



INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION I
OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES

TO: Mr. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila
A: Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UNMEE

DATE: 13 December 2005

REFERENCE: AUD-7-5:21
05-00299

THROUGH:
S/C DE:

FROM: Patricia Azarias, Director
DE: Internal Audit Division I, OIOS

P. Azarias

SUBJECT: **OIOS Audit No. AP2005/624/04: Monitoring of the Temporary Security Zone in UNMEE**
OBJET:

1. I am pleased to present herewith our final report on the audit of the above subject, which was conducted during June - July 2005. The audit was conducted in accordance with the standards for the professional practice of internal auditing in United Nations organizations.
2. We note from your response to the draft report that UNMEE has generally accepted the recommendations. Based on your response, we have closed recommendations 1, 2 and 4 in the OIOS recommendations database and recommendation 5 has been withdrawn. In order for us to close out the remaining recommendations (3 and 6), we request that you provide us with additional information as indicated in the text of the report and a time schedule for implementing each of the recommendations. Please note that OIOS will report on the progress made to implement its recommendations, particularly those designated as critical (i.e. recommendations 1, 2, 4 and 6) in its annual report to the General Assembly and semi-annual report to the Secretary-General.
3. IAD is assessing the overall quality of its audit process and kindly requests that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors and complete the attached client satisfaction survey form.

I. INTRODUCTION

4. In April and May 2000, extensive fighting broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as a result of a border dispute. Proximity talks in Algiers, by the OAU, led to a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, which the Parties signed on 18 June 2000. Under this agreement, Ethiopia, following deployment of a UN Peacekeeping Mission, would re-deploy to positions it had held before 6 May 1998. Following verification by the UN Peacekeeping Operation of Ethiopian re-deployment, Eritrea was to re-deploy so that its forces remain 25 km from

Ethiopian forces, thereby creating a 25 km wide and 1,100 km long demilitarized Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). A Peace Agreement between the two parties was signed in Algiers on 12 December 2000. UN Security Council Resolution 1320 (2000) of 15 September 2000 authorized the deployment of up to 4,200 troops, including 220 United Nations military observers and the necessary support Units, to monitor the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) to assist in ensuring compliance with the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.

5. As at 18 February 2005, the total strength of the UNMEE military component stood at 3,344, comprising 3,049 troops, 87 headquarters staff officers and 208 military observers. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1560 (2004) of 14 September 2004, the adjustment of the Mission and streamlining of its operations commenced in December 2004 and was completed at the end of January 2005. As planned, the Force has been reduced from three to two battalions. The former Sector East has now been reorganized into a sub-sector under the operational command of Sector Central. Some 250 troops from the Indian battalion, with a standby reserve of 30 to 40 troops, are now deployed in the new Sub-Sector East. The core operations under the revised concept dated 17 May 2005 approved by DPKO, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1320 (2000), remain -- observation, reporting, analysis, identification of potential flash points and preventive action. The downsizing of UNMEE Force necessitates utilization of increased air flights for reconnaissance and other operational purposes. Also the current UNMOs Headquarters at Asmara will be closed and all UNMOs will be deployed in the field. Staff Officers will plan all UNMOs operations.

6. The comments made by the Management of UNMEE on the draft audit report have been included in the report as appropriate and are shown in italics.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

7. The objectives of the audit were to:

- Identify the effectiveness of land and aerial patrolling in the TSZ by reviewing the targets set vis-à-vis the performance achieved;
- Identify the constraints (operational, administrative, logistics, financial and human), if any, in the achievement of targets; and
- Review the effectiveness of the mechanisms set up for detection and resolution of TSZ violations.

III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

8. The audit covered the patrolling activities undertaken since 2003 to date in the Area of Operations, which comprise of between 15 and 25 km wide areas adjacent to TSZ on both sides of TSZ along the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea approximately 1,100 km long. The audit included interviews with key personnel such as the Deputy Force Commander, Chief of Staff, Chief of Operations and Chief of Air Operations and review of relevant records and documents including Daily Situation Reports (DSR) and Daily Logistical Reports (DLR). It also involved a

visit to two Team Sites, located in Sector West and Sector East to review the effectiveness of land and air patrols by Military Observers and the contingents. The criteria for this audit was based on the following documents issued by the Military Planning Service of DPKO:

- Guidelines to TCC for Military Units in UNMEE;
- Guidelines to TCC for UNMOs in UNMEE;
- UNMEE's revised concept of operations for the period 1 June 2005 to 31 May 2006.

IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

9. UNMEE has been mandated to monitor the sanctity of the 1,100-km long, 25-km wide Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). This is being accomplished through ground and aerial patrols conducted daily by the contingents and UNMOs. For the budget period 2004/05 the Mission conducted 33,448 ground patrols and 1,037 air patrols compared to 35,350 ground patrols and 467 air patrols for the budget period 2003/04. Overall, the Mission had effectively monitored the sanctity of the TSZ. So far there has been no serious violation of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. However, given the right air assets for aerial reconnaissance, UNMEE could further enhance its monitoring capability.

V. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Aerial patrolling

10. The 21 July 2000 report of the UN Peacekeeping Operations Reconnaissance Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea recommended four military light observation helicopters for aerial observation task. However, paragraph 30 of the Guidelines to TCC for Military Units in UNMEE (October 2000) issued by Military Planning Service of DPKO stated that there should be two light observation helicopters and within each sector there should be a likely requirement for two to three inspections/monitoring flights per day to maintain a credible frequency of inspections/monitoring visit. The two light observation helicopters ideal for reconnaissance was never given to the Mission. Presently, the Mission's fleet of aircraft includes six units of MI-8 helicopters, which are more suitable for cargo and passenger movement, and two units of BELL-212 light helicopters, used specifically for medical evacuation purposes.

11. In a code cable dated 4 June 2005 to DPKO, the Mission reported the following gaps in its aerial patrolling capability:

- a) The aerial reconnaissance with the MI-8 helicopters was not suitable/practical because:
 - i. Suitable observation facilities and field of view are not available
 - ii. The civilian safety regulations do not permit flying below 1,000 feet and hovering of the aircraft
- b) The MI-8 helicopters are not suitable for landing at temporary helipads

c) The current available aerial assets are not adequate to ensure coverage of the entire area.

12. OIOS' visits to the Sectors and interviews with contingents and UNMOs confirmed the above setbacks. UNMOs also commented that during aerial patrols in the MI-8 helicopter, they are not able to communicate with the pilots to request any specific manoeuvring of the aircraft. An analysis was made for the recent period, April to June 2005 on the number of aerial patrols conducted and major observations made. Out of 312 aerial patrols conducted by the Force, only one incident was noticed and nothing was observed for the rest of the 311 aerial patrols. It is possible that the limited observations resulted from the restricted view from the MI-8.

13. In October 2004, the Force Commander requested, as an interim measure, that the two BELL-212 helicopters, which have been contracted for 60 flying hours per month, be partially used for reconnaissance purposes. In his reply, the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) stated that the BELL-212 helicopters have been performing three flights per week at daytime to Sector Central and Sector West for night MEDEVAC/CASEVAC compliance and that the Force could utilize these flights for aerial patrols by having two Military Observers on each flight. However, in a communication dated 15 July 2005, the CAO stated that since his proposal of 25 October 2004, those flights to the sectors were not utilized to the maximum due to lack of request by the Force as well as insufficient coordination between Military Observers, Military Contingents, Force Headquarters and the Uruguayan Contingent that operated the flights. In addition to the three available weekly flights to the sectors that could be utilized by the Force, the CAO also stated that Air Operations Section could provide one special flight per week upon request.

14. As a result of downsizing of the Force, there is a need for increased surveillance to patrol the same area covered by a larger military contingent. It is therefore vital that not only should the Mission be given additional air assets, but also for the existing air assets to be utilized to the maximum capacity.

Recommendations 1 and 2

The UNMEE Force Commander should utilize to the maximum the current BELL-212 helicopters as proposed by the CAO, whereby during its daytime flight to the Sectors performed three times per week, two UNMOs could join in to do aerial patrolling; and also utilize one special flight per week that Air Operations Section agreed to provide upon request by the Force (AP2005/624/04/01).

The UNMEE Force Commander should request DPKO to provide the Mission with an additional light helicopter more suitable for reconnaissance taking cognizance of the ineffectiveness of aerial patrolling using MI-8 helicopters as reported by the Force and also the 21 July 2000 report of the UN Peacekeeping Operations Reconnaissance Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea where light

observation helicopters were recommended for aerial patrolling (AP2005/624/04/02).

14. UNMEE accepted recommendation 1 and stated that it had already been implemented. The Mission clarified that the proposal to combine pilot familiarization with aerial reconnaissance was first made by the Force Commander in June 2005. UNMEE also accepted recommendation 2 and provided a copy of the communication sent to DPKO. Based on the Mission's response, OIOS has closed recommendations 1 and 2.

B. Land patrolling

15. Besides aerial patrolling, both the contingents and UNMOs are conducting land patrolling on a daily basis within their respective area of responsibility. Land patrolling is more crucial for the monitoring of the TSZ because it enables the UNMEE peacekeepers deployed in patrolling to verify compliance with the Protocol Agreement dated 17 April 2001 signed between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for UNMEE and the Government of Eritrea. In accordance with the Protocol Agreement, the Mission's peacekeepers are to ensure that all militia and police in the TSZ carry identification cards, no heavy weapons are brought into the TSZ, ammunition stockpiled are subjected to UNMEE inspection deemed as "challenge inspections", no live firing exercises are conducted in the TSZ, etc.

