.

The development of the war economy had a tremendous social and cultural impact upon the United States. Because a large portion of the male population went overseas to fight, job opportunities were opened to women and minorities. Victory gardens were planted to supplement the food supply, and even fashion was affected. Bathing suits became smaller due to restrictions on the supply of cloth, and nylon stockings, only recently introduced at the 1939 World's Fair, became a scarce item, sacrificed to the production of tents and parachutes.

The altered social dynamics characterizing the war economy had a long-term impact upon American society, as evidenced in the activities of the women's movement and the civil rights movement in the decades that followed. However, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, one of the most pressing domestic concerns was the possibility of an economic recession. The war economy had in effect lifted the country out of the Great Depression, thanks to a tremendous increase in U.S. government spending and industrial production. After the troops returned and the economy returned to a focus on domestic production, it was feared that there would be a return to low consumer demand and high unemployment.

Those fears proved unfounded as consumer demand, restricted from years of economic depression and war, drove an economic boom of historic proportions. The U.S. economy also benefited from the fact that the United States was the only major power left untouched by the war. U.S. industrial and consumer good production filled the gap left by the devastated economies of Europe and Asia. Because of the war, the United States became the world's leading industrial economy.

This dramatic U.S. economic growth was accompanied by a sizable increase in the number and importance of defense-related industries. World War II saw the introduction of many technological innovations as a standard part of war, including the tank, airplane, submarine and aircraft carrier, radar, sonar, and a host of other inventions. These advances led to the creation of entire new industries in the United States after the war. As military technology progressed, newer firms entered the defense industry. Defense contractors were soon doing tens of billions of dollars of business each year with the U.S. government and employing millions of Americans.

OTHER WAR ECONOMIES

Other countries have also benefited, and suffered, by gearing their domestic economy toward military production. Two well-known examples are Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. After Adolf Hitler took power in Germany in 1933, he announced a program of rearmament. The Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, limited the German Army to a force of 100,000 troops and stripped Germany of its air force. Hitler was determined to rebuild the German armed forces, so in the late 1930s he devoted the German economy to that task. The German rearmament ended in World War II, which resulted in defeat, national partition, and the almost total destruction of the German economy.

The Soviet military-industrial complex was, like the U.S. version, a product of World War II and the Cold War. After the war, the Soviet Union turned its attention to securing its borders and spreading communist ideology and revolution. Facing opposition from the United States, the Soviet Union also diverted enormous economic and social resources into maintaining

a formidable military machine. This military emphasis placed a huge strain on the already inefficient state-run Soviet economy. Over the long run, the military buildup weakened the overall Soviet economy, which was a major contributing factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

CURRENT ISSUES

In 2005, the total annual U.S. defense budget exceeded $400 billion, and that total did not even account for the costs of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. With that much money at stake, it is clear that defense contacting is a major part of the U.S. economy. Defense contracting has become particularly vital as the Pentagon seeks to outsource tasks—that is, to pay civilian firms to perform duties that were carried out previously by enlisted soldiers (including food service or transportation of fuel and supplies). These contracts are often criticized as being less competitive than they should be—or even completely uncompetitive. One recent example is the awarding of no-bid contracts to the Halliburton Corporation for reconstruction work in Iraq. Because Vice President Dick Cheney served as chief executive officer (CEO) of Halliburton prior to taking office in 2001, critics have charged that Halliburton received preferential treatment.

The development of military-industrial complexes in the United States and overseas has been cited as a factor in issues such as weapons proliferation and violence in the developing world. Some observers claim that the existence of a military-industrial complex makes war inevitable because both the military and defense firms need to justify their prominent role in society. Whether or not these social concerns are justified, the tremendous influence of the military presents an economic dilemma. On one hand, military spending takes resources that could be used to improve other areas of society, such as education or public health. On the other hand, a drastic reduction in defense spending could have a significant negative impact on the U.S. economy. Some defense firms have managed to retool some or all of their facilities to produce consumer goods, but they represent a small fraction of defense contractors. For the foreseeable future, it appears that the military will continue to exert a major influence on the American economy.

See also Arms Procurement; Arms Race; Cold War; Defense Budgeting; Defense Contractors

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REFLECTIONS

Excerpt From Eisenhower's Farewell Address

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

—Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 17, 1961

MILITIA

Paramilitary organizations composed of and led by civilians. Prior to the American Revolution, the British North American colonies relied heavily on militias for defense during times of conflict. Colonial militias protected settlers from hostile Native Americans and served alongside British forces during wars with French troops in North America. During the Revolutionary War, militias formed a significant part of the rebel force because the individual colonies refused to give General George Washington the authority to draft troops for the continental army.

The nation's founders, concerned that a permanent standing army represented a threat to civil liberties, largely disbanded the continental army after the war. As a result, state militia remained extremely important as the only ready means of defense. At the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, state militias took the lead combat role for both armies. They were joined by many volunteer units, typically organized at the local level. Only later in the war did each side resort to a draft to fill the ranks of their armies.

Several factors led to a waning of the importance of state militias after the Civil War. The modern technological warfare pioneered in that conflict required more training and discipline, more advanced weaponry, and far greater numbers of troops than could be supplied by a group of small militias. In addition, the established states were no longer threatened by hostile Native Americans. By the 1880s, most American Indians had given up their resistance to U.S. expansion and settled on reservations. Finally, by the late 18th century, the United States had eliminated all its serious military rivals on the continent and had little need of standing forces of any type.

In 1903, the U.S. Congress passed a law that united all state militias into the U.S. National Guard. Like the militias from which they sprung, separate guard units are organized for each state and placed under the control of the state's governor. In addition, under current U.S. code, all male citizens aged 17 to 45 are considered part of the militia and can be called to service in times of national emergency.

Most of the militias in the United States today are tied to white supremacist or survivalist groups, many of whom are also considered hate groups. These groups grew to prominence in the late 1980s and 1990s. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), which tracks extremist groups, there were 858 active militia groups in the country in 1996, but by 2004, only about 143 groups remained active. In the mid- and late 1990s, several militia leaders were convicted of plotting to bomb government buildings and assassinate officials. The most infamous of these incidents was the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The defendants in that case, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, were members of a group called the Michigan Militia.

Another factor in the decline of militias was a loss of credibility among the groups' rural midwestern and northwestern power bases. After years of dire predictions, ranging from the imposition of martial law to the United Nations taking over the U.S. government, many adherents of the far right who had been stockpiling food and munitions became disenchanted that the predicted Armageddon never materialized.

The modern militia movement shares little in common with its colonial and Civil War counterparts, although earlier independent militias were willing to work together and even subordinate themselves to command by regular army forces when necessary. Modern militias view the government and its agents (such as the regular army) as the enemy and have shown little inclination to cooperate, even with other militia groups. Whereas earlier militias were dedicated to common defense of all the people in a state, modern militias are concerned only with their own members and families. Finally, traditional militias served to bring their communities closer together, whereas modern militias are separatist by nature.

See also Oklahoma City Bombing; Ruby Ridge; Terrorism, Domestic

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MRV *See* MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES (MIRVS)

MISSILE GAP

Belief by U.S. officials during the late 1950s and early 1960s that the United States trailed the Soviet Union in ballistic missile technology. Following the Soviet testing of two intercontinental ballistic missiles

(ICBMs) in August 1957 and the successful launch of *Sputnik* in October, the United States began to believe that the Soviet Union possessed superior missile capability. Moreover, U.S. military and intelligence agencies projected that the Soviet Union would likely significantly improve its missile capabilities relative to U.S. capabilities. Members of the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower feared that if the United States did not reassess its nuclear posture and regain a comparative advantage in weapons capability, it would not be able to defend against a Soviet missile attack.

Fears of a missile gap were further exacerbated by a report issued by an ad hoc civilian group, the Gaither Committee, in November 1957. The Gaither Report gave a comparative analysis of U.S. and Soviet weapons capabilities and presented policy proposals. The report emphasized the potential difficulties of maintaining the U.S. second-strike capability and indicated that a Soviet attack could best be deterred if the United States possessed a force that could survive an attack and then strike back. U.S. nuclear strategy could no longer be built around its superior weapons capability and destructive capacity. Instead, the report proposed that the United States alter its strategy to develop an invulnerable force capable of massive retaliation. The report concluded that to achieve this strategy, the defense budget had to increase significantly, and weapons production needed to accelerate.

President Eisenhower was adamant, however, about reducing security expenditures under his New Look program. This fueled public debate about whether the administration was allocating enough funds toward closing the missile gap.

When President John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, his administration acted quickly to fulfill its promise to rebuild America's defense forces. Members of the administration soon learned that the perceived missile gap did not, in fact, exist. Moreover, if a gap did exist, it was in favor of the United States. Nonetheless, intelligence reports and assessments from the air force's Strategic Air Command (SAC) pressured the administration to accelerate the deployment of new U.S. missiles. The agencies argued that a more flexible response strategy would ensure that the United States could effectively react to a range of aggression.

Based on the recommendations made by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the administration moved away from Eisenhower's policy of massive retaliation toward a deterrence policy of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Under this policy, the United States expanded its nuclear arsenal to ensure that it could survive a Soviet attack and still launch a counterstrike that would destroy the Soviet Union.

See also Arms Race; Bomber Gap; Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy; Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs); Kennedy, John F., and National Policy; Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD); Nuclear Deterrence; Sputnik

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)

Informal association of countries dedicated to nonproliferation of unmanned weapons systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) also seek to coordinate national laws relating to the licensing of such systems for export to other countries.

Founded in 1987 by Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States, the MTCR was created partly in response to the proliferation of WMD during the preceding two decades. At that time, the primary concern among nonproliferation advocates was the growth of state-owned stockpiles of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Since then, the number of members and the focus of the MTCR have broadened. As of 2005, 34 countries have joined the association. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, the MTCR has placed greater emphasis on preventing WMD delivery systems from falling into the hands of terrorists.

Perhaps the greatest challenge to the effectiveness of the MTCR is overcoming conflicting national policies (or lack thereof) concerning the licensing of the systems for export. To help surmount these difficulties, all members of the MTCR, as well as some nonmember states, have voluntarily introduced export-licensing measures on rockets and other unmanned airborne delivery systems, related equipment, material, and technology.

See also Arms Control; Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs); Nuclear Proliferation; Terrorism, War on International; Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

MISSILES

Weapons that are thrown or propelled at a target. Technically, anything from a rock hurled by a slingshot, to an arrow shot from a bow, to a bullet fired from a gun is classified as a missile. Today, however, the term *missile* commonly refers to a guided rocket—or a jet-propelled device that carries an explosive warhead.

DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN MISSILES

Missile weapons are as ancient as warfare itself, but until the development of gunpowder, all missile weapons were powered and guided by humans. The British pioneered the wartime use of small exploding rockets during the 18th century, but early rockets were unguided, unreliable, and inaccurate. Modern missiles had to await the development of more powerful propellant fuels and more advanced guidance devices in the mid-1900s.

The first recognizably modern missiles were probably the German V-1 and V-2 rockets of World War II. The V-1 rocket was a jet-powered tube about 25 feet long and loaded with some 1,800 pounds of explosives that had a top speed of about 400 mph (670 km per hour). The guidance system, although crudely made, was based on a sophisticated concept. An autopilot on the V-1 controlled its height and speed—based on feedback from a series of pendulums mounted in the fuselage; a gyromagnetic compass controlled the rudder. The missile was set to dive after traveling a certain distance and then explode on contact with the ground. In concept, the V-1 was the direct forerunner of today's cruise missile.

By contrast, the V-2 rocket was the early prototype of today's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Although much larger than the V-1, the V-2 carried only a slightly larger warhead (about 2,000 pounds) and had roughly the same range. The main difference, however, was that the V-2 was designed to enter space and reenter the atmosphere before striking its target, so there would be no way to intercept it. The V-2 had a simple onboard computer to control its flight path and distance. It was also much more accurate than the V-1, although far less so than modern missiles.

The development of more sophisticated electronics following World War II made modern missiles possible. Increasing miniaturization and the invention of remote guidance and tracking systems spurred rapid advances in missile technology. During the 1950s, heat-seeking and radar-guided missiles began to replace machine guns and cannons as the main armament on combat aircraft. The first guided nuclear-armed ICBMs were developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s. By the 1960s, the United States had also introduced the first submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM): the Polaris. Cruise missile technology also advanced significantly during the 1960s.

Current missile technology represents refinements of the systems pioneered during the 1950s and 1960s. Since the 1960s, ICBMs have become larger, as well as much more accurate and destructive. Antiair missiles have also become more accurate and have shrunk to the size where they can be fired by a single person. Cruise missiles now contain sophisticated computers that use satellite maps to guide the weapon hundreds of miles to its target while hugging the ground to avoid detection by radar. These refinements have changed the nature of warfare, making it more focused, more destructive, and more remote.

TYPES OF MISSILES

Modern missiles are classified according to their primary uses, which also dictate their design and performance. The main types of missiles are ballistic missiles, antiballistic missiles (ABMs), cruise missiles, and antiaircraft missiles. Within each of these classes, individual missiles are further categorized by the type of guidance systems they use, how they are launched, and their intended targets.

Ballistic Missiles and ABMs

A ballistic missile is one designed to enter space before reentering the atmosphere and falling on its target. Ballistic missiles are powered by rocket engines that reach tremendous speeds to launch the missile into space. At the highest point of the missile's flight, the rocket engine shuts off, and an internal guidance system ensures that the missile hits its intended target.

ICBMs are ballistic missiles that have a range of several thousand miles and can strike targets on the other side of the globe. At the beginning of the 21st century, the main U.S. land-based ICBMs were the Titan II, the Minuteman, and the Peacekeeper. The Titan II missiles are the oldest ICBMs in the arsenal,

dating to the early 1960s. The Minuteman series was first deployed shortly after the Titan II. The Peace-keeper, also known as the MX, began to replace these older missiles in 1986.

In addition to land-based ICBMs, both the United States and the Soviet Union developed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in the 1950s and 1960s. The modern nuclear submarine's ability to escape detection underwater makes SLBMs a particularly dangerous threat. The first U.S. SLBM was the Polaris, first deployed on U.S. submarines in 1960. In the late 1970s, the Polaris began to be phased out in favor of the more accurate and longer-ranged Trident.

The development of ICBMs gave rise to programs to create missiles to counter such a threat. The United States began working on ABM systems as early as the 1950s, but other military expenses crowded out funding for significant ABM development. Both the United States and Soviet Union deployed ABM systems in the 1960s. However, the invention of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) complicated the task of intercepting ICBMs, and the ABM Treaty of 1972 ended development of ABM systems for more than a decade. In the mid-1980s, the administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan began research into a space-based ABM system dubbed Star Wars. Despite a lack of success and a series of disappointing test results, the program was still active as of 2005.

Cruise Missiles

The cruise missile has become one of the most versatile weapons in modern military arsenals. Designed to strike targets at long distances with pinpoint precision, cruise missiles typically are used against large targets such as buildings, storage facilities, and large ships. Cruise missiles can launch from aboard ship, from airplanes, and even from submarines. With computerized, preprogrammed guidance systems, cruise missiles offer a more effective alternative to aerial bombing.

The most widely used cruise missile in the U.S. conventional arsenal is the BGM-109 Tomahawk, which is employed by both the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy. The Tomahawk can be carried on planes, ships, and submarines. The Air Force also uses the air-launched AGM-86 cruise missile against conventional targets. These missiles saw extensive use in the Gulf War of 1991 and the Iraq War of 2003. The Air Force

also carries an arsenal of nuclear-tipped AGM-129 cruise missiles, carried onboard B-52 Stratofortress long-range bombers.

Antiair Missiles

There are two main types of antiair missiles: air-to-air missiles, used in combat between aircraft, and ground-to-air missiles, used by troops or ships to intercept attacking aircraft. The first air-to-air missiles were introduced in the 1950s, but advances in the 1960s made their target-tracking capabilities much more sensitive and thus more effective. Today, air-to-air missiles form the mainstay of modern combat aircraft weaponry.

Heat-seeking air-to-air missiles are designed to home in on the heat produced by an aircraft. Early models could only pick up a plane's exhaust, so they had to be fired from behind the target. Modern heat-seeking missiles can detect the heat generated by the movement of air over the skin of an aircraft, which enables them to track a target from any direction. The current U.S. heat-seeking missiles are the AIM-9 Sidewinder and the AIM-132 ASRAAM.

Radar-guided air-to-air missiles are used when a target is too far away to detect its heat signal. Radar-guided missiles employ two methods to find their targets. The simplest and most widely used is called semiactive radar. The plane launching the missile sends out a radar signal that reflects off the target aircraft, and the missile follows the signal to the target. Active radar missiles have their own onboard radar systems that allow them to track targets without having to ride the launching plane's radar beam. The most widely used U.S. radar-guided missile in the AIM-54 Phoenix, which has both semiactive and active radar capabilities.

The U.S. military also deploys surface-to-air missiles to protect ships, troops, and facilities from enemy aircraft. The Air Force has used the Nike surface-to-air missile for antiaircraft defense since the late 1950s. The Navy was particularly active in the development of antiair missiles to protect its large and vulnerable carrier fleets. Currently, the Navy employs a wide range of surface-to-air missiles on all its capital ships. It also used the sophisticated Aegis cruiser to guide and track hundreds of missiles at the same time.

The Army has pioneered the development of manually launched, portable surface-to-air missiles called manually portable air defense systems (MANPADS).

The most popular MANPAD is the Stinger shoulder-launched missile, introduced in the mid-1980s. A single operator using a Stinger can hit a target 15,700 feet (4,800 meters) away at an altitude of 12,500 feet (3,800 meters).

During the 1980s, the United States supplied hundreds of Stinger systems to anti-Soviet mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan. After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, a large number of these former mujahideen joined militant Islamic terrorist groups. As a result, many Stingers ended up in the hands of terrorists and have occasionally been turned against the United States and its allies, which obviously severely threatens national security. In 2004, for example, a militant group operating in Iraq claimed credit for downing a British airliner using a Stinger missile.

—John Haley

See also Aegis Weapon System; Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972); Anti-Tank Missiles; Arms Race; Cruise Missile; HARM Missile; Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM); Missile Gap; Missile Technology Control Regime; Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs); Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs); Stinger Missiles; Tomahawk Cruise Missiles

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REFLECTIONS

A Nuclear Warrior's View of Nuclear Weapons

What, then, does the future hold? How do we proceed? Can a consensus be forged that nuclear weapons have no defensible role, that the political and human consequences of their employment transcends any asserted military utility, that as weapons of mass destruction, the case for their elimination is a thousand fold stronger and more urgent than for deadly chemicals and viruses already widely declared illegitimate, subject to destruction and prohibited from any future production? I believe that such a consensus is not only possible, it is imperative and is in fact growing daily. . . .

Where do we begin? What steps can governments take, responsibly, recognizing that policy makers must always balance a host of competing priorities and interests? First and foremost is for the declared nuclear states to accept that the Cold War is in fact over, to break free of the attitudes, habits, and practices that perpetuate enormous inventories, forces standing alert, and targeting plans encompassing thousands of aimpoints. Second, for the undeclared states to embrace the harsh lessons of the Cold War: that nuclear weapons are inherently dangerous, hugely expensive, militarily inefficient, and morally indefensible; that implacable hostility and alienation will almost certainly over time lead to a nuclear crisis; that the strength of deterrence is inversely proportional to the stress of confrontation; and that nuclear war is a raging, insatiable beast whose instincts and appetites we pretend to understand but cannot possibly control."

—General Lee Butler
Former Commander, Strategic Air Command
From a speech given at the State
of the World Forum, San Francisco, October 3, 1996

MONETARY POLICY

A central bank's actions to affect short-term interest rates, the supply of money, and credit to promote national economic goals. Monetary policy is the government's attempt to manage the money supply of a country or transnational region to achieve specific economic objectives. The European Central Bank and U.S. Federal Reserve are examples of institutions that exist independently of the government to form and maintain monetary policy. These institutions are called central banks. Globally, the Bank for International Settlements also plays a role in standardizing policy but sets no monetary policy of its own.

The goals of monetary policy are to promote maximum sustainable output and employment and to support stable prices by controlling aberrant cycles of inflation and deflation. The U.S. Federal Reserve System can achieve this aim in two ways. Most obviously, it can raise or lower short-term interest rates to control inflation and influence output and employment by introducing the additional cost of borrowing. The aim of implementing policy through raising or lowering interest rates is to influence demand for goods and services.

More subtly, the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) can also become active in open market operations in the federal funds market. *Open market operations* refer to the FRB buying and selling government securities in the open market to expand and contract the nation's money supply and the amount of money in the banking system. Open market operations influence short-term interest rates and the volume of money and credit in the economy. Purchases inject reserves into the banking system and stimulate growth of money and credit; sales do the opposite by taking disposable income and funds out of the system.

National monetary policy also has repercussions and implications beyond a country's borders—although this was not the case prior to the 1960s. From the period following World War II until that time, each country maintained its own capital controls in general isolation. Because monetary affairs and financial affairs were in separate spheres, there was little interdependence in the system, which could trigger the type of causal-effect conditions we have in today's global economic order. These circumstances began to unravel with the emergence of the Eurodollar market and inflationary pressures on the U.S. economy. These events forced international finance and the international monetary system to interlock and thus influence one another.

U.S. government financing of the Vietnam War and the costs of the Great Society programs of President Lyndon B. Johnson created a string of events that transformed the rule-based international monetary system of fixed exchange rates (a rate established by the government or national central bank). In its place emerged an informal political agreement arrangement among the dominant economic powers (known as the G-7 powers).

To compensate for the inflationary policies of the 1960s, the United States abandoned the gold standard in 1971 and rescinded the promise to holders of U.S. currency that their assets could be redeemed in gold. The world was also undergoing a major oil crisis during the early 1970s as scarcity of oil, high inflation, and a sluggish economy created a worldwide global recession.

Stagnant economic growth engulfed the world even as petrodollars flooded the system seeking an outlet for investment. A backdrop to these conditions were the technological advancements in the communication industry and deregulation. What resulted was a system that, despite its stagnancy, required structures and mechanisms to accommodate a massive increase in the scale and velocity of global financial flows.

As a result, developed and developing countries alike were becoming more subject to the whims of an expanding international financial market and events taking place in distant locales. As the global financial market expanded, so did the network of interdependency of economic life among all countries. The consequences of monetary policies in any part of the world radiated in varying degrees via the financial system.

These elements ushered in an economic condition of *hot money* and problems of *capital flight*. These terms refer to the practice of investors moving assets abruptly throughout the world in search of higher returns or out of fear of political instability. As defensive measures, governments considered defensive monetary policies such as interest rate adjustments, open market activity, and capital controls.

Until 1971, the international monetary system of fixed rates provided domestic policy autonomy and monetary stability. As the system transformed to a floating rate arrangement, the dynamic of relationships of the international political economy also underwent change. Although the market and the financial system were more tightly linked, the interests of the stakeholders grew more widely apart. Governments of developing nations preferred the fixed exchange rates to ensure price stability and as a defense against capital flight.

On the other hand, liberal economists and international bankers welcome the flexible floating rate system. The latter benefits because the new standards and practices facilitate the movement of financial capital by putting countries in a competitive situation for financial capital and forces their governments to be less inclined to yield to political pressures for currency controls. Examples of currency controls include subsidies, cheap credit, and credit rationing. These policies not only provide commercial advantage to local industries but also buffer the system from a volatile international financial market.

The outcome of these events has led to a reduction in the number of national currencies. As the international monetary system becomes less stable, there has been a rise of currency blocs and a trend toward *dollarization* (the use by one country of any major currency, be it the dollar, euro, or yen). Until a compromise between currency stability and domestic policy flexibility happens, many economists believe these

trends will continue or the global economy will begin to fracture.

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MONEY LAUNDERING AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Concealing or assisting in the concealment of illicit financial transactions. The term *money laundering* dates from the Prohibition Era of the 1920s, when large amounts of money generated from the illegal sale of alcohol had to be disguised as legitimate income. A common way of doing so was to purchase laundromats, which were cash businesses, and to hide illicit earnings by mixing them with legitimate profits.

Money laundering has become an important aspect of national security because terrorist organizations do not fund themselves like traditional governments. They support themselves instead through donations and illegal activities. The illegal arms and weapons trade is an important element in the maintenance and perpetuation of terrorist actions, and money laundering makes the source of these enterprises harder to trace. Money laundering also plays an important role in the illegal drug trade. The large profits generated by the sale of controlled substances have been used to finance terrorist activities, a problem referred to as *narcoterrorism.*

In 1996, the International Money Laundering Information Network (IMoLIN) was established under the auspices of the United Nations to develop a database to help detect illegal transactions. The United Nations has also launched the Global Programme Against Money Laundering. In addition, most nations devote federal law enforcement resources to combat money laundering. In the United States, both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Treasury Department have money laundering task forces.

Besides facilitating the illicit sale of arms and drugs, money laundering has other adverse effects. It can hamper economic growth, particularly in the developing world where many illegal arms and drug dealers operate. Money laundering causes large amounts of cash to flow into and out of local economies, causing volatility in interest and exchange rates and contributing to inflation. In addition, money laundering activities in poor countries siphon billions of dollars per year away from legitimate projects that promote long-term development. This undermines political stability, which can create foreign security problems for the United States.

See also Arms Trading; Terrorism, War on International

MONROE DOCTRINE (1823)

Policy first outlined by James Monroe in 1823, warning the European powers to refrain from involvement in the affairs of the western hemisphere. He warned that "the Americas [were] not to be considered subjects for future colonization. . . . "

As the United States entered the 19th century, three events significantly augmented the young nation's confidence. First, Thomas Jefferson executed the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 and doubled the nation's size. Second, the United States successfully withstood a British invasion in the War of 1812. Finally, James Monroe carefully orchestrated the annexation of Florida from Spain in 1819. These successes against the European powers fostered the nation's belief in its Manifest Destiny, a belief that the nation would expand and become the preeminent nation in the world.

However, turbulent events in both Europe and the western hemisphere threatened this vision. During the Napoleonic wars, French and Spanish colonies throughout Latin America declared their independence and overthrew their colonial governments. However, by 1823, the Bourbon dynasty regained the thrones of both France and Spain, and the two nations avidly discussed their desire to recapture their former colonies.

This prospect troubled the United States. Well aware of its own colonial heritage, the United States harbored a strong sympathy for the newly independent Latin American states. Additionally, the United States feared that France and Spain also wanted to establish new colonies on the North American continent, thereby impeding America's westward expansion. Furthermore, Alexander II, the Russian czar, was aware of the French and Spanish plans and spoke openly of developing a colony along North America's Pacific coastline.

Amid this uncertainty, the American government received a surprising proposal. In October 1823, British Foreign Minister George Canning suggested that the United States and Great Britain publish a joint declaration, warning France and Spain to abstain from any involvement in Latin American affairs. Following the Napoleonic wars, Great Britain virtually monopolized oceanic shipping and trade, and feared that new Spanish and French colonies in Latin America would jeopardize its maritime dominance. To help deter their European rivals, the British solicited the support of the United States.

At first, the offer gratified President Monroe and his administration. An alliance with Great Britain would apparently signal the United States' emerging prominence. However, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams argued vehemently against the alliance. Adams believed that to join the militarily dominant British would exhibit subservience to Great Britain, which the United States fought a revolution to overcome.

Eventually, President Monroe rejected the British offer and issued his own solitary statement. In December 1823, Monroe used his State of the Union Address to outline three key positions that eventually became known as the Monroe Doctrine. First, the United States would not allow any new colonies to be established in the western hemisphere. Second, Monroe forbade any European involvement in the affairs of independent Latin American nations. Finally, Monroe asserted that the United States would not interfere with relations between the European powers and their existing colonies.

Monroe's proclamation was somewhat disingenuous. The United States lacked the power to enforce this new policy and would still need to rely upon Great Britain's support. Still, his speech depicted the United States as an emerging world power, positioning it as the foremost nation in the western hemisphere and establishing a precedent for future administrations to follow.

By 1860, Monroe's policy was officially called the Monroe Doctrine. The principle of American hegemony over the western hemisphere has subsequently provided the justification for such diverse events as the Spanish-American War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and even the funding of the Nicaraguan Contras during the 1980s.

See also Cuban Missile Crisis; Manifest Destiny

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MORGENTHAU, HANS (1904–1980)

A founding proponent of an approach to the study and practice of international politics known as political realism. As the father of the realist theory of international relations, Hans Morgenthau consistently argued that international politics is conflict-based and subject to the competitive nature of humankind. He remains the central figure in international relations scholarship and in the ongoing debate over the continued relevance of realist thought in the post–Cold War era.

The son of a physician, Morgenthau was born in Coburg, Germany, on February 7, 1904. He earned early degrees in law at the Universities of Munich and Frankfurt and practiced law until 1930. In 1932, Morgenthau went to teach in Geneva, Switzerland and eventually became a Professor of International Law at the Institute of International and Economic Studies in Madrid, Spain.

In 1937, Morgenthau came to the United States, seeking citizenship and intellectual freedom. Fluent in English, French, German, and Spanish, he held many teaching posts. His influence as a scholar of political science established, his book *Politics Among Nations* (1949) literally defined the field of diplomacy and the post–World War II shift in power alignments.

Realism is an approach to the study and practice of international politics, which claims that national interest is the primary motivator of international relations. National interest can be characterized by military, economic, political, diplomatic, or even cultural objectives, but it must be defined in terms of power. For the realist, power is important only in regard to its comparison and dominance over rival power. The ability to coerce, successfully defend, or achieve parity are important differences among states and the emphasis of the realist approach. Underlying the approach is the notion that international relations resides in anarchy, and states are motivated by their interests to either enforce or abandon agreements to maintain desirable order. In achieving this goal, nation-states must rely on their available resources, understanding that there is no authority over their sovereignty.

Until his retirement in 1971, Morgenthau was regarded as an intellectual giant in the truest sense. His dominance among scholars of the realist school of international relations was unquestioned. Yet Morgenthau had a vital moralist side that never outeclipsed his realism. Toward the end of his career, Morgenthau lamented the decline of the public realm. His liberal values found expression in his opposition to the Vietnam War, the subjugation of ethics to the values of the market, and the neglect of pressing issues such as housing and education.

MORTAR

A portable muzzle-loading cannon that fires shells indirectly at low velocities, short ranges, and high, arcing trajectories. Mortar is contrasted with larger artillery pieces, which fire at high velocities, long ranges, and low arcs. Present-day mortars consist of a lightweight tube that rests on a base plate and is supported by a bipod. The weapon is operated by dropping a mortar shell onto a firing pin in the tube that detonates the propellant and fires the shell.

TYPES OF AMMUNITION

In modern warfare, mortars up to 81mm can be carried by infantry and used as a small-scale, limited-range substitute for artillery. Mortars have the advantage of portability due to their size, freedom of movement without the need for logistical support, and capacity to be fired from a trench or defilade—protecting the operators from direct return fire. Due to its high trajectory, mortar fire can be used against enemy positions not protected by overhead cover such as trench lines, gun pits, or fighting positions.

HISTORY

The need to attack enemy strongholds from a distance, combined with advances in the field of metalwork, resulted in the invention of increasingly complex siege devices. Mortars were first used as siege weapons around the year 1500. These simple devices consisted of a tube roughly one meter in length and weighing more than 100 kilograms. Inserted into the ground at an angle, a round was dropped down the tube and propelled upward by an explosive charge. These weapons were popular in early modern European warfare despite their inaccuracy.

Although crude, unwieldy ancestors of the modern mortar were employed by the armies of Napoleon and the North and South in the American Civil War. The progenitor of most present-day mortars is the Stokes Mortar developed by the British Army in World War I. Designed in January 1915 by F.W.C. Stokes, it was used to counter German superiority. This weapons system could fire up to 22 rounds per minute at a range of 1,100 meters. The Stokes would be standard issue for the British through World War II.

The mortar made its presence felt in the fierce ground fighting of World War II. Mortars cleared the way for advancing Allied armies from the fields of France to the rugged hills of Pacific island outposts. The mortar also served American and allied fighting forces in Korea and Vietnam, in which enemy forces took advantage of the hilly landscape for concealment and were not always easily dislodged by direct fire.

Insurgents in Iraq have effectively used the firepower and mobility of mortars against American and coalition forces. A mortar can be easily fired on a coalition position and be withdrawn by its operators before return fire can be directed. Insurgents have also used mortars against concentrations of civilians and civic leaders to cause terror and political instability.

Since their inception 500 years ago, mortars have provided commanders in the field with an increasingly mobile means of attacking protected enemy positions with indirect fire. Although possibly ill-suited to present-day urban warfare operations in which the risk of civilian casualties is high, mortars continue to be used by our armed forces in an age where national security demands mobility.

MOUSSAOUI, ZACARIAS (1968–)

French citizen of Moroccan descent accused by the U.S. government of conspiring with members of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network of terrorists to perpetrate acts of terrorism on American soil. As of 2004, Moussaoui was the only individual to be charged in the United States in direct connection with the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, DC.

The U.S. government refers to Moussaoui as the 20th hijacker, alleging that he planned to be aboard the United Airlines plane that crashed in Pennsylvania before reaching its intended target. Moussaoui's ongoing trial was followed closely by legal experts, who have been looking for clues about U.S. government intentions for future handling of penal court cases against suspected terrorists. Four of the six charges against Moussaoui—including conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism and conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—carry the death penalty.

BEGINNINGS

In a book published in 2002 after the terrorist attacks, Zacarias Moussaoui's older brother, Abd Samad Moussaoui, described Moussaoui's troubled childhood and his subsequent attraction to a particularly violent strand of Islamic fundamentalism. Growing up in a racist environment in southern France, Moussaoui became very frustrated, which later provided an apparent justification for his adoption of an ideology of vengeful violence against Islam's "enemies."

Frustrated and angered by numerous failed attempts to find a job in his town, Moussaoui decided at the end of 1991 to relocate to London, where he pursued a master's degree in international business. It was in England that he came into close contact with a well-organized fundamentalist Islamic sect (called the Wahhabists), whose uncompromising belligerent ideology soon radicalized Moussaoui's already developing aggressive impulses. Enveloped in his newly found radical religious community, Moussaoui gradually grew away from his family back in France.

THE PLOT

According to U.S. intelligence, Moussaoui flew to Pakistan on December 9, 2000, where he remained for two months, allegedly meeting with suspected al-Qaeda members. Shortly after his return to England, he flew to the United States. Between February 26 and May 29, 2001, he attended the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma, but he did not receive a pilot's license despite undergoing extensive instruction.

Moussaoui's next destination was Minneapolis, Minnesota, where he trained on Boeing flight simulators with the Pan Am International Flight Academy. However, his behavior soon attracted the suspicion of

Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen of Moroccan descent who was indicted in December 2001 as a key figure in the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Still held in prison awaiting trial, Moussaoui maintains his innocence despite some evidence that suggests he was involved. Moussaoui was already being held in prison when the September 11 terrorist attacks occurred, and some critics contend that more investigation by the FBI and other intelligence agencies immediately after Moussaoui's arrest may have helped prevent at least one of the terrorist hijackings.

Source: Corbis.

the flight school staff, who contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). On August 15, 2001, Moussaoui was arrested for failing to renew his expiring American visa. At the time of the arrest, he was found to possess Boeing flight manuals, a flight simulator computer program, and a disk containing information related to aerial crop dusting.

The FBI failed to acquire a search warrant for Moussaoui's laptop, which would be examined only after the September 11 terrorist attacks. FBI critics have argued that if the FBI had accessed information on that laptop that connected Moussaoui (albeit indirectly) to several of the September 11 hijackers, the

terrorist attacks might have been averted. Although Moussaoui admitted his relationship with al-Qaeda, he denied any involvement in the September 11 plot.

See also Enemy Combatants; Islamic Fundamentalism; September 11/WTC and Pentagon Attacks; Terrorists, Islamic

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MULTILATERALISM

A foreign policy strategy in which a sovereign state chooses to pursue its international interests and goals in concert with many other sovereign states as well as international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The policy of multilateralism suggests that even the most powerful nations are ill-suited in the modern age to grapple effectively with global issues and challenges on their own. Although the pursuit of multilateralism requires states to relinquish some decision-making authority and freedom, proponents argue that such losses are outweighed by new capacities gained to achieve shared objectives (for example, economic dispute resolution systems, well-established opportunities for dialogue, and so on). Moreover, the negotiation of broad multilateral objectives often brings with it not only a heightened sense of legitimacy on the world stage but also the infusion of policy expertise by international organizations and NGOs.

The 20th and 21st centuries contain numerous examples of sovereign states taking multilateral actions and forming multilateral coalitions. These alliances have historically fallen under several basic rubrics. The first involves military endeavors, such as the formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the U.S.-led coalition in the Gulf War (1990–1991). A second type of multilateral action has involved economic arrangements, such as the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Another type of multilateral arrangement involves political associations; an example of this is the establishment of the United Nations (UN) or the Organization of American States (OAS). In recent years, multilateral actions are growing increasingly common in the areas of public health—including the founding of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)—and in human rights—including the evolution of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Multilateralism is a strategy most often embraced by second-tier powers (for example, Canada, Australia, and Denmark) that possess the economic wherewithal to participate on the world stage, but lack the individual military might to project their interests overseas. The record of multilateralism for superpowers such as the United States and the former Soviet Union is mixed at best. Critics are quick to claim that nations such as the United States often operate under the veil of multilateralism and then fail to embrace fully multilateralism's most important principle: The decision to take action is ultimately made collectively.

In 2002, for example, the United States made the case for the liberation of Iraq and the ousting of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein before the UN, claiming that it sought a multilateral approach and action. However, when the UN (and particularly Security Council members France and Germany) failed to adopt a second UN resolution authorizing the use of force, the United States opted to build its own coalition of allies. Had the United States fully embraced what is termed *principled multilateralism*, it would have considered the UN's decision as the final authority and not initiated the military campaign on its own.

Although the United States possesses more than one-half of the world's total military capability, which enables it to act unilaterally in the military sphere, its power is more easily checked in matters of international trade and economics. On several occasions, for example, U.S. membership in NAFTA or the WTO has meant that its disputes with other nations have been settled by international arbitration. When found at fault, the United States has accepted the decisions of multilateral organizations, albeit reluctantly, by changing policies or altering business practices. Given that the United States relies so heavily on the open international market for its prosperity at home, it often has little recourse but to accept multilateral decisions rather than take action alone.

See also Bilateralism; Unilateralism

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REFLECTIONS

The Grand Alliance

Americans and Europeans together built the greatest political-military alliance in history. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was at the core of our efforts to keep the peace in Europe for more than four decades. Since the Cold War ended, ten more nations have joined the NATO alliance. Why were they so anxious to join? And why do still others wait on the list to become members of this grand alliance?

The answer, I think, is rather simple. They want to join to be part of Europe, a Europe whole and free, but they also want to be part of a body that links the United States and Canada to Europe. They want to be part of a transatlantic community, a transatlantic community that at one and the same time promotes peace, prosperity and democratic values—the power of men and women to choose, to sustain government of the people.

—U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, 2003
Address to the World Economic Forum

MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES (MIRVs)

Vehicles mounted on a ballistic missile and containing several nuclear warheads, each of which may be programmed to strike a separate target. The multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) was developed to enhance first-strike capability of nuclear warheads by increasing the number of targets a single missile could strike. The MIRV is one of a number of nuclear weapons that can be transported by an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

The MIRV is distinct from the multiple reentry vehicle (MRV), which deploys multiple warheads against a single target. Because both MRVs and MIRVs can strike several different targets, they are more attractive to advanced nuclear powers such as the United States and Russia. Nations with less-advanced nuclear technology, such as India or Pakistan, prefer single warhead missiles because of the large amount of nuclear material consumed by multiple warhead missiles. In the U.S. nuclear arsenal, the Polaris sea-launched ballistic missile is an example of an MRV. The sea-launched Poseidon and Trident, and the land-based Minuteman and Peace Keeper, are MIRVs.

The idea for the MIRV dates to the early 1960s. A necessary condition for the deployment of MRVs was the creation of small thermonuclear weapons. The positioning of multiple space satellites at various orbits to direct the missiles was also essential. Both of these technological advances were accomplished by 1962, and the conception and design of multiple, separately targeted warheads could begin. Meanwhile, advances on Minuteman missile technology and the development of increased payloads allowed for an increase in the size of the weapons package and supporting equipment carried by ICBMs. This had taken place by the latter half of the 1960s.

The development of MIRVs coincided with the development of a national missile defense system in the United States. U.S. military planners assumed that the Soviet Union would try to deploy a similar defensive system. An important purpose of the MIRV was to circumvent antiballistic missile (ABM) systems that relied on intercepting individual warheads. Intercepting missiles would have only one warhead, whereas the MIRV would have anywhere from three to twelve. This would also increase the cost of any Soviet antimissile system.

The designers of the MIRV envisioned several important advantages over standard nuclear warheads. One advantage was the reduction of collateral damage. Aimed at enemy missile silos or bases, MIRVs could pinpoint targets so accurately that larger or more devastating warheads were unnecessary. Another advantage of the MIRV was that it reduced the number of missiles need to carry out a successful attack. Rather than launching several missiles, one missile could be launched to strike a number of targets across a vast geographic area, if desired.

Like other weapons systems, both offensive and defensive, the MIRV was also promoted for its peacekeeping capabilities. Proponents argued that it would serve to maintain the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the fact that the MIRV increased both U.S. first-strike capability and its response capability likely sped the momentum of the arms race rather than slowed it.

The development of the MIRV also undermined the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD), which was considered essential to prevent the outbreak

of nuclear conflict throughout the Cold War. The possibility that the use of nuclear weapons could never be justified by the consequences of a counterattack would be negated if one side had the capability to overwhelm the other with more warheads on fewer missiles. Fears of this possibility led to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in the 1990s. Under the START II treaty, signed in 1993 and finally ratified in 2000, all Peacekeeper MIRVs were to be removed from the U.S. arsenal by the year 2005.

See also Arms Race; Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs); Missiles; Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD); Nuclear Deterrence; Nuclear Weapons; Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

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MULTIPOLARITY

A state of world relations in which a multiplicity of power centers exist and wield strategic influence over global affairs, shaping political and economic change. The alternatives are the unipolar and bipolar systems. In the unipolar system, a single state assumes unchallenged superpower status; in the bipolar system, two sources or centers of power exercise a comparable measure of leadership and influence in global affairs.

The post–world war period has seen major changes in the nature of the international system. The 19th and early 20th centuries were characterized by a balance of power equation in which the power play between competing forces and nations was aimed at keeping each other's hegemonistic and expansionist tendencies in check. The only modern experience of a multipolar world without a dominant leader occurred between World War I and World War II.

At the end of World War II, a bipolar system emerged with the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, each with its respective diplomatic and military allies. This system lasted until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. After this historic event, the United States emerged as the only remaining superpower, with a level of military might and economic power that was unmatched in the modern world.

At the same time, however, a more complex yet subtle multipolar distribution of global power has also emerged, involving new and unique relationships among an expanded number of states belonging to the international community. This multipower distribution includes regional weights, such as Japan and the European Union (EU), as well as the growing power and influence of China and India—which together account for more than one-third of the world's population.

A new pattern of global power has emerged, owing to some of the same forces that led to the breakdown of the bipolar world. These forces included mutual deterrence (invoked by states as a result of its increased military and, in some cases, nuclear capability); the emergence of Western Europe as a prosperous, dynamic, and self-confident group of nations; and the gaining of independence by colonial societies throughout Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Arab world.

The new and complex multipolar world order has been accompanied by a process of regionalization intensified by the pressure exerted by globalization. All regions are experiencing the formation of zones of cooperation or integration. These zones are based on geographic proximity and shared cultural features, although they also serve the end of joint self-assertion in the face of an increasingly globalized world, which is sometimes seen as a threat to political autonomy, cultural identity, and economic competitiveness. Due to these same developments, as well as competing and opposing views on global engagement, the emergent multipolar order also threatens the claim by the United States to world leadership.

After the end of the Cold War and the rise of the United States as the only power capable of global action, the United States generally acted in accordance with the maxim—as much unilateralism as possible and as much multilateralism as necessary. Military might was seen as the necessary prerequisite of its superpower status. Yet, with a pentarchy of new power centers emerging—the EU, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States—a number of international political realities and trends are beginning to refute the U.S. claim to unipolar hegemony.

Foremost among these realities is the inability and unwillingness of the United States to police the entire world. The formation of antihegemonic alliances (between Russia and China, for example) and efforts to establish a counterpower through regional cooperation and integration projects are taking shape. The European

Union's launch of the euro was not only a monetary project but a political one as well. Also, as the world has become transnational and interdependent, even a military superpower like the United States is unlikely to maintain a unipolar world order in the long run.

Some experts have described the emergent international system as the *unimultipolar system*, with one superpower and several big powers. In today's world, military power alone does not determine the ranking of nations in the global competitive order. Technological potential and systemic competitiveness have become increasingly important, so the United States is being increasingly forced to seek international cooperation, especially in the economic realm.

As the age of globalism unfolds and releases forces that are beyond the control of individuals, groups, and nation-states, it will force these entities to adjust to a continuously changing reality. The resulting interdependence will necessitate more cooperation—both politically and economically—between countries. For the same reason, it is also likely to facilitate the reemergence of multipolarity as the defining characteristic of the new world order.

See also Bipolar System; Superpower; Unilateralism

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MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR)

Talks between the United States and Soviet Union during the 1970s and 1980s aimed at achieving parity in the level of conventional forces stationed in Europe. The agreements made during the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations were incorporated into the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), which was signed in late 1999.

The first MBFR negotiations took place in Vienna, Austria in 1973. The United States proposed to withdraw 29,000 troops from Europe in return for Soviet withdrawal of 1,700 tanks and 68,000 troops. That would be followed by a reduction by both sides to a total of 900,000 troops apiece. The Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviet Union, proposed removing 20,000 soldiers apiece and freezing troop strengths at this reduced level. Afterward, each North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact country would reduce its forces by 15%.

Differences in the two sides' negotiating positions stalled the talks, which would continue off and on with little progress for years. Warsaw Pact proposals were met by NATO counterproposals, and these in turn generated counter-counter proposals. Little of substance was accomplished until 1988, when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced plans for a unilateral 500,000 troop reduction in Soviet forces and the withdrawal of 50,000 troops in Europe by 1990.

In 1989, NATO and the Warsaw Pact agreed to establish a new forum to negotiate troop reductions in Europe. The MBFR talks formally ended February 9 and were replaced by the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) on March 9. However, events overtook the parties with the unraveling of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe in 1990. This led to questions about the future of the Warsaw Pact, which complicated the issue of troop levels. The forces of Warsaw Pact nations were included in Soviet troop levels, but the USSR could no longer be sure these countries would remain allies.

On November 19, 1990, 22 nations, including the United States and the USSR, signed the CFE, which initially covered only reductions in equipment. The issue of troop reductions was deferred for the time being. Under the treaty, both sides agreed to limit their forces in Europe to 20,000 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, 30,000 armored personnel carriers, 2,000 attack helicopters, and 6,800 combat aircraft apiece. Within a year of signing the treaty, however, the Soviet Union collapsed, replaced by an alliance of newly independent former Soviet republics called the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The replacement of the USSR by the CIS once again delayed ratification of the treaty. Each of the nations in the CIS had its own armed forces, and each would now have to agree to troop and equipment limits. In addition, many of these new states had troops from the Russian republic in their territory (although only one of 12 Soviet republics, Russia, dominated the former Soviet Union). Many wanted to negotiate

the removal of those troops at the same time as the reduction of equipment in Europe.

In July 1992, the Russian Parliament ratified the CFE, ensuring the cooperation of the largest and most militarily powerful former Soviet republic. Difficulties with verifying equipment reductions and differences over issues such as the application of the treaty to the former Soviet republics in Central Asia delayed final approval of the CFE for another seven years. The CFE was signed by 30 nations on November 19, 1999.

See also Arms Control; Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE); Gorbachev, Mikhail; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Soviet Union, Former (Russia) and U.S. Policy; Treaties; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR); Warsaw Pact

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MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION (MAD)

Principle of deterrence in which opposing parties with nuclear arsenals recognize that each could annihilate the other and therefore do not attack. Immediately after dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II, the United States and the world realized that they were facing a new kind of security environment. Unlike traditional weapons, a single nuclear bomb was capable of destroying an entire city; and many nuclear bombs could destroy a country as a functioning society. When the Soviet Union, the rival superpower to the United States, acquired the bomb in August 1949, global security changed forever.

Suddenly, two hostile powers had the capability to utterly destroy one another. This resulted in a security dilemma at the survival level and required a new kind of logic. Because both sides would want to launch preemptive attacks and destroy the other's arsenal (to prevent the same kind of attack on themselves), nuclear war was likely to break out, although both sides were certainly averse to the idea. The only way to counter such

a possibility was to accept mutual vulnerability and mutual destructive capacity—a concept that became known as mutually assured destruction (MAD).

This acceptance was gained through the development of second-strike capacity (massive retaliation). According to this logic, the United States and the Soviet Union should protect their arsenals from attack so that one would be capable of destroying the other, even if attacked first. Both countries accordingly kept their defenses on hair-trigger alert to avoid being placed at a disadvantage; they could respond within minutes to a nuclear strike. Both had extensive targeting lists, showing which cities should be struck within the rival nation, and in what order.

The United States and the Soviet Union recognized that an attack could destroy the enemy but would also result in self-destruction. Both countries accepted this reasoning. Both countries also asserted that they would attack only if fired upon, and the threat of nuclear destruction was sufficient to prevent both from cheating. MAD asserted that the best way to avoid a nuclear war was to realize and accept its potential consequences.

The logic of MAD became even more bizarre— both countries needed to ensure that they could truly devastate the other for a second-strike doctrine to be acceptable. Therefore, each country needed to build its nuclear arsenal to make certain that it could launch a more effective second strike if it would become necessary (and make the other country believe that an overwhelming counterattack would follow a strike). Yet, as each country built up its arsenal in this kind of defensive maneuver, the other perceived the buildup as threatening and expanded its own arsenal, resulting in an escalating arms race as each side sought a relative advantage. Ironically, however, the point of having a highly developed weapon system in a MAD world was that the weapons should not be used.

This kind of deterrence logic was developed and used in the 1950s and 1960s, most particularly during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Postures changed somewhat in the 1970s and 1980s, as both countries began to think about alternative forms of offense and defense. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were looking for ways in which they might take leads in the arms race and move beyond MAD to a strategy of assured survival. The United States began developing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) for this purpose and explored space technology for the launching of missiles, earning the SDI program the nickname *Star Wars*.

Both countries also began to look into the practicalities of enhancing defensive systems. In 1972, some argued successfully that building up defenses was counterproductive in a world of MAD logic because it would simply induce the other party to create stronger offensive weapons and accelerate the arms race. Defensive arms were previously rejected for that reason. During the Reagan administration, others asserted that limited defenses in the form of antiballistic missiles (ABMs) might actually slow the arms race and would be of some value if relations between the superpowers deteriorated. They would raise the costs of attack and protect the American people better.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the new imbalance in power relations, MAD has become irrelevant. The former nuclear deterrence principle is being gradually replaced by a strategy of cooperative threat reduction (a mix of defense and deterrence). The balance of power shifted in favor of the United States, and the unequal strategic positions of Russia—and China, which has gained recognition as a nuclear power—called for different kinds of nuclear deterrence, including a new form of MAD: minimal assured destruction. During the administration of President Bill Clinton, there were even suggestions of a new kind of strategy altogether: mutual assured safety.

Despite the numerous instances of seeming illogic, MAD was an effective form of deterrence for a number of years. It raised the cost of attack so high that deliberate nuclear strike became almost unthinkable. Although there were instances in which it seemed that mutual destruction was a possibility, recognition of the imminence of self-destruction was sufficient to prevent attack and retaliation.

See also Arms Race; Cold War; Deterrence; Nuclear Deterrence; Nuclear Proliferation; Nuclear Weapons

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
UNITED STATES
NATIONAL SECURITY

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RICHARD J. SAMUELS EDITOR

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

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A DWJ BOOKS Reference Work

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NAGASAKI

Japanese city that was the target (on August 9, 1945) of the second U.S. atomic bomb dropped in World War II. The bombing effectively ended the war because Japan surrendered within days.

Three days before the bombing of Nagasaki, the United States dropped the world's first atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima. Most U.S. military and government leaders felt that a single bomb would be sufficient to convince Japan to surrender. However, when the bombing of Hiroshima did not produce an immediate Japanese response, the decision was made to drop a second bomb. In addition, the Los Alamos scientists who developed the bomb wanted to determine whether a uranium- or plutonium-based bomb worked better. The Little Boy bomb dropped on Hiroshima used uranium; the Fat Man bomb destined for Nagasaki used plutonium.

Nagasaki was not the first choice of targets for Fat Man. Although it had major shipbuilding facilities and a military port, it was bombed five times in the preceding year, so the impact of the atomic bomb would be obscured by the already damaged condition of the city. Also, Nagasaki was spread over hills and valleys and broken by waterways. The three primary targets for the second bomb were Kokura, Kyoto, and Nigata. Kyoto dropped off the list because it was a sacred city to many Japanese, and the United States feared that bombing it would only stiffen Japanese resistance. After Nigata was eliminated because it was too far away, the choice came down to Kokura. However, on the day of the raid, the weather over Kokura was too cloudy to

sight the target properly. *Bock's Car*, the B-29 bomber carrying Fat Man, then headed for Nagasaki, which was also clouded-over. A last-minute break in the clouds allowed the bomb to be dropped.

The devastation at Nagasaki was almost as terrible as that at Hiroshima. Fat Man obliterated an area 2.3 by 1.9 miles square. Reports of deaths varied according to different sources. The 1953 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey estimated 35,000 dead, 60,000 wounded, and 5,000 missing because of the bomb. The Japanese in 1960 cited a figure of 20,000 dead and 50,000 wounded. A later report by the Nagasaki Prefectural Office claimed that the bombing resulted in 87,000 deaths and the destruction of 70% of the industrial zone. Because Nagasaki was a frequent target of American bombers, the residents became somewhat casual in their response to air raid warnings. As a result, people did not seek shelter as early or as urgently as they might otherwise have, and many more lives were lost than necessary. On the other hand, Nagasaki's hilly and broken topography helped limit the amount of damage and the spread of fires.

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain controversial. Defenders of the bombings cite the massive casualties—some estimates predicted a million lives—that an invasion of Japan would have cost. Critics claim that the weapons were too horrific and that nothing justified their use on civilians. They argue that the United States should have targeted military facilities or an unoccupied site as a demonstration of the bomb's power. Many opponents are especially critical of the decision to drop a second bomb after the destruction of Hiroshima. Proponents respond by pointing out that the bombing of Hiroshima did not

force Japan to surrender, which necessitated dropping another bomb. Although the controversy is unlikely to be settled, the bombing of Nagasaki remains the last time nuclear weapons were used in combat.

See also Atomic Bomb; Hiroshima; Nuclear Weapons; World War II (1939–1945)

NANOTECHNOLOGY

The science of constructing devices at the molecular level. Taking its name from a nanometer (one-billionth of a meter), nanotechnology is poised to change numerous aspects of industrial technology; it also promises potentially wide-ranging social ramifications.

Everything in the physical world is composed of atoms, and the properties of any material depend on how its atoms are arranged. Arranging carbon atoms one way produces coal; arranging them in a different way produces diamonds. With modern technology, scientists can rearrange the atoms in sand, add in other elements, and produce computer chips. However, current manufacturing methods at this low level are very crude.

Today's computer chips are produced by etching electrical circuits onto a silicon wafer in a process known as lithography. Using this technique, chip designers can manipulate bits of silicon approximately as small as a micron (1,000 nanometers). With nanotechnology, however, designers could manipulate pieces of silicon thousands of times smaller, thus dramatically reducing the size of computer chips. Nanotechnology has been heralded as the next major leap in the evolution of computing.

Research in nanotechnology began in the late 1950s, when the famed physicist Richard Feynman (who worked on the Manhattan Project that developed the atomic bomb) gave a talk titled "There's Plenty of Room at the Bottom." Feynman envisioned the ability to manipulate atoms and molecules directly by developing machine tools at one-tenth scale. These tools would then be used to help develop one-hundredth scale machine tools, and so on until a truly microscopic scale was reached. As the tools get smaller, however, the relative strength of various forces, such as gravity and surface tension, would change. This would require redesigning some tools to account for these changes.

In the late 1980s, development of the scanning tunneling microscope (STM) by Gerd Binnig and Heinrich Rohrer made true nanotechnology research and development possible. The STM allows the imaging of solid surfaces with unprecedented resolution, down to the nanometer level. This process gives researchers the opportunity to move molecules and fabricate new, never-before-seen particles and devices. Since that time, the U.S. government has become increasingly involved in nanotechnology research. Government-sponsored spending on nanotechnology has risen from $116 million in 1997 to nearly $1 billion in 2004. Meanwhile, private industry is investing billions more in nanotechnology research and development. The National Science Foundation has predicted that the nanotechnology goods and services market could reach $1 trillion by 2015.

The U.S. military is especially interested in nanotechnology. Among the current military research related to nanotechnology are efforts to reduce the weight and increase the strength of armor, produce advanced protective materials for soldiers, develop sensors for biological and chemical agents and land mines, and make ever-smarter weapons. The development of smaller thermonuclear devices with decreased radioactive fallout also appears possible. Many other countries are also at work on military applications of nanotechnology.

Besides studying its possible beneficial uses, the U.S. government is also concerned about possible negative effects of nanotechnology, which could compromise national security. One of these concerns is the possibility of creating *grey goo*—out-of-control, self-replicating nanomachines. One of the principles of nanotechnology is that the devices created with it would be capable of making copies of them without human direction. Opponents of nanotechnology worry that science will be unable to control the nanodevices it creates. A similar fear is *green goo*—the creation of artificial molecules that could displace or destroy vital natural elements, leading to ecological catastrophe.

Some critics also fear widespread economic disruption from nanotechnology. Because nanotechnology could be used to produce an infinite variety of products cheaply and quickly, those who control the technology would be able to force competitors out of business. Because few people would be needed to run nanotechnology enterprises, this could lead to massive unemployment and social breakdown. The owners of nanotechnology would wield immense power disproportionate to their numbers and would not be answerable to the public for their actions. The possibility of

such wide-ranging societal effects represents new challenges to national security in the 21st century.

NARCOTICS, WAR ON

Enforcement of laws prohibiting the sale and distribution of controlled substances, such as marijuana, cocaine, heroin, MDMA ("ecstasy"), LSD, and a number of others. Under U.S. law, the term *narcotic* refers specifically to opium and opium derivatives. Although coca and cocaine are technically not narcotics, they are classified as such under the Controlled Substances Act. The phrase *war on narcotics* is often used interchangeably with the phrase *war on drugs*.

Although narcotics can be consumed in a variety of ways, most commonly they are smoked, sniffed, or injected. Effects depend upon dosage, previous drug history, and the mood of the user. In the short term, narcotic use generally results in a sense of euphoria, happiness, or general well-being. Long-term effects include loss of energy, sleeplessness, nausea, dilation of blood vessels, constipation, diarrhea, and vomiting.

Health risks associated with drug use are infection, overdose, and diseases. The use of needles for intravenous injection can result in AIDS or hepatitis, and the fact that drug use is primarily a subculture makes nonsterile practice common. In addition, the supply of illegal street drugs is by nature unregulated; therefore, the purity of a substance is often impossible to determine.

Repeated narcotic use leads to increased tolerance and addiction. The development of tolerance creates the need to administer progressively larger doses to achieve the same effect. Physical, emotional, and psychological dependence occur as the user's body comes to require the substance to avoid feelings of withdrawal. Narcotics users move from using the drug for recreational purposes to requiring the drug to function normally. Withdrawal symptoms include depression, watery eyes, runny nose, sneezing, anxiety, loss of appetite, tremors, nausea, and vomiting. Withdrawal also involves bone and muscle ache, excessive sweating, and spasms. Psychological dependency tends to result in relapse even after the physical withdrawal is complete. The amount required to induce a fatal dose increases proportionally over time with tolerance; although there is always a point that will constitute an overdose.

Although abuse of narcotics can be initiated by exposure through medical treatment, most people begin drug use because of social interaction. The social acceptance of drugs and their influence upon and reflection in popular culture makes the war on narcotics increasingly complex.

HISTORY OF NARCOTICS INTERDICTION

The first law specifically targeting the use of narcotics was an ordinance passed in San Francisco in 1875, which prohibited the smoking of opium in opium dens. At the time, construction of the west-east portion of the transcontinental railroad was dependent upon Chinese labor; this legislation against opium is often associated with general fears about Chinese immigrants and the corrupting influence of Asian culture. Federal laws followed, prohibiting Chinese from trafficking in opium; however, laudanum, a drug containing opium and popular in the wider culture, remained legal. During the same period, cocaine was used in the manufacture of Coca-Cola.

The Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, passed in 1914, was the first comprehensive federal drug law that regulated the manufacture, importation, and distribution of narcotics. The proximate cause for the Harrison Act was the U.S. occupation of the Philippines following the Spanish-American War (1898), after which the U.S. government was confronted with the question of how to deal with the regulation of opium use for the first time. At the time, opium use was legal in the Philippines under a licensing system. A commission was established to study alternatives to this system, resulting in a recommendation that narcotics be subject to international control.

A series of international opium conferences followed, which also dealt with concerns over the so-called *opium wars* between Great Britain and China. The outcome was the Hague Convention of 1912, which has the distinction of being the first international narcotics agreement. Meanwhile, in the United States, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan urged the passage of the Harrison Act as a gesture of compliance with the desires of the international community.

The purpose of the Harrison Act was simply to regulate narcotics; however, it was interpreted more broadly and had the effect of tightly curtailing the availability of opiates in the United States. In 1924, the importation of heroin was banned outright. Other drug laws followed, including the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, which is often associated with prejudice against Mexicans crossing the border to find work during the Great Depression.

WAR ON NARCOTICS

The current war on narcotics began in 1972, when President Richard Nixon used the term *war on drugs* to refer to U.S. domestic drug policy. The phrase echoed President Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty, which established the Social Security Act of 1965, implementing Medicare and Medicaid. The phrase has since become popular as a way of indicating a high level of intent toward dealing with a specific problem or situation. However, like other metaphorical wars, the war on narcotics is highly controversial.

Attempts to deal with domestic drug problems in the 1970s came to focus on

Sailors off load more than 3,000 pounds of cocaine.
Source: Corbis

elimination of drug production. The vast majority of cocaine was produced in Colombia, South America, so the U.S. government began pressuring the Colombian government to participate in helping end the drug trade. Drug smuggling grew from small-scale operators flying into the United States on commercial airliners to a highly profitable, organized business that brought in hundreds of millions of dollars. Attempts by the Colombian government to interfere with large-scale operators like the Medellín cartel and the Cali cartel nearly drove the country of Colombia into civil war. Thus, the domestic war on narcotics had the unintended consequence of nearly setting off an actual war outside of the United States.

Domestic efforts have focused on education and mandatory minimum sentencing. A policy of zero tolerance for narcotics distribution and possession was declared, and the phrase *zero tolerance*, like *war on . . . ,* has also been repeatedly invoked with reference to a wide variety of other topics. However, zero tolerance policies, with regard to controlled narcotics, have come under increasing criticism for resulting in the incarceration of large numbers of individuals in an already overcrowded prison system. The fact that minorities constitute the vast majority of those thrown in jail under minimum sentencing for narcotic use, distribution, and possession adds to the controversy.

Antinarcotic education programs have focused on adolescents. Those best known are the Just Say No campaign, begun during the Reagan administration, and the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program. The success of these campaigns has been difficult to measure. Criticism has centered on the fact that all drugs—from so-called soft drugs such as marijuana to more serious narcotics such as cocaine—are all treated similarly. In addition, drug campaigns are forced to contend with the complexities of peer pressure and the content of popular culture.

PAST EXPERIENCE AND FOREIGN EXAMPLES

The failure of Prohibition in the early 20th century is regarded by many as indicative of the problems currently faced by agencies waging the war on narcotics. By contrast, Europeans, who historically have taken a far more liberal approach toward drug use, today demonstrate lower rates of crime associated with drug use than is found in the United States. Explanations range from the value of demystification to the constructive treatment of drug addiction as a health problem.

—*William de Jong-Lambert*

See also Drug Cartels; Narcotrafficking

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NARCOTRAFFICKING

International transfer and sale of illegal narcotics. Narcotrafficking is a feature of the so-called war on narcotics or war on drugs. In regard to the United States, narcotrafficking refers to the production of drugs such as cocaine, heroin, marijuana, hashish, or other controlled substances in a foreign country and their subsequent illicit importation to this country. Although the term *narcotic* defines only opium or opium derivatives, the term is generally applied to all illegal drugs.

The negative impact of opium brought into the United States by foreign nationals was first formally recognized by the passage of the first drug law in the United States—in San Francisco at the end of the 19th century. Aimed at the Chinese immigrant population, the law prohibited the smoking of opium. Throughout the 20th century, the United States passed a series of laws banning the production, sale, and possession of a variety of drugs, including alcohol during the 1920s. The ineffectiveness and unpopularity of Prohibition led to its repeal in the 1930s, but other drugs have remained illegal.

During the administration of President Richard Nixon, a public antidrug campaign was launched called the War on Drugs. The program was the product of a number of factors, including research linking different kinds of drugs with rising crime rates, the growing social acceptance of drugs such as marijuana among young people, and reports about the use of more serious drugs, such as heroin, by U.S. troops in Vietnam. The increased government focus on drugs led to prescriptions for interdiction at the level of importation and production. South America and the country of Colombia in particular became the focus of these efforts.

The trafficking of illegal drugs into the United States changed dramatically in method and scale during the 1970s. As demand for cocaine grew, drug cartels developed, which functioned as organized crime networks handling every stage of the process. Drugs were produced in jungle laboratories and then transported in large shipments north to the United States. The method of transporting these drugs across the border and into the major cities changed from being dependent upon individual smugglers to involving the use of private aircraft. The volume thus transformed as well, from the amount that one smuggler could carry, to the amount that could be transported by a small plane.

As profits grew, so did competition. The Medellín drug cartel in Colombia dominated the cocaine trade until the 1980s, when the group was supplanted by the Cali cartel. The Cali cartel worked in conjunction with the Colombian government and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to destroy the Medellín cartel. As a result, the Cali cartel grew more successful. Although the Cali cartel itself was finally liquidated in the 1990s, its leaders are said to be operating the cartel from behind bars.

Since becoming the focus of the international antidrug effort by the United States, Colombia has ceded its central role in production to Mexico, so the primary point of entry into the United States has shifted from Florida to California.

Meanwhile, the focus on the production and illegal importation of drugs into the United States has shifted to a focus on the role of the illegal drug trade in terrorism. The terms *narcoterrorism* and *narcoterrorist* have emerged to describe the use of profits from the sale of illicit substances to fund terrorist activities. By associating drug use with support for terrorism, the new strategy focuses on cutting the demand for drugs in the United States.

See also Drug Cartels; Terrorism, War on International

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NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CENTER (NACIC)

Early post–Cold War effort to improve the use and coordination of U.S. counterintelligence information. The National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC) was

created through a 1994 presidential directive by President Bill Clinton. President Clinton signed the directive after a review of U.S. counterintelligence, which was shaken by the revelation that senior U.S. operative Aldrich Ames was a longtime Soviet spy. The directive defined counterintelligence as "information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorist activities."

The Ames investigation made clear that various federal agencies needed to increase their cooperation, accountability, and integration of crucial counterintelligence information. It found a particularly worrisome communications failure between the intelligence community and law enforcement communities. In response to these shortfalls, the NACIC was meant to serve as an interagency forum for reviewing complementary national-level intelligence activities and promoting interagency cohesiveness and information sharing. The directive established the NACIC as an independent federal entity, initially headed by a senior executive of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which employed representatives from a wide range of government agencies, including the armed forces, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), FBI, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of State, and Defense Security Service.

Based at the CIA, NACIC reported to the National Security Council (NSC) through the National Counterintelligence Policy Board. The board, also created through the 1994 directive, was the principal mechanism for reviewing and proposing legislative initiatives and executive orders related to U.S. counterintelligence to NSC staff. The center also worked toward creating a better understanding between the federal counterintelligence community and private industry, as well as raising public awareness of threats such as economic espionage. Along those lines, the NACIC produced many publications, including the classified *Counterintelligence Digest*, which summarizes current concerns by country and subject matter. The center also distributes an unclassified annual report to Congress on foreign economic information collection and industrial espionage.

In 2001, President George W. Bush signed a presidential decision directive that replaced the NACIC and the National Counterintelligence Policy Board with the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) and the National Counterintelligence Board of Directors. The NCIX, under the provisions of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002, serves as the head of national counterintelligence for the U.S. government, subject to the direction and control of the president.

See also Clinton, Bill (William Jefferson), and National Policy; Economic Espionage; Espionage

NATIONAL DEFENSE EDUCATION ACT (NDEA)

Federal legislation passed in 1958 providing aid to education in the United States at all levels, both public and private. Instituted primarily to stimulate the advancement of science, mathematics, and modern world languages, the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) has also provided assistance in other areas, including technical education, geography, English as a second language, counseling and guidance, school libraries, and educational media centers. The act also provided for low-interest loans to college students. The NDEA is considered the most important federal law concerning higher education since the 1862 Morrill Act.

Cold War rivalries between the United States and the Soviet Union led to the passage of the National Defense Education Act of 1958. The successful Soviet launch of Sputnik, the first satellite to orbit the earth, and well-publicized American space failures induced a climate of national crisis. Critics pointed to the educational deficiencies of American students, especially in mathematics and science.

Thus, Congress passed the NDEA to help ensure that highly trained individuals would be available to help the United States compete with the Soviet Union in scientific and technical fields. President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the NDEA on September 2, 1958. Because of the NDEA, federal expenditures for education more than doubled in the years that followed. For higher education, this included funding for federal student loan programs, graduate fellowships in the sciences and engineering, aid for teacher education, and increased funds for curriculum development.

In the United States, education was (and remains) primarily a state and local governmental responsibility. States and communities—as well as public and private organizations—establish schools and colleges, develop curricula, and determine the requirements for enrollment and graduation. The NDEA recognizes this local control of education; the act prohibits federal direction, supervision, or control over the curriculum,

program of instruction, administration, or personnel of any educational institution.

The NDEA laid the foundation for further federal legislation concerning education. These acts include the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965), Higher Education Act (1965), Education for All Handicapped Children Act (1975), Goals 2000: Educate America Act (2000), and No Child Left Behind Act (2001).

See also Cold War; Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy

NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL (NDP)

Independent congressional body formed in 1996 to conduct a major review of U.S. military security policy and structure. The nine-member National Defense Panel (NDP) was chaired by Philip Odeen, chief executive officer of the private information technology firm BDM International.

In 1997, the NDP released its final report, titled "Transforming Defense—National Security in the Twenty-First Century." The NDP recommended that the "United States must take a broad transformation of its military and national security structures, operational concepts and equipment, and the Defense Department's key business processes" and accelerate changes already under way. Four years before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, the report identified the threats posed by terrorist groups and rogue states. It warned of their potential acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and called for improved homeland defense.

The authors of the report also advised spending between $5 and $10 billion to ward off these threats while continuing to reduce the U.S. nuclear stockpile. In his introductory letter to Secretary of Defense William Cohen, NDP Chairman Odeen stated that "We are convinced that the challenges of the 21st century will be quantitatively and qualitatively different from those of the Cold War and require fundamental change to our national security institutions, military strategy, and defense posture by 2020." He wrote that the NDP report expanded on the latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which was also conducted in 1997, but looked farther into the future and offered a more developed transformation strategy. Mandated only to produce the report, the NDP disbanded after its release.

See also Homeland Security; Rogue State; Terrorism, War on International

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

A graduate-level institution for military officers and civilians from the United States and allied nations, consisting of four colleges, five strategic research centers, and one leadership training program. The National Defense University grants master's of science degrees in National Resource Strategy and National Security Strategy. University facilities are located in Washington, DC, and Norfolk, Virginia. More than 1,000 students are enrolled, and more than 500 master's degrees are awarded each year.

HISTORY

Before World War II, needs for advanced scholarship in military strategy were met separately by each service branch on an ad hoc basis. The bloodiest war of the 20th century, however, brought to light the need for closer ties between the military, the defense industry, and the diplomatic community. The founding of the National War College (NWC) and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) in the immediate aftermath of the war addressed this need.

In 1976, the NWC and ICAF joined to form the National Defense University, which expanded with the addition of the Joint Forces Staff College in 1981 and the Information Resources Management College the following year. In 1993, another key milestone in the history of the National Defense University was passed when President Bill Clinton signed legislation granting the school authority to award master's degrees. This was in response to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which reemphasized the importance of joint services experience for the nation's military officers. The first master's degrees were awarded on June 15, 1994.

RESEARCH CENTERS

The National Defense University administers five research centers to broaden understanding of strategic areas of the world and one program to develop civilian leadership skills. The Center for Hemispheric Studies, founded in 1997, educates civilians from Western Hemisphere nations in military affairs. The Defense Leadership and Management Program was inaugurated the same year to develop leadership skills among civilians working in the defense field.

In addition, the year 2000 saw the establishment of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the Near

East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, and the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs. Of these, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies is particularly notable for its role in fostering democratic governance in Africa through courses geared to civilian and military leaders from the continent. The Center for Technology and National Security opened its doors in 2001 to study the relationship between technological development and defense planning.

PRESENT AND FUTURE

In the present global security environment, the role of joint operations, regional knowledge, and personal diplomacy is paramount. To meet these needs, which will play a vital role in global security, the National Defense University prepares military and civilian leaders from around the globe to face present and emerging security threats through education in military strategy and application of the latest technology, as well as foreign culture and strategic thinking.

See also War Colleges

A member of the Texas National Guard (Lieutenant General Wayne D. Marty) saluting the American flag during the 49th Armored Division formation as Apache helicopters fly over in July 2004. The oldest military force in the United States, the National Guard consists of citizens trained as soldiers and aviators. Service in the guard has often been viewed as a part-time job, but approximately 40% of the U.S. troops stationed and fighting in Iraq since 2003 have come from either the guard or the Army reserves. As of September 2004, more than 90,000 members of the Army Guard were deployed to Afghanistan and other countries in the front lines of the war on terrorism.

Source: U.S. Army.

NATIONAL GUARD

Reserve component of the U.S. military that is organized on a state-by-state basis and is under state, rather than federal, control. An outgrowth of the early state militias of the American colonial period, the U.S. National Guard is the oldest organized military structure in the United States. It also has the unique distinction of providing an armed force that serves both a federal and state mission.

The first state militia was established in Massachusetts in 1636 by the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. By the time of the American Revolution, every state had its own militia. During the Revolutionary War, the militia played a significant role in defeating British forces and actually fought in greater numbers than the Continental Army. In 1787, the U.S. Constitution mandated the maintenance of a militia as well as a regular army. The state militia system existed side by side with the U.S. Army until 1903, when Congress reorganized the state militias into the National Guard system.

The National Guard plays a unique dual role among U.S. military units. It has both a federal and a state mission, and both federal and individual state governments dictate the size, structure, and implementation of national guard units. U.S. National Guard servicemen and servicewomen hold the joint position as a U.S. soldier and a soldier from their respective state. There are 54 national guard organizations for the United States: one for each of the 50 states, and one each for Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Washington, DC.

The National Guard is administered by the National Guard Bureau, a joint bureau of the Army and Air Force. The National Guard Bureau administers the federal regulations and missions of the Army and Air National

Guard. The federal mission of the National Guard is to maintain well-trained and well-equipped forces, whose size is mandated at the federal level, for fast mobilization in times of war or national emergency. The National Guard's state mission includes providing peace, order, and public safety, and responding to emergencies such as natural disasters. The state mission requires National Guard personnel to report to their state's governor.

The National Guard is divided into two branches, the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. Although both fulfill the dual state and federal mission, each is charged with specific reserve roles to reinforce active duty U.S. military personnel. The Army National Guard's mission is to train, equip, and maintain forces to assume crucial combat, combat support, and combat service support roles. The Air National Guard similarly plays a unique role in accordance with its federal mission. The Air National Guard provides almost half of the tactical airlift support, combat communications functions, and aeromedical evacuation capability for the entire Air Force. It is charged with maintaining well-trained and equipped forces in support of the broader Air Force.

Both the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard also figure prominently in U.S. homeland security policy. The Army National Guard has become a central component of homeland security policy because the National Guard's state-by-state organization allows it to respond quickly to emergencies and crises at home. The Air National Guard holds responsibility for U.S. domestic air defense.

The National Guard was called upon to play a major role in both the Gulf War of 1991 and the Iraq War of 2003. The latter war placed severe strains on the National Guard because troop shortages required many Guard troops to serve past their discharge dates. This practice, called *stop loss*, along with quick rotations that put units back into action after only a brief time at home, had a negative impact on recruiting and retention rates. This has become a subject of concern among military planners. With its expanded role as both a military reserve and homeland defense force, the National Guard is perhaps more important now than it has been since the American Revolution.

See also Gulf War (1990–1991); Homeland Security; Iraq War of 2003; Militia; Reserve Forces

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NATIONAL INTERESTS
See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

System for which planning began in the United States in the 1960s to guard against a nuclear attack. The concept of missile defense is a product of the Cold War, a time in which the international framework was determined by competition between the two global superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union.

During the Cold War, both superpowers possessed overwhelming arsenals of nuclear weapons, so the prospect of nuclear war played a central role in diplomatic relations between them. The purpose of a National Missile Defense system would be to intercept nuclear missiles before they could strike the United States. Thus, the initiative was conceived as purely defensive. However, the fact that an impermeable defense umbrella would also undermine the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD)—the idea that neither side would start a nuclear war because the consequences of retaliation were too severe—put the development of a National Missile Defense system at the center of arms negotiations in the early 1970s.

EARLY PROJECTS

The Nike-Zeus Program, initiated in the late 1950s, introduced the ultimately unpalatable prospect of nuclear missiles being used to intercept nuclear missiles. The Nike warhead would detonate in the vicinity of the incoming Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), thus destroying the enemy missile. The risks to the project were obvious, and the potential countermeasures (such as decoys) were easily imaginable. The Nike-Zeus project was therefore abandoned in 1961.

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara announced the Sentinel program in 1967, in the midst of the Vietnam War. Rather than attempting to account for a general nuclear attack against the United States, the Sentinel was

envisioned specifically to safeguard against a nuclear attack from China. (It was assumed that China would be capable of launching an intercontinental ballistic missile by 1970.) A secondary advantage of developing the Sentinel system is that it allowed the United States to continue arms-reduction talks with the Soviet Union because the program was not directed against it. Opposition to the Sentinel program became part of the more general protest movement at the time against the Vietnam War. The Sentinel system was ultimately abandoned and replaced with a program called Safeguard to defend ballistic missile sites in North Dakota.

The development of the Sentinel raised the problem of MAD. The possibility that a nation might feel forced to initiate a preemptive strike—realizing that after the system was in place it would have no retaliatory capability—led to the signing of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty in 1974. It also left open the question of how a defense system could be developed that would not be perceived as offensive.

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), better known as Star Wars, was initiated during the administration of President Ronald Reagan as a system that would provide a space-based defense umbrella for the United States. Reagan's stated goal was to share the technology with the Soviet Union, thus negating the question of MAD. Funding for SDI began in 1984, but the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s removed motivation for the project. Star Wars has been reinvented to serve in the war on terrorism with President George W. Bush's National Missile Defense program.

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

Work on a missile defense program continued under President Bill Clinton, but with little momentum. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, provided a new rationale and a new approach to the concept of missile defense. President George W. Bush announced the National Missile Defense program in 2002, soon renamed the Ground-Based Missile Defense system because the idea of ground-based interceptors seemed, at least in the short run, to be more technologically feasible. In recognition of the U.S. role as the sole remaining global superpower, the purpose of the system is projected to guard against acts of nuclear terrorism. However, the question of whether any kind of missile defense system—deployed against terrorists or another nation—could ever be effective remains controversial.

See also Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

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NATIONAL POWER, DETERMINANTS OF

Factors that dictate a state's strengths and weaknesses in its relations with other nations.

A state's national power determines whether it can obtain what it wants and whether it can influence others to do what it wants them to do.

States draw national power from several sources, including the size of their populations, their natural resources, and their geographic position. A state's national power also depends upon how effectively it exploits, organizes, and uses these different resources. In their relations with other states—including hard power, soft power, and economic power—states possess and use various types of national power.

HARD POWER

The threat of force or the actual use of force to compel another state to do something or refrain from doing something is called hard power. For example, in September 2001, the United States threatened to invade and forcibly remove the Taliban regime in Afghanistan if it did not hand over international terrorist Osama bin Laden. When the Taliban refused, the U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan the following month and quickly ousted the Taliban regime. Both the U.S. threat of force and its actual use of force constituted hard power.

To increase hard power, a state can build up its military capabilities. If a state is strong militarily, it can coerce other states effectively and resist coercion itself. Currently, the United States is the strongest military power in the world and thus exhibits immense hard power. Its military spending in 2002 and 2003 was greater than the military spending of the next nine spenders combined. The U.S. possesses the world's most advanced military technologies, including its sophisticated nuclear arsenal and vast space technologies. These assets set the United States apart from any other state in the world.

Other factors also contribute to a state's hard power. Surrounded by two oceans, the United States' geographic position protects it from land-based threats. Meanwhile, the fact that it lies on two oceans allows it to project its sea power worldwide. The United States can also draw from its huge population and extraordinarily abundant natural resources. The legitimacy of the U.S. government and the public support that the government receives also contribute to the United States' military effectiveness and thus its hard power.

States have accumulated and used hard power in different ways throughout history. During the 19th century, Britain used its naval prowess to create an empire. It used the natural resources drawn from its empire to further strengthen its navy. In contrast with the United States, the small island nation came to dominate the globe despite its lack of natural resources and a small population at home.

SOFT POWER

In contrast with hard power, a state can use soft power to influence a targeted state by persuading it, rather than coercing it, to alter its behavior. If the targeted state can be convinced that the change is beneficial to its condition, it does not have to be coerced. Positive national image, persuasive leadership, strong cultural affinities, economic trade, and international prestige all contribute to a state's soft power. A state can use its soft power to co-opt other states and build relations of *complex interdependence*, in which states become linked through mutually beneficial economic and social exchange.

Throughout the Cold War, the soft power of the Western states was exhibited in their ability to persuade the members of the Soviet bloc of the benefits of liberal democracy and capitalism. Such persuasion was consciously conducted through cultural exchanges between East and West and through the projection of media programs, such as Radio Free Europe, into the East.

Perhaps more importantly, the Western states set an example for the East with the prosperity that they attained with their liberal economic and political policies. The allure of the West's economic and political success gave it an advantage over the Soviet Union in winning the allegiance of the states of Eastern Europe. This contributed to the momentum that brought down the Berlin Wall in November 1989. With the collapse of the Soviet Union two years later, the countries of Eastern Europe aligned their political and economic policies with those of the West.

ECONOMIC POWER

A third way in which a state can affect the behavior of other states is by using economic power. Economic power is determined by the degree to which a state can affect the flow of goods or the level of prices in the international economic system. Economic power can be wielded by offering positive incentives or by imposing economic sanctions. Because of the degree to which most states rely on international trade, economic power is an important factor in determining relations in the international system.

A state can offer positive incentives to induce another state to change its behavior. The United States, for example, might offer most-favored-nation (MFN) status to another country, which lowers trade barriers and allows the other country access to lucrative U.S. markets. In the 1980s, the United States granted China MFN status, but this status would have to be renewed every year. The United States was content to renew China's MFN status until the Chinese crackdown on prodemocracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Since then, the U.S. has used renewal as a way to pressure China to modify its human rights policies.

Sanctions are another way in which a state can wield its economic power. Sanctions can include the imposition of embargoes or the freezing of the overseas assets of a targeted state. In the midst of the Iranian revolution in 1979, student protesters overtook the U.S. embassy in Tehran and held dozens of Americans hostage. To force the Iranian revolutionary leadership to free the hostages, U.S. President Jimmy Carter froze $8 billion of Iranian assets in the United States and imposed a complete economic embargo on Iran. On January 20, 1981, the Iranian leadership agreed to release the hostages in exchange for having the assets unfrozen and the embargo lifted.

States can form cartels as a way of concentrating economic power. The most prominent example is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). OPEC is a cartel in which 11 major suppliers of oil collude to control prices and supplies. The clearest demonstration of OPEC's power came during the oil crisis of 1973. On October 17, 1973, the OPEC countries declared that they would refuse shipment of oil to states that supported Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War against Egypt. The shock of this embargo had wide-ranging international effects. Western European and Japanese foreign policies shifted toward favoring Arab countries, and the United States transferred fuller control of oil production in Saudi Arabia to the Saudi government.

Statecraft involves the use and interaction of all three types of national power. Hard power is often referred to as the stick that is coupled with the carrot of positive economic incentives to induce a target state into changing its behavior. Proponents of soft power do not question the significance of a state's hard power or economic power. They simply propose that states have other national means, such as persuasion, through which they can influence the behavior of other states. The most powerful states in history have relied on all three types of national power.

See also Economic Sanctions; Interdependence

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACT (1947)

Congressional act that reorganized the structure of the U.S. armed forces following World War II. The National Security Act created the office of secretary of defense to oversee the nation's military establishment, as well as separate departments for each branch of the armed forces. It also provided for the coordination of the military with other departments and agencies of the government concerned with national security.

The stated goal of the National Security Act was "to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States" and "to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to national security." To accomplish these goals, the act made several organizational changes. It replaced the former Department of War with a Department of Defense (DoD), and included the departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy (which also included the U.S. Marine Corps) under the DoD.

The reorganization was intended to create a clear and direct line of command for all military services, to eliminate the duplication of effort in the DoD (particularly

in the fields of research and engineering), to provide more efficient and economical administration in the defense establishment, to provide unified strategic direction for the armed forces, and to facilitate the operation of the military under unified command—but not to establish a single chief of staff over the armed forces nor an overall armed forces general staff. However, the act did establish the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to advise the president on military strategy and planning.

The National Security Act placed a tremendous amount of emphasis on the coordination of national security with the intelligence community and its many capabilities. Most notably, the legislation created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and established the position of director of central intelligence, which was charged with managing the CIA as well as overseeing the entire intelligence community. As specified in the National Security Act, the intelligence community included not only the CIA but also the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the National Reconnaissance Office, along with other intelligence and reconnaissance-related offices within the DoD and the individual services.

The National Security Act also established the National Security Council (NSC) to assist in the coordination of the nation's security assets. The NSC includes the president, vice-president, the president's national security advisor, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, and other presidential appointees approved by the Senate. The NSC also manages smaller subcommittees to address threats to national security.

See also Department of Defense, U.S. (DoD); Joint Chiefs of Staff; National Security Agency (NSA); National Security Council (NSC)

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA)

A cryptological agency of the U.S. government, which is responsible for the security of government communications as well as the collection and analysis of foreign communications through the Internet, radio, and other means. Part of the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency (NSA) is headquartered at Fort Meade, Maryland, and employs an estimated 35,000 staff members.

The roots of the NSA can be traced at least as far back as its predecessor, the short-lived Armed Forces

Security Agency, founded in 1949. Although the goal of that agency was to coordinate all cryptological analysts under one organization, the agency failed in its mission because of a lack of centralization.

The United States thus entered the Cold War without a truly effective cryptology service. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, which took the United States by surprise, the country needed to unite its civilian and military code specialists under one roof. This led to the creation of the NSA.

The NSA was created by a classified executive order from President Harry S. Truman in June 1952. It went to work immediately, providing intelligence to the military in Korea under its first director, Army Lieutenant General Ralph Canine. In 1957, amid mounting Cold War tensions, the NSA moved to its current headquarters in Fort Meade to place it out of harm's way in case of a possible nuclear attack on the nation's capital. With the world on the brink of war in the 1961 Cuban Missile Crisis, the agency closely followed Soviet naval communications and helped avert tragedy by informing President John F. Kennedy that Moscow had turned its ships around in the face of the U.S. blockade of Cuba.

The NSA faced its next big challenge in Vietnam, where specialists were dispatched four years before the first U.S. Marines landed at Da Nang in 1965. Cryptologists were sometimes forward deployed during the 10-year U.S. campaign in Southeast Asia, risking and sometimes losing their lives to intercept enemy communications. After the last combat troops pulled out of South Vietnam in 1972, NSA specialists stayed to the end at the U.S. embassy in Hanoi to provide secure communications and intelligence on the communist North.

During the Cold War, research conducted by the NSA had considerable spillover effect into everyday civilian life. The agency's research contributed to the development of the supercomputer, cassette tapes, the microchip, semiconductors, nanotechnology, and data encryption. In 1993, the highly secretive organization offered the public a glimpse into its activities with the opening of the National Cryptologic Museum at NSA headquarters, in which memorabilia such as the World War II German Enigma machine and the recently declassified Cray computer can be viewed.

With the end of the Cold War and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, the NSA is gearing up to adapt its human and material resources to a far more agile, shadowy threat than the Soviet Union. Twenty-first century telecommunications have enabled anyone with sufficient knowhow to intercept and encode communications. Not only can terrorist organizations and insurgents in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan fully exploit this modern technology to call others to arms, but they have also demonstrated the ability to communicate effectively by low-tech means not vulnerable to NSA eavesdropping.

In the new century, the NSA thus faces the challenge of adapting to new technologies and new equally versatile adversaries who unfortunately have demonstrated the threat they present to the security of the United States.

See also Department of Defense, U.S. (DoD); Intelligence and Counterintelligence

NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives, formerly the House Committee on Armed Services, which is a standing committee of Congress concerned with national security issues. The National Security Committee is responsible for supervising the activities of and making appropriations to support the military forces of the United States.

Composed of approximately 55 members of Congress and a staff more than twice as large, the National Security Committee includes five subcommittees with responsibility for military installations and facilities, military personnel, military procurement, military readiness, and military research and development. The committee was established on January 2, 1947, as a part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, by merging the Committee on Military Affairs and the Committee on Naval Affairs. The committee has jurisdiction over military and naval activities and appropriations, as well as oversight jurisdiction to review and study on a continuing basis all laws, programs, and government activities dealing with or involving international arms control and disarmament and the education of military dependents in schools.

The committee also has jurisdiction over ammunition depots; forts; arsenals; Army, Navy, and Air Force reservations and establishments; the common defense in general; conservation, development, and use of naval petroleum and oil shale reserves; and general aspects of the Department of Defense (DoD). The

House of Representatives granted the committee additional legislative and supervisory authority over merchant marine academies, national security aspects of the merchant marine policy and programs, and interoceanic canals. The enabling legislation for the committee codified the existing jurisdiction of the committee over tactical intelligence matters and the intelligence-related activities of the DoD.

In practice, the committee has interests that range far and wide. In 1997, for example, topics considered by the committee included ballistic missile defense, base realignment and consolidation, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The committee also covers lesser concerns, such as the shooting down of two army helicopters in Iraq before the Iraq War of 2003, prisoners of war and troops missing in action from the Vietnam War and the Korean War, and extremism within the ranks of the military. Working in conjunction with the U.S. Senate and the executive branch, the committee is a key actor in the national security process.

See also National Security Act (1947)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC)

Agency established by the National Security Act of 1947 to coordinate foreign and defense policy and harmonize diplomatic and military policies and engagements. The National Security Council (NSC) is the principal forum in which the president of the United States discusses and shapes national security and foreign policy issues. The function of the NSC is to advise the president in these areas and coordinate policy among government agencies. The importance and role of the NSC has varied with the managerial style of each president and his personal relationships with the principal members.

The NSC is chaired by the president. Although the National Security Act established the secretaries of defense and state as key members, the vice president, secretary of the treasury, and national security advisor are also regular NSC attendees. In addition, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) serves as military adviser, and the director of central intelligence holds the title of intelligence adviser to the NSC. The president's chief of staff, the counsel to the president, and the assistant to the president for economic policy

can also attend NSC meetings. The attorney general and the director of the Office of Management and Budget attend meetings when the subject matter falls under their jurisdiction. Other senior officials attend meetings when necessary.

Although the NSC was established by the National Security Act of 1947 to coordinate foreign policy and defense issues, in reality this stipulation gave way to the understanding that the NSC would directly serve the president in an advisory role. The NSC is, in fact, often a forum for the president to control and encourage cooperation among competing departments.

During the administration of President Harry S. Truman, the secretary of state was the dominant player on the NSC. The military experience of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, however, reshaped the NSC into an elaborate staff structure to monitor implementation of key foreign policy decisions closely.

In the 1960s, President John F. Kennedy initially relied on Secretary of State Dean Rusk to handle diplomacy, but he soon turned to the national security advisor and other ad hoc groupings of experts and associates when it became apparent that the state department lacked sufficient authority over other departments. Kennedy also dismantled Eisenhower's NSC staff structure, which blurred the distinction between policy making and implementation that had been clear under his predecessor. President Lyndon B. Johnson often relied on informal groups of experts and friends for advice on diplomatic issues. The elaborate NSC machinery established during the Eisenhower administration continued to shrink in the Johnson years.

During the administrations of presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, the NSC staff, under the direction of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, provided intelligence to the national security advisor who, in turn, presented the president with a range of decisions on foreign policy issues. This arrangement reflected the executive style of President Nixon, who preferred detailed written evaluations to informal advisory groups. Although Kissinger attempted to restore the distinction between policy formulation and its execution, as secretary of state he frequently found himself performing both, such as the negotiation of the 1973 Paris peace accords to end the Vietnam War.

President Jimmy Carter continued to rely on his national security advisor as a primary source of foreign affairs consultation. National security staff members were recruited and managed to fit this arrangement.

However, the national security advisor's proximity to the president created tensions among other NSC members, which were often noted in the press.

In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan returned to a collegial style of policy making, with his chief of staff coordinating between and among cabinet members. This arrangement, however, eventually collapsed amid highly publicized conflicts between department heads. NSC staff emerged as a separate entity vying for power during this time.

Reagan's successor, President George H. W. Bush, brought considerable foreign policy experience to the presidency and successfully restored a collegial approach to foreign policy issues in the NSC. President Bush reorganized the NSC to include a principal's committee, deputies committee, and eight policy-coordinating committees. The NSC guided U.S. diplomacy during such crucial events as the fall of the Soviet Union, German reunification, and Operation Desert Storm.

President Bill Clinton continued to emphasize an informal, collegial approach within the NSC during his two terms in office. Clinton also expanded NSC membership to its present form by officially including the secretary of the treasury, the ambassador to the United Nations, the assistant for economic policy, the president's chief of staff, and the national security advisor.

Entering into the 21st century, President George W. Bush molded the NSC into a close circle of advisers to direct the global war on terrorism following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the Iraq War of 2003. Because President Bush particularly valued loyalty among his advisers and associates, those with dissenting views resigned or found their influence diminished. Among NSC members in the Bush administration, the vice-president, secretary of defense, and national security advisor are among those who have wielded the most influence in shaping foreign policy and military deployments.

Since the National Security Act of 1947, the NSC has played a central role in shaping and implementing U.S. foreign policy. Although the membership of the council and the influence it wields have changed significantly over nearly 60 years and nine presidents, National Security Council members are a steady hand guiding American diplomacy through turbulent times.

See also National Security Act (1947); National Security Agency (NSA)

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE (NSDD)

Highest-level documents issued by modern U.S. presidents pertaining to all elements of U.S. national security policy: foreign policy, defense policy, intelligence, and international economic policy, as well as organizational structure and initiatives. These directives are signed or authorized by the president and issued by the National Security Council (NSC). Many recent directives are classified as top secret or higher and have been given different names by different presidential administrations.

Documents from the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, called NSC policy papers, combined a study of a particular subject with policy recommendations. These papers were accepted in their original form and became the basis for policy or were sent back by the NSC for revision. A less formal system was introduced in the Kennedy administration, which instituted the National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM), a series of study directives and decision directives. Study directives are commissioned by the NSC or other government agencies to perform studies and serve as aids to decision making. Decision directives announce policy decisions, but might also ask for studies and reports. Sources for the studies and implementing documents include a wide range of government agencies, including the departments of state, defense, and justice, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

Each administration assigned new names for the directives. Thus, study memoranda and decision directives became presidential review memoranda (PRMs) and presidential directives (PDs) in the Clinton administration. The practice of separating decision and study directives ended when President George W. Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1 in February 2001. That directive abolished both the presidential decision directives (PDDs) and presidential review directives (PRDs) of the Clinton administration and replaced both with the NSPD series.

A recent variation of security directives came in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC. President Bush designated special presidential directives called homeland security presidential directives (HSPDs) to be issued by the president of the United States with the

advice and consent of the Homeland Security Council. The first such directive created the Homeland Security Council, whereas the second changed immigration policies to combat terrorism.

—*John D. Becker*

NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION ACT OF 1991

The brainchild of U.S. Senator David Boren of Oklahoma, federal legislation that created the National Security Education Board, the National Security Education Program, and a trust fund in the U.S. Treasury to provide resources for scholarships, fellowships, and grants.

In December 1991, President George H.W. Bush signed the National Security Education Act, which has a three-part mission. The act leads in developing the national capacity to educate U.S. citizens to: (1) understand foreign cultures, (2) strengthen U.S. economic competitiveness, and (3) enhance international cooperation and security.

The National Security Education Board is composed of 13 members, 7 of whom are senior federal officials, and 6 of whom are senior nonfederal officials appointed by the president of the United States. The board provides program policies and direction, as well as determining the criteria for the awards and recommending critical areas that the program should address. Supporting the board is a broadly-based group of advisers composed of distinguished Americans in the field of higher education—people who have international expertise.

The overall objectives of the National Security Education Program include equipping Americans with an understanding of less commonly taught languages and cultures that will enable the nation to remain integrally involved in global issues related to U.S. national security. The act also aims to build a critical base of future leaders, both in government service and in higher education, who have cultivated international relationships with, worked with, and studied alongside experts of other countries.

Another objective of the National Security Education program is to develop a cadre of professionals who have more than the traditional knowledge of language and culture and can use this ability to help the United States make sound decisions about and deal effectively with global issues related to U.S. national security. Finally, the legislation aims to enhance institutional capacity and increase the number of faculty who can educate U.S. citizens toward achieving these goals.

Scholarships, fellowships, and grants are made to both undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in educational institutions. They can include domestic as well as international components of language and training in regions deemed critical to the United States. One unique condition of the awards for this program is the requirement that within five years of earning their degrees, recipients must serve in the federal government, working in the general area of national security.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

Plan that dictates the overall political and military goals of the United States and the methods used to accomplish those goals. A nation's security strategy is driven by its perceived national interests—those objectives the nation sees as vital to its survival.

EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Throughout most of its early history, the U.S. national interests focused on laying claim to all of North America, with its vast natural resources. This goal was summed up in the phrase *Manifest Destiny*. The United States, according to this belief, was destined to expand across North America.

In his farewell address, the nation's first president, George Washington, warned his colleagues in government against becoming involved in "foreign entanglements." Washington's advice and the notion of Manifest Destiny led the United States to adopt an isolationist foreign policy. Avoiding international politics as much as possible, the government's main security concerns were internal challenges such as the regional dispute over slavery and conflicts with Native Americans.

The Spanish-American War of 1898 ushered in a major change in U.S. national security strategy. With its victory, the United States gained possession over Spanish colonies in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Suddenly, the United States had several foreign possessions; this made avoiding international politics extremely difficult. Even so, the United States made significant efforts to remain apart from foreign political disputes. When World War I started in 1914, the United States remained neutral. Only a series of extreme German provocations finally brought the United States into the conflict in 1917.

The United States reverted to an isolationist stance soon after the war's end, declining to the join the post-war League of Nations. By this time, the United States possessed the world's largest economy and was the most rapidly growing new global power. Nevertheless, it chose to absent itself from world affairs. This decision undermined the authority of the League of Nations and emboldened countries such as Germany and Japan to ignore the League's efforts to maintain peace in Europe and Asia.

When World War II began in 1939, the United States again chose to remain neutral, although the U.S. government provided significant nonmilitary assistance to Great Britain. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 ended U.S. isolationism, both in World War II and after. At the end of the war, the United States was one of two superpower nations left standing, along with the Soviet Union. The two nations, although allied to defeat Nazi Germany, were ideological enemies.

After the war, Soviet attempts to spread communism by force led the United States to abandon its historical isolationism. For the next half-century, the national security strategy of the United States would be defined by Cold War politics. The Soviet Union was the nation's primary enemy, and stopping the expansion of Soviet influence and the spread of communism were the main goals of U.S. strategy during this time.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked a sea change in U.S. national security strategy. That event not only eliminated the object of U.S. strategic planning for the past 45 years but also produced a host of new issues that shaped U.S. national security strategy for the 21st century. Many former Soviet-dominated nations erupted in civil war or attacked one another as long-suppressed ethnic and religious hatreds burst to the surface. Dealing with failed states

and the resulting ethnic and civil conflict were important security issues of the 1990s.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, introduced a new element into U.S. national security policy. Although international terrorism had been a problem for years, the direct and devastating attack on U.S. soil gave the issue a new immediacy. Combating international terrorism and rogue states that supported it became the centerpiece of U.S. national security strategy.

CURRENT STRATEGY

In September 2002, President George W. Bush unveiled a comprehensive new national security strategy for the United States. Key components included combating terrorism, promoting democracy and free trade, support for offensive actions to protect America, and qualified support for multilateral security operations.

Fighting Terrorism

Terrorism, the premeditated and politically motivated attack of innocent civilians, was identified as the number one security threat for America and the world. The current plan to challenge terrorism is a three-pronged strategy: targeting terrorists and those who support them, bolstering homeland defense, and contributing to development in impoverished countries that are likely to be breeding grounds for terrorists.

U.S. operations in Afghanistan can be understood as a direct challenge to terrorist organizations and the states that support them. The Iraq War of 2003 was justified by the Bush administration's claim that President Saddam Hussein was a supporter of terrorism and had the potential to provide weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorists. Current diplomatic pressures on Libya and Iran are further evidence of the Bush administration's commitment to targeting terrorist-friendly states. A policy of regime change, adopted by President Ronald Reagan during the 1980s, has again found favor as an integral component of U.S. national security. Whereas regime change under Reagan was characterized by covert attempts to overthrow unfriendly regimes, the current administration favors regime change that is carried out overtly and with significant military backing.

The current national security strategy also aims to combat terrorism by increasing resources for homeland defense. Policies regarding airport security and

immigration have been particularly targeted to combat terrorism, with more federal oversight of airline security and significantly stricter immigration policies in the post–September 11 era. In addition, the administration created a new department devoted entirely to issues of domestic security: the Department of Homeland Security.

In an attempt to decrease the number of terrorists in the future, the U.S. national security strategy also recognizes the importance of development assistance. In societies in which poverty is rampant and opportunities are few, terrorists often have little difficulty recruiting members. As such, the current security strategy calls for increasing the reach of democracy and economic aid to impoverished countries that have historically been the birthplace of terrorists.

Free Trade and Democracy as a Security Strategy

Since September 11, the promotion of free trade and democracy has been articulated as critical to the security interests of the United States. Establishing democracy has been a central goal of the Bush administration, particularly in states that formerly harbored terrorists. In Afghanistan and Iraq, democracy is seen as the antidote to the emergence of extremist regimes and terrorism. China has also been targeted as a key state to undergo a democratic transformation, with many in the Bush administration believing that a democratic China would be less threatening than a communist China.

Free trade has been suggested as a powerful weapon in the fight against terrorism because it might help improve the economies of severely impoverished nations. This is seen as critical in decreasing the number of recruits for terrorist activities. Further, some observers have argued that the anti-American sentiment behind the terrorist attacks of September 11 was economically motivated. They suggest that other nations are not content with the increasing wealth of the United States and the continued impoverishment of much of the rest of the world. To the extent that free trade can address this disparity, it might be helpful for decreasing future terrorist attacks.

OFFENSIVE SECURITY POSTURE

The current national security strategy can be characterized as offensive in nature. The Bush administration has adopted a proactive strategy for instigating regime change, preventing the potential spread of WMD, and dismantling terrorist cells before they attack. This has been a point of significant controversy, with some suggesting that the United States, in its desire to fight terrorism, is actually being unjustly aggressive. Such a criticism can be heard from key U.S. allies in Europe, as well as domestically. Thus far, however, the United States has remained committed to this offensive security posture, choosing to act unilaterally and without United Nations approval in the war in Iraq.

THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES

Despite a penchant for offensive security measures that have not always received support from American allies, the current national security strategy does emphasize the importance of global cooperation in the war on terrorism and the preservation of peace. Current security policy calls for the strengthening of NATO as well as its expansion eastward across Europe. Further, increased and improved information sharing among governments is seen as critical in the war on terrorism, and the United States has been quite successful in opening information channels among European allies; the sharing of information has had more limited success among African, Middle Eastern, and Asian allies.

The United States has also recognized the importance of multilateral assistance in nation building, with the United Nations and several foreign governments providing financial aid, military support, and technical assistance in the rebuilding of Afghanistan and Iraq. This multilateral approach has clear limits, though, with current national security policy stating that when necessary, the United States will not hesitate to act unilaterally to protect its security.

NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

U.S. national security strategy in the 21st century is likely to continue to focus on nonstate actors and the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. The threats of rogue states, as well as the difficulties of failed states, are likely to remain strong challengers to the security of the United States. It is too early to assess whether long-term development strategies will prove to be effective insurance against threats to American security, but certainly such programs will be closely monitored

for their efficacy. Finally, U.S. national security strategy currently contains strands of unilateralism and multilaterism, and the balance between these two principles will likely be a critical question in the coming century.

—Erica Bouris

See also Border Policy; Bush Doctrine; Bush, George W., and National Policy; Cold War; Communism and National Security; Containment and the Truman Doctrine; Democracy, Promotion of, and Terrorism; Development, Third-World; Globalization and National Security; Grand Strategy; Homeland Security; Immigration and National Security; Interventionism; Isolationism; Manifest Destiny; Multilateralism; New World Order; Preemptive War Doctrine; Terrorism, War on International; Trade and Foreign Aid; Unilateralism

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NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY REPORTS

Annual reports to Congress that describe the national security goals of the United States and the strategies used to accomplish those goals. The reports, which are prepared by the National Security Council (NSC), examine various issues that shape national security goals, including U.S. foreign policy, military and security commitments overseas, and current national defense capabilities. They also feature proposals for the short-term and long-term use of political, economic, and military power to promote U.S. interests, and they evaluate the effectiveness of these elements of national power in supporting national security strategy.

Section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 calls for the president to submit a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States to Congress every year. A sitting president must present both the national security strategy report and the following year's federal budget to Congress on the

same date. A newly elected president must submit the report within 150 days of taking office. The report is submitted in two forms: a classified version for officials with high security clearances and an unclassified version available to the public.

The first national security strategy report was NSC-68, presented to Congress by President Harry S. Truman in 1950. Truman's report focused on the growing rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union since the end of World War II. It outlined the doctrine of containment—the worldwide use of American political and military power to resist the spread of communism—that dominated U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War era. Each president since that time has submitted reports that have reflected the most pressing national security issues of the day and indicated the direction of national security policy.

The national security strategy report submitted by President George W. Bush in September 2002 signaled a major change in U.S. security policy. Since the 1950s, the United States pursued a policy of deterrence—the threat of massive retaliation to prevent attacks against it or its allies. The report of September 2002 called for a new policy of preemption, in which the United States announced its intention to strike at enemies it perceived as threats before they actually attacked.

This change came about largely because of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States. The Bush administration maintained that the United States could no longer afford to wait until it was attacked by terrorist groups or states that support terrorists to respond to the threat they posed. In addition to changes in military policy, the report also proposed changes in the structure and organization of the U.S. military to enable it to meet these new security challenges.

Despite its focus on armed threats, the national security strategy report considers more than military policies and strategies. For example, the September 2002 report outlined diplomatic and economic policies to work with other nations and international organizations to defuse conflicts around the world. It also presented plans to promote the spread of free market economic principles and to reduce the toll of HIV and AIDS and other infectious diseases. These aspects of the report reflected the belief that providing effective national security depends as much on addressing economic and social challenges as it does on meeting military threats.

—John Haley

See also National Security Agency; National Security Council (NSC); NSC-68 (National Security Report); September 11/WTC and Pentagon Attacks; Terrorism, War on International

NATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. COMMISSION ON (USCNS)

A federal advisory commission, more commonly known as the Rudman-Hart Commission, formed under President Bill Clinton and funded by the secretary of defense, established to look comprehensively at how the United States provided for its own security since the National Security Act of 1947.

Cochaired by Senator Warren Rudman and Senator Gary Hart, the U.S. Commission on National Security (USCNS) included 12 other prominent Americans chosen by the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, and the national security advisor. The commission released three reports over three years (1999–2001) that warned of the potential for terrorist attacks at home, and offered a long list of short- and longer-term reforms.

The report, whose final volume was released shortly before the September 11, 2001, attacks, warned that "attacks against American citizens on American soil causing heavy casualties are likely over the next quarter century." It added, "These attacks may involve weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass disruption," and that "The United States is today very poorly organized to design and implement any comprehensive strategy to protect the homeland."

Chartered in 1998, the USCNS's project was intended as a study that would last two and a half years, and was divided into three phases of research. The first report, completed on September 15, 1999, entitled, "New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century," endeavored to describe the world as it would emerge in the first quarter of the 21st century. Among its conclusions, the report stated that "America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and our military superiority will not entirely protect us," and "Foreign crises will be replete with atrocities and the deliberate terrorizing of civilian populations."

The second phase of the report, completed on April 15, 2000, entitled, "Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom," attempted to devise a U.S. national security strategy to deal with the world in 2025. The report defined an American strategy based on U.S. interests and key objectives. It outlined a "strategy for America to reap the benefits of a more integrated world to expand freedom, security, and prosperity and to dampen the forces of instability."

The third and final report, "Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for Change," was completed on February 15, 2001. That report recommended "significant and comprehensive institutional and procedural changes throughout the Executive and Legislative Branches in order to meet the challenges of 2025." The report suggested major changes to many of the executive branch departments and recommended the creation of a department of homeland security.

The USCNS consisted of Gary Hart and Warren Bruce Rudman as cochairs, with 12 additional commissioners: Anne Armstrong, Norm R. Augustine, John Dancy, John R. Galvin, Leslie H. Gelb, Newt Gingrich, Lee H. Hamilton, Lionel H. Olmer, Donald B. Rice, James R. Schlesinger, Harry D. Train II, and Andrew Jackson Young, Jr.

—Eric Watnik

See also Homeland Security, Department of; National Security Act (1947)

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NATIONALISM

Political concept in which a group of people living in the same area derives a common identity from shared governance. Nationalism is what causes the people of a territory to recognize one another as sharing the same general goals and encourages them to work

together toward those goals honoring that nation above all others. It is also what gives the government legitimacy and allows it to make decisions in the name of the citizenry.

CHARACTERISTICS OF NATIONALISM

Nationalism stands in contrast to group identity based on race, ethnicity, language, or religion. However, any or all of these elements can be associated with the nationalism of a particular country. For example, most modern European countries arose from related linguistic and ethnic groups. Thus, shared language and ethnicity play a role in the nationalism of those states. By contrast, the borders of most modern African states were drawn by European colonial powers in the 1800s, ignoring the local distribution of ethnic and linguistic groups. As a result, many of these nations contain several distinct—and often historically hostile—groups that compete for power and resources. This has been the source of much of modern Africa's instability.

Nationalism in the United States stemmed largely from the shared economic and political sentiments of British colonists in 18th century North America. American merchants and manufacturers were opposed to British laws that restricted what kinds of goods the colonies could produce and with whom they could trade. The practice of billeting British soldiers in colonial homes and forcing the colonies to pay for the soldiers' expenses also rankled many Americans. These grievances united colonists who disagreed over other issues such as slavery or religious practice.

Factors other than economics and politics also played a unifying role in colonial America. Americans were mostly white and European, and many of those who were not were slaves. In addition, although the religious affiliations of Americans included a wide variety of sects, most of them shared basic Christian beliefs. No other major religion competed for Americans' faith. These additional factors provided a broad base of common support for U.S. nationalism.

Nationalism has psychological as well as physical dimensions. It can include love of one's state or nation, but can also extend to a feeling of superiority over other states or nations. Nationalism can reflect the sentiment of different peoples sharing a common identity within a state or peoples with different identities seeking to found a new state of their own. It can lead to calls to unite against an outside enemy that

threatens the common identity or calls to rid the state of perceived enemies within. Although nationalism has often led to great sacrifice and patriotism, it has also been used to justify repression, ethnic violence, and genocide.

FORMS OF NATIONALISM

Two major forms of nationalism include large group identity and inclusion, and small group identity and separation. The first brings disparate peoples together into a common state; the second exists when a group or groups of people within a state seek to separate from it. Both forms of nationalism have had positive and negative effects, historically, and both have the potential to reduce or inflame security concerns.

Large Group Identity and Inclusion

The formation of large group identity can be thought of as the nationalism of unity because it involves creating a single people out of separate groups. In Europe, the ancient Roman Republic (and later Roman Empire) created a nationalism based on shared Roman citizenship that united peoples from Spain to the Middle East. After the fall of the Roman Empire, Europe splintered into hundreds of separate ethnic and linguistic groups with no powerful central authority.

Beginning around 750 CE, kings arose in Europe to unify local groups who shared similar cultural and ethnic ties. By the year 1100, stable kingdoms arose in England, France, and Spain that would stand for hundreds of years. These lands eventually shed their kings, but their people retained a shared identity based on hundreds of years of common political leadership.

Drawing peoples together, however, can have significant negative consequences as well. States and empires seeking to create a single culture sometimes repress minority cultures in the interest of unity, and they can mask diversity by presenting a unified front. This was particularly evident in the case of Russia, and later the Soviet Union and the countries that fell under its domination during World War II.

During the 17th century, Russia began a dramatic expansion of its empire that eventually led to Russian control over one-sixth of the world's land surface. Included in this territory were thousands of different ethnic and linguistic groups practicing hundreds of separate religions. As in Africa, many were longtime and bitter adversaries. To control these tensions and

maintain order, Russian czars brutally repressed ethnic and religious minorities and imposed Russian culture on its conquered territories.

This practice continued after communists overthrew the Russian government in 1917. The Soviet Union that arose from the former Russian Empire extended it by resettling large numbers of people as a way to destroy troublesome groups. Following World War II, these same methods were used in other communist countries, particularly in multiethnic Yugoslavia. As the Soviet system collapsed between 1989 and 1991, ethnic and religious tensions erupted in Yugoslavia and in several Soviet republics. Conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are some of the legacies of forced Russian inclusion.

Small Group Identity and Separatism

In contrast with inclusion, small group identity is the nationalism of separatism, in which groups within an existing nation break away from the state. This typically occurs when a minority population feels marginalized on religious, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or economic grounds. The minority feels that the government of the state in which they are living is hostile to their interests, and they seek a separate autonomous territory or outright independence.

History is filled with examples of smaller subgroups seeking independence from the larger nations. The Kurdish people in the Middle East have been seeking to create their own state for hundreds of years. During that time, they have fought Mongol khans, Ottoman sultans, British kings and queens, and modern Middle Eastern democrats and dictators. In Europe, Basques of the border region between Spain and France have long sought independence from both of those nations. Like many separatist movements, both the Basques and the Kurds have often resorted to violence to advance their causes. By contrast, the French-speaking people of Quebec have tried unsuccessfully several times to vote to secede from Canada. They have not engaged in organized violence to gain their independence, however.

The record of separatist movements in established nations is checkered at best. Most disaffected minority groups in any country are too small or too divided to achieve independence. However, there have been a few recent exceptions. The nation of Eritrea successfully separated from Ethiopia in 1993, and the province of East Timor won independence from Indonesia in 2002.

NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF NATIONALISM

Nationalism frequently has been misused to justify the marginalization or oppression of certain groups, including such extreme measures as forced expulsion, mass detention, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. Governments that practice such policies justify them as necessary to "purify" the nation by removing the so-called undesirables.

Historically, nation building often has included the expulsion of minority ethnic or religious groups that were not part of the dominant culture. In medieval Europe, for example, Jews were expelled from England, Spain, and other places by Christian communities seeking a monocultural society. The United States' principle of Manifest Destiny, which entailed nationalist expansionism across the continent, led the government to remove Native Americans from their lands so that white settlers could appropriate those lands.

Nationalism in the past and present has included a strong expansionist element. Attempts to bring similar peoples under the umbrella of a single empire or nation, to glorify one nation through acquisition of others' territory, or to conquer peoples considered inferior to serve the needs of the nation often have encroached on the rights of other groups. All these elements were part of the nationalist expansion of Germany under Adolf Hitler in the 1930s and 1940s.

Hitler deliberately reinforced nationalistic tendencies by trying to create a strong German identity and a deep love of the German fatherland. This shared identity brought hope to a people devastated by World War I and the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Versailles that ended the war. However, Hitler's Nazi Party also manipulated public opinion to make the country's Jews the scapegoat for its ills and to convince Germans of the superiority of their culture to those of other peoples. Ideas of "Aryan" superiority were used to justify Germany's right to seize lands from "inferior" peoples and exploit those people for the benefit of the German nation. This attitude led to World War II and the subsequent Holocaust, in which millions of innocent people were slaughtered.

Nationalism can be used to justify atrocities on both sides if two separate groups lay claim to the same lands. Both the Israelis and the Palestinians have put forth historic claims for their nations in the region

known as the Holy Land. For both groups, the city of Jerusalem is a sacred site. Both Israelis and Arabs have attempted to establish exclusive rights in Palestine, and they have resorted to land appropriation and war to consolidate their claims.

NATIONALISM AND SECURITY

Nationalism can be used to strengthen a state, and internal stability can promote external stability. Crafting a common identity, affirming a common history, drawing on similar mythologies, and ensuring equality for disparate groups can prevent separatist movements and foster support for the country in which different groups live. The common identity that supports, but does not supplant, ethnic or religious or other small group identities is often the most successful form of nationalism.

Although nationalism can strengthen a state, nationalistic factions can also destroy states or peoples from the inside. Repression of groups based on language, ethnicity, religion, or culture often leads to separatist movements because the repressed groups perceive that the state opposes their interests. If the separatist movements succeed, the result can be partition and a total loss of resources to the newly independent territory, diminishing the economic base of the original state.

Nationalism can also foster outside opposition that undermines a state's security. Secession movements by peoples seeking greater autonomy can weaken a state and make it more susceptible to external threats such as invasion. Importantly, nationalism taken to extremes (as in the case of Hitler's Germany) can also spur other states to intervene on behalf of the repressed groups. More recently, the ethnic and religious conflict between Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia led to intervention by both the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), both of which intervened to restore order and stability to the region.

The increasing technological and cultural interconnectedness of the modern world presents a threat to nationalism. Multinational corporations, for example, operate in many different countries and seek private gain above the interests of the state. The loyalty of shareholders and employees of such corporations are therefore often divided between what is good for the company and what is good for the nation.

The growth of international terrorism also threatens to undermine nationalism by challenging the legitimacy of governments that oppose terrorist goals. Al-Qaeda and other Islamic terror groups, for example, call for an overthrow of all western-influenced governments in the Islamic world and war against those who support them. In many Middle Eastern countries, these groups seek to drive a wedge between the government and the people. They hope to replace the current governments with regimes based on Islamic law and shared Muslim culture, and ultimately with a state that encompasses all Islamic lands. Islamic terrorism thus represents a rejection of modern nationalism in favor of a return to empire based on common religion.

See also Colonialism; Decolonization; Ethnic Cleansing; Genocide; Globalization and National Security; Hegemony; Manifest Destiny; McCarthyism; Nation-State; New World Order; Propaganda; Regionalism; Sovereignty; Terrorists, Islamic

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REFLECTIONS

Notes on Nationalism

In 1945, the internationally known British author and political philosopher George Orwell published a brief essay titled "Notes on Nationalism." In the piece, he outlined what he believed were the basic features, strengths, and drawbacks of nationalism. He also drew a distinction between patriotism and nationalism, which he summed up as follows:

Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism. Both words are normally used in so vague a way that any definition is liable to be challenged, but one must draw a distinction between them, since two different and even opposing ideas are involved. By "patriotism" I mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily

and culturally. Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power. The abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige, not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality . . .

A nationalist is one who thinks solely, or mainly, in terms of competitive prestige. . . . He sees history, especially contemporary history, as the endless rise and decline of great power units, and every event that happens seems to him a demonstration that his own side is on the upgrade and some hated rival is on the downgrade. But finally, it is important not to confuse nationalism with mere worship of success. The nationalist does not go on the principle of simply ganging up with the strongest side. On the contrary, having picked his side, he persuades himself that it *is* the strongest, and is able to stick to his belief even when the facts are overwhelmingly against him. Nationalism is power-hunger tempered by self-deception. Every nationalist is capable of the most flagrant dishonesty, but he is also—since he is conscious of serving something bigger than himself—unshakably certain of being in the right.

NATION BUILDING

The process of rebuilding infrastructure, government, and industry in postconflict or failed states. One of the largest projects of nation building during the 20th century was the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after World War II. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has again been drawn into the arduous task of helping nations rebuild after years of conflict and violence.

The two most recent attempts at nation building can be seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. Following the U.S.-led interventions in each of these nations, the United States, supported by members of the international community, has worked to help these nations develop their governments, rebuild vital infrastructures (including roads, power systems and schools), and lay the groundwork for functioning and productive industry.

Nation building is a process filled with challenge—it is expensive, time-consuming, and often only marginally successful. Some of the many challenges include the introduction of a democratic form of government in a state that may have been ruled by tyranny for many years. There might be a shortage of qualified,

educated leaders to fill government positions, corruption might be rampant, and the norms of democracy, including voting and civilly managing conflict, might not be well-established among the population of the country.

Particularly in protracted conflicts (such as in the Balkans during the 1990s), the possibility of significant devastation to basic infrastructure is high. Although the rebuilding of infrastructure is a high priority in nation building, garnering the necessary resources and protecting these projects from postconflict flares of violence is often challenging. Particularly in rural areas, it often takes many years to rebuild roads, install power lines and water purification systems, and rebuild and staff schools.

Ideally, rebuilding the infrastructure and establishing a functioning government provides the basis for the return of industry. Here, too, there are significant challenges, including the lack of an educated workforce, the decimation or nonexistence of natural resources, and sometimes the control of economic resources by a small group of elites unwilling to contribute to the overall economic health of the populace. In addition, nations that for years have been mired in conflict might find it particularly difficult to compete on the global market.

One final challenge in the process of nation building is the ever-present threat that violent conflict might return. As the process of nation building in Iraq has demonstrated, members of the deposed regime can and often do violently disrupt the process of nation building.

Despite obstacles, nation building remains an important task for the international community. It serves to promote national stability, spreads a doctrine of human rights and democracy, and, if successful, can significantly improve the quality of life for those who live in postconflict societies. The international community's continued experience with nation building has led to the adoption of certain best practices.

First, it is clearly critical to involve all ethnic, religious, and minority groups within the state in the process. Doing so ensures that the democratic goals of representative government can be met, and further decreases the likelihood of marginalized groups challenging the legitimacy of the new government. Second, adequate resources, are important; as the United States quickly learned in Iraq, rebuilding a nation takes significant financial resources—resources that few single nations can afford to commit. Soliciting aid from the

United Nations, other foreign nations, and nongovernmental organizations is clearly critical if nation building is to be successful.

The international community has learned about the importance of carefully timing and managing the inaugural elections. The first elections are a time of excitement but also fear—fear that if a particular group or political party wins or loses, a return to violence might follow. The election processes in the transition from an interim government to an elected government are carefully monitored by the international community.

Finally, nation building is a long process and requires a long-term commitment—not only of resources but in terms of a military presence. Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq continue to require the presence of foreign troops to maintain peace, and there is little indication of a withdrawal of troops in the near future.

See also Afghanistan, War in; Bosnia Intervention; Iraq War of 2003; Kosovo Intervention; Peacekeeping Operations

NATION-STATE

Autonomous area inhabited by a people sharing a common culture, history, and/or language. The term *nation-state* (or *nation-state*), although often used interchangeably with the terms *unitary state* and *independent state*, refers to recognized authorities, or states, in which a single nation is dominant. Spain, Ireland, and France are examples of nation-states. A nation-state can be a federal state at the same time (for example, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States of America, and, previously, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

The origins of the modern nation-state are traced to the Treaty of Westphalia, which most historians believe shaped subsequent relations between countries. The Treaty of Westphalia is a collective name given to the two treaties concluded on October 24, 1648, which ended the Thirty Years War, one of the most destructive conflicts in European history. The war initially pitted Protestant Germany against Catholic France and Spain, but it eventually drew in Swedes, Danes, Poles, Russians, Dutch, and Swiss. Commercial interests and rivalries played a part, as did religion and power politics.

The Peace of Westphalia established the principle of national sovereignty—the notion that states should have control of their own internal affairs without outside interference. One of the factors that sparked the war was the Holy Roman Emperor's attempt to impose Protestantism on the various kingdoms and duchies in Germany. The Peace of Westphalia recognized each state's right to choose its own religion. The German states also won the right to exercise independent foreign policies, but not to declare war on the emperor. Before the Peace of Westphalia, most European wars were sparked at least partly by religious matters. Afterward, wars became rooted in state self-interest rather than on purely religious grounds. From this point on, European powers instigated conflict in accordance with their perceived political and commercial interests.

The nation-state remains the main organizing principle in international relations, but its status has weakened in recent years. The formation of nongovernmental organizations such as the United Nations and of supra-national bodies such as the European Union (EU) have raised challenges to the ultimate authority of the nation-state. Multinational corporations have become so large and influential that they also rival state governments as sources of power and influence. In today's era of globalization, porous borders, and powerful nonstate participants, there is some debate about whether the concept of the nation-state will soon become obsolete.

See also Globalization and National Security; Nationalism

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NATO *See* NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

NATURAL RESOURCES AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The contribution of a nation's natural wealth to its security. Natural resources can influence security in a variety of ways. A nation that is rich in natural

resources such as oil or minerals is more able to afford a strong military to defend its borders than a resource-poor nation. In addition, a nation possessing a rich variety of natural resources is likely to enjoy greater economic security because it is not dependent upon foreign sources of vital commodities. On the other hand, poor government in a wealthy country can cause significant instability as competing interests struggle for control of the nation's wealth. Many resource-rich African nations have been plagued by unrest and civil war caused by weak or corrupt central governments.

World War II provides an excellent example of a direct relationship between natural resources and the security of a nation. The Axis Powers, Germany and Japan, being neither as large nor as rich in natural resources as the United States, had to conquer and subdue vast overseas empires to fuel and supply their respective militaries. The United States, on the other hand, was able to shift its own massive domestic industrial base quickly from consumer to wartime production. U.S. factories easily out-produced those of Germany and Japan combined, becoming the driving engine of the final Allied victory.

The reality of U.S. industrial superiority was recognized by its foes. Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who planned the attack on Pearl Harbor, is alleged to have remarked that the attack had awakened a "sleeping giant." A German soldier captured by the Americans in Europe recalled feeling that his country was foolish to declare war on a nation that could fill the horizon with tanks and planes. In this case, both Germany and Japan were defeated in a prolonged conventional war with a resource-rich nation dubbed by its own leader an "arsenal of democracy."

The post–World War II world, by contrast, offers several examples of resource-poor nations increasing national security by achieving economic success. After its defeat in World War II, Japan was occupied and rebuilt by U.S. forces under a program called *centrally planned capitalism*. Under this plan, the Japanese government promoted and protected industries that imported raw materials to create goods for export. The result was a boom in the Japanese export trade, which brought in large sums of money that fueled Japan's economy. Between 1945 and 2000, Japan went from a broke and war-devastated country to the world's second largest economy. Besides enriching the country, Japan's economic might made it a valuable asset to the United States and other capitalist nations. Because the United States forbade the Japanese from maintaining large armed forces after the war, U.S. forces have provided security guarantees to Japan since 1945.

In a similar manner, resource-poor South Korea was devastated by the Korean War (1950–1953) and faced a hostile North Korea across the 38th parallel. South Korea developed close ties between government and industry to create industrial conglomerates known as *chaebols*. Like Japan, this government-business partnership led to export success; by 2000, South Korea was the 12th-largest economy in the world. The Korean success also had a complex relation with the U.S. military protection of South Korea. Following the Korean War, the reasons for U.S. security guarantees to South Korea were mainly ideological—South Korea was a symbol of western refusal to accept the forcible expansion of communism. After the South Korean economy blossomed, however, defending the country's large capitalist economy became an added reason for U.S. protection.

Recent history shows that many factors must be taken into account when considering the relationship between natural resources and national security. Nations blessed with a rich variety of natural resources might see their national security threatened by incompetent governance at home and military might from abroad. Resource-poor nations might ensure a strong economy as well as their national security through close alliance with a foreign power that provides an export market along with its military might.

The appearance of asymmetrical threats such as terrorism, however, threatens to challenge the relationship between natural resources and security. Natural resources contribute to the formal state-organized capacity for defense and military action, whereas terrorists tend to concentrate on civilian targets. As demonstrated by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, a handful of determined individuals using relatively crude weapons can slip past the defenses of even the most sophisticated military forces. In such an environment, nontangible resources such as international cooperation, communication, and information sharing might prove more valuable than traditional natural resources in ensuring national security.

See also Asymmetric Warfare; Korea, North and South; U.S.-Japan Alliance

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NAVAL AVIATION

Planes and pilots in service to the U.S. Navy. Naval aviators operate from aircraft carriers—warships designed for the launching and landing of aircraft at sea. These carriers facilitate the mobility of U.S. air power and reduce reliance on permanent air bases overseas in foreign territory.

The Navy's interest in aviation began as early as 1898, when naval officers were appointed to an inter-service board that considered the military potential of the airplane. Naval observers subsequently attended air meets in the United States and overseas, as well as public demonstrations by Oliver and Wilbur Wright. In 1910, the Navy designated an officer to be in charge of aviation matters. The following year the first naval officer reported for flight training and the Navy purchased its first plane.

An American pilot, Eugene Ely, was the first person to take off successfully from a stationary ship. In 1910, Ely took off from a temporary platform built on the deck of the cruiser USS *Birmingham*. The following year, he became the first person to land on a stationary ship—the battleship USS *Pennsylvania*. In these early days of naval aviation, existing ships were modified to accommodate aircraft. However, in 1922, Japan built the first ship specifically designed to launch and retrieve aircraft. At the same time, the United States tested small air detachments in exercises with ocean fleets. The United States also began building aircraft carriers in the 1920s, and three carriers were in service with the Navy by the end of the decade.

The Great Depression of the 1930s had a stifling impact on the development of U.S. naval aviation. America's economic problems and isolationist attitude toward international affairs meant less funding for the military. However, the growing threat of an aggressive and expansionist Japan, with its powerful carrier-based navy, led to increased training of U.S. Navy pilots in the late 1930s.

On December 7, 1941, Japan demonstrated the power of naval aviation with a surprise attack on the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Four Japanese carriers, lying some 250 miles northwest of Pearl Harbor, launched more than 400 dive-bombers, torpedo bombers, and escorting fighters against the unsuspecting Americans. Tactically, the raid was a complete success: The Japanese sank or seriously damaged 12 large U.S. warships, destroyed or damaged more than 300 aircraft, and killed 2,403 U.S. troops and civilians on the base. However, the primary targets of the attack, the U.S. carriers, were not in port that day and so escaped damage. The following summer at the Battle of Midway, those U.S. carriers would inflict a crippling defeat against Japan, sinking four Japanese carriers and their experienced and irreplaceable aircrews.

Naval aviation played a key role in land warfare during World War II in the Pacific. To overcome Japan, the United States first had to defeat dozens of fortified island outposts located hundreds of miles from the nearest U.S. airbases. Naval aircraft were invaluable to amphibious invasions of these islands, softening up Japanese defenses before U.S. troops landed, and providing support for the actual attacks. By the end of the war, it was clear that the day of the battleship as king of the ocean was over. The aircraft carrier had proven itself the most powerful weapon in the U.S. Navy's arsenal.

Naval aviation underwent a major revolution in the 1950s, when the Navy replaced most of its propeller-driven planes with jet aircraft (even today, the Navy retains propeller-driven planes for some weather, radar, and intelligence-gathering functions). The faster speeds at which jets travel required modifications to existing carriers and spurred the evolution of carrier design. For example, jets need a longer runway than propeller-driven planes, but there are practical limits to the size of carrier decks. The solution was to mount steam-powered catapults on the flight deck to help launch planes more quickly. Carriers also became larger to accommodate more planes and the many different types of weapons modern combat aircraft can carry.

The Korean War and Vietnam War reaffirmed the combat value of naval aviation. In Korea, Navy pilots attacked North Korean troops, supplies, and infrastructure in support of United Nations land operations. Naval aviators also performed some of the most extensive bombing campaigns in history during the Vietnam War. In both conflicts, naval aircraft operating

off carriers gave the United States a powerful weapon that was almost invulnerable to its opponent. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. carrier groups served as a symbol of America's military might and commitment to defend its allies throughout the world. They also allowed the United States to respond quickly to any perceived Soviet threat in Asia or Africa.

At the end of the Cold War, navy pilots were among the first U.S. forces to participate in the invasion of Iraq in the Gulf War of 1991. Operating from carrier groups in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, U.S. Navy planes flew thousands of sorties in the four days of combat. After the war, navy pilots took part in enforcing the no-fly zones for Iraqi aircraft in northern and southern Iraq. The importance of naval aviation again was demonstrated in the Iraq War in 2003. Despite the inability to base large numbers of aircraft on allied territory in the region, the United States was able to maintain substantial air power by using carrier-based aircraft.

Naval aviation's flexibility—both in mobility and in the range of duties it can perform—makes it well-suited to modern military missions. It can be as equally effective at striking terrorist bases, enemy facilities, and hostile troops. With the potential for hostilities in faraway places, including the Middle East and North Korea, naval aviation will likely continue to be a central element of U.S. military might.

See also Air Warfare; Aircraft Carrier; U.S. Navy

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NEOCONSERVATISM

A uniquely right-wing U.S. political philosophy that seeks to promote American values across the globe, is sympathetic to traditional moral values, is highly suspicious of various forms of world government, and is overtly supportive of both the sovereign state of Israel and the broader need to maintain a democratic foothold in the Middle East. Neoconservatives believe strongly that liberal democracy is the political and economic model toward which all societies should strive. In comparison with traditional conservatives, neoconservatives are more comfortable with the presence of the welfare state, tend to be less isolationist in philosophy, and view the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a serious and growing threat to the United States.

Neoconservatism began as an offshoot of left-wing, New York intellectualism of the 1960s and early 1970s. These intellectuals were highly supportive of U.S. social progress (particularly as it pertained to equal rights), but were troubled by what they perceived as the social excesses and weakening anticommunist stances of the political left.

Modern neoconservatives opted to leave the Democratic party in favor of the right-wing politics of conservatives Richard Nixon, Barry Goldwater, and Ronald Reagan. Although they eventually found an intellectual home within the Republican party, their mission continues to revolve around its transformation. As Irving Kristol, the so-called godfather of neoconservatives, noted in a 2003 issue of *The Weekly Standard* (a popular neoconservative magazine), the project of neoconservatism is "to convert the Republican party, and American conservatism in general, against their respective wills, into a kind of conservative politics suitable to governing a modern democracy."

During the 1980s, neoconservatism was most closely aligned with (and defined by) the staunch anti-communism of the Reagan administration. However, with the crumbling of Soviet hegemony in the 1990s, support for the neoconservative movement—and for the large military budgets that typically accompanied it—began to wane. The United States found itself in the midst of a new multilateralism, as evidenced by the formation of the Operation Desert Storm coalition during the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993, and the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.

Neoconservatism experienced a major setback in 1991 when President George H.W. Bush, largely on the advice of General Colin Powell, refused to remove Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein from power and liberate the Iraqi Kurds at the conclusion of the Gulf War. However, with the election of President George W. Bush in 2000 and the introduction of a massive U.S. effort to curtail international terrorism after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, neoconservatism has experienced a rebirth.

Sustained military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the world reflect the neoconservative belief that the United States can ill afford simply to

contain threats to the American way of life—it must prevent them altogether. More broadly, such efforts are in line with the neoconservative belief that the United States should actively flex its political, economic, and military might around the globe, and that such actions, even if they appear imperialistic, represent the best hope for bringing about a new era of peace.

The establishment of the so-called Bush Doctrine, giving the United States the moral authority to take preemptive, unilateral action abroad for the purpose of fighting international terrorism, represents a new high-water mark for the neoconservative movement. Although there is much speculation as to whether or not President George W. Bush is himself a true neoconservative, few would argue that his administration included many prominent neoconservative figures (such as Deputy Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz), as well as others who are highly supportive of neoconservatism's stance on U.S. foreign policy (such as Vice President Richard Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld).

Those most worried about the neoconservative movement and its imperial tendencies often cite as evidence a draft of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, written secretly by Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Cheney and leaked to the *Washington Post* shortly after it was prepared. The report argues that the top priority for U.S. interests abroad should be "to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival." The harshest critics of the foreign policy of the Bush administration insist that the ongoing war on terrorism is a thinly veiled attempt to do exactly that.

See also Bush Doctrine; Bush, George H. W., and National Policy; Bush, George W., and National Policy; Cheney, Richard (1941–); Powell, Colin (1937–); Rumsfeld, Donald (1932–)

NEUTRON BOMB

A small thermonuclear weapon that produces a minimal blast and heat while releasing large amounts of lethal radiation. Sometimes called enhanced radiation warheads, neutron bombs are designed to kill troops—especially those protected by armor. The bomb's blast and heat can be confined to a relatively small area, perhaps a few hundred feet in radius, but the bomb throws off a massive wave of neutron and gamma radiation that can penetrate armor and is extremely pernicious to humans.

The weapon can be delivered to the battlefield via missile or aircraft, or it can be launched from an 8-inch howitzer, making it effective against tanks and infantry formations. A neutron bomb disables tank crews in minutes, and troops exposed to the radiation wave die within days.

The alloys used to protect tanks can absorb the radiation and become radioactive themselves. Some types of tank armor, such as the M-1 tank, employ depleted uranium, which can undergo fast fission after being exposed to the radiation wave generated by a neutron bomb blast. These tanks remain toxic to crews for some time. The United States suspended production of neutron bombs in 1978, but production was resumed in 1981.

See also Nuclear Weapons

NEW WORLD ORDER

New era in international relations and global economics following the end of the Cold War. The phrase *new world order* came from a speech in which President George H. W. Bush described the beginnings of the Gulf War. The expression was apt for both the time and the global situation. In early 1991, the world was poised to enter a new era in international relations—the communist governments of Eastern Europe (including the Soviet Union) had collapsed, leaving the United States as the sole surviving world superpower.

The end of the intense Cold War ideological competition created a partial ideological vacuum. Part of the world, having seen the collapse of its previous framework, was ready for a new system of thought. The United States was in an ideal position to bring its ideas forward. It could also encourage other nations to embrace reforms it saw as desirable—reforms leading countries politically toward liberal democracy and neoliberal economic principles. Some regard the emerging new world order as Euro-American imperialism or as an order based on—and maintained by—U.S. power and influence. Others regard it as opening the door to a fair and just international civil society.

The plan to create such a world culture is complex and implies new priorities in international politics. First and foremost, it signifies a break from the previous competitive world order and a transformation of the international system. The new world order relies

upon cooperation among nations, rather than the sometimes-precarious balance of power that existed during the Cold War. Great powers especially need to take leadership roles in creating international order.

The new world order also encourages international institution of the rule of law. Ideally, the rule of law will bring an end to impunity and to government abuses in nations around the world. President George H. W. Bush's speech also focused particularly on an expanded role for the United Nations and the UN Security Council in world affairs. These organizations could do more to help maintain international peace and security, as they were designed to do; peacekeeping operations would be especially encouraged. In addition, the new world order foresaw increased participation of international organization in world affairs. These organizations could help smooth the progress of nations toward liberal development.

Domestically, the new world order stresses the development of multiparty democracies in countries previously living under dictatorships or other forms of authoritarian rule. The creation of liberal democracies means creating governments that protect the ability of citizens to participate meaningfully in the political process, to dissent, to form opposition parties, and so on. The international community can put pressure on developing countries to form such governments; loans and other forms of assistance are often tied to the establishment of *good governance*.

