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United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor

**Executive summary of investigations of police
response to the riots on 4 December 2002**

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**UNMISSET**

United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor

14 November 2003

Excellency,

I am attaching herewith a detailed executive summary prepared by UN Police Commissioner Sandra Peisley outlining UNPOL's investigations of police response to the civil disturbances of 4 December 2002 and related events.

2. As you are aware, UNMISSET has already conducted extensive investigation into the causes of the riots, and provided detailed information to the Office of the Prosecutor-General of Timor-Leste, with a view to assisting him in his determination of where criminal actions may have occurred, so that the perpetrators could be appropriately prosecuted. This information complemented the Government's own review of the riots, and resulted in the arrest of a number of individuals.

3. In addition, it was clearly a matter of grave concern that shootings during efforts to control the riots gave rise to two deaths and a number of injuries among civilians. In this context, UNMISSET undertook a review of police actions that took place in response to the riots, with a particular focus on the circumstances of these shootings. A summary of these investigations, along with detailed evidence and statements is being sent directly to the Prosecutor General. The entirety of this detailed information, on the causes of the riots and on the police response, should be considered UNMISSET's final report on these tragic events.

4. In broad terms, the investigation of police response to the riots gave rise to some immediate steps, including the adoption of certain policy changes. However, it could not conclusively identify individuals responsible for the shots that caused injury or death, nor could it provide the level of clarity that we would have wished regarding the circumstances in which the shootings took place. This is largely attributable to difficulties associated with forensic examination, the lack of eyewitness statements, multiple incident scenes, inability to forensically examine 9 mm Glock casings, the fact that despite search over several days no spent casings were discovered at the incident sites and that no bullets were recovered from the bodies of the deceased. These were all factors that contributed to the difficulties faced by the investigators. The investigation, together with necessary follow-up of inquiry, analysis and review, has been a demanding and time-consuming process. It is disappointing that so much

H.E. Dr. Mari B. Alkatiri,
Prime Minister
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste,
Dili


effort -- covering over 400 interviews, test firing of 151 police weapons, forensic examination of 30 police vehicles, involving many work-hours by investigators and support staff -- could not produce a clearer conclusion.

5. Additionally, the need for urgent measures to strengthen police capability was made tragically apparent by the fact that the riots could not be brought under control for some eight hours, in the course of which extensive destruction and loss of property took place, including the burning of your own residence. Therefore, even though police forces in even long established states can get temporarily overwhelmed in exceptional circumstances, beyond this detailed investigation of the shootings that took place, UNMISSET undertook an extensive review of means through which the training, professional experience and management of the police could be enhanced to facilitate a swifter response. The attached executive summary notes that a number of measures were already at an early stage of implementation when the riots took place, and that further needs were revealed at that time. To address these various shortcomings, a number of internal actions have been taken, as detailed in the Police Commissioner's executive summary. Furthermore, vital additional resources were provided by the Security Council (Resolution 1473 of April 2003), which also called for greater training capacity for the PNTL.

6. The PNTL, while a young and as yet inexperienced force, has in general performed well, even when faced with challenges that it was ill-equipped to confront. I am confident that, over the years, the measures introduced for greater professionalisation of the police force, enhanced training, including in the promotion and protection of human rights, better accountability, disciplinary and oversight mechanisms, and promotion of technical expertise, will enable it to become a force that will be a source of pride for all. I would like to assure you of the continued commitment of UNMISSET, and indeed the United Nations, to work in a spirit of partnership, with all relevant stakeholders, in this direction. I would like to express my deep appreciation at the consistent support always extended by you and by your Government towards the realisation of this shared purpose.

7. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to all the United Nations Member States whose peacekeepers played a critical role in the restoration of order, and to record my deep appreciation of the Timorese citizens who contributed to the swift return to calm and made clear their abhorrence of such mindless destruction and violence.

8. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Kamallesh Sharma
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Timor-Leste




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UNMISSET

United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
Office of UNPOL Commissioner

¹⁶
14 November 2003

TO : Mr. Kamallesh SHARMA
SRSG

FROM: Sandi PEISLEY 
UNPOL Commissioner

SUBJECT : Executive summary of investigations of police response to the
riots on 4 December 2002

1. The present executive summary has been prepared by United Nations Police ("UNPOL") to outline the review of police response to the riots that occurred on 4 December 2002. This summary takes a broad overview of the December 4th riots and includes issues of response, investigation, post-incident lessons learnt and a way forward to deal with such incidents in the future.
2. Detailed information that emerged from this investigation has already been provided to the Prosecutor General.
3. It is envisaged that this summary is appropriate for release to the Government and indeed its release is recommended prior to the anniversary date of the tragic events that occurred on 4 December 2002.

Context of the present investigation

4. The present investigation complements previous efforts by the Government of Timor-Leste and by United Nations police to clarify the causes of the 4 December riots.

5. An Independent Parliamentary Commission ("the Commission") was established on 6 December 2002 to inquire into the events of 4 December 2002, and particularly the incident at Parliament House. The Commission was headed by the Prosecutor General, Longinhos Monteiro, and also had a representative from UNMISSET and *Dereitos Humanos no Justica* (Attachment 1). In compiling this report, information was also collected from the report of this commission. (Attachment 2).

6. The UNPOL Dili District Commander made the following comments in regards to the Commission's findings on 1 September 2003:

"In this Commission, after interviewing several members of Parliament, it was clear that there was one (1) member of the East Timorese Transitional Administration Security that incited the demonstration to attack the Parliament. Further criminal investigative inquiries were undertaken on this individual without any result from the Judiciary process."

The preliminary report from the Commission, as attached to this report, concluded the following:

"1. There is an indication that the third party took advantage of the demonstration to challenge the existence of the Government. To reveal the truth, it is recommended that competent Government bodies should conduct an over-all investigation.

2. There has been criminal offences such as attack, beatings, looting done by some persons, be it spontaneous and planned ones. These should be brought to justice.

3. Security elements: both UNPOL and PKF were slow in dealing with brutal act; and

4. There was a political motive behind the 4 December incident."

(Attachment 3)

7. On the day of the riots, Dili District Patrols and Dili District Investigations arrested 88 persons involved in looting and burning in Dili. These suspects were temporarily housed at a special compound near the Japanese Engineering Battalion just outside of Dili. Dili District Investigations interviewed all the suspects on 5 December 2002.

8. On 6 December 2002, Dili District Court held a special session for all 88 suspects at Dili District Headquarters; the court released all suspects that day. The reason the special session was conducted was because the facilities at the Japanese Engineering Battalion did not meet minimum Human Right standards and was therefore inadequate to hold prisoners any longer than a short period of time.

9. Thousands of dollars of property was recovered from eighty of the persons arrested and most has since been returned to the owners. Dili District Investigations continued to investigate the following locations that were burned and looted during the 4 December 2002, to wit; the Parliament House, the Prime Minister's House, Hello Mister, Gloria Shop and Resende Hotel.

10. Subsequently, 20 new suspects were arrested, most of whom were identified on videotape or photographs taken by journalists. Seven (7) of these suspects were arrested for burning and looting the Prime Minister's house. These seven (7) were remanded over to Becora Prison until a trial could be held. They were held at Becora Prison for 60 days and then released. The case was presented to Dili Court and the Prosecutors Office on 9 February 2003 and all seven (7) received probationary sentences. These probationary sentences have been served.

11. The total number arrested for looting and burning was 102, with seven receiving probationary sentences.

Key findings emerging from the investigation of police response

12. The events of 4 December 2002 were unfortunate and tragic and had a significant impact on the appreciation of internal threat perceptions of Timor-Leste as a Nation, but more importantly on the development of the PNTL, as well as the level of responsibility expected of the UN, and in particular UNPOL, while it continues to exercise executive policing authority in Timor-Leste.

13. It is also important to acknowledge that the events of 4 December 2002 occurred at a time when there were considerable social, economic and political issues manifesting in certain sectors of Timor-Leste society. The manifestation of these issues represented an exceptional concentration of circumstances that occurred at a very early stage in the independence of this nation and before it could develop its civil security capability sufficiently to more effectively respond to the challenges of 4 December 2002. However, the situation was controlled within the same day. It is also worth noting that security forces are often temporarily overwhelmed by security challenges in towns and cities the world over.

