

United Nations  Nations Unies

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION I  
OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES

TO: Mr. Abdou Ding, DO, a.i.  
A: Guinea-Bissau

DATE: 11 October 2004

REFERENCE: AUD-7-4:16 (0928/04)

FROM: Patricia Azarias, Director  
DE: Internal Audit Division I, OIOS

*P. Azarias*

SUBJECT:

OBJET: **OIOS Audit Assignment No. AP2004/646/01: Field Security and Emergency Procedures in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS)**

1. I am pleased to present herewith the final report on the subject audit, which was conducted in 2004.

2. We note from your response to the draft report that the Designated Official has generally accepted the recommendations and initiated their implementation. Based on the response, we have withdrawn recommendations 4 and 8 in the OIOS recommendation database. In order for us to close out the remaining recommendations we request that you provide us with additional information as indicated in the text of the report and a time schedule for implementing each of the recommendations. Please refer to the recommendation number concerned to facilitate monitoring of their implementation status. Also, please note that OIOS consider recommendations 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 11 and 12 as being of critical importance and request that you focus your attention on them.

3. IAD is assessing the overall quality of its audit process and kindly requests that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors and complete the attached client satisfaction survey form.

4. I take this opportunity to thank the management and staff of UN agencies in Guinea-Bissau for the assistance and cooperation provided to the auditors in connection with this assignment.

Copy to: Mr. Kieran Prendergast, Under-Secretary-General, Department of Political Affairs  
Mr. Joao Honwana, Representative of the Secretary-General (RSG), UNOGBIS  
Mr. Alberic Kacou, Designated Official, Senegal  
Ms. Diana Russler, Director and Deputy UN Security Coordinator  
Ms. Diane Kepler, Chief, Internal Audit Section, UNDP  
Mr. Gunnar Mattsson-marn, Regional Coordinator in Guinea-Bissau, UNDP  
Mr. Kishan Sirohi, Auditor-in-Charge, OIOS  
UN Board of Auditors  
Programme Officer, OIOS

**Office of Internal Oversight Services  
Internal Audit Division I**



**Draft Audit Report of Security and Emergency Procedures in  
Guinea-Bissau**

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**Audit no:** AP2004/646/01  
**Report date:** 11 October 2004  
**Audit team:** Kishan Sirohi, Auditor-in-Charge  
Iba Gueye, Resident Auditor, MONUC

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**  
**Audit of Security and Emergency Procedures in Guinea-Bissau**

OIOS conducted an audit of the emergency and security procedures compliance in Guinea-Bissau from the period 19 through 23 June 2004. The main objectives of this audit were to assess the security function management framework (organization and resources) of United Nations offices and agencies located in Guinea-Bissau, including the security plans and policies, and to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of security function delivery.

The security program in Guinea-Bissau had a clearly defined executive level leadership, and direction. Overall, the structure to conduct the security management was in place, and operational. The Designated Official was fully in control as the security decision maker and coordinator. The chain of command was clear, and cooperation with other agencies was excellent. The Security Management Team (SMT) was operating effectively, and agencies were committed to contributing to the cost sharing budget. The communication system and training for staff was in place. Best practices learned in Guinea-Bissau should be disseminated to other places.

Weaknesses identified were about unverified assumptions made in the security and evacuation plans. The warden system although existent needs updating, and rehearsal. The assumptions made on safe havens, regrouping points, concentration points in time of crisis were good on paper but need to be verified. This can be done through anticipated negotiation, and signing of memorandum of understandings with the partners involved.

The role of military and police experts at the United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) needs to be emphasized in order so that such expertise is used by the Security Management Team in coordination, and management of security program in Guinea-Bissau. Finally, the procurement of security devices such as anti-shatter film coating, screening machines, identification badges for access control, needs to be expedited. UN experts in security matters available in the country be associated in the threat assessment, and ultimately in the Crisis Management Team. Furthermore, cooperation with other security partners in the region, and with the host government and foreign embassies be further improved.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. OIOS conducted an audit of security procedures in Guinea-Bissau. The review was conducted in accordance with generally accepted United Nations auditing standards. An exit conference was held on 23 June, 2004 with the Designated Official accompanied by the Field Security Coordination Officer, and the Officer-in-Charge, UNOGBIS, wherein our findings were communicated, and their comments requested on the results of the audit. They all concurred with the criteria, and agreed fully with the auditor's position regarding the findings. The report incorporates the Designated Official's (DO) comments, which are shown in italics.