The new world order also encourages different economic and social priorities. In the economic realm, liberalization of economies and increased economic interdependence are favored. By transitioning to market economies, countries around the world would be able to enjoy the fruits of capitalism. Consumers would have more choice and producers more opportunity than ever before because of the virtues of the market. Greater economic freedom would prevail. Liberalization includes the creation of laws that structure enforceable contracts and enforce rights to private property. It also includes lowering trade barriers and privatizing public industry. Trade and foreign investment are encouraged. The economic integration implied by these moves would not only produce positive economic results but would also raise the costs of warfare substantially, in the hope of promoting peace and harmony.

The new world order supports economic globalization. It also tacitly advances philosophical and social globalization. It encourages the spread of western rationalist, secularist principles around the world. These principles are intended to be the hallmarks of a world without war, a world of freedom, a world without persecution or discrimination. In some countries (such as in the former communist states of Eastern Europe), these ideas have been accepted more eagerly and have advanced social equality. In other places, however, these principles have been rejected (such as in China and Iran).

The ideas of the new world order are utopian to some extent, which leave them open to criticism. There are two principal kinds of critics of the new world order: those who want to reform it and those who reject it. The reformers believe that the move toward liberalism in politics and economics will be a long-lasting or permanent global change. Thus, they do not challenge the system itself; they criticize the vastly uneven distribution of society's benefits in a liberal market economy—poor individuals and poor countries not only receive little but also tend to get poorer. As a result, the reformers support social liberalism—a market economy that tries to correct market failures and create social safety nets.

Those rejecting the new world order want to replace it with another system entirely. Many tend to subscribe to various forms of Marxism. Some argue that the liberal system is inherently exploitative and they want to replace it with a more egalitarian order. Others who want to replace the new world order altogether loathe its insistence on secularism. Some Islamist groups, for example, oppose it on these grounds and want to replace the existing order with an Islamic society. Extremist groups around the world (including religious extremists and right-wing paramilitary groups) see the new world order as an international conspiracy of shadow governments that lies at the root of political evils. It is an idea and a system these groups want to see destroyed.

For better or worse, the idea of a new world order retains ideological dominance in international politics and economics. It continues to influence policymakers at the UN, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other multilateral institutions.

See also Multilateralism

NITZE, PAUL H. (1907–2004)

Leading strategist, arms control expert, and eminent public figure of the U.S. strategic and foreign policy

establishment during the years spanning the Cold War. Born on January 16, 1907, in Amherst, Massachusetts, Paul H. Nitze was German by descent; his grandfather immigrated to the United States from Germany after the Civil War.

After graduation from Harvard University and a decade working as an investment banker, Nitze joined the U.S. government in 1940 and advised every president from Franklin Roosevelt to Ronald Reagan (with the exception of Jimmy Carter). In 1950, while at the state department, Nitze was responsible for the formulation of NSC-68—the document that provided the framework for the Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union. Nitze also served as director of the department of state policy planning staff, as deputy secretary of defense, and as a member of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) from 1969 to 1974. In 1962, he was a member of the group of top officials who met daily with President John F. Kennedy to advise him during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

As head of the U.S. negotiating team at the arms control talks in Geneva from 1981 to 1984, Nitze took a now famous walk in the woods with Soviet negotiator Yuli Kvitsinsky in an effort to break the deadlock between the superpowers on the issue of missiles in Europe. From 1984 to 1989, he was ambassador-at-large and special adviser to the president and secretary of state on arms control matters, playing a crucial role in negotiating the Immediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) and strategic arms treaties. President Reagan awarded Nitze the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1985 for his contributions to the freedom and security of the United States.

Nitze founded the School of Advanced International Relations (SAIS) in 1943, along with Christian Herter and other leading statesmen. In 1989, the school, which became a division of the Johns Hopkins University in 1950, was renamed in his honor to recognize his distinguished private and public career and exceptional service to SAIS and the university for five decades.

See also Arms Control; NSC-68 (National Security Report)

REFLECTIONS
Wise Counselor

The guided missile destroyer USS *Nitze* was completed in 2004 by Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine, and officially commissioned by the U.S. Navy on March 5,

2005. In awarding him the Medal of Freedom in 1985, President Reagan called Paul Nitze,

> the wisest of counselors, exemplifying the powers of mind, commitment and character needed to fulfill America's world responsibilities. And I think to put his name on this ship which will sail the world will be a great symbol to the world itself, to the men and women who are serving us in the Navy, in the military. And it will remind people, I think, of Paul's passionate commitment to avoid war by being prepared to fight it.

NIXON DOCTRINE (1969)

Policy announcing the U.S. intention to support its threatened allies with economic and military aid rather than ground troops. During the Vietnam War, at the beginning of a 1969 global tour, President Richard Nixon spoke with reporters on the island of Guam. In this informal discussion, Nixon stated that the United States could no longer afford to defend its allies fully. He added that although the United States would continue to uphold all of its treaty responsibilities, it would expect its allies to contribute significantly to their own defense.

Nixon also indicated that the United States would continue to extend economic and military assistance (arms), especially in cases where it was in the national interest of the United States. At the same time, he reassured U.S. allies by promising that the United States would continue to use its nuclear arsenal to shield its friends from nuclear threats.

The Nixon Doctrine was not intended to influence U.S. actions in its engagement in the Vietnam War, in which ground troops were already committed. It was, in fact, because of the tremendous drain of the Vietnam War on U.S. resources that Nixon created the doctrine. Even so, from 1969 onward, although the Nixon Doctrine was a firm message to U.S. allies, the Nixon administration did not adhere absolutely to the doctrine. The U.S. invasions into Cambodia in 1970 and Laos in 1971 employed the use of U.S. ground troops, contradicting the intentions of the doctrine.

Historians and foreign policy experts emphasize that with the Nixon Doctrine, Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, were intent on shifting U.S. foreign policy away from a bilateral view of international relations—that is, away from a sole focus on the U.S.-Soviet struggle for power. Nixon and

Kissinger also envisioned a world in which the United States would share power with a number of its allies.

According to this multilateral view, the United States would not be the sole rescuer of the free world but would share that responsibility with its most powerful allies. Nixon hoped that one day the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Japan would coexist peacefully and trade together to their mutual benefit.

The Nixon Doctrine influenced the United States in its decision to sell arms to Iran and to Israel in the early to mid-1970s. In Iran, the United States agreed to a request by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (the shah of Iran) to purchase conventional weapons. The shah purchased a total of $15 billion in U.S. arms, buying weapons that were technologically superior to most of those in the U.S. arsenal. Nixon and Kissinger believed that strengthening Iran's weapons program would stabilize the Middle East, thereby not only protecting Iran's oil supply but also the oil reserves in all nations bordering the Persian Gulf.

An unintended negative consequence of the decision to sell arms to Iran was its impact on the U.S. economy. To pay for the weapons, the shah raised oil prices, creating a situation that contributed to the already heavily inflated Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil prices, which hurt U.S. oil consumers.

Although the sale of arms to Israel improved U.S. relations with that country, the use of the Nixon Doctrine in this case may have inadvertently supported Israel in its development of nuclear weapons. Although the United States intended to stabilize the Middle East by selling arms to Israel, its entry into the nuclear community destabilized the region and raised the specter that Israel might resort to using nuclear weapons if attacked by Arab nations.

During the administration of President Jimmy Carter, continuing violence in the Middle East and the overthrow of the shah of Iran by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979 so destabilized the region that the guidelines of the Nixon Doctrine no longer met the U.S. national interests. In the Carter Doctrine of 1980, Carter declared that if any power attempted to control any nation within the Persian Gulf region, the United States would retaliate, and, if necessary, resort to military force, including the use of ground troops.

See also Carter Doctrine; Kissinger, Henry (1923–); Nixon, Richard, and National Policy; Vietnam War (1954–1975)

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NIXON, RICHARD, AND NATIONAL POLICY

Thirty-seventh president of the United States (1969–1974), who sought to maintain U.S. military strength, contain communism throughout the world, and end the Vietnam War with "peace and honor" while advocating global peace and security through improved relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Richard Nixon (1913–1994) also became the first president to resign from office—a result of the notorious Watergate scandal.

KISSINGER AND VIETNAM

In December 1968, shortly after being elected president, Nixon selected Harvard political scientist Henry Kissinger as his national security advisor. Once in office, Nixon emphasized the role of the National Security Council (NSC) in the formulation of his foreign policy. He rarely depended on the advice of either his secretary of state, William Rogers, or his secretary of defense, Melvin Laird. Nixon primarily consulted Kissinger and the large staff of analysts in the NSC, a significant departure from the policy making of previous presidents.

From the moment Nixon became president, he was embroiled in the ongoing crisis of the Vietnam War. He was determined to uphold his campaign promise to withdraw U.S. troops from Vietnam and end the war, but he insisted that he must accomplish this goal with the nation's honor intact. Nixon and Kissinger believed that from a national security standpoint, the United States could not afford to lose prestige or its standing in the court of world opinion. When Nixon urged communist North Vietnam to begin peace negotiations, the North Vietnamese were adamant that they would not stop fighting until the United States had

withdrawn from Vietnam and discontinued its support of the government of South Vietnam led by Nguyen Van Thieu. Because Nixon refused to abandon the South Vietnamese regime, the talks did not progress.

Nixon tried to force the peace negotiations forward by bombing North Vietnam into compliance. Despite intense bombing raids, the North Vietnamese did not waver. Moreover, the U.S. bombings and invasions of Cambodia from 1969 to 1970 and of Laos in 1971—designed to eliminate North Vietnamese strongholds in these countries—did not persuade the North to alter its demands. Late in 1972, Nixon promised South Vietnam one billion dollars in military assistance and informed Thieu that he must accept the peace terms the United States (through Kissinger) had negotiated with the North or the United States would strike a separate agreement with the North Vietnamese. Although the terms Nixon was forcing on Thieu were certain to result in the fall of South Vietnam to the North Vietnamese, Thieu reluctantly agreed. The peace talks proceeded, leading to a signed agreement on January 23, 1973.

Nixon's decision making in Vietnam ran counter to his stated national security policies. Although he advocated decreased military spending and declared in his Nixon Doctrine that U.S. ground troops would no longer be deployed to fight the battles of U.S. allies, he discovered that he could not conclude the war while adhering to these objectives.

Nixon and Kissinger perceived the powerful antiwar movement in the United States as a threat to national security. Nixon believed that some peace groups were funded by foreign sources and sought to undermine traditional U.S. values. He ordered the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to step up its infiltration of antiwar groups as part of Operation CHAOS, an illegal project that had its beginnings in 1967 during the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson. (Operation CHAOS was illegal because the CIA charter prohibits domestic intelligence gathering.)

THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA

Nixon and Kissinger were far more successful in their dealings with the Soviet Union and the PRC. Nixon favored a policy that aimed to foster improved relations with the Soviets, limit the U.S.-Soviet arms race, and sustain a balance of power between the two nations.

In the early 1970s, Soviet leaders indicated that they were amenable to pursuing nuclear arms reductions.

During the Moscow summit of May 1972, Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev made agreements that instituted a brief era of détente, or a relaxation of hostilities, between the two superpowers. The two leaders agreed to sign two treaties that emerged from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) of 1969–1972. The Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty limited antiballistic missile systems, whereas the other agreement called for a freeze (until 1977) on the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and submarines carrying SLBMs.

While détente with the Soviet Union was developing, China indicated that it would be open to communication with the United States. Nixon grasped this opportunity in the hopes that better relations with China might encourage its leaders to persuade the North Vietnamese to end the war. The president traveled to Beijing to meet with Chinese leaders, particularly Premier Zhou Enlai, in late February 1972. The trip was especially noteworthy because it initiated an era of rapprochement, or cordial relations, between China and the United States, although not much else was accomplished.

POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST

In the troubled Middle East, Nixon was determined to contain communism and ward off Soviet incursions. According to the Nixon Doctrine, pronounced in February 1970, the United States declared that it would supply its Middle East allies with economic and military assistance (instead of ground troops) in the event of a crisis, thus ruling out a large-scale military engagement such as Vietnam.

As Israel clashed with the Arab states of Syria and Egypt, the United States supplied weapons to Israel and Iran to counterbalance the arms the Soviet Union provided to Syria and Egypt. During the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Arab states protested U.S. arms assistance to Israel by initiating an embargo on oil destined for the United States through the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Spiraling oil prices and the resulting U.S. oil crisis of 1973–1974 forced Nixon and Kissinger to take action. Kissinger's so-called shuttle diplomacy, in which he flew from one meeting with Mideast leaders to another, may have kept the conflict from escalating into a larger war and influenced OPEC to discontinue the oil embargo in March 1974.

LATIN AMERICA

Even before the procommunist Salvador Allende was elected the president of Chile in 1970, CIA operatives, on orders from President Nixon, covertly discouraged his election. President Lyndon Johnson had stated in his Johnson Doctrine that the United States would stop a communist government from gaining control of any nation in the Western Hemisphere. Nixon, according to the Johnson and Nixon Doctrines, ordered the CIA to undermine the Allende government and force him from power. A military coup in 1973 overthrew Allende, resulting in his assassination. The CIA acknowledged its support of the coup, but denied any involvement in the assassination.

The Watergate scandal, which came fully to U.S. public attention in 1973, distracted President Nixon from foreign affairs and diminished his overall effectiveness. During this crisis, Kissinger assumed a greater involvement in foreign policy making, becoming Nixon's secretary of state in 1973. This scandal and Nixon's resignation in August 1974 ended his foreign policy initiatives, most of which were not carried forth by subsequent administrations. This outcome was primarily the result of Nixon's and Kissinger's private, behind closed doors method of policy making, which blocked the state department, Cabinet members, and other advisers from building on the successes of the Nixon administration.

See also Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Détente; Johnson, Lyndon B., and National Policy; Kissinger, Henry (1923–); Nixon Doctrine (1969); OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries); Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)

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NIXON SHOCKS

Policies initiated by the administration of U.S. President Richard Nixon that challenged the prevailing strategic and economic relationship between the United States and Japan. This account traces events leading up to and culminating in the Nixon Shocks. Although not all of these events directly impacted the decisions that produced the Nixon Shocks, they offer a context for understanding the political atmosphere that shaped important international policies of the Nixon administration.

U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Following its victory over Japan in World War II, the United States forged a security relationship with Japan based on containment of Chinese communism in Asia. In 1951, the two nations signed the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which allowed the United States to maintain armed forces in and about Japan to deter any armed attack against that nation. The treaty was signed in the expectation that Japan would increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression by outside powers. In addition to this security arrangement, a strong dollar and open American market served as engines driving Japan's economic growth.

STRATEGIC ISSUES AND THE OKINAWA QUESTION

By the time Nixon took office in 1969, the Soviet Union was approaching strategic military parity with the United States, and economic policies pursued by Western Europe and Japan threatened American prosperity. By 1971, ballooning trade and balance of payments deficits eroded faith in the dollar and reduced Washington's global influence. By the spring of 1971, foreign pressure to redeem dollars for gold reached a climax. For the first time since World War II, American global economic interests collided with those of the European allies and Japan. Facing an economic crisis unprecedented since 1945, Nixon was forced to introduce the New Economic Policy, which economically and strategically hurt its chief Asian ally at the time, Japan.

In March 1969, Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato told the Japanese Diet (parliament) that he intended to make the return of a nuclear weapons-free Okinawa the first issue of business with President Nixon. The American government considered the Okinawa bases to be of inestimable value, not just for the ongoing U.S. operations in Vietnam but also for the U.S. strategic position in the Pacific. Japanese-American negotiations over Okinawa began in earnest in June 1969 and continued through the Nixon-Sato summit that November.

The two sides tacitly agreed on several points that, although not legally binding, went beyond previous

commitments. The United States agreed to withdraw its nuclear weapons from Okinawa and return the island to Japanese control. In return, Japan would allow the United States to use existing military Okinawa bases for a wider variety of combat operations against Vietnam than other bases in Japan. The Japanese also agreed to adopt a "positive attitude" toward the use of U.S. bases in Japan to defend South Korea and Taiwan.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE

As the diplomats worked on the details of the Okinawa deal, Nixon took a lengthy trip though Asia. On July 25, at a press briefing in Guam, the president issued a statement on future security policy that his aides soon dubbed the Nixon Doctrine. In his speech, Nixon pledged to honor existing security pacts with Asian nations and promised to provide material support to resist aggression. However, he also stressed that Asian nations must take primary responsibility for their own defense.

The call for a new security structure in Asia reflected both political and economic realities. At the time, the emergence of dynamic export economies among America's European and Asian allies were hurting American manufacturers and creating an unfavorable trade balance. Complaints by American textile companies (who had contributed generously to Nixon's 1968 campaign) made the president especially anxious to get Japan to agree to reduce the export of synthetics to the United States.

In Sato's eagerness to assure the rapid return of Okinawa under acceptable terms, he accepted the American export restraint formula without consulting Japanese manufacturers and ministries, whose approval and cooperation was required under Japanese law. Japan ultimately failed to implement the export restrictions, causing Nixon to complain about Japanese "betrayal" of the United States.

THE NIXON-SATO SUMMIT

Efforts to broker a deal on Okinawa appeared comparatively simpler. Because of diplomatic negotiations in late 1969 led by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, both sides agreed to several concessions, and Nixon agreed to return Okinawa to Japan by 1972. After the formal talks concluded, however, a private meeting supposedly took place between Nixon and Sato, with

Kissinger present. In the meeting, Nixon explained that the U.S. military, Congress, and other interest groups in the United States objected to the nuclear-free return of Okinawa as a "give-away." As payback, the president wanted Sato to implement the synthetic textile restraint deal. Kissinger and Nixon were certain that Sato agreed to implement export controls and that "he committed his sincerity and all his efforts" to carry out the export restraint agreement.

In December 1969, Sato parlayed the results of the Okinawa agreement into an electoral victory, but the stalemate over textiles continued. Despite months of additional negotiations during 1970 and another visit by Sato in October 1970, the Japanese prime minister failed to implement the export restraint agreement that Nixon and Kissinger believed he had agreed to at the earlier summit meeting. On March 8, 1971, representatives of the Japanese textile industry announced that they and U.S. Congressman Wilbur Mills concluded a voluntary three-year export restraint program that precluded the need for a government-to-government agreement. Nixon was furious; not only had Sato failed to deliver on his promise, but he appeared to be colluding with one of Nixon's Democratic rivals.

THE TWIN JOLTS

On March 11, 1971, Nixon denounced the Japanese industry plan as too lenient and refused to approve the agreement. Sato, hoping he could still deal with Nixon, reshuffled his cabinet and named two political allies as ministers for trade and foreign affairs. Just as these officials were assuming their new posts, Nixon administered the first jolt to Japan—his July 15 announcement of a planned visit to China.

By the summer of 1971, the festering textile dispute blended into the larger economic problems dividing the United States from its trading partners. Nixon feared that European nations holding dollars would demand that the U.S. redeem those dollars in gold. This would be a major shock to the U.S. economy. He hurriedly assembled his political and economic advisers and on August 15 announced that the United States would no longer exchange dollars for gold.

In addition to removing the U.S. from the so-called gold standard, Nixon also announced a 10% surcharge on imports, imposed a temporary freeze on all wages and prices in the United States, provided investment incentives to industry, and reduced federal spending. In September, Nixon threatened to impose quotas on

Japan's textile exports under the terms of the Trading With the Enemy Act. These initiatives had a disproportionate impact on Japan, given its dependence on the American market and the fact that more than 90% of its exports were subject to the new surcharge. Delinking the dollar from a gold standard also caused a decline in the value of the dollar and a corresponding rise in the value of the Japanese yen. This further hurt Japanese exports to the United States by making them more expensive to U.S. consumers.

Just as the opening to China overturned the political ground rules of the postoccupation Pacific alliance, Nixon's New Economic Policy undermined the basis of the postwar economic relationship between the United States and Japan. Although the China shock had primarily injured Japan's pride, the economic shock was designed (as Nixon put it) to really "stick it to Japan."

TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY

Nixon and Kissinger's interest in opening a dialogue with China reflected deeper changes in the Cold War. Upon taking office, both men recognized that the Soviet Union had achieved a rough nuclear parity with the United States. However, even as Washington realized that a more cooperative relationship with Moscow was needed, the political and economic policies pursued by Europe and Japan had begun to clash frequently with American interests. Tensions within the western alliance were matched by fragmentation of the Sino-Soviet bloc. At the same time, Japan's growing wealth and assertiveness—including Sato's pledge to support the defense of South Korea and Taiwan—raised for China the specter of a rearmed, expansionist Japan.

It was in America's best strategic interests to keep China, Japan, and the Soviet Union concerned with one another to maintain the balance of power in Asia and restrict the rise of any one single power. This calculation on the part of the United States required it to engage in *triangular diplomacy* among Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. It also required Nixon to play the "China card" first.

Nixon's calculated announcement of his visit to China stunned most Japanese, particularly Sato. The timing was particularly brutal because while Washington and Beijing moved toward cooperation from 1970 to 1971, Sino-Japanese relations were simultaneously deteriorating. Chinese leaders expressed alarm over Japan's expanding economic power and

rising military budget. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai issued strict new guidelines governing Sino-Japanese trade. These new rules prohibited Chinese trade with Japanese companies assisting or investing in Taiwan and South Korea, manufacturing arms for the American war effort in Southeast Asia, or engaging in joint ventures with American firms.

Sato urged Japanese business leaders to resist Chinese pressure. Nevertheless, business groups were anxious to enter China, which was (and still is) the largest market in Asia. Many political observers in Japan argued that strategic and economic cooperation with China seemed imperative to ensure Japanese prosperity in the post-Nixon shock environment. Although Sato probably agreed with much of this assessment, his desire to retain American goodwill constrained his actions.

On September 21, at roughly the same time as he threatened to invoke the Trading With the Enemy Act against Japan, Nixon finally sent the Okinawa reversion treaty to the U.S. Senate. The treaty won easy passage on November 10, 1971, and Okinawa returned to Japan on May 15, 1972. On September 26, in a sign that he desired to resume a dialogue with Tokyo, President Nixon flew to Alaska to greet Japanese Emperor Hirohito.

AFTERSHOCKS

The effects of the Nixon Shocks were not limited to the United States and Japan; they produced worldwide economic and political changes. On December 17, 1971, the so-called Group of Ten (the major Western European powers plus Canada, Japan, and the United States) reached an agreement to revalue the world currencies. The member states agreed to a devaluation of the dollar by approximately 9%. The yen-dollar exchange rate fell from 360 to 1 to approximately 308 to 1, and Washington dropped the import surcharge.

Following the Group of Ten conference, Nixon embarked on his trip to China. During his week there, he stressed the point that America's alliance with Japan was in China's interest. However, Nixon's effort to sell Beijing on the U.S-Japan security treaty fell short. In the joint Shanghai Communiqué issued by Nixon and Zhou at the end of the visit, the Chinese declared their opposition to "the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism." By allowing himself to be associated with this assertion, Nixon came close to endorsing Beijing's basic views. Even without knowing the details of the Nixon-Kissinger-Mao-Zhou

discussions, the Shanghai Communiqué shocked Sato. Although leaders of Sato's Liberal Democratic Party varied in their responses to the Nixon shocks, nearly all now recognized that Sato's days as prime minister were numbered.

China's view of Japan changed and evolved rapidly after the Nixon visit. During the summer of 1972, Zhou announced that China no longer objected to the U.S-Japan security treaty. That fall, a new Japanese Prime Minister, Tanaka Kakuei, normalized relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Chinese not only ceased complaining about resurgent militarism in Japan but also praised Tokyo as an incipient ally.

By the twilight of the Nixon years, American views of both China and Japan altered radically from those prevailing in 1969. A new realism about the necessity for the United States and China to coexist peacefully replaced the ideological hostility toward Beijing and sympathy toward Tokyo. The logic that underlay the post–World War II system of favoring Japan because of its anticommunist orientation was rapidly giving way to a multipolar world in which Japan was both ally of and competitor with the United States.

See also China and U.S. Policy; Cold War; Communism and National Security; Nixon Doctrine; Nixon, Richard, and National Policy; Okinawa; U.S.-Japan Alliance.

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NON- AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION

Efforts to slow or prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to decrease the risk of such weapons being used in an armed conflict. Nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies are based on the assumption that the proliferation of these types of weapons increases the threat of war, amplifies the destructiveness of war, and raises the costs of preparing for war.

Nonproliferation regimes include treaties, sets of international organizations, and the states that subscribe to them. For example, the nuclear nonproliferation regime consists of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), parts of the United Nations, and the states that subscribe to the NPT. Nonproliferation regimes also exist for chemical and biological weapons and for their delivery systems, notably missiles.

By contrast, counterproliferation policies, such as those advanced by the United States, are intended to convince or compel states to discontinue weapons programs, by force if necessary. Counterproliferation policies can take various forms, including war (as in the case of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003) or even negotiated aid packages (as in the case of the Agreed Framework negotiated with North Korea in 1994).

Despite these varied approaches for slowing proliferation, nonproliferation regimes and counterproliferation policies often work in tandem to achieve the common goal of halting the spread of WMD. This was the case from 1991 to 1999 with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which combined both approaches in preventing Iraq from continued development of WMD.

NONPROLIFERATION AND THE COLD WAR

During the Cold War, efforts by individual states and the UN to slow the spread of WMD focused primarily on the nonproliferation of the nuclear weapons through multilateral and bilateral agreements. Many countries believed that proliferation would end if the nuclear states agreed not to share nuclear weapons technology with nonnuclear states. Despite this widespread belief, the creation of an international nonproliferation treaty regime actually was quite complicated and required extensive international bargaining.

The creation of the IAEA in 1957 was the first cooperative response to controlling the proliferation of nuclear technology for weapons use. Six years later, the Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed, prohibiting nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. The NPT, which entered into force in 1970, marked the most significant international cooperative prohibition on the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The treaty forbids nonnuclear weapons member-states from manufacturing, controlling, or receiving the transfer of nuclear weapons. It also prohibits nuclear

weapons member-states from assisting them in developing nuclear technology for weapons purposes. Article VI of the NPT requires the five certified nuclear weapons member-states—the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia (the former Soviet Union), and China—"to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament."

Bilateral U.S.-Soviet talks during the Cold War showed that both parties wanted to slow nuclear proliferation. These talks led to negotiation of the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and SALT II) in the 1970s. However, the independent development of nuclear weapons by France and China in the 1960s demonstrated the possibility that states could acquire nuclear weapons without the assistance of others. The later development of nuclear weapons by non-NPT signatories India, Pakistan, and Israel revealed that the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons would likely continue, despite the best efforts of international regimes to prevent it. Moreover, the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1989) highlighted the fact that international nonproliferation regimes could no longer focus solely on nuclear weapons.

NONPROLIFERATION AFTER THE COLD WAR

The discovery of Iraq's extensive clandestine weapons program following the 1991 Gulf War was a turning point for the international regimes. The scope of Iraq's WMD program was revealed in international inspections by UNSCOM. These discoveries generated wide debate about whether the nonproliferation regimes were effective, and whether the United States should limit its counterproliferation policies to efforts within the framework of the regimes.

Many of the assumptions from the Cold War era are no longer appropriate for non- and counterproliferation. Advancements and diffusion of technology have made WMD more accessible. The dual-use nature of nuclear, biological, and chemical technologies, combined with their spread, has made it difficult to track programs and judge their intent.

Some efforts to strengthen nonproliferation regimes in the post–Cold War era have been successful. Unilateral decisions by states (e.g., South Africa and Libya) to dismantle WMD programs have demonstrated that nations can change course and choose to renounce programs within the regimes' frameworks.

Moreover, additional NPT signatories, the indefinite extension NPT (1995), and the development of the IAEA Additional Protocol have strengthened the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The Chemical Weapons Convention of 1997 and the negotiation of measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention reveal other positive trends in nonproliferation.

The spread of international terrorism since the 1990s has broadened the objectives of nonproliferation regimes and U.S. counterproliferation policies. For example, the 1995 sarin gas attacks by Aum Shinrikyo in Tokyo suggested that the use of WMD by terrorists was already a threat. The stated determination of terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda to acquire WMD has raised the specter of their use in future terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the discovery of an illicit trading network in nuclear material operated by the Pakastani nuclear scientist AQ Khan reveals the ease with which terrorists may be able to acquire WMD.

Nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts are no longer limited to slowing the spread of WMD to states. Efforts such as the revived Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and UN Security Council Resolution 1540 seek to prevent terrorists and rogue states from acquiring WMD. The United States has also implemented the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to assist Russia in protecting poorly guarded weapons from being stolen or illegally sold.

See also Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972); Arms Control; Arms Race; Biological Weapons and Warfare; Biological Weapons Convention; Chemical Weapons; Chemical Weapons Convention; Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996–); Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963); Nuclear Proliferation; Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; Nuclear Weapons; Verification

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NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER

Officer appointed by a commissioned officer in the military hierarchy. The noncommissioned officer corps

is the administrative apparatus of the U.S. military. A noncommissioned officer (NCO) usually supervises enlisted men and serves as adviser to the officer corps. NCOs receive their authority from commissioned officers, who in turn receive their authority from a sovereign power, such as the United States government.

The laws of war require the existence of an officer class in the military, although there are commissioned officers who are not members of the military. These individuals work in the uniformed services such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Public Health Service (PHS) commissioned corps. The distinction between civilians and combatants is crucial to the laws of war. The motivation for commissioning officers is so they cannot be legally tried as spies if captured on the battlefield.

NCOs are considered vital to the day-to-day management of military operations. They typically function at the rank of sergeant, but they can also serve as corporals and petty officers. NCOs can receive advanced military training.

The position of tactical NCO exists at the level of the military academy. Tactical NCOs are responsible for training leaders for companies of cadets at the U.S. Military Academy. Their responsibilities range from teaching and supervising drill and ceremony procedures to military training.

See also U.S. Air Force; U.S. Army; U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Navy

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NONPROLIFERATION
See NON- AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION

NORAD (NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND)

Military headquarters established by the United States and Canada to monitor and defend North American airspace. The agreement that created the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) was signed on May 12, 1958. It was a Cold War deterrent to airborne threats to North America from outside the region. The agreement has been renewed eight times since 1958.

NORAD uses data from satellites and ground-based radar installations to monitor, validate, and warn of attacks against North America by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles. NORAD also provides surveillance and control of U.S. and Canadian airspace and operates fighter aircraft. Before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, NORAD was focused on airborne threats to the Canadian and U.S. borders. After the terrorist attacks, NORAD's mission has broadened to include threats from domestic airspace.

NORAD is integrated into the command and intelligence structures of both the U.S. and Canadian armed forces. The commander in chief of NORAD is appointed by the president of the United States and the prime minister of Canada and reports to both leaders. NORAD is headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado, but the command and control center for its worldwide system of sensors designed to detect aerospace threats is located at Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado.

NORAD's area of responsibility stretches from Clear, Alaska, to the Florida Keys and from St. John's, Newfoundland, to San Diego, California. It operates three regional sectors to perform its dual mission of aerospace warning and aerospace control: the Alaskan NORAD Region (ANR), headquartered near Anchorage; Canadian NORAD Region (CANR) in Winnipeg, Manitoba; and the Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR). The CONR is broken into three sectors: Western Air Defense Sector at McChord Air Force Base in the state of Washington; Northeast Air Defense Sector at Rome, New York; and Southeast Air Defense Sector at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. Tyndall Air Force Base is the CONR headquarters.

See also Deterrence; Nuclear Deterrence

NORMANDY INVASION

The Allied endeavor to open a second front on the French coast of Normandy in the European theater of operations during World War II. The Battle of

Normandy (code-named Operation Overlord) activated a second front with amphibious Allied landings on the morning of June 6, 1944.

Although often and famously referred to simply as D-day, the fighting in Normandy lasted for months, with the bulk of the German resistance finally eliminated by late August. The objectives of the operation were to establish a beachhead from which to liberate occupied regions and eventually drive back the German Reich.

Although ultimately successful, the early assault at Normandy was extremely costly in terms of men and materiel. The landings on the coast of Normandy involved a massive joint operation of mostly U.S., British, and Canadian forces—with naval, aerial, and paratroop elements supporting the main amphibious assault. In their path, the Germans placed three *Panzer* divisions under the command of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, which were reinforced by only minimal air and armor support. As part of their Atlantic Wall defenses, the Germans had extensively fortified the foreshore area, but they manned it with only a haphazard collection of troops, including non-German nationalities (mainly Russians) who agreed to fight for the Germans rather than endure prisoner of war camps.

Following the initial landing phase of the Normandy invasion, many more Allied troops and equipment continued to come ashore after D-day. By the end of July, more than one million Allied troops were entrenched along the Normandy coast. In the end, Operation Overlord succeeded in its objective by sheer force of numbers in both men and materiel.

Although the footing the Allies gained at Normandy was crucial to the efforts and success of the western front, it may not have affected the ultimate outcome of the war. By the time of D-day, the Red Army of the Soviet Union was irreversibly advancing toward Germany from the east. In 1942–1943, the incursion into Stalingrad had been the Third Reich's high-water mark, but by the time of the Normandy invasion, Hitler's army was in retreat.

Despite the fact that four-fifths of the German forces were in the east, the Soviets had the capacity to defeat Germany by itself. With its repulse of the German Army, the Soviet Union laid claim over Eastern European states left in the wake of its drive toward Berlin. A complete occupation of Europe by communist forces, therefore, was within the realm of possibility.

To ensure the survival of democracy in Europe, a U.S. and British presence may have been needed to counter the extent that communism would spread in Western Europe. Accordingly, the Battle of Normandy not only has historical relevance in regard to the events of World War II but is also significant within the context of the postwar period. With the cessation of hostilities between the Axis and the Allies, a new arena of conflict was to emerge immediately: the era of Cold War rivalries and power alignments. The Normandy invasion signaled the eventual end of one global struggle and the harbinger of another.

See also D-Day; World War II (1939–1945)

NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA)

A trilateral agreement among the United States, Canada, and Mexico that eliminated tariffs and other barriers to trade. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) both succeeds and expands upon the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement of 1989. Trade barriers were to be eliminated within 10 years for most products and sectors, and within 15 years for others. Exceptions to the program include the trade of some agricultural products between the United States and Canada, cultural industries, and petroleum production.

NAFTA took effect on January 1, 1994. Beyond just reducing tariffs, the NAFTA nations also pledged in the agreement to eliminate nonbarriers to trade such as labeling requirements and import quotas); facilitate the cross-border movement of goods and services between the nations by investing in transportation and technology improvements; promote conditions of fair competition within the free trade area; substantially increase investment opportunities by giving potential investors access to a shared market; provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights; create effective procedures for the joint administration of the agreement and for the resolution of disputes; and establish a framework for further trilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of the agreement.

Following a lengthy series of trilateral negotiations among the United States, Canada, and Mexico, NAFTA was ratified by the Canadian Parliament in June 2003 and by the United States and Mexican senates in November 2003. Proponents in the United States and Canada hoped that the opening of the

Mexican market would translate into thousands of new, high wage, export-producing jobs, and afford domestic businesses access to a free trade area on par with those developing in Europe, Asia, and various other parts of the globe. NAFTA supporters in Mexico presumed that the agreement would trigger an infusion of American and Canadian capital, stabilize economic growth, and create countless jobs in emerging industries.

Critics of NAFTA in the United States, both on the left and right, cite the widening trade deficits with Canada and Mexico as indications of the agreement's failure. Between 1993 and 2002, the U.S. export deficit with the NAFTA nations increased by 281% to $85 billion. Although U.S. exports to its NAFTA partners increased considerably over that time (95% to Mexico and 41% to Canada), imports from those nations grew faster still (195% from Mexico and 61% from Canada). Moreover, opponents claim that the United States lost nearly 900,000 net jobs during the first 10 years that NAFTA has been in effect. Over the same period, the total share of U.S. exports to Mexico represented by Maquiladora imports (U.S. parts and components that are shipped to Mexico and assembled into final products for sale in the United States) rose from 39% to 61%.

The extent to which NAFTA can be seen as either a success or failure is largely a matter of perspective. Large transnational firms have been helped considerably by the ability to site production facilities in whatever geography within the free trade area is most advantageous. More-skilled and higher-paying segments of the production process (for example, research and development) have gravitated toward the United States and Canada, whereas less-skilled and lower-paying segments (for example, simple assembly) have become more common in Mexico.

See also Free Trade; Multilateralism

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

The quintessential example of a collective defense system, an alliance that extended over the 40 years of the Cold War and evolved in its aftermath into a collective security system. The altered threat posed by changing world conditions after the Cold War has changed the alliance system. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) originally opposed the expansion of the Soviet Union into Western Europe, but today many threats remain unnamed and might call for operations outside of the region of the NATO members. The United States has dominated NATO since its inception in 1949, but the growing strength and independence of its member states have proven frustrating to U.S. leadership, especially in recent years.

BACKGROUND

As the Allied coalition of World War II deteriorated in the wake of Germany's defeat, and as Cold War discords emerged, Western Europe teetered on the brink of economic collapse. The renewed strength of communist parties in the region seemed to argue for an impending breakdown of the entire social and political system. As an initial step toward European recovery and strengthening the democratic political parties of Western Europe, the United States developed the European Recovery Program, or Marshall Plan. Because the Marshall Plan tended to escalate competition with the Soviet Union, and incidents such as the Berlin crisis of 1948 demonstrated the intractable nature of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, a military component of the Western alliance seemed even more necessary.

Europe was not under threat of immediate Soviet attack in the early Cold War years, but the introduction of a U.S. military deterrent would provide security for the economic and political recovery in the west. The participation of the United States in a collective defense of Europe would not only deter aggression against it but also provide the essential assurance to West Europeans that the disunity and weakness of previous attempts to achieve collective defense would not happen again.

Under these circumstances, 12 countries inaugurated NATO in Washington, DC, on April 4, 1949: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952, completing the alliance plans for the Mediterranean—but leading critics to question how these two countries had been "moved" into the North Atlantic as if by magic. West Germany joined the NATO alliance in 1955 after a debate over how the Germans could be rearmed, settling upon a special command arrangement for West German

forces under NATO. Spain was the last to join, in 1982 before the Cold War ended, and the *NATO 16* considered the future of the alliance.

NATO AND U.S. POLICY

The United States entered an alliance system reluctantly and relatively recently. The long-term tradition, lasting until 1941, was that the United States would enter no permanent alliance. Alliances were considered the source of incipient warfare among European nations, and would be best avoided by the United States, which saw itself as a trader nation.

However, the twin political shocks of World War I and World War II, culminating in the Cold War of permanent opposition and enduring readiness, led the United States to reconsider its opposition to permanent alliance. Thus, the United States and its West European allies founded the NATO pact and created a doctrine of containment versus the Soviet Union and other communist states.

After a century and a half of avoiding permanent entanglements, the United States launched into a "pact-o-mania" of alliances. In addition to NATO, the United States joined alliances in Southeast Asia (SEATO), with east Asian nations (bilaterals with Japan and Korea), with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS), and the Baghdad Pact (CENTO), which became its most glaring major failure. Bilateral defense agreements also blossomed in the years since NATO was established.

The United States served as the major member in all these alliances, and it distributed military and financial aid to the others, relying at the time upon its extensive stores of World War II materiel. With such military aid frequently came requests for base rights, and the United States built a large number of bases, principally for its strategic bomber force, to add teeth to the doctrine of containment.

Thus, from the beginning, the United States entered into alliance politics as the dominant partner. Although the politics of democracy emphasized that this was not an imperial concept and was a true partnership for peace and freedom, the conduct of foreign policy and military relations remained indistinguishable from any other doctrine of imperial defense.

In fact, the NATO alliance worked successfully only because the lesser members acceded to the leadership of the major members and, in effect, deferred their control of defense and foreign policy in part to

the alliance. However, NATO then evolved from a collective defense agreement of mostly weakened and war-ravaged nations to a dominant alliance system composed of some of the wealthiest and prosperous world nations.

In time, the other NATO nations began to chafe at the continuing dominion of the United States and its interests. The recovery of Western Europe also restored the economic balance and renewed the rivalry of that bloc with the United States (and later, Japan). When U.S. leadership frustrated British and French designs on the Suez Canal in 1956 and brought NATO close to war over Berlin in 1961 (and again over Cuba in 1962), European leaders, especially the French under President Charles De Gaulle, began to edge away from loyalty to the United States. U.S. leaders had taken European subordination for granted for decades and reacted spitefully to any signs of wavering, especially as the U.S. presence in Vietnam took form in the mid-1960s and European criticism grew against U.S. cultural and economic imperialism.

U.S. leaders, for their part, remained ever suspicious of Europeans. First were the usual suspicions that they remained as quarrelsome and warlike as in the days when the United States sought no alliances. Also, the Western Europeans allowed real socialists into their governments, and this flirting with Marxism seemed a real and present danger to the security of the American world.

When the treachery of renewed economic rivalry became noticeable, and the larger European nations demanded more of a partnership in NATO affairs, the lines were drawn. France departed from the operational participation in NATO in 1965, forcing the alliance to give up facilities (and U.S. bases) on its territory. French President De Gaulle announced an independent French defense policy and strategic deterrent force.

Since then, the major powers have continued cordial relations, and the French have even returned to full NATO status. However, the period of interdependency has disappeared from the foreign affairs of the United States and its European allies. For the latter, this is a refreshing dose of reality and does not mean that they will refuse most U.S. requests for coordination or joint actions. However, the United States has not adjusted well to increasing independence among its erstwhile allies in the few alliances remaining from the 1950s.

Nuclear weapons proved a particular dilemma for NATO, stemming from the 1950s period of true military dependence of Europe upon the United States.

Most Europeans lived on the potential battlefield and believed in absolute nuclear deterrence. Unwilling to trust to a conventional defense, the Europeans considered early resort to strategic U.S. nuclear weapons as the only way to deter Soviet moves toward any type of warfare in Europe.

In effect, there was no distinctive conventional defense of Europe. U.S. policy sought to conserve its central strategic arsenal, and if a conventional defense could be mounted, so much the better. Even a tactical nuclear defense of Europe (that is, not including strategic weapons fired from U.S. soil against the Soviet Union) was preferable for the American leadership.

The United States introduced tactical nuclear weapons to counter the numerically superior forces of the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies. These weapons took the form of smaller-sized and smaller-yield devices designed for use in artillery projectiles, short-range rockets, and aerial bombs. However, the continuing improvements in warhead design and miniaturization began to blur the distinction in these weapons between tactical and strategic arms by the late 1960s.

The ultimate nuclear dilemma was the introduction of short-range nuclear ballistic missiles by the United States to offset perceived Soviet superiority in that class of weapons. The Pershing II ballistic missile and the land-based cruise missiles based in several European countries provoked much anguish among political factions. Many of them questioned whether these were credible balances to the opposing armaments and whether they represented disengagement of NATO regional defense from the strategic nuclear umbrella that had traditionally provided the ultimate deterrence to a NATO–Warsaw Pact conflict—a strategic exchange between the superpowers on each side.

NATO DEFENSES

Early in NATO planning, the members hoped to raise a combined force in the region of some 60 ground divisions and a balanced air component. It soon became clear, however, that the defense budgets of the participating countries could not provide them. Moreover, the population base of a Europe experiencing the so-called economic miracle of 1954–1966 was also limited in military components. The addition of West Germany to the alliance allowed a high-quality ground force to be established on the NATO central front, backed by a superior tactical air force.

The northern front of NATO consisted of the Norwegian Sea, the Icelandic Straits, the common Norwegian border with the Soviet Union, and the Baltic approaches. With regional manpower at a premium, the defense of these sectors depended on air and sea superiority and the use of highly mobile ground reinforcements from other member states. In the south, NATO defenses hinged on the land defense of Turkey, the other member-state sharing a common border with the Soviet Union, and the defense of the Mediterranean by air and sea forces to shore up the land defenses of Italy and Greece—which would face second-echelon attacks in a NATO–Warsaw Pact conflict.

Although hopes continued for a common approach to defense procurement, national sentiments required healthy defense industries for the major powers. Initially, U.S. surplus weaponry from World War II provided a great deal of commonality to NATO forces. However, in the mature alliance, what counted most were interoperability standards that established common fuels and lubricants, munitions, command, control, and communications, and the compatible infrastructure of bases, pipelines, cargo handling, and other myriad features of the most successful peace-time permanent alliance.

Operationally, NATO never had to enter a conflict until it was called upon for peacemaking and peace-keeping duties in the Balkans in the 1990s. A brief air campaign to subjugate Serbia as a final measure of Balkan security activities came in 1999. By that time, the NATO alliance had begun to change into a collective security arrangement, adding members from the former Warsaw Pact and extending cooperative links to eastern neighbors not technically qualified for membership.

After a difficult period of persuasion, even Russia began to actively cooperate and participate in NATO exercises. As of 2004, NATO has expanded to include 26 nations, with the addition of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. A new set of joint forces commands and headquarters charged with preparing missions in and out of the NATO areas have replaced the old Atlantic northern, central, and southern commands.

—Kenneth W. Estes

See also Alliances; Atlantic Alliance; Berlin Crises (1958–1961); Bosnia Intervention; Burdensharing; Central Front in Europe; Cold War; Collective Security; Containment; Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (1990); Cooperative Security; Cruise Missile; De Gaulle, Charles (1890–1970); Deterrence; European Union (EU); Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR); Nuclear Weapons; Prepositioned Equipment; Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy; Tactical Nuclear Weapons; Treaties; War Planning; Warsaw Pact; World War II (1939–1945)

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NORTH KOREA CRISES (1994–)

Series of diplomatic and military incidents since the mid-1990s, which have strained the tense political relationship between the United States and North Korea. The end of the Cold War brought a decade marred by several bouts of crisis between North Korea and what it views as its primary foe—the United States. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 left North Korea without its most important political ally and trading partner, drastically damaging it politically, militarily, and economically. It also gave North Korea renewed impetus to continue pursuing the nascent nuclear program it began nurturing in the previous few decades.

Citing security concerns each time, North Korea tried to use its growing nuclear capabilities repeatedly in the early 1990s to gain economic, diplomatic, and military concessions from the United States. Each time, diplomatic agreements were reached, but they were broken, or deemed so, by one or both parties. The latest such agreement was the 1994 Agreed Framework, which is a nonbinding document signed by North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and former U.S. President Bill Clinton. Under the Agreed Framework, the United States offered North Korea some measure of security guarantees and fuel aid, and promised to construct two light-water nuclear reactors for North Korea. In turn, North Korea promised to freeze nuclear activities, renew its membership to the Nonproliferation Treaty, and reinstate International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections.

The Agreed Framework brought about some positive results, including the successful freezing of operations at North Korea's main nuclear facility in Yongbyon for eight years, verified by inspections at the end of 2002. Also, since 1994, North Korea created no new plutonium nor extracted plutonium from existing fuel rods—a main point of contention during the negotiations. However, North Korea made little progress toward freezing nuclear activities, and construction of the two light-water reactors was never completed.

In August 1998, North Korea test-launched a ballistic missile over Japan into the Pacific Ocean, causing the United States to consider withdrawing from the Agreed Framework. Rather than take such drastic action, President Clinton determined that the best strategy was for the United States to coordinate a message and strategy with China, South Korea, and Japan. In May 1999, the four nations approached North Korea together with the goal of attaining "verifiable elimination of the nuclear and missile programs." They promised that they would not attack North Korea to change its behavior, but that such a promise was binding only if North Korea gave up its nuclear ambitions. Deterrence must be limited to conventional weapons, and a road would be paved for nuclear dismantlement and for North Korea's reintegration into the international community. North Korea agreed to a moratorium on tests of long-range missiles, to continue the freeze at Yongbyon, and to conduct a series of talks with South Korea. This resulted in the 2000 summit meeting of the leaders of the two countries.

In contrast with the efforts of the Clinton administration to work with North Korea, President George W. Bush turned a relatively cold shoulder to North Korea from his first day in office. Some observers cite this as one of the factors motivating North Korea to renew its nuclear posturing. In November 2002, the United States confronted North Korea with intelligence that showed North Korea's likely possession of two nuclear bombs and its operation of a uranium enrichment plant. North Korea subsequently admitted that it had indeed restarted its nuclear program, and it withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty on New Year's Eve 2002. At the beginning of 2003, North Korea

ejected IAEA inspectors, capped IAEA surveillance cameras, and rejected the Agreed Framework.

In the midst of the 2002 crisis, North Korea called for direct negotiations with the United States. The U.S. policy demanded that any negotiations be held on a multilateral level and must include other prominent regional powers, such as China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan. Two rounds of talks have been held since 2002, but the general consensus is that these negotiations have not led to any concrete shifts in the situation. The fact that each of the regional parties involved in the negotiations has very different objectives and positions toward North Korea has further complicated efforts to reach an agreement.

President George W. Bush listens as Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao makes a point during a press conference in the Oval Office of the White House on December 9, 2003. During meetings at the White House, President Bush encouraged Wen to help resolve the year-old North Korean nuclear crisis. The continued development of nuclear weapons by North Korea has been a vital concern of the United States, which wants to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such weapons in the hands of a rogue state such as North Korea is especially worrisome.

Source: Corbis.

See also Agreed Framework; Bush, George W., and National Policy; Clinton, Bill (William Jefferson), and National Policy; International Atomic Energy Agency; Korea, North and South; Non- and Counterproliferation; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); Nuclear Proliferation

NSC-68 (NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT)

Official report written in 1950 that was one of the critical U.S. government documents defining the Cold War and establishing the U.S. strategy for winning that war.

Paul H. Nitze of the state department wrote the National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) at the behest of Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The report forecast a Soviet capability to attack the United States with nuclear weapons by 1954. It called for increased U.S. arms spending to destroy the Soviet Union and give the United States unmatched military capabilities.

Specifically, NSC-68 was a top secret internal document designed to convince President Harry S. Truman to increase military spending well above the low limits he had set in the downsizing after World War II. Initially, Truman refused to increase spending, but the outbreak of the Korean War convinced him to spend more on defense. The defense budget soon doubled and then tripled.

NSC-68 remilitarized the United States and set up a permanent war economy and national security structure. It used national security to justify the right of the United States to claim scarce resources anywhere in the world.

The report said that "Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States."

NSC-68 revealed the mindset of U.S. cold warriors. It begins by explaining that World War II had ended the German and Japanese empires and the exhaustion of the French and British ones. The report noted that two great powers remained standing and in competition for world dominance and leadership—the United States and the Soviet Union. One of these two powers, the United States, stood for good, whereas the other, the Soviet Union, was evil.

NSC-68 assumed that the Soviet Union wanted to expand until it controlled the Eurasian landmass, and that its eventual goal was world domination. The threat was of such magnitude that it might destroy the United States, if not civilization itself. Thus, however unwillingly, the United States faced a mortal challenge from the Soviets. To counter the threat, the United States had to dominate the world and create an environment amenable to its survival and prosperity.

Realistically, the United States would have pursued this course whether or not the Soviet threat existed. But because the threat existed, the United States had to contain it while protecting the free world. The containment of communism and the protection of freedom would require a strong military deterrent. Soviet aggression or sponsorship of aggression by others might well require the military to defeat aggression, whether limited or total.

According to NSC-68, the United States and the Soviet Union were at war as leaders of a bipolar world. Only one would survive. U.S. policy would use the Soviet threat as justification for establishing political, economic, and military dominance of the free world. Given that the war was real and not just one of words, the United States had to be aggressive politically and militarily. It should use psychological warfare to create defections from the Soviet bloc and otherwise hamper Soviet efforts. Covert economic, political, and psychological techniques would encourage and abet revolts and unrest in satellites. At home, meanwhile, the United States needed to implement internal security and civil defense programs so that the American people would accept the need to fight and win nuclear war, even on a global scale.

NSC-68 was a basic U.S. foreign policy document for the Cold War and after. Since the release of NSC-68, every U.S. administration has established hardline policies consistent with the basic assumptions of the report. The report's assumptions that the United States should seek hegemony, with the right to control global resources, continued past the Cold War.

With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, a new world enemy was needed. The new rationale became a so-called clash of civilizations. As late as 2004, the legacy of Nitze and NSC-68 was apparent as Nitze's intellectual disciples—which included such advisers to the administration of President George W. Bush as Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and James Woolsey—dominated the voices that pushed for war with Iraq after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

See also National Security Act (1947); National Security Agency (NSA); Nitze, Paul H. (1907–2004)

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Strategy aimed at preventing war by maintaining a sufficient nuclear arsenal to dissuade a similarly armed adversary from initiating an attack for fear of a destructive retaliation. Nuclear deterrence is a strategic policy implemented to make the cost of going to war too high for a country to instigate conflict because the potential response would be devastating. The necessary component in deterrence strategy is to maintain a credible capability to balance the adversaries' own resources.

In early August 1945, the Little Boy and Fat Man atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan, thereby introducing the nuclear weapon into modern warfare. The advent of this new technology coincided with the beginning of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. As nuclear weapon proliferation by these two superpowers increased, strategic policies likewise began to incorporate the nuclear component.

Traditionally, strategic policy focused on conventional deterrence. This included bolstering the size and capability of the armed forces, developing new weapons technology, and augmenting defense capabilities to deter opponents' aggression. During the Cold War, however, strategic policy began to integrate a nuclear deterrent to reinforce the conventional military capability.

Beginning in 1950, this change was reflected in U.S. strategic policy with the National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), which recognized the threat of a nuclear-armed Soviet Union. In 1954, in response to the potential Soviet threat, the United States formulated its nuclear deterrence policy in

terms of massive retaliation. This policy asserted the United States' right to respond to aggression with massive retaliatory force.

During the 1960s and 1970s, however, the United States clearly possessed a superior strategic nuclear capability, and massive retaliation was replaced by assured destruction, a policy that reflected the U.S. advantage. Assured destruction became the guiding deterrent policy. It was predicated on the ability to absorb a first strike from the Soviets and have a subsequent capability to retaliate with unacceptable damage on the Soviets. Unacceptable damage was defined as destroying more than one-third of the population, two-thirds of Soviet industry, and more than 200 Soviet cities.

Two key elements of the assured destruction capability included survivability and flexible response. The survivability aspect describes a nuclear weapons system capable of absorbing a nuclear strike and still being able to function at sufficient strength to retaliate. Flexible response includes possessing a triad of nuclear delivery options—by land, air, and sea. This versatility bolstered the nuclear deterrent, enabling the dispersal of attack options.

During the 1970s, the Soviets significantly increased their nuclear arsenal, and U.S. strategic nuclear superiority diminished. The United States therefore modified its deterrent policy to reflect this reality in the way of mutually assured destruction (MAD). MAD was based on both countries possessing a significant second-strike capability to retaliate and inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary following a first strike.

Currently, advances in technology have significantly improved the precision of nuclear warhead delivery methods and subsequently altered some elements of nuclear deterrence. Whereas with massive retaliation, assured destruction, and MAD, targeting was aimed at countervalue elements—including enemy population centers, industries, and resources. Modern technology has facilitated a transition to counterforce targeting, which is directed at destroying enemy military infrastructure and capabilities.

During the Cold War and continuing through to this day, several additional countries have acquired a nuclear capability: China, France, Great Britain, India, Israel, and Pakistan. However, their deterrent capability in relation to the United States or Russia is minimal because of the overwhelming numeric and technological advantage held by these two countries.

Beginning in the late 1940s, U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles grew significantly, and this increase lasted through several decades as both countries entered into a nuclear arms race. From 1945 through the 1990s, the combined total of nuclear warheads for the United States and the Soviet Union was more than 100,000. Through arms limitation and reduction talks, and following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the nuclear stockpiles of both countries have been significantly reduced. It is estimated that the United States now possesses 10,455, and Russia has 8,400.

See also Counter-Force Doctrine; Countervalue; Deterrence; Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD); Nuclear Proliferation; Nuclear Weapons

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

Treaty intended to halt the spread of nuclear weapons that obliges nonnuclear weapons member-states to agree not to manufacture, control, or receive the transfer of nuclear weapons. Nonnuclear weapons states also agree to accept certain safeguards to verify that nuclear materials are not being diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons. In exchange, nuclear weapons state signatories with advanced nuclear technology pledge to assist them in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force on March 5, 1970, and as of 2005, it has been signed and ratified by 189 countries.

The testing of nuclear weapons by France in 1960 and China four years later gave impetus to the formation of a nuclear nonproliferation treaty regime. Both countries had independently developed their nuclear weapons, which raised concerns that other industrial countries might also attempt to develop nuclear weapons. Reasoning that nuclear proliferation increases the risk of nuclear war, a treaty regime intended to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons was proposed at the United Nations. After a decade of intense negotiations, primarily between the Soviet Union and the United States, the UN endorsed the treaty and opened it for signature in 1968.

The most significant feature of the NPT is the separation of all potential parties into two groups—states that manufactured and detonated a nuclear weapon

prior to January 1, 1967, and those that had not. Under the terms of the treaty, nuclear weapons states—namely the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France, and China—are permitted to keep their nuclear arsenals, provided that they do not transfer nuclear weapons to nonnuclear weapons states or assist them in developing nuclear weapons.

In addition, under Article VI of the treaty, the nuclear weapons states pledge to pursue negotiations in good faith to end the nuclear arms race and achieve complete nuclear disarmament. However, little progress has been made toward reducing nuclear arsenals, prompting controversy that the nuclear-weapons states are not meeting their obligations under Article VI. Nonnuclear weapons states argue that failure to meet these obligations is discriminatory because they bear the majority of the costs and responsibilities under the treaty, whereas the nuclear weapons states maintain a monopoly over the transfer and control of nuclear weapons.

A key element of honoring the NPT is the verification of compliance with its terms through the implementation of safeguards. The international organization responsible for verifying compliance is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Founded in 1957 and headquartered in Vienna, Austria, the IAEA is an independent organization, not a UN agency. It conducts audits of declared nuclear materials and on-site inspections in nonnuclear weapons states. The IAEA cannot conduct inspections on undeclared or indigenously developed nuclear facilities, however.

The discovery of clandestine nuclear activities during the 1980s and 1990s in Iraq and North Korea revealed the ineffectiveness of the verification system. It demonstrated the IAEA's inability to provide credible assurances against prohibited nuclear activity occurring within a member-state. To resolve these shortcomings, the Additional Protocols, which would allow for more intrusive inspections of nuclear facilities, were proposed in 1997. However, NPT member-states remain reluctant to ratify the Additional Protocols, mainly because of concerns for the security of sensitive nuclear technology and increased discrimination against nonnuclear weapons states.

Article X of the NPT gives member-states the right to withdrawal from the treaty provided a state gives three months notice. North Korea is the only member-state to have exercised this right. It announced its intentions to withdraw immediately from the treaty on January 10, 2003, stating that its previous announcement to withdraw in 1993 was never suspended, so it was not required to give three months' advanced notice to the security council and other NPT parties. Although issues remain as to whether North Korea's withdrawal should be recognized, it no longer considers itself bound by the treaty.

North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT further damages the treaty's effectiveness in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. Its refusal to comply with IAEA safeguards and eventual expulsion of IAEA inspectors implies that North Korea had an advanced nuclear program prior to its withdrawal from the treaty. Although the IAEA Board of Governors referred the North Korea issue to the UN Security Council, it has yet to decide on the matter. North Korea's withdrawal without consequences reveals the limited capability of the regime to respond to those who breach the treaty, lending further uncertainty to the legitimacy of the NPT.

The NPT's lack of universality and its inability to control nuclear weapons outside of the treaty are its most serious challenges. The ambiguous status of North Korea and the three de facto nuclear weapons states—Israel, India, and Pakistan—pose an uncontrolled threat to the international community. It is unlikely that these nations will be persuaded to join the NPT as nonnuclear states, citing the discriminatory features of the treaty and prevailing security concerns. Granting these states any special status within the NPT, however, might assign value to the possession of nuclear weapons.

Because of gaps in the NPT, many member-states have called for strong reforms of the treaty and the IAEA verification system. Without reforms, they argue, the legitimacy of the NPT regime will continue to be jeopardized and never achieve its original objective of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. Despite its weaknesses, though, the NPT continues to have a prominent role in maintaining the security of its member-states and the international community.

See also Arms Control; Arms Race; Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996–); International Atomic Energy Agency; Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963); Non- and Counterproliferation; Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; Nuclear Weapons; Verification

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NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

International spread of nuclear technology. The term *nuclear proliferation* may refer to nuclear energy, but it is more often used in reference to nuclear weapons.

In 1945, the United States was the only country that possessed nuclear weapons technology. Despite extensive efforts to protect the nuclear secret, the Soviet Union exploded its own atomic bomb in 1949. Over the next decade, the pace of nuclear weapons development would accelerate dramatically. By 1955, both nations had developed powerful thermonuclear weapons and were designing more-sophisticated systems to deliver them.

By the late 1950s, other nations had caught up to the United States and Soviet Union in nuclear technology. France and Great Britain both exploded thermonuclear devices in the 1950s; China followed in 1968. Fears about the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons led to the creation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. The purpose of the treaty was to limit the possession of nuclear weapons to the five countries that possessed them at the time: the United States, Great Britain, the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and the Soviet Union. The treaty was subsequently signed by the vast majority of the world's nations. However, since that time a number of other countries have acquired nuclear weapons, and others are close to doing so.

India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa refused to sign the treaty. All four countries have admitted to (or have been suspected of) possessing nuclear weapons. South Africa did finally sign the treaty in the 1990s after dismantling its nuclear weapons program. North Korea was an original signatory to the treaty, but revoked its signature after a conflict with nuclear inspectors over the question of secret nuclear facilities. Iran is also believed to be in the process of developing nuclear weapons capability.

Throughout the Cold War, the problem of nuclear weapons was framed by the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Proliferation at this time was mainly concerned with slowing and eventually stopping *vertical proliferation*—the growth of the nuclear arsenals of the world's two superpowers. The spread of nuclear technology to China (1968) and India (1974), and the suspicion that Israel possessed nuclear weapons made *horizontal proliferation* to formerly nonnuclear states a pressing issue.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created a new set of proliferation concerns that centered around the fate of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal. Although thousands of weapons that had been placed in former Soviet Republics such as Belarus and the Ukraine were destroyed, the entire Soviet arsenal never has been comprehensively accounted for. Investigators in the former Soviet Union uncovered several cases of cash-strapped scientists trying to sell nuclear technology to foreign nations.

In 1990, the possibility of increased special inspections and expansion of routine safeguards under the NPT was proposed. The necessity of increased vigilance was more apparent in the wake of the Gulf War of 1991, when inspections in Iraq revealed an extensive secret program to develop nuclear weapons. Iraq had been attempting to acquire nuclear weapons since the 1960s, and Israeli bombers destroyed a production plant in 1981.

After years of elusiveness about its nuclear intentions, North Korea announced in 2003 that it did indeed possess nuclear weapons. North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il has used the threat of these weapons to prevent the international community from pressing for regime change in North Korea. In 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush named North Korea as part of an "Axis of Evil," along with Iraq and Iran. The latter nation's potential development of nuclear weapons has recently become a focus of concern in the international community, particularly given the continued political instability in the Middle East.

See also Arms Control; Arms Race; Cold War; Loose Nukes; Non- and Counterproliferation; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

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NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY

International agreement that aims to ban all types of nuclear explosions under any conditions in any location. The treaty was opened for signing on September 24, 1996, and by 2005 had been signed by a total of 71 nations.

Signatories to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) agree not to undertake any type of nuclear weapons test explosion or any other type of nuclear explosion, as well as to prohibit such explosions from taking place on any territory under their jurisdiction. Moreover, signing parties agree to refrain from causing, encouraging, provoking, or in any way taking part in or having anything to do with any type of nuclear testing involving an explosion for any purpose, including weapons development.

The CTBT was preceded by the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty, which prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. However, neither China nor France, both of whom possessed nuclear weapons, signed the Partial Test-Ban Treaty. By contrast, both joined the three other nuclear powers (the United States, Great Britain, and Russia) in signing the CTBT.

The desire to ban nuclear weapons was expressed from the start of the arms race in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This reflected fears concerning not only nuclear war but also the potential environmental damage caused by repeated nuclear tests. The issue was first raised by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954, but mutual U.S.-Soviet paranoia during the Cold War made the problem of verification insurmountable.

The policy of the United States with regard to nuclear warfare in the 1950s was massive retaliation, also known as Nuclear Utilization Theory (NUT). This meant the United States was prepared to fight a nuclear war and considered the use of nuclear weapons a legitimate response to threats to national security. The primary site for nuclear testing by the United States at this time was the Marshall Islands. These South Pacific islands were the location of 67 U.S. atmospheric nuclear tests between 1946 and 1958.

It was only in the 1960s that the policy of mutually assured destruction (MAD) became the centerpiece of U.S. nuclear policy. MAD was based upon the recognition that both the United States and the Soviet Union already possessed more than enough weapons to destroy one another many times over. During this time, the question of proliferation attracted international attention, resulting in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. However, weapons development continued, and the issue of testing remained unresolved.

During the 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union held repeated talks meant to defuse the arms race by lowering the number of nuclear weapons possessed by both sides. These included Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), and others. Agreements such as the Hotline Agreements and Treaty at Sea Agreements were intended to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war by improving emergency communication on both sides.

An important precursor to the CTBT was the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty, also known as the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, which opened for signing in July 1974. The treaty established a threshold of 150 kilotons for nuclear test explosions. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union signed the treaty immediately, but in 1976 both announced their intentions to abide by it. Additional provisions and protocols were added, and the agreement entered into force in December 1990.

Even so, problems of mistrust and verification remain, even after the Cold War. In 1997, the United States accused Russia of having violated the treaty based upon seismographic data received from a location near a Russian test site. The earth tremors, however, turned out to have been the result of a small earthquake. The United States Senate rejected the CTBT in 1999, adding it to the list of nuclear powers that have refused to sign: India, Pakistan, and North Korea. China has signed the CTBT but has yet to ratify it. The nonparticipation of so many nuclear states seriously compromises the effectiveness of the CTBT.

See also Arms Control; Disarmament; International Atomic Energy Agency; Non- and Counterproliferation; North Korea Crises (1994–); Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); Nuclear Proliferation; Treaties

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NUCLEAR UTILIZATION THEORY (NUT)

United States military doctrine in the late 1950s and early 1960s, underpinned by the belief that nuclear war was winnable. First associated with the nuclear policy of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, nuclear utilization theory (NUT) was intended to intimidate the Soviet Union and lead it to believe the United States considered the use of nuclear weapons a viable military option.

After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, U.S. policy shifted to mutually assured destruction (MAD), which held that nuclear war was unwinnable and could result only in the destruction of both sides. Belief in MAD maintained the balance of power in the latter half of the Cold War and motivated arms limitation talks in the 1970s to prevent one side from acquiring the ability to strike securely. In the 1980s, this policy was transformed as U.S. president Ronald Reagan once again adopted the stance that nuclear war was winnable.

It has been argued that one of the motivations for dropping the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was to intimidate the Soviet Union with a massive display of U.S. military power. However, just four years later, the Soviets successfully tested their own nuclear weapon and quickly worked to achieve parity with the United States. Both sides also worked to develop viable means of actually delivering the weapons to make their threats more credible. The advent of long-range bombers in the late 1940s and early 1950s made this possible. Recognizing the numerical superiority of Soviet troops in Europe, Eisenhower articulated an official nuclear policy of massive retaliation.

The policy of nuclear utilization received further impetus from events in the Middle East, coupled with the desire to prevent the spread of communism. The Soviets hoped to use the 1956 Suez Crisis as a pretext to increase their influence in the Middle East. The crisis began when Egyptian President Gamal Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal and closed it to Israeli shipping. This alarmed Great Britain and France, who were not only allied with Israel but also did not want the pro-Soviet Nasser to have control over the canal. French, British, and Israeli troops subsequently invaded Egypt to prevent Egypt from seizing the canal. However, the United States opposed the invasion and pressured the invading nations to withdraw their troops from Egypt.

The Soviet Union kept its distance in this dispute, glad to let the United States humiliate its allies and reduce the European presence in the Middle East. In the longer term, the Soviets attempted to use the Suez war as a pretext to forge closer political and military ties with Egypt. For his part, Nasser adopted a stance of "positive neutrality," which allowed him to manipulate both the United States and the Soviet Union for Egypt's benefit. Announcing its intention to use nuclear weapons in case of war was a way for the United States to compensate for having effectively undermined western influence in the region.

The notion that nuclear weapons represented any kind of viable military option soon became outmoded by advances in military technology. The development of ballistic missile submarines at the end of the 1950s created the possibility of a nuclear force that could survive a first strike to retaliate successfully. Even if the United States struck first, there was no guarantee that using nuclear weapons would ensure victory. This realization led U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to adopt the doctrine of MAD in the early 1960s.

Despite the prevalence of MAD, arguments for the limited use of nuclear weapons, and for the idea that the United States should be prepared to fight a nuclear war remain current. Under the administration of President George W. Bush, the United States announced its intention to continue research and development of tactical nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield. This signals a continued willingness on the part of military and civilian leaders to consider use of nuclear arms in a combat situation.

See also Doctrine; Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy; McNamara, Robert S. (1916–); Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD); Nuclear Deterrence; Nuclear Weapons; Suez Canal Crisis (1956)

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NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL

Storage and elimination of radioactive by-products of nuclear weapons production, nuclear power generation,

Workers in radiation suits standing by trucks at a nuclear waste site, waiting to pump one million gallons of high-level radioactive waste at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Washington state. The safe disposal of nuclear waste has been a growing concern of many since the 1970s. Because such waste can remain dangerous for hundreds of thousands of years, it can pose a continuing threat to many generations of people in the future unless it is disposed of safely.

Source: Corbis.

and other uses of nuclear materials. The management of nuclear waste of any sort received little attention from government policymakers in the three decades after the atomic bomb's development in 1945. Although the nation spent billions of dollars to produce nuclear weapons and commercialize nuclear power in the 1950s and 1960s, only a few hundred million dollars were spent researching storage and disposal processes. Starting in the 1970s, however, considerable public and government attention and resources have focused on nuclear waste as a serious national problem.

Radioactive materials from nuclear waste must be kept from entering the atmosphere, the ground, and the water supply. This is usually possible only by storing the waste securely beyond reach—what is known as *shielding*. Storage facilities must provide maximum protection against the escape of radioactivity, sometimes for thousands of years. There are two main types of nuclear waste: defense-related waste and civilian waste. Although many of the issues are similar, in other ways the problems are quite different.

DEFENSE WASTE

Short-term priorities in the early development of atomic energy created significant waste disposal and site cleanup problems later. These priorities included the sense of urgency in developing the atomic bomb during World War II, the pressure to maintain nuclear parity with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and a lack of outside regulation and government openness about the nation's atomic program. As a result, radioactive waste created by the defense industry was treated, stored, or disposed of in the most expedient way, with little thought for long-term problems.

It was not until the 1970s that federal government management of nuclear facilities came under scrutiny. Reports of high-level liquid radioactive waste leaking from government storage tanks and abandoned uranium mills raised public awareness and concern about nuclear waste disposal. Successful lawsuits, new legislation, and changed policies gradually opened the weapons production sites to state and public review and oversight. The government finally also allocated substantial funds and personnel to develop a plan for the long-term management of defense waste. In 1987, the Department of Energy (DOE) was reorganized to consolidate defense-related waste management programs and to place increased emphasis on site cleanup.

CIVILIAN WASTE

Civilian waste is produced not only by commercial nuclear power plants but also in industrial processes, in medical and biotechnological research, in diagnosing and treating disease (for example, in X-ray use), and in many other ways. For years, users of radioactive materials relied on private sector facilities to dispose of low-level radioactive waste. Meanwhile, most scientists, regulators, and proponents of nuclear-generated electric power thought of high-level waste disposal as a problem that would be solved by future technology.

In the late 1970s, power plant operators realized that serious storage problems for their reactors' spent fuel could emerge by the late 1980s and that some reactors might need to shut down by the mid-1990s unless additional storage became available. At the same time, public concern began to grow. Several states passed legislation prohibiting further nuclear power plant construction until the federal government demonstrated that waste could be disposed of safely and permanently. Other states restricted or prohibited disposal of radioactive waste within their borders. By 1978, only three operating commercial disposal sites remained for low-level waste: at Barnwell, South Carolina; Beatty, Nevada; and Richland, Washington. Governors of these states gave notice that they planned to either close these sites or cut back their operations.

Beginning in the late 1970s, Congress attempted to deal with the issue of radioactive waste. Several pieces of legislation were eventually passed, including the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. Both of these laws were substantially amended in the mid-1980s, and problems with the management of civilian nuclear waste disposal remain.

GENERAL ISSUES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF NUCLEAR WASTE

Resolving issues and setting public policy on nuclear waste remain difficult. The responsibility for setting policy is widely dispersed among federal and state governments and agencies. There are complex social issues, such as geographic and generational equity. The effects of low-level radiation on human health are still unknown, as is the long-term behavior of natural or manufactured systems of containment. The issue of terrorism—and fears of a terrorist attack during the transportation of nuclear waste through heavily populated areas—add a new dimension to the discussion.

Some of the issues associated with the management of nuclear waste include minimizing the amount of waste produced. Other decisions also have to be made: how and where such waste should be stored; if and how it should be treated to make it safer to handle, store, and dispose of; when and why waste should be moved; how and by what routes it should be transported; and where and how the waste can be successfully isolated. To answer these questions, attention must be paid to how hazardous the waste is; what level of risk is to be allowed to workers, the public, or the environment; and the costs and benefits of the various methods of management, disposal, and transportation.

The cleanup of already contaminated sites raises additional questions. What is the goal of the cleanup? What eventual uses of contaminated land are achievable or acceptable, and how much money should be spent? Are materials to be removed from the site, and if so, where are they to be taken?

Overall, decisions regarding nuclear waste disposal must be made in a way that incorporates both scientific fact and social values. Should the current waste disposal solutions be used, or should decisions be delayed in the hopes that better technology will be developed? How can the risks to the health of today's workers and public be compared with the risks to the health of future generations?

See also Environment and National Security; Nuclear Weapons

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which convert the energy created by a nuclear chain reaction into an explosion of tremendous force. There are two classes of nuclear weapons: atomic weapons and thermonuclear weapons. Atomic weapons derive energy from fission, the splitting of the nucleus of an atom. Thermonuclear weapons generate energy through fusion, the combining of several atomic nuclei into a single massive nucleus. Both forms of nuclear reaction produce enormous amounts of energy, but fusion creates significantly more than fission. Most of the nuclear weapons in existence today are thermonuclear devices.

Nuclear weapons became central to the Cold War as the two major contenders in the conflict, the United States and the Soviet Union, amassed enormous stockpiles, well exceeding the amount needed to

destroy one another. The nuclear arms race was underpinned by the notion of mutually assured destruction (MAD), requiring the maintenance of a state of affairs in which the prospect of launching a nuclear offensive would always be deterred by the likelihood of a devastating counterstrike. An oft-cited contributing cause for the collapse of the Soviet Union was the inability to afford competition with the United States in building and maintaining a large nuclear arsenal.

The development of nuclear weapons required extensive testing and also resulted in a large number of accidents because of radioactive contamination. The problem of nuclear proliferation (i.e., the development of nuclear weapons by nations other than the United States, the Soviet Union (Russia), Great Britain, and China) was recognized even during the Cold War. Because they are so powerful, the development of nuclear weapons by countries previously not possessing them consistently provokes controversy in the international community. In recent years, concern has shifted to the possibility of a nuclear attack by terrorists.

DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The potential power of the atom was understood before the outbreak of World War II, a conflict ultimately ended by nuclear weapons. Developments in theoretical physics during the early 20th century laid the foundations of knowledge for nuclear weapons. In 1905, Albert Einstein published his theory of general relativity, in which he showed that mass and energy are basically the same thing and that mass can be turned into energy. Einstein and other physicists realized that if enough mass could be turned into energy at once, the power generated by the reaction would be tremendous. This raised the happy possibility of creating a nearly perpetual source of energy, but also the dark shadow of a terrible source of destructive power.

THE MANHATTAN PROJECT

In 1938, German chemists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman were the first scientists to split an atom successfully. The following year, the publication of the process of nuclear fission by Lise Meitner and Otto Robert Frisch made the development of atomic weapons seem increasingly feasible. Chillingly, both of these advances occurred in Nazi Germany, a totalitarian country seemingly bent on dominating Europe by force.

In 1939, Einstein and several colleagues wrote a letter to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, alerting him to the dangerous possibilities resulting from recent discoveries in nuclear physics. Roosevelt decided that it was imperative for the United States and Great Britain to develop nuclear weapons before the Germans did. That year, the U.S. government initiated the Manhattan Project to research the creation and construction of a nuclear weapon. Research was directed by Robert J. Oppenheimer, an eccentric genius who received his Ph.D. in theoretical physics from Harvard University at the age of 22.

The Manhattan Project was based at New York City's Columbia University, but most of the research and development work was carried out at Los Alamos, New Mexico, the University of Chicago, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and the Hanford site in Washington state. These last two (designated Site X and Site W, respectively) were charged with producing uranium and plutonium, the nuclear fuel used to power the weapon.

The Germans and the Japanese were also conducting research to develop an atomic bomb during World War II. The Japanese were still many years away from success by the time the war ended, but the status of the project under the Nazis is more controversial. The German atomic weapons program was led by Werner Heisenberg, a close friend and coworker of Niels Bohr, who later contributed to the Manhattan Project. The question of where Heisenberg's loyalties lay with regard to the Nazis and the reasons for his personal fallout with Bohr inspired wide speculation. Some suggest that Heisenberg had moral qualms about developing a Nazi atomic bomb, but others contend he had no such reservations. In any event, the Germans were unsuccessful in producing a nuclear weapon before the end of the war.

USING THE BOMB

By the summer of 1945, the Manhattan Project had produced two working atomic bombs. One was a uranium-based bomb called Little Boy; the other was a plutonium-based weapon dubbed Fat Man. With Japan still unwilling to surrender, and facing the possibility of an invasion that could cost as many as a million lives, U.S. President Harry S. Truman ordered the dropping of the world's first nuclear weapon on Japan. On August 6, 1945, Little Boy obliterated the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Three days later, with no

Japanese surrender forthcoming, Fat Man devastated Nagasaki. The death toll at both cities, from the atomic blasts and the effects of radiation poisoning afterward, is estimated to be as high as 350,000.

The use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains controversial. The casualties from the bombings are compared with the estimated number of combat deaths the United States would have been forced to suffer in a land invasion. On the other hand, the bombs were dropped to elicit an unconditional surrender from the reluctant and fanatical Japanese military. Some historians contend that the prospect of a Soviet invasion, not the dropping of nuclear weapons, caused the Japanese to surrender. In this interpretation, the use of the atom bomb was primarily motivated by the need to justify the expense of the Manhattan Project and take revenge for Pearl Harbor.

THE ARMS RACE

The United States was the sole atomic power until 1949, when the Soviet Union successful tested its own atomic bomb. Three years later, the United States tested the world's first thermonuclear device. The Soviets followed with a thermonuclear test in 1955. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the United States and Soviet Union engaged in a desperate race to surpass one another in the number and destructive power of their nuclear arsenals.

Each side also developed ever-more sophisticated systems to deliver nuclear weapons. In the 1940s and 1950s, long-range bombers were the only means of delivering a nuclear weapon to the enemy's homeland. The development of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the late 1950s and early 1960s made it possible to strike targets thousands of miles away from bases in one's own country. Later developments included the invention of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) that allowed a single ICBM to deliver several warheads to different targets.

By the 1970s, both the United States and Soviet Union were willing to address the issue of their runaway nuclear rivalry. In the late 1970s, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) produced the first-ever reductions in the superpowers' nuclear arsenals. These negotiations were followed up in the 1980s by the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START). The START treaty continued the arms reduction work begun in the SALT talks.

PROLIFERATION AND NONPROLIFERATION

By the late 1960s, the arms race between the United States and Soviet Union was increasingly being seen as a threat to peace. By 1968, Great Britain, France, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) would also conduct nuclear weapons tests. The rapid growth in the number of nuclear weapons and nuclear states was seen as an alarming development. Existing nuclear powers worried about the possibility of unstable regimes acquiring nuclear weapons. States that could not afford nuclear programs wanted to prevent regional foes from developing them. In 1968, the five nuclear powers, along with most other countries around the world, signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The treaty aimed to restrict possession of nuclear weapons to the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, and China.

A number of other states, however, have since developed nuclear weapons. India tested a nuclear device in 1974, and Israel is also suspected of having developed nuclear weapons in the 1970s. India's longtime and bitter rival Pakistan announced in 1998 that it had conducted a series of nuclear weapons tests. Six years later, North Korea declared that it possessed several nuclear weapons. Iran is also suspected of developing nuclear weapons, although the Iranian government claims its nuclear program is solely for producing energy. South Africa once had a nuclear program, but dismantled it in the early 1990s.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 raised fears that impoverished Soviet scientists might sell nuclear secrets, materials, or weapons themselves to rogue states seeking such technology. To prevent that possibility, the United States has worked with Russia and other former Soviet republics to dismantle nuclear weapons in their territory. By 2005, some 5,000 nuclear warheads had been destroyed in the former Soviet Union. Even so, nuclear material has gone missing from some former Soviet republics in central Asia. The location of these states in an area that is home to terrorist groups raises fears about the possibility of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons.

EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Nuclear weapons produce several effects that contribute to their extraordinary capacity for death and destruction. These include blast, radiation, heat, fallout, and nuclear winter.

Blast and Heat

Most of the physical damage caused by a nuclear explosion is a product of the blast itself. The nuclear blast drives air away from the point of the explosion, producing tremendous winds and dramatic changes in air pressure. The force is strong enough to vaporize objects near the center of the explosion. Large objects such as buildings are usually obliterated because of overpressure. Super high-powered winds hurl smaller objects about at great speeds, turning them into deadly projectiles.

Nuclear blasts generate searing heat that can literally melt a person's skin in a matter of seconds. Thermal energy also produces fires from the spontaneous combustion of flammable materials such as wood and paper. Natural gas leaking from lines broken by the blast can be ignited and produce widespread fires. Another serious danger is the possibility of a firestorm, which occurs when hot air rises rapidly and cold air rushes in at ground level to fan the flames even further. These winds are strong enough to cause fire tornados that carry the fire elsewhere. An extremely large firestorm can even create its own weather system, resembling a thunderstorm, driving its spread. Firestorms caused by conventional bombing of the German city of Dresden during World War II were reported to have melted people on the spot.

Fallout, Radiation, and Nuclear Winter

When a nuclear weapon is detonated on or close to the surface of the earth, it digs out a crater. Most of the debris from the crater is flung into the air and returns to the earth in the form of radioactive fallout. Radiation from fallout might cause significant casualties further away from the blast location and hamper cleanup efforts nearer the blast. Some radioactive particles might be flung far up into the stratosphere, returning to earth many years later. Fallout from nuclear weapons tests conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s is still detectable today.

Radiation is experienced directly during a nuclear attack. The extremely concentrated radiation produced by a nuclear explosion can kill a victim within hours or days. Those exposed to nonlethal but still highly elevated doses of radiation might develop long-term illnesses from which they never fully recover. A study carried out by the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission on pregnant women in Hiroshima and Nagasaki found no short-term genetic impact because of radiation. The prospect of longer-term impact however, remains unresolved.

The most serious long-term consequence of a nuclear war is the possibility of a nuclear winter. In this scenario, nuclear blasts would throw up enough dust to block sunlight for a prolonged period of time. Plants deprived of the warmth and sunlight they need to grow would die, leading to massive famine. Eventually, without plants for food or to produce oxygen, all animal life would die as well. Although nuclear winter is still just a theory, it reflects the consensus of most experts on nuclear weapons.

—William de Jong-Lambert

See also Arms Control; Arms Race; Atomic Bomb; Cold War; Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996–); Dresden, Bombing of; Fissile Material; Hiroshima; India-Pakistan Rivalry; Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs); Limited Nuclear Option; Limited Test Ban Treaty; Loose Nukes; Los Alamos; Manhattan Project (1942–1945); Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD); Nagasaki; Neutron Bomb; Non- and Counterproliferation; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); Oppenheimer, J. Robert (1904–1967); Strategic Nuclear Triad; Tactical Nuclear Weapons; Teller, Edward (1908–2003); Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); World War II (1939–1945)

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REFLECTIONS

A Nuclear Warrior's View of Nuclear Weapons

What, then, does the future hold? How do we proceed? Can a consensus be forged that nuclear weapons have no defensible role, that the political and human consequences of their employment transcends any asserted military utility, that as weapons of mass destruction, the case for their elimination is a thousand fold stronger and more urgent than for deadly chemicals and viruses already widely declared illegitimate, subject to destruction and prohibited from any future production? I believe that such a consensus in not only possible, it is imperative. . . .

Where do we begin? What steps can governments take, responsibly, recognizing that policy makers must always balance a host of competing priorities and interests? First and foremost is for the declared nuclear states to accept that the Cold War is in fact over, to break free of the attitudes, habits, and practices that perpetuate enormous inventories . . . . Second, for the undeclared states to embrace the harsh lessons of the Cold War: that nuclear weapons are inherently dangerous, hugely expensive, militarily inefficient, and morally indefensible; that implacable hostility and alienation will almost certainly over time lead to a nuclear crisis; that the strength of deterrence is inversely proportional to the stress of confrontation; and that nuclear war is a raging, insatiable beast whose instincts and appetites we pretend to understand but cannot possibly control.

—General Lee Butler, former Commander, Strategic Air Command, in a speech at the State of the World Forum, San Francisco, October 3, 1996.

NUCLEAR WINTER

Theory that nuclear war would result in major climatic and ecological changes. The theory of nuclear winter is attributed to scientist Carl Sagan and four coauthors in the 1983 article, "Global Atmospheric Consequences of Nuclear War," which appeared in the journal *Science*. The article was written when the antinuclear movement was active and when Soviet and U.S. stockpiles of nuclear weapons were abundant. In subsequent years, the article has generally been referred to as TTAPS, an acronym derived from the last initial in each of the author's names.

The article envisions the aftermath of a nuclear war where, depending on the combined yield of the warheads used, a blast would generate significant amounts of dust into the air. The accumulation of dust and smoke into the atmosphere would create a blanket around the earth, preventing sufficient sunlight from entering the atmosphere. The authors argued that the lack of sunlight would precipitate a cooling that would lower the earth's temperature several degrees centigrade in a short period of time. It is believed that the change of one degree could have a serious effect on the environment. The article further posits that the cooling would affect agriculture and animal life, thereby contributing to a greatly diminished ecosystem.

Subsequent to its printing, the nuclear winter theory has been the subject of vigorous debate.

See also Nuclear Weapons

NUNN, SAM (1938–)

Democratic Senator from Georgia known for his long service on the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Born September 8, 1938, in Perry, Georgia, Nunn was the grandnephew of Congressman Carl Vinson of Georgia. He graduated from Emory University in 1961 and received a law degree from the school the following year. While an undergraduate, Nunn served two years in the Coast Guard and served in the Coast Guard Reserve from 1960 to 1968. After admission to the bar in 1962, he worked for the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives, but soon had to return to his hometown to help on the family farm.

Nunn entered politics by winning election to the Georgia House of Representatives in 1968. Four years later, he entered the U.S. Senate in a special election to fill a vacancy caused by the death of Senator Richard Russell. His most noteworthy legislative achievements include drafting the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act, and the 1991 Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. The former resulted in the most significant defense reorganization since the National Security Act of 1947; the latter provided incentives for Russia and its former republics to destroy excess nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. For their pioneering legislation, Senators Nunn and Lugar were nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in both 2000 and 2001. In addition to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Nunn also served on the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and the Intelligence and Small Business Committees.

Also notable in the career of Senator Nunn was his 1991 vote in opposition to military action against Saddam Hussein's forces in Kuwait. Mr. Nunn himself has stated that this vote ruined an otherwise promising run for the White House on the 1992 Democratic ticket. After the United States emerged victorious from Operation Desert Storm, Senator Nunn withdrew from the presidential race because of the unpopularity of his antiwar stance. Nunn chose not to run for reelection in 1996.

Following his retirement from politics, Nunn practiced law for the firm King and Spalding in Atlanta and has served on many corporate boards. In addition, he serves as cochairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), founded in 2001 to reduce the threat posed to global security by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Sam Nunn is also a distinguished professor at the School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech University, which bears his name.

See also Goldwater-Nichols Act

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
OFFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM

Development, stockpiling, and maintenance of weaponized bacteria, virus, or toxin for military purposes. The use of biological weapons was banned by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature in 1972. The Biological Weapons Convention was intended to augment the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The convention is the first international disarmament treaty to ban an entire category of weapons. Although more than 100 states have signed, the lack of any verification mechanism makes compliance almost impossible to determine.

Biological warfare is part of the history of colonization and conquest, as invaders have conquered local populations by inadvertently—and deliberately—infecting them with diseases they carry. As a military strategy, the use of biological weapons dates back to the Roman Empire and also was employed during the Middle Ages. Biological warfare was at work during the American Revolution and the Civil War, and earlier, Native Americans were devastated by the diseases brought by Europeans to the New World.

During World War II, the Nazis conducted notorious, horrific experiments on human subjects in concentration camps, involving everything from the deliberate infection of victims with disease to subjecting prisoners to extreme temperatures and other inhumane conditions to test how the human body endures. Unit 731 of the Japanese Imperial Army was also engaged in biological weapons research, including live vivisections and the manufacture of plague bacteria. Meanwhile, the British conducted anthrax experiments off the coast of Scotland, rendering the island test site uninhabitable for decades.

Biological weapons research was conducted throughout the Cold War by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Though nuclear weapons were the focus of contention and agreement, both sides also continued research programs on weaponized disease-causing agents. President Nixon officially disbanded the biological weapons program in the United States in response to public pressure and disgust over the use of chemical weapons in the Vietnam War. The Soviet Union, however, secretly continued to perfect smallpox for dissemination by aerial bombs and missiles. The collapse of the Soviet Union and all that it entailed for the scientific community, including financial hardship and unemployment, has contributed to concern for the fate of materials produced under the program.

In the post–Cold War era, the proliferation of biological weapons and their potential use by terrorists have become matters of deep concern. The past two decades have seen a marked improvement in production techniques for biological agents, resulting in more aggressive disease strains and the use of genetic engineering to turn benign organisms into harmful ones. Genetic engineering can also make disease strains more toxic and robust, thus allowing for a wider range of attack methods. Biological warfare is notoriously difficult to conduct, but scientific advances are making

it more efficient and effective. The most important of these advances include the development of agents that are more virulent after deployment, targeting delivery to specific populations, protection for manufacturing personnel against infection, use of genetic engineering to create strains that are harder to detect, and modification of immune systems of target populations to make them more susceptible to infection.

Since the 1990s, more aggressive efforts have been made to establish verification procedures for the Biological Weapons Convention. The United States rejected the convention in 2001, however, on the grounds that it would interfere with legitimate biodefense and commercial activity. Many observers claim that U.S. reluctance to sign the agreement has undermined the treaty's effectiveness.

See also Anthrax; Biodefense/Biosecurity; Biological Weapons and Warfare; Biological Weapons Convention; Bioterrorism; Geneva Conventions; Infectious Disease

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OFFICE OF DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS

Principal component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), charged with preventing and responding to acts of terrorism. The Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), formerly the Office of State and Local Preparedness, is an agency within the Department of Justice responsible for enhancing the capacity of state and local governments to prevent, deter, and respond safely and effectively to acts of domestic terrorism involving chemical, biological, nuclear, and explosive weapons. In this capacity, the ODP provides training, funds for the purchase of equipment, support for the planning and execution of exercises, technical assistance, and other antiterrorism support to assist states and local jurisdictions.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, demonstrated that responding to catastrophic incidents can rapidly deplete local supplies and equipment. The ODP provides grants to first responders to purchase equipment, as well as training and technical assistance. ODP domestic training includes the Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Technical Assistance; Terrorism Early Warning Group Replication; Interoperable Communication Technical Assistance; Rapid Assistance Team Technical Assistance; General Technical Assistance; Prevention Technical Assistance and Plans; and Planning Synchronization Technical Assistance.

See also Emergency Preparedness and Response; First Responders; Homeland Security, Department of; September 11/WTC and Pentagon Attacks

OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH (ONR)

Government agency that acts as a liaison between the U.S. Navy and the scientific and technical communities in the United States. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) coordinates, executes, and promotes the science and technological programs of the U.S Navy and Marine Corps through schools, universities, and government laboratories, as well as nonprofit and for-profit organizations. The ONR provides technical advice to the chief of naval operations and the secretary of the navy and works with industry to improve technological manufacturing processes.

The ONR has its roots in the World War II Office of Scientific Research, which established an office in London in 1940 for the exchange of war research between the United States and its allies. In May 1946, the London office became a branch of the Navy's Office of Research and Invention (ORI). Shortly thereafter, Congress transformed the ORI into the Office of Naval Research, with headquarters in Washington and London.

Although the London office had a strong connection to Great Britain, its mission extended beyond that country to survey and report on the rebuilding of Europe and developments in post-Nazi European science. The ONR Tokyo office, opened in 1977, shared a similar mission in Asia. In 1997, the London and Tokyo offices were merged into the present ONR International Field Office, whose scope includes all of Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Africa, Northeast and

Southeast Asia, India, Australia, and New Zealand. An additional office was added in Singapore in 2000. Today, the International Field Office provides a single science and technology strategy to its users.

The ONR is responsible for four major programs: Liaison Visits, the Science and Technology Engagement Program (STEP), Conference Support Program (CSP), and Naval International Cooperation Opportunities in Science and Technology (NICOP). These programs range from formal conferences and meetings with science and technical people to programs teaming ONR investigators with academic, industrial, and government laboratories. The end product of these programs is input into the ONR's global database.

See also Science, Technology, and Security; U.S. Navy

OFFICE OF NET ASSESSMENT

Department of Defense think tank created in 1973 and tasked with imagining all possible threats to the national security of the United States. The Office of Net Assessment (ONA) was created in 1973 by President Richard Nixon, who was dissatisfied with the quality of intelligence he was receiving. Nixon created a *net assessment group* in the National Security Council to evaluate intelligence from different agencies about Soviet and Chinese nuclear capabilities. Defense theorist Andrew Marshall was named to head the ONA, a post he has held ever since. The group was transferred to the Department of Defense in 1972.

The ONA arguably has been the most influential organization in shaping American military thinking. Its analyses of U.S. and Soviet military spending in the 1970s convinced U.S. president Jimmy Carter to increase the U.S. military budget during his term in office. During the 1980s, the ONA regularly criticized estimates of Soviet economic strength produced by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The accuracy of the ONA's views was confirmed after the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union. More recently, the ONA pioneered the transformation of the U.S. military using information technology.

One of the tasks of the ONA has been to identify and define major transformations in the conduct of warfare that result when technological developments help cause a fundamental alteration in the conduct of warfare. Such developments are known as revolutions in military affairs, or RMA. The advent of strategic bombing between World War I and World War II is an example of RMA. The development of airplanes capable of carrying large bomb loads and flying far behind enemy lines led military commanders to realize that it was possible to strike at an enemy's homeland, targeting its civilian population as well as the factories that produce war material. This resulted in the creation of new military units and doctrines designed to strike directly at the enemy's capacity to make war and to weaken the morale of its citizens to continue to fight.

In the early 1990s, the ONA identified three areas of technology that provide the basis for the beginning of a new RMA. These include the information revolution, long-range, precision-guided weapons, computer battlefield simulation, and computer-aided design and manufacturing. The ONA also remarked on an apparent trend toward small "special operations" units gradually taking over many functions once performed by "heavy" military formations.

Despite mixed assessments of its work, there is no doubt that ONA has shaped U.S. military planning and strategy for decades. In a sign that ONA is still generating controversy, in 2004 it released a report predicting that climate change could lead to global ecological catastrophe as early 2020. The report warns that such change may well lead to political instability and increase the chances for war and unrest in the near future. This view directly contradicts the views of the administration of President George W. Bush, which discounts the threats caused by global warming.

See also Intelligence and Counterintelligence; National Security Strategy of the United States; Think Tanks

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS)

Predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), an office formed during World War II to provide the United States with the ability to conduct intelligence and wage clandestine operations. Led by the colorful William "Wild Bill" Donovan, a lawyer turned military commander who earned a Medal of Honor in World War I, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) made significant contributions to fighting the Axis forces, including parachuting behind enemy lines and developing spy technology.

In July 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, dissatisfied by the lack of coordination among State Department sources, Army G-2 intelligence, and Naval

Intelligence forces, appointed William Donovan to be coordinator of information (COI). Donovan's job was to direct the nation's first peacetime, nondepartmental intelligence organization, and Donovan pulled together what became known as a "fourth arm" of the military. He combined an odd collection of hand-me-down units from the military and State Department, including intelligence, research, propaganda, subversion, and commando operations, into a unified whole.

The United States' entry into World War II in December 1941 prompted new thinking about the place and role of the COI. This led to the establishment of a new agency, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was formed in June 1942 with a mandate to collect and analyze strategic information required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to conduct special operations not assigned to other agencies.

The OSS was soon moved under the Joint Chiefs and some of its original responsibilities were split, with radio broadcasting operations—the Foreign Intelligence Service—becoming part of the Office of War Information. The other responsibilities included the Research and Analysis Branch, which gathered information from unclassified sources such as the Library of Congress; the X-2 Branch (the counterintelligence branch); and the Special Operations Branch, which ran guerrilla operations in Europe and Asia.

As the United States developed its military operations in Europe, OSS operatives played a key role by deploying behind enemy lines and engaging in commando operations and sabotage. At its peak strength in the mid-1940s, the OSS employed 13,000 personnel, the size of an army division. This figure included 7,500 individuals deployed overseas and 4,500 women overall. One prominent woman in the OSS was Virginia Hall, who helped coordinate French resistance fighters prior to D-day and ultimately earned a Distinguished Service Cross, the only one awarded to a civilian woman in the war.

See also Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Espionage; Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Roosevelt, Franklin D., and National Policy

secretary of defense with policy development, planning, resource management, and program evaluation.

The OSD has several missions, which it pursues in coordination with other elements of the DoD. The main job of OSD is to develop and implement policies in support of United States national security objectives. It also oversees the allocation and management of resources related to DoD plans and programs and serves as the liaison between the DoD and the U.S. intelligence community and other government agencies. Each OSD staff official is responsible for conducting analyses, developing policies, providing advice, making recommendations, and issuing guidance on DoD plans and programs.

The OSD is headed by the secretary of defense and includes the deputy secretary of defense, under secretaries of defense, director of defense research and engineering, assistant secretaries of defense, general counsel, director of operational test and evaluation, assistants to the secretary of defense, and the director of administration and management. The office also includes any other positions created by the secretary of defense to assist in carrying out the OSD's assigned responsibilities.

Until the end of World War II, the military establishment was divided between the Department of War and the Department of the Navy, a framework that caused great inefficiency in the war effort. After the war, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, which established a single department for military matters called the National Military Establishment (NME). Two years later the NME was renamed the Department of Defense.

The authority of OSD was strengthened by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The act specifies that the U.S. military chain of command runs from the president of the United States to the secretary of defense to the regional military unified commanders, also known as the commanders in chief, or CINCs.

See also Department of Defense, U.S. (DoD); Goldwater-Nichols Act; National Security Act (1947)

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD)

Government staff responsible for running and managing the Department of Defense (DoD) and assisting the

OFFSHORE BALANCING

Theory of international relations that views multipolarity as an opportunity rather than a threat. Proponents of offshore balancing believe that attempts to maintain

U.S. hegemony as the world's only superpower will lead other states to unite against the United States and ultimately reduce its relative power. Because the United States cannot stop the rise of new great powers, it should aim toward a strategy of *burden shifting,* whereby others will take over responsibility for maintaining regional power balances and quelling problems.

To encourage cooperation in a multipolar world, the great powers would delineate spheres of influence and pledge noninterference in those regions. By pushing for burden shifting and spheres of influence, proponents of offshore balancing hope to dampen the backlash against U.S. hegemony, especially after the launch of the war on terrorism and the Iraq War of 2003. Two leading theorists of offshore balancing are Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, who supported the idea in a 2002 article in *Atlantic Monthly* titled "A New Grand Strategy." The authors stated that "Although jockeying for advantage is a fact of life for great powers, coexistence, and even cooperation between and among them, is not unusual. Offshore balancing seeks to promote America's relative power and security, but it also aims to maximize the opportunity for the United States to be on decent terms with the other great powers."

See also Balance of Power; Hegemony; Multipolarity

OIL AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The relationship between petroleum, the vital resource fueling the industrialized world (and the American lifestyle), and economic security as a prominent issue of national security (the absence of a threat to American values). Interruption in the supply of oil and other natural resources would have dire economic consequences for the United States and for the entire industrialized world. As a result, the United States and other major oil-importing countries consider the protection of this resource to be a significant concern.

More controversially, dependence on oil imports from unstable regimes and volatile regions, particularly Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states, forces foreign-policy compromises on U.S. policymakers that can also adversely affect national security. For instance, the United States maintains a close alliance based on oil with the autocratic and despotic Saudi regime, despite its nebulous sponsorship of and complicated relationship with radically anti-American Islamic forces.

OIL SHOCKS

Oil has had been a key factor in many of the wars and crises of the 20th century, motivating countries to go to war and determining outcomes. In 1990, for example, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded neighboring Kuwait in large part because of a desire to gain access to the country's oil fields. In response, the United States went to war as part of a United Nations (UN) coalition to push back Iraq and restore the oil status quo.

Fears of oil shortage as an issue of U.S. national security stem primarily from the oil shocks of the 1970s. In October 1973, the Arab oil-producing states belonging to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), an international organization that seeks to regulate the price of oil, successfully imposed production restraints and an embargo on the United States and hiked oil prices by 70%. These actions were taken partly in retaliation for U.S. aid to Israel during a joint Egyptian and Syrian offensive known as the Yom Kippur War. It was also a chance for the OPEC cartel to gain leverage over U.S. and international oil companies that were taking a large slice of the profits from the oil-producing countries. (OPEC's first failed attempt at embargo, in 1967, followed Israel's speedy victory in the Six-Day War.)

The effects of the OPEC embargo and price hikes were immediate. By 1973, the United States was importing up to 35% of its oil, as a result of the decline of its own oil production coupled with ever-increasing demand. The oil shortage meant that the United States was effectively held hostage by the Arab nations. Accustomed to an uninterrupted flow of cheap oil, U.S. citizens were suddenly forced to ration everything, from thermostat use to gas consumption, and gasoline lines snaked their way around city blocks. At the height of the crisis, the price of gasoline had risen from 30 cents a gallon to about $1.20. The United States and the entire Western world reeled from a severe recession.

A second energy crisis struck in 1979 in the immediate aftermath of the Iranian revolution. The disruption of Iranian oil exports led to oil shortages, which allowed OPEC to drive up prices once again. Oil lines appeared in the United States as they had six years earlier.

POLICY RESPONSES

Since the economic traumas of the 1970s, America's civilian leadership and military establishment have come to include the concept of economic security within the purview of national-security issues. On December 22, 1975, then-President Gerald Ford signed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), which officially established the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). This legislation declared that official U.S. policy would be to establish a petroleum reserve of up to 1 billion barrels. In mid-November 2001, President George W. Bush directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to fill the SPR to maximum capacity of 700 million barrels to "maximize long-term protection against oil supply disruptions." As of April 9, 2004, the SPR contained the largest emergency oil stockpile in the world, at 653 million barrels.

Under the EPCA, it is up to the U.S. president to determine that withdrawal of supplies from the SPR is required by a severe energy-supply interruption. Such an interruption is defined as (1) one of significant scope and duration and of an emergency nature; (2) one that may cause major adverse impact on national safety or the national economy; or (3) one that results from an interruption in the supply of imported petroleum products.

STRATEGIC SHIFT

During the Cold War, U.S. national-security strategy was narrowly focused on military power and rivalry with the Soviet Union. Since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, however, U.S. security and defense experts have viewed the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea, and the South China Sea as sources of vital oil and natural-gas resources with increased strategic importance. In 1999, the Department of Defense reassigned Central Command to take over senior command authority of U.S. forces in Central Asia, instead of the more peripheral Pacific Command. Central Command oversees U.S. forces in the Middle East and its flow of oil to the United States and its allies.

The strategic reshuffle meant that the vast flow of oil resources from the Caspian basin would now receive the same attention and protection as those in the Middle East. Also in 1999, the National Security Council's annual report stated explicitly that "the United States will continue to have a vital interest in ensuring access to foreign oil supplies," such that the nation "must continue to be mindful of the need for regional stability and security in key producing areas to ensure our access to and the free flow of these resources."

Today, the United States is the world's largest energy producer, consumer, and net importer. Although its own oil reserves rank 11th worldwide, it typically meets around 60% of domestic total gross oil demand with foreign imports (according to 2003 data). In 2003, more than two-fifths of the nation's oil came from OPEC nations. Half of this amount, in turn, derives from Persian Gulf nations, or one fifth of total U.S. oil imports. In 2003, Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil exporter, was the second-largest supplier of oil to the United States, after Canada.

Today, OPEC controls a smaller share of the oil market than in the 1970s and 1980s. What the United States does not import from OPEC countries such as Saudi Arabia or Iraq, it buys from Canada, Norway, or Mexico. However, oil is a finite resource. Scientists forecast that global oil production will peak in the first decade of the 21st century and decline thereafter. With no corresponding effort to decrease oil consumption, and with global and U.S. demand growing at approximately 2% every year, nations will compete more intensively for resources in the near future. Even as nations around the world search for alternatives, energy prices will likely soar and economies may be plunged into recession.

Some commentators view recent and ongoing turmoil between the United States and Islamic extremists in the Middle East as a predictable consequence of competition over oil. More than two-thirds of the world's remaining oil reserves lie in the Middle East, including the Caspian basin. The United States' dependence on these oil imports makes such regions strategically vital and keeps U.S. military forces tied to the Persian Gulf. Many people also remain concerned that U.S. strategic energy policy has still failed to address larger issues at stake, namely the problem of oil dependence, climate change, and the developing world's lack of access to energy.

See also Middle East and U.S. Policy; Natural Resources and National Security

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OKINAWA

Japanese island that was the site of one of the fiercest battles between Allied and Japanese forces during World War II. The island of Okinawa is now home to one of the largest U.S. Marine Corps military bases.

After the Japanese defeat in World War II, the United States occupied Okinawa and used the island as a major strategic base for American forces in Asia. A presence in Okinawa allowed the United States to project power in Asia and deter communist threats from the Soviet Union and China. In 1960, the United States signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan, which stipulated that the United States would respond to an attack against Japan and placed Japan under the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The treaty obligated Japan to provide land for U.S. military bases to be financed mainly by the Japanese. Okinawa was the site of the largest and most important of those bases.

Okinawa was officially returned to Japan in 1972, but the United States retained the right to station troops there indefinitely. The Marine Corps base on the island is one of the largest regular marine deployments in the world. There are currently about 20,000 marines stationed in Okinawa in addition to civilian employees and dependents. The total number of U.S. military and civilian personnel has been estimated at 52,000.

The large U.S. military presence on the island of Okinawa has been a source of contention with the local population and has placed strains on the U.S.–Japan security alliance. Because the island of Okinawa is becoming increasingly urbanized, there have been rising complaints from Okinawans over issues including the proximity of the large military facilities to urban areas, as well as environmental problems, training accidents, and crimes committed by U.S. personnel against local citizens. Despite these disputes, the United States is likely to continue to maintain a presence in Okinawa in light of potential trouble spots in East Asia such as Taiwan, China, and North Korea.

See also U.S.–Japan Alliance

OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING

The 1995 truck bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. At the time, the

The Oklahoma City Bombing Memorial, which commemorates the 168 people who were killed when a bomb planted by domestic terrorist Timothy McVeigh and his accomplices destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building on the morning of April 19, 1995. Construction of the memorial began in September 1998, and it was dedicated by President Bill Clinton on the fifth anniversary of the bombing, on April 19, 2000. This picture was taken just five days before the June 11, 2001, execution of McVeigh.

Source: Corbis.

Oklahoma City bombing was the most deadly terrorist attack on U.S. soil.

Shortly before 9 a.m. on April 19, 1995, a rented truck packed with 5,000 pounds of explosive material was parked in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which housed several federal law-enforcement agencies. The bomb inside the truck consisted of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and nitromethane racing fuel. At 9:05, the bomb exploded,

destroying the north face of the nine-story building. After several weeks of search-and-rescue efforts, the final death toll was 168, including 19 children.

Initial reports indicated that the main suspects were individuals of Middle Eastern origin. However, attention turned quickly to Timothy McVeigh, a U.S. citizen known to have far-right antigovernment views. Within 90 minutes of the bombing, an Oklahoma highway patrolman pulled McVeigh over for lack of a license plate and arrested him for possession of an unregistered gun. McVeigh was in police custody when his connection to the attack became known days later. He left a mostly complete paper trail of purchases and rental agreements that tied him to the bombing.

At McVeigh's trial, the U.S. government alleged that McVeigh had sought the help of his friend Terry Nichols. According to the government, McVeigh, Nichols, and other conspirators made preparations in Kansas and headed to Oklahoma with their bomb. Their alleged motive was revenge for a 1993 assault by federal agents on the compound of a religious fringe group called the Branch Davidians near Waco, Texas. April 19 was the anniversary of the raid, which had resulted in the deaths of 80 Branch Davidians. One of the tenants of the Murrah building was the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), which McVeigh regarded as complicit in the Waco attack.

McVeigh was found guilty of the bombing and received the death penalty for the murder of eight federal law-enforcement officials. He died by lethal injection at the federal penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana, on June 11, 2001. An accomplice, Michael Fortier, received a fine of $200,000 and 12 years in prison for failing to notify authorities when he learned of McVeigh's intended attack. Terry Nichols received a life sentence on a manslaughter conviction. He also stood trial in state court at McAlester, Oklahoma, and received a life sentence for 160 murders. A jury deadlock prevented him from receiving the death penalty. The half-destroyed Murrah building was demolished in May 1995, replaced by a memorial and terrorism research center. A museum was dedicated in 2001.

After the bombing, the government changed the protective measures in place around all federal buildings. For example, the close-in parking that allowed McVeigh to park his truck next to the building was eliminated. The bombing further provided a boost to passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. In February, President Bill Clinton had proposed the Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, and after the attack he added another $1.25 billion to the package. Congress failed to complete action before the summer recess, but the next year it passed the antiterrorism legislation.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act weakened habeas corpus by eliminating federal review of state death-penalty cases. It also allowed the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to hold deportation hearings for any noncitizen who provided material support to terrorist organizations. The act redefined material support to include activities previously assumed to be protected under the First Amendment and froze the assets of any American citizen or organization believed to be an "agent" of a terrorist group. There were no specifications for what constituted an agent. The act served as the legal authority for many of the cases pursued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Justice in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, DC.

See also Branch Davidians; Terrorism, U.S. (Domestic)

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OPEC (ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES)

Intergovernmental organization formed to coordinate the petroleum policies of oil-producing nations with a view toward economic stability in the oil market. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) exerts a tremendous influence over world oil supplies and prices. This influence makes it a significant force in shaping the foreign policy of the United States, which imports most of its oil.

In the late 1950s, global oil supplies greatly exceeded the worldwide demand for oil. Prices fell accordingly, and petroleum-producing nations began

losing revenue. In 1959, a group of oil-producing countries met in Cairo, Egypt, to find ways to stabilize prices and guarantee steady oil revenues. The following year, five of the nations represented at the meeting—Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela—formed OPEC to obtain for its members the "best possible terms within the postwar petroleum order." By 1971, OPEC had expanded to include Algeria, Indonesia, Libya, Qatar, Nigeria, and the United Arab Emirates.

OPEC engages in collective bargaining in order to stabilize oil production and revenues, and to ensure the highest possible prices for oil. Collective bargaining prevents a "race to the bottom" among producers who might otherwise drop prices to compete for clients. The cartel likewise permits member countries to coordinate their petroleum policies to prevent political conflicts that could cause splits within OPEC. This scheduling and forecasting is important, as OPEC countries possess more than 75% of the world's proven petroleum reserves and produce 55% of all internationally traded oil.

OPEC is governed by a Conference that meets every March and September but that may convene additional meetings as needed. The Conference is advised by a Board of Governors and is supported by a Secretariat, an Economic Commission, and the Ministerial Monitoring Committee. Delegates to the Conference are typically oil, mining, or energy ministers from the member countries. The governing principle of the organization stresses unanimity, and the Conference operates on a one-member, one-vote basis. OPEC members establish quotas to coordinate oil production, but they retain their sovereignty in production matters. Beyond strict oil-production matters, members have established an OPEC Fund for International Development that issues grants and loans to non-OPEC countries.

The stated goal of OPEC is "to promote stability and harmony in the oil market," but this aim is sometimes overridden by political considerations. One of the most prominent examples of this was the Arab oil embargo imposed on the United States after the 1973 Arab–Israeli war. The Arab members of OPEC also substantially decreased exports to other countries, hoping those nations would pressure Israel to return land it captured from Egypt and Syria during the war.

As a result of the embargo, world oil prices nearly quadrupled, affecting vulnerable markets and causing economic hardship. Even today, critics complain that OPEC's domination of the oil market means that prices are linked to politics rather than to supply and that the cartel's market power represents a risk for other oil producers as well as consumers.

See also Energy Policy and National Security; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Middle East Conflicts (1956, 1967, 1973); Oil and National Security

OPEN DOOR POLICY

Proposed in 1899 by U.S. president William McKinley, policy that aimed to guarantee to all countries equal economic access to China. The Open Door policy was focused on increasing U.S. regional power in East Asia and China.

At the end of the 19th century, China was in political isolation and economic trouble. No major powers recognized China as a sovereign nation, and most of them were claiming extraterritorial rights on its land and exploiting its natural resources. The United States had become an imperial power in East Asia after the acquisition of the Philippines from Spain. However, it was excluded from the sphere of influence of major powers in China.

In the fall of 1898, President William McKinley stated his desire for the creation of an "open door" that would allow all major powers to access the Chinese market. In 1899, Secretary of State John Hay sent notes to France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia, asking them to guarantee equal economic access to China and to preserve Chinese territorial integrity. The goal of such a policy was to put all imperial countries, including the United States, on an equal level of influence over China. No country formally agreed to Hay's policy, each of them stating that they could not commit themselves until the other countries had complied. However, in March 1900, Hay announced that an agreement had been reached. Only Russia and Japan complained.

The Open Door policy was challenged from the beginning. In 1900, Russia exercised almost exclusive influence in Manchuria, a region of northeastern China. In 1915, Japan presented to China the Twenty-One Demands*,* which included the provision that other powers be barred from further territorial concessions in China. Japan also insisted on control over China's military, commercial, and financial affairs, a

demand dropped under U.S. pressure. A series of secret treaties that promised Japan control over German possessions in China at the end of World War I further weakened the Open Door policy.

The increasing disregard of the policy spurred the United States to call a conference on the Limitation of Armaments in Washington, DC, in 1921. The conference produced the Nine-Power Treaty, which guaranteed the integrity and independence of China and reaffirmed the Open Door policy. The treaty was signed by the United States, Belgium, China, France, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal. However, with the 1931 Japanese seizure of Manchuria, the open door was definitely compromised. China would not be recognized as a sovereign state until after World War II.

See also China and U.S. Policy

OPEN SKIES TREATY

International agreement that allows signatory nations to conduct unarmed aerial observation flights over the territory of other participating members. Designed to enhance confidence and security, the Open Skies Treaty gives each party the right to gather information about the military forces and activities of other parties.

The original open-skies concept was proposed by U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1955. At the time, the Soviets rejected the concept, and it lay dormant for a generation. In May 1989, the initiative was reintroduced by President George H. W. Bush and signed on March 24, 1992, in Helsinki, Finland. The U.S. Congress ratified the treaty in 1993. The treaty entered into force by January 1, 2002, when it received final ratification by the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The main provision of the Open Skies Treaty allows each member state to observe military forces and actions in the territories of other members by permitting the installation of photographic and advanced sensory equipment on aircraft and satellites. Images collected by a member state are available to any other member willing to pay the costs of reproduction. The treaty also ensures that all surveillance equipment covered under the treaty will be available to all participants in the regime. Signatories agree on an annual

quota of observation flights each member state is willing to receive and send out. The treaty covers the national territories—land, islands, and the internal and territorial waters—of all the member states. It is also of unlimited duration and open to other states based on certain stated qualifications.

Provisional application of portions of the treaty took place between 1992 and 2002, and formal observation flights have been in place since August 2002. Since the signature of the Open Skies Treaty in 1992, the security environment in Europe has changed significantly. Nevertheless, Open Skies is the most wide-ranging international effort to date to promote openness and transparency of military forces and activities. It thus remains an important element of the European security structure, along with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Vienna Document 1999 agreement on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

See also Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Spy Satellites; Treaties

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD
See GULF WAR (1990–1991)

OPERATION DESERT STORM (1991)

The combat phase of the American-led campaign that inflicted a debilitating defeat on Iraq and liberated Kuwait in the period from January to March 1991. Operation Desert Storm required a month of aerial bombardment followed by a swift thrust by land forces, mostly mechanized. Although most fighting took place in Iraq and Kuwait, a brief incursion into Saudi Arabian territory, as well as ballistic missile attacks upon Saudi Arabia and Israel, contributed to heightened tensions. This operation followed Operation Desert Shield, which was the initial response to the Iraqi seizure of Kuwait in August 1990, deploying forces in and near Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf to counter further Iraqi moves, or to resist attack by Iraqi forces.

During Operation Desert Shield, the United States and its allies sent forces to the Persian Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean to defend Saudi Arabia, control the gulf, and prepare for the recapture of Kuwait. The head of the U.S. Central Command, General Norman Schwarzkopf, had focused considerable energy upon arraying overwhelming naval and air superiority in the region, accompanied by a logistical buildup calculated to give the coalition forces a comfortable military balance and margin of security. The required 60-day supply of ammunition, tens of thousands of hospital beds, and thousands of tons of spare parts were either in place or placed in the long supply lines extending to bases in Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

A presidential order by President George H. W. Bush on November 8, 1990—which called for an effective doubling of the ground forces slated for the offensive—reflected a fail-safe strategy calculated in the Pentagon and agreed to by General Schwarzkopf. The British contingent swelled to an armored division, and a second heavy corps was ordered to the region from the U.S. garrison in Germany. An additional Marine Corps division and amphibious brigade, as well as additional air and naval forces, swelled the U.S. contingent to a total of some 540,000 troops, 6 aircraft carriers, 4,000 tanks, 17,000 helicopters, and 1,800 fixed-wing aircraft.

Important combat forces also were drawn from Egypt (armored corps) and France (armored division and 60 aircraft). Although a Syrian armored division deployed and prepared for action, it was not used, in part because it had equipment identical to that of the Iraqi army. Saudi Arabia, the host nation for most of the allied forces, provided several brigades of ground-combat troops, combat aircraft, and the all-important supply and transportation services required by all the contingents.

THE AIR CAMPAIGN

The air war segment of Operation Desert Storm began on January 17, 1991, with a predawn-attack helicopter strike on the outermost Iraqi radar systems, followed by waves of cruise missiles and stealth aircraft sent against Iraqi air defenses and command and control systems. The classic U.S. air doctrine of "turning out the lights" consisted of destroying the communications and data nodes of the opposing forces and suppressing antiaircraft sites.

Once those goals were accomplished, conventional fighter-bomber and strategic-bomber attacks could occur in relative safety with large volumes of high-explosive bombs. The air attack would also include significant numbers of precision-guided munitions (PGM), which used terminal guidance to destroy high-value targets and those considered too close to the civilian population for conventional attack.

After several successive nights of methodical air attack, the known key Iraqi military and government command and control centers; communications centers; air bases; and suspected sites for storing and manufacturing nuclear, chemical, and biological weaponry had all been destroyed or neutralized. The priority of the air offensive then turned to the tactical units of the Iraqi army, which was dug into positions facing the Kuwaiti–Saudi border, as well as the prize target: Iraqi Republican Guard forces being held back in operational reserve. As the bombing destroyed bridges over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, Iraqi supply lines evaporated because all road traffic from Iraq to the frontline units was blocked. Meanwhile, on the front lines, all types of U.S. and coalition aircraft struck to achieve the 50% diminution of Iraqi forces in the field stipulated by General Schwarzkopf as his requirement.

The air war of Operation Desert Storm would have achieved its objectives sooner but for the key distraction of the Iraqi bombardment of Israel by medium-range ballistic rockets, the so-called Scuds, which were really improvised medium-range ballistic missiles fashioned from tactical-range rockets. Although the rocket attacks, begun on January 17, did not contain much-feared chemical or biological munitions, they nonetheless provoked considerable tension in both Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Modified U.S. Patriot antiballistic missiles seemed to be effective in stopping most of the Iraqi Scuds. Later analysis, however, revealed that the Scuds, rather than being destroyed by Patriot missiles, were breaking up in final trajectory as a result of faulty design. In any event, a considerable portion of the allied special-forces patrols and tactical air power had to be pulled from their tactical and strategic missions and directed against the SCUD launching sites in the western desert of Iraq.

THE GROUND CAMPAIGN

On February 23, 1991, the much-anticipated ground war of Operation Desert Storm began with nearly simultaneous attacks by three U.S. and two Arab

mechanized corps across the Saudi frontier into Iraqi-held territory, including Kuwait. Previously, both sides had sparred with ground forces. For instance, between January 23 and February 10, 1991, U.S. Marines made a few artillery raids against key Iraqi positions, and the Iraqis launching an ambitious attack across the Kuwait–Saudi border on January 29–30, intending to disrupt coalition preparation and morale in what was known as the Battle of Khafji.

In the Battle of Khafji, three Iraqi brigades, perhaps precursors of a full three-division attack, attempted an incursion into allied lines—one by amphibious end-around, one at the border town of Khafji, and the other two against desert outposts covered by the First Marine Division. Allied air reconnaissance, using radar and the JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) airborne ground detection system, detected these movements. As a result, the amphibious effort was destroyed almost before it had begun, the outpost incursion was defeated overnight, and the Khafji battle became a testing ground for the Saudi and Gulf states contingents assembled on the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia, to retake it. They took Khafji quickly, with strong allied air and artillery support, and the incident revealed for the first time the ineffectiveness of the Iraqi army, even when it achieved an element of tactical surprise.

No effective forces lay before the allied corps sweeping into the Iraqi desert and Kuwaiti oil fields, merely third-rate Iraqi infantry divisions filled with conscripts terrorized by weeks of allied bombing and shelling. Moreover, the minefields and field fortifications so tenaciously constructed by the Iraqis in the Desert Shield phase of the conflict had deteriorated from lack of maintenance and bombardments, holding the coalition forces up less than half a day, for the most part.

From east to west, the U.S. 18th Airborne Corps, 7th Corps, Joint Forces Command West (Saudi and Egyptian), 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, and Joint Forces Command East (Saudi and Gulf states) advanced on February 23–24, 1991, against the demoralized Iraqi forces. The U.S. 18th and 7th Corps swept around the exposed inland flank and began to annihilate the Republican Guard units, which were outclassed thoroughly by U.S. and British technical ability to fight at night and in low visibility.

Meanwhile, the Joint Forces and U.S. Marine commands advanced frontally into Kuwait, eliminated a few weak counterattacks, and entered Kuwait City on February 26. In a mere 100 hours, the Iraqi army was in full retreat across the Euphrates River, totally at the mercy of allied air attacks. President Bush declared a cease-fire on the next day, February 27, 1991, and a negotiated armistice took effect on March 3.

The offensive actions of Operation Desert Shield succeeded handily in defeating Iraqi forces and restoring Kuwait to its emir. The offensive crippled Iraqi military power, forcing a political solution to Iraqi threats in the region. United Nations inspection teams later certified the destruction of prohibited munitions and weapons, and allied (later Anglo-American) air patrols were established over the northern and southern sectors of Iraq to deny Iraqi use of airspace from which they could threaten their minority populations and neighboring countries.

See also Chemical Weapons; Cruise Missile; Gulf War (1990–1991); Operation Desert Storm (1991); Precision-Guided Munitions; Stealth Technologies

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OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (OOTW)

Activities involving the use of the military but that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces. Operations other than war (OOTW) include activities such as providing support for civilian authority, emergency evacuations of noncombatants from war zones, antidrug operations, and disaster and humanitarian assistance.

Despite its name, OOTW can also include military operations or the use of troops and military equipment to perform security and peacekeeping functions. These include activities such as combating terrorism, ensuring no-fly or no-go zones, protecting shipping and air lanes, making military shows of force, carrying out preemptive strikes and raids, and providing support to insurgents.

According to the government's Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, the principles

used in OOTW are simply an extension of the military's war-fighting doctrine. Military OOTW doctrine has six basic principles: (a) every operation should be directed at a clearly defined and attainable objective; (b) all efforts must be directed to a common purpose; (c) security is extremely important, that is, the enemy should never have a military, political, or intelligence advantage; (d) OOTW may require restraint in applying military power; (e) the force must persevere with its mission and stay focused on the long-term goal; and (f) operations must be seen as legitimate by the government and people of the country where they are taking place.

One of the main distinctions between combat operations and OOTW is that considerations other than military victory often are of primary importance in OOTW. The goal of combat is to defeat the enemy's forces as quickly as possible and conclude peace on the terms most favorable to one's own side. However, the goals of OOTW are not always as clear. These goals may include deterring potential enemies, supporting local authorities, and providing humanitarian assistance all at the same time. All of these objectives must be taken into consideration when planning OOTW.

Operation Restore Hope, the U.S. effort to provide famine relief to Somalia in the early 1990s, offers an example of the complex nature of many OOTW. At the time, Somalia was a country without a working central government that was ruled by a variety of armed warlords. The country's political chaos led to a breakdown in food production and distribution, resulting in a devastating famine that threatened the lives of millions of Somalis. Although many countries and international aid agencies sent food and relief supplies, most of these were seized by warlords before they could reach the general public.

The operation began on December 9, 1992, as U.S. Marines landed in Somalia and took control of major airports, seaports, and food distribution points in order to facilitate the delivery of relief supplies. The force of some 38,000 troops patrolled the area in and around the capital Mogadishu, safeguarding relief operations, escorting convoys, and searching for weapons. Troops also repaired more than 1,200 miles of roads, drilled wells to provide fresh water, rebuilt hospitals and schools, and treated thousands of Somalis for everything from bullet wounds to typhoid. Although the international effort to rebuild the central government failed, Operation Restore Hope saved countless lives

and provided much-needed assistance to ordinary Somalis.

Operation Restore Hope reflects the three main political objectives of all OOTW. The first is to deter war by intervening to protect U.S. interests. The second is to establish an overseas presence in order to demonstrate U.S. commitment to its allies, to lend credibility to U.S. alliances, to ensure regional stability, and to provide the United States with access to and influence with foreign governments. The third is to respond to crises, whether military or humanitarian. The government considers the attainment of these objectives a major contribution to the national security of the United States.

See also Doctrine; Peacekeeping Operations; Somalia Intervention (1992)

OPPENHEIMER, J. ROBERT (1904–1967)

Scientist, professor, and director of the Manhattan Project, which developed America's first atomic bomb. Born into a wealthy Jewish American family in New York City on April 22, 1904, Robert Oppenheimer was to become known as the father of the A-bomb.

From an early age, Oppenheimer distinguished himself as a brilliant thinker and intellectual. After graduating from Harvard College in 1925, Oppenheimer continued his studies at Cambridge University in England and at Gottigen University in Germany, where he earned his Ph.D. Following his academic pursuits, Oppenheimer returned to the United States in 1929 to teach at the University of California, Berkeley, and at California Institute of Technology.

Despite early successes as a professor and scholar in quantum theory, Oppenheimer is best known for his work on the U.S. atomic bomb project. Following the creation in 1941 of the Manhattan Project—the atomic-bomb program—Oppenheimer was initially brought in to calculate the amount of uranium needed to sustain a chain reaction for an atomic bomb. Soon after, however, Oppenheimer was named the director for the Manhattan Project. The project accelerated under his guidance as he assembled the top theoretical scientists in the country to discuss the atomic program.

Although Oppenheimer is considered the father of the atomic bomb, his reaction to its testing and subsequent

use on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is well documented. As a result of these bombings, Oppenheimer became an activist for international controls on atomic energy and was opposed to the development of a potentially more powerful weapon, the hydrogen bomb.

At the end of his life and career, Oppenheimer was subjected to increased scrutiny as a former communist sympathizer. During the height of the Red Scare in the 1950s, awareness of his attraction to leftist politics early in his life led to the loss of his security clearance and thus a limitation on the work he could do in the atomic-energy field. He continued to teach and write at Princeton University until his death from throat cancer in 1967.

See also Atomic Bomb; Manhattan Project (1942–1945)

ORDER OF BATTLE

Organizational tool used by military leaders to analyze the composition of enemy units. An order of battle describes the kind of forces one might encounter in an engagement with any particular enemy. This information is used in planning U.S. military strategy and tactics with regard to different potential foes.

The U.S. Army breaks down enemy orders of battle according to several different factors, including numerical strength, level of training and technology employed, combat tactics, and combat effectiveness. Order-of-battle analysis also examines enemy force composition, that is, the command structure and organization of enemy headquarters units and subunits. It also considers the locations of enemy units and other factors including the personalities of opposing commanders and the battle history of individual units.

American military intelligence calls for each U.S. combat unit to maintain an order of battle for enemy units two echelons down. In other words, a U.S. division should monitor enemy battalions, a U.S. brigade should monitor opposing companies, and a U.S. battalion should monitor enemy platoons. This intelligence practice has been in place since first recommended by General George S. Patton during World War II.

See also Combat Effectiveness; Intelligence and Counterintelligence; War Planning

ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE)

Pan-European security organization dedicated to conflict prevention, crisis management, and postconflict rehabilitation in Europe. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest regional security grouping in the world, with 55 member states from Europe, Central Asia, and North America.

The OSCE approaches security with broad definitions and includes issues such as human rights and economic cooperation as key components in the promotion of peace and stability. Although it conducts peacekeeping and conflict-resolution operations, it does not employ force to accomplish its objectives. The OSCE is based on a concept of consensus-based decisions whereby all member states have equal status. Because the organization has no legal standing under international law, these decisions are politically but not legally binding.

The Soviet Union floated the idea of a pan-European security organization in the 1950s, but Soviet attempts to exclude North American countries—and later Soviet aggression in central Europe—derailed those early plans. The idea was revived during the early 1970s, and in 1973, countries from Europe and North America—including the United States—formed the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). This organization served as a predecessor to today's OSCE.

The collapse of communism at the end of the 1980s caused a rethinking of the role of the CSCE. Absent the threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, the CSCE sought a new mandate. In November 1990, this mandate was expressed in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Under the charter, CSCE members agreed to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms such as freedom of thought, freedom of conscience, freedom of religion or belief, freedom of expression, freedom of association and peaceful assembly, and freedom of movement. The CSCE officially became the OSCE in January 1995. Since that time, the OSCE, once seen as merely setting standards to promote its broad concept of security, has moved toward a robust presence in the field. It has launched more than 20 peacekeeping and security missions

throughout the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslav republics.

With operations winding down in parts of the Balkans, more OSCE resources have been transferred to the Caucasus and Central Asia, which are seen as breeding spots for terrorism. Still, some security analysts believe that major international powers continue to underutilize the potential of the OSCE, to the detriment of making inroads on the root causes of terrorism and organized crime. These issues received renewed emphasis following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as OSCE officials reaffirmed the organization's comprehensive security approach, designed to tackle the underlying causes of terrorism and not just the results.

See also Cooperative Security; Regionalism; Terrorism, War on International

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

Intergovernmental organization designed to address security issues, settle disputes among member nations, and promote democracy throughout the Western Hemisphere. During World War II, the majority of nations in the Western Hemisphere agreed to defend one another from any potential attacks by German or Japanese forces. This cooperation was the direct result of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy, an assurance that the United States would no longer interfere in the internal affairs of Latin American countries. After the war, the nations of the Western Hemisphere hoped to strengthen this newfound sense of cooperation, leading to the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS) in April 1948.

The organization was designed to ensure the region's collective security, peacefully settle disputes between member nations, and promote trade throughout the region. A General Assembly, consisting of one representative from each member, was created to oversee the organization and vote upon its activities. To fund the organization, each member was required to pay dues based upon the size of its economy.

The member nations also signed a nonbinding agreement called the *American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.* The document enumerated the political and civil rights that member nations were expected to grant their citizens. The United States had wished to list the spread of democracy as the foremost goal of the organization. However, many of the Latin American nations harbored bitter memories of past United States incursions into countries such as Panama and Haiti. Therefore, the OAS resolved not to topple any existing government, even if human-rights violations were involved.

This resolution, however, was soon ignored. In 1954, the OAS granted the United States permission to overthrow the Marxist government in Guatemala. The vote in the General Assembly was sharply divided; those opposed to the overthrow noted that the Guatemalan government was democratically elected. In 1959, a much stronger consensus was formed to eliminate the brutal dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. Led by the United States, the OAS enacted an economic boycott that smothered the Dominican economy until Trujillo was killed in an uprising.

This success convinced OAS members that intervention in the internal affairs of individual nations was sometimes justified. An effort was therefore made to outline when such intervention was permissible. In 1960, the OAS formed the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Consisting of seven members, the commission compiles reports outlining its judgments of both the level of democracy and human-rights conditions in each nation. Based on these reports, the commission recommends whether the OAS should take any action against offending members. In 1969, the commission's authority was increased when the Inter-American Court was formed. This body possesses the power to impose economic penalties upon nations that suppress human rights.

Despite bestowing this additional authority on the OAS, many members condemned the United States' invasion of Panama in 1989. In the wake of the invasion, the General Assembly struggled to further clarify when military action could be taken against a member nation. In 1991, the assembly issued the Declaration of Santiago, a document that specifies five criteria for the use of military intervention. Most of the criteria concern the overthrow of a legally elected leader or the use of violence against innocent civilians. Since the declaration was adopted, the OAS has successfully intervened during uprisings in Haiti, Peru, Guatemala, and Paraguay.

The OAS originally consisted of 21 member states but has since expanded to include 35 nations. Under its guidance, democracy has become much more

widespread throughout the Western Hemisphere, and the number of corrupt or oppressive governments in the regions has been reduced.

See also Good Neighbor Policy; Interventionism; Latin America and U.S. Policy

ORGANIZED CRIME

Unlawful activities systematically planned and carried out by highly organized associations of individuals. In addition to designating a type of action, the term *organized crime* also can, and often does, refer to the organizations that are responsible for illicit acts.

MAIN CHARACTERISTICS

The difficulty in clearly defining the concept of organized crime comes from the ambiguity of the term *organized.* For example, how organized does a criminal outfit need to be to be considered an agent of organized crime? Most people who have studied the phenomenon agree that, at the very least, an organized-crime group has to maintain a clear hierarchy among its members and function according to a set of enforceable rules and regulations. A city gang, therefore, which temporarily groups a few youths involved in illegal activities, does not constitute organized crime.

The primary goal of organized crime is economic profit. Organized crime does not traditionally espouse and fight for a particular political ideology. Thus, terrorist organizations like Hamas and al-Qaeda are not usually considered organized-crime groups, even if they are well organized and engage in illegal activities. Organized-crime groups may acquire political power to ensure prosperity for their members, but they do not generally perceive political power as a goal in itself.

Organized-crime groups have a limited, highly specialized membership and are characterized by a carefully thought-out division of labor. As in any legal business enterprise, every member knows his or her place in the organization and will undertake specific duties on a regular basis. Unlike legal businesses, however, organized crime shows a willingness to resort to violence and bribery to achieve its goals.

The continued existence of an organized-crime group does not rely on specific individuals. In other words, in this kind of a group, everybody is replaceable. Even if the leader of the outfit dies or goes to jail, the organization is designed to promptly find somebody to take over. Organized crime, therefore, is characterized by permanency, as much as by its economic priorities, lack of political ideology, hierarchy, and specialization.

METHODS

By definition, organized crime is involved in illegal activities, and its members run the risk of being apprehended by the police. Secrecy and loyalty to one's peers, therefore, are an unquestionable necessity. Such behavior is often supported both by one's respect for a tradition and by one's fear of violent retribution in case of disobedience.

The illegal activities in which organized crime is involved are as numerous as they are diverse. Traditionally, organized-crime groups run operations such as auto theft, narcotics production and trafficking, counterfeiting, economic fraud, gambling, robbery, extortion, loan sharking, money laundering, smuggling, and prostitution. In recent years, organized crime has followed the diversifying strategies of business corporations, establishing overseas branches and identifying new types of potential enterprises. Sophisticated operations such as identity theft, online extortion, and stock market fraud have in many cases become the primary source of income for transnational organized-crime outfits.

Being able to function in more than one country not only provides access to new markets but also allows one to escape police investigators, who are frequently hampered by limited jurisdictions. Often, organized-crime outfits will run legitimate businesses in parallel with their illegal enterprises. This practice lends the enterprises an aura of respectability and serves as a means to launder illegally obtained money.

HISTORY OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA

Groups exhibiting some characteristics of organized crime have been active in the United States as far back as the 18th century. Pirates, whiskey bootleggers, and smugglers were common in the colonial period. However, the phenomenon is generally said to have taken its present form in the late 19th century, with the association of corrupt politicians and street gangs.

New York City was the primary venue for early organized-crime groups, due to its many economic opportunities and the easy availability of poor young immigrants willing to break the law in order to come up in the world. With money acquired through activities such as illegal gambling, prostitution, and extortion, New York crime lords were able to buy themselves protection from police and political pressure. By the early 1900s, newly arrived Italian immigrants organized into crime outfits, which later gave rise to the famous Mafia families. The Prohibition era of the 1920s saw an explosion in the number and sophistication of organized-crime groups, which acquired immense wealth—and notoriety—from bootlegging.

In the 1970s, confronted with a rapidly expanding collection of organized-crime syndicates, federal legislators passed a series of laws designed to make it easier to prosecute suspected organized-crime members. By the early 1980s, legislation such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) succeeded in significantly reducing, but not eliminating, the influence of organized-crime outfits.

THE ITALIAN MAFIA

Between 1875 and 1920, southern Italy was one of the most important sources of immigrants for the United States in general and New York City in particular. With immigrants seeking freedom from persecution and better lives came characters who had been involved in illegal extortionist organizations back in Italy, such as the Ndragheta in the city of Calabria and the Cosa Nostra in Palermo. The term *Mafia* later came to designate all Italian American organized-crime groups, regardless of origin. These groups found in the immigrant masses both a convenient target for extortion and a permanent source for recruiting organized-crime members.

By the early 1900s, dozens of gangs operated from the midst of the approximately half a million Italians living in New York City. In the decades to follow, famous mafiosi such as Salvatore Maranzano, Giuseppe Masseria, Lucky Luciano, Joseph Bonanno, Frank Costello, Vito Genovese, Thomas Lucchese, and Joseph Profaci would forge alliances and vie for preeminence in the city. In Chicago, another breeding place for the Italian Mafia, "Scarface" Al Capone achieved unrivaled notoriety through his impressive bootlegging operation.

In the early 1980s, the Mafia became the target of crippling blows from prosecutors aided by legislation such as RICO, as well as by the increasing public interest in gangster activities. At present, Mafia control over organized crime is fiercely challenged by relatively new organized-crime groups, such as the Russian mob, South American drug cartels, and East Asian gangs.

THE RUSSIAN MOB

The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, as well as the subsequent economic depression that engulfed the former Soviet states, set off a wave of immigration to the United States. Coming from a society with little respect for the law, some of the ex-Soviet immigrants saw organized crime as an opportunity to dramatically improve their economic fortunes. As a result, cities including New York, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Baltimore saw the emergence of dozens of organized gangs whose members came from the former Soviet Union.

The preferred activities of the Russian mob are drug trafficking, prostitution, smuggling, auto theft, financial fraud, extortion, and contract assassination. Among these, financial fraud is probably the most profitable occupation, with the Russian mob believed to be the beneficiary of many large-scale embezzlement schemes. In addition, the group is thought to control hundreds of banks used to launder illegally obtained money. Russian organized-crime outfits have recently become the target of intense investigation, as they are believed to be able and willing to sell nuclear and biological weaponry acquired from poorly guarded sites in the former Soviet Union. The Russian mob is currently said to be operating in nearly 60 countries around the world.