14. The investigation of the actions of UNPOL members and PNTL members was based on the brief of evidence in the form of statements and interviews from about 50 members of the Timor-Leste Community, 144 UNPOL members, 78 PNTL members, 122 SPU members, four (4) PKF members, video footage and photographs, and forensic

analysis assessments. This material has been forwarded to the Prosecutor General for review.

15. Investigation undertaken by UNPOL failed to identify those directly responsible for either wounding a number of crowd participants or fatal shooting of the two of them, namely Honorio Ximenes and Manuel da Silva. The number of shots fired, inability to locate the projectiles responsible for the deaths of the two young men, together with the inability to forensically analyse 9mm Glock shell casings; the number of incident scenes; the lack of eyewitness evidence directly implicating police members; were all major factors which contributed to the level of difficulty with which the investigators were faced.

16. The reason no projectiles were found in either of the deceased bodies was because the projectiles entered and then exited the victims' bodies immediately after they were fired.

17. A disappointing aspect of the investigation, was the high incidence of contradictory statements made by SPU members. The prevalence of these statements prolonged and cost, unnecessarily, the investigation in time and resources.

18. Although the investigation failed to identify those directly responsible for wounding and/or killing two (2) of the crowd participants, it did identify that twenty-two (22) Special Police Unit (SPU), nine (9) PNTL and two (2) UNPOL members did discharge firearms on 4 December 2002.

19. As a result of the investigation into the events outside UNPOL Headquarters that included; an analysis of the events leading upto 4th December 2002 (detailed in Attachment 4); witness statements, interviews, a number of re-interviews, analysis of video recordings taken on the day, and limited forensic testing, nine (9) PNTL, one (1) UNPOL and one (1) SPU member were identified as having fired their weapons. The investigation failed to identify anyone as being directly responsible for either the wounding of the three (3) victims, or the killing of Ximenes.

20. From the evidence gathered at the Colmera incidents statements from victims, witnesses, suspects and the re-interviews that were conducted, six (6) SPU members and one (1) UNPOL member were identified as having fired their weapons. The investigation was not able to conclude definitively, whether, or which of the seven (7) police officers was responsible for the wounds sustained by the seven (7) victims.

21. In relation to the incident, at Comoro it was appropriate for gun testing to be undertaken on weapons of the seven (7) SPU and three (3) PTNL members identified, or suspected of firing their weapons during this incident. Unfortunately, testing was unable to assist in the identification of which police members were directly responsible for wounding the seven (7) victims.

22. Re-interviews were conducted with five (5) SPU members because some SPU members were not forthcoming with information, and only provided it, when evidence was put before them.

23. This investigation was made more difficult due to the existence of contradictory statements made by SPU members concerning their movements and their denial of possessing firearms during the incidents. Also, as mentioned above, the absence of projectiles, which would have led to the identification of specific firearms, added yet another level of difficulty to the investigations.

24. The management team of UNPOL is confident that the measures taken in response to the events of 4 December 2002, have strengthened Timor-Leste's law enforcement capability, but this capability will obviously require continuing enhancements and development. Important to this law enforcement capability development will be the continued implementation of executive and middle management training, and development of Human Rights, Use of Force and, Code of Conduct training, both during and post UNMISSET. In the interim, the presence of an International Formed Police Unit (FPU) could provide valuable assistance to any PNTL and UIR security response.

Investigative process

25. On 6 December 2002, the UNPOL National Investigations Department commenced an investigation into the incidents that occurred on 4 December 2002. The purpose of this investigation was to investigate the incidents that occurred on 4 December 2002 at UNPOL HQ, Colmera Area, Comoro Area, Democracy Field and to investigate incidents of looting and arson that also occurred at various locations around Dili on that same day.

26. In the course of this investigation the following tasks were undertaken:

- Over 50 members of the Timor-Leste community were interviewed;
- 144 UNPOL members were interviewed;
- 78 PNTL members were interviewed;
- 122 SPU members were interviewed;
- Four (4) PKF members were interviewed;
- 13 victims interviewed;
- Forensic analysis of crime scenes and evidence collected;
- 151 police weapons test fired for ballistics comparison;
- 30 police vehicles forensically examined;
- Video and photographic evidence viewed and examined; and
- Thousands of work hours spent by investigators and support staff preparing the brief of evidence for the Prosecutor General.