2. The primary responsibility for the security and protection of United Nations personnel, and of its assets rests with the government of the host country. However, within the United Nations system, each mission and agency is responsible for establishing security arrangements commensurate with its operational responsibilities, and the processes and controls established should follow a set of policies and guidance set down by the United Nations and should be balanced with each mission's responsibilities for accessibility, and accountability. In addition, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) is responsible for the development and coordination of overarching policy guidelines for all United Nations missions.

3. In Guinea-Bissau, there are ten United Nations agencies including the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) with a total of 242 staff members (55 international and 187 national). Each has designated a focal point for security that integrates closely with UNSECOORD nominated Field Security Coordination Officer (FSCO) located in Guinea-Bissau. List of agencies and staff in Guinea-Bissau is provided in the Annex.

4. Except for a 45-day period immediately following the 14 September 2003 coup during which Phase 2 was declared most of the country remains under Phase 1. Along the country's northern border with the Senegalese region of Casamance, Phase 2 has remained in effect throughout due to rebel activity in that region and the permeability of the borders.

## II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

5. The main audit objectives were to:

- a) Assess if effective security plans, policies and procedures had been developed and implemented;
- b) Determine if there was adequate monitoring and implementing recent changes to field security procedures;
- c) Determine if security staffing resources are adequate and are being effectively managed;

- d) Evaluate the adequacy of the level of coordination and communication in performance of security function; and
- e) Coordinate the timely and effective implementation of actions to correct known security weaknesses.

### **III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY**

6. The scope of the audit was to assess the security management framework of United Nations offices and agencies in Guinea-Bissau, including the efficiency of the security policy and its level of compliance, and to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of security function delivery. The audit phase covered all United Nations offices and entities in Guinea-Bissau, including UNOGBIS. The audit was conducted in accordance with the general and specific standards for the professional practice of internal auditing in United Nations organizations and included such procedures as the auditors considered necessary.

7. Key personnel and staff in a number of United Nations agencies, DO and the FSCO were interviewed. Independent views and impressions were obtained through structured questionnaires and collective interviews with staff, both international and local. Separate meetings were held with the Government of Guinea-Bissau officials and the Portuguese Embassy.


8. As part of our audit program, we reviewed applicable security policies, procedures and standard operating procedures (SOP). In addition, we obtained and reviewed security related administrative and budgetary documentation to include security plan and policies, evacuation plan, crisis management, zonal warden system and minutes of SMT meetings. We also studied previously issued security reports to identify security weaknesses reported over the past years that remained uncorrected.

### **IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **A. Security Organization Structure**

9. Guinea Bissau has clear allocation of responsibility and a chain of command for security function at various levels within the organization. The responsibilities are clearly defined and established, there is an effective leadership and direction, and clear lines of communication. The security management structure in Bissau is depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Bissau Security Management Structure



10. The UNDP Resident Representative as the nominated DO with responsibility for all security related matters has been providing effective leadership for the security function. A Field Security Coordination Officer (FSCO) as the nominated representative of UNSECOORD with responsibility for day-to-day security function and providing advice to the DO has been performing the function since January 2004. A senior managerial level security management team (SMT) is operational for the development, coordination and dissemination of policy guidelines, standards and policy decisions. The SMT is chaired by the DO and is composed of chiefs of all United Nations offices and agencies in Guinea-Bissau. The SMT meets on a monthly basis in order to deliberate on security related issues. United Nations agencies have nominated focal points for security that integrate closely with the overall security management, and serve as points of contact for all security related deliberations.

11. There are two military advisors and one civilian police advisor with the UNOGBIS office located in Guinea-Bissau who have not been included as part of the SMT. It is felt that such an expertise when available in a location should be gainfully utilized in the over all security management function. The matter was discussed with OIC, UNOGBIS and the DO, who were prompted to consider a role for such expertise in the security structure.

### **Recommendation 1**

The Designated Official should consider inclusion of UNOGBIS military and civilian police military advisors in the security management structure (AP2004/646/01/01).

12. *The Designated Official has accepted recommendation 1 and stated in his response that the security management will look into ways to include UNOGBIS military and civilian police advisors into the security management structure of the UN in Guinea-Bissau, including the SMT, although it has always been its intention to include these entities in the warden system (soon-to-be updated) as well as in the crisis coordination group. OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.*

### **B. Human Resource, Budget and Equipment**

13. The FSCO staffing level with two support staff provided from the integral budget allocation is considered adequate. Besides, the FSCO has additional four staff, financed by all UN agencies in Guinea-Bissau, to operate the UN Radio Room on 24/7 basis.