EAST ASIAN GANGS

East Asian organized crime came to the United States mainly from China (including Hong Kong) and Japan. The Chinese Triads and the Japanese Yakuza are perhaps the best-known Asian crime organizations that are currently active in the United States.

The Triads are organizations initially formed in China in the 17th century and are characterized by strong loyalty among their members and willingness to resort to extreme violence. As with the other ethnically based organized-crime groups, the Triads entered the United States in the midst of the immigrant waves of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Their preferred activities center around illegal gambling, prostitution run from massage parlors, extortion (often aimed at fellow Chinese business owners), armed robberies, drugs, and contract murder.

The name *Yakuza* describes a variety of criminal organizations of Japanese origin. These groups are highly organized and are often based on a family system, much like the traditional Italian Mafia. In the United States, where it is deeply involved in financial fraud, the Yakuza does not shy away from drug dealing, weapons trafficking, extortion, and prostitution. Exceptionally high levels of sophistication and almost impenetrable structures make the Chinese Triads and the Japanese Yakuza two of the most effective and dangerous kinds of organized crime in contemporary America.

DRUG CARTELS

Organized crime is heavily involved in the narcotics business. A large share of the fabrication, transportation, and commercialization of illegal drugs has traditionally been in the hands of South American crime lords, particularly those operating from or connected to the country of Colombia. The Medellín and Cali drug cartels, in particular, long controlled the drug supply to cities such as New York, Miami, Los Angeles, and Houston. Drug cartels employ thousands of people in both North and South America. With the help of well-organized and generously financed networks, they are able to ship huge quantities of illegal drugs to the United States every year. Once inside the United States, the drugs are usually sold to other organized-crime groups.

In an effort to thwart drug-smuggling operations, the United States has worked with the Colombian government to annihilate the drug supply at its source. To this end, the United States has provided Colombia with extensive military and financial assistance and has sought the extradition of captured drug lords. Nevertheless, the South American drug cartels remain the most affluent organized-crime outfits in America.

CURRENT CONCERNS

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York City and Washington, DC, organized crime has come under serious scrutiny for its potential to collaborate with ideologically driven terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda. Given the increasing sophistication of organized-crime operations and their immense breadth of resources, terrorist leaders such as Osama bin Laden are likely to see great advantages in establishing commercial relations with organized-crime groups in the United States. From the Russian mob's expertise in smuggling nuclear and biochemical warfare agents to the availability of East Asian gangs to provide contract assassins, organized-crime groups perform many activities that may appeal to a well-funded terrorist organization in need of logistical and material help.

Technological advances that have facilitated communication and trade across borders have made such cooperation easier. Today, organized-crime groups can operate in many different countries, making them a more difficult target for national police forces. In response, law-enforcement institutions across the globe are making great efforts to coordinate their activities and thus acquire the same flexibility and effectiveness that have kept transnational organized-crime and terrorist groups in business for decades.

—Razvan Savii

See also Biodefense/Biosecurity; Border and Transportation Security; Drug Cartels; INTERPOL; Narcotics, War on

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OTTAWA LANDMINE TREATY

International agreement banning antipersonnel land mines. Officially titled the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines, the Ottawa Landmine Treaty marks the first time that a conventional weapon in widespread use has been outlawed by a majority of world nations.

Military experts believe that, over the past 25 years, more than 50 countries have manufactured as many as 200 million antipersonnel land mines. The leading producers have been China, Italy, the former Soviet

Union, and the United States. Antipersonnel land mines have been used in countless conflicts throughout the 20th century, and millions remain buried on former battlegrounds. These mines continue to be a daily threat in scores of countries. This ongoing danger to civilians was a significant factor leading to the treaty. Opponents of antipersonnel land mines maintain that the weapons violate an important rule of warfare, in that they are incapable of distinguishing between soldiers and civilians. Moreover, unlike other types of weapons, land mines remain a danger in the areas where they are deployed long after a cease-fire has been called or a conflict has ended.

The impetus for the eventual elimination of antipersonnel mines began with a 1994 speech delivered by U.S. president Bill Clinton to the United Nations. Nevertheless, the United States is not one of the 150 signatories of the treaty. The United States's reluctance to ratify the Ottawa Landmine Treaty stems largely from the unwillingness of the international community to give the United States a so-called Korea exemption. In order to protect South Korea from a possible North Korean invasion, the United States maintains some 40,000 troops and tens of thousands of land mines along the Korean Peninsula's demilitarized zone. The United States considers these mines part of its security guarantee for South Korea in particular as well as a key part of overall U.S. tactical military strategy.

The Clinton administration pledged that the United States would sign the treaty by 2006 if it could identify and deploy an alternative to land mines. In March 2004, however, the administration of President George W. Bush announced that the United States had effectively abandoned that pledge, though it would significantly increase its financial contribution to mine-elimination programs beginning in 2005. The United States has not deployed antipersonnel land mines since the Gulf War of 1991.

United States attitudes and actions in regard to the treaty are contradictory. On the one hand, the United States is not a signatory and is actively developing new types of land mines. On the other hand, the United States has given more money to other countries for demining operations than has any other nation. It has also destroyed more mines—some 3 million—than any other country.

The treaty has had mixed results in controlling the production, deployment, and removal of land mines. As of 2002, the estimated annual number of deaths from land mines decreased from about 26,000 before the treaty went into effect to between 15,000 and 20,000 deaths afterward. The treaty has also resulted in modest reductions in land mine production and sales. However, 16 countries—including the United States—still count land mines among their tactical weapons, and mine-clearing operations have only barely scratched the surface of the problem. The United Nations estimates the number of land mines in Afghanistan alone at 5 to 10 million.

See also Arms Control; Land Mines; Treaties

OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT
See Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (1990)

P

PACIFISM

Theory that peaceful rather than violent relations should govern human behavior and that disputes should be resolved through negotiation. Pacifism is not only a response to war but also a response to domestic injustices and government repression.

PACIFIST THEORY

Philosophers draw a distinction between two forms of pacifism: absolute pacifism and conditional pacifism. Each of these forms of pacifist theory has two basic expressions based upon the individual's motivation for pacifist behavior. For some people, pacifism is driven by a moral imperative; for others, it is based on more practical considerations.

The basic premise of absolute pacifism is that one must never use or support the use of force, regardless of circumstances. In deontological pacifism, this is an absolute moral duty, regardless of the immediate consequences of refraining from violence. For example, deontological pacifism might involve refusing to inflict harm on someone to prevent another person (or even oneself) from being injured or killed. Consequentialist pacifism also absolutely forbids the use of violence, but not from an abstract moral or ethical perspective. The consequentialist opposes violence because he or she believes that the evil resulting from it outweighs any good that it might achieve.

Absolute pacifism is an exceedingly difficult philosophy to put into practice. Very few people are willing to passively submit to a violent assault or stand by while a friend or loved one is attacked. Historically, absolute pacifism has a mixed record of success. The charismatic Indian leader Mohandas K. Gandhi successfully used nonviolent resistance to lead India to independence from Great Britain in 1947. However, his campaign took years and led to the death and injury of many Indians at the hands of British colonial troops and police. Civil-rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. led a successful nonviolent crusade for African American rights in the 1950s and 1960s. However, throughout most of history, significant political or social change has been accomplished through or accompanied by force.

In contrast to absolute pacifists, conditional pacifists believe that violence is necessary and permissible under certain circumstances. Conditional pacifists hold that a violent response is sometimes needed to prevent or redress a greater evil, such as threats to one's own or another person's life or health. In conditional deontological pacifism, however, one must consider whether the duty to use violence to right a wrong conflicts with other moral duties. For example, some people argue that aggressors forfeit their rights when they attack others, so any measures to prevent their aggression are justified. The conditional deontological pacifist would disagree with this position, asserting that even aggressors have basic rights that must be respected and that restrain one's actions toward them.

Conditional utilitarian pacifism, on the other hand, examines the use of violence from a results-oriented perspective. That is, it asks whether using violence will produce more morally favorable results than refraining from violent behavior. The utilitarian pacifist believes that the use of force is justified if it results

in a greater good. Examples would include self-defense or intervening to prevent an innocent person or persons from being harmed. Conditional pacifism is more common than absolute pacifism and much easier to put into practice. For example, many people opposed to violence in the course of daily life have felt the need to take up arms to defend themselves and their country in times of war.

ROOTS OF PACIFISM

Pacifism is an ancient philosophy whose roots span the continents of Asia and Europe. In India, the spiritual leader Siddhārtha Gautama, known as the Buddha, began preaching a nonviolent philosophy well before 500 BCE. His ideas found wide acceptance throughout Asia and eventually developed into the religion known today as Buddhism. By the early 21st century, there were approximately 350 million Buddhists worldwide. Ancient Greek histories from the 400s BCE record a pacifist protest against the Peloponnesian War in the city of Thásos. The ancient Greek comedy *Lysistrata,* from the same time period, centers around the refusal of the women of a city to sleep with their husbands when the men insist on war with a neighboring city.

Jesus of Nazareth is often cited as an advocate of nonviolence, and some Christian sects do espouse pacifist doctrines. The Quakers, Amish, Mennonites, and Universalist Unitarians are the most avowedly pacifist Christian denominations. Many Christians, however, dispute the contention that Jesus was an absolute pacifist or that he opposed the use of force in all circumstances. The Roman Catholic philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas developed what is known as the *just war theory,* which states that violence is justified in situations where doing nothing would result in a greater wrong than using force.

For some Protestant Christian sects, such as the Mennonites and Quakers, pacifism became a tool of political resistance. As religious minorities, these sects were often persecuted in Europe, where most nations had an official, state-supported religion. Members of these minority denominations practiced peaceful noncooperation, refusing to abandon their faith but renouncing violent opposition to the state church. Many of these sects took part in the settlement of North America in hopes of escaping religious persecution. They formed the core of what would later become the U.S. pacifist movement.

For many centuries, pacifism remained a minority sentiment espoused primarily by specific religious communities. However, developments during the 1800s spurred a wave of more popular pacifist feelings, particularly in Europe. The bloody French Revolution of the 1790s, and the Napoleonic Wars that engulfed Europe in the early 1800s, raised general revulsion on the Continent at the waste and destruction of war. Peace societies, antislavery societies, and decolonization societies sprang up throughout Europe in the mid-1800s, and the first widespread calls for arms control and disarmament came at this time.

PACIFISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Historically, the pacifist movement was less robust in the United States. Although a small and struggling nation at the beginning of the 19th century, by 1850, the United States had expanded to fill North America. Much of its territory was gained by conquest—the Mexican War of 1846 added the entire American Southwest and most of the Pacific coast to the country—and "pacified" during a subsequent military campaign against Native Americans. The fact that the nation had earned its independence by force of arms also fostered the notion that violence was an acceptable solution to political disputes.

It took the disaster of 500,000 American deaths in the Civil War to stir strong pacifist feelings in the United States. The Northern public, in particular. found the toll of battle terrible. Throughout 1863 and even into 1864, there was a strong sentiment in the North to sign a peace treaty and end the war, even if it meant losing the Southern states to secession. Union general Ulysses S. Grant's grim campaign of spring 1864, which resulted in staggering casualties on both sides, horrified many Americans. In the end, however, President Abraham Lincoln stuck with Grant, realizing that his bloody strategy would eventually wear out the numerically inferior Southern forces.

For the next 50 years, American pacifist feelings found expression in U.S. isolationism. In the latter half of the 19th century, the United States concentrated on developing its vast and almost untapped domestic resources, largely continuing its historic policy of avoiding involvement in international politics. This isolationism began to change with the Spanish-American War of 1898, in which the United States gained possessions in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.

However, even as the United States was taking its first steps toward empire, it was trying to avoid military confrontations. The country remained out of European conflicts, and its president on the eve of World War I was a man with strong pacifist leanings, Woodrow Wilson.

PACIFISM IN THE 20TH CENTURY

By the early 1900s, it appeared that the antiwar movement in Europe had achieved some lasting results. With the exception of several regional wars in the Balkans, Europe had been at peace since 1870. The Great Powers of Europe—Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia—competed for colonial, economic, and diplomatic influence, but they managed to avoid coming to blows. Although pacifism certainly played little part in their colonial policies, the most powerful European nations seemed to share an aversion to conflict among themselves. Among many Europeans there was a sense that Western culture had developed to a point where peace between so-called civilized nations was inevitable.

Europe's apparent calm was shattered by the outbreak of World War I in 1914. The savagery with which civilized nations fought one another dispelled the notion that peace was inevitable. For many people, the war confirmed their suspicion that pacifism was wrong-headed and dangerous. They argued that German aggression proved peace could be maintained only by force. On the other hand, the unprecedented carnage of that war—the first fought with modern weaponry such as the machine gun, tank, and airplane—eventually led many others to the opposite conclusion. They said that the war proved the futility of combat. Millions had died in a war that, at least on the western front, was fought over a narrow strip of muddy wasteland. The conflict was dubbed "the war to end all wars" because many observers believed it showed that modern war was too costly even to contemplate.

In the United States, isolationism and pacifism combined initially to keep the country out of the war. Despite numerous German provocations, including the sinking of American merchant and passenger ships by German U-boats, the United States refused to become involved. As they read reports of the battles in Europe, most Americans felt they were wise to stay out of the fray. However, repeated German transgressions against U.S. sovereignty finally convinced President Wilson to declare war in 1917. Although the United States participated in the fighting for less than a year, its fresh manpower and industrial might made a critical difference in the outcome.

Pacifism was ascendant in Europe after World War I, as most of the countries devastated by the war looked to rebuild their societies. Many Germans, however, were disillusioned with losing the war and the humiliating peace agreement forced upon their country. When the Nazis came to power in the early 1930s, they sought to rebuild Germany's military and restore German political power by force. Great Britain and France, still haunted by their huge manpower losses in World War I, sought to deter the Germans from using force to achieve their goals. However, neither country was willing to stand up to German provocations, even the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938. Only with the German attack on Poland in September 1939 did France and Great Britain finally declare war on Germany.

As in World War I, the United States at first remained neutral in World War II, although the government did provide nonmilitary assistance to Great Britain. It was only after Japan attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in December 1941, that the United States entered the war. The drive to defeat the Axis powers, and the subsequent threat of Soviet communism after the war, dampened pacifist sentiments in the United States during the 1940s and 1950s. During the Red Scare of the 1950s, pacifists who opposed the U.S. Cold War military buildup were often labeled communists or communist sympathizers.

The civil-rights movement and the Vietnam War provided new life to the pacifist movement in the United States. The leaders in the fight for civil rights for African Americans espoused principles and practices of nonviolence in their confrontations with local political and law-enforcement officials. Television images of peaceful protesters being attacked by police dogs or sprayed with fire hoses generated sympathy for the civil-rights cause. The willingness of civil-rights leaders to suffer abuse, jail, and even death to advance their cause peacefully eventually won the day and resulted in far-ranging civil-rights legislation in the 1960s.

Opposition to the Vietnam War offered another venue for advocates of pacifism. As the war dragged on, U.S. objectives—not to mention prospects for victory—seemed increasingly unclear to many Americans. An antiwar movement that began on college campuses in

the mid- to late 1960s spread to the general population by the early 1970s. Whereas there had been conscientious objectors (those who refuse to perform military service for religious reasons or reasons of conscience) in previous conflicts, their numbers rose dramatically during the Vietnam War. For the first time in history, large numbers of Americans felt that their country was engaging in an immoral war. Antiwar pressure at home, combined with military stalemate in Vietnam, forced an end to U.S. involvement in 1973.

The experience of Vietnam led to wariness on the part of U.S. officials to commit the country to another land war, but it did not result in a strong surge of pacifism. As one of the world's two superpowers, the United States remained engaged in international affairs and did not shy from the threat of force. During the 1980s, the administration of President Ronald Reagan adopted a policy of fostering counterrevolutionary movements in left-leaning and communist countries. However, the government preferred to support indigenous groups such as the Nicaraguan contras, rather than commit U.S. forces overseas.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 led to a change in U.S. posture. Assembling a broad international military coalition, the United States led an allied response that pushed Iraqi forces from Kuwait and crippled Iraq's once-mighty army. The episode did much to restore the U.S. public's faith in the ability of military force to accomplish positive goals. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent end of the Cold War also raised hopes that military might in the future could be used for constructive purposes such as peacekeeping. During the 1990s, the United States dispatched military forces on several United Nations and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) peacekeeping missions.

Unfortunately, the widely anticipated peace dividend from the end of the Cold War never materialized. Ethnic conflicts, civil war, and the rise of international terrorism have accompanied the demise of Soviet communism. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, DC, ended any notion that the world was entering an era of peace.

In the uncertain environment of the war on terror, those who advocate pacifism are often looked upon suspiciously or contemptuously. Many Americans feel that pacifist sentiments undermine the national will and national security at a time when the country is threatened by violent extremists. Some even claim that opposing U.S. foreign policy gives aid and comfort to U.S. enemies and is thus treasonous. These are not new arguments, but they are widely accepted. Today, as in the past, pacifists face the challenge of upholding their moral beliefs while supporting the national interests of their country.

See also Antiwar Movement; Just War Theory; Vietnam War (1954–1975)

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PANAMA CANAL TREATY
See TREATIES

PANAMA INTERVENTION (1989)
See LATIN AMERICA AND U.S. POLICY

PATRIOT MISSILE

Propelled weapon that achieved fame and notoriety during the first Gulf War in 1991, when it had limited success against Iraqi Scud missiles. The purpose of the Patriot missile is to detect, track, and destroy incoming enemy missiles, but in one notorious incident, a software failure resulted in the deaths of 28 American soldiers in Saudi Arabia. The outcome of a congressional inquiry into the incident suggested that the Patriot missiles were not as successful as they had been widely reported to be. The effectiveness of the Patriot is central to wider debates concerning the development of the so-called Star Wars defense system, which would be capable of destroying nuclear weapons in space before they can reach the United States.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The Patriot missile is a guided missile that was conceived in the 1960s and put into development for anti-aircraft use in the 1970s. The Patriot system consists of

a combined transporter-launcher carrying 32 missiles, hauled by a trailer. A separate trailer transports radar and other electronic equipment that controls the missiles. The launchers can be up to a kilometer away from the radar and control hub, to which they are linked by microwave signals.

The trailer-mounted radar scans the horizon with a thin beam, flicking between thousands of locations each second. Once something is detected, a message is sent to the control center. It is possible for Patriot to track up to 100 targets. It is also possible for the system to be automated, although an operator is capable of overriding it. The control computer tells the launcher when to fire, at which point two missiles are fired in rapid succession to improve the probability of a hit. The Patriot is 5 m long, reaches supersonic speed almost immediately after being launched, and ultimately accelerates to five times the speed of sound.

PERFORMANCE CONTROVERSY

During the first Gulf War in 1991, the success rate of the Patriot in intercepting Iraqi Scud and Al-Hussein missiles was put at 80% in Saudi Arabia and 50% in Israel, according to U.S. Army figures. The reason the Patriot was said to be more successful in Saudi Arabia than in Israel had to do with the fact that in the former, missiles were aimed at military targets in the desert, whereas in the latter they were aimed at civilian populations. Also, reports on the performance of the Patriot in Saudi Arabia were conducted by the U.S. military and censored in the press, and in Israel the Patriot's effectiveness was monitored by Israel Defense Forces, and press coverage was not censored. Serious doubts about the Patriot were raised in a 10-month investigation by the House Subcommittee on Government Operations, where expert testimony indicated that the Patriot's actual success rate was likely only 10%, and possibly zero.

The controversy surrounding the Patriot missile has continued with the recent U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Patriot was implicated in the downing of a British Royal Air Force Tornado jet fighter during the invasion, and follow-up investigations on the downing of other British pilots blame the Patriot system. The U.S. Army, however, has not publicly acknowledged any serious flaws, despite published reports that computer program errors caused allied aircraft to be identified as incoming enemy missiles, triggering automatic targeting.

Other reports, warning of repeat friendly-fire incidents, describe soldiers forced to rely on cell phones to verify the authenticity of targets. The Patriot's radar systems are said to produce numerous false indicators and "ghost" incoming enemy missiles. Patriot missiles are currently possessed by the United States, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Israel, Greece, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Taiwan.

See also Ballistic Missiles; Gulf War (1990–91)

PATTON, GEORGE (1885–1945)

United States general who achieved near-legendary fame in World War II, leading U.S. field armies in North Africa and Europe. Known as Old Blood and Guts, Patton's fiery and unusual character, combined with a high degree of professional insight and competence, made him well respected by friends and enemies, both foreign and domestic.

Born in San Gabriel, California, Patton grew up in a wealthy Southern California family and attended both Virginia Military Institute and West Point, taking his commission in the Army in 1909. He served initially in the cavalry branch, excelling in horsemanship, athletics, and most military skills. Shamelessly romantic in his quest to be a heroic soldier, Patton immersed himself in military history and lore. Outwardly brusque and tough-minded, he inwardly harbored insecurities and sensitivities that he strived to conceal from the public.

Luck also favored Patton, beginning with his participation in General John Pershing's Mexican Expedition of 1916, which gave Patton a future patron, contact with motor vehicles in military operations, and his first encounter with publicity. Promoted quickly to colonel during World War I, Patton formed the Army's Tank Corps with the assistance of Major Dwight D. Eisenhower, who remained behind in the United States while Patton took command of the first U.S. tank units in combat in France.

Peacetime boded ill for Patton, and he languished in several posts after World War I, always able, thanks to his family fortune, to entertain well and keep a fine stable of horses. He graduated from all the Army staff courses and continued to study history and military affairs, being equally at home with concepts of mechanization in the Army as well as furnishing the design

of the last U.S. cavalry saber to be adopted. By 1939, however, the 54-year-old colonel feared that his opportunity to perform great feats had passed him by.

The U.S. entry into World War II gave Patton another opportunity to excel, and he was not found wanting. In command of an armored division, he trained it in the Carolina Maneuvers of 1941, demonstrating to all his incredible energy and zeal. His public persona by now had been purposely molded into his ideal of a modern warrior, and he used his various personal connections well, gaining command of the Western Task Force, which he landed on the Atlantic coast of Morocco in the North Africa landings of November 1942. Patton quickly succeeded to the command of the U.S. II Corps in the Tunisian Campaign and formed the Seventh Army for the invasion of Sicily. There he impetuously converted a supporting operation for the British Eighth Army into an Anglo-American race for the Straits of Messina and military honors that almost neglected the enemy situation. Ironically, in midst of his first clear operational victory, his public and military reputation almost collapsed because of incidents in August 1943, in which he slapped enlisted soldiers.

After the invasion of Normandy in June 1944, Patton's mission was to transport his Third Army to France and use it to break out of the Normandy landing region, spearheading the U.S. forces engaged in defeating the German forces in France. This he did with the greatest aplomb, outmaneuvering the Germans and pushing his forces in a madcap race to the Franco-German border. The Battle of the Bulge (December 1944–February 1945) gave Patton his greatest moment in command, redeploying his army on short notice, saving the Belgian town of Bastogne and assisting in the final rout of the Germans. Ironically, Patton died in a traffic accident after the war, having achieved his greatest vainglorious hopes. His memory remains as an icon of aggressive and competent command in battle.

See also Amphibious Warfare; Bulge, Battle of the; Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy; Tanks; U.S. Army; World War II (1939–1945)

PEACE CORPS

Federal agency whose mission is to increase mutual understanding and friendship between the United States and other nations. Peace Corps volunteers undertake a variety of programs to improve the quality of life of people in developing countries. These have traditionally included educational and agricultural programs, but in recent years they have been expanded to include programs aimed at developing businesses, as well.

In a speech at the University of Michigan on October 14, 1960, presidential candidate John F. Kennedy challenged his student listeners to work in less-developed countries and embark on an adventure that would serve mankind. Three weeks later, in another speech, he dubbed the program the Peace Corps. During the first months of his administration, newly elected President Kennedy consolidated numerous previous discussions about a secular volunteer corps into a plan of action.

On March 1, 1961, Kennedy issued an executive order creating the Peace Corps. The law establishing the Peace Corps gave the agency a mandate to "promote world peace and friendship."

The Peace Corps had two primary stated goals. The first was to promote economic development in developing nations and help those "struggling to break the bonds of mass misery" to help themselves. The second goal of the Peace Corps was to generate a mutual understanding between Americans and citizens of developing countries, in hopes that this would launch a "new relationship" between the United States and the developing world.

The philanthropic mission of the Peace Corps was complemented by a significant foreign-policy agenda. Kennedy and his advisers believed that the United States had to "do better" as it competed with the Soviet Union for the loyalties of the newly decolonized third-world nations. Responding to the needs of the newly independent countries would prevent them from being seduced by communism. Moreover, the administration felt that it had to respond effectively to decolonization and the possibility that instability in former colonies may threaten U.S. interests. The Peace Corps, with its anti-imperialist ethos, advanced both understanding and U.S. foreign policy in many cases. The organization was sometimes able to rise above political realities to earn the respect of the people it served.

Peace Corps volunteers receive three months of training in their host countries, learning the local culture and acquiring needed skills they may lack. After volunteers complete their training, they spend 24 months living in communities in a developing

nation, working in the fields of education, health, business development, agriculture, the environment, and youth programs. The agency has also recently begun to send volunteers to assist in short-term disaster-relief efforts.

The Peace Corps is open to any U.S. citizen at least 18 years of age, and there is no upper age limit. Many older and retired individuals volunteer their time and expertise to the Peace Corps. The agency currently sends volunteers to work in 69 countries on five continents. Since the organization's founding in 1961, 170,000 volunteers have worked in 136 countries.

See also Humanitarian Aid; Kennedy, John F., and National Policy

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Multinational forces dispatched by the United Nations Security Council to observe, monitor, report on, and, in the post–Cold War era, enforce cease-fires established in the wake of inter- and intranational conflicts. Peacekeeping operations have been launched in a number of regions in the world over the course of the past half century.

HISTORY OF MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

The United Nations (UN) was founded in the wake of World War II to establish a system of collective security to address interstate conflict and to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." The UN Charter empowers the United Nations, through the Security Council, to take actions it deems necessary to address situations that pose a threat to international peace and security, manifested in conflict among nations. The council's practice of dispatching missions, known as *peacekeeping operations,* to conflict situations, is founded in this provision.

The first peacekeeping operations dispatched by the United Nations were cease-fire monitoring missions. These first took place at the conclusion of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, and the second followed the cessation of fighting between India and Pakistan in 1949 over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. For the next 40 years, peacekeeping operations would follow the formula set down in these initial efforts. Missions

required not only the consent of the two states involved in the conflict but also that of the then two rival superpowers engaged in the Cold War—the United States and the Soviet Union. Because both nations possessed veto power in the Security Council, it was impossible to dispatch a mission into conflicts in which the combatants were proxies for either superpower.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ushered in a new era in the development and practices of peacekeeping. The end of direct U.S.–Soviet rivalry, and unrest caused by ethnic tensions in formerly Soviet-controlled states, led to greater cooperation in the Security Council. Both the number and the nature of peacekeeping missions intensified in the 1990s. Without the constant threat of an automatic veto by one of the superpowers, the Security Council's ability to dispatch peacekeeping missions expanded significantly.

The United Nations defines peacekeeping today as "a way to help countries torn by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace." This definition reflects the evolution that has taken place within peacekeeping since its first days, when missions were limited to observing preestablished cease fires or pacts. It recognizes the fact that more than simple monitoring is required to establish and maintain peace in complex conflict situations. Planners and reviewers at all levels in the United Nations recognized the fact that addressing conflict successfully and sustainably requires a more complex and multifaceted approach. This realization produced today's more diverse peacekeeping missions, which incorporate conflict resolution, diplomacy, development work, and human-rights and truth commissions into the process.

ISSUES IN PEACEKEEPING

Under the UN Charter, member states of the United Nations agree to provide resources in the form of armed forces, money, and rights of passage to missions deemed necessary by the Security Council. In this way, all member states have the ability and the duty to participate in peacekeeping operations. Generally, missions are composed of multinational forces under rotating command.

The Security Council first looks to regional organizations to put together and man peacekeeping missions. Despite some drawbacks, it is a widely recognized principle that a regional solution to problems is usually preferable to the introduction of outside actors who may lack the cultural, geographic, and historical

familiarity and sensitivity that regional forces possess. For example, in 1993 the Organization of American States was dispatched to handle the crisis in Haiti pursuant to the military coup in that country, before UN-sanctioned U.S. intervention finally reinstated the democratically elected leader.

However, problems can arise when a regional force is used to handle a conflict. The 1991 intervention by the military arm of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the Sierra Leonean civil war offers an example of the potential difficulties. Problems arose when ECOWAS became partial in the conflict, to the extent that it was viewed by some as another party in it and no longer a neutral observer force. This is a danger when the party sent in to mediate a conflict has a stake in its outcome, as most neighboring states do when a conflict occurs in their geographic vicinity.

Rules of engagement are also a topic of constant review. Although most missions in the first few decades limited the United Nations *blue helmets* to engaging only when under attack, this policy has many critics. Indeed, it has had disastrous results in the past. The most recent and egregious example of UN troops' failure to engage at a level proportionate to the situation is the Srebrenica massacre of 1995. In this incident, UN peacekeeping troops failed to prevent the summary executions of more than 7,000 Muslim men and boys in UN-designated safe areas during the Balkan conflict.

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN PEACEKEEPING

Like many industrialized Western nations, the United States has infrequently participated in UN peacekeeping operations. Troop contributions by developing states are disproportionately high, for a number of reasons. For one, financial compensation is provided to contributing states, which is a greater incentive for poorer countries than wealthier ones. Another reason for the United States' reluctance to participate in peacekeeping operations is the aversion to suffering casualties in regions of the world where the United States has no significant political interests. This reluctance is sometimes referred to as the *Mogadishu factor.*

In 1993, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed during a UN mission in Somalia. The mission began as a humanitarian effort to secure UN food deliveries to famished populations. However, humanitarian relief efforts were hampered by the actions of local warlords, who seized relief shipments and either sold them or used them to buy the loyalty of other Somalis. The relief effort eventually turned into an attempt to apprehend a prominent local warlord, Mohammed Farah Aideed.

On October 3, U.S. forces were lured into an ambush in the Somali capital of Mogadishu. Two Black Hawk helicopters carrying U.S. troops were downed by local militias armed with rocket-propelled grenade launchers. The pilot of one helicopter was taken hostage for 11 days, and bodies of dead U.S. soldiers were dragged through the streets by cheering crowds. This incident fueled already existing domestic distaste for U.S. participation in multinational efforts under the auspices of the United Nations, where goals do not pertain to specific U.S. interests.

The United States is, on the whole, opposed to putting its troops under the command of other states. When it commits a large number of troops to a UN operation, the United States maintains command control or delegates control only to trusted military allies, such as other NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) members. The United States maintained command control over its troops when it participated in large UN operations in Korea in 1950 and in the Persian Gulf War of 1991. In fact, although critics cite the Mogadishu tragedy as evidence of UN command failure, the troops involved were under U.S. control, not that of the UN or any other member state.

See also Bosnia Intervention; Collective Security; Humanitarian Intervention; Interventionism; Kosovo Intervention; Regionalism; Somalia Intervention (1992); United Nations; UN Peacekeeping; UN Security Council;

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PEARL HARBOR

Surprise attack responsible for bringing the United States into World War II. The attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan on December 7, 1941, was famously described by U.S. president Franklin Delano Roosevelt as a

"date which will live in infamy." The slogans "Remember Pearl Harbor!" or "Remember December 7th" became central to U.S. propaganda as the United States entered the war more than two years after it had begun in Europe.

United States–Japanese relations had been deteriorating as Japan expanded its empire into China in the years before the outbreak of war in Europe. As the ally of Nazi Germany, Japan felt confident enough to seize French Indochina and threaten Britain's Pacific colonies, as well. The United States responded with an oil and steel embargo against Japan. The positioning of ships in Pearl Harbor, closer to Japan than to the west coast of the United States, was also a deliberate action to draw Japan's attention to the United States and its power.

The battleships USS *West Virginia* (foreground) and USS *Tennessee* sit low in the water and burn after the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The *West Virginia* sank after the attack, and more than 100 of her officers and men were killed. Five crewmen aboard the *Tennessee* were killed, but the ship survived the attack, was repaired, and saw active duty in the Pacific during World War II.

Source: Corbis.

On the morning of December 7, 1941, the Japanese embassy in Washington, DC, received the final part of a 14-part message from Tokyo, stating that diplomatic relations with the United States were going to be ended. The message was decoded by U.S. code breakers. Tokyo further directed its embassy to deliver the message to the White House at 1:00 p.m. eastern time. However, the military in Pearl Harbor, on the Hawaiian island of Oahu, were advised too late of the Japanese message, and the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor at 7:55 a.m. Hawaii time. Although the message was meant to be delivered just before the attack, it was in fact delivered well after the attack had begun, adding to U.S. outrage.

Approximately 100 U.S. battleships, destroyers, cruisers, and support ships were present in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. The nearby U.S. Army airfield, Hickam Field, was attacked simultaneously, and 18 bombers, fighters, and attack bombers were destroyed or damaged without having a chance to take off. More than 188 U.S. aircraft were destroyed, and more than 2,400 Americans were killed. Japanese losses were comparatively minimal—a total of 29 Japanese aircraft were shot down, and possibly 100 Japanese pilots perished.

The attack on Pearl Harbor consisted of two strikes, the second of which completed the mission. The Japanese had considered a third strike, as well, which would have been devastating and greatly delayed the ability of the U.S. Navy to recover. However, Japanese admiral Chuichi Nagumo decided against this third strike, and at 1:00 p.m. Hawaii time, the Japanese planes returned home.

The purpose of the attack on Pearl Harbor was to strike a crippling blow to U.S. naval power in the Pacific. However, one of the primary objectives—to sink U.S. aircraft carriers—was not accomplished, because none were present at the time of the attack. As the war continued, the importance of aircraft carriers (rather than battleships) to naval warfare became increasingly apparent.

Despite the devastation of the attack, the United States quickly recovered. Except for five ships, every ship sunk or damaged at Pearl Harbor was repaired to sail again. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy went on to sink every one of the Japanese aircraft carriers, battleships, and cruisers that participated in the attack.

The treachery of the Pearl Harbor attack also generated tremendous resentment in the United States toward the Japanese. The subsequent internment of Japanese Americans has been partially attributed to anger over Pearl Harbor. False claims of espionage and collaboration with the enemy were leveled against many Japanese Americans.

Despite numerous investigations, including joint hearings by the U.S. Congress in 1946, many questions about the Pearl Harbor attack have remained unresolved. A number of conspiracy theories have emerged, for example, that have questioned whether President Roosevelt or other U.S. officials may have known of the plan in advance, but let it happen so it would galvanize public opinion to go to war.

At the time, Pearl Harbor was the largest mass use of aircraft carriers in an attack, the farthest-range naval attack, and the largest air attack against a naval target. The assault on Pearl Harbor was also an important factor in the establishment of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, which was intended, among other things, to prevent future sneak attacks like the one at Pearl Harbor.

See also Japanese Internment; Roosevelt, Franklin D., and National Policy; World War II (1939–1945)

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PENETRATING MUNITIONS

Ammunition capable of penetrating hardened targets such as tanks or bunkers and causing more serious internal damage than conventional munitions. Penetrating munitions come in a variety of forms, including artillery shells, bombs, rockets, and missiles.

The earliest penetrating munitions were developed in rudimentary form during World War II. Allied forces used powerful *dambuster* bombs in an attempt to penetrate the concrete structures of dams along the Rhine River. By collapsing the dams, the Allies hoped to flood important industrial and agricultural regions of Germany, hampering its war effort. Although the bombs did breach some dams, the widespread damage anticipated by the Allies failed to occur.

Today's penetrating munitions awaited technological developments that allowed for more precise targeting and better penetration of hard surfaces, thereby increasing their effectiveness during conflict. Tungsten, a superhard metal, has been used in penetrating munitions since the 1960s. More recently, penetrating artillery and armor-piercing rounds have been designed using depleted uranium, or DU, a radioactive material that is extremely dense. The invention of microelectronics and laser guidance enabled the incorporation of sophisticated targeting systems inside shells and bombs. These targeting systems produced a revolutionary improvement in the ability to strike an intended target.

Penetrating artillery shells and antitank weapons typically consist of a long, thin rod called a *fléchette* surrounded by a casing (or sabot) that allows the round to fit into the barrel of the firing weapon. After the round is fired, the sabot falls away and the fléchette continues to the target. Upon impact, the nose of the fléchette splits in a way that allows it to remain sharp. The energy released at impact disintegrates the fléchette as it bores through the surface of the target. This disintegration creates a hot ball of dust and gas that ignites upon contact with the air inside the vehicle, killing its crew and igniting the ammunition and fuel.

Another type of penetrating munition is the so-called bunker-buster bomb. The bunker buster is similar in configuration to penetrating shells, with a long, narrow body. The bunker buster is loaded with explosives and equipped with a fuse that delays its explosion until after the bomb penetrates its target. More complicated weaponry can even count the number of floors in a building or bunker it has penetrated and, after a specified number, detonate the explosives. Because it is dropped from extremely high altitude, a bunker buster must be laser-guided to its target by the

pilot of the aircraft. Bunker busters were used extensively during the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.

See also Antitank Missiles; Science, Technology, and Security

PENTAGON

Located in Arlington, Virginia, headquarters of the U.S. Department of Defense. The term *Pentagon* refers to both the building itself and to the military establishment headquartered there. The Pentagon is the center of military power in the United States.

THE BUILDING AND ITS HISTORY

The Pentagon, which lies across the Potomac River from Washington, DC, is the world's largest office building. It consists of five concentric rings, designated A, B, C, D, and E, each five stories high. Each ring occupies an area large enough to contain the U.S. Capitol building. The Pentagon covers a total area of 29 acres and contains 3,705,793 square feet of office space, three times the floor space of the Empire State Building. Despite its size, the Pentagon is efficiently designed. Although the building contains some 17 miles of hallways, it takes no more than seven minutes to walk between any two points inside.

The Pentagon's tremendous size is a product of the enormity of the role it was built to fulfill. United States involvement in World War II put a tremendous strain on the then-existing Department of War, whose personnel were spread across 17 different buildings in Washington, DC. The Pentagon was designed to consolidate departmental personnel in a central location to increase efficiency.

The original plan for the building, developed by Brigadier General Brehon B. Somervell, took less than four days to conceive. The building was intended to be a three-story facility meant to house 40,000 people. General Somervell, however, ignored President Franklin D. Roosevelt's stated size preferences and began construction on a five-sided building much larger than had been anticipated. The number of stories was increased to four, and then finally five.

Construction on the Pentagon began on September 11, 1941, and was completed less than two years later. The project was subject to the same wartime rationing requirements as every other initiative; thus, concrete ramps substituted for elevators to connect floors. Even so, 13,000 workers were employed in its construction, and the building cost $80 million when it was completed in 1943.

Since its completion, the Pentagon has acquired tremendous symbolic importance as the headquarters of the U.S. military. For many, it stands as a symbol of American power and stability; for others, it symbolizes a U.S. overreliance on military force to advance national interests. The depth of feeling stirred by the Pentagon has been expressed by a number of acts intended to deface or destroy it. Pig's blood was thrown on the Pentagon during Vietnam War protests, and in the 1960s, the radical antigovernment Weather Underground group successfully bombed a women's bathroom in the building. The Pentagon was one of the main targets of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, DC, placing the building at the center of the war on terror.

THE PENTAGON AS AN INSTITUTION

The spread of War Department personnel across Washington, DC, was a metaphor for the lack of coordination among the U.S. armed forces. During the war, it became clear that Army, Navy, and Air Force units had to work together closely to be effective. However, the military was plagued by interservice rivalries over allocation of resources and command responsibility. In 1945, President Harry S. Truman proposed unifying military planning and command in a Department of National Defense. The thought of concentrating so much power and authority in one department was worrisome to many military commanders and members of Congress. However, Truman's views won out, and the National Security Act of 1947 combined the Department of War, the Navy Department, and the Department of the Air Force into a new Department of Defense. The civilian head of the department, the secretary of defense, was given authority over all branches of the U.S. military.

The Department of Defense is made up of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, as well as noncombat agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. The Department of Defense also has authority over the U.S. Coast Guard during wartime; during peacetime, the Coast Guard is under the Department of Homeland Security. The Joint Chiefs of Staff—a panel composed

An aerial view of the Pentagon, the headquarters of the U.S. Department of Defense and the nerve center for U.S. military command and control. Virtually a city within itself, the Pentagon is the biggest office building in the world, housing approximately 23,000 military and civilian employees, as well as about 3,000 nondefense support personnel. Built between September 1941 and January 1943, the Pentagon covers a total of 583 acres and contains more than 3.7 million sq ft of office and storage space. The five-story building contains 17.5 mi of corridors, and each of its five outer walls measures 921 ft.

Source: Corbis.

of the top-ranking officers of each service—is responsible for military planning and serve as the president's military advisers. Though the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is by law the highest-ranking military officer in the United States, neither the chairman nor the various chiefs of staff are in the chain of command. The chain of command for the U.S. military begins with the president and extends through the secretary of defense to various regional commanders.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The secretary of defense is the Pentagon's primary representative to the federal government and the citizens of the United States. The office has evolved in the context of military priorities and challenges to U.S. security. The first secretary of defense, James V. Forrestal, served from 1947 to 1949, the early years of the Cold War. His tenure was marked by the formation of the Eastern bloc and the establishment of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Forrestal also served as secretary of defense during the Berlin airlift

and the initiation of the Marshall Plan for European postwar recovery.

Louis A. Johnson, who succeeded Forrestal, was known for his thriftiness, espoused in slogans such as one that claimed the American taxpayer received "a dollar's worth of defense for every dollar spent." Fiscal practicality was, however, soon confronted by the realities of the Korean War. Johnson also presided over serious dissent among branches of the armed services with regard to spending priorities. The essence of the debate concerned the best approach to confronting the numerical superiority of Soviet ground forces and the practicality of atomic deterrence.

Initial setbacks in Korea provoked Johnson's resignation, and he was replaced by George C. Marshall, author of the Marshall Plan. Marshall oversaw a massive expansion of the military in response to what he perceived as the aggressive willingness of communist states to wage war. Despite these efforts, Senator Joseph McCarthy accused Marshall of being soft on communism. The attacks on Marshall backfired; McCarthy's performance during Senate hearings into communist influence in the army turned the U.S. public against him and his mania for seeing communists around every corner. Marshall received the Nobel Peace prize in 1953 for his fundamental role in rebuilding war-torn Europe.

One of the most controversial secretaries of defense was Robert S. McNamara, who served in that position from 1961 to 1968, the longest consecutive tenure in the office. McNamara presided over the increase in U.S. involvement in Vietnam during the administration of John F. Kennedy. A proponent of the use of force in Southeast Asia, McNamara was retained by Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson. Many years later, McNamara repudiated his earlier views on Vietnam, saying that U.S. involvement in the conflict was a mistake.

Donald Rumsfeld, who served as secretary of defense under President Gerald R. Ford in the mid-1970s and 25 years later under President George W. Bush, has also been a divisive figure. Under President Bush, Rumsfeld formulated a new military doctrine that emphasized reliance on technology, overwhelming airpower, and the use of small, specialized ground forces rather than large troop formations. This approach flew in the face of the existing Powell Doctrine, devised by former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell. The Powell Doctrine argued that U.S. forces should not enter any engagement without overwhelming superiority of forces on ground, sea, and air.

Rumsfeld's ideas were put to the test in the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. In Afghanistan, the United States relied heavily on U.S. special-operations forces supported by local militia. Iraq featured a conventional ground attack carried out by a relatively small force of about 150,000 troops. In both cases, the initial assaults were extremely successful in overwhelming the military opposition. However, in Afghanistan, U.S. forces failed to capture the leaders of the terrorist group al-Qaeda, for whom they were searching, and since the end of fighting, much of the country has come under the control of local warlords. In Iraq, U.S. troops, limited in number, have been unable to control a postwar insurgency that has claimed thousands of U.S. and Iraqi lives.

SCANDAL AND CONTROVERSY

The central role of the Pentagon in defense and national security has also placed it at the center of related scandals and controversies. Two of the most notorious were the Pentagon Papers incident and the Iran-Contra scandal. Both revealed extensive deceptions of the American public by top-ranking administration officials.

The Pentagon Papers

The Pentagon Papers are a 7,000-page history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam since the end of World War II. The papers were leaked, first to the *New York Times,* by Department of Defense employee Daniel Ellsberg and published in 1971. Among other things, the papers revealed that Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon did not believe the war was winnable, despite public statements and increased commitment of troops by both administrations. These revelations undermined the already deteriorating public credibility of the government over the Vietnam War. The publication of the papers also provoked the anger of President Nixon.

The Nixon administration was successful in obtaining a federal court injunction, forcing the *Times* to cease publication. It was the first incidence in U.S. history of prior restraint of publication for national-security reasons. The *Washington Post,* however, soon began publishing the papers, as well, and refused a request from the assistant attorney general to cease and desist. The Justice Department once again sought an injunction, but this time they were refused. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled against the government and held that the injunctions were unconstitutional. The Pentagon Papers have been regarded historically as an important instance of the tensions between respecting the First Amendment versus the necessity of protecting national security.

The Iran-Contra Affair

The Iran-Contra affair once again placed the Pentagon at the center of questions concerning checks and balances on presidential power. In 1985, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger agreed to give Iran U.S.-made antitank missiles in return for the release of a prominent American hostage held by Iranian sympathizers in Lebanon. This agreement led to another deal, involving the sale of anti-aircraft missiles to Iran, in which President Ronald Reagan chose to ignore rules requiring him to notify Congress beforehand.

These activities culminated in presidential approval of a plan to sell arms to Iran in exchange for the release of hostages. The funds received from the sales were subsequently (and secretly) used to fund anticommunist rebels in Nicaragua, known as the *contras.* Several government officials, including National Security Advisor John Poindexter, were convicted on several counts of conspiracy, but their convictions were ultimately overturned. The scandal raised numerous issues, among them the proper role of the executive branch in defense and security policy initiatives.

The Pentagon Papers and Iran-Contra scandal highlight one of the main criticisms of the Pentagon: the secrecy and lack of accountability that often spring up around issues of military policy. Because the president appoints the secretary of defense, Pentagon policies naturally tend to reflect the priorities and concerns of the administration. Critics argue that this close tie to the president allows political considerations

to intrude on prudent military planning. It may also prevent military leaders from speaking out against policies or decisions that are not in the best interests of the United States.

—William de Jong-Lambert

See also Department of Defense, U.S (DoD); Joint Chiefs of Staff; National Security Act (1947); Pentagon Papers; September 11/ WTC and Pentagon Attacks

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PENTAGON PAPERS

Secret government study about America's involvement in the Vietnam War, the release of which sparked an unprecedented legal battle between the administration of President Richard Nixon and the national media (particularly the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*). Commissioned in 1967 by then-Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the Pentagon Papers examined the decision-making process behind U.S. participation in the war in Vietnam.

Researched and written under utmost secrecy, the Pentagon Papers were supposed to provide posterity with a candid account of the context surrounding the U.S. decision to go to war in Vietnam. Instead, thanks initially to a former government official and to the *New York Times,* the papers were partially revealed, in 1971, to the American public, whose attitude toward the Vietnam War was already rapidly deteriorating. The disclosure of the study (first by the *Times* and subsequently by the *Washington Post* and other publications) led to a string of high-profile legal confrontations between the federal government and the press.

CONTENTS OF THE STUDY

Robert S. McNamara had been serving as secretary of defense for six years under two presidents (John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson) when he asked 35 Pentagon officials and civilian experts to undertake an in-depth study of U.S. involvement in Vietnam since the end of World War II. The task took one year to complete (from 1967 to 1968) and yielded 47 volumes of documents, including both copies of official memoranda (4,000 pages) and the researchers' own analyses (3,000 pages).

Preoccupied solely with establishing the facts related to Vietnam, the researchers wrote their assessments without any consideration for the government's official perspective on historical (and contemporary) events. The uproar that the papers subsequently brought about when they were leaked to the press is rather easy to understand in light of the study's revelations.

The information unearthed by the researchers showed that the U.S. government had repeatedly misled the American public with reference to its handling of the initial stages of the conflict in Vietnam—that is, from early 1964 to the spring of 1965, before U.S. ground troops landed in South Vietnam. Even as administration officials were publicly denying reports of conducting extensive hostile actions in the region, the Pentagon was engaged in ground-troop deployments in South Vietnam and was conducting air strikes in Laos. In addition, contrary to official government pronouncements, the U.S.-backed South Vietnamese government was described as an "emerging fascist state," and the communist movement was shown to enjoy a huge popularity in both South Vietnam and North Vietnam.

LEAKING THE PAPERS

Upon its completion, the study was kept under close guard and only 15 copies were made. Two of these copies ended up in the vaulted archives of the RAND Corporation, an organization that had been closely associated with the Pentagon.

Prior to being one of McNamara's 35 researchers, one of RAND's employees, Daniel Ellsberg, had worked for the U.S. Department of Defense in Vietnam, studying potential conflict-resolution options. Ellsberg became disenchanted with the American involvement in the conflict, and soon after the completion of the study, he decided to take the initiative and change the state of affairs.

Thanks to his status at RAND, Ellsberg was able to make additional copies of the study. He eventually provided the *New York Times* with some of the documents in question, and the newspaper began publishing them on June 13, 1971. After the *Times* had published

three installments of the papers, the Justice Department obtained a temporary restraining order, arguing that, should publication continue, "the national defense interests and nation's security will suffer immediate and irreparable harm."

Because of the court order, the *Times* was forced to halt publication of the Pentagon Papers, but the *Washington Post* concomitantly began to publish excerpts of the study. The extensive legal wrangling that ensued between the government and the newspapers became the most famous instance in U.S. history of governmental efforts to prevent the press from publishing disturbing information. On June 26, 1971, the Supreme Court took up the case and heard oral arguments from all parties. Several days later, the Court decided that the government could not stop the newspapers from printing the study.

CONSEQUENCES

The legal outcome of the battle between the government and the press and its implications regarding press freedom probably constitutes the most significant consequences of the entire Pentagon Papers incident. However, the case had several other far-reaching reverberations, as well. Daniel Ellsberg's prosecution for theft and espionage became a frequent reference in law manuals, in part because of the government's ill-advised tampering with the court proceedings (by illegal wiretapping and suppressing evidence). A few years after the Supreme Court ruling, more of the same governmental misconduct led to the Watergate scandal, which eventually cost Richard Nixon the presidency.

The publication of the Pentagon Papers also convinced an already increasing number of Americans that the war in Vietnam was being mishandled and even manipulated by the executive branch of government for purely political purposes. Following massive popular demonstrations against the war, President Ford announced the end of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War on April 23, 1975.

To this day, every aspiring American journalist studies the *New York Times*' legal battle with the government over its publication of secret documents. Moreover, the ethical issues arising from Ellsberg's alleged illicit actions and the subsequent breach of national security will probably continue to be dissected by both scholars and journalists for years to come.

See also Civil Liberties; Civil–Military Relations; Classification; Denial; Vietnam War (1954–1975)

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REFLECTIONS

An Assault on Democracy

That is what is so chilling: the contempt for public opinion, the ready recourse to the press as an instrument for misleading the public; the easy arrogance with which these men arrogated to themselves decision which no government ought to take without the knowledge, let alone consent, of the people; the contempt for Congress as yet another inconvenience to be dealt with, when necessary, with blithe duplicity.

—Excerpt from a *Washington Post* editorial, June 17, 1971

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
See CHINA AND U.S. POLICY

PERESTROIKA

Program of economic, political, and social retooling unveiled by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986. Thereafter, the word *perestroika,* or restructuring, was added to the modern lexicon. Perestroika*,* along with Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost,* or openness, became the unintended catalyst for the dismantling of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

For much of its 70-year existence, the Marxist–Leninist–Stalinist totalitarian state known as the Soviet Union had towered over the majority of nations in military and industrial might. In its waning decades, however, the USSR was swaying and heaving under the strain of an outmoded economic system and industrial infrastructure. The Soviet economy had been stagnating since the 1960s. In order to continue competing with its political rivals in the West, the Soviet economy would need drastic restructuring. Hoping to make his nation's economy more efficient, Gorbachev

put his faith in his program of reform and adjustment known as *perestroika.*

The main aim of perestroika was to gradually transform the old state-managed command economy into a demand economy that heeded market signals and vested more authority in managers at the enterprise level. The program encouraged limited private ownership and profitability. Reactions to the new policies were contentious and, at times, violent.

In the conflict between the old order and emerging market forces, the communist system of centralized power and privilege continued to hold on. As a result, the new policies produced no economic miracles. Instead, shortages of goods developed, civic order declined, and ethnic rivalries erupted. Perestroika ultimately failed because its measures were too timid, its timing was too late, and its hopes were too grand. Moreover, when more radical changes were made, they often had adverse effects.

After much early hope, Gorbachev failed to bring significant change and lost the support of the Soviet people. His belief that the system could be gradually reformed, as well as his attempt to straddle the line between conservatives and radicals, cost him his political base.

On August 19, 1991, conservative elements in the government launched an abortive coup d'état to prevent the signing of a new union treaty. In the aftermath of the coup, Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian republic, ascended to power as head of the nation. Under his leadership, Russia embarked on even more far-reaching reforms: The Soviet Union broke up into its constituent republics, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a loose federation of former Soviet republics, arose to take its place.

See also Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy

PLO (PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION)

Umbrella group of various Palestinian nationalist organizations dedicated to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Founded in 1964 with the support of the Arab states, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has become the most important representative of the Palestinian people.

A union among different groups with diverse ideologies and priorities, the PLO has undergone extensive transformations over time. One of the most significant of these was the PLO's official 1993 acceptance of the right of Israel to exist as a nation, established by decree in 1948. Until his death in 2004, the one constant within the PLO had been its chairman, Yasir Arafat, leader and founder of Fatah, the most powerful group within the PLO. In 1994, following extensive negotiations with Israel, Arafat formed the Palestinian Authority, which was slated to become the legitimate government of a future independent Palestinian state.

CONSOLIDATION

The establishment of the PLO in 1964 was a long-awaited effort on the part of some of the most influential Palestinian nationalist groups to pool their resources and political power with the aim of fighting and destroying the nation of Israel. Three years after the PLO's inception, in 1967, Israel fought the successful Six-Day War against the combined forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait, leaving the Jewish state in control of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, two areas heavily populated by Palestinians.

At that time, events that brought the PLO to the forefront of the Middle Eastern conflict began to rapidly succeed each other. In July 1968, the PLO drafted its official charter, which called for the elimination of Israel from the Middle East and declared that the only way to establish an independent Palestinian state was through armed struggle. The same year, a relatively powerful guerrilla movement called Fatah joined the PLO. Its leader, Yasir Arafat, quickly came to dominate the organization, acquiring in 1969 the position of chairman of the PLO's executive committee. Meanwhile, the various organizations making up the PLO stepped up their guerrilla activities against the Jewish state.

INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION

In addition to fighting Israel, the PLO soon found itself in conflict not only with Israel, but also with Jordan, which had for years hosted the organization's command center. Feeling threatened by the increasing influence of Palestinians in Jordan's internal affairs, King Hussein of Jordan forced the PLO out of the country. The organization relocated to Lebanon, from where it continued to stage attacks against Israel.

By the early 1970s, the PLO was hard at work acquiring much-needed international legitimization. Its efforts were rewarded in 1974, when the United Nations

officially recognized the organization and granted it observer status. The same year, the Arab countries proclaimed the PLO to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Successful on the international scene, the PLO now has to face an offensive by its opponent, Israel, which in 1982 invaded Lebanon with the stated aim of annihilating the PLO guerrillas.

Once again, the PLO went on the move, relocating its headquarters to Tunisia. Within five years, however, the world's attention focused on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, where hundreds of Palestinian youth clashed with Israeli troops in an uprising that came to be known as the first *intifada* (an Arabic word meaning "shaking off"). Although the PLO was not initially the moving force behind the events, it quickly moved to take control of (and credit for) the Palestinian revolt.

THE OSLO ACCORDS

The intifada continued intermittently for six years. During that time, Yasir Arafat proclaimed an independent Palestinian state composed of the two embattled territories—the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—and officially repudiated terrorist acts. Although the move was well received internationally, relations with the West (and much of the Arab world) took a turn for the worse in 1990, when Arafat gave his political support to the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, who had just invaded Kuwait.

Finally, after prolonged secret negotiations between the PLO and Israel, the PLO signed the Oslo Accords in the presence of U.S. president Bill Clinton. In a dramatic transformation of its initial goal to destroy the Jewish state, the PLO renounced its claim to the territory on which Israel had been founded in 1948 (not including the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem). In its turn, Israel agreed to withdraw gradually from the Palestinian territories and gave the Palestinians limited autonomy over the areas of Jericho and Gaza.

AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

One year after the ground-breaking Oslo Accords, Arafat created the Palestinian National Authority (PA) to administer the autonomous territories, which by 1995 also included parts of the West Bank. The PLO leader was soon after elected president of the PA, and his associates controlled the organization's legislative body.

Within a few months, the PLO removed from its charter all articles that called for the destruction of the state of Israel. Arafat also began a series of face-to-face negotiations with successive Israeli leaders, but the proceedings were hampered by repeated acts of terrorism, including suicide bombings, in the streets of Gaza and the West Bank, as well as by severe ideological differences.

A second intifada erupted in 2000, further obstructing the peace process. Israel ceased to recognize Arafat as a legitimate and credible negotiation partner and isolated him in his compound in the West Bank city of Ramallah. Under pressure from the international community, Arafat appeared to reform the Palestinian Authority and delegated some of his powers. In November 2004, Yasir Arafat died in a hospital in Paris.

Arafat's successor as leader of the PLO, Mahmoud Abbas, has sought to end the violence between Palestinians and Israelis and to move forward toward peace and independence for Palestinians. At present, however, the PLO's key objective, the creation of an independent Palestinian state, remains unaccomplished.

See also Arab-Israeli Conflict; Hamas; Intifada; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Middle East Conflicts (1956, 1967, 1973)

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POLICE ACTION

An isolated undertaking, military in nature, intended to curb either an insurgency within a state's own borders or by one state against another when that state is in violation of international treaties or norms or is found to have engaged in an act of aggression. Under international and domestic laws, military action can be undertaken by a state either pursuant to a declaration of war against another state or as a police action. In the United States, the Constitution requires that a declaration of war against another state be approved

by Congress. Absent a declaration of war, however, the president can order military action by virtue of his powers as commander in chief of the armed forces.

In terms of international law, police actions are permissible under two circumstances. Initiating military action against a state—thus infringing upon its political and territorial sovereignty—is permissible under international law only when that state has perpetrated an act of aggression against another state or when it has otherwise posed a threat to international peace and security and a collective decision has been made by the United Nations to curb this action. One other instance in which a police action is permissible is when a state acts in self-defense against imminent attack by another state, which is deemed the aggressor even if it has not yet attacked. In the post–Cold War era, these lines have been blurred to occasionally include the permission of territorial and political infringement upon states whose governments perpetrate atrocities against their own people, but this is a developing issue. In the post–September 11, 2001, era, these guidelines have become even murkier as states militarily pursue individuals they deem terrorists within the borders of other states.

Even before today's global issues challenged the parameters set up by the UN Charter and other instruments of international law, military activity between states never quite fit neatly within the framework set up by those treaties and pacts. That is, most military activity takes place outside of the context of a declaration of war.

In U.S. history, examples of such incidents abound and include the Korean War, the invasion of Grenada, the Gulf War of 1991, and U.S. involvement in the Balkan wars of the 1990s.

Arguably the most infamous police action undertaken by the United States is the Vietnam War. Like the Korean War, the Vietnam conflict was fueled by the tensions of the Cold War, and U.S. involvement in it was intended to curb the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. The conflict was prolonged far beyond initial expectations, snowballing and drawing the United States further and further into the quagmire, despite growing antiwar sentiment at home calling for extraction from the region.

POLITICAL ASSASSINATION

The purposeful killing of foreign political or military leaders. Although political assassination is prohibited

by executive order, the United States has attempted to use assassination as a policy tool in peacetime and in war. Longstanding moral objections to assassination also have made policymakers wary of using it as a weapon of foreign policy. However, contemporary trends in international politics, especially the rise of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, suggest that assassination may become a more tempting policy option in the future.

THE USE OF ASSASSINATION IN HISTORY

Until the beginning of the 17th century, assassination was widely accepted as a political device. As late as 1516, English scholar and statesman Sir Thomas More defended the ethics and practicality of political assassination. More was in the mainstream of thought; from the medieval period through the counter-Reformation (ca. 1200–1650), the practice of assassinating rulers or leaders was used with little reservation.

The Protestant Reformation and resulting Catholic counter-Reformation in the 1500s and early 1600s brought a religious dimension to politics that fueled the use of assassination. Monarchs during this time often viewed their foreign counterparts not merely as political rivals but also as heretics. Thus, King Phillip II of Spain, a Catholic, tried repeatedly to assassinate Protestant monarchs such as Holland's William of Orange and Queen Elizabeth I of England. The Vatican took part in such activities, as well, publicly supporting the assassination of Elizabeth.

Political and legal theorists began to codify the prohibition on assassination in the late 16th and 17th centuries. Anticipating the approach of the nation-state, Italian jurist Alberico Gentili wrote in 1598 that European leaders who used assassination might find it used against themselves. He also tied public security to the safety of public leaders. The rise of the nation-state system in the mid-17th century introduced a new norm against political assassination. Because the state system was defined by its political leaders, international order depended on mutual respect for their lives. Because the Great Powers each had an interest in maintaining the existing political order, this tacit agreement reduced the likelihood of any established state resorting to assassination, thus promoting the safety of all their leaders. Assassination remained a domestic problem, but it rapidly declined as a tool of foreign policy.

In the mid-1700s, Swiss legal scholar Emmerich de Vattel gave voice to the prevailing view of assassination.

De Vattel expressed revulsion at the "infamous and execrable" practice of assassination and warned policymakers that any leader who resorted to killing political rivals would be "regarded as an enemy of the human race." At roughly the same time, on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, Thomas Jefferson wrote that assassination was a product of the Dark Ages, and he applauded civilization for moving forward.

Despite these strong condemnations of assassination, scholars disagree on the historical strength of the norm against political killing. Those who feel that the norm largely has been upheld point out that state-supported international assassination virtually disappeared by the 19th century. Other scholars contend that leaders weigh many factors in making decisions, and that assassination simply came to be seen by decision makers as a less effective political tool. They argue that the apparent norm against assassination was nothing more than a decision to choose options perceived to be better.

Notwithstanding the continuing debate over the power of norms in international politics, the historical record suggests that the informal ban on political assassination had important consequences for the modern state system. Even though a number of political assassinations occurred during the 20th century, there were striking examples of restraint. Perhaps the most telling was in 1938, when British leaders apparently rejected a plan to kill Adolf Hitler, calling it "unsportsmanlike."

During the early Cold War, U.S. policymakers had a freer hand in conducting covert operations, some of which involved assassination attempts on foreign leaders. Because the Soviet threat appeared grave, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was given considerable discretion in its foreign activities. For example, the CIA targeted Cuban leader Fidel Castro after he became a Soviet ally. The CIA arranged a variety of operations, including a plan to kill Castro by using a ballpoint pen that concealed a poisonous hypodermic needle.

The United States also has been accused of planning and participating in assassinations of political leaders in Asia and South America. In 1963, for example, South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem was assassinated by army generals dissatisfied with his rule, apparently with the approval of the U.S. ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. In later decades, U.S. leaders strenuously denied involvement in such assassinations. These denials implied a fear of exposure, suggesting that U.S. policymakers were constrained by the general objections to assassination.

The prolonged war in Vietnam, and episodes such as the assassination of South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh

Diem, caused Congress to look more closely at U.S. covert action. Congress demanded greater oversight and sought to rein in the morally questionable practices of the CIA, including assassination. An executive order prohibiting assassination, authorized by President Gerald R. Ford in 1976, was in a sense the culmination of these reforms. From the end of the Vietnam War to the end of the Cold War, few policymakers in Washington were willing to publicly challenge the ban.

The objection to political assassination survived into the 1990s. During the first Gulf War in 1991, Saddam Hussein's close control over Iraqi military operations gave rise to advocates of *decapitation* strategies. They held that killing key officials would critically disable the Iraqi fighting machine. Here, the norm against assassination came in direct opposition with the military obligation to defeat the enemy. Still, the norm against assassination held. President George H. W. Bush declared, "We're not targeting any individual," and U.S. general Norman Schwarzkopf argued, "That's not the way we fight wars anyway."

THE ASSASSINATION CONTROVERSY

In recent years, the debate over the legality, morality, and effectiveness of political assassination has returned. Evidence suggests that the historical norm against assassination may be eroding. Some analysts argue that state leaders who harbor terrorists should not enjoy protection against assassination. In addition, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction means that individual leaders can cause astonishing levels of death and destruction. Because more power is wielded by a few individuals, political assassination may seem like the best way to avert potential danger.

Political assassination as a tactic of foreign policy is tempting for several reasons. First, assassination may help influence the behavior of a target state by removing an unfriendly leader. This outcome assumes that the leader's immediate subordinates are more amenable to one's demands. It also assumes that they are likely to be frightened into cooperation by the killing of their leader. Second, the threat of political assassination may give pause to leaders of other states who would challenge U.S. interests. The emphasis on regime change in the foreign policy of President George W. Bush suggests that the United States is trying to coerce leaders of rogue states with direct threats.

Political assassination is also tempting because it may shorten an ongoing war by debilitating enemy command and control. Ending a war would spare the

trouble of launching a costly ground invasion and compel surrender. Finally, assassination may have preventive value if targeted leaders seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction or attack American interests. Such rationales are more tempting if the target state is tightly controlled—the greater the degree of centralization, the greater the potential benefits of assassinating the leader.

Despite these incentives, there are two main reasons why political assassination remains controversial. First, Executive Order 12333 makes it unacceptable for any individual employed by or acting on behalf of the United States government to "engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination." The order, originally signed by President Ford in 1976, has been renewed by every subsequent administration.

The second reason why assassination is problematic and controversial is that it has a dubious record of success. In rare circumstances it has achieved its operational and political objectives; more often, however, it has not. A study by the RAND Corporation analyzed nearly two dozen assassination attempts between 1943 and 1999. It concluded that these attempts were utterly fruitless; there were no successful direct attacks on foreign political heads of state. In rare cases, U.S. support for coups had helped topple undesirable governments. However, even then, the deterrent and coercive goals of leadership attack were hard to achieve. The RAND study found that invasion and occupation was a more reliable strategy for attaining such objectives.

There are other reasons why political assassination is controversial. Some observers question the morality of targeted killings, especially when the target is a democratically elected leader. In addition, opponents of assassination argue that the norm against political killings helps to protect American leaders. Should that norm erode, foreign adversaries may use the threat of assassination as a way to counter U.S. conventional military might.

ISSUES

Targeting Osama

Can the United States legally assassinate Osama bin Laden? Should assassination become a feature of the war on terrorism?

President Gerald Ford explicitly prohibited assassination amid public pressure to reign in "rogue" intelligence operations abroad. Signed in February 1976, Executive Order 11905 states, "No employee of the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination." The prohibition

remains in force, but the September 11 attacks rekindled the debate over the appropriateness of assassination.

Supporters of the ban note that the war on terror is essentially a war of ideas. Reducing the danger of terrorism requires improving America's reputation abroad. The resort to assassination–even against the most notorious terrorist leaders–would make the United States appear hypocritical. It cannot promote democratic ideals if it uses targeted killing as a tool of foreign policy. In addition, supporters argue that assassination remains contrary to domestic and international law.

However, the Executive Order does not offer a precise definition of assassination, leaving much room for interpretation. It fails to distinguish between peacetime and wartime assassination, and it is unclear whether leaders of transnational groups are protected. Thus, the Bush administration has argued that targeting al Qaeda leaders is constitutional because the prohibition does not apply to wartime or to actions taken against nonstate terrorists.

Advocates also contend that assassination is justified on moral and strategic grounds in the continuing war on terrorism. Some of these arguments were made even before 9/11. In early 2001, Representative Bob Barr (R-GA) introduced legislation that would overturn the executive prohibition on assassination. The Terrorist Elimination Act of 2001 implicitly challenged the morality of the ban, noting that "present strategy allows the military forces to bomb large targets hoping to eliminate the terrorist leader, but prevents our country from designing a limited action, which would specifically accomplish that purpose." It also argued that prohibiting assassination limits the "swift, sure and precise action needed by the United States to protect our national security."

—*Joshua Rovner*

See also Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Covert Action; Covert Operations; Executive Orders

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POLITICAL CULTURE
See STRATEGIC CULTURE

PORTLAND SIX

Group of six Portland Muslims convicted on charges of aiding al-Qaeda. The six Portland, Oregon, natives were indicted in October 2003 on charges of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, conspiracy to contribute services to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and conspiracy to wage war against the United States. Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the Portland Six traveled to China in order to make their way into Afghanistan via Pakistan, where they were denied visas. The group members planned to fight alongside the Taliban against the U.S. military.

Members of the Portland Six pled guilty to money-laundering charges, plotting to fight for the Taliban, and conspiracy and weapons charges in connection with the plan to go to Afghanistan. Following their guilty pleas, they were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 4 to 18 years.

The Portland Six indictments are notable as some of the earliest cases of the USA PATRIOT Act being implemented for domestic security concerns. The PATRIOT Act, enacted shortly after September 11, gives law-enforcement agencies wide-ranging powers to investigate and prosecute terrorists within the United States. In the Portland Six case, prosecutors had broad authority to issue national warrants and gain access to information they previously did not have.

See also Al-Qaeda; September 11/WTC and Pentagon Attacks; Taliban; Terrorism, War on International

POSITIVE SUM GAME

A game-theory term that refers to situations in which the total of gains and losses is greater than zero. A positive sum occurs when resources are somehow increased and an approach is formulated in which the desires and needs of all concerned are satisfied. One example would be when two parties both gain financially by participating in a contest, no matter who wins or loses. Positive sum outcomes occur in instances of distributive bargaining where different interests are negotiated so that everyone's needs are met.

In contrast to the positive sum game are the zero sum game and the negative sum game. The term *zero sum game* refers to situations in which the total of wins and losses adds up to zero: One party benefits at the direct expense of another. The term *negative sum game* describes situations in which the total of gains and losses is less than zero. The only way for one party to maintain the status quo is to take something from another party. It is in the context of negative sum games that the most serious competition tends to occur.

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POTSDAM CONFERENCE (1945)

From July 16 to August 2, 1945, the final meeting of the Big Three Allied powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union), which presaged the opening of the Cold War. Called to determine the details of the occupation of Germany and Austria, the terms to be imposed upon Japan, and other aspects of the postwar world, the Potsdam Conference demonstrated the tensions always present in the Allied camp.

As agreed to by Big Three leaders Truman, Churchill, and Stalin at the conference, Germany, Austria, and their capital cities were divided into separate occupation zones, and reparations in kind were to be taken from each zone. Germany was to be occupied and reformed under the concept of the five Ds: demilitarization, de-Nazification, democratization, decentralization, and deindustrialization. No attempt to redraw the map of Europe was attempted at the meeting, except to clarify the German–Polish border as the Oder and Neisse rivers and to apportion part of former East Prussia to the Poles. The purpose of the Soviet occupation of the remaining countries in Eastern Europe was characterized as assisting in the democratic reorganization of those states. The conference called upon Japan on July 26 to surrender unconditionally, and in a secret codicil, the Russians promised to enter the war against Japan three months after the defeat of Germany.

By the end of the Potsdam meeting, the United States had tested successfully the first atomic bomb, and the Russian participation in the war against Japan became less significant. However, President Harry S. Truman indicated to Soviet marshal Joseph Stalin that his country had a new weapon of remarkable power and would use it shortly to end the war. This was the beginning of a nascent policy of atomic diplomacy, in which the United States hoped to intimidate the Soviet Union into a more favorable postwar posture.

Although the usual protocols of solidarity emerged from the Potsdam Conference, the wartime alliance was essentially over. Although the Cold War was not yet inevitable, the Soviet Union was not going to open its political, social, and economic system to the West and still feared capitalist encirclement as before the war. The presence of the Red Army in eastern and central Europe served Russian security interests well, and to Russia the language of democratization in the postwar administration signified the establishment of governments friendly to the USSR. Russia entered the war against Japan as promised in August 1945 and stripped reparations from Germany with considerable enthusiasm. Atomic diplomacy failed to shock the Russians at Potsdam, because their espionage system had already informed Stalin of U.S. progress with the A-bomb, and the Russian program to develop the bomb was well underway.

Postwar cooperation continued to remain unlikely between the East and West, largely because of divergent national interests, rather than because of specific problems encountered at Potsdam. If the conference failed to unite a world left devastated and divided, such may have been beyond the normal range of diplomacy. Potsdam, like the previous 1945 Yalta Conference, soon became a rallying point for national political debates in each country, where opposition groups asserted that their political leaders had been duped by the other signatories of the agreements. As a result, peace treaties ending World War II required decades to resolve, and to this day they remain unsigned between Russia and Japan.

See also Atomic Bomb; Cold War; Espionage; Grand Strategy; Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy; Stalin, Joseph (1878–1953); Truman, Harry S., and National Policy; World War II (1939–1945); Yalta Conference (1945)

POWELL, COLIN (1937–)

Soldier and statesman best known for his role as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (from 1989 to 1993) and as secretary of state in the first administration of President George W. Bush. Following retirement from the United States Army and prior to his public service, Powell served on the board of America Online. He also founded America's Promise, a non-profit organization for children, in 1997.

Colin Luther Powell was born on April 5, 1937, in the Bronx, New York, to Luther and Maud Powell, immigrants to the United States from Jamaica. He attended the City College of New York, where he participated in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) and earned a bachelor's degree in geology in 1958. During his military career, Powell also earned a master's degree in business administration from George Washington University.

MILITARY CAREER

When Second Lieutenant Powell graduated college in 1958, he began a military career that would span 35 years, include two wars, and culminate in his appointment as a four-star general, the highest military rank in the country. As a junior officer, Lieutenant Powell served stateside as well as in Germany and did two one-year tours in Vietnam as a captain and later as a major.

During his first tour in Vietnam, Captain Powell served as an adviser to the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam. Major Powell's second Vietnam tour, as deputy assistant chief of staff of the 23rd Infantry Division, was marred by what some see as an attempt to cover up the My Lai massacre in an investigation of a letter written by a witness to the killings.

Later tours of duty included service as a battalion commander in Korea, study at the prestigious National War College in Washington, DC, and command of the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division. As a brigadier general, Powell served as assistant commander of the 4th Infantry Division. In 1986, Powell returned to Germany as commander of V Corps, a position he held for only five months.

General Powell returned to Washington in 1987 to serve as national security advisor under President Ronald Reagan. Although he played an instrumental role in the Iran-Contra affair, Powell escaped close scrutiny and was subsequently promoted to four-star general and appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1989. It was in this post, which he held until his retirement in 1993, that Powell became a household name for his command of the military during 1991's Operation Desert Storm.

In the months leading up to the 1991 invasion of Iraq, Powell gained a reputation as a dovish, even-headed military leader who rarely advocated use of

force as the first solution to international conflict. In advocating his so-called Powell Doctrine of diplomacy—sanctions and a steady buildup of forces in Kuwait—Powell found himself in opposition to most officials in the administration of President George H. W. Bush. Once Operation Desert Storm began, however, Powell developed a reputation for fierce loyalty in not attempting to undermine a policy he disagreed with after it was implemented.

CIVILIAN CAREER

Following his retirement from the military in September 1993, Powell embarked on a public-speaking career with audiences across the United States and abroad. In 1995, he finished writing his autobiography, *My American Journey,* which soon became a best seller.

The former general was sought after by both the Democratic and Republican parties and eventually declared himself a Republican. Although he was touted as a possible opponent to Bill Clinton in the 1996 presidential election, he declined to run for office and devoted himself to campaigning for Republican candidates.

The following year, Colin Powell founded America's Promise, an organization devoted to building a better future for children through community involvement. Powell encountered controversy again in his career while serving on the board of America Online, a company that merged with Time Warner in 2000. Powell's son, Michael, was the only member of the Federal Communications Commission who urged that the merger be approved without scrutiny. Controversy arose as a result of the alleged conflict of interest.

POST 9/11

Also in 2000, Powell served as foreign-policy adviser on the presidential campaign of then Texas governor George W. Bush, son of his previous commander in chief during Desert Storm. After Bush emerged victorious, few were surprised when Powell was appointed the 65th secretary of state, thereby becoming the highest-placed African American public official in U.S. history.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States thrust Secretary of State Powell onto center stage. Powell was charged with securing the cooperation of foreign nations in the war against terror, and he presented the case against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq to the United Nations Security Council in February 2003. Although successful in gaining the support of numerous allies for regime change in Afghanistan, the United States did not succeed in garnering support for a Security Council Resolution authorizing use of force against Saddam Hussein and his alleged weapons of mass destruction.

Powell's reputation was somewhat tarnished by his role in "selling" the Iraq War of 2003 to the American people and the world, and he chose not to continue as secretary of state after President George W. Bush was reelected in 2004. Since his resignation and return to private life, Powell has begun to offer cautious criticism of some of the foreign-policy decisions of the Bush administration concerning the move toward war with Iraq.

—Daniel P. McDonald

See also Department of State, U.S.; Gulf War (1990–1991); Iraq War of 2003; Joint Chiefs of Staff

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POWER, WORLD

A state whose political, economic, and military influence extends worldwide and affects other states and global dynamics. Throughout history, a number of states have served as what might be considered world powers: the ancient Roman Empire, Spain in the 16th century, and France and Great Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries. After World War II, the two greatest world powers were the Soviet Union and the United States, both of which were considered superpowers because of their strength and influence.

CONTEMPORARY EVOLUTION OF WORLD POWER DYNAMICS

At the time of the American Revolution, the world's major powers were Great Britain and France. Until the turn of the 19th century, the United States generally took an isolationist stance in its foreign policy and global posture. The relatively new nation focused its energies internally, forging westward, building domestic industry, and bolstering and protecting economic markets. However, at the end of the 1800s, a shift in the U.S. global position occurred. The expansion of the U.S. Navy, the annexation of Hawaii, and U.S. engagement in the Spanish-American War transformed the United States into a power on a multipolar world stage.

By the early 20th century, Great Britain and France had been joined on the world stage not only by the United States but also by rapidly industrializing societies in Germany and Japan. However, two world wars within the span of 30 years devastated the traditional European powers and broke the military power of Japan. By the end of World War II, the Soviet Union emerged as a new force in world politics, joining the United States as the only truly global powers. For 45 years after World War II, a delicate and often dangerous bipolar rivalry known as the Cold War persisted between the two superpowers. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 produced today's unipolar system with the United States as the world's sole superpower.

Several factors have combined to put and keep the United States at the top of the global power pyramid. These include military superiority, trade volume and economic strength, and political influence. These sources of power enable, supplement, and advance one another, helping to sustain the preeminent U.S. position in world affairs.

The United States military is the largest and most technologically advanced in the world. In addition, no other state has as many military personnel stationed in as many foreign bases as the United States. Some of the roles performed by the U.S. military abroad include ensuring the security of other states, enforcing bilateral security agreements with other states, training other states' armies and specialized units, protecting U.S. interests internationally, stabilizing areas subject to tenuous and delicate political or military situations, and helping to patrol the borders of states whose own armies require reinforcement.

By virtue of this military superiority, the United States sets the standard for NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) military capabilities. Whereas Western European states are as developed in other sectors as the United States, they typically do not put as much emphasis on armament and military development as does the United States. As the leading military power, then, the United States armed forces set the bar for NATO's military standards. Because NATO is a military alliance whose member states contribute troops to create a collective force, interoperability is essential. Therefore, all members' armies must be mutually standardized to some degree. Before being considered for membership, aspirant states must ensure that their militaries will be able to fit into this fold.

The United States' political heft can be seen in many ways. Two manifestations of its global political influence are its status as a member of the Permanent Five (P5) on the United Nations Security Council and its influential and enormous global diplomatic corps. Both work to extend American influence and power abroad.

The U.S. position among the P5 gives it veto power and thus allows it to maintain control over most significant initiatives undertaken by the United Nations. Because the Security Council dispatches peacekeeping operations, any military undertaking initiated and approved by the United Nations must be approved by the states that have P5 status. This power has many implications, as evidenced by the fact that it essentially paralyzed the Security Council during the Cold War years. That is, most conflicts in the world during the Cold War years were proxy to the larger tensions of the communist–capitalist rivalry and were therefore of interest to the opposing superpowers. As both were members of the P5, both could veto Security Council actions that were contrary to their national interests.

POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY

The place of the United States as a world power has always had implications for its national security. For instance, despite strong isolationist sentiment at home, the United States eventually became involved in both world wars after initial hedging. Although the specific circumstances that drew the United States into each of those wars were different, the fact remains that lesser powers would not find themselves in positions that virtually mandated that they actively join in large global conflicts.

Later, during the Cold War years, the U.S. status as one of two superpowers had obvious implications for its national security. Aside from perpetually being on some degree of nuclear alert, U.S. Cold War superpower status had the direct result of forcing the United States' involvement in military engagements it otherwise never would have entered. Both the Korean and Vietnam wars were conflicts that the United States entered for the purpose of balancing Soviet global influence.

The conclusion of the Cold War left the United States as the sole superpower in a world that saw many regions suddenly subjected to security vacuums. Although it spread instability in some ways, the Cold War also suppressed many conflicts that simmered under the surface of American or Soviet control. When the influence of the superpowers was lifted or withdrawn, many states were suddenly left with regional, ethnic, and national conflicts previously obscured by the ideological cover provided by the Cold War. This change made the 1990s a tumultuous decade.

One example of such conflict was the series of wars in the Balkans resulting from the breakup of the former communist state of Yugoslavia. Cobbled together after World War I from several countries of varied ethnicity, Yugoslavia had always been torn by internal rivalries. Its post–World War II communist leader Josip Tito, used force to keep a lid on these tensions for decades. With the demise of communism in Eastern Europe, several Yugoslavian provinces declared independence. Some of these new states saw rival ethnic groups renew old hatreds; others were the targets of attempts by the Yugoslav government to prevent secession. Conflict raged for several years before Western powers, led by the United States, intervened militarily under the auspices of NATO.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, DC, redefined the U.S. role as a world power. By subsequently declaring itself the leader in the war against terror, the United States has essentially committed to a global military presence for an indeterminable period. Given the amorphous and decentralized nature of terrorist organizations, the United States may itself wage this war for a very long time.

American troops are currently engaged in counterterrorism-related missions in Afghanistan, several Southeast Asian states, the Caucasus, and central Europe. In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, foreign terrorists have established a presence on Iraqi soil, adding another major front to the war on terrorism. This war has additional implications for U.S. national security, in that the threat to domestic soil is more tangible and realistic since the attacks of September 11. Critics of America's aggressive campaign against terror in other global regions argue that it will reinvigorate those seeking to attack the United States and that it will increase the threat to Americans both on U.S. soil and internationally.

See also Balance of Power; Bipolarity; Cold War; Communism and National Security; Great Power Rivalry; Hegemony; Hyperpower; Multipolarity; New World Order; Realpolitik; Superpower; Terrorism, War on International

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PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS

Explosive devices delivered to their targets by the use of highly accurate electronic guidance devices. Precision-guided munitions are called *smart bombs,* whereas normal bombs that rely solely on gravity to reach their targets are referred to as *dumb bombs.*

Precision-guided munitions have several advantages over conventional dumb bombs. A smart bomb's high degree of accuracy means that an attacker virtually can be assured of hitting the target. It also means that one needs fewer weapons to take out critical targets. Also, because of its accuracy, a smart bomb can carry a smaller explosive charge than dumb bombs.

Much of the damage done by conventional bombs results from the combined force of near misses and impacts on noncritical areas of a target. Thus, dumb bombs must contain large explosive charges to do significant damage. A single smart bomb with a smaller charge, precisely placed at the weakest point of a building or right on top of a bunker, can be much more effective than many more powerful dumb bombs dropped on the same target.

Another advantage of smart bombs is that they produce a limited amount of collateral damage—that is, damage that affects nearby nontargeted areas. When dumb bombs are dropped, a certain percentage will miss their target entirely and fall in surrounding areas, producing collateral damage. Smart bombs, with their greater accuracy and smaller explosive charge, reduce both the chances and the severity of such damage. However, in the event that its guidance system malfunctions, a smart bomb is much more unpredictable than a dumb bomb. Conventional bombs that miss their targets will still fall in the general area; a malfunctioning smart bomb is likely to fall many miles from its intended target with no way to predict where it will land.

Three types of guidance devices control most precision-guided munitions: television, laser, and satellite. Television-guided weapons were first developed during the Korean War and later perfected in the 1960s. The *fire-and-forget* camera bomb features a television camera that transmits an image back to the aircraft that drops it. The bomb itself is equipped with steering fins controlled remotely by the pilot or copilot of the aircraft, who uses a joystick to direct the bomb to its target. The U.S. Air Force made extensive use of television-guided weapons in the latter stages of the Vietnam War because of public criticism of collateral damage from U.S. bombing.

The U.S. Air Force developed the first laser-guided bomb in 1968. However, these weapons did not enter common use until the invention of the microchip in the 1970s made their guidance devices significantly smaller. A laser bomb is guided by a laser beam that "paints" (illuminates) its target. The laser that produces the beam (called the *target designator)* is mounted either on an aircraft or at a ground site of some type and is aimed by a remote operator. Sensors on the bomb detect the "painting" on the target and direct the bomb to that spot. One weakness of laser-guided bombs is that that they are limited to targets in range of friendly target designators. In addition, they cannot function in weather conditions that obscure the sensors' ability to see the "paint."

A satellite-guided weapon receives signals from orbiting satellites that direct it to its target. These satellites are part of the Global Positioning System (GPS), which circles the earth and provides extremely accurate data about the location of specific points on the ground. When a target is identified, its location is fed into computers aboard GPS satellites. The satellites then locate the point identified as the target and send a signal that guides the bomb directly to that spot. Satellite-guided weapons operate in all conditions and require no remote operator to guide them once released.

Satellite weapons have two main drawbacks. First, it is possible to jam a GPS signal. To address this problem, every satellite-guided bomb stores a map of the target location in its computer memory. In case it loses the GPS signal, the bomb relies on this inertial navigation. However, active GPS guidance is much more accurate than inertial navigation. The second drawback is that the guidance is only as good as the information provided to the satellites. It is up to military intelligence to provide accurate information beforehand about the location of targets.

In recent years, as at the end of the Vietnam War, U.S. military actions in the Middle East have been tempered by concerns about the political consequences of collateral damage. These fears contributed to the widespread use of smart bombs in the Gulf War of 1991 and the Iraq War of 2003. In each case, the U.S. military claimed that the use of precision-guided weapons significantly reduced the amount of suffering among Iraqi citizens. Critics, however, maintain that many of the so-called precision munitions missed their targets and caused extensive collateral damage.

See also Cruise Missile; Science, Technology, and Security; Smart Bomb

PREEMPTION

Use of force by one state against another to prevent a potential attack or counter a perceived threat. The accepted norms of international relations give states the right to defend themselves when attacked. However, a state that faces an imminent threat to its security is not required to wait for an aggressor to strike before taking action. Preemption thus becomes an extension of the right of self-defense, but only if unprovoked aggression is imminent.

Arguably, Israel's strike against the Egyptian air force that began the 1967 Six-Day War was justifiably preemptive. Israel had reason to fear that the Egyptians were planning to attack, making its strike a necessary act of self-defense. The Israeli bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981, however, is not considered preemptive, because the reactor was under construction and did not present an immediate threat.

Preemption has developed into a foreign policy under U.S. president George W. Bush. He first alluded to preemptive action in an address at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point on June 1, 2002. In that address, Bush asserted that the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment were outdated and ineffective in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. He stated, "If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge." Bush described an altered international sphere where threats had to be eliminated before given a chance to effectively form and threaten nonaggressors.

The 2003 National Security Strategy of the United States stated, "We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends." The document outlined a preemptive strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction, a threat the president argued must be defended against before it is unleashed. In the report, the president asserted that the United States would act preemptively if it deemed a perceived threat to be imminent.

The Bush administration applied this doctrine of preemption to Iraq in its argument for deposing Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. The administration alleged that Saddam had amassed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and that he was developing a nuclear weapons program. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell presented a case for disarming Saddam Hussein

before the UN Security Council in February of 2003. Powell maintained that Saddam's past history of aggression indicated that the Iraqi leader was willing to use WMD to achieve his goals. The secretary of state characterized Iraq as an immediate threat to its neighbors and to the United States.

The announced policy of preemption was widely criticized, both in the United States and abroad. Many Americans were uncomfortable with the idea of the United States starting a war before it was attacked. The notion seemed at odds with the country's principle of mutual respect for the sovereignty of nations. To many Americans, the idea of preemption was disturbingly reminiscent of the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, which brought the United States into World War II. That event became a metaphor for treachery for many Americans, who were concerned that the United States was now adopting something disturbingly similar as national policy. Some critics have also voiced the fear that the administration's aggressive policies may result in increased terrorist attacks against Americans.

Critics of preemption became more vocal in the wake of the Iraq War of 2003, when U.S. forces failed to find any evidence of either WMD or nuclear-weapons facilities in Iraq. This pointed out one of the great dangers of preemption—the possibility that the supposed target state is not actually being targeted. Many experts now believe that Iraq ended its WMD programs and destroyed any WMD stockpiles after the Gulf War of 1991. They think that Saddam continued to pretend to possess such weapons in order to maintain his image as a powerful and dangerous force in the region.

The failure of U.S. intelligence to determine the true state of affairs in Iraq led to an attack that arguably could not be considered truly preemptive. This danger continues to exist with regard to states such as Iran, which the Bush administration listed among the so-called Axis of Evil, along with North Korea and Iraq. Iran's nuclear capabilities are unclear, and it resists international inspection of its nuclear program. Since the invasion of Iraq, there has been much speculation about a preemptive U.S. strike against Iran. As of early 2005, the Bush administration denied having any immediate intention to attack Iran. However, it also refused to rule out the possibility of action to compel Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions.

See also Bush Doctrine; Bush, George W., and National Policy; Containment and the Truman Doctrine; Deterrence; Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Iraq War of 2003; Preemptive Force; Preemptive War Doctrine; Saddam Hussein; Terrorism, War on International

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PREEMPTIVE FORCE

Emergency measure taken with the aim of preventing an imminent, and otherwise unavoidable, attack. The idea of preemptive force is usually employed in a military context, whereby a state claims its right to launch an offensive on a potential enemy *before* that enemy has had the chance to actually implement a plan of attack. The advantage of preemptive strike is rather obvious; by being the first to act decisively, one renders the enemy unable to carry out aggressive intentions. There are also several disadvantages, however, to this strategy. For one, the threatened state might be wrong in its assessment of the threat and launch an unwarranted destructive attack. Second, the use of a preemptive force by one state might set a precedent that would lead to widespread abuse of the preemptive option.

BASIC CONDITIONS

Although scholars and politicians sharply disagree on the ultimate legitimacy of the use of preemptive force, most do tend to agree on several fundamental prerequisites for a specific attack to even be conceived as a potentially justifiable preemptive strike. First, the attack has to come as a reaction to a perceived threat that is both absolutely credible and immediate. Second, the state that reacts to the threat needs to be sure that a preemptive attack is the only effective way to defend itself. Third, the preemptive action needs to be proportionate in scope and potential for destruction with the perceived threat.

One problem, however, is the ambiguous concepts on which these three conditions rest. How credible is credible enough? What does *immediate* mean? What are the measurements by which one assesses the

potential for destruction of an event that has not yet taken place?

INTERPRETING THE UN CHARTER

Article 51 of the UN Charter is widely perceived as being extremely relevant to the question of preemption, as it explicitly protects "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations."

Opponents of the strategy of preemption argue that the article clearly conditions a defensive action on the previous occurrence of an attack, not on the perception of the possibility for an attack. Supporters of the strategy, however, point out that Article 51 does not use the phrase "if and only if an armed attack occurs," therefore leaving the door open for other instances when preemptive force can be used legitimately.

In 2002, President George W. Bush presented the American people with a new National Security Strategy. According to it, the rise of terrorism and the increase in the availability of weapons of mass destruction have changed the international climate to such an extent that the United States now reserves the right to launch a preemptive attack on an enemy "even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack." That right was invoked most recently in the Iraq War of 2003, and it remains a highly controversial concept.

See also Declarations of War; First Strike; Interventionism; Terrorism, War on International

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PREEMPTIVE WAR DOCTRINE

Policy that proposes waging war in an attempt to avoid an imminent attack or to gain a strategic advantage over an impending threat. The main aim of a preemptive attack is to gain the advantage of initiative by using military force before the opponent does. A typical example of a preemptive strike is an attack against enemy troops massed at a state's border ready to invade.

The *Dictionary of Military Terms,* the official dictionary of the U.S. Department of Defense, defines *preemption* as "an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent." It defines *prevention* in different terms. A preventive war is "initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk." This apparently was the logic that led to the war in Iraq in 2003.

There are several examples of preemptive attacks throughout the history of warfare. In 1587, English privateer Sir Francis Drake, under the order of Queen Elizabeth I, launched a preemptive attack to destroy the Spanish armada of King Philip II of Spain while it was still anchored in the Spanish port of Cádiz. Prussia's invasion of Saxony and Bohemia in 1756 as Austrian, Russian, and French troops were plotting to attack is also considered a preemptive strike. Preemption was also a strong motive behind the rush to war by Germany, Russia, and France at the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the Chinese intervention in Korea in 1951, and the Israeli strike against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan's forces that were gathering on Israel's borders in 1967.

Preemptive war is often confused with preventive war, and, in fact, a thin line divides the two. Academics define the difference between preemption and prevention solely in terms of time frame. Scholar Robert Jervis, for example, in the November/December 2002 issue of *Foreign Policy,* defined preemption as "an attack against an adversary that is about to strike," whereas preventive attack "is a move to prevent a threat from fully emerging." Although preventive attack is generally considered to violate international law and to fall short of the requirements of a just war, preemptive war is usually thought to be more acceptable.

Specifically, a preemptive attack is believed to be justifiable if it meets the criteria that Secretary of State Daniel Webster spelled out in 1837. According to his strict conditions, a threat must be "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means or no moment of deliberation" for this type of attack to be permissible.

In contrast, the U.S. National Security Strategy document issued in September 2002 argued that the conditions that justify military preemption must be revised. According to this document, the old standard in international law that states can legally order preemptive

strikes only when faced with an imminent threat is too restrictive. Instead, it argues that the anticipatory action is justified even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack, because the possibility of a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction makes the risk of waiting too high.

Before President George W. Bush's National Security Strategy of 2002, the United States had not engaged in a preemptive military attack. The nation had not attacked another country prior to being attacked itself or before U.S citizens were attacked—with one exception. The Spanish-American War represents the sole instance, when the United States initiated hostilities against Spain in 1898 in order to compel that nation to grant Cuba independence. Some have argued that the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 also had elements of preemption, but it did not actually include a preemptive military attack by the United States.

The 2002 national security document states that the United States will exercise the right to act preemptively in the event of deadly challenges to its people or to allies emerging from rogue states or terrorist groups. The document states that, "Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer rely solely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option."

Although to some observers this so-called Bush Doctrine calls for preventive rather than preemptive attacks, the final result does not change: The United States will act against emerging threats before they are fully formed. According to this approach, an adversary that cannot be deterred and whose attacks cannot be defended against must be stopped before it gains the capability to do harm. This is how President Bush defined preemption, which is considered the only way to be proactive in the face of two new serious threats—terrorism and rogue states.

See also Bush, George W., and National Policy; Preventive War; Terrorism, War on International

PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT

Military material that is stored in forward bases or forward-deployed ships and is available for immediate use in a theater of operations. The concept of prepositioning equipment makes preparing for a conflict situation much easier and faster because only troops and limited amounts of equipment must be flown in. During the Cold War, the U.S. rivalry with the Soviet Union created a need to respond to Soviet military challenges, particularly in Europe and the Middle East. At this time, most prepositioned U.S. equipment was stationed at land bases in Europe.

During the 1980s, the army recognized that their existing prepositioning strategy did not provide sufficient flexibility to meet challenges in places far from U.S. land bases. At this time, the military greatly expanded the seaborne prepositioning of equipment. During the Iraq War of 2003, the Army and Marines were helped immensely by the existence of ship-based prepositioned equipment, including most of the combat equipment used to fight the war. Congressional testimony later on, however, revealed some problems with older equipment and a lack of some supplies—problems that were overcome largely because of a long lag period between the movement of troops and the launching of the war.

The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union led to changes in U.S. prepositioning strategy. Troop reductions occasioned by the end of the Cold War have forced the Department of Defense to rely even more heavily on prepositioned equipment. Much equipment remains in Europe, but many items have been moved to potential trouble spots in the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, Korea, and the Pacific. As the military continues to transform and to adapt more mobile and technologically advanced models of warfare, planners will also need to consider changes in the use of prepositioned equipment in favor of less expensive and more effective options.

See also Forward Basing

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVES (PDDs)

Issued by the president of the United States, types of executive orders for which different presidents have used a variety of names. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations issued National Security Council policy papers, which made policy recommendations on various topics pertaining to U.S. security. A less formal

system was initiated by the Kennedy administration, and both John F. Kennedy and his successor Lyndon B. Johnson referred to them as National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs).

Later, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford called them National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs), and the system put in place by the Nixon administration served as the model for the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations, as well. This system functioned according to the issuance of two series of documents: study directives and decision directives. Study directives were commissioned by the National Security Council or other government agencies to carry out studies to produce data to be used in decision making. Decision directives served the purpose of stating the decision made on the basis of the study directives, and allocated tasks to specific agencies for implementation.

Jimmy Carter used the name Presidential Directives (PDs), and Ronald Reagan called them National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs). President George H. W. Bush called them National Security Directives (NSDs), and Bill Clinton used the title Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs). George W. Bush uses the term National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs). The Presidential Decision Directives are issued with the advice and consent of the National Security Council, and because they pertain to vital areas of national security, they are often classified.

Different administrations have relied to greater and lesser degrees on Presidential Decision Directives for formulating national-security policy. The Carter and George H. W. Bush administrations produced a relatively small number (63 and 79, respectively), at a rate of 16 to 20 per year, in contrast to the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan administrations, which produced more than 40 per year.

Although Presidential Decision Directives do not account for all aspects of executive policy, they do provide a timeline of the major issues dealt with by various administrations. For example, National Security Action Memorandum No. 271, issued by the Kennedy administration, referred to "Cooperation with the USSR on Outer Space Matters." Later, National Security Study Directive 5-83, issued by the Reagan administration, was concerned with the development by NASA of a permanently manned space station. Presidential Review Directive NSTC-3, "Global Positioning System Policy Review," issued by the Clinton administration, paved the way for commercial and civilian use of the Global Positioning System (GPS).

The subject and uses of Presidential Decision Directives thus change and evolve in response to current events. Presidential Directive NSC-63, issued by the Carter administration, on the Persian Gulf security framework, was a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War. The purpose was to account for the numerical superiority of Soviet forces in the region by making the Soviet Union aware that it would face economic and diplomatic sanctions if it intervened. Moreover, it declared: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

In the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks, President George W. Bush initiated the use of Homeland Security Directives, to be issued by the president of the United States in concert with the Homeland Security Council, which was in itself created by the first directive. The next Presidential Decision Directive issued by the Bush administration altered immigration policies in response to the war on terrorism.

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PREVENTIVE DEFENSE STRATEGY

Post–Cold War guide to national-security strategy that emphasizes the absence of a major, traditional military threat on the scale of the Soviet Union and seeks to prevent similar threats from emerging in the future. Articulated in the late 1990s by former Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Ashton B. Carter. Although preventive defense is defined as a broad politico-military strategy that draws on political, economic, and military instruments, the role of the Defense Department, and of contacts between military establishments, is central.

Preventive defense acknowledges the post–Cold War status of the United States as the dominant military force in the world and stresses the need for American foresight and vision in planning for the prevention of future threats to national security. To fulfill its mission, preventive defense focuses on nurturing cooperative security relationships with Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union, engaging a rising China, reducing and safeguarding nuclear arsenals, and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Preventive defense stresses prevention over the Cold War objectives of containment and deterrence, and argues for maintaining an important peacetime military establishment and diplomatic engagement.

According to Perry and Carter, preventive defense strategy hierarchically outlines different types of threats to U.S. national security. The A-list threats are described as imminent military threats, on the scale of the former Soviet Union, that could threaten the survival of the United States. Preventive defense strategy recognizes five dangers that, if ignored and mismanaged, have the potential to become A-list threats: a chaotic, unstable, and potentially aggressive Russia; loosening of control over nuclear arsenals by Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union resulting in nuclear proliferation among rogue states and terrorists (*loose nukes*); an emerging and potentially adversarial China; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and "catastrophic" terrorism.

Threats to U.S. interests, but not necessarily to American survival, constitute a B-list of dangers and include contingencies such as the Persian Gulf and North Korea. The C-list of threats is defined as important contingencies that indirectly affect U.S. national security but that do not directly threaten U.S. interests. These third-tier threats include conflicts such as those in Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. Preventive defense calls for continuing to maintain a strong military to deal with these important B- and C-level threats while focusing mainly on A-level dangers.

Preventive defense strategy is based on strong interpersonal relationships between political and military leaders and makes use of a nongovernmental *track-two* dialogue to promote international cooperation and security partnerships. Track-two dialogue includes efforts to influence public opinion among the civilian populations of countries in conflict so that political leaders can more easily make compromises. Military-to-military contacts, in the form of joint training and exercises, confidence-building measures, and consultations, are central to the preventive defense strategy. According to Carter and Perry, in their book *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America,* defense cooperation with the Russian, Chinese, and European militaries through military-to-military relationships can lessen their propensity to threaten U.S. national interests. Carter and Perry also maintain that military-to-military links can help resolve difficult diplomatic and political issues. A main mechanism for engaging Russia according to preventive defense strategy is the complete and unfettered implementation of the military provisions of both the Partnership for Peace and the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The centrality of the Defense Department in the formulation and implementation of such broad security policies, and the "defense diplomacy" advocated by preventive defense, raises the issue of civil–military relations.

Preventive defense strategy argues that in the post–Cold War world, the United States cannot afford to elaborate a defense strategy based on B- and C-level threats. Major regional contingencies around which defense planning is centered—specifically, conflicts in Iraq and North Korea—do not constitute grave dangers to U.S. survival. Preventive defense stresses programs designed for shaping the environment and hedging for the long term against the failure of its initiatives. It seeks to maintain force structure and readiness for potential regional conflicts but stresses investing in preventive programs that engage Russia and China and that guard against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and asymmetrical threats to U.S. power and survival.

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PREVENTIVE WAR

Attacking an enemy now in order to avoid the risk of war under worsening circumstances later. A preventive war occurs when a state attacks another and claims preventive self-defense.

Preventive war and preemptive war differ in the certainty of an attack. Whereas a preemptive war concerns

an imminent attack, preventive war takes place with no military provocation. States generally justify preventive war by claiming that the enemy may attack in the future. Therefore, a preventive strike is necessary in order to prevent a worse outcome in the future. For example, Israel launched a preventive strike against the Iraqi Osirak nuclear facility in 1981 in an attempt to prevent Iraq from developing a nuclear capability and threatening Israel at some future date. Additionally, during the Cold War, U.S. officials contemplated attacking the USSR and China before they could develop strong nuclear capabilities.

Although the U.S. National Security Strategy issued by President George W. Bush in September 2002 discussed preemptive attack, it in fact proposed a preventive doctrine. The definition of preemptive action in the document was quite broad. In the letter accompanying the document, President Bush wrote that the United States must be ready to wage war against emerging threats before they are fully formed. Terrorists and rogue states with weapons of mass destruction cannot be contained by deterrence. Because terrorists are fanatics and rogue states are willing to take what would normally be considered unacceptable risks, deterrence that is based on rational reactions does not work. Defense also may not be possible, as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks proved. Thus, the United States must be ready to strike first.

Preventive war represents an alternative to deterrence. If a country has no confidence in deterring an adversary with its military or diplomatic might, preventive war becomes the least bad option. Harvard professor Graham Allison was quoted by David Sanger in the *New York Times* in 2002, describing the logic of preventive war: "I may some day have a war with you, and right now I'm strong and you're not. So I'm going to have the war now." In fact, preventive wars typically are initiated by dominant powers. In 1912 the chief of staff of the German army, Helmut von Moltke, opposed a diplomatic solution to the Balkan crisis because he believed that Germany still had a military advantage over France and also over Russia, which was rapidly modernizing its army and could pose a future threat to Germany.

This logic is similar to the rationale behind the 2003 U.S. attack on Iraq. The Bush administration claimed that the reconstituted Iraqi nuclear program would have threatened U.S. interests in the Middle East and that Iraq would eventually attack U.S. territory. The United States also claimed that Iraq was ready to use biological and chemical weapons. On the basis of these impending threats, the United States attacked Iraq as a preemptive strike in March 2003. Following the overthrow of dictator Saddam Hussein's regime, evidence showed that the Iraqi threat was less immediate than the Bush administration had claimed. However, President Bush later maintained that the war in Iraq was justified on the grounds that Saddam Hussein might have someday been able to develop nuclear weapons. Based on this justification, the invasion would constitute a preventive war. Preventive wars are based on long-term calculations about power relations and are attractive to countries that are in a dominant position and seek to stop a rising adversary.

Critics argue that preventive wars are rarely necessary, because deterrence can be effective. Moreover, many threats are often exaggerated. German chancellor Otto von Bismarck called preventive wars "suicide for fear of death." Although the disparity of power between the United States and its enemies means that death is probably no longer a likely outcome, the argument for preventive war still faces some major challenges. First of all, preventive war is based on information about the future threats that sometimes might not be accurate. As the case of Iraq showed, Saddam Hussein's program to develop weapons of mass destruction had been overestimated. Second, motives for preventive war involve predictions about threats that have still to materialize. No one knows how a state, which may be perceived as a threat today, will act tomorrow. Libya, for example, once a leading rogue state, is no longer viewed as a threat. Fortunately, leaders are aware of these limitations and generally are hesitant to resort to the preventive use of force.

See also Bush, George W., and National Policy; Preemption; Preemptive War Doctrine; Terrorism, War on International

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PRISONER OF WAR (POW)

In an armed conflict, a participant who is captured and held by an enemy. The United States uses the term

prisoner of war (POW) to refer only to its own soldiers, or soldiers of its allies, who are captured by an enemy. Prisoners of war taken by the United States are referred to as *enemy prisoners of war* (EPW).

Soldiers are the individuals most likely to become prisoners of war, although the third Geneva Convention does define other categories entitled to POW status. These include members of other militias and other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements who are commanded by someone responsible for their subordinates. In order to be eligible for protection under the Geneva Conventions, such individuals must be represented by a sign, symbol, or insignia; carry arms openly; and conduct their operations according to the laws of war.

United States Marines assigned to the Third Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion lead rescued U.S. prisoners of war (POWs) off a Marine Corps KC-130 Hercules cargo aircraft in April 2003. The flight transported the POWs from an airfield near Baghdad to Kuwait following U.S. military actions in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the war that deposed Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Every major conflict in history has had prisoners of war, many of whom were not fortunate enough to be rescued.

Source: U.S. Navy.

Other individuals who receive POW status include members of armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or authority, even if that authority is not recognized by the power that captures them. Those who take up arms spontaneously to resist invading forces and who obey the laws of war, even if they have not organized themselves into regular army units, also receive POW status. Unarmed noncombatants captured during a conflict are covered by the fourth Geneva Convention.

The POW issue has taken on different dimensions in different conflicts. Treatment of POWs became more significant in the aftermath of World War II, when the Nazi death camps were opened up in central Europe. The brutal treatment by the Nazis toward enemy combatants and their slaughter of more than 6 million Jews and members of other groups formed the critical part of the prosecution's case at the Nuremberg war trials. Horrific medical experiments carried out on human subjects, gassing, forced labor, and complete disregard for sanitation set a new standard of inhumanity.

The fact that Nazi atrocities had occurred despite Red Cross inspections raised questions about the ability to assure the humane treatment of prisoners. The Nazis, however, were selective in what they showed to the inspectors. In addition, the Red Cross has pointed out in its own defense that its primary goal was maintaining access to the camps. They argued that far more people might have suffered if the camps had been closed completely.

A significant number of veterans from the Korean War and the Vietnam War believe that the U.S. government has not done everything it should to account for those taken prisoner and those whose status is missing in action (MIA). This issue is particularly central to the Vietnam conflict, where certain groups have even gone so far as to accuse the government of covering up evidence of remaining prisoners. The POW/MIA issue has had a recurrent impact on popular culture, where movies, books, and other media feed an appetite for conspiracy theories and rescue scenarios. One school of critical thought suggests that these narratives are manifestations of the fact that the

United States was forced to retreat from Vietnam. These critics say the stories serve the purpose of portraying an alternative type of victory, or re-fighting the war with a revised outcome.

Questions concerning the meaning and definition of POW status have become particularly pertinent in the context of the war on terror declared by President George W. Bush following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, DC. A number of individuals taken into custody by the United States military during the war in Afghanistan were not granted POW status by the U.S. government. These prisoners are held in a special detention facility at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.

The Bush administration argues that because this base is not on U.S. territory, the detainees are not subject to U.S. laws regarding the treatment of POWs. In addition, the administration asserts that the prisoners' status as suspected terrorists exempts them from the conditions of the Geneva Conventions. This policy has drawn great criticism, particularly in light of revelations about the abuse of prisoners held by the U.S. military in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Photographs became public of soldiers subjecting prisoners to humiliation and inhumane conditions; the fact that these activities took place in one of Saddam Hussein's former prisons had a galvanizing effect on world opinion.

See also Afghanistan, War in; Geneva Conventions; Legal Ramifications of National Security; Terrorism, War on International

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PRISONER'S DILEMMA

A game concept that analyzes the losses and gains from conflict and cooperation between any two or more players, people, or other variables in a given situation. The word *game* is used here as a scientific metaphor for a much wider range of human interactions in which the outcomes depend on the interactive strategies of two or more persons who have opposing, or at best mixed, motives. Thus, the concept borrows mainly from political science and from game theory— a distinct and interdisciplinary approach to the study of human behavior founded and first written about by the mathematician John von Neumann in 1928.

HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT

The concept of *prisoner's dilemma* is a product of the Cold War. In 1950, scholars Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher at the RAND Corporation were grappling with the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. They posed a hypothetical situation in which two partners in crime are caught by the police, who do not have sufficient proof to convict them. Each individual is thus presented with a matrix of options.

In this matrix, if both prisoners cooperate by not saying anything, they are both rewarded at an equal, intermediate level because of insufficient proof. If only one prisoner defects, he receives the highest level of payoff by going free, while the other player faces the most unfavorable outcome of many years in prison. Finally, if both prisoners defect, each receives an intermediate, rather than maximum penalty, due to the in-built *confession dividend* in the matrix that they both receive. Thus, defection is seen as the best option for either player. The dilemma resides in the fact that each prisoner has a choice between only two options, but neither individual can make a good decision without knowing what the other one will do. The concept thus presents a curious struggle between individual and collective interests.

The concept assumes that the synergistic effect of cooperation will be smaller than the gains made from defection. Many people have argued that this assumption is not valid in many real-life situations, in which the absolute benefits from synergetic cooperation outweigh gains from noncooperation for any single party involved. The assumption, however, becomes more realistic if it takes into account that the synergy takes some time to get realized. In short-term decision making, which is the context in which prisoner's dilemma was initially studied, the actors supposedly do not have any specific expectations about future interactions or collaborations.

In the 1950s and 1960s, several studies of the prisoner's dilemma were performed in which two players acted out a prisoner's-dilemma-type situation repeatedly. Researchers seemed to explore all elements of

the dilemma during this period, but a clear strategy did not emerge. As a result, by the 1970s, the prisoner's dilemma fell out of favor among researchers.

However, the question of when to be nice and when to defect was important considering that many business decisions fall into the category of prisoner's dilemma and a great deal of money would be at stake. In search of this elusive strategy, in the early 1980s, the political scientist Robert Axelrod organized a series of computer tournaments. The simplest strategy submitted, "TIT for TAT," won in two successive computer tournaments and basically illustrated that one should cooperate while confronting an opponent on the first round and for the following rounds simply do what the other player did in the round before.

After further analysis, Axelrod finally came up with four maxims to choose an effective strategy. These included not being the first to double-cross; defending yourself but being forgiving; not being envious (if someone has more than you, not getting provoked into a double-cross action); and being clear (making sure that the opponent understands the consequences of his or her actions). Axelrod wrote about this strategy and the prisoner's dilemma in his groundbreaking 1984 book *The Evolution of Cooperation.*

PRINCIPLE OF SUBOPTIMIZATION AND TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS

In rational decision making, a person makes a decision that is best for him or her, whatever another individual chooses. Thus, in the prisoner's-dilemma framework, it follows that if both decision makers were purely rational then they would never cooperate. The paradox, however, emerges because if both actors are rational, then both will decide to defect and neither of them will gain anything. However, if both irrationally decide to cooperate, both will gain something. This seeming paradox can be formulated more explicitly through what is known as the *principle of suboptimization.*

The principle of suboptimization states that trying to maximize the gains of one person in a group, in general, does not necessarily lead to global optimization or gains for the group as a whole. This is because there is also interaction between the decision challenges of each of the subsystems or people in the group, and the combination of the optimal decisions for each person will be different from the optimal decision for the global problem or the group as a whole. The concept derives from the more basic systemic

principle that maintains that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. The problem of suboptimization underlies most of the problems appearing in evolutionary ethics, which tries to achieve the utilitarian aim of greatest good for the greatest number.

Another, more dramatic implication of the problem of suboptimization is what bioethicist Garrett Hardin called *the tragedy of the commons.* The phrase emphasizes the inherent friction between finite resources and the pressure put on them by the potential gain for one or a few by following an economically rational but selfish mode that assures maximum possible benefit (in the short run) by overutilizing or monopolizing the use of the common resource, eventually leading to its total exhaustion.

RELEVANCE IN GEOPOLITICS

When Axelrod's book, *The Evolution of Cooperation,* first appeared in 1984, it was seemingly read largely as a manual for dealing with the arms race, which at the time was very much on the minds of leading military strategists and makers of foreign policy. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union each adopted double-crossing strategies and built up large stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Fortunately, this game of prisoner's dilemma never reached the final round, although there were many moments that came to the brink. More recently, Axelrod's book and the concept of prisoner's dilemma have been rediscovered by individuals interested in emergence, social software, and other such areas.

See also Arms Control; Arms Race

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REFLECTIONS

No Solution

At the end of a 1964 article on the future of nuclear war, J. B. Wiesner and H. F. York concluded that

Both sides in the arms race are confronted by the dilemma of steadily increasing military power and steadily decreasing national security. *It is our considered professional judgment that this dilemma has no*

technical solution. If the great powers continue to look for solutions in the area of science and technology only, the result will be to worsen the situation.

PRIVACY ACT

Passed in 1974, legislation that restricts the dissemination of personal information by federal agencies and requires that when information is collected, the individual be told of the ways in which the information could be used. The Privacy Act was passed in the wake of the abuse of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) records by the administration of President Richard Nixon. The act created checks on the transfer of personal information between agencies. The law provided for 12 exceptions, including one that permits law-enforcement agencies to obtain records without a subpoena and another that allows federal agencies to share any information for routine uses after publishing in the Federal Registry a statement of their intent to release such information.

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a companion to the Privacy Act passed in 2000, allows individuals the right to see the contents of files maintained about them by federal executive branch agencies, such as the FBI, the State and Defense departments, and the IRS. Files maintained by Congress, the judicial system, and state governments are not covered by this law, although many states and courts have similar access rules for their files.

Critics of the Privacy Act claim that the law is out-of-date and does not allow for modern information-sharing technologies. In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, there have been calls to reduce access to public information, citing the use of FOIA requests by people with links to terrorist groups to obtain blueprints for public buildings and power plants, and other sensitive data.

See also Freedom of Information Act (1967); Nixon, Richard, and National Policy; Pentagon Papers; Privacy Rights

PRIVACY RIGHTS

The right to be left alone without unwarranted intrusion by government, media, or other institutions or individuals. Although the Bill of Rights and the U.S. Constitution guarantee the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, it was not until the 1965 U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Griswold v. Connecticut*—which overturned a state law making the sale and use of contraceptives a criminal offense—that a modern privacy doctrine emerged. The extent of the right to privacy and its basis in constitutional law remain contested despite the fact that all recently confirmed U.S. Supreme Court justices have affirmed their belief in that right.

The right to privacy is a relatively new constitutional issue. With the exception of *Meyer v. Nebraska* (1923)—a court case that voided a state law prohibiting teaching of foreign languages in elementary schools—the major privacy cases have been decided in the last 40 years. These cases concern sexual activity, marital and family rights, abortion, and the right to die. More recently, of course, they involve issues pertaining to national security.

For example, in one of the most controversial decisions in the history of the nation, *Roe v. Wade* (1973), the Supreme Court voided state laws that made most abortions criminal offenses, on the grounds that such laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment, which some jurists have interpreted as protecting the right to privacy. The right to privacy concerning sexual matters in *Griswold* was cited as a precedent in the decision in *Roe v. Wade.*

Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in *Roe v. Wade* that the Fourteenth Amendment included the qualified right to terminate a pregnancy in the first trimester, at the judgment of the woman and her physician. In the second and third trimesters, the states were given some latitude in regulating abortions to protect the life and health of the woman. Despite upholding the woman's right to privacy in having an abortion, the high court gave the states the ability to supersede that right later in the pregnancy, to sustain the state's right to protect health. Thus, the right to privacy in this case is defined but not absolute.

Modern technology has made credit, medical, and other data readily available and extremely marketable commodities, raising new issues and concerns about the individual's right to privacy. The recently created Do Not Call registries are designed to protect the individual's right to privacy from intrusive telemarketers. However, businesses argue that the registries are an unfair limitation on their right to commerce.

See also Freedom of Information Act (1967); Nixon, Richard, and National Policy; Pentagon Papers; Privacy Act

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PRIVATIZATION

The economic process of transferring property from public ownership to private ownership, sometimes called *denationalization.* Privatization is the process by which economic activity (the production of goods or services) is removed from the government sector of the economy and placed in the private sector. The reasoning behind privatization is that the market environment of the private sector will force business enterprises to respond to market signals and stimuli and become more efficient.

Privatization is frequently associated with industrial or service-oriented enterprises, such as mining, manufacturing, or power generation, but it can also apply to utilities, such as land, roads, energy providers, telecommunications, or rights to water. In recent years, government services such as health, sanitation, prison facilities, and education have also been targeted for privatization in many countries, including the United States.

According to proponents of privatization, in addition to making enterprises more efficient, privatization policies help to establish a free market as well as foster capitalist competition. The absence of competition, critics of state ownership argue, puts management of state-owned firms under no pressure to produce goods and services that consumers demand and to provide them at lower cost. Moreover, state companies often supply their products and services without direct charges to consumers. Therefore, even if they want to satisfy consumer demands, these firms are unaware of what consumers want because consumption reflects only the availability of goods, not consumer preferences.

Although nationalization (governmental acquisition and management of assets) was common during the immediate post–World War II period, privatization became a more dominant economic trend during the 1980s and 1990s, especially within the United States and the United Kingdom. In these countries, the experience of economic recession in the 1970s catapulted the conservative political parties of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Ronald Reagan to power. Both leaders called for less government regulation and more business.

Meanwhile, at the World Bank (the post–World War II donor organization for the reconstruction and development of economically distressed countries), developmental economists began to depart and free-trade advocates took control of economic policy at multinational lending organizations. These free-trade advocates became known as *neoliberals* because of their belief in liberal trade policies and their disdain for intervention into economic affairs by national governments.

Believing firmly in the efficiency of the market, the neoliberals scorned the developmentalist theories of government-led planning, which they claimed encouraged protectionist policies and placed the world economy at risk. Reducing barriers to trade and capital flows, it was reasoned, would generate a cycle of economic growth and a sustained attack on poverty. Furthermore, as the world witnessed the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the failure of the Communist Party trumpeted proof for neoliberals that governments were fallible and that the market was not.

In the case of Eastern Europe, however, the haste to transform economies and transfer state-owned property to the private sector resulted in disastrous consequences. Reformers felt pressured to put in place the rudiments of a middle class in order to avert the return to communism. Private property, it was believed, would help accomplish this by buttressing an economic order that would install an indigenous middle class and redistribute national wealth more evenly.

Unfortunately, the process of property transferal often became mere schemes that put property back in the hands of former communists, placed it under the control of criminal elements, and disenfranchised the very population that privatization was designed to benefit. This situation seemed to confirm the original fears of socialists, that entrusting private businesses with control of essential services would reduce the public's control over them and result in corruption.

The problems in these Eastern European economies were not all the result of privatization. More than 40 years of central planning, along with supply and price controls, posed a perilous set of difficulties. Decades of low wages meant that little wealth was available for investment, no stock markets existed to ease the transfer of property, and indigenous banking systems were not yet sufficiently organized to deal with the pace and turbulence of global financial markets.

In addition, there were no laws to protect or even permit private ownership, nor were there the supporting infrastructure of contract law, an equitable tax

code, and financial support services such as the accounting profession. Furthermore, as the burden for transforming the economy was placed upon this newly developing private sector, local industries, which were hastily subject to competition from abroad and conventional lending practices, began to fail. Local firms were in their developmental stages and not prepared to meet the demands of global competition.

These same problems have applied to the developing world, as well. In addition to societies in the process of making the transition to market economies, the economies of lesser-developed countries (LDC) are often ill-prepared to contend with the onslaught of the competitive global market. Privatization in today's economy also means an environment of ceaseless movement of financial capital, demands for tight credit controls, and the exposure of local industry to free-trade policies.

As a result of these conditions, competition from exports has systematically wrought unemployment and poverty in many underdeveloped areas of the world. Many national economies, despite receiving large financial-assistance packages, have suffered harshly rather than prospered. Some experts estimate that as much as 50% of government revenues in such countries go toward the repayment of the national debt. In some cases, this could represent as much as one-fifth to one-quarter of total export earnings to a national budget.

To many, it has become obvious that privatization and free-trade policies alone are not universal solutions to the problems of transition societies, developing economies, and deficit-ridden industrialized nations. Because the economic playing field is not completely level, many neoliberal economists now believe that some degree of regulation is desirable if free trade and privatization are going to be part of the foundation of the new global economic order.

See also Development, Third-World; Globalization and National Security

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PROCUREMENT
See DEFENSE BUDGETING

PROHIBITION ON WEAPONIZING SPACE

International ban on the deployment of weapons systems in outer space. As a result of the military utility of space, the ban on weaponizing space is considered a key principle of arms control.

The power to project force capabilities anywhere in the world with weapons from space decreases the security of all nations and increases the threat of space becoming a battlefield. An extended military conflict in space would likely hinder the use of space for commercial and scientific purposes thereafter. Concern about the future capabilities of state militaries to launch weapons of mass destruction or target enemy troops from outer space have led technologically advanced countries, principally the United States and the Soviet Union, to agree in a series of treaties to limit the use of space for military purposes.

The U.S.–Soviet space race of the late 1950s and 1960s provided the impetus for prohibiting weapons in space. The 1957 Soviet launch of *Sputnik,* the world's first artificial satellite, raised fears that the United States was falling behind the Soviet Union in science and technology. The United States responded with more aggressive efforts to accelerate its own space program. By the early 1960s, these efforts led to concerns on both sides that space might be the next frontier of conflict in the Cold War. In 1963, U.S. president John F. Kennedy and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which placed a de facto moratorium on the use of space for military purposes. The treaty banned the testing of nuclear weapons in space and initiated successive negotiations on the military use of space.

In 1967, the United States and the Soviet Union were two of several nations to sign the Outer Space Treaty. The agreement prohibited member states from carrying, installing, or stationing weapons of mass destruction in space. Member states were also forbidden to establish military bases and conduct military maneuvers in space. By assenting to the Outer Space Treaty, the superpowers indicated their willingness to cooperate on space matters and arms control.

Five years later, the signing of the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty marked the high point of

U.S.–Soviet cooperation in space. Under the bilateral treaty, both countries were forbidden from deploying or testing ABM systems or components in space. The treaty also prohibited the parties from interfering with each other's national technical means of verification, or spy satellite programs. The treaty remained binding until both countries agreed to withdraw from it in 2002.

Although the ABM Treaty was considered successful at halting space weaponization by the superpowers, it failed to address U.S. concerns about a preemptive attack aimed at disabling U.S. military and civilian satellites. Because satellite systems can easily be tracked, they are vulnerable to being attacked with conventional or nuclear weapons. The U.S. interest in pursuing active-defense systems and hardening satellite targets indicates that the United States will continue to advance its already superior space program. As long as the United States remains the only country to possess the technological capabilities to weaponize space, it will likely retain space superiority for decades to come.

Although few countries possess space programs, the prohibition on weapons in space remains a centerpiece of international arms-control agreements. By agreeing not to allow the stationing and deployment of weapons from space, states hope to quell a possible space arms race. However, despite international cooperation in this endeavor, U.S. superiority in space technology means that it will not likely be deterred from using space for supporting its military capabilities.

See also Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; Limited Test Ban Treaty; Satellite Reconnaissance; Space Race; Space-Based Weapons; Sputnik; Spy Satellites; Treaties

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PROJECT VENONA
See ESPIONAGE

PROPAGANDA

Mass suggestion or influence through the manipulation of symbols and of individuals. Like other forms of persuasion, propaganda aims to communicate a point of view in a way that leads the target audience to adopt that point of view, doctrine, or practice as its own. Propaganda differs from other forms of persuasion, in that it is typically one-way communication that is carefully controlled, systematic, sustained, and well organized, often intended to damage an opposing viewpoint.

PROPAGANDA CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES

Propaganda relies on two basic psychological principles to achieve its purposes: cognitive dissonance and rationalization. First articulated in the 1950s, cognitive dissonance is said to occur when a person simultaneously holds two inconsistent beliefs, such as an aversion to killing versus the need to take up arms to defend one's country. Over time, this state of inconsistency becomes so uncomfortable that individuals strive to reduce the conflict in the easiest way possible. In doing so, they will artificially alter one or both cognitions to make them fit together more easily. For example, people historically have justified and provided legal sanction for taking life during wartime, even though they condemn and punish it in times of peace.

Propagandists also rely upon what is commonly referred to as *the rationalization trap.* The trap is set by intentionally arousing a person's feelings of cognitive dissonance by threatening his or her sense of self-esteem or security. It is then sprung by offering a single solution to reduce the dissonance. In times of armed conflict, one of the most common methods of reducing dissonance is through dehumanization. For example, most people are reluctant to treat others inhumanely. To overcome this hesitation, a propagandist might portray a particular group of people as so dangerous that to offer them any consideration or humane treatment would be a threat to national security. Dehumanizing a group in this way makes it easier for members of the propagandist's target audience to maltreat members of that group.

Scholars began systematic investigation into the use of propaganda during the 1930s and 1940s. Following an extensive examination of World War I propaganda, the U.S. Institute for Propaganda Analysis in 1938 suggested that nearly all propaganda relied upon one or more of several standard communicative devices. These included name-calling (applying a

negative label without evidence); the glittering generality (applying a positive label without evidence); transfer (associating an untested idea with a group that possess a positive popular image, often through the use of symbols); the testimonial (using the image of a person or persona to promote an idea, often through quotations or photographs); the plain folks device (appealing through an emotional association with the average citizen); card-stacking (using deception through underemphasis and/or overemphasis of selected evidence); and bandwagoning (appealing to the desire to be associated with the popular opinion or the behavior of the majority).

BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. PROPAGANDA

Propaganda played an extremely significant role in spreading support for independence in the American colonies. The Committee on Correspondence, a loose-knit group that traveled along the east coast promoting revolutionary ideas, represents one of the earliest effective examples of political *spin*—reporting and discussing current events with a partisan slant. At the same time, Thomas Paine's fiery leaflet *Common Sense,* one of the first widely disseminated pieces of American propaganda, both riled and rallied readers with its impassioned arguments for independence from England.

During the 19th century, propaganda provided a spur to expansion of the nation as well as to civil war. To justify the forcible removal of Native Americans from their lands, the U.S. government promoted a popular image of Native Americans as treacherous and dangerous savages. The campaign against the Indians was promoted as a crusade to "civilize" the frontier and Christianize the "heathens." During the Civil War, each side portrayed its enemy as the champion of an immoral cause. Supporters of slavery raised images of free blacks running rampant, killing and raping whites. Opponents portrayed all slave owners as cruel and heartless taskmasters who beat and took advantage of their slaves.

However, it was not until the 20th century that propaganda became an integral tool of U.S. policy. Woodrow Wilson was arguably the first U.S. president to use propaganda systematically to advance both a national agenda and a particular worldview. In 1917, Wilson launched the Committee on Public Information (CPI), which was charged with spreading Wilson's secular ideology—the need for U.S. involvement in World War I and the desire to establish a postwar League of Nations—to a particularly isolationist American public. The CPI employed posters, films, a newspaper-style publication (*The Official Bulletin*), and so-called four-minute men—citizens who were specially trained to give compact, concise oral presentations supporting Wilson's agenda.

World War II brought propaganda to an entirely new level of importance and sophistication when German Nazi leader Adolf Hitler and propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels mastered the delicate art. Their success in using propaganda to garner public support for Nazi policies was derived from a deep understanding of the inherent strengths and effective application of propaganda. They understood that the government must have access to intelligence concerning public opinion and that propaganda must be planned and executed by a single authority. In addition, they realized that the intended consequences of the propaganda must be considered well in advance and it must be carefully timed to provoke a response from the audience.

The German Ministry of Propaganda utilized the cinematic talent of actress and director Leni Riefenstahl, whose films *Triumph of the Will* and *Olympia* glorified the Nazi cause and demonstrated the power of ceremony and spectacle in swaying public opinion. To combat German propaganda efforts, President Franklin Roosevelt and U.S. general George Marshall recruited famed Hollywood director Frank Capra to produce a set of films known as the *Why We Fight* series. In producing these films, Capra incorporated much of Riefenstahl's footage into a package that effectively turned Nazi propaganda against itself. The film provided a powerful argument for U.S. involvement in the war to fight Nazism.

CONTEMPORARY PROPAGANDA: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Though still prevalent, the use of propaganda has become more nuanced since the end of World War II. In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower established the United States Information Agency (USIA), an independent foreign-affairs agency with the mission of promoting U.S. national interests through a wide range of overseas programs. Today, USIA maintains 190 posts in 142 countries, operates the federal government's educational and cultural exchange (known as the Fulbright Program), broadcasts a number of radio and television programs, including Voice of

America and Radio Free Asia, and coordinates the dissemination of pro-U.S. materials to international audiences.

In 2002, President George W. Bush established a new propaganda arm for the U.S. government, the White House Office of Global Communications. The office has the mission of advising the president and other senior government leaders as to how best to utilize U.S. government communication resources effectively and consistently. It is also charged with promoting the interests of the United States abroad, preventing misunderstanding of U.S. aims and intentions, building support among allies, and informing international audiences of U.S. values and virtues.

These propaganda vehicles and processes are often labeled as efforts of so-called *public diplomacy,* a term first used by Edmund Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in 1965. According to Gullion, public diplomacy deals with the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries, and the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another. Central to public diplomacy is the transnational flow of information and ideas that ultimately influence public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies.

Public diplomacy continues to be a major part of the Bush administration's efforts to fight global terrorism. As stated in the most recent National Security Strategy of the United States of America, "We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism. Our immediate focus will be those using effective public diplomacy to promote the free flow of information and ideas to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism."

—Bryan M. Baldwin

See also Capra, Frank (1897–1991); Cinema and the Military; Media and National Security; Psychological Warfare (PSYOPS); Public Diplomacy

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SECRETS REVEALED

The Four-Minute Men: General Suggestions to Speakers

The speech must not be longer than four minutes, which means there is no time for a single wasted word.

Speakers should go over their speech time and time again until the ideas are firmly fixed in their mind and can not be forgotten. This does not mean that the speech needs to be written out and committed [memorized], although most speakers, especially when limited in time, do best to commit.

Divide your speech carefully into certain divisions, say fifteen seconds for final appeal; 45 seconds to describe the bond; fifteen seconds for opening words, etc., etc. Any plan is better than none, and it can be amended every day in the light of experience.

There never was a speech yet that couldn't be improved. Never be satisfied with success. Aim to be more successful, and still more successful. So keep your eyes open. Read all the papers every day, to find a new slogan, or a new phraseology, or a new idea to replace something you have in your speech. For instance, the editorial page of the *Chicago Herald* of May 19 is crammed full of good ideas and phrases. Most of the article is a little above the average audience, but if the ideas are good, you should plan carefully to bring them into the experience of your auditors. There is one sentence which says, "No country was ever saved by the other fellow; it must be done by you, by a hundred million yous, or it will not be done at all." Or again, Secretary McAdoo says, "Every dollar invested in the Liberty Loan is a real blow for liberty, a blow against the militaristic system which would strangle the freedom of the world," and so on. Both the *Tribune* and the *Examiner,* besides the *Herald,* contain President [Woodrow] Wilson's address to the nation in connection with the draft registration. The latter part is very suggestive and can be used effectively. Try slogans like "Earn the right to say, I helped to win the war," and "This is a Loyalty Bond as well as a Liberty Bond," or "A cause that is worth living for is worth dying for, and a cause that is worth dying for is worth fighting for." Conceive of your speech as a mosaic made up of five or six hundred words, each one of which has its function.

Get your friends to criticize you pitilessly. We all want to do our best and naturally like to be praised,

but there is nothing so dangerous as "josh" and "jolly." Let your friends know that you want ruthless criticism. If their criticism isn't sound, you can reject it. If it is sound, wouldn't you be foolish to reject it?

Be sure to prepare very carefully your closing appeal, whatever it may be, so that you may not leave your speech hanging in the air.

Don't yield to the inspiration of the moment, or to applause to depart from your speech outline. This does not mean that you may not add a word or two, but remember that one can speak only 130, or 140, or 150 words a minute, and if your speech has been carefully prepared to fill four minutes, you can not add anything to your speech without taking away something of serious importance.

Cut out "Doing your bit." "Business as usual." "Your country needs you." They are flat and no longer have any force or meaning.

Time yourself in advance on every paragraph and remember you are likely to speak somewhat more slowly in public than when you practice in your own room.

There are several good ideas and statements in the printed speech recently sent you. Look it up at once.

If you come across a new slogan, or a new argument, or a new story, or a new illustration, don't fail to send it to the Committee. We need your help to make the Four-Minute Men the mightiest force for arousing patriotism in the United States.

—U.S. Committee on Public Information, 1917
Four-Minute Men Bulletin #1

PROTECTIVE GEAR

Equipment worn to shield oneself from physical threats, including gunfire; other munitions; and exposure to chemical, biological, or radiological agents. Protective gear includes body armor such as helmets and bulletproof vests, as well as garments to guard against biological and chemical attack.

Armor is one of the oldest battlefield technologies, although historically only the wealthy could afford the best protective gear. During the Middle Ages, for example, infantry rarely wore steel armor. Most often they used heavily padded cloth or hardened leather to protect their most vulnerable areas. The evolution of

firearms led to the gradual abandonment of armor by the 1700s. By this time, muskets capable of piercing steel plate at a considerable distance made heavy armor obsolete. Even hardened helmets disappeared from most armies.

The evolution of military technology, particularly the growing destructive power of artillery, led to the reintroduction of helmets by the late 19th century. However, other forms of armor remained the province of specialized units; bomb-disposal personnel, for instance, have long worn heavy protective gear. However, combat soldiers remained mostly unprotected until the development of body armor that was light enough to wear for extended periods of time yet effective against modern small-arms fire.

The invention of Kevlar, a lightweight mesh-weave fiber that is stronger than steel, led to the first modern bulletproof vests in the mid-1970s. By the 1980s, the U.S. Army began issuing Kevlar body armor to its frontline units. In the late 1990s, the Army replaced the Kevlar vests with the Interceptor Multi-Threat Body Armor System. The Interceptor has ceramic inserts that can stop, shatter, and catch the standard 7.62 mm rounds used in most military rifles. Protective vests like the Interceptor are designed to absorb the impact of a bullet and spread it out over a wider area, hopefully preventing it from penetrating the body.

Small-arms and other conventional munitions are no longer the only threats a soldier can expect to face on the battlefield. Modern biological and chemical weapons can kill just as effectively as bombs and bullets if delivered accurately. Army units are issued *battle dress overgarments*—protective suits to wear over their regular battle gear—in case of biological or chemical attack. These garments are designed to shield the skin from biological and chemical agents and contain filters to prevent inhalation of contaminants.

In the early 2000s, the U.S. Army began replacing its existing protective overgarments with the Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology, or JSLIST. Although the suits were billed as an improvement over existing technology, the Army has struggled with problems of procurement and inventory control. A Pentagon audit in 2002 found than many of the suits are not complete. Another study showed that the suits do not perform well when soaked in sweat or seawater. As a result, the military is currently considering a replacement for the JSLIST.

See also Biological Weapons and Warfare; Science, Technology, and Security

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE (PSYOPS)

A variety of techniques that seek to influence the emotions, attitudes, and behavior of selected audiences in support of political and military objectives. Psychological warfare, also known as psychological operations (PSYOPS), usually connotes nonlethal attempts to gain advantage over the enemy. Techniques include dropping leaflets, airing radio and television broadcasts, and using loudspeakers. Psychological warfare may be conducted independently or as a *force multiplier* that compounds the effects of conventional military actions.

PSYOPS campaigns can be specifically tailored according to the target audience. Operations against enemy soldiers, sometimes called *battlefield PSYOPS,* seek to lower morale and encourage surrender. Psychological warriors often use threatening leaflets to scare the enemy in advance of an attack, often combined with other messages that offer incentives for defection. *Consolidation PSYOPS* have a different audience—noncombatants. Civilians play an important role in war; they work in factories that produce weapons and equipment, they provide support to enemy political leadership, and they offer refuge to enemy fighters. Consolidation operations seek to reduce that support and encourage civilians to accept defeat after fighting has ended. Finally, PSYOPS are used to try to retain the support of allies and sympathizers.

In addition to the benefits PSYOPS can yield on the battlefield, some U.S. commanders believe that PSYOPS help avoid killing foreign civilians. The killing of civilians, often referred to as *collateral damage,* risks damaging the reputation of the country responsible and undermines political objectives in the theater of operations. Civilian casualties also may reduce support for the war effort within the country that perpetrates the killings. For these reasons, contemporary U.S. PSYOPS often encourage local populations to stay out of harm's way during violent conflicts. During the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, for example, military aircraft broadcasted messages encouraging Iraqi civilians to stay indoors as American armored columns passed through their towns or neighborhoods. Millions of leaflets dropped on Iraq carried the same message.

Psychological warriors trace their intellectual lineage to the ancient Chinese strategy text *The Art of War,* most likely written during the 400s BCE. The authors (probably a collection of philosophers writing under the pseudonym Sun Tzu) argued that "subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence." However, PSYOPS have only recently received significant formal attention from Western military planners.

The United States established a psychological warfare section in the War Department during World War I but made no effort to continue PSYOPS research in the interwar period. In World War II, the Army established the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) in Europe. Its mission was to disseminate "propaganda designed to undermine the enemy's will to resist, demoralize his forces and sustain the morale of our supporters." However, as happened at the end of World War I, organized psychological warfare units mostly disbanded after 1945.

The Korean War was a watershed for psychological warfare. After re-creating units to drop leaflets and conduct loudspeaker PSYOPS, the Army established the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where it has been headquartered ever since. At the same time, the government funded extensive academic research on communications. Scholars eagerly participated in this effort, viewing psychological warfare as more humane than conventional conflict. A torrent of studies appeared on the nature of psychological coercion. In the 1970s, however, many Americans began to view PSYOPS with skepticism. The Vietnam War experience made the public less willing to support Cold War actions abroad. Covert wars, propaganda, and psychological warfare all fell into disrepute.

