

United Nations

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM



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MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION
OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES

TO: Mr. Youssef Mahmoud
A: Executive Representative of the Secretary-General
United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)

DATE: 6 February 2007

REFERENCE: AUD-7-5:75 (07-00049)

FROM: Dagfinn Knutsen, Acting Director
DE: Internal Audit Division, OIOS

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Dagfinn Knutsen', written over the printed name and title.

SUBJECT: **OIOS Audit No. AP2006/648/02: Security management in ONUB (In Liquidation)**
OBJET:

1. I am pleased to present herewith our final report on the audit of the above subject, which was conducted between July and August 2006.
2. We note from your response to the draft report that ONUB has generally accepted the recommendations. Based on your response, we are pleased to inform you that we have closed recommendations 1, 6, 12, 15 and 17 in the OIOS recommendations database. Recommendation 4 has been withdrawn. In order to close recommendations 2, 3, 5, 7 to 11, 13, 14, 16 and 18, we request that you provide us with the additional information as discussed in the text of the report and a time schedule for their implementation. Please note that OIOS will report on the progress made in implementing its recommendations, particularly those designated as critical (i.e., recommendations 1 to 5, 14, 16 and 18) in its annual report to the General Assembly and semi-annual report to the Secretary-General.
3. The Internal Audit Division is assessing the overall quality of its audit process and kindly requests that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors and complete the attached client satisfaction survey.
4. I take this opportunity to thank the management and staff of ONUB for the assistance and cooperation provided to the auditors in connection with this assignment.

Copy to: Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
Mr. Philip Cooper, Director, ASD/DPKO
Mr. Gianni Deligia, Chief Administrative Officer, ONUB
Mr. Swatantra Goolsarran, Executive Secretary, UN Board of Auditors
Mr. Jonathan Childerly, Chief, Oversight Support Unit, Department of Management
Mr. Mika Tapio, OIOS
Mr. Malick Diop, Chief Resident Auditor, ONUB

Office of Internal Oversight Services
Internal Audit Division



Audit of Security Management in ONUB

Audit no: AP2006/648/02
Report date: 6 February 2007
Audit team: Nicholas M. Makaa, Auditor-in-Charge

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Security management in ONUB (Assignment No. AP2006/648/02)

OIOS conducted an audit of security management at the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in July and August 2006. The overall objectives of the audit were to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the Security Section's organizational structure and operational procedures; determine whether the Mission's security staff and resources are adequate and are being effectively managed; and determine whether there are any organizational or other problems that hinder the effective implementation of the security and emergency planning activities of the Mission.

The Designated Official (DO), the Security Management Team (SMT) and the Chief Security Adviser (CSA) have, in general, adequately managed the security system established to protect the staff and safeguard the property and premises of the United Nations in Burundi. However, OIOS identified the following areas where improvement is needed:

- Establishment of a well defined and integrated Burundi Security Section covering all members of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT);
- Assessment of the impact of the downsizing of the Mission, including the repatriation of military contingents and taking appropriate action to ensure that potential gaps in terms of security escort, interventions and other support are adequately covered;
- Engaging the host government to play its role as the main security provider to the UNCT;
- Ensuring that the security plan is reviewed, updated and rehearsed regularly; and
- Filling of vacancies in the Security Section.

It is also essential that the guidance and leadership of the Designated Official, the SMT, the CSA and the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) are effectively exercised to ensure an adequate security system for the entire UNCT and its activities in the country.