As mentioned previously, there was also an investigation undertaken by a specially convened parliamentary commission into the incidents that occurred around Parliament House on 4 December 2002. Although the Commission interviewed 19 members of

Parliament, it made special reference in its final report that some members of Parliament did not provide testimonies, despite their prior agreement to do so (Attachment 3).

UNPOL HQ

27. The three (3) wounded in the vicinity of UNPOL HQ, on 4 December 2002, were all interviewed. In addition to the interviews of the three (3) wounded, a further 20 members of the community were interviewed to establish the exact locations the three (3) wounded had received their injuries, and also to attempt to identify who had killed Ximenes.

28. The investigation team interviewed at least 59 UNPOL, 16 PNTL, 45 SPU and two (2) PKF members in relation to the attack on UNPOL HQ.

29. The investigation team also appealed to the general public for further information regarding the shootings on 4 December 2002. Unfortunately, this appeal did not result in any significant information being received.

30. A number of shell cases were found in the vicinity of UNPOL HQ and these were sent to Australia for forensic testing and analysis to assist investigators to identify those responsible for wounding the three victims and killing Ximenes. Unfortunately, due to the casing of the shells found, having come predominantly from 9mm Glock Pistols, which leave little or no characteristics for forensic analysis, the forensic testing proved to be of limited assistance in identifying those directly responsible for wounding the three victims or killing Ximenes.

31. It is worth noting that the effectiveness of forensic testing was further reduced because no projectile was retrieved from Ximenes' body. Projectiles were not retrieved from Ximenes' body because they entered and immediately exited his body at the time he was shot. The projectiles that killed Ximenes were also not found in the vicinity of where he was shot, despite an extensive search by police and the use of metal detectors.

Colmera Area Shooting

32. In relation to the incidents that occurred in the Colmera Area, the seven (7) victims who received bullet wounds were all interviewed. In addition, four (4) members of the community were also interviewed as witnesses to the events in the Colmera Area.

33. The investigation team also interviewed at least nine (9) UNPOL, eight (8) PNTL, four (4) SPU and two (2) PKF members. Investigators also conducted door-to-door inquiries and interviewed the security guards who were on duty at the ANZ Compound on 4 December 2002.

34. In consideration of differences/discrepancies identified in the statement of a SPU Armoury Officer with a number of statements made by SPU members, in regards to their

possession of firearms, re-interviews were conducted with three (3) SPU members and additional interviews were conducted with 13 other SPU members.

35. The re-interviews conducted, confirmed that certain SPU members were not forthcoming with information, until the evidence was put before them. Further, this investigation was made more difficult because of the existence of conflicting statements from SPU members concerning their movements during the incident, their denial of possessing firearms until provided evidence suggesting otherwise, and continual contradictions between SPU statements.

36. A number of bullet shell cases were found at the incident sites and submitted to Australia for forensic testing. Similarly to the UNPOL HQ incident, due to the casing of the shells that were found, having predominantly come from 9mm Glock Pistols, which leave little or no characteristics for forensic analysis, the forensic testing proved to be of limited assistance in identifying those directly responsible for wounding the seven (7) victims.

37. It is worth noting that despite an order being given to deploy the SPU members without their weapons, a situation that could have avoided some of the injuries to victims, the SPU Commander, who denies ignoring such an order, despite at least four (4) witness statements to the contrary, ignored this order.

38. As mentioned previously, it is worth noting that at least four (4) people have indicated in their statements, that the Commander of the SPU ignored an order to deploy the SPU members without firearms on 4 December 2002.

Democracy Field

39. In relation to the incident that occurred at Democracy Field, initially five (5) members of the community were interviewed, along with six (6) UNPOL, four (4) PNTL and six (6) SPU members. Following on from these interviews and from further information received, the investigation team then interviewed another four (4) PNTL, 18 SPU members, four (4) members of the community, two (2) UNPOL, and conducted five (5) re-interviews with SPU members.