16. Ground patrolling by UNMOs is conducted utilizing UN vehicles and fuel, while contingents use Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) with fuel provided by the Mission. The estimated costs of logistical requirements for patrolling are determined on the basis of projections made by the Force in the Results Based Budgeting. In the 2004/05 budget document for UNMEE under the Military Component, the output in respect of land patrolling was 1,425 patrols per month for UNMOs (2.5 patrols per day x 19 posts x 30 days) while for the contingents it was 2,625 patrols per month (2.5 patrols per day x 35 posts x 30 days). OIOS' analysis of the total number of land patrols done by the contingents and the UNMOs as reported in the Daily Situation Reports for the year 2005 is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Number of land patrols done per month by Contingents and UNMOs

2005	Total patrols by Contingents	Total patrols by UNMOs
Total for the budget period	21,932	11,556
Average per month	1,828	963
Percentage of actual output compared to projections in the budget	70%	68%

Recommendation 3

The UNMEE Force Commander should establish an acceptable variance between actual patrols conducted by the contingents and UNMOs and the expected output as reflected in the budget document and provide an analysis of any excessive variances (AP2005/624/04/03).

17. *UNMEE did not accept recommendation 3, stating that the projections were based on anticipation. Actual patrolling is carried out based on tactical situations and to create an environment aimed to fulfill the needs of the mandate, rather than fulfilling the targets projected. The Mission felt that these matters are better left to the operational commanders.* While OIOS acknowledges the principle that patrolling is based on tactical considerations rather than to merely fulfill target projections, the results-based framework submitted to the legislative bodies reflect the minimum number of patrols planned to be carried out using the resources provided by Member States. Significant shortfalls in the number of patrols require explanation. OIOS therefore reiterates recommendation 3, which will remain open until UNMEE provides documentation showing the actual patrols carried out during the financial period 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005, with explanation for any significant shortfall as compared to the numbers indicated in the results-based framework for that period.

C. Deployment of UNMOs

Professional qualifications

18. As at June 2005, the Mission has 217 UNMOs comprising 164 from the Army, 33 from the Air Force, 19 from the Navy and one from the Marines. 167 UNMOs are engaged in monitoring the TSZ and the rest are engaged in administrative work at the Force Headquarters. According to the guidelines to Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) for UN Military Observers in UNMEE issued by DPKO, the following qualifications are considered essential for UNMOs assigned to UNMEE: ability to speak, read and write English, communicate in clear English on voice radio sets, at least two years experience in driving and proficiency in map reading. They are expected to undergo pre-deployment training at their home country prior to arrival in the Mission. In the Mission they are given induction training and tested in driving skills, English and computer skills.

19. According to UNMEE Evaluation Report of DPKO dated 29 October 2003, the standard of UNMOs deployed to the Mission was inconsistent with DPKO and Mission requirements, which was having a negative impact on operational effectiveness. The deficiencies noted were lack of required skills including driving ability, English language skills and the capability to use GPS and computer equipment. This was also pointed out by OIOS in an audit conducted in April 2002.

20. An analysis of the results of the English tests taken by the UNMOs revealed that only 22 percent of the UNMOs had scored 90 percent and above. Further, the personal interviews conducted by the Chief Military Personnel Officer revealed several cases of UNMOs being weak in English although they had scored relatively well in the written examination. The training programme does not incorporate any module on report writing, which is an essential requirement for UNMOs in reporting their observations noticed while patrolling. During interviews with OIOS, Senior Sector UNMOs indicated the low level of proficiency in English amongst UNMOs coming from certain regions to be an impediment in discharging duties effectively. There are also those who lack computer skills and the ability to handle GPS. The Mission acknowledged this fact and stated that the main reason for this is that TCCs, which participate actively in

peacekeeping operations and volunteer to send Military Observers, are from regions where English is not widely spoken. However, to remedy this situation, the UNMOs are carefully evaluated and put into teams whereby each team has a mixture of UNMOs proficient in English, computer and map reading.

21. Of the 217 UNMOs in the Mission, 31 passed the driving test in their second attempt and five in their third attempt. One of the UNMOs, who passed in the third attempt, declared that he had five years of driving experience although his driving license was issued only 10 months prior to his arrival in the Mission. In another case, the UNMO stated that he had no previous experience of driving. It was also noted that he had obtained his driving license only 7 months prior to his coming to the Mission. OIOS also noted that while the Annual Mission Training Plan approved by the Force Commander lists Scout vehicle training as mandatory for all UNMOs, only some UNMOs have Scout vehicle driving license.