14. The FSCO has to manage his operation with an annual budget of \$284,741, which it was felt was adequate for its operations. For all other expenditure on security related issues, a process has been established to formalize a cost sharing MOSS budget, which had full acceptance by all agencies. The budget was being effectively utilized for procurement of essential security equipment such as radio communications, metal detectors and other security control devices.

15. Some of the agencies lacked in basic security equipment like metal detector archway and hand-held metal monitors which is being centrally procured by the FSCO from the cost shared budget. The field vehicles from all agencies are fitted with appropriate radio communication equipment and are fully MOSS compliant, except for a few vehicles from UNOGBIS which still lack a few basic items such as first aid kit, fire extinguisher and triangle. Vehicles without appropriate communication equipment are not allowed to travel outside the city limits or base town. A few vehicles still lack long distance HF radio communications.

### **Recommendation 2**

The Designated Official should expedite procurement and installation of specialist security equipment including radio communications in office premises and vehicles as per Guinea-Bissau MOSS stipulations (AP2004/646/01/02).

16. *The Designated Official has accepted recommendation 2 but advised OIOS to emphasize that the items to be procured and installed are 'last remaining items' in the list of deficiencies, as the last remaining communication equipment ordered arrived in July 2004 and its installation was presently in the process of being finalized. The metal detector equipment, including a metal detector archway for the UN Building and hand-held metal detectors for country offices housed*



outside the UN Building were in the process of being shipped from South Africa. OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.

### **C. Security Policy, Direction and Guidance**

17. OIOS assessed whether the United Nations offices in Guinea-Bissau have achievable security policies supported by executable procedures, directions, and guidance. The security management in Guinea-Bissau has achieved a well articulated security policy based on the prevailing security situation. There is an updated risk management program that includes threat assessment, and security is managed and planned. The operational policies and practices are established and comply with laid down United Nations guidelines and procedures.

18. However, effective communication of these policies, procedure and guidelines to the staff level can be further improved. There was an absence of clear policies and procedures on certain key aspects of security, such as the issue and control of identity passes, recording of visitors, and access to the UN premises.

#### **Recommendations 3 to 4:**

The Designated Official should:

- (i) Lay down clear policy guidance articulating uniform security control measures for all UN agencies (AP2004/646/01/03); and
- (ii) Develop a mechanism to monitor effective implementation, and operation of security policies and procedures (AP2004/646/01/04).

19. *The Designated Official has accepted recommendation 3 and informed that the FSCO plans to undertake within the next few weeks a complete review and overhaul of access control and perimeter security measures of all UN offices in Guinea-Bissau, including a review of the work of guard firms employed and the provision of common training for all guards. OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.*

20. *Concerning recommendation 4, the Designated Official informed OIOS that the meetings of the SMT, where all "pending issues" are brought up and discussed, serves as a control and monitoring framework for ensuring that security policies are being implemented and operating as desired. Also, the FSCO undertakes regular reports on compliance, such as of MOSS, for instance, which are presented to the members of the SMT. In view of the above, OIOS has withdrawn recommendation 4.*

## **D. Security Management System**

21. The security management program covers the policies, practices and processes to protect United Nations functions and resources from threats and dangers and other violent activity. Guinea-Bissau has well established procedures for security clearance. All UN personnel and visitors to Guinea-Bissau require a security clearance approved by the DO prior to travel. UN field missions from Bissau city to the regions, which are all in security Phase 1 or 2, require an additional security clearance approved by the DO prior to departure of staff members. In order to monitor staff movements, a radio communications linkage is maintained between the UN agencies field missions and the Radio Room during field visits in the regions. OIOS determined that the system is working well without any major difficulties.

22. Managing security risk involves developing a security plan by which the organization intends to address the potential security risks. The plan should be based on the context in which the organization operates and a thorough security risk assessment which is updated and reviewed with changes in the security environment. However, there is a need to review the evacuation plan with regard to the details of concentration and re-grouping points, evacuation modalities, evacuation responsibilities and negotiation for safe havens.

### **Recommendation 5**

The Designated Official should revisit the security plan for various assumptions that form the basis for evacuation and movement to safe havens, and updating and validating them through rehearsals (AP2004/646/01/05).