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I. INTRODUCTION

1. OIOS conducted an audit of security management at the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) between July and August 2006. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
2. On 21 May 2004, by resolution 1545, the Security Council established ONUB with the objective of restoring lasting peace and bringing about national reconciliation in Burundi. On 25 October 2006, the Security Council, by resolution 1719, decided to set up the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) to replace the current mission, ONUB, which completes its operation as of 31 December 2006. ONUB planned to gradually phase out its military personnel by December 2006 and go into liquidation phase from January to June 2007. An average of 71 military observers, 3,985 military contingent personnel, 15 UN police officers, 341 international staff, 376 national staff and 120 United Nations Volunteers were deployed up to December 2006.
3. The Chief Security Adviser (CSA) reports directly to the Designated Official for Security in Burundi (DO) and serves as the Principal Security Adviser to the DO and the Security Management Team (SMT) on all aspects of security management, crisis readiness and preparedness with regard to the safety and security of UN staff members and property. The Acting SRSO of ONUB is the DO in Burundi.
4. The ONUB Security Section operated with expenditures of approximately \$1.38 million in the year 2005-2006 and a budget of \$1.33 million is proposed for the year 2006-2007. The post of the CSA is funded by the Department of Safety and Security (DSS). While ONUB continues to downsize, a new structure, shown in Figure 1, is proposed to integrate ONUB and all UN agencies in Burundi into a unified security management system in accordance with General Assembly resolution 59/276:

Figure 1: Burundi Security Section Provisional Organization chart



5. The comments made by the Management of ONUB on the draft audit report have been included in the report as appropriate and are shown in italics.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

6. The objectives of the audit were to:
- (a) Assess the Security Section’s organizational structure and operational procedures to effectively and efficiently carry out its mandate;
 - (b) Determine whether the Mission’s security staff and resources are adequate and are being effectively managed; and
 - (c) Determine whether there are any organizational or other problems that hinder the Mission’s effective implementation of the security and emergency-planning requirements.

III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

7. The audit involved an assessment of procedures established by ONUB to manage the security and safety of its personnel and property in Burundi. The audit scope covered the

implementation of a security plan and warden system; and arrangements for the integration and coordination with other UN agencies and the host government in the execution of the security mandate in the Mission area. The audit activities involved interviewing staff and management, reviewing available documentation and inspecting property and facilities, as appropriate.

IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Organizational structure

Integrated security management system

8. The United Nations General Assembly resolution 59/276 requires the reorganization of the UN security activities into an integrated and unified security management system comprising all UN agencies operating in the country, which in the case of Burundi includes: UNDP, UNESCO, WHO, UNICEF, UNCHR, FAO, UNFPA, OHCHR, WFP, UNOCHA, UNAIDS, World Bank and ONUB. The group is collectively called the United Nations Country Team (UNCT). In order to implement the resolution, the responsibility of the Chief Security Adviser (CSA) which initially covered only ONUB, was extended to include all the UNCT security activities under the direction of the DO. Up to June 2006, the ONUB Security Section operated under an organizational structure with reporting relationships identified and defined by USG/DPKO and DSS, whereby the Chief Security Officer reported functionally to the Head of the Mission/SRSG and administratively to the CAO.

9. Under the new integrated security management system, the proposed structure has the following major functions: management, security services, security information and operations, and coordination with the Funds, Programmes and Agencies. The CSA serves as the Principal Security Adviser to the DO and the Security Management Team (SMT) on all aspects of security management, crisis readiness and preparedness with regard to the safety and security of UN staff members and property in Burundi while maintaining a technical reporting line to DSS. The CSA is responsible for ensuring that security considerations are integrated into the country level programmes, operational planning, programme/project designs and delivery modalities, including response capabilities. In addition, the CSA works closely with security focal points of the UNCT on security matters and ensure that all security officers at the duty station work together and cooperate closely with all other security officers of the UN system for the best possible security management.

10. The Burundi Security Section, however, faces several challenges including the phasing out of ONUB military operations in December 2006. The Mission's military component provided the essential security support in the regions and served as the key backup in case of major security problems.

