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INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION I  
OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES

**Confidential**

TO: Mr. Vladimir Sotirov  
A: Representative of the Secretary-General  
United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building

DATE: 22 September 2004

REFERENCE: AUD-7-5:15 (0750/04)

FROM: Patricia Azarias, Director  
DE: Internal Audit Division I, OIOS



SUBJECT:  
OBJET: **OIOS Audit No. AP2004/658/01: Field Security Procedures in the UN  
Tajikistan Office for Peace-building (UNTOP)**

1. I am pleased to present herewith the final report on the subject audit, which was conducted during the period June-July 2004. The audit was conducted in accordance with the general and specific standards for the professional practice of internal auditing in United Nations organizations and included such tests as the auditors considered necessary.
2. We note from your response to the draft report that UNTOP has generally accepted the recommendations and initiated their implementation. Based on the comments, the recommendations remain open in OIOS' recommendation database pending remedial actions completed. Please refer to the recommendation number concerned to facilitate monitoring of their implementation status. Also, please note that OIOS considers recommendations 9 to 14 as being of critical importance and requests that you focus your attention on them.
3. OIOS is assessing the overall quality of its audit process and kindly requests that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors and complete the attached client satisfaction survey form.
4. I would like to take this opportunity to thank you and your staff for the assistance and cooperation provided to the auditors in connection with this assignment.

Copy to: Mr. Kieran Prendergast, Under-Secretary-General, Department of Political Affairs  
Ms. Diana Russler, Director and Deputy UN Security Coordinator  
Ms. Diane Kepler, Chief, Internal Audit Section, UNDP  
Mr. William Paton, Designated Official for Tajikistan, UNDP  
UN Board of Auditors  
Programme Officer, OIOS  
Mr. Nikolai Grigoriev, Auditor-in-Charge, OIOS

# Office of Internal Oversight Services

## Internal Audit Division I



### **Audit of Field Security Procedures in UNTOP**

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**Audit no:** AP2004/658/01  
**Report date:** 22 September 2004  
**Audit team:** Nikolai Grigoriev, Auditor-in-Charge  
Gerald Kopil, Auditor

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Field Security Procedures in the UN Tajikistan Office for Peace-building**

In view of the changing security environment and threats worldwide, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) identified the audit of global field security procedures as a matter of priority.

The Security Council, General Assembly and Secretary-General have issued several policy documents recognizing the paramount importance of security and safety of UN personnel in the field. In one of these documents [A/57/365 of 28 August 2002], the Secretary-General set out an inter-organizational security framework for accountability for the United Nations field security management system. The document states unambiguously the responsibilities of every entity, individual and group of individuals within the United Nations system of organizations involved in the management of security.

This report assesses the capability and readiness of UNTOP Security Unit in carrying out effectively its mandate for staff safety and security in the Mission area. It also assesses the Mission's performance against the established accountability framework and SOPs. The report discusses policy and procedural issues that are associated with the security of UN personnel and assets, and provides practical recommendations for improving security management.

The review of the documents and the discussions with the responsible officials, including the Designated Official/Resident Coordinator for Tajikistan, showed that recently, UNTOP enhanced its security system, including strengthening of the staff security and improving physical security. Based on the audit work performed, other improvements on the planning, coordination, and control of the Security function in the Mission are needed that will ensure the capability and readiness of the Security Office in performing its mandate and the operational application of the accountability framework.

The following major audit findings were noted:

- There is a need for more transparent budget allocations for security with charges made to specific accounts, and actual resources reconciled to security needs and equipment requirements.
- The Mission did not develop or maintain a centralized and computerized information database of Security-related lessons learned, including the establishment of internet links with a number of relevant political missions worldwide.
- UNTOP did not prepare an annual work plan for the Security Office, which includes activities, resources and milestones.
- The Mission did not develop a crisis management plan, which took into account possible scenarios and major contingencies.
- There is a need for UNTOP to prepare a drill plan covering various types of drills, like fire and medical emergencies and providing for systematic testing of the Warden System.