23. *The Designated Official has accepted recommendation 5 and conveyed that another activity on the FSCO's work plan that will be undertaken before the end of the year is an update of the security plan, including visits to the residences of all staff (national and international), an update of the warden system and a review of city zones, concentration points, exit points and safe havens. A further activity planned is the carrying out of live practices of the warden system and country evacuation and detailed surveys of all exit routes from Bissau to Banjul/Dakar and Conakry, including visits to in-country safe havens (Bafatá and Gabú) and cross-border safe-havens (Banjul, Dakar and Conakry). OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.*

## **E. Coordination and Communications**

24. The security coordination in Guinea-Bissau particularly amongst the agencies was found to be good. The DO and the FSCO enjoy good cooperation from all agency heads and staff on security issues. The agencies involvement in security assessment and delivery, including with the host government and local law enforcement agencies is good.

25. However, there is scope for improvement in coordination and information flow within the agencies particularly between the agency heads and the security focal points. Some staff reported

that information with regard to security matters, for example, the deliberations of the SMT, was not being communicated to the staff levels.

26. We also assessed host government's position and commitment in security assistance and whether the responsibilities are clearly defined, and coordination mechanisms are in place. The FSCO maintains communications and liaison with government officials through a nominated Liaison Officer (LO). In our meeting with the LO, we noticed a positive approach to security but he mentioned their limited capacity to provide assistance in time of crisis.

27. The FSCO maintains good liaison with the Portuguese embassy in Guinea-Bissau. In our meeting with the Portuguese Ambassador, he affirmed his full cooperation in the event of evacuation but was unable to allocate any priority to the UN staff. He indicated that Portuguese and EU nationals would have priority.

28. Communication obtains high importance due to extended distances in the region. All UN agencies maintain and operate vehicles with HF radio communications for travel in the field and emergency operations. As a routine practice, radio checks are carried out by the Radio Room with all UN personnel present in Bissau, including visitors. The Radio Room also keeps track of any UN mission visiting the field or regions outside Bissau. This is considered as a good practice for emulation in other missions.

#### **Recommendation 6**

The Designated Official should expedite fitment of HF radio communication equipment in UNOGBIS vehicles (AP2004/646/01/06).

29. *The Designated Official accepted recommendation 6 and informed OIOS that additional items such as first aid kit, fire extinguisher and triangle are included in the list of items to be procured for full MOSS compliance of UNOGBIS vehicles.* OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.

### **F. Physical Security Systems and Controls**

#### Security awareness training

30. The security awareness of UN staff in Guinea-Bissau was assessed to be much higher than that in Dakar. But, there is still scope for improvement, particularly, amongst the local staff. Some agencies like the World Food Programme (WFP) had adopted in-house security awareness training program, which should be emulated by others in Guinea-Bissau. The staff awareness of protective security plans and policies, mostly in relation to crisis management and emergency procedures, was satisfactory.

31. The level of security training is satisfactory with nearly 95 percent staff having completed the basic security in the field CD Rom training, which is very encouraging. Besides,

the FSCO was able to organize security orientation training for all staff in March 2004, covering as main topics, the UN security system, communications and emergency procedures.

#### Physical security of office premises

32. Physical security of office buildings in Guinea-Bissau is an issue of serious concern and a security risk. Six agencies that include UNOGBIS, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank are accommodated in a common UN building. The building is well protected but is deficient with a number of MOSS compliance measures. Areas that need improvement are facility for security control, metal detection, and perimeter protection. In addition, none of the buildings are equipped with anti-shatter screens, and most of the premises lack access control measures, and perimeter security measures.

33. The food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) shares office building with the Ministry of Agriculture within the military premises. WFP is located opposite the Ministry of Education. The WFP Warehouse is accommodated in a Government installation. The WHO office is accommodated by the Government. The IOM Country Office is located in a building within the compound of the State Secretariat for ex-combatants.

34. Sharing premises with a Government entity has the effect of diluting any security measures that may be in place, and may also make them vulnerable to acts of violence that may be perpetrated against the Government. In view of the above, UNSECOORD should review the policy followed by some UN agencies of utilizing host nation courtesy for office accommodation. Some guiding parameters should be laid down for the host nation to follow in allotting accommodation for UN offices.

