

Internal Audit Division I
Office of Internal Oversight Services

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: General Lamine Cisse
A: Representative of the Secretary-General
BONUCA

22 September 2004

REFERENCE: AUD-7-5:22
 (0751/04)

FROM: Patricia Azarias, Director
DE: Internal Audit Division I, OIOS

P. Azarias

SUBJECT:
OBJET: Audit of BONUCA Field Security Procedures (AP2004/644/01)

1. I am pleased to present our final report on the audit of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Mission in Central African Republic (BONUCA) field security procedures, which was conducted in Bangui, Central African Republic from 13-18 June 2004.
2. Based on comments received on a draft of this report, OIOS has closed recommendations 10 and 11. Recommendations 1 through 9 will remain open in OIOS' recommendations database pending further actions summarized in the table below. I would also like to draw your attention to recommendations 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9 as being of critical importance.

Recommendation No.	Action Required
AP2004/644/01 to 04	Notification of decisions taken by the Security Management Team and actions taken by the Mission to implement the recommendations
AP2004/644/05	Comments from the Department of Political Affairs as to whether they accept this recommendation and the proposed date of its implementation
AP2004/644/06	Receipt of further comments from the BONUCA Administration on the acceptance and implementation of this recommendation
AP2004/644/07 and 08	Notification by the Mission that implementation action has been completed for these recommendations.
AP2004/644/09	Notification by the Mission that all staff members have completed the security in the field training course.

1. OIOS is assessing the overall quality of the audit process. I therefore kindly request that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with auditors and complete the attached client survey.
2. I would like to take this opportunity to thank you and your staff for the cooperation and assistance extended to the auditor on this assignment.

Copy to: Mr. Kieran Prendergast, Under-Secretary-General, Department of Political Affairs
Ms. Diana Russler, Director and Deputy UN Security Coordinator
Ms. Diane Kepler, Chief, Internal Audit Section, UNDP
UN Board of Auditors
Programme Officer, OIOS
Mr. William Petersen, Auditor-in-Charge, OIOS

Office of Internal Oversight Services
Internal Audit Division I



Audit of BONUCA Field Security Procedures

Audit no: AP2004/644/01
Report date: 22 September 2004
Audit team: William Petersen, Auditor-in-Charge

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Audit of BONUS Field Security Procedures (AP2004/644/01)

OIOS conducted an audit of BONUS field security procedures in Bangui, Central African Republic from 13-18 June 2004 as part of a global review of the security procedures for political and peacekeeping missions throughout the world.

The audit found that the Mission's security procedures are fully integrated with the Security Plan for UN agencies operating in the Central African Republic (CAR). As an active member of the Security Management Team, BONUS interacts regularly with the Designated Official and the UNSECOORD Field Security Coordination Officer (FSCO). However, the overall security of BONUS facilities and personnel rests with one unarmed field security officer and a complement of locally contracted guards. The physical security of the BONUS headquarters compound and its field office at Bouar are not fully compliant with Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS), and the security protection provided to the Representative of the Secretary-General requires strengthening in order to meet a minimum acceptable security standard.

OIOS makes a number of recommendations to improve the operational effectiveness of the Security Plan and to strengthen the overall security of BONUS personnel and facilities.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The United Nations Peacebuilding Support Mission in Central African Republic (BONUCA) was established in February 2000 to support the Central African Republic (CAR) government's efforts to inter-alia promote peace and national reconciliation, strengthen democratic institutions, and facilitate the mobilization of international political support and resources for national reconstruction and economic recovery. Following a coup d'etat in March 2003, the security situation in the country has been precarious and 15 of the 16 CAR provinces are classified as either phase III (requiring evacuation of dependents) or phase IV (suspension of all except emergency operations).

2. BONUCA is headed by the Representative of the Secretary-General and has a total of 67 staff comprising 31 international staff (including 4 civilian police advisers and 5 military advisers), and 36 national staff. BONUCA's net budget for the period 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 is \$5,020,800 and its organization includes the political, information and human rights sections, civilian police and military liaison teams, and the office of administration.