At a deeper level, scholars have argued that there is a natural tension between PSYOPS and democracy. This tension arises because the deception involved in PSYOPS stands in direct contradiction to democratic values such as truth and transparency. The strength of any democracy is the people's ability to make informed decisions about the government. A government that routinely engages in large-scale deception and psychological manipulation can shield itself from the public scrutiny required for healthy democracy. It is also difficult to maintain strategic coherence in a pluralistic society. In other words, planners find it hard to project a single message as long as there are dissenting views.

Nonetheless, the United States continues to employ psychological warfare against its enemies. During Operation Just Cause in 1989, U.S. special forces used loudspeakers and radio broadcasts to disorient General Manuel Noriega of Panama and his staff. In Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the U.S.-led

coalition dropped an estimated 29 million leaflets on Iraq. According to one report after the war, many Iraqi soldiers waved these leaflets at coalition troops to indicate their desire to surrender. The war against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 saw extensive use of leaflets, as well as more than 800 hours of radio broadcasts from U.S. military aircraft.

More recently, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 incorporated a host of PSYOP tactics and witnessed two significant developments in the practice of psychological warfare. First, PSYOP planners adopted the language of public diplomacy, using terms such as *truth-telling* and *credibility* instead of *influence* and *coercion.* Previous doctrinal statements had been far more blunt. Second, planners carefully coordinated PSYOPS with conventional missions. For example, warning leaflets often landed just ahead of conventional strikes.

The United States not only has used psychological warfare but also has been a target of it. In fact, some analysts worry that foreign states may use PSYOPS and other kinds of information operations increasingly as a way to mitigate the overwhelming military advantage of the United States. This kind of asymmetric strategy emerged during the war in Kosovo in 1999. During that war, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) initiated a bombing campaign to end Serbian aggression against ethnic Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo. To counter this campaign, the Serbs sought to generate public pressure in the Balkans to end the bombing. The Serbs took control of regional television and radio stations, broadcasting messages critical of NATO and printing anti-NATO posters and leaflets.

The Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq revealed the ugly side of PSYOPS. Prisoners in U.S. custody at the facility were subjected to sexual humiliation, physical abuse, and psychological intimidation, such as threats of being killed and simulated drownings. The scandal raised serious questions about the morality, wisdom, and effectiveness of such methods. The U.S. Constitution forbids the use of "cruel or unusual punishments" on U.S. citizens, and the Geneva Conventions restrict the use of force on prisoners of war. In addition, most experts agree that information gained through such methods is rarely reliable. Political observers also note that using such methods on Muslim detainees—the majority of whom officials admit are not guilty of any crime—harms the image of the United States among

the very people it is trying to win over in the war on terrorism.

Despite continued faith in psychological warfare, both in the United States and abroad, it remains difficult to measure the actual effects of these techniques. War is a highly charged environment, and many factors influence the emotions and behaviors of participants. Combat causes huge psychological impact, whether or not psychological warfare is employed. Thus, it is hard to disentangle the unique effects of PSYOPS from the typical psychological effects of warfare itself.

See also Constitution of the United States; Geneva Conventions; Legal Ramifications of National Security; Prisoner of War (POW); Propaganda; Terrorism, War on International

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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Government-sponsored efforts to communicate directly with foreign publics, often bypassing normal channels of formal diplomacy. Public diplomacy includes all official efforts to convince targeted sectors of foreign opinion to support or tolerate a government's strategic objectives. Methods include statements by decision makers, purposeful campaigns conducted by government organizations dedicated to public diplomacy, and efforts to persuade international media to portray official policies favorably to foreign audiences.

There are two basic kinds of public diplomacy. The first is *branding* or *cultural communication,* in which the government tries to improve its image without seeking support for any immediate policy objective. States use branding strategies to foster a better image of themselves in the world. Ideally, branding creates general goodwill and facilitates cooperation across a variety of

issues. It also helps to maintain long-term alliance relationships and undermine enemy propaganda.

During the Cold War, for example, the United States used public diplomacy to persuade European audiences that the foundations of democratic government and capitalist enterprise were superior to Soviet alternatives. The Voice of America broadcast directly into the Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe to dispel myths about the West. At the same time, the U.S. State Department built and maintained reading rooms in Allied nations, replete with books about American history and culture. The department hoped that exposure to American principles and ideas would reinforce broad support for U.S. policies.

The second type of public diplomacy includes various strategies designed to facilitate more rapid results—a category sometimes called *political advocacy*. Although branding or cultural communication is meant to affect long-term perceptions, political-advocacy campaigns use public diplomacy to build foreign support for immediate policy objectives. States sometimes encourage foreign publics to support their own leaders when they cooperate with the sender's policy, or oppose their leaders when they do not. Sometimes states need to quickly convince foreign audiences to support costly alliance military strategies. Foreign leaders may want to cooperate with alliance plans but fear domestic reprisal for agreeing to unpopular actions. Under these conditions, public diplomacy may help those leaders cooperate by reducing the threat of backlash at home.

Kuwait's efforts to gain U.S. popular support for an attack against Iraq in 1990 illustrate this kind of political advocacy. In late 1990, Kuwait hired an American public-relations firm to convince U.S. voters that liberation from the dictator Saddam Hussein was worthwhile and morally correct. Americans had mixed feelings about intervention, and most voters knew little about Kuwait. President George H. W. Bush rightfully worried that he lacked the public mandate to act firmly against Iraq. Kuwait therefore undertook a carefully orchestrated political-advocacy campaign to demonstrate the scope of Saddam's cruelty and gain American sympathy.

In other cases, states use public diplomacy to discredit adversaries. Nations tacitly or explicitly urge foreign publics to oppose leaders who do not share the sender's strategic interests. This strategy has two goals. First, it attempts to encourage cooperation by pressuring recalcitrant foreign leaders who rely on popular support. Second, when prospects for a change in policy are minimal, it encourages foreign audiences to revolt against their leaders. Neither strategy has a long history of success, probably because public-diplomacy campaigns are often received with skepticism. In addition, leaders who are the targets of such campaigns can limit and distort outside information before it reaches the public.

Skeptical commentators have suggested that *public diplomacy* is simply a euphemism for propaganda. Scholars sometimes use the terms interchangeably because, in practice, it is difficult to distinguish one from the other. Professional diplomats recoil at this suggestion, however, because of the negative connotations associated with propaganda. However, the difference between the two can be tenuous. For this reason, public diplomats actively work to avoid the perception that they are mere purveyors of propaganda.

In the years before World War II, for example, Great Britain waged a quiet but effective campaign to rally U.S. popular support for its cause. Many Americans felt that Britain had exaggerated the German threat in World War I and had needlessly drawn the United States into that conflict. Hence, British public diplomats slowly cultivated their message while being cautious not to rouse accusations of propaganda. To do so, they built relationships with members of the U.S. press corps, who had more credibility with American audiences. They also restricted direct broadcasts from the British Broadcasting Company into the United States.

Today, public diplomacy has important implications for the war on terrorism. Improving the image of the United States may reduce the legitimacy of terror among disenchanted audiences in the Middle East and elsewhere. Although public diplomacy may not fully reduce negative images, it may reduce hatred so that terrorists are no longer glorified as martyrs. Thus, public diplomacy, if effective, will make violence against civilians an unacceptable form of protest.

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, analysts have offered a number of proposals to reinvigorate American public diplomacy. Some have argued that the United States ought to study the efforts of private marketing firms experienced in shaping public preferences. Others feel that government-owned and operated media, such as the U.S.-based Arabic-language television station Al-Hurrah, are the best way

to disseminate U.S. public diplomacy. Despite differences over approach, all policy analysts believe that public diplomacy can assist in the war on terrorism by reducing the sources of recruitment for terrorist organizations.

See also Democracy, Promotion of, and Terrorism; Media and National Security; Propaganda; Psychological Warfare (PSYOPS); Terrorism, War on International; Voice of America

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PUBLIC HEALTH, NATIONAL SECURITY AND

Preventing disease and promoting and defending public health in the maintenance of U.S. national security. Attention to public health is a crucial facet of national security at a time when biological and chemical agents can more easily be used as weapons against populations.

The anthrax attacks in the United States, which followed the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, highlighted the increased threat to public health in the age of international terrorism. Letters containing anthrax spores that were mailed to offices of several government officials and members of the media claimed five victims. These events were by far the most serious and frightening incidences of terrorist-related threats to public health. In addition, U.S. intelligence programs report biological weapons have been developed in foreign countries and include not only anthrax but smallpox, botulism, bubonic plague, and the Ebola virus. These diseases are all communicable and potentially deadly.

Large-scale violent acts also have public health implications not related to direct injury to the victims. There are many residual effects that must be dealt with. When whole buildings are destroyed—as happened with New York's World Trade Center in the September 11 attack—sanitation and sewer systems may fail, spreading disease and contaminants much farther than the primary site of destruction. Chemicals, such as the freon used in cooling systems, may release into the air, causing serious health effects on nearby populations. The very real nature of the threat has heightened awareness of the need for increased emphasis on safeguarding public health as a part of national-security policy.

OFFICIAL RESPONSES

In October 2001, President George W. Bush created a new cabinet-level government agency called the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), dedicated specifically to ensuring the safety of U.S. citizens within the nation. Part of the mission of the DHS was to develop a comprehensive national strategy against potential terrorist threats or attacks that might have an impact on public health concerns. These concerns include the availability and adequacy of vaccinations, the training of health care personnel, public health surveillance capabilities, hospital capacity, and the coordination of containment of biological threats.

The U.S. public also began to look at the maintenance of public health not only as a critical issue in a time of crisis but also as a good to strive for to prevent catastrophe nationwide. If widespread disease disabled a significant number of people, it would also reduce the ability of survivors to respond effectively to such an attack. Responding after the fact in a haphazard, uneducated manner would not only be unwise but could prove deadly.

In November 2001, the U.S. Health and Human Services Department created a new office called the Office of Public Health Preparedness (OPHP). The purpose of OPHP is to direct the efforts by the Department of Health and Human Services to prepare for, protect against, respond to, and recover from all acts of bioterrorism and other public health emergencies affecting the civilian population. The OPHP also serves to coordinate all activities within the Health

and Human Services Department related to such activities. The office works with all health and human service agencies to enhance the response to any possible biological incidents in the future.

Dr. D. A. Henderson, who was later appointed as the first director of the OPHP, testified before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee just five days before the September 11, 2001, attacks. Speaking on the need for better biodefense preparation, he stated, "Nothing in the realm of natural catastrophes or man-made disasters rivals the complex problems of response that would follow a biological weapons attack against a civilian population. The consequence of such an attack would be an epidemic and, in this country, we have had little experience in coping with epidemics. In fact, no city has had to deal with a truly serious epidemic accompanied by large numbers of cases and deaths since the 1918 influenza epidemic."

CURRENT POLICIES

Current U.S. efforts to safeguard public health combine public education about potential threats and implementing increased strategies to prevent such threats from materializing. In Fort Campbell, Kentucky, researchers are experimenting with a new procedure to develop a treatment for anthrax from the blood of people who are already vaccinated against it. The DHS and private groups including the American Red Cross have been encouraging families to make plans and prepare emergency kits that include food and water, flashlights, battery-powered radios, and anything else they might need for up to three days in case of a power outage. In addition, they are emphasizing that schoolchildren should talk to their parents about where to go and how to maintain contact if the power and phone lines go out. By targeting schoolchildren in a public education program, they are in turn hoping to raise the consciousness of their parents to better prepare the public in a time of national disaster that may affect public health.

Hospitals across the United States are also increasing their awareness and preparedness for a public health threat. Stanford University School of Medicine has established a Bioterrorism and Emergency Preparedness Task Force to deal with events such as those following the September 11 attacks. This task force has developed clinical pathways, medical diagnosis information, and other treatment recommendations that are intended for the use of physicians and other health care providers in the event of a threat to the public. Understandably, the recent events of terrorism in the United States have increased awareness of the need for national security regarding public health, not only in a reactive manner but, more important, in a proactive one. By implementing these measures, great headway can be made in preventing a mass outbreak of disease that would cripple the United States and its ability to defend itself against future terrorism.

See also Anthrax; Biodefense/Biosecurity; Bioterrorism; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Homeland Security, Department of; Infectious Disease; Terrorism, War on International

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PUEBLO INCIDENT

Incident in which communist North Korea seized the intelligence ship USS *Pueblo* in international waters in January 1968. One American sailor was killed and 82 captured.

Originally an Army supply vessel that was retired in 1954, the ship was converted into a spy ship in 1966 and served as part of Operation Clickbeetle, a joint mission of naval intelligence and the National Security Agency, intercepting and gathering signals communications. On January 23, 1968, North Korean boats surrounded the ship, which was in waters off the eastern coast of the country, and escorted it to shore. The *Pueblo*'s captain stalled for time, attempting to have the crew destroy classified documents; the Koreans then fired from short range, killing one sailor and wounding four others, and boarded the ship.

Although the U.S. government initially claimed the intelligence losses were not significant, historians today believe otherwise; they believe that the North Koreans were sending important information about communications technology to Moscow. The military planned various scenarios for recovering the ship and

its crew, but President Lyndon Johnson opted for a diplomatic solution, fearing any other intervention would lead to the loss of American lives with little likelihood of rescuing the imprisoned sailors. During their ordeal, the sailors were tortured and forced to appear in public to confess their crimes. Only late in the year was a deal finally worked out in which the United States would sign a letter of apology admitting to having violated North Korean waters and promising never to do so again. On December 23, the letter was signed and the crew released. The ship remained in North Korean hands.

PUSAN PERIMETER

Defensive cordon formed by U.S. and South Korean troops around the city of Pusan in southeastern South Korea during the early phases of the Korean War. At the end of World War II, the Korean peninsula was divided into northern and southern halves separated at the 38th parallel. North Korea was a communist dictatorship, closely aligned with the Soviet Union and communist China. South Korea was a capitalist country nominally under the protection of the United States. However, in January 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson excluded South Korea from the postwar defensive perimeter that the U.S. had established to prevent the spread of communism in Asia.

North Korean leader Kim Il Sung saw this as an opportunity to unite the Korean Peninsula under his rule. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army stormed across the border and overwhelmed the poorly equipped and trained South Korean troops, who were joined by UN forces and U.S. forces hastily rushed in from Japan. The defenders were quickly pushed back into a defensive perimeter around Pusan.

Throughout August, the North Koreans launched a series of intense attacks on the Pusan perimeter. On August 4, North Korean troops crossed the Naktong River roughly 60 miles northwest of Pusan, nearly wiping out the U.S. and South Korean defenders. In an attack on August 24, the North Koreans nearly overran an American force of 20,000 men some 30 miles west of Pusan. In early September, a limited communist breakthrough 60 miles north of Pusan forced South Koreans to abandon their headquarters at Taegu. However, UN troops, reinforced by well-trained American infantry, did not break under the North Korean assault.

On September 15, 1950, an amphibious landing by U.S. and South Korean forces at Inchon Harbor relieved the siege of the Pusan perimeter. The invasion, led by U.S. general Douglas MacArthur, opened up a second front behind North Korean lines that forced the overstretched communist forces to retreat in order to avoid being encircled. The stand at Pusan was just the first act in a bitter three-year struggle. However, it demonstrated how hard the United States would fight to prevent a communist takeover of South Korea.

See also Cold War; Communism and National Security; Containment and the Truman Doctrine; Inchon Landing (1950); Korea, North and South; Korean War; MacArthur, Douglas (1880–1964)

PUTIN, VLADIMIR (1952–)

Former Soviet intelligence agent who succeeded Boris Yeltsin as president of the Russian Federation in 2000. Putin has been a controversial figure whose assurances of democratic sympathies stand in contrast to the authoritarianism of many aspects of his administration.

Born in Leningrad on October 7, 1952, Putin received a law degree from Leningrad State University in 1975. After graduation, he began a 15-year career with the foreign intelligence arm of the KGB, the Soviet secret police. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, he continued in the service of the KGB's successor in Russia, the FSB. Putin served as head of the FSB from 1998 to 1999. In August 1999, Russian president Boris Yeltsin appointed Putin to be Russian prime minister. Four months later, Yeltsin resigned and named Putin as his interim successor. Elections held in March 2000 confirmed Putin as Russia's new president. In March 2004, Russian voters overwhelmingly reelected him to a second term.

After amicable relations under Yeltsin, the tone of the Russia–U.S. relationship has changed under Putin. Whereas Yeltsin worked hard to erase all vestiges of communist influence, including symbols and songs from the Soviet past, Putin has been more open to allowing their return to Russian society. In 2004, Putin went so far as to declare the collapse of the Soviet Union a "national tragedy on an enormous scale." At the beginning of his first term in office, U.S. president

George W. Bush established what seemed to be a good rapport with Putin. Bush met with the Russian leader and declared, "I looked the man in the eye. I was able to get a sense of his soul."

Since that time, Putin's policies have often proven vexing for the United States. For example, Putin was critical of the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union into formerly Soviet-dominated countries in Eastern Europe, moves strongly supported by the United States. To counter Western influence in the nations surrounding Russia, Putin moved aggressively to forge closer ties with other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a loose federation of countries composed of the independent republics of the former Soviet Union. Putin has also increased Russian political influence over its western neighbors in Ukraine and Belarus, a step that has put his government at odds with the Bush administration, which accused Russia of interfering in Ukraine's 2004 presidential elections. Putin's opposition to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has also been a source of strain on U.S.–Russian relations.

Putin has come under fire for the increasingly antidemocratic manner in which he has handled political criticism and opposition. As president, he has led a high-profile campaign to prosecute businessmen who control the Russian media and powerful Russian industries. Critics of Putin claim the trials of these so-called oligarchs, who were accused of tax evasion and other financial misdeeds, were merely an excuse for Putin to seize control of the Russian media and economy. Indeed, by 2005, most of the media outlets in Russia were state controlled. The state also held significant financial interests in Russian oil, gas, and other industries.

Putin has shown little tolerance for dissent from his political views. Former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, who opposed some of Putin's prosecutions and state interference in Russian business, was sacked by Putin a month before the March 2004 elections: Putin dismissed Kasyanov and his entire cabinet and appointed Vikton Khristenko as prime minister. A week later, Putin dismissed Khristenko in favor of Mikhail Fradkov. The seemingly offhand manner in which Putin changes the government when it impedes his plans is a worrisome sign for the Russian republic.

Developments in late 2004 brought an even sharper turn toward authoritarianism in Russia. In the wake of a school hostage crisis that left hundreds of Russian students dead and injured, Putin moved to give himself even greater powers in the name of national security and fighting terrorism. He announced that regional governors would no longer be popularly elected, but instead would be appointed by the president and approved by regional legislatures. He also supported a plan to elect parliamentary deputies by party, rather than choosing individual candidates to fill the seats.

The Bush administration sees both of these moves as further attempts by Putin to consolidate power in the president's hands. The U.S. government openly worries that Putin is dragging Russia back into the autocracy of the Soviet era. Putin denies this is the case, justifying his actions by saying that he is trying—like his U.S. counterpart—to do whatever is necessary to combat terrorism. He also points to the strength of his showing in the 2004 elections as proof that the Russian people support his ideas. According to the current Russian constitution, Putin is not eligible to run for a third term in office in 2008. Western observers are waiting to see if he will try to amend the constitution before that time to continue his time in power.

See also Commonwealth of Independent States; Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy; Terrorism, War on International; Yeltsin, Boris (1931–)

Q

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR)

Administration report, released every four years, that is a crucial element in ongoing national security and military reforms aimed at identifying new threats and developing new strategies to combat those threats. In response to what critics perceived as the slow pace of reform at the Pentagon in the years following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Congress passed the Defense Authorization Act in 1997. The Act mandates that each new administration conduct a comprehensive examination of the nation's defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plans, and other elements of the defense program and policies. This is the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

Each Quadrennial Defense Review must define current threats, suggest strategies to foil those threats, and propose the required military forces. The first QDR was the third major strategic reassessment of the force structure of the armed forces in a decade, following the base force assessment in the administration of President George H. W. Bush and the bottom-up review of the administration of President Bill Clinton.

According to the Defense Authorization Act, the pace of global change required a new and comprehensive assessment of the defense strategy of the United States and the force structure of the armed forces needed to meet the threats to the nation in the 21st century. Critics, however, charged that neither the first QDR nor the National Defense Review, a Congress-appointed independent body that evaluated the QDR, went far enough in challenging ingrained security policy. In particular, these critics were concerned about the need to fight two regional wars almost simultaneously and maintain the forces necessary to do so.

See also Bottom-Up Review

R

RADAR (RADIO DETECTION AND RANGING)

Remote detection system used to locate and identify objects. Radar relies on sending and receiving electromagnetic radiation, usually in the form of radio waves or microwaves. Electromagnetic energy moves in waves at or near the speed of light. The wavelength of an electromagnetic wave determines some of the characteristics of the wave. Gamma rays and X-rays have very short wavelengths and can penetrate solid objects. Longer wavelengths such as radio waves or microwaves tend to be reflected by solid objects and are more effective for radar.

Radar creates an electromagnetic energy pulse that is focused by an antenna and transmitted through the air. This focused wave is called the *signal*. Objects in the path of the signal, called *targets*, scatter the electromagnetic energy. Some of this scattered energy is reflected or bounces back toward the radar. This is called an *echo*. The receiving antenna (which is usually the transmitting antenna as well) gathers this radiation and feeds it to a device called a *receiver*. The receiver reports the return and, depending on the sophistication of the device, simply reports the detection or analyzes the signal for more detailed information.

Radar can determine a number of properties of an object, including its distance, speed, direction of motion, and shape. Radar can detect objects in the dark, beyond a line of sight, and in diverse weather conditions. Even though radio waves and microwaves reflect better than other electromagnetic waves with shorter lengths, only a minute fraction of the radar signal is reflected back (about a billionth of a billionth). This low return requires the radar system to transmit high amounts of energy in the signal.

Radar has many applications, from meteorology to speed limit enforcement. Air defense and tactical military operations are dependent upon airborne and ground-based radar installations to track threats and coordinate attacks. Radar is integral to air and sea navigation, defense, improving traffic safety, and providing scientific data. Air traffic control is highly dependent on large networks of ground-based radar systems.

Meteorologists use radar to observe and forecast the weather. Recent improvements, such as Doppler radar, have been effective for providing tornado, hurricane, and other types of severe weather warnings. Radar is also employed in climate research, for mapping the surface of the earth from orbit, in remote sensing applications, and for investigating the surface of other planets and asteroids.

Radar systems perform the same basic tasks, but the manner in which these are operationalized affects the systems' parts. Pulse radar, for example, sends out bursts of electromagnetic waves at intervals. This requires a method of timing that bursts from the transmitter, causing this type of radar to require a more complex transmitter. Continuous wave radar sends out a continuous signal to obtain detailed information about the target—about its speed and direction, for example. Because this type of radar is more dependent on the return, or echo, it requires a more complex receiver.

See also Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line

RADIO FREE EUROPE

Radio broadcasting organization created by the U.S. government to provide information and political commentary to the people of communist Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In the absence of unbiased media in the communist countries, Radio Free Europe provided its estimated 35 million listeners with news from around the world and, more important, from their own countries. Due to its largely successful efforts to outwit communist censors and reach its listeners on a daily basis, Radio Free Europe is credited with having contributed significantly to the demise of communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe and the Near East.

Radio Free Europe first began transmitting from its headquarters in Munich, Germany, on July 4, 1950, to a Czechoslovakian audience. Soon, its target was enlarged to include most of the Soviet-dominated countries, across 13 time zones. The station was funded by the U.S. Congress through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). However, the fact of CIA involvement was kept secret until the late 1960s for fear of Soviet retaliation.

The CIA ended its involvement in Radio Free Europe's financing and operation in 1971, and control was transferred to a Board for International Broadcasting appointed by the U.S. president. Four years later, in 1975, Radio Free Europe was merged with a similar broadcasting organization named Radio Liberty, creating what is still called Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). Despite the termination of CIA involvement in Radio Free Europe, the Soviet Union continued its attempts to jam the station until 1988.

Following the end of the Cold War in 1989, the role of RFE/RL has changed in many of its target countries. The station is now officially allowed to operate in most of the states it broadcasts to, with the exception of Belarus, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Iran. RFE/RL currently has bureaus in 23 countries throughout Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the Middle East. In 1995, its headquarters moved to Prague, Czech Republic.

RFE/RL broadcasts in more than 20 different languages, including lesser-known tongues such as Bashkir, Circassian, Tatar, and Chechen (all spoken in the Russian Federation). It does not broadcast in English at all. Nineteen of the languages in which it broadcasts are spoken by Muslim communities, ranging from Kosovo (in the Balkans) to Iran (in the Middle East). In addition to providing its listeners with local news and information, RFE/RL aims to assist countries that are in transition in developing their civil societies (including the media) and guarding against the resumption of totalitarian rule.

See also Communism and National Security; Eastern Bloc; Iron Curtain; Propaganda; Psychological Warfare (PSYOPS); Voice of America

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RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSION DEVICE (RDD) OR DIRTY BOMB

A device that uses conventional high explosives to disperse highly dangerous radioactive materials, such as the isotopes americium, cobalt 60, and cesium 137, which are well-suited for radiological weapons because of their availability and the length of time they remain radioactive.

Experts believe that terrorists could assemble a radiological dispersion device (RDD), or dirty bomb, in a matter of weeks, and the idea that terrorists might one day try to detonate such a device is one of the greatest fears in the war on international terrorism. Responding to possible threats at the New Year's Eve celebrations in New York City in 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other federal agents were armed with small radiation detectors and patrolled Times Square on the lookout for a terrorist dirty bomb. Terrorists could also achieve the results of a dirty bomb attack without the actual use of explosives. Radiation could be released using smoke or aerosols to mask the attack.

According to the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University (NDU), a successful dirty bomb attack in

New York or Washington, DC, would kill dozens of people, sicken thousands, and contaminate an area the size of the Washington Mall. In the aftermath of the attack, buildings would have to be razed, and debris—including more than three feet of topsoil—would have to be removed and taken to a protected area. Estimates on the economic impact of such an attack using a dirty bomb range as high as $40 billion.

An NDU report calls for a number of steps to defend the United States against an attack with an RDD or dirty bomb. These steps include the deployment of more decontamination equipment, the stockpiling of medication, the implementation of national standards for emergency response, better disaster coordination, and insurance reform to buffer the economy from dirty bomb attacks.

See also Homeland Security; Terrorism, War on International

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RAND CORPORATION

A U.S. think tank organization established following World War II to offer independent research and analysis to the U.S. military.

On May 14, 1948, Project RAND (a contraction of the term *research and development*) broke away from its parent company, the Douglas Aircraft Company of Santa Monica, California, and became an independent nonprofit organization. The project was dedicated to furthering and promoting scientific, educational, and charitable purposes for the public welfare and security of the United States.

The RAND Project was an outgrowth of discussions that involved the U.S. War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and industry leaders. These groups saw a need for a private organization to connect military planning with research and development decisions in a postwar period in which peace might not be permanently assured. Covert foreign policy became an early specialty of RAND policy analysts.

Since its establishment, approximately two-thirds of RAND's research has involved national security

issues. The remainder of the research conducted by the organization is devoted to issues concerning health, education, civil and criminal justice, labor and population studies, and international economics.

Today, RAND boasts achievements in its contributions to the U.S. space program, digital computing, and artificial intelligence. The organization also has expertise in child policy, civil and criminal justice, education, environment and energy, health, international policy, labor markets, national security, population and regional studies, science and technology, social welfare, terrorism, and transportation.

See also Think Tanks

RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE (RDF)

An elite formation of troops designed to move greater distances in a shorter time than conventional military formations. The U.S. military has long used rapid deployment forces as a way to move troops quickly to trouble spots. However, the expansion of U.S. security interests after World War II increased the need for a force that could be quickly dispatched anywhere around the world. This led to the creation of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

The concept of light, mobile special forces can be traced to military formations popularized in the 18th century. The French army of that time created light cavalry units called hussars to carry out fast strikes on enemy targets. During the Napoleonic Wars of the early 1800s, many European armies used special light infantry formations as scouts and sharpshooters on the fringes of the main formations. These units went by various names, depending upon their nationality. For example, such forces in German and Austrian armies were often called *Jaeger*, or hunter, battalions. These units typically consisted of irregular troops who could live off the land and were not as dependent as regular conscripts were on direct control by senior staff officers.

During the American Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress established the U.S. Marine Corps as a rapid deployment force for use against British troops. The Marines continued to serve in this capacity after the United States won its independence in 1784. In the early 1800s, the Marines were sent to North Africa in response to Barbary pirates who were attacking U.S. shipping in the Mediterranean. During

the Mexican War, U.S. Marines invaded the Mexican port of Veracruz to pave the way for the U.S. victory over Mexico.

The Marines remained the sole U.S. rapid deployment force for many years. However, this changed following the Allied victory in World War II and the rise of communism as a global challenge to U.S. interests. Immediately after the war, the United States viewed Western Europe and the Korean Peninsula to be the main areas of potential overseas military confrontation. During the decades following the war, political and military rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union spread across all the world's continents. The Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia joined Europe and Korea as potential trouble spots. The United States thus faced the need for combined land, sea, and air forces that could respond to threats in any of those places at a moment's notice.

In 1977, a U.S. government study called for the creation of a multiservice force that could be rapidly deployed outside the operational regions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Korea. That year, U.S. President Jimmy Carter directed the military to establish a force that could project U.S. power quickly and decisively. The 1978 seizure of American hostages in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the following year, stimulated and justified the formation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) in 1980.

Originally established as part of the U.S. Readiness Command, the RDJTF was made a separate force in 1981, reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, the RDJTF was responsible for planning, training for, and carrying out rapid U.S. responses to threats against vital national interests. The focus of the RDJTF was on the Middle East, particularly the Southwest Asia-Persian Gulf region. In 1983, the RDJTF was replaced by the formation of the U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM. Like the RDJTF, CENTCOM has no permanent forces assigned to its control. When an emergency arises that requires a military response, available forces from the four service branches and the U.S. Coast Guard are assigned to CENTCOM control.

The United States is not the only country that maintains rapid deployment forces. Russia, Great Britain, France, and Germany all have similar units. According to some military analysts, post–Cold War budget pressures on national militaries will make rapid deployment forces more important in the future. Indeed, not only are many larger nations upgrading their rapid deployment forces but a number of smaller states such as South Africa, Brazil, and Malaysia have also begun to form similar units. NATO has also established a large-scale rapid deployment force, known as the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). These developments reflect the importance of flexibility and speed in modern military operations.

See also CENTCOM; Special Forces; U.S. Marine Corps

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REAGAN DOCTRINE

Term used to characterize the policy of the administration of President Ronald Reagan (1981–1988), which aimed to support anticommunist insurgents globally.

Ronald Reagan, who held strong anticommunist views, was elected President of the United States in November 1980. The former actor had become embroiled in disputes over the issue of communist influences on the film industry when Reagan was president of the Screen Actors Guild in the mid-1950s.

In his 1985 State of the Union address, President Reagan reasserted his vehement anticommunist stance when he called on Congress and the American people to stand up to the Soviet Union, which Reagan termed the *Evil Empire*. As early as 1983, the Reagan administration had articulated a shift in U.S. policy in a series of national security directives, which identified turning back Soviet expansionism as a central priority of U.S. foreign policy.

In a policy break from the doctrine of containment established by President Harry S. Truman, Reagan sought to turn back what he termed Soviet aggression on every continent. Based on the *Roll Back* strategy advanced by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in the 1950s, the Reagan Doctrine sought actively to reduce the influence of the Soviet Union beyond its borders.

Reagan differed from Dulles in that the president relied primarily on overt material support of anticommunist

insurgents attempting to oust Soviet-backed regimes. The Reagan administration sought to rebuild the credibility of the U.S. commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on the interests of America and its allies and support third-world states willing to resist or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to those interests.

Under the Reagan Doctrine, the Reagan administration provided overt and covert support to several anticommunist insurgents. In Nicaragua, the administration supported the Contra movement in an effort to force the leftist Sandinista government from power. In Afghanistan, the United States provided material support to Afghan rebels, known as the mujahideen, to help them end Soviet occupation in Afghanistan.

See also Cold War; Iran-Contra Affair; Reagan, Ronald, and National Policy; Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy

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REAGAN, RONALD, AND NATIONAL POLICY

The foreign policy agenda advanced by Ronald Reagan (1911–2004), 40th president of the United States, calling for active American confrontation with the Soviet Union, a significant expansion of U.S. military capacity, a renewed offensive on communist insurgencies in third-world nations, and the development of a controversial space-based missile defense system—an agenda often identified by the moniker peace through strength.

Ronald Reagan took office in the winter of 1981, intent on establishing a new aggressive plan of action for U.S. involvement in the Cold War. Beginning with the administration of President Richard Nixon, and continuing through those of Presidents Ford and Carter, the American approach to its Soviet adversary had become one of détente, or a gradual thawing of tensions and deescalation of military conflicts. Reagan's fierce anticommunist position (originating from his

experience as the president of the Hollywood Screen Actors Guild, 1947–1952 and 1959–1960), combined with a renewal of Cold War pressures brought on by the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, set the stage for the dramatic shift in U.S. foreign policy.

Reagan believed wholeheartedly that the Soviet Union, with its planned economy and state-sponsored socialist system, would be unable to stand toe-to-toe with the United States simultaneously on every front—most notably the arms race, the battle for economic supremacy, and the ongoing war of competing ideologies. Moreover, Reagan maintained that the United States had a moral obligation to combat the Soviet Union, a regime he once famously referred to as the Evil Empire.

As such, Reagan initiated an enormous $800 billion defense buildup, secured passage of a radical series of tax cuts (in which the top tax rate was reduced from 70% to 28%), and funded anticommunist military uprisings in such nations as Nicaragua, Angola, and Afghanistan. Reagan's programs, though arguably contributing to the demise of the Soviet Union, saddled the United States with more than $2 trillion in debt.

Among President Reagan's most controversial proposals was the development and eventual deployment of a space-based missile-defense system. This Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was dubbed *Star Wars* by critics who maintained that not only was such a program too far-fetched (both in terms of cost and technology), but that it was also in direct violation of America's legal commitment to the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972.

SDI ultimately led to the breakdown of a series of groundbreaking arms-limitation talks between Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October of 1986. Prior to discussing SDI, Reagan and Gorbachev had agreed in Iceland to immediately limit their respective nuclear forces to 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads, reduce all strategic strike forces by 50% over the first five years of any agreement, eliminate all stockpiles of nuclear ballistic missiles over a 10-year period, and remove large amounts of nuclear munitions from Europe and parts of Asia in the interim. As a concession, Premier Gorbachev wanted the Reagan administration to effectively end its pursuit of SDI. Reagan countered by offering to share SDI technology with the Soviet Union; Gorbachev balked. In a moment of genuine

brinkmanship, Reagan ultimately refused to concede SDI and walked away from the talks altogether. Many felt that Reagan was playing a very dangerous game, but others point to Reykjavik as the defining foreign policy moment of his eight-year presidency. Reykjavik set the stage for U.S.-Soviet agreement on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed in December of 1987, as well as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) signed in July of 1991. The Soviet Union dissolved five months after the START I treaty was ratified.

Reagan's support of anticommunist efforts in third-world nations tarnished his reputation as both a proponent of democratization and a law-abiding citizen. American efforts in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, and elsewhere were often conducted in concert with highly questionable resistance leaders. Moreover, critics claimed that Reagan's interference in the domestic affairs of other nations would ultimately lead to an anti-American backlash from the third world.

The administration's most damaging move came in its decision to secretly sell weapons to Iran (which needed to arm itself in its ongoing war with Iraq) and channel the proceeds to anticommunist Contras in Nicaragua. Although Reagan was ultimately absolved of any of the legal charges levied against him in the so-called Iran-Contra affair, the scandal raised serious questions about both his leadership and ability to speak truthfully to the American people.

A controversial and colorful figure to be sure, Ronald Reagan presided over one of the most precedent-setting periods of American foreign policy history. Much of what he accomplished—for better or for worse—has set the stage for the international environment of the 21st century.

See also Arms Control; Arms Race; Cold War; Communism; Communism and National Security; Democratization; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Grenada Intervention; Iran-Contra Affair (1985–1986); Nuclear Weapons; Reagan Doctrine; Reykjavik; Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy; Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

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REFLECTIONS

The Flourishing of Democracy

The objective I propose is quite simple to state: To foster the infrastructure of democracy—the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities—which allows a people to choose their own way to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.

This is not cultural imperialism; it is providing the means for genuine self-determination and protection for diversity. Democracy already flourishes in countries with very different cultures and historical experiences. It would be cultural condescension, or worse, to say that any people prefer dictatorship to democracy. Who would voluntarily choose not to have the right to vote, decide to purchase government propaganda handouts instead of independent newspapers, prefer government to worker-controlled unions, opt for land to be owned by the state instead of those who till it, want government repression of religious liberty, a single political party instead of a free choice, a rigid cultural orthodoxy instead of democratic tolerance and diversity?

—U.S. President Ronald Reagan
Speech to the British House of Commons, 1982

REALISM

Political theory that conceives of world affairs as a struggle for power among nations. Realism discounts moral considerations in foreign policy, and asserts that a state can achieve security only by amassing power. States project power mainly by relying on force or the threat of force.

Variations of realist theory have dominated the study of international relations since World War II, especially in the United States, in which realism also influenced policymakers. Rival theories question realism's most fundamental assumptions. Yet realism remains relevant, even in an interdependent world plagued by nonstate threats, such as the international terrorist group al-Qaeda.

According to realists, the struggle for power among nations is rooted in human nature. When nations find that their interests coincide, they collaborate. However, when nations' interests clash, rivalry and conflict

ensue. To survive, states must follow national interests by maximizing their power.

Realists admit that skilled diplomacy can achieve mutual accommodation, but they reject idealist visions of durable peace, trust, and cooperation among countries. Realists are skeptical about the possibility of moral progress or human improvement; they believe that wars are bound to occur because of an innate lust for power and because there is no overarching authority to impose peace. Relations among states are inherently competitive, especially in the field of military security.

PROPONENTS

Realism rose to the fore after World War II, but its origins can be traced back to the 5th century BCE. The ancient Greek historian Thucydides attributed the Peloponnesian War (between Athens and Sparta) to the growth of Athenian power and the fear that it evoked in Sparta. In his *Melian Dialogue*, Thucydides observed that the strong do what they will; the weak do what they must.

Realist themes resurfaced in *The Prince* (1513), a treatise on princely rule by Renaissance Italian political leader Niccolò Machiavelli. Dismissing all ethical considerations, Machiavelli focused on the strength of the ruler as the prime factor for successful government.

In the 1930s, British political scientist and historian Edward H. Carr argued for *realism* in the study of international relations. Carr advocated realism as an antidote to what he saw as utopianism or wishful thinking in the League of Nations and in U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's ideal of self-determination for all nations.

Realism was most compellingly systematized by the German-born American political scientist Hans Morgenthau in *Politics Among Nations* (1948). Morgenthau argued that political leaders could deduce rational and objectively correct policies from the immutable laws of nature that govern politics. He conceived of power as the principal goal in international relations, and he defined the national interest in terms of power. Morgenthau's views inspired generations of scholars and practitioners of international politics in North America and Western Europe.

ASSUMPTIONS

Realist theory assumes that the state is the most important actor in world affairs. It discounts other actors above the state level (such as the European Union or the United Nations) and below the state level (such as terrorist networks, multinational corporations, and ethnic minorities within states). The state is also assumed a single unit (ignoring divisions among government bureaucracies such as the State Department and the Pentagon) that acts based on a rational calculation of costs and benefits. From a realist point of view, the international system is one of anarchy, with no authority capable of enforcing rules on sovereign states.

In realist thought, relations among states are considered naturally conflictual, and the outcome of international relations is dictated by differences in the relative level of military and economic power. World affairs are defined by security competition among sovereign states under the chronic threat of war. According to realists, states claiming to promote universal values such as democracy or peace are concealing their self-interest, in fact. State leaders cannot be expected to adhere to the moral rules that normally bind individuals because state leaders have only one goal: the survival of the state.

CRITICISM

According to critics, realism is too narrowly focused on power politics and the causes of conflict, ignoring broader social, economic, and environmental issues. Most critics agree that the world is indeed anarchic, but they point to the development of a complex interdependence and at least the idea of an international community.

Critics of realist thought also claim that states are no longer alone on the world stage. Their borders are increasingly permeable, and other actors have gained importance, including supranational organizations, multinational corporations, and terrorist networks.

The realist emphasis on sovereign states is falling behind the times, as virtually no government can now claim absolute control over its territory, in the face of globalization. Modern communications technology, global financial markets, and a shared environment contribute to interdependence, making it practically impossible to guarantee the security of one state without also ensuring the security of other states. Institutions, rather than states, can best address the problems of an emerging global village. Institutions promote trust and mitigate the effects of international anarchy.

State preferences are determined not only by military and economic capabilities but also by culture and ideology. States have largely lost the incentive for territorial expansion because knowledge resources are becoming more important than natural resources for generating power and prestige.

Critics of realism also draw attention to examples of cooperation among countries beyond a narrowly defined self-interest. Such cooperation is possible because states, which are motivated by human wants and needs, strive for absolute (rather than relative) gains.

Critics also take issue with realism's exclusion of ethical and sociopsychological dimensions. Realism cannot explain the growing salience of moral imperatives such as human rights. Moral restraint and responsibility affect the struggle for power among states. Realism cannot fully account for the complexity of the contemporary world, in which power is exercised in many dimensions, not only among independent states.

NEOREALISM

U.S. political scientist Kenneth Waltz updated realist theory in the late 1970s, founding the school of neorealism, or structural realism. Waltz attempted to provide a coherent theoretical framework to explain behavior in the international system, especially the consequences of major shifts in the balance of power, recurring patterns of interaction, and similar behavior by disparate states.

Instead of referring to human nature, Waltz focused on the anarchic characteristics of the international system. He assumed that the ultimate state interest was not power but security. According to Waltz, the maximization of power often ensures security, but in some cases, it might trigger an arms race, as happened in the Cold War.

As a theory, realism gave form and structure to the study of international politics. As a worldview, it offered insight into diplomacy and statecraft, especially for practitioners of *realpolitik* (an expansionist national policy having as its sole principle the advancement of the national interest). Despite its limitations, realism remains relevant today, even in a globalized world in which multiple actors strive for various goals, of which military power is only one.

See also Geopolitics; Globalization and National Security; Interdependence; Machiavelli, Niccolò (1469–1527); Morgenthau, Hans (1904–1980); Realpolitik

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REFLECTIONS

Realism

[I]t appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of a matter than the imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much that is evil.

—Niccolò Machiavelli
The Prince, 1513

The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible.

—Hans J. Morgenthau
Politics Among Nations, 1948

REALPOLITIK

Term of German origin that refers to international relations based upon the advancement of national interest and calculation of power. Realpolitik is a central principle of political realist thought and a reference to power politics among states.

In the arena of international relations, political realist thought emphasizes the constraints placed upon politics by human nature and the nonexistence of a dominant international governing body. These conditions combine to transform international relations into a realm of actors motivated by power and interest.

Realists assert that human nature remains unchanged since the days of classical antiquity and is, at its core, egoistic and thus inclined toward immorality. According to realpolitik, the nonexistence of a dominant governmental body in international relations results in anarchy in the international arena. The concept also holds that, within states, human nature usually is tamed by hierarchical political authority and rule. In international relations, anarchy not merely allows but encourages the worst aspects of human nature to be expressed.

The Prince, written by the Renaissance Italian political leader Niccolò Machiavelli, is universally acknowledged as a classical political work that espouses realpolitik behavior. In the book, Machiavelli discusses how to gain, maintain, and expand power. Any means necessary to achieve the desired end—security of the state—are justified.

Other realist political philosophers include the ancient Greek historian Thucydides and the 17th-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes concluded that humanity's natural condition is a state of war, but a superior power dominating the actions of individuals can impose constraint and social structure, thus allowing humanity's escape from anarchical existence. According to Hobbes, hierarchical political authority awes humanity into submission and peace.

See also Hobbes, Thomas (1588–1679); Machiavelli, Niccolò (1469–1527); Realism

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REGIONALISM

Political philosophy that emphasizes the primacy of the interests of larger regional groupings over those of individual states. Regionalism stands in contrast to nationalism, in which the interests of the nation-state are considered paramount.

Nationalism has been the preeminent force in international relations for hundreds of years. The Peace of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648 formally established the nation-state system as the accepted political order in Europe. That conflict was the culmination of several large and myriad smaller religious wars stretching over more than a century. Westphalia established the principle that rulers had the right to determine what religion would be observed in their territories. By extension, it recognized the sovereignty of established states and condemned interference in their internal affairs.

Regionalism is largely a product of forces shaping the world since the early 20th century, including decolonization and globalization. After World War II, newly independent nations in Africa and Asia created several regional political and economic organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). These organizations had ambitious goals based on a perceived sense of shared interest among former colonies. National interests, however, often overrode regional priorities, checkering the groups' records of achievement.

The OAU was established in 1963 by 23 African states seeking to end the remaining colonialism in Africa and to promote peace and economic development on the continent. The OAU had some modest successes in promoting economic liberalization in Africa, but it failed to prevent or mitigate scores of regional wars and the rise of authoritarian regimes throughout the continent. The OAU was disbanded in 2002 and replaced by a new organization named the African Union (AU).

The AU has shown a greater willingness to intervene in the affairs of member states than did the OAU. In May 2003, an AU force composed of troops from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique was dispatched to Burundi to enforce peace agreements in the wake of Burundi's recently ended civil war. The AU also sent 300 observers to monitor ethnic violence in the Darfur region of Sudan and is now considering the deployment of peacekeepers to the area.

Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan formed the RCD in 1964 to liberalize and promote trade among the three countries. However, the member states could not develop a mutually acceptable mechanism for expanding trade or mobilizing regional resources. Political instability following the 1979 Iranian revolution caused the RCD to suspend operations until 1985. At that time, a new group, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), arose from the old RCD. In 1990, following the collapse of Soviet communism, seven newly independent states in Central Asia and the Caucasus joined the ECO.

The goals of ECO incorporate both economic and social objectives. Economic goals include promoting sustainable development in member states, removing trade barriers and promoting regional trade, developing transportation and communications links among member states and with neighbor states, developing economic liberalization and privatization, and mobilizing the region's resources (particularly energy) to increase regional economic power. Social objectives of ECO include cooperating to control regional drug trafficking, having mutual ecological and environmental protection, and strengthening cultural ties among the people of the region.

Globalization—the growing worldwide economic, political, and social interconnectedness—has also provided a strong impetus toward regionalism. This has found its most prominent expression in a surge of regional economic and trade agreements since the 1990s. The increased internationalization of business caused by improvements in transportation and communications has led neighboring countries to create regional trade zones to protect themselves against economic competition from other regions. Pacts such as the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among the United States, Canada, and Mexico have facilitated lower trade barriers among neighbors and political allies.

Europe has taken regionalism a step further with the adoption of the euro as the common currency by 12 members of the European Union (EU), a supranational organization that attempts to coordinate the economic policies of member countries. The EU has existed formally since 1992, but Western European nations have instituted informal organizations for similar purposes since the 1950s. However, the introduction of the euro marked a radical abandonment of one of the historic hallmarks of national sovereignty: a separate currency.

By discontinuing their own currencies in favor of the euro, the 12 EU states that form the so-called Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have committed to an unprecedented experiment in regionalism. Sharing a common currency means that the economic health of each member can significantly affect that of all the others. EMU members agree to work through the EU parliament to resolve differences or disputes over economic policy, marking a shift from national toward regional control over internal state affairs. Some EU states, most notably Great Britain, have resisted joining the EMU for fears of losing control over their national economic fortunes.

The long-term goal of the EU is the political integration of Europe, in part motivated by a desire to act as a counterweight to the economic and military power of the United States. After one-half century of close interdependence between Europe and the United States during the Cold War, the partners in the Cold War Atlantic Alliance are still political allies, but they are also competitors for global economic and political influence. Both the EU and NAFTA reflect the rise of regionalism as a political and economic force gradually supplanting national rivalries as a focus of international relations.

See also Globalization and National Security; Nationalism; Nation-State; New World Order

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REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN

Political self-designation for the island commonly known as Taiwan.

Although its international legal status is unclear, the Republic of China on Taiwan functions as an independent state, electing its own leadership and managing its own internal and external affairs. Its neighbor to the west, the People's Republic of China (PRC), claims Taiwan as a province and considers the Taiwanese government to be illegal. Since 1949, Taiwan and China have developed an uneasy standoff, occasionally trading provocations but never engaging in open warfare.

Complex political and economic issues have vested other world powers, notably the United States and Japan, with an interest in the conflict. Such outside forces exert a considerable measure of influence over the actions of both Taiwan and China.

ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT

The history of Taiwan is as complicated as its present political situation, with the island changing hands several times over the past five centuries. After decades of Spanish and Dutch rule, China annexed large parts of Taiwan in the late 1600s. Two centuries later, in 1895, following the Sino-Japanese war, control over Taiwan passed to Japan. Despite Taiwanese resistance, the Japanese dominated the island for the next 50 years. In 1945, at the end of World War II, a defeated Japanese Empire returned Taiwan to China.

The Chinese, however, were experiencing a political crisis at the time. The country's loyalties were divided between followers of Nationalist Party leader Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Communist Party leader Mao Zedong as China plunged into civil war. Chiang, who had fought both Japan and the Chinese communists on the mainland, faced his first challenge in the form of a revolt by the indigenous Taiwanese, which the Nationalists rigorously repressed. The United States and other western powers recognized Chiang as China's legitimate ruler, whereas the Soviet Union supported the Chinese communists.

While battling the communists, Chiang reestablished Chinese administration in Taiwan. However, the Nationalist Party on the island proved to be thoroughly corrupt, and in 1947, the generalissimo had to call in troops to crush a Taiwanese revolt. As chance would have it, two years later Chiang lost his struggle with the communists and was forced to evacuate to Taiwan with more than one million supporters. The generalissimo's presence on the island and the threat of a powerful Communist Chinese neighbor seeking reunification sent shock waves through Taiwan's already tumultuous political life.

From Taiwan, the generalissimo still claimed to represent the legitimate government of all Chinese people. He considered Mao's communist regime to have usurped his legitimate rule. For its part, Communist China, formally known as the People's Republic of China (PRC), perceived Taiwan as a renegade province and reserved the right to take whatever measures it thought necessary to reunite the island with the mainland.

Taiwan's Nationalist government, however, had more to worry about than PRC threats. In 1947, frustrated by the corruption that plagued a government run by Chiang's imported mainlanders, the Taiwanese rose up once again. The revolt was again suppressed and Chiang declared martial law, a condition that stayed in effect for the next 40 years. During this time, no opposition party legally could be formed, and the government ruled with an iron fist. Throughout this period, the Nationalists continued to espouse the goal of reuniting island and mainland under Nationalist rule. At the popular level, however, a Taiwanese identity, distinct from a Chinese identity, began to appeal to an increasing number of islanders. That sense of identity eventually changed the Taiwanese public's perspective on the desirability of joining the mainland under one government.

CHANGING DIRECTION

In the late 1960s, Taiwan's economy started growing at a rapid pace. By the early 1980s, the phenomenon came to be known as the Taiwanese miracle. The booming economy, coupled with the end of martial law and the subsequent democratization of the political process in the late 1980s, contributed significantly to the gradual transformation of the Taiwanese attitude toward mainland China.

In March 1991, Taiwanese President Lee Teng Hui announced that his government no longer claimed the territory of mainland China, as the generalissimo and his successors had done for over 40 years. This did not placate the PRC, however, which continued to express frustration at what it perceived to be the island's dangerous drift toward independence. In 1996, China staged live-ammunition war games just off the coast of Taiwan—a not-so-subtle warning against a unilateral declaration of Taiwanese independence. Just three years later, Taiwanese President Lee raised the political stakes by speaking on the record of the need for a "state-to-state" relationship with China. Taiwan now contemplated a choice between two policy options that were equally distasteful to China: supporting the ambiguous yet relatively stable status quo or supporting a drive for outright independence.

The dilemma, however, did not affect Taiwan and China only. Other world powers with serious interests in the region wasted no time in getting involved in the conflict. As early as 1971, the United Nations General Assembly officially recognized the PRC as the sole

legitimate representative of the Chinese people. A year later, the United States officially acknowledged Communist China's position that Taiwan was a part of its territory. Because China refuses to establish diplomatic relations with countries that recognize Taiwan's statehood, the United States does not currently have an embassy on the island. However, the U.S. government maintains the American Institute in Taiwan, which plays the role of America's official representative to the island.

As a matter of official policy, the United States is neutral in regard to questions of Chinese reunification and Taiwanese independence. Successive American administrations have regularly disapproved of any potential Taiwanese declaration of independence. However, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 allowed the island to buy sophisticated American armament, which would allow it to defend itself efficiently against a potential Chinese attempt to achieve unification by force.

Should the PRC attempt to invade the island, it would face well-armed Taiwanese forces potentially aided by an American military that is anxious about China's increasing influence in Asian and global affairs. The Chinese government, aware of this fact and cognizant of U.S. anxieties, has proposed a peaceful reunification within the one-China, two-systems framework. The policy would allow Taiwan to maintain a measure of political and economic autonomy. Taiwan would be able to continue deciding its own policies, except those that deal with matters of diplomacy and national defense. Similar policies were adopted with regard to Hong Kong and Macau, former European colonies returned to Chinese control in recent years.

The Taiwanese government does not agree with the proposed solution, and local politicians declare themselves in favor of outright independence from time to time. These declarations incense the communist government, which typically responds with threats or provocative actions. As of 2005, the conflict remains unresolved, with the main actors (Taiwan, China, and the United States) deadlocked in a situation that arguably each resents and finds uncomfortable. Nevertheless, the status quo seems to be the only conceivable situation in which the contenders do not feel compelled to resort to aggressive, even military, measures.

—*Razvan Sibii*

See also China and U.S. Policy; Communism and National Security; Geopolitics; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Sovereignty

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RESERVE FORCES

Component of the U.S. military consisting of individuals who train and serve part-time. The U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force all maintain reserve forces.

The reserve consists of both soldiers who have retired from active military duty as well as individuals who enlist directly into the Reserve. Reservists typically spend one weekend per month in inactive duty training and two consecutive weeks of active-duty training each year. Reserve forces are divided into two components: the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve. The Selected Reserve is the primary pool from which the armed forces draw reserve personnel. Those who train on weekends or who are on full-time support status make up the Selected Reserve. The Individual Ready Reserve consists of retired former soldiers and other standby forces.

Many critical support capabilities are located either exclusively or primarily in the reserves. The Army Reserve, for example, contains all the services training divisions, railway units, enemy prisoner of war (POW) brigades, and chemical brigades. It also has most of the Army's civil affairs; psychological operations; medical and transportation units; and a large portion of its public affairs, engineer, and power projection assets. All the Army's bridging capability is also assigned to reserve units.

The Army and Navy reserve forces both began as informal support units that were later institutionalized by the U.S. Congress. The Naval Reserves can trace their origin to the actions of American citizens who took to the seas to harass British shipping during the Revolutionary War. State naval militias provided a reserve force of sorts for the United States throughout the 19th century, but by the outbreak of World War I, it was clear that the navy required a more formal reserve system. On March 3, 1915, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson signed legislation creating a naval reserve force.

The Army Reserve formally came into being at about the same time as the Naval Reserve. Like the Navy, the Army relied heavily on state militias and volunteers to serve as a reserve force. Their training and readiness, like that of naval militia members, was uneven and often of dubious quality. In 1908, the U.S. Congress authorized the Army to create a reserve corps of medical officers. Four years later, the Army Appropriations Act created the Regular Army Reserve. The National Defense Act of 1916 formed the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC); a year later the Medical Officers Corps was incorporated into the Regular Army Reserve to form what is now the U.S. Army Reserve.

The U.S. Air Force Reserve is the youngest of the reserve forces, created as a result of the National Defense Act of 1947. It was officially designated an agency of the Air Force on April 14, 1948. It did not become a separate command (the status of the Army and Navy Reserves) until 1997. The Air Force Reserve participated in the Berlin airlift that relieved the Soviet blockade of West Berlin in 1949. Since that time, Air Force Reserve units have seen action in the Gulf War of 1991 and the Iraq War of 2003, and participated in many humanitarian and disaster relief efforts.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought significant changes to the reserves' force structure. These changes placed reserve forces directly in the line of fire. Reserve units were used extensively in the Gulf War of 1991, the Bosnia Intervention of the mid-to-late 1990s, and the Iraq War of 2003. Reserve units are also among the first-line defense against terrorist attacks on the United States. The Civil-Military Cooperation Program uses Army Reserve expertise to help communities plan for and respond to such attacks.

At the beginning of the 21st century, U.S. reserve forces have assumed a greater responsibility for national security than ever before. The Army Reserve was deployed 10 times between 1991 and 2003; by contrast, it had been mobilized only 9 times in its previous 75 years of existence. In addition, the reserves have played an unprecedented role in the 2003 Iraq War. The subsequent U.S. occupation has stretched the reserves to the limits. Force limitations have prevented many reserve units from rotating out of combat or compelled them to return much more quickly than normal. Some military experts have warned of the threat of breaking the reserve forces by relying too heavily on them for front-line duty. This has sparked debate about a return to the draft, but the administration of President George W. Bush has opposed that idea.

See also All-Volunteer Force; Conscription/Volunteer Force; Gulf War (1990–1991); Iraq War of 2003; National Guard; Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC)

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RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS (ROTC)

Elective military education program at a college or university that leads to a commission as an officer in the U.S. armed forces. Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) programs are offered by the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy (including the Marine Corps). ROTC is one of the three programs of commissioned officers in the military, along with the service academies and officer candidate schools.

Established in 1916, ROTC was created as a way to expand the pool of candidates for the military officer corps beyond the students at the sometimes-clannish service academies. The ROTC program also brought the military and its officers to high schools and colleges throughout the country, a move that developed and cemented ties with local communities. As of 2004, ROTC programs existed on more than 1,000 campuses in the United States and accounted for 60% of all officers in the U.S. armed forces.

For its members at colleges or universities, ROTC provides tuition, fees, and a small stipend, as well as uniforms and military gear. Cadets are organized into military units in which they have the opportunity to exercise leadership skills as they move through the four-year program. Experienced military officers and noncommissioned officers serve as mentors and guides to ROTC cadets. ROTC cadets also participate in supplementary activities, including rappelling, learning to pilot planes, and attending military schools such as Airborne and Ranger training.

Military training in ROTC occurs year-round, but summer is when most tactical training takes place.

Spread over two summers, this tactical training includes a basic session covering soldier training and tasks and an advanced session emphasizing leadership training and skills. Depending on the needs of the military, graduates of ROTC can serve in active-duty units or be assigned to reserve duty.

See also All-Volunteer Force; Reserve Forces

REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS (RMA)
See OFFICE OF NET ASSESSMENT

REYKJAVIK

Summit meeting held in October 1986 between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, the aim of which was to discuss the placing of limitations on the strategic arms of each nation. Following a summit meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, in November 1985, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev met in Reykjavik, Iceland, to discuss the possibility of strategic arm reductions. Only the second meeting between the two world leaders, they approached the talks with diverse agendas.

Reagan staked his presidency on his commitment to opposing the Soviet Union at every opportunity. The White House believed that American supremacy was key to U.S. survival, and it was thought that an accelerated arms race would cause irreparable harm and place tremendous pressure on a faltering Soviet economy.

Meanwhile, Gorbachev was basing his presidency on the dual reform programs of *perestroika* and *glasnost*. For much of its 70 years, the Soviet state towered over the majority of nations in military and industrial might. In its waning decades, however, the Soviet Union was faltering under the strain of its outmoded economic system and industrial infrastructure. To compete against political rivals in the West, the Soviet economy and society would need drastic restructuring.

However, Gorbachev could not afford to continue down the path to reform without assurances about national security. He needed an arms limitation treaty to accomplish this. Reagan, on the other hand, was

gradually being perceived as an extremist hard-liner bent on the destruction of the Soviet Union. To allay such fears, Reagan would appear open to negotiations and was thus willing to attend summit meetings.

The two leaders met in Reykjavik from October 11 to October 16 to discuss arms limitations. During the exchange of proposals, it became clear that the sticking point was the space-based missile defense system known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or Star Wars, under consideration by the United States. President Reagan refused to limit SDI research and technology to the laboratory. Gorbachev, however, would not accept anything less than a ban on missile testing in space. Despite the failure to reach an agreement on this issue, both sides felt that the meeting was a success and that it opened the way for further progress.

Gorbachev later remarked that he and President Reagan had had real conversations about key issues during the Reykjavik meeting. For this reason, he considered the meeting a turning point in the Cold War.

See also Arms Control; Summit Conferences

RIO PACT

Mutual defense agreement signed in 1947 by the United States and 19 Latin American countries. Under the terms of the Rio Pact, an attack against any of the signatory nations is regarded as an attack against all. The pact provides for all signatories to send troops in defense of any member that is the target of foreign aggression.

The Rio Pact was both an extension of the Monroe Doctrine of the 19th century and a product of the 20th century Cold War. The Monroe Doctrine, outlined by U.S. President James Monroe in 1823, declared the western hemisphere off-limits to European intervention. It stated that the United States would regard any attempt by foreign powers to interfere in Latin America to be an act of aggression against the United States. The Monroe Doctrine, however, was a unilateral declaration by the United States. It reflected a desire to create an exclusive U.S. sphere of influence in the western hemisphere rather than a collective statement of solidarity among western nations.

Fears about the spread of Soviet communism after World War II led the United States to seek a more

active alliance with other Western-Hemisphere nations. Thus, on September 2, 1947, the United States and 19 Latin American countries signed the Rio Pact, which created a hemisphere-wide security zone. Under the pact, members agreed to refrain from aggression against each other, as well as to defend one another from outside aggression. The Rio Pact authorizes the use of force to resist aggression if two-thirds of the members vote to do so. Each member nation, however, must consent to the use of its troops in any military action. The Rio Pact was the first formal regional defense agreement concluded under the terms of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It also served as a model for the North Atlantic Treaty that created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.

As the perceived Soviet threat to the Western Hemisphere decreased, the Rio Pact became less important for U.S. foreign policy. For example, Argentina invoked the pact in 1982 to obtain U.S. assistance in the Falklands War against Great Britain, but the United States backed the British in that conflict. However, after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against New York City and Washington, DC, some Western-Hemisphere nations—particularly Brazil—have talked of reviving the Rio Pact in response to the threat of international terrorism. These suggestions have been met with a positive response from the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush.

See also Cold War; Collective Security Communism and National Security; Latin America and U.S. Policy; Monroe Doctrine (1823); Regionalism; Treaties

RISK ASSESSMENT

The process of weighing the potential benefits and drawbacks of a course of action to determine whether to undertake that action. Risk assessment is the initial step in the risk management process and the one that is perhaps not only the most difficult to execute but also most subject to error. The individuals charged with shaping and executing U.S. national security policy constantly engage in risk assessment. Every decision they make that affects the security of the country contains both possible benefits and potential risks. Through risk assessment, decision makers determine whether the potential benefits of the policy outweigh the accompanying risks. After the risks of a course of action have been identified and weighed, decision

makers formulate policy based on their assessment of risk versus reward.

CHALLENGES IN RISK ASSESSMENT

One of the first challenges in risk assessment is identifying all the possible risks and benefits of a course of action. Often a policy can lead to unforeseen consequences that change the final balance of risk and reward. For example, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the United States decided to provide weapons and training to the Afghan defenders. With U.S. support, the Afghans eventually defeated the Soviet invasion. However, U.S. policymakers failed to anticipate that many of the same Afghan fighters would later form the core of the international terrorist group al-Qaeda. Members of al-Qaeda members turned U.S. training and weaponry against their former sponsors, and the group has become one of the principal threats to U.S. security interests.

Another obstacle to accurate risk assessment is weighing the relative importance of the severity of a risky outcome versus the possibility that such an outcome will occur. Which should be granted higher priority when determining policy: a risk that potentially could result in a large loss but has a low probability of occurring, or one that is more likely to happen but would result in a lower potential loss? Making such a determination accurately might require more time and resources than are available to policymakers. These restrictions can contribute to faulty risk assessment and thus faulty decision making.

CASE STUDY: THE BAY OF PIGS

A study of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion offers some insights into the difficulties and pitfalls of risk assessment. It also highlights the role of outside factors such as political pressure that can affect the risk assessment process. The failed U.S.-backed invasion of Cuba illustrates how failing to assess adequately the potential risks of a policy can lead to disaster in its implementation.

Background of the Invasion

When communist guerrilla leader Fidel Castro overthrew Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959, U.S. leaders were stunned and dismayed. The U.S. government had supported Batista because of his strong anticommunist and pro-United States policies. The

presence of a communist, anti–United States regime less than 100 miles from the United States was seen in Washington as a serious threat to U.S. national security. Castro increased U.S. fears when he signed economic and defense agreements with the United States' strategic rival, the Soviet Union. In response to these developments, the administration of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower began to formulate plans to invade Cuba and topple Castro.

The Eisenhower administration worked on plans for the invasion throughout 1960, using the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to recruit and train an army of Cuban exiles for the mission. The initial plan called for an amphibious landing near the Cuban city of Trinidad, supported by U.S. air power. The administration hoped the invasion would lead to a popular uprising on the island that would force Castro to flee Cuba.

After John F. Kennedy became the U.S. president in 1961, he approved Eisenhower's plan with several modifications, including moving the invasion site to the Bay of Pigs. The original site was chosen because it was closer to the area in which most of the active anti-Castro forces in Cuba were located. The new location was chosen because the tides there were more favorable for an amphibious landing.

On April 15, 1961, U.S. planes bearing the markings of the Cuban Air Force bombed airfields in Cuba. The following day, some 1,500 Cuban exiles landed on the southern coast of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. It soon became clear, however, that the plan was going quite poorly. Cuban resistance to the invasion was much tougher than expected, and the hoped-for local uprisings never occurred. Some of Kennedy's military advisers recommended using U.S. air support to help the troubled invaders, but Kennedy refused. He did not want to risk revealing U.S. involvement in the invasion, even though (unknown to Kennedy) the Soviet Union was aware of the plan before the invasion ever started. The invading forces lost some 90 men before surrendering on April 19.

Lessons for Risk Assessment

In hindsight, both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations made several erroneous assumptions in assessing the risks of an invasion of Cuba. Perhaps the most significant was their conviction that an invasion would lead to massive anti-Castro sentiment in Cuba. The success of both U.S. plans depended upon the invasion stimulating an anti-Castro uprising.

Although there was a strongly anti-Castro faction on the island, the United States overestimated both its numbers and its influence. By changing the landing site from Trinidad to the Bay of Pigs, the Kennedy administration reduced the already-slim chances of such an uprising occurring.

A second major failure of risk assessment was the belief that the invading forces would be able to support themselves after they landed. U.S. planners believed that the exile army could live off the land with help from the local population. They envisioned the invaders sweeping across Cuba, receiving support and additional recruits from Cubans who wanted to depose Castro. As it turned out, the invaders were no match at all for the Cuban defenders. Only the use of U.S. air power could have saved the invasion from total failure at the start, but political considerations prevented President Kennedy from providing overt U.S. military support. If Kennedy had been aware that the Soviet Union knew of the invasion plans, he may have been less reluctant to use U.S. air power. Lacking that knowledge, Kennedy's desire to keep U.S. involvement a secret sealed the fate of the invasion.

It is clear that both U.S. administrations involved in planning the Bay of Pigs made several errors in risk assessment. They overestimated the likelihood of popular support for the invasion while underestimating the risks should that support fail to materialize. They also placed too much hope for success on the anticipated popular uprising in Cuba. The decision to conceal U.S. involvement meant using a hastily assembled and trained force of amateurs to carry out the invasion. Neither administration properly assessed whether such a ragtag force could succeed against the Cuban army, which U.S. leaders considered inconsequential. This faulty assessment of the relative military capabilities of both sides also contributed to the failure of the invasion.

MODERN FAILURES IN RISK ASSESSMENT

Despite the lessons taught by the Bay of Pigs invasion, U.S. planners have repeatedly made similar mistakes in risk assessment. For example, the U.S. involvement in Vietnam was based upon the assessment that it was riskier to allow South Vietnam to become communist than to commit U.S. troops to defend the pro-West South Vietnamese government. However, the U.S. defeat in Vietnam did not lead to a communist

takeover throughout Southeast Asia, as U.S. leaders had predicted. Thirty years after the war, Vietnam is one of only two communist nations in Southeast Asia, and it enjoys friendly relations with the United States.

Flawed risk assessment also contributed to the difficulties faced by occupation forces in Iraq following the 2003 U.S. invasion of that country. Certain elements within the administration of President George W. Bush argued that the Iraqis would welcome invading forces as liberators, and that the country would return to normalcy soon after the invasion. Based on this assessment, they ignored warnings by uniformed military leaders that the U.S. was not committing sufficient troops to maintain order after the invasion. As a result, the occupying forces found themselves unable to deal with widespread looting in the wake of the invasion and unprepared for the guerrilla insurgency that began soon after the fall of the Iraqi regime.

These more recent examples show that despite the vast intelligence resources available to modern national leaders, risk assessment is still a difficult and inexact art. As the world grows increasingly complex and interrelated, predicting all the potential risks, rewards, and consequences of national security policies becomes more difficult. The potential for unforeseen consequences of an action are perhaps greater now than ever. This means that national security planners must be given—and use effectively—as many resources as possible to help assess the risks of U.S. national security policy.

—John Haley

See also Afghan Wars; Bay of Pigs; Iraq War of 2003; Threat Assessment; Vietnam War (1954–1975)

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ROGUE STATE

Nation that rejects international law and the conventions of the international community. Rogue states are feared and condemned in the international community (or, at least, other states feel uneasy about their leadership) because they reject international accountability. Their decision-making behavior does not follow traditional, recognized patterns, and it is hard to predict what they will do.

CHARACTERISTICS OF A ROGUE STATE

Numerous behaviors lead the international community to categorize a nation as a rogue state. Some of these pertain to a nation's treatment of its own people, whereas others pertain to its relations with other nations. Often, a combination of both domestic and international outrages can lead to a nation's appellation as a rogue state.

Nations that flagrantly commit human rights abuses against their own citizens or maintain repressive ideologies while ignoring the condemnation of the international community are classified as rogue states. For example, when South Africa was under white minority rule it ignored decades of United Nations Security Council resolutions and international sanctions aimed at its apartheid policies. Under Fidel Castro, Cuba continues to deny its citizens the kinds of rights guaranteed under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Other rogue states include North Korea, in which Kim Jong Il (and his father before him) has reduced the nation to extreme poverty while building up an offensive military-industrial complex. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was criticized for gassing its Kurdish population and for torturing its citizens. The Taliban government in Afghanistan was criticized for its authoritarianism, in particular its oppressive gender policies, restrictions of free press, and human rights violations.

The Iranian government under the leadership of its fundamentalist Islamic mullahs continues to face similar criticisms. So, too, does the government of Sudan, which in recent years tacitly or overtly supported the displacement and extermination of hundreds of thousands of its black citizens by paramilitary groups loyal to the government.

Although the states mentioned here are often classified as rogue states, other nations engaged in similar activities or abuses might not be classified the same way. This may be the result of political sympathies or because those nations are in the process of attempting to improve freedoms for their citizens.

Numerous kinds of offenses against the international community render a nation a rogue state. Nations that deliberately or illegitimately harm their neighbors; nations that deliberately and consistently flout

international law, conventions and norms; and nations that persist in acting unilaterally, without the support of the community of nations, are called rogue states. An example of international harm was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Violations of international law and conventions by rogue states are numerous. The United States feels significant threat from such nations, particularly those that are state sponsors of terrorism or provide support to terrorists. For example, Afghanistan under the Taliban government refused to surrender the perpetrators of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Rogue states can be havens for anti-West terrorist organizations as well; rogue governments have usually declared some form of opposition to the West and are unlikely to examine terror activities too closely.

The pursuit of weapons of mass destruction outside of great power approvals or treaty-based agreements is frowned upon by the international community and contributes to the status of a rogue state. Iran, Libya, and Syria have offensive biological weapons in violation of international treaties, whereas Cuba, North Korea, and the Sudan are suspected of developing them. Several of these states are also developing long-range missiles that could pose a threat to neighboring countries.

THE UNITED STATES AS A ROGUE STATE

One nation consistently identified as a rogue state by some nations is the United States. The United States frequently violates international law and conventions and engages in unilateral action. Its violations of international law include the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War and the mining of Nicaragua's harbors in the 1980s. The United States also has blatantly intervened in numerous states and ousted (or supported the ousting) of democratically elected governments. In so doing, the United States has violated the sovereignty of other nations. In many cases, the United States has also installed or supported dictators, including the shah of Iran, Pol Pot of Cambodia, Joseph Mobutu of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), and General Augusto Pinochet of Chile.

To the dismay of the international community, the United States refuses to participate in a number of treaty-based international organizations, such as the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. Although the government cites reasons of national security, it has not signed conventions that otherwise have considerable worldwide support, including the 1997 convention on land mines. The United

States has withdrawn from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Kyoto Protocols.

Unilateral action (often considered reckless by the international community) is another characteristic of a rogue state, and it is one more reason why many classify the United States as a rogue nation. Its near-unilateral regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq, while removing totalitarian regimes, were criticized for their one-sided approach. Since 1945, for example, the United States has attempted to destroy more than 30 national-populist movements with economic and diplomatic pressures or with intervention by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

CONSEQUENCES OF ROGUE STATUS

Rogue states lose a number of benefits by going their own way. Belonging to the community of nations confers some legitimacy, whereas rogue states suffer in the eyes of public opinion. Many states will, and do, refuse to maintain normal diplomatic relations with these states, resulting in political isolation. Because these states frequently refuse to participate in (or are not invited to attend) international conventions, they lose representation in conferences and agreements of worldwide importance.

Many nations refuse to engage in trade with rogue states or they can launch economic sanctions against them. Not only does the rogue state in question lose the opportunity to purchase cheaper or different products from other countries, it is forced to attempt to produce almost everything it needs itself. This task can be difficult because some countries do not have the resources needed to produce advanced technologies, pharmaceuticals, and so on. Overall, rogue states, despite their ability to act without international accountability, lose the opportunity to interact meaningfully with other states, often rendering them pariahs on the world stage.

See also Axis of Evil; Unilateralism

ROOSEVELT COROLLARY

Informal addendum to the Monroe Doctrine articulated by President Theodore Roosevelt stipulating American involvement in Latin America.

In a 1904 address to Congress, President Theodore Roosevelt asserted the right of the United States to exercise international police power and intervene in

Latin America if European debt collectors interfered in the Western Hemisphere. This declaration by the president became known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine because of its implicit warning to Europeans to stay out of Latin America.

Written in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine was a response to increasing European involvement in the affairs of Latin American countries. It cautioned Europeans from any ambitions to colonize Western-Hemisphere territories because this would represent "an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

The Roosevelt Corollary is notable because it reasserts the Monroe Doctrine. However, it provides justification for U.S. intervention in the western hemisphere. It also rationalizes a U.S. international police role to stabilize Western-Hemisphere countries when deemed necessary.

The Roosevelt Corollary emerged in a climate of increasing European involvement in debt collection in the Western Hemisphere, primarily in the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Both Haiti and the Dominican Republic amassed substantial foreign debt in the late 19th century. The dictator of the Dominican Republic, Ulises Heureaux, in an attempt to prevent his country from falling into bankruptcy, entered into corrupt and complex refinancing schemes with European nations, skimming millions of dollars for himself. Under Heureaux's regime, the Dominican Republic found itself bearing the burden of the crippling debt owed to French and English creditors. Following his assassination in 1896, the Dominican Republic was too weak financially to repay these creditors, and in response, the French and English governments positioned warships in the Caribbean.

These French and English warships signified a European presence that threatened to displace the significant economic and political interests of the United States in the region. Thus, Roosevelt reacted by creating the corollary to the Monroe Doctrine to make clear the U.S. position on European interference.

Similarly, using the justification for intervention outlined in the Roosevelt Corollary, the United States encouraged the Dominican government to seek U.S. assistance for the collection of duties and debt repayment. As a result, the United States assumed responsibility for customs collection in the Dominican Republic. Despite suspicions that Roosevelt and the United States had territorial ambitions in the Western Hemisphere, the president maintained that his sole motive was the recovery of the Dominican economy.

However, scholars have debated whether President Roosevelt's intentions were purely benevolent. In fact, subsequent to the debt crisis in the Dominican Republic, the United States intervened about a dozen times with military force in Latin America. Roosevelt himself avowed that his aim of reasserting the Monroe Doctrine was not for the purpose of U.S. territorial expansion into the region as many critics suggested, but rather an acceptance of responsibility to the United States' neighbors to the south.

However, Theodore Roosevelt's presidency suggests a highly assertive approach to Latin America and the Caribbean. While limiting European interests in the region, Roosevelt worked aggressively to promote U.S. interests in Latin America, including his ambitious project for the Panama Canal. Working to link the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans, Roosevelt supported Panama's separation from Colombia to facilitate the construction of the canal.

See also Latin America and U.S. Policy; Monroe Doctrine (1823); Panama Canal Treaty; Roosevelt, Theodore (1858–1919)

ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN D., AND NATIONAL POLICY

Thirty-second president of the United States (1933–1945), who served longer than any U.S. president and presided over a period that included the Great Depression and World War II. The policies and decisions of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) had an enormous impact on the future of the United States, both domestically and internationally, and thereby forever affected its national security policies.

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's views of national security changed significantly over the course of his four terms in office. Domestic economic difficulties were the most serious threat facing the nation when Roosevelt was first elected in 1932. This led him to focus on U.S. domestic problems and to avoid entanglement in European disputes that were threatening to lead to war. By the start of his fourth term, however, Roosevelt was one of the principal leaders of the Allied forces fighting Nazi Germany. During his presidency, Roosevelt thus was forced to move from a philosophy of defense to one of offense to respond to Japanese and German aggression.

When Roosevelt became president in 1933, U.S. foreign policy was one of isolationism. At that time, the United States perceived no significant foreign threats to its security. The armed forces of France and Great

Franklin Delano Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference (1945), flanked by British prime minister Winston Churchill and Soviet premier Joseph Stalin.

Source: Library of Congress.

Britain, and the intervening Atlantic Ocean, seemed to isolate the United States from Germany. Although Japan was considered a dangerous rival, it was occupied with a land war in China. In addition, Japan's limited access to important military resources, such as oil and rubber, checked its expansionist tendencies. The Soviet Union, although it was an ideological opponent, was not a serious military rival and was more concerned with internal matters than with foreign policy.

Roosevelt's primary challenge when elected in his first term was to lead the country to economic recovery from the depths of the Great Depression. A stock market crash in 1929 caused widespread bank failures in the early 1930s. Countless families lost their savings, and thousands of businesses went bankrupt, throwing millions of Americans out of work. When Roosevelt was elected, one out of every four Americans was unemployed. During his first two terms in office, Roosevelt refused to become deeply involved in the European affairs, despite increasing pleas from France and Great Britain.

With the outbreak of hostilities in Europe in 1939, Roosevelt decided to walk a fine line between isolationism and interventionism. He made it clear that the United States would help the European democracies by providing arms through the so-called cash and carry program, but the nation was not prepared to commit troops or declare war on the Axis powers. At the same time, however, Roosevelt took steps to prepare the country for the possibility of war. After the German conquest of France in 1940, he increased the size of the U.S. Army to 375,000 troops because of German progress in Europe. The year before, he launched the Manhattan Project to develop a nuclear weapon in response to warnings that the Germans were working on such a device.

As German successes mounted, Roosevelt became concerned about the ability of Great Britain, Germany's sole remaining opponent, to hold out. Still, he knew there was little enthusiasm in the United States for entering World War II. In 1940, Roosevelt implemented the Lend-Lease program that supplied weapons and other supplies and equipment to Great Britain to forestall victory by the Axis forces. However, this policy was subject to much criticism from U.S. isolationists. Roosevelt also deepened U.S. involvement in the Atlantic by increasing the Navy's patrols there and by ordering its ships to fire on German U-boats.

The decision about going to war was taken out of Roosevelt's hands on December 7, 1941, when Japanese aircraft attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Several days after the attack, German leader Adolf Hitler, in a surprising move, declared war on the United States. Within a week, the United States had gone from noninvolvement in foreign conflicts to engagement in a war that spanned most of the globe.

After the United States' entry into World War II, Roosevelt's national security policy focused completely on winning the war in Europe and in the Pacific. To that end, he allied the United States not only with Great Britain but also with the Soviet Union, despite ideological differences and widespread anticommunist sentiment in the United States.

Toward the end of his presidency, Roosevelt concentrated not only on the war effort but also on ensuring peace afterward. This led him to champion the creation of an international organization for collective security. Roosevelt died in April 1945, just months after his fourth inauguration. Although he had articulated no clear vision for the world following the war, he clearly felt that international cooperation was critical for maintaining international stability. He also believed that the great powers, with the creation of an international organization such as the League of Nations, could play a constructive role in preventing future conflict in their respective regions of the world.

See also Isolationism; Lend-Lease; Manhattan Project (1942–1945); Pearl Harbor; World War II (1939–1945); Yalta Conference (1945)

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ROOSEVELT, THEODORE (1858–1919)

Twenty-sixth president of the United States; also a noted author, explorer, and political reformer. Theodore Roosevelt was born on October 27, 1858, in New York City. After graduating from Harvard University in 1880, he briefly attended Columbia Law School before abandoning law to pursue politics. In 1881, Roosevelt was elected as a Republican to the New York State Assembly at age 23. In the Assembly, he incurred the wrath of the Tammany Hall politicians who controlled New York City politics. Roosevelt fought bills that would enrich Tammany Democrats, their supporters, and business trusts.

POLITICAL ADVANCES

In 1889, three years after unsuccessfully running for New York City mayor, Roosevelt was appointed to the Civil Service Commission in Washington, DC. He returned to New York City in 1895 as Police Commissioner, a post he held until he was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy two years later. Roosevelt rose to national prominence during the 1898 Spanish-American War. He organized the First U.S. Volunteer Cavalry that fought Spanish forces in Cuba, returning home a hero.

Roosevelt was elected governor of New York in 1898, earning a reputation as a political reformer and staunch opponent of corruption and monopolistic business practices. In 1900, Republican presidential candidate William McKinley named Roosevelt as his running mate in the upcoming election. Less than a year later, McKinley was assassinated and Roosevelt became the (then) youngest president in U.S. history. Roosevelt was handily reelected in 1904.

Among Roosevelt's accomplishments were dissolving several large companies for violating antitrust laws, intervening in the 1902 coal strike, and securing the passage of the Elkins Law (1903), which denied rebates to favored corporations. Roosevelt also extended the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, obtained passage of the Food and Drug Act, created the Department of Commerce and Labor, and initiated several laws protecting workers.

Roosevelt was an avid environmentalist who limited mining and lumber operations that were exhausting natural resources at an alarming rate. He set aside millions of acres of land for public use, creating several national parks. He also championed seminal conservation legislation, including the Reclamation Act of 1902.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Roosevelt increased the power of the presidency in the foreign affairs arena as well. He coined the phrase walk softly and carry a big stick, which aptly describes his foreign policy. This was especially true in the Western Hemisphere, where he sought to solidify the position of the United States as a world power.

Potential European intervention in South America and the Caribbean led Roosevelt to formulate what is known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. This stated that the United States had a direct interest and obligation to impose order in the affairs of Latin American countries. The concept of *dollars for democracy* was born during Roosevelt's tenure, a policy of using financial incentives to U.S.-friendly regimes in Latin America.

A typical example of Roosevelt's Latin American policy was his action in response to Colombia's refusal to ratify the Hay-Herran Treaty in 1903. The treaty

recognized the independence of the territory that is now Panama, which was in rebellion against Colombia. Roosevelt dispatched the warship USS *Nashville* to prevent Colombian troops from landing in Panama, thus assuring the success of the Panamanian revolution. Roosevelt quickly extended diplomatic recognition to the new republic, and soon afterward construction of the Panama Canal began, thus providing a financial boon to the new nation.

Roosevelt was proactive in world affairs as well. He is credited with opening U.S. relations with China and he was awarded the 1906 Nobel Peace Prize for organizing the conference that ended the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. Roosevelt was an ardent supporter of the World Court at The Hague, the Netherlands, and was an effective diplomat. In 1907, he made a gentleman's agreement with the Japanese to discourage emigration of laborers to the United States, thus reducing tensions created by several anti-Japanese laws passed by the California legislature.

LATER CAREER

In 1908, Roosevelt practically ordained his successor as president, William Howard Taft. However, Roosevelt felt betrayed by many of Taft's policies, especially his lenient attitude toward corrupt business practices. Thus, Roosevelt ran as a third-party presidential candidate on the Progressive (or Bull Moose) Party platform in 1912. Many Republicans voted for Roosevelt instead of Taft, splitting the Republican vote and assuring the election of Democratic nominee Woodrow Wilson. Four years later, Roosevelt made a final unsuccessful bid for the Republican nomination for president.

During his remarkable career, Roosevelt found time for big game hunting and exploration, most notably a 1913 trip to the Amazon, during which the River of Doubt was renamed *Rio Teodoro* in his honor. He was also the author of some 40 books. His most famous work is a four-volume set titled *The Winning of the West*. Roosevelt also authored books on politics, hunting, the military, biographies of American politicians, and exploration. His autobiography was published in 1913.

See also Monroe Doctrine (1823); Panama Canal Treaty; Roosevelt Corollary; Spanish-American War (1898)

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RUBY RIDGE

In August 1992, incident in which FBI agents and federal marshals engaged in an 11-day standoff with self-proclaimed white separatist Randy Weaver, his family, and a friend named Kevin Harris, in a remote cabin in Ruby Ridge, Idaho. Weaver's wife, Vicki, his 14-year-old son, Sammy, and U.S. Marshal William Degan were killed during the siege. Harris and Weaver were injured. A Justice Department review and Senate hearings were critical of the way the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) handled the case.

Randy Weaver was a former Army engineer with special forces training. His wife and children—Sammy, Sara, and Rachel—moved in 1983 to a cabin he built on Ruby Ridge in Idaho, about 40 miles from the Canadian border. Another daughter, Elisheba, was born there, and Harris joined the family later.

Weaver's troubles with the federal government began when he attended several meetings of the white supremacist group the Aryan Nation at the group's compound in Hayden Lake, Idaho, in the late 1980s. Weaver was not a member of the Aryan Nation, but he shared a similar ideology. At one of the meetings, Weaver befriended an informant of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), who purchased two sawed-off shotguns from Weaver in October 1989.

When Weaver refused to become an informant for the ATF, federal agents pursued a weapons charge against him. A magistrate released Weaver after his arrest, setting a trial date for February 19, 1991. The trial was then moved to February 20, but a probation officer sent a letter to Weaver, incorrectly stating that the trial date was March 20. When Weaver failed to appear for trial, the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Weaver was subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury for failing to appear at trial.

On August 21, 1992, the situation turned violent. Weaver's dog discovered federal marshals hiding on the Ruby Ridge property. Federal marshal Art Roderick shot the dog. Sammy Weaver returned fire and was shot in the back by Federal Marshal Larry Cooper, who later claimed the shooting was accidental. Soon after, Harris killed Deputy Marshal William Degan in an armed exchange that included Randy Weaver.

After the shootings, the federal marshals requested assistance from the FBI, which dispatched its elite Hostage Rescue unit to Ruby Ridge. (The Justice Department investigation conducted after the incident was critical of the FBI for failing to gather sufficient

intelligence and for not ordering the residents of the cabin to surrender before engaging them in a firefight.)

On August 22, FBI sniper Lon Horiuchi, hiding about 200 yards from the cabin at Ruby Ridge, fired two rounds. The first shot hit Randy Weaver in the arm. The second shot was meant for Harris, but struck Vicki Weaver in the face while she held her infant daughter behind the front door of the cabin. Vicki Weaver died soon after, but her body remained in the cabin for 11 days.

Weaver and Harris finally surrendered to the federal officers about a week later. They were charged with a host of crimes, including murder, conspiracy, and assault. An Idaho jury acquitted Harris of all charges. Weaver was convicted of failing to appear for the original firearms charge.

The Justice Department inquiry—differing from a separate FBI report—concluded that FBI agent Hourichi's second shot was unconstitutional because Harris and Weaver were running for cover and could not be considered imminent threats. The inquiry further alleged that Hourichi unnecessarily endangered others by firing at the door of the cabin. The agent was later acquitted of manslaughter charges brought by Boundary County, Idaho, prosecutors.

Federal investigators ruled that there was insignificant evidence to charge Larry Potts, then deputy director of the FBI, and other top officials with conspiring to cover up the botched operation. In 1995, the government settled a lawsuit brought by Randy Weaver and his three surviving daughters.

See also Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Militia

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RUDMAN-HART COMMISSION

See National Security, U.S. Commission on (USCNS)

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Directives meant to describe the circumstances under which ground, naval, and air forces will enter into and continue combat with opposing forces. Formally, rules of engagement refer to the orders issued by a competent military authority with reference to when, where, how, and against whom military force may be used. Rules of engagement are part of a general recognition that procedures and standards are essential to the conduct and effectiveness of civilized warfare. These rules have implications for what actions soldiers may take on their own authority and what directives may be issued by a commanding officer.

Rules of engagement must be consistent, attempt to account for expected scenarios, and reflect an understanding of both the political and military aspects of a given situation. They might describe points with regard to dealing with unarmed mobs, the property of local civilians, the use of force in self-defense, the returning of hostile fire, the taking of prisoners, the level of hostility (that is, whether the country is at war), as well as a number of other issues.

The notion that war should be regulated has a long history in international treaties and agreements, the most significant being the Geneva Conventions, which regulate the treatment of prisoners and civilians in time of war. However, rules of engagement are a more modern concept. They are the product of fears concerning the possibility of nuclear warfare, advances in telecommunications, the role of the media in modern conflicts, and the increased use of military forces in a peacekeeping role.

During the Cold War, both superpowers realized that the potential advantages of attacking were not worth the consequences of retaliation. The possibility that a minor incident could result in nuclear warfare inspired a need to establish procedures defining allowable actions. At the same time, technological advances allowed for greater possibilities in monitoring what was taking place on the battlefield, tightening the chain of command. These same advances also created a more prominent role for the media. The tendency of war correspondents to make political leaders responsible for military excesses, first clearly evident in the Vietnam War, led to greater concern for regulating events on the ground.

The Vietnam War has since become a commonly cited example to describe the problems of requiring soldiers to fulfill an ambiguous set of objectives. It was also during this time that the acronym ROE (for rules of engagement) became broadly familiar. However, the concept of a standing order not to return fire without a clear target began with the U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958. The subsequent U.S. intervention in

the Dominican Republic in 1965–66 also required restraint, and American soldiers became increasingly familiar with ROE. The standard operating procedures imposed on U.S. troops during the Vietnam War resulted in accusations that domestic concerns were inhibiting the military's freedom of operation.

Since the bombing of a U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983, a caveat has been added to the ROE, stating, "Nothing in these rules limits your right to exercise your inherent right of self-defense." There was also the development of peacetime rules of engagement (PROE), which differentiated between hostile acts versus intent, and also emphasized proportionality—that a response must be appropriate to the level of threat.

In 1994, PROE was replaced by Joint Chiefs of Staff standing ROE (JCS SROE), which instructs that use of force must also be consistent with international law. The two commonly recognized ROE are standing ROE (SROE), which refers to situations in which the United States is not actually at war and thus seeks to constrain military action, and wartime ROE (WROE), which does not limit military responses to offensive actions.

See also Geneva Conventions; Military Doctrine

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RUMSFELD, DONALD (1932–)

An experienced Washington insider, appointed secretary of defense in 2001 by President George W. Bush. Donald Rumsfeld previously occupied that office from 1975–1977, and his early handling of the Defense Department as an experienced administrator later deteriorated under the pressure of serious national defense issues.

Born in 1932, Donald Henry Rumsfeld grew up in Chicago, Illinois, and graduated in 1954 from Princeton University. He served briefly in the Navy as an aviator and then began pursuing political aspirations. Starting as a staffer to members of Congress from Ohio and Michigan in 1958 and 1959, he took a three-year break as an investment broker in Chicago before winning election to Congress as a Republican from Illinois in 1962.

In 1969, Rumsfeld resigned his congressional seat to join the White House staff of President Richard Nixon. He served as special assistant for economic opportunity for less than a year before becoming an adviser to the president for the next three years. Appointed Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1973, Rumsfeld departed the White House just before the Watergate scandal reached crisis level.

During the administration of President Gerald Ford, Rumsfeld served as chief of staff before becoming secretary of defense in 1975. In 1977, Rumsfeld removed himself from government for several years, serving as a corporate CEO. However, he sometimes also served on special commissions, such as arms control adviser (1983–84), presidential envoy to the Middle East (1983–84), and chairman of the Commission to Assess United States National Security, Space Management, and Organization (1999–2001). This last group recommended in its January 11, 2001, report that the United States needed a ballistic missile defense program, effectively reviving the moribund Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—the so-called Star Wars of the administration of President Ronald Reagan.

While in the business world, Rumsfeld retained close enough connections with Republican party members to win a nod from Vice President Dick Cheney in 2000 for the defense cabinet post in the newly formed cabinet of President George W. Bush. Because the Bush administration had few defense policy initiatives in mind besides missile defense and the substitution of advanced technology war fighting systems for programmed defense expenditures (the so-called Transformation Defense Initiatives), Rumsfeld was ideally suited for the chief defense position.

However, the military service chiefs soon registered dismay with Rumsfeld's single-minded approach to defense programming. The money needed to revive ballistic missile defense programs and kick start the ill-defined Transformation Defense Initiatives would leave little for the desired modernization and operations budgets that were already in the defense plans but lacked sufficient funding to accomplish. In addition, Rumsfeld displayed a sense of intellectual and managerial superiority as a former defense chief, seen

as arrogance by some, an attitude that left the service chiefs and their staffs baffled.

After only six months of mutual discomfort, the Pentagon had to respond to the September 11, 2001, attack by terrorists upon the United States. It became necessary to correct homeland defense weaknesses while also devising a campaign to occupy Afghanistan and eradicate the terrorist centers there. Additionally, the Defense Department had to expand the scope of military operations to plan the defeat and occupation of Iraq within a year of initiating operations against Afghanistan.

Defense spending soared under these wartime conditions, and at first, it seemed as if the conventional force modernization would be funded after all. However, the nation's deepening economic crisis, national debt, and unending demands for military operations after the poorly planned Iraq campaign made program cuts seemingly inevitable. By mid-2004, Rumsfeld's originally confident management style met with heavy criticism, although he continued to enjoy the strong support of President Bush.

See also Afghanistan, War in; Bush, George W., and National Policy; Cheney, Richard (1941–); Civil-Military Relations; Defense Budgeting; Department of Defense, U.S (DoD); Iraq War of 2003; Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); Pentagon; Terrorism, War on International

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SADDAM HUSSEIN, (1937–)

President of Iraq from 1979 to 2003. Saddam Hussein was born April 28, 1937, to a poor family near Tikrit, Iraq. He joined the Ba'ath Party at the age of 20 and participated in the party's coup on July 17, 1968. Saddam rose to the top of the party, assuming the Iraqi presidency in 1979. From 1980 to 1988, he oversaw the Iran-Iraq War, a protracted conflict remembered for the indiscriminate use of chemical weapons by both sides. In 1991, Saddam invaded Kuwait, setting off the first Gulf War.

Under his repressive dictatorship, the economic and human rights conditions deteriorated for average Iraqi citizens. Saddam used chemical weapons against the Kurdish populations in northern Iraq and brutally squelched an uprising by the Shia Iraqis in the southern part of the country. Throughout the 1990s, Saddam refused to fully cooperate with the international community and its inspectors to eliminate the threat of chemical weapons under his control. The resulting sanctions only exacerbated the plight of most Iraqis.

In 2003, acting on the belief that Saddam still possessed chemical and biological weapons, was attempting to develop nuclear weapons, and had friendly relations with the international terrorist group al-Qaeda, a U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq to liberate its citizens. Saddam was captured by U.S. forces on December 13, 2003. Currently, the former dictator is awaiting trial in an Iraqi court.

See also Gulf War (1990–1991); Iraq War of 2003

SALT I AND II
See STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT)

SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

Use of satellites equipped with photo-optic, electro-optic/infrared, or radar technology to provide detailed reports of geographical areas, military installations and activities, troop positions, or other picture-based intelligence. Satellite reconnaissance relies on data provided by image intelligence (IMINT) satellites, which operate in low, near-polar orbits at an altitude of between 500 and 3,000 km and maintain the same orbit around the earth. They make about 14 revolutions per day and scan a new swath of ground with each orbit.

The IMINT satellites depend on three general technologies. Using *photo-optic* technology, an image is recorded on film, which must then be retrieved, processed, and analyzed. Because there is a one-to-three-day time lag from the time the data is requested to the time the image can be used, photo-optic satellites are more useful for strategic planning than for tactical combat situations. Photo-optic satellites cannot penetrate clouds or darkness and can be fooled by camouflage.

Electro-optic/infrared (EO-IR) satellites provide full-spectrum photographic imagery, including infrared. Images from EO-IR satellites can be further sharpened and defined through digital enhancement. Although IR sensors can spot heat sources at night,

The northern VIP palace of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, which was looted and vandalized by Iraqis during the Iraq War in 2003. Located in the city of Mosul, the palace, one of many owned by Saddam Hussein, was occupied by the 101st Airborne Division as a command-post headquarters after U.S. forces captured the city. The occupation of the palace and its grounds was part of a shifting of operations from Baghdad, the Iraqi capital, to Mosul to help ensure the security of that city. The entire site, which occupies 2.6 square miles, includes several palaces and other residences as well as three lakes and artificial waterfalls.

Source: U.S. Army.

they cannot spot vehicles or aircraft on the ground once their engines are cold. Like photo-optic satellites, EO-IR satellites are unable to penetrate clouds and darkness and are only slightly less likely to be fooled by camouflage. IR sensors can also be fooled by dummy heat sources and can be blocked to some degree by special IR-netting.

In satellites using *radar* technology, an image is created by high-energy radar pulses reflected off the earth's surface. Synthetic aperture radar technology, a technique used to generate radar images in fine detail, allows imaging at any time of day or night. Long wavelengths allow penetration of cloud cover and imagery even in dusty conditions. Doppler-radar technology is used to spot movement of ships and aircraft, and ground moving-target indication (GMTI) radar is useful for detecting ground movement of vehicles. Radar ocean reconnaissance satellites (RORSAT) are primarily used over oceanic regions to search for shipping. Resolution is not as good with radar satellites as

with photo-optic or EO-IR satellites, however, and analyzing the imagery requires a higher level of skill. Images can also be subject to noise due to backscatter (a form of electronic static) caused by unfavorable conditions such as rough seas or nearby large, metallic surfaces. Radar satellites are also susceptible to active jamming.

One of the most significant advances in IMINT technology has had to do not with the platform in space but with the manipulation of the digital data derived from these satellites. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency, which was set up to centralize the research, development, and analysis of satellite imagery, can now configure data in three-dimensional format. These so-called *envisions*, computer-generated 3D animations of terrain and landscapes, are valuable not just in warfare but also in mission rehearsals of military and intelligence operations. The animations can help policymakers gain both diplomatic leverage in negotiations and understand problems faced by peacekeepers or soldiers prior to deployment.

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), established in 1960, is the U.S. government agency responsible for designing, building, and operating U.S. reconnaissance satellites. The NRO is a separate operating agency of the Department of Defense (DoD) and is jointly managed and staffed by the DoD and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Director of Central Intelligence establishes the NRO's data collection priorities and requirements.

In addition to the DoD and the CIA, other government agencies that work closely with the NRO in maintaining the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program include the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central MASINT (measurements

and signatures intelligence) Office, and the United States Space Command. In addition, six Congressional committees oversee NRO programs and activities. The NRO is funded through the National Reconnaissance Program, part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program. In recent years, the NRO has implemented a series of actions declassifying some of its operations. In December 1996, for the first time, the NRO announced the launch of a reconnaissance satellite in advance.

National and military leaders rely on data from reconnaissance satellites to provide warning of potential military aggression, monitor weapons of mass destruction programs, track terrorists, enforce arms control and environmental treaties, and assess the impact of natural and man-made disasters. Advances in weaponry, space, communications, and information technology have made possible near real-time information support for military personnel, arms proliferation issues, and counterterrorism efforts.

In 1996, in response to a recommendation from an independent panel of experts from the defense, intelligence, and corporate sectors, the NRO adopted a goal of devoting 10% of its budget to research and development. Technology-sharing programs were also developed with the Department of Defense and with NASA. Two recent technological advances were the Geosynchronous Lightweight Technology Experiment (GeoLITE) and the Space Technology Experiment (STEX). GeoLITE explored advanced satellite communications methods and STEX demonstrated multiple leading-edge spacecraft technologies.

Additional new technologies significantly advanced civil and military space programs and had commercial benefits as well. These include visual display technology for high definition television (HDTV), optical instruments for personal camcorders, advanced integrated circuit chips and micro devices for personal computers, communications technology for the Internet, and imagery exploitation technology for medical screening.

See also Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); Geopolitical Intelligence; Geospatial Mapping; Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Radar (Radio Detection and Ranging); Science, Technology, and Security; Spy Satellites

SCHELLING, THOMAS (1921–)

Distinguished university professor and professor of economics who, using game theory, contributed to the development of such concepts as bargaining and strategic behavior applied to diplomacy of war and peace. Schelling's research interests include military strategy and arms control, conflict and bargaining theory, nuclear proliferation, energy and environmental policy, climate change, smoking behavior, international trade, and ethical issues in policy and in business.

Born in 1921, Schelling earned a degree in economics at the University of California, Berkeley in 1944, before starting his career at the U.S. Bureau of the Budget. He worked with the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe between 1948 and 1951 and then joined the Executive Office of the President at the White House, where he served until 1953. In 1951, Schelling obtained a Ph.D. in economics at Harvard University.

In 1953, Schelling joined Yale University as professor of economics. Five years later, in 1958, he moved to Harvard, where in 1969 he became Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government. At Harvard, Schelling also directed the Institute for the Study of Smoking Behavior and Policy from 1984 to 1990. In 1990, he joined the Maryland School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland.

In his 1960 work, *The Strategy of Conflict,* Schelling pioneered the study of bargaining and strategic behavior. The book was considered among the most influential on strategic studies since 1945. Schelling studied strategy and bargaining situations in international conflict by applying game theory. He saw bargaining as a game in which it is important to think what the opponent can do, how one can react, and how the opponent will react to one's behavior. In these situations, threats and promises may have important strategic effects.

According to Schelling, a threat is a communication of one's incentives, designed to impress on another party the automatic consequences of an action. For example, a threat of retaliation may prevent a country from starting a war, or, in an economic context, it may prevent a company from starting a competitive price war. The efficacy of a threat depends to large extent on its credibility, which is built on the incentives of the player who threatens to carry out the threat. In this context, reputation plays an important role. It tells if one should believe that a player keeps his promises. A threat without credibility has no strategic value.

Schelling further developed these concepts in *Strategy and Arms Control,* published in 1961. In

1966, in his work, *Arms and Influence,* he applied these notions to military power and the diplomacy of war and peace. In his 1978 work, *Micromotives and Macrobehavior,* Schelling analyzed how minor decisions of individuals may interact in such a way that they have serious consequences at the macro level.

During his career, Schelling was elected to numerous prestigious institutions, including the National Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Medicine, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Economic Association, and the Eastern Economic Association. He also served as chairman of the advisory committee of the Institute for Social and Economic Policy in the Middle East at Harvard University and as a member of the Board of Trustees of the Albert Einstein Institution, a nonprofit organization devoted to the study of nonviolent political action.

See also Brinkmanship; Deterrence; Strategic Culture; Zero Sum Game

SCHWARZKOPF, NORMAN
See GULF WAR (1990–1991)

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SECURITY

The exploitation of science and technology in the furtherance of the U.S. national security interests. Science and technology (S&T) development is obviously crucial to national security issues and to the international diplomatic agenda of the United States. The U.S. government, through the Department of State, frequently interacts with other governments under conditions in which technological capabilities are central to the deliberations. In addition, new technologies and scientific advances are critical to the maintenance of U.S. intelligence, military efforts, and antiterrorism strategies.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE (DOD)

Most of the science and technology efforts that are critical to national security are conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Anita Jones, Director of Defense Research and Engineering for DoD, reported that in 2005 the DoD funded 16 percent of the total federal investment in research and development. These activities include basic research, applied research, and development of advanced technology. Currently, most of the DoD emphasis is on the development of advanced technologies. The department dominates federal investment in areas including computer science; materials; electrical, mechanical, and civil engineering; and mathematics.

The DoD science and technology effort involves numerous agencies. These include the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which developed the computer networking technology that led to creation of the Internet; the Defense Technical Information center (DTIC), which is responsible for the transfer of information among DoD personnel, defense contractors and potential contractors, and other government agencies; and the Information Science and Technology Directorate, which is responsible for exploring new technologies and determining the department's technology needs.

Responsibility for overseeing the DoD's technology efforts rests with the director of Defense Research and Engineering in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Individual research initiatives are managed by the Service Research Offices, which include the Army Research Office (ARO), the Office of Naval Research (ONR), the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Ballistic Missiles Defense Organization (BMDO), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Army Corps of Engineers (COE). The director of research also coordinates basic research activities with the National Science Foundation (NSF) and other federal departments and agencies.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT

The Department of State is responsible for ensuring that S&T considerations are integrated into U.S. foreign policy. It is also charged with identifying and exploiting opportunities for international cooperation involving the U.S. science community. Science and technology play a critical role in foreign policy discussions of topics such as nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, the use of outer space, population growth, adequate and safe food supplies, infectious diseases, energy resources, and the competitiveness of industrial technologies.

The Department of State has several internal departments involved in S&T issues. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is responsible for building sound science into national security policies such as arms control, export controls, and nonproliferation. The Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) often leads international negotiations on issues such as the building and operation of an international space station or controlling substances that deplete the stratospheric ozone layer and cause global climate changes. OES has negotiated international umbrella agreements to create a network of advisory and regulatory mechanisms to protect oceans and fisheries.

A 1999 report by the National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council made several recommendations to improve government collaboration with the scientific community. Among these suggestions was the appointment of a science and technology advisor with direct access to the secretary of state and other senior officials. The adviser leads a department-wide initiative called "Science and Diplomacy: Strengthening State for the Twenty-First Century." Its core objectives include increasing the number of scientists in the department and exposing lay personnel to S&T issues; building partnerships with the S&T community, other government agencies, and foreign partners; providing the department with accurate advice on emerging S&T; and creating an environment that fosters proactive decision making, as opposed to reactive crisis management, on S&T issues.

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The exploitation of science and technology has always been a significant element of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities. The CIA's S&T efforts have been responsible for the design and operation of some of the United States' most important spy satellites and for the U2 and A-12 spy planes. The agency is heavily involved in the collection of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and helped pioneer the technical analysis of foreign missile and space systems. Its satellites and SIGINT activities are vital to intelligence analysts in assessing the capabilities of foreign weapons systems. It is also responsible for a number of scientific advances—including a key component of heart pacemaker technology—that have been made available for medical and other purposes.

The CIA's S&T efforts have also led to some less noble activities. Among the CIA's early scientific interests were special interrogation methods, including the use of drugs and chemicals, hypnosis, and isolation. Experiments in the 1950s led to the suicide of Frank Olson, an Army scientist, after he was given LSD without his knowledge as part of a CIA program. Poison pens and exploding seashells were designed in futile attempts to assassinate Cuban leader Fidel Castro. The CIA funded the attempts of alleged psychics to report on activities at Soviet military facilities by "viewing" those activities from California and sought to employ cats and birds for intelligence collection—in one case implanting assorted equipment in a cat to turn it into a mobile, controllable, bugging device.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POST–SEPTEMBER 11

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the challenge of balancing the nation's national security with the openness required for the advancement of science has become increasingly complicated. This has led to several changes in the treatment of visiting scientists as well as government procedures for dealing with technology firms.

Due to concerns about terrorism, foreign students and scholars in S&T fields are finding it increasingly difficult to obtain visas to study or work in the United States. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 tightened both the requirements and the enforcement of entry procedures for foreign visitors. In 2001, the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System was created to allow officials to maintain up-to-date information on foreign students and exchange visitors in the United States. Various surveys conducted since 2001 have indicated declines in the number of foreign students enrolling in U.S. educational institutions. Increased security has even kept many foreign students and scholars from attending brief academic meetings in the United States.

The two main restrictions scientists and their institutions are encountering in contracts and grants in the post–September 11 era are tighter prepublication reviews and background checks on foreign collaborators. The federal government is now more likely than previously, to intervene in "sensitive but unclassified" research, implementing procedures such as requiring special permits and clearances for all projects

with foreign workers. Since September 11, the scientific community also must seriously consider whether and to what extent to restrict the publication of certain studies that may compromise national security.

Critics of such measures argue that the free flow of ideas and unhindered exchange of information is vital for the health of the scientific community. They worry that these restrictions will hamper the creativity and vitality of U.S. scientists. Supporters of the restrictions point out that the unprecedented ease with which dangerous technology information can be acquired or spread requires caution to avoid having it fall into the wrong hands. The resolution of this debate is certain to have a significant effect on the conduct of U.S. scientific and technological research in the 21st century.

See also Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); Dual-Use Technology; Information Warfare; Nanotechnology; Signals Intelligence (SIGINT); Spy Satellites

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SEA-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES (SLBMs)

In the event of a nuclear war or other threat to U.S. national security, missiles capable of being launched from nuclear submarines. Nuclear submarines form one-third of the strategic nuclear triad, along with land-based missiles and bombers. The advantage of launching missiles from submarines is that the missiles may be dispersed across a wide area, making it essentially impossible to destroy them all at once. The disadvantage is that communication with nuclear submarines enables the detection of the submarine's location; also submarine-launched missiles are less accurate than those launched from land.

Sea-launched ballistic missiles are carried by Ohio class, Trident submarines, the largest submarines deployed by the U.S. Navy, second in size only to Russian Typhoon submarines. These submarines,

specifically designed for extended patrols at sea, are equipped with Trident Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), which are designated as sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

Missile launch from a submarine occurs below the ocean's surface. However, the missile never makes contact with the water because it is surrounded by a bubble of gas. Gas pressure ejects the missile from its launch tube within the submarine. The first Trident was deployed in 1979, and the first Trident II in 1990; the Trident II is expected to be in service until the year 2020.

See also Ballistic Missiles; Submarines

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SEA WARFARE
See ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW); SUBMARINE WARFARE

SEALIFT

Maritime transportation of equipment and troops to sustain and augment military forces deployed overseas during war or peacetime. During wartime, as much as 95% of the equipment needed for fighting forces to operate at the battlefronts is transported by sea. Sealift has several key advantages over airlift, the other key method for transporting troops and materiel.

Unit for unit, ships involved in sealift have a greater capacity than transport aircraft. Ships can also preposition at a friendly port or at sea near an area of potential conflict. Furthermore, ships that travel in international waters do not require permission to operate from foreign governments.

In the United States, the Military Sealift Command (MSC) is responsible for all stages of sealift. Its responsibilities include planning, requisition of crews and ships, and execution of its duties in support of U.S. forces around the globe.

STRATEGIES

The Military Sealift Command embraces three operational strategies in its mission of maritime transportation of military cargo in both peacetime and wartime. The first of these strategies is *prepositioning,* the strategic location of transport ships, manned with necessary logistical support, near a crisis area. A second strategy, *surge shipping,* is the transportation of urgently needed supplies and equipment, such as tanks and helicopters, in the critical early stages of a conflict. *Sustainment shipping,* the third strategy, provides a constant supply pipeline by transporting the weapons, food, and other equipment needed by forces in the field to sustain the conflict.

FORCE STRUCTURE AND SIZE

The MSC, which employs roughly 7,500 personnel worldwide, is headquartered in Washington, DC, and has area commands in Norfolk, Virginia; San Diego, California; Naples, Italy; and Yokohama, Japan. Most of its personnel are assigned to seagoing jobs, and approximately 4,700 are civilian employees of the federal government. MSC ships are crewed by civilians, but manpower may be augmented by naval reservists during wartime.

The Military Sealift Command currently operates about 120 ships worldwide, with an additional 100 ships in reserve status. These include government-owned ships and privately owned charters. In addition, the MSC also commands hospital ships, fast sealift ships, which transport armored equipment to combat theaters in minimal time, and maritime prepositioning ships, which are positioned at overseas strategic locations and contain equipment and supplies for the support of armed forces in areas of conflict.

The MSC also commands the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF), which deploys nearly 40 ships around the world in direct support of U.S. naval ships. The NFAF ships conduct towing and salvage operations in addition to their central responsibility of underway replenishment.

HISTORY

Maritime transportation of supplies and equipment in support of forces deployed overseas is as old as sailing itself. Ancient Egyptian vessels plied the Nile River, transporting troops and supplies in periods of external conflict and civil war. Roman galleys crossed the Mediterranean Sea, transporting diplomats, troops, and supplies to distant colonies. The conquest of England by William the Conqueror in 1066 is a notable early example of a successful sealift operation.

In the 20th century, both World Wars saw sealift operations take the form of convoy systems to transport equipment and supplies to an embattled Europe. Despite threats from German U-boats, tens of millions of tons of supplies crossed the Atlantic. The U.S. island-hopping campaign against Japanese forces in the Pacific is an example of sealift operations on an epic scale. During World War II, the industrial might of the United States was transported across two oceans to vanquish two powerful, committed enemies.

Although four separate government agencies controlled sealift for the United States in World War II, sealift command functions were combined in 1949 under the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS). The MSTS was renamed the Military Sealift Command (MSC) in 1970.

During Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf War, the MSC distinguished itself by undertaking the largest sealift operations of any coalition nation. More than 12 million tons of equipment—including tanks, helicopters, and supplies—were delivered to the combat zone in support of forces charged with expelling Iraqi forces from occupied Kuwait.

Military Sealift Command ships also took on the task of delivering humanitarian aid during the ill-fated Somalia intervention of 1992 to 1994. Today, the MSC continues to supply U.S. fighting forces in the aftermath of the Iraq War of 2003, with equipment and supplies ranging from ammunition to helicopters.

The rise of international terrorist groups as a threat to national security has led to an emphasis on the importance of rapid response airlift as a means to counter terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, the United States and its allies still find themselves in sustained stability maintenance and combat operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Both of these undertakings serve to underscore the continued need for sealift to sustain prolonged deployments of large numbers of troops to any corner of the world.

See also Airlift; Military Sealift Command (MSC)

SECRET SERVICE

Federal agency, originally founded to combat counterfeiting, best known for its role in protecting the president

of the United States. In recent years, the scope of Secret Service duties has broadened to include fighting electronic crime.

The Secret Service, created as part of the Treasury Department in 1865, is the oldest general law enforcement agency of the U.S. government. Established to halt the spread of counterfeit currency, the agency's responsibilities were expanded in 1867 to investigating any attempts to defraud the government. Targets of early Secret Service investigations included the Ku Klux Klan, smugglers, mail robbers, and bootleggers.

The Secret Service provided occasional protection for presidents beginning in 1894 with President Grover Cleveland. However, it was not until the 1901 assassination of President William McKinley that the agency was assigned to protect the president full time. In 1922, Congress created the White House Police at the request of President Warren G. Harding. Eight years later, this force was placed under the supervision of the Secret Service. It was renamed the Executive Protection Service in 1970 and its jurisdiction was extended to include protection of foreign diplomatic missions on U.S. soil. Over the years, Secret Service protection was extended to the president-elect, vice president, former presidents, major presidential and vice presidential candidates and their immediate families, as well as visiting heads of state and their spouses.

Laws enacted in the 1980s and 1990s expanded the purview of the Secret Service into the areas of electronic fraud, bank fraud, and overseas counterfeiting operations. The Telemarketing Fraud Act and the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, both enacted in1998, provided the Secret Service with a mandate against computer fraud. The agency's jurisdiction was expanded by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, which increased the Secret Service role in investigating criminal computer activities. In this role, the Secret Service has established nationwide electronic task forces to combat computer crimes.

On March 1, 2003, the Secret Service became part of the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This is a signal of the importance that the U.S. government places on computer and electronic crime. Adding the Secret Service to DHS, a cabinet-level department, puts the agency in direct touch with the president and at the center of the war on international terrorism.

See also Computer Security; Homeland Security, Department of; Terrorism, War on International

SECURE SECOND STRIKE

A term dating from the Cold War, also known as *counter-force,* which refers to the ability to strike an enemy's population centers with nuclear weapons, after having first attacked missile silos and nuclear bases. The desirability of the secure second-strike option partially explains the extraordinarily high number of nuclear weapons maintained by both the United States and the Soviet Union during the arms race.

Secure second strike was a concern that followed the massive retaliation doctrine (also known as nuclear utilization theory) and ignored the implications of mutually assured destruction (MAD). The policy of the United States in the early 1950s was that the country should be prepared to respond to security threats with nuclear weapons. This policy was established in the context of the recognition of the overwhelming superiority of Soviet conventional forces.

By the early 1960s, the U.S. defense establishment realized that the most likely outcome of the outbreak of nuclear war would be the elimination of both sides. This understanding came to underpin the maintenance of the balance of power and negotiation of peace agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their nuclear arsenals. The secure second-strike doctrine was criticized by most experts for failing to recognize that the number of weapons unleashed in such a scenario would automatically make life impossible throughout much of the world.

See also Arms Race; First Strike; Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD); Nuclear Deterrence; Nuclear Weapons.

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SECURITY DILEMMA

Security problem encountered among states of roughly equal power, states that may get involved in an arms

race and then be unable to disengage. Security dilemmas are possible when states are most concerned with their own security and with their relative power position in the international system. When this is the case, even peaceful states with no expansionist or aggressive ideas may be drawn into the dilemma. A security dilemma—and the arms race, which is tied to it—can occur without any participant desiring it.

The security dilemma begins when one state tries to improve its power position relative to one or more states by acquiring more arms. Its purpose—whether offensive or defensive—is unimportant; it has the same effect. This state, either seeking to grow more powerful or defend against another state, gains an advantage over its rivals or neighbors. These states, which are always protecting their own security, grow nervous because the first state has the means of violence and domination available. The increase in the first state's security causes a corresponding decease in the security of its rival or neighboring states.

To protect itself, each rival state will begin to acquire new weapons. The problem, however, is that offensive and defensive weapons are often indistinguishable, and the new weapons begin to look suspicious and menacing to the first state and to the other neighbors. Suspicions multiply, and the states begin to acquire more and more arms, resulting in a theoretically infinite game of one-upmanship. Security dilemmas lead almost inevitably to arms races, in which rival states race to acquire more and better weapons.

The security dilemma exists because both acquiring more arms *and* not acquiring more arms will not increase the country's security. In acquiring more arms, a state simply induces its rivals to buy more as well; in not acquiring more arms, the state faces a risk of military defeat by its enemies.

The security dilemma played itself out in accordance with the theory during the Cold War. Each time either the United States or the Soviet Union gained a slight advantage in the types of weapons, the other tried to match the first country or turn the advantage around. Thus, the Soviet Union raced to obtain nuclear weapons to catch up to the United States; the United States and the Soviet Union raced to develop space-based strategic weaponry. The same pattern occurred with regard to the number and location of weapons each acquired. Both countries became embroiled in an arms race; the United States placed missiles in Eastern Europe; and the Soviet Union attempted to place missiles in Cuba.

Security dilemmas do not necessarily need to be related to arms, nor do they necessarily depend on the actions of more than one country—though that is usually the way it happens. A country can create its own security dilemma, as did the European colonial powers and Japan in the 1930s, to some extent. Insecure economically, each of these powers sought to expand its territorial base to gain control of more resources. The English, French, and Belgians moved into Africa; the Japanese moved into China. As each country acquired control of more territory, it had more territory to defend, causing each to try to expand further to secure the previously conquered territory, rendering the country perpetually insecure.

The security dilemma can be ameliorated. At some point, each country will decide that continuing to expand its arsenal is simply too costly—or it will simply run out of resources to build the arsenal. In either case, the nation will start to seek other solutions to increase its power. One solution is forming an alliance with another country. Cooperation does leave the country vulnerable to cheating, but the country accepts this risk rather than going on alone. Rival or neighbor states may (and probably will) feel threatened by the alliance, and will form their own alliances, gradually creating a balance of power. Once balance is achieved, both sides will realize there is nothing to be gained from attack and there will be an absence of war. Nineteenth-century Europe realized this solution.

Seemingly unrealistic, another solution to the security dilemma has been effective nonetheless. A state with a strong neighbor, with whom it cannot effectively compete, may attempt to enter into heavy economic cooperation with the neighbor it fears. Economic cooperation leads to interdependence and significantly raises the costs of attacking the weaker neighbor. Some argue that France began trading heavily with Germany after World War II for this reason.

A third solution is that one country's resources will simply give out over time, and the country will drop out of the race altogether. Since there is little need for states of vastly unequal power to compete with one another, they may both escape from the security dilemma. This occurred at the end of the Cold War, when the economic infrastructure of the Soviet Union could no longer sustain the arms race with the United States.

A fourth way to ameliorate the security dilemma is for a state to try to acquire weapons that are used specifically for defense and deterrence. At the same time, it should announce that it is obtaining these weapons purely for defensive purposes. Although

such an action may not solve the security dilemma, it may render it less dangerous.

See also Arms Race

SELECTIVE SERVICE

Federal agency created to administer the nationwide military draft in the United States. The agency oversees the military registration of draft-age (18- to 25-year old) males, even though the U.S. government has not conducted a draft since 1973.

The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, signed into law by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, created the country's first peacetime draft. It also formally established the Selective Service System as an independent federal agency to administer the draft. The Selective Service was established to provide a means to call up troops quickly in the event of war. With Europe already engulfed in World War II and Japan making threatening moves in the Pacific, Roosevelt wanted to beef up the unprepared U.S. armed forces.

The end of World War II did not bring with it the end of the draft, as the Soviet Union arose to challenge U.S. political and military power. The United States retained the draft after the war to maintain a large standing army that could counter potential Soviet aggression. However, public sentiment turned against the draft during the Vietnam War. The availability of deferments that seemed to favor the wealthy and powerful spread a perception that the poor were shouldering more than their fair share of the burden in Vietnam. That perception, combined with the general unpopularity of the war, led Congress to refuse to extend the draft law in 1973.

Since that time, the United States has had an all-volunteer military. In 1975, President Jimmy Carter suspended the requirement that draft-age males register for service but reinstated the law in 1980 after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. In the event that a military draft is enacted, the Selective Service System will manage the process and run an Alternative Service Program for individuals classified as conscientious objectors.

Almost all noncitizens living in the United States, including illegal aliens, refugees, and those with permanent residency status are required to register with the Selective Service. Full-time military personnel are not required to register, but members of the Reserve and National Guard not on full-time active duty must do so. Conscientious objectors must also register; however, if the draft is instituted, they have the opportunity to file for an exemption from military service on religious or moral grounds. Individuals who are hospitalized or incarcerated are required to register within 30 days after they are released. Disabled men who are not institutionalized and are capable of leaving their homes must also register. The Selective Service requires the disabled to register even if their disability would excuse them from service because it does not have the authority to classify an individual as disabled. Only the military has that authority.

Changes made since the end of the Vietnam War are designed to make the draft more equitable, should it be necessary. These include stricter guidelines for educational deferments and a revised lottery system designed to provide for less uncertainty. As of early 2005, many military experts were warning that continued overcommitment of U.S. armed forces would eventually force the United States to resume the draft. The administration of President George W. Bush declared that it had no plans to reinstate the draft, but some observers feel that it may be just a matter of time.

See also All-Volunteer Force; Conscription/Volunteer Force

SEPTEMBER 11/WTC AND PENTAGON ATTACKS

Series of terrorist strikes in which Islamic fundamentalists hijacked four American planes and crashed them into New York City's World Trade Center and the Pentagon building outside Washington, DC. The terrorist attacks, which claimed nearly 3,000 lives, were the most deadly foreign attack on U.S. soil since the War of 1812.

The operation was carried out by 19 members of the international terrorist network al-Qaeda, headquartered at the time in Afghanistan. In the wake of the attacks, President George W. Bush announced a worldwide assault on terror, which significantly changed the tone and nature of U.S. foreign and domestic policy. These changes have generated criticism from many quarters.

A SUCCESSION OF TRAGEDIES

According to evidence uncovered in 2005, planning for the September 2001 terrorist attacks began as early as 1996. The culmination of those plans occurred early on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001. Soon after takeoff, American Airlines Flight 11 from Boston to Los Angeles was hijacked and, at 8:46 a.m., the hijackers crashed it into the north tower of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City. Eighteen minutes later, the south tower of the World Trade Center was hit by another commercial airliner, United Airlines Flight 175, which had been commandeered shortly after American Airlines Flight 11.

In little more than a hour, both towers collapsed from structural meltdown caused by burning aviation fuel. At least 20 other buildings around the WTC complex were damaged from the impacts and the subsequent explosions. The planes carried over 150 passengers and crew members, and more than 2,600 additional people died at the site. That total included some 400 firefighters, paramedics, and police officers who had rushed to the area to save the people trapped inside the skyscrapers.

At 9:43 a.m., shortly before the WTC towers collapsed, a third hijacked airliner slammed into the western side of the Pentagon building in Washington, DC. American Airlines Flight 77 had been on route from Washington's Dulles Airport to Los Angeles, and was carrying 64 persons. A fourth hijacked plane—United Airlines Flight 93—never reached its intended target, later believed to be the Capitol building in Washington, DC. Following a struggle between the hijackers and some of the passengers, the airliner crashed in rural southwest Pennsylvania.

The North Tower

American Airlines Flight 11 was hijacked by five individuals who had received prior training in Afghan terrorist camps. The hijacker who piloted the plane was Mohammed Atta, believed to have been the ringleader and coordinator of the entire operation. On September 11, Flight 11 took off from Boston at 7:59 a.m. The hijacking apparently started about 15 minutes later, when two of the hijackers stabbed flight attendants who were preparing to serve breakfast.

The hijackers quickly gained access to the cockpit, and Atta, who had been trained as a pilot, took the controls. Meanwhile, four other terrorists used irritant sprays to push the passengers toward the rear of the plane. Two flight attendants, Betty Ong and Amy Sweeney, managed to phone the authorities on the ground and alert them of the crisis, but the plane could not be stopped.

Forty-seven minutes after takeoff, American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the WTC north tower. Within 10 minutes of impact, access to and from the skyscraper's upper section was cut, and the encroaching fire forced several individuals to jump from the burning building to their deaths. At 10:29 a.m., the north tower collapsed, killing hundreds of people, World Trade Center workers and rescuers alike.

The South Tower

The south World Trade Center tower was hit by United Airlines Flight 175, which had been hijacked by five citizens of the United Arab Emirates and four Saudi Arabians. Half an hour after the 8:14 a.m. takeoff, the pilots reported receiving a suspicious transmission from another plane. That plane was later identified as Flight 11, which was being hijacked at that very moment. Minutes afterwards, their own aircraft was taken over.

The hijacking operation on Flight 175 followed roughly the same pattern as the one on Flight 11. Several crew members were stabbed, and the terrorists kept the passengers under control by resorting to irritant sprays and bomb threats. Once again, some passengers managed to phone family members and tell them about the unfolding crisis.

At 9:03 a.m., Flight 175 hit the south tower of the World Trade Center. Many people in the building heard an earlier explosion from the direction of the north tower, but they were unaware that it had been caused by a plane crash. A few minutes before the south tower was hit, the occupants were told to begin an orderly evacuation. The order had been given because the burning north tower was endangering the entire complex, not in anticipation of a possible second plane impact. This fortunate coincidence likely saved many lives in the south tower. Nevertheless, more than 1,000 first response personnel had arrived on the scene before the second skyscraper collapsed, and many were trapped when the south tower disintegrated at 10:05 a.m.

The Pentagon

As Americans were trying to recover from the shock of the attacks on New York, they discovered that

Family members and onlookers watch a hearing of the 9-11 Commission (officially known as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States) in New York City on May 18, 2004. The bipartisan commission, created by Congress in late 2002, was charged with preparing a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, including the government's preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks. The commission also provided recommendations designed to guard against future attacks.

Source: Getty Images.

the terrorists were not content to restrict themselves to one city. Soon after takeoff from Washington, DC, five people took over American Airlines Flight 77. At least three were veterans of multiple Islamic holy wars in Central Asia. However, the story of the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 77 reads a little differently than those of the New York planes. Unlike the terrorists who seized planes in New York, the Washington hijackers used box cutters instead of knives, and they employed no irritant sprays or bomb threats. They were also less aggressive toward the passengers, and did not harm any of them prior to crashing the plane.

When Flight 77 ceased communication with the ground towers, some dispatchers realized that the plane had been hijacked. However, many believed that it was the plane that hit the south tower of the World Trade Center. Instead, at 9:37 a.m., the plane turned around and flew back toward Washington, crashing into the western side of the Pentagon building and killing 125 people inside. Fighter jets from nearby Langley Air Force Base had been scrambled in response to the hijacking, but they were still some 150 miles away when the crash occurred.

Pennsylvania

Four planes were hijacked on September 11, 2001, but only three crashed into buildings. The fourth, United Airlines Flight 93, crashed in a field in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, following a pitched struggle between passengers and hijackers. The crisis on board Flight 93 began 46 minutes after takeoff. The operation did not go as planned from the very beginning. Gaining access to the cockpit proved harder than the hijackers thought, and ground controllers were able to listen to noises of a struggle and shouts of "Mayday" through an open radio channel. Unlike the other three hijackings, there were only four terrorists on Flight 96, which may have contributed to their inability to carry out the plan in its entirety.

As with the other flights, some passengers were able to communicate by phone with family members, who told them what had happened in New York City. Aware that their plane was probably meant to be used in a similar manner, the passengers decided to fight the hijackers. At 9:57 a.m., a fight erupted onboard the plane. Shortly after 10 a.m., with passengers storming the cockpit, the hijackers crashed the plane in a field southeast of Pittsburgh. It was later revealed that Vice President Dick Cheney had given permission for fighter jets to shoot down Flight 93, but confusion in the chain of command prevented the order from being carried out.

A CHAIN OF FAILURES

As soon as the initial shock passed, important questions began to flood the government, the intelligence community, and the media. How could a handful of crudely armed individuals execute such a devastating attack? Why weren't they stopped before they could carry out their plan? Were they contemplating similar attacks in the future? How could the country protect itself against such attacks?

In the wake of the terrorist attacks, the U.S. Congress convened a special commission to study the attacks and determine what factors allowed the plot to proceed undetected. According to the commission's official report, the hijackers were able to prepare and execute their grim undertaking because of widespread "failures of imagination, policy, capabilities, and management" on the part of various U.S. authorities whose role it was to prevent such an event from happening.

The commission report cited failures of imagination that prevented the top echelons of the intelligence community—notably the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—from conceiving of the possibility that a terrorist network based in the rugged mountains of Afghanistan would be able to plot such a complex operation. Moreover, failures of policy denied such institutions as the CIA and the FBI the ability to share information on suspect activity inside and outside the United States.

The report also cited failures of capability that allowed the terrorists to enter the country and prepare their plan in relative comfort—including taking flight lessons and moving money around—out of the sight of the police and the FBI. Finally, failures of management prevented federal field agents with legitimate suspicions or even some knowledge of potential attacks to properly communicate with their superiors. All of these failures ultimately conspired with decades-old instability in Middle Eastern politics to produce one of the most traumatic events in modern American history.

INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES

Public and institutional criticism of intelligence and security failures prior to the September 11 attacks led to a dramatic restructuring of the U.S. national security apparatus. In 2002, a new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created to coordinate efforts to prevent terrorism on U.S. soil. In an attempt to centralize authority for domestic security matters, the DHS assumed authority over many formerly independent government agencies, including the Secret Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The DHS was given responsibility for protecting U.S. cities and vital infrastructure from terrorist threats and monitoring the flow of people and goods across U.S. borders.

The intelligence community was also restructured because of the congressional committee's findings. A new director of national intelligence position was created in 2004 to coordinate intelligence gathering and sharing between federal agencies. The heads of the CIA, FBI, State Department, and military intelligence services are required to provide copies of the information they collect to the director of national intelligence. This allows the director to gain a comprehensive overview of U.S. intelligence rather than the views of a single agency.

A less popular institutional response to the attacks was the passage of legislation abridging certain civil liberties in the name of combating terrorism. In the months following the attacks, many terrorist suspects were arrested and held without charges in federal facilities. Detainees were routinely denied the right to see attorneys and their whereabouts were often kept secret. These actions outraged many Americans, who complained that they violated basic constitutional guarantees against illegal seizure. The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, which broadened federal investigatory and police powers, was protested by many citizens. In March 2005, the Montana State Senate voted 88-12 to condemn the act as un-American.

However, many supporters of the Patriot Act and similar laws believe that such measures are necessary to stop terrorism. They feel that Americans must give up some of their accustomed liberties to ensure the safety of the country against terrorist attack. The debate over security versus freedom is fiercely contentious, and has become one of the most significant issues to arise from the September 11 attacks.

—*Razvan Sibii*

See also Afghanistan, War in; Al-Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Bush, George W., and National Policy; Homeland Security, Department of; Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Iraq War of 2003; Legal Ramifications of National Security; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Terrorism, War on International; Terrorists, Islamic

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SECRETS REVEALED

War on Terrorism

The consequences of the September 11 events are as numerous as they are wide-ranging. A few hours after the attacks in New York City and Washington DC, President George W. Bush announced his administration's decision to annihilate not only the individuals directly responsible for the terrorist attacks—Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda associates—but also those governments who gave them aid.

The United States quickly acted on that decision. On October 7, 2001, U.S. and British forces attacked Afghanistan, which had acted as a host for al-Qaeda training camps. Less than three years later, the United States also attacked Iraq, partly on the pretext that Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein supported al-Qaeda. Both operations were presented as milestones in the newly declared War on International Terrorism. Although the former regimes of both countries were swiftly overthrown, the considerable numbers of U.S. troops required for postwar occupation have experienced unrelenting armed resistance.

SHERMAN, WILLIAM TECUMSEH (1820–1891)

In the American Civil War, union general known for destroying southern infrastructure during his infamous March to the Sea in 1864. Sherman's direct targeting of the enemy's means of production marked the first large-scale implementation of the strategy of *total war*.

William Tecumseh Sherman was the son of an Ohio judge who died when William was nine years old. The young Sherman was raised by a neighbor who served as a U.S. senator and who later obtained a commission for Sherman to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Sherman graduated from West Point in 1840 and subsequently served in the Mexican War. In 1852, he resigned his commission and became a banker in San Francisco and New York before practicing law in Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1859, Sherman took a post as head of Louisiana's state military academy. He resigned the position when Louisiana seceded from the Union in January 1861.

Upon the outbreak of the Civil War, Sherman accepted a commission as a colonel in the U.S. Army. He commanded a Union brigade at the first battle of Bull Run in July 1861 and was promoted to brigadier general in August of that year. At his own request, Sherman was removed from field command due to personal problems, including drinking. He was placed in charge of a military department in Kentucky but returned to combat in April 1862 as a division commander under General Ulysses S. Grant at the Battle of Shiloh. The following month Sherman was promoted to major general, and, in July, his troops occupied Memphis, Tennessee. In the spring and summer of 1863, Sherman participated in Grant's Vicksburg campaign, which cut the Confederacy in two and helped hasten the defeat of Southern forces in the west. He led the U.S. 15th Corps in the Union assault on Vicksburg in July 1863.

In October 1863, Grant was named supreme commander in the west, and Sherman succeeded him as commander of the Army of Tennessee. Between November 1863 and February 1864, Sherman's troops conducted a successful campaign against Confederate forces in the Deep South, destroying vital Southern transportation and supply links. When Grant was appointed to command the Army of the Potomac in March 1864, Sherman was named supreme commander in the west.

Over the next five months, Sherman laid down a fierce siege against Atlanta that culminated in the city's surrender on September 2, 1864. On November 15, Sherman burned most of the city a day before setting out on his historic March to the Sea. With some 60,000 troops and little opposition, he used a scorched earth strategy to decimate the Southern infrastructure. Sherman's strategy was to demoralize enemy combatants and noncombatants alike by destroying everything in his path. Houses, farms, factories, railroads, harbors, food supplies—nothing was spared from looting, burning, or spoilage.

Sherman's tactics represented a radical departure from the way wars had been fought in the previous century. Retreating armies had used scorched earth tactics to deny food and other supplies to invaders, but advancing forces had never adopted it as a conscious strategy. Attackers routinely pillaged territories they invaded and tried to live off the land when possible, and the destruction of property to spread terror among the populace is as old as war itself. However, Sherman's deliberate and systematic destruction of every functional part of Southern society was something entirely new in warfare.

The path of destruction continued from Atlanta to Savannah, Georgia, which fell to Sherman's forces on December 21, 1864. Sherman continued up the coast

into South Carolina, ravaging Charleston and raining devastation on the home state of Southern secession. By the spring of 1865, Sherman's troops had advanced through South Carolina into North Carolina, driving the remaining Confederate forces from the south while Grant closed in from the north. On April 9, 1865, Confederate commander in chief General Robert E. Lee surrendered to Grant's forces, ending the war.

In 1869, Grant was elected president of the United States and Sherman was promoted to succeed him as commander of the U.S. Army. During the 1870s, Sherman led U.S. forces in the Indian Wars against Native American tribes in the western United States. He applied the same scorched earth tactics in these campaigns that he pioneered on the March to the Sea. Despite his ruthless campaigning, however, Sherman spoke out against government maltreatment of Native Americans who settled on reservations.

Sherman retired from the Army in 1884 and settled in New York City. Friends and supporters tried to urge him to run as a Democratic candidate in that year's presidential election. However, he resisted their attempts to draw him into politics with the now-famous quote, "If nominated I will not accept, if elected I will not serve." Sherman died in 1891 and was buried in St. Louis, Missouri.

See also Tactics, Military

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SIGNAL CORPS

Combat support branch of the U.S. Army whose mission is to manage all aspects of communications and information systems support. The primary competency of the Signal Corps is in the management and maintenance of communications and information systems from domestic Army bases to forward deployed combat areas.

The Signal Corps was officially established as a branch of the U.S. Army in March 1863. The evolution of the Signal Corps' mission and methods to carry out that mission has reflected the advance of technology in the United States. At its inception during the Civil War era, the Signal Corps used semaphore—a flag signaling

system. By the end of the Civil War, however, the corps was using the telegraph to communicate from coast to coast.

By the late 19th century, the Signal Corps was employing the telephone, heliograph, and observation balloons in wartime. Because of its expertise in ballooning, the Signal Corps was tasked with control of early aviation technology and the development of military aircraft, including the first procurement of an army aircraft purchased from the Wright brothers in 1908. The Signal Corps relinquished control of aviation in 1914 when the Air Corps was established as a separate branch of the military.

During World War I and World War II, the Signal Corps was responsible for implementing and designing radio technology in support of the war effort. In subsequent years, the Signal Corps continued to develop radio, radar, and sonar technology to enhance its communications ability.

The contemporary mission of the Signal Corps includes the management of all modern telecommunications and information systems. This includes the maintenance and management of computer systems, Internet and local area networks, and voice and data communications. In the modern age of technological warfare, the Signal Corps continues to play a central role in defending and promoting U.S. national security.

See also Computer Security; Radar (Radio Detection and Ranging); Science, Technology, and Security; Signals Intelligence (SIGINT); U.S. Army

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT)

Intelligence gathering by interception of communications, lasers, or radio signals. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) became a critical tool for military intelligence gathering with the development of wireless communications in the late 19th century. Nearly all militaries deploy units that specialize in SIGINT, and the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) specializes in this field of intelligence. SIGINT often involves encryption (coding) and cryptanalysis (decoding), since sensitive diplomatic and military communications are usually encrypted.

TYPES OF SIGINT

There are five types of signals intelligence. Communications intelligence (COMINT) is the interception,

processing, and analysis of communications from foreign sources. These include voice messages, Morse code, or Teletype messages that may or may not be encrypted. COMINT often involves interception of diplomatic communications.

Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is the interception of signals from military and civilian hardware that is not used for traditional forms of communication, such as radar. Interception of signals from air defense radars allows analysts to discern their operating characteristics and devise ways for friendly aircraft to avoid detection. ELINT may also involve interception of signals from navigation and weapons tracking systems on aircraft, vehicles, or ships.

Radar intelligence is the detection of enemy aircraft or missiles and their operational characteristics by means of radar. Whereas ELINT scans enemy radar signals to gather information, radar intelligence collects data by sending out radar signals of its own.

Nonimaging infrared intelligence employs sensors that can detect the presence and movement of an object by its temperature. This type of intelligence gathering may be used at night or in other situations in which the detection of enemy forces by visual means is difficult.

Laser intelligence involves the interception and analysis of laser communications. Laser intelligence has been critical in the development of precision-guided munitions, or smart bombs. A laser called a target designator shoots a laser beam at a target and sensors in the smart bomb pick up and follow the beam to the target. Because this is a relatively new field of SIGINT, many activities remain classified.

HISTORY OF SIGINT

Signals intelligence is as old as the history of human conflict. Leaders in the American War of Independence, for example, employed relatively simple codes and ciphers as well as invisible ink in their communications. Encrypted British communications, intercepted and deciphered by the Americans, helped seal the fate of the British at the Battle of Yorktown in 1781.

However, the ability to act quickly on signals intelligence became possible only with the advent of wireless communications toward the end of the 1800s. Letters or battle plans inadvertently captured in combat may have been days or weeks out of date. Radio or telephone intercepts, on the other hand, provide current information and the technology to communicate them instantly to military commanders. As a result,

SIGINT came to occupy a central role in the wars of the 20th century.

In World War I, the failure of the czar's forces to protect their communications led to a catastrophic Russian defeat at the hands of the Germans at the Battle of Tannenburg in 1914. On the other side of the Atlantic, the 1917 interception of the German Zimmerman telegram by the United States contributed significantly to the U.S. decision to enter World War I on the side of the Allies. The telegram outlined a German offer to annex large parts of the United States to Mexico if Mexico entered the war on the side of Germany.

The use of signals intelligence in World War II has been well documented. Perhaps most well known is the American breaking of the Imperial Japanese Navy code JN 25. The U.S. ability to read Japanese messages allowed the U.S. Navy to inflict a decisive defeat on Japanese forces at the Battle of Midway in 1942.

During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both employed SIGINT to gather intelligence on the military capabilities and diplomacy of friends and foes. Both, however, also found that there were limits to SIGINT. The U.S. Army in Vietnam and the Soviet Army in Afghanistan both encountered irregular forces that did not rely heavily on electronic signals to communicate. Such situations reinforced the need for other forms of intelligence gathering, particularly human intelligence (HUMINT).

Today's war on terror presents similar challenges to signals intelligence. Threats to national security now are as likely to come from terrorist groups or other nonstate actors using less conventional forms of communication such as cell phones, Internet chat rooms, and messages circulated through underground audio or videotapes. These new forms of communication require new responses from those responsible for U.S. signals intelligence.

See also Cryptology; Human Intelligence (HUMINT); Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Science, Technology, and Security

SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN (SIOP)

The U.S. strategic warfighting plan for the use of nuclear weapons. The Single Integrated Operational

Plan (SIOP) is one of the most highly classified of all government documents.

The SIOP is the culmination of a long process that begins with the president of the United States, who provides the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) with a conceptual guide for the use of nuclear weapons. The DoD converts that information into the Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy, a list of objectives, specific targets, and operational constraints. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then rework that list into the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The U.S. Strategic Command uses the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan to compile the SIOP, which contains the specifics of targeting orders, scheduling, and needed weapons. A new SIOP is approved each year, even if it is not fundamentally different from the previous year's plan.

The first SIOP was approved in late 1960 as an attempt to develop a more systematic approach to the various targets for potential U.S. nuclear strikes. It was also a response to advances in technology that improved the U.S. ability to hit a broader range of targets. Recently declassified documents indicate that outgoing President Dwight D. Eisenhower and other top officials believed that the first SIOP went too far. The plan called for multiple nuclear strikes against military and urban-industrial targets in the Soviet Union, China, and their allies. The initial SIOP also tried to unite the various nuclear forces of the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Army into a synchronized format.

Since those early years, various SIOPs have been developed. SIOPs focused on counter-force strategy from the early to mid-1960s, deterrence and more flexible responses with limited nuclear options in the mid-1970s and early 1980s, and again on counter-force strategy in the mid- to late 1980s. The number of targets has dropped dramatically since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The existence of SIOP was not publicly acknowledged for more than a decade, and many details about SIOP remain shrouded in mystery. From the beginning, a special information category—extremely sensitive information (ESI)—has been attached to the SIOP. The U.S. government is understandably cautious about revealing details of its nuclear strategy, even though some observers feel that American citizens should be aware of their country's nuclear intentions.

See also Nuclear Utilization Theory; Nuclear Weapons; Strategic Nuclear Triad

SMALL-SCALE CONTINGENCIES

Military operations that require fewer preparations than major war and whose missions include humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Small-scale contingencies (SSC) are not defined or limited by a single military operation but rather include varying degrees of military participation. These include limited strikes, evacuation operations, enforcing no-fly zones, and peacekeeping and humanitarian affairs missions that may require military intervention. These missions are referred to by several terms including operations other than war (OOTW) and major operations other than war (MOOTW).

U.S. military planning is derived from two primary sources: the Quadrennial Defense Review prepared by the Department of Defense every four years, and the National Security Strategy developed by the White House at its discretion, generally every few years. In 1997, the Quadrennial Defense Review required the military to build up sufficient resources to meet demands for stability and support operations and to fight two major theater wars while simultaneously intervening in small-scale contingency operations. This was the first official inclusion of SSCs in national defense planning.

Small-scale contingencies require more planning than stability and support operations, but not nearly as much as a major theater war. The Quadrennial Defense Review and other analyses guide planning for SSC missions. They also focus on maintaining flexible, rapidly deployable forces that can meet the requirements for a variety of situations. The U.S. military, however, has been criticized for a sluggish transition to the peacekeeping and humanitarian mission. United States forces are still ill trained to handle these missions on a large scale. Partly for this reason, SSC planning has emphasized the need to prepare the military appropriately for the peacekeeping aspect of its mission.

One unique characteristic of small-scale contingency operations is that their desired outcome and duration are not always clearly defined. Some of the more recent examples of U.S. small-scale contingency operations have included both short- and long-term missions. Following the 1991 Gulf War, the United States established no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq to protect ethnic minorities from air attacks by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Projected to last several months, their enforcement ended only after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. From 1992 to 1994, the U.S. military

conducted Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, a military-humanitarian effort to provide food and health assistance to Somalis. In the Balkans, the 1995 Implementation Force/Stabilization Force (IFOR/SFOR) was an SSC projected to last for one year. Ten years later, the United States was still involved in the mission.

Small-scale contingency operations, while focused on humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts in recent years, still occasionally require the U.S. military to exercise its military might. Some of the more traditional military roles assigned to SSCs include carrying out military exercises in the Taiwan Straits, participating in multinational force deployments in Haiti, and enforcing a naval embargo on Bosnia.

See also Humanitarian Intervention; Military Doctrine; National Security Strategy of the United States; National Security Strategy Reports; Operations Other Than War (OOTW); Peacekeeping Operations; Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

SMART BOMB

Guided munitions that achieve a greater degree of accuracy and cause less collateral damage. Features that distinguish smart bombs from ordinary bombs are an electronic sensor system, a control system, and adjustable flight fins for guidance.

The three primary types of smart bomb technology are TV/IR-guided bombs (television/infrared), laser-guided bombs, and Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bombs. The TV/IR-guided bombs essentially operate like a remote-control glider, with a remote operator steering the bomb to a given target. Laser-guided smart bombs are guided by an operator, who directs the bomb to the target via laser light. The disadvantage of both of these systems is that the bomb sensor must maintain visual contact with the target and may be diverted by cloud cover or other obstacles.

The JDAM bomb avoids this problem by using Global Positioning System (GPS) technology to orient itself. Before dropping the bomb, the attacking aircraft uses its own GPS receiver to locate the target on the ground. This information is fed to the JDAM's computer just before launch and the JDAM's GPS receiver processes signals from GPS satellites to steer the bomb toward its target.

Technological advances toward the development of more accurate smart bombs dates back to experiments with guided aircraft during World War I. The first successful guided-bomb experiments took place during World War II. Greater sensitivity to civilian casualties during the Vietnam War led to the development of more sophisticated smart bomb technology. It was not until the Gulf War of 1991, however, that smart bombs received the most attention.

See also Global Positioning System (GPS); Precision-Guided Munitions

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SOMALIA INTERVENTION (1992)

Military operation mounted by the United States as part of a wider international humanitarian and peacekeeping effort that started in the summer of 1992 and ended in the spring of 1995. The intervention in Somalia was an extremely complex enterprise. It has remained in the mind of many Americans mainly because of one major incident that took place on October 3 and 4, 1993: namely the so-called Battle of Mogadishu, in which 18 U.S. soldiers and hundreds of Somali militia and civilians were killed. What started as a humanitarian operation aimed at channeling food supplies to the famished Somali population ended in a bloody fight that wrought even more chaos on an already embattled country.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The politically-charged events that foreshadowed the 1992 intervention in Somalia arguably go back to 1991, when Somali dictator Mohammed Siad Barre was overthrown in a military coup staged by a coalition of opposition warlords. As soon as the warlords saw themselves in power, the two most powerful—Ali Mahdi and Mohammed Aideed (who would later play a crucial role in the Battle of Mogadishu)—began fighting among themselves.

The incessant conflict led to the destruction of the country's agriculture and, by way of consequence, to nationwide famine. By the fall of 1991, the United Nations estimated that 4.5 million Somalis were on the brink of starving to death. Under international pressure, the warring factions, including General Aideed, agreed to a cease-fire, allowing UN observers to enter the country and organize a humanitarian effort there.

In April 1992, the UN humanitarian effort, known as Operation Provide Relief, arrived in Somalia. However, the undertaking proved to be extremely difficult, as various Somali militia disregarded the cease-fire and engaged in extensive fighting as well as in large-scale hijacking and looting of international food convoys.

In his last weeks in office, President George H. W. Bush proposed to the United Nations that American combat troops be sent to Somalia to protect aid workers. The United Nations accepted Bush's proposal, and on December 9, 1992, around 25,000 U.S. troops began arriving in Somalia.

FIGHTING AIDEED

Almost from the very beginning, just like in the case of the humanitarian effort, the military operation was beset with difficulties. The lack of a national Somali leadership, as well as the daily mayhem in the streets of the capital city of Mogadishu, bedeviled the security operation. Unsatisfied with the mission's results, the new U.S. president, Bill Clinton, ordered the number of U.S. troops reduced.

By June 1993, only 1,200 American combat soldiers remained in Somalia, aided by troops from 28 other countries acting under the authority of the United Nations. The already unstable situation on the ground took a sharp turn for the worse when 24 Pakistani soldiers were ambushed and killed while inspecting a weapons storage facility. The United Nations unofficially blamed General Aideed's militia for the operation, and passed a resolution calling for the apprehension of those responsible for the massacre.

During the next two weeks, U.S. and UN troops attacked objectives associated with Aideed's forces, without succeeding in capturing the general. On August 29, more than 400 elite U.S. Delta Force troops flew into Somalia on a mission to apprehend Aidid. The ensuing Battle of Mogadishu was to become a symbol for the entire Somali operation.

A LOST CAUSE

On October 3, 1993, the U.S. elite forces staged their sixth attempt to arrest or annihilate General Aideed and his top lieutenants. The objective was the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu, where the targets were thought to be meeting.

The mission, however, did not go as planned. The troubles began when one of the six Black Hawk helicopters that transported the Delta Force soldiers was shot down near the hotel. Rushing toward the site of the crash to rescue the crew, other U.S. troops came under a heavy barrage of fire. Hundreds of Somali fighters filled the streets, and the U.S. soldiers became trapped.

After 17 hours of continuous fighting, the surviving U.S. troops were finally rescued by an international force. The battle left 18 U.S soldiers dead and 84 wounded. On the Somali side, at least 300 people were wounded, many of them civilians caught in the crossfire. Although the mission was technically successful—as several high-ranking Aideed associates were apprehended—it was widely perceived as a failed operation due to its high cost in human lives.

Soon after the incident at Mogadishu, President Clinton pulled all of the American troops out of Somalia. A year later, in the spring of 1995, UN troops followed suit, leaving the country engulfed in clan warfare. General Aideed died of bullet wounds in 1996, but the internal strife in Somalia continued. To this day, the Somali national government operates from exile because of the unsafe conditions inside the country. Somalia remains one of the poorest countries in the world.

See also Humanitarian Intervention; International Peacekeeping and Overseas Deployment; Peacekeeping Operations

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SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION (SEATO)

Anticommunist alliance among Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines,

and the United States. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was created to halt the spread of communism among the nations of Southeast Asia.

SEATO was established September 8, 1954, with the signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. The treaty was promoted by the Western powers when France withdrew its colonial army from Vietnam. An integral part of the treaty was the Pacific Charter, affirming the rights of Asian and Pacific people to equality and self-determination. The stated goals of SEATO were to increase economic, social, and cultural cooperation among the member countries. Civil and military organizations were also established under SEATO and headquartered in Bangkok, Thailand.

SEATO sanctioned the use of U.S. forces in Vietnam, although France and Pakistan withheld their support. Many critics, in fact, saw the organization as a way to legitimize U.S. participation in Vietnam among Southeast Asian publics. Without the unanimous support of all of the member nations, however, SEATO was precluded from intervening in the fighting in Laos and Cambodia.

Pakistan withdrew from SEATO in 1968; and, with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam in 1974, SEATO lost much of its reason for existence. The following year, in 1975, France suspended financial support for the alliance. By that time, the alliance was seriously weakened, and SEATO was officially disbanded on June 30, 1977.

See also Alliances; Collective Security; Communism and National Security; Treaties; Vietnam War (1954–1975)

SOVEREIGNTY

Institution in international relations that affirms a state's legitimate domestic and international autonomy; also an organizing principle of modern international relations.

Most often applied to states, sovereignty is a complex and evolving concept. Modern-state sovereignty originated in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, the agreement that ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe. This war of religion had torn Europe apart and made political reorganization desirable. Thus, the treaty signed by the Western European powers represented a rejection of a hierarchical system in which they were subject to the pope and the Holy Roman emperor. It established, instead, a system of territorial nation-states. The new states were capable of exercising supreme authority within their territories and acting (theoretically) as equal actors in the international realm.

The system of mutual recognition of sovereign states forms the basis for modern international relations. This institution, however, depends heavily on recognition, de facto control, and legitimacy. For a system of sovereign states to endure, each state must accept the others as legitimate political and territorial entities with their own identities, power, and interests.

Sovereignty can therefore be very controversial; breakaway nations or states must be acknowledged by other entities before they can claim sovereign authority or participate (legally) in international relations. To gain acknowledgment—which can be quite difficult— states must be able to exert domestic sovereign control. Merely claiming to rule without the power, resources, or political will to substantiate the claim is insufficient. Would-be sovereign states generally must also demonstrate that they rule legitimately.

As it developed, sovereignty was understood as existing on two separate levels—internal and external. Internal sovereignty means that a state has certain spatial and political characteristics. A sovereign state is a territorial entity with clearly delineated borders. The state has ultimate authority within its borders over people, material resources, and domestic affairs, and is not subject to a higher power. Importantly, this authority is regarded as legitimate.

External sovereignty has intertwining political, territorial, and legal characteristics. The sovereign state is independent of all external authority and represents an autonomous unit; it has a political identity. In principle, it is free from the interference of other states in the conduct of its own domestic and international affairs; and it is thus responsible for its own security as well.

It is understood, therefore, that each state has a right and responsibility to protect and defend the integrity of its borders. As such, a sovereign state is seen as having a legitimate right to use force to resist direct invasion or indirect attempts at control. Sovereign states are therefore legitimate actors in international politics, with the power to formulate foreign policy, conclude treaties and trade agreements, form alliances, and wage war.

Sovereignty also has legal implications. For all states, sovereignty represents *standing* in international law. States may, rightfully, enter contracts, sue one another and be sued in international courts, conduct diplomatic negotiations, and so forth. They may also

claim jurisdiction in international disputes. In the special case of failed states, the principle of sovereignty can be a safeguard against total disintegration. While a functioning government may not exist, previous recognition of sovereignty is generally a guarantee that a state will continue to survive, in a de jure sense, as a sovereign nation. The institution of sovereignty thus normalizes relations between states. In its political and legal manifestations, it provides an organizing principle for the contemporary international system.

See also Power, World

SOVIET UNION, FORMER (RUSSIA), AND U.S. POLICY

The impact of the policies of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on U.S. national security from the time of the Russian Revolution in 1917 to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union not only dominated the foreign policy of both nations for decades but also had a great impact on domestic policy and life in both countries. The rivalry drew the countries into an arms race and military conflicts that cost trillions of dollars and claimed tens of thousands of lives.

EARLY HISTORY

The Soviet Union arose from the chaos of postrevolutionary Russia in the later stages of World War I. In February 1917, with the war going badly for Russia, a popular uprising forced Czar Nicholas II to abdicate the Russian throne. He was replaced by a provisional government that continued the war against Germany. Six months later, Bolshevik rebels led by Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov—better known as Lenin—overthrew the provisional government. Lenin signed a peace treaty with Germany in March 1918 and set up a revolutionary communist form of government.

Lenin, however, had opposition both at home and abroad. The less-revolutionary Mensheviks, who had been partners in the provisional government, were unwilling to accept Lenin's leadership. They soon began an armed resistance to Bolshevik rule, setting off a civil war. The Bolsheviks' revolution also caused great concern among the Western Allies in the war against Germany—the United States, Great Britain, and France. These states were shocked by the coup against and subsequent murder of the czar. Lenin's withdrawal of Russia from the war and his establishment of a hard-line communist government was more than the Allies could take.

After defeating Germany in late 1918, the Western Allies sent troops and equipment to support the Mensheviks in the Russian Civil War. This began a period marked by simultaneous civil war and foreign incursion to which the Bolsheviks responded with a set of policies known collectively as War Communism. It was also a time of economic experimentation, as Lenin centralized the Russian economy. The government in Moscow took ownership of all private enterprises, including farms. Moscow set agricultural and industrial production quotas and state bureaucrats managed the Russian economy.

By 1920, the Bolsheviks had prevailed in the civil war, but Lenin's policies had been disastrous for the Russian economy. Realizing the weaknesses of economic centralization, Lenin introduced the New Economic Period (NEP)—market-friendly measures designed to encourage private ownership and foreign investment in the country—in 1921. During this period, U.S. firms, including General Electric, Ford, and Westinghouse, entered the Soviet market. This move toward capitalist economic philosophy encouraged Western politicians who had grown increasingly concerned about the direction of Lenin's rule.

In 1922, the former Russian Empire was formally renamed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (The name Soviet was taken from the Russian word for a local worker's council. Such councils were the backbone of the Bolshevik movement during the revolution.) Lenin did not live to see the Soviet Union rise to its eventual status as a world superpower. His death in 1924 set off a struggle between his old ally and revolutionary partner Leon Trotsky and the general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Joseph Stalin. Although clever and brutally efficient, Stalin was not one of Lenin's favorites. In a political testament dictated before his death, Lenin advised other communist leaders to "think about a way of removing Stalin from that post [general secretary]."

THE USSR UNDER STALIN

Stalin eventually won the power struggle with Trotsky, forcing Trotsky to leave the country in 1928. Having

consolidated his power, Stalin set about reversing many of Lenin's policies. In 1929, Stalin scrapped the NEP and set out to build a modern society that was economically self-sufficient. The Soviet economy, again disdainful of private ownership, was directed by a series of five-year plans that controlled production schedules and consumption patterns. Virtually all aspects of Soviet life came under the direction and watchfulness of the state.

By the early 1930s, the Soviet Union was boasting impressive economic numbers. Industrial goods were being produced in astonishing volume and military output had reached great heights. In some categories, Soviet production led the combined efforts of the rest of the world. Stalin's forced industrialization and militarization of the Soviet state accomplished rapid economic development and accrued tremendous power to the Communist Party.

In achieving these numbers, however, the Soviet government resorted to a policy of systematic repression and brutality. Stalin used state propaganda organs to whip up fear of foreigners and suspicion of Western capitalist society. He portrayed the Soviet Union as an island of communist progress surrounded by evil capitalist forces waiting to destroy the Soviet Union. To maintain an iron control over the populace, Stalin resorted to purges, massive arrest and deportation of political opponents, and forced migration of entire peoples to break up their political power. He even implemented policies designed to create famine in areas opposed to his rule.

The rise of a strong, anticommunist German state in the 1930s posed a serious challenge to Stalin. The purges had decimated the Soviet military, which although large, was poorly trained, poorly equipped, and poorly led. On the eve of Germany's 1939 invasion of Poland, which started World War II, Stalin signed a nonaggression pact with Germany's leader, Adolf Hitler. The Nazi-Soviet pact bought Hitler peace on his eastern front so he could turn his attention to France in 1940. It also gave Stalin time to rebuild the Soviet officer corps and modernize his army. The agreement between such bitter ideological enemies stunned the rest of the world.

After overrunning France, Hitler turned on Stalin. He broke the nonaggression pact by invading the Soviet Union in 1941 and driving deep into the country. Over the next four years, the Soviet population would suffer terribly from war and Nazi brutality. By the end of the war in 1945, some 30 million Soviet soldiers and civilians had lost their lives, and much of the country was devastated by incessant fighting. The wholesale destruction of Soviet industry and agriculture led the U.S. intelligence community to conclude that the Soviet Union would be unable to mount any major military operations for the next 15 years.

The memories of German invasions in 1914 and 1941, and Western intervention in the Russian Civil War, left Stalin more paranoid than ever about the need for security from foreign threats. He refused to withdraw his army from the Eastern European countries that Soviet troops occupied as they drove Nazi forces back to Germany. In these countries, the Soviet Union set up communist governments whose policies were aligned with those of the Soviet Union. Eastern Europe thus formed a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and the West and created a closed economic area for Soviet exploitation. The presence of the Soviet Red Army in Eastern Europe left the Western powers few options but to accept the situation or attack the Soviet Union.

Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were tense throughout the Stalin era, but they grew increasingly confrontational after World War II. In June of 1948, the Soviets imposed a blockade of Western traffic in and out of the Allied-controlled zone of the German capital, Berlin. The Soviets hoped to dislodge the Western Allies from the city, which was completely enclosed within the Soviet-occupied eastern portion of Germany. The Allied powers responded with an airlift that forced the Soviets to abandon the blockade by May of 1949.

CONTAINMENT

The Berlin blockade signaled the formal beginning of an extended period of U.S.-Soviet political and military rivalry known as the Cold War. During this time, the United States adopted a policy toward the Soviet Union known as containment, first articulated by U.S. diplomat George Kennan.

One of the main architects of U.S. foreign policy, Kennan recognized that the Soviet state commanded the loyalty of its people by raising the constant threat of invasion and by arguing that only a highly centralized and militarized state could protect the country from foreign takeover. Kennan asserted that the Communist Party successfully used these ideas to demand sacrifice and allegiance of the Soviet people at the cost of personal liberties and a better quality of life. He also

predicted that this constant fortress mentality, if denied an outlet, would eventually push the Soviet system to the brink of collapse. His idea, then, was to defeat communism by containing it to the Soviet Union if possible.

Kennan advised the United States to identify and defend only its most vital spheres of interest. These would be major centers of industrial power, such as Western Europe and Japan. By opposing the Soviets at every vital strategic point, Kennan calculated that the West's material, ideological, and strategic advantages would eventually win out in a war of attrition. Built into the strategy, too, were opportunities to allow the Soviets an honorable way out rather than the sole option of warfare.

A group of U.S. policy analysts known as *idealists* felt that containment did not go far enough in meeting the Soviet challenge. They complained that losing even peripheral interests meant a loss to Western industry of clients in the developing world. These losses also represented psychological defeats in the ideological struggle between communism and capitalism. Because of these concerns, containment underwent intellectual revision in a 1950 National Security Council directive known as NSC-68.

This NSC-68 document called for a massive U.S. military buildup to counter Soviet aggression. Believing that the Soviets understood raw force only, the idealists claimed aggression by the Soviet Union had to be met on a worldwide basis with military might, no matter the cost. The strategy outlined in NSC-68 placed the world on the brink of nuclear holocaust and paved the way for an intense period of domestic U.S. anticommunism in the 1950s. The decade saw the United States fight a Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea, as well as the beginnings of U.S. military involvement to oppose communist influence in Vietnam.

POST-STALINISM

Stalin's death in 1953 set off another struggle for Soviet leadership that was eventually won by Nikita Khrushchev. In a reversal of policy, Khrushchev denounced Stalin's brutalities and the cult of personality that had grown up around Stalin. Khrushchev promoted political reform and moved to soften relations with the West. He characterized the United States as a rival rather than an enemy, a move that angered many hard-line Soviet communists as well as the Soviet Union's ally, Communist China.

Khrushchev reopened high-level dialogue with the United States to ease the strain in relations that had heightened during the final days of the Eisenhower administration. However, when the Soviets downed an American U2 reconnaissance plane flying over the Soviet Union, tensions between the superpowers rose once again. The situation was eventually defused, and President John F. Kennedy's administration believed that Khrushchev desired a period of calm in foreign affairs to gain time to make economic progress at home and solidify his political base.

Superpower relations again took a dangerous turn in October 1962, when President Kennedy discovered that the Soviet Union was building secret missile bases in Cuba. The United States imposed a naval quarantine of Cuba and demanded the removal of all Soviet missile bases from the island. Khrushchev threatened to launch tactical nuclear weapons against Western Europe in the event of a U.S. invasion of Cuba. For seven days, the world teetered on the brink of a nuclear war. The deadlock in the Cuban Missile Crisis, as it was called, was finally resolved when the Soviets agreed to remove their missiles from Cuba.

The Cuban Missile Crisis marked the depth of Cold War animosity between the United States and the Soviet Union. It also ushered in an extended period during which superpower relations made little progress. Khrushchev's ouster as Soviet leader in 1964, and the eventual succession of hard-liner Leonid Brezhnev, further lowered expectations for a thawing in international affairs. Every positive development, such as the 1968 signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, seemed to be balanced by a setback, such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia that year. Fading hopes for improved relations were further undercut by the 1968 election of President Richard Nixon, a longtime staunch anticommunist.

FROM DÉTENTE TO PERESTROIKA

Despite his reputation as a Cold War warrior, President Nixon sought to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. Rather than any desire to create an environment of general good will, Nixon was motivated by the recognition that the two nations had specific areas of mutual interest. The resulting relaxation of tensions between the superpowers was known as détente. The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty signed at the 1972 Moscow summit meeting represented the application of détente in an area where both powers shared similar interests—the reduction of the threat of nuclear war.

President Nixon was convinced that the time of U.S.-Soviet bipolar world dominance was ending and

that a multipolar world order was rapidly approaching. He anticipated a deepening split in Chinese-Soviet relations and saw China as an emerging global power. Sensing this change in political dynamics, and realizing that the United States did not have the resources to sustain its current level of global commitment, Nixon embraced a strategy called triangular diplomacy. To this end, Nixon pursued the opportunity to establish relations with the People's Republic of China as a way to pressure the Soviet Union to adopt less confrontational policies.

The United States continued to pursue a policy of détente after Nixon resigned the presidency in 1974. His successors, Gerald Ford and then Jimmy Carter, continued to negotiate arms control treaties with the Soviet Union while avoiding military confrontation. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, spelled the end of détente. President Carter withdrew U.S. athletes from the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow to protest the Soviet invasion. Carter's successor, Ronald Reagan, presided over a renewed era of U.S.-Soviet hostilities.

President Reagan believed that the United States could deal effectively with the Soviet Union only from a position of U.S. strength. He called for massive investments in defense and proposed the development of a high-tech missile defense system nicknamed Star Wars. American military expansion was matched by Soviet defense spending, which put great strains on the Soviet economy. The occupation of Afghanistan was also becoming a serious burden on the Soviet Union. Despite years of fighting and massive Soviet casualties, Afghan rebels still successfully resisted Soviet forces. Like the United States in Vietnam, the Soviet Union became bogged down in a guerrilla war in Afghanistan that was growing increasingly unpopular among the Russian people at home.

Brezhnev's neglect of domestic affairs and obsession with military and technological rivalry with the United States brought the Soviet Union to a time of crisis in the mid-1980s. His death in 1982 was followed by a period of political jockeying by members of the Soviet leadership. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev emerged as the victor in the contest for power. Gorbachev inherited a country whose economy had been severely weakened under Brezhnev's rule and a populace that was growing ever more restive in the face of shortages of food and consumer goods.

To ease the burden on the weak Soviet economy, Gorbachev supported an end to the nuclear arms race, as well as a reduction in conventional arms. He opened a dialogue with Western leaders, emphasizing the shared benefits of reducing stockpiles of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In 1987, the United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) arms limitation treaty. Two years later, the Soviet Union pulled its troops out of Afghanistan.

Domestically, Gorbachev instituted the twin programs of *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (economic reform). Glasnost was an effort to reveal the terrible secrets of the Soviet past that had been hidden by previous regimes, and to promote more openness, or transparency, in government. It was an attempt to win the confidence and trust of a public that had been motivated for decades by lies and intimidation. Perestroika represented a restructuring of the Soviet economy to promote private investment and reverse policies that had hindered productivity.

Though Western leaders praised these strategies as a welcome move toward democracy, they produced domestic troubles for Gorbachev. Perestroika failed in its attempt to reform Soviet economic policies by not completely abandoning central planning. Glasnost, meanwhile, set off demands for independence in many Soviet republics and brought to the surface local ethnic and religious tensions that had been repressed under Soviet rule.

As Gorbachev's reform drive stalled, both reformers and conservatives roiled in discontent. An attempted 1991 coup by communist hard-liners unleashed massive street protests in Moscow. Poorly coordinated and lacking support from the military, the coup soon collapsed. Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Republic, led the resistance in the capital and helped reinstall Gorbachev into power. However, the coup irreparably damaged Gorbachev's credibility, and he resigned as president of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991. Gorbachev turned power over to Boris Yeltsin, who announced the dissolution of the Soviet Union the next day.

POST-SOVIET RUSSIA

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was replaced by a new entity, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The CIS is a loose alliance composed of 12 of the 15 newly independent former Soviet republics. (The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania chose not to join the CIS.) The Russian Federation, successor state to the former Russian Federated Soviet

Republic, assumed the seat in the United Nations that had been held by the Soviet Union. As the largest and most populous of the former Soviet republics, the home of the former Soviet capital Moscow, and the inheritor of most of the Soviet Union's military might, Russia is looked on as the successor to the Soviet Union.

In Russia, Yeltsin adopted a policy of aggressive desovietization, reversing Soviet economic and political policies, removing former Soviet officials from power, and even outlawing symbols of the old regime. He began a thorough privatization of the Soviet economy, auctioning off state-owned enterprises and breaking up the nation's collectivized farms. These policies were popular in the West and among much of the Russian public. However, Yeltsin's reforms brought significant instability to a society that had resisted change for almost 75 years.

The privatization of Russian industry was accompanied by charges of massive corruption, as a few well-connected businessmen were able to purchase valuable assets for a fraction of their true value. The explosion of unrestrained capitalist sentiment in Russia led to the rise of organized crime and an unprecedented level of crime and violence. Yeltsin also faced domestic political challenges, including an armed uprising in the province of Chechnya. Civil wars in neighboring countries such as Georgia and Armenia also threatened Russian political stability.

Throughout the 1990s, Yeltsin maintained a close political and personal relationship with U.S. President Bill Clinton. The United States supported Russian economic and political reforms, even though it opposed Yeltsin's use of force in Chechnya. Despite reservations about some of Yeltsin's policies, the Clinton administration saw him as a valuable ally.

At home, however, Yeltsin was growing less popular as his economic shock therapy drove more and more Russians into poverty. The failed Soviet policies had to be corrected, but doing so meant dismantling the social safety net that once supported most Russian citizens. The state was forced to lay off thousands of workers and had difficulty paying those it kept. Soldiers often went months without pay, prompting discontent and leading to a rash of desertions. With little prospect of income from state-funded research work, Russian weapons scientists often turned to selling their expertise to other nations, thus raising concerns about rogue states or terrorist groups obtaining nuclear weapons from cash-strapped former Soviet republics.

RUSSIA UNDER PUTIN

In 2000, Vladimir Putin, former head of the Soviet secret police (KGB) and an unabashed Russian nationalist intent on restoring Russia's stature as a world power, was elected to succeed Yeltsin as president of Russia. While most Russians were glad to be rid of Soviet rule, they lamented the decline of Russia's international prestige following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Putin seized on that sentiment in his presidential campaign, announcing support for rebuilding Russia's security services, a vigorous nationalist foreign policy, and market-friendly economic policies.

When President George W. Bush announced an international war on terrorism following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Putin quickly aligned Russia with the Bush program. Additionally, Putin has been much more aggressive than Yeltsin in repressing Chechen independence and replying to terrorist attacks in Russia. In the three years following September 11, Putin ordered military assaults to resolve terrorist hostage crises that took place in a Moscow theatre and in a school in Russia's Caucasus region.

Putin's willingness to settle matters with force troubles some U.S. observers, as does his increasing tendency toward authoritarianism—bypassing the Russian parliament and dismissing political appointees who oppose his policies. In 2005, he amended the Russian constitution to replace the system of popularly elected regional governors to one in which the president appoints the governors, significantly increasing the power of the president and the central government at the expense of local populations.

Putin also embarked on a highly publicized and widely criticized anticorruption campaign that involved prosecuting prominent Russian businessmen for fraud and tax evasion. Many observers called the charges politically motivated and saw them as a way to return control of critical industries such as oil and gas to the state. They also felt that Putin used the defendants, who were highly unpopular with the Russian public, as scapegoats for his own inability to make progress in revitalizing Russia's economy.

As of early 2005, the U.S. relationship with Russia was ambiguous. Putin is first and foremost committed to advancing Russian interests and bolstering Russian power and prestige. In some cases, such as in the war on terrorism, those goals coincide with the objectives of U.S. national security. In others, however, they lead

to significant differences of opinion between the United States and Russia. For example, Russia's long-standing political and economic ties to Iraq contributed to Putin's refusal to join the U.S.-led invasion of that nation in 2003. The United States and Russia are no longer bitter ideological foes as they were during the Cold War. However, they remain rivals for geopolitical influence in a complex and competitive world.

—*Jack A. Jarmon*

See also Arms Race; Cold War; Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); Communism; Communism and National Security; Containment and the Truman Doctrine; Cuban Missile Crisis; Détente; Geopolitics; Nixon, Richard, and National Policy; Putin, Vladimir (1952–); Reagan, Ronald, and National Policy; Terrorism, War on International; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR); World War II (1939–1945); Yeltsin, Boris (1931–)

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SPACE RACE

Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union to gain technological superiority and achieve historic firsts in the field of space flight and exploration. The space race served political goals as well as scientific ones. The superpowers viewed their accomplishments in the space race as a public measure of the relative strengths of the capitalist and communist systems. Beyond that, the competition for superiority in outer space rapidly accelerated development of many areas of high technology that have since become an integral part of modern society, most notably computers and telecommunications.

SPUTNIK AND EXPLORER

The beginning of the space race traditionally dates to the launch of the Soviet Sputnik satellite on October 4, 1957. The Sputnik was the first artificial satellite placed into Earth's orbit by humans. However, both the United States and Soviet Union had been working seriously on the problem of space flight since the end of World War II. The defeated Germans had made significant progress in this area during the war, developing the world's first ballistic missile, the V-2 rocket.

After the war, both sides scrambled to acquire the services of as many former German rocket scientists as possible. The United States seemed to fare much better in this effort, capturing the head of the V-2 program, Dr. Werner von Braun, and many of his top assistants. Yet, despite this head start, work on a U.S. rocket capable of leaving the earth's atmosphere was slow and filled with setbacks. Meanwhile, the Soviets were making steady progress that eluded the notice of U.S. intelligence services.

The Sputnik announcement shocked and stunned the United States. The Soviet Union not only had managed to launch a rocket into outer space, it had also successfully placed a satellite into Earth orbit. By contrast, the U.S. space program was marked by a series of spectacular failures, as several rockets exploded on or shortly after launch. These failures appeared to be an indictment of the relative weakness of U.S. science education. In the wake of the Sputnik launch, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower spearheaded a movement to place greater emphasis on teaching science in American schools.

In December 1957, the Soviets launched a second Sputnik satellite into orbit, this one carrying a live dog, named Laika. The move seemed to confirm the total Soviet dominance in the space race. The United States, however, was not willing to concede defeat so easily. On January 31, 1958, a Mercury Redstone rocket carried the first U.S. satellite, *Explorer I*, into orbit. On its flight, *Explorer I* discovered the Van Allen radiation belt that surrounds Earth. This marked the first practical use of an orbiting satellite; neither Sputnik had performed any scientific functions.

The success of *Explorer I* brought renewed confidence to the U.S. space program and served notice that both sides were willing to devote substantial economic and political resources to the space race. Later that year, the United States authorized the establishment of a separate government agency—the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—to coordinate the nation's space exploration efforts. The race for space had begun in earnest.

MANNED FLIGHT

When John F. Kennedy became president of the United States in 1961, he set the nation a goal of putting men on the moon and returning them safely by the end of the decade. Kennedy issued his challenge just a month after Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin became the first human to fly in space on April 21, 1961. Gagarin made a single orbit of the earth in a flight that lasted just 108 minutes. Three weeks later, astronaut Alan Shepard became the first American in space, although his Mercury spacecraft did not achieve orbit. The first American to orbit the earth was John Glenn, who achieved that feat in February 1962.

The Soviet Union recorded a string of other firsts during the early days of human space flight. In August 1962, the Soviets launched the first spacecraft to carry more than one person into space. In June 1963, Soviet cosmonaut Valentina Tereschkova became the first woman in space. Soviets made the first flight without spacesuits in 1964, and cosmonaut Aleksei Leonov made the world's first spacewalk outside of a spacecraft in 1965.

While the Soviets were making headlines with these pioneering accomplishments, the United States was working methodically toward achieving the goal set by President Kennedy. In 1961, NASA established the Apollo program to develop the technology needed for a lunar landing. Two years later, it launched Project Gemini, which sent astronauts into orbit to perform tasks that would help prepare them for the duties they would face on a moon flight. The Gemini and Apollo programs carried out more than 20 space flights in preparation for a manned flight to the moon. On July 20, 1969, *Apollo 11* landed on the moon and astronaut Neil Armstrong became the first human to set foot on the lunar surface.

POST-APOLLO DEVELOPMENTS

Most observers felt that the U.S. moon landing ended the space race with a decisive American victory. The Soviet Union never matched the feat, instead concentrating on the development of orbiting space stations, such as the Salyut series and *Mir*. The United States sent several more Apollo missions to the moon, but made no further plans for human exploration of other planets. The formal end of the space race occurred with the 1975 joint Apollo-Soyuz mission, in which U.S. and Soviet spacecraft docked, or joined, in orbit while their crews visited one another's craft and performed joint scientific experiments.

After this time, the goals of the two space programs diverged sharply. The Soviets focused on space stations, while the United States pursued development of the space shuttle, a reusable orbital vehicle, formally known as the Space Transportation System (STS). The intense head-to-head competition that marked the peak years of the space race gave way to an acknowledgment that space exploration was no longer considered a matter of critical political importance.

The challenges of conquering space, however, did produce lasting scientific results. Computer technology, for example, advanced at an astronomical rate during the space race. Spacecraft required computers powerful enough to control complex functions yet small enough to fit on board a cramped capsule. The needs of the space program also led to a host of breakthroughs in electronics, telecommunications, guidance, and remote control systems. Much of the technology that runs modern society was developed and perfected because of the space race.

Of course, space flight also led to the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of delivering nuclear warheads thousands of miles away. The guidance systems developed for space flight increased the accuracy of ICBMs, allowing pinpoint delivery of nuclear warheads to distant targets. Many of the electronics pioneered in space flight have since found extensive military uses. The legacy of the space race is thus very mixed. It has, for better or worse, had a significant impact on life in the 21st century.

See also Ballistic Missiles; Cold War; Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs); Science, Technology, and Security; Sputnik

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REFLECTIONS

Nuclear Weapons and the Space Race

During their competition for outer space sovereignty, the United States and the Soviet Union promoted the

idea that countries were willing to devote significant economic and political resources to the space race. With the resulting advanced technology, each nation also amassed huge arsenals of nuclear weapons, creating a legacy of the space race that many believe no longer serves U.S. interests or national security.

> What steps can governments take, responsibly, recognizing that policymakers must always balance a host of competing priorities and interests? First and foremost is for the declared nuclear states to accept that the Cold War is in fact over, to break free of the attitudes, habits, and practices that perpetuate enormous inventories, forces standing alert, and targeting plans encompassing thousands of aimpoints. Second, for the undeclared states to embrace the harsh lessons of the Cold War: that nuclear weapons are inherently dangerous, hugely expensive, militarily inefficient, and morally indefensible; that implacable hostility and alienation will almost certainly over time lead to a nuclear crisis; that the strength of deterrence is inversely proportional to the stress of confrontation; and that nuclear war is a raging, insatiable beast whose instincts and appetites we pretend to understand but cannot possibly control.
>
> —General Lee Butler
> Former Commander, Strategic Air Command
> Speech given at the State of the World Forum
> San Francisco, October 3, 1996

SPACE-BASED WEAPONS

Weapons deployed from space. Space-based weapons fall into three general categories—those that defend against ballistic missiles, those that attack or defend satellites, and those that attack terrestrial targets. Currently in these categories, land-based systems are the only weapons to have been deployed. To defend against space-based weapons, two types of land-based systems have been tested—antisatellite weapons (ASATs), which have been under development since the 1960s, and ground-based lasers that impair or disable satellites.

Outer space has been used for military purposes—such as reconnaissance missions or targeting—since the launch of the first Sputnik by the Soviet Union in 1957. In 1959, the UN General Assembly set up the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) to promote international cooperation in space. Shortly after the Sputnik launch, the fear of

bombardment satellites prompted both the Soviet Union and the United States to research space weapons for defensive and offensive purposes. While the development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles served to limit offensive space weapons, research into defensive space weapons continued.

In the 1960s, antisatellite (ASAT) weapons were developed to disable enemy satellites. These early antisatellite weapons consisted of missiles packing high explosives and shrapnel; kinetic weapons were investigated later. Although many ASAT weapons tested by both the United States and the Soviet Union failed to perform as expected, and treaties were signed to limit the deployment of space weapons, research into new weapons systems continued.

In the late 1990s, the U.S. Army began work on the kinetic energy antisatellite system (KEASAT), which fires a multitude of pellets to slow down enemy satellites, forcing them to burn up in the atmosphere. Ground-based lasers have also been successfully tested. In 1997, the U.S. military tested a chemical laser against a satellite, temporarily disabling its optical sensors. Russia was known to have tested such weapons as well.

The weaponization of space is controlled through a number of norms and treaties, most notably the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space and was signed by 97 countries, including the United States. The treaty bans weapons of mass destruction, defined as "nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction," from space. However, it does not prohibit the launching of ballistic missiles, such as ICBMs, through space. What constitutes a weapon of mass destruction is also under debate, and so many experts feel that the Outer Space Treaty is outdated.

The second most important treaty that pertains to space weapons is the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972, the ABM treaty constrained each country's antimissile defense to two fixed, ground-based defenses of 100 missile interceptors each. The ABM treaty also prohibited interference with monitoring satellites. Concerns that a nationwide defense system would spur a renewed arms race caused the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce the number by half. Both sides reasoned that a nuclear first-strike policy was unacceptable and, ultimately, that remaining vulnerable to each other's offensive nuclear weapons, while maintaining a policy aimed at deterrence, was the lesser of two evils.

However, research into space weapons continued in the 1970s and 1980s. In March 1983, President Ronald Reagan announced the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The program, which became known as Star Wars, sought to present the end to nuclear weapons through perfect, space-based defense. However, SDI was fraught with political and scientific difficulties. Notable scientists argued that with cheap technologies, such as multiple dummy warheads, an opponent could easily overwhelm a missile defense space weapon, thwarting the weapon's capacity to respond to real danger.

Many defense experts consider the ABM treaty to be a Cold War leftover that is dangerously outdated. In January 1999, the administration of President Bill Clinton approached Russian president Boris Yeltsin with a request to amend the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to permit U.S. deployment of a limited National Missile Defense (NMD) system aimed at protecting U.S. territory from missile attacks by rogue nations.

In 2001, President George W. Bush met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to promote a reduction of nuclear weapons and abandon the framework of the ABM treaty. Both sides agreed to cooperate in the development of national missile defense systems, symbolically ending the ABM treaty. The collapse of the ABM treaty is illustrative of the move to test and deploy space-based weapons.

In addition to the costs of developing space-based weapons, many predict that the development of such weapons will launch a renewed race to weaponize space with China. However, should the United States decide not to put weapons in space, Moscow and Beijing might still pursue antisatellite technologies of their own.

Critics argue that the risks of weaponizing space far outweigh the benefits. First and foremost, inexpensive antisatellite technology—such as ground-based lasers or nuclear missiles—could incapacitate space weapons as well. The stakes are high. As of January 2004, some 600 operational military and commercial satellites were in orbit, and the U.S. Space Command estimated that by 2010, nearly 2,000 satellites would be operational and in orbit. The United States also spends large sums on commercial space uses and even more on military uses in space.

Proponents of space weapons argue that the U.S. investment and reliance on satellites makes protection of those assets a necessity. Given recent public statements and military assessments, the deployment of space weapons has the air of inevitability, causing some to suggest the need for revamping the Outer Space Treaty. Current military plans, such as the Air Force's Vision 2020, outline the need for weapons to defend those assets and, probably, conduct offensive operations in space.

Many different types of weapons are envisioned, some as simple as jamming technologies that can be directed from orbit to others that focus lethal energy or employ kinetic weapons that are dropped on their targets. In the near term, space weapons will include hypersonic bombers that could attack targets anywhere in the world within a matter of hours.

See also Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972); Missiles; Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

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SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (1898)

Between the United States and Spain (April 21– August 12), brief war fought mainly in the Spanish colonial territories of Cuba and the Philippines and considered a turning point in the history of U.S. foreign relations. Victory in the Spanish-American War quickly went to the United States, and peace negotiations resulted in U.S. control over Cuba, and the annexation of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. The Spanish-American War turned the United States into a world power, as it removed Spain from the Western Hemisphere and established an important U.S. presence in the Pacific.

Cuban revolutionaries had been fighting Spanish colonialists since the 1860s. U.S. public support for the Cuban cause grew as the rebels gained ground in the late 1890s. The U.S. press strongly promoted intervention on behalf of Cuba and published accounts of Spanish concentration camps and of the destruction of U.S. property on the island. Expansionist politicians, U.S. business interests, and general public opinion also favored war against Spain and urged a reluctant President William McKinley to intervene on behalf of Cuba.

On February 15, 1898, the U.S. battleship *Maine*, which had been sent to Havana Harbor to protect U.S. citizens and property, was hit by an explosion and

sunk, killing more than 250 men. Although a thorough investigation eventually concluded that technical problems had caused the explosion, the U.S. public and Congress concluded that the Spanish had attacked the *Maine* and as a result, prowar sentiment in the United States was further incensed.

The U.S. Congress began preparations for war as President McKinley demanded that Spain grant Cuba its independence and withdraw from the island after U.S. mediation. Spain refused and declared war on the United States on April 24; Congress then issued an April 21 retroactive declaration of war on Spain.

The ensuing conflict was tilted in favor of U.S. forces. Admiral George Dewey led a quick and easy naval victory over the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, Philippines. With the help of Filipino forces, U.S. land forces soon occupied Manila and the whole island of Luzon. War was also waged in Cuba, where 16,000 U.S. troops, including Theodore Roosevelt's Rough Riders, captured Santiago by July 17. The island of Puerto Rico was quickly occupied in August. An armistice was signed on August 12, 1898.

The Treaty of Paris peace agreement was ratified by the U.S. Senate on February 6, 1899. Although Cuba was now free, the United States forced the Cuban Constitutional Convention to accept the Platt Amendment, which, among other provisions, gave the United States the power to intervene in Cuba to protect Cuban sovereignty. The Platt Amendment also established a 99-year lease of the naval base at Guantánamo in Cuba, and it forced enactment of programs to make Cuba more attractive to U.S. investors. Puerto Rico also was annexed by the United States as an *unincorporated territory,* and its inhabitants were not made U.S. citizens until 1917. Guam also was ceded to the United States as part of the peace agreements that ended the war.

U.S. commercial and military interests also led to a demand for the annexation of the Philippines. The strategic importance of a Manila base allowed easier access to Chinese trading ports and would prevent U.S. commercial rivals France, Germany, and Great Britain from seizing the islands. Philippine rebels fighting Spanish colonialists had initially welcomed and fought alongside the U.S. troops. However, when it became clear that the United States was not leaving the islands, fierce fighting erupted between the rebels and U.S. troops and lasted through 1901. Lower-level conflict continued until 1913.

The Spanish-American War led to charges that President McKinley's foreign policy was expansionist and promoted U.S. imperialism. In response, a large and significant anti-imperialist movement soon emerged in the United States among middle-class and wealthy professionals, including large numbers of women. Many historians have argued that the Spanish-American War was really about the United States seeking markets for U.S. goods rather than land or the responsibility of subjugating foreigners.

See also Interventionism; Isolationism

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SPECIAL FORCES

Elite military units specially organized and trained to conduct unconventional warfare, usually behind enemy lines. Special operations forces (SOF) work in small units and the selection process for SOF operators is extremely demanding. SOF units use their specialized skills to gain an advantage over numerically superior adversaries, using surprise to exploit weaknesses in an opponent's defenses. Other distinctive characteristics of SOF units include self-sufficiency and the ability to operate under a variety of conditions. Special forces often possess unique language skills and traditionally have trained and worked with indigenous forces.

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

The line between conventional and unconventional operations is often fuzzy. In practice, it is sometimes difficult to isolate missions that are the unique purview of special forces. This is because conventional forces also operate in hostile environments and perform many of the same missions as SOF units. U.S. military doctrine tries to clarify the distinction by declaring that SOF units operate in "hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas." In other words, SOF is

used in places where it is not feasible to apply overt conventional force.

Special Forces Missions

The U.S. Department of Defense distinguishes nine principal SOF missions. These include direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, psychological operations, civil affairs, counterproliferation, and information operations.

Direct actions include guidance for precision weapons systems, mine warfare, and personnel rescue. Special reconnaissance involves human intelligence gathering in hostile or denied areas. Foreign internal defense means helping foreign host governments fight domestic insurgents. Unconventional warfare is composed of a range of activities including sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Counterterrorism relies on intelligence gathering and preemptive strikes. Psychological operations help missions succeed by influencing the emotions or objective reasoning of targets. Civil affairs are efforts to encourage and maintain positive interaction with local military and civilian officials. Counterproliferation involves intelligence gathering to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Finally, information operations target enemy command and communications networks.

In addition to the nine principal SOF missions, there are six collateral missions. These include coalition support, combat search and rescue, counterdrug activities, countermine activities, foreign humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. The last category is *special activities,* or covert missions that are not publicly acknowledged by the United States. Such activities require presidential approval and strict congressional oversight.

Special Forces Organization

Each military service has its own dedicated special forces. The United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) oversees the SOF of all services. These forces usually are deployed to regional combatant commands, but also may be integrated into a number of different command authorities depending on location and the nature of the deployment.

Contemporary Army SOF units include, among others, Army Special Operations Forces (Green Berets) and Rangers. Delta Force is a more recent addition,

created in the late 1970s as a counterterrorism unit proficient in civilian rescue. Air Force parachute-rescue jumpers (PJs) act as ground-based forward air controllers and specialists in combat search and rescue. Navy SEALs are experts at underwater demolition and amphibious infiltration. Marine Force Recon is an elite unit, even though elitism is anathema to corps culture. Although these units each have different specialties, all operatives undergo thorough military training and pride themselves on flexibility and adaptability.

HISTORY OF U.S. SPECIAL FORCES

Units resembling special forces have existed for centuries. In 1756, British Major Robert Rogers organized a battalion to act as both a reconnaissance and strike force against French and Indian enemies in North America. This group ranged through the New England wilderness and took the name Rogers's Rangers. During the American War for Independence, U.S. commanders Ethan Allen and Francis Marion formed small groups of militia to perform surprise attacks on British forces. Confederate cavalry led by Nathan Bedford Forrest became adept at infiltrating Union lines during the American Civil War and wreaking havoc in rear areas. Merrill's Marauders, an aggressive cavalry unit from Texas, also earned a reputation for harrying Union supplies and communications.

The modern origins of SOF, however, lie in World War II. U.S. Army Ranger battalions trained with the British Special Air Service and operated behind Japanese lines in the Philippines, during the invasion of Italy, and on the D-day landings at Normandy. World War II also gave birth to the Office of Strategic Services (forerunner of today's Central Intelligence Agency), U.S. Navy Frogmen, and Air Commandos. These groups eventually evolved into the modern Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, and Air Force special operators, respectively.

Special forces have been involved in most U.S. combat operations since World War II. In some cases, they played crucial roles, such as in the invasion of Panama in 1989. Special forces have also been subject to a good deal of political controversy. Before Vietnam, for example, the Army Green Berets enjoyed wide popularity. But accusations of torture and executions during the war sullied their reputation and increased tension between SOF and conventional forces.

Special forces historically have also dealt with acrimony from within the conventional military establishment. Conventional force commanders, who

often believe that victory is the result of the application of overwhelming force, tend to view SOF with skepticism. Special operations such as sabotage and psychological warfare play only a minor role in conventional military doctrine. In addition, SOF units break from standard military practices, sometimes eschewing rank and uniform codes. Because conventional officers do not always understand the role of special forces, they occasionally mistrust the SOF operators under their command.

Special forces are important in the ongoing debate over military transformation. Advocates believe that the United States should make greater use of its highly trained special forces. They argue that the United States currently has less need to rely on conventional units because it is unlikely to face an enemy of comparable military strength for decades. Special forces, by contrast, are ideal for the asymmetric confrontations more typical of the 21st century. The speed and flexibility of SOF allows them to track clandestine adversaries, and their language skills assist coordination with local forces. Some defense analysts, however, worry that too much faith is being put into SOF capabilities. They argue that the United States still needs large conventional forces if it wants to pursue an assertive foreign policy.

See also Asymmetric Warfare; Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (1990); Covert Action; Covert Operations; Green Berets; Psychological Warfare (PSYOPS)

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SPUTNIK

The world's first artificial satellite, launched by the Soviet Union on October 4, 1957. The Sputnik program (*sputnik* roughly translates into "fellow traveler") comprised four separate launches.

At a weight of 184 pounds, *Sputnik 1* was sent into space from the Soviet Union's desert rocket testing facility near Tyuratam in the Kazakh Republic. The satellite was designed to relay information about the upper atmosphere back to Earth. The launch of *Sputnik 1* came as a surprise to the United States and created a sense of panic among many experts because it was believed that the Soviets could soon deploy a nuclear missile into space that would be capable of reaching the United States. Thus, far from being heralded as a great scientific achievement, *Sputnik 1* shattered Americans' sense of security and technological superiority.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower was not very concerned with the Soviets being the first into space, but he missed the significance of the event to ordinary Americans. Technology had been a decisive factor in World War II, and fears that communists had taken the technological lead had Americans greatly concerned. After the launch of the 1,120-pound *Sputnik 2* in November 1957, anxieties skyrocketed. Finger pointing among U.S. government officials and military departments led to debate over an ostensible technology gap between the United States and its archrival, the Soviet Union.

Sputnik 2 was also another first for space science—the satellite carried the first live passenger into orbit, a dog named Laika. The third Russian attempt to launch a satellite was a failure, although the fourth attempt was another success. Designated *Sputnik 3*, the satellite was powered by solar panels and returned geophysical data for over two years.

Although the post-Sputnik confidence crisis was largely the work of politicians and fanned by the media, public reaction to the Soviet launches prompted a deeply introspective period in the United States, followed by action to remedy the purported technology gap. It appeared that the Soviet Union had taken the lead in science education, and so such education in the United States received greater attention, particularly precollege physics and elementary-school science. Educators worked with prominent scientists to shape curricula that were to have far-ranging effects on U.S. technological, scientific, and industrial advances.

In 1958, Congress passed the National Defense Education Act (NDEA), which drastically changed the federal government's role in education and provided grants and loans to public and private schools, as well as individuals, for programs in mathematics, foreign

language studies, and science. In response to the Soviet challenge, Congress also passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act (1958), creating the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); in that same year, the Department of Defense formed the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (first called ARPA). Numerous projects and agencies were advanced. The space race began with Sputnik. Eleven years later, after the launch of the first Sputnik, the United States became the first to put a man on the moon.

See also Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy; National Defense Education Act (NDEA); Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy; Space Race

SPY SATELLITES

Use of space satellites to spy on other nations and provide intelligence that might be crucial to a nation's security and other interests. Military strategists have always sought higher ground to look down on enemies, and spy satellites afford just such a unique position.

There are two basic types of spy satellites—those that eavesdrop on communications for signals intelligence, or SIGINT, and those that generate high-quality image intelligence, or IMINT. SIGINT satellites detect and intercept radio, mobile telephone, and data transmissions for the National Security Agency (NSA). Signals intelligence satellites cannot intercept communications carried over landlines, however. The United States operates signals intelligence satellites in geostationary, elliptical, and low Earth orbits.

IMINT satellites return images to the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and fall into three general categories—radar imaging, optical imaging, and a combination of the two. Radar imaging satellites use radio (microwave) signals to scan the earth, while optical satellites use mirrors to gather light for photography. Radar imaging satellites generate a microwave beam, bounce it off an object, receive the echo, and then reconstitute the information into a picture. A relatively new technology is synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites, which are unhindered by darkness or bad weather. Optical imaging suffers from the inability to see through clouds, a shortcoming overcome by space-based imaging radar.

All imaging satellites suffer from relatively short windows of opportunity in which to take images. However, due to various technological advances, spy satellites can now remain over an area for about 10 minutes. With enhancements in optical and radar technology, satellite developers hope to place satellites at higher orbits so they can take pictures for longer durations. Imaging quality has also been greatly enhanced. Early optical imaging satellites produced photographs that ranged in resolution down to about two meters. The current generation of U.S. spy satellites is reportedly able to identify objects on the ground as small as 10 centimeters.

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) operates satellites for the U.S. military and the intelligence community, while U.S. reconnaissance satellites are launched by the Air Force. The NRO designs, builds, and operates the nation's reconnaissance satellites, and supplies data to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DoD). The first spy satellite program in the United States was named Corona. Corona was designed to take photographs over the Soviet Union and China, replacing the dangerous U2 flights over the territory of those two nations. U2 flights had been ongoing since 1956, but Soviet radar systems had soon proven better able to track the planes than originally thought.

With the fallout from the U2 spy plane incident of 1960, in which Air Force pilot Gary Powers and his plane were shot down over the Soviet Union, a better way of seeing Soviet installations had to be found. Satellite photography proved to be the way. After taking the photographs, the satellite would jettison the developed film back to Earth.

After several rocket failures, Corona made its first successful flight and film return in August 1960. Bringing back the first images of Earth from outer space was no small achievement. Of the first 30 Corona missions, only 12 were considered successes. Camera systems such as those employed in Corona continued in use until the 1980s, after which image data began being beamed directly to Earth.

Spy satellites return enormous amounts of data. While the exact amount of image data collected by spy satellites is classified, experts estimate that orbiting satellites each day produce hundreds of terabytes of data. By comparison, the entire text holdings of the Library of Congress constitutes roughly 20 terabytes.

Since the end of the Cold War, the data from spy satellites has been used in operations throughout the world. However, all this data needs to be processed, examined, and ultimately put to use by people. A classic example of duping U.S. spy satellites is India's nuclear test of 1996.

Soviet scientists checking the chamber containing the dog Laika in preparation for the launch of *Sputnik 2*, the second of a series of Sputnik spacecraft sent into Earth orbit. Launched on November 3, 1957, *Sputnik 2* carried Laika aloft to an altitude of 1,060 miles and circled the earth at about 18,000 miles an hour. The first living being to leave Earth and travel to outer space, Laika, a female part-Samoyed terrier, survived in orbit only a day or two before thermal problems in the spacecraft killed her. Nevertheless, the mission provided Soviet scientists with important data on the behavior of a living organism in a space environment.

Source: Corbis.

India put its nuclear testing equipment underground after a story reported that U.S. spy satellites were monitoring their activities. Through charting satellite orbits and cleverly avoiding activity while satellites were overhead, India was able to conduct its test in secrecy.

In recent years, the use of SIGINT to track terrorists has become one of the highest priorities. According to intelligence reports, signals intelligence satellites monitored the whereabouts of Islamic terrorist Osama bin Laden and his satellite and mobile phone communications. Field reports have confirmed satellite intelligence of his general location on a number of occasions.

In addition to the intelligence uses of spy satellites, the media has been quick to take advantage of declassified and unclassified imagery produced by these satellites. The French SPOT (Satellite Pour l'Observation de la Terre, or Earth observation satellite) series of surveillance satellites mainly serves commercial customers. A SPOT satellite observed the Soviet nuclear reactor accident in Chernobyl. On February 22, 1995, President Bill Clinton signed an executive order directing the declassification of intelligence imagery acquired by the first generation of U.S. photoreconnaissance satellites. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency leads U.S. government efforts to declassify and release formerly secret images. Much of that data is now used commercially.

The future development of satellite technology promises even greater resolution and signals techniques. Additional challenges include the hardening of spy satellites against attack and the development of redundant systems to ensure information availability. Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) is a National Reconnaissance Office plan to develop small-satellite technology for a new generation of spy satellites in what analysts believe is the largest intelligence-related contract ever. The supersecret project for the National Reconnaissance Office is estimated to be worth up to $25 billion over two decades, and FIA projects it will be designed to operate effectively for the next few decades.

See also Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

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STALIN, JOSEPH (1878–1953)

Soviet dictator and despot famed for his brilliant tactics, brutal methods, and police-state totalitarian rule.

Stalin was a secretive figure, a man who obscured his past as much as possible, rendering even his birth date a matter of dispute.

Stalin was born Iosif Dzhugashvili in 1878 (he claimed 1879) to poor parents in Georgia, then part of Greater Russia, or the Russian Empire. He attended a strict religious seminary in Tiflis, then became involved in politics. Between 1902 and 1917, Stalin was arrested for revolutionary activity, was exiled within the Russian Empire, and escaped repeatedly.

He first used the pseudonym Stalin—signifying *man of steel*—in 1912, signing that name to an editorial for the newspaper *Pravda*. He used multiple aliases over the years, but eventually settled on Stalin in 1913. Possessed of an excellent memory, a gift for intrigue, and ruthlessness, Stalin came to dominate the Soviet Union for many years.

Stalin became the general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in 1922, and thereafter used that position to build a support base. When Soviet revolutionary leader Vladimir Lenin died in 1924, Stalin defeated Leon Trotsky—a gifted orator and political philosopher and Stalin's greatest rival—for leadership of the Communist Party. Stalin successfully portrayed Trotsky as a counterrevolutionary and enemy of the Soviet Union, and forced him into exile.

Stalin thus emerged as Lenin's successor, surprising many party members who saw him as an excellent organizer but not a visionary. He worked hard to promote his legitimacy in the eyes of the party and the public, stressing his devoted adherence to Leninism. Stalin went so far as to have history rewritten to make the roles of his adversaries less, and his own revolutionary role greater.

Once in power, Stalin implemented his vision to the detriment of the people. He forced collectivization in agriculture, a move that was both unpopular and unproductive, and led, moreover, to a massive famine. He emphasized military buildup in his first Five-Year Plan, created the first modern command economy, and steered the country toward industrialization. Nevertheless, his rule heartened Russia in the early 1930s. His vision was the dawn of hope after the previous decades of unrest, civil war, and famine. His popularity gave rise to a Stalinist cult of personality.

Stalin was a leader who, like the Machiavellian princes he admired, was more feared than loved. Terror was a fundamental part of the regime, at no time more so than during the purges of 1936–1938. Paranoid and focused on maintaining power, Stalin instituted the so-called Great Terror to rid the country of "anti-Soviet elements." He instituted show trials to make an example of those who had "strayed" and become "traitors." Victims of Stalin's ruthlessness often were sent to prisons or labor camps, known as *gulags*. Millions perished, including ordinary citizens, top party members, and many of the original Bolshevik revolutionaries. Many of these individuals were killed because of their dissent or imaginary crimes against the state, or because they represented threats to Stalin's own power.

Stalin's international politics tended to be opportunistic. In 1939, he formed an alliance with Nazi leader Adolf Hitler against the "capitalist-imperialist victors of World War I," an alliance formalized by the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression pact. However, when Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union in violation of the alliance, Stalin formed an uneasy Grand Alliance with the United States and Great Britain. After World War II ended, this alliance collapsed with mutual distrust and the intensification of power rivalries and the fall of the Iron Curtain.

Stalin's emphasis on nationalism and active promotion of expansionist interests of the Soviet Union made him very popular in the postwar environment within his country. Though increasingly glorified in the Soviet Union toward the end of his life, Stalin died after a stroke, morose and alienated, on March 5, 1953.

See also Cold War; Potsdam Conference (1945); Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy; World War II (1939–1945); Yalta Conference (1945)

STAR WARS/MISSILE DEFENSE
See STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)

STEALTH TECHNOLOGIES

Techniques, designs, and materials employing scientific advances for deceiving radar or other means of detection. Some techniques used in stealth technology can be as simple as pigments that make it hard to see objects against their background or applying materials that absorb radio waves. Others may involve complicated

designs to scatter enemy radar signals, confuse infrared detectors, or cloak electromagnetic energy.

While radar-absorbing coatings had been in use since World War II, better stealth designs were made possible by computers. In the early 1970s, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began work on stealth technologies aimed at reducing an object's radar cross section (RCS), or the measure of radio waves reflected back to their point of origin. Diamond-shaped objects proved most able to reduce the RCS, so much so that some planes appeared invisible to conventional radar. Just as looking in a mirror reflects your image, flat perpendicular surfaces returned radio waves directly to the radar antennas.

Stealth technologies are used primarily in aircraft and ships and have proven successful in warfare. During the 1991 Gulf War, the F-117A Nighthawk was heavily used and suffered no losses. Since its debut in 1982, only one Nighthawk aircraft has been lost in combat, and the U.S. Air Force intends to continue flying the planes well into the next decade. However, critics maintain that stealth aircraft are susceptible to low-cost defensive measures, such as the 1960s era missile launcher that brought down a Nighthawk over Yugoslavia in 1999.

Most stealth aircraft fly at subsonic speed to avoid the attention generated by a sonic boom, making the aircraft vulnerable to attack by faster flying jets as well. The high price of development and maintenance of stealth aircraft is also a concern. The B-2 bomber, which reportedly has the RCS of an aluminum marble, became a byword for cost overruns, and the high-tech Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), whose RCS is near that of a golf ball, is currently $1 billion over cost due in large part to its stealth features. Costly radar-absorbing paints and tapes must be regularly reapplied and the planes themselves must be sheltered from the weather.

Stealth aircraft are often painted in dark colors to blend with the night sky, although advances in materials science may make it possible for planes to change color on the fly. Electrochromic polymers are similar in principle to the technology found in some new car mirrors that sense bright lights and darken accordingly. Such technology may work its way onto stealth aircraft and ships of the future.

See also Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); F-117A Stealth Fighters; Joint Strike Fighter; Radar (Radio Detection and Ranging)

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STINGER MISSILES

Portable guided surface-to-air missile system. The FIM-92A Stinger Weapons System is effective against low-altitude airborne targets including fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, unmanned drones, and cruise missiles. The Stinger, launched from a portable shoulder mount, is a fire-and-forget weapon that uses passive infrared targeting and an advanced navigation system. The Stinger can be launched from field vehicles, such as the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle or HMMWV (Hum-Vee) Avengers, attached to a helicopter, or by a soldier using a disposable launch tube and reusable stock.

The Stinger missile replaces the Redeye, the first lightweight shoulder fired surface-to-air missile, which was developed in the 1960s and adopted for combat use by the U.S. Marines in 1966. The first Stingers, which featured advanced targeting and navigation systems, were introduced in 1982.

With a range of five miles, the Stinger can hit targets flying as high as 11,500 feet. Stinger are extremely accurate, and once launched, the five-foot long, 22-pound missiles travel at 1,500 mph. Stingers use sensors that look for the infrared light (heat) produced by the target's engine. The missiles carry identification friend or foe (IFF) technology, which enables them to identify the ultraviolet shadow of the target and use that information to distinguish the target from other heat-producing objects in the area.

The missile operator (typically a two-man detail, though a single person can operate the system) simply centers the target in a digital display. While the missile is flying, the on-board guidance system will keep the target centered and make necessary course corrections.

Stinger missiles are manufactured by Prime-Hughes Missile System Company and have a replacement cost of $38,000. U.S. forces currently have an inventory of about 13,400 Stingers, primarily for use in protecting combat soldiers in the field from airborne enemies.

The terrorists who shot down Pan Am Flight 800 off Long Island in 1996 were believed to have used a Stinger missile. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided Stinger missiles to Afghan insurgents in the late 1980s for use against Soviet helicopters during the Soviet occupation and war in Afghanistan.

See also Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); Missiles

STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

U.S. military command whose role was critical to providing a deterrent threat against the Soviet Union during the Cold War in support of U.S. nuclear strategy. Headquartered at Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, Nebraska, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was the component of the unified command plan charged with organizing, training, equipping, administering, and preparing strategic air forces for combat. Most importantly, SAC controlled most U.S. nuclear weapons as well as the air delivery systems, bombers, and missiles capable of delivering those weapons.

The Strategic Air Command was critical to the U.S. deterrent policy against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The task of the Strategic Air Command was to provide strategic nuclear bombing depth to the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The SAC was central to deterrence policy, as it strengthened U.S. capabilities to deliver a costly blow to the Soviet Union. Specifically, the Strategic Air Command oversaw the bombers capable of carrying nuclear payloads with the intent of strategically bombing Soviet cities. Because of its central role in the nation's nuclear strategy, SAC received a significant portion of the U.S. defense budget.

The Strategic Air Command was first established in 1946 as a part of the larger U.S. Army Air Corps. However, with the establishment of the Air Force as a separate branch of the armed forces, and the advent of the Cold War, the Strategic Air Command soon took on a new and important role.

The Strategic Air Command grew significantly following the discovery of a so-called *bomber gap* in the 1950s, in which U.S. intelligence reported significant Soviet bomber superiority. Because of this, President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the immediate production of more bombers. As was later discovered, the bomber gap did not actually exist, because the Soviets flew their bombers in loops to convey the picture that they had greater numbers of bombers.

It was under Eisenhower's administration that the Strategic Air Command grew most significantly in both size and importance. Under his administration, the New Look concept was forwarded, positing that U.S. forces would be reliant on nuclear weapons as a deterrent and air power as a strategic advantage. It was at this point that the Air Force began developing numerous bombers to deliver strategic nuclear weapons and serve a reconnaissance role in detecting Soviet military power and intentions.

Along with overseeing the strategic bombing capability, the Strategic Air Command oversaw long- and medium-range missile development as well. In this respect, SAC facilitated the development and maintenance of U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).

Although headquartered at Offutt Air Force Base, SAC maintained several forward operating bases, including bases overseas in countries such as England. These bases were important to the nuclear mission—in the event that war with the Soviet Union broke out, forward-based bombers would be significantly closer and more easily able to strike the Soviet Union. Similarly, planning for SAC increasingly focused on spreading SAC assets to several different areas to lessen their vulnerability and limit the possibility of having one strike disable the Strategic Air Command. As such, SAC bombers were deployed to well over 50 domestic and overseas locations.

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the culmination of the Cold War, the fear of nuclear war and the need for major nuclear deterrence capabilities came to an end. In 1992, the Strategic Air Command was decommissioned and, in its place, the Strategic Command was created. The Strategic Command assumed many of the previous SAC responsibilities, but also absorbed U.S. military space operations.

See also Bomber Gap; Cold War; Deterrence; Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy; Strategic Command, U.S.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT)

From 1969 to 1979, negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union that resulted in treaties (SALT I and SALT II) to reduce the proliferation of

nuclear arms. SALT I is an acronym for the first series of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks held from 1969 to 1972 between the United States and the Soviet Union. The talks resulted in a number of agreements reducing the offensive nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers. A second round of talks (SALT II) occurred between 1972 and 1979 and focused on curtailing the manufacture of strategic nuclear weapons.

SALT I (1969–1972)

The late 1960s was a period of change in the character of the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviets were deploying heavy land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as well as ICBMs launched from submarines (SLBMs) at a rate of about 200 per year beginning in 1968.

Meanwhile, the U.S. nuclear arsenal had remained at 1,054 ICBM and 656 SLBM since 1967, but the United States was deploying more multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads that enabled a single missile to attack as many as 10 separate targets. The United States had a substantial lead in long-range bombers as well. Both nations had developed and deployed antiballistic missile systems.

Essentially, the arms race was moving toward a stalemate as both nations had the capability to destroy one another several times over. On November 17, 1969, representatives of the superpowers held the first of a series of negotiations in Helsinki, Finland. Further sessions alternated between Helsinki and Vienna, Austria.

After protracted negotiations, the United States and Soviet Union reached an agreement on antiballistic missiles in May 1971. The negotiations ultimately culminated in the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement Between the US and the USSR on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the so-called SALT I treaties). U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev signed the treaties in Moscow on May 26, 1972. In the treaties, both sides agreed to reduce the number of ICBMs and ABMs, but the United States refused to reduce the number of MIRV warheads.

SALT II (1972–1979)

Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter were less successful than President Nixon in the subsequent Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), which lasted from 1972 to 1979. President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with Brezhnev and agreed to reductions in the number of missiles, but Soviet treatment of its Jewish citizens chilled relations between the superpowers. When President Carter proposed even deeper cuts, Brezhnev refused.

Threatened by improved U.S. relations with China and a deteriorating economy, Brezhnev finally met with President Carter in Vienna in 1979 and the leaders signed a treaty. The SALT II treaty limited each nation to 2,250 nuclear missiles with no more than 1,320 MIRVs. The U.S. Senate balked at the treaty, however, and when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, U.S.-Soviet relations again deteriorated.

The U.S. Senate never ratified the treaty, although both nations honored its terms. In 1982, President Ronald Reagan announced a new round of negotiations, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), to replace the SALT treaties. START resulted in subsequent agreements to reduce nuclear weapons.

See also Arms Control; Carter, Jimmy, and National Policy; Cold War; Ford, Gerald R., and National Policy; Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs); Kissinger, Henry (1923–); Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs); Nuclear Weapons; Reagan, Ronald, and National Policy; Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START)

Disarmament agreements that began in Geneva in 1982 (START I) and continued with two further treaties (START II and START III) after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. These Strategic Arms Reduction treaties took place between the United States and the Soviet Union until 1993, when the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus joined Russia in the talks. The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 delayed the implementation of the START I agreement by three-and-a-half years.

START I dealt with offensive weapons and was finally signed in 1991, just before the collapse of the Soviet Union. START II focused on the elimination of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and multiple warhead ICBMs. START II was ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1996 and by the Russian Duma

in 2000. START III is currently under negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Enforcement of the treaties is dependent on extensive data exchange, notifications, on-site inspections, and continuous monitoring activities. A projected START IV agreement would involve all declared nuclear nations and would have the goal of substantially reducing global warhead levels. A central concern of nations in the post–Cold War era is the issue of weapons proliferation and the maintenance of large arsenals, for which the collapse of the Soviet Union is seen as an important contributing factor.

See also Arms Control; Treaties

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STRATEGIC BOMBING

Military approach involving bombing that is intended to destroy a nation's ability to wage war. Strategic bombing targets features of infrastructure—such as factories, railways, and refineries—that are essential for the production and supply of war materials. The strategy of strategic bombing is a part of total war, a concept that refers to the enlistment of the sum total of a society's resources to aid in a conflict.

Strategic bombing was developed during World War I. Although, initially, aircraft were only used in the war for surveillance purposes, they soon were being used in offensive operations as well. Bomb squadrons began conducting missions farther from the front lines for the purposes of causing indirect harm to military targets. This evolved, during the interwar period, into recognition of the value of strategic bombing. Technological developments during that time, such as extended aircraft flight and the ability to reach higher altitudes, also made the strategy more feasible.

At the start of World War II, all nations' air forces had a policy of attacking military targets only. That changed, however, once the German Luftwaffe began conducting air raids on British cities, including London. As a result, strategic bombing became a fundamental part of military combat. The purpose of strategic bombing was not only to undermine industrial production but also to demoralize the population. Thus, civilian populations suffered to a degree that was unprecedented. Meanwhile, as more and more planes were shot down, both sides began adopting a policy of night raids, which, while less accurate, were safer for bomb crews.

The most significant episode of strategic bombing during World War II was the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The United States had already used conventional bombing raids to devastate civilian centers in both Germany and Japan. However, the use of atomic weapons raised the stakes of dropping bombs from the sky and thus had a permanent impact on the conduct of war and international relations in the post–World War II era.

Nuclear warfare quickly developed into an arms race for weapons that did not require planes for delivery. The focus of international relations shifted to missiles and defense systems meant to destroy incoming nuclear missiles. However, bombers did remain one-third of the strategic nuclear triad, due to the greater flexibility they offered in the event of heightened tensions and a potential conflict. Unlike a missile, a bomber could be retrieved. Also, unlike missile silos where the missiles were launched, bombers were mobile and thus less vulnerable to attack. They were also more accurate than the missiles launched from nuclear submarines.

Aside from the altered implications of bombing campaigns initiated by the introduction of nuclear weapons, the increased media exposure of modern warfare also had an impact on strategic bombing. Bombing campaigns were an essential element of U.S. strategy during the Vietnam War, and these campaigns gained a reputation for being unacceptably indiscriminate. For example, the administration of President Lyndon Johnson implemented Operation Rolling Thunder, which was meant to be a ceaseless and relentless bombing campaign against North Vietnam. The bombing campaign, however, was ultimately regarded as ineffective, and it also added to the catalogue of images broadcast back to the United States showing civilian casualties. The total-war aspects of strategic bombing, in effect, became part of what depleted support for the Vietnam conflict back in the United States.

Nevertheless, strategic bombing has continued to play an important role in U.S. military strategy. The first Gulf War (1991) against Iraq began with an air campaign called Operation Desert Storm, aimed at paving the way for the ground campaign that followed. The intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in former Yugoslavia in 1999, led by the United States under President Bill Clinton, also involved a bombing campaign that was essential to the success of the operation. Most recently, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously referred to the "Shock and Awe" to be produced by the air offensive at the beginning of the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

See also Air-Land Battles

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STRATEGIC COMMAND, U.S.

Military command established in 1992, which is one of nine U.S. military commands under the Department of Defense (DoD). The primary responsibility of the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) lies in providing early warnings of attacks against the United States. It also works to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The USSTRATCOM has its origins in the establishment of the U.S. Air Force's Strategic Air Command (SAC) at the beginning of the Cold War. Due to the development of nuclear capabilities by the Navy, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) was formed in 1960 to work with SAC to develop the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)—a nuclear war plan at the strategic level.

In June 1992, immediately following the end of the Cold War, the JSTPS and SAC were eliminated and USSTRATCOM was established to respond to the changing global political reality. In October 2002,

USSTRATCOM was combined with the U.S. Space Command. This change reflected the current push toward restructuring the military to respond to the changing nature of security threats.

In January 2003, new duties were assigned to the U.S. Strategic Command: C4ISR (otherwise known as command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and global strike), Department of Defense Information Operations, and missile defense integration. The current mission of the USSTRATCOM is to establish and provide the full spectrum of global strike and coordinated space and information operations capabilities to meet national security objectives. The mission of USSTRATCOM is also to provide operational space support, integrated missile defense, global C4ISR, and specialized planning expertise.

The headquarters of USSTRATCOM is located in Nebraska at the Offutt Air Force Base. Located elsewhere in the country are other operations centers. Located in Arlington, Virginia, the Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) of the USSTRATCOM acts to secure the information network of the Department of Defense. The Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, at the Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station (CMAFS) in Wyoming, provides a real-time view of what is occurring in space. At Lockland Air Force Base in Texas, USSTRATCOM's Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) helps to incorporate Information Operations (IO) into various military actions and plans.

The USSTRATCOM is headed by a member of the U.S. armed services who acts as the commander of various assigned forces from the four branches of the U.S. military. Approximately 2,500 personnel, coming from both military and civilian sectors, work at USSTRATCOM headquarters. Below the central command are smaller units, each assigned various tasks such as plans and policy, manpower and personnel, capability and resource integration, and global operations. Below global operations are subsections that focus on logistics, intelligence, C4 systems, and current operations.

Under USSTRATCOM are several task forces assisting it in carrying out its assigned mission. The intercontinental ballistic missiles network is one example of a resource under the USSTRATCOM. Other task forces include ballistic missile submarines, aerial/refueling submarines, and reconnaissance aircraft and strategic bombers. The Army Space and

Missile Defense Command (SMDC), and Army Forces Strategic Command (ARSTRAT) are commands within the army that provide support for USSTRAT-COM. Within the Air Force, the Strategic Air Forces (STRATAF) and the Air Force Space Command occupy the same role. The U.S. Marines also have a specific command, the Marine Forces Strategic Command (MARFORSTRAT), to facilitate the use of marine forces under the command of USSTRATCOM. Within the U.S. Navy, it is the Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM) that controls the naval resources used by USSTRATCOM.

With the emerging new threats that impact the national security of the United States, USSTRATCOM strives to provide the necessary capabilities to protect the United States and its citizens. USSTRATCOM protects U.S. national security using deterrence, and it works to prevent surprise attacks. The command also provides strategic support to military campaigns, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom. The USSTRATCOM will likely play an even more significant role in the future, especially as space warfare technology develops.

See also Space-Based Weapons; Strategic Nuclear Triad

STRATEGIC CULTURE

How states go about viewing national security issues and concerns. A direct descendant of political culture, strategic culture is based on the idea that a national style derives logically from the concept of political culture. Grounded in the study of anthropology, political culture says we can understand a particular group by looking at their norms, practices, and values. From that theory comes the notion that a particular culture should encourage a particular style in thought and action. Applied to national interests, including national security, strategic culture suggests that there is a distinct U.S. strategic culture, a distinct Russian strategic culture, and a distinct Chinese strategic culture.

All of these cultures are based on particular ways of thinking and acting on national security issues. For example, a Chinese strategic culture might be based on the political ideas of China as a protective and closed civilization. From that might come a reliance on more regional and defensive methods and technologies. By contrast, the U.S. strategic culture may be based on notions of using many resources and

using overwhelming combat power to obtain a victory. This might be based on the experiences of the United States in World War I and World War II, as well as in decisive victories such as in Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), and the Gulf War (1991).

Jack Snyder, one of the prominent theorists in the area of strategic culture, has noted that the socialization process in a particular strategic culture not only inculcates the culture but also provides a basis for seeing future actions. This worldview, in turn, shapes the possibility of reforms and changes. Strategic culture thus has an effect on the development of strategy and tactics in a particular country.

The theory of strategic culture has been criticized as being too determinative and for failing to recognize the role that factionalism and factions play in any society, including the national security and military communities. Yet, it is clear that the culture of anything has an effect on it, its development, and its responses. As a result, experts generally include strategic culture as an element for consideration in any discussion of strategy.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)

During the administration of President Ronald Reagan, a research and development program, initiated to build a space-based antiballistic missile defense system. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program sought to end the threat of nuclear missiles through a perfect, space-based defense, but it was fraught with political and scientific difficulties.

SDI became known by the moniker Star Wars after President Reagan's March 1983 speech declaring the U.S. ambition to make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" through space-based laser interceptors. The ambitious SDI concept originally entailed the use of high-powered X-ray lasers to shoot down enemy missiles. Such lasers required an enormous amount of energy to produce, so much so that the use of atomic energy was considered the only feasible energy source.

Initial estimates for the power required to instantly destroy warheads ranged from 100 to 1,000 megawatts for up to 2,000 seconds, comparable to the power generated hourly by a nuclear power plant. Later designs incorporated the use of kinetic weapons or missiles to hit incoming missiles. Last resort ground-based interceptors were also designed. In discussion with Ronald Reagan,

Edward Teller, who along with Richard Garwin is credited with the creation of the hydrogen bomb, advocated the use of X-ray lasers as interceptors to shoot down incoming missiles. Teller's vision convinced Reagan that such a system was both feasible and highly desirable.

Critics maintained that SDI was technically unworkable and that it would alter the balance of power that had kept the world's superpowers in check. Many scientists argued that with cheap technologies, such as multiple dummy warheads, an opponent could easily overwhelm a missile defense space weapon, thwarting the weapon's capacity to respond to real danger. Cruise missiles, which do not enter space, and unmanned planes were also of concern.

Treaties would also have had to be renegotiated if SDI was implemented. The Antiballistic Missile Treaty held the United States and the Soviet Union to a small number of ground-based missile defenses. Signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972, the ABM treaty constrained the antimissile defenses of each country to two fixed, ground-based defenses of 100 missile interceptors each. Concerns that a nationwide defense system would spur a renewed arms race caused the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce the number by half.

Both sides reasoned that a nuclear first-strike policy was unacceptable and that ultimately, remaining vulnerable to each other's offensive nuclear weapons, while maintaining a policy aimed at deterrence, was the lesser of two evils. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 also prohibited the deployment of space-based nuclear weapons, and so tests of such weapons could not be carried out without pulling out of the treaty.

In response to U.S. research, the Soviet Union began work on its own version of SDI. Some experts now reason that the enormous financial burden placed on the Soviet Union due to SDI helped speed the downfall of communism, and so the indirect benefit of SDI was that the United States outspent the Soviets in an economic war.

Work on SDI was discontinued after the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, although research into ground-based interceptors continued. Under the Reagan administration, actual expenditures on SDI amounted to approximately $30 billion. During the administration of President Bill Clinton, missile defense received continued funding under what some dubbed the Son of Star Wars program, or National Missile Defense (NMD).

With the apparent demise of the ABM treaty, the administration of President George W. Bush is funding the development of the less-costly NMD system. Such a system, if successful, would be deployed at several locations throughout the United States and, potentially, in allied countries. As of 2004, a defense system that employs early warning radar and consists of 10 missiles to intercept nuclear ballistic missiles had been deployed in Alaska. Additionally, another 10 missiles will be deployed in California, and by the end of 2005, 10 more will be placed in Alaska.

The goal of the NMD system is what is known as *layered defense,* which would provide multiple opportunities to shoot down an enemy missile along its entire flight path. Ballistic missiles can be attacked in any of four phases—the boost phase, postboost phase, midcourse phase, and terminal phase. During the boost phases, missiles are at their most vulnerable. However, attacking a missile at the boost phase poses daunting challenges. First and foremost, the threat must be detected within moments.

Another antiballistic missile technology under development is the airborne laser, which is currently conceived of as a fleet of 747s outfitted with chemical lasers that would be deployed in 2008 or 2009. Adding another layer to the defense will be the Kinetic Energy Interceptor program. This initiative is aimed at deploying a boost-phase intercept capability by the year 2008. The concept of using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to counter ballistic missiles during their boost phase is also being considered.

Unlike the huge numbers of missiles that SDI would have had to field, the primary mission of National Missile Defense is the defense of the United States against a limited strategic threat, such as that posed by a rogue nation or terrorist organization. Critics maintain that the cost (currently at more than $8 billion per year) is too high and that the risk of missile attack is too low to justify NMD's continued development.

A recent report by a team of economists found that the cumulative cost of a missile defense system—including boost-phase, midcourse, and terminal defenses as called for by the Bush administration—could be between $800 billion and $1.2 trillion. According to the Center for Defense Information, over $100 billion has been spent on SDI and NMD since President Reagan first advanced the program.

As with SDI, critics argue that simple countermeasures could be designed to thwart the NMD system. While Russia has agreed to allow the development of NMD, some experts suggest that the system might compel China to increase its nuclear arsenal, which in turn could cause India and Pakistan to increase theirs as well.

See also Ballistic Missiles; National Missile Defense; Reagan, Ronald, and National Policy; Space-Based Weapons

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STRATEGIC FORCES

Military units capable of destroying large-scale targets from extremely long ranges. In modern military parlance, strategic forces typically refer to units that provide nuclear strike capability. These forces take three forms: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range strategic bombers.

HISTORY OF U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES

Limits on transportation technology prevented the development of true strategic forces until quite recently. The invention of the airplane first provided military commanders with the ability to deliver a significant blow deep behind enemy lines. Perhaps the first truly strategic military forces were the Allied long-range bombers of World War II. Flying in fleets of up to 1,000 planes, U.S. and British bombers wrought extensive damage on Germany's industry as well as its civilian population. This bombing campaign contributed significantly to the Allied victory in the war in Europe and proved the value of strategic forces in modern warfare.

During World War II, the bombers were one of several branches of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF), which was part of the U.S. Army. In March 1946, the USAAF was divided into three branches: Air Defense Command (ADC), Tactical Air Command (TAC), and Strategic Air Command (SAC). The primary missions of SAC were to conduct long-range offensive operations in any part of the world, either independently or in cooperation with land and naval forces; and conduct maximum-range reconnaissance over land or sea, either independently or in cooperation with land and naval forces.

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, SAC bombers were considered the United States' strategic front line of defense against possible Soviet aggression. However, the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the late 1950s radically changed the nature of strategic forces. An ICBM could be launched from a base thousands of miles away from its intended target and, unlike a bomber, could not be shot down once in flight. Advances in miniaturization and missile guidance technology during the 1960s and 1970s made ICBMs more powerful and more accurate. By the mid-1970s, a single land-based ICBM could deliver multiple nuclear warheads accurately to many separate targets. Both the United States and the Soviet Union built and deployed thousands of land-based ICBMs.

The late 1950s also witnessed a revolution in sea warfare that produced the world's first nuclear powered submarines. Capable of staying at sea for months at a time—and almost undetectable underwater—nuclear subs soon became the newest addition to U.S. strategic forces. By the mid-1960s, submarines were being outfitted with sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that could be fired from hundreds of feet below the surface of the ocean. Like land-based ICBMs, SLBMs have ranges measured in the thousands of miles. Because they are virtually undetectable, ballistic missile subs are almost ensured of surviving a nuclear first strike by an enemy nation. This made them perhaps the most valuable strategic weapon for both the United States and the Soviet Union during the period of the Cold War.

MODERN U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES

As of the early 21st century, U.S. strategic forces were composed of the so-called *strategic nuclear triad* of strategic bombers, land-based ICBMs, and submarine-based SLBMs. Until 1992, these three components of U.S. strategic forces were under separate areas of command. Through SAC, the USAAF had responsibility for strategic bombers. In 1947, the USAAF became a separate military service, the United States Air Force (USAF), with SAC as one of its main components. The USAF was also in charge of land-based ICBM operations. The U.S. Navy had command authority over the nation's ballistic missile submarines.

In 1992, the U.S. Department of Defense placed all three parts of the nuclear triad under a single command—the U.S. Strategic Command (STRAT-COM). This change was prompted by the recent collapse of the Soviet Union and a subsequent shift of focus from strategic nuclear weapons to terrorism and rogue states as the main threats to U.S. national security. Consolidating the nation's strategic forces was intended to streamline intelligence gathering and help

coordinate planning for U.S. strategic defense policy. Since 2002, STRATCOM has also included the U.S. Space Command, which is in charge of U.S. military efforts in space.

U.S. strategic force doctrine has evolved along with the changing mission of STRATCOM. During the Cold War, strategic deterrence was based on massive nuclear retaliation in case of a first strike by either side. The doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) called for each side to have enough nuclear weapons to survive an attack and launch an equally devastating counterattack. Nuclear weapons were both the offensive threat and the defensive response.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 dramatically changed the threat of nuclear war between the superpowers, causing the U.S. government to reevaluate the role of strategic forces in U.S. national security policy. In 2002, a U.S. Nuclear Posture Review called for expanded nuclear deterrence, but also included recommendations for nonnuclear options as well as active and passive defenses to meet strategic threats. The use of nuclear weapons thus is no longer the sole focus of U.S. strategic force planning.

See also Ballistic Missiles; Bomber Gap; Cold War; Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (1990); First Strike; Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs); Limited Nuclear Option; Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs); Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD); Nuclear Deterrence; Nuclear Weapons; Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs); Secure Second Strike; Strategic Air Command; Strategic Bombing; Strategic Command, U.S.; Strategic Nuclear Triad; Submarines

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STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRIAD

Three major types of nuclear weapons systems in the strategic forces of the United States; consisting of land-based missiles, strategic bombers, and submarine-based missiles. The purpose of maintaining the triad

is to create a flexible series of policy options in the event of a nuclear crisis. The various programs that make up the triad have a variety of strengths and weaknesses that account for, and are reinforced by, one another.

Land-based missiles are the most accessible from the command perspective because of the simplicity of communications and officers with access to firing circuits. They are subject to the greatest degree of control and promise great accuracy once fired. Their greatest disadvantage lies in the fact that their locations are fixed; thus they are easily targetable. More important, once launched they cannot be recalled. Thus, their use requires extremely high levels of assurance.

Unlike missiles, bombers can be recalled, and their location is not fixed, making them less vulnerable to attack. Their disadvantage relative to missiles, however, lies in the slow delivery time entailed by bomber-based nuclear weapons.

The submarine-based missiles are the safest part of the nuclear triad in terms of their relative invulnerability to a first strike. The mobility of the submarine forces, in addition to the near impossibility of hitting them all at once, makes them the most survivable. The disadvantage, however, is that it is nearly impossible to maintain two-way communications with a submarine without revealing its location. Because the location of the submarine and its relative motion at the time of launch are more difficult to determine, the missiles are less accurate.

The strategic nuclear triad has provided the foundation of U.S. nuclear strategy since the early 1960s.

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STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTION TREATY (SORT)

Signed in Moscow in 2002, agreement between the United States and Russia to reduce offensive nuclear

weapons. According to the provisions of the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed that both countries would reduce their strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012. This level is nearly two-thirds lower than the current level of nuclear warheads in each country. SORT is part of a broad array of cooperative efforts announced between the two countries in the aftermath of the Cold War.

The reductions stipulated by SORT were first announced by President Bush in 2001 during a summit held in Washington, DC, and at Crawford, Texas, with President Putin. The treaty was later ratified by both the U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma. The earlier-negotiated Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) of 1991 continues unchanged, and the verification procedures begun by START are to provide the foundation for these same processes with SORT. Immediate implications for the U.S. arsenal are to include the retirement of Peacekeeper ICBMs and the conversion of nuclear submarines to conventional use. Some of the warheads removed from deployment are to be used as spares, some will be stored, and some will be destroyed.

See also Arms Control; Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy; Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

SUBMARINE WARFARE

The use of diving craft, usually armed with underwater weapons, in combat operations. Although initially ineffectual because of their primitive designs, submarines developed into highly effective combat vessels, capable of sinking the largest surface ships and causing severe strategic and economic disruption in modern war. Ironically, the submarine menace attracted a great deal of attention since World War II, but the end of the Cold War has returned submarines almost to an auxiliary role similar to the era of its origins.

EARLY DEVELOPMENTS

The primitive submersible torpedo boats built at the beginning of the 20th century offered few portents for the future. Short ranged, unstable, blind, dangerous to operate, and pitifully under armed, these vessels nevertheless employed the new torpedo (torpedo first meant a sea mine) as main armament and thus could sink the grandest warship then afloat under certain circumstances.

Accordingly, the sole role assigned to these early submarines was the defense of harbors and coastlines against conventional blockades that navies had been using since the 16th century. Russian submarines kept the otherwise victorious Japanese navy clear of Vladivostok during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, for example. However, the threat of surface torpedo boats had already caused naval doctrine to change by then, introducing the distant blockade tactic, where fleets covered enemy coasts from hundreds of miles away, leaving coast defenses with little to accomplish.

The technical improvements to the submarine before 1914 sufficed to make it a formidable threat against warships on patrol and merchant ships, although their poor handling characteristics kept them out of fleet actions of the day. The submarines of World War I sank all classes of warships, driving blockading units far offshore, and the warfare potential of the submarine advanced it to the major naval problem of the day.

Initially, the submarine was expected to follow the rules for seizure of shipping established by the 1899 Hague Convention. Under such rules, a submarine was expected to stop a merchant vessel by surfacing to signal or fire a shot across its bow, after which the merchant ship would be seized as a prize of war or sunk after the crew had been ordered into lifeboats and safeguarded. Of course, submarines had minimal crews and accommodations, making the detachment of crews to take captured merchant ships or the embarking of their crews an absolute impossibility. The surfacing of a submarine before an unidentified merchant vessel also made it vulnerable to attack by ramming or concealed armament, not to mention nearby escorting warships and aircraft.

The tempting targets posed by Allied commerce— and the limited results offered under conventional attacks permitted by the rules of the Hague Convention— pressured the German navy to opt for unrestricted submarine warfare in World War I. The German government authorized this on two occasions—January 1915 to May 1916 and May 1917 to November 1918—the latter becoming the key cause of the U.S. declaration of war against Germany in April 1917. This calculated risk on the part of Germany almost brought Britain and Italy to economic collapse, but the improved weapons and detection equipment of

antisubmarine craft and ships, and the use of convoys to pass more ships through the submarine zones under escort, resulted in the defeat of the German submarine campaign.

THE WEAPONS MATURE

During the interwar period, navies counted on improved submarines to render good service in fleet reconnaissance, attack of the opposing battle lines, and attrition by attacking naval vessels outside ports and in transit. Attacking merchant vessels counted for less, given the problems of World War I and the continuation of Hague Convention rules treating the attack of commerce. Even the German navy, resurrected under the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement, relegated its submarine force to auxiliary functions. The Japanese navy, however, considered the submarine an integral unit supporting the battle fleet, as did the U.S. Navy.

The coming of World War II found the German navy unready for confrontation with its opponents on the high seas, and it quickly converted its strategy to target shipping (commerce warfare), using unrestricted submarine warfare. The U.S. Navy, damaged by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, opted for unrestricted submarine warfare as its only effective offensive measure.

Japanese submarines, technically inferior in several respects to Western craft, scored few successes against U.S. naval vessels and never waged a dedicated campaign against commerce. Thus, the key submarine campaigns of the war were the two commerce warfare campaigns of the United States and Germany, in which the former succeeded beyond all expectations and the latter narrowly failed as the Allies mounted a massive antisubmarine campaign that still saw over 21 million tons of shipping lost in the process.

The postwar and Cold War situation saw the Soviet navy developing the world's largest submarine force, although this had been the case, unrecognized, before World War II. The members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), faced with the apparent threat of the Soviet force, converted their submarines largely to antisubmarine missions, made possible with technical advances in detection, fire control, and weapons technology. Few Russian naval surface targets could be expected in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war,

but submarines did perform reconnaissance in each other's inland waters and harbors.

The development of nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range torpedoes and missiles allowed the return of antiship and fleet support missions to the world's submarine flotillas. Nuclear submarines had the speed and endurance to operate with fleet units, providing scouting and antisubmarine support, as well as attacking opposing fleet units. The end of the Cold War left these concepts untested, but the submarines of each side had already registered their abilities to track and follow opposing fleet units. Submarines also continued to perform clandestine reconnaissance and landing of agents, as they had since World War I.

A final evolution in submarine warfare was the strategic bombardment mission. German submarines had experimented with rocket launching during World War II, and the Japanese had built submarine carriers for launching torpedo-armed floatplanes against the Panama Canal at the end of that war. U.S. and Russian submarines became launch platforms for early cruise missiles in the 1950s, and then became part of their strategic forces, employing submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in the 1960s. The stealth, security, and reliability of SLBMs have made them a permanent part of the U.S., Russian, French, Chinese, and British naval forces in the present day.

The contemporary state of naval forces and doctrine still holds many roles for the submarine, but few of these correspond to the original tasks or the missions that the vessels performed in their heyday. The narrowing probability of conventional warfare between great and medium-sized powers, which still have submarines in their arsenals, has relegated submarine forces to strategic missile-launch duty, on one extreme, and clandestine reconnaissance and agent landing, on the other. Neither mission will demand flotillas the size of previous epochs.

See also Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW); Ballistic Missiles; Cruise Missile; Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs); U.S. Navy; World War I (1914–1918); World War II (1939–1945)

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SUBMARINES

Craft and ships designed to operate underwater for at least useful intervals of time, usually employing underwater weapons or equipment. In less than a century, the clumsy and unsafe submersible torpedo boat had become the terror of the seas once forecast by writer Jules Verne.

Beginning as a crude invention barely suitable for the defense of harbors and coastlines, the submarine boat has evolved through several generations of technological advances. In all generations, however, the vessels have made special demands on their personnel for training and psychological preparation. Many navies eschewed the submarine for that reason, but an effective submarine force marks a first-rate navy, even in current times.

THE SUBMERSIBLES

The early submersibles were simple ballasted and sealed launches or diving bells that merit attention only as precursors or novelties prior to the development of effective war machines. For example, a Confederate submersible named the *Hunley* sank the Federal steam sloop USS *Housatanic* on February 17, 1864, during the American Civil War, but it operated as a low-lying torpedo boat, incapable of submerged operations.

Several notable boats performed marginally satisfactory sea trials in the last decades of the 19th century. But, in 1899, John P. Holland invented the first successful submarines for the United States. He is rivaled only by the Spaniard Isaac Peral for the title of father of the modern submarine. After a brief dalliance with a group of Irish rebels, for whom he built three unsuccessful submersible rams, Holland joined a New York iron works as a draftsman and designed his first submarine torpedo boat in 1888. That was the same year in which Peral finished the first practical submarine, which was not adopted by the Spanish navy. Finding his own financiers, Holland formed his own company in 1893, but his first successful submarine is considered the *Holland No. 6* boat, commissioned in 1900 as the U.S. Navy's first submersible. Holland designs found favor in navies overseas, including those of England, Japan, and Russia.

In the early 20th century, all major and several minor navies placed submarines in service. Some, like the British Royal Navy, viewed the submarine with both disdain and fear because of its potential to upset the naval balance. The boats placed in service in the first decade of the century remained crude, dangerous to operate, and limited to coastal defense. However, the introduction of the diesel engine for surface propulsion, and the gyroscope for underwater navigation, enabled the next generation of submarines to perform very well against defenseless surface ships in early World War I.

Although still more like their submersible predecessors than like modern submarines, owing to their limited endurance and speed underwater, the submarines of World War I scored spectacular successes in the war against both warship and merchant ship targets. Although hopes that the submarine could contribute to fleet actions proved false, the destruction of merchant shipping by World War I submarines seriously threatened both Great Britain and Italy during the war. The swift development of hydrophones and depth charges to detect and attack submarines enabled the antisubmarine forces of World War I to eventually gain the upper hand, especially when the Allies organized merchant shipping convoys and laid extensive mine barrages to bar submarines from the high seas.

SUBMERSIBLES TO SUBMARINES

The period between World War I and World War II saw feverish developments of submarine designs and concepts, reflecting the experience of World War I and the emerging technologies. Attempts to control submarines through disarmament and law of war conventions would have little effect in the second world conflict, however.

Several threads of development may be discerned— coastal defense boats of around 250 tons displacement, a standard oceangoing submarine in the 700-to-1,000 ton range, and submarine cruisers in the 2,000-to-3,000 ton range. The latter category included amazing designs of submarines built to carry large-caliber guns, aircraft, and mines, in addition to large propulsion plants and large fuel storage to permit worldwide deployments. Again, hopes ran high that battle fleets could be supported offensively by submarines operating with them or defensively by submarines establishing screens to detect and attack approaching enemy fleets before surface actions began.

World War II saw the submarine reach its maturity as a commercial raider and as a valuable fleet auxiliary.

The nation's newest and most advanced nuclear-powered submarine, the PCU *Virginia*, Portsmouth, Virginia, in August 2004, on its way to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard after completing sea trials. The *Virginia* is the only major naval vessel designed with the post–Cold War security environment in mind. As such, it embodies the fighting and operation capabilities required to dominate the coastlines while maintaining undersea dominance in the open oceans.

Source: U.S. Navy.

In the immediate post–World War II period, the world's major navies adopted most German innovations for modernizing their older submarines and designing newer ones, aided by improvements in welding and steel alloys. Deck guns and other drag-producing items disappeared, but hydrogen peroxide fuel proved infeasible, owing to its volatility. The U.S. Navy first turned to nuclear power plants to achieve true submarine performance, allowing the boats to operate underwater for long periods.

Nuclear reactors produced steam to drive propulsion turbines and operate auxiliaries that permitted endurance limited only by crew stamina and supplies. The Russian, British, and French navies joined the nuclear submarine club with a few others in process. Other navies opted for quieter conventional submarines better suited for inland and shallow waters. Nuclear power permitted the construction of much larger and more capable boats than ever before. The large power reserves of the nuclear plants allowed the installation of large active and passive sonar equipment, fire control computers, and weapons.

Incremental improvements in the design and construction of the submarines gave them much better underwater speed, endurance, diving and sea-keeping capabilities, fire control, torpedoes and mines, optics, and sound detection and ranging equipment, including the new sonar devices.

Although the U.S. Navy developed outstanding 2,000 ton submarine designs for long-range patrols against fleets and convoys in the Pacific, greatly aided by the Allied radar advantage, it was the German navy that made significant developments in underwater performance. These improvements set the postwar trends for developing the first true submarines. The German type XXI and XXIII boats used high capacity batteries, air induction snorkels, hulls without appendages, and improved underwater fire control systems that gave them underwater performance superior to surfaced operations. With the type XVI boat, the use of hydrogen peroxide as a combination fuel and oxygen source offered near independence of action while operating submerged at high speeds and high endurance. On the other extreme, the Japanese produced the first primitive strategic submarine, the I-400 class submarine aircraft carrier, designed to strike the Panama Canal with three floatplanes each.

Many different submarine designs emerged from the shipyards, but they eventually settled into two basic designs—an attack submarine with from 4,000 to 10,000 tons of displacement, used to attack other ships and submarines, and the strategic submarine of 6,000 to 22,000 tons, able to fire ballistic or other types of guided missiles, whether submerged or surfaced, against land targets. The development of submarine-launched cruise missiles for attacking ship and land targets blurred the differences between attack and strategic submarines to some extent.

By the early 1980s, the submarine had become the weapon of dominant sea power, and each contending navy feared opposing submarines more than any other threat. Since then, however, the high cost of operating, maintaining, and manning submarines has placed

severe limitations on the size of modern flotillas, especially in the cases of the nuclear-powered craft.

See also Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW); Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs); U.S. Navy; World War I (1914–1918); World War II (1939–1945)

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SUEZ CANAL CRISIS (1956)

In the fall of 1956, the surprise military intervention in Egypt by France and Great Britain to seize control of the Suez Canal. The Suez Crisis demonstrated the continuing diplomatic role of spheres of influence, uncomfortably parallel to the suppression of the Hungarian Revolt in the same year by the Soviet Union. U.S. attempts to draw Egyptian interests toward the West by economic means foundered with disputes over the Aswan Dam project and Egyptian dallying with Soviet aid. The resulting chaos of the Canal crisis effectively ended the postwar solidarity of the Western powers.

Western enmity toward the government of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser rose with the failure of negotiations over the building of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile River in July 1956. The subsequent embracing of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations by Nasser, and his nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, brought France and Britain together in plotting a military seizure of the canal.

The Israelis made a fitting ally for France and Great Britain, as they were anxious to weaken or destroy the Nasser regime. Accordingly, Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula with the bulk of its army on October 29, 1956, fighting through the passes and approaching the Suez Canal. Meanwhile, the British and French declared that they would enforce a UN cease-fire resolution by landing and separating the forces along the canal.

Under air and naval supremacy, France and Britain landed troops at Port Said and Port Fuad on October 30 and began to occupy the entire Canal Zone. U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower was greatly angered by the effrontery of the Anglo-French moves, which were made without informing the United States.

Furthermore, the incident removed the spotlight from the Soviets and their behavior in the revolt in Hungary.

Pressure from the United Nations, especially from the Soviet Union and United States, forced the Anglo-French attackers to break off the action and evacuate their forces, ending this peculiar intervention on December 22, 1956. The Israeli forces withdrew separately in March 1957, having administered a moral and physical blow to the Egyptian army.

The military difficulties and diplomatic morass that subsumed the British and French in the Suez Canal incident signaled the end of postwar British and French independence of action outside of their standing alliances. Meanwhile, the United States gained a new antagonist in Egypt and became further embroiled in the problems of the Middle East. U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958 may be considered a direct outgrowth of the Suez episode. Moreover, the continuing bargaining with Saudi Arabia over economic and defense issues crossed with American-Israeli relations, became more serious, and drew the United States deeper into the Gulf region.

The arms race also accelerated in the region because of the Suez incident, with the United States and Soviet Union the leading suppliers of arms for their respective clients there. For the Israelis, the tonic of military success was soured by the diplomatic actions that, in their view, had denied them the fruits of military victory.

The Six-Day War of 1967 redressed that failure a decade later by creating a crisis covering a unilateral Israeli offensive that carried their forces to the banks of the Suez Canal and forced the closing of this vital Egyptian waterway and financial treasure for more than seven years. However, the Egyptian army then astounded the world with its surprise crossing and reoccupation of the Suez Canal zone on October 6, 1973, eliminating many of the Israeli fortified outposts that had been mistakenly considered impregnable.

The Egyptian forces dug in and repulsed both air and armored counterattacks of the Israelis with layered air defenses and antitank guided missiles. However, Egyptian attempts to enlarge their zone and relieve pressure on their Syrian allies led to heavy losses and opened the way for an Israeli counteroffensive, crossing the canal and threatening both Cairo and Suez.

Israel and Egypt signed a cease-fire agreement in November 1973 and peace agreements on January 18, 1974. The Israelis withdrew to the Sinai passes, and Egypt placed only reduced forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Israel eventually relinquished the Sinai to Egypt in return for a permanent peace settlement in 1979.

See also Arab-Israeli Conflict; Cold War; Eisenhower, Dwight D., and National Policy; Interventionism; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Middle East Conflicts (1956, 1967, 1973); Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy

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SUICIDE BOMBING

Most prevalent today in the Middle East, armed violence, generally involving civilians, in which the perpetrator is prepared to lose his or her own life in the attack. Since the term implies the existence of a bomb of some sort, suicide bombing per se has only become possible in the modern era with the advent of explosive materials.

The idea of intentionally sacrificing one's life to harm one's enemies is probably as old as warfare itself. In recent decades, however, suicide bombing has been associated primarily with three main phenomena—the Japanese kamikaze attacks of World War II, the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, and the violent Palestinian struggle against Israel.

Insofar as terrorism is a concept that describes violence aimed primarily at instilling fear into a group of people, not all forms of suicide bombing are terrorist, although they are all vicious in nature. Some have argued that suicide attacks against strictly military targets (such as the World War II kamikaze strikes) do not qualify as terrorist acts since their primary goal is to physically destroy an armed opponent and not to terrorize a civilian populace. All suicide bombing, however, owes its effectiveness to the absolute determination of the perpetrator to accomplish his or her deadly mission at all costs.

HISTORY OF SUICIDE BOMBING

The term "suicide bombing" entered the media vocabulary in the early 1980s, when members of the Lebanese terrorist organization Hezbollah began to detonate bombs after infiltrating enemy compounds in Beirut, Lebanon, killing themselves in the process. The most infamous of these attacks occurred at a Marine barracks in Beirut on October 23, 1983, and left 241 U.S. military personnel dead. War historians subsequently connected Hezbollah's technique with the famous kamikaze attacks perpetrated at the end of World War II by the Japanese air force and navy against American warships in the Pacific.

Since the 1980s, suicide bombing has been adopted by many armed groups, notably Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (all in Palestine), and the Tamil Tigers (in Sri Lanka). On September 11, 2001, 19 Arab men hijacked four commercial planes and piloted them into selected buildings in the United States in a suicide bombing of unprecedented scale, killing themselves and almost 3,000 other people. In recent years, more than 20 countries across the globe have experienced suicide bombings.

As a military tactic, suicide bombing is more likely to be employed in asymmetric warfare—that is, in a conflict between two unequal forces. A perpetrator who does not have to worry about a postoperation escape plan is an enemy that cannot be deterred by the threat of imprisonment, torture, or death. For that reason, antiterrorist specialists have long been frustrated in trying to formulate a coherent strategy to neutralize the devastation wrought by suicide bombers. Most experts agree that the only way to guard against such attacks is to prevent potential perpetrators from acquiring what is, arguably, a death wish.

PROFILE OF A SUICIDE BOMBER

Due to the extensive media coverage of the countless suicide attacks that have occurred in the past two decades in the Middle East, the words "suicide bomber" immediately bring to mind a militant Islamic fundamentalist. Fighting against an Israeli army that is vastly superior in weaponry and organization, for example, Palestinian militants have increasingly resorted to suicide attacks, aimed at striking fear into the hearts of the Jewish civilian population of Israel.

During the 1990s, when such attacks began to multiply, the typical suicide bomber was a highly religious man between the ages of 18 and 23, single, with a high school education. In more recent years, however, this profile has lost its relevance to counterterrorist specialists, as different categories of people (including women, teenagers, and college graduates) have chosen to become suicide bombers.

Suicide attacks, however, do retain a religious dimension as most bombers consider themselves to be

future martyrs (called *shaheed* in Arabic) engaged in a holy war, or jihad. Since the Koran explicitly forbids suicide, the bombers interpret their self-sacrifice as merely a radical military technique, and not a purposeful destruction of their God-given life.

Drawing from the testimonies of prospective suicide bombers, it has been possible to identify a handful of justifications or rationalizations for their drastic actions. The most important motive, at least as far as Palestinian militants are concerned, is the perceived heavenly reward promised to everyone who dies fighting the holy war against the enemies of the Islamic faith. Revenge is also often invoked as an important reason for committing an act of suicide bombing.

This form of armed violence has many wealthy supporters in the Middle East, terrorists who guarantee a prospective suicide bomber that his or her family will receive a large financial reward after the mission is successfully accomplished. Although money is never mentioned as the primary reason for perpetrating such attacks, it undoubtedly helps the recruitment of potential martyrs. Successful (and hence dead) suicide bombers are celebrated as fallen heroes, and their families enjoy an enhanced social status within their communities.

TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION

Islamic suicide bombers are typically drafted from mosques and youth centers. While seeking fanatical single-minded individuals, recruiters do not, however, enlist what psychologists would describe as mentally unstable, suicidal personalities. Once a prospective bomber joins the cause, he or she undergoes a long period of preparation, which includes many hours of religious indoctrination. Reportedly, some recruits have been asked to lie in empty graves for hours so that they can see for themselves how peaceful a so-called righteous death can be. They spend progressively less time with their families and friends, and concentrate almost obsessively on spiritual preparation for the attack.

Suicide bomber *handlers*—that is, the organizers of the suicide attacks—do not give the bombers the details of their missions until days before they are sent out to seek their targets. The weapon of choice is usually an explosives-laden belt, which can be wrapped around the bomber's body and hidden by loose clothes. The organizers of suicide bombings are extremely media-conscious, making sure that the death of their martyrs attracts a lot of publicity through massive destruction and loss of human life, and through the selection of highly symbolic targets (as in the case of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon).

In recent years, it has become a tradition for prospective Palestinian suicide bombers to write or videotape a testimony before setting out to accomplish their mission. The videotaped recordings are usually rife with religious and military symbols. The subsequent death of the bomber is often celebrated as a happy event in his or her community, as this particular kind of sacrifice is thought to be pleasing to God. Given the inefficacy of deterrents, as well as the sense of moral superiority and religious accomplishment that prospective perpetrators typically acquire, suicide bombing remains extremely difficult to counteract, even by powerful, well-organized militaries.

See also Hamas; Intifada; Kamikaze; September 11/WTC and Pentagon Attacks

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SUMMIT CONFERENCES

Meetings between or among the heads of rival or enemy powers in an attempt to satisfy mutual demands through negotiation rather than warfare. Summit conferences are not just meetings between heads of state. A true summit requires powers that are more or less evenly matched and rulers who have the power and prestige to make major decisions on the spot with the authority to carry them out afterwards. A practical agenda for a summit meeting must be devised ahead of time, and those involved must not only have agreed on some subjects to discuss, but those on which they are willing to make compromises or concessions.

The modern era of the summit conference began in 1938, when British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, Italian leader Benito Mussolini, and French Premier Edouard Daladier met with Nazi leader Adolf Hitler in an attempt to avert war on the European continent. In the end, in exchange for Hitler's promise to avoid further aggression, Churchill, Mussolini, and Daladier agreed to allow Hitler to control the German-speaking border regions of Czechoslovakia, thus effectively eliminating Czechoslovakia as a military power. Unfortunately, for those who hoped this would keep the peace, Hitler reneged on the agreement within months, sending troops into Prague, and then invading Poland. The result was World War II.

In the modern era, summits continued to make sense as a means of gaining concessions from other nations. Modern methods of communication and travel make it relatively easy for leaders to cover large distances quickly if they wish to talk things over in person. Because they do not have to be absent or out of touch for long periods, heads of state can risk travel in a way that would have been unthinkable in an earlier era.

A series of summit meetings among the leaders of the victorious Allies of World War II—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain—were held to decide how to carve up what was left after the war. The first of these summit meetings was held in occupied Teheran, Iran, in 1943. In 1945, Allied leaders met again at the Crimean summer resort of Yalta. Later that summer, when a third meeting was held in Potsdam, Great Britain's presence was largely irrelevant, and the summit primarily consisted only of the two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union.

Summit conferences have remained an important part of international diplomacy since the end of World War II. In the modern era of mass media, a summit conference always leads to banner headlines, television specials, photo opportunities, and a lot of print and broadcast commentary.

During the Cold War, U.S. presidents from Dwight Eisenhower to Ronald Reagan met their Soviet counterparts from Nikita Khrushchev to Mikhail Gorbachev at summits held in places from Glassboro, New Jersey, to Reykjavik, Iceland. Although they sometimes came to agreement on practical details, such as reductions in the number of ballistic missiles held by each country, arguably these summit meetings had no true effect on the course of the Cold War.

The last of the summit meetings held between the two superpowers was in Reykjavik, Iceland, in 1987. At that summit conference, Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan came close to agreement on a massive disarmament plan. At the same time, however, for all intents and purposes the Soviet Union was already disintegrating.

Although currently without a comparable superpower with whom to negotiate, the United States has remained an active participant in the summit meetings of other nations. In particular, the United States has played an important mediator role in summits designed to negotiate an end to the Israeli-Arab conflict. This role began in September 1978, when President Jimmy Carter met with Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David, where they agreed to what is known as the Camp David Accords—a framework for peace in the Middle East. In July 2000, President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat, along with other officials and technical advisers, met at Camp David to negotiate a final settlement of the Palestine-Israel conflict based on the Oslo accords. The negotiations ended in failure in 2005, however, when the sides could not agree about the issue of Jerusalem.

Other nations also continue to hold summit conferences. For example, Arab heads of state have held a number of summits, with the primary goal of determining strategy toward Israel. These Arab League summit meetings began in Khartoum, Sudan, in 1964, and have been held as recently as 2002.

—Laura Kittross

See also Arab-Israeli Conflict; Camp David Accords; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Potsdam Conference (1945); Reykjavik; Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy; World War II (1939–1945); Yalta Conference (1945)

SUN-TZU (300s BCE)

Chinese general who lived in the fourth century BCE and authored the military treatise *The Art of War,* which contains strategic principles still employed today. Sun-Tzu lived in the Chinese state of Wu, located in modern Shandong Province, during the fourth century BCE. This period in Chinese history is known as the Warring States Period. At that time, a cluster of

states in southern China battled frequently for control of the region's plentiful natural resources. The price for defeat was steep; the population of a losing state was commonly slaughtered or enslaved.

When Sun-Tzu became commander of Wu's military, he was well aware of the perils of military defeat. But he also recognized that Wu was positioned to dominate the region. The state of Chou, which had long controlled the surrounding states, was in a period of steep decline. Wu and another state, Yüeh, both possessed the strength to succeed Chou as the region's power. Sun-Tzu thus crafted a strategy designed to elevate Wu's standing in the region while avoiding a potentially devastating confrontation with Yüeh. Sun-Tzu charted this strategy in his famous book *The Art of War*.

The Art of War outlined several key principles. First, Sun-Tzu contended that the decision to initiate a war is the gravest choice a nation can make. Therefore, war must be pursued only when a nation is threatened. Once a nation has decided to engage in a war, it must carefully plan its overall strategy. This planning includes a meticulous observation and assessment of the enemy. Sun-Tzu demanded that his military commanders evaluate the enemy's numbers, the ability of the enemy's forces, its level of discipline, the reputations of its leaders, its supplies, and even whether the enemy preferred to fight in good or bad weather.

Sun-Tzu next listed the rules for confrontation once war became imminent. A direct battle must never occur, Sun-Tzu cautioned, unless the enemy has definitely fielded the weaker force. Otherwise, an army must maneuver itself into a position to attain victory. First, the enemy must be deceived so that it underestimates its opponent's strength. Next, it must be craftily led into terrain that will hamper its movements. Subsequently, guerrilla attacks can be used to weaken the enemy once it has been placed in a defenseless position. Once the enemy has been significantly weakened, it can be exploited by striking at its most vulnerable points. Overall, Sun-Tzu advised that fighting should occur only when victory is assured.

The Art of War has gained adherents through successive centuries. The text gained new pertinence in the 20th century when Chinese revolutionary Mao Zedong followed its principles to lead the communist takeover of China. Aware of Mao's success, the Vietcong adopted Sun-Tzu's guerilla tactics in its battles against the United States during the Vietnam War.

The Art of War has even influenced recent U.S. military strategy. While serving as head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell devised a policy known as the Powell Doctrine. The doctrine stated several firm principles: The United States should engage in military action only when the mission's purpose is clearly stated and the mission is of vital importance to national security; the United States must enter the battle with the clearly superior force; and a clear end to the mission must be declared. Echoes of Sun-Tzu's advice about the gravity of war and the need to ensure victory resound throughout the Powell Doctrine and explain the U.S. desire to maintain a military that is far superior to any other in the world.

See also Guerrilla Warfare; Powell, Colin (1937–)

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SUPERPOWER

Uniquely powerful nation, with superior military, economic, and political strength. At the close of World War II, two nations emerged from the wreckage as superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union. With most of their infrastructure still intact, and in possession of significant arsenals, these two countries were poised for rivalry. Relations soured as both countries laid claim to spheres of influence, and superpower rivalry became superpower hostility, with significant impact on the rest of the world.

Superpowers enjoy a natural claim to world leadership because they have substantial *hard* and *soft power*. They can enjoy maximum benefits by employing both. Hard power includes coercive power—both military and economic. Military might is important, but international law, customs regarding legitimate use, and the high cost of use (in terms of the loss from trade) render it best employed as a deterrent for superpowers. Hard power is also economic power; superpowers can create incentives or economic punishments that force other states to follow its lead. Soft power—state charisma, or leadership by example—can make leadership from superpowers more palatable and legitimate to other countries and render the use of hard power unnecessary.

With their overwhelming strength, superpowers enjoy certain privileges and hegemonic power relationships. Due to their superior strength, superpowers essentially dictate the world security climate. In a bipolar system, any agreements that rival superpowers reach (on arms control, for example) are necessarily binding on every other country. The lack of an agreement may have even greater effects: Alliance with one power or the other can make even small or weak countries into legitimate military targets.

Moreover, superpowers—because of their overwhelming military strength—have the capacity for mutual annihilation, and so they generally prefer not to go to war with one another. As a result, superpowers sometimes diffuse conflict by playing out their hostilities by proxy in small nations (as was the case in Korea and Vietnam).

There are, however, certain responsibilities that accompany such power. Superpowers, even more than great powers, have some obligation to maintain international peace and security. In a bipolar world system, some tension and conflict is expected. Nevertheless, because of their overwhelming power and influence, superpowers are obliged—morally and in their own interests—to prevent conflicts in their spheres from escalating. Even more important, rival superpowers are obligated to regulate their own behavior to protect life itself—the former Soviet Union had, and the United States still has, the capacity to destroy the world through nuclear holocaust. A sole superpower also has a responsibility to protect peace and security through self-regulation, and not to abuse its power.

Like great powers, superpowers have the ability to intervene (for humanitarian purposes or in their own interest) in interstate and intrastate conflicts. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were extremely active in third-party conflicts during the Cold War. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States has led numerous interventions—some with the support of the world community (as in the first Gulf War) and some without (as it instituted regime change in Iraq in 2003). The legitimacy of preemptive warfare, particularly when practiced by a superpower against a weak state, is hotly contested.

The rights and duties of a lone superpower like the United States are still being determined. Among the issues under contention are whether such a nation has the right to impose its will on other countries because of its strength; whether it has the right to preemptive defense; whether it has a duty to intervene in humanitarian crises, and whether it has a duty to assert responsible leadership even at a cost to itself and its own security.

See also Bipolarity; Cold War; Great Power Rivalry; Hyperpower; Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy

SUPREME COURT, ROLE OF U.S.

Role in national policy of the highest court in the United States, which has jurisdiction to hear certain cases that may affect national security issues. Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court shares jurisdiction with lower district courts to hear all cases arising under the Constitution, U.S. laws, treaties of the United States, and between U.S. citizens and foreign states. The Court is granted original jurisdiction—the power to be the first court to try a case and make findings of fact—over "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls." U.S. Congress has also given district courts original jurisdiction to decide civil cases involving the U.S. Constitution, federal laws, and treaties. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court is vested with constitutional and statutory power to decide cases concerning national security.

Despite its jurisdiction, the Supreme Court generally has been reluctant to decide on cases involving national security. Instead, it has chosen to abstain from such cases and has based these decisions on constitutional and political limitations. The judicial doctrines primarily relied on by the Supreme Court to abstain from national security cases are the political question doctrine, standing, and ripeness. These doctrines are important to issues involving national security not because they limit the Supreme Court's role, but because they force the U.S. Congress and the president to carry out their war power duties.

POLITICAL QUESTION

The U.S. Supreme Court may decline to rule on disputes when it decides that the resolution of an issue is better left to the political branches of the government. This political question doctrine, when relied on by the Court, renders an issue nonreviewable. The U.S. Congress and the president—with the intention that the result will better reflect the will of the people—must instead decide the issue. Legal scholars disagree,

however, on how the Court decides that the question is political and whether it is then required or optional to abstain.

The political question doctrine was first expressed by Chief Justice John Marshall in *Marbury v. Madison* (1803) and later reexamined in *Baker v. Carr* (1962). The Court rarely relies on the doctrine and has only invoked it twice in cases relating to national security. In *Gilligan v. Morgan* (1973), a group of students sought a declaratory judgment allowing for federal judiciary assessment of the Ohio National Guard's "training, weaponry, and orders" to determine whether force would inevitably be used against the students at Kent State University. The Court held that the Constitution gave power of control of the National Guard to Congress.

The Court invoked the doctrine again in 1979, when Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater challenged President Jimmy Carter's decision to withdraw from the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan without Senate authorization. Although the Constitution requires the "advice and consent" on making treaties, it is silent on the unilateral abrogation of treaties. Senator Goldwater's claim was held to be not proper for judicial resolution by four members of the Supreme Court because it was deemed a political question. A fifth member of the Court agreed that the case should be dismissed but concluded instead that the case was not ripe for review.

STANDING

A plaintiff has standing if he or she is qualified to assert or enforce legal rights in a court of law. To demonstrate standing in a federal court, a party must show three things. First, a plaintiff must show *injury in fact*—that is, a violation of a legally protected interest—that is specific and actual or imminent. Second, the plaintiff is required to explain a *causal connection* between the injury and the conduct in dispute. Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a favorable decision by the court will *redress* his or her injury. However, if the Court dismisses a lawsuit based on standing, it does not mean that the case is not justiciable. It may merely suggest that the wrong plaintiff brought the suit.

In cases involving national security, the Court has held that a plaintiff who is merely a concerned citizen lacks standing to initiate a lawsuit unless Congress statutorily grants the person standing and the plaintiff is within the zone of interest. The Court has held that a plaintiff may have taxpayer standing, but only if the claim challenges specific constitutional limitations of the government's taxing and spending powers. For example, in *Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War* (1974), members of an antiwar group who opposed United States involvement in Vietnam brought an action against the secretary of defense and three service secretaries on behalf of all citizens and taxpayers, challenging the membership of members of Congress in the reserves. The Court held that the group did not have standing to sue the secretaries because the injury they argued to have suffered was an abstract injury rather than a concrete injury. In addition, the plaintiffs also lacked taxpayer standing because they failed to demonstrate a logical nexus between their claim and their status as taxpayers.

RIPENESS

Finally, the Supreme Court may temporarily avoid adjudication if it holds that the issues in a case are not ripe for review—that is, if the Court holds that future events will alter the issues in the case and will render the case irrelevant. A court's reliance on the ripeness doctrine does not completely bar an issue from being heard in court. The Court has merely determined that it is not the right time for the case to be heard. The doctrine is relied on in cases involving national security if parties in the case seem to be seeking only an advisory opinion and not the resolution of an actual and specific legal case.

In *Dellums v. Bush* (1990), the Court ruled that the case was not ripe for review. The case involved the deployment of U.S. troops to the Persian Gulf prior to the 1991 war against Iraq. The plaintiffs were 53 members of the House of Representatives and one member of the Senate. They claimed that the president did not have the authority to deploy U.S. troops because the power to declare war is reserved to Congress. The Court held, however, that although the plaintiff had standing to request an injunction stopping the deployment, the case was not ripe for judicial review because the issue had not first been brought to a vote in Congress. The Court held that it would be premature to decide on the issue of whether a declaration of war is required if Congress itself has not yet determined that a declaration is necessary. The Court did not offer guidance on how or when the case would be ripe for review.

TERRORISM CASES

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the war in Afghanistan, the administration of President George W. Bush implemented a series of controversial antiterrorism policies. The first issue brought before the Supreme Court concerning the antiterrorism policies involved the detention of 660 men from 40 countries who were captured during the course of the campaign in Afghanistan by the U.S. military. The men had been held for over two years at the U.S. Navy Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. In *Rasul et al. v. Bush* (2004), the Court held that because Guantánamo Bay is under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, U.S. courts have jurisdiction to consider legal challenges surrounding the detention of the foreign nationals captured abroad by the U.S. military in connection with ongoing hostilities. The Court also considered the fact that the plaintiffs, two Australians and twelve Kuwaitis, were not nationals of any country that the United States was at war with and that they denied any acts of aggression against the United States. The Court also noted that the men had not been charged with any crime and did not have access to any tribunal.

The *Rasul* case remains one of the few cases that the Supreme Court has agreed to hear involving the antiterrorism policies of the federal executive branch. The two other cases—*Hamdi v. Rumsfeld* (2004) and *Rumsfeld v. Padilla* (2004)—both involved U.S. citizens. Similar to the ruling in *Rasul*, the Court held in *Hamdi* that the plaintiff must be given access to the U.S. court system. In *Padilla*, the case was sent back to the lower court because the plaintiff lacked standing.

The limited role of the Supreme Court in matters of national security is apparent from its refusal to hear most cases involving the issue. The Court has, for the past two centuries, relied on constitutional limitations and political constraints to avoid ruling on national security issues. The recent terrorism cases mark a shift in the types of national security issues being brought before the Court, primarily issues of civil liberties and consideration of international law.

See also Constitution of the United States

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SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE (SAM)

Radar or infrared guided missile fired from a ground position to intercept and destroy enemy aircraft or missiles. Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) were developed to protect ground positions from hostile air attacks, specifically high-altitude bombers flying beyond the range of conventional antiaircraft artillery.

During the 1950s and 1960s, batteries of Nike-Ajax and Nike-Hercules SAMs provided strategic air defense against Soviet ICBMs and long-range bombers. Following agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States to limit strategic nuclear devices and the subsequent dismantlement of the Soviet Union into independent republics, research focused on the development of short-range, lighter, and more portable SAMs to protect ground troops. An important development among hand-held SAMs is integrated fire-control systems for ground units, which can separate friendly aircraft from hostile aircraft.

Since 1970, almost all the major industrial nations have developed tactical weapons to protect ground troops from air attack. Hand-held antiaircraft missiles using optical sighting and infrared homing devices like the Stinger missile have been used effectively against fighters and helicopters in conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other areas.

The United States provided anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the late 1980s with Stinger missiles, which were an effective defense against Soviet helicopters attacking mountain positions. Muslim extremist groups have retained some of these weapons and acquired new SAMs, a situation that poses a significant terrorist threat at the current time.

A SAM was fired on an Israeli airliner in Africa in 2003. Insurgents also have downed a number of U.S. aircraft during Operation Iraqi Freedom using handheld surface to air missiles. Recent homeland security advisories have directed domestic airports to increase security around their perimeters to prevent a SAM missile from being launched at commercial airliners departing or arriving at U.S. airports.

See also Missiles

SURGE CAPACITY

The ability of a system to expand rapidly, beyond its normal capacity, to meet increased demands made because of unexpected emergencies or disasters. Surge capacity has been a traditional concern of the military, given the ambiguities of war and war fighting. It is also a concern in times of peace.

A significant reason for having a military surge capacity is that if the nation ever requires a large increase in military capabilities due to a rapid change in the security environment, it can do so. Thus, in part, this argument has justified having more military bases and posts than might otherwise be efficiently operated. For example, after major wars, U.S. military planners have sought to build surge capacity into the support structures. This would, and does, include plans for calling up and supporting military reserves and National Guard forces to active duty, both in the United States and overseas.

While surge capacity has been a concern of the military and national security, it also has become a concern of other nonmilitary systems. These systems may be directly or indirectly affected. For example, in the case of bioterrorism, a bioterrorist attack would test the surge capacity of the health care system by increasing demand for qualified personnel, medical care, and public health. Other examples would include first-responder systems (police, fire, and emergency systems), communications systems (telephone, cell phone, and Internet systems), and transportation systems (such as the Civilian Air Backup System, which supports military deployments like recent ones to the Gulf and Iraq).

See also Bioterrorism; First Responders

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Form of development that ensures that economic growth, rising living standards, and other types of development can be maintained for the current and for future generations. Sustainable development is domestically acceptable, economically sound, eco-friendly, and culturally sensitive. It embraces the regular types of development—economic, political, social infrastructure, health, and education development—and makes certain that progress in these areas can be continued. Moreover, it includes the replenishment and development of cultural and social resources as well as traditional material ones. It is a form of development that tries to improve the present without compromising the future. The principle of sustainable development recognizes that today's human beings deserve a reasonable standard of living and that future generations should be given the same opportunity.

Development projects that are prompted by outsiders require local acceptance. They should be culturally, socially, and ethically appropriate for the region. Projects might be well intended, and indeed productive, but if they do not obtain buy-in from those in charge, they are not sustainable. As much as possible, however, sustainable development projects and ideas should come from the people (who are most aware of their own needs) and should be run and maintained by them. It is their participation, zeal, and long-term commitment that will keep a particular program running.

Economic sustainability is a major concern. It includes protecting natural and physical resources, as well as implementing sound policies that protect a nation's capital and goodwill resources. In developing countries—which tend to rely heavily on primary economic activities, such as agriculture and extraction— protecting natural resources is very important. Sustainable development argues for crop rotation (which depletes the soil less) and fallowing (allowing the soil to rest).

Sustainable development argues against monocropping, in which farmers plant all their fields with a single cash crop such as peanuts or soybeans. Not only does such monoculture deplete soil, it is economically risky. A farmer is not guarded against loss if the crop is destroyed; and if the market price for the crop is low, the farmer may not be able to earn enough to feed his family—especially as some cash crops, like cotton, are not food. In terms of other natural resources, sustainable development argues against practices like deforestation (particularly in old-growth forests) and overfishing, and it argues in support of replanting and responsible harvesting.

It is likewise important for developing countries to protect their other resources, such as their infrastructure, machinery, and technology. Sustainable development includes the creation of a technological cadre— machinists, technicians, engineers—who have the knowledge and skill to design, build, maintain, and repair infrastructure and other elements of society.

Past agricultural development projects, while well intended and productive, were stopped because local people had not been trained in how to fix broken tools or equipment.

Sound economic policies can help sustain all kinds of development within a state. It includes basic maintenance of economic machinery—not overspending; investing income, loan, and grant monies prudently; and keeping the money supply at appropriate levels to prevent inflation or deflation. Privatization, which is occurring in developing countries and is often mandated as part of the loan policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), must be pursued appropriately. The rate at which privatization occurs should not produce excessive unemployment, and it should give the population enough time to learn about private business management. Openness to foreign investment may help grow the economy, but it should be introduced at sustainable levels.

One of the most significant factors affecting sustainability and closely aligned with economic sustainability is *environmental protection.* Many developing countries have significant renewable and nonrenewable natural resources, such as good soil, timber, fish, minerals, oil, or gas. If harvested or developed too quickly, even normally renewable resources may be depleted. Results may include soil erosion or degradation, loss of soil fertility, deforestation, desertification, and imbalances in local ecosystems that result in an eventual loss of biodiversity. Extracting nonrenewable sources too quickly may also result in ecologic damage (such as from mining operations set up with insufficient attention to the environment).

There are economic arguments against environmental damage as well. In the case of renewable resources, exhausting them too quickly may endanger their capacity to reproduce themselves. Selling off limited resources quickly may result in lower prices and an ultimate loss to the developing country. Sustainable development, then, is ecologically friendly, ensuring that renewable resources are able to regenerate themselves, and that nonrenewable resources are not parted with too quickly,

nor extracted at a cost to the environment. Protecting the environment as a whole—particularly special ecological zones like the rainforests—is also economically important because of the rise of ecotourism.

The human component of sustainable development is important as well. To make other development practices more effective, population levels need to be addressed. Many developing countries have large populations, and large populations, particularly those in large metropolitan areas, tend to put significant pressure on resources. Sustainable development thus includes maintaining the population at a sustainable level. Education about family planning options may help families make informed decisions about reproduction. Improved health care may also help families stay smaller. Some families currently have many children because they know that not all will survive until adulthood; the ability to treat childhood disease particularly may slow population growth naturally.

Sustainable cultural and social development is likewise important to creating a stable society with a higher standard of living. Social development includes reducing social ills, like murder, rape, arson, and other violent crimes; theft; alcohol and substance abuse; juvenile delinquency, and so forth. These things may be countered in part by poverty reduction, which stems in part from economic development, job creation, and government welfare benefits. Health education and access to health care can also reduce these ills.

Social development likewise includes granting access to basic education for boys *and* girls of all socioeconomic strata. In a globalizing world, cultural development means concerted efforts to preserve the unique traditions of a nation's peoples, reinforcing identities, and creating social order. It includes the preservation of historical legacies for the future—historic sites, monuments, and religious edifices—as well as local language, customs, and ideals.

See also Development, Third-World

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
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Small nuclear warheads intended for use in a battlefield situation or a limited strike. Tactical nuclear weapons, also referred to as *battlefield nukes*, are less powerful than the strategic nuclear warheads mounted on intercontinental ballistic missiles. They are meant to devastate enemy targets in a specific area without causing widespread destruction and radioactive fallout.

The United States began developing lightweight nuclear warheads in the 1950s. One of the first such devices was the W-54 warhead, whose explosive force, or yield, varied from 0.1 to 1 kiloton (a kiloton is a force equal to 1,000 tons of TNT). By comparison, the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in World War II had yields of 12 to 25 kilotons. The W-54 was the main warhead used on the Davy Crockett nuclear recoilless rifle, a portable warhead launcher that was crewed by a single soldier. The Davy Crockett could deliver a warhead to a target up to 2.5 miles away.

During the 1960s, the U.S. Navy and Marines collaborated on development of a tactical nuclear device called the Special Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM). The project called for a two-man crew to parachute from an aircraft carrying a portable warhead similar to the W-54. The crew would place the weapon in a harbor or other target reachable by sea. They would then swim to a small craft waiting offshore to pick them up. The nuclear device was set to explode after the crew was safely out of the blast area.