- There is a need for the Security Management Team to explore the feasibility of establishing a Crisis Management Working Group in order to ensure that an appropriate crisis response capability is maintained.
- There did not exist a comprehensive and formal training programme for the officers who deal with security issues at UNTOP.
- UNTOP did not actively participate, as a leading member of the UNSECOORD common system in Tajikistan, in discussions of the optimal cost-sharing formula.
- There were no documented and agreed upon restricted access rights to the premises between UNTOP and the landlord.
- There was no fire alarm system at the Mission and there is a need for strengthening of fire safety procedures in the building.

The report sets out details in support of the principal observations and makes recommendations that will install a new culture of awareness and sustained commitment to the UN security management programme. Management should develop an action plan to address observations and recommended improvements contained in this report.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building was established in June 2000 with the support expressed by the Security Council in a statement by its President of 21 March 2000 (S/PRST/2000/9). The budget of the Mission for 2004 amounted to \$1,756,600. The mission consisted of 10 international and 21 local staff. Six local staff members were involved in providing security services for the Mission. The budget for security, which was based on the calculations done by the Mission, amounted to \$60,000 (\$25,000 for posts \$11,000 for equipment, \$14,000 for miscellaneous expenditures including residential security services and Government security guards and \$10,000 for country-level MOSS compliance). The audit was carried out in accordance with the standards for the professional practice of internal auditing in United Nations Organizations. The report incorporates UNTOP comments with a time schedule established by the mission for implementing each of the recommendations, which are shown in italics.

## II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

2. The overall objective of the audit was to assess the capability and readiness of UNTOP Security Office in carrying out effectively its mandate for staff safety and security in the Mission area. It was also to review the Mission's performance against the established accountability framework and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Specific objectives were to review and assess whether:

- (i) the Mission has adequate security policy and guidance;
- (ii) adequate security plan and procedures that address evacuation, medevac and major emergencies has been implemented;
- (iii) in country and in mission coordination is timely and effective;
- (iv) staff are sufficiently informed on security matters;
- (v) the level of security education and training is adequate; and
- (vi) the present levels of staffing and available equipment meet minimum security needs of the Mission.

## III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

3. The audit included interviews with key UNTOP personnel and review of documents, which the auditors considered necessary under the circumstances. The team also met with the Designated Official/Resident Coordinator for Tajikistan and the Assistant Field Security Coordination Officer, UNSECOORD, Tajikistan.

## IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

4. The review of the documents and the discussions with the responsible officials, including the Designated Official/Resident Coordinator for Tajikistan, showed that recently UNTOP has made improvements in its security system, including strengthening of the staff and improving physical security. However, procedures to identify security related lessons learned and a database should be developed. UNTOP needs to be more active in contributing to comprehensive security plans for

Tajikistan to include the crisis management plans, a drill plan that will test the warden system. Expected accomplishments, performance indicators and outputs relating to security are not included in the budget, and work plans for the management of security need to be prepared. There is also a need for a comprehensive and more meaningful training programme for security to be developed. Restricted access rights to the UNTOP premises should be established and documented between UNTOP and the landlord.

## V. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. Performance Indicators and Baseline Data

#### Difficulty in reconciling actual resources to the security needs

5. During 2001, 2002 and 2003, no specific budget was made for security purposes. Only in 2004, a specific object code for safety and security equipment was introduced. Also, there was no official document from the UN Headquarters with the approved staffing table, which specified security related posts. Hence, the audit was not in a position to compare the post requirements against the actual situation. Although, at present, the Mission considers the awareness of staff concerning security risks and subsequent actions to mitigate them as top priority, the expected accomplishments, performance indicators and outputs relating to security were not included in the 2004 budget. This makes the review and analysis of the security-related expenditures for the Mission a complicated exercise.

#### **Recommendations 1 - 4**

The RSG should ensure that:

- (i) A system is established whereby actual resources on hand can be easily reconciled to the security needs and equipment requirements in order to identify any resulting shortage or surplus (AP2004/658/01/01);
- (ii) Budget allocations for security are more transparent and charges are made to specific security related accounts (AP2004/658/01/02);
- (iii) Performance indicators are established for effective monitoring of security (AP2004/658/01/03); and
- (iv) A staffing table for the Mission is prepared, which specifies the security related posts (AP2004/658/01/04).