11. Furthermore, a number of policy and structure issues were noted. For example:

- (a) The DO and the CSA did not have clear guidance on the organizational structure and other arrangements that would define and/or clarify the roles and responsibilities of each UNCT security officer to avoid confusion;

(b) The new structure was also not clear as to the relationship and role of the CAO, who gives administrative support to the Burundi Security Section;

(c) There are no mechanisms in place for the monitoring, reporting and analysis of security information at the Integrated Mission HQ (IMHQ). The Joint Operations Centres (JOC) and Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC) were established for this purpose; but in view of the downsizing and withdrawal of the Mission's military component, the actual operation of JOC and JMAC are planned to commence in 2007 after funding and staff resources become available.

Recommendation 1

The Designated Official for Security in Burundi should seek the advice of the Department of Safety and Security at Headquarters on the optimal setup for an integrated security system comprising all members of the United Nations Country Team in Burundi. Specifically, the DO should seek clear guidance on the structure of the security organization, clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of the Chief Security Adviser, the security focal points of each UN agency, and the Chief Administrative Officer of ONUB (AP2006/648/02/01).

12. *The DO accepted recommendation 1 and explained that an integrated security system has been established covering ONUB/BINUB and the UNCT. Accountability and responsibility of all UN security actors have been clearly identified by UNDSS and provided to the new DO. The BINUB CAO is a member of the Security Management team. Based on the Mission's response, recommendation 1 has been closed.*

Host government security forces

13. To ensure adequate security coverage after the withdrawal of the ONUB military contingents on 31 December 2006, the Security Section has started to integrate the Burundi host government security forces into the UN security structure as recommended by a DSS team, which conducted an assessment of the UN security arrangements in Burundi in January 2006. This recommendation is based on the principle set out in section XI (3) of GA resolution 59/276, which stipulates that the primary responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of UN staff and premises rests with the host country.

14. With the planned withdrawal of the military contingents, the ONUB Security Section is expected to assume the overall responsibilities for the provision of security in Burundi. The Security Section therefore has to assess and work out modalities to fill the gaps resulting from such withdrawal through the use of host government security forces, combined with security resources from commercial security companies based in Burundi. To date, the use of the government security forces has not been clarified in a host country agreement. OIOS is also concerned with the following:

(a) The Mission has neither conducted a gap analysis and/or needs assessment in view of the withdrawal of military contingents nor defined the operational procedures that would be adopted for the host government's provision of safety and security services to UN staff members and property. The CSA has initiated negotiations with the Government of Burundi officials that resulted in the assignment and subsequent training of 220 security personnel from the National Defense Force (FDN) and the Burundi National Police (BNP). These forces have been trained by the ONUB Police and Security Section and deployed in Bujumbura and the regional offices. A further 171 members of the government forces were expected to be available soon and several others later on. In support of this, ONUB recruited 16 drivers and purchased 12 vehicles, which have been deployed for the forces' use. The Security Section stated that several other vehicles are needed. While ONUB is aware of the host government's limited capacity, i.e., lack of adequate vehicles, fuel, communication equipment, rations, etc., it has not planned for the additional resources that would be needed to ensure an effective implementation of the operations.

(b) The arrangement also calls for the payment of a monetary allowance to the host government security forces estimated at \$294,400 to cover the period from July to December 2006. As it is the responsibility of the host government to provide security to UN staff members and property, the practice to pay allowances does not seem appropriate, as highlighted by the DSS' report in its security assessment of Burundi in January 2006.

Recommendations 2 to 4

The Designated Official for Security in Burundi should:

(i) Assess the Security Section's resource requirements concerning the use of host government security forces to replace ONUB military to provide adequate safety and security services to UN staff members and property, and take appropriate action to obtain funds necessary to finance the additional requirements (AP2006/648/02/02);

(ii) Formalize operational and other arrangements with the host government as regards its provision of security and safety services to the Mission. The formal agreement should specify the nature and types of services to be provided, and the terms and obligations to be fulfilled for control and accountability purposes (AP2006/648/02/03);

(iii) Review the appropriateness of paying the Government of Burundi a financial allowance in return for the provision of security and safety services to the Mission (AP2006/648/02/04).