40. Although there was no projectile found in Manuel Da Silva's body, a number of bullet shell cases were found near the incident scene and sent to Australia for forensic examination. Unfortunately, due to the bullet shells that were found having predominantly come from 9mm Glock Pistols, which leave little or no characteristics for forensic analysis, the forensic testing proved to be of limited assistance in identifying who was directly responsible for killing Da Silva.

41. During this investigation, ten (10) SPU members were interviewed as suspects, but no one was identified as being directly responsible for the killing of Da Silva.

42. Again, it is worth mentioning that at least four (4) people have indicated in their statements, that the Commander of the SPU ignored an order to deploy the SPU members without firearms on 4 December 2002.

Comoro Area

43. In relation to the incidents that occurred in the Comoro Area, the investigation team interviewed the three (3) wounded victims and five (5) members of the community who were in the vicinity on 4 December 2002. Additionally, at least seventeen (17) UNPOL, nine (9) PNTL, 13 SPU and two (2) PKF members were either interviewed or provided witness statements to the investigation team.

44. In consideration of differences/discrepancies identified in the statement of a SPU Armoury Officer with a number of statements made by SPU members, in regards to their possession of firearms, re-interviews were conducted with two (2) SPU members and additional interviews were conducted with 14 other SPU members.

45. The re-interviews conducted confirmed that certain SPU members were not forthcoming with information, until it was put before them. Further, this investigation was made more difficult due to the existence of contradictory statements made by SPU members concerning their movements and their denial of possessing firearms during the incidents.

46. No bullet shells were located in the vicinity of Comoro Area for forensic testing or analysis.

Chronology of events

47. A chronology of events reflecting events immediately before and culminating in what has now been termed the Dili riots is attached (Attachment 4). This chronology commences at 1315 hrs on 3rd December 2002 and concludes around 1800 hrs on 4th December 2002.

Discussion

Deficiencies Identified Prior to 4 December 2002

48. As far back as February 2002, UNPOL management had identified deficiencies in Timor-Leste's law enforcement capability and had advertised two (2) positions, one (1) being a Training Adviser position and the other a Capacity Building position. Both positions were filled respectively in June and September 2002¹.

¹ Denis McDermott, Former UNPOL Acting Police Commissioner, 28 May 2003.

49. Additionally, the 'Police Needs Assessment Mission', with representatives from PNTL, UNMISSET, UNPOL and UNDP was formed and this body examined police operations in late November 2002. The findings of this study not only identified shortcomings in police training, but also aspects generally of operational policing including:

- A weakness in the chain of command and control in policing roles;
- A lack of structured communications amongst the rank and file;
- Inadequate training in use of force and firearms;
- A lack of discipline;
- A lack of and poor police equipment;
- A lack of understanding/knowledge of human right principles (problem specific to PNTL members);
- Generally a lack of understanding of procedural practice; and
- Further specialist skills training².

50. At the time the study was completed, it was understood by UNPOL management that these law enforcement capability deficiencies would require a considerable amount of time, effort and resources to rectify. Unfortunately, the incidents on 4 December 2002 preceded UNPOL's response to these deficiencies. However, it is worth noting that plans were in train to address these deficiencies prior to 4 December 2002. For example, a 'Standard Operating Procedure for the Deployment of Headquarters Personnel' to assist the Dili District Station to respond to unrest or emergency situations was approved by UNPOL's Chief of Operations, Mr. Vic Josey, in September 2002 (Attachment 5).

51. Also since November 2002, a number of other improvements have been made to Timor-Leste's law enforcement capability, and they are detailed later in this report.

Utilisation of Police Resources on 4 December 2002

52. On 4 December 2002, UNPOL and PNTL Headquarters, staff attendance records reveal 106 UNPOL, 140 PNTL officers (these figures include administration staff) were on duty for the shift commencing 8am. Additionally about 120 SPU members were also, either on stand-by, or on duty that day. The roles and functions carried out by these officers are many and varied, and required officers to attend other locations outside of the Headquarters complex for meetings and conferences.

53. Additionally, and as a result of events during 4 December 2002, UNPOL, PNTL and PKF were also responsible for providing security during 4 December 2002 and two weeks following it, to about 23 installations of significance to Timor-Leste throughout Dili and they were:

² Ibid, 28 May 2003.