#### Physical security for residences

35. Assessment of physical security arrangements for staff residences has not been carried out, and lacks vulnerability analysis (MORSS compliance). While the UN regulations entitle the staff to claim 80 percent of security charges up to a maximum of \$300 for protection services to private guards, some staff members complained that they were not in receipt of the allowance.

36. A standardized system of UN ID badges in Guinea-Bissau is in the works, but has not as yet been introduced. Only WFP has been providing ID badges, thus far. This could pose a serious security hazard in time of crisis, and efforts to streamline the procedure should be expedited.

### **Recommendations 7 to 10:**

The Designated Official should:

- (i) Develop a formal security awareness training program encompassing all UN agencies and offices in Guinea-Bissau (AP2004/646/01/07);
- (ii) Establish a plan to ensure that all agencies are MOSS compliant for physical security measures (AP2004/646/01/08);
- (iii) Review the physical security arrangements in staff residences and ensure MORSS compliance (AP2004/646/01/09);  
and
- (iv) Establish a uniform system of identification (UN IDs) for all United Nations staff in Guinea-Bissau (AP2004/646/01/10).

### **Recommendation 11**

UNSECOORD should consider laying down guiding parameters that host nations should follow while allotting accommodation to United Nations agencies (AP2004/646/01/11).

37. *The Designated Official accepted recommendation 7 and informed OIOS that part of this training (UN security system, communications and emergency procedures) has already been given by the FSCO, and the latter has already made plans to undertake training in all remaining subject of security awareness, such as personal and family security; residential security; office and facilities security; fire safety; driving safety; cash movements; travel security; mine awareness; and first aid, possibly in early 2005. OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.*

38. *Concerning recommendation 8, the mission informed that with the implementation of recommendations 2, 3 and 10, all physical security measures, including the ordering and installation of metal detector equipment, the review of access control and perimeter security measures in all UN offices, and the establishment of a uniform system of identity cards, would have been dealt with. In view of the above, OIOS has withdrawn recommendation 8.*

39. *The Designated Official accepted recommendation 9 and informed OIOS that the security management in Guinea-Bissau has already elaborated and approved and forwarded to UNSECOORD the Country MORSS Submission for Guinea-Bissau. The SMT decided at its meeting of 7 September 2004 to give international staff of all agencies 30 days to comply with the residential security measures outlined in this document, following which the FSCO will begin undertaking inspection visits to all residences concerned. OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.*

40. *The Designated Official accepted recommendation 10 and intimated that a uniform system of identification (UN IDs) has already been established for all UN staff in Guinea-Bissau. The design of the common ID card has been decided upon, photographs have been taken of all staff and the cards printed. The security management in Guinea-Bissau is awaiting the procurement (already initiated) of a suitable lanyard for the badges concerned. As soon as the lanyards arrive, the cards will be distributed and access control procedures in all offices will be adapted to this new measure.* OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.

41. *The Designated Official accepted recommendation 11.* OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.

### **G. Management of Emergencies and Crisis**

42. Guinea-Bissau has a crisis management plan involving procedures that can be implemented at short notice. The FSCO has identified a crisis management committee composed of members from the United Nations agencies; however, some of the staff members that we interviewed lacked full knowledge of these plans and procedures. This is mainly attributable to lack of any rehearsals for staff so far.

43. In addition, more training is required for administration and staff in the area of crisis management. This gains importance since quick response from local police is not available since they lack communication and transportation.

44. Guinea-Bissau does not yet have a fire safety plan, and many agencies are deficient in basic fire safety equipment. The FSCO should on priority develop a comprehensive fire safety plan encompassing fire alarm systems, fire extinguishers, identify fire wardens, training of fire wardens, fire evacuation plans, bomb-threat preparedness/plans, etc. Fire safety plan for Guinea-Bissau is critical as local support is absent from local fire brigades which are neither functioning nor equipped with the requisite equipment.

45. Medical facilities in Guinea-Bissau are very poor and the only reliable facility is the UN dispensary, which can only provide first aid assistance. Even relatively simple cases require medical evacuation to Dakar (which is the nearest medical evacuation center). Moreover, evacuation cannot be performed after dawn, as the airport is only open from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.

46. Since 2000, Guinea-Bissau is facing chronic shortage of electricity and water, which has worsened in recent months. The city sometimes has to go without electricity for weeks leading to security concerns and traffic accidents. Hence, UN agencies should take steps to procure emergency power generation capacity with in their premises. Alternatively, the FSCO may recommend inclusion of power generators in Guinea-Bissau specific MOSS.