15. *The DO accepted recommendation 2, stating that a total of 600 National Defense Force/Burundi National Police (FDN/PNB) troops have been assigned for the security and safety of UN staff and property. In February 2007, this force will be reduced to a maximum of*

250 assigned to the new BINUB structure. OIOS acknowledges the DO's response but notes that it does not address the recommendation which deals with the adequacy of resources. Recommendation 2 will remain open until it has been fully addressed.

16. *The DO also accepted recommendation 3, stating that the CSA will prepare a memorandum of understanding or Note Verbale formalizing operational and other security arrangements with the host government.* Recommendation 3 remains open pending receipt of a copy of the MOU or Note Verbale.

17. *The DO did not accept recommendation 4, explaining that the FDN/PNB elements are normally fed in their barracks, and that when they are dispatched to the UN Security, they need to receive a feeding allowance in the form of an adapted DSA.* Based on the DO's response, recommendation 4 has been withdrawn.

B. Security plan

Security plan

18. OIOS, in its review of the August 2005 security plan, noted the following weaknesses:

(a) Although detailed and encompassing all ONUB offices and regions, the plan does not include the ONUB military emergency support component strategy. In addition, the plan does not show the role to be played by the host government military and police forces already being used in Bujumbura and the regional offices to provide safety and security related services when the military is phased out in December 2006. This suggests a serious weakness in the risk and gap analysis carried out to update the plan.

(b) No evidence was provided to establish that the plan is being updated at least semi-annually as required by the UN Field Security Handbook, as Burundi is in security phases Two, Three and Four, and whether it has ever been submitted to the USG/DSS for review.

(c) The ONUB management confirmed that the plan has not been rehearsed as recommended in a prior audit of security procedures (AP2004/648/01). Senior management believed that if rehearsed, it would send out wrong political signals to the host government and the local population. As an alternative, town hall meetings were held to familiarize staff members and their zone wardens with evacuation procedures. As Burundi is currently under security Phases Two, Three, and Four, it is critical that ONUB liaise with the host government to conduct routine drills to test the systems in place for emergency evacuation in case of crisis or other critical events. Not performing these drills is inconsistent with the UN Field Security Handbook that requires the plan to be tested in accordance with Annex B of the Handbook.

(d) With the repatriation of the Pakistan Aviation contingent and its air assets in November 2006, the Mission will not be able to conduct medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). The CSA planned to make a formal request to MONUC for assistance to airlift Burundi UN staff members in case of emergencies.

Recommendation 5

The Designated Official for Security in Burundi should ensure that the security plan is: (a) revised to incorporate the military emergency support component, the role to be played by the host government security forces when ONUB military contingents withdraw, the arrangements for emergency medical evacuation procedures, and the continuing assessment of threat, vulnerability and impact of adverse incidents; and (b) rehearsed and updated in accordance with the UN Field Security Handbook, and approved by the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security (AP2006/648/02/05).

19. *The DO accepted recommendation 5 and stated that the Security Plan will be reviewed accordingly.* Recommendation 5 remains open pending receipt and review of the revised Security Plan.

Security Management Team

20. Although the SMT met periodically to discuss security issues in Burundi, minutes of meetings were not consistently prepared. For example, there were no minutes documenting the SMT meetings for 23 May, 13, 20 and 27 June and 4 July 2006. This suggests weaknesses in the process as meetings appear not to have taken place, which contravenes the UN Field Security Handbook's requirement for meetings to be held weekly or more often if Security Phases Three, Four or Five are in effect. OIOS could not therefore assess how security risks were reviewed for over one month given the prevailing security situation in Burundi, whereby past events and reports on criminality indicated an increase in attacks and street mugging, and incidents of grenade lobbing by unidentified persons have been occurring more frequently. UN staff members have been victims of some of these incidents as they have either lost personal effects and/or sustained bodily injuries. Hence, the DO may not have been provided with information to manage threats effectively on an ongoing basis.