During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union manufactured and deployed tens of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons. These included nuclear artillery shells, nuclear antiaircraft missiles, and nuclear antitank rounds. However, none were ever used in combat. For destroying small targets, modern conventional munitions were found to be just as effective as nuclear weapons. The only advantage of nuclear weapons in a tactical situation is that one warhead can be used in place of many conventional explosives. In addition, neither of the superpowers was willing to risk unleashing all-out nuclear war by employing battlefield nukes.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, Russia has developed a much more open attitude toward the use of tactical nuclear weapons. This change stems largely from the deterioration in Russian conventional forces following the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. The cash-strapped Russian military sees tactical nuclear weapons as a cost-effective way of defending Russian interests in the post-Soviet era. By contrast, the United States unilaterally destroyed its tactical nuclear arsenal after the fall of the Soviet Union, and Congress passed legislation forbidding the testing, development, and stockpiling of nuclear warheads with yields of less than 5 kilotons.

See also Nuclear Utilization Theory (NUT); Nuclear Weapons; Reagan, Ronald, and National Policy; Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy

TACTICS, MILITARY

Specific methods used to engage and defeat an enemy in combat. Tactics stand in contrast to strategy, which is the military's overall plan to achieve its objectives.

The history of U.S. involvement in World War II offers an example of the differences between strategy and tactics. In 1941, Japan planned to seize much of Southeast Asia to secure much-needed supplies of oil and rubber. Knowing that the United States would oppose this plan, Japan adopted the strategy of crippling the United States' ability to respond to Japanese invasions in the region. The tactics they employed to achieve their objective included a surprise air attack on the U.S. fleet in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and an amphibious assault on U.S. Army forces in the Philippines. The Japanese attacks brought the formerly neutral United States into World War II.

TYPES OF TACTICS

Military tactics can be classified into several categories, including offensive tactics, defensive tactics, and tactics of deception. The tactics one chooses to employ depend upon the military situation and the composition of one's forces. In fact, an army's makeup is often a reflection of the types of tactics it prefers to use. An army consisting mainly of light and mobile units will be more likely to employ tactics that emphasize speed and flexibility. By contrast, an army made up primarily of heavy units will probably prefer tactics that rely on massive firepower and strength of numbers for success.

Offensive Tactics

The oldest and simplest offensive tactic is the frontal assault—a straightforward charge into known enemy positions. The frontal assault typically relies on sheer numbers and firepower to overwhelm the defenders. There is no pretense of deception or question about where the main attack will take place.

Until quite recently, the frontal assault was the preferred offensive tactic in most combat situations. However, the increasing accuracy, range, and dependability of firearms since the mid-1800s have made the frontal assault nearly obsolete. The use of the machine gun in World War I made frontal assaults on prepared defensive positions almost suicidal.

Flanking and encirclement maneuvers offer an alternative to the risks of a frontal assault. A flanking attack is one that strikes an enemy from the side rather than the front. A flank attack is usually preceded by a holding attack—a limited assault on the front of the enemy line meant to draw the defender's attention. While the opponent is busy dealing with the holding attack, the real assault comes from the side, with the goal of surprising the defenders and throwing them into confusion. The troops conducting the holding attack then press their assault, driving the defenders back from both the front and side.

In an encirclement, the attacking force completely surrounds its enemy, cutting off the opponent's lines of communication, supply, and retreat. Many times, an encircling army does not need to make a concerted attack on the opposing force to destroy it. By denying the encircled enemy access to vital supplies such as food, medicine, and ammunition, the attackers are often able to compel the defender to surrender with limited use of force. Encirclement requires a very mobile and well-coordinated army that can get around an enemy position and maintain its own supply lines while doing so. The increasing use of tanks and other mechanized vehicles in the mid-20th century made encirclement a much more common military tactic.

The reconnaissance in force is an offensive tactic that combines two goals—assaulting an enemy position and gathering military information. Like other offensive tactics, a reconnaissance in force aims to capture territory and kill enemy troops. However, these goals are secondary to the objective of gathering battlefield intelligence to help plan military operations in the area. A related but smaller-scale operation is called a *raid* or *patrol*. Patrols are typically carried out by small units that attempt to quickly infiltrate enemy positions, capture prisoners for interrogation, and return with a minimum of casualties.

Defensive Tactics

Basic defensive tactics can be classified generally into two categories: static defense and mobile defense. Static defense relies on heavily defended forward lines, typically supported by strongpoints such as fortifications and bunkers. Static defenses are designed to repel even the strongest frontal assault. The strategic placement of strongpoints is meant to reduce the chances of flanking or encirclement of defenders by enemy forces. Static defensive positions are designed so that adjacent units have lines of fire that allow them to support one another.

The advent of the tank and airplane as weapons of war rendered purely static defensives obsolete against modern armies. For example, in the 1930s France built an enormous series of complex fortresses along its eastern border to prevent a German invasion. When

the Germans did invade in 1940, they simply drove around the northern flank of this so-called Maginot Line. German forces did assault the Belgian fort at Eben Emael during their invasion. Although the fort was considered the strongest in the world, German air bombardment and parachute landings on the fort forced its surrender in less than a day.

Mobile alternatives to static defense include the defense-in-depth and the fighting withdrawal. In defense-in-depth, only a portion of a defender's army occupies positions on the front line. Additional lines of defense are located behind the front line. If attackers breach the first line of defense, the defenders fall back to join troops already in the next line back. The defense-in-depth forces attacking troops to make a series of assaults on prepared positions rather than allow them to achieve a significant breakthrough with a single victory. Defense-in-depth also continually forces attacking troops to face fresh defenders.

In a fighting withdrawal, defending forces establish temporary positions that they gradually abandon in the face of superior attacking forces. As they retreat, defending forces look for good defensive positions where they can make stands and inflict casualties on the attacker. However, no position is considered too valuable to abandon in order to preserve the defending force. Fighting withdrawals are meant to slow the pace of an attack without committing to a static defense.

A fighting withdrawal often turns into a counterattack, in which units that were on the defensive move over to the offensive. Counterattacks usually occur when an attacking force is tired or has overstretched its supply lines. In this weakened state, it is much more vulnerable to being attacked and defeated by the opposing force.

Deception Tactics

As their name suggests, deception tactics are meant to confuse an enemy or provide it with false information about one's own strength, position, or intentions. Some deceptive tactics are extremely old, whereas some are products of modern technology.

Camouflage—concealing troops from the enemy by making them hard to distinguish from their surroundings—has been used since ancient times. German tribes fighting against the legions of the Roman Empire often concealed their ranks by carrying tree limbs or other forms of vegetation. Native Americans achieved a reputation among Europeans for the "ungentlemanly" way they concealed themselves behind trees or other forms of cover during combat. These tactics contrasted sharply with European warfare of the 18th century, in which armies fought each other in the open, methodically advancing on enemy lines in the face of defending fire.

Camouflage clothing, however, is a relatively new development in warfare. Ancient and medieval armies, being composed mainly of citizens conscripted to serve in times of war, had no regular uniforms of any type. They simply wore their everyday attire into battle. In contrast to today's uniforms, early modern armies often wore brightly colored uniforms so that it was easy to distinguish one side from the other. The great amounts of smoke produced by early firearms limited visibility on the battlefield, making it difficult for leaders to identify troops in drab clothing. The invention of more powerful, smoke-free propellants for firearms eliminated much of the visibility problem. By the early 20th century, most armies adopted uniforms that were camouflage or dull-colored; providing one's troops with concealment against enemy fire had become a greater challenge than distinguishing them from the opponent.

Misdirection is an important deception tactic often used by attacking forces. Misdirection involves making an opponent think one is going to strike in a certain place, while actually striking someplace else. Prior to the Allied invasion of German-occupied France during World War II, U.S. military intelligence pulled off one of the greatest misdirection operations in history.

The Germans suspected that the Allied forces would land either at Normandy or the Pas de Calais, both in France. The latter site was considered more likely because it was closer to Allied bases in England. The Allies chose to invade at Normandy, but they created an entire fake army in England across from the Pas de Calais to convince the Germans that the landing would occur there. Made up of dummy tanks, trucks, and planes, as well as fake radio traffic, the phantom army held the Germans' attention. Even after the real landings occurred, German commanders were reluctant to send reinforcements to Normandy, as they were convinced that the attack there was only a diversion. They were still sure the real invasion would come at Pas de Calais. By the time the Germans realized they had been deceived, the Allied forces were successfully ashore.

MODERN TACTICAL DOCTRINE

As warfare has evolved and become more complex, so have military tactics. In the not-too-distant past, military

tactics were largely restricted to battlefield activities—the positioning and use of large-scale troop formations. Over time, however, tactics have been devised for actions involving even very small numbers of troops and situations not directly related to battle. Current military doctrine specifies tactics for storming individual buildings or even rooms, securing an area following combat, and dealing with local insurgencies in occupied areas.

Comparing the composition of early-21st-century U.S. armed forces with those of World War II reveals signs of both continuity and change in U.S. military tactics. During World War II, the U.S. military was a mass force of millions of conscripts, organized into large-scale heavy fighting units. The U.S. military at that time leaned heavily on tactics that made use of massive firepower and the ability of the U.S. economy to produce seemingly unlimited amounts of war materiel. It also employed advanced technology to great effect, pioneering the use of strategic air warfare and making great advances in radar, communications, and weapons technology. The U.S. Army was the world's first completely mechanized force, relying solely on trucks and other self-propelled vehicles to transport ground troops. By contrast, even the sophisticated German Wehrmacht (which consisted of the navy as well as the army) used horses extensively for transport until the end of the war.

The modern United States military, by contrast, is a much smaller volunteer army composed of professional soldiers for whom the military is a career. Instead of relying on large troop formations and overwhelming logistical superiority, it employs tactics that emphasize mobility and the efficient application of force. Hundreds of bombers were needed to destroy a target in World War II, but the modern U.S. military can do the same job using a relative handful of unmanned cruise missiles. The sheer weight of arms used by the United States in World War II has given way to precision accuracy and greater explosive power concentrated in fewer munitions. Even more so than its World War II counterpart, the modern U.S. military relies heavily on technologically sophisticated military hardware to defeat its enemies.

The changes in U.S. force composition and tactics since World War II are also a result of changes in the global political situation. Throughout most of the Cold War period, the United States believed that the next major war, should one occur, would take place in Europe. Both U.S. and Soviet military planners envisioned that

such a conflict would entail large tank battles in the same vein as those fought during World War II. However, such massive armored conflicts never materialized.

The shooting conflicts fought during the Cold Wars were mostly brush wars—engagements fought between relatively small forces in jungles or other areas not conducive to conventional military tactics. Even the large-scale conflicts of the era, such as the Vietnam War and the Soviet War in Afghanistan, were won by the triumph of unconventional guerilla warfare over conventional military tactics. By the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States had begun to significantly reshape its forces to reflect this reality.

By the late 1980s and early 1990s, it had become clear that the primary military threats in the near future would likely arise in regions more remote from U.S. bases in North America and Europe. At this time, the United States accelerated its transformation from a heavy-unit-based force to one focused on mobility and rapid-deployment capability. As of the early 21st century, this transformation was still underway. Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defense under President George W. Bush, is a staunch proponent of a leaner and more flexible military. Rumsfeld's views increase the likelihood that future U.S. military tactics will show an even greater emphasis on small-scale operations.

—John Haley

See also Air-Land Battles; Blitzkrieg (Lightning War); Carpet Bombing; Counter-Force Doctrine; Decoys; Forward Basing; Military Doctrine; Psychological Warfare (PSYOPS)

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TAILHOOK SCANDAL

In 1993, scandal involving naval and marine officers. The Tailhook Association is a private organization that sponsors the Tailhook symposium, a reunion of former

marine and navy flyers that began in 1956. Members of Tailhook also include defense contractors, and the U.S. Navy and contractors provide significant support to the meetings. By 1992, the Tailhook Association boasted 10 corporations and 15,000 individual members.

In 1993, Navy lieutenant Paula Coughlin claimed on ABC News that the Tailhook convention that she attended had included a gauntlet of officers who groped her and made questionable comments as she attempted to get through. Her revelations brought forth other women, who indicated that similar indignities had happened to them at Tailhook conventions.

Admiral John W. Snyder, for whom Coughlin was an aide, acknowledged her report, noting that such behavior was the natural consequence of getting naval aviators drunk. Coughlin filed charges and, when her case moved slowly, she went public with her allegations. A seven-month investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service and Inspector General uncovered 140 cases of misconduct against 80 to 90 female victims.

As a result of the investigation, the secretary of the navy, H. Lawrence Garrett III, ordered the services to take disciplinary action against 70 individuals. Fifty were participants in the gauntlet, and 6 had obstructed the investigation. When witnesses placed Garrett and his chief of naval operations (CNO), Frank Kelso, near the gauntlet, the secretary resigned and the CNO retired early.

As the Tailhook story spread, senior officers retired or had their careers ruined. Defenders of the Tailhook Association attacked Coughlin's credibility, but she and other victims maintained that allegations were true. She and six other victims sued the association, which settled out of court. Coughlin resigned her commission in 1995.

Kelso and Garrett had previously worked to better women's status and opportunities in the navy, but the Tailhook scandal ended both their careers. In 1994 the aircraft carrier USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* became the first combat ship to accommodate women. That happened shortly after the 1994 Tailhook convention.

Other careers were affected by the scandal. Admiral Snyder was relieved of duty, and three other admirals were censured. Thirty more admirals got letters of caution. More than three dozen lower-grade officers received letters of caution or fines. Of the 117 officers implicated in the scandal, only 10 were junior grade.

The Tailhook scandal brought sexual harassment and sexual crimes in the military from out of the shadows. In the aftermath, military women began speaking out about the abuses that had occurred since the active recruitment of women with the end of the draft in 1973. The increasing presence of women in greater numbers in the new unisex military placed great stress on the old-line traditional military. To many, the Tailhook events were the logical outcome of such stresses breaking through under the weakening influence of excess alcohol.

As a result of Tailhook, the other armed services became more aware of the problems of sexual harassment and more aggressive in dealing with it, but not particularly more successfully. The army weathered a number of scandals in the 1990s, and as of 2004, the Air Force Academy had not yet overcome the stigma of periodic flare-ups of sexual harassment and sexual crimes against women.

A decade after the Tailhook scandal, traditionalists in the military continued to fault Coughlin for damaging the image of the armed services, accusing her of seeking her own advantage at their expense. Moreover, women continue to struggle for unqualified acceptance within the armed forces.

See also Gender Issues; U.S. Navy

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TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT

A 1979 congressional act that ensured the continued protection of Taiwan after the United States had normalized relations with Communist China.

On December 15 1978, President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States planned to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China. Beginning in January 1979, the United States would grant the Communist Chinese republic full diplomatic recognition. Negotiations between the two nations

had secretly occurred since the administration of President Richard Nixon. During these deliberations, the Chinese government had made three consistent demands: that the United States would end its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, that it would withdraw from the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty it had signed with Taiwan, and that all U.S. military forces would depart from Taiwan.

Carter realized that a bipartisan group of congressmen, known as the China Lobby, would vehemently protest the Chinese demands. These congressmen strongly supported Taiwanese independence and argued that an independent Taiwan was vital to U.S. security interests in Asia. However, Carter viewed China as an emerging world power; in his view, a steady relationship with China was far more important than guaranteeing Taiwan's freedom from Chinese control. Therefore, when Carter made his announcement, he acceded to the Chinese demands, but to appease his congressional opponents, he stipulated that the Taiwanese question must be settled peacefully and that the United States would retain the right to supply Taiwan with weapons for defensive purposes. He also created the American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit corporation that would be used to conduct informal relations with Taiwan.

The U.S. Congress, however, was not satisfied with either Carter's ambiguous assurance that the Chinese would not invade Taiwan or with the nation's new informal arrangement with Taiwan. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate began drafting bills that would ensure America's continued protection of Taiwan. The outcome of these bills was the Taiwan Relations Act.

On March 19, 1979, a congressional conference committee met to reconcile the differences between the House and Senate bills. The committee ultimately emerged with a compromise that contained several key provisions. First, the bill demanded that the future of Taiwan be resolved peacefully and urged the president to seek a Chinese renunciation of force. Second, the bill noted that any threat against Taiwan would be considered a matter of security for the United States. Next, the bill confirmed that the United States could supply Taiwan with the weaponry necessary for its self-defense. Finally, the bill stipulated that the president and Congress would jointly determine what weapons would be sold to Taiwan.

Not surprisingly, China vociferously protested the bill, even threatening to withdraw from its newly normalized relation with the United States. But the congressional leadership correctly guessed that the Chinese government was bluffing; the Chinese wanted the new diplomatic relationship as badly as the Carter administration did. The true threat came from Carter's veto pen. Carter received the bill on March 30. He expressed his displeasure with the bill by waiting until April 10 to sign it, the last day before the bill would have automatically become law. He also declined to hold a public signing ceremony, instead signing the bill late at night.

In retrospect, Carter's displeasure seems highly misplaced. Since the Taiwan Relations Act was passed, the United States has strengthened its relationship with the People's Republic of China. Although China's relationship with Taiwan has not been resolved, the act has prevented China from directly using force against the island. The act has also prevented Taiwan from aggravating the Chinese by declaring its independence. In over two decades, democracy has flourished in Taiwan and U.S. security interests in the region have been maintained.

See also Carter, Jimmy, and National Policy; China and U.S. Policy

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TALIBAN

Government of Afghanistan between 1996 and 2002, which was dominated by an extreme Sunni Muslim political-religious ideology. The Taliban ("seekers") began as a small movement of religious students in Kandahar around 1994. At that time, Afghanistan was a failing state, rendered unstable by war with the Soviets followed by a civil war as various indigenous movements and leaders fought for control of the government. None gained full popular support; and in Kandahar, these turf battles left the city in a state of virtual anarchy. The religious students in the city reacted to the corruption and infighting by advocating a strong, Islamic-based intervention.

The Taliban was overwhelmingly a movement of Pashtun peoples, though it did include other ethnic groups. Its major sources of coherence were a strict, radical, Sunni interpretation of Islam and devotion to the idea of an archetypal Islamic state. Their call for security and order, and the end of corruption, was widely attractive. The Taliban gained recruits from among university students and ex-military officers, but particularly from among those educated in *madrassas* (religious schools) in refugee camps in Pakistan. They gradually took control of Afghanistan from 1994 to 1997, seizing abandoned equipment and seeking recruits as they went. The Taliban came to power in 1996 after seizing the Afghan capital of Kabul in September of that year and creating a ruling establishment. They ultimately controlled nearly 90% of the country.

Although they gained quick victories in the field, the Taliban had focused only on military campaigns and had little experience with civil government or foreign policy. The internal decision-making process and the chains of command were deliberately unclear, informal, and secretive. The Taliban tabled discussion of foreign affairs until stability could be achieved. Moreover, the Taliban attracted the attention of aid agencies and watchdog groups because of their human-rights violations, particularly against Shiite Muslims, members of other minority sects, and women. The Taliban did, however, restore order to much of the country by implementing the Islamic rule of law known as *sharia.*

Once in power, the Taliban began to enforce their narrow, puritanical interpretation of Islam, repudiating all elements of modern Western rationalism. The Taliban strongly regulated appropriate behavior. They issued edicts for proper appearance (long beards and turbans for men, burkas for women). They banned women from working, except within the health sector (a woman's duty was to bring up the next generation of Muslims) and closed girls' schools (pending the creation of a suitable curriculum). Because many women were teachers, boys' schools were often closed as well because of a lack of teachers. The Taliban also strongly condemned inappropriate behavior: The implementation of the sharia meant that adulterers were stoned and thieves had their hands cut off. The Taliban also banned music, games, and any representation of the human or animal form as being contrary to Islam. Later, the Department for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice acted as a religious police to enforce these decrees.

A Taliban militia member manning antiaircraft artillery in Afghanistan in 1995 during the period of civil strife between the Taliban rebels and government forces. In the fall of 1996, the Taliban finally managed to take the Afghan capital of Kabul and consolidate their power. After taking Kabul, the Taliban leaders began to institute their rigid and uncompromising fundamentalist brand of Islam.

Source: Corbis.

The Taliban in Afghanistan became a rogue regime, openly flouting international conventions and harboring radical elements, such as members of the international terrorist group al-Qaeda. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States, the United States appealed to the Taliban to extradite some of the known ringleaders, including al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. When the Taliban refused, the United States launched a military campaign against Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, to induce regime change and unearth the terrorists.

The Taliban government officially capitulated to U.S. forces in January 2002, but many of their leaders remain at large.

See also Afghanistan, War in; Al-Qaeda; Terrorism, War on International

TANKS

Tracked, heavily armored combat vehicles that can destroy enemy forces by direct fire. Most tanks in use today are main battle tanks (MBT), which have heavier armor and a larger-caliber main gun than other types of tanks. Tanks have seen action across the globe in every major combat engagement since World War I. Since their development, the vehicles have improved greatly in speed, armament, armor, and size.

TYPES OF TANKS

The main battle tank (MBT) is the most powerful direct-fire land-based weapon. An example of this firepower is the 120mm main gun mounted on the U.S. M1 Abrams tank. Although MBTs are employed mainly to fight other MBTs, they can also be used against other targets, such as infantry troops.

The term *main battle tank* is used to distinguish this type of vehicle from lighter, less expensive tanks, generally used in airborne and amphibious operations, as well as older tanks. One such smaller tank is the so-called tankette, a small tank, usually without a turret, that carries a crew of two and has one or two machine guns. Tankettes were produced mainly in Great Britain in the 1930s, and production of the vehicles ceased with the onset of World War II as the tankette's limited usefulness and vulnerability to more powerful tanks became apparent.

Light tanks are small and designed for speed. They have been used in a scouting role and to strike vulnerable areas of enemy formations. Some were even light enough to be airlifted into battle. Most saw action in World War I and World War II, but the M551 Sheridan tank employed by the U.S. Army saw action in Vietnam and Operation Desert Storm.

Medium-sized tanks were the predecessors of today's MBTs. Examples of these tanks include the M4 Sherman and M48 Patton tanks of the United States and the Russian T-34 tank. Heavy tanks were designed to break through enemy formations with their powerful guns and armor. The tanks are no longer in use, however, due to their lack of speed and high cost. Notable examples of the heavy tank are the PzKfw V and VI tanks built and used by the Germans during the World War II.

Another type of tank is the infantry tank. Originally developed during World War I by the British and French, this type of tank was slow and heavily armored. These features suited its main purposes, which were to clear battlefields of obstacles and to protect advancing friendly troops. Examples of the infantry tank are the British Mk II Matilda and the Mk IV Churchill, both of which served with distinction in World War II.

Developed by the Germans in World War II, tank destroyers usually consisted of an antitank gun mounted on an existing tank chassis. Tank destroyers combined powerful main guns (usually over 75mm) with speed, but they were lacking in armor. Although designed to destroy other tanks, tank destroyers were eventually superseded by the more capable medium tank. Examples of tank destroyers include the Russian SU-85 and the German Rhinoceros, which combined a Panzer chassis with an 88mm gun.

TANK ARMOR

The MBT is the most heavily armored vehicle in any modern army. Its armor protects the crew as well as the vehicle itself from penetrating rounds fired from other tanks, antitank guided missiles fired from infantry or aircraft, and antitank mines. Designers of MBTs must find the right balance between armor and weight, because it would be impractical to attach heavy armor to every part of the tank. Usually the front of the chassis and turret front are the most heavily armored, and the sides and turret top have the lightest armor.

Several types of armor are used in different modern MBTs. Passive armor is made up of layers of steel, metallic alloys, and ceramics. Another type of armor is reactive armor, so named because it explodes outward and away from the crew on contact with an incoming mortar round. One of the most effective types of armor is British Chobham armor, used in construction of British Challenger and American M1 Abrams tanks. This type of armor consists of spaced ceramic blocks wrapped in a resin

fabric between layers of conventional armor.

TANK ARMAMENT

The history of tank armament follows the development of increasingly large-caliber guns with longer ranges. The British "Little Willie" of 1916 carried 57mm guns and machine guns, and the German Panzer IV tank of World War II had a 75mm main gun. The American M48A5 tank of the 1950s had a 105mm main gun with a range of 2,000 yards.

The main guns of modern MBTs generally measure 120mm for American and European models and 125mm for Russian models, and they fire high-explosive penetrating rounds at ranges of over 2,000 yards. Most MBTs also have a small-caliber machine gun mounted coaxially with the main gun. Many tanks also have a machine gun mounted on the turret roof for use against aircraft as well as enemy troops.

Soldiers of the First Infantry Division's Second Battalion, Third Brigade Combat Team, heading back to their base in Iraq in M1 Abrams tanks after fighting with Iraqi insurgents in July 2004. The backbone of U.S. armored forces, the M1 Abrams provides enough mobile firepower to destroy any opposing armored fighting vehicle in the world, while providing protection for its crew in any conceivable combat environment. During the Iraq War, the M1 Abrams easily countered Iraqi forces and dismantled them.

Source: U.S. Army.

HISTORY OF TANKS AND TANK WARFARE

The tank was originally developed by the British in World War I for the purpose of overrunning enemy trenches in Europe. The term *tank* was used so that factory workers would think they were producing mobile water tanks rather than an entirely new type of weapon.

The first tank prototype was tested in September 1915, and the first British MK1 tanks saw action at the Battle of the Somme in September of the following year. Although most of these early tanks broke down, at the Battle of Cambrai, British tanks succeeded in breaking through German positions. World War I also witnessed the first tank-against-tank battle, when German and British tanks squared off in April 1918.

Between World War I and World War II, the tank began to take its modern shape, with a lower profile, a compact hull, and a turret in place of the earlier rhomboidal form. The 1930s saw the development of the German Panzer and Soviet T-34 tanks, both of which would play a prominent role in the approaching war.

World War II introduced the term *blitzkrieg* to military history. This tactic, which stressed combined attacks of infantry, tanks, and air support, allowed the Germans to sweep quickly across Europe with devastating success. Although early German Panzers were actually inferior to some tanks in the British and French arsenals, blitzkrieg and the unprecedented use of communication radios in German tanks ensured victory.

Although far superior to the American M4 tank, later Panzer and Tiger models were outnumbered by the Americans and British coming from the west and from Russian T-34s coming from the east. Although tanks were used by the Americans and Japanese in the fighting in the Pacific, jungle terrain somewhat limited their range and usefulness.

The Korean War once again proved the usefulness of tanks. Because of reluctance on the part of the great

powers to cross the nuclear threshold in Cold War conflict, North Korean T-34 tanks faced off against U.S. Sherman and Patton tanks as well as the British Centurion. Due to the entrenched nature of the Korean War, however, tanks did not serve in an assault role with infantry but were essentially long-range, heavy-caliber snipers used to fire against enemy positions.

Tanks served in a limited support role in the Vietnam War, and many experts proclaimed them to be obsolete following heavy Israeli losses at the hands of anti-tank guided missiles in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. However, Operation Desert Storm in 1991 proved once again not only the potential effectiveness of tanks in an assault role but also the superiority of U.S. and European tank design over older Russian models in Iraqi hands.

TOWARD THE FUTURE

The end of the Cold War raised questions regarding the relevance of the main battle tank. The threat of a Soviet invasion of Europe subsided with the political collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Moreover, unconventional security threats requiring unconventional responses have since arisen in every corner of the world. In 1989, for example, rapid reaction forces toppled the dictatorship of Manuel Noriega in Panama, and the tank played a limited role in toppling the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001. Tanks also played little more than an ancillary role in the Iraq War of 2003 and the occupation of Iraq that followed. The MBT has yet to establish a steady role in this new age of asymmetrical warfare, and its future is far from certain.

—Daniel P. McDonald

TELLER, EDWARD (1908–2003)

American physicist who played an instrumental role in developing the hydrogen bomb. Edward Teller was born in Hungary, where he received his Ph.D. from the University of Leipzig in 1930. He came to the United States in 1935 to teach physics at George Washington University. In 1939, he watched Albert Einstein sign a letter urging President Franklin D. Roosevelt to develop the atomic bomb. He became an American citizen in 1941 and worked on the Manhattan Project, which successfully detonated the first nuclear weapon in New Mexico in July 1945.

Following the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II, Teller became an advocate of bigger and stronger nuclear devices and critical of the reticence of Manhattan Project scientists to develop such weapons. His criticism of Robert Oppenheimer, the physicist who headed the Manhattan Project, and Teller's subsequent call for a new laboratory to develop more potent nuclear weapons, alienated Teller from many of his colleagues.

After World War II, Teller served as a professor of physics at the University of Chicago, and he was also associated with the thermonuclear research program at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Teller was instrumental in the development of the first hydrogen bomb, which was detonated on November 1, 1952. As a result, he is often called the Father of the Hydrogen Bomb, an appellation he reportedly disliked. In 1952, Teller became a professor at the University of California and cofounder and director of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. In 1960, he resigned from the laboratory to devote time to teaching and research. In 1962, he received the Enrico Fermi Award for his contributions to the development, use, and control of nuclear energy.

Teller was a staunch supporter of President Ronald Reagan's so-called Star Wars space-based missile defense system and an advocate for new and more potent weapons systems as a means to maintain peace. He opposed several treaties aimed at reducing the spread of nuclear weapons. Teller worked in his office at the Livermore lab several days a week until his death at the age of 95.

See also Atomic Bomb; Hiroshima; Manhattan Project (1942–1945); Reagan, Ronald, and National Policy

TERRORISM *See* Terrorism, U.S. (Domestic)

TERRORISM, U.S. (DOMESTIC)

Systematic assaults within the United States for the purposes of creating fear and influencing government policy. Terrorist acts may consist of kidnapping, bombing, murder, attacks with chemical or biological

weapons, blackmail or any number of other types of activities meant to coerce by causing, or threatening to cause, harm. There is a long history of terrorism carried out on U.S. territory; however, the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon near Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001, focused an unprecedented level of public attention on terrorism. Since that time, U.S. foreign policy has been specifically focused on fighting the war on terrorism.

DEFINING TERRORISM

One of the problems with describing domestic terrorism is deciding what terrorism is. Terrorism is typically portrayed in the media and popular culture as the strategy of a weak, marginalized minority seeking to impose its beliefs on a wider population. Terrorist activities are covert and isolated because the interests represented are not shared by the majority of the world's inhabitants.

If the question is tactics and interests, however, then it is also possible to understand the founding of the United States as a terrorist act. At the time of the American Revolution, the Continental Army represented desires in conflict with those of the large Loyalist population, upsetting the British colonial system. As far as military strategy was concerned, the Continental Army frequently employed guerrilla tactics to compensate for the advantages of the professional British troops, which the latter derived from representing an established government with a sizable treasury.

Additionally, there are critics who argue that the United States is itself the most powerful terrorist regime in existence today. Examples cited to substantiate this view include anticommunist activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Central America during the 1980s and the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. The latter has been referred to by some critics as the greatest terrorist act in human history. Citing these examples, then, it is possible to say that the identity of a terrorist can be defined as dependent upon who is being terrorized.

Whatever position one takes on the question of terrorism and the identity of the terrorist, terrorist activities conducted within the United States can, for practical purposes, be described as acts by individuals opposed to the United States or to U.S. government policy. Though current concerns with terrorism are centered on Islam and the activities of Muslims, terrorists

throughout U.S. history have represented a variety of causes and interests. These have ranged from abolitionism, anarchism, libertarianism, socialism, and communism, to anticapitalism and opposition to U.S. military activities overseas.

TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES BEFORE 9/11

The question of slavery was the source of a number of violent incidents within the United States, even before the outbreak of the Civil War. The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 meant that new states entering the Union were allowed to decide whether or not slavery would be legal within their borders. This made these states grounds for conflict between pro- and antislavery groups. The conflict grew so violent that the terms *bleeding* or *bloody* Kansas have been adopted to describe the sequence of violent events that took place between 1854 and 1856. The activities of both sides may also be described as terrorist, in that they involved violence and intimidation in order to influence a political outcome.

Among the more well-known individuals involved on the antislavery side in Kansas was radical abolitionist John Brown. Brown later became famous for his raid on Harpers Ferry, Virginia, in 1859, when he and a group of abolitionists attempted to seize the local armory for the purpose of arming local slaves. Brown's raid was initially successful, but a raid by U.S. Marines resulted in the deaths of a number of his men, and Brown himself was brought to trial on charges of treason and later hanged.

One of the most important acts of terrorism in U.S. history was the Haymarket bombing, which took place in Haymarket Square, Chicago, on May 4, 1886. The bombing occurred during an anarchist rally organized to protest the killings of four people the day before, when police opened fire on a strike at the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company. Police arrived to disperse the rally, and eight were killed when a bomb was thrown among them. The police responded by opening fire, killing several and injuring nearly a hundred more. The Haymarket bombing triggered a panic that soon spread across the country. Socialism and anarchism were associated with immigrant labor, and hundreds of radicals were quickly rounded up. Though no one was ever charged with throwing the bomb, eight anarchists were put on trial, all but one of whom were German immigrants. Three

ended up with life imprisonment, four were hanged, and one committed suicide.

The trial of the anarchists in the Haymarket bombing is typically regarded as an extremely biased manifestation of paranoia regarding immigrants and the supposed threats to social and political order they had brought with them from Europe. It was also a precursor to future "red scares," the most well known of which took place at the height of the Cold War in the context of McCarthyism.

Another significant terrorist act involving an anarchist was the assassination of President William McKinley in 1901. McKinley was assassinated by Leon Czolgosz, son of Russian-Polish immigrants, whose motivation for his act was protesting the injustices of capitalism. Nearly a decade later, in 1910, the headquarters of the *Los Angeles Times* was bombed by two union leaders, killing 21 people. The perpetrators ultimately pleaded guilty, but at their trial they were defended by famed lawyer Clarence Darrow.

The first terrorist act that specifically targeted the U.S. public, serving to provoke fear in the innocent bystander, was the Wall Street bombing of 1920. The bombing involved a horse-pulled wagon passing by a lunchtime crowd, loaded with 100 pounds of dynamite and 500 pounds of steel shards. Seventy people were killed and 300 were injured. Eastern European and Italian anarchists were suspected in the bombing, but the crime was never solved. The Wall Street bombing remained the most significant bombing attack on U.S. soil until the Oklahoma City bombing, 75 years later.

A source of domestic terrorist activity during the 1950s was Puerto Rican nationalism. The desire for an independent Puerto Rico resulted in the attempted assassination of President Harry S. Truman, in 1950, and the wounding of five congressmen in 1954. In the former incident the assassins were unsuccessful, and in the latter the terrorists were brought to trial and convicted.

Terrorist fears have frequently been associated with foreigners, immigration, and foreign cultures. The use of the word *terrorism* originally derived from the period known as "the Terror" during the French Revolution, which inspired fear in the established aristocracies across Europe. The notion of terrorism and terrorist activities was also closely associated with the activities of the Russian intelligentsia, including the assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881, the failed 1905 Revolution, and the then-epitome of left-wing radicalism, the Bolshevik Revolution.

Although considered mainly a crime of foreigners or immigrants, a number of significant terrorist attacks on U.S. soil have been carried out by U.S. citizens, against U.S. citizens, for purposes unrelated to any foreign ideology. In 1963, for example, a member of the Ku Klux Klan, Robert Chambliss, opposed to civil rights for African Americans, murdered four girls by setting off a bomb in a Baptist church in Alabama. Chambliss was initially found not guilty, thanks in part to the intervention of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. Public outrage, however, inspired by the atrocity, helped pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Fourteen years later, Chambliss was finally convicted, as were two of his accomplices in 2000.

Anger over the Vietnam War motivated the activities of the Weather Underground, a splinter group of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The Weathermen were responsible for blowing up a monument to victims of the above-mentioned Haymarket bombing in Chicago as a kickoff to the so-called Days of Rage in October of 1969. The subsequent riot in Chicago's business district led to shootings and scores of arrests.

The next year, the Weathermen declared war on the U.S. government in response to the shooting of a Black Panther and carried out bomb attacks on the Capitol and the Pentagon. The group dissolved over the course of the 1970s, and very few members ever did jail time. One member, in an unfortunately timed interview with the *New York Times* on September 11, 2001, described the aesthetic quality of bomb explosions and regretted that the group had not been successful in carrying out more.

The activities of the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), including murders, robberies, and extortion, were considered significant acts of domestic terrorism during the 1970s. The SLA achieved particular notoriety with the kidnapping of newspaper heiress Patty Hearst, who later became a member of the organization that had abducted her. Hearst was ultimately captured and sentenced to prison. She is considered a textbook example of the so-called Stockholm syndrome, in which victims identify with, and become allies of, their captors.

The activities of Theodore Kaczynski (also known as the Unabomber) may also be defined as terrorist, although his political motivation was not dissatisfaction with the government as much as the conditions of modernity. Between 1978 and 1994, Kaczynski sent a number of bombs to individuals and locations he considered responsible for technological development.

Kaczynski's neo-Luddite opinions, as expressed in a manifesto published in the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times,* consisted of dystopian predictions for the future of complex societies.

The worst terrorist attack in U.S. history, prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks, was the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The attack took place on April 19, 1995, and was carried out by militia member Timothy McVeigh, with the help of two accomplices, Terry Nichols and Michael Fortier. The attackers exploded a pickup truck containing a bomb at around 9:00 a.m., just after parents had dropped their children off in a day care center located in the building. The explosion killed 168 people.

McVeigh was apprehended less than an hour after the explosion. At his trial, the prosecution asserted that the attack was motivated by the FBI assault on the headquarters of the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas, in 1993. The latter incident had helped fuel anti-government sentiment among libertarians nationwide. McVeigh was sentenced to death, Fortier received 12 years in prison and a $200,000 fine, and Nichols received life imprisonment.

SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

The attack on the World Trade Center in New York City in 2001 had been preceded by an earlier attack and a bomb plot eight years before. In 1993, terrorists attempted, unsuccessfully, to bring down the Twin Towers with a bomb inside a van parked in the underground garage. The explosion resulted in the deaths of six people and caused significant structural damage. The attack had a significant effect on public fears concerning terrorist attacks, particularly once the New York City landmark bomb plot was uncovered several months later. The latter plan was to involve the destruction of the United Nations building, Lincoln Tunnel, Holland Tunnel, George Washington Bridge, and the New York City headquarters of the FBI.

The events of September 11, 2001, are significant in a number of ways. Not only were they the most significant terrorist attacks ever carried out on U.S. soil, but they were also among the best-documented tragedies in U.S. history. The collapse of the World Trade Center was broadcast live on television, narrated by reporters who were still not quite sure what the attacks were and who was responsible. The impact of the number of casualties, nearly 3,000, was compounded by the dramatic circumstances of their deaths—hijack victims, trapped office workers, and first responders attempting to rescue bystanders. The two targets in the 9/11 attack—the World Trade Center and the Pentagon—were symbols of American power and affluence.

Responsibility for the 9/11 terrorist attacks was claimed by Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist network. Bin Laden is a citizen of Saudi Arabia, as were nearly every one of the terrorists who took part in the attacks. At the time, bin Laden was sheltered by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, a fundamentalist Muslim government that the United States had earlier supported in its opposition to the Soviet Union. When the Taliban refused to give up bin Laden after the 9/11 attacks, the United States invaded Afghanistan. That invasion was followed two years later by an invasion of Iraq in 2003, under the pretext that Saddam Hussein had links with al-Qaeda and possessed weapons of mass destruction that he planned to use in terrorist attacks against the United States. Neither of these accusations has ever been proven.

Public anxiety over terrorism was heightened in the weeks after September 11, when letters containing anthrax were sent to media offices and two U.S. senators. The identity of the senders has never been determined, nor is it known whether the anthrax attacks were related to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. However, all of these incidents, occurring in quick succession, created concern, fear, and paranoia among many Americans.

Significant domestic measures taken in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks include the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the implementation of the Homeland Security Advisory System, which is a color-coded terrorist-threat alert meant to inform the public of the current likelihood of a terrorist attack.

—William de Jong-Lambert

See also Al-Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Homeland Security Advisory System (Color-Coded Alerts); Homeland Security, Department of; Oklahoma City Bombing; September 11/WTC and Pentagon Attacks; Terrorism, War on International; Terrorists, Islamic

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TERRORISM, WAR ON INTERNATIONAL

Ongoing United States–led international campaign aimed at apprehending or destroying individuals and groups judged to have been involved in the planning or the execution of acts of terrorism. The war on terrorism was declared by President George W. Bush soon after the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. The campaign has so far included a wide range of aggressive measures, from military action against Afghanistan and Iraq, to financial restrictions against countries or groups thought to harbor terrorists, to legal initiatives and enhanced intelligence-gathering operations.

In the evening of September 11, 2001, President Bush announced his intention to launch a long-term offensive—a war on terrorism—against the individuals who planned the hijackings that were responsible for the 9/11 attacks, as well as the countries that gave them support and shelter. Within less than a month, a U.S.-led coalition began an air assault on Afghanistan, the country that had been sheltering suspected September 11 mastermind Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist organization. A year and a half later, another U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq, in the second major armed conflict since the war on terrorism began.

Meanwhile, on the financial front, a concerted international effort has blocked numerous financial assets linked to terrorist entities. The United States, as well as many other countries, also has passed an impressive volume of antiterrorist legislation. Since September 11, the list of targets in the war on terrorism has expanded to include not only individuals and groups linked to al-Qaeda, but also other, unrelated groups that have been officially labeled terrorist organizations. The war on terrorism continues around the world and, according to virtually every political and military leader (including President Bush), it is likely to last for generations.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

In analyzing the circumstances of the September 11 terrorist strikes, a special commission (the 9/11 Commission) deplored the "failures of imagination, policy, capabilities and management" that prevented the government from apprehending the attackers while they were still in their planning phase. As early as September 2001, policymakers in Washington, DC, began addressing those problems.

Seven days after the terrorist attacks, in a drastic departure from pre-9/11 legal standards, the Justice Department initiated a series of regulations allowing it to detain noncitizens suspected of terrorist activities for an unspecified period of time. Two weeks later, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, a highly controversial piece of legislation that, among other things, improves the ability of law enforcers to identify, track down, and collect evidence on suspected terrorists operating on U.S. territory. By the end of the year, more than 750 terrorism suspects had been detained by the U.S. authorities. In August 2002, following an earlier presidential order, military tribunals opened in Guantánamo Bay (Cuba), ready to try terrorism suspects being held there. Within less than a year, the U.S. government gained a new executive-level department—the Department of Homeland Security, established by law in November 2002.

FINANCIAL MEASURES

According to the Bush administration, one of the measures taken by the president in the war on terrorism was to direct government agencies to block the flow of money suspected of funding terrorist groups. To that end, three organizations were formed. The first, the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center, became active less than a week after the 9/11 attacks. It was designed to dismantle terrorist financial bases and shut down their fundraising capabilities by creating financial profiles of known terrorist groups and taking steps to close down their sources of money.

The second institution, Operation Green Quest, sought to encourage the business community to report suspicious financial activity, such as movements of funds originating from or going to countries suspected of aiding terrorist groups. The third organization, the Terrorist Financing Task Force, aimed to prevent individuals from using the U.S. banking system to move money earmarked for terrorist activities. Besides the United States, more than 167 other countries have made efforts to deny alleged terrorists access to money. Since September 11, 2001, the international community has frozen more than $138 million owned or managed by terrorism suspects.

THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

Having declared its intention to launch an immediate offensive against both the individuals responsible for

the 9/11 terrorist strikes and the countries that harbored them, the Bush administration wasted no time in initiating a war against Afghanistan.

Addressing a Joint Session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush had already identified a group of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, as responsible for the plane hijackings that culminated in the 9/11 attacks. The president had also told Congress that al-Qaeda was based in Afghanistan, a country ravaged by decades of civil war and controlled at the time by a fundamentalist Islamic regime known as the Taliban.

The Afghan government was asked in stark terms to surrender bin Laden and his associates. Faced with a Taliban refusal, the Unites States and its ally, Great Britain, began a bombing campaign over Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. Closely collaborating on the ground with the anti-Taliban resistance, the Allied troops soon captured all of Afghanistan's major cities. The Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, along with Osama bin Laden, managed to disappear, and they have yet to be captured.

THE INVASION OF IRAQ

Afghanistan was not the only large-scale open conflict in the war on terrorism. Less than three years after the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, the United States and Great Britain invaded Iraq. Like Afghanistan, Iraq had been at the center of worldwide attention for decades. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had long been accused of numerous infringements of international law, war crimes against its neighbors Iran and Kuwait, oppression of his own citizens, and illicit development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To this long roster, the Bush administration also added the *terrorist* designation despite considerable debate over the purported connection between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein.

Having announced in September 2002 the adoption of the doctrine of preemption—which would allow the United States to strike at enemies who pose an immediate threat to the United States but have not yet acted on that threat—President Bush received authorization from Congress to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to dismantle his weapons-of-mass-destruction programs. On March 19, 2003, despite significant international and domestic opposition, American and British forces invaded Iraq.

After three weeks of fighting, Saddam Hussein's regime was toppled and the allied forces began what was to become a protracted, costly occupation of Iraq. Saddam Hussein was captured in mid-December of 2003. Despite the high-profile arrest, the fighting continued in Iraq, with a daily toll of both Iraqi and allied lives. United States and international investigators failed to find any WMD.

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

International cooperation in the war on terrorism has been extremely fragmented. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, President Bush told the countries of the world that they had to make a decision—they were either with us, or against us. Bush insisted that the war on terrorism was the world community's fight against the enemies of civilization.

Many of the countries that rallied behind the U.S. cause after 9/11, however, had since then expressed profound disagreements with the Bush administration's handling of the campaign to annihilate terrorist groups around the world. Most notably, many traditional U.S. allies—such as France and India—opposed the war in Iraq. The United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan declared the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq illegal and counter to the UN Charter.

Other international actors, however, pledged various kinds of assistance to the United States and its "coalition of the willing." Australia, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands, as well as around 35 other nations, supported the invasion of Iraq.

TAKING IT GLOBAL

Afghanistan and Iraq have so far been the only two countries attacked under the banner of the war on terrorism. Clashes between U.S. troops (or their allies) and groups accused of terrorist activity have nevertheless taken place around the globe. Dozens of governments received what was, in some cases, unexpected help in prosecuting decades-long regional conflicts against rebel groups.

In April 2002, for example, the United States inaugurated a 20-month, $64 million plan aimed at helping the country of Georgia fight insurgents, and more than 100 U.S. soldiers are currently providing training to Georgian forces. In the Philippines, more than 1,500 U.S. troops are actively assisting the local military in its campaign against the Abu Sayyaf group—an

Islamic fundamentalist militia thought to have ties with al-Qaeda. Iran and North Korea, two of the three countries identified by President Bush in 2002 as being part of an "axis of evil," are coming under much pressure to give up their WMD programs. Pakistan, one of President Bush's most important allies in the war on terrorism, has sent a considerable number of troops to its unruly Northwestern Frontier region with a mission of annihilating al-Qaeda sympathizers. Dozens of other countries are currently receiving financial, military, or intelligence help from the United States.

HIJACKING THE WAR ON TERRORISM?

The war on terrorism did not belong exclusively to the United States. Whereas various states (notably Israel) had traditionally spoke of the militia groups they fought as "terrorists," after the 9/11 attacks, a plethora of nations adopted the terminology of the war on terrorism, to the outrage of some human-rights groups.

Russia's military campaign against Chechen separatists is but one example of this development. In almost every speech delivered by a Russian official on the subject, the Chechens are labeled as terrorists and the Russian government's attempts to subdue them are presented as battles in the war on terrorism. On the other side, certain actions of the Chechen insurgents (such as the August 2004 suicide bombings that brought down two commercial airliners, and the September 2004 hostage crisis in the town of Beslan) have certainly helped the effort of Russian officials to recast the conflict within a war-on-terrorism framework. In South Asia, India's campaign against the Kashmiri militants was also infused by the war-on-terrorism vocabulary, allowing the government to present the clash as part of what President Bush called the "monumental struggle of good versus evil."

SUCCESSES AND CRITICISM

Because of the complexity of the war on terrorism and the multiple fronts on which it is fought, its successes and failures are hard to identify and quantify. The numerous participants flood the media with claims of victory on a regular basis, often in defiance of the reality on the ground. In terms of the military campaign against al-Qaeda, the Bush administration announced in 2004 that two-thirds of the group's known leaders had been apprehended or killed. In March 2003, Pakistani forces arrested Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was suspected of having put together the September 11 plan of attack.

Another high-profile success claimed by the United States was the official renunciation by Libya of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Following at least nine months of secret diplomatic talks, Libyan leader Mu'ammar Gadhafi admitted that his country had been trying to develop WMD and pledged to get rid of the WMD technology.

On the other hand, the U.S.-led war on terrorism also has received a lot of criticism because of its aggressiveness, which some countries and human-rights groups call excessive and unwarranted, and its seeming unilateralism. Steeped in controversy, the war on international terrorism is likely to continue shaping world politics for many decades to come.

—*Razvan Sibii*

See also Afghanistan, War in; Bush, George W., and National Policy; Coalition Building; Democracy, Promotion of, and Terrorism; September 11/WTC and Pentagon Attacks

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TERRORISTS, ISLAMIC

Individuals or groups who use violence in order to advance a political or cultural agenda based on their own interpretation of Muslim religious and social ideology. Islamic terrorism is not a single entity; it consists of many proponents and practitioners using violence to achieve a variety of goals. Many Islamic terrorist groups are devoted to establishing an independent Palestinian state in the Middle East. Many have pledged to destroy the state of Israel. Some seek to overthrow secular governments in the region and replace them with Islamic regimes. Others fight non-Muslim (especially Western) influence in the Middle

East, and still others pursue several or all of these goals at once. One thing these different groups share in common is a willingness to use violence—and often their own suicides—to achieve their ends.

THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

The philosophical roots of Islamic terrorism lie in the Arab nationalist and religious movements of the early 20th century. Perhaps the most influential of these was the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood were upset with reforms in the Islamic world following the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Under its reformist president Kemal Ataturk, Turkey—which had inherited the administrative and political structures of the old Ottoman Empire—became a thoroughly secular state. Ataturk abolished the position of caliph (secular leader of all Muslims) and replaced Muslim religious law with Western-style civil law.

The Muslim Brotherhood saw these moves as a betrayal of Islam to the materialist and secular ideals of the West. However, prior to the 1940s, the brotherhood confined its activities largely to political protest and organization. After World War II, the group's lack of peaceful progress led it to embrace violent action against Egypt's pro-Western government. The brotherhood also took up arms against Israel in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. In 1954, the brotherhood tried to assassinate Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. In retaliation, Nasser outlawed the group in Egypt.

Over the next 25 years, the brotherhood spread to other countries in the Middle East and carried out many terrorist acts. It particularly targeted Arab politicians who were seen as too secular or not sufficiently anti-Israeli. The group was very active in Syria until a failed 1980 attempt against the life of Syrian president Hafaz al-Assad. The incident led to an all-out government campaign that decimated the brotherhood in Syria. After the so-called Hama Massacre, the Muslim Brotherhood disappeared as a political force in the region. In the late 1980s it reinvented itself as a religious and social organization that is now seen as a relatively moderate voice in the Islamic world.

THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)

Many young Muslims heard the brotherhood's call for the restoration of what it saw as "pure" Islamic society in the Middle East. Quite a few of these founded their own organizations to pursue violent political change. In the 1970s, several of these groups came together under the banner of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The members of the PLO were united by opposition to Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands taken in previous Arab-Israeli wars. They also objected to the denial of Israeli citizenship to Palestinians living in Israel and the so-called occupied territories. The PLO denied Israel's right to exist and called for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, groups aligned with the PLO carried out hundreds of terrorist activities. Most of these bombings, shootings, kidnappings, and hijackings occurred in Israel and the Middle East, usually involving the deaths of noncombative civilians. However, the violence frequently spread to surrounding countries in Europe and Africa. In 1972, for example, eight PLO gunmen took Israeli athletes hostage at the Summer Olympic Games in Munich. A gun battle with German police and army units resulted in the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes and five of the terrorists.

During the 1990s, PLO leader Yasir Arafat announced a change in the group's policy. Arafat agreed to recognize Israel's sovereignty if Israel would begin discussions to establish a separate Palestinian state in the occupied territories. Since that time, the Israeli government has recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO runs a separate political organization within Israel, but the two sides still have not reached final agreement on the date or form of a Palestinian state. Setbacks in the process have led to several uprisings, or *intifada,* by Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas and Fatah, which are unhappy with the lack of progress.

AL-QAEDA

The late 1970s saw a shift in the nature of Islamic terrorism, which coincided with two major political events in the Middle East—the toppling of the shah of Iran in 1979 and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan later that year. The shah of Iran, a staunch ally of the United States, was installed in power as the result of a 1953 coup planned by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). His reign was marked by both an enthusiastic embrace of Western

ideas and culture, and extreme brutality toward his political opponents. By 1978, radical Islamic college students, led by the exiled cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, were leading public demonstrations against the shah. In February 1979, the protesters forced the shah to flee the country. Shortly thereafter, Khomeini and his followers established an Islamic state in Iran and immediately named the United States as the number-one enemy of Islam. The United States was, in Khomeini's phrase, "the great Satan."

While events in Iran whipped up anti-U.S. sentiment among Muslims, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan fueled general anti-Western feelings in the Middle East. Many Islamic nations saw the invasion by the officially atheist Soviet Union as yet another attempt by outside powers to force their culture onto Muslims. Among Muslim extremists, anti-U.S. rhetoric merged with anti-Soviet rhetoric in a rejection of all influences that were seen as non-Islamic or anti-Islamic.

The war in Afghanistan attracted many idealistic young Muslims who wished to drive the Soviets from the Middle East. One of these *mujahideen,* or freedom fighters, was Osama bin Laden, the son of a rich and prominent businessman in Saudi Arabia. While fighting the Soviets, bin Laden learned valuable skills and built up a network of committed and fanatical mujahideen. Much of the mujahideen's training and weaponry was supplied by the United States, which was covertly supporting the Afghan resistance against the Soviets. The combination of U.S. support and Afghan troops finally forced the Soviets to withdraw their forces in 1989. However, bin Laden was convinced that the United States was just as dangerous to Islam as the Soviet Union. He dedicated himself to ridding the Middle East of all non-Islamic influences and reestablishing the caliphate.

After the Afghan war, bin Laden used his family wealth to set up a terrorist organization called al-Qaeda ("the base") to carry out attacks on U.S. interests in the Middle East and elsewhere. Al-Qaeda was involved in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City; the 1996 attack on U.S. troops in Khobar, Saudi Arabia; the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; and the bombing of the destroyer USS *Cole* in Yemen in 2000. On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda carried out the deadliest terror attack ever on U.S. soil, flying jet airliners into the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon near Washington, DC. The attacks caused the collapse of both towers of the World Trade Center and resulted in the deaths of some 3,000 Americans.

Immediately following the September 11 attacks, the United States invaded Afghanistan, whose government was providing bases for al-Qaeda. Although many of the group's important leaders were caught and their bases in Afghanistan destroyed, bin Laden escaped and al-Qaeda survived. Since that time, al-Qaeda has claimed responsibility for a number of other deadly attacks, including a nightclub bombing in Bali in November 2002 and the bombing of commuter trains in Spain in March 2004, which killed hundreds. In the wake of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, groups affiliated with al-Qaeda have claimed responsibility for many acts of violence against U.S. troops and Iraqi citizens.

The religiously inspired terrorism characterized by al-Qaeda represents a break from the more politically motivated terrorism of the PLO. Establishing independent Arab states in the region is no longer sufficient—modern Islamic terrorists demand that those states reject Western cultural influences and impose Muslim holy law on their citizens. This attitude has alienated many Muslims who might support the group's political goals but who oppose their social agenda. Recognizing this split in Muslim public opinion forms a key part of the current war on terrorism. Western nations are trying to convince average Muslims that the negative image of the West painted by al-Qaeda is incorrect. In this way, they hope to reduce the flow of new recruits attracted by the terrorists' message. At the same time, the United States has committed to combating Islamic terrorists with every weapon at its disposal, including the use of military force.

See also Afghan Wars; Al-Khobar, Attack on U.S. Troops at (1996); Al-Qaeda; Bali, Terrorist Bombing in; Bin Laden, Osama; Iranian Hostage Crisis; Iraq War of 2003; Middle East and U.S. Policy; Moussaoui, Zacarias; September 11/WTC and Pentagon Attacks; Taliban; Terrorism, U.S. (Domestic); Terrorism, War on International; USS *Cole* Bombing

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TET OFFENSIVE

Attack staged by North Vietnamese forces, beginning in the early hours of January 31, 1968, during the Vietnam War. The Tet Offensive consisted of simultaneous attacks by 85,000 troops under the direction of the North Vietnamese government. The attack was carried out against five major South Vietnamese cities, dozens of military installations, and over 150 towns and villages throughout South Vietnam. The offensive derives its name from the Vietnamese New Year holiday—Tet—during which the attacks occurred.

In the fall of 1967, the communist Vietcong decided to gamble upon a course of action that would ideally break the stalemate between the United States and North Vietnam. This course of action consisted of a series of widespread and repeated attacks on South Vietnam. For the North Vietnamese government, the best result would be a galvanizing of discontent in the South that would, in turn, enforce the collapse of America's ally, the government and army of South Vietnamese leader Nguyen Van Thieu. The least optimistic result would be convincing the United States that it could not win the war. Many Americans did believe this by the third day of the Tet Offensive attacks.

The Tet Offensive has been seen by many as the turning point in the war. By February of 1968, the U.S. death toll in Vietnam had risen to more than 500 per week. As the death toll rose, U.S. public support declined. Much of the American public viewed the Tet Offensive as a sign of the undying North Vietnamese aggression and will. The place of the U.S. media in fostering and furthering this belief in North Vietnamese strength during that period has been a topic of study and argument.

Whatever the impetus, the American public grew increasingly vehement in its opposition to the continued presence of U.S. solders in Vietnam, and the gulf between what the military saw as the most effective means of fighting the war became even larger from the inevitably politically driven administration.

On March 10, 1968, the *New York Times* ran a story under the headline "Westmoreland Requests 206,000 More Men, Stirring Debate in Administration." This request galvanized the public and convinced them that, rather than a Vietnamization of the conflict, America's involvement was increasing at the cost of American lives in the face of an unfaltering and seemingly unbeatable enemy.

The military, however, unlike the American public, had grown more optimistic following the Tet Offensive. They saw a successful rebuke of the enemies' attacks and an undeniable weakening of communist forces and strength, for the communist forces had suffered heavy casualties. General William C. Westmoreland viewed the post-Tet situation as an opportunity for an American offensive and expansion of the conflict on the ground, to further debilitate the enemy and deny any future resurgence. He renewed a former request for more troops, with the encouragement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, General Earle Wheeler. His request was initially denied, however—President Johnson did not desire any expansion of the ground war.

Increasingly vocal antagonism against any escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam put greater pressure on the Johnson administration and the U.S. Congress. In mid-March, 139 members of the House of Representatives sponsored a resolution asking for congressional review of U.S. policy in Vietnam. Secretary of State Dean Rusk was called before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and questioned for 11 hours. On March 22, President Johnson decided upon only a small increase of troops. At the same time, the president announced that General Westmoreland would be returning to the United States in midsummer to become chief of staff of the army.

See also Vietnam War (1954–1975)

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THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE

Deployment of nuclear and conventional missiles for the purpose of maintaining security in a specific region, or *theater*. The purpose of theater missile defense is to protect allies from local threats in their region or to address specific security issues and enable credibility in addressing particular threats. Theater missile defense addresses specific defense concerns, which may be unique and vary from region to region.

Theater missile defense primarily refers to defensive, antiballistic missile systems, such as the United

States's Patriot missile. Systems such as the Patriot are designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles before they can strike their intended targets. During the Gulf War of 1991, the Patriot was employed for theater missile defense in Israel and Saudi Arabia to counter the threat of Iraqi SCUD missiles. Although initial assessments suggested that Patriot missiles were highly effective, later analyses cast doubt on the number of incoming Iraqi missiles actually destroyed by Patriots.

Another important feature of theater missile defense is that it may decrease the likelihood of global nuclear war. A premise of theater missile defense is that limited, winnable nuclear war is possible, and appropriate strategies to account for such an outcome must be devised. The focus of disarmament talks throughout the cold War was primarily intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Ballistic and intermediate ballistic missiles were the weapons of theater defense. These weapons did not differ in terms of their destructive power but rather in terms of their range and, thus, their strategic applicability.

Aside from ballistic missiles positioned on allied territory, another important element of theater strategy was tactical nuclear weapons, which are design for attacking nuclear forces in close quarters. Theater nuclear weapons do not have intercontinental range and may consist of long-range to battlefield nuclear weapons, such as land mines, bombs, and artillery shells. This aspect of theater missile defense in Western Europe was of great concern throughout the Cold War because the United States recognized the vast superiority of Soviet ground forces. The only way of meeting a Soviet conventional threat, it was argued, would be to resort to nuclear weapons. The question, however, was whether or not nuclear conflict could realistically be contained.

The issues of theater missile defense and fighting a limited nuclear war influenced both U.S. and Soviet defense policy throughout the Cold War period. The Soviet Union prepared for the possibility of nuclear war by investing in nuclear-proof bunkers for civilians and the maintenance of emergency food stores. Early in the Cold War, U.S. defense policy with regard to nuclear weapons was premised on the idea that fighting and winning a nuclear war was possible. That stance changed in the early 1960s with the recognition of mutually assured destruction (MAD).

Aside from the construction of private bomb shelters, the United States made no preparations to defend the civilian population from a nuclear war. The U.S. government preferred to imply that they had no first-strike intentions, accepting that a counterattack would easily decimate the civilian population. Another feature of this strategy was targeting Russian population centers rather than military targets. This also made sense, primarily in terms of a counterstrike, rather than a first strike, because it assumed that aiming at military targets would be futile if the missiles were already launched.

A noted disadvantage of theater missile defense is that it requires the placement of nuclear weapons on foreign, allied soil. This placement makes the weapons a highly visible target for antinuclear protestors in countries where sentiment is much more negative toward nuclear weaponry (this was particularly true in Europe). Another element of this antinuclear sentiment was that many Germans, in both East and West Germany, considered their country as a likely ground zero in the event of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. A commonly predicted scenario was that an attempt to fight a limited nuclear war in Europe, beginning in Germany, would escalate into global nuclear war.

With the end of the Cold War, the center of theater defense has shifted from Western Europe to northeast Asia. This shift is particularly evident as concerns over a potentially hostile North Korean military presence continue to escalate.

See also National Missile Defense; Nuclear Deterrence; Nuclear Weapons; Patriot Missile; Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Strategy

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THINK TANKS

Nonprofit research organizations engaging in public policy analysis, research, and often advocating solutions. The term *think tanks* describes a wide range of organizations established to assess the validity and utility of the ideas that form the basis for policy. In

addition to evaluating ideas, think tanks often develop new concepts upon which future policies might be based.

Some think tanks are strictly nonpartisan, researching policy issues without regard to the political implications of their final analysis. Others view their main purpose as providing intellectual support to politicians or parties. Think tanks—more properly, public-policy research organizations—are ubiquitous in U.S. political life, and many occupy the same sphere of activity as interest groups, media consultants, spin doctors, and political parties.

The term *think tank* first was used during World War II and was applied to a secure room or environment where defense scientists and military planners could meet and confer over strategy. Today, the term is used to cover more than 2,000 U.S.-based organizations that engage in policy analysis and development—as well as at least 2,500 similar institutions worldwide.

Largely the consequence of efforts by leading philanthropists and intellectuals, the first major wave of think tanks in the United States began to emerge at the beginning of the 20th century. These initial enterprises were foreign-policy institutes where scholars and private-sector elites could meet, conduct research, and debate issues. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (established in 1910 by Pittsburgh steel baron Andrew Carnegie), the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (created by President Herbert Hoover in 1919), and the Council on Foreign Relations (established in 1921) became the leading forums for the exchange of ideas and debate on international subjects in the early 20th century. Later to appear were the Brookings Institution, established in 1927, and the American Enterprise Institute, established in 1943.

Today, with the intensity of the competitive political debate, think tanks have come under as much censure as praise. According to journalist Tom Brazaitis, writing in the *Cleveland Plain Dealer,* modern think tanks are "political idea factories where donations can be as big as the donor's checkbook and are seldom publicized." Another critic has observed that "Think tanks are like universities minus the students and minus the systems of peer review and other mechanisms that academia uses to promote diversity of thought. Real academics are expected to conduct their research first and draw their conclusions second, but this process is often reversed at most policy-driven think tanks."

However, not all assessments of think tanks are negative. Andrew Rich, a political scientist who has studied think tanks, says that they "remain a principal source of information and expertise for policy makers and journalists. . . . Their studies and reports are regularly relied upon to guide and/or bolster members of Congress in their legislative efforts."

THREAT ADVISORY LEVELS

A color-coded indicator of the likelihood of a forthcoming terrorist attack on the United States or its citizens and interests abroad. Introduced by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the threat advisory levels function both to alert U.S. citizens to the possibility of attack and to direct federal and state agencies to take enhanced security precautions. The threat advisory level is set by the president of the United States on the advice of the secretary of homeland security.

There are five threat advisory levels: green (low risk of attack), blue (guarded risk of attack), yellow (elevated risk of attack), orange (high risk of attack), and red (severe risk of attack). Each threat level ostensibly adds an additional layer of security and subsumes all of the extra precautions taken at lower threat levels. The Homeland Security Advisory System specifies what precautions should be taken at each threat level.

During a blue condition, federal agencies check communications with designated emergency response and command locations and review emergency response procedures. When the threat advisory is yellow, law-enforcement agencies increase their surveillance of critical locations and coordinate emergency plans with other state and local personnel. During an orange alert, federal agencies take additional precautions at public events and restrict access to threatened facilities. With a red alert, the federal government increases personnel and resource levels to address critical emergency needs, mobilizes specially trained teams, and closes affected public and government facilities.

Critics of the threat advisory system maintain that its five incremental levels hold little practical utility, in that neither the green (low) level nor the blue (guarded) level will ever likely be set. Supporters of the threat advisory system, however, argue that it has been a highly effective tool for raising public awareness at critical moments and for helping governments make opportune policy and resource decisions.

See also Homeland Security; Homeland Security Act (2002); Threat Assessment

THREAT ASSESSMENT

Efforts to identify the precursors of violence through a studied analysis of a perceived or real danger and then initiating an intervention process to stop violent acts before they erupt. Threat assessments are tools that can be useful in any relevant context. However, in the realm of international relations and geopolitics, the concept essentially refers to a situation in which studied and tactical responses are needed to counter threats posed by an individual, group, or country to harm the citizens or territory of another country. The nature of threats may emanate from an armed invasion, a nuclear threat, other weapons of mass destruction (including chemical and biological weapons), and, more recently, terrorism, which may use one or a combination of weapons and other nonconventional methods to attack its chosen targets.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Traditionally, the application of threat-assessment methodology has been more focused on individual systems and has been used primarily by law-enforcement and anticrime branches of government. However, with the onset of globalization, the spread of multidimensional dynamic systems, and the changing nature of domestic and international security threats, an expanded definition of threat-assessment methodology was required to address the new complexities. In this transitional phase, it is recognized that these threat assessments are part of a distinct and ongoing process; to identify new and changing threats effectively, continuous data gathering and analysis (intelligence) are required.

During the Cold War era, the geostrategic and political environment necessitated threat assessments on numerous occasions. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 could well be considered among one of the most notable of these moments, when the United States was brought to the brink of a potential nuclear war because of a real threat posed by the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba. However, the threat-assessment approach was not very well developed at that time, particularly in national defense and security ranks and institutions. During the past two decades, however, and particularly in the 1990s, this has changed with the unpredictable threat of terrorism across the globe, which has brought unparalleled international attention to the problem.

TERRORISM AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM

In recent decades, terrorism has struck hard with a new and changing face. The United States has been among the main victims of terrorist attacks, many of which have taken place beyond the territorial boundaries of the nation.

In the past two decades, the United States has suffered the single largest number of terrorist attacks, along with concomitant loss of life and damage to national assets. The targets have included symbols and institutions that represent U.S. power or presence in some way across the globe.

The nature of such attacks is always uncertain, ranging from food poisoning in Oregon, to a truck bomb in Oklahoma, to suicide airline hijackings in New York and Washington, DC, to anthrax-laced letters in the District of Columbia.

In fighting terrorism, or any other threat, some of the questions that arise are: How credible and serious is the threat? To what extent does the threatening source appear to have the resources, intent, and motivation to carry out the threat? Determining the credibility and seriousness of the threat is complicated by the increasingly diffuse nature of attacks. For example, potential adversaries are more likely to strike vulnerable civilian or military targets in nontraditional ways in order to avoid direct confrontation with military forces, or to coerce governments to take some action that they desire, thus winning a symbolic or actual victory.

In terms of the resources available to carry out such acts, terrorists have become more viable today because of porous borders, rapid technological change, greater information flow, and the destructive power of weapons now within the reach of states, groups, and individuals who seek to use them in nondesirable ways. The most difficult elements to measure, however, are intent and motivation, because perpetrators of terrorism are driven by nontangible and immeasurable elements, such as religious fundamentalism or anti-American sentiment caused by past historical events and economic deprivation.

RISK-MANAGEMENT APPROACH

In an effort to combat terrorism, and taking into account the unique nature of the threat posed by it, some U.S. government and intelligence groups and individuals have promoted the adoption of the risk-management

approach as an important element in developing national-security strategy. This approach is advocated as a complement to other military and nonmilitary options to fight the danger.

The risk-management approach is a systematic process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and the relative importance of assets, in order to better support key decisions linking resources with prioritized efforts for results. The other two components of an effective risk-management approach include a vulnerability assessment and an assessment of criticality (relative importance).

In the context of this approach, a threat assessment is a decision-support tool that helps to establish and prioritize security-program requirements, planning, and resource allocations. In practical terms, this definition of threat assessment implies that intelligence and law-enforcement agencies assess the foreign and domestic terrorist threats to the United States and prioritize them accordingly. The U.S. intelligence community, which includes, among others, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, monitors the foreign-origin terrorist threats to the United States. The FBI gathers information and assesses the threat posed by domestic sources of terrorism.

OTHER APPLICABLE AREAS

Several federal government organizations, as well as companies in the private sector, apply some formal threat-assessment process in their programs, or such assessments have been recommended for implementation. For example, the Department of Defense (DoD) uses threat assessments for its antiterrorism program designed to protect military installations. It evaluates threats on the basis of several factors, including a terrorist group's intentions, capabilities, and past activities.

Similarly, the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports reported that threat assessments would assist seaports in preparing for terrorist threats. Additionally, a leading multinational oil company attempts to identify threats in order to decide how to manage risk in a cost-effective manner. Due to the fact that the company operates overseas, its facilities and operations are exposed to a multitude of threats, including terrorism, political instability, and religious or tribal conflict.

Some individuals and groups who have examined threat assessments in detail argue that, although they are key decision support tools, they might not adequately capture emerging threats posed by terrorist groups. The rationale is that it is practically impossible to identify every threat or acquire complete information even about the threats one is aware of, let alone potential threats. They suggest the adoption of a more holistic risk-management approach that incorporates the two additional assessments of vulnerability and criticality, which can provide a better assurance of preparedness for terrorist and other attacks in general. Regardless, it is becoming clear that, because the United States and the world continue to face increasing danger from terrorism and other such threats, threat assessments will be a necessity, not just an option.

—Divya Gupta

See also Counterthreat; Threat Advisory Levels

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THUCYDIDES

Ancient Greek historian whose main work, *The History of the Peloponnesian War,* was meant to provide future generations with valuable lessons on the causes and dynamics of all violent conflicts. His extraordinary insight into the historical implications of a single, albeit prolonged, armed dispute, as well as his scholarly impartiality, set Thucydides apart even from such illustrious predecessors as the Greek historian Herodotus.

Thucydides was born in the ancient city of Athens around the year 460 BCE to a wealthy, aristocratic family. At that time, Athens was the center of a flourishing empire, kept under tight control with the help of an impressive military force hardly matched by any of the other powers in the region. Around the year 431 BCE, however, these powers rallied around the rival city-state of Sparta. The war that subsequently broke out between the two city-states and their allies—the Peloponnesian War—raged on and off for more than 25 years. The conflict eventually came to an end with the capitulation of Athens.

HIS LIFE

At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides was in his 20s, possibly already serving in the Athenian army as an infantryman, or hoplite. In 424 BCE, while in his 30s, he was elected general and shared the command of military operations in Thrace, a region northeast of Athens. Unable to deliver the important city of Amphipolis from the hands of a Spartan army, Thucydides was exiled from Athens.

For the next 19 years, Thucydides lived in Thrace, spending much of his time traveling in the Peloponnesian region (southwest of Athens). Thanks to his aristocratic roots and his status as an Athenian exile, Thucydides was able to speak to many of the war's major participants, who provided him with precious information for his history of the conflict. Thucydides was permitted to return to Athens in 404 BCE, at the end of the war, but he returned to Thrace soon after. He spent the rest of his life working on his account of the Peloponnesian War. He died around 401 BCE, possibly by violent means.

THE HISTORY

Thucydides died before he could complete *The History of the Peloponnesian War,* which ends abruptly in the middle of a sentence. The author begins his work by explaining his belief that this particular war is "more worthy of relation than any that had preceded it" (even greater than the Trojan War), mainly due to the high state of military development that both Athens and Sparta enjoyed at the time. Thucydides then lays out the principles on which he sees fit to undertake the writing of his *History.*

According to Thucydides, his aim is to produce a truthful account of the war, avoiding the temptation to blend historical events with myths and legends. In doing so, the Greek historian introduces a term on which all realist theories of international relations have since been founded—the *balance of power.* Thucydides was the first historian to work with the assumption that the rise of a powerful state will, by necessity, be accompanied by constant attempts from other states to arrest that development. Because of the exceptional scholarly rigorousness of his work and the introduction of concepts that are now considered to be political-science fundamentals, many consider Thucydides to be the true father of modern historians.

See also Balance of Power

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TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILES

Land-attack cruise missiles launched from ships or submarines. The BGM-109 Tomahawk flies at low altitudes to strike fixed targets, such as communication and air-defense sites, in high-threat environments and in all weather conditions. The Tomahawk eludes radar detection because of its small cross section and low-altitude operation. A turbofan engine propels the missile after launch, emitting little heat, which makes infrared detection difficult, as well.

Once it reaches land, the Tomahawk uses inertial and terrain-contour-matching (TERCOM) radar guidance. A map is stored on the missile's computer, and the system continually compares the map with the actual terrain to locate its position relative to the target. Similarly, the target is identified from a stored image. As the TERCOM scans the landscape, the Tomahawk missile is capable of twisting and turning like a radar-evading fighter plane, skimming the landscape at an altitude of only 100 to 300 feet.

The Tomahawk is a long-range, highly survivable, unmanned attack weapon capable of pinpoint (nearly 92%) accuracy. During the opening salvos of a regional attack, military planning calls for sea-based Tomahawks to be used to compromise and suppress enemy air operations and defenses. The 20-foot-long missile has a range of about 700 miles. Manufactured by Hughes Missile Systems at an average unit cost of $1.4 million, Tomahawk missiles traveling at 550 mph are capable of carrying conventional, cluster, and nuclear payloads.

Ships and submarines have different weapons-control systems for launching the Tomahawks. A vertical launch system is used on ships, whereas attack submarines can launch the system horizontally by using torpedo tubes or from external launchers attached to the hull.

The first combat test of the Tomahawk system occurred in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm in Iraq. In the war, about 280 Tomahawks were used to destroy hardened targets, such as Iraqi surface to air

The launching of a Tomahawk cruise missile from the USS *Florida* in the Gulf of Mexico in January 2002. The launch was part of Giant Shadow, a Naval Sea Systems Command/Naval Submarine Forces experiment of potential future submarine force capabilities. The event was a milestone in the history of the submarine force—the first time that a Tomahawk missile had been launched from a missile tube of an SSBN class (ballistic missile) submarine.

Source: U.S. Navy.

missile sites, command and control centers, and electrical power facilities; the missiles also are credited with destroying the Iraqi presidential palace.

Operation Desert Storm saw the first coordinated Tomahawk and manned-aircraft strike in history. Since then, Tomahawks have been used extensively in Iraq (January and June 1993), Bosnia (1995), Operation Desert Strike against Libya (1996), Afghanistan (2002), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003).

See also Missiles; Operation Desert Storm (1991)

TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION

Resolution that authorized President Lyndon B. Johnson to use whatever force he deemed necessary in Vietnam. This Tonkin Gulf Resolution passed the U.S. Senate on August 10, 1964, with only two dissenting votes.

The Tonkin Gulf Resolution stated that communist Vietnamese naval units had violated the UN Charter and international law by attacking U.S. naval vessels lawfully present in international waters on August 1, 1964. North Vietnamese torpedo boats had attacked the *Maddox,* a U.S. destroyer, in the Gulf of Tonkin on that date. The *Maddox* and another ship reported that they were under attack again three days later. This second attack was incorrect, however, for the sailors misread sonar and radar equipment malfunctioning in heavy seas.

Notwithstanding any possible errors or misjudgments, President Johnson presented the attack to the U.S. Congress as impetus for passing the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Two days of debate followed, with ultimate passage of the resolution. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution was ultimately repealed by Congress on January 2, 1971.

The purpose of the joint resolution was to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution depicted the attacks in the Tonkin Gulf as a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the communist regime in North Vietnam was waging against its neighbors. It emphasized that the United States did not contain any territorial, military, or political ambitions in Southeast Asia, but that it desired only that the Vietnamese people should be left in peace to work out their own destinies.

The Tonkin Gulf Resolution granted President Johnson, as commander in chief, the power to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against U.S. forces and to prevent further aggression.

See also Johnson, Lyndon B., and National Policy; Vietnam War (1954–1975)

TOTALITARIANISM

A system of government in which a leader (often a charismatic one), supported by a loyal party, dominates all aspects of an atomized society with weapons of propaganda, indoctrination, and terror. Totalitarian regimes since the mid-20th century have included Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, and the rogue state of North Korea.

TOTALITARIANISM DEFINED

Totalitarianism is not just a dictatorship or one-party rule, although it may contain aspects of each of these. What distinguishes totalitarianism from other forms of authoritarian rule is that the totalitarian society is one in which the dividing line between the government and society has disappeared. This means that the government controls—through propaganda, indoctrination, and terror—the actions and the psyches of the individuals it rules. It ordains both public and private life, and, at its pinnacle, rules them totally.

Totalitarianism is not politically defined or determined. It may occur in reactionary (rightist) or revolutionary (leftist) states. The two most famous totalitarian states—Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia—were at opposite ends of the political spectrum but quite similar in their methods of domination. Certain social conditions, rather than political ones, must be met for the implementation of a totalitarian state.

PREREQUISITES FOR TOTALITARIANISM

The totalitarian process requires huge numbers of isolated individuals. Large numbers ensure that people will feel sufficiently superfluous, will not find common interests, and will not suffer total depopulation when the liquidation of classes begins. Therefore, the first and most necessary condition for a totalitarian society is a collapse of a previously existing society of millions—usually a corrupt, hypocritical system. Its breakdown creates the *masses*—enormous numbers of people without common interests. The masses of the new classless society feel adrift, frustrated, powerless, and insecure, having lost their previous sense of identity and place in the social structure. The individual in this society feels superfluous and alone. He or she does not enjoy normal social bonds or human connections, even at the level of the family. Society as a whole becomes atomized and individualized.

The totalitarian movement (which exists before it gains total control and becomes a totalitarian state) stands in opposition to the hypocritical, stable respectability of the previous system. The movement's frank glorification of violence in the service of its ideology is both a contrast to the previous regime and fascinating in its own right. Propaganda attracts attention to the ideology and the power of the movement, ultimately providing a way for the individuals to lose themselves in something greater—something that will be of historical importance. In this context, the huge numbers of isolated individuals find structure and a sense of place in the totalitarian movement. Therefore, totalitarian movements enjoy the confidence of the masses up to the end.

FEATURES OF TOTALITARIANISM

The defining characteristic of totalitarianism is *coerced unanimity*. As totalitarianism involves total control over many aspects of life, coercion must take many forms: ideology, propaganda, indoctrination, and terror. Ideology forms the backbone of the totalitarian movement. Whether focusing on race or class or some other category, the totalitarian party is not designed to promote the interests of a group and therefore never has a specific agenda. It is intended to ponder sweeping ideological questions of importance to the ages, not to everyday life. It is often pseudoscientific, based on "laws" of humanity and human nature. Because only the future can resolve the correctness of the ideological arguments, the use of reason and logic against them becomes useless.

The ideology of totalitarianism is interpreted by a mysterious, and often charismatic, totalitarian leader. This leader is represented as infallible by the party and often speaks prophetically, describing predictable forces of human nature and political relations. To this end, the truth is often adjusted by the party to fit the declarations of the leader, leading to such practices as the rewriting of history (practiced famously by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin). Predictions made by the leader may be actively fulfilled by the party, reinforcing the leader's status. The leader can manipulate the truth and determine what is true; and the party reinforces this truth through repetition.

The totalitarian state has a single mass political party, though only a few are allowed to be full party

members (the rest are considered sympathizers). Party control means that *active unfreedom* exists—citizens are continually forced to show their support for the regime and may be punished if they do not. Control is exerted through a party monopoly over armed combat and centralized direction of the economy. It also involves a near monopoly on mass communications (the press, movies, radio).

These technologies are used by the party as means for disseminating propaganda and penetrating the minds of the citizens. Propaganda convinces those who are not sufficiently indoctrinated and those not yet properly subdued, although its primary use is for communication about the state to the outside world. The regime generally uses indoctrination and psychological domination to pacify its population once it has taken control of the government. Individual intellectual, spiritual, and artistic initiatives are actively destroyed.

Despite these psychological attacks, a few dissenters may remain within the totalitarian state. The government actively seeks out these individuals, using its communications base to discredit them. The government aggressively uses technology to infiltrate private lives—to supervise individuals' activities and, later, to organize records and reports on these individuals. With sufficient (or fabricated) evidence, the government proclaims dissenters to be enemies and then purges or eliminates them. In Stalinist Russia, for example, a common practice involved the use of *show trials* in which the guilt of the accused was already decided. The purpose of the trial was to serve as a warning to other potential dissidents.

As the list of real enemies is depleted, other scapegoats or enemies are created to maintain the totalitarian system. These enemies are often found among party members. Personnel are interchangeable and expendable, so members who pose real or imagined threats to the leader are often eliminated.

Ironically, once the population is subdued, propaganda ceases and terror (previously used but held in check) is fully unleashed. Terror is the strongest weapon of the totalitarian state. Its agents are often secret police who inspire terror because they purge enemies of the regime and innocents alike, often indiscriminately.

Terror increases exponentially because of a belief in guilt by association—family members and acquaintances of the accused become suspect. Out of fear, these associates may give (true or false) information to support the accusations, in an attempt to save themselves,

resulting in deeper isolation and greater submission to the regime. Over time, whole classes of people—such as peasants in Russia and Jews and other "undesirables" in Nazi Germany—are destroyed, with death tolls running into the tens of millions. The horror of totalitarianism lies in its complete and unremitting domination of an already pacified population.

See also Communism

TRADE AND FOREIGN AID

The relationship between U.S. foreign aid and the growth of international trade in the 20th century. America's advance as an economic and financial world power began with its entry into World War I. By the end of that conflict, the United States had wiped out its foreign debt, strengthened its currency, and become a major player in international financial markets. However, it was not until the conclusion of World War II that the United States fully emerged as the world's premier economic force.

EARLY FOREIGN AID POLICY

The foreign aid policy of the United States and its bureaucracy took form following World War II. By the end of that war, Western fears that the power vacuum of a defeated Germany and an exhausted Britain and France might be filled by an aggressive and unrestrained Soviet Union created great international tension. There was great concern not only that Soviet influence would expand into this political void, but also that a threat to democratic market-oriented economies could arise from within the emerging sociopolitical structure of Western Europe itself.

The experience of the Great Depression, and the possibility of an aggressive military agenda by the Soviet Union, created deep uneasiness among U.S. policymakers. This apprehension toward the market, during the same period in which the Soviet Union was proclaiming remarkable economic numbers with regard to industrial growth, helped propel the communist parties of Italy and France. The anxiety over such circumstances was a driving force behind U.S. foreign policy in the immediate postwar period.

With these circumstances as a backdrop, officials and organizers from various nations met at a conference

in Bretton Woods in New Hampshire. The document prepared at this conference, the Bretton Woods Agreement, created three important economic institutions: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

The conventional wisdom at the time was that the cause of the Great Depression and World War II was the decline of world trade brought about by "beggar-thy-neighbor" trade policies. This assessment became a guiding principle of political economists in the United States and its allies in the West. Western economists and U.S. policymakers reasoned that a reduction in barriers to trade and capital flows would generate a cycle of economic growth and a sustained attack on poverty, thus making communism less attractive and viable. Although the Soviet Union was invited to join in this process of institution building, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin declined to participate.

Within the economic environment created by the Bretton Woods Agreement, the policies of free trade flourished. The effort to ensure the dominance of U.S. business in the postwar era while containing the advance of communism became the main thrust of U.S. trade policy and foreign-assistance programs.

THE POSTWAR WORLD

In the initial years following World War II, Europe faced tremendous economic plight. The continent suffered not only from a lack of investment capital, but also from a massive U.S. trade surplus that raised the specter of uncontainable inflation. In order to ease these strains on the system, the United States designed and implemented the Marshall Plan to help rebuild Europe's economic infrastructure. Doing so, it was hoped, would stimulate European trade with the world as well as increase intraregional trade among European countries.

Several economic programs and commercial mechanisms were devised to promote these policy aims. The most notable was the invention and placement of counterpart funds. Under this arrangement, U.S. commodities would be delivered to the representatives of the Committee for European Economic Cooperation. These goods were then resold through normal commercial channels, and each recipient government would deposit, in local currency, the equivalent to the amounts received, in grant form, from the proceeds from these sales.

Ninety five percent of the counterpart funds could only be released with the consent of the U.S. government, which directed that the funds be used either for debt retirement or economic stimulus. Additional grants and loans to recipient aid countries enabled European managers to purchase U.S. specialty tools for emerging industries and pay for technical assistance programs for industrial specialists and farmers. The remaining 5% went for overhead costs to cover administrative, acquisition, and procurement expenses and even the cost of postage on privately contributed relief packages.

The Marshall Plan, or the European Recovery Program (ERP), as it was formally called, is commonly viewed as a great success. Between 1947 and 1951, the goal of increased European production was largely fulfilled, and foreign trade expansion, the second priority of the ERP, was also realized. However, inflation and lingering balance-of-payment difficulties undermined the hope of full internal financial stability. These economic problems were mostly due to rearmament policies resulting from the Korean War, which also led to further depletion of Western Europe's gold and silver reserves. As defense budgets expanded, so too did imports of high-cost raw materials. Inflationary pressures returned and private consumption declined, but not before the payment crisis to U.S. industry and agriculture was averted and Europe was put back on its economic feet.

USAID

Building upon the experiences of the Marshall Plan, the U.S. State Department began providing economic aid beyond Europe to third-world allies in the 1950s. In 1961, the U.S. government passed the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), which established the Agency for International Development (AID) to coordinate humanitarian assistance, business-promotion programs, and developmental and food aid.

With the intent of meeting the communist challenge in these regions, military aid programs for bolstering anticommunist regimes paralleled U.S. economic aid. The main aims of U.S. foreign trade strategy and assistance were to promote the economic interests of corporate America and keep recipient nations under the political influence of Washington.

In the 1960s, the flagship program of U.S. foreign aid was the Alliance for Progress, which supported agrarian land reform and cooperative solutions to

rural poverty through more equitable income distribution and economic and social planning in Latin American. A multilateral program, the Alliance for Progress aimed to increase per capita income in Latin American countries by 2.5% a year and gain a commitment from those nations for the promotion and spread of democratic institutions. In this effort, the United States agreed to supply or guarantee $20 billion over 10 years. As part of the assistance package in the Alliance for Progress, the United States contributed programs of military and police assistance to counter communist subversion in Latin America.

By the late 1960s, the Vietnam War had diverted attention and resources away from the Alliance for Progress, and commitments to Latin America were reduced. Most Latin American nations were unwilling to implement needed reforms, and the permanent committee created to implement the alliance was disbanded by the Organization of American States in 1973.

As opposed to the successes of the Marshall Plan, USAID programs were often viewed as a part of the problem rather than the solution. *Tied aid* policies forced a dependence on U.S. commodities, thereby eliminating any option on the part of the recipient country to source supplies from an open and competitive market. Support for free trade unions and other AID-dependent organizations inhibited the development of local, independent organizations. Finally, military aid buttressed repressive regimes and undermined the original pledge to promote and support democratic governance.

SHIFTS IN AID POLICY

The simultaneous complementary and competing forces of economic aid and counterinsurgency programs often led to failure. Such failures led the United States to reconsider and redefine its assistance programs. In the 1970s, U.S. foreign aid policy gave more weight to meeting the basic economic needs of the poor than to implementing developmental strategies. From 1976 to 1980, the administration of President Jimmy Carter stressed human-rights provisions as a way to limit the provisioning of military and police aid to repressive governments.

In the 1980s, the direction of U.S. international assistance shifted again. The experience of the worldwide recession of the 1970s catapulted Ronald Reagan into the presidency. At this time, free-trade advocates took over control of policy, not only in Washington, but also in London and at the World Bank. The emphasis in foreign aid now swung toward using aid to subsidize private-sector development and as a weapon to contain the Soviet Union.

As the strategic focus moved away from basic needs, the Reaganomic belief in the efficiency of free markets linked U.S. assistance with the structural-adjustment programs of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Under the new policies, states that received IMF loans had to follow a set of strict economic prescriptions. These prescriptions called for monetary stabilization, but at the cost of giving local governments the ability to manage their economy through monetary policy. Hence, the greatest onus for reforming the economy was placed upon the private sector.

As the world witnessed the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, many viewed the failure of communism as proof that governments were fallible and the market was not. Urged on by these events, the World Bank and the IMF blanketed the developing world with template structural adjustment programs.

As a result of these programs, local industries were subject to competition from abroad and conventional lending practices. The aims of these programs were to force the private sector to respond to market signals. Local firms, however, often were not prepared to meet the demands of global competition. Furthermore, indigenous banking systems, particularly in the transition economies of Russia and Eastern Europe, were not yet sufficiently organized to deal with the pace and turbulence of global financial markets.

CRITIQUING THE SYSTEM

Some observers have argued forcefully that capital market liberalization does not always yield the desired fruits. The ceaseless movement of financial capital, demands for tight credit controls, and requirements that local industry be exposed to free-trade policies and foreign competition from exports have all too often contributed to unemployment and poverty in many underdeveloped areas of the world.

As a result of such measures, many economies that received large financial-assistance packages have suffered harshly rather than prospered. In many third-world countries, the situation has developed into what has been described as a debt trap. Experts estimate, for example, that as much as 50% of government

revenues in some nations go toward paying off the national debt. In some cases, this represents one-fifth to one-quarter of export earnings to a national budget.

Compounding any current debate on the role and application of foreign aid are the difficulties wrought by religious fundamentalism, global terrorism, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, and the U.S. deficit. Additionally, rapid economic globalization is overwhelming the structures of many national states.

The financial pressures of national security and parity of the dollar relative to other currency blocs may force the United States to redefine foreign aid within the context of trade once again. Faced with these challenges, the role of the United States as the premiere economic power in the world may undergo reassessment and change. The impact upon future foreign aid policy and international trade relations is thus yet to be determined.

—*Jack A. Jarmon*

See also Alliance for Progress; Foreign Aid; International Monetary Fund (IMF); Marshall Plan; World Bank

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TRADE LIBERALIZATION

The decrease in trade barriers between countries, including reductions in quotas, tariffs, and nontariff barriers. Reductions such as these are designed to increase trade between nations and encourage economic interconnectedness.

Trade liberalization policies have contributed significantly to increases in international trade; average quotas and tariffs on foreign goods have been reduced from 40% prior to World War II to less than 4% currently. And while overall global output has increased over five times since the end of World War II, total world exports are now nearly 15 times greater than they were in 1950. This indicates a staggering growth in international trade relative to overall economic output.

INSTITUTIONS DEDICATED TO TRADE LIBERALIZATION

The modern era of global trade liberalization can be traced to the post–World War II period. The most notable step toward liberalizing trade during this period was the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). GATT, which was created in 1947 and maintained offices in Geneva, Switzerland, was committed to systematically reducing barriers to international trade. Over a period of nearly five decades, it conducted eight rounds of multilateral negotiations to reduce trade barriers among member states.

The final round of GATT negotiations, the Uruguay Round (1986–93) resulted in the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO was designed to carry on the work of GATT but had expanded goals that included not just reducing barriers to trade, but fostering global competition. The WTO also promotes the liberalization of trade by serving as a dispute settler for member nations. Additional tasks of the WTO include providing assistance to developing nations as they prepare to enter the global trade arena. The WTO, also based in Geneva, currently has 146 members, with more than a dozen additional states seeking membership.

Domestically, one of the most important institutions committed to trade liberalization is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA went into effect in 1994 and links the United States, Canada, and Mexico into a free trade zone. Both President Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush have attempted to increase the reach of NAFTA to include much of the rest of Latin America, but protests, both within the United States and from several Latin American governments, have delayed any significant progress on this initiative.

THE THEORY BEHIND TRADE LIBERALIZATION

Liberal trade policies are supported by a belief that a free market system of international trade is best equipped to provide for global economic growth. Proponents of trade liberalization suggest that by

removing barriers to trade, states can more efficiently use the resources they have (capital, labor, and so forth) and purchase additional goods and services from other nations at competitive prices. Other arguments made by supporters of liberal trade policies include the potential for decreased international conflict as national economies become more tightly linked. Finally, supporters of trade liberalization often cite the effects of trade liberalization on income; the WTO estimates that aggregate global income may have increased by as much as $519 billion as a result of the Uruguay Round talks.

ISSUES IN TRADE LIBERALIZATION

Trade liberalization is currently a highly controversial topic, as evidenced by the recent protests against the WTO in Seattle, Montreal, and Geneva. Some of the most contentious topics include the differing effects of trade liberalization on the Northern Hemisphere versus the Southern Hemisphere, lingering protectionism among many states, and an ongoing debate between the merits of free trade versus fair trade.

Despite the impressive growth of the global economy often cited by the WTO, there is ample evidence that this economic growth is occurring disproportionately in favor of nations in the Northern Hemisphere. Income disparity between the North and the South has risen precipitously (doubling from a 30 to 1 disparity in 1960, to a 60 to 1 disparity in 1990), suggesting that the economic gains from trade have not been distributed equally among nations in the North and those in the South.

Although many developing countries (particularly in Latin America and Africa) have attempted to liberalize their trade policies and shift economic resources to export-driven activities, heavy debt loads and chronic trade deficits have prevented the realization of many of the purported benefits of trade liberalization. The North/South issue thus remains a fiercely contested topic in discussions of trade liberalization, and many southern countries are working to get a stronger voice in the WTO in an attempt to modify some of the trade liberalization policies supported by the WTO.

Another concern about trade liberalization is that even in this era of free trade, protectionism lingers. Even countries in the North, traditionally the strongest proponents of trade liberalization, have at times resorted to protectionist measures, particularly in agriculture. Subsidies for domestic agriculture, as well as health and quality concerns over imported agricultural products, have contributed to many protectionist measures within the United States, Japan, and Europe. The hypocrisy of these protectionist measures is felt particularly strongly by developing nations, which resent the rhetoric of trade liberalization combined with the practice of certain protectionist policies among those in the North.

Although trade liberalization has guided policy-makers for more than 50 years, there are increasing voices in support of fair trade. Supporters of fair trade are concerned about the discrepancies in labor standards, worker rights, and environmental standards between states. Fair trade supporters advocate for a global harmonization of minimum standards for worker rights and environmental protection and are critical of the competitive advantage that many developing nations get through exploiting their workers and/or the environment.

Despite the recent controversy over trade liberalization, it seems that liberal trade policies continue to be supported and advanced by many world leaders. Liberal trade polices, though at times contradicted by instances of protectionism in both the North and South, continue to dominate the arena of international trade. The WTO currently oversees more than 90% of the world's trade, and it is actively working to increase free trade among nations across the globe.

See also Free Trade; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); World Trade Organization (WTO)

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TRADE WARS

Situation in which countries attempt to protect their own industries and agriculture through mechanisms such as tariffs or subsidies. These actions spark similar retaliation from other countries.

Countries often attempt to protect their industries from cheaper imports or to obtain an advantage in exports to other countries. Subsidies that give an edge in global competition, (such as farm subsidies in the

United States) or the imposition of stiff tariffs on imports from other countries (such as steel tariffs imposed by the United States in 2002) are common mechanisms for gaining such an advantage.

Sometimes it is not clear whether other countries are acting in a protectionist manner, such as when the European Union banned beef from cattle reared using growth hormones in 1999, arguing that such beef was not safe for consumption. In that case, however, the United States, which was the primary country injured by the ban on cattle imports, was allowed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) to impose sanctions on European countries. Such protectionist measures tend to benefit more developed countries and hurt the ability of developing nations to compete in the global economy. However, due to the tendency of other countries to retaliate in response to protectionist measures, often no one truly benefits.

THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO)

The World Trade Organization (WTO), headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, and established by the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994, is the primary regulator of trade disputes in the world. The WTO oversees a huge number of agreements defining the rules of trade between its member states. The WTO replaced several previous attempts at international trade regulation and agreement, such as the International Trade Organization (ITO) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATT). As of December 2004, there were 148 members of the WTO. All WTO members are required to grant one another most-favored-nation status, such that (with some exceptions) trade concessions granted by a WTO member to another country must be granted to all WTO members.

The WTO is a one-vote, one-country organization, which means that the very smallest and poorest countries theoretically have the same influence over trade policies as the largest and most powerful countries. In reality, however, most decisions of the WTO are made by consensus rather than by a vote. The advantage of consensus is that it encourages efforts to find the most widely acceptable solutions. The main disadvantages include the large time requirements and the many rounds of negotiation needed to develop a consensus decision, and the tendency for final agreements

to use ambiguous language on contentious points, making future interpretation of treaties more difficult.

At the heart of the WTO, and most relevant to the issue of trade wars, is its Dispute Resolution Body (DRB). When a member nation feels that it has a cause of action against another member, it may request that a Dispute Settlement Panel (DSP) be established. Panels are required to complete their hearings and present their report within six months, absent extenuating circumstances. Panel reports may be appealed by the countries involved.

The WTO has faced controversy from the very beginning of its existence. It took four months to seat the first director-general, Reanto Ruggiero, primarily because of U.S. fears that an Italian would favor Europe. It took many more months to install the necessary bureaucracy and to implement more than 24,000 pages of agreements that form the framework of the WTO.

In the late 1990s, the WTO became a focus of protests by the antiglobalization movement, which exploded into the public consciousness during the WTO meetings in Seattle, Washington, in 1999. More recently, trade talks collapsed in Cancún, Mexico, in 2003, due to the refusal of some developing countries, led by India, China, and Brazil, to accept proposed decisions unless the European Union and the United States eliminated their agricultural subsidies.

WORLD TRADE BLOCS

Countries have attempted to forge trade links with neighboring countries and to deny access to competing nations. These free-trade zones and trade blocs are one of the major issues currently facing the world trading system. Debate exists as to whether they will lead to increased protectionism, or to the promotion of trade liberalization. The following are some of the major trade blocs in existence.

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) links the United States, Canada, and Mexico in a free-trade zone. The agreement covers environment and labor issues, as well as trade and investment. U.S. unions and environmental groups have argued that these safeguards are too weak.

The United States hopes to expand the agreement to the rest of Latin America by forming the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005. However, key countries such as Brazil are skeptical of its benefits. The United States has signed separate free-trade agreements with Chile and with some Central American countries.

The European Union (EU)

The European Union (EU) is now the most powerful trading bloc in the world, with a gross domestic product (GDP) nearly as large as that of the United States. The EU has found it difficult to shed its protectionist past in the area of agricultural imports, but it plans to implement a major reform of its Common Agricultural Policy in January 2005. The creation of the euro as a common currency for EU members has led to even closer economic links for many of the countries in the European Union.

The Cairns Group

Named after the Australian town where the first meeting took place, the Cairns group is made up of agricultural exporting nations. It was formed in 1986 for the purpose of lobbying in world trade talks to free up trade in agricultural products. As highly efficient agricultural producers, the countries in the Cairns group are interested in ensuring that their products are not excluded from markets in Europe and Asia. In addition to Australia, leading member nations of the group include Canada, Brazil, and Argentina.

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC)

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperative Forum (APEC) is a loose confederation of countries bordering the Pacific Ocean that have agreed to facilitate free trade. The 21 members, which account for 45% of the world's trade, include China, Russia, the United States, Japan, Australia, and a number of other smaller countries in Asia and the Pacific region.

See also Bretton Woods Conference; Development, Third-World; Free Trade; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Trade Liberalization

TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT, 1917
See EXECUTIVE ORDERS

TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

Threats to national security that do not originate in nor are confined to a single country. A 2000 study by the RAND Corporation identified four particularly serious transnational threats to U.S. security: terrorism, organized international crime, the spread of radical Islamic politics, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The emergence of transnational threats is a consequence of rapid advances in transportation and telecommunications during the late 20th century. Jet airliners have reduced dramatically the time and effort needed to travel over great distances. Cellular telephones, e-mail, and the Internet have made it much easier for large groups of individuals to communicate across long distances. The ease of travel and communication in the modern world facilitates the ability of criminals and terrorists to operate on a global basis.

Terrorism offers a good example of how modern technological advances have turned a once-local problem into one of international dimensions. Politically motivated violence was not unknown prior to the late 20th century, but it typically took the form of assassinations or attacks on local targets. The groups involved— such as the Serbian Black Hand organization—were usually confined to a single country or geographical area and operated independently of one another. Although they posed a problem for local authorities, such groups rarely spread far from their source or joined forces with other terrorist organizations.

In more recent times, however, terrorist groups from different nations and regions have become much more interconnected. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) coordinated the activities of nearly a dozen terrorist groups from across the Middle East and North Africa. Since the 1990s, the al-Qaeda international terrorist network has spawned cells that operate in dozens of countries and have carried out many terrorist attacks around the world. Al-Qaeda leaders communicate to their followers via e-mail and the Internet, and through

smuggled audiotapes and videotapes. They also use computers to transfer funds from secure bank accounts to operatives worldwide. Before the advent of computers and digital technology, such coordination and global organization were difficult, if not impossible.

The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union contributed significantly to the increasing number of transnational threats. The Soviet collapse created a host of newly independent nations from the former Soviet republics and led to the emergence of free, more democratic governments throughout Eastern Europe. However, it also stripped away the state-supported Soviet economic system that protected the businesses of these nations from outside competition. Freedom was accompanied by economic depression, as uncompetitive state-owned businesses either were shut down or privatized and dramatically reduced in size.

The post-Soviet economic crisis created an atmosphere in which organized crime flourished. The Russian mafia, virtually unknown in the West before the fall of the Soviet Union, quickly became a scourge of European and U.S. law-enforcement agencies. Since the late 1990s, the Russian mob has dealt heavily in crimes such as computer and financial fraud, human trafficking, and murder for hire on a global scale. The Russian mafia is also suspected of having ties with Middle Eastern terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, which flourished in heavily Muslim former Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia after the Soviet collapse.

Economic uncertainty in the wake of the Soviet collapse also raised the possibility that unemployed scientists might seek to earn cash by selling chemical, biological, or nuclear secrets to terrorists or rogue states. With most state-funded research canceled or severely curtailed, scientists in many former Soviet republics were forced into poverty. Some sought to raise money by offering their expertise to groups or states that wished to acquire WMD. In many former republics, the materials used in the construction of nuclear weapons were poorly guarded and monitored. Parts of the stockpiles of nuclear materials in these nations remain unaccounted for.

In the United States, the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism is responsible for coordinating the nation's efforts to counter and respond to transnational threats. This official consults with various federal law-enforcement and security agencies to form policies with regard to computer security, protection of critical infrastructure assets, counterterrorism, continuity of government operations, international organized crime, and emergency preparedness against the use of WMD. The Department of Homeland Security also tackles many of these same issues.

The revolution in computer and communications technology shows little signs of slowing, which means that transnational threats are likely to grow in significance in the foreseeable future. Effectively combating these threats will require a high level of international cooperation, especially the sharing of information between countries that can help track terrorists and organized-crime groups. The same technology that made transnational threats possible will be integral to protecting against them.

See also Al-Qaeda; Asymmetric Warfare; Globalization and National Security; Nuclear Proliferation; Organized Crime; Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and National Security; Terrorism, Islamic; Terrorism, War on International

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TRANSPORTATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY
See BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (TRANSCOM), U.S.
See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, U.S. (DOD)

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

A U.S. agency, created following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, that is charged with developing policies

to ensure the safety of U.S. air traffic and other forms of traffic. The mission of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is to protect the transportation systems of the United States, while ensuring freedom of movement for people and commerce. Airport security and preventing aircraft hijacking are important concerns of the TSA.

The public face of the Transportation Security Administration is seen in the form of uniformed screeners at airports as part of airport security. Screeners examine both passengers, through a rigorous screening process including X-rays, and luggage, through larger screening machines. Screeners and some of their administrative procedures, including the list of banned items (which has included items such as fingernail clippers and knitting needles), have been subject to criticism. Overall, Americans and other foreign travelers have accepted increased security measures, as expressed by the TSA, as part of the post-9/11 world.

The TSA is also concerned with threats—such as shoulder-fired missiles—at and around airports and the profiling or screening of passengers, sometimes using computers and information technologies. The policies and actions of the Transportation Security Administration have been and will continue to be subject to executive, legislative, and judicial scrutiny.

See also Homeland Security

TREASON

Attempting to overthrow the government to which one owes his or her allegiance or assisting that government's enemies. The history of treason is populated by numerous infamous names, including Benedict Arnold, Guy Fawkes, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, and John Walker Lindh.

The history of the crime of treason is a long one. As early as 1350, the English Statute of Treason distinguished between two forms of treason—petty and high. Petty treason was the murder of one's lawful superior, including when a wife killed her husband or a servant killed his master. High treason, on the other hand, dealt with acts that were serious threats to the stability or continuity of the state. It included attempts to kill the king, the act of counterfeiting coins, or waging war against the state. In the 18th century, high treason was further defined as encompassing or imagining the death of the ruler, violating the ruler's companion or heir, levying war against the ruler, and adhering to the ruler's enemies. The punishment for high treason in England, up until 1998, was death.

In the United States, the crime of treason is spelled out in the Constitution. Article III of the Constitution defines treason as levying war against the United States or giving aid and comfort to its enemies. Possible penalties for treason under U.S. law include five or more years in prison, a fine of $10,000 or more, preclusion from holding any public office, and death.

There have been approximately 40 federal prosecutions for treason in the history of the United States and even fewer convictions. Several people were convicted of treason as a result of the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794; they were all pardoned by President George Washington. Perhaps the most noted trial for treason was that of Aaron Burr in 1807. The former vice president was charged with treason on the grounds that he was planning to set up a new nation between Mexico and the area west of the Appalachians. Burr was acquitted due to the lack of the required two witnesses.

The most controversial 20th-century case of treason may have been the case of the Rosenbergs. A husband and wife, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were convicted in 1951 of conspiring to steal U.S. atomic secrets for the Soviet Union. Although a great deal of debate surrounded their trial and shocking execution, the charge was confirmed years later, at least concerning Julius, by declassified Soviet secret transmissions.

Treason laws are also found in the statues of states. Florida, for example, defines treason as levying war against the state, adhering to its enemies, or giving them aid and comfort. There have been only two convictions for treason at the state level in the United States. Thomas Dorr, leader of a rebellion in Rhode Island in 1842, was tried and convicted of treason against the state. The radical abolitionist John Brown was tried and convicted of treason in Virginia as a result of his raid on a government arsenal in Harpers Ferry, Virginia, in 1859.

The most recent cases of treason have been related to wars, including the U.S. war against Afghanistan in 2001. During Operation Enduring Freedom, while fighting for the Taliban, U.S. citizen John Walker Lindh was captured by U.S. forces and became the subject of a great media blitz. Brought to trial, but not on charges of treason, Lindh eventually pled guilty to lesser charges and is currently serving time in prison in California.

See also Lindh, John Walker

TREATIES

Formal agreements, embodied in a document and binding under international law, between two or more nations in reference to peace, alliance, commerce, territorial agreements, and the like. In the field of foreign affairs, the power of the president under the U.S. Constitution to negotiate and sign treaties is second only to his power as commander in chief. A treaty is negotiated by the president and/or his plenipotentiaries and requires approval by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate before the president may sign the treaty into law.

PRESIDENTIAL POWER

Article II, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution provides the president with the authority to make treaties, with the consent of the Senate. It was by no means clear at the outset of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, however, that the treaty power would come to be vested jointly in the president and the Senate. Under the Articles of Confederation, the power to make treaties had been vested in the legislature, and the Virginia Plan seemed to indicate that all powers vested in the Congress under the articles should inhere in the legislature under the new constitution.

Alexander Hamilton appears to have been the first person to suggest, in mid-June 1787, that the treaty power should be held jointly by the legislative and executive branches. As late as early August of that year, it seemed as though the Constitutional Convention was heading toward giving the Senate the power to make treaties.

Skeptics were concerned, however, that the new Senate would be pliant to the states and liable to consummate treaties that were not in the interest of the country as a whole. Various regions also feared being sold out. Southerners worried about the future of navigation rights to the Mississippi River, and New Englanders were concerned about the future of fishing rights to the waters off Newfoundland. James Madison took the position that the president, being the only truly national figure entrusted with guarding the interests of the country, should possess the full treaty power himself.

As with so many other important issues at the Philadelphia convention, the delegates sent the treaty issue to the Committee on Postponed Matters. The committee suggested the essential arrangement and language that would become part of Article II, giving the president the power to make treaties "with the Advice and Consent of the Senate," and specifying that no treaty could be approved without the assent of two-thirds of the senators.

The two-thirds supermajority, put forward as a mechanism to protect regions from having their interests surrendered by treaty, was the object of an amendment that would have required a simple majority vote to approve treaties. Other amendments sought to involve the House of Representatives in the treaty process and to apply the two-thirds supermajority only to treaties that sought to end a war.

Madison offered the lone motion seeking to change the president's role in the treaty process, urging that the Senate should be able to enact peace treaties on its own by a two-thirds vote. Madison believed that a self-interested president might stand in the way of a peace treaty, to maintain his prominence in wartime. But the convention dispatched with his argument quickly when it became clear that Congress could end any war by refusing to fund it.

As the first president, George Washington had to define for posterity what exactly "advice and consent" meant with respect to the treaty process. While negotiating a treaty with the Creek Indians early in his presidency, Washington sought consultation with the Senate. Washington's request, contained in a letter that Vice President John Adams read to the Senate, caught the chamber off guard. When the Senate finally worked through its confusion and responded to the query, an angry Washington found the reply completely inadequate.

In truth, part of the blame was Washington's for having surprised the Senate and expecting a reply too quickly. Nonetheless, Washington thereafter took "advice and consent" to mean that the Senate would simply approve or deny a treaty that the president submitted to it once his administration had finished negotiating it. The precedent stuck, although presidents from time to time have unofficially solicited the opinions and concerns of individual senators on negotiations pertaining to particular treaties and even involved them in the negotiation process. The norm is for ambassadors and diplomats to negotiate a treaty at the president's direction, although he sometimes dispatches diplomatic special agents—chosen by the president alone, without Senate confirmation—on important diplomatic missions abroad.

ROLE OF THE SENATE

Before concluding debate on a treaty and voting on it, the Senate may amend a treaty's text, thus altering its content and necessitating additional diplomacy between the United States and the foreign nation or nations in question. Additionally, the Senate can affix to a treaty reservations that clarify the Senate's understanding of its terms and provisions.

An example of the attachment of reservations occurred with the Panama Canal treaties of 1977–1978, which obligated the United States to turn over the Panama Canal to Panama. President Jimmy Carter had to accept two crucial reservations that the Senate attached to the two treaties. The first reservation reaffirmed the right of the United States to use military force to keep the canal open; the second stated explicitly that the United States did not intend to interfere in Panama's sovereignty. The former reservation was necessary to secure the votes of hawkish senators, whereas the latter was calculated to calm the Panamanian people. Over the course of U.S. history, the Senate has made changes to approximately 15% of the treaties it ultimately approved.

Because a supermajority is required for Senate approval of treaties, the president must be mindful of the idiosyncratic demands of individual senators and also reach out to members of the other party. Senators, keenly aware of their chamber's reputation as the world's greatest deliberative body, tend to have robust egos, a national rather than local orientation, and considerable expertise on foreign policy matters. A certain senator thus may be determined that a treaty reflect his or her personal priorities on its subject matter. In the case of the Panama Canal treaties, President Carter's acquiescence to the reservation concerning the right of the United States to use military force was driven by the concerns of Senator Dennis De Concini, a democrat from Arizona.

Rarely in recent decades has the president's party had a decisive majority in the Senate, and frequently his party has been in the minority. This means that Senate approval of a treaty must be anchored in bipartisan support, which requires the president to bargain for the votes of individual senators, much as he often does on domestic legislation. For example, as World War II drew to a close, President Franklin D. Roosevelt went to great lengths to secure support from senators of both parties for the United Nations. President Woodrow Wilson's complete alienation of Republican senators during his quest to secure U.S. membership in the League of Nations a generation earlier loomed large in Roosevelt's thinking.

Presidents have stirred controversy by attempting to reinterpret the language of treaties in a manner contradictory to the Senate's prior understanding of their meaning. From the Senate's point of view, such a presidential action is little more than an attempt to go around the Senate by amending the treaty in question without the Senate's assent. In 1985, for example, the administration of President Ronald Reagan announced that it had decided to reinterpret the language of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the Soviet Union to allow the United States to go forward with research and development on President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). However, the interpretation of the Senate at the time of the ABM treaty's ratification, and of the three subsequent administrations, was that the treaty forbade development of a space-based antimissile system.

After a protracted struggle with the Senate over the meaning of some of the ABM treaty's crucial terms, the Reagan administration finally tailored its SDI research to conform to the original interpretation of the treaty's language. President George W. Bush finally withdrew the United States from the ABM treaty in 2002, after Russian Premier Vladimir Putin seemed to accept Bush's argument that a space-based antimissile system would not represent a danger to Russia.

The Constitution is silent on the subject of how a treaty may be terminated, but this issue was resolved in the case of *Goldwater v. Carter* (1979). In 1978, President Jimmy Carter moved to establish full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, a policy change that required him to sever the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China (Taiwan). Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona contended that the Senate had to approve the termination of treaties, and he filed suit in federal court. Ultimately, the Supreme Court let stand a lower federal court decision against Senator Goldwater, thereby setting the precedent that the president can unilaterally abrogate a treaty.

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

By custom and practice, presidents have come to possess the universally acknowledged power to accomplish certain diplomatic objectives through the use of executive agreements rather than treaties. An executive

agreement amounts to a handshake agreement between the president and a foreign leader, committing each of them to take specified reciprocal actions. The president's authority to make executive agreements emanates from his powers as commander in chief and chief diplomat, the vesting of executive power in the presidency, existing laws and treaties, and Supreme Court decisions. In *U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation* (1936), the Court memorably referred to the president as the nation's "sole organ" in the routine conduct of foreign policy.

Importantly, executive agreements do not require Senate approval. Because the Constitution does not mention executive agreements, there is no formal demarcation between subject matter that should be handled by treaty and that which should be handled by executive agreement. The decision is up to the president, who is expected to be mindful of the Senate's insistence that core foreign-policy concerns require its imprimatur, and also of the fact that a treaty carries greater legitimacy in domestic and international opinion than an executive agreement.

President Carter's decision to handle the return of the Panama Canal via two treaties was driven by both the subject matter's direct relationship to U.S. national security and also Carter's need to share political responsibility with the Senate for such a controversial policy adjustment. Many executive agreements require subsequent legislation or appropriations to carry them out, and this fact may caution presidents further against attempting to accomplish through executive agreements what would more properly be done through treaties.

Some of the most significant diplomatic actions in U.S. history have been carried out by executive agreement rather than treaty. During the period of the modern presidency, Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1940 exchange of 50 U.S. destroyers for 99-year leases on British bases in the Western Hemisphere stands out as an executive agreement of exceptional importance.

Executive agreements have steadily become much more common than treaties over the past century and a half. By the late 1800s, presidents were concluding more executive agreements than treaties. This imbalance grew in the early decades of the 20th century and skyrocketed during the era of the modern presidency. Between 1939 and 1989, more than 11,500 executive agreements were concluded, compared with just over 700 treaties. However, this ratio of executive agreements to treaties has declined slightly during the presidencies

of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, due mainly to the large number of trade treaties engineered by the former and the decline in foreign-policy multilateralism of the latter. It is too soon, though, to conclude that the larger historical trend has changed fundamentally.

As executive agreements came to be the preferred diplomatic instrument of modern presidents, the potential for misusing them to commit the power of the United States became a real possibility. By the 1970s, the Senate often spent time ratifying treaties dealing with such secondary concerns as international archaeological preservation, aviation, and radio regulation, while presidents concluded secret executive agreements pledging the United Sates to the sharing of intelligence and the use of military force. In the Case-Zablocki Act of 1972, Congress required the president to notify the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee of all executive agreements within 60 days. In 1977, Congress reiterated its will on this matter, passing legislation requiring the president to inform Congress of any written or oral agreement that could be construed as a formal commitment by the United States.

The greater post-Vietnam scrutiny of executive agreements has not been matched by a significantly greater hesitancy to ratify treaties. Between 1953 and 1989, fewer than 6% of treaties submitted by the president to the Senate were not ratified. Interestingly, when Senate approval is in serious doubt, a president is more likely to withdraw a treaty from consideration at the last moment than let it go down to defeat. For instance, during the same time period, 1953–89, presidents withdrew 17 treaties from consideration by the Senate, whereas the Senate flatly rejected only 2.

Some scholars contend that the required two-thirds majority for Senate approval of treaties is unrealistically high and that it drives presidents to circumvent the Senate by conducting as much of their foreign policy as possible through executive agreements. Experts who take this view argue that a simple majority, which is the metric required in many other countries for approval of treaties, would be much more realistic in an age in which divided party control of government is the norm. Other authorities, citing the Case-Zablocki Act and Congress's general post-Vietnam determination to carefully scrutinize the president's handling of all aspects of foreign policy, believe that the two-thirds threshold should stand. Given the difficulty of amending the Constitution, the prospect of changing the treaty process seems improbable. What

is certain in the age of U.S. hegemony, however, is that U.S. presidents will continue to face intricate questions about whether and how to make treaties and secure the support of the Senate for them.

—*Douglas M. Brattebo*

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TRIAD

A three-sided military-force structure consisting of land-launched nuclear missiles, nuclear missile submarines, and strategic aircraft with nuclear bombs and missiles. The triad was a central element in the U.S. military strategy during the Cold War. The theory underlying the triad was that by having its nuclear assets spread across various weapons platforms, the force was more likely to survive an attack by the Soviet Union and be able to respond to a first strike successfully.

Following the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union entered into the Cold War, a period of increased political, economic, and military tensions. Both sides engaged in a military rivalry, in which initially, the United States sought to balance its nuclear supremacy against the conventional superiority of Soviet troop strength. Later, the Soviet Union acquired nuclear technology—atomic and then thermonuclear weapons. An arms race ensued, and both sides eventually possessed extensive arsenals of nuclear missiles, bombs, and rockets.

The development of political and military strategy in that era included each nation's concern with surviving a first strike by the other. In order to ensure that sufficient nuclear forces survived to conduct a second strike, both the United States and, to a lesser degree, the Soviet Union spread their resources across various weapons platforms. These platforms included rocket-launched nuclear missiles, submarine-launched nuclear missiles, and strategic aircraft with nuclear bombs or nuclear missiles.

For example, the land component of the triad included intercontinental ballistic missiles ranging from the Atlas to Titan to Minuteman, and later, the Peacemaker missile; all were multistage rockets capable of carrying one or more nuclear weapons and guided by highly developed inertial guidance systems. With a range of 8,000 km, these missiles posed a formidable threat to an enemy. The sea component of the triad included older nuclear submarines, as well as more modern Trident submarines carrying sea-launched missiles such as Poseidon C-3s and Trident C-4s. The air component of the triad included bombers such as the old, but still flying, B-52s and newer B-1B bombers, equipped with eight or more nuclear bombs.

The triad still exists as a component of U.S. military strategy, but with reduced nuclear arsenals and inventories. Recent decisions to develop the so-called Star Wars technology, and later a National Missile Defense, will undoubtedly affect the continued reliance on the Triad.

See also Missiles

TRIP WIRE

National Security Strategy (NSS) concept that is analogous to the actions of a land mine. A wire can extend from a land mine and serve as the means to detonate or trigger the explosive in the mine. For instance, in Vietnam, soldiers would employ Claymore land mines along guerrilla trails. If an enemy soldier went down the trail, not paying too much attention, he could trip the wire and cause the mine to go off, killing himself and other members of his unit. In national-security strategy, different things can serve as a trip wire in some form of military action.

During the Cold War, for example, various outposts were considered trip wires for the use of force. In Berlin, Germany, the U.S. stationed an army brigade. Its primary purpose was to serve as a trip wire, setting off war in Germany if the Soviet Union took any sort of action. Likewise, the deployment of the Second Infantry Division to the northern part of South Korea continues to serve as a trip wire. If North Korea crosses the demilitarized zone and engages the Second Division in combat, that action will cause the deployment and employment of additional U.S. and allied military units to the Korean peninsula.

Another trip wire has been the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, a deployed early-warning system that tracks missiles or aircraft entering U.S. and Canadian airspace. If any missiles cross that DEW trip wire, a response would occur, including launching U.S. missiles.

Even in the post–Cold War world, the concept of a trip wire is still employed. During the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, the establishment of safe zones in the country served as a trip wire for military action by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). When Bosnian forces entered those safe zones, NATO launched air strikes against them. It is likely the trip-wire concept will continue to be employed at different levels—strategic, operational, and tactical—in the future and in future conflicts.

See also Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line

TRUMAN DOCTRINE

Cold War position articulated by U.S. President Harry Truman pledging support to countries fighting communism to contain communist expansion. In 1944, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin made a so-called percentages agreement, in which they traded British and Soviet influences in the Balkan and Mediterranean countries. This agreement essentially resulted in the recognition of Romania as part of the Eastern bloc and Greece as part of the West. The British thus retained their traditional influence in Greece, considered the cradle of Western civilization. The British foreign minister had declared this influence crucial to the defense of British mandates in the Middle East and the protection of the British Empire. As a result, the British participated in the Greek civil war, maintaining an active presence until forced to withdraw.

The internal war in Greece had been raging periodically since 1941 among monarchist, republican, and communist factions. The first two rounds of fighting saw little intervention from third parties. In the third round of the civil war, however, the British fought with the republicans against the communists, who were both fighting the monarchists. As the war progressed, the communist-backed Greek Democratic Army (GDA) gained much popular support, control of much of the country, and the wherewithal to proclaim

a rival government in 1947. The British, however, could do nothing to prevent the GDA's progress. Extensive domestic fiscal woes had forced them to relinquish their control in the region in late 1946, and they called upon the United States to take their place.

Up to that point, the United States had expressed little interest in the Greek conflict, providing minimal amounts of aid. However, new fears of communist expansion and Cold War politics caused the United States to reassess its position. Notably, the Soviets had sent a letter to nearby Turkey in August 1946, in which they offered to share control and defense of the Turkish Straits. This indirect threat to Turkey's security would have threatened U.S. strategic and economic interests.

Furthermore, the *domino theory,* supported by Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson suggested that a communist takeover in Greece could contaminate neighboring countries in the Middle East and North Africa. It was thus feared that a communist Greece and other Soviet satellites in the region could encircle Turkey and bring it into the Soviet camp. The United States recognized the vital security concerns in the region and felt a need to act decisively.

On March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman gave the speech that elucidated a policy that became known as the Truman Doctrine. In his speech, Truman announced that it was the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. The Soviet Union was not mentioned explicitly, but the speech was clearly directed at it.

Truman's speech painted a black-and-white world that pitted democratic freedom against oppressive totalitarianism. The potential conflict was described in ideological language rather than security terminology. The rhetoric Truman used had multiple purposes: to convince a fiscally conservative Republican Congress to support the proposed aid package; to arouse U.S. popular support for cold warfare; and to express a clear doctrine of containment of communism.

Truman called directly for aid for Greece and Turkey—seen as actively battling communist pressures, internally and externally—in the form of food, money, and military support. The majority of hundreds of millions of dollars in aid, in both cases, went to military support. The United States helped modernize the Turkish army, navy, and air force. It took firm control in Greece and advocated a no-compromise solution to the war, supporting the government's call for unconditional

surrender. The U.S. involvement in Greece ultimately prolonged and changed the course of the war. It did, however, help to contain the conflict to Greece, so that it did not spread throughout the region.

The United States helped the embattled Greek government roll back the communist insurgency that was supposedly taking direction from Moscow. The movement, however, was not Soviet supported. Ironically, Stalin continued to abide by his agreement with Churchill and actually succeeded in stemming communist Yugoslavia's aid to the Greek rebels. The Soviet Union did not provide a significant amount of aid until after the Truman Doctrine was issued, and then for only six months. Regarding the doctrine as mere propaganda, Stalin did not react strongly to it.

The verdicts on the purposes of the Truman Doctrine are varied. With some justification, it has been described as aggressive containment of a belligerent enemy (the Soviet Union, after all, had installed numerous puppet governments in neighboring Eastern European countries). It also has been seen as justification for hegemonic direct intervention in the politics of other nations (when the United States intervened, the government required State Department approval to conduct its foreign policy and make important decisions).

The Truman Doctrine has also been regarded as an attempt to reestablish a balance of power in Europe and ensure Western European security. Often, it is portrayed as protection of genuine national-security interests. A communist success might, over time, have leaned toward Moscow for support, and a Stalinist-style regime would have threatened U.S. trade and security throughout the eastern Mediterranean region.

The Truman Doctrine—the security-based complement to the Marshall Plan in democratic Western Europe—had far-reaching impacts. It served as justification for Cold War warfare in any region of the world. Moreover, it justified a new U.S. tradition of intervention (outside the Western Hemisphere) when the nation felt that its interests were at stake, ultimately providing the basis for intervention in Korea. The doctrine also changed the face of governance in Greece, turning back the tide of communist successes. The Truman Doctrine also provided an ideological base for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and helped promote the admission of Greece and Turkey into that alliance.

See also Communism and National Security; Doctrine; Marshall Plan; Truman, Harry S., and National Policy

TRUMAN, HARRY S., AND NATIONAL POLICY

Thirty-third president of the United States (1945–1953), who faced the initial challenges of the emerging Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. During his administration, President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) strove to strengthen war-torn Europe, bolster the United States as the defender of the noncommunist world, contain communism, halt the spread of Soviet influence in Europe and Asia, and maintain a superior nuclear arsenal. The unifying theme of Truman's foreign and national security policies was the conviction that the free world must be protected from the Soviet Union and its goal of global domination.

SHAPING THE POSTWAR WORLD

Shortly after the death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in April 1945, Vice President Truman was sworn in as president, a month before the end of World War II in Europe. Having served only 82 days as vice president, Truman took office with negligible experience in foreign affairs. He had not been privy to any of the policy-making relating to the conduct of the war, and he had been excluded from most foreign-policy meetings. Realizing the extent of his handicap, Truman relied on his advisers, particularly the secretary of state, James F. Byrnes; ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman; and Roosevelt's close assistant, Harry Hopkins.

At the Potsdam Conference in Germany in July 1945, with the war in the Pacific still raging, Truman met with Allied leaders Winston Churchill of Great Britain and Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union. At the conference, the three Allied leaders agreed on the future of a dismantled, disarmed Germany. However, they came into conflict when the issue turned to carving out the lands each would occupy after the war—regions that soon would become their nations' spheres of influence. Truman was adamant that the United States would occupy Japan without Soviet interference, and the Soviets made it clear that they wanted dominion over Eastern Europe.

While Truman was at Potsdam, the United States tested the world's first atomic bomb in New Mexico, in preparation for using two bombs to attack Japan during the last days of the war. The success of the atomic bomb test inspired Truman to envision the

United States as the future guardian of all nuclear arms. However, his faith in U.S. supremacy in nuclear weaponry fell apart when the Soviet Union tested its own atomic bomb in 1949. This event persuaded Truman that the United States must maintain nuclear superiority, a conviction that contributed to the development of the nuclear arms race.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND MARSHALL PLAN

The cornerstone of Truman's national-security policy was set in place on March 12, 1947, in a speech that outlined the so-called Truman Doctrine. The event inspiring the speech was a civil war in Greece, in which procommunist rebels sought to overtake the repressive right-wing Greek government. With little money and an inadequate military, the Greek government was sure to be overthrown.

Truman and his advisers became convinced that if Greece fell to the rebels, a Soviet-backed communist government would take over. The president thus beseeched Congress for $400 million in economic and military aid for Greece, framing the civil war as a global battle between free (noncommunist) nations and totalitarian (communist) nations. He maintained that if Greece fell to communist rule, then Turkey and the Middle East were in danger, and possibly Europe and the rest of the free world, as well.

In 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall pushed for an economic recovery and reconstruction plan for Europe. Known as the Marshall Plan, the project was supported by Truman's belief that Europe must be strengthened to prevent communism and Soviet aggression from gaining a foothold. The Soviet Union insisted that the Marshall Plan was a ruse for the U.S. to control Europe. The Soviets then planned their countermoves accordingly.

Crisis in Berlin

In June 1948, the Soviet Union formed a blockade encircling the city of Berlin, preventing food and other supplies from entering West Berlin. The United States and Great Britain responded by organizing the Berlin airlift, shipping supplies via military aircraft to West Berlin in 1948–1949. In April 1949, the U.S. Senate approved U.S. membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in hopes that a strong European military alliance would bolster war-weakened

Europe and prevent the likelihood of Soviet incursions. Truman also wanted to encourage Western Europe to be strongly pro-U.S. in the Cold War.

The successful operation of the Berlin Airlift caused the Soviets to lift the blockade in May 1949. The outcome of the Berlin crisis reinforced the balance of power in Europe, with the Soviet Union in control of Eastern Europe and East Germany, and the United States and its allies protecting Western Europe from Soviet aggression.

Communist China

When Chinese communist revolutionary Mao Zedong ousted nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek's forces in 1949 and formed the People's Republic of China, Truman refused to recognize the new nation, thus opening the door for the communist Chinese to consider aligning themselves with the Soviet Union. The situation destabilized Asia.

The Soviet Union's entry into the league of nuclear nations and the rise of communism in China, both occurring in 1949, caused Truman in early 1950 to order the National Security Council (NSC) to overhaul the nation's national security policy. With the strong support of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the new policy document, entitled NSC-68, urged an immediate, dramatic increase in all U.S. military spending, including for nuclear arms. NSC-68 held that the United States must prepare itself to counter the steps the Soviet Union was taking to dominate the world, including the United States. In addition to building a superior military and nuclear arsenal, NSC-68's recommendations called for a campaign to galvanize Americans to support an expansion of the military.

Korea

Several months later, on June 25, 1950, Kim Il Sung, the leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), attacked the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Truman responded by immediately engaging U.S. air and naval forces. With the support of the U.S. Congress and the United Nations, U.S. ground troops landed in South Korea.

Truman was adamant that the United States must intervene in Korea to prevent the fall of South Korea to the communist North. Believing that the Soviets intended to control a united communist Korea, Truman

was determined that the United States must prevent the Soviets from gaining more territory in Asia. If they succeeded, Truman believed, the Middle East would be the next region to succumb to communism, perhaps followed by Europe. The president agreed with General Douglas MacArthur and his advisers that U.S. troops must not only save South Korea but must also oust the communists from North Korea.

As U.S. forces pressed into North Korea toward the Chinese border, Mao Zedong retaliated by ordering Chinese troops to assist the North Koreans in the fall of 1950. The communists pushed U.S. forces south of the 38th parallel into South Korea. The Korean War arrived at a point of stalemate, with neither side gaining an advantage. Negotiations began, but there was little progress on the Korean front during the rest of Truman's administration.

Truman concluded his presidency in 1952 having achieved an expansion of the U.S. military and nuclear arsenal, which sharply polarized the United States and the Soviet Union and accelerated the arms race. In 1952, as the next election grew closer, President Truman announced he would not seek another term

See also Arms Race; Atomic Bomb; Berlin Airlift; Korean War; Korean War, Entry Into (1950); Marshall Plan; National Security Act, 1947; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); NSC-68 (National Security Report); Potsdam Conference (1945); Truman Doctrine

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TWO-THEATER WAR

Also known as two-major-theater war (2MTW), or major regional conflicts (MRCs), a defense-planning construct used to estimate the size and composition of U.S. forces necessary for optimal military readiness at any given time. The two-theater-war concept holds that the United States should be capable of simultaneously fighting two major conflicts in different parts of the world.

During the administrations of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, the Defense Department used a two-and-one-half strategy—the ability to fight two major wars and one limited conflict simultaneously. In the 1960s, this paradigm referred to the ability to confront a Soviet attack in Europe, a Chinese attack somewhere in Asia, and a minor conflict in Cuba.

Fiscal constraints and the war in Vietnam led to a one-and-one-half concept during the 1970s. During the late 1970s and 1980s, President Jimmy Carter used the measure of multitheater war, with the Soviet Union in Europe and the Persian Gulf, and the administration of President Ronald Reagan sized U.S. forces on the basis of an all-out global war with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies (an idea known as the Illustrative Planning Scenario). The administration of President George H. W. Bush used a base-force concept built on general capabilities rather than planning based on specific scenarios.

The two-theater-war force-planning mechanism was adopted in 1993 by the administration of President Bill Clinton, and it referred to the readiness to concurrently fight a large, offensive ground war in the Persian Gulf (most likely against Iraq) and another war on the Korean peninsula (against North Korea).

Critics of the two-major-theater-war criterion cite the problem of planning as if one were "fighting the last war." They stress the changing nature of threats to U.S. national security—such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among smaller states, and an emerging China. As a result, emphasis is now usually placed on lighter, more flexible, and more mobile rapid-response forces.

The administration of President George W. Bush laid out a slightly modified two-theater-war concept in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. The requirement for the United States to be able to simultaneously fight a war in two critical areas was maintained, and U.S. forces were expected to be able to win decisively in one of those conflicts. A decisive victory is defined as including the potential for territorial occupation and regime change if necessary. Defense of the homeland, forward deterrence in four critical regions of the world (Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East and Southwest Asia), and planning for smaller-scale contingency operations forms part of the new force-sizing construct articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.

See also Quadrennial Defense Review; War Planning

Further Reading

Metz, Steven, ed. *Revising the Two MTW Force Shaping Paradigm.* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001.

TYRANNY

A form of dictatorial, one-person government characterized by injustice and lack of respect for the rights of individual citizens. Tyranny frequently arises out of dissension as another social system is either disintegrating or experiencing internal strife. The potential tyrant may be part of the existing aristocracy and may endeavor to seize control during a power struggle with his or her peers. A tyrant may also be a popular leader or demagogue who already has some support from the masses. In either case, the tyrant helps to overthrow the existing regime and replace it with one-person rule. Tyrants are not subject to checks and balances from other parts of the government and may ignore or reject a previously existing constitution. The tyrant's rule is absolute.

The tyrannical ruler recognizes that he needs a base of support and protection from enemies. He will attempt to please a segment of the population large enough to ensure that his rule will continue unchecked. To gain such support, he maintains a group of loyal and powerful supporters, whom he rewards richly but fundamentally distrusts and keeps at an appropriate distance. As the supporters are entrusted with maintaining his rule, the tyrant will choose to surround himself with powerful, wealthy nobles or military forces. His rule is not based upon a social contract or the consent of the governed; people obey because of fear of punishment.

The tyrant's rule may enjoy broad-based support despite the autocratic nature of his regime, but more often he is despotic and controls the population through propaganda, repression, or fear. He controls political speech (by preventing the formation of a popular representative body) and the media. The citizens' basic civic rights are nonexistent; their human rights are subject to abuse if they are perceived to be enemies of the regime. The tyrannical leader frequently employs a network with secret police, spies, or informers that can be used to find, intimidate, or harm would-be resisters. Moreover, the population living under tyranny is frequently impoverished. Poverty (often induced through taxation) is both a form of control and a means to pay for wars or the tyrant's own private goods.

The tyrant is at all times conscious of the fragility of his regime and uses specific tactics to keep it afloat. He frequently participates in or instigates wars, which simultaneously distract the citizens from domestic problems and keep them preoccupied and prevented from organizing against the ruler. War also ensures that the environment remains unstable and the people continue to feel a need for a leader. To these ends, tyrants may actively cultivate fear of foreign powers and fear of anarchy, leading the populace to the conclusion that tyrannical rule is better than anarchy or domination. Tyrannical rule relies on both domestic and international insecurity and the fear it creates.

U

UNABOMBER (THEODORE J. KACZYNSKI, 1942–)

Person responsible for the worst serial bombing case in U.S. history. On January 29, 1998, Theodore J. Kaczynski, then 55, pled guilty to 13 federal charges involving the bombing deaths of three people and injury of two others. Kaczynski's plea—made two years to the day after a tip by his brother led the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to Kaczynski's remote Montana cabin—ended the 18-year search for the so-called Unabomber.

Ted Kaczynski, a Harvard-trained mathematician and former professor at the University of California, Berkeley, admitted responsibility for mailing and placing 16 bombs in a string of attacks motivated by his antitechnology beliefs. The attacks began on May 26, 1978, when a security officer at Northwestern University opened a small wooden box he had found in a parking lot. The box contained a bomb and the officer narrowly avoided injury.

Other victims of the Unabomber were not as fortunate. Sacramento computer-store owner Hugh Scrutton; timber lobbyist Gilbert Murray, who also lived in Sacramento; and Thomas Mosser, a New Jersey advertising executive, all died as a result of bombs sent by the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski. A total of 29 people were injured in the bomber attacks. The identity of the bomber was a mystery for years.

In 1995, the Unabomber promised to suspend his attacks in exchange for the publication in several newspapers of his *Unabomber Manifesto*—a 35,000-word attack on technology. A man named David Kaczynski, who turned out to be the Unabomber's brother, contacted the FBI after noting similarities between the manifesto and letters he had received from his brilliant but reclusive brother. David hoped his actions would spare his brother from the death penalty. That turned out to be the case. In 1998, Ted Kaczynski—the Unabomber—received consecutive life sentences for the attacks and was fined $4.7 million to prohibit him from profiting from Unabomber movies or book deals.

See also Terrorism, U.S. (Domestic)

UNILATERALISM

Foreign-policy strategy in which a sovereign state chooses to pursue its international interests and goals strictly on its own and not in concert or consultation with other sovereign states, international organizations, or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Unilateralism is the easiest of foreign-policy options, as it requires no diplomacy, no need to build consensus, and no prerequisite of multilateral support. At the same time, however, unilateral actions often generate a backlash of international anger and accusations of illegitimacy.

The United States has been a major contributor to multilateral and bilateral efforts (for example, it was a charter member of the United Nations), yet the United States has a long history of unilateral engagement. Post–World War II examples of U.S. unilateralism abroad include the Bay of Pigs invasion (1961), the so-called Secret War in Laos (1960s), the Grenada

intervention (1983), and the Panama intervention (1989). The United States' unilateralism is also reflected in its abandonment of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, its choice not to ratify the Ottawa Landmine Treaty (1999), and its decision to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003 despite widespread international opposition.

Supporters of American unilateralism insist that the United States has the legitimate authority to take whatever actions it sees fit in the defense of its own security. They also claim that, as the world's only current superpower, the United States is obligated to promote and protect democratic regimes throughout the world. Critics of U.S. unilateralism fear that, over the long term, the United States will stray from the rules of multilaterally defined international law, weaken the strength of international institutions, favor military action, and generally raise arguments that international rules place too heavy a constraint on the freedom of the United States to act alone to protect its interests.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the administration of President George W. Bush signaled a major foreign-policy shift in stating that the United States has the right to pursue unilateral actions against terrorism when acceptable multilateral alternatives cannot be found. Critics of the so-called Bush Doctrine maintain that the need to obtain international support for military ventures constitutes a critical check on the power of individual nations. The doctrine is indicative of the struggle between the need to maintain multilateral international institutions and the desire of nations to pursue their own interests.