3. OIOS conducted an audit of BONUCA field security procedures in Bangui, Central African Republic from 13-18 June 2004 as part of a global review of the security procedures in place for political and peacekeeping missions throughout the world. The audit was conducted in accordance with the standards for the professional practice of internal auditing in United Nations organizations and included such tests as the auditors considered necessary under the circumstances. The Mission provided its comments on the report's findings and recommendations in a facsimile from the Representative of the Secretary-General dated 27 July 2004. These comments are reflected as appropriate in the report and are marked in italics.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

4. The objectives of the audit were to assess:
- (a) Whether the Mission's overall security procedures are being efficiently and effectively carried out;
 - (b) If the Mission's security staff and resources are adequate and are being effectively managed; and
 - (c) Whether there are any organizational or other problems that affect the Mission's effective implementation of the security and emergency-planning requirements.

III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

5. The audit scope covered the Security Plan for UN offices/agencies operating in CAR, the security staffing and operations for BONUCA during 2003 and 2004, and the level of coordination with the various parties and officials involved in execution of the security mandate in the Mission area (e.g., UNDP, UNSECOORD Field Security Coordination Officer, other UN agencies and the host government). The auditor undertook such audit

procedures as a walkthrough and physical inspection of BONUCA facilities, an analysis of data and structured interviews with key personnel of BONUCA and other entities involved in UN Security. A questionnaire was used to survey a sample of international and local staff on security related issues and their familiarity with procedures in place for emergencies.

IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

6. The audit found that, overall, the security procedures in place for BONUCA are inadequate. Security in BONUCA is under-resourced and not fully compliant with the UN's Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS). The physical security of BONUCA personnel and facilities require strengthening in order to meet a minimum acceptable standard. Also, there needs to be additional protection provided to the Representative of the Secretary-General. The Mission's security procedures are fully integrated with the comprehensive Security Plan for the UN agencies operating in the Central African Republic (CAR). As an active member of the Security Management Team (SMT), BONUCA interacts regularly with the Designated Official and UNSECOORD Field Security Coordination Officer (FSCO) in the implementation of the security measures outlined in the Security Plan. Nonetheless, OIOS has identified a number of areas for the SMT's consideration in order to further enhance the Plan's effectiveness.

V. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Security Plan

7. The Joint UN Agency Security Plan developed by the UNSECOORD Field Security Coordination Officer (FSCO) in consultation with the SMT is a comprehensive document covering all significant aspects of security for the United Nations international and local staff. The Plan was updated in April 2004 and provides the planned procedures and related points of contact for dealing with security situations and emergencies ranging from accidents and medical emergencies to thefts, armed attacks, hostage situations and the evacuation/relocation of staff. OIOS notes with appreciation that the Security Plan fully integrates provisions for the security and safety of the national staff. In this regard, all international and national UN staff have been provided with radios, and there is a 24-hour situation center at UNDP that coordinates the emergency response to any security or medical situation.

8. The SMT is comprised of the Designated Official (who is the UNDP Resident Coordinator), the FSCO, and representatives from each UN agency/office operating in the CAR (BONUCA, FAO, UNHCR, World Food Programme, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WHO). BONUCA plays an active role in the weekly SMT meetings, and the BONUCA field security officer and a senior military adviser serve as alternates to the FSCO. Although the Plan was updated in April 2004, the most recent threat assessment was conducted by the FSCO and SMT in November 2003. At that time, the SMT reaffirmed the threat and risk assessment conducted in late August 2003. This assessment concluded that the UN in CAR was an easy and convenient target of a general or international attack, and that the most likely targets would be the RSG and offices of BONUCA; the UNDP Resident Coordinator and offices of UNDP/UNFPA; the FAO/UNHCR/WFP complex, and the offices of UNICEF and WHO. United Nations staff were also considered targets mainly on economic grounds. The audit also noted that the last UNSECOORD assessment visit was

reportedly conducted in 2002, however, the FSCO could not locate a copy of the report of this assessment