Recommendation 6

The Designated Official for Security in Burundi should ensure that Security Management Team meetings are held weekly or more often to address any possible emergencies, and minutes of meetings are prepared, in compliance with the UN Field Security Handbook (AP2006/648/02/06).

21. *The DO accepted recommendation 6, stating that SMT meetings chaired by the DO are held weekly. Minutes of the SMT meetings are prepared in compliance with the UN Field Security Handbook and sent to UNDSS after being endorsed by the SMT members.* Based on the DO's response, recommendation 6 has been closed.

Mustering, concentration points and safe haven

22. OIOS noted that the Burundi Security Section has adequate arrangements for designated regrouping sites, which are also documented in the security plan. The mustering and concentration points and safe havens are adequately identified.

Warden system

23. OIOS also found that adequate arrangements for the warden system are in place with the following exceptions:

(a) The current warden system does not account for all staff members residing in the various zone locations. OIOS noted that each zone has zone wardens as well as alternates, who have been properly designated by the DO. A triangular marking to identify each ONUB international staff residence has been placed on most/each residence. Meetings between zone wardens and zone residents have been organized via town halls to allow each staff member to identify their respective zone wardens. However, there have been no follow-up to ensure that wardens know all staff members in their zones.

(b) The Security Section has been working for approximately one year on introducing the use of a new electronic system to assist in mapping and identifying residential locations of staff members. It is unclear when this system will become operational and when town hall meetings would be organized to rehearse and educate staff members on the system's operational procedures, which should improve the response time when staff members face security problems at their residences, particularly at night.

(c) The audit team contacted zone wardens to determine whether they are familiar with and have received training on their responsibilities as wardens, and whether they have been in contact with all staff members located in their zones. Only 6 of 13 wardens responded. All six wardens who responded indicated that they received training and instructions on the operations of the warden system and that they understand their responsibilities. One warden had not been in contact with staff members in the zone while five other wardens had been in contact at least once between May and July 2006. None of the six wardens who responded had conducted drills at mustering points to familiarize staff members with evacuation related procedures.

(d) As required by section f (5.24) of the UN Field Security Handbook and for reasons of practicality, separate warden systems should be established for internationally and nationally-recruited staff members. However, OIOS confirmed that such a system has been established only for international staff members. It is not maintained for approximately 323 national staff members as at August 2006, which poses a risk if evacuations are undertaken.

Recommendations 7 to 9

The Designated Official for Security in Burundi should:

- (i) Implement a mechanism for wardens to periodically meet staff members in their zones and to have listings of staff members kept up to date (AP2006/648/02/07);
- (ii) Establish a warden system for national staff members to enhance the Mission's preparedness in the event of a relocation, as recommended in section f (5.24) of the UN Field Security Handbook (AP2006/648/02/08);
- (iii) Expedite the implementation of the electronic system for mapping and identifying residential locations of staff members (AP2006/648/02/09).

24. *The DO accepted recommendation 7, stating that the zone warden system has been reviewed and integrated, and now comprises both UN agencies and BINUB staff members. A UN staff and location list has been established and is sent to the Zone Wardens every month. OIOS acknowledges the DO's comments but notes that it does not respond to the issue of meetings between wardens and staff members in their zones. Recommendation 7 will remain open pending notification that arrangements for such meetings are in place.*

25. *The DO accepted recommendation 8, explaining that a Zone Warden system for national staff members has already been established for UN Agencies. The BINUB national staff will be included as soon as the BINUB recruitment process is completed by the end of March 2007. The DO also accepted recommendation 9 stating it had been implemented. Recommendations 8 and 9 will remain open until receipt of documentation showing that they have been fully implemented.*

Radio communication with staff members

26. The Mission has systems and procedures to ensure quick dissemination of security information, enabling the Security Section to reach staff members through e-mail, network broadcasts, town hall meetings and hand-held radios. For example, effective August 2006, integrated radio checks are conducted from 1800 hours on a daily basis involving all UN staff members in Burundi. However, OIOS noted a high incidence of non-response to radio checks. Part of the problem is the lack of a mechanism to deter repeated non-responses and/or procedures to reprimand staff members who repeatedly fail to answer radio checks without valid reasons.