- The President's Residence;
- The Prime Minister's old and new Residences;
- The Foreign Minister's Residence;
- Parliament Building;
- GPA;
- UNPOL HQ;
- SPU Compound;
- The Dili Police Station HQ;
- The Dili Fuel Depot;
- The Dili Mosque;
- The Dili Power Station;
- The Dili Airport and Heliport;
- Peace Keeping Forces HQ;
- Becora Prison;
- Tacitolo Prison;
- The Mosque;
- Eurest Compound;
- ESS Compound;
- Telstra Compound;
- National Bank;
- Obrigado Barracks;
- UN Hospital; and
- The Dili Hospital (Many of these installations are marked on Attachment 6).

Nonetheless, the vitality and escalation of the incident made it difficult for police to respond with the resources available, and as detailed above, dispersed at a number of locations throughout Dili. These factors made it extremely difficult for police to attend and control systematic outbreaks of violence in up to ten (10) different locations, at times simultaneously.

Lessons learnt and UNPOL's Immediate Response

54. The lessons learnt from 4 December 2002, such as poor communication, equipment, command and control, discipline, understanding of Human Rights, use of force practices, crowd control, and procedural practices, substantiated some of our already identified shortcomings in the Timor-Leste law enforcement capability and many changes were immediately implemented and included:

- A remedial Restructuring of the SPU (RIU) – Immediate and “near” term (Attachment 7);

- Improved communication process between UNPOL & PNTL Command procedures – i.e. proper record keeping, regular updating of staff mobile phone numbers and improved portable radio communications³.
- Minimum Staffing at Headquarters - regulated to ensure a minimum presence of at least 50% at any given time⁴.
- Improved Demonstration Equipment – allocated to appropriate stations and personnel (Attachment 8)
- Preparation and promulgation of a PNTL 'Code of Conduct' (Attachment 9)
- Preparation and promulgation of a 'Use of Force Policy' (Attachment 10)

55. Another lesson learnt from the incidents of 4 December 2002, related to Command 'Strategic Information' functions. In order to improve law enforcement, as a whole, policing should be proactive in nature and involve the gathering, evaluating, analysing and disseminating of information. Policing practices of this nature clearly hold the potential to intervene and to stop such a violent occurrence before it commences.

56. At the least an awareness of such matters leads to better anticipation and therefore proactive measures can be taken to defuse such occurrences prior to their imminent commencement or escalation. Accordingly, Command instigated new information gathering teams responsible for such proactive policing practice.

57. The 'National Operations Centre', ("NOC") located in UNPOL Headquarters forms the foundation of this structure and is the central point where all information is received, processed and disseminated (Attachment 11). Every section of the PNTL is vested with forwarding 'information reports', as necessary, on all facets of law enforcement.

58. In summary, clearly all the parties involved learnt many lessons from the incidents that occurred on 4 December 2002. Indeed, this was supported by comments made by H.E, the President, Timor-Leste, and documented in his address to the people:

1. *"The situation was one that went beyond acceptable limits and there were individuals and groups who took advantage of the situation (Attachment 12);*
2. *It is wrong to analyse the actual situation strictly in political or security terms; and*
3. *There was manipulation of a situation of social-economical dissatisfaction.*

H.E. the President considered the lessons as follows:

1. *To ensure a better and effective coordination of information and action between the State institutions, namely, the Government and UNMISSET;*

³ Denis McDermott, Former UNPOL Acting Police Commissioner, 28 May 2003.

⁴ Denis McDermott, Former UNPOL Acting Police Commissioner, 28 May 2003.

2. *Six months after independence, we should not continue to tie ourselves exclusively to political problems (namely over the concept of democracy) and neglect the socio-economic problems, namely those which can contribute to improving the standard of living of the population; nor, should we allow the opposite to happen;*
3. *It was possible to manipulate and utilize the confusion clearly demonstrated by the population because there is a vacuum of information and communication from the State institutions to the grassroots and the population.⁵*

Ongoing capacity/capability strengthening

Technical Advisor Strategy Implementation

59. Post 4 December 2002, an integral component to PNTL's capacity and capability strengthening has been the continuation and enhancement of the UNPOL Technical Advisors strategy. By November 2003, UNPOL will have 200 Technical Advisors distributed throughout Timor-Leste and their main functions are, and will continue to be to monitor and evaluate PNTL undertaking their daily operational functions, and to advise PNTL on best practise in enforcing the laws of Timor-Leste. A copy of the role description for a Technical Advisor is attached to this report (Attachment 13)

60. It is worthy to note that post 4 December 2002, UNPOL management has taken particular care in selecting the most appropriate Technical Advisors for the SPU (RIU) (Attachment 7).