9. Under the Security Plan, BONUCA and the other UN agencies operating in the country rely on a 40-member government military unit (Group de Protection et de Securite-GPS) to provide security to UN agencies and personnel. Thirty of the troops are paid by a common budget; 10 are based at UNDP to provide a quick reaction response to problems, and 20 are used as escorts for trips to the field where there is organized armed banditry. Ten of the GPS troops are paid directly by the UN agencies, and are used to provide security for offices and senior officials (except for BONUCA which does not use GPS personnel for security of its premises – see paragraph 18 below). There is also an international peacekeeping force (Committee Economique en Afrique Centrale-CEMAC) based at MPOKO international airport that could potentially be called on in an emergency to protect the UN staff. However, according to the Representative of the Secretary-General, there is no written agreement with CEMAC to this end.

10. OIOS noted that the armed GPS troops present in the UNDP building and used for perimeter guard and vehicle escorts have been provided with UN accoutrements (hats and arm bands) to identify them as working with the United Nations. However, they are, in fact, government troops and not UN employees and, therefore, OIOS is of the opinion that their close identification with the United Nations could potentially cause problems if they should act in an undisciplined manner or be forced to use force against the local population.

11. OIOS also questions the Security Plan's provisions concerning the availability of emergency food stocks. The Plan makes note that 1400 individual rations are maintained by WFP at CEMAC and by extension, assumes that these rations would be available to the UN in the case of emergency. Due to the limited time available for its review, OIOS was not able to confirm the existence of these rations. We also noted that no food or bottled water stocks are maintained at BONUCA HQ, which is one of the three assembly points to be used in the case of emergencies (The other assembly points include Base Aerienne at MPOKO Airport and the UNDP offices). We were informed that BONUCA staff members have been advised to maintain food stocks at their individual residences. OIOS is of the opinion that it would be prudent to have a supply of rations and bottled water on hand at each assembly point sufficient to cover a period of up to two weeks.

12. The audit surveyed a sample of 11 international and national staff members to determine their perceptions about the preparedness of the Mission and the staff to meet emergency situations. The overall response to this survey indicated that the staff felt the Mission was generally doing a good job in providing induction briefings and security-related updates. However, nearly all of the staff that responded to the survey (5 international and 2 national staff) said they were not familiar with the Mission's emergency evacuation/relocation procedures, and that they were not fully satisfied with the level of security provided by BONUCA. In this regard, OIOS was informed by members of the SMT that no rehearsal drills have been held to go over the security relocation/evacuation procedures with the staff due to concerns about appearance to the government and local population. OIOS notes that any rehearsal drills need not be done in such a way that they are visible to the public. Rather, they should be conducted so that all staff are practiced in the procedures to be followed in carrying out their responsibilities or following the evacuation/relocation instructions as the case may be.

Recommendations 1 to 4

OIOS recommends that BONUCA raise the following proposed actions to the Senior Management Team for consideration by the UN agencies operating in the Central African Republic:

- (i) Request appropriate quantities of rations and bottled water for stocking at the designated concentration points as part of the next submission of requirements for Minimum Operating Security Standards (AP2004/644/01/01);
- (ii) Initiate discussions with CEMAC for the purpose of entering a memorandum of agreement for the provision of military assistance to BONUC and the other UN agencies in the event of an emergency evacuation situation or other crisis (AP2004/644/01/02);
- (iii) Conduct limited rehearsal drills to ensure that all staff are knowledgeable about the procedures to be followed in carrying out an evacuation/relocation emergency (AP2004/644/01/03); and
- (iv) Reconsider the practice of equipping the government GPS troops with UN accoutrements identifying them as working with the United Nations (AP2004/644/01/04).