Recommendation 10

The Designated Official for Security in Burundi should ensure that all staff members answer radio checks. Staff members should be held accountable for repeated failures to

answer their call-signs during radio checks (AP2006/648/02/10).

27. *The DO accepted recommendation 10, explaining that daily radio check for SMT members, zone wardens and essential international and national staff members is already in place. It will be reviewed and revamped in a manner that will facilitate a better answer rate level and streamline the radio check process which is cumbersome at the moment. Recommendation 10 will remain open until receipt of notification that it has been fully implemented.*

C. Security awareness and training

Staff members' security awareness

28. ONUB staff members receive security orientation as part of the check-in and induction procedures. However, there is no mechanism to monitor whether all staff members have completed the mandatory UNSECOORD training program 'Basic Security in the Field – Staff Safety, Health and Welfare' including the DPKO addendum 'DPKO specific security arrangements' as required by ST/SGB/2003/19 dated 9 December 2003. There is also no evidence of any follow-up action to ensure that all staff members at the Mission area had undertaken this training.

Recommendation 11

The Designated Official for Security in Burundi should ensure that all staff members in Burundi have undertaken and completed the mandatory UNSECOORD training program 'Basic Security in the Field – Staff Safety, Health and Welfare' including the DPKO addendum 'DPKO specific security arrangements' immediately upon arrival as part of the check-in procedures, and a record of completion is kept on the staff member's Personnel file for control purposes (AP2006/648/02/11).

29. *The DO accepted recommendation 11, stating that all UN staff members arriving in Burundi are clearly advised of the date and time when they must attend the mandatory security training upon arrival in Burundi. This is mentioned on the security clearance delivered by the DO. Further, it has been recommended by UNDSS that it is the responsibility of the chiefs of agencies and sections to ensure that all their staff perform the basic and advanced security in the field training before traveling to a phased area. OIOS notes DO's response and requests that he clarify the monitoring procedures to be adopted to ensure that all UN staff members in Burundi complete the mandatory DSS training. Recommendation 11 will remain open pending such clarification.*

Training for security officers

30. ONUB has no training plan for its security personnel because of the lack of funding, but it has *ad hoc* training arrangements, particularly for security officers who handle firearms.

The Security Section confirmed that such training was given in Burundi in February 2006 by a UNHQ expert, and that a similar training on handling fire arms and other security and safety related services is planned.

31. As the Security Section does not have a qualified weapons instructor among its staff members, and with the closing of the Mission in December 2006, interim arrangements could be made to obtain such expertise from MONUC as needed to avoid the risk of having security officers not certified to handle weapons.

Recommendations 12 and 13

The Designated Official for Security in Burundi should:

- (i) Prepare a training plan to ensure that security officers receive appropriate and periodic training to keep abreast of developments as regards their functions and to effectively carry out their responsibilities (AP2006/648/02/12); and
- (ii) Arrange with MONUC or another mission to obtain the expertise of a qualified weapons instructor to certify the Mission's security officers as needed (AP2006/648/02/13).

32. *The DO accepted recommendation 12, stating that a specific security training plan has already been established for Security Officers, and the Training Unit will periodically review and monitor its implementation.* Based on the DO's response, recommendation 12 has been closed.

33. *The DO did not accept recommendation 13, explaining that instead of having to rely on external expertise, it has been decided that it would be better to send two BINUB Security Officers to a weapons instructor training course in New York. This cost-effective solution has been proposed to the BINUB Administration.* Recommendation 13 will remain open pending notification that the weapons instructor training has been undertaken.