See also Bay of Pigs; Bilateralism; Bush Doctrine; Bush, George W., and National Policy; Grenada Intervention; Iraq War of 2003; Multilateralism; Preemption; Preemptive War Doctrine

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (USSR)

Also known as the Soviet Union; world's first communist regime and principal rival of the United States during the Cold War.

ORIGINS OF THE USSR

The USSR arose as a result of the collapse of the Russian empire, one of the longest-standing monarchies in Europe. The Romanov family had ruled Russia for centuries, but during the reign of Czar Nicholas II (1894–1917), Russia began to come apart. Economic and political troubles caused popular discontent with the czar's authoritarian rule. Although the 1906 creation of the Duma (parliament) was supposed to give the people a voice in government, real power still lay with the czar.

The outbreak of World War I in 1914 brought Russia and its allies Britain and France into conflict with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The war went badly for Russia, which suffered military defeats on the battlefield and hunger, shortages, and deep political troubles among the civilian population. The February Revolution of 1917 brought rioting in the streets and caused the shaken czar to lose control of the government. Nicholas dissolved the Duma and abdicated his throne, throwing the country into revolution.

With Nicholas gone, the Duma joined with the Petrograd Soviet (worker's council) to form a provisional government, but this was unable to provide real reform. Vladimir Lenin, leader of a radical socialist party known as the Bolsheviks, put forth a program that promised peace, food, land redistribution, and local government. As the populace grew increasingly restless for change, the Bolsheviks staged a coup, seizing power in the October Revolution of 1917. They proclaimed the founding of a new state—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—built on the foundations of the fallen Russian empire.

The Bolsheviks set about creating a communist state, abolishing the old imperial regime of classes and titles, prohibiting counterrevolutionary speech and action, and establishing state ownership of land. The workers were to be liberated and united in their common struggle, and land would be given to the poor. The bourgeois and the aristocracy who lived off the labor of others were to be eliminated. The Bolsheviks, however, were not securely in control. Turbulence continued as other groups, notably the less revolutionary Mensheviks, battled Lenin for control. In December 1917, Lenin dismissed the recently formed Constituent Assembly after a vote that did not favor the Bolsheviks, and he used the Cheka (secret police) to quash resistance to Bolshevik control. The country dissolved into a civil war that pitted the Bolshevik *Reds* against the *Whites*—social democrats, more moderate socialists, czarists, and others. The Bolsheviks, with better organization and more military support, eventually triumphed in 1920 and consolidated their control over the USSR.

From the time the Bolsheviks gained power, the Western world looked askance at the Soviet Union. The West was fearful that the communist revolution would spread from Russia to its own countries. Ideologically opposed to communism and fearful of domestic threats to their leadership, western powers including Great Britain, France, and the United States made consistent efforts to balance their power against that of the Soviet Union. On the whole, however, Soviet foreign policy was aimed at counterbalancing the West and protecting the USSR from invasion.

THE USSR BETWEEN THE WARS

Lenin, the charismatic leader of the Bolshevik movement, wasted no time in laying down the political and economic foundations of the USSR. In 1919, he helped establish the Communist International (Comintern), an organization dedicated to promoting future communist revolutions and whose policy was dictated by Moscow. Outlawing private ownership of land, Lenin forced farmers to work on large collective farms in which farmers pooled their resources and planted crops dictated by the government. He also created a centralized, planned economy that gave the state control over industry and the new collectivized farms. Lenin's policies proved to be a disaster; millions of Soviet citizens died during a famine in 1921–22 that is widely blamed on Lenin's collective-farming policies.

The Soviet Union under Lenin was governed by the Central Committee, a relatively small group of senior government officials. Lower-level officials received their orders from the committee, and both were subject to the shadow government of the Communist Party. Joseph Stalin, who became general secretary of the Central Committee in 1924, strongly influenced both it and the Communist Party. Stalin would use this appointment as a springboard to further his political career.

Lenin died in 1924 after a period of deteriorating health. Almost immediately, a battle over who would succeed Lenin flared up among Stalin, Leon Trotsky (a leading organizer of the February Revolution), and Nikolai Bukharin, a general favorite but a poor political infighter. Stalin, who was politically ruthless and brilliant at manipulation, emerged as the new leader. In the years that followed, his former rivals would be among millions of Soviets killed in Stalin's pursuit of absolute power.

Although communist rule was supposed to produce a classless society, the USSR was still marked by haves and have-nots. Stalin used these remaining class distinctions to stir up hostilities between wealthier citizens and the poorer peasants and workers. He then used the resulting social agitation to justify a campaign to purge "bourgeois" elements from Soviet society. In 1928, Stalin organized a series of show trials to eliminate political rivals by trying them on phony charges.

Despite adoption of the 1936 constitution that guaranteed civil rights and the equality of all Soviet people, concentration camps emerged in distant reaches of the country and the regime became increasingly totalitarian. From 1936 to 1938, Stalin instituted the Great Terror to rid the country of anti-Soviet elements. Millions of people were killed or sent to the camps, known as *gulags*. Many of the victims were generals and high-ranking party opponents, including Bukharin. The purge crippled many sectors of Soviet society and proved disastrous for the country's military leadership.

In his efforts to control the Soviet economy, however, Stalin failed to duplicate his mastery of political affairs. His Five-Year Plan, begun in April 1929, was intended to increase the growth of the industrial working class, spur the growth of heavy industry and the military, accelerate the collectivization of agriculture, and create a cultural revolution. The USSR industrialized rapidly in spite of the worldwide Great Depression of the 1930s, yet collectivization again proved a failure and resulted in a famine in 1933.

WORLD WAR II

Stalin was aware that external and internal enemies abounded, especially as Europe moved closer to war in the late 1930s. He also realized that the Soviet armed forces were not ready to face a rearmed Germany. He thus signed a nonaggression pact with German dictator Adolf Hitler in August of 1939. Under the agreement, the USSR agreed not to attack Germany if the Germans went to war with Great Britain and France. In return, when Germany invaded Poland the following month, it ceded the eastern portion of Poland to the USSR. Germany also agreed not to interfere with Soviet expansion in the Baltic states and Finland.

The Nazi–Soviet pact stunned the world, but both parties realized it was merely an alliance of convenience.

German Nazism and Soviet communism were ideological opposites, and each had vowed to destroy the other. Two years later, in June 1941, Hitler discarded the pact and invaded the Soviet Union. The Soviet army, purged of its most senior officers, was overwhelmed by the German invasion. Several million Soviet troops were killed or captured in the next six months. However, the German assault gradually ground to a halt due to the vastness of the Soviet Union and the brutally harsh Russian winter. German forces were stopped just 20 miles from Moscow; they would never get any closer.

The German invasion ended Soviet neutrality in World War II and thrust the Soviet Union into an uneasy grand alliance with the United States and Great Britain. Ideologically, the Western powers were just as far from the USSR as was Nazi Germany. However, Stalin and the Allies had no choice but to work together. Their survival depended upon defeating Hitler; differences between the Allies would have to be settled after the war.

By the end of 1942, German troops were again threatening Moscow and had pushed deep into the southern USSR. By winter, however, the renewed advances had stretched the German army to its limits. The Soviets staged a massive counteroffensive at Stalingrad from November 1942 to January 1943 that destroyed the entire German Sixth Army. The Battle of Stalingrad was a major turning point in the war. From that point on, the Soviet army gradually pushed the Germans back to their own borders. In April 1945 the Soviets launched the final assault on the German capital, Berlin, and on May 8 the Germans finally surrendered.

World War II was both a disaster and a tremendous opportunity for the Soviet Union. The country had suffered some 30 million deaths and millions more casualties, and the years-long fighting had destroyed much of the country's industry and agriculture. At the same time, the Soviet Union had captured all of Eastern Europe during the advance to Germany. Stalin established communist regimes in these nations, creating satellite governments that would take direction from Moscow and that would form a protective sphere of influence to protect the USSR from future invasions.

THE COLD WAR

Disagreements over political and economic doctrines, as well as practical issues such as the future of Germany and the development of the atomic bomb, estranged the USSR from its World War II allies. The next 45 years would be marked by an intense political and military rivalry between the USSR and the West (particularly the U.S.) known as the Cold War. This period was marked by *proxy wars,* in which the main opponents fought each other through conflicts involving third-party nations. At times, neither nation was directly involved in the fighting. This kind of competition was particularly common during the 1960s and 1970s in Africa, where the United States and USSR frequently supported opposing sides in civil wars. At other times, one of the superpowers fought forces backed by the other, such as in the wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan.

Stalin's death in 1953 marked a significant change in Soviet internal and external politics. The new Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, was a devoted communist who began an active campaign of de-Stalinization in the USSR. In his address to the 20th Communist Party Congress—the first since Stalin assumed power—Khrushchev promised to overcome "the cult of the individual and its consequences." Many cases of imprisonment under Stalin's rule were investigated, and thousands of innocent persons were released from the gulags.

During the early years of his tenure as first secretary, Khrushchev's policy of decentralization led to high economic growth rates in the USSR. This growth, and Cold War military competition with the United States, also fueled the Soviet space program. In October 1957, the USSR launched Sputnik, the world's first artificial satellite. The achievement stunned the West and triggered a space race between the United States and the USSR. The political rivalry between the USSR and the West was sharpened in 1955 with the signing of the Warsaw Pact, a military alliance between the USSR and its Eastern European satellites.

These successes were offset by a number of foreign-policy and domestic problems that eventually toppled Khrushchev from power. The Cold War threatened to become hot several times in his tenure, especially during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the world came close to nuclear war. Khrushchev was held accountable for the Chinese communists' decision to end their alliance with the USSR, even though relations between the two countries were poor when he took power. Added to these woes were a slowing economy in the early 1960s and highly unpopular state campaigns against religion and subversive writers.

Leonid Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev in 1964, reversed some of Khrushchev's more unpopular

reforms, and encouraged recentralization and short-term economic development. As with the policies of previous Soviet leaders, the plan failed to improve the economy but succeeded in consolidating Communist Party control of the Soviet Union. Although the economy declined, the availability of consumer goods and leisure time increased, so it appeared as if the nation was prospering. The illusion of prosperity contributed to a complacent mood in the party leadership. Those previously in power stayed in power, and party leaders grew more rigid and out of touch by the day.

In the foreign-policy arena, Brezhnev embraced a policy of détente, and relations with the West improved. He helped alleviate the arms race by signing SALT I and SALT II arms-limitation agreements with the United States. However, he made a tremendous mistake with his decision to intervene militarily in Afghanistan to support the Marxist faction that had taken power in 1978. The 1979 Soviet invasion would prove as costly to the USSR as the Vietnam War was to the United States. Unable to defeat an elusive enemy in the rugged terrain of Afghanistan, Soviet troops remained mired in stalemate for a decade. The USSR's standing in the international system was substantially damaged by its involvement, and the economic and human costs of the war were enormous.

COLLAPSE OF THE USSR

Although few realized it at the time, the mid-1980s witnessed changes that soon would spell the end of the Soviet Union. Brezhnev's death in 1984, followed by the sudden death of his successor Yuri Andropov, brought Mikhail Gorbachev to power as general secretary in 1985. Gorbachev inherited a nation mired in a bloody war that was straining an already weakened Soviet economy. His response was a risky policy based on three principles: *perestroika* (reform), *glasnost* (openness), and *demokratizatsiia* (democratization), which he hoped would bring new life to the Soviet system. One sign of the new spirit of openness was the Soviet willingness to admit (if belatedly) that a nuclear reactor at Chernobyl exploded in 1985. Under previous Soviet regimes, such an incident would have been hidden from the press and might not have been discovered for decades.

Internationally, Gorbachev made a great deal of headway, meeting with President Ronald Reagan in 1985 to discuss a way to end the arms race. Disarmament programs were initiated under Gorbachev's leadership, and the two leaders agreed to eliminate land-based intermediate- and short-range weapons, efforts that culminated in the Intermediate Range Nuclear Treaty. When popular pressure forced the resignation of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, Gorbachev refused to intervene militarily to prop them up. This decision was cemented by the breakup of the Warsaw Pact in July 1991.

Although these moves were popular outside of the Soviet Union, they alarmed Communist Party hardliners. The Emergency Committee—an eight-man group representing the interests of the party, the Soviet military, and the secret police (KGB)—attempted a coup on August 18, 1991. The organizers seized Gorbachev, who was vacationing on the Black Sea. They also tried but failed to arrest Soviet President Boris Yeltsin, who made his way to the Russian White House and took control of the government. After a tense, weeklong standoff with Soviet troops encircling the building, the coup collapsed.

Gorbachev officially resigned as head of the Communist Party but remained in office as head of state, attempting to keep the Soviet Union together. His efforts, however, were unsuccessful. In December 1991, the Soviet republics of Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia (which later became the nation Belarus) put forth the Minsk Declaration, which stated that the Soviet Union would be replaced by a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Gorbachev resigned on December 25, and the Soviet Union was officially dissolved on the last day of that year.

The USSR was replaced by 15 successor states: the Russian Federation, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, the Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Although politically independent, they share membership in the CIS, which coordinates the powers of its member states in areas of trade, finance, lawmaking, and security. Russia, the largest and most populous of the countries that arose from the USSR, remains a world power due to its massive size, abundant resources, and large (if decaying) military.

The breakup of the USSR was accompanied by a brief period of cooperation between the United States and Russia. However, hopes for a closer friendship between the two nations have been frustrated over disagreement about the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe, and an increasing turn back to authoritarianism under Russian

President Vladimir Putin. The fall of the Soviet Union removed a significant threat to U.S. national security but presented new challenges, as well.

See also Afghanistan, War in; Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); Cold War; Communism; Eastern Bloc; Glasnost; Gorbachev, Mikhail (1931–); Iron Curtain; Khrushchev, Nikita Sergayevich (1894–1971); Korean War; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Perestroika; Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy; Sputnik; Stalin, Joseph (1878–1953); Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT); Superpower; Vietnam War (1954–1975); World War I (1914–1918); World War II (1939–1945); Yalta Conference (1945); Yeltsin, Boris (1931–)

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SECRETS REVEALED

Purges and Terror

The brutal and totalitarian techniques perfected by Stalin were initially instituted under Lenin, who established the first concentration camps during his reign. Lenin approved the suspension of civil liberties for *bandits* (those rebelling against Bolshevik leadership), some of whom were shot on the spot without trial. He interned political opponents and dissidents who died by the tens of thousands. Lenin also authorized the judiciary to legalize and justify terror.

Stalin's crimes vary from Lenin's mainly in degree. Millions of people died during Lenin's leadership from purges as well as from famine, war, and disease. However, Stalin was directly responsible for orders that sent millions to death through execution or exile. From 1936 to 1938, the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs), under Stalin's direction, implemented the Great Purges. Stalin himself edited the lists of persons to be purged and arranged show trials for the accused. Branded as enemies of the people, the defendants were made into scapegoats, blamed for undermining the Soviet regime. Notoriously, some of those prosecuted were opposition leaders Zinoviev,

Kamenev, and Bukharin; much of the Red Army general staff; and regional party leadership.

The reasons given for the purges vary. Some cite Stalin's paranoia and perceptions of enemies. Others argue that the problem was systemic—in totalitarian systems, it is necessary to continually turn over the staff to prevent subordinates from becoming too powerful. Still others claim that the purges began as Stalin's attempt to eliminate political opponents but that the program eventually sought to eliminate potential opponents as well as actual ones. Whatever the reasons for them, the purges characterized the historical brutality and inhumanity of the Soviet political system.

UNITED NATIONS

Intergovernmental organization with worldwide membership established to promote international peace and security. The United Nations (UN) is a multilateral institution that helps to establish international norms of conduct and harmonious relations. It promotes national self-determination and mutual understanding and cooperation between countries.

Unlike other organizations and institutions, the United Nations is a forum in which large states and small states can connect on an equal footing. Large states gain recognition as important pillars of international peace and security and can shape policy. Small states that are interested in diplomacy but cannot afford to support embassies in every country, gain access to decision makers from other nations. Moreover, states have a forum in which to address universal issues, build coalitions, and instigate worldwide change.

HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

During World War II, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China began shaping an agreement for a postwar intergovernmental organization that would succeed the weak League of Nations. They created the major forms of the organization—its aims, structure, and framework—at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington, DC, in 1944. The new organization would help all nations resist another conflict that plunged the world into war by fostering economic, social, and diplomatic cooperation. Fifty nations completed the agreements forming the United Nations on June 26, 1945, concluding the United Nations Conference on International Organization in

San Francisco. The United Nations Charter was ratified on October 24 (now United Nations Day).

THE COLD WAR

Despite the spirit of cooperation that led to the formation of the United Nations, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated quickly after World War II. For the next 45 years, the two powers would compete for global influence politically, militarily, and economically. During this period, known as the Cold War, the United Nations was often unable to function as an effective force for peace. The permanent members of the UN Security Council—China, France, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union—frequently vetoed actions within their spheres of influence. For example, the Vietnam War was left out of UN security discussions.

Nevertheless, the United Nations did take some significant actions and began defining its scope beyond the charter. It authorized the use of international force for the first time in the Korean War, calling for UN member states to assist South Korea in repelling the North Korean invasion. The mission, conducted largely under U.S. direction, was successful and South Korea remained independent. The UN mission in Afghanistan in the late 1980s accomplished what it set out to do: negotiating a withdrawal of Soviet troops. However, it did not end the fighting between local Afghan factions, nor did it help create lasting stability in Afghanistan.

The United Nations achieved a few notable successes toward the end of the Cold War. The principle of collective security was applied successfully for the first time when a UN force helped repulse Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991, preserving Kuwait's sovereignty. The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia supervised a cease-fire in that nation, promoted stability, and helped the country reach full independence.

POST–COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS

Ironically, the United Nations has used its enforcement powers more since the end of the Cold War than it did during those years of international tension between superpowers. Since the 1990s, the United Nations has expanded the nature of its peacekeeping operations as well as its social and economic programs. The substantial commitments made to these efforts have produced mixed results.

In 1991–92, the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) and the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) helped bring peace to much of that country, supervised free and fair elections, and promoted civic participation and human rights. At the same time, it failed to realize a total cease-fire or create a reliable political infrastructure. From 1992 to 1995, the United Nations launched three major operations in Somalia to maintain a cease-fire between warring clans and deliver humanitarian aid. The country had been torn apart by civil war and the collapse of the central government, and conditions were worsened by drought. The UN, although engaged in a peacekeeping mission, became an active belligerent in the conflict. Humanitarian efforts were successful in delivering aid, but UN military forces were unable to impose a cease-fire or disarm the most powerful warlords.

Rwanda proved another problem. There had been a UN presence in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, which killed around 800,000 Tutsis, but the United Nations refused to give its military commanders in Rwanda the authority to try to stop the killings. In fact, UN troop levels were actually decreased during this time. After the slaughter ceased, the United Nations engaged in some reconstruction work and humanitarian aid.

The Bosnian intervention from 1993 to 1995 was another ambiguous endeavor. The United Nations was reluctant to intervene in a civil war set off by Bosnia's decision to seek independence from Yugoslavia. Despite reports of atrocities and ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims at the hands of Bosnian Serbs, the United Nations took no action for years. Its humanitarian efforts delivered a great deal of aid but did not always get supplies to where they were needed most. United Nations–guarded safe areas, such as Srebrenica, were not secure, and conventional peacekeeping was unsuccessful. The fighting ended only after U.S. and NATO armed forces intervened in the conflict.

Despite hopes that the United Nations could take a more active role in supporting peace in the post–Cold War atmosphere, some of its larger interventions have been ambiguously successful and largely criticized. In many cases, failures were caused by a lack of political, economic, military, and logistical support from the members. The United Nations has had, on the other hand, some important nonmilitary successes. It engaged in human-rights monitoring for the first time in Guatemala and El Salvador in the late 1990s. Election monitoring in Cambodia, South Africa, Kosovo, and East Timor likewise proved successful.

The United Nations has had a great deal of success in less political arenas, such as the promotion of women's rights, the eradication of disease, humanitarian aid, clearing land mines, protecting the environment, and other domains into which it has expanded more recently. Moreover, the United Nations continues to grow and develop, progressively expanding into new areas of international concern.

UN ORGANIZATION

The United Nations is divided into six main bodies—the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretariat, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, and the International Court of Justice. It also includes a large number of subordinate boards and organization. The organizations' structure and responsibilities are spelled out in the United Nations Charter.

The UN Charter

The charter includes several principles necessary to the functioning of the UN. It recognizes the "sovereign equality" of the members; each nation—no matter what its size, population, or power—is considered equal and autonomous. The charter also presumes that nations will attempt to use peaceful means first in settling disputes, directs that all members will respect the sovereignty of each member state, and outlines a system of collective security.

The charter gives the organization four broad missions: "to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights, and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations." To fulfill these missions, the charter includes provisions for the development of six principal organs: the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretariat, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, and the International Court of Justice.

The Security Council

The Security Council is composed of 15 nations, 5 of which are permanent members: the United States, Great Britain, France, China, and the Russian Federation (although Germany, India, Japan, and Brazil are working to also become permanent members). These so-called P5 members have the right of veto and may block any proposed motion before the council. The other 10 member nations of the Security Council are elected for two-year terms. A successful motion must receive the support of nine members, including all five permanent members. Motions and decisions made by the Security Council are binding on all UN members.

The UN Charter gives the Security Council primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The council is given specific authorization to determine threats to, and breaches of, international peace and security; to call upon conflicting factions to settle disputes peaceably; to implement blockades, embargoes, and sanctions; and to use armed force.

The General Assembly

The General Assembly is permitted to discuss any matter within the scope of the UN Charter. It may also discuss questions of international peace and security and make recommendations to the Security Council on these matters. Specifically, it is entrusted with developing international law, encouraging international cooperation, and promoting human rights.

All members of the United Nations may send up to five delegates to the General Assembly, which operates on a one-nation, one-vote principle. As of 2005, there are 191 member nations in the General Assembly. Votes on important questions—such as the election of non-permanent members to the Security Council, admission of new members to the UN, or approval of the budget—require a two-thirds majority; normal motions require only a simple majority.

The Secretariat

The Secretariat is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the United Nations; the staff for each organ is considered part of the Secretariat. Its head, the secretary-general, is the face of the United Nations and the chief administrative officer of each of the UN organs. The secretary-general has the power to advise the Security Council of threats to international peace and security. Unofficially, these assertions carry a great deal of weight on the international scene in private negotiations or public proclamations.

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has the power to investigate and make recommendations

regarding international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters. It consists of 54 UN members elected to three-year terms by the General Assembly. Decisions are made by simple majority. The council is also charged with actively promoting respect for human rights. ECOSOC may issue reports and submit its findings on these matters to the General Assembly for consideration.

The Trusteeship Council

The Trusteeship Council consists of those nations that administer trust territories, any of the P5 members not administering trust territories, and elected delegates of other nations. In the aftermath of World War II, the Trusteeship Council looked after territories in transition that were already under UN mandate or that were taken from the losing powers at the end of the war. Today, the Trusteeship Council continues to oversee any territories that members voluntarily place under UN mandate.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ)

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is a court used by member states to settle legal disputes. It may decide cases involving member states, and states using the court are obliged to regard its decisions as binding. The ICJ may also give advisory opinions on legal matters at the request of the General Assembly. All member nations are party to the Statute of the ICJ, though non-UN-member states may use the court with the agreement of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

OTHER UN ORGANIZATIONS

The United Nations has a multitude of other programs and organizations not specifically delineated by the UN Charter. These bodies address global issues such as human rights and development, the environment, and trade. They include the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The United Nations also supports scientific and cultural development and preservation through the United Nations Educational, Scientific,

and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), human health through the World Health Organization (WHO), and financial stability through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

See also Bosnia Intervention; Cold War; Collective Security; Humanitarian Aid; Humanitarian Intervention; Korean War; Kosovo Intervention; League of Nations; Peacekeeping Operations; Somalia Intervention (1992); United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC); United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM); UNOSOM (United Nations Operations in Somalia); UN Peacekeeping; UN Security Council

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REFLECTIONS

Preamble to the UN Charter

We the peoples of the United Nations, determined
    To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
    To reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
    To establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
    To promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
    AND FOR THESE ENDS,
    To practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and
    To unite our strength to promote international peace and security, and
    To ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
    To employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,
    HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS.

Accordingly, our respective governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

—Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations

UNITED NATIONS MONITORING, VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION COMMISSION (UNMOVIC)

The successor commission to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), charged with disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and monitoring Iraq's compliance with United Nations (UN)–mandated weapons restrictions. The United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) with UNSC Resolution 1284 on December 17, 1999.

The Iraq-Iran War in the 1980s and the Gulf War of 1991 were followed by nearly a decade of efforts by the United Nations Special Commission to address Iraq's weapons program. During this time, the international community was concerned about the capacity of the Iraqi weapons program, particularly its plans to develop chemical and biological weapons. Building on the work of UNSCOM, the United Nations Security Council passed UNSC Resolution 1284 to establish the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission. The mandate for this new commission was twofold: to disarm Iraq of its unconventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction, which included chemical weapons, biological weapons, and missiles with a range greater than 150 km (90 mi), and to establish a system of monitoring and verification to ensure Iraq's compliance with UN restrictions and prevent future acquisition of prohibited weapons by the Iraqi government.

The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission is headed by an executive chairman supported by a sixteen-member College of Commissioners who act as advisers. Dr. Hans Blix was nominated for the position of executive chairman of the commission by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and confirmed by the UN Security Council in January 2000. The executive chairman is required to report to the United Nations Security Council every three months. The College of Commissioners is comprised of weapons specialists, analysts, scientists, engineers, and operational planners. This body meets four times yearly to brief the executive chairman. Within the UNMOVIC, there are four divisions: planning and operations, analysis and assessment, technical support and training, and information. The UNMOVIC is financed by the UN oil-for-food program.

On September 15, 1998, the Iraqi parliament voted to cease cooperation with the United Nations Special Commission. It was not until December of the following year that a successor commission was established to confront the threat posed by Iraq's weapons program. Despite the creation of UNMOVIC, inspections in Iraq did not resume until the United Nations Security Council adopted UNSC Resolution 1441 in November 2002. This resolution 1441 chastised Iraq for its continued noncompliance with the UNMOVIC. It also insisted that UN inspectors be granted unrestricted access to sites of their choosing throughout the country to confirm Iraq's compliance with disarmament requirements. During the approximately four months UNMOVIC was able to operate in Iraq, inspectors discovered previously undisclosed munitions and munitions components consistent with chemical and biological weapons. The intended purpose of these items has not yet been determined by UNMOVIC.

The UNMOVIC inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq on March 18, 2003, just prior to the U.S. invasion of that country. Dr. Hans Blix subsequently stepped down as the executive chairman of UNMOVIC on June 30, 2003. He was replaced by Demetrius Perricos, under whose chairmanship the commission continues to assess the Iraqi weapons program.

See also Biological Weapons and Warfare; Chemical Weapons; Gulf War (1990–1991); Iraq War of 2003; United Nations; Verification; Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION (UNSCOM)

United Nations (UN) inspection agency established in the wake of the first Gulf War to ensure the elimination of Iraq's supposed ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Unable to surmount Iraqi obstructions,

UNSCOM became embroiled in disagreements within the UN Security Council over policy toward Iraq. UNSCOM was replaced by another commission in 1999.

The UN Security Council established UNSCOM in April 1991 to conduct on-site inspections of Iraq's biological, chemical, and missile capabilities. The commission had a mandate to monitor the elimination of any discovered weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km, and related production facilities. UNSCOM was also given the task of ensuring that Iraq did not resume the acquisition or production of prohibited weapons. UNSCOM conducted nuclear weapons inspections in Iraq in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The twenty members of the commission held full sessions twice a year in New York to discuss policy and to assess results of the inspections. UNSCOM's executive chairman reported directly to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The first executive chairman of UNSCOM was Rolf Ekéus, a Swedish ambassador, who was later succeeded by Australian diplomat Richard Butler.

UNSCOM had an office in New York, staffed by technical experts, analysts, and data processors, and another office in Bahrain, where inspection teams were trained and logistics planned. A third office in Baghdad provided communications support in the field. The commission's operating costs (about $25–30 million per year) were covered by frozen Iraqi assets, receipts from the oil-for-food program, and voluntary contributions from UN member states. The United States and Britain provided aircraft, facilities, equipment, and intelligence about suspected Iraqi weapons sites. UNSCOM inspection teams were staffed by 1,000 individuals from more than 40 countries, although most of the inspectors came from the United States and Great Britain.

UNSCOM's work was to be implemented in three stages, which sometimes overlapped. First, UNSCOM was to gather the information necessary to assess Iraq's chemical, biological, and missile capabilities. Second, the commission was to dispose of any weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and related facilities, by destroying them, removing them, or rendering them harmless. Third, UNSCOM was to conduct long-term monitoring to verify Iraq's compliance with its obligation not to reacquire banned capabilities. In the pursuit of the first two tasks, UNSCOM launched more than 250 inspection missions to Iraq. The commission never managed to reach the third stage.

Based on gaps in the weapons inspectors' inventory of Iraqi weapons, UNSCOM demanded an explanation about 550 artillery shells filled with mustard gas, which Baghdad claimed had been lost after the Gulf War. The commission also insisted that Iraq report on the fate of 500 aerial bombs that contained chemical and biological agents. Iraq refused to respond to these inquiries, which were later taken up by UNSCOM's successor, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).

Baghdad resented the UNSCOM inspections as an interference in its internal affairs. Iraqi president Saddam Hussein also accused UNSCOM of serving as a cover for U.S. spies. Iraqi officials continually obstructed the searches by UNSCOM investigators, deceiving them through false statements and documents. Inspectors also were subjected to physical threats and psychological intimidation by the Iraqis. In one instance, UNSCOM inspectors had to chase Iraqi trucks hauling electromagnets away from a military base, while guards on the trucks fired over the heads of the inspectors.

Iraq provided to UNSCOM only a portion of its weapons stocks and reportedly retained the production capability and documentation necessary to revive weapons programs when possible. Iraq was also widely suspected of concealing the full extent of its chemical-weapons program, including a VX nerve-agent project. In 1997, Iraq barred UNSCOM inspectors from a new category of sites, those declared to be sovereign presidential palaces. Many of these sites were, in fact, large compounds capable of storing weapons material.

In December 1998, UNSCOM inspectors were evacuated from Iraq on the eve of a U.S. and U.K. bombing campaign. Subsequently, Iraq did not allow UNSCOM investigators to resume their work. Iraq's failure to cooperate caused deep divisions within the UN Security Council, which weakened UNSCOM's political mandate. The council could lift UN economic sanctions against Iraq only after the inspectors declared Iraq free of weapons of mass destruction, which it could not do if it was barred from making further inspections. Finally, in December 1999, the UN Security Council agreed to form a new inspection agency, UNMOVIC, which would maintain political neutrality by abstaining from exchange of information with U.S. intelligence services.

Despite Iraqi obstructions, UNSCOM managed to compile some information about Iraq's capabilities and facilities. It also managed to destroy some banned weapons and facilities. Although UNSCOM did not fully achieve its mission, it set an important precedent and standards for arms control in the future.

See also Iraq War of 2003; United Nations; United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC); UN Security Council; Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

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UN PEACEKEEPING

Military and civilian operations intended to restore or preserve peace in a specific area of conflict. Although peacekeeping is not a prerogative of the United Nations, most often it is carried out by that organization.

United Nations peacekeeping has evolved from small emergency operations to large multidimensional mobilizations. Since 1948, there have been 59 United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations involving troops from 130 nations. The diversity of the participating forces is reflected by the fact that Canada and Fiji—hardly global military powers—have taken part in almost all UN peacekeeping operations. A total of 1,800 soldiers from more than 100 countries have been killed while serving on peacekeeping missions. Thirty percent of the fatalities occurred in the years 1993–95.

HISTORIC OVERVIEW

The UN Charter does not mention the concept of peacekeeping, nor does it provide specific provisions for implementation. Indeed, peacekeeping was not envisaged as one of the original missions of the United Nations. However, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and Canadian Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson developed the idea of preventive diplomacy in the 1950s as a concept to limit superpower confrontation. Peacekeeping subsequently became the primary means of preventive diplomacy.

Traditional Peacekeeping

The first UN peacekeeping operation took place in response to the Greek civil war in 1947. This mission was authorized by the United Nations General Assembly rather than the UN Security Council. A second mission occurred in 1948 when the United Nations sent a group of military observers, the UN Truce Supervision Organization, to oversee the cease-fire in the Arab-Israeli conflict. A similar team was sent to the India-Pakistan border in 1949. These operations, the forerunners to traditional peacekeeping, aimed to supervise cease-fires and monitor activities in the territory.

Pearson, who was now the Canadian prime minister, developed the concept of traditional peacekeeping in the 1950s, an achievement for which he was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The goal of traditional peacekeeping is to help war-torn countries create and maintain conditions conducive to long-term, sustainable peace. Traditional peacekeeping generally takes place in the period between a cease-fire in a conflict and a political settlement to the conflict. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld embraced the idea of traditional peacekeeping, which provided the United Nations a new collective security role with peacekeeping at its core.

The first traditional peacekeeping mission was established in 1957 at the end of the Suez Crisis in the Middle East. The second mission, which took place in 1960–64 in Congo (now Democratic Republic of Congo), was larger and more complex. Almost 20,000 troops were deployed, as well as a significant number of civilian staff. This mission was extremely costly. The Soviet Union and France claimed the mission exceeded its mandate and refused to pay their UN dues, provoking a UN funding crisis that has never been fully overcome. As a consequence, peacekeeping expenses were removed from the general UN budget and became part of a separate budget.

Several large-scale traditional peacekeeping missions established in the 1960s and 1970s are still ongoing. These include one launched in Cyprus in 1964, to supervise the cease-fire between Egyptian and Israeli forces in 1973. In general, however, Cold War tensions and rivalries produced dissent in the Security Council over proposed peacekeeping operations, and the number of missions declined significantly.

The only mission authorized in the 1970s was in Lebanon and was deployed between 1974 and 1987.

Wider Peacekeeping

Following the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping operations increased dramatically. The rise in the number of operations reflected the view that in the post–Cold War era, the United Nations could play a relevant role in bringing solutions to regional conflicts.

According to the authors of *Understanding Peacekeeping,* UN peacekeeping operations experienced three different changes between 1988 and 1993. First, there was a quantitative transformation—during these five years the Security Council authorized 20 new missions, more than in the previous 40 years combined. In 1993, 80,000 peacekeepers were deployed on the ground. Second, there was a qualitative transformation. Peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Bosnia, and Somalia saw an expansion of the traditional peacekeeping mandate to include monitoring elections; training police; and overseeing civil administration, humanitarian aid, and peace enforcement. In contrast to their indifference to peacekeeping in previous decades, the United States and Great Britain became actively involved in these new missions. Finally, peacekeeping expanded to include the promotion of principles such as democracy and rule of law.

In 1992, the United Nations assessed how it could respond to the new challenges of the post–Cold War era. *Agenda for Peace,* authored by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, was the first internal report that proposed ways to strengthen the UN's peacekeeping capacity. The report was optimistic about the organization's ability to match the new challenges, but it called for additional funds and resources that member states, despite their verbal commitments, failed to provide. The *Agenda* also established the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in order to improve the organization's capacities to manage peacekeeping. However, Boutros-Ghali's report failed to address the challenges of expanding traditional peacekeeping in more complex missions and in more dangerous environments, where troops were deployed during ongoing conflicts.

The Retreat

From 1995 to mid-1999, the number of UN peacekeepers on the ground declined sharply, from 80,000 to 12,000. The failure of missions to Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia accounted for most of this retreat. In addition, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces took over the peacekeeping responsibilities in the former Yugoslav republics and other missions were closed. These included operations in Mozambique (ended January 1995), Somalia (March 1995), El Salvador (April 1995), and Rwanda (March 1996). The only new peacekeeping operation set up during this time outside the former Yugoslav republics was in Angola.

This period witnessed two of peacekeeping's greatest failures. The genocide in Rwanda in 1995 illustrated how difficult it was for the United Nations to react rapidly to impending crises. In Bosnia, peacekeepers failed to create safe areas to protect civilians from Serbian aggression. The massacre of Srebrenica, where more than 7,000 Muslims were killed, happened under the watch of UN peacekeepers who had neither the mandate nor the resources to intervene.

New Operations

Beginning in June 1999, new missions in Kosovo and East Timor, and expanded missions in Sierra Leone and the Congo, increased again both the costs and personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping operations. From July 1999 to June 2001, overall UN peacekeeping personnel levels increased to 43,000. Several factors account for this new expansion in peacekeeping. First of all, there was a renewed concern with humanitarian problems, which motivated the interventions in Kosovo and East Timor. Also, the merging of security and development agendas, the activism of African states such as Nigeria and South Africa, and the lessons learned from the past induced a rebirth of peacekeeping. East Timor and Kosovo also involved a new level of complexity, with a greater emphasis on civilian administration and state-building.

As of July 2004, 58,741 military and civilian police from 100 different countries are serving in 16 peacekeeping operations, half of which are in Africa. Pakistan is the largest contributor, with more than 8,600 personnel, followed by Bangladesh with 8,200 and Nigeria with 3,500. Other significant contributors are Ethiopia and Ghana, with more than 3,000 troops, along with India, Uruguay, South Africa, and Nepal. The approved UN peacekeeping budget for 2004–2005 is about $2.8 billion, bringing the estimated total cost of peacekeeping operations since 1948 to $31.5 billion. This means that debts incurred by UN peacekeeping

operations are higher than debts to the UN's regular budget. By the end of 2004, 15 countries owed more than $1.9 billion in peacekeeping debts. The United States topped the list with a debt of $480 million, and Japan owed the second-largest amount, $176 million.

ESTABLISHING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is responsible for planning, managing, deploying, and supporting all UN peacekeeping operations. Established in 1992, DPKO works closely with the UN Department of Political Affairs and provides executive direction to all UN peacekeeping operations. Each operation requires a new mission, authorized by the UN Security Council, and resources have to be assembled to meet the requirements of the situation.

Authorizing Peacekeeping Operations

There is no standard procedure to establish a peacekeeping operation. However, in most cases, the process starts with consultations among member states, the UN Secretariat, and the parties involved in the conflict, which have to agree on troop deployment. Sometimes, peace agreements require the presence of peacekeepers on the ground.

As soon as security conditions permit, a technical-assessment team travels to the area to analyze the needs for and implications of a UN mission. The secretary-general makes recommendations to the Security Council, taking into consideration the findings of the assessment team. The Security Council must authorize a peacekeeping operation with a resolution that specifies the size and mandate of the mission. Such resolutions require at least 9 out of 15 votes in favor and are subject to veto by the council's five permanent members—China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States.

Planning, Deploying, and Financing Peacekeeping Operations

Planning for political, military, operational, and logistical aspects of the operation involves the secretary-general's special representative, appointed to head the operation, and DPKO. Member states are asked to contribute military troops and civilian police on a voluntary basis. Personnel in peacekeeping operations remain members of their own national service but serve under the operational control of the United Nations. They wear their own uniforms but also wear blue berets or helmets and the UN insignia.

When a significant number of U.S. troops are involved, operational control remains in U.S. hands or in the hands of a military ally such as a NATO member. Because the U.S. president never relinquishes his command authority over U.S. troops, American officers retain authority over their own military forces serving in UN operations.

The time required to deploy a mission depends on the will of member states to provide troops and financial resources. It varies from 24 hours—as happened in 1973 for the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East—to several weeks for more complex missions.

The General Assembly allocates peacekeeping costs based on a special scale that takes into account the relative economic wealth of member states. The five permanent members of the Security Council are required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Member states providing troops or other tangible support for a mission are reimbursed from the mission budget at agreed-upon rates, and this payment creates an incentive for developing countries to contribute to peacekeeping.

MODERN PEACEKEEPING

After 56 years, UN peacekeeping has evolved from little more than short-term policing to complex and multidimensional operations. Lessons learned from the past show that there is no single model for a successful peacekeeping operation, although a clear mandate and adequate resources are considered fundamental elements for an adequate response. Modern peacekeeping doctrine suggests that missions must respond to the needs and aspirations of the local populations and fit the political and socioeconomic dimensions of the territory, country, or region of concern.

—Francesco Mancini

See also Bosnia Intervention; Interventionism; Kosovo Intervention; Somalia Intervention (1992); United Nations; UN Security Council

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UN SECURITY COUNCIL

Organ of the United Nations (UN) that has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

RATIONALE AND ORGANIZATION

After World War II, the victorious Allied powers led an international community of states in forming the global security organization called the United Nations. However, it soon became clear that meetings of the entire membership were neither a speedy nor practical way to address rapidly developing international crises. Thus, the founders of the United Nations created a body known as the Security Council, so that a subset of the membership could quickly come together to attend to crises and formulate responses on behalf of the entire organization. The council was originally composed of 11 members, but added 4 more seats in 1965 in response to a doubling in the United Nation's overall membership since 1951. The council remains at 15 today, although the United Nations has since grown to 192 states.

Council members fall into two broad groups: those that have permanent status, and those with two-year terms. Since the UN's founding, the permanent members have been the United States, Great Britain, France, the Russian Federation (as the successor to the Soviet Union), and China (with the mainland government replacing that of Taiwan in 1971). Collectively referred to as the P5, these states owe their status to their being accepted in 1945 as the post-war great powers (with the United States and the Soviet Union being then, of course, the greatest among the great). The General Assembly, the forum for political meetings of the entire UN membership, elects the 10 term members with due regard for ensuring, as specified in Article 23 of the charter, "equitable geographical distribution." Half of the 10 are replaced each year, and retiring members are not eligible for immediate reelection.

FORMAL POWERS AND FUNCTIONS

The UN Charter assigns the Security Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." Although the General Assembly also has the authority to consider such matters, the council's primacy is underscored in charter provisions. Article 10 makes clear that the assembly's powers on these issues are advisory only. Article 14 states that the assembly must defer to the council when the latter attends to a specific international dispute or a potential threat to peace and security.

The most significant of the council's enumerated powers fall under Chapters VI and VII of the charter. The former addresses the peaceful settlement of disputes and empowers the council to investigate international disputes or predispute situations and recommend procedures or methods to resolve them. Chapter VII specifies those actions that the council can take or call for when confronted with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression. It goes considerably further than Chapter VI in the powers assigned. It gives the council the right to determine the existence of any such threats, breaches, or acts. Once it identifies a threat, the council can call on the parties to take measures to dampen their dispute and give the council time to consider what else should be done.

Should all of these measures prove inadequate, the council can move toward enforcing its decisions. Article 41 gives the United Nations the power to impose nonmilitary means of enforcement, including economic sanctions, severing diplomatic relations, and embargoing transportation, postal, electronic, and other means of communications. Article 42 authorizes the use of armed force by member states on behalf of the organization should lesser actions be deemed inadequate. Chapter VII resolutions are generally regarded as legally binding on the membership.

Consistent with these powers, the charter also states that UN members must accept and carry out decisions of the council. The council can recommend that the General Assembly suspend any member that fails to do so or expel particularly grievous violators of charter principles. The council later can reinstate suspended members on its own should it choose to do so.

Other important assigned council functions include making recommendations to the General Assembly on the appointment of new members to the United Nations and on the appointment of the organization's chief administrative officer, the secretary-general.

Together with the General Assembly, the council also elects the judges of the International Court of Justice, which sits in The Hague.

PROCEDURES AND ACTIVITIES

The council is always on call, and any member state or the secretary-general can bring to its attention a situation that threatens international peace and security. Should it be willing to be seized by the situation, the council usually calls on the parties to resolve their dispute through peaceful means while it awaits a report from the secretary-general on the facts of the matter. It may also call on the secretary-general to use his good offices, or it may directly appoint a special representative (or ask that the secretary-general do so) to mediate between the parties. With their consent, it may, among other things, authorize the dispatch of cease-fire monitors, a civilian peace mission, or a peace-operations force that can assist in establishing conditions conducive to a long-term return to peace. Should such actions not suffice, it can move to the Chapter VII measures outlined above. In unusual circumstances (such as occurred with Iraq's aggression against Kuwait in 1990) or in the face of a humanitarian disaster, it may go so far as to authorize an international military force to use all necessary means to set a situation right.

Although the council conducts some of this business in open session, it also resorts to private meetings and informal consultations. These often allow for more pointed exchanges and dispense with the diplomatic niceties and political rhetoric characteristic of public events. Some informal consultations are considered meetings of council members rather than meetings of the council per se. No official records are kept of such proceedings.

The most solemn expression of the council's will is its passage of a resolution. There must be nine affirmative votes for a proposed resolution to be accepted. On substantive votes, each member of the P5 holds a veto, that is, the right to prevent a proposal's passage. Ceding this privilege to the P5 reflected both the hope that they would see eye to eye on decisions and the recognition that no one can force a great power to accept and implement a decision that it opposes. Without this proviso, it is clear that the P5 would not have signed on to the organization. When a P5 state wishes to make clear its displeasure with a proposal without vetoing it outright, it also has the option (as do other members of the council) of abstaining from the vote.

There has been a very significant decrease in the number of P5 vetoes since the end of the Cold War. From 1946 through 1990, P5 states, especially the Soviet Union, cast an average of five vetoes a year. The average has since dropped to somewhat less than two. The fact remains, however, that the veto is a last-resort measure. Its very threat provides considerable leverage. With that threat, a P5 state can discourage consideration of any issue it wishes to keep off the agenda or cause a proposed resolution to be modified until it meets the state's requirements. There is no indication that the P5 are any less apt to resort to such threats in this era than they were in the past.

Nonmembers of the council can participate in its meetings under specified conditions. In particular, when the council is considering a question, any state within the UN that believes its interests could be affected has a right to address the council, but unless it is already a member, it has no right to vote on a resolution. Conversely, a member of the council that is party to a dispute under consideration by the council must abstain from voting.

Whereas voting constitutes the most formal and public way that the council expresses its will and intent, it also uses less formal presidential statements. Each member of the council takes a one-month turn in the president's chair. Among the president's duties is issuing statements that reflect the sense of the council on questions such as "The Situation in Somalia" or "Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts." Such statements are often seen as less binding or more provisional than are resolutions.

THE COUNCIL'S CHANGING SIGNIFICANCE

The significance of the council is a function of what states make of it, and the P5 are ultimately controlling in this regard. The East–West rivalries of the Cold War went far to relegate not only the council but the entire United Nations to the role of bit player and forum for mutual accusations. The end of intense Cold War rivalries, and an accompanying international sense that the UN could be useful, led to greater attention to and reliance upon the organization and particularly on the Security Council as the organ that made things happen.

By several measures, the United Nations clearly has been more active since the end of the Cold War.

The council held 55 formal meetings and 62 informal consultations in 1988, compared to 273 and 259, respectively, in 2002. The council passed an average of 10 to 20 resolutions per year from 1946 through 1988, and about 50 to 70 per year since then. Just 8 presidential statements were issued in 1988; 42 were issued in 2002. The United Nations authorized a total of 46 peacekeeping missions from 1989 through 2004, compared to 13 in its previous 42 years of existence.

The council has also been more active in invoking Chapter VII enforcement measures. Of the 14 cases in which the council has invoked nonmilitary sanctions, 2 occurred before 1990 and 12 occurred thereafter. Similarly, although military enforcement actions were authorized only twice prior to 1990 (with the Korean War and with enforcement of a trade embargo against Rhodesia), they have since been invoked to deal with situations in the former Yugoslav republics, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, the African Great Lakes region, Albania, the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, East Timor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Liberia, Ivory Coast, and Afghanistan.

The council's activism has not been without controversy. In particular, states and informed observers have sharply criticized it for authorizing military peace missions that were overly ambitious in their goals and demands despite lacking needed resources. Some of these missions led to the deaths of innocent civilians and to the humiliation and sometimes the death of peacekeepers, as well. Highly publicized problems in Somalia and the former Yugoslav republics, compounded by the council's failure to authorize forceful action at the start of the 1994 Rwanda genocide, threw a pall over the UN's 50th-anniversary celebrations in 1995. Although the council's expressed aims are usually laudatory, council members still do not always follow through to ensure that what they resolve should be done actually can be done.

The greatest dissatisfaction with the council may be among developing states. Many have viewed the council's increased activism as a mixed blessing, because it is they or their neighbors who are often the subjects of council resolutions and sponsored actions. They chafe at control of the council by the P5 in general and by the United States in particular as the sole post–Cold War superpower. Hence, a significant development in the council's history may have been a nonevent. In spite of President George W. Bush's expressed determination to force a final vote authorizing the U.S. attack against Iraq that took place in March 2003, the United States ultimately decided against such a course of action. The Bush administration not only expected vetoes by as many as three of the P5 but also failed to garner positive votes among several term members, as well. That example may foreshadow increased U.S. reluctance to bring future critical issues to the council.

PROSPECTS FOR REFORM

Proposals to reform the council have focused on three features: size, makeup, and the veto power. As the UN's membership has grown, pressure has increased to broaden the council's membership, possibly to 21 or 24 members. The United Nations has also considered creating some kind of a special membership for Germany, Japan, and regional leaders such as Brazil, India, South Africa, or Nigeria. The special membership could take the form of a permanent seat without veto power. However, the veto itself may be in for changes, as well. Some UN members have proposed that it either be done away with or that its use be restricted—for example, only to resolutions that involve Chapter VII. The consensus among informed observers is that the P5 will not restrict their own veto and will be reluctant to grant it to other states. It also seems certain that the council will grow, but whether that growth will involve giving some states a special membership status remains to be seen.

—Donald C. F. Daniel

See also Bosnia Intervention; Cold War; Interventionism; Korean War; Kosovo Intervention; Peacekeeping Operations; Somalia Intervention (1992); United Nations; UN Peacekeeping

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REFLECTIONS

A Peacekeeper's Reaction to Security Council Decisions

And just when it seemed things could not get worse, the Security Council started to make life impossible

for UN commanders and troops on the ground in Bosnia.

In late 1992 and early 1993, the Security Council issued resolutions that called for UNPROFOR (the UN Protection Force) to "use such force as necessary to guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid" and to establish a number of "safe havens" for the Bosnian Muslims. The resolutions were announced with great fanfare in the halls outside the council. Unfortunately, no one had bothered to check the military viability of these resolutions considering the reluctance of potential troop-contributing countries to get more deeply involved in the Bosnian conflict. First, all sides in the Bosnian conflict were interfering with the delivery of aid and, more often than not, using women and children to block roads. Second, safe havens would merely have concentrated the Muslims in seven or eight locations, thereby tacitly encouraging ethnic cleansing and providing the Serbs and Croats with easily identified targets.

—Major General Lewis MacKenzie
Chief of Staff, UNPROFOR

UNMANNED
AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVs)

Powered aircraft that are guided without an onboard crew. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are used primarily for reconnaissance and gathering intelligence, but the U.S. military has been exploring other ways of using the potential of these craft.

The earliest recorded use of unmanned aerial vehicles occurred during the American Civil War, when both sides tried to use balloons loaded with explosive devices as unmanned flying bombs. The idea was for the balloons to come down inside a supply or ammunition depot and explode. The Japanese repeated this tactic in World War II, sending long-distance bomb-laden balloons over the Pacific toward the United States. Unable to gauge their success, the Japanese called off the project after several weeks.

The United States experimented with early self-propelled UAVs during World War II, modifying aircraft for use as unmanned flying missiles. After World War II, the U.S. military developed target drones—remote-controlled, unmanned aircraft used as targets for missile or air gunnery tests.

During the Vietnam War, advanced aviation technology began to make UAVs more effective. The United States launched large numbers of unmanned drones over North Vietnam for day reconnaissance missions. Known as Firebees, the drones later were used for other military missions, including night reconnaissance, gathering electronic intelligence, eavesdropping on enemy communications, dropping propaganda leaflets, detecting surface-to-air missile (SAM) radar sites, and identifying enemy units.

Since the 1980s, UAVs have been used extensively in recent conflicts in the Middle East. The Pioneer UAV system of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps has been in operation since 1985 and played a significant role in the 1991 Gulf War. The battleship USS *Missouri* used its Pioneer drones to spot targets for its main guns, which devastated Iraqi defenses off the coast of Kuwait during that war. Following the Gulf War, military officials recognized the worth of the unmanned systems.

The two main U.S. UAVs now in use are the Predator and the Global Hawk. The Predator operates between 15,000 and 25,000 feet and carries three sensor systems—a color video camera and two types of radar. The air force has also placed Hellfire missiles aboard some Predators. In the near future, the Predator may be able to conduct missile attacks on remote targets, mark targets with its laser for other aircraft, or read targets marked by other sources.

Predator does have some drawbacks. For example, it is not an all-weather system. When it was first deployed in the Balkans in the early 1990s, it was found to ice up frequently. As a result of that experience, Predator now employs an anti-icing system. This system allows it to de-ice its fuselage for a short time, but the missile still cannot operate for a long period under icy conditions. The new Predator B has a number of characteristics that will improve its ability to deal with a wider range of environmental events, including icing conditions.

The Global Hawk is a jet-powered UAV first deployed in the skies over Afghanistan in 2002. The Global Hawk operates at around 60,000 feet and carries a package of sensors similar to that of the air force's U-2 spy plane. Although the Predator currently has a more sophisticated system for electronic eavesdropping, tests show the Global Hawk has great potential in this area. The Global Hawk can stay aloft for up to 34 hours, compared to 12 hours for the updated Predator.

The air force and navy are currently designing and testing UAVs for use as weapons platforms. The marine corps has Dragon Eye, a small, hand-launched UAV that can give small-unit leaders a picture of the battleground. Some of the UAVs currently under development will be as small as a human hand. Even though UAVs are increasing their roles in combat, surveillance, and other areas of combat, military strategists are just beginning to understand the impact of multiple UAV on modern airpower doctrine and practice.

See also Cruise Missile; Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

UNOSOM (UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA)

Two United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and humanitarian missions—UNOSOM I (1992–93) and UNOSOM II (1993–95)—designed to alleviate problems in Somalia created by civil war and drought. UNOSOM I was dispatched by the United Nations in mid-1992. Because the central government had collapsed, the United Nations was unable to seek consent to deploy troops, so the mandate was kept neutral and limited. United Nations personnel were to distribute humanitarian aid to alleviate the drought-created famine. More than 4,000 troops were authorized for the mission, but only 500 were deployed, because local warlords prevented them from moving much beyond the airport in the Somali capital, Mogadishu. Like its successor mission, UNOSOM I suffered from several problems. Troops often refused to accept orders from UN commanders before checking with their own governments, and difficulties with communicating and coordinating activities impeded the mission. The $43 million intervention had few casualties, but its effectiveness was poor.

The failing mission was replaced in December 1992 by a UN-mandated, U.S.-led peace-enforcement mission known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). The more heavily armed military personnel of UNITAF had greater success, managing to disarm several of the warring Somali clans. However, the warlords tolerated UNITAF solely because of the U.S. troops' capacity to use force, the limited-time mandate of the mission, and—most significantly—because the operation did not threaten the political balance in the

civil war. UNITAF did not last long. On October 3, 1993, an ambush that downed an American helicopter and killed 18 U.S. soldiers shook American public support for the mission. The Americans pulled out of the country by March of 1994.

The United Nations formally returned to Somalia in 1993 with the $1.6 billion mission called UNOSOM II. Twenty-nine countries authorized troops to pursue a highly ambitious mandate—a mandate that went far beyond the limits of traditional, neutral peacekeeping missions. The troops were to restore order to Somalia, disarm Somali civilians, and build the foundation for a stable government. Humanitarian aid, rather than being distributed according to need, was used as a reward for those who supported the mission. Moreover, the attempt to arrest Mohammed Aideed, the most powerful warlord in the nation, was not a neutral act. The ruling warlords were making a lot of money out of the chaotic situation, and they strongly resisted the proposed rebuilding operations.

After planning such an ambitious operation, the United Nations failed to support the mission adequately. The UN resolutions that created the mission were unclear and did not provide for the use of military force. Little attention was given to promoting stable cease-fires or preventing minor incidents from becoming larger ones. Furthermore, the United Nations did not obtain consent for operations from the warring parties in Somalia, a mistake that proved costly. The organization assumed that the UN flag would protect the troops, so they were lightly armed and lacked the equipment necessary in a civil-war zone. There were 110 UN fatalities from hostile acts.

The mission was considered a peacekeeping disaster and was ended in March 1995. UNOSOM II did not—and could not—fulfill its mandate, and the population continued to suffer from all it had endured from 1992 onward. The mission was a further failure for the United Nations because of rampant mismanagement and corruption. Some $3.9 million was lost to theft, $76,000 in cash was lost to mildew, and millions were wasted on overpriced contracts.

The failed missions had substantial repercussions for Somalia and for future peacekeeping missions. First, Somalia remains mired in internal conflict, despite the peacekeepers' efforts; order remains elusive and death tolls continue to rise. Second, the Mogadishu Syndrome—fear of politically unpopular casualties as part of a UN mission—continues to

plague planners of peacekeeping missions in the United Nations and particularly in the United States. Third, the blatant failure in Somalia made the international community reluctant to intervene in other civil conflicts; as a result, it failed to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

See also Humanitarian Aid; Humanitarian Intervention; Peacekeeping Operations; Somalia Intervention (1992); United Nations

URANIUM, DEPLETED

Dense, mildly radioactive metal that is primarily used in the production of U.S. munitions. Depleted uranium (DU) is created as a waste product when the radioactive isotope U-235 is extracted from natural uranium ore. This U-235 uranium is used as a fuel in nuclear power plants and in the production of some nuclear armaments.

Depleted uranium consists of natural uranium minus the U-235 isotope. As a waste product, DU is plentiful and extremely costly to dispose of because of its radioactivity. As a result, arms manufacturers can obtain DU for minimal or even no cost.

Because DU is exceptionally dense, it is used in the production of tank armor, armored clothing, cruise missiles, aircraft, and bombs designed to destroy metal or metal-frame bunkers. It is also manufactured as a coating on ammunition and other armaments. Munitions coated with DU can easily penetrate metal and are readily combustible.

The U.S. defense industry began using DU in 1977, but DU-enhanced armaments were not used in combat until the Gulf War in 1991. They have since been used in the Bosnia and Kosovo interventions, the War in Afghanistan, and the Iraq War of 2003. The benefits of DU on the battlefield were demonstrated in the Gulf War when DU-coated artillery, tank bombs, and ammunition deployed by the United States and coalition forces destroyed at least 1,000 Iraqi tanks. By contrast, not one U.S. DU-coated Abrams tank was knocked out.

Questions have been raised since the Persian Gulf War about the impact of DU on human health and the environment. Some scientists, medical experts, and Gulf War veterans believe that exposure to DU causes a variety of health problems, including cancer. European NATO veterans of the Bosnian conflict have made similar charges. The U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Veterans Administration, the United Nations, and NATO have each conducted investigations exploring these claims. Both the Defense Department and NATO have concluded that the risk to human health from DU is negligible in most cases. In situations of extreme exposure, experts recommend that the involved soldiers receive medical follow-up for evidence of excessive uranium ingestion. Such exposure has occurred when soldiers in armored vehicles accidentally have been hit by DU-coated missiles fired by friendly units and when troops have been involved in clearing away destroyed DU-coated tanks.

Although the U.S. military and many medical experts maintain that DU poses no significant threat to human health, DU in sufficient concentrations can contaminate soil and water supplies. The U.S. Army has estimated that a cleanup of its weapons-testing site at the Jefferson Proving Ground in Indiana, where 77 tons of DU ordnance has been deployed, will cost at least $1 billion. The World Health Organization has also identified a number of locations in Bosnia and Kosovo that require cleanup.

See also Environmental Degradation; Nuclear Waste Disposal; Penetrating Munitions; Protective Gear; Tanks

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID)

United States government agency with the explicit dual purpose of advancing America's foreign-policy interests and fostering a better quality of life in less-developed countries. Created in 1961 by an executive order from President John F. Kennedy under the Foreign Assistance Act, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has philosophical roots in immediate postwar America and the plans to reconstruct Europe. At that time, international development assistance was seen as vital and necessary for U.S. political and economic interests. After the expiration of the Marshall Plan's reconstruction initiative in Europe, the U.S. government created multiple programs to manage international aid monies.

USAID's predecessors—the International Cooperation Administration, the Development Loan Fund, the Export-Import Bank, and the Food for Peace program— were often politically stymied or uncoordinated in their

efforts. Thus, USAID was created with a mandate to consolidate these agencies and organize and administer all nonmilitary aid to foreign countries. Although USAID is an independent agency, it is still guided by official policies and it reports to the secretary of state.

USAID works to put policy into practice: The agency promotes global health, economic development, and democracy, and it sponsors related programs in agriculture, education, conflict management, and humanitarian assistance. It is the U.S. agency most actively involved in disaster relief, antipoverty initiatives, and encouraging the growth of good governance, either through its own programs or through nongovernmental partners.

USAID actively sponsors health programs in a number of different arenas: maternal and child health, nutrition, family planning, and the reduction of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria. A major project involves care for those infected with or affected by HIV and AIDS; to date, in fighting the AIDS pandemic, the agency is the largest donor in any organization, public or private. It also supports the Food for Peace program to bring food to the chronically undernourished.

As a party to the Washington Consensus, USAID supports a neoliberal approach to economic development. The agreement concluded that nations seeking to promote economic growth and end poverty should undergo structural adjustment—in the form of deregulation and privatization of industry. USAID gives advice to governments seeking to promote a business-friendly climate but does not seek to intervene actively in the market. Rather, much of its help includes technical assistance: advising states about the creation of stable fiscal, banking, and trade policies; reliable financial institutions; and private property protections. Programs also include information-technology initiatives and support for education.

USAID likewise has a strong political thrust. The agency is charged with supporting ideas and institutions that lead to stable, peaceable, democratic governance in countries with little prior history of civil society. Specifically, the agency supports the development of the rule of law, the creation of written civil and commercial codes, the protection of human rights, the promotion of free and fair elections, active civic participation by the citizenry, government transparency and accountability, and anticorruption initiatives. The agency also provides education about democracy and democratic practices.

USAID has had some substantial successes. It contributed largely to the worldwide eradication of smallpox and supported agricultural research, which had enormous positive impacts wherever it was implemented. At the same time, the agency has participated in less-successful efforts. Past programs were criticized for ignoring cultural differences and for operating inefficiently in their design and implementation. Aid programs in Israel and Egypt have faced particularly severe criticism regarding their effectiveness. The agency, however, has an active evaluation system that supports organizational learning and development. For instance, to become more attuned to cultural considerations, USAID is developing a "listen to the customer" strategy. In this way, it is improving its ability to advance the interests of the United States and the countries it serves.

See also Foreign Aid; Kennedy, John F., and National Policy; Marshall Plan

U.S. AIR FORCE

Aviation branch of the U.S. military. The U.S. Department of the Air Force was founded by the National Security Act of 1947, signed by President Harry S. Truman. The National Security Act also created the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The creation of the U.S. Air Force was thus a feature of the more general consolidation and reorganization of U.S. defense strategy following World War II.

WORLD WAR I AND THE INTERWAR PERIOD

Military aviation finally gained formal status in the United States with the creation of the Aviation Section of the U.S. Army Signal Corps in 1914. The flying unit consisted of 12 officers, 54 enlisted men, and 6 airplanes. By contrast, when World War I broke out in Europe that same year, the German air force consisted of 180 planes, the French air force boasted 136 planes, and the British had 48. Early in the war, airplanes were used solely for reconnaissance. However, the rapid development of airplane design, air gunnery, bombing equipment, and combat strategies and

techniques turned the skies into a battlefield. Most of these developments bypassed U.S. military aviation. The United States remained neutral until 1917 and its air-combat readiness lagged well behind. High-ranking U.S. Army officers were still convinced that the airplane's primary military use was to gather intelligence.

The first military use of U.S. airpower actually occurred a year before the nation entered World War I. When Mexican bandit Pancho Villa staged a raid into New Mexico in March 1916, the First Aero Squadron was enlisted to take part in border patrol as a tactical air unit. The squadron also participated in the subsequent U.S. expedition that hunted Villa after he retreated into Mexico.

The United States entered World War I with woefully inadequate military airpower but a tremendous pool of resources that, with guidance from European Allies, could be transformed into a credible force. The U.S. Army Air Service was formed as part of the American Expeditionary Force that was dispatched to Europe to join the fighting. Congress allocated $640 million for aeronautics and airplane production, but all of the planes constructed in U.S. factories were based on British, French, and Italian designs. Because the war ended just a year after U.S. entry, the United States ultimately purchased, rather than built, most of its combat aircraft.

Advances in aircraft technology and air combat doctrine made between World Wars I and II would have important implications for future conflicts. New altitude records were set, the first test jumps were made with parachutes, the first Round-the-Rim (periphery of the continental United States) flight was conducted, and coast-to-coast flight tests were carried out. Speed tests were also conducted to improve flight time, and gyroscopic equipment was installed to control altitude and direction.

With the United States officially uninvolved in foreign wars during this time, American pilots gained experience where they could. Some volunteered their services to fight in the Kościuszko Squadron during the Polish-Soviet War (1921). At home, former World War I ace Billy Mitchell was developing new doctrines for the use of airpower. In 1923, he conducted a demonstration in which he proved that airplanes could sink battleships at sea. Mitchell was furious when his superiors dismissed the significance of the demonstration. United States military leaders still were unable to grasp the full potential of airpower. By the 1930s, European nations, particularly Germany and England, were much further advanced in both aircraft design and air-combat doctrine than the United States.

WORLD WAR II AND THE COLD WAR

World War II began with the German invasion of Poland in 1939. The German air force played a key role in supporting ground forces during the Germans' rapid victories in Poland, Holland, Belgium, and France in the early years of the war. The Germans demonstrated dramatically the value of airpower in modern combat. It soon became clear that command of the skies over the battlefield would be essential to victory.

As in World War I, the United States was at first neutral in the conflict. However, in recognition of the growing importance of airpower, in 1941 the Army Air Corps was renamed the U.S. Army Air Force; two years later it acquired equal status with the army and navy. The United States finally entered the war on December 7, 1941, when Japanese naval air forces attacked the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in a real-life application of Mitchell's demonstration nearly 20 years before. However, unlike in World War I, during this war the United States would have ample time to design, build, and make history with its own aircraft.

Airpower played an important role for U.S. operations in both the European and Pacific theaters of combat. United States strategic bombers struck at German and Japanese industrial targets, significantly impairing Axis war production. Reconnaissance aircraft gathered vital intelligence for offensive operations such as the 1944 D-day invasion of France. Fighter-bombers attacked enemy troops and other ground targets, such as railroads and supply depots. By 1944, the Allied forces had uncontested control over the skies on both fronts, with U.S. airpower playing the leading role. Fittingly, airpower ended the war with the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Airpower also played a significant role in U.S. Cold War strategy. The first postwar test of U.S. air strength came during the Berlin Airlift in 1949. The Soviet Union had blockaded all land routes to the city of West Berlin, which was located in the heart of Soviet-controlled East Germany. In response, the U.S. Air Force flew in thousands of tons of essential supplies such as food and fuel. The success of the airlift ultimately forced the Soviets to lift the blockade.

The importance of the air force to national security was once again demonstrated during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Air force spy planes provided

photographic evidence that the Soviets were planning to install nuclear weapons in Cuba, within quick striking distance of U.S. soil. President John F. Kennedy, acting on this intelligence, ordered a naval blockade of Cuba to prevent the Soviets from sending further missiles to Cuba. Faced with a possible nuclear confrontation over the matter, the Soviets backed down and dismantled the missile sites they had begun to construct on the island.

The role of the air force in Korea and Vietnam is more ambiguous. Particularly in the latter conflict, airpower was associated with some of the worst excesses of the war, such as the dropping of napalm and the relentless bombing of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs were dropped in Southeast Asia during this time period, and the phrase "bomb them back to the Stone Age" became part of the rhetoric of some of the most virulent war supporters. In this context, attacks from above by pilots who never saw their enemy were considered representative of the anonymity of modern warfare.

Perhaps the most important role the air force played during the Cold War was as a nuclear deterrent to Soviet aggression. A branch of the air force known as the Strategic Air Command was and still is responsible for maintaining and overseeing the U.S. arsenal of strategic nuclear bombers and nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Although the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 substantially decreased the chances of nuclear conflict, the air force retains its nuclear strike capability as a deterrent against attacks by other nations on U.S. soil.

POST–COLD WAR ERA

The casualties suffered by the U.S. military during the Vietnam War instilled a reluctance among U.S. leaders to commit ground troops in combat operations. As a result, the most important engagements conducted by the United States military since the end of the Cold War have involved the heavy use of airpower. In some instances, punitive air strikes have been used as a tactic where ground attacks would be logistically difficult or politically sensitive.

The 1991 Gulf War began with air assaults lasting six weeks before troops moved in. Between that conflict and the Iraq War of 2003, the air force maintained no-fly zones inside Iraq as part of the larger strategy of keeping Saddam Hussein's regime isolated. Airpower also played a vital role in U.S. peacekeeping

efforts in the former Yugoslav republics, including airlift operations to provide relief to refugees.

Today the air force is also heavily involved in activities aimed at fighting international terrorism. These include airborne spraying to eradicate narcotics that are a potential source of terrorist funding, and intelligence gathering through the use of spy satellites and unmanned planes called drones. In remote and rugged areas such as the mountains of Afghanistan, airpower can be applied to such tasks more easily and flexibly than can ground troops. The ability to deliver the appropriate amount of force directly to a target quickly and efficiently makes the air force an ideal tool for projecting U.S. power and defending U.S. national security.

—William de Jong-Lambert

See also Air Warfare; Atomic Bomb; Berlin Airlift; Bomber Fleet; Cold War; Cuban Missile Crisis; Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs); National Security Act; Nuclear Deterrence; Strategic Air Command; Truman, Harry S., and National Policy; World War I (1914–1918); World War II (1939–1945)

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REFLECTIONS

Arguing the Case for Airpower

In January 1921, General Billy Mitchell appeared before Congress to testify about the effectiveness of airpower against ships at sea and to ask to be given a chance to demonstrate his ideas. The following exchange with members of the congressional committee shows the difficulties he faced selling his ideas but also the conviction with which he argued for them.

MITCHELL:	[Our airplanes] can destroy or sink any ship in existence!
CONGRESSMAN BASCOM SLEMP:	If that's true, why aren't you able to convince high-ranking officers of the Army who have the consideration of these problems?
MITCHELL:	We are presenting the situation to you, and we're ready to demonstrate this thing. If you allow no air force, not only will an

REPRESENTATIVE
THOMAS SISSON: Should the British example in carriers and a unified air force serve as a model for our country?

opposing fleet land at will, but their aircraft will fly all over our country.

MITCHELL: Yes Sir. I do not consider that the Air Force is to be considered as in any means supplanting the Army. You have always got to come to manpower as the ultimate thing, but we do believe that the air force will control all communications, that it will have a very great effect on land troops and a decisive one against a navy.

SLEMP: Your argument really leads up to the advocacy of a combined air service.

MITCHELL: There is no other efficient solution of the air problem. If you scatter the air force around it leads to double overhead, and to a double system of command, and many other difficulties. It has been proven wrong everywhere.

SLEMP: It seems to me that the principal problem is to demonstrate the certainty of your conclusions.

MITCHELL: Give us the warships to attack and come and watch it!

U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY

Military service academy whose primary function is the development and preparation of officers for air service. In 1948, a board of leading civilian and military educators was appointed to plan a curriculum for an air force academy. The board was headed by then-president of Columbia University Dwight D. Eisenhower. The board's original recommendation was that, during peacetime, at least 40% of the regular officers taken into each branch of the service should be academy graduates. Two years after its creation, the board reached the conclusion that the needs of the air force could not be met merely by expanding other service academies.

The U.S. Congress authorized creation of the Air Force Academy in 1954. On April 1, 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the bill establishing the U.S. Air Force Academy. Construction on the facilities began in Colorado Springs, Colorado, in 1955, and the first class of 306 men was sworn in that year. The first class containing women graduated from the academy in 1980. Holly Adams, a member of the academy's 43rd graduating class, was the first female senior class president in Air Force Academy history.

See also U.S. Military Academy; U.S. Naval Academy

U.S. ARMY

Branch of the U.S. military with primary responsibility for land combat. It is the only one of the nation's armed forces able to conduct large-scale land warfare and to seize and occupy territory. These assets make the army one of the principal instruments of U.S. military and national-security policy.

ORGANIZATION

The U.S. Army consists of three branches: the active-duty army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard. Each branch includes both military and civilian personnel. The army is a part of the Department of the Army, which is itself a division of the Department of Defense. The secretary of defense is the civilian officer with direct authority over the U.S. Army.

The active-duty army consists of some 512,000 troops deployed in bases throughout the world. As a result of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, some 115,000 of those troops are currently stationed in the Persian Gulf region. Most of those are serving in Iraq, although there are significant numbers of soldiers in Kuwait and smaller numbers in other Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia. The army also stations about 70,000 soldiers in Germany and some 40,000 each in South Korea and Japan.

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve were developed as auxiliary organizations to support the active-duty army. They serve as a pool of trained reinforcements for the army and a ready force to handle emergency tasks, such as providing disaster relief. There are currently about 350,000 troops in the Army National Guard and 200,000 in the Army Reserve. Both the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have been called upon to shoulder a large part of the burden in Iraq following the 2003 war. As of March 2004, approximately 37,000 Army National Guard troops and 17,000 army reservists were serving in the Gulf.

HISTORY

The army has not always held the prominent place in U.S. affairs that it does today. Throughout most of U.S. history, the army has been a small force that was expanded only during times of war. It was not until after World War II that the United States adopted the policy of maintaining a large standing army.

Revolutionary War to Civil War

The U.S. Army had humble beginnings in the American Revolutionary War. The main American force was the volunteer Continental Army, most of whose recruits signed up to receive a cash bonus and a promise of land after the war. The soldiers were inexperienced and ill-equipped and had little or no training for battle. The Continental Army was joined by state and local militia, who were often better equipped and more experienced than the regular army.

The Continental Army lost most of the battles it fought against British regular troops early in the war. Late in 1776, General George Washington adopted a new strategy of avoiding large confrontations in favor of a guerilla war using hit-and-run tactics. These tactics proved successful in frustrating the British army and in convincing France to enter the war against Britain in 1780. The Continental Army's defeat of British forces at Yorktown four years later ensured American independence.

Congress disbanded most of the army after the war, and by 1789, the army had only 800 soldiers. The military weakness of the United States was revealed when the country became involved in the War of 1812. The United States hoped to drive British forces from Canada, but the small and poorly trained American troops were ineffective against British soldiers. The army did win a major engagement at the Battle of New Orleans in 1815, but by and large, the few land combats of the war had no decisive influence on the outcome.

The army remained small in the following decades, but it grew increasingly professional after the establishment of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York. The westward expansion of the United States during this period brought the nation into conflict with Mexico in 1846. The Mexican War (1846–48) was the first conflict fought by the U.S. Army mainly on foreign soil. In a foreshadowing of future wars, the U.S. Army defeated a numerically superior Mexican foe through the use of improved technology and superior tactics.

The Civil War and the Late 1800s

The United States Army entered the American Civil War (1861–65) with its already small core of experienced soldiers divided between Union and Confederate forces. Robert E. Lee, commander of the Confederate Army, and his Union rival in the final years of the war, Ulysses S. Grant, were West Point graduates who had served together during the Mexican War. Many other former U.S. Army officers also served in the ranks of the Confederacy.

Civil War combat was marked by an unprecedented level of death and destruction. Technical improvements in weaponry, combined with a reliance on outdated tactics from an earlier era, produced staggering casualties for both sides. A major battle might claim 10,000 to 20,000 lives and result in many times more casualties. An estimated 600,000 Americans on both sides died during the war, more than the total of all other U.S. wars combined.

The horrible casualties convinced U.S. President Abraham Lincoln that a volunteer army would be insufficient to win the war. In March 1863, the U.S. government declared that all male citizens 20 to 35 years of age, and all unmarried men 35 to 45, were eligible for military service. The measure was extremely unpopular and led to a draft riot in New York City that summer. The Confederate Army was also forced to resort to conscription, which was no more popular in the South than it was in the North.

After the Civil War, most army draftees and volunteers returned to civilian life and the army once again shrunk in size. The army's main missions in the years following the war were the occupation of the former Confederate states and pacifying the Indians on the western frontier. In the South, the army kept order during Reconstruction, the process of rebuilding the South and bringing it back into the Union. Reconstruction officially ended in 1877, when the last federal troops were withdrawn.

During the 1870s and 1880s, the army directed its efforts mainly to fighting Native American tribes who resisted U.S. expansion into their lands. The earliest major battles of the so-called Indian Wars took place in the mid-1850s, and the last occurred in 1877. However, continuing battles with remaining tribes continued throughout the 1880s. By the early 1890s, the last remaining pockets of Native American resistance had been subdued, largely as a result of the efforts of the army.

The Era of Imperialism

By the late 19th century, the United States had grown from a weak agricultural nation to a powerful

industrial giant. American companies, eager to find new markets for their goods, drove a new wave of American imperialism. In 1898, the destruction of the U.S. warship *Maine* in Cuba's Havana harbor led the United States to declare war on Spain (which owned Cuba at the time), despite proof of Spanish involvement. During the war, the United States captured Spanish possessions in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Although the war lacked notable land battles, it marked the Army's first major seaborne deployment on foreign soil. More importantly, it established the United States as a global power with interests far from its own shores.

At the start of World War I in 1914, the U.S. Army consisted of some 98,000 regular troops with an additional 27,000 in the National Guard. It was the largest American peacetime army to date, but it was dwarfed by the major European armies, which numbered millions of soldiers apiece. The United States remained neutral until 1917, finally declaring on war on Germany after repeated German provocations. The U.S. entry was a turning point in the war. A wartime U.S. draft brought hundreds of thousands of fresh troops to the Allied cause and helped to defeat the tired German army. World War I marked the largest U.S. Army mobilization up to that time. More than 4 million soldiers served in the U.S. Army during World War I, and over 50,000 were killed in action.

As after previous wars, the United States rapidly demobilized after 1918, cutting the size of the army to fewer than 100,000 troops. However, by the 1930s, the growing possibility of another European war, and the rise of a militarily aggressive Japanese empire in the Pacific led to an increase in U.S. military spending. This spending was not, though, accompanied by a significant increase in U.S. ground forces. When Japan attacked the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the United States found itself once again at war with an army unprepared for the task. However, outrage at the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor spurred a wave of enlistment in the United States; millions of men volunteered for the army and other branches of the military. Congress reinstated the draft and conscripted millions more.

World War II and Korea

Supported by Allied industrial and technological superiority, the U.S. Army during World War II grew into the most powerful military force in the world. In addition, the army was no longer solely a land-bound force; it relied heavily on airpower during the war. The Army Air Force, separated from the Army Signal Corps between the wars, provided much of the U.S. striking power in World War II. Tactical army fighters and fighter-bombers provided close support for troops in battle, and long-range strategic bombers attacked German and Japanese industry.

The U.S. Army in World War II was also the nation's first fully mechanized army. Troops no longer marched or rode into battle on horseback but were carried by trucks, jeeps, half-tracks, and other motorized vehicles. Combined land-sea-air amphibious assaults throughout Europe and the Pacific also enabled the army to perfect its combined arms tactics. Open terrain in North Africa and Western Europe allowed tank commanders to develop and practice new armored doctrines. The army pioneered the development of new technology, such as radar, field radios, flamethrowers, bazookas, and guided rockets that would change the face of warfare.

At its peak in World War II, the U.S. Army totaled more than 8 million soldiers; 230,000 lost their lives in combat. After the war ended, most draftees and volunteers left the army and quickly returned to their civilian lives. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 thus caught the United States unprepared to wage another major land war. President Harry Truman returned to the draft to provide the manpower needed to defend South Korea. Some 2 million Americans would eventually serve in Korea, and 27,000 would die before the war ended in 1953. The United States still maintains a significant military presence in South Korea.

Growing Cold War tensions, exemplified by the outbreak of the Korean War, convinced the U.S. government that the country needed a standing army. After Korea, the United States maintained the largest peacetime army in its history. Large numbers of troops were stationed in overseas hotspots, particularly Germany and South Korea. Basing troops in Germany assured American allies that U.S. troops would meet any planned invasion of Western Europe by the USSR. United States troops in South Korea provided similar security guarantees against North Korean aggression.

Vietnam and Its Aftermath

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the United States became increasingly involved in affairs in Southeast

Asia. Concerned about a communist takeover of South Vietnam, President John F. Kennedy sent U.S. Army Special Forces overseas in 1961 to support the South Vietnamese Army. By 1963, more than 16,000 American troops and advisers were in the country and some had even taken part in combat. The following year, President Lyndon B. Johnson dramatically increased the number of troops in Vietnam.

In Vietnam, the army relied on airpower and technological sophistication as never before. The war saw the first large-scale use of helicopters to engage enemy troops, carry U.S. soldiers into battle, and evacuate casualties. In response, the less technologically advanced North Vietnamese forces borrowed a page from George Washington, using hit-and-run tactics with devastating effect. By avoiding large set-piece battles, they canceled the U.S. Army's advantage in firepower and frustrated efforts to force the war to a decisive conclusion. American public support for the war gradually eroded in the face of heavy U.S. casualties in a war that seemed to have no prospect for victory. The United States finally pulled out in 1973 after the loss of 50,000 soldiers, more than 30,000 of them from the army.

The defeat in Vietnam had two major effects on the U.S. Army. First, it made American leaders more reluctant to commit troops to combat. The United States turned to the rapid, long-range striking power of the air force and navy to project U.S. power with less risk of casualties. Protests about the unfairness of the draft during Vietnam also put an end to conscription. Even before the last U.S. troops left Vietnam, the draft was abolished and the army became once again an all-volunteer force.

The Post–Cold War Army

Throughout the Cold War, army tactics and strategy were dictated by the need to counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 forced a major reassessment of army priorities. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the army reduced its force by about one-third and concentrated on increasing its readiness and modernization. The United States adopted a new strategy of being ready to fight two major conflicts at the same time while still providing troops for disaster relief at home or UN peacekeeping missions abroad.

That same year, during the Gulf War of 1991, the U.S. Army fought its first major engagement since Vietnam. In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in late 1990, U.S. forces led an international coalition to expel the Iraqi forces. Nearly 500,000 U.S. Army troops took part in the campaign, which forced the Iraqis to surrender in just four days. The swiftness and decisiveness of the Gulf War victory restored a great deal of the pride and prestige the army had lost after Vietnam.

With the United States uninvolved in major conflicts during the 1990s, the army was deployed mainly in several UN peacekeeping missions, including those in Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Somalia. These missions, though important for U.S. foreign relations, were often unpopular with the American public—especially when they resulted in U.S. casualties. Public outcry at the loss of 18 soldiers in Somalia in 1993 led the United States to abandon that mission.

Afghanistan, Iraq, and the War on Terror

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the U.S. Army was deployed in an overseas war for the first time since 1991. In early 2002, U.S. Army units supported by special-operations troops were sent to Afghanistan. Their objectives were to capture the al-Qaeda terrorists who planned the attacks and to depose Afghanistan's ruling Taliban government, which was supporting the terrorists. The rugged Afghan terrain made operations difficult and offered an almost endless number of hiding places for al-Qaeda forces. Although the army succeeded in toppling the Taliban and installing a democratic Afghan government, it failed to capture most of the senior al-Qaeda leaders or destroy the terrorist organization.

A year later, the U.S. Army led a coalition that invaded Iraq to depose the regime of President Saddam Hussein, who was suspected of concealing weapons of mass destruction. The army overran Iraq in less than a month, sweeping the overmatched Iraqi army from the battlefield. However, in the aftermath of the fighting, Iraqis loyal to the former regime began an armed resistance that soon killed more U.S. troops than had died during the invasion itself. Critics claimed that the army had not committed sufficient forces to secure the peace after winning the war. They faulted civilian leaders for relying on a doctrine that deemphasized the need for troops and relied too much on mobility, speed, airpower, and superior intelligence and communications technology.

The occupation and insurgency in Iraq poses a serious dilemma for the army. To meet troop demands without resorting to a draft, the army has forced soldiers to stay beyond their official discharge dates, a practice called *forced retention.* It has also speeded up troop rotations, so soldiers get less time off before having to return to combat. The war has also stretched the National Guard and Reserves to their limits. In early 2005, the army reported that all three of its branches were significantly below their reenlistment and recruiting goals. Nevertheless, President George W. Bush has vowed not to reinstate the draft. If crises arise in Korea or other global hotspots, that vow may be put to the test.

—John Haley

See also All-Volunteer Force; Conscription/Volunteer Force; Conventional Forces; Conventional Forces in Europe; Green Berets; Guerrilla Warfare; Interservice Rivalry; Military Draft; Patton, George (1885–1945); Powell, Colin (1937–); Reserve Forces; Signal Corps; UN Peacekeeping; U.S. Air Force; U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Navy

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REFLECTIONS

Executive Order 9981: Integration Comes to the Army

On July 26, 1948, President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 9981, which led to the integration of African Americans within the ranks of the U.S. Army. The following are excerpts from that executive order:

Whereas it is essential that there be maintained in the armed services of the United States the highest standards of democracy, with equality of treatment and opportunity for all those who served in our country's defense . . . it is hereby ordered as follows.

It is hereby declared . . . that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale.

There shall be created in the National Military Establishment an advisory committee to be known as the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity . . . [which] is authorized on behalf of the President to examine into the rules, procedures and practices of the armed services in order to determine in what respect such rules, procedures and practices may be altered or improved with a view to carrying out the policy of this order.

All executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government are authorized and directed to cooperate with the Committee in its work, and to furnish the Committee such information or the services of such persons as the Committee may require in the performance of its duties.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
See WAR COLLEGES

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND (USCENTCOM)

A regional headquarters responsible for planning and conducting U.S. military activity in northeast Africa and southwest and central Asia. As a unified combatant command, CENTCOM is composed of forces from the army, navy, air force, and marines, and has a broad and ongoing mission. The regional division of commands represented by the Unified Combat Command structure allows U.S. defense planning to be focused on specific regions. CENTCOM is one of nine Unified Combatant Commands that include U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), as well as the functionally ordered U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). CENTCOM is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. The commander in chief of CENTCOM (CINCCENT) reports directly to the secretary of defense.

CENTCOM has no combat units permanently assigned to it. Instead, all four armed services provide CENTCOM with component commands. These include USARCENT (army), USCENTAF (air force),

USMARCENT (marines), USNAVCENT (navy), and SOCCENT (special operations).

CENTCOM's area of responsibility covers 27 countries from the Horn of Africa to central Asia. CENTCOM's Northern Red Sea and Arabian Peninsula area consists of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, as well as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. United States interests in this area include strategic oil resources and access to waterways such as the Persian Gulf. The Horn of Africa region covered by CENTCOM consists of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and the islands of Seychelles. This region is considered important because it borders the critical sea lines of communication through the Red Sea. CENTCOM's south Asian area comprises Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Main U.S interests in this region include containing Iranian military expansion and fighting terrorism. The central Asian states included in CENTCOM's area of responsibility are Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Oil and gas development in the Caspian area are of key importance to U.S. interests in the region.

CENTCOM seeks to enhance U.S. presence in order to maintain stability and regional security in the volatile regions it covers. The free flow of oil and trade, freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, and the war on terrorism are key U.S. interests in the region covered by CENTCOM. To fulfill its objectives, CENTCOM maintains an active peacetime politico-military engagement program with countries in its area of responsibility, which include combined exercises and training, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. In the event of a conflict, CENTCOM is poised to quickly mobilize and respond.

The Defense Department defines CENTCOM's theater strategy as "shaping the Central Region for the 21st Century." CENTCOM's theater goals are grouped into war fighting, engagement, and development categories. War-fighting objectives are the most important and include protection, promotion, and preservation of U.S. interests in the Central Region, such as regional stability, free flow of energy resources, and freedom of navigation; development and maintenance of necessary forces and infrastructure to be able to respond militarily should the need arise; deterrence of conflict through forward presence and joint military exercises; and maintenance of combat readiness to be able to decisively fight and win a conflict should deterrence fail. Engagement objectives include maintenance

and support of coalitions and collective security efforts that support U.S. interests in the region; close relationships with regional political and military leaders; support for regional militaries; and countering terrorism and the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Development goals include prompt response to humanitarian and environmental crises and the maintenance of awareness of regional security, political, social, and economic trends.

Created in 1983 to replace the temporary Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), the primary mission of CENTCOM originally was to deter Soviet aggression and protect U.S. interests in southwest Asia. CENTCOM has since served as an effective means of projecting U.S. military power to the Gulf region from halfway around the globe. Some recent operations conducted under CENTCOM include the liberation of Kuwait under Operation Desert Storm (1991); humanitarian intervention in Somalia with Operation Restore Hope (1992–93); combating international terrorism in Afghanistan with Operation Enduring Freedom (2001); and the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein with Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003).

See also Counterterrorism; Gulf War (1990–1991); Iraq War of 2003; Middle East and U.S. Policy; U.S. Northern Command; U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Southern Command

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U.S. COAST GUARD

Branch of the U.S. armed forces responsible for coastal defense, maritime security, maritime safety, facilitation of maritime commerce and recreation on the water, and the protection of national resources. In carrying out its duties, the Coast Guard operates in domestic waters, off the coast, and internationally.

The Coast Guard has its roots in the late-18th-century establishment of the Revenue Cutter Service. or, as it was also known, the Revenue Marine. This service was initially responsible for protecting the collection of federal revenue, preventing smuggling, and enforcing trade and tariff laws. On January 28, 1915,

the Act to Create the Coast Guard combined the Revenue Cutter Service and the Life-Saving Service into the U.S. Coast Guard.

In 1939, the Lighthouse Service was also moved under the Coast Guard's control. This placed the operation of lighthouses under the authority of the Coast Guard. However, recent improvements in navigational technology, such as the satellite-based Global Positioning System (GPS), have made most U.S. lighthouses obsolete. Currently, there is only one lighthouse still in use, the light station in Boston Harbor.

Over the years, the duties of the Coast Guard have been expanded to include more law-enforcement responsibilities, as well as search-and-rescue tasks, with the merging of various other services under the Coast Guard. In 1946 the Bureau of Marine Inspection was eliminated and its duties—the safety of merchant vessels and merchant marine licensing—were also transferred to the Coast Guard. Additionally, the Coast Guard has been charged with charting the U.S. coastline and protecting the marine environment. The Coast Guard also responds to oil spills throughout the world, creating the National Strike Force for this purpose in 1973.

Due to the ever-changing international and domestic political environment, certain duties have received greater emphasis during different periods in the Coast Guard's history. During Prohibition, the Coast Guard found itself primarily focused on the prevention of smuggling. After World War II, navigation and safety became a much more important responsibility for the Coast Guard. The law-enforcement duties of the Coast Guard again rose to prominence during the 1960s, in response to increased emigration from Cuba in the wake of Fidel Castro's communist takeover of the island. Preventing drug smuggling became an increasing challenge to the Coast Guard starting in the 1970s.

The Coast Guard has for much of its history been under the control of the Treasury Department. However, in 1967 the Coast Guard was placed under the Department of Transportation. Later, in 2003, it was moved to its current placement under the Department of Homeland Security. During wartime, however, the Coast Guard comes under the supervision of the U.S. Navy. The Guard's smaller ships with shallower drafts often prove useful when supplementing the navy's fleet. Under the navy, Coast Guard ships have been sent to foreign waters and its personnel have participated in many military actions.

Soon after its founding, the Coast Guard began to make use of aircraft for its missions. As technology has improved over the years, airpower has increasingly been used to carry out many of the Coast Guard's duties. In 1941, the Coast Guard created the Office of Air Sea Rescue. During World War II, Coast Guard aircraft patrolled the seas for German U-boats. Aircraft are especially suited to the Coast Guard's search-and-rescue missions. Helicopters, originally developed for antisubmarine warfare, were found to be particularly effective in a search-and-rescue role.

There are currently two U.S. Coast Guard commands: the Atlantic and Pacific commands. The Coast Guard has approximately 1,400 boats and 211 aircraft under its authority. It is made up of civilian, active-duty, reserve, and auxiliary personnel. Throughout its more than 200-year history, the U.S. Coast Guard has performed a valuable service in both war and peacetime, and it continues to do so today.

See also Border and Transportation Security; Coast Guard, The, and National Security; U.S. Navy

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USE OF FORCE, AUTHORIZATIONS OF
See WAR POWERS ACT (1973)

U.S.–JAPAN ALLIANCE

Military and diplomatic partnership between the world's two largest economies. Official diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan date to the Treaty of Peace and Amity at the Convention of Kanagawa in March 1854. Since 1951, with the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the U.S. has been allowed to maintain bases in Japan in exchange for which the Japanese have received security guarantees, including the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, a situation that has enabled Japan to maintain security at minimal cost.

HISTORY

In 1853, Japan was a country that had been sealed in a self-imposed isolation from the outside world for

some 200 years. That era of Japanese history vanished with the appearance of four U.S. Navy ships under the command of Commodore Matthew Perry at Shimoda on July 8, 1853. The Treaty of Peace and Amity, signed the following year in Yokohama, established diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. Japan opened itself to commerce and diplomacy with foreign powers and embarked on a lightning-quick modernization of its economy, infrastructure, education system, and military. With its formal annexation of Korea in 1910, Japan was fast on its way to becoming a world power. It also embarked on a collision course with its powerful Pacific Rim ally, the United States.

Japan's militarism and expansionism culminated in its 1941 attack on the U.S. fleet in Pearl Harbor, an act that brought the United States into World War II. Four years later, the Japanese empire came to a tragic end with the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Japan's subsequent surrender. The war was followed by a seven-year American occupation, which saw the writing of a new Japanese constitution, the establishment of the National Police Reserve (the forerunner of Japan's Self-Defense Forces), the rebirth of the Japanese economy, and the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty that laid the foundation for the current alliance. The postoccupation 1950s also saw the establishment of the '55 system, through which the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has controlled the Diet (Japanese parliament) and Japanese politics alone or by coalition since 1955.

The 1960s were marked by several controversial developments in the U.S.-Japan alliance. In 1960, Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke rammed through the Diet a revised U.S-Japan Security Treaty in advance of a scheduled visit by President Dwight Eisenhower. Although widespread public protests led to the resignation of Kishi and the cancellation of the Eisenhower visit, the revised treaty went into effect. Ideological tensions between the United States and Japan in the immediate post-occupation period were relieved by the economic-growth policies of Kishi's successors, Prime Ministers Ikeda and Sato.

The Vietnam War tested the strength of the U.S.–Japan alliance. Japanese university students protested the decision to allow U.S. planes to use the Japanese island of Okinawa as a base for bombing raids on North Vietnam. Tensions on university campuses in Japan mirrored those in the United States,

and Japanese gathered outside U.S. military facilities to protest the war. At the same time, Japan's increasing economic might gave it the necessary leverage to negotiate the recovery of land held by the United States since World War II. In 1968, the Ogasawara Islands were returned to Japan and an agreement was reached to return to Japanese control large U.S. industrial facilities in the Tokyo area.

Diplomatic tensions eased somewhat with the return of Okinawa to Japanese control in 1972 and the U.S. withdrawal of troops from Vietnam the following year. The early 1970s also witnessed diplomatic rapprochement with China on the part of both alliance partners. The late 1970s, however, brought strain to the alliance. A booming Japanese economy and trade surplus with America, combined with an economic slump in the United States, led to allegations of Japanese protectionism. Another object of dispute between the two allies has been the 1978 Host Nation Support agreement, through which Japan pays maintenance and utilities costs at U.S. military bases.

The 1980s witnessed several conflicting trends within the alliance. Increasing Japanese trade surpluses with the United States led to public outcry and calls for protection of the American market and American jobs. On the other hand, the U.S.-Japan alliance remained strong in the waning years of the Cold War, guided as it was by the strong interpersonal ties between President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone. It was Nakasone who coined the phrase "unsinkable aircraft carrier" to characterize Japan's security role in the enduring U.S.–Japan partnership.

The following decade brought with it Japanese financial support of U.S.-led efforts to defeat Iraqi forces in Operation Desert Storm. This effort often has been derided as checkbook diplomacy due to the fact that Japan sent money but was prohibited by its constitution from sending troops. Japanese public support for the security alliance was eroded in 1995 with the rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by three U.S. Marines. Tensions between the U.S. military and the people of Okinawa had been simmering for years; the rape incident brought them to boiling. The fact that 75% of U.S. bases in Japan are located in Okinawa prefecture further complicated the issue of civilian–military relations.

In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi emerged as a staunch U.S. ally. Koizumi stretched the limits of public and parliamentary

support—as well as Japan's own constitution—in dispatching the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to the Indian Ocean to support U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan. Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Koizumi sent Ground Self-Defense Forces to Iraq in early 2004 as a show of support for coalition efforts. This deployment of troops has served to strengthen the U.S.–Japan security relationship but is greatly unpopular with the Japanese public.

CURRENT ISSUES

As the alliance moves into the 21st century, the relationship between the two strongest Pacific Rim economies faces a great number of challenges to its continued popular support and shared goals. Will the United States move its military facilities from Okinawa? Will the Japanese public continue to tolerate the U.S. military presence? How long will they tolerate having Japanese Self-Defense Forces deployed into harm's way in support of the American presence in Afghanistan and Iraq? Will Japan and the United States continue to maintain a joint approach to North Korea's claimed development of nuclear weapons? Will both powers take the same approach to growing Chinese military might?

The U.S.–Japan alliance, based on 50 years of common security interests, has weathered wars in Korea and Vietnam, a Cold War, disputes over trade, public protest against U.S. bases, and the very security treaty that binds the two nations together. Prime Minister Koizumi has chosen to cast his nation's lot with the security interests of the United States. Whether Japanese and American security interests will continue to converge is a question key to understanding the future of this alliance between the world's two largest economies.

—Daniel P. McDonald

See also Burdensharing; Iraq War of 2003; Korea, North and South; Okinawa; Trade and Foreign Aid; World War II (1939–1945)

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U.S. MARINE CORPS

Branch of the U.S. armed services specializing in amphibious and combined land–sea–air operations. Marines, historically defined as soldiers who are transported by sea but fight on land, have a long combat history. Ancient navies often carried significant land forces into battle. For example, in the second century BCE, the Romans conquered their longtime rival Carthage with a seaborne invasion. The Dark Ages following the fall of the Roman Empire was a time of little maritime activity in Europe, and marines disappeared as a significant military force for several hundred years. However, expanded naval activity during the Age of Exploration in the 16th and 17th centuries revived the marines as part of European military forces.

HISTORY OF THE U.S. MARINES

By the time of the American Revolution in the late 18th century, all of the world's major navies included marine detachments. The U.S. Marines trace their history to November 15, 1775, when the Continental Congress decided to create two battalions of marines to add to the colonies' existing military forces. These two battalions were never actually formed, due primarily to a shortage of manpower, but small bands of U.S. marines did see action in the Bahamas. By the end of the war, marines had seen action on both land and sea, but their numbers remained small and they were a relatively insignificant part of the U.S. armed forces.

In 1798, the U.S. Congress passed an act to attach a Marine Corps of 33 officers and 848 soldiers to the U.S. Navy. One of the notable early missions undertaken by the new U.S. Marine Corps was an engagement with Barbary Coast pirates who had been threatening U.S. shipping interests in the Mediterranean Sea. After landing on the coast of North Africa and crossing the Libyan Desert, the Marines captured the city of Derna in Tripoli. This, however, was one of the few significant military roles the marines played in early U.S. history.

Though originally the marines focused on hand-to-hand combat aboard ship, due to the changing nature of technology, by the second half of the 19th century the U.S. Marine Corps began to train in amphibious warfare. Marine Corps participation in U.S. military campaigns increased steadily throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries. During the Spanish-American War

of 1898, the corps played a larger role than it had in previous conflicts, attacking both Manila Bay in the Philippines and Guantánamo Bay in Cuba. President Theodore Roosevelt also frequently used the U.S. Marines to project U.S. power in Latin America during the early 1900s.

Although the United States entered World War I quite late in the conflict, the marines played a part in the Allied victory over Germany. The most notable example of the marine contribution was their reinforcement of the French troops at the Bois de Belleau against a major German advance. It was reportedly during this engagement that Marine Corps captain Lloyd Williams uttered the famous line, "Retreat, hell! We just got here!"

During World War II, the corps, with its training in amphibious assaults, played a decisive role in the fighting in the Pacific against the Japanese. From 1942 to 1945, the marines fought a series of brutal and costly battles against Japanese island fortresses such as Guadalcanal, Wake, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. In the battle for the small island of Iwo Jima off the coast of Japan, 23,000 out of the 60,000 marines who landed on the island were killed or wounded. Fighting against Japanese forces that refused to surrender even in the face of overwhelming odds, the marines proved victorious despite suffering extremely high casualties.

The aftermath of World War II brought several changes to the marines. The National Security Act of 1947 reorganized the U.S. military structure and gave the Marine Corps a measure of formal independence, although it still remained under the general authority of the navy. In the 1960s, the Marine Corps was called upon to play a major role in the Vietnam War. In fact, more marines fought in Vietnam than had fought during World War II. However, the Vietnam War severely depleted marine manpower and forced the Corps to lower standards to meet recruiting goals. The U.S. pullout from Vietnam reduced the demand for active-duty troops and eased recruiting pressures on the marines. As a result, the quality of marines and their training improved during the late 1970s and 1980s. In 1973, the Marine Corps was given a separate seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Recruitment for the Marine Corps today is highly selective; candidates must have a high school diploma as well as meet certain physical requirements, such as minimum height, weight, and physical fitness. An enlistee enters the marines as a private, the lowest enlisted rank. Corps officers either serve under a warrant from the service secretary or receive a commission from the president and are confirmed by the U.S. Senate. The Marine Corps officer generally begins at the rank of second lieutenant and can work his or her way up the ranks to achieve the highest rank of general. The ratio of officers to enlistees in the Corps is approximately 1 to 8.6, a ratio that is much lower than in the other service branches.

MARINE CORPS ORGANIZATION

As of 2004, there were about 172,000 active-duty marines, organized into three divisions. Each division consists of three infantry regiments of three battalions each. Three companies make up each battalion, and three platoons make up each company. A platoon contains three squads, each of which is composed of three fire teams. In addition to active-duty troops, the Marine Corps has reserves that can be called up in times of need. These reserves were used during both the Gulf War of 1991 and the Iraq War of 2003. The requirements for joining the reserves are slightly more relaxed than for the regular marines.

Marines can choose to serve in one of several fields, including infantry, supporting combat units, or aviation. Aviation is a particularly sought-after field. Marines are stationed on several of the Corps' bases located in various locations in the United States. The commandant of the Marine Corps is headquartered at the oldest U.S. Marine post, found in Washington, DC. Other marine bases are located at Quantico, Virginia; Camp LeJeune, North Carolina; and Camp Pendleton, near San Diego, California. The marines also have several training bases on Parris Island, South Carolina.

The U.S. Marine Corps has had a complex history and has at certain periods found itself on the verge of extinction. Over time, the marines have had to adapt to the changing military environment to find their role. With the current need for flexible specialized forces that can be deployed rapidly, it is likely that the marines will play a significant role in future conflicts.

—Rebecca S. Perkins

See also Amphibious Warfare; Marine Barracks, Beirut (1983); Spanish-American War (1898); World War II (1939–1945)

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U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY (WEST POINT)

Military academy established to educate and train commissioned officers for the United States Army. The mission of the academy is "to educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the values of Duty, Honor, Country; professional growth throughout a career as an officer in the United States Army; and a lifetime of selfless service to the nation."

Located on the Hudson River in West Point, New York, the U.S. Military Academy has been an integral part of the American military since the Revolutionary War. At that time, West Point was the site of a key American fortress that the revolutionaries, including General George Washington, considered the most strategically important location in America. Legislation signed by President Thomas Jefferson in 1802 transformed West Point from a fortress to an educational establishment: the United States Military Academy. In its more than 200 years of existence, the United States Military Academy has produced many notable graduates, including Ulysses S. Grant, Robert E. Lee, William Tecumseh Sherman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson, Douglas MacArthur, Omar Bradley, and George Patton.

Initially, the academy provided only engineering training to students. Throughout the ensuing two centuries, the curriculum was expanded to include a broader range of sciences and humanities. However, academics are only one part of the broader educational experience required by the academy. In addition to the academic program, cadets participate in a physical program, a military program, and moral-ethical development to produce a well-rounded graduate prepared to carry out the duties of a U.S. Army officer. There are approximately 4,000 graduates enrolled at the academy under the current legislative provisions.

The academy graduates approximately 900 cadets a year. Each graduate is awarded a bachelor of science and is commissioned as a second lieutenant in the United States Army. Following their commission, the graduates are obligated to provide at least five years of military service. These newly commissioned graduates account for approximately 25% of the army's annual need for new lieutenants. Despite their relatively small numbers in the overall force, academy graduates are considered an indispensable part of the modern U.S. Army.

See also U.S. Air Force Academy; U.S. Naval Academy

U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY (ANNAPOLIS)

Educational establishment responsible for training and educating officers for the United States Navy. The United States Naval Academy is charged with the mission of developing students (known as midshipmen) "morally, mentally, and physically," thereby by producing graduates who are effective marine and naval officers.

Prior to the founding of the United State Naval Academy, the navy oversaw the Philadelphia Naval Asylum and a few smaller naval schools in New York City, Norfolk, and Boston. In 1845, Secretary of the Navy George Bancroft moved the Naval School to Fort Severn in Annapolis, Maryland. The institution's name was changed to the United States Naval Academy in 1850 and a four-year study program was implemented. In 1933, Congress authorized the Naval Academy to award bachelor of science degrees. Among the Naval Academy's notable alumni are Senator John McCain, former president Jimmy Carter, former chief of naval operations Arleigh Burke, and Admirals Chester Nimitz and George Dewey.

Today, the academy's curriculum has been expanded beyond the core classes to include nearly 20 different majors encompassing the sciences and humanities. However, the education provided to students at the Naval Academy is not limited to academics. The academy also provides moral, physical, and professional education to produce future officers trained and equipped to carry out the duties of a naval or marine officer in the United States military.

See also U.S. Air Force Academy; U.S. Military Academy

U.S. NAVY

Branch of the United States armed forces responsible for naval operations. The navy is the oldest of the U.S.

armed services to be officially established by Congress. Throughout its long and colorful history. it has played a key role in defending U.S. interests, assisting U.S. allies, and projecting U.S. power.

REVOLUTIONARY WAR PERIOD (1775–89)

On October 13, 1775, the Continental Congress authorized the creation of the Continental Navy to intercept supplies and arms destined for the British soldiers occupying Boston. Others in the rebellious colonies had also seen the need for a naval fighting force. Even before Congress acted, George Washington had assumed command of several vessels and some colonial governors also had outfitted warships. The Continental Navy would prove to be an effective weapon against the British and would signal to the world that America was a mature nation.

Cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, tossing their caps in the air at the conclusion of their graduation ceremony on May 29, 2004. Established in 1802, the United States Military Academy has been training future army officers for more than 200 years. In addition to teaching basic military skills and preparing cadets for leadership roles, West Point works to develop their intellect, physical abilities, and moral and ethical values.

Source: U.S. Army.

In March 1776, U.S. Naval Commander in Chief Esek Hopkins led a small American fleet against the city of Nassau in the Bahamas, where the British had been stockpiling gun power. On April 6, Hopkins's armada, joined by the USS *Fly,* engaged HMS *Glasgow* in America's first major sea battle. The successful engagement enabled Hopkins's forces to capture Nassau. Congress soon authorized the construction of 13 frigates to supplement the fleet of refitted merchant ships that were serving as naval vessels. The Continental Navy performed a variety of missions throughout the war, including raiding British supply lines, protecting American commercial vessels, and resupplying American troops.

The Navy's contribution to the American victory in the Revolution demonstrated its value to the new nation. When the United States Constitution was ratified in 1789, it charged Congress with maintaining the navy. In this capacity, Congress ordered the construction of six frigates to replace ships lost in the Revolution. It also called for construction of the *America,* a 76-gun ship given to France to compensate that country for the loss of its ship *Magnifique* during the war.

THE CONTINENTAL PERIOD (1790–1890)

In the years following the war, the cash-poor Congress was forced to sell most of the navy's ships to raise funds to run the new nation. Lacking an effective navy to protect them, American merchant vessels increasingly became the targets of pirates. The problem was particularly acute in the Mediterranean Sea, where North African Barbary pirates preyed on U.S. merchant ships. The British, not eager to assist their former colonies, refused to protect American ships. Although the United States lost relatively few ships to pirates, the insult of seeing their countrymen held for ransom or sold into slavery outraged many Americans.

Actor and comedian Robin Williams entertaining the crew of the USS *Enterprise* during a holiday special hosted by the United Service Organization (USO) in the Arabian Gulf in December 2003. The troops onboard the *Enterprise* were part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (the U.S.–Iraq War) and the continuing war on terrorism. Performers such as Williams have been entertaining U.S. troops abroad since World War II.

Source: U.S. Navy.

Public support for a strong navy grew; the cause was championed by Thomas Jefferson, among others. The need for a strong navy became even more apparent after British swept U.S. merchant ships from the sea and blockaded U.S. ports during the War of 1812.

The United States' clear vulnerability at sea convinced Congress to commit to the construction of a formidable navy in the early 19th century. Struggling to keep up with innovations in ship-building technology, the navy experimented with armor plating, improved weapons such as breechloaders and shell guns, steam-powered propulsion systems, and the telegraph. In 1845, Congress established the Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, to educate and train officers for service in the U.S. Navy. The early curriculum focused almost solely on engineering, a reflection of the importance of technology in this era of naval development.

During both the Mexican War (1846–48) and the American Civil War (1860–65), the navy performed its most valuable service blockading enemy ports. During the Mexican War it also provided significant support for U.S. ground forces. When the Mexicans refused to negotiate with the United States, President James Polk authorized the navy to conduct a sea invasion at Veracruz that proved to be one of the decisive battles of the conflict.

During the Civil War, the U.S. Navy gave the Union a virtual monopoly on naval power. When the war began, the Confederate states had no oceangoing ships and most of the country's men-of-war were in northern ports. As the war progressed, the South managed to purchase several swift cruisers that combined steam and sail power. For a time these vessels took a serious toll on commercial shipping in the North. However, the Union's superior industrial and economic power enabled the U.S. Navy to maintain numerical and technological superiority over the Confederate Navy. The Union effected a blockade of key Southern ports that crippled Southern trade and forced the Confederates to keep tens of thousands of soldiers posted on the shore against possible sea invasions.

The Union flexed its naval might on inland waterways as well. Armor-clad gunboats accompanied Union ground operations south and protected important river supply routes. During critical battles along the Mississippi River, the Union's oceangoing and inland water forces combined in a classic campaign to cut the Confederacy in half.

Ship-building technology was changing the face of warfare. This change may be no more apparent than in the May 1862 clash between the Confederate ironclad *Virginia*—a captured Union vessel named *Merrimack* that the Confederates outfitted with iron plate and rechristened—and the Union ironclad *Monitor*. The *Monitor* was one of the most innovative vessels of all time. It was made entirely out of iron in nine sections that were assembled in less than 120 days. Its innovations included a rotating turret containing cannon—the first

time such a device was ever used. The *Monitor* was also the first vessel fitted with a marine screw propeller, anticipating some elements of submarine design. All of the facilities of the ship except the pilot station and the turret were underwater.

THE OCEANIC PERIOD (1890–1945)

In the 1880s, the United States entered an era of change. With the wounds of the Civil War healing and the American frontier closed, the nation turned its sights outward. The United States was a growing industrial power that desired foreign markets for its goods. The advent of steam-powered vessels in this period put the Caribbean and Central and South America within easy reach of U.S. merchantmen. As the United States expanded its role as a maritime nation, the navy took on a greater role in U.S. national security.

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the navy became a tool of foreign policy. It was particularly useful for protecting American commercial interests and denying any significant European presence in the Western Hemisphere. The navy moved to the forefront of military operations when the Spanish-American War broke out in 1898. It moved quickly against the Spanish Pacific fleet, annihilating it in Manila Bay and trapping most of Spain's remaining ships in Cuba. By destroying a Spanish armada considered one of the world's leading navies, the U.S. Navy established dominance in the western Atlantic and ended Spain's colonial ambitions.

The United States launched a new ship-building campaign following the war. In 1907–1908, President Theodore Roosevelt sent the so-called Great White Fleet of 16 new battleships on a global cruise to demonstrate to the world the might of America's navy. The message was aimed particularly at Japan, a growing naval rival in the Pacific. The U.S. Navy had become America's first defenders, sentries on a line far from American shores.

When World War I broke out in 1914, the United States—although neutral in the conflict—faced a dual threat in the Atlantic. Germany had ordered submarine attacks against shipping to and from Great Britain, a move that endangered U.S. merchant vessels. Meanwhile Britain, concerned about the effects of submarine warfare exploitation of its economy, tried to use its naval power to force entry into American-dominated markets. In 1916, the United States embarked on another massive naval build-up. A year later, after

several German provocations, including the sinking of U.S. merchant ships, President Woodrow Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany. He dispatched the navy to deliver the troops of the American Expeditionary Force across the Atlantic. The entrance of fresh troops and American economic might against a war-weary Germany assured the Allied victory.

The lessons of World War I were not lost on naval policymakers. Although there were a couple of major naval surface battles during the war, none were decisive. The greatest naval threat of the war was the German U-boat, which wrought havoc on merchant shipping and came close to crippling the British economy. To counter the German U-boats, the navy needed smaller, faster ships such as destroyers. This need for smaller vessels went hand in hand with a wave of naval disarmament following the war.

For more than a decade after World War I, the navy struggled to maintain forces at levels permitted by postwar naval treaties. However, during this time the navy adopted new doctrines and technologies that would prove valuable in the next major war. The navy embraced air power by moving its resources away from battleships and toward building aircraft carriers. With the knowledge garnered from the German U-boat, the navy sought improved designs for submarines capable of coastal operations as well as fleet support in the vast Pacific. During the 1930s, the navy began to build a two-ocean force capable of meeting threats in both the Pacific and the Atlantic. At this time also, the Japanese imperial fleet emerged as the main rival of the U.S. Navy.

On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attacked and destroyed the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor using carrier-based aircraft. Luckily for the United States, none of its aircraft carriers—the principal intended target of the attack—were in port at the time. Four days later, the Germans declared war on the United States and the nation faced a two-ocean war. The early phase of the war went poorly for the United States. In the Atlantic, U-boats torpedoed Allied tankers and freighters within sight of the East Coast. In the Pacific, the attack on Pearl Harbor bought Japan a window of uncontested naval superiority that it used to expand and secure its island empire.

By mid-1942, however, the tide had begun to turn in the Allies' favor. In June 1942, a U.S. task force built around two U.S. aircraft carriers dealt a severe blow to the Japanese fleet at the Battle of Midway. The much smaller U.S. force sank four Japanese carriers and several other large surface ships. The loss of

ships and experienced aircrew was a setback from which the Japanese navy never recovered.

In the Atlantic, German U-boats remained a menace throughout the war. The struggle for control of the sea-lanes, known as the Battle of the Atlantic, was still in grave doubt throughout 1942. However, new anti-submarine technology—and U.S. industrial might, which continued to produce new ships—finally turned the course of the naval war in favor of the Allies by mid-1943. Once the sea-lanes were secure, the Allies were able to bring to bear all of their forces around the perimeter of Hitler's empire. The U.S. Navy supported amphibious assaults in North Africa, Italy, and France that allowed the Allies to liberate Europe from German control.

While the United States played a valuable supporting role in the Atlantic, it played the lead in the Pacific. Japan built a far-flung empire across the Pacific that the United States had to recapture step by step. The Americans fought their way across the Pacific in a series of large-scale amphibious operations, part of an island-hopping strategy supported by carrier-based aircraft. In 1944, decisive victories at the Battles of the Philippine Sea and the Leyte Gulf virtually ended the Japanese military threat. By the end of the war, U.S. submarines had devastated Japanese shipping, and amphibious marine landings denied Japan the resources from its captured territories. The U.S. victory in the Pacific demonstrated the mobility, sustainability, flexibility, and striking power of the U.S. Navy.

THE TRANSOCEANIC PERIOD (1945–PRESENT)

With the defeat of Germany and Japan, the navy needed to consider a new enemy—the Soviet Union. During the coming Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the navy would play a very active and visible role. The Cold War marked a shift in thinking about U.S. national-security policy. Instead of passively waiting for Soviet aggression, the United States adopted a policy of active deterrence. Aircraft-carrier battle groups deployed on all the world's oceans became a symbol of U.S. might and America's commitment to its allies.

Carrier task forces gave the United States a quick strike capability anywhere in the world. In the case of war with the Soviet Union, these carriers could launch attacks on naval and air bases on the periphery of the USSR. Amphibious forces would then invade, reinforce, or retake strategic land positions. Submarines also played a key role in the new naval strategy. Rather than attacking Soviet merchant ships, Allied submarines would try to bottle up their Russian counterparts attempting to leave base.

The decade of the 1950s brought revolutionary development in the navy. At the beginning of the decade, the navy still relied on World War II–era tactics. This force proved viable and even decisive during the Korean War, deploying and supporting troops in the amphibious invasion at Inchon in September 1950. Carrier-based aircraft also supported Allied ground forces in Korea. However, Korea marked the last major conflict for the steam-powered carrier and propeller-driven aircraft. The navy would soon enter both the jet age and the atomic age.

In 1955, the navy launched the world's first nuclear-powered naval vessel, the submarine USS *Nautilus.* The year before saw the construction of the world's first supercarrier, the USS *Forrestal,* designed specifically to handle jet-powered aircraft. Five years after the *Nautilus* was launched, the aircraft carrier USS *Enterprise* became the world's first nuclear-powered surface vessel. All U.S. carriers commissioned since that time have been powered by nuclear reactors. Advances in nuclear technology led to the development of smaller reactors, which by the 1960s powered many naval vessels other than carriers.

Nuclear power led to a revolution in submarine design. The old diesel-electric submarines could stay underwater for only relatively short periods before they had to surface to charge their batteries. Nuclear-powered submarines can stay underwater for months at a time, surfacing only when they need to take on food. New missile-guidance technology led to the development of mobile, stealthy submarines capable of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The United States considered submarine-based nuclear missiles perhaps its most valuable military asset during the Cold War because of their near invulnerability to detection and destruction by the USSR. They ensured a U.S. retaliatory strike in case of a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States.

The navy benefited from continuing technological evolution during the 1970s and 1980s. During the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan committed the United States to a military buildup to counter the threat of Soviet expansion. During this time, the navy was expanded and equipped with updated technology. Quieter submarines armed with improved Trident nuclear missiles patrolled the oceans as a nuclear deterrent. Carrier groups supported by ships carrying long-range cruise missiles and the latest antisubmarine

warfare technology continued to patrol the north Atlantic, Mediterranean, and western Pacific.

The navy was not simply a strategic deterrence after the Korean War. Naval airpower played a major part in the Vietnam War, as carrier-based aircraft bombed North Vietnam and supported American ground assaults. Navy *swift boats* patrolled the Vietnamese coasts and rivers to locate and destroy North Vietnamese forces. During the 1980s, the Navy supported military action in Lebanon, Libya, Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf.

Carriers in the Red Sea and Gulf of Oman played a crucial role during the Gulf War of 1991, guarding sea-lanes and protecting the huge troop buildup before the Allied invasion of Iraq. Twelve years later, the navy once again supported ground and air operations against Iraq, during the Iraq War of 2003. Because of the strategic importance of the Middle East, the navy retains a significant presence in the region.

Headed by the secretary of the navy, the U.S. Navy today has more than half a million men and women on active and reserve duty operating more than 300 ships and 4,000 aircraft. The navy continues to play its traditional role as defender of the nation's interests at sea, as well as its more modern role as a deterrent to aggression against the United States and its allies abroad.

—Will Hughes

See also Aircraft Carrier; Cruise Missile; Inchon Landing (1950); Leyte Gulf, Battle of (1944); Midway, Battle of (1944); Pearl Harbor; Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs); Sealift; Secure Second Strike; Strategic Nuclear Triad; Submarine Warfare; Submarines; Washington Naval Treaty (1922); World War I (1914–1918); World War II (1939–1945)

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U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND (USNORTHCOM)

A regional headquarters responsible for planning and conducting U.S. military activity in the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) was established in 2002 in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, DC. Located at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado, NORTHCOM is one of the nine combatant commands established and operated by the United States Department of Defense. Northern Command centralizes the homeland defense activities being conducted by other Defense Department agencies, by putting them under a single command. Organizationally, it is under the same command as North American Aerospace Defense Command.

According to the Department of Defense, Northern Command's mission is homeland defense and civil support. It conducts operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility. It also provides military assistance to civil authorities, as directed by the president or secretary of defense. Like the other combatant commands, NORTHCOM does not maintain its own standing forces; rather, the troops are tasked to the command as needed. NORTHCOM's permanent staff consists of approximately 500 civilian and uniformed personnel.

Northern Command's operations on domestic soil are regulated by the Posse Comitatus Act. The act limits the role of the military in domestic affairs, including the prohibition of the military from participating in the interdiction of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft; execution of surveillance, searches, pursuits, and seizures; or arresting individuals in lieu of civilian law-enforcement agencies. A congressional exception can allow the military to assist civilian law-enforcement agencies at the federal, state, and local levels on a case-specific basis.

See also September 11/WTC and Pentagon Attacks; U.S. Central Command; U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Southern Command

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (USPACOM)

A regional headquarters responsible for planning and conducting U.S. military activity in the Asia-Pacific region. As a Unified Combatant Command, PACOM is composed of forces from the army, navy, air force, and marines and has a broad and ongoing mission.

The regional division of commands allows defense planning to be focused on a specific region.

USPACOM is one of nine Unified Combatant Commands that include U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). PACOM is headquartered at Camp H. M. Smith in Oahu, Hawaii. As of October 2002, by direction of the secretary of defense, the title "Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command" was changed to "Commander, U.S. Pacific Command" (CDRUSPACOM). The PACOM commander reports directly to the secretary of defense.

Component commands of PACOM from the four services consist of U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Marine Forces Pacific, and U.S. Pacific Air Forces. Unified commands subordinate to PACOM are U.S. Forces, Japan; U.S. Forces, Korea; Alaskan Command; and Special Operations Command, Pacific. PACOM forces are organized into three categories: forward deployed, forward based, and CONUS (Continental U.S.). Additional support units located in Hawaii and throughout PACOM's area of responsibility include the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the Information Systems Support Activity, Pacific Automated Server Site Japan, Cruise Missile Support Activity, Special Intelligence Communications, Joint Intelligence Center Pacific, Joint Intelligence Training Activity Pacific, Joint Interagency Task Force West, and Joint Task Force Full-Accounting.

PACOM was established in 1947 and is the oldest and largest of the Unified Combatant Commands. PACOM's area of responsibility covers 43 countries, 10 territories and possessions, and 10 U.S. territories. Some of the major countries in the PACOM area include China, India, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, North Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Antarctica was recently added to USPACOM's area of responsibility. Although Russia is included in the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility, USPACOM, in coordination with USEUCOM, retains responsibility for force protection in the areas of the Russian Federation east of 100° east longitude, counterterrorism (CT) planning for U.S. diplomatic missions, and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). A Memorandum of Understanding signed between USEUCOM and USPACOM outlines Theater Security Cooperation responsibilities in eastern Russia.

The stated mission of PACOM is to enhance security and promote peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region by deterring aggression, responding to crises, and winning quickly and decisively in the event of war. The U.S. military through PACOM also seeks to establish and maintain security relationships with countries in the region and deter future conflicts. PACOM is also responsible for providing support to the mutual defense treaties forged in the region, including the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (1960); South East Asia Collective Defense among the United States, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines (1955); ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S., 1952); the U.S.–Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty (1954); and the U.S.–Republic of the Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (1952). PACOM has participated in more than 1,500 exercises and other engagement activities with foreign military forces. Disaster-relief operations are also conducted as needed in the region by PACOM.

The Asia-Pacific region is of strategic importance to the United States. A potentially hegemonic China with growing military and economic power, another China–Taiwan crisis, and the instability on the Korean peninsula remain primary concerns for U.S. national security. Economic interests are also central, because 35% of U.S. trade is within the region. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, PACOM has increased counterterrorism operations in the Philippines and Indonesia.

See also ANZUS Security Treaty; Counterterrorism; U.S. Central Command; U.S. Northern Command; U.S. Southern Command

U.S.–PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE

U.S. military agreement between the United States and the Philippines that guaranteed a U.S. military presence in the Philippines from 1901 until 1991. For almost a century, the U.S. military maintained two major bases in the Philippines: Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Station. Subic Bay was designated a U.S. naval station after the 1901 U.S. invasion that ended Spanish rule in the Philippines. Prior to

World War I, Subic Bay was the largest training facility for U.S. Marines. In 1902, Fort Stotsenberg, renamed Clark Air Base in 1947, was opened in the Philippines' Pampanga province.

The United States controlled the Philippines until the end of World War II, when the islands finally gained independence. Then, in March 1947, the Philippines signed an agreement that allowed the United States to maintain military bases on the islands for 99 years. In addition to the U.S. military presence, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) maintained an active role in the Philippines. Throughout the Cold War and the Korean War, Subic Bay and Clark Air Base remained important logistical support bases for the United States. During the Vietnam War, air traffic at Clark Air Base reached as high as 40 transports per day bound for Vietnam.

In 1966, the duration of the U.S.–Philippine agreement was reduced to 25 years, with the expiration to occur in September 1991. The bases remained important to U.S. interests during the oil crises of the 1970s, and regular deployment of Subic Bay–based naval units to the Indian Ocean began at that time. Carrier forces from Subic Bay were also deployed to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea during the 1979 Iranian revolution and during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 and 1980.

In 1986, long-standing political opposition to dictator Ferdinand Marcos within the Philippines finally pressured the Philippine government into calling an election. The opposition, led by Corazon Aquino (the widow of Marcos's main political opponent, Benigno Aquino), campaigned on a demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the bases. Aquino triumphed in the election, and her victory led to the drafting of a new Philippine constitution.

Under the new constitution, foreign bases, troops, and facilities would not be allowed in the country unless a new treaty was ratified by a two-thirds vote in the Senate. Although President Aquino went against her campaign promises and called for the extension of the bases treaty, the Philippine Senate voted 12–11 to reject it, as thousands of Filipinos marched in opposition. As a result, the U.S. bases were closed in 1992.

Since the closures of Clark and Subic Bay, the United States has been looking for ways to maintain its influence in the region. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the government has been even more concerned with the establishment of military bases near vital U.S. interests in Southeast Asia.

The United States became concerned that the Philippines could become a sanctuary for al-Qaeda operatives fleeing Afghanistan after the U.S. invasion there. Domestic terrorism in the Philippines, including the kidnapping of foreigners, perpetrated by the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, made the Philippine government eager for an antiterrorist alliance, as well.

In 2001, President George W. Bush and Filipino president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo came to an agreement following the September 11 attacks. They agreed to work together to combat terrorism and to revive the dormant alliance between the two nations. Since that time, the United States has provided the Philippine government with at least $100 million in military aid, as well as 660 U.S. troops to help Filipino authorities hunt down members of the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group. Meanwhile, the Subic Bay base has been reopened to the U.S. Navy for the maintenance of its warships, and in 2002 it was revealed that the U.S. military was in the process of building a new military base on the Philippine island of Basilan.

Besides the war on terrorism, a strong military presence in the Philippines remains important to U.S. interests for several other reasons. The ongoing thaw in relations between North and South Korea endangers the continued presence of U.S. bases and other U.S. assets in South Korea. A Philippine presence would allow the United States to keep a closer eye on China's growing military power and on its conflict with Taiwan. Finally, the control of key shipping lanes in the South China Sea remains an important issue, as well.

See also Imperialism; September 11/WTC and Pentagon Attacks; Terrorism, War on International; Terrorists, Islamic

U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE

Security pact based on the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Originally offered as enticement to then Korean president Syngman Rhee to accept the armistice ending the Korean War, the U.S.–Republic of Korea alliance has had a major impact on the Republic of Korea. Under this security umbrella, South Korea has become one of the most dynamic economies in the world and has developed a thriving democratic government. At present, some 37,000 U.S. military personnel are stationed there.

COLD WAR ALLIANCE

On June 25, 1950, the opening shots of the Korean War were fired when North Korean forces stormed across the 38th parallel, sweeping South Korean troops and hastily assembled U.S. reinforcements down the Korean peninsula to a perimeter around the city of Pusan. The tide of the communist offensive turned, however, following a daring amphibious landing at Inchon led by General Douglas MacArthur in September of the same year. Although truce talks between UN forces and opposing North Korean and Chinese forces began at Panmunjon in July 1951, war would rage for two more years. The signing of an armistice occurred two years later, but a formal peace treaty has yet to be signed. For the past 50 years, South Korea has enjoyed an uneasy peace guaranteed by the U.S.–ROK alliance.

The Korean War took place against the backdrop of the Cold War, which arrayed the United States and its allies against the Soviet Union and fellow communist nations. Under the security guarantee of the United States, South Korea experienced a dramatic political and economic transformation. From a backward agrarian economy under military dictatorship and later authoritarian rule, South Korea grew into a democracy with the third-largest economy in Asia exporting a wide variety of manufactured goods to the United States and other nations. During this period, Korea received large amounts of technical and financial support from the U.S. and its allies, most notably Japan. This aid was aimed at preventing the spread of communism in east Asia and strengthening South Korea as a key ally of the United States in the Cold War struggle.

The long-standing alliance was further strengthened by developments during the Vietnam War. South Korean economic growth was spurred by wartime U.S. defense contracts to Korean industrial conglomerates called *chaebol.* In addition, South Korea sent more than 300,000 troops to Vietnam over the course of the war. Cold War peace on the Korean peninsula was occasionally tested by confrontations such as the capture of the USS *Pueblo* by North Korea in 1968. In the 1976 Poplar Tree Incident, two U.S. Army officers were killed by axe-wielding North Korean troops, Despite these incidents, South Korea has prospered economically and, since 1988, has enjoyed democratic elections as a result of the stability created by the alliance.

The rise of democratic government has seen the emergence of an active, increasingly strong political left, exemplified by the 2002 election of human-rights lawyer Roh Moo-hyun as president of South Korea. Roh stated during his campaign that the South might remain neutral in the event of war between North Korea and the United States. His rise to the presidency is seen by many as a reflection of the political views of the *386* generation (in their 30s, went to college in the '80s, born in the '60s), who tend to be less trustful of the United States, more conciliatory toward North Korea, and more focused on ties with Korea's other Asian neighbors.

POST–COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the global communist threat, the U.S.–ROK alliance has been tested. Many observers have noted a refocusing of U.S. foreign policy away from strengthening relationships with traditional allies and toward fighting the global war on terror following the attacks of September 11, 2001. The alliance has been plagued by lack of awareness of U.S.–Korea relations among the American public. Growing anti-American sentiment from a generation of Koreans eager for a country free of American troops and geopolitical influence has also put strains on the alliance.

Furthermore, the administration of President George W. Bush entered office in 2001 with a policy of mistrust and confrontation toward North Korea over the issue of development of nuclear weapons. This position, along with the labeling of the North Korean regime as a member of the "axis of evil" in January 2002, was at odds with the Sunshine Policy of engagement with the North adopted by then South Korean President Kim Dae Jung. This has led many left-wing, younger Koreans to question whether the U.S.–ROK alliance actually represents the security interests of South Korea.

The alliance has also been strained by the U.S. military itself, whose stabilizing presence has contributed so much to prosperity in the South. In June 2002, massive anti-American demonstrations followed the accidental killing of two schoolgirls by a U.S. military vehicle in the village of Donggucheon. The location of headquarters for U.S. forces in Korea in downtown Seoul is yet another issue dividing the partners. The existence of the headquarters will continue to impede further development of Seoul until the projected

relocation of the base to an undecided location in the southern part of the country in 2006. Critics also claim that lack of sufficient language and cultural training for U.S. military personnel hinders public support for the alliance. A 2003 survey suggests that roughly 70% of South Koreans desire the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the peninsula.

Over considerable protest and controversy, in May 2003 the South Korean government dispatched troops to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This deployment indicates that the U.S.-ROK alliance remains strong despite the changing political environment in South Korea. Both nations continue to face the threat of a reclusive, nuclear-armed North Korea some 50 years after the beginning of the alliance and have rushed to each other's aid in times of conflict. The United States and South Korea enjoy strong ties in the cultural arena, as well, evidenced by the immigration of more than 2 million Koreans to the United States and the large number of U.S.-educated university professors in Korea. The two nations have also established a robust economic partnership. South Korea is the seventh-largest trading partner of the U.S., with $58 billion in goods and services exchanged in 2002.

The deterrence of North Korean aggression, the establishment of a democratic government in the Republic of Korea, and the transformation from an economic backwater to the 12th-largest economy in the world are certainly cause for celebration. At the beginning of the 21st century, however, questions remain regarding the future of the U.S.–ROK alliance. The terror attacks of September 11, 2001, have shifted U.S. national-security concerns, and the ascendance to political leadership in Korea of a generation born after the Korean War has led to a reassessment of Korean security ties to its powerful ally. A changing geopolitical environment will test and may ultimately transform the nature of one of the longest-standing U.S. security agreements.

—*Daniel P. McDonald*

See also Axis of Evil; Bush, George W., and National Policy; Cold War; Inchon Landing (1950); Korea, North and South; Korean War; Pueblo Incident; Vietnam War (1954–1975)

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USS *COLE* BOMBING

Attack on a U.S. naval vessel carried out by the international terrorist group al-Qaeda. The attack on the USS *Cole* was one in a series of terror attacks on U.S. overseas interests by al-Qaeda during the second term of President Bill Clinton. The attack on the *Cole* confirmed al-Qaeda as a significant threat to the United States, although at the time the perpetrators remained unknown.

On October 12, 2000, the destroyer USS *Cole* stopped in the port of Aden, Yemen, for a routine refueling. A small boat later pulled alongside the destroyer and detonated a bomb close to the *Cole.* The suicide bombing left a hole approximately 40 feet square in the side of the *Cole.* Seventeen sailors were killed and an additional 39 were injured in the blast. In response to the attack, then President Bill Clinton said, "If, as it now appears, this was an act of terrorism, it was a despicable and cowardly act. We will find out who was responsible and hold them accountable."

Despite this threat, a legal debate emerged surrounding the bombing of the USS *Cole* because the perpetrators had attacked a military target. Under U.S. law at the time, attacks on military targets did not fall under the definition of terrorism. No overt military responses were initiated in response to the attack. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the United States learned that al-Qaeda was behind the bombing of the *Cole.*

See also Al-Qaeda; Terrorism, War on International; Terrorists, Islamic

U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND (USSOUTHCOM)

Regional headquarters responsible for planning and conducting U.S. military activity in the Latin American region. As a Unified Combatant Command, SOUTHCOM is composed of forces from the army,

United States Navy and Marine Corps security personnel patrolling past the damaged U.S. Navy destroyer USS *Cole* following the terrorist attack on the ship off the coast of Yemen on October 12, 2000. The security personnel established checkpoints and searched incoming vessels for contraband and explosives while the *Cole* was prepared for its trip back to the United States. The ship rejoined the Atlantic Fleet in April 2002 after undergoing 14 months of repairs at a shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi.

Source: Getty Images.

navy, air force, and marines and has a broad and ongoing mission. The regional division of commands allows defense planning to be focused on a specific region.

SOUTHCOM is one of nine Unified Combatant Commands, along with U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). SOUTHCOM is headquartered in Miami, Florida. The SOUTHCOM commander reports directly to the secretary of defense.

SOUTHCOM is responsible for all U.S. military activity on the land mass of Latin America south of Mexico; the waters adjacent to Central and South America; the Caribbean Sea, its 13 island nations, and the European and U.S. territories there; the Gulf of Mexico; and a portion of the Atlantic Ocean. Southern Command's area of responsibility covers 32 countries (19 in Central and South America and 13 in the Caribbean).

Component commands of SOUTHCOM from the four services consist of U.S. Army South (USARSO), U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (COMNAVSO), U.S. Marine Corps Forces South (MARFORSO), U.S. Southern Command Air Forces, Special Operations Command South, Joint Interagency Task Force South, Joint Task Force Bravo, and Joint Task Force Guantánamo.

SOUTHCOM's 26 Security Assistance Organizations (SAO) form an important component of the command and work in support of U.S. interests in the region. The SAOs manage U.S. security assistance programs and special activities in Central and South America and the Caribbean. SOUTHCOM also has responsibility for security assistance in Cuba, Mexico, and the Bahamas even though these countries are outside the command's area of responsibility.

Training programs and joint exercises between the United States and regional militaries are a major aspect of SOUTHCOM's activities in the region. Military Groups (MILGPs) exist in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. MILGP commanders serve as liaisons to the regional militaries and oversee most U.S. military activities in their respective countries. Military Liaison Offices (MLOs) are located in Belize, Mexico, Brazil, Haiti, Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Bahamas, and Nicaragua. Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODCs) can be found in Costa Rica, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Panama. Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) are in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Peru, and Defense Assistance Offices (DAOs) exist in Suriname and Barbados. SOUTHCOM also includes liaison officers and representatives from the Department of State, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Coast Guard, U.S. Customs Service, and other U.S.

government agencies. Foreign military interaction in the form of military-to-military contact programs has historically been an important component of U.S.–Latin American relations and has sometimes resulted in U.S. support for dictatorial regimes and military governments in the region.

SOUTHCOM's stated mission is to conduct military operations and promote security cooperation to achieve U.S. national-security objectives. In support of the U.S. interest of ensuring hemispheric security, SOUTHCOM is responsible for building regional partnerships that strengthen democratic principles and that can collectively deter, dissuade, and defeat transnational threats to the stability of the region.

Forces assigned to USSOUTHCOM also support local law-enforcement agencies in antinarcotics operations, perform joint and bilateral/multilateral exercises, engage in engineering and medical exercises, and conduct search-and-rescue operations, disaster-relief operations, and humanitarian and civic-assistance operations. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, SOUTHCOM has increased its counterterrorism efforts in the Tri-Border Area of South America between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay.

See also Latin America and U.S. Policy; U.S. Central Command; U.S. Northern Command; U.S. Pacific Command

U.S.–THAILAND ALLIANCE

Alliance formed as part of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in which the United States helped Thailand suppress its communist rebels in exchange for support during the Vietnam War.

At the Geneva Convention in April 1954, the French government agreed to withdraw its forces from Indochina in an effort to quiet the rebellions that had erupted across the region at the conclusion of World War II. Although France's concession was widely welcomed, it still troubled the United States. Communist parties were highly active in most of the Southeast Asian nations. With the Cold War unfolding, the United States feared that Southeast Asia would become a fertile ground for communist uprisings. Therefore, the United States quickly assembled the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Consisting of the nations of Australia, New Zealand, the

Philippines, and Thailand, the organization pledged to halt the spread of communism.

Because of Thailand's crucial central location in the region, the United States heavily supported the smaller nation. The two nations signed bilateral security pacts, the United States established military bases throughout Thailand, and enormous levels of financial aid were used to bolster the Thai economy. From 1954 to 1958, the United States sent nearly $30 million per year in aid to Thailand. As other area nations, such as Cambodia, Laos, and especially South Vietnam, became increasingly unstable, the United States relied upon Thailand to promote U.S. interests in the region.

Neither the United States nor Thailand, however, was completely pleased with the alliance. When SEATO was formed, Phibun Songgram was Thailand's premier. A former general, Phibun had seized power during a military coup in 1947. Although Phibun was, in effect, a dictator, he was a generous leader and commonly upheld the Thai constitution. However, in 1957, Phibun's government was overthrown during another military coup. The new Thai leader, Sarit Thanarat, suspended the constitution, declared martial law, and outlawed all political parties. The United States strongly objected to these policies, and many government officials felt uneasy aligning the United States with such an overtly undemocratic regime. However, the situation in South Vietnam was rapidly worsening, and the United States desperately needed to maintain a firm presence in Southeast Asia. Therefore, the alliance continued.