13. *The Mission stated that recommendations 1 through 4 would be submitted to the Security Management Team for discussion and clearance. The recommendations will remain open in OIOS' database pending notification of actions taken to implement them.*

B. Security Expenditures

14. BONUCA does not have a separate line item or cost center for security. Rather, security is included as part of the overall programme support costs of the Mission and is comprised principally of the cost of one G-5 field security officer (FSO) and 10 contracted security guards (8 at HQ and 2 at the field office in Bouar) having a budgeted cost of \$31,000. Since security is not considered a budget cost center, there are no results-based budget goals or indicators of achievement for security.

Recommendation 5

OIOS recommends that for future budget requests, DPA consider including a separate budget category for the security of its political missions together with results-based indicators of achievement (AP2004/644/05).

15. *The Mission stated that it had drafted a separate budget for the Security Section and that this would be included in the BONUCA budget submission for 2005.*

16. It was noted that BONUCA staff hire their own residential security guards and are reimbursed for 80 per cent of the cost of three guards (one day and two night) up to \$480 per month. Staff reimbursement claims for guards contracted individually ranged from CFA 30,000 (\$54) to the maximum allowable amount of CFA 100,000 (\$182) per guard per month. In view of the very low local salary levels in the country as well as the individual contracting of these services, there is a high potential for fraudulent claims. Furthermore, there is a risk that the guards may not be adequately trained or equipped. OIOS was advised that there are several societies that offer the services of trained guards at costs within the authorized reimbursement limits. It should also be noted that several peacekeeping missions maintain a policy of reimbursing guards only contracted through approved companies.

Recommendation 6

The BONUCA administration should identify and evaluate existing societies that provide security guard services and initiate a policy requiring that guards be contracted from an approved society or exceptionally reviewed and approved by the Field Security Officer (AP2004/644/01/06).

17. *The Mission stated that the Security Management Team has approved companies' guards for Offices/Agencies/Missions only and that it directed that staff members are not obligated to use the companies.* OIOS continues to be of the view that there is a high potential for fraud in this area, and that residential guards should a minimum level of support and training. It is therefore reiterating this recommendation for further consideration by the BONUCA Administration.

C. Security of BONUCA Facilities and Personnel

18. The BONUCA headquarters compound is comprised of six villas surrounded by a wall approximately 3 meters high with a V-shaped cover of deteriorating barbed wire. The gate is comprised of two solid steel anchored doors also 3 meters high with one door having a 1 x 3 meter barred window opening for observation (it should be noted, however, that this window also allows people to look into the compound, and therefore, there should be closeable shutter for this window). There is also an adjacent building that could allow entry to the compound from the building's roof. The compound walls could also be hurdled with the aid of a tall ladder. Therefore, it is necessary to replace the existing barbed wire cover with properly secured coiled razor wire.

19. Security within the compound is limited to the four locally-contracted guards on duty equipped with batons and whistles. There is no security presence, either by BONUCA guards or government military or police personnel, outside the gate or around the perimeter of the compound. We were informed that the presence of government personnel is not considered desirable since they would be able to monitor comings and goings of people visiting BONUCA.

20. During regular working hours the doors of each villa are open, and although there is a security desk at the entryway of the villa housing the Representative of the Secretary-General (RSG), at most times observed by the auditor it was not manned. There is no close protection officer for the Representative of the Secretary-General, and no armed security officers within the compound. The office of the RSG has a buzzer installed to open the door, but there is no way to determine the identity of the person(s) seeking to enter. We were informed that, *inter alia*, two closed circuit TV cameras as well as 5,000 meters of 'barbed wire'¹ were included in a list of urgently needed MOSS equipment submitted to UN Headquarters for approval in February 2004, but that no funding has yet been provided for the items requested.

21. Although we were not able to visit the BONUCA field office in Bouar, which is approximately 450 kilometers from the capital, we were informed that there are similar concerns about the physical security of the office there. BONUCA has contracted two local guards for this office and has provided radios to the staff. The office also has an HF radio and a satellite telephone for emergency communications. However, the FSO believed that the physical compound needed to be fortified with concertina wire. He also believed that there will be a need to provide an FSO to this office as well as other field offices established when BONUCA gears up to support the election process.