D. Staffing matters

Recruitment

34. With the prevailing security situation in Burundi and the withdrawal of military personnel as of December 2006, 12 national General Service staff posts were redeployed to the Security Section to strengthen its security capabilities. As of July 2006, vacancies included one P-2, eight Field Service (FS), one international GS, and 14 national staff posts. Furthermore, the CSA separated from the Mission at the end of September 2006 for another duty station.

35. Since the establishment of ONUB in June 2004, there has been a lack of continuity as regards the functions of the Chief Security Adviser. This has hampered the Section's ability to put appropriate mechanisms in place for the effective operations of the Section. It is important that the a longer tenure of the post of the Chief Security Adviser be enforced and

other vacancies be filled immediately because, under the new mission, BINUB, the Security Section has to operate under a new integrated security structure comprising all the UNCT members in Burundi, without the presence and assistance of military contingents. Also, it has to supervise the host government's security forces assigned to the UN.

Recommendation 14

The Designated Official for Security in Burundi should expedite the recruitment of staff for the vacant posts in the Security Section and ensure that there is continuity in the tenure of the post of Chief Security Adviser (AP2006/648/02/14).

36. *The DO accepted recommendation 14, explaining that the Chief Security Adviser has been appointed for two years and the recruitment process for security officers should be completed in March 2007. Recommendation 14 will remain open until receipt of evidence that the section is fully staffed.*

Staff Performance Appraisal System

37. ONUB is implementing the Performance Appraisal System (PAS) as required by ST/AI/2002/3 on PAS, which entails setting goals, planning work in advance and providing continuous feedback. However, work plans for the Chief Security Adviser and the heads of individual units within the UNCT Security Cells could not be reviewed as they were not prepared. Therefore, OIOS could not assess whether work plan goals were being achieved, and also it was also difficult to assess the performance of individual units as well as the overall effectiveness of the Security Section.

Recommendation 15

The Designated Official for Security in Burundi should ensure that the Performance Appraisal System is fully implemented to establish staff accountability and assess staff performance, and that linkages between the individual and unit work plans are established and used as a basis to measure the performance of the Security Section (AP2006/648/02/15).

38. *The DO accepted recommendation 15 and stated that electronic PAS and results and competency assessments are already in place. Based on the DO's response, recommendation 15 has been closed.*

E. Other security matters

Security operating procedures

39. OIOS noted that some basic security management operating procedures have been put in place to enhance the security and safety of UN personnel and operations and to ensure compliance with the Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS), with the following exceptions:

(a) ONUB has no procedures to require that undercarriages of vehicles be subject to mirror checks at entrances to all Mission premises at all times. Checks are conducted at the IMHQ entrance gate F, but not at entrance gate A for important officials (VIPs).

(b) Physical and personnel arrangements are not in line with the security threat assessment for the following:

- Access controls to buildings and facilities are inadequate. Staff members are not required to sign-in when using offices after office hours or during holidays and week-ends.
- Closed circuit television and alarm systems have not been installed in sensitive areas to monitor facilities.
- There are no escort procedures for visitors.

(c) At IMHQ, the only metal detection machine located at the entrance gate F is not being utilized, suggesting a weakness in control procedures to prevent visitors from entering ONUB facilities with firearms or dangerous equipment.

Recommendation 16

The Designated Official for Security in Burundi should improve the physical security of, and access control to, the Mission's premises and other areas of operations by instituting procedures such as (a) requiring staff members to sign in when using offices after office hours or during holidays and weekends; (b) searching vehicles at all entry points to ONUB premises; (c) requiring that all visitors be escorted by a staff member; (d) using the available metal detection equipment at entrance gate F (AP2006/648/02/16).