6. *UNTOP accepted recommendation 1 and stated in its response of 16 September 2004 that it will be fully implemented by 31 October 2004.*

7. *Concerning recommendation 2, UNTOP informed OIOS that the mission has always included in its cost estimates the contribution to be made to UNSECOORD. However, while approving the budget and subsequently issuing the allotment advice, UNHQ did not allocate funds for that specific expenditure. Upon receipt of the inter-agency apportionment of the UNSECOORD budget, when the mission raises the matter with UNHQ, it was usually advised to charge it to object*

code 3901 – Services by Other Specialized Agencies. In regard to the purchase of security equipment UNHQ has advised to charge this expenditure to object code 5345 – Safety and Security Equipment. In addition, UNHQ has allocated the following account codes, which are used by the Mission as and when funds are allocated: 4102 – Minor Alterations to Premises; 5201 – Communications Equipment; 5361 – Miscellaneous Equipment.

8. UNTOP accepted recommendations 3 and 4 and advised OIOS that they will be fully implemented by 30 September 2004. OIOS will keep recommendations 1, 2, 3 and 4 open in its database pending their implementation.

#### Need to introduce annual planning in the Security Office

9. Detailed work plans have not been prepared for the management and operations of the security staff of UNTOP. The audit was provided with daily plan/actions of the Security Assistant and Security Guard/Officer. These daily plans looked more as daily standard operational procedures and not as work plans. The necessary elements of a work plan indicating risks and relevant activities were missing. Also, the daily plans were not designed to include the outputs or outcomes of typical security functions, such as protection, information gathering and training.

#### **Recommendation 5**

The RSG should ensure that annual work plans are prepared for the Security Office, which should include activities, resources and milestones. Typical key security functions embodied in the plans should entail protection, equipment, investigations liaison and training (AP2004/658/01/05).

10. UNTOP agreed with recommendation 5 and stated that it will be fully implemented by 31 December 2004. OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.

### **B. Policy, Direction and Guidance**

#### Need for an action plan to introduce best practices and identified improvements

11. The Mission did not establish procedures for the identification of security-related lessons learned and best practices. Although UNSECOORD, Tajikistan conducted security assessments, the latest one being at the request of the Mission before the audit team arrived, there is no evidence to indicate that the results of these assessments had been thoroughly analyzed, documented and that steps were taken to rectify all the deficiencies noted.

#### **Recommendation 6**

The RSG should ensure that the Mission develop and maintain a centralized and computerized information database of Security-related lessons learned; this should include the establishment of internet links with a number of relevant peacekeeping missions worldwide. UNTOP should also prepare an action plan to follow-up and correct the deficiencies identified during the security assessments (AP2004/658/01/06).



12. *UNTOP accepted recommendation 6 and informed OIOS that it will be fully implemented by 31 December 2004. According to UNTOP, security-related lessons learned will be analyzed in a more systematic way. The mission will seek to obtain the necessary technical expertise in the coming months to ensure that this recommendation is implemented as soon as possible.* OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.

#### Need to formalize agreement on cost sharing formula and respective payments

13. There was no written agreement to support payments made to UNSECOORD, Tajikistan for common services dealing with security. The existing cost sharing formula, based on the number of organizations participating in the system could not be considered as an optimal one and did not take into account several important factors, for example, the number of staff in a particular organization. In view of the fact that UNTOP was not provided with duly certified document on expenditures for the previous year, it stopped the payments for 2004. The audit believes that in order to ensure the smooth running of the common system, this issue has to be resolved as soon as possible.

#### **Recommendation 7**

The RSG should ensure that UNTOP receive certified statements of costs to support the expenditures incurred by UNSECOORD, Tajikistan, and subsequently billed to UNTOP. As a leading member of the UNSECOORD common system for Tajikistan, it should actively participate in discussions on the optimal cost-sharing formula (AP2004/658/01/07).

14. *UNTOP accepted recommendation 7 and stated that it will be fully implemented by 31 December 2004. UNTOP agreed that the current security cost sharing system does not meet standard requirements. The issue has been discussed at one of the recent SMT meetings and it has been agreed that the Tajikistan UNCT would introduce a "on a per capita basis system" for security cost sharing, which will be effective 1 January 2005.* OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.