Recommendations 7 and 8

The BONUCA administration should:

(i) Urgently request funding from DPA to upgrade the security of the Headquarters compound and the Bouar field office so that these offices fully comply with MOSS requirements. Such upgrading should include *inter alia* replacing the deteriorating barbed wire with coiled razor wire, and providing a closeable shutter for the gate window (AP2004/644/01/07); and

(ii) Consider requesting the budgetary authority to recruit a close protection officer for the Representative of the Secretary-General, as well as any additional field security officers deemed necessary to provide security during the election process. BONUCA should also consider requesting authorization for the field security officers to carry firearms (AP2004/644/01/08).

22. *Concerning recommendation 7, the Mission stated that it has already sent the budget request to DPA, and that while awaiting DPA's reply, it has commenced calling vendors for quotations, and two vendors have already submitted their quotations for the necessary upgrades. With regard to recommendation 8, the Mission stated that the costs for a close protection officer and firearms have been included in the budget for the Security Section in the BONUCA budget submission for 2005, and that security during the election period*

¹ The auditor did not see the specifications for this item, but as noted in paragraph 15, OIOS is of the opinion that this should be coiled razor wire.

would be provided by FOMUC. The recommendations will remain open in OIOS' database pending notification that implementation action has been completed.

D. Other Security and Personnel Management Matters

23. The audit also disclosed the following security and personnel concerns that need to be addressed by the Mission.

- A review of the list of MOSS equipment requested in July 2002 and reiterated in February 2004 that is needed for BONUCA to be MOSS compliant showed that many of the items have not yet been procured by the Mission due to the lack of funding. These include *inter alia* mobile satellite phones (5), camera control systems (2), barbed wire (5,000 meters), PEP kits (2), emergency power supply (18), body armor (50), mine carpets (20), ballistics blankets (40), etc. In fact, BONUCA did not know the specifications for some of the items such as the mine carpets and ballistics blankets since these requirements were put forward by the FSCO.
- There are three international staff members who have not completed the mandatory DPKO course on "Security in the Field-Staff Safety Health and Welfare." The staff members reported to the Mission between November 2003 and April 2004 and should be required to complete the course as soon as possible.
- BONUCA does not have a functioning ID card system and has had to improvise in making identification cards for its staff. We were informed that the Mission has received the CPU for the ID system, but that the card printer is still on order.
- BONUCA management has not circulated the Secretary-General's Bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13) to all staff to ensure that they comply with the provisions of this bulletin. In view of the recent scandals involving sexual exploitation by UN staff and peacekeepers, OIOS is of the opinion that this bulletin should be distributed to all staff and that they be required to sign a written acknowledgement and agreement to maintain the required standards of conduct.

Recommendation 9 through 11

The BONUCA Administration should:

- (i) Ensure that all staff members complete the on line DPKO security in the field training course as soon as possible after arriving in the Mission (AP2004/644/01/09);
- (ii) Follow-up to ensure the delivery of the ID card printer needed to complete the ID card system (AP2004/644/01/10); and
- (iii) Distribute the Secretary-General's Bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse to all staff and require them to sign a written acknowledgement

and agreement to maintain the required standards of conduct (AP2004/644/01/11).

24. *The Mission stated that recommendations 10 and 11 have been implemented; the ID card printer was received and ID cards have been issued to the staff, and all staff have acknowledged receipt of the Secretary-General's bulletin in question. Concerning recommendation 9, the Mission stated that two staff members are still in the process of completing the security course. Based on the comments received, OIOS has closed recommendations 10 and 11. Recommendation 9 will remain open pending notification by the Mission that all staff members have completed the security in the field training course.*

VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

25. We would like to express our appreciation for the assistance and cooperation provided to the auditor by the BONUCA staff and in particular by the Security Officer who acted as the point of contact for meetings with the UN security management team in Bangui.

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