22. Thirty percent of the UNMOs who responded to a survey conducted by OIOS stated that they had not received any training at the Sector Headquarters or at the Team Sites after their deployment although this is a requirement in the Annual Mission Training Plan.

Recommendation 4

The UNMEE Force Commander should request DPKO to advise the TCCs that only UNMOs who possess the requisite skills, have undertaken an UNMO course and peacekeeping training should be selected for deployment to the Mission (AP2005/624/04/04).

23. *UNMEE accepted recommendation 4 and stated that it had already been implemented. DPKO was fully aware of the issue and the matter has been conveyed to the TCCs a number of times.* Based on the explanation provided by UNMEE, OIOS has closed recommendation 4.

Living conditions of UNMOs at Team Sites

24. About 50 percent of the UNMOs who responded to the OIOS survey indicated dissatisfaction with the present arrangement with regard to accommodation, ablution units and kitchen facilities at their respective team sites, especially those in harsh regions where temperatures could exceed 50 degrees Celsius. Some team sites face acute water shortage while in others electricity is not available for more than 12 hours. In line with the DPKO Code Cable dated 18 July 2005, on Peacekeeping Personnel Welfare and Recreation Facilities, the Mission should look into the needs of the UNMOs at all team sites.

Accommodation of UNMO Team Site at Bure in Sub-Sector East



Recommendation 5

UNMEE Management should request DPKO to review and issue guidelines to the Mission on the basic living conditions that should be provided to UNMOs serving in harsh regions without having to deduct from their Mission Subsistence Allowances (AP2005/624/04/05).

25. *UNMEE did not accept recommendation 5 stating that the matter would have to be addressed by DPKO. However, the Mission clarified that at present, UNMEE Administration provides certain support to UNMO team sites with the harshest living conditions. Based on the Mission's response, OIOS has withdrawn recommendation 5.*

D. Logistical support

26. While the contingents are on self-sustainment, the Mission's Administration has been providing logistical support to the UNMOs. OIOS evaluated the adequacy of logistical support given to UNMOs and interviewed them as well as the Deputy Force Commander who is also the Chief Military Observer, to determine if there are areas to be further enhanced in logistical support. The general consensus was that the logistical support was good, especially considering the fact that the operational readiness of vehicles has been maintained at above 90 percent.

27. Most of the UNMOs surveyed expressed dissatisfaction with regard to the suitability of the vehicles made available to them for the performance of their patrol duties. As the area of operations is extremely rugged, with poorly maintained or non-existent roads, the Toyota Four Runners and Scouts are prone to mechanical failure in this type of terrain. It was also reported that flat tires were a recurrent feature in this kind of terrain necessitating the provision of additional spare tires. UNMEE Administration should address this requirement.

28. OIOS also observed that with the downsizing of the Mission, there has been a general shortage of technicians and mechanics in the sectors resulting in delays in addressing IT,

communications and transport-related problems. According to the UNMOs, any breakdown of IT or communications equipment on a Friday can only be attended to on Monday of the following week while the UNMOs are required to be on duty seven days a week.

Recommendation 6

The UNMEE Chief Administrative Officer should establish Mobile Technical Teams for Sectors to address shortage of technical personnel (AP2005/624/04/06).

29. *UNMEE accepted recommendation 6 and stated that Mobile Technical Teams have been formed and would start work in the sectors beginning of September.* Recommendation 6 remains open pending confirmation by UNMEE that it has been fully implemented.

E. Mechanism for detection and resolving TSZ violations

30. Violations of TSZ take place in the form of non-compliance with the Protocol Agreement signed between UNMEE and the Government of Eritrea with regard to Militia and Police activities within the TSZ; non-compliance with the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement signed between Ethiopia and Eritrea; and any form of hindrance to the key tasks of UNMEE peacekeepers within the TSZ. For the period 2004/05, 994 cases of restrictions on freedom of movement and violations were reported compared to only 416 cases for the period 2003/04, indicating an increase of 58%. However, no serious violations of the Agreement have been reported.

31. Active and unimpeded patrolling of the TSZ provides the mechanism for detection of violations. Serious restrictions on the freedom of movement imposed within the TSZ by Eritrea and in adjacent areas north of the TSZ by Ethiopia restricted UNMEE Force in discharging its mandated tasks of observing, monitoring and reporting on the activities in the TSZ and the adjacent areas. The Military Coordination Commission (MCC) chaired by the UNMEE Force Commander is one of the main instruments for addressing and resolving issues related to TSZ violations. The MCC with representation from Ethiopia, Eritrea and the African Union holds meetings on a regular basis in Nairobi. Besides this, the Sector level Military Coordination Commission (SMCC) had also played a major role in resolving local issues.

VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

32. We wish to express our appreciation to the Management and staff of UNMEE for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

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