40. *The DO accepted recommendation 16 and stated that it has been implemented.* However, the DO did not outline the measures taken to implement the recommendation. Recommendation 16 will remain open pending notification of specific actions taken for its implementation.

Residential security

41. Mechanisms are in place to implement the Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (MORSS), in conformity with section 5.62 (b) of the UN Field Security Handbook and in view of the worsening security situation, including robberies and crimes, in Burundi whereby UN staff members are targeted at times. The various arrangements in place concerning residential accommodation for staff members include the Security Section conducting security checks on the suitability and locations of residences, additional security measures to be put in place at the residences such as using recommended commercial security

guard companies, alarm systems, door and window bars, locks, safe havens, adequate lighting at night, or other protective devices. Staff members are compensated, subject to ceiling amounts established at the Mission area, when they undertake alterations to their residences when the minimum residential security devices are not in place.

42. However, OIOS confirmed that several staff members have leased or changed residential houses without first obtaining residential security assessment and clearance from the Security Section. This is critical because recently, reports on criminality indicated an increase in attacks and street mugging. Incidents of grenade lobbing by unidentified persons have also become more frequent, and UN staff members have been victims of some of these incidents as they have either lost personal effects and/or sustained bodily injuries.

Recommendation 17

The Designated Official for Security in Burundi should put control mechanisms in place to ensure that all staff members obtain security clearance assessment for suitability of residences and location prior to leasing residential houses. Those staff who have not obtained security clearance should not be compensated for guard and alarm services or other approved protective devices (AP2006/648/02/17).

43. *The DO accepted recommendation 17, explaining that all staff members receiving the security briefing and having completed the Basic Security in the Field training are advised to request a security clearance from the Security Officer before signing a lease for their residences. Staff members are entitled to reimbursement for residential guards only if such contracts are signed with any of the five approved security companies. Based on the DO's response, recommendation 17 has been closed.*

Fire drills

44. ONUB has not conducted any fire drills because the Mission does not have a fire officer and the necessary equipment for the emergency exercises. The host government's facilities are inadequate as the only fire vehicles available are restricted to servicing the airport that handles commercial international flights. A MONUC fire officer visited ONUB in May 2006 to give guidance.

45. Although fire extinguishers are placed in UN premises and facilities, there are no maintenance procedures to ensure that the fire extinguishers are regularly checked and refilled. Hence, there is no assurance that the Mission can effectively respond to fire emergencies.

Recommendation 18

The Designated Official for Security in Burundi should assess the need for a fire expert for ONUB and initiate the necessary corrective action or establish an alternative mechanism to enhance the Mission's fire fighting capability (AP2006/648/02/18).

46. *The DO accepted recommendation 18, stating that the recruitment process for a fire marshal should be completed in March 2007. Recommendation 18 will remain open pending notification that a fire marshal is on board.*

V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

47. We wish to express our appreciation to the Management and staff of ONUB for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.



Dagfinn Knutsen, Acting Director
Internal Audit Division, OIOS

UNITED NATIONS



OIOS Client Satisfaction Survey

Audit of: Security Management in ONUB

(AP2006/648/02)

	1	2	3	4	5
By checking the appropriate box, please rate:	Very Poor	Poor	Satisfactory	Good	Excellent
1. The extent to which the audit addressed your concerns as a manager.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. The audit staff's understanding of your operations and objectives.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Professionalism of the audit staff (demeanour, communication and responsiveness).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. The quality of the Audit Report in terms of:					
• Accuracy and validity of findings and conclusions;	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Clarity and conciseness;	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Balance and objectivity;	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Timeliness.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. The extent to which the audit recommendations were appropriate and helpful.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. The extent to which the auditors considered your comments.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Your overall satisfaction with the conduct of the audit and its results.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please add any further comments you may have on the audit process to let us know what we are doing well and what can be improved.

Name: _____ Title: _____ Date: _____

*Thank you for taking the time to fill out this survey. Please send the completed survey as soon as possible to:
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