The Thai government had at first enthusiastically welcomed the alliance. In 1951, a communist group named Free Thai launched an insurgency in northern Thailand with the assistance of China. United States military aid helped to suppress the rebellious party. However, by the 1960s, the alliance had an adverse effect on Thailand's stability. Because of its close relationship with the United States, Thailand was increasingly drawn into the Vietnam War. As the South Vietnamese government collapsed and communists gained control of the Laotian government, Thailand faced new communist uprisings both in the north and along its southern border with Malaysia.

Consequently, Thailand was relieved in 1969 when the United States began to withdraw from Vietnam. Although the loss of aid from the United States temporarily depressed the economy, Thailand was able to revise its relations with its neighbors. Increased trade with China soon replaced the lost assistance from the

United States. In 1972, a new constitution was adopted, and in 1976 the first free elections in nearly three decades were held.

Thailand's alliance with the United States, however, did not completely dissolve. Thailand remained the one solidly noncommunist nation in Southeast Asia and therefore occupied a position in the United States' interests. Thailand also frequently backed the United States in SEATO policy making. In 2003, Thailand reaffirmed the importance of the alliance by sending troops to aid in the occupation of Iraq.

See also Alliances; Geneva Conventions; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; Vietnam War (1954–1975)

U2 SPY PLANE INCIDENT (1960)

One of the biggest international crises of the Cold War period, sparked by the downing of an American spy plane over the territory of the Soviet Union. The illicit spy mission that the U2 plane was undertaking at the time of its destruction infuriated the Soviet Union, which accused the United States of gravely damaging the relationship between the two superpowers by resorting to aggressive measures. The entire episode was heavily publicized around the world, as the Soviet Union released footage of the trial of the captured U2 pilot. An embarrassment to the United States, the incident temporarily brought to light the large-scale spying operations that characterized so much of the Cold War period.

On May 1, 1960, CIA-employed pilot Francis Gary Powers took off from Pakistan in a superlight U2 spy plane. His mission required him to fly over 3,000 miles of USSR territory, in an attempt to photograph an entire range of Soviet secret factories and military installations. U2 spy planes had been used by the United States for more than four years with tremendous success: The groundbreaking technology of the U2s permitted them to fly high enough to be out of the reach of the Soviet air defenses. The intelligence acquired by these planes constituted the most valuable USSR-related information to date. Powers's flight, however, put an end to that stream of information.

Using an innovative ground-to-air missile, the Soviets were able to reach the U2 and shoot it down. The plane had been flying at an altitude 68,000 feet, some 1,200 miles inside USSR territory. Powers bailed out of the stricken plane and parachuted to safety, but he was subsequently captured with all of his equipment. He was brought to Moscow and interrogated by the KGB on the specifics of his mission.

In August 1960, Powers was publicly tried for espionage in a Soviet military court. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 10 years in solitary confinement but stayed imprisoned for only two of those years. In 1962, Powers was traded for a Soviet spy who had been apprehended by the Americans in the late 1950s while attempting to establish a spy network in New York. It was to be the first in a series of such exchanges between the two superpowers.

Although Powers came out of the incident relatively unharmed, the already tenuous relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union had been seriously affected. At the time of the U2 incident, the two countries had been engaged in a negotiation process aimed at relaxing the arms race. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower were planning to continue these negotiations at the upcoming summit in Paris, but the spy plane incident put an end to the conference before it began.

See also Cold War; Espionage; Intelligence and Counterintelligence

V

VERIFICATION

The process of ensuring compliance with an agreement usually involving some system or means of observation. In arms control and reduction, verification is considered a critical element because it provides a warning to noncompliance with treaty elements. It also provides a measure of confidence in the process itself because it proves that all parties are doing what they agreed to do.

Means of verification include both intrusive and nonintrusive means. *Intrusive* means can involve the imposition of teams of personnel on the ground in a country, as well as counting and checking the numbers and types of weapons platforms. Both the United States and the former Soviet Union had these kinds of teams on the ground in the 1980s and 1990s.

Nonintrusive means of verification include overhead surveillance, including spy planes and satellites. An example of this type occurred in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when American spy planes discovered the emplacement of Soviet missiles. As later demonstrated by U.S. actions prior to the Iraq War, however, this system is not comprehensive, nor is it foolproof, and it cannot be applied to all types of weapons systems. Biological and chemical weapons can be easily dispersed and hidden, making verification difficult, if not impossible. Other forms of warfare, such as information warfare, are also difficult to control or even monitor. Nonetheless, verification remains a critical concern for any form of arms control and reduction.

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

The organization responsible for taking care of the veterans of the nation's military services. The Veterans Administration provides a number of programs, services, and benefits to veterans and their families—including medical and health care, psychological care, educational and rehabilitative services, housing, transitional assistance to the civilian sector, and burial services.

In the United States, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is responsible for providing federal benefits to veterans and their families. The department was established on March 15, 1989, succeeding the previous Veterans Administration. The VA, headed by the secretary of veterans' affairs, is the second largest of the 15 Cabinet departments and operates nationwide programs for health care, financial assistance, and burial benefits.

There are approximately 26 million living U.S. veterans, of which nearly three-quarters served during a war or an official period of conflict. Approximately one-quarter of the nation's population, approximately 70 million people, are potentially eligible for VA benefits and services because they are veterans, family members, or survivors of veterans.

The nation's responsibility to care for its veterans, spouses, survivors, and dependents can last a long time. As noted in the literature of the VA, the last dependent of a Revolutionary War veteran died in 1911. Six children of Civil War veterans still draw VA benefits. Approximately 440 children and widows of Spanish-American War veterans still receive VA compensation or pensions.

Benefits for veterans include disability compensation and pensions, education and training, medical care, research, vocational rehabilitation, home loan assistance, insurance, and VA national cemeteries. For example, disability compensation is a monetary benefit paid to veterans who are disabled by injury or disease incurred or aggravated during active military service. As of 2003, approximately 2.8 million veterans received disability compensation or pensions from the VA. Also receiving VA benefits were 568,146 spouses, children, and parents of deceased veterans. Among them are 147,291 survivors of Vietnam-era veterans and 272,883 survivors of World War II veterans.

Likewise, education and training is also a benefit for veterans. The most well-known program is the GI Bill. Created in 1944, the GI Bill was the first veteran's training and education program, allowing veterans to go to school, providing tuition and fees for the costs of school, and providing a living allowance during the time the veteran attended school. Since its inception, more than 21 million veterans, service members, and family members have received $77 billion in GI Bill benefits for education and training. The number of GI Bill recipients includes 7.8 million veterans from World War II, 2.4 million from the Korean War, and 8.2 million post-Korean and Vietnam-era veterans (in addition to active-duty personnel). Since the dependents program was enacted in 1956, the VA also has assisted in the education of more than 750,000 dependents of veterans whose deaths or total disabilities were service-connected.

VIETNAM WAR (1954–1975)

Conflict in Southeast Asia that became the longest war in U.S. history, which took the lives of 58,000 Americans and ended with the unification of Vietnam in 1975. The Vietnam War grew out of a long conflict with France over its colonial rule of Vietnam and Cold War tensions following the Korean War (1951–1953).

BACKGROUND

After the Vietnamese nationalist guerillas known as the Vietminh defeated French colonial forces at Diem Bien Phu in 1954, the French sued for peace. The Geneva Peace Accord, signed by Vietnam and France in the summer of 1954, temporarily divided the Southeast Asian nation of Vietnam in half at the 17th parallel.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) was led by Ho Chi Minh, whose forces had defeated the French. Ngo Dinh Diem was the president of the Republic of South Vietnam.

The Geneva Accord provided that elections be held in 1956 for the unification of the country. However, Diem canceled the elections when it became apparent that the communists would win. In so doing, Diem ensured the continued division of the country. However, approximately 10,000 communist troops remained in hiding in the South. These insurgents, called the Vietcong, became masters of guerilla warfare, which escalated after the cancellation of the elections. By 1960, despite U.S. aid and advisers sent by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Vietcong had established a political organization in the South called the National Liberation Front.

In 1961, concerned about South Vietnam falling under a communist regime and still stinging from the Korean War, the United States signed a military and economic aid agreement with Diem's government. The first U.S. support troops landed in South Vietnam later that year, and the U.S. Military Assistance Command was established in 1962.

Meanwhile, Diem faced stiff opposition in the South. He used the CIA to identify his enemies and he arrested thousands of people. Diem convinced the United States to support his counterrevolutionary government by claiming that the North Vietnamese communists wanted to invade the South. In 1959, Diem passed *Law 10/59*, which made it legal to hold suspected communists in jail without bringing charges. Students, intellectuals, Buddhists, and others opposed Diem's repressive policies and joined the National Liberation Front. Diem represented his government to be a peace-loving democracy, whereas the communists sought to reunite the country through elections.

In November 1963, following years of growing dissatisfaction with his corrupt and ineffectual government, Diem was executed following a successful coup by elements of the South Vietnamese military led by Duong Van Minh. The leadership of South Vietnam remained in flux for the next few years as U.S. aid increased.

THE GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION

Early in 1964, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson and his military advisers developed a detailed plan to launch major attacks on North Vietnam, which supported and supplied the Vietcong insurgents in the South.

Johnson and his advisers feared they lacked public support for expanding the war and were concerned about provoking North Vietnam's communist allies, the Soviet Union and China.

On August 2, 1964, after South Vietnamese gunboats carried out a raid on the coast of North Vietnam, the USS *Maddox* (which was conducting electronic espionage in the area) was fired on by North Korean torpedo boats. Two days later, the *Maddox* and another destroyer reported that they were under attack—reports that later proved inaccurate.

Responding to these reports, Johnson authorized air strikes against North Vietnam in retaliation and assembled the heads of Congress to accuse North Vietnam of open aggression on the high seas. Congress acted quickly—although without a complete set of facts—and authorized the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which rapidly escalated U.S. involvement in the war.

Six years later, in the wake of public outrage at President Richard Nixon's authorization of raids on Cambodia, the Tonkin resolution was terminated by Congress. Yet, the war was sustained by continued military appropriations. Although Johnson cited the resolution as congressional support for the war, critics used it as a symbol of the escalation they opposed, and later of the dishonesty of the top levels of government about the prosecution of the war.

THE WAR ESCALATES

The first American combat troops arrived in Vietnam in March 1965. Following an attack on two U.S. bases in South Vietnam by the National Liberation Front, President Johnson ordered sustained bombing raids on the North—an action known as Operation Rolling Thunder. The introduction of U.S. combat forces, coupled with the air strikes, forced the North Vietnamese communists to reassess their strategy.

Originally, the North Vietnamese thought they could easily defeat the South militarily and reunite the country. The U.S. presence forced a change in strategy, as suddenly the South's hand was greatly strengthened. Beginning in 1965, the communists moved to a protracted war strategy, hoping to bog the U.S. military down into a long conflict it could not win.

The North Vietnamese reasoned that the United States had no clearly defined strategy and would tire of incessant guerrilla attacks. Ultimately, a political settlement to the war could be negotiated. Ironically, the Johnson administration wanted to pursue a similar

tack, using precision strikes against the North with little disruption to the everyday lives of Americans.

THE WAR IN AMERICA

Television grew exponentially since the end of the end of World War II, and advances in miniaturized cameras and satellite technology facilitated unprecedented coverage of the Vietnam War. The war in Vietnam became the living room war; each night, television footage from the battlefield brought the death, destruction, and horror of the war into the homes of hundreds of millions of Americans.

The Vietnam War became a disruption in American society. College campuses and major cities exploded with protests after the draft was reimposed. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front launched massive coordinated attacks on major cities in South Vietnam in January 1968, in an attempt to drive the Johnson administration to the negotiating table.

Every corner of the United States felt the war's impact, and in March 1968, Johnson announced he would not run for reelection. At the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968, armed police clashed with antiwar demonstrators. Meanwhile, Johnson began secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese.

THE NIXON YEARS

Despite progress with the North Vietnamese in the Paris negotiations throughout 1968, the Democrats could not keep the White House, and Republican candidate Richard Nixon was elected president.

Nixon advocated a policy of *Vietnamization*, in which massive air strikes would cover a gradual withdrawal of American troops. At the same time, Nixon expanded the war into Cambodia and Laos in an attempt to cut communist supply routes and destroy troops operating on both sides of the borders with Vietnam. The stepped-up bombing raids with concomitant civilian casualties, as well as news of the secret wars in Laos and Cambodia, triggered a second wave of protests on college campuses throughout the United States.

In late April 1970, Ohio National Guard troops were called to Kent State University to preserve order following a series of anti-Nixon protests on the campus. After the protesters set the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) building ablaze, the guard opened fire, killing four students and wounding nine

Visitors to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, DC, reading the names of the American men and women who lost their lives during the Vietnam War. Designed by Chinese American Maya Lin and completed in 1982, the wall contains more than 58,000 names of Americans killed or missing in action. The memorial grew out of a need to heal the nation's wounds over the very divisive Vietnam War.

Source: U.S. Navy.

others. Following a similar protest at Jackson State University in Mississippi, police fired into a dormitory and killed two more students. These incidents turned even more Americans against the Vietnam War as the violence spread at home.

Nixon's expanded air war did not deter the North Vietnamese communists, who continued to press their demands at the Paris peace negotiations. Although the withdrawal of troops appeased some domestic critics, the destructive air war and the deaths of the students energized the antiwar movement at home.

By the fall of 1972, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the U.S. chief negotiator at the Paris talks, and North Vietnamese representatives Xuan Thuy and Le Duc Tho reached a preliminary peace proposal. But the new leadership in Saigon, President Nguyen Van Thieu and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, rejected the peace plan and refused to make any concessions to the North Vietnamese communists.

Nixon hoped to force peace by unleashing deadly bombing raids against North Vietnam's largest cities: Hanoi and Haiphong. The so-called Christmas Raids backfired as the United States was condemned by the international community, forcing the Nixon administration to press the negotiations.

In January 1973, the White House convinced the South Vietnamese that America would stand by the regime if they signed the peace accord. At the same time, Hanoi convinced the National Liberation Front that political prisoners would be released after the accord was signed. Open hostilities between the United States and North Vietnam ended on January 23, 1973, but the war continued. From March 1973 to April 1975, the Thieu-Ky administration continued to battle the communist forces. Saigon finally fell on April 30, 1975, when the presidential palace was captured by North Vietnamese tanks.

—*Will Hughes*

See also Cold War; Johnson, Lyndon B., and National Policy; Kennedy, John F., and National Policy; Nixon, Richard, and National Policy; Vietnam War Protests

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VIETNAM WAR PROTESTS

The collective antiwar sentiment in America, expressed through demonstrations and marches during

the 1960s and 1970s by individuals and groups opposed to the U.S. military presence in Vietnam. The Vietnam conflict, whose origins and relevance many did not understand, left an entire nation questioning the policies of a government it had always trusted. The country had not been so divided since the American Civil War. Every American family was affected, more than 50,000 Americans were killed, and many of those who returned suffered (and continued to suffer) deep physical and emotional scars.

ORIGINS OF THE ANTIWAR MOVEMENT

The origins and growth of the protests and adversary culture before and during the Vietnam era stemmed from the monumental social changes taking place at the time. The so-called baby boomers witnessed unprecedented economic expansion, hypnotic effects of television, and insecurity induced by the development of the nuclear bomb and the ongoing Cold War with Soviet Russia. They saw the exponential growth of suburbia and the birth of the consumer society—two phenomena that many believe contributed to the breakdown of both the extended and nuclear family, and the religious bonds that typically went with them. The nature of music also changed from the acoustic rhythms of blues and boogie-woogie in the mid-1950s to the electric rumble of rock and roll, whose lyrics became increasingly politicized.

In sum, most members of the Vietnam generation grew up with a sense of moral engagement, unlimited social prospects, and social hopefulness. Racism and social injustice, made more glaring by the power of television, threatened to burst the bubble of optimism and invincibility, and the civil rights struggle became the most important catalyst of the antiwar movement. Predisposed to protest, this generation was enticed by counterculture.

NATURE AND EVOLUTION

The antiwar movement passed through three broad phases. In the first phase (before 1966), opposition to expanding the war in Vietnam was primarily liberal in inspiration. In the second phase (between 1966 and 1969), the movement's center of gravity shifted to being increasingly radical as the war's unpopularity was growing in the country at large. In the third phase (from 1969 to the fall of Saigon in 1975), the more liberally centered movement again took over, which some argue helped to limit U.S. military activity in Vietnam.

For the liberals, the idealism engendered in a new generation inspired by the youngest president in the nation's history established the foundations of the early movement. Before 1965, public demonstrations against the war were small, rare, and went largely unnoticed by the administration and the press. Very few demonstrations were sponsored by the liberal organizations, with the exception of the National Committee for A Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), which in 1963 called publicly for a U.S. disengagement from Vietnam.

Small-scale radical actions continued. In August 1963, a march commemorating the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was organized by a group of demonstrators called the Student Peace Union (SPU). At the same time in New York, the Catholic Worker Movement marched in front of Vietnam's permanent observer mission to the United Nations. In the same month, 250,000 people participated in the March on Washington and listened to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. deliver his *I Have a Dream* speech.

Meanwhile, in 1963 and 1964, the effort by what soon became known as the right wing of the antiwar movement tried to restrain U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia through well-connected private conversations, newspaper articles, and advertisements by the social networks of the ruling liberal elite. The New Pacifists were also involved.

The psychological turning point for the antiwar movement, and for most Americans, came on November 22, 1963, when President John F. Kennedy—the American symbol of hope, youth, vitality, and idealism—was assassinated. The incident left the entire nation stunned, shaken, and angry. The war was not yet fully Americanized until the end of 1964; at the year's end, there were only 23,300 U.S. military personnel in Vietnam. The administration, however, was Americanized in the immediate post-Diem epoch mainly because of a North Vietnamese–driven escalation of the war.

By late 1964, there was televised coverage of American soldiers coming home in body bags. The most notable event that triggered an escalation of the war was a November 1, 1964, Vietcong attack on a U.S. air base at Bien Hoa, during which five American soldiers were killed and six B-57 bombers were destroyed. However, it was not until President Lyndon B. Johnson decided on a massive bombing campaign

against North Vietnam in 1965 that the antiwar movement really took hold.

ESCALATION AND CAMPUS PROTESTS

In 1965, the Vietnam War became an American war. It was the year that the air bombardment campaign known as Rolling Thunder began in earnest, and the American contingent in Vietnam grew from 23,000 to 184,000 soldiers. It was also the year when dissent in the Democratic Party began to be expressed, albeit privately. Liberals, leftists, radicals, and pacifists all found fresh causes in which to participate and become part of the movement.

Over the next two years, the antiwar movement snowballed. Demonstrations became national in nature. The Free Speech movement started at Berkeley, and kindred movements joined in and bolstered antiwar activism. The country's youth, many dying in the line of fire, began demanding reasons for America's presence in Vietnam. They wanted to know why peace talks were organized and continually failed. They wanted to know what they were fighting for.

After the instatement of the draft, young people on college and university campuses around the country began to organize protests against the war. The teach-in movement developed, attracting thousands of students, and soon spread to almost every campus. Student organizations held rallies and marches, the first of which occurred in Washington, in April 1965. More than 25,000 students gathered under the sponsorship of an organization called the SDS, Students for a Democratic Society.

Extensive media coverage brought the violent and bloody guerrilla war home each night to every American living room. People realized that the glowing reviews of the war effort released by the government were manipulated and far from the truth. Even congressional senators began questioning Vietnam policies. Through it all, the bombings continued and more American GIs came home in body bags.

Activists, celebrities, and musicians—including Abbie Hoffmann, Timothy Leary, Allen Ginsberg, Jane Fonda, Jimi Hendrix, Jefferson Airplane, and countless others—took up the antiwar cause. Their speeches and their music reflected the anger and hopelessness that Americans felt over the Vietnam War. Even the GIs stationed overseas began supporting the antiwar movement, from wearing peace symbols to refusing to obey orders.

CIVIL UNREST, WOODSTOCK, AND KENT STATE

By 1967, America was also mired in its own urban problems. As the bombings and body count in Vietnam continued to escalate, so did civil unrest. One hundred thousand antiwar protesters gathered in New York, and thousands more gathered in San Francisco. There were urban riots in Detroit. Johnson's support was falling drastically on all fronts. Antiwar rallies, speeches, demonstrations, and concerts continued being organized all over the country. There was a backlash against all that was military. Soldiers returning home from the war were no longer regarded as heroes but as "baby killers." Young men sought to evade the draft by being conscientious objectors or leaving for Canada.

In 1968, a North Vietnamese general led a surprise attack against American and South Vietnamese forces. Known as the Tet Offensive, the attack resulted in horrendous casualties on both sides and further eroded the situation at home. The assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy also sparked racial tension and unrest. Wisely, Lyndon Johnson did not seek reelection.

The new president, Richard Nixon, had made a campaign promise to Americans that he would end the war with Vietnamization, or systematic troop withdrawals. Yet the American presence in Vietnam remained high while the casualties and costs of war mounted. In 1969, as the miasma of Vietnam worsened, legions of the young made their way to Woodstock for a music festival billed by its promoters as "three days of peace and love." A concert brought 500,000 young people from all across America to a nonviolent protest against the war.

Meanwhile, Nixon announced his plans to attack communist supply locations, a strategy that failed and set off another round of protests. May 4, 1970, the day after Nixon's announcement, marked the tragic culmination of a weekend of antiwar protests at Kent State University in Ohio. Four students were killed during a protest on the school grounds, following a face off with the Ohio National Guard. Students across the country became enraged, and campuses all over the United States came to a virtual standstill in the following days.

MY LAI MASSACRE AND TROOP PULLOUT

As 1970 ended, Nixon's plans to end the Vietnam War were not realized, and American citizens demanded to

know why their country was still involved in a war in which a resolution seemed impossible. In 1971, the My Lai massacre came to light, an atrocity committed by American soldiers that shocked the world and gained huge media attention. An intended search-and-destroy mission led by Lieutenant William Calley in the village of My Lai, Vietnam, soon degenerated into the massacre of more than 300 apparently unarmed civilians, including women, children, and the elderly. As the gruesome details of the massacre reached the American public, serious questions arose concerning the conduct of American soldiers in Vietnam. Another round of peace talks was organized on the heels of this controversy, but again all attempts to end the fighting in Vietnam failed.

Finally, after some failed attempts and more bombing, peace talks resumed in Paris; by the end of January 1973, a pact was signed by the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the Vietcong. By March, all American troops were pulled out of the country and a systematic release of prisoners of war on both sides was initiated. However, when the Watergate scandal came to light and destroyed Nixon's presidency at the close of 1974, communist forces had overrun Saigon. Within a few months, most of Indochina fell into communist hands, and the antiwar movement's mantra of "what are we fighting for" seemed eerily prophetic.

Today, many agree that the antiwar movement had significant impact on the length and perhaps even the outcome of the Vietnam War. Others disagree, saying that the massive protests were part of an eroding and troubled society. What is certain, however, is that the antiwar movement left an everlasting mark on an entire generation and its country.

—*Divya Gupta*

See also Johnson, Lyndon B., and National Policy; Nixon, Richard, and National Policy; Tet Offensive; Vietnam War (1954–1975)

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REFLECTIONS

Kent State Killings: A Sad Legacy

The day after Richard Nixon's announcement to send U.S. troops into Cambodia, an estimated 500 students gathered in the school commons at Kent State University for a student rally. Protesting Nixon's decision to send troops into Cambodia without Congress' approval, students spilled into the city. Broken windows and other damage to a number of downtown businesses prompted fear, rumors, and eventually a call by the city's mayor to the governor for assistance.

The Ohio National Guard arrived, and on the same night of their arrival, some students set fire to the campus headquarters of the Army Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC). The next morning, the governor came to Kent, and in a press conference, he said that the university would remain open.

After a Sunday of relative calm, an antiwar rally at noon on Monday brought 2,000 to 3,000 people to the University Commons. When the Guard gave the order to disperse, some in the crowd responded with verbal epithets and stones. The Guard answered with tear gas, and, attempting to enforce the Ohio Riot Act with raised bayonets, forced demonstrators to retreat. The Guard then changed formation and as they approached a hill, some seconds away from safety, some Guardsmen turned to face the parking lot and started to fire their rifles at random. Between 61 and 67 shots were fired. Four students were killed, and nine were wounded. It was the only time federal troops shot U.S. students. That afternoon, the university president ordered the Kent State University closed. Through scholarships in their name, the university continues to remember the four students who died on May 4, 1970: Allison Krause, Jeffrey Miller, Sandra Scheuer, and William Schroeder.

Some people, from today's students to yesterday's protesters to historians, believe the Kent State shootings helped turn the tide against the Vietnam War more than any other single event, and that the shift in attitude helped save lives. Many of the Kent State

victims and their family members see that as an important legacy.

—Gary Tuchman "Kent State
Forever," May 4, 2000 (CNN Interactive)

VOICE OF AMERICA

The official U.S. government broadcasting service and a primary component of America's public diplomacy abroad. Created to counter enemy propaganda in World War II, the Voice of America (VOA) now oversees a network of radio, television, and Internet media that spans the globe.

The VOA Charter describes three basic functions: to accurately and objectively report the news, to clarify American philosophy and political institutions to international listeners, and to explain American foreign policies. The VOA Charter stresses the need for objectivity. To become a credible source, VOA strives to make sure that the news it presents is accurate, objective, and comprehensive. The Charter for the service mandates "responsible discussions and opinion" of U.S. policies to avoid the perception that it is simply a source of propaganda.

From the start, VOA officials emphasized the importance of objectivity. In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the creation of the Foreign Information Service (FIS) and appointed playwright Robert Sherwood as its director. The first broadcast to Germany began with the phrase, "Here speaks a voice from America." FIS thus became known as the Voice of America, and soon it was transmitting in more than two dozen languages. The VOA's commitment to truth telling was tested immediately because it had to report a string of German and Japanese victories in the early stages of the war.

With the end of World War II, the VOA lost its original purpose, and a variety of domestic critics sought to disband the outfit. Some congressmen complained that the VOA needlessly competed with American businesses, arguing that news reporting should be a private enterprise. To make things worse, the Associated Press and United Press International stopped working with the VOA because they felt that associating too closely with the government would threaten their own reputations.

The VOA was initially part of the Office of War Information (OWI). However, President Harry S. Truman liquidated the office in August 1945 and moved the VOA into the U.S. State Department. This nearly proved disastrous, however, because the VOA became a target for Senator Joseph McCarthy's anti-communist crusade, along with other sections of the State Department. The VOA survived the McCarthy witch hunts, however, when it moved from the State Department to the independent U.S. Information Agency in 1953. At around that time, the war of ideas with the Soviet Union gave new purpose to the VOA and permitted its resurgence during the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

During the Cold War, some critics denounced the VOA as a propaganda vehicle for the U.S. government. Despite the high-sounding purpose in its charter, they argued that the VOA was nothing more than a mouthpiece for U.S. policy. VOA representatives rejected these claims, taking pains to demonstrate the organization's objectivity.

Nevertheless, American diplomats admitted that foreign leaders often doubt that the VOA, as a government-sponsored institution, can be truly independent. The tension of explaining government policy while remaining independent from government influence is built into the structure of the VOA. This dilemma probably explains why VOA doctrine places such a strong emphasis on impartiality.

Today, the VOA believes that public diplomacy plays a pivotal role in the ongoing war on terrorism. If this is the case, the VOA might indeed be an important part of U.S. national security. On the other hand, lingering doubts remain that the VOA will be perceived as credible by important audiences in the Middle East and elsewhere.

See also Media and National Security; Propaganda; Radio Free Europe

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VON BRAUN, WERNER (1912–1977)

German-American rocket scientist and advocate of manned space travel. Von Braun was born in Germany

in 1912. In 1930, he began to assist German scientist Hermann Oberth in early experiments with small liquid fuel rockets. Von Braun received his bachelor's degree in 1932 from the Berlin Technical Institute and his Ph.D. from the University of Berlin in 1934.

Von Braun was a research professor and the technical director of the German rocket research center at Peenemunde from 1937 to 1945. In 1943, he gave up his professorship to pursue the development of the V-2 rocket and other liquid fuel rocket weapons for the German government. (When von Braun died, the U.S. government declassified many documents that revealed that he had been a supporter and active member of the Nazi party during the 1930s and the early 1940s).

After World War II, von Braun was brought to the United States and became a technical adviser at the White Sands Proving Grounds (from 1945 to 1950). He was also a project director at Fort Bliss and became the chief of the guided missile development division at the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, in 1950.

One year after becoming a U.S. citizen in 1956, von Braun was appointed director of the development operations division of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (now the Marshall Space Flight Center). He was instrumental in designing rockets used to launch manned deep space flights, most notably the Apollo moon missions.

Von Braun became deputy associate administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1970 and was a well-known spokesperson for space exploration and rocket development. He is the author of several books, including *Across the Space Frontier* (1952), *The Exploration of Mars* (with Willy Ley, 1956), and *First Men to the Moon.*

VON CLAUSEWITZ, KARL
(1780–1831)

Prussian soldier and thinker, author of *On War*, one of the most influential books on military strategy. The book introduced to the field of military theory concepts such as friction, fog of war, and center of gravity, which became common currency in military strategy as well as in other military fields. In the United States, von Clausewitz became particularly prominent after the Vietnam War. *On War* was adopted as a key text at the Naval War College (NWC) in 1976, the Air War College in 1978, and the Army War College (AWC) in 1981.

LIFE

Karl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz was born on June 1, 1780, near Magdeburg, Germany, part of the former Prussian empire. Coming from middle-class origins, the von Clausewitz family reached nobility in 1827, thanks to Karl's achievements. At age 12, von Clausewitz entered the Prussian army and spent five years in garrison duties while broadening his education beyond military topics. He studied art, science, and education and entered the Institute for Young Officers in Berlin in 1801.

Prussia declared war on France in 1806, and von Clausewitz was eager to fight. Prussians were defeated in battles at Jena and Auerstadt, and von Clausewitz was captured and detained until 1808. In the peace settlement at the end of the war, Prussia lost half of its population and territory and became a French satellite. Writing in the 1820s, von Clausewitz offered a strong critique of 1806 Prussia called *Observations on Prussia in its Great Catastrophe*.

When Prussia provided an army corps to Napoleon's France to assist in the 1812 invasion of Russia, von Clausewitz, along with many other Prussian officers, resigned from the Prussian army. He then accepted a commission in the Russian army, fought in the battle of Borodino, and witnessed the disastrous French retreat from Moscow.

After Prussia changed sides in the French-Russian struggle, von Clausewitz was reintegrated in the Prussian army as a colonel. Between 1813 and 1814, he participated in many battles of the War of Liberation. At Lützen, he led several cavalry charges and was wounded. In 1818, von Clausewitz was promoted to general and became administrative head of the General War College in Berlin. During those years, he began to draft some theoretical work that eventually became *On War*.

Von Clausewitz returned to active duty with the army in 1830, when he was appointed commander of a group of artillery brigades stationed in eastern Prussia. He was later sent to the Polish border. Before leaving, he sealed his unfinished manuscripts. Back from Poland in 1831, he fell ill with cholera and died on November 16, at the age of 51, leaving a number of manuscripts unfinished.

ON WAR

In the first pages of *On War*, von Clausewitz introduced the term absolute war, a concept that does not exist in the real world. It means war in a pure form—unlimited by frictional effects of time, space, and

human behavior—that takes place in one instantaneous maximum effort by both warring parties. In the rest of the book, von Clausewitz dealt with real war—war as it exists in the real world. Real war is constrained by social and political context, by human nature, and by the restrictions imposed by time and space.

"War is merely the continuation of policy by other means," is perhaps the most-quoted line from *On War*. With this quote, von Clausewitz did not mean that a state should routinely resort to war to achieve its goals. Rather, he wanted to reject the idea that war is an irrational act. He suggested that war is a purely rational act of state policy and a legitimate means to achieve a state's interests. He defined war as an act of force to compel our enemies to do our will. If war is an extension of policy, military leaders must be subordinated to the political leadership. However, political leaders must understand the nature and limitations of war. Politicians must avoid waging war to achieve goals for which it is unsuited.

After laying out the argument that war is a rational act, von Clausewitz introduced concepts that make war real. These concepts include the *fog of war* (a lack of knowledge that occurs during a war) and *friction* (caused by incidents, difficulties, and chance—such as weather).

Another von Clausewitz concept that became important in American doctrine is *center of gravity*—the hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends. It represents a point from which the enemy derives its physical strength or will to fight. The center of gravity can be a physical object, a skill, the will to fight, or public opinion.

Also particularly interesting is von Clausewitz's analysis of strategic aspects of defense. Offense inevitably weakens as it advances from its starting point. The need to defend and maintain the lines of supply and communications dilute the aggressor's might. Every offensive has a culminating point of attack. Beyond that point, the scale turns, and the reaction follows with a force that is usually much stronger than that of the original attack. Also, victory has a culminating point, at which the success provokes sufficient counteraction to be reversed.

On War represents the most significant attempt in western military doctrine to understand war, both in its internal dynamics and as an instrument of policy. It has been read throughout the world and has inspired generations of militarists, statesmen, and scholars.

See also Military Doctrine

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V-22A OSPREY

Multimission aircraft with vertical takeoff and landing capability (VTOL). The V-22A Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft with a 38-foot rotor system and engine/transmission unit (nacelle) mounted on each wing tip. The unique design enables the Osprey to operate like a helicopter when taking off and landing vertically. Once airborne, the nacelles rotate forward 90 degrees to facilitate high-speed, fuel-efficient horizontal flight as a turboprop airplane. The wing rotates for compact storage enabling the Osprey to operate from ships or expeditionary airfields.

The U.S. Marines are the lead service in the development of the Osprey, which will be utilized as a joint service, multimission aircraft. The Marines and Army will use the Osprey (MV-22A) as an assault transport for troops, equipment, and supplies. The Navy version (HV-22A) will provide combat search and rescue, delivery, retrieval of special warfare teams, and fleet logistical support. The Air Force Osprey (CV-22A) will conduct long-range, special-operations missions.

With an operating ceiling of 25,000 feet, the Osprey can cruise at 257 knots. The aircraft was first flown in March 1989, and were grounded briefly in August 2000 after pilots encountered a problem with one of the driveshaft assemblies. The aircraft was returned to service in September 2000 following an investigation. Bell-Boeing, which manufacturers the V-22A Osprey, will provide the Marines with 360 aircraft, the Navy with 48, and the Air Force with 50. The aircraft have provisions for two .50-caliber machine guns.

See also Air Warfare

W

WAR COLLEGES

Six U.S. institutions of higher education that offer professional military education to senior officers, defense department civilians, and foreign military officials. Four of the institutions—the Army War College (AWC) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; the Naval War College (NWC) at Newport, Rhode Island; the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama; and the Marine Corps War College (MCWAR) at Quantico in Virginia—are linked to their respective service branches.

The concept of joint military leadership training grew from concern about the difficulties of coordinating land, sea, and air attacks during World War II. Although their student bodies vary according to their missions, the colleges share similar goals: improving the professional education of the highest levels of military leadership and applying lessons learned during war.

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY (NDU)

The National Defense University (NDU), established in 1976 and headquartered at Fort McNair in Washington, DC, includes the National War College and the Industrial War College, which were created after World War II to provide leadership education for members of different service branches. The NDU also includes the Joint Forces Staff College and the Information Resources Management College.

The NDU serves as the primary research and policy development institution for the Department of Defense as well as providing a joint educational program for senior military leadership. NDU centers provide outreach to the leadership of countries on every continent. In 1994, the NDU began granting a master of science degree in National Resource Strategy to graduates of the Industrial War College and a master of science in National Security Strategy to graduates of the National War College.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (NWC)

The oldest military institution in the United States is the NWC, which was established in 1884 on Coasters Harbor Island, Newport, Rhode Island, to offer an advanced course of professional study for naval officers. The founding president, Commodore Stephen B. Luce, viewed the college as a place for senior officers to study strategy, tactics, and operations based on the examination of history. He expanded a one-month course for junior officers into a full-year program integral to a naval officer's career pattern.

The school gained international notoriety when Luce's successor, Alfred Thayer Mahan, published *The Influence of Seapower Upon History* in 1890. Mahan's writings and lectures greatly influenced Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and other world leaders, including Kaiser Wilhelm II, shaping global policy based on sea power at the beginning of the 20th century.

In 1887, the NWC introduced an elaborate program of war-gaming. The college soon emerged as an internationally recognized laboratory for war planning and military operations. Tactical, operational, and even technical problems were routinely submitted to the college for solution.

World War I interrupted studies at the NWC, and when the college reopened in 1919, its program focused on four major subjects: command, strategy, tactics, and policy. Since 1949, the NWC has published a journal currently titled *Naval War College Review* and hosted the annual Current Strategy Forum.

ARMY WAR COLLEGE (AWC)

The AWC, established in 1903, traces its roots to the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. Although the United States easily defeated the Spanish, the American military was criticized in the media and political arenas.

Henry Ball's history of the AWC, *Of Responsible Command*, identified three distinct incarnations. The first AWC sought to improve the professional preparation of the Army's general staff. The AWC was closed during World War I.

The second AWC emerged in response to the lessons of the nation's first Industrial Age conflict when the college reopened following World War I. The curriculum was expanded to include history and analysis of the political, economic, and social factors that influenced the conduct of World War I.

The third AWC appeared after World War II and was shaped by the Cold War and unilateral conflicts such as Korea and Vietnam. During the post–World War II era, the need for joint command led to the establishment of the NWC and Industrial War College. To better prepare senior Army officers, the third AWC expanded its scope to include global strategy, national military strategy, and international security. It continued to train its graduates for high-level staff and command positions.

The fourth AWC emerged in the 1980s in response to the end of the Cold War and the appearance of new threats such as international terrorism, regional conflicts, and drug lords.

AIR UNIVERSITY

The Air University, established in 1946 near Montgomery, Alabama, is a major component of the Air Force system of education. Several specialized schools, including the Air War College, were brought together to form the university. The Montgomery area has a long history associated with flight. The Wright Brothers established the first civilian air school there in 1910. In the 1930s, the Army Air Corps Tactical School moved to the area.

The Air War College is the senior school in the Air Force's professional military education system. Its mission is to educate planners and leaders in air and space power for the Air Force, other branches of the armed forces, federal government civilians, and many international organizations.

MARINE CORPS WAR COLLEGE (MCWAR)

The MCWAR in Quantico, Virginia, is the smallest of the war colleges. Established in 1990, MCWAR has been offering a certificate in Art of War Studies since 1994. MCWAR's mission is to educate select senior officers for decision making during war and military operations. The typical class at MCWAR includes seven USMC officers; two Navy, Army, and Air Force officers; a Coast Guard officer; and a civilian military official.

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WAR CRIMES

Committed in the context of international armed conflicts, criminal acts that violate international norms regarding the conduct of war. The doctrine of *jus militaire* (a just war) and the rise of humanism in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, respectively, started forming an ethic that limited the means and conduct of war.

Further efforts in the 19th century, such as the first Geneva Convention and the Lieber Code (which regulated the U.S. Army laws of war), helped to

humanize conflict. The Hague Peace Conferences, held near the turn of the 20th century, also helped to diminish the evils of war and began to regulate the new and frightening technology that was created in the last half of the 19th century—technology that permitted total war. The conventions, ideas, and norms that came from these sources helped constitute an idea of war crimes.

VARYING DEFINITIONS OF WAR CRIMES

Definitions of war crimes vary. A common definition, however, and that used by the International Criminal Court, is based on the idea that war crimes are intentional acts that violate the rules for the conduct of war, or the Geneva Accords of 1949. These accords protect noncombatants in belligerent countries in times of war—both civilians and soldiers who have been removed from combat (because of illness, injury, capture, and so on). Many past definitions of war crimes (and the Geneva Accords themselves) focused on international armed conflicts, but because many modern wars are interethnic, intrastate wars, these definitions are changing.

Not all illegal or immoral acts committed in time of war are war crimes. To fit into that category, acts must meet certain criteria. They must be acts that violate the Geneva Accords' provisions in the context of an armed conflict. The perpetrator must know that the victim has protected status in the conflict. The crime must be committed as part of the war effort, with the perpetrator acting on the part of a belligerent party, with the consent or agreement of an individual who is acting in an official capacity.

AN INTENTION TO HARM

War crimes require an intention to harm, but can be committed directly or indirectly. Many statutes regarding war crimes agree that those who order (or persons of authority who tacitly support) such crimes are as guilty as those who actually carry out the prohibited acts. Thus, military personnel as well as civilians—members of government, judges, prosecutors, doctors and nurses, executioners, and businessmen—can be equally guilty of crimes under the appropriate circumstances.

War crimes include deliberate killing, torture, and inhuman treatment caused by omission or commission of certain acts. They also include using improper weapons, violating norms about conducting warfare, and committing postwar crimes against civilians (such as armed robbery or looting). Deliberate killing includes murder, massacre, and direct killings of criminal suspects without trial. Courts have also recognized indirect methods of causing death—withholding adequate food or medical treatment from prisoners of war, and forced marches—as war crimes.

Torture is defined as a belligerent act, deliberately inflicting significant mental or physical pain on a noncombatant. Activity legally categorized as torture would have been perpetrated to extract information or confessions; to punish, humiliate, coerce, or intimidate a victim, or for reasons based on discrimination. Specific activities that have been recognized by international conventions as physical torture include beatings during questioning, rape and sexual aggression, burns, electric shock, sleep deprivation, prolonged denial of food, and denial of appropriate medical treatment. Mental torture includes threats of execution of the victim or the victim's relatives, threats of exposure to others' torture, isolation, sensory deprivation, and simulated executions and burials.

Inhuman treatment resembles torture; in some conventions, it is a difference in the degree of suffering inflicted; in others, the reason for the torture makes the difference. They may occur simultaneously. Inhuman treatment includes "outrages upon personal dignity," murder, and torture, and may also include detainees being subject to biological experiments, being mutilated, being deprived of their livelihoods, being put on display to the public, having inadequate food or medical care, or being used as human shields.

Related to both inhuman treatment and torture is the crime of *willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health*. This crime does not require that the act have the same purposes as torture, but the two categories may overlap. Offenses of this nature might include enslavement, deportation, detention of people in ghettos, and detention in concentration camps.

USE OF WEAPONS AND OTHER CRIMES

The use of certain weapons or tactics may also constitute war crimes. Using biological or chemical weapons against a civil population would be regarded as a war crime; flamethrowers are likewise taboo. Tactics such as disguising combat personnel as medical staff, declaring that no prisoners will be taken,

or firing on military or civilian medical facilities are considered crimes. Other condemned tactics include making improper use of flags of truce, military insignias, or uniforms that cause death or injury. Deliberately targeting civilians or relief workers, or civilian targets such as schools—anything that is not a specific military objective—is also regarded as a war crime. Such attacks may involve concerted efforts or the use of indiscriminate weapons.

Other crimes include specific misdoing in the conduct of war, such as using children in combat, taking hostages, unlawful detentions, compelling captured combatants to serve in their captors' forces, and denying fair trials to captives. Other war crimes include deliberate shifts in population (occupation or deportation), acts against civilians after the fighting is over (such as looting), and the use of military personnel for nonmilitary objectives such as terrorizing and intimidating a local population for political reasons.

The prosecution of war crimes has been occurring since late 1945, when senior Nazi officials were tried at Nuremberg. It continued on an ad hoc basis into the 1990s. During that decade, the international community established two war crimes tribunals: the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), for atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia; and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), for perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide. The International Criminal Court was designed with the intention of creating a more permanent seat for trying war crimes. Each court has had successes and failures, but each is part of continuing international security efforts to create accountability for some of history's worst crimes and, by creating accountability, to prevent recurrences.

See also Geneva Conventions

WAR GAMES

Simulations meant to replicate real war scenarios. War games vary in design from simple board games like chess to modern computer simulations. Also included under this term are mock scenarios or exercises engaging real equipment with actual soldiers.

War games, no matter how simple or complex, have a common basic structure: A player or players respond to an opposing side's action. The reactions of the players during the scenarios tend to be similar to real reactions. War games are often based on the Lanchester equations, which use two variables to predict warfare: size of the forces involved and quality of these forces. As these equations have limited predictive ability when tested against real war situations, more variables have been added to the original ones to attempt to fix the problem.

War games hold the promise of enabling military officers to predict outcomes of strategies and tactics without the loss of human life. War games also help to prepare soldiers and officers for the real thing. The type of war game commonly used in military colleges evolved from the Prussian war game *Kriegspiel*. The basic elements, such as the colors blue and red for the opposing teams, have remained the same although the game has been continuously improved upon. Historically, the U.S. Navy has been one of the most frequent users of war games. Civilian military leaders are increasingly using war games themselves, generally focusing on political-military games. The *Strategic Analysis Simulation* (SAS), created in 1980, is a prime example of this type of political-military game. Before the Gulf War the game *Operation Internal Look*, which used computer technology, was able to predict what the war would look like and its duration, although there was some variation.

Although some war games are focused on the decision-making process of war, others provide the soldiers with battle practice. SIMNET (*Simulation Network*), a war game developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s and heavily reliant on computer technology, became an extremely useful tool for preparing soldiers for combat. Today, war games, specifically computer war games, are used commercially as well as militarily.

War games are useful tools of analysis, but critics contend that an overreliance on their predictions can be dangerous. A great deal of trust has been placed on the outcomes of war games based on mathematical calculations despite the criticism that the games oversimplify war situations. Another significant problem is the human factor. Humans who use these games often do not want to take into account certain negative factors that might occur in real-world situations, such as miscommunication. The search continues for the ideal war game that will remove the unpredictability involved in waging war.

WAR PLANNING

Planning for a military campaign or campaigns, either offensive or defensive in orientation. War planning potentially allows a country to be prepared for various future military scenarios that it may face. However, there has been controversy over the years regarding the effectiveness of war planning.

War planning concentrates on developing an effective plan for winning a conflict. To plan for war, models such as war games are often used. Additionally, lessons learned from previous conflicts serve as important sources of information for military planning.

War planning can take place during times of peace or in the midst of a conflict. War plans are often generated during times of peace in preparation for future conflict. During peacetime, plans are made for likely scenarios and some unlikely ones. A primary historical example of preconflict war planning often cited is the period before the outbreak of World War I. Before World War I, the great powers were all engaged in extensive offensive prewar planning.

Criticisms have been made against the practice of prewar planning, however, suggesting that planning for war, specifically offensive war, increases the likelihood of going to war. Some scholars argue that wars have been started by accident because of extensive offensive war planning, which encourages or even compels a nation into war. World War I, with the lead-up to the conflict consisting of heavy offensive war planning, is a commonly cited example of this phenomenon.

Arguably, the rigidity of the war plans and lack of exit strategies may have led these countries into a world war before they realized it. The situation in this case is unlike an ideal situation, in which a politician decides on a course of action and then looks for war plans to achieve the objectives. The war plans became the focus, and the politicians found themselves in a war without a political objective.

However, other scholars have argued that the war plans that were made did not necessarily propel the great powers into war, and that furthermore the assumptions that were made in this case, such as the rigidity of the war plans, were inaccurate. What is clear is that the war planning affected how the war was carried out.

War planning has potential benefits, however. For instance, plans can affect the decision-making apparatus during a crisis because those who can cite specific plans are more likely to have their positions carry more weight. There have also been many past examples of the usefulness of war planning. For example, in World War II, creative war planning helped the Germans achieve much of their battlefield success, although obviously not in the long term.

In practice, there are two types of U.S. planning: that executed as a situation occurs and planning conceived during peacetime. Plans are made on several levels, from the operational level to the strategic level, and occur up and down the military hierarchy. The planning timeline ranges from the beginning stage of a conflict through the potential subsequent stages of the campaign.

War planning, both defensive and offensive, allows a nation to be prepared for potential future scenarios. Due to the impact of chance and the inability of war planners to predict accurately the shape of future conflict, war plans have to be adaptable if they are expected to work. As long as there exists an awareness of the potential limitations of the plan, strategists maintain that war planning is of great benefit to both the military and civilian leadership of a country.

See also War Games

WAR POWERS ACT (1973)

Law addressing the balance of power between the president and Congress in declaring war. The War Powers Act clarifies the mechanism by which the president may use U.S. armed forces. It spells out the situations under which he can deploy the forces with and without a congressional declaration of war. The resolution that created the War Powers Act was passed over the veto of President Richard Nixon on November 7, 1973.

Supporters viewed the War Powers Act as a reaction to Presidents Nixon and Lyndon B. Johnson, who acted without congressional approval or a declaration of war during the Vietnam War. During the Korean and Vietnam wars, the United States found itself involved for many years in undeclared wars. As a result, many members of Congress became concerned with the erosion of congressional authority. Opponents saw the law as an unconstitutional effort to restrict the commander in chief.

The War Powers Act indicates the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution as the basis for

legislation on the war powers. It states that the president's powers as commander in chief to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities are exercised only following (1) a declaration of war; (2) specific statutory authorization; or (3) a national emergency created by an attack on the United States or its forces.

The law requires the president to consult with Congress before using armed forces, unless there has been a declaration of war or other specific congressional authorization. Consultation in this case means that a decision is pending and the president is asking members of Congress for advice and opinions. It also requires the president to report to Congress any introduction of forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities, as well as any introduction or substantive enlargement of combat forces into foreign countries. After a report is submitted, Congress must authorize the use of forces within 60 to 90 days or the forces must be withdrawn.

In the absence of a declaration of war or congressional authorization, the president has to report within 48 hours the introduction of U.S. armed forces into hostilities. Hostilities refer to a situation in which fighting actually has begun or where there is a clear and present danger of armed conflict.

The War Powers Act seeks to clarify interpretations of the president's authority. For example, Section 8 of the Act states that authority to introduce armed forces is not to be assumed from any provision of law or treaty unless it is specifically mentioned. This section aimed to avoid the use of a broad resolution, such as the Tonkin Gulf resolution, to justify hostilities abroad. That resolution stated that the United States was prepared to take "all necessary steps, including use of armed force," to assist certain nations, and it was cited by presidents and many members of the Congress as congressional authorization for the Vietnam War.

The War Powers Act also makes clear that it does not prevent U.S. forces from participating in joint military exercises with allied or friendly organizations or countries, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations. Another important specification appears in Section 8(c) of the Act, which defines the introduction of armed forces to include the assignment of armed forces to accompany regular or irregular military forces of other countries when engaged, or potentially engaged, in hostilities. The purpose of this provision was to prevent secret or unauthorized military support to foreign countries. The deployment of U.S. ground troops in Vietnam began with the assignment of advisers to South Vietnamese forces.

Since the beginning, the War Powers Act has been controversial. The war powers are not assigned by the Constitution in a definitive way between the president and Congress. By the early 1970s, the congressional majority thought that the constitutional balance of war powers had swung too far toward the president.

In his veto message, President Nixon said the War Powers Act would impose restrictions upon the authority of the president that would be dangerous to the safety of the nation. President Nixon challenged the constitutionality of the proposal. In particular, every president since Nixon has maintained the position against the provision requiring withdrawal of troops after 60 to 90 days unless Congress authorizes the deployment. U.S. presidents claim that it is unconstitutional because it checks presidential powers without affirmative congressional action.

The Congressional view has always been that the Constitution gave Congress alone the power to declare war. Most members of Congress agree that the president, as commander in chief, has power to lead the U.S. forces once the decision to wage war has been made. However, most members of Congress believe that the president does not have the power to commit armed forces to war. The executive branch replies to that view, arguing that the president has broader authority to use forces. For example, the president can use forces to rescue American citizens abroad, protect U.S. embassies, enforce a cease-fire involving the United States, or carry out the terms of security commitments contained in treaties.

See also Nixon, Richard, and National Policy; Tonkin Gulf Resolution

WARSAW PACT

A central symbol of the Cold War, an organization (also known as the Warsaw Treaty Organization) that bound together the Soviet bloc countries of central and Eastern Europe in a military alliance pitted against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev drafted the founding document of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, and

the member nations signed the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance later that year (on May 14) in Warsaw.

Although NATO was established in 1949, the Warsaw Pact's agreement stated that recent events—particularly a remilitarized West Germany's integration into NATO—had created a new ominous atmosphere. Faced with the threat of another war and a "menace to the national security of peaceloving states," the pact's signatories decided to establish an alliance that would supersede the existing bilateral agreements that the countries had concluded since communist regimes took over central and Eastern Europe after World War II. The pact agreement bound member states to defend one another if attacked and set the pact's duration at 20 years with an automatic 10-year extension. The Warsaw Pact was renewed once, in 1985.

The signatories of the Warsaw Pact included the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia; China was given observer status. Yugoslavia, which sought to chart its own socialist course and broke with the Soviet Union in 1948, was never a member. Albania ceased cooperating with the pact in 1961, after its Stalinist regime fell out with the Soviets and became more closely allied with Communist China.

Although the countries were all nominally equal members in the pact, in reality Moscow dictated all the alliance's moves and effectively ran it through the Soviet Ministry of Defense and General Staff, without a NATO-like independent structure. Top Warsaw Pact soldiers were trained in the Soviet Union. In its early history, the pact held few joint exercises, and the Soviet Union made no real attempt to integrate the members' armies into a multinational pact force.

That changed after Khrushchev and the Soviet elite saw de-Stalinization and attempts to permit the satellite states more autonomy spin out of control in the 1950s, first with Polish workers' riots in October 1956 and the Hungarian revolution that soon followed. During the Hungarian revolution, Budapest unilaterally announced plans to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, a key reason behind Moscow's decision to use its troops to defeat the uprising, which left 25,000 Hungarians dead.

Faced with such defiance, the Soviets decided to transform the Warsaw Pact armies into more of an integrated multinational force that could suppress similar uprisings and, as a byproduct, limit the ability of any national forces to act independently of the Soviet Union. As part of that trend, many more joint military exercises between Soviet forces and the allied national armies began taking place in the 1960s.

The most notorious use of Warsaw Pact troops occurred during the so-called Prague Spring of 1968, when Czechoslovak Prime Minister Alexander Dubcek and his allies introduced liberalizing reforms aimed at creating what they called "socialism with a human face." In contrast with the Hungarians, however, the Czechoslovaks did not seek to leave the Warsaw Pact, but to restructure and reform it.

Nevertheless, Warsaw Pact armies invaded Czechoslovakia. Dozens of people were killed, and hard-line forces were brought in to end all reforms. Already pursuing a comparatively independent foreign policy line, Romania condemned the invasion and refused to participate. Also in response, Albania formally left the pact (although cooperation had already ended in the early 1960s), claiming that the invasion had transformed a defense pact against imperialist aggression into an aggressive pact against the socialist countries themselves.

Attempting to justify the invasion, the Soviet leadership formulated the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine. This doctrine, named after Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, stated that "When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries."

The Brezhnev Doctrine, which for all practical purposes had already been in effect for many years, began to lose its validity only with the rise of the reform-minded Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s. In a series of speeches, as well as behind the scenes, the new Soviet leader began to make clear that Moscow would not intervene militarily in central and Eastern Europe. (This position came to be known colloquially as the Sinatra Doctrine after the famous Frank Sinatra song "My Way"—the socialist states could now do it their way). At a Warsaw Pact meeting in Bucharest, Romania, in July 1989, Gorbachev went a step further, suggesting that the organization transform into a mainly political grouping.

After the changes that swept the region following the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of communism, some initial attempts were made at reforming the Warsaw Pact. Most of the new national leaders, however, quickly concluded that the security

of their states would be better served by dissolving the alliance as soon as possible and individually applying to enter NATO. The last meeting of the political committee of the Warsaw Pact took place in Moscow on June 7, 1990, with central European leaders pushing for the group's dissolution rather than democratization as originally planned. Gorbachev agreed, and in Prague on July 1, 1991, the member states officially ended the Warsaw Pact.

The true symbolic death of the Warsaw Pact and everything it had represented perhaps occurred when the old member states entered NATO, beginning with the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary in 1999, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2004.

See also Alliances; Cold War; Eastern Bloc; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

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WASHINGTON NAVAL TREATY (1922)

Conference that attempted to resolve the naval arms race among the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, and to resolve disagreements in the Pacific. The Washington Naval Treaty of February 6, 1922, had five signatories: the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. The United States ratified the agreement in 1923.

Under the treaty, with specified exceptions for current or under-construction vessels, the navies of the United States and Great Britain were limited to 525,000 tons. The Japanese were limited to 315,000 tons, while the French and Italians could keep 175,000 tons apiece. The maximum size of an individual ship was 35,000 tons, and the maximum gun size was 16 inches.

The Washington Naval Treaty included aircraft carriers—the United States and Britain were limited to 135,000 tons, France and Italy to 60,000 tons apiece, and Japan to 81,000 tons. Each nation could support two carriers over 27,000 tons, but they could not exceed 33,000 tons each. The aircraft carrier section limited the number of large guns on a carrier and specified that a battleship with an airplane on it was not called a carrier.

The treaty led the United States to convert from battleships to carriers because it was over the battleship limits at ratification and had to decommission older ships to get under the limit. It was well under on carriers, however, having only the USS *Langley* (11,500 tons), a converted collier. The *Langley* was experimental and not charged against the total, so the Navy had the whole tonnage to work with.

The United States converted the over-the-limit battle cruisers *Lexington* (41,000 tons) and *Saratoga* (33,000 tons) to carriers, even though the Navy did not really care for naval aviation. By 1931, still under the limit, the United States finally had a true carrier—the USS *Ranger* (14,500 tons)—primarily because it was at the limits in the other classes. With the *Yorktown* and *Enterprise* (19,800 tons each) authorized in 1933, the U.S. carrier fleet was at 128,100 tons, where it remained until termination of the treaty in 1936. Experience with the carriers led the Navy to appreciate their benefits. In 1936, the keel of the *Wasp* (14,700 tons) was laid.

The Washington Naval Treaty also encouraged new techniques for making guns more efficient and armor lighter because of the desire to get more bang for the pound.

The status quo prevailed with respect to naval bases and fortifications in the Pacific. There would be no new construction or improvements on certain specific areas, usually small islands. For instance, the United States could build on Hawaii and Alaska, but not on the Aleutians. Britain could not build on Hong Kong, but it could on New Zealand and Australia. Japan could build on its home islands, but Formosa was off-limits. The British and Americans would find at the onset of World War II in the Pacific that their unimproved possessions—Hong Kong, the Philippines, and others—would be easy conquests for the Japanese military.

As the United States turned toward normalcy and disarmament, the impulse to get agreements on the cheap meant that there were no enforcement provisions, and the United States gave Japan unwarranted advantage in the Pacific. In return, it retained the Open Door in China. The treaty remained in effect until 1936, although Japan announced its intent to terminate as early as December 1934.

See also U.S. Navy

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WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)

A relatively new term, initially used in civilian policy talk, but passing to the military terminology in the 1990s, that refers to a class of weapons able to destroy a large number of people and cause other damage of catastrophic size, out of proportion to their limited size and cost. The use of delivery systems to place these weapons on or near targets usually does not form part of the term or its discussion.

Despite significant success in the use of international accords to reduce the danger of the employment or export of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their component materials and technologies, increased attention to terrorism in recent years has caused considerable apprehension and debate over the real and perceived threats that these weapons pose.

ORIGINS OF WMD

The U.S. military establishment defines WMD as weapons capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a way that can destroy large numbers of people. WMD can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but the term generally excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon.

The origins of the term WMD in current usage probably relates to a perception that the public remained insensitive to the dangers of chemical and biological warfare. Decades of living under Cold War conditions had raised awareness of nuclear weapons, and the public certainly recognized the need to control and dissuade their use at nearly any cost. However, the same public awareness was not apparent for chemical or biological weapons.

The armed forces, for an equally long time, had used the term *nuclear-biological-chemical* (NBC) in its basic training and in the organization and training of damage control and monitoring teams. In European parlance, the term was *chemical, biological, and radiological* (CBR). However, the expertise for each type of warfare resided in separate branches of the services.

Ultimately, the terminology of WMD probably came into being to bring the dangers of chemical and biological attack home to the public and to highlight the importance of impending treaty negotiations on chemical and biological warfare. WMD as a term is close enough to MAD, or mutually assured destruction, a nuclear doctrine of the early Cold War era, to attract appropriate attention.

ASSESSING THE PROBLEM

Apart from the origins of the term WMD, its usage remains fraught with ambiguities and potential error. In support of its usage, authorities have cited endless studies illustrating how a small amount of anthrax spores (a potential biological weapon) could kill 600,000 people in New York City, or how a few milliliters of nerve agent (a potential chemical weapon) could kill more than 100,000 persons. Such laboratory specifications can never be matched in the field, however, because of the problems of dispersal, weather conditions, and the random protection level of the target population.

The 1995 attack on the Tokyo subway by the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo terrorist group demonstrated very limited lethality for such an ideal target. Moreover, the nonhuman damage of the chemical-biological branch of WMD seldom registers any grave danger. There is a contamination problem, to be sure, but buildings, vehicles, and other infrastructure can be decontaminated and renovated, and damaged crops and animal herds can be disposed of, by using techniques and procedures that are well-known and available.

However, the detonation of a strategic nuclear device over a major city would likely level most of the buildings, kill most of the population, and cause considerable loss of life and ancillary damage for tens of miles outside the city. The resulting radiation levels would likely render large sections of the ruined city unrestorable and uninhabitable for a significant period.

By comparison, a surprise attack on a city with a lethal nerve agent might cause the deaths of several hundreds, or thousands, or tens of thousands of inhabitants and tax sorely needed emergency and government services. However, the survivors would find all

structures intact, and the city would be usable after a short period of decontamination (or longer, without decontamination).

An attack by airborne anthrax spores or the placing of a botulinum virus in a city water supply would cause thousands of deaths, depending upon random probabilities of time of discovery or warning; ambient conditions of temperature, humidity, wind, and sunlight; and the relative alertness of civil utility, health, and emergency services. Once again, the physical surroundings would be returned to normalcy following a decontamination process using technology and procedures already available.

Without downplaying the impact of chemical and biological attacks on a population, or their cost to government, one can see the extreme differences between the nuclear and the chemical-biological wings of the supposed WMD triad. One might just as easily classify knives, pistols, and 155mm howitzers as weapons of personal destruction. However, the uses, effects, and dangers associated with each weapon remain totally disparate.

Recent statements by the U.S. executive branch seem to recognize the disparity. Because of the failure to find nuclear weapons or evidence of an active weapons program in Iraq after the 2003 U.S. invasion of that country, authorities now are referring to the Iraqi history of manufacturing weapons of mass murder as justification for the preemptive attack. That characterization simply confirms the lesser magnitude of the chemical-biological branch of WMD.

RESTRAINTS TO USE

Historian John L. Gaddis noted in his study of the end of the Cold War that nuclear weapons had altered the continuing growth of warfare and the automatic application of technology to killing and destruction. Despite massive production of all kinds of nuclear weapons of all sizes and applications during the Cold War, a peace reigned for 50 years. Although the weapons remained aimed at one country or another during that period, not a single device was ever used, nor could any reason be found to consider such use. Indeed the unlikelihood of using WMD has proven most difficult for experts and critics to understand.

Thus, it can no longer be assumed that every innovation in military technology will provoke its use at the next opportunity. Even in the minds of some irrational people, the use of weapons of such massive lethality and destructiveness seems counterproductive. To a far more limited extent, the use of chemical and biological weapons might follow this same logic, with important exceptions.

The 20th century illustrated the soldiers' dislike of chemical weapons, despite their ready availability in most armies after 1920. Developments in bioweaponry proved equally lacking in practical demonstration. The chemical warfare escalation of the Iraq-Iran War of 1980–88, under threat of absolute conquest, proved an exception, but only because each side proved totally inept in conventional military operations.

In addition to new forms of chemical weapons, military forces have or will develop prototype-directed energy weapons, blinding devices, and frangible (fragile or breakable) ammunition, all capable of inflicting high casualties. Yet nations have also turned to nonlethal weapons and banned antipersonnel land mines in an attempt to limit suffering.

Gaddis may err to the extent that he apparently assumes that the hawks on both sides of the Cold War remained under sufficient restraint. Events since the end of the Cold War suggest that not all states exercise such restraint. In 2002, some Pakistani officers suggested that a nuclear exchange with India would be a boon, for it would settle some accounts with India, raise Pakistani prestige, and kill a portion of the population of both countries, populations that remain in desperate straits with no hope from impoverished governments. Similar musings came from India. One hopes that these hawks experienced the same restraints imposed on officers in the United States and the Soviet Union.

The development and employment of WMD remains no easy task, despite the availability of designs and formulas. The required special handling, storage, and employment techniques have dogged the most sophisticated armed forces for decades. One does not simply pour several gallons of botulinum into a crop-dusting airplane and launch a WMD attack. Unfortunately, the weaknesses of popularly based governments in the face of any risk has fed new fears that a vulnerability exists and that massive preparations to prevent, endure, and recover from WMD attacks must be undertaken, perhaps returning us to the duck and cover days of life in the 1950s under the shadow of Cold War nuclear exchanges. Perhaps we will eventually come to downgrade constructs like WMD in the same way we have emerged from that earlier Cold War era.

—Kenneth W. Estes

A Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) wanted poster from 1970 listed Bernardine Rae Dohrn as one of its most wanted fugitives. Dohrn, a self-proclaimed communist revolutionary, was the reputed underground leader of the violence-oriented Weathermen faction of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). By the 1980s, the Weathermen, then known as the Weather Underground, were essentially history, although several of the fugitives remained successfully hidden for decades, emerging only in recent years to answer for their crimes.

Source: Corbis.

See also Anthrax; Arms Control; Asymmetric Warfare; Atomic Bomb; Aum Shinrikyo; Biodefense/Biosecurity; Biological Weapons Convention; Bioterrorism; Chemical Weapons Convention; Cold War; Dirty Bomb; Germ Warfare; Loose Nukes; Neutron Bomb; Nuclear Weapons; Terrorism, U. S. (Domestic)

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WEATHERMEN, THE

Radical organization cofounded in 1969 by Bill Ayers, John Jacobs, Bernardine Dohrn, Kathy Boudin, and others as an offshoot of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), which was dedicated to the violent overthrow of American imperialism.

The Weathermen, or Weather Underground, emerged following a meeting in Flint, Michigan, at which cofounder John Jacobs said, "We are against everything that is good and decent in honky America. We will burn and loot and destroy." Following a trip to Havana to plot strategy with representatives of other members of the global communist movement's terrorist fifth column, the Weather Underground turned radical thought into action.

In 1969, the Weather Underground organized Days of Rage in Chicago with other militant left-wing groups. During Days of Rage, hundreds of people stormed the city's downtown areas, smashing hotel and store windows to protest the Vietnam War. Dozens of people were injured in the melee, including a current Chicago judge who was crippled for life.

Between 1970 and 1972, the Weather Underground carried out bombings against targets that included the headquarters of the New York City Police Department, the U.S. Capitol, the Pentagon, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) buildings, draft offices, corporate headquarters, and even statues of "oppressors." In March, 1970, three members of the group died in a Greenwich Village townhouse when a bomb they were working on exploded prematurely. The bomb was intended for a dance at nearby Fort Dix, New Jersey.

Kathy Boudin, who survived the Greenwich Village bombing, went on to join the Black Liberation Army, an ultraviolent wing associated with the Black Panther Party. She was on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) most wanted list for nearly a

decade. Boudin was involved in the 1981 New York Brinks robbery that left two guards dead. The proceeds of the robbery were to fund the "republic of New Afrika" in the southwestern United States. When Boudin was arrested, she possessed bomb-making materials and plans for a bombing campaign against New York City police stations. She was sentenced to 20 years to life and was paroled in 2003.

Ayers and Dohrn were fugitives before surrendering in December 1980. Charges against them were dropped because of improper surveillance. Ayers, a professor at the University of Illinois-Chicago, has written a book about his experiences in the Weather Underground. Dohrn, now a law professor at Northwestern University, has been denied admittance to the bar because of her association with the Weather Underground.

See also Terrorism, U.S. (Domestic)

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WESTMORELAND, WILLIAM
(1914–2005)

Commander of the U.S. forces in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968. General William Westmoreland was a key architect of the U.S. military strategy in Vietnam and a consistent advocate for a greater commitment from Washington. He oversaw the buildup of U.S. ground troops in Vietnam beginning in 1965.

Son of a textile plant manager in South Carolina, Westmoreland graduated from West Point in 1936, winning the coveted John J. Pershing sword for leadership and military proficiency. During World War II, he commanded artillery battalions in Sicily and North Africa. During 10 months of front-line combat, he suffered from malaria, and a land mine blew a truck out from under him (and fortunately left him almost unhurt).

Westmoreland volunteered for the Korean War in 1952, in which he was in command of the 187th Regimental Combat Team. In 1960, after becoming the Army's youngest major general at age 42, he was named superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where he expanded the facilities and increased enrollment from 2,500 to 4,000. In 1964, he was sent to Saigon, South Vietnam as deputy to General Paul Harkins. By midyear, when Harkins returned to the United States, Westmoreland became head of the Military Assistance Command (MACV) and received a fourth star.

Westmoreland was the top U.S. adviser to South Vietnamese armed forces and the commander of about 6,000 U.S. advisers attached to the Vietnamese units. He commanded U.S. forces in Vietnam as they gradually expanded from a few thousand to more than half a million. Westmoreland continuously requested more ground troops for Vietnam. In 1968, President Lyndon Johnson refused to send more troops and finally recalled Westmoreland after he successfully stopped the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive. Westmoreland was replaced by General Creighton W. Abrams.

Back in Washington, Westmoreland served as U.S. Army chief of staff. His biggest challenge was to withdraw the troops from Vietnam and redeploy them for duty in other regions of the world. General Westmoreland retired in 1972.

See also Vietnam War (1954–1975)

WEST POINT
See U.S. Military Academy (West Point)

WORLD BANK

A multilateral development institution for poverty reduction and promotion of sustainable economic development worldwide, also known as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Ironically, the development aspect of the World Bank, which is now its main mandate, was possibly an afterthought, emphasized only later by the developing country delegations present at a conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944. It was from there that the bank was created—along with its sister organization, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the third pillar of the newly proposed multilateral Bretton Woods system, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The World Bank finally came into official existence in 1946 when the United Nations was established.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The creation of the World Bank was a result of the geostrategic and global economic conditions present in Europe and America just before World War II. In 1942, both the American and British governments were planning innovations that would prevent the international economy from sinking back into the economic disasters of the 1930s after World War II was over. In Britain, noted economist John Maynard Keynes and his associates were advocating full employment policies, emphasizing the need for government action to redress the shortfalls of the market and building new multilateral institutions to manage an increasingly interdependent global economy and provide a counterbalance for any single rising force in Europe.

In America, Harry Dexter White of the U.S. Treasury, along with Keynes, was also concerned with forming an institution or international bank to supplement financing a depression, the war-shocked private financial markets, reconstruction of the economies of Europe, and finally to advance the economies of less-developed countries.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND POLICIES

Since its birth in 1946, the World Bank has expanded into a large organization employing nearly 10,000 people. It comprises an amalgam of five organizations—collectively called the World Bank Group—that operate under a common governing board but with different functions. These include the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Agency (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multinational Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).

The World Bank is headed by a president, appointed for a five-year term by the United States, the institution's single largest shareholder and financier. An executive board, composed of representatives from various member countries, oversees and approves the day-to-day operational and lending activities of the World Bank.

Over time, the World Bank has had to adapt its role to changing economic challenges and the perceptions of the contribution that a multilateral public sector institution can make to development. Postwar reconstruction dominated the first 15 years of the institution's

life. As this role became redundant over time, there was a widening of the bank's mandate, emphasized in shifts through its different decades of existence. This broader mandate included poverty reduction, economic growth, debt restructuring, developmental research, structural adjustment policies, and other program-based lending forms to the bank's clients: mainly poor and developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

There has been extensive and complex analysis of the World Bank's past five decades of existence in terms of its projects, lending policies, and overall developmental impact. There have been both successes and failures, and the lessons learned from them provide critical feedback for yet another role the institution has recently adopted—that of a knowledge bank, or the repository of best practice in developmental assistance. How this relatively recent role shapes the bank's future direction, policies, and indeed its effectiveness remains to be seen.

See also Bretton Woods Conference; International Monetary Fund (IMF); United Nations

WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION (WCO)

An independent intergovernmental body aiming to enhance the effectiveness of customs agencies. Seventeen European countries founded the Customs Cooperation Council, now known as the World Customs Organization (WCO), in 1952. Since then, membership in the WCO has grown to 162 states, stretching around the globe. WCO members are responsible for processing more than 95% of international trade.

Headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, the WCO promotes technical and legal improvements to help participating countries cope with the rise in international trade. The WCO strives for the standardization and uniform application of simplified customs procedures. It also enables members to share best practices and to cooperate more effectively.

The WCO's network of international partnerships encourages efficient customs administration at the national level. It contributes to a more transparent and predictable customs environment, which facilitates world trade. The WCO also promotes mutual assistance

among customs agencies to combat arms trafficking, the illegal movement of chemical, biological, and nuclear materials. In addition, the organization helps detect activities that finance terrorism, such as drug trafficking and money laundering.

In July 2004, the WCO urged its member states to implement stringent cargo-security standards similar to the ones adopted by the United States after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Such measures include the requirement that sea carriers provide advance cargo information to customs officials at destination ports. U.S. customs requires sea carriers to present data on United States-bound cargo 24 hours before it is loaded at a foreign port. By harmonizing national cargo-security regulations, the WCO hopes to safeguard the supply chain and to reduce the cost of compliance for shipping companies. The WCO insists that stricter security measures should not hinder the flow of legitimate trade.

In addition, since 1998, the WCO prepares and circulates a code of conduct for customs officials and holds training courses to promote professional integrity. The WCO also offers regional seminars to provide a forum for sharing best practices and for identifying strategies to prevent corruption among customs officials. In 2003, the WCO helped open a regional education center outside Baku, Azerbaijan, to improve the professional skills of local customs officers. The United States, Japan, and Germany contribute nearly half of the WCO's annual budget. As of 2005, the organization's secretary-general was Michel Danet, formerly a French customs official.

See also Trade and Foreign Aid; World Trade Organization (WTO)

WORLD TRADE CENTER ATTACK (2001)
See SEPTEMBER 11/WTC AND PENTAGON ATTACKS

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO)

A multilateral organization established in 1995 at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization (WTO) succeeds the GATT as the world's preeminent international trade organization.

The WTO administers trade agreements, provides a forum for trade negotiations, handles trade disputes, monitors national trade policies, offers technical assistance and training for developing countries, and cooperates with other international organizations. Nearly 150 nations are members of the WTO, and 30 others were negotiating membership as of 2004. The current members of the WTO account for 97% of all international trade.

The WTO is governed principally by ministerial conferences that are required to take place at least every two years under the terms of the WTO agreement. At this level, decisions are made not by voting but by consensus building among member nations (although there are provisions for voting to take place under special circumstances). During the last ministerial conference, held in Cancun, Mexico, in 2003, WTO members failed to reach a consensus.

The day-to-day government of the organization is found in its general council. Representatives from member nations (typically ambassadors) meet regularly and have the authority to make decisions on behalf of the ministerial conferences. The administrative agency of the organization, known as the WTO secretariat, consists of nearly 600 Geneva-based policy and legal specialists.

Proponents of trade liberalization and the mission of the WTO note that the volume of world trade is 22 times greater today than it was when the GATT was formed in 1947. The WTO is said to promote peace, handle disputes constructively, reduce the cost of living in member nations, enhance consumer choices, raise national incomes, stimulate economic growth, shield governments from lobbying efforts, and encourage efficient government. Moreover, given that rules are applied equally to all WTO members and that decisions are made by consensus (rather than simple majority), smaller nations enjoy more leverage with the WTO than without it; developing nations are afforded lengthier periods to adjust to WTO provisions.

Since its founding, the WTO has triggered fierce opposition, perhaps most graphically illustrated by the enormous protests and riots surrounding the 1999 ministerial conference in Seattle. Critics of the organization claim that the WTO (not sovereign governments) drives international policy making, places commercial interests above those of development, destroys the global environment, generates poverty, destroys jobs,

and threatens safety. Notions of free trade at any cost and their subsequent calls for rapid trade liberalization have widened trade deficits in developing countries. Such nations are obligated to open up their domestic markets (and allow in more imports), but have little control over export flows. During the 1990s, the average trade deficit (as a percentage of national income) for developing countries was 3% higher than in the 1970s, just as the average rate of economic growth was 2% lower.

See also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); Multilateralism; Trade and Foreign Aid

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REFLECTIONS
Opportunities Offered by the Global Economy

For over two decades, Mauritius has grown by nearly 6% per year. At independence in 1968, Mauritius had a per capita income of about US $260. Today, it is about US $3,800. Improvements in human development indicators have been equally impressive. Life expectancy at birth has increased from 61 years in 1965 to 71 years in 2001. The infant mortality rate has gone down dramatically—from 64 per 1,000 in 1970 to 19 per 1,000 in 2001. Virtually all households now have access to sanitation and water, and more children are being enrolled at school than ever before. The fact that economists today are able to quibble over the causes of the Mauritian miracle is proof of the astounding progress that has been achieved.

These achievements are due, in no small measure, to your determination, your creativity, and your confidence to take advantage of all the opportunities offered by the global economy. However, this was not the end of the story. One can quite reasonably ask why did a small island developing country heavily dependent on a single commodity, vulnerable to terms of trade shocks, situated at a considerable distance from world markets and faced with a rapidly growing population succeed where other better-endowed countries have failed.

The answer will come as no surprise to you. The key ingredients to your success have been political and macroeconomic stability, the rule of law, human capital, a coherent economic development strategy, judicious use of preferential access to key markets, a staunch belief in free enterprise, and most importantly the ability to adjust and turn adverse conditions into economic assets. Mauritius successfully turned the disadvantage of rapid population growth into the blessing of a dynamic and plentiful workforce. You used your ethnic diversity, which could so easily have led instead to social fragmentation, to gain advantageous business links throughout the world. And you invested heavily in educating your people and in building the institutions needed to support development.

—WTO Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi
Speech at Mauritius National
Day Celebration, 2004

WORLD WAR I (1914–1918)

The first major conflict of the 20th century, which resulted in the deaths of more than 16 million people and launched a new era of total war. Issues of national and international security would become commonplace during the 20th century.

The assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, is typically cited as the starting point of the conflict that would transform not only the map of Europe but also the concept of war itself. World War I led to the demise of three empires, as well as to the idea that conflicts between modern European societies could be quick, decisive, or inexpensive.

An alliance system constructed for more than half a century split Europe into opposing antagonistic camps, each of which formulated war plans and maintained large standing armies. Meanwhile, the Industrial Revolution had resulted in the development of tremendous resources that, once mobilized, could not be stopped. Add to this the tensions of nascent nationalism, and the outcome was a conflict that ultimately claimed the lives of more than eight million combatants and nearly the same number of civilians. Of further significance was a reorientation of power and influence, as the Russian, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian empires disappeared from the map of Europe to be replaced by a number of smaller states and the new role of the United States as a global power.

Members of the American expeditionary forces wearing gas masks in the trenches at Lorraine in France during World War I. The use of poison gas by both sides was one of the most horrifying dangers of trench warfare during the war. Beginning in the spring of 1915, the Germans released thousands of cylinders of deadly chlorine gas, and the gas attacks left gaping holes in Allied defenses as soldiers fled choking and gasping from the fumes. The use of gas masks, which became vital equipment in the trenches, eventually lessened the threat.

Source: Corbis.

STALEMATE AND TRENCH WARFARE

The Battle of the Marne in early September 1914 ended all hope of the Germans for a quick victory, although their successful retreat also ended all hope for a short war on either side. In the meantime, the Russian defeat at the battle of Tannenberg in August 1914 was so devastating that the Russian general committed suicide, and in Britain, all news of what happened was kept from the public.

Trench warfare immediately became a feature of World War I as the Germans began digging trenches in September 1914 to protect them from advancing French and British forces. The trenches soon came to symbolize the apparent intractability of the conflict, and the conditions of trench life—rats, flooding, cold, and the constant vulnerability to shelling and poisoned gas—forever undermined romantic associations of war with cavalry charges or heroic combat. The oft-repeated promise that the troops would be home by Christmas soon came to sound more like mockery.

The worst day in the history of the British military was the first day of the Battle of the Somme—July 1,

1916. The futile advance of British troops in parade ground formation across the so-called No Man's Land of barbed wire and shrapnel between enemy trenches lasted less than a half hour. By the end of the day, there were about 58,000 British casualties. The battle continued for five more months, and the Somme Campaign did not end until November 1919, with 600,000 casualties exchanged for an advance of less than 10 miles.

Technological innovation in the forms of poison gas, aircraft, tanks, and machine guns played an important role in shaping the conflict. Poison gas was first used by the French, who fired tear gas grenades at Germans advancing through Belgium during the first month of the war. The French attack was more irritating than lethal, however. The gas used by the Germans against the French at Ypres in April 1915 had a more devastating impact, which surprised even the Germans themselves. Using poison or toxic gas required perfection, as the British found when the wind blew their own gas back upon them in an attack on September 25, 1915. Gas masks were continually perfected as standard equipment, and by 1916, gas shells were being produced for use with heavy artillery to increase the range of attacks and protect the troops when weather conditions for launching a gas attack were not ideal.

The first zeppelin attack took place on the east coast of England in January 1915, and the first air raid on London took place that May. The zeppelins were successful at conducting long-range bombing missions, but they were vulnerable to attack and bad weather. The airplane played a more vital role, and by 1917, the Germans had stopped using zeppelins for bombing raids.

The motivation for tank design was to find a way of combating the machine gun, which was responsible for the deaths of thousands of infantry advancing

toward enemy trenches. The first use of tanks was by the British army during the battle of the Somme in July 1916 (although most of the tanks broke down). The first effective use of tanks was at the Battle of Cambrai in 1917, but the soon-to-be-obsolete horse cavalry, assigned the task of following up on the breakthrough, were not successful.

THE UNITED STATES ENTERS THE WAR

Two incidents played an important role in bringing the United States into World War I on the side of the Allied Powers: the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the Zimmerman telegram. In February 1915, the German government announced a policy of unrestricted warfare at sea, indicating that any ship delivering goods to an Allied country was in danger of being attacked. Although this policy broke with international agreements concerning nonmilitary vessels and the endangerment of civilian passengers, it was motivated by awareness that imports from the United States were an important source of supplies for Britain and France.

The British ship *Lusitania* left New York Harbor for Liverpool on May 1, 1915. A few days before, a statement was issued by the German embassy, reminding transatlantic travelers that a state of war existed between Great Britain and Germany. Thus, passengers on vessels flying the flag of Great Britain entered the war zone, including waters adjacent to the British Isles, at their own risk. Six days later a German submarine spotted the *Lusitania* and sank it with a torpedo. The Germans later apologized, but also claimed that the ship was carrying a cargo of heavy munitions. The American public was outraged.

U.S. President Woodrow Wilson ran for reelection in 1916 using the slogan "He Kept Us Out of War." However, Germany's announcement of a new submarine offensive in January 1917, half a year after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, caused Wilson to break off diplomatic relations. That same month, German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmerman sent a coded telegram to the German minister in Mexico City, instructing him to propose an alliance with Mexico if war broke out between Germany and the United States. As compensation, the Germans promised that they, along with Japan, would help Mexico regain the territories it lost to the United States in 1848 (Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona).

The so-called Zimmerman telegram was intercepted by the British government, shown to President Wilson in February, and by April, Wilson was asking Congress for permission to go to war. Isolationist tendencies still existing in the conduct of American foreign policy were evidenced by the fact that war was declared only against the German government, not German citizens, and war was not declared on Austria-Hungary until December 1917.

THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION AND THE END OF THE WAR

Despite possessing the largest army in Europe, Russia entered World War I with tremendous liabilities. The country lagged far behind Germany in industrial output, and its literacy rate was the level of Great Britain's in 1750. Both of these factors were exacerbated by an indiscriminate draft policy that called up skilled industrial workers along with illiterate peasants. Russian morale was also burdened by recent defeats in the Crimean and Russo-Japanese wars, not to mention the humiliating peace imposed upon them by Europe after the Russian defeat in the Russo-Turkish war. After a series of early defeats, the czar personally took over as commander of the Russian military.

The Russian army was further hobbled by class stratification, with peasant soldiers, whose local identities superseded nationalist sentiment, commanded by an aristocratic officer class, rumored to be rife with German sympathy. This led to riots in the rear against recruitment and the continued spread of disgust with the war among soldiers at the front. After the Russian Revolution in 1917, the Bolshevik's primary foreign policy interest was to remove Russia from the war.

Meanwhile, the Allies were deeply suspicious of the Bolshevik regime led by Vladimir Lenin, which many considered the outcome of a German plot. The Russians concluded a separate armistice with the Central Powers in December 1917 and a peace treaty at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, eight months before the general armistice signed between the remaining Allies and the Central Powers in November 1918. With the entry of the United States into the war, the defeat of the Central Powers was only a matter of time. By July of 1918, there were more than a million U.S. troops in France. Although more than two million troops would eventually reach Europe, a large number arrived too late to see any action.

The Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919, was unsatisfactory to all sides and is often cited by

historians as one of the causes of World War II. The U.S. Congress refused to ratify the treaty, Germany bitterly resented what they considered unnecessarily harsh reparations, and Britain and France were upset that there was no trial of the kaiser or other wartime German leaders. One significant outcome, however, was the creation of the League of Nations, proposed by Woodrow Wilson in his famous Fourteen Points. Although the League itself eventually proved a failure, it provided a model for the creation of the United Nations after World War II.

—Will Hughes

See also Air Warfare; Tanks; World War II (1939–1945)

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WORLD WAR II (1939–1945)

Global conflict that resulted in the deaths of 50 million civilians and combatants. World War II pitted the Allies, which included the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France, against the fascist forces of Germany, Italy, and Japan. The most widespread conflict in history, the war was waged on battlefronts from Europe to North Africa to the Pacific and prompted new debates over national security.

BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS

The Treaty of Versailles, signed in 1919 at the conclusion of World War I, forced Germany to admit responsibility for the Great War, cede territory to its neighbors, reduce its military to a fraction of its former strength, and pay heavy reparations. The German people, who suffered greatly after the war, blamed the humiliation and severe economic consequences of the treaty on the new Weimar government.

The rising leader of the National Socialist German Workers' (Nazi) party, a man named Adolf Hitler, attributed German defeat in World War I to a stab in the back. Hitler won much popular support by vowing

to amend the outrage committed at Versailles. Named Chancellor of the Reich in January 1933, Hitler helped suspend substantial elements of the Weimar constitution. He also directed German rearmament in violation of the peace agreements from 1935 onward, and that same year he reclaimed the Saar region, which had been ceded to France after World War I.

Germany's future allies, Japan and Italy, were likewise attempting to consolidate power and land holdings. Japan took over the Chinese region of Manchuria (Manchukuo) in 1931 to gain access to its resources and to south Asia. Italy invaded Ethiopia to try to establish an empire in Africa. In both cases, the League of Nations, the Western European powers, and the United States failed to take significant action—the former for fiscal reasons; the latter because of a retreat into isolationism.

In 1936, Germany, Japan, and Italy signed the anti-Comintern pact, which provided a basis for the Axis alliance. Facing little opposition, each country pursued particular strategies of expansionist rule, including Hitler's *anschluss* (union) with Austria to fulfill his dream of reuniting German-speaking peoples under one Reich. In September 1938, Hitler negotiated with representatives from Great Britain and France and gained control of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. The western powers hoped that Hitler would be appeased by these concessions. Instead, he effectively took over the rest of Czechoslovakia in early 1939. A nonaggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union completed Hitler's preparations.

THE OPENING PHASES, 1939–1942

War was declared officially on September 1, 1939, when Hitler launched a devastating *blitzkrieg* (lightning war) against Poland. The attack combined tactics of speed, surprise, and divide-and-conquer maneuvers using the most up-to-date technology, stunning the world with its force.

Poland was invaded again by the Soviet Union on September 17 and surrendered on September 27. The Soviets next launched an attack against Finland in November and dictated a settlement in which Finland ceded some of its territory by March of 1940. Meanwhile, Germany took over Denmark in one day in April and then invaded Norway, creating a puppet state there by June to secure food and other supplies.

Response to these actions from the French and British was limited—described as a phony war—until

Germany turned westward and invaded Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in May 1940. The Germans likewise broke through France's Maginot line on May 13, and France fell on June 22. Marshall Pétain, the beloved French World War I hero, was made the puppet ruler in the German-controlled Vichy government.

Under its fascist leader, Benito Mussolini, Italy entered the war in June, launching an attack against and occupation of British Somaliland in August and beginning a series of North Africa campaigns. Numerous battles took place between Italian and British forces from Egypt to Libya, but neither side could gain more than a temporary advantage.

Back in Europe, Germany began the Battle of Britain in August, an all-out air offensive in preparation for a planned amphibious invasion of the British Isles. The use of radar and coordinated British resistance helped repel the German advance. Meanwhile, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria joined forces with the Germans in late 1940.

On April 6, 1941, Germany attacked Yugoslavia and Greece, followed by Crete in May, and quickly prevailed in those areas. Hitler then launched Operation Barbarossa, invading the Soviet Union on June 22 in blatant violation of their nonaggression pact. The advancing German army, aided by Finland and other German-allied east European nations, swept through much of the Soviet Union west of the Caucasus Mountains with land forces and air attacks. Bitter weather, however, forced a halt to the advance and created a war of attrition rather than a quick victory. Stung by German treachery in violating the nonaggression pact, the Soviet Union joined forces with the Allies against Germany.

U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt met with British prime minister Winston Churchill at sea in August 1941 and created the Atlantic Charter. This document established principles of democracy, self-determination, and nonaggression, which helped form a basis for further cooperation after the war. The United States entered the war on the side of the Allies after December 7, 1941, when the Japanese bombed the American fleet in a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. The United States declared war the following day.

TURNING OF THE TIDE: 1942–1945

In the early part of 1942, the Allies had their first major victories with successes against Japan at the battles of Coral Sea and Midway. These were followed by a U.S. success on the Japanese-held island of Guadalcanal (which was finally captured early in 1943). Nevertheless, at the same time, German forces under General Erwin Rommel replaced Italian troops in North Africa and gained an advantage there. Germany and its allies also launched an intense attack against the Soviet city of Stalingrad. With the help of American aid fueled through a lend-lease program, the Soviets managed to keep the enemy at bay. By October, the British forces in Africa received reinforcements from Australia and the United States and pushed Rommel back, turning the tide of the war.

In January 1943, the Allied leaders—Churchill, Roosevelt, Charles de Gaulle (leader of the Free French), and Henri Giraud (leader of the French forces in North Africa)—attended the Casablanca Conference, where they pledged to seek unconditional surrender of the Axis powers. The German army surrendered at Stalingrad in February, after which the Russians marched westward uninterrupted.

The Allies finally defeated Rommel and prevailed in North Africa in May 1943. That summer saw the Allied conquest of Sicily, and invasion and success in Italy, which finally surrendered to the Allies on September 8, 1943. Germany reoccupied the country briefly, but the Allies reclaimed it in June of 1944. Meanwhile, in the Pacific, the Allies won victories in the Solomon Islands late in the year.

The Allies also began bombing Germany in the spring of 1944 to weaken her capabilities to continue to conduct the war. Moreover, they designed a plan to liberate occupied Europe. The Allies launched Operation Overlord (known as the D-Day invasion) on June 6, 1944, landing at Normandy to regain control of occupied France. They neutralized principal German defenses by late August and controlled most of France and Belgium by October.

At the same time, Soviet forces moved through eastern and central Europe, pushing back German and Axis forces as they progressed, eventually reaching as far as Germany in early 1945. After battles in New Guinea, the Allies grew progressively stronger in the Pacific and reclaimed the island groups bit by bit from the Japanese, fighting in the Philippines, Bougainville, New Guinea, the Mariana Islands, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and Manila.

The Nazis launched one final major offensive at the Battle of the Bulge in Belgium, which began on December 16, 1944. Early successes in that protracted

battle gave way to Allied victory by January 25, 1945. In February 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met at the Yalta Conference, at which they began designing final strategies for the Pacific, including Soviet entry into the war there.

At Yalta, the Allied leaders also laid plans for the postwar order, including the temporary partition of Germany, the resolution of Japanese/Chinese/Soviet territorial disputes, the management of east European nations, and the design of the future United Nations. After the conclusion of the conference, the German forces went into retreat, and the Allied forces pushed into Germany. The Nazi defenses finally collapsed at Torgau on April 25. Hitler committed suicide five days later, and surrender of the German forces was finalized on May 8, 1945.

The war in the Pacific came to a rapid close soon after. In early 1945, the United States bombed the Japanese home islands to cut it off from its empire and prepare the way for a later land invasion. The United States also convinced the Soviet Union to enter the Pacific war by August 1945. Meanwhile, U.S. scientists were secretly developing nuclear weaponry as part of the Manhattan Project. Following a successful July test of an atomic bomb in New Mexico, President Harry S. Truman ordered the *Little Boy* bomb dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima on August 6. When the Japanese still did not surrender, the United States dropped a second bomb, nicknamed *Fat Man*, on the city of Nagasaki. Japan surrendered unconditionally on August 14, 1945.

THE HIDDEN WARS

After Hitler came to power in Germany, concentration camps created by Nazi storm troopers (the SA) proliferated. Prisoners, including political dissidents and criminals, were put into the camps to remove them from society and break their spirits. By 1938, the list of potential detainees was expanded to include antisocials of all types—tramps, beggars, gypsies, pimps, and some already imprisoned male Jews. They were detained usually without having committed any crime, usually without trial, and usually without hope of release. The mentally ill and insane were likewise sent to the death camps, usually being killed upon arrival.

With the outbreak of war, the concentration camps were mobilized in Germany and occupied territories to eliminate all undesirables from the Reich, including homosexuals, Jehovah's Witnesses, and other persons deemed to be antisocial. Slavs became targets as well, but the primary population the Nazis wanted to eliminate was the Jews. The Office for Jewish Emigration under Adolf Eichmann became an agency that organized Jewish deportation to the concentration camps, which served as detention centers, work camps, and sites of extermination. Jews were taken from their homes throughout German-occupied territories and sent to camps such as Dachau and Auschwitz to do hard labor, for the Nazis were desperately short of laborers.

The prisoners lacked food, clothing, and medical care; families were divided. They were sometimes used for horrendous medical experiments. As the war progressed, the Nazis arrived at their Final Solution to the Jewish Question—extermination. Those who did not die of exhaustion, starvation, or cold were sent to their deaths by firing squads or gas chambers. Approximately six million Jews were killed, and an estimated five million others died at the hands of the Nazis.

See also Atlantic Alliance; D-Day; Hiroshima; Manhattan Project (1942–1945); Midway, Battle of (1942); Nagasaki; Roosevelt, Franklin D., and National Policy; Truman, Harry S., and National Policy; World War I (1914–1918); Yalta Conference (1945)

SECRETS REVEALED

Japanese Internment

The Nazis were not alone in establishing camps to detain suspected opponents. In the United States, President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, stating that Japanese Americans should be detained in internment camps in the American west out of "military necessity."

Racial prejudice, wartime paranoia, and economic pressures contributed to the signing of the order. Japanese Americans were suspected of sabotage or collaboration, despite the fact that no proof existed that they had ever been engaged in such activities.

More than 120,000 people—more than half of them children—were crowded into the camps. Some died because of inadequate medical care, and some were killed by guards. President Roosevelt gave the order to close the camps in 1944; the last of them was finally closed in 1945. In 1988, the U.S. government issued a formal apology and paid reparations to many of the Japanese Americans who were detained in the camps.

WORLD WAR II AND ESPIONAGE

Covert intelligence activities during World War II. The combined intelligence operations of the United States and its allies were crucial to the course of World War II military campaigns and were responsible for hastening victories in both the European and Pacific theaters.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt fully recognized the importance of intelligence to the war effort and was instrumental in making intelligence gathering a vital component of the U.S. government. During the war, U.S. intelligence analysts studied and reported on information gathered from spies, double agents, encrypted radio communications, aerial reconnaissance photos, and prisoner and deserter interviews, as well as from analyses of open radio communications, books, magazines, pamphlets, newspapers, and other archival data.

U.S. ESPIONAGE PRIOR TO A DECLARATION OF WAR

In 1939, at the beginning of World War II in Europe, the United States had no official, separate intelligence organization. In the 1920s, the United States had been a world leader in cryptanalysis, or codebreaking. However, President Herbert Hoover's secretary of state, Henry Stimson, had a great distaste for the deceptive, ungentlemanly nature of intelligence work, and as a result, U.S. intelligence fell into a period of neglect in the 1930s. In 1939, the intelligence available to U.S. leaders was inferior to the intelligence that most European leaders took for granted.

As war loomed large, President Roosevelt took steps to remedy the deficiency. Deeply concerned about U.S. national security, Roosevelt explored a number of intelligence options in the early 1940s. In 1940 and 1941, he privately and informally enlisted his distant cousin, the wealthy philanthropist Vincent Astor, and columnist John Franklin Carter to each develop a small, private network of spies to engage in espionage. Astor and Carter reported only to Roosevelt and were hired largely because the president distrusted intelligence from other sources, including U.S. military intelligence.

Realizing Astor and Carter's limitations, Roosevelt was open to a proposal by former assistant attorney general William J. Donovan that the United States cooperate with Britain's superior intelligence organizations. Donovan also advocated a centralized U.S. intelligence service. In July 1941, Roosevelt established the first U.S. intelligence organization, the Office of the Coordinator of Intelligence (COI), with Donovan as its director.

The COI functions were not to overlap or impinge on the work of other U.S. intelligence groups, including the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the Military Intelligence Division (MID), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the State Department. Although not the centralized organ that he had proposed to Roosevelt, Donovan immediately set to work, hiring distinguished academic experts for the COI's research and analysis group. He also collaborated with British intelligence officials, searched for accomplished espionage agents, and created a group dedicated to training spies.

PEARL HARBOR

Touted as the grossest intelligence failure of World War II, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, shocked Americans, including Roosevelt and U.S. military and intelligence leaders. Although they knew weeks before December 7 that a Japanese attack on U.S. forces was imminent, they did not know where the enemy would strike. The intelligence available suggested that Southeast Asia was the most likely target.

Months before Pearl Harbor was attacked, U.S. cryptographers decoded the cipher used by Japanese diplomats, nicknamed Purple. The coded messages, called MAGIC by U.S. analysts, did not in and of themselves indicate an upcoming attack on Hawaii. Although an analysis of decoded messages from all sources available at the time point to the conclusion that Pearl Harbor was to be attacked, there was no person or office in charge of this coordinated function who could have alerted the government.

THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS)

After Pearl Harbor and the U.S. declarations of war on Japan, Germany, and Italy, President Roosevelt was determined to expand U.S. intelligence capabilities. On June 13, 1942, he issued a military order establishing an expanded COI, to be renamed the U.S.

Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Donovan was to remain the director.

The OSS was still under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and continued to be locked in competition with the ONI, MID, FBI, and the State Department. In fact, the latter four organizations colluded to prevent the OSS from intruding on their traditional domains. The military insisted that the OSS not be involved in cryptography; the FBI declared that the OSS must not work in the Western Hemisphere, including the Caribbean and Latin America; and General Douglas MacArthur ordered that the Pacific Theater must remain off-limits (although the OSS was permitted to conduct espionage on the mainland of Asia).

Despite its limited jurisdiction, the OSS capitalized on its original mandate, focusing much of its work on the war in Europe. OSS agents engaged in sabotage, subterfuge, counterespionage, fifth-column (individuals within the country aiding the enemy), guerrilla, and commando operations. The research and analysis group of the OSS produced a tremendous volume of information about the geography, culture, history, economics, industry, demographics, and architecture of Europe, all necessary to military commanders as they planned their campaigns.

Although the OSS was never the equal of British intelligence, it was highly successful in the work of its spies on the ground in Germany, in operations that the British dismissed as being too risky in terms of the amount and quality of the intelligence likely to be collected. The OSS proved them wrong. OSS agents sent to Germany excelled in roaming the country undercover, gathering critical tactical information that was then communicated to U.S. military commanders on the ground in Europe.

Historians concluded that the work of the OSS had less of an impact on battle outcomes than the British and U.S. signals operations (codebreaking). Nevertheless, U.S. commanders, including General Dwight D. Eisenhower, commander of all Allied forces in Europe, attested to the importance of the OSS in its contribution to the Allied victory in Europe.

FEARS OF FOREIGN ESPIONAGE IN THE UNITED STATES

Donovan, Carter, and FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, reporting to Roosevelt in the weeks and months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, independently concluded that there was no evidence that Japanese aliens or Japanese Americans presented any threat to U.S. national security. Despite this intelligence, Roosevelt, citing the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, issued an executive order in February 1942 that called for the internment of Japanese citizens and Americans of Japanese descent.

Public fear, distrust, and racial prejudice toward the Japanese in the United States, especially rife among Americans living on the west coast where the vast majority of Japanese Americans lived, pressured the president politically. Heeding the public's call for action, and responding to his own deeply seated fear of enemy infiltration, Roosevelt acted and ordered the internment of thousands of Japanese in America. Similarly, though to a far lesser extent than the Japanese, 11,000 Germans and 11,600 Italians were also interned.

Roosevelt's concern about fifth-column sabotage contributed to his reluctance to permit Jews from Nazi-occupied Europe to immigrate to the United States. As early as 1938, FBI director Hoover informed Roosevelt that Nazi leaders ordered some of their espionage agents to pose as Jewish refugees. In 1942, the capture of eight Nazi saboteurs (two of them U.S. citizens) on the east coast reconfirmed Roosevelt's suspicion that enemy infiltration in the United States was a definite threat to national security. He insisted that the eight men be tried by a military tribunal rather than a civilian court. The tribunal found the eight saboteurs guilty, and they were sentenced to death. Roosevelt upheld the sentence for six of the saboteurs, sparing the lives of the two Nazis who had turned in the rest of the group.

CODEBREAKING

The cryptanalysis of the Army's Signal Intelligence Service (renamed the Signal Service Agency in 1943) and U.S. Navy codebreakers was of paramount importance to U.S. naval commanders in the war in the Pacific. Because the United States had been able to crack the Japanese Purple code and decode its MAGIC messages, U.S. naval forces were decisive in the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway in 1942, a turning point in the naval war against Japan.

Purple was also important to U.S. commanders in Europe because it decoded the diplomatic messages of Japan's ambassador to Germany, Hiroshi Oshima. Oshima met frequently with Adolf Hitler and his aides, who kept their ally's ambassador informed about German military campaigns, industry, and Hitler's

projections about the future course of his military campaigns. The United States and its allies profited from this window into Hitler's top secret plans.

As much as General Eisenhower commended the contributions of the OSS and the decoding of MAGIC to the war effort, he depended most heavily on British intelligence to remain informed about German troop movements and numbers, the positions of German U-boats in the Atlantic and the North Sea, and data about the struggles of the French Resistance. Ultra, the messages decoded by Britain's German Enigma code machine (acquired from the Poles), was also vital to the execution of Operation Overlord, the code name for the Allies' D-day invasion on the Normandy coast of northern France in June 1944.

COUNTERESPIONAGE
AND THE D-DAY INVASION

Counterespionage, important to all World War II intelligence operations, was critical to the success of the D-day invasion. Through an operation known as *Fortitude*, the Allies collaborated to persuade the Germans that the landing would occur both at Pas de Calais in France, north of the Normandy coast, and in Norway. The Allies went to enormous expense to pull off this elaborate, unprecedented ruse. Eisenhower ordered General George Patton, the best U.S. field commander, to move his army to Kent on the south coast of Britain, within striking distance of Pas de Calais, to deceive the Germans into believing that he would lead the invasion across the English Channel.

Weeks and weeks of false and misleading radio communications were broadcast. Fake jeeps, tanks, and planes fooled German interpreters of aerial reconnaissance. The United States even put pseudogas tanks in place. The grand intelligence stratagem of Overlord, known as the Double-Cross System, also involved the British military's use of German double agents, who were convinced (when threatened with death for noncompliance) to pass on false information to persuade the Germans to believe that invasions at Pas de Calais and on the Norwegian coast were imminent.

Eisenhower also directed security for Overlord, ensuring that the time, location, and strength of the invading Allied armies would not be revealed to the Germans. He convinced British Prime Minister Churchill to evacuate all British civilians from the invasion launch area and to prohibit all open diplomatic communication. Due to the painstaking planning, most of the German defensive forces were concentrated at Pas de Calais when the Allies landed in Normandy, enabling Overlord to be a success.

THE MANHATTAN PROJECT

Throughout the war years, the Manhattan Project—the U.S. operation to build an atomic bomb—was shrouded in secrecy that was unprecedented in U.S. history. General Leslie Groves, director of the project, supervised the procedures that enabled the Manhattan Project's goal to be unknown, even to most of the tens of thousands of workers involved. The bomb laboratory, located at Los Alamos, on an isolated mesa in the mountains of New Mexico, allowed the physicists and engineers (including the few who knew that the gadget, as it was nicknamed, was an atomic bomb) to openly discuss the weapon they were producing. Yet, despite the intense efforts at secrecy, the Soviet Union and Germany knew that the United States was working on an atomic bomb.

As adept as U.S. cryptographers were at decoding enemy radio communications, the United States was ineffective in monitoring the heavy flow of Soviet information. (The United States gathered intelligence from all its allies.) Had the United States successfully decoded all Soviet messages, U.S. leaders would have known how deeply the Soviets had penetrated the Manhattan Project, a fact that would have enormous influence on the Soviet Union's development of its own atomic bomb in 1949.

Much later, long after the war, U.S. leaders learned how severely security was breached at Los Alamos. A German-born communist, Klaus Fuchs, a former resident of Britain and a specialist in the separation of uranium-235 (essential to nuclear fission), became a Los Alamos scientist and passed information about bomb production to the Soviets. Nineteen-year-old American Theodore Hall, a physics prodigy and expert in quantum mechanics at Los Alamos, also informed the Soviets about the implosion method of atomic bomb detonation because he believed that the United States should not have a monopoly on atomic weapons. Soviet sympathizers and spies infiltrated other parts of the Manhattan Project and even the White House, though to a less serious extent.

Throughout most of the war, President Roosevelt was extremely concerned that the Nazis were developing an atomic weapon. In 1944, as the Allies were liberating Paris, a U.S. army intelligence agent named Boris T. Pash discovered that the Germans, despite their years of extensive research in nuclear physics,

had not produced and would not be producing an atomic bomb. Despite the good news, Roosevelt demanded that all security remain at the highest levels.

In September, 1945, one month after World War II ended, President Harry S. Truman disbanded the OSS. Truman distrusted the organization and disliked Donovan. He was also concerned that the British had infiltrated the OSS. Truman recognized the need for a centralized intelligence organization, however, so he established the Central Intelligence Group in January 1946. In December 1947, due to a provision of the National Security Act, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was created.

See also Covert Action; Covert Operations; Cryptology; Espionage; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Japanese Internment; Los Alamos; Manhattan Project (1942–1945); Office of Strategic Services (OSS); Roosevelt, Franklin D., and National Policy; World War II (1939–1945)

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PUBLIC PORTRAITS

"Wild Bill" Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)

William J. Donovan was born to first-generation Irish American parents in Buffalo, New York, on January 1, 1883. He received a law degree from Columbia University and returned to Buffalo to practice. In World War I, he enlisted in the U.S. Army and commanded a battalion on the front lines in France. Nicknamed "Wild Bill" for his fearless pursuit of the enemy, he was awarded four medals for his courageous exploits, including the Congressional Medal of Honor.

After the war, Donovan served as district attorney general for western New York State from 1922 to 1924. From 1924 to 1929, he was assistant attorney general in the U.S. Justice Department in Washington, DC. In 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt asked Donovan, a Republican, to embark on a secret mission to Great Britain and the Mediterranean to report on the strength of British forces and their ability to withstand a war with Germany.

As a director of the Office of Coordinator of Intelligence (COI) and the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II, Donovan created an intelligence organization that was the precursor to the postwar Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). His leadership of the OSS in Europe demonstrated how effective covert operations could be in infiltrating the enemy's occupied territory and homeland. Although his critics attacked him for his deficiencies as an administrator and organizer, Donovan's vigor and ingenuity in creating an organization dedicated to exploiting every means of covert action will remain his legacy.

After supervising the dismantling of the OSS in late 1945, Donovan returned to the practice of law. In 1946, he served for a brief time as an assistant to Robert Jackson, the chief U.S. prosecutor at the Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal in Germany. During the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Donovan was ambassador to Thailand from 1953 to 1954. He died in Buffalo in 1959 at age 76.

See also Office of Strategic Services (OSS)

Y

YALTA CONFERENCE (1945)

Meeting held near the end of World War II and attended by the leaders of the United States (President Franklin Roosevelt), the United Kingdom (Prime Minister Winston Churchill), and the Soviet Union (Premier Joseph Stalin). The purpose of the conference was to discuss Europe's postwar reconstruction and organization. Often referred to as the beginning of the Cold War, the Yalta Conference was instrumental in the secret division of the continent (as well as other regions of the world) into competing spheres of influence—the Western bloc, led by the United States, and the Eastern bloc, led by the Soviet Union.

The Yalta Conference took place in February 1945 in a former czarist palace in the Soviet province of Crimea (part of present-day Ukraine). The negotiations lasted for one week, during which the "Big Three" (as the attending leaders became known) resolved a variety of issues from the establishment of the United Nations to the fate of the Soviet-liberated central and Eastern Europe.

At the time of the meeting, Hitler's army was on the brink of final defeat. The Soviet army, having entered Germany from the east, was awaiting word from its supreme commander to advance on Berlin. Given the imminent takeover of the German capital by the Soviet army, Europe's largest, Joseph Stalin bargained from a position of strength. He was able to extract a series of concessions from his British and American allies—concessions that later became the object of widespread criticism.

THE PROVISIONS

The first issue that the world leaders dealt with at Yalta was the forthcoming occupation of Germany. With Hitler's armies almost entirely defeated, the Allies divided Germany into four occupation zones, one for each of the powers represented at the conference, plus France. France's interests were ardently backed by Winston Churchill, despite Stalin's disdain for a country that had been defeated by the Nazis.

Next, the Big Three discussed the case of Poland, which had been successively occupied by Nazi Germany and then by the Soviet Union. Fearing that an already Stalin-dominated Poland would become a mere satellite of Russia, Churchill and Roosevelt convinced Stalin to agree to the formation of a broad coalition government there, which would be joined by Western-supported Polish émigrés as well as procommunist leaders. As a principle, the Yalta participants declared the right of all European countries that had been conquered by Hitler to hold free and fair popular elections. In effect, many of these countries—particularly those of Eastern Europe—were to be placed under the indirect control of the three great powers.

With respect to the Asian front, where fierce battles were still raging in the Pacific, the Soviet Union agreed to join in the battle against Japan a few months after Germany had been defeated in Europe. In exchange, Stalin was guaranteed a series of territorial rights in the Far East.

A GOOD DEAL?

Most historians agree that the 1945 Yalta Conference was an event of immense historical significance. The

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Yalta agreements spelled the defeat of both Germany and Japan, set up the United Nations, and, most important, created a genuinely new world order in Europe.

It is that last accomplishment, however, that gave rise to countless questions and interpretations. Was the political partition of Europe inevitable, or could the subsequent Cold War have been avoided had the Western powers not conceded so much to Stalin? Critics of Roosevelt and Churchill argued that the Yalta protocols, though written in a cautious diplomatic language, practically awarded Stalin all of Eastern Europe on a silver platter. During the next few years after the war, the Soviet Union was able to install puppet regimes in most of the countries in the region, creating a communist bloc that became increasingly hostile to America and its allies.

Critics argued that because Roosevelt and Churchill were unable to keep Stalin's demands in check, the stage for the Cold War was set even before Germany and Japan were completely defeated. Eastern European historians and politicians, in particular, speak of the Yalta agreements as a sellout to the Soviets, who were given a green light to lord over all of Eastern Europe.

From another point of view, however, the concessions given to Stalin by the West were inevitable. Because the immense Soviet Red Army was already firmly in charge of half of Europe, Churchill and Roosevelt secured the best deal possible, giving up control over some European countries in exchange for the Soviets' precious military aid on the Japanese front. Whichever perspective one takes, the Yalta Conference remains a high-profile example of the pragmatic nature of international politics.

See also Cold War; Eastern Bloc; Iron Curtain; Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy; World War II (1939–1945)

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PUBLIC PORTRAITS

Winston Churchill

A gifted politician, orator, and military strategist, Winston Churchill led Great Britain during World War II from the brink of defeat to victory over the Nazi aggressors. Throughout his lengthy political career (almost 60 years of active service in various representative bodies), Churchill was both highly admired and utterly disliked by his colleagues and compatriots.

Churchill first appeared on the British political stage in 1900 as a Conservative member of Parliament, but he subsequently twice changed his party affiliation. He was known as an accomplished public speaker and somewhat of an eccentric who was rarely seen without a large Cuban cigar in his mouth. Churchill became prime minister of Great Britain in 1940, when the country was already in its ninth month of war with Nazi Germany. His subsequent performance as commander in chief of the British forces won him renown as one of the most remarkable leaders of all times.

YELTSIN, BORIS (1931–)

Soviet and Russian politician and president of Russia from 1991 to 1999, who struggled to lead his country through the troubled years that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Boris Yeltsin was born in 1931 in Yekaterinburg, a city several hundred miles east of Moscow near the Ural Mountains. Yeltsin began his career as a construction worker and did not join the Communist Party until 1961. In 1985, Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev chose him as Moscow party boss, and in 1986, Yeltsin was inducted into the Communist Party's ruling Politburo.

In October 1987, Yeltsin's career took the first of several fateful turns. After opposing party conservatives and criticizing Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost reforms as inadequate, he was removed from his Moscow post. His stance against the ruling elite cast him as a populist advocate of radical reform and attracted a large constituency of followers.

When a group of conservative plotters attempted a coup d'état and struck out against Gorbachev in August 1991, Yeltsin led the opposition against the plot. His successful opposition shifted power from the party elite to the reformers and individual Soviet republics. Soon after, Yeltsin renounced the Communist Party and helped to found the Commonwealth of Independent States, a loose federation of Soviet republics. Yeltsin's political savvy and personal resolve during this crisis helped to end attempts by conservative Communists to preserve the Soviet Union. His leadership and example

carried him into office as Russia's first popularly elected president later that same year.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin moved to end state control of the economy and to privatize most enterprises. However, his presidency eventually came under assault as economic difficulties and political opposition mounted. When the legislature, the Supreme Soviet, resorted to open conflict, Yeltsin used the army to crush the revolt. Although Yeltsin continued to advocate human rights, a free press, and the guarantee of private property, many of his opponents later returned to office through the support of a population that was dissatisfied with the conditions of a struggling economy and longed for the security and glory of the old days.

In foreign affairs, Yeltsin enjoyed marginally greater success. He significantly improved relations with the West and signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the United States in 1993. Yet his attempts to secure more than a restricted amount of economic aid from multilateral institutions and other industrialized countries fell short. In 1994, he dispatched forces to the Russian region of Chechnya, where a separatist revolt had erupted. Suppression of this separatist rebellion continued to be an unpopular and unyielding struggle that lasted beyond Yeltsin's tenure as leader of Russia.

During his second term as president, Boris Yeltsin's hold on power appeared to fade away. The Russian economy lumbered along spasmodically, and Yeltsin's judgment, and even his health, fell into question. After repeated cabinet reshuffling, Yeltsin settled on the little-known Vladimir Putin as prime minister in August 1999. That December, Yeltsin resigned abruptly. He named Putin as his successor and quietly departed from public life after a career marked by crises, challenges, and monumental historical events.

See also Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); Soviet Union, Former (Russia), and U.S. Policy

Z

ZERO SUM GAME

A game theory term that refers to situations in which one party's gain is contingent upon a second party's loss. For example, if there is a situation in which one person receiving 1 million dollars means another person losing 1 million dollars, the wins and losses add up to zero. Another example is an employment situation in which one person's receiving a job means a second person is unemployed, or in a budgeting situation in which one department's funding comes at the expense of another department's. Zero sum situations typically arise in the context of distributive bargaining, where there is a set amount to be divided.

In contrast to the zero sum game are the positive sum game and the negative sum game. The term *positive sum game* refers to situations in which the total of the wins and losses adds up to more than zero, even if one side may still get more than another. The term *negative sum game* refers to situations in which gains and losses taken together add up to less than zero. In such a situation, the only way for one party to maintain its current position is to take something from another party. It is in the context of negative sum games that the most serious competition tends to occur.

List of National Security Acronyms

ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

Bilateral Agreements between U.S. and Soviet Union/Russia

Efforts to control weapons have led to a number of treaties, conventions, and protocols over the years, some of which are shown in the following list.

Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty)
May 26, 1972

United States and Soviet Union agree to have only two ABM deployment areas, restricted and located so they cannot provide a nationwide ABM defense or become the basis for developing one.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty)
December 8, 1987

Eliminated all nuclear-armed, ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, and their infrastructure; was the first nuclear arms control agreement to actually reduce nuclear arms rather than establish ceilings that could not be exceeded

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I)
November 1969–May 1972

Ended with the signing of the ABM Treaty on May 26, 1972
Agreement freezes existing levels of the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers and permits an increase in SLBM launchers up to an agreed-on level

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II)
November 1972–June 1979

Ended with SALT II agreement on June 18, 1979
Established a long-term comprehensive treaty providing broad limits on strategic offensive weapons systems

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)
July 31, 1991

Reduced aggregate levels of strategic offensive arms, carried out in three phases over seven years representing a 30% to 45% reduction in the number of total deployed strategic warheads permitted under START II

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II)
January 3, 1993

Eliminates heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles and all other multiple warhead ICBMs; also reduces by two-thirds below existing levels the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and Russia

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III)
Negotiations of details pending

To establish a ceiling of 2,000–2,500 strategic nuclear weapons for each of the signatories to the treaty, representing a 30–45 percent reduction in the number of total deployed strategic warheads permitted under START II.

Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT)
May 24, 2002

United States and Russia agree to reduce strategic nuclear warheads to a level of 1,700–2,200 by December 31, 2012.

Multilateral Agreements

Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
Opened for signature on April 10, 1972

Prohibits signatories from developing, producing, stockpiling, or acquiring biological agents or toxins in quantities that have no justification for protective and other peaceful purposes

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
April 29, 1997

Bans the production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons; signatories agree to destroy chemical weapons and any chemical weapons production facilities

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

A number of nations signed the treaty as of September 26, 1996; U.S. Congress still has not ratified the treaty; prohibits any nuclear explosions, whether for weapons or peaceful purposes

Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)
Opened for signature on July 25, 1963

Prohibits nuclear weapons tests or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, in outer space, or under water

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Opened for signature on July 1, 1968

Obligates signatories not to transfer nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices, or their technology to any nonnuclear weapon states

Open Skies Treaty
March 24, 1992

Establishes a regime for the conduct of observation flights over the territories of the signatory nations and regulates the technicalities of the flights

Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
November 17, 1990

Complex treaty that provided ceilings for major weapons and equipment systems, providing national limits for each signatory

CURRENT UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, BY COUNTRY

As of 2005, the United Nations was engaged in peacekeeping operations around the globe. This chart shows the current, ongoing UN operations as of that year.

AFRICA

Acronym	Name of Mission	Purpose	Headquarters	Duration	Head of Mission	Strength as of February 2005
UNMIS	UN Mission in the Sudan	Provide humanitarian assistance and promote human rights	Khartoum, Sudan	March 2005 to present	Jan Pronk (Netherlands)	Up to 10,000 military personnel, 715 civilian police, 1,018 international civilian staff, 2,623 national staff, 214 UN volunteers
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	Monitor cease-fire between government and rebel groups; organize and conduct a referendum on future status of Western Sahara	Laayoune, Western Sahara	April 1991 to present	Alvara de Soto (Peru)	237 uniformed personnel, 125 international civilian personnel, 113 local civilian staff
UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone	Assist in implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reinte-gration of the government	Freetown, Sierra Leone	October 1999 to present	Daudi Ngelautwa Mwakawago (Tanzania)	3,622 uniformed personnel, 134 military observers, 79 civilian police, 243 international civilian personnel, 517 local civilian staff
UNMEE	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	Establish a mechanism for verifying cease-fire between Ethiopia and neighboring Eritrea	Asmara, Eritrea; and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	July 2000 to present	Legwaila Joseph Legwaila (Botswana)	3,335 military personnel, 214 military observers, 212 international civilian personnel, 251 local civilian staff
MONUC	UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Help maintain cease-fire among five regional states	Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo	November 1999 to present	William Lacy Swing (United States)	16,270 uniformed personnel, 563 military observers, 734 international civilian personnel, 1,154 local civilian staff
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia	To help implement cease-fire	Monrovia, Liberia	September 2005 to present	Jacques Paul Klein (United States)	16,017 uniformed personnel, 1,074 civilian police, 486

(Continued)

		agreement; support humanitarian and human rights activities; assist in national security reform				international civilian personnel, 668 local civilian staff
UNOCI	UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire	Help implement peace agreement between warring factions	Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire	April 2004 to present	Pierre Schori (Sweden)	6,237 uniformed personnel, 218 civilian police, 266 international civilian personnel, 225 local civilian staff
ONUB	UN Operation in Burundi	Help implement and restore lasting peace between warring factions and bring about national reconciliation	Bujumbura, Burundi	June 2004 to present	Carolyn McAskie (Canada)	5,445 uniformed personnel, 313 international civilian personnel, 217 local civilian staff

AMERICAS

Acronym	Name of Mission	Purpose	Headquarters	Duration	Head of Mission	Strength as of February 2005
MINUSTAH	UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti	Help stabilize situation between warring factions	Port-au-Prince, Haiti	June 2004 to present	Juan Gabriel Valdes (Chile)	7,413 uniformed personnel, 359 international civilian personnel, 800 local civilian staff

ASIA

Acronym	Name of Mission	Purpose	Headquarters	Duration	Head of Mission	Strength as of February 2005
UNMISET	UN Mission of Support in East Timor	Provide assistance in establishing independence for East Timor	Dili, East Timor	May 2002 to present	Sukehiro Hasegawa (Japan)	608 uniformed personnel, 268 international civilian personnel, 539 local civilian staff
UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	Supervise cease-fire agreement between India and Pakistan over the State of Jammu and Kashmir	Rawalpindi, Pakistan; and Srinagar, India	January 1949 to present	Major-General Guido Palmieri (Italy)	44 military observers, 23 international civilian personnel, 47 local civilian staff

EUROPE

Acronym	*Name of Mission*	*Purpose*	*Headquarters*	*Duration*	*Head of Mission*	*Strength as of February 2005*
UNFICYP	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	Supervise cease-fire lines between Greek and Turkish Cypriots; maintain a buffer zone; undertake humanitarian activities	Nicosia, Cyprus	March 1964 to present	Zbigniew Wlosowicz (Poland)	937 uniformed personnel, 42 international civilian personnel, 110 local civilian staff
UNOMIG	UN Observer Mission in Georgia	Verify compliance with cease-fire agreement between government of Georgia and opposition factions	Sukhumi, Georgia	August 1993 to present	Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland)	130 uniformed personnel, 101 international civilian personnel, 181 local civilian staff
UNMIK	UN Mission in Kosovo	Promote establishment of autonomy and self-government; coordinate humanitarian relief; support reconstruction of infrastructure; maintain civil law and order; promote human rights; assure safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons	Priština, Kosovo	June 1999 to present	Soren Jessen-Petersen (Denmark)	19,000 uniformed personnel, 910 international civilian personnel; 2,900 local civilian staff

(Continued)

MIDDLE EAST

Acronym	Name of Mission	Purpose	Headquarters	Duration	Head of Mission	Strength as of February 2005
UNDOF	UN Disengagement Observer Force	Supervise the implementation of the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights and maintain a cease-fire	Camp Faouar, Golan Heights, Syria	May 1974 to present	Major-General Bala Nanda Sharma (Nepal)	1,030 uniformed personnel, 35 international civilian personnel, 108 local civilian staff
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon	Confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon; restore international peace and security; help Lebanese government restore effective authority	En Naqoura, Lebanon	March 1978 to present	Major-General Alain Pellegrini (France)	1,994 uniformed personnel, 103 international civilian personnel, 296 local civilian staff
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization	Monitor cease-fires; supervise armistice agreements; prevent isolated incidents from escalating; assist other UN peacekeeping operations in the region	Jerusalem, Israel	May 1948 to present	Brigadier General Clive Lilley (New Zealand)	165 military observers, 96 international civilian personnel, 121 local civilian staff

COMMON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ACRONYMS

2MTW	two-major-theater war
ABM	antiballistic missile
ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASW	antisubmarine warfare
ATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (past); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (present name of the bureau; uses same acronym)
ATGM	antitank guided missile
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
AWC	Army War College
BTS	Bureau of Transportation Security
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
CAP	Civil Air Patrol
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CERT	computer emergency response team
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIG	Central Intelligence Group
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
COMINT	communications intelligence
CPI	Committee on Public Information
CTR	cooperative threat reduction
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DEW	Distant Early Warning
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DMZ	demilitarized zone
DoD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defense Community
EEC	European Economic Community
ELINT	electronic intelligence
EPCA	Energy Policy and Conservation Act
ERP	European Recovery Program
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
EU	European Union
EUCOM	European Command
FAA	Federal Aviation Agency
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FFRDC	Federally Funded Research and Development Center
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
GATT	General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
GPS	Global Positioning System
HUAC	House Un-American Activities Committee
HUMINT	human intelligence
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBIS	Interagency Border Inspection Service
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMINT	image intelligence
INF	intermediate-range nuclear forces
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
Interpol	International Crime Police Organization
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRBM	intermediate-range ballistic missile
ITO	International Trade Organization

JAST	Joint Advanced Strike Technology	OMB	Office of Management and Budget
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff	ONA	Office of Net Assessment
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command	ONR	Office of Naval Research
JSS	Joint Surveillance System	OOTW	operations other than war
JSTPS	Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff	OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
MAD	mutually assured destruction		
MCWAR	Marine Corps War College	OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
Mercosur	Mercado Commun del Sur (Southern Common Market)		
		OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
MFN	most-favored nation		
MIA	missing in action	OSI	Office of Special Investigations
MIRV	multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle	OSS	Office of Strategic Services
		OWI	Office of War Information
MLRS	multiple launch rocket system	PACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
MRBM	medium-range ballistic missile	PCIJ	Permanent Court of International Justice
MRC	major regional conflict		
MSC	Military Sealift Command	PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement	PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
		POW	prisoner of war
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	PRC	People's Republic of China
NDEA	National Defense Education Act	PSYOPS	psychological operations
NDU	National Defense University	QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency	RDD	radiological dispersion devices
		RFE/RL	Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
NGO	nongovernmental organization	RICO	Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
NID	national intelligence		
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology	ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
		SAC	Strategic Air Command
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command	SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
		SAM	surface-to-air missile
NORTHCOM	U.S. Northern Command	SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; *also* Non-Proliferation Treaty	SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
		SIGINT	signals intelligence
		SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office	SLBM	sea-launched ballistic missile
NSA	National Security Agency	SOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
NSABB	National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity	SORT	Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty
		SOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command
NSAM	National Security Action Memoranda	SPR	Strategic Petroleum Reserve
		SRBM	short-range ballistic missile
NSC	National Security Council	SSC	small-scale contingencies
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive	START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive	STRATCOM	U.S. Strategic Command
		TRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command
NUT	nuclear utilization theory	TSA	Transportation Security Administration
NWC	Naval War College		
NWFC	Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign	UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
OAS	Organization of American States	UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
OAU	Organization of African Unity	UCP	Unified Command Plan
ODP	Office of Domestic Preparedness	UN	United Nations

UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme	USCNS	U.S. Commission on National Security
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization	USIA	United States Information Agency
		USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees	VA	Veterans Administration
		VOA	Voice of America
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund	WCO	World Customs Organization
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission	WEU	Western European Union
		WHO	World Health Organization
		WMD	weapons of mass destruction
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission	WTO	World Trade Organization

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Timeline

Timeline of Major Events, National Policies, and Establishment of Government Agencies Involved in U.S. National Security

1790—August 4	U.S. Coast Guard founded as part of Department of the Treasury
1791—December 15	Adoption of the U.S. Bill of Rights
1815—September 26	Holy Alliance established among Holy Roman Empire, Prussia, and Russia
1819—February 22	Spain cedes Florida to United States in Transcontinental Treaty
1848—February	Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
1863	First Geneva Convention
1886—May 4	Haymarket Bombing, one of the worst domestic terrorist attacks in U.S. history
1898—April–August	Spanish-American War
1899	First Hague Convention
1904—May	Theodore Roosevelt articulates his Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine
1906	Second Geneva Convention
1906—June–August	Second Hague Peace Conference
1909—December 4–February 26	First London Naval Conference
1914—June 28	Assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand is the spark that ignites World War I
1917—April 6	United States enters World War I
1917—May 18	President Woodrow Wilson signs draft law to enlist soldiers for World War I
1917—November 2	Balfour Declaration
1918—October	Native American codetalkers first employed during World War I
1920—January 10	League of Nations convenes for first time
1920—September 16	Terrorist bombing of Wall Street in New York City
1922—February 6	Washington Naval Treaty signed by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy
1923	Interpol founded

1925—June 17	◆	Gas Protocol signed by many nations
1928—August 27	◆	Kellogg-Briand Pact signed in Paris
1929	◆	Third Geneva Convention
1930—January 21–April 22	◆	Second London Naval Conference
1938—May 26	◆	Creation of House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC)
1939—August 23	◆	Soviet Union and Nazi Germany sign nonaggression pact
1939—September 1	◆	Nazi forces launch blitzkrieg against Poland, marking the official start of World War II
1939—November 4	◆	Neutrality Act
1940—June 22	◆	France falls to Nazi Germany
1940—September 16	◆	First peacetime draft takes place in the United States
1941—March 11	◆	U.S. Congress passes Lend-Lease Act
1941—July	◆	Creation of the Foreign Information Service (FIS) by President Franklin D. Roosevelt
1941—August 9	◆	Atlantic Charter signed by Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt
1941—October	◆	Manhattan Project launched to produce atomic bomb
1941—December 1	◆	Civil Air Patrol founded by Mayor Fiorello La Guardia of New York
1941—December 7	◆	Japanese attack Pearl Harbor, bringing the United States into World War II
1942—February 19	◆	Executive order allowing for internment of Japanese Americans in the United States
1944—June 1–22	◆	Bretton Woods Conference held in New Hampshire
1944—June 6	◆	Allied forces launch the D-Day invasion of France
1944—December	◆	Battle of the Bulge, World War II
1945—February 3	◆	Allies begin bombing Dresden, Germany
1945—February 4–11	◆	Yalta Conference of the Big Three—Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin
1945—May 8	◆	German forces officially surrender, ending the European phase of World War II
1945—June 26	◆	Formation of the United Nations
1945—July 16	◆	Successful atomic bomb test at Trinity test site in New Mexico
1945—August 6	◆	United States drops atomic bomb on Japanese city of Hiroshima
1945—August 9	◆	United States drops atomic bomb on Japanese city of Nagasaki
1945—August 14	◆	Japan surrenders unconditionally to the United States, ending World War II
1945—October 24	◆	Ratification of the United Nations Charter
1946—March 5	◆	Winston Churchill gives "Iron Curtain" speech
1947—January 2	◆	National Security Committee established as part of Legislative Reorganization Act
1947—June 5	◆	Announcement of the European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan

1947—July 26	National Security Act
1947—August 15	United States and 19 Latin American countries sign the Rio Pact
1947—October 30	Creation of General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
1948—April 3	President Harry S. Truman signs the Marshall Plan into law
1948—June 28	Start of Berlin airlift
1948—December 9	UN General Assembly adopts Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
1949—March 26	Camp David Accords signed by Israel and Palestinians
1949—April 4	North Atlantic Treaty establishes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
1949—April–August	Fourth Geneva Convention
1949—May 12	Soviet Union ends blockade of Berlin
1949—October 1	Formation of the communist People's Republic of China
1949—October	Chinese Communist Party takes control in China
1950—June 25	North Korean troops attack South Korea, beginning the Korean War
1950—July 4	Radio Free Europe begins broadcasting to Eastern Europe
1951—September 1	Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) established
1953—July 27	Cease-fire in Korea
1953—July	Demilitarized zone (DMZ) established in Korea along the 38th parallel
1953—October 1	Mutual Defense Treaty signed between United States and Republic of Korea
1953—December 8	Dwight D. Eisenhower presents Atoms for Peace speech at the United Nations
1954—March 1	United States detonates hydrogen bomb on Bikini atoll in the Pacific
1954—April 7	Dwight D. Eisenhower first articulates the domino theory
1954—July 21	Vietnam and France sign the Geneva Peace Accord
1954—September 8	Formation of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)
1955—May 14	Formation of the Warsaw Pact in Eastern Europe
1956—July 26	Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal
1956—October	Revolt in Hungary
1956—October 29	Great Britain and Israel attack Egypt, initiating the Suez War
1956—November 6	Cease-fire in the Suez War
1957—January 5	Dwight D. Eisenhower proposes Eisenhower Doctrine
1957—March	Establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC)
1957—July 29	International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) founded
1957—October 4	Soviet Union launches *Sputnik 1*, the first satellite to reach outer space

1957—November	◆	Gaither Report presents proposals to narrow the missile gap between the United States and Soviet Union
1958—January 31	◆	First U.S. satellite, *Explorer I*, sent into orbit around the earth
1958—August 6	◆	U.S. Congress passes Defense Reorganization Act
1958—September 2	◆	National Defense Education Act (NDEA)
1959	◆	Formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
1960—May 1	◆	U.S. spy plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers shot down by Soviets over Soviet territory
1961—March	◆	John F. Kennedy launches Alliance for Progress program
1961—April 17	◆	Cuban exiles begin so-called Bay of Pigs invasion
1961—August 13	◆	East German government begins building a wall between East and West Berlin
1961—September 4	◆	Creation of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
1962—October	◆	Cuban Missile Crisis
1963—July	◆	Limited Test Ban Treaty signed in Moscow
1964—August	◆	U.S. Congress passes the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
1966	◆	Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution begins in China
1967—June 5	◆	Israel attacks Egypt, precipitating the Six-Day War
1967—August 8	◆	Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) established
1968—January 23	◆	North Korea seizes U.S. intelligence ship, the *Pueblo*
1968—January 31	◆	Tet Offensive launched by North Vietnamese against South Vietnam
1969—July 20	◆	U.S. places first humans on the moon with the *Apollo 11* flight
1970	◆	Racketeer Influenced and Corruption Organized Act (RICO)
1970—March 5	◆	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force
1970—May 4	◆	Shootings of students at Kent State University by Ohio National Guard troops
1971—January 2	◆	Congress repeals Tonkin Gulf Resolution
1971—June 13	◆	*New York Times* begins to publish the Pentagon Papers
1972—February 27	◆	Richard Nixon and Zhou Enlai sign U.S.-China joint communiqué
1972—April 10	◆	Biological Weapons Convention goes into effect
1972—May	◆	Moscow Summit between United States and Soviet Union
1972—May 26	◆	United States and Soviet Union sign the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
1973—January 23	◆	North Vietnam and South Vietnam sign peace agreement ending the war
1973—July 1	◆	Conscription (the draft) ends in the United States
1973—October	◆	OPEC nations impose production restraints and an embargo on the United States
1973—October 6	◆	Egypt and Syria launch surprise attack on Israel, beginning the Yom Kippur War

1973—November 7	◆	Congress passes the War Powers Act
1975—May 15	◆	Cambodian gunboats seize the *Mayaquez*, a U.S. merchant vessel
1976	◆	National Defense University formed from the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces
1977—June	◆	U.S. Congress establishes Department of Energy
1978—May 26	◆	First attack of the Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski
1979—April 10	◆	President Jimmy Carter signs the Taiwan Relations Act
1979—June 18	◆	United States and Soviet Union sign the SALT II Treaty
1979—November 4	◆	Iranian hostage crisis begins with seizure of U.S. embassy in Tehran
1980—April 11	◆	Operation Desert One, attempt to free U.S. hostages in Iran
1981—January 20	◆	End of Iranian hostage crisis, with release of the hostages
1983—March 23	◆	President Ronald Reagan announces his Strategic Defense Initiative
1983—October 25	◆	U.S. forces invade Caribbean island of Grenada
1986—April 15	◆	United States launches bombing raid against Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi
1986—October	◆	Summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, between the United States and Soviet Union
1986—October 1	◆	Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
1986—December 20	◆	United States invades Panama and captures Manuel Noriega
1987—May–August	◆	Televised hearings on the Iran-Contra affair
1987—December	◆	Founding of radical Islamic organization Hamas
1987—December 8	◆	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed by Reagan and Gorbachev
1990—August 2	◆	Iraq invades and seizes neighboring nation of Kuwait
1990—October 3	◆	People of East and West Germany vote to reunite their countries
1990—November 5	◆	Defense Closure and Realignment Act
1990—November 19	◆	Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty signed by NATO and Warsaw Pact members
1990—November 21	◆	Charter of Paris for a New Europe signed by various European nations
1990—November 29	◆	United Nations authorizes use of force against Iraq after Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
1991—January 9	◆	U.S. Congress authorizes use of force against Iraq
1991—January 17	◆	Beginning of Operation Desert Storm, offensive against Iraq in first Gulf War
1991—February 24	◆	Beginning of Operation Desert Sabre, the ground invasion of Kuwait
1991—March	◆	Founding of Mercosur, the so-called Southern Common Market
1991—July	◆	Break up of the former Warsaw Pact
1991—August 18	◆	Attempted coup by communist hardliners against Mikhail Gorbachev and Soviet government
1991—September 25	◆	Collapse of the Soviet Union

1991—December	◆	National Security Education Act passed by Congress
1991—December 12	◆	Maastricht Treaty establishes the European Union (EU)
1991—December 31	◆	Soviet Union is officially dissolved and broken up into separate republics
1992—March 24	◆	United States and Russia sign the Open Skies Treaty
1992—May	◆	United Nations authorizes sending of humanitarian aid to Bosnia
1992—August	◆	FBI siege of white separatists at Ruby Ridge, Idaho
1993—January 3	◆	United States and Russia sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II)
1993—February 26	◆	Terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City
1993—February 28	◆	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms launches Operation Trojan Horse against Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas
1993—September 13	◆	Israel and the PLO sign the Oslo Accords
1993—October 3	◆	Start of the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia
1994—January 1	◆	North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) takes effect
1994—October 21	◆	Agreed Framework signed by United States and North Korea
1995—January	◆	Creation of World Trade Organization (WTO)
1995—March 20	◆	Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, releases deadly sarin gas in Tokyo subway
1995—April 19	◆	Oklahoma City bombing of the Murrah Federal Building
1995—November 21	◆	Signing of Dayton Accords by Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia
1996—June 25	◆	Terrorist attack on Al-Khobar complex housing U.S. forces in Dhahran
1996—September	◆	Taliban seizes power in Afghanistan
1996—September 24	◆	Signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
1997—April	◆	Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force
1998—July 17	◆	Rome Statute creates the International Criminal Court
1998—August	◆	Terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
1998—October 1	◆	Defense Threat Reduction Agency established
1999—March 1	◆	Ottawa Treaty outlaws land mines
1999—December 17	◆	Establishment of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)
2000—October 12	◆	Terrorist bombing of USS *Cole* at the port of Aden, Yemen
2000—November 30	◆	Congress passes the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
2001—September 11	◆	Terrorist attacks against World Trade Center and the Pentagon
2001—October 7	◆	United States begins bombing campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan
2001—October 8	◆	Homeland Security Council established by executive order
2001—October 26	◆	George W. Bush signs USA PATRIOT Act into law

2002—January	◆	George W. Bush refers to "axis of evil" in state of the union address
2002—March	◆	Adoption of Homeland Security Advisory System
2002—May 24	◆	Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) signed by United States and Russia
2002—October 12	◆	Terrorist bomb explodes on island of Bali
2002—November 25	◆	U.S. Congress passes Homeland Security Act
2003—January	◆	U.S. Department of Homeland Security begins operation
2003—March 20	◆	United States begins air strikes against Iraq in Iraq War of 2003
2003—May 1	◆	George W. Bush proclaims end to major combat operations in Iraq