### **C. Country-Wide Plans**

#### Crisis Management Plan has to be developed

15. Although the Security Plan for Tajikistan was prepared in May 2004, the Security Management Team (SMT), with the help of the Field Security Coordination Officer (FSCO), has yet to develop a Crisis Management Plan that will include the possible scenarios, such as kidnapping, death, arrest or detention of staff members or various natural disasters. For natural disasters, the Security Plan has only safety guidelines. These guidelines are of general nature and should be reinforced by concrete steps to be taken in case of natural disasters, for example earthquakes, which are not uncommon in Tajikistan. The responsible officials assured the audit that the Crisis Management Plan would be prepared by the beginning of 2005.

#### **Recommendation 8**

The RSG should ensure that the issue of developing a crisis management plan is raised in the Security Management Team meeting, which should take into account possible scenarios and

major contingencies. Most common natural disasters, like earthquakes, should be reflected in the plan (AP2004/658/01/08).

16. UNTOP accepted *recommendation 8* and advised OIOS that it will be fully implemented by 1 December 2004. According to UNTOP, the Crisis Management Plan will be a useful tool in a number of emergency situations. The Field Security Coordination Officer (FSCO) is currently working on the plan. The first draft of the plan will be available to the SMT in early November this year and, after comments and formal approval, will be included into an updated version of the Security Plan. OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.

#### Drills to test security scenarios and warden system not performed

17. The conduct of drills is of utmost importance to verify the functioning of a security system in real time mode. The interviews and the review of documents revealed that UNTOP did not conduct any drills to test the security system in a number of areas, including fire and medical emergencies. Further, according to the Security Plan for Tajikistan, international and national wardens have been formally appointed and given a list of staff residing in their respective security zones. Wardens and Deputy Wardens were appointed by geographical principle, which means that wardens and members of their teams could belong to different organizations and don't know each other well enough. Furthermore, procedures relating to the warden system have not been rehearsed.

#### **Recommendation 9**

The RSG should ensure the preparation and execution of a drill plan providing for various types of drills, like fire and medical emergencies. The warden system should also be systematically tested (AP2004/658/01/09).

18. UNTOP accepted *recommendation 9* and informed OIOS that it will be fully implemented by 31 October 2004. UNTOP further stated that all relevant drills should be performed on a regular basis. Recently the Mission has carried out both fire and medical emergencies drills. Another round of fire drills will take place in October this year. The warden system is new and all respective personnel have no previous experience in terms of security and all of them need proper training. A training programme for security wardens is being prepared by UNSECOORD and this will be delivered before end of October 2004. OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.

#### **D. Coordination between Offices and other Bodies**

19. The audit was not assured that a Crisis Management Working Group was established to ensure rapid reaction and effective coordination in times of major crisis. We are not convinced that the SMT, taking into account its broad membership, was a suitable mechanism for this. The primary mission of the Crisis Management Working Group would be to ensure hands-on management of the emergency on a full time basis and to provide senior decision-makers with timely and accurate information and to carry out decisions and orders of the Designated Official and Alternate Designated Official.

#### **Recommendation 10**

The RSG should ensure the establishment a Crisis Management Working Group in order to ensure that an appropriate crisis response

capability is maintained and case study exercises conducted to test its readiness (AP2004/658/01/10).

20. UNTOP accepted *recommendation 10* and informed OIOS that it will be fully implemented by 31 December 2004. UNTOP stated that the mission supports the establishment of a Crisis Management Group and this will be discussed at the next SMT meeting. OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.

### **E. Training Activities**

#### Limited training activities within the Security Office of UNTOP

21. Security training of the UNTOP Security Office staff was not comprehensive and important issues such as terrorist attacks, bomb threats etc. were not included. Also, it was limited to instructions and guidance that were sent by e-mail and meetings at various levels. There is a risk that in the absence of rehearsals, the readiness of security staff to confront these threats would be of a limited scale.

#### **Recommendation 11**

The RSG should ensure that a comprehensive and more meaningful training programme is prepared for the officers who deal with security issues at UNTOP. The feasibility of inviting trainers from the UN Headquarters to the area of Central Asian countries to organize security-related training for several smaller missions should be assessed (AP2004/658/01/11).