## Recommendations 12 and 13

The Designated Official should:

- (i) Ensure validation of the crisis management plan and SOPs through rehearsals and practice (AP2004/646/01/12); and
- (ii) Should develop a comprehensive fire safety plan for UN agencies in Guinea-Bissau, and assess the requirement of including power generators in country specific MOSS requirement (AP2004/646/01/013).

47. *The Designated Official accepted recommendation 12. OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.*

48. *Accepting the recommendation 13, the Designated Official has advised that the elaboration of a comprehensive Fire Safety Plan for the UN agencies in Guinea-Bissau is presently on top of the list of priorities of the FSCO, and will be finalized by the end of October. This activity will involve a review and update of all fire detectors and alarm systems, fire extinguishers, the identification and training of fire wardens, the elaboration of fire evacuation and bomb-threat plans, and the carrying out of live practices and drills of office and building evacuation. He has, however, pointed out that the security management in Guinea-Bissau, while deliberating about MOSS and MORSS, found that the inclusion of power generators in either of these documents would not be feasible due to the costs involved. In addition, he mentioned that it is possible to provide minimum emergency lighting for residences at night using a 12 V battery, a neon bulb, a few cables and a battery charger. OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.*

## VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

49. We wish to express our appreciation for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors by the security management of United Nations offices in Guinea-Bissau.



Patricia Azarias, Director  
Internal Audit Division I, OIOS

## ANNEX

GUINEA-BISSAU – UN AGENCIES AND STAFF LIST

	AGENCY	INT'L. STAFF	INT'L. STAFF DEPENDENTS	NATIONAL STAFF	NATIONAL STAFF DEPENDENTS
1	UNOGBIS – United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau	13	4	12	26
2	UNDP United Nations Development Programme	22	4	63	62
3	UNICEF – United Nations International Children's Fund	7	3	35	36
4	FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization	1	0	11	19
5	WFP – World Food Programme	4	1	30	43
6	WHO – World Health Organization	2	0	13	19
7	IMF – International Monetary Fund	0	0	5	9
8	WORLD BANK	0	0	4	10
9	IOM – International Organization for Migration	3	1	8	12
10	UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund	1	0	8	11
11	UNSECOORD – Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator	1	0	6	12
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>259</b>





OIOS/IAD Client Satisfaction Survey

The Internal Audit Division is assessing the overall quality of its audit process. A key element of this assessment involves determining how our clients rate the quality and value added by the audits. As such, I am requesting that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors, and complete the survey below. I assure you that the information you provide will remain strictly confidential.

**Audit Title & Assignment No.: OIOS Audit No. AP2004/646/01: Field Security and Emergency Procedures in Guinea Bissau (UNOGBIS)**

**By checking the appropriate circle please rate:**

1. The extent to which the audit addressed your concerns as a programme manager.
2. The audit staff's understanding of your operations and objectives.
3. The professionalism of the audit staff (communications, integrity, professional knowledge and responsiveness)
4. The quality of the audit report in terms of:
  - accuracy and validity of findings and conclusions
  - clarity and conciseness
  - balance and objectivity
  - timeliness
5. The extent to which the audit recommendations were appropriate and helpful.
6. The extent to which your comments were considered by the auditors
7. Your overall satisfaction with the conduct of the audit and its results.

	1 (poor)	2	3	4(excellent)
1. The extent to which the audit addressed your concerns as a programme manager.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2. The audit staff's understanding of your operations and objectives.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3. The professionalism of the audit staff (communications, integrity, professional knowledge and responsiveness)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4. The quality of the audit report in terms of:				
-- accuracy and validity of findings and conclusions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
-- clarity and conciseness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
-- balance and objectivity	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
-- timeliness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
5. The extent to which the audit recommendations were appropriate and helpful.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
6. The extent to which your comments were considered by the auditors	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
7. Your overall satisfaction with the conduct of the audit and its results.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please comment on any areas in which you have rated the audit team's performance as below your expectations. Also, please feel free to provide any further comments you may have on the audit process to let us know what we are doing well and what can be improved.

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Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Organization: \_\_\_\_\_

*Thank you for taking the time to fill out this survey. Please send the completed survey form as soon as possible in the enclosed envelope addressed to: Ms. Patricia Azarias, Director, Internal Audit Division - I, OIOS, Room DC2-518 United Nations Headquarters New York, NY 10017 U.S.A. or by fax to: 212-963-8100.*