61. It is also worth mentioning that I had commissioned a special project team to be formed to assess every Technical Advisors current performance in Timor-Leste and make recommendations to improve this network, including advice as to the most appropriate distribution of these UNPOL members. This special project team reported to me in end October 2003 and required modifications in order to further strengthen the Technical Advisor strategy have been implemented. This review has impacted on the profiles for selection of UNPOL officers for the duration of the mission.

62. Since August 2003, three Technical Advisor workshops have been conducted involving participation from all current UNPOL, including all UNPOL who will remain in mission until May 2004. These workshops have focussed on the role of technical advisors, stressing the need for training, mentoring and advising the PNTL and further focussing on a need for on-the-job training to be undertaken ensuring a theme of human rights, professional standards and the use of force. This workshop content has now been incorporated into the induction training for all new UNPOL joining the mission.

Improvements to PNTL Training

63. To address obvious 'Use of Force' and 'Command and Control' short comings corroborated as a result of events on 4 December 2002, there have been a number of improvements and new training programs incorporated into the PNTL Police Academy's training curriculum and calendar.

⁵ Denis McDermott, Former UNPOL Acting Police Commissioner, 28 May 2003.

Enhanced and longer recruit training

64. Obvious gaps identified in the PNTL recruit training program post 4 December 2002 included:

- The training program, running for only three (3) months, did not provide enough time for recruits to obtain the minimum levels of knowledge required prior to being deployed operationally; and
- Insufficient time was allocated to Human Rights, Use of Force and Civil Disturbance Training.

In response to these requirements, the next recruit-training program, which commenced on 8 September 2003, will run for four (4) months (Attachment 14). Additionally, the revised curriculum now incorporates:

- All classes with Human Right principles; and
- More practical/scenario-based training - to provide recruits with exposure to more "real-like" incidents, prior to their operational deployment.

It is envisaged that the recruit-training program will also be extended from four (4) to six (6) months in 2004 (Attachment 15)

65. The PNTL Academy has also produced a Police Handbook – 'A Guide for PNTL Officers' (Attachment 16). This handbook is designed to be readily accessible and a portable reference for PNTL Officers undertaking their duties and covers many topics such as Human Rights, Policing Skills, Investigation Skills and Legal considerations. UNPOL management is still reviewing this Police Handbook and it is hoped it will be ready for distribution shortly.

Other pertinent training programs

66. The following pertinent training programs, addressing deficiencies identified on 4 December 2002, have been delivered to PNTL members (Attachment 17):

- Human Rights Training

Human Rights Unit of UNMISSET is providing enhanced training to specialised units of PNTL, particularly the UIR, VPU and the RDS, in addition to the training sessions provided as part of the courses conducted by the Police Training College. In service training of community policing focal points is planned.

17 – 22 Feb 2003 11 PNTL Officers attended this program.

10-14 March 2003 44 PNTL Officers attended this program

August 2003	half day training workshops in Aileu, Ainaro, Ermera, Liquiça, Maliana and Suai.
29 September to 10 October	Training of Trainers Workshop for police officers from all 13 districts.
10 November	Conduct of a workshop by a police officer trained in the Training of Trainers Workshop, in Ainaro.
August to September 2003	Human Rights training to sub-district Commanders
Ongoing	Briefing on human rights issues to all new UNPOL Technical Advisors

- Civil Disturbance Management Course

10 – 21 March 2002 30 PNTL Officers attended this program.
11 – 22 March 2003 89 PNTL Officers attended this program

- Police Supervision Course

22 April – 3 May 2002 29 PNTL Officers attended this program
24 March – 7 July 2003 165 PNTL Officers attended this program

- Mid-Level Management Course

17 Feb – June 2003 137 PNTL Officers attended this program

- Station Commander Training

7 – 14 July 2003 32 PNTL Station Commanders from all 13 districts