22. UNTOP accepted *recommendation 11* and stated that it will be fully implemented by 31 December 2004. In July the mission has expressed the need for a comprehensive training of security staff and the required resources to be made available for this training. Implementation will commence as soon as funds are authorized. OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.

### **F. Premises and Equipment**

#### Access to the premises

23. Access to the UNTOP building by visitors and guests poses a risk of entry by individuals, who could jeopardize security of UN staff and facilities. Visitors, who do not have any dealings with UNTOP, have unrestricted access to the ground floor, for example to the premises, which are right below the office of the RSG. The audit is of the opinion that the entry regime should be strengthened in the interest of all parties concerned. Furthermore, there was no documented agreement on access rights to the building between UNTOP and its landlord – the Friendship Society.

24. The responsible officials explained to the audit team that some time ago, an X-RAY machine was placed at the entrance to the building to ensure that personal belongings of the visitors are checked. However, it was sent to another mission. The possibility of procuring a replacement for this X-RAY machine should be explored.

### **Recommendations 12 - 13**

The RSG should ensure that the Mission:

- (i) Sign an agreement with the landlord on the optimal entry regime to the building (AP2004/658/01/12); and
- (ii) Study the possibility of acquiring an X-RAY machine (AP2004/658/01/13).

25. UNTOP accepted *recommendations 12 and 13 and scheduled their implementation by 30 September and by 31 December 2004 respectively. UNTOP also stated that in July the mission has requested funding for the purchase of an X-Ray machine. Implementation will commence as soon as funds are authorized.* OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.

#### Further actions needed to reinforce security and safety in the UNTOP compound

26. The audit raised two issues linked to the security and safety procedures in the compound occupied by UNTOP. First, there was no alarm system linking the guard booth at front gate of the compound to the control room inside the building which would, in case of an emergency situation at the gate, discretely notify the UN security guard inside the building about the possible threat. Second, the fire safety procedures in the UNTOP building needed to be strengthened since the building was not equipped with a fire alarm system or smoke detectors.

### **Recommendation 14**

The RSG should ensure that further steps are taken to reinforce security and safety features of the UNTOP compound by procuring the alarm system linking the front gate and the control room inside the building, as well as a fire alarm system equipped with smoke detectors (AP2004/658/01/14).

27. UNTOP accepted *recommendation 14 and stated that it will be fully implemented by 31 October 2004. The Mission is in the process of installing a fire alarm system with smoke detectors.* OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.

## **VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

28. We wish to express our appreciation for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors by the UNTOP management and staff.

Patricia Azarias, Director  
Internal Audit Division I

## ACRONYMS

CAT	Crisis Action Team
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CMWG	Crisis Management Working Group
DO	Designated Official
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
FSCO	Field Security Coordination Officer
FSH	Field Security Handbook
MOSS	Minimum Operating Security Standards
MORSS	Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards
MWSP	Mission Wide Security Plan
OPPBA	Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts
SG	UN Secretary-General
SMT	Security Management Team
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
RSG	Representative of the Secretary-General
TAC	Threat Assessment Committee
UNHQ NY	United Nations Headquarters, New York
UNTOP	United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building
UNSECOORD	United Nations Security Coordinator
USG	Under-Secretary-General



OIOS/IAD Client Satisfaction Survey

The Internal Audit Division is assessing the overall quality of its audit process. A key element of this assessment involves determining how our clients rate the quality and value added by the audits. As such, I am requesting that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors, and complete the survey below. I assure you that the information you provide will remain strictly confidential.

**Audit Title & Assignment No.: Audit of UNTOP Field Security Procedures (AP2004/658/01)**

By checking the appropriate circle please rate:

	1 (poor)	2	3	4(excellent)
1. The extent to which the audit addressed your concerns as a programme manager.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2. The audit staff's understanding of your operations and objectives.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3. The professionalism of the audit staff (communications, integrity, professional knowledge and responsiveness)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4. The quality of the audit report in terms of:				
-- accuracy and validity of findings and conclusions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
-- clarity and conciseness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
-- balance and objectivity	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
-- timeliness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
5. The extent to which the audit recommendations were appropriate and helpful.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
6. The extent to which your comments were considered by the auditors	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
7. Your overall satisfaction with the conduct of the audit and its results.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

