

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 04MADRID527, SPANISH ELECTION OUTLOOK: ONE MONTH OUT, POPULAR
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04MADRID527.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
04MADRID527 | 2004-02-13 17:21 | 2010-12-06 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000527
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/WE
NSC FOR VOLKER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV SP NATO
SUBJECT: SPANISH ELECTION OUTLOOK: ONE MONTH OUT, POPULAR
PARTY HOLDING ON TO LEAD
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires J. Robert Manzanares,
reasons 1.4(B) and (D).
Summary
¶1. (C) Polls one month before the March 14 Spanish general
election continue to point to victory for the Popular Party
and Aznar's successor as party leader, Mariano Rajoy. The PP
hopes not just for a plurality, but for an absolute majority.
Were the PP to fall far short of an absolute majority,
coalition formation would prove troublesome. Most polling
consistently shows the PP hovering just short of the absolute
majority threshold. Socialist leader Rodriguez Zapatero has
sought to breathe new life into his campaign by exploiting
the Iraq/WMD controversy, criticizing Aznar for joining the
Iraq coalition. Most analysts believe the Iraq issue will
not be a major factor unless Spain's 1300 troops in Iraq
suffer large casualties. One month before the election, the
outlook is similar to when Rajoy became Aznar's successor
last September: the perception in Spain is that it is Rajoy's
race to lose. End Summary.
Major Party Differences on Relations with the U.S.
¶2. (SBU) On March 14, Spaniards will go to the polls to
select a new Parliament, which will, in turn, select a new
Prime Minister, known in Spain as "President of the
Government." Polling data and political commentary have, for
the past six months, pointed to a plurality for the PP, led
by Aznar's successor as party leader, Mariano Rajoy. This
trend continues. Most polls show the PP leading by seven or
eight points over the Socialists.
¶3. (C) Rajoy and Socialist (PSOE) leader Jose Luis
Rodriguez Zapatero offer distinct domestic and foreign policy
choices to the Spanish electorate. Rajoy has pledged to
maintain Aznar's strong ties with the US, including its close
counter-terrorism cooperation and participation in the Iraq
coalition. He also promises to keep Spain's vigorous economy
on track and preserve the integrity of the Spanish state in
the face of nationalist pressures in the Basque and Catalunya
regions.
¶4. (C) Zapatero, in contrast, pledges to re-focus Spain on
Europe. Zapatero argues that Aznar's tilt to the US has
damaged Spain's standing in the EU, where the Socialists see
their country's future. Zapatero has been a relentless
critic of Aznar's Iraq policy and what he sees as Aznar's
"subservience" to the Bush Administration. Zapatero says he
will establish a transatlantic relationship based on "mutual
respect and friendship," not on submission.
¶5. (C) Zapatero also strongly criticized Aznar for appearing
before a joint meeting of Congress February 4, saying that
Aznar was willing to go before the US Congress while ignoring
Socialist calls for him to appear before a special session of
the Spanish parliament (in recess because of the elections)
to explain pre-war intelligence on WMD in Iraq. On the
domestic front, Zapatero pledges to increase social spending
for education, health and culture. He has promised not to
raise taxes and says he will pay for these programs by
reducing defense spending.
¶6. (C) Despite efforts to shift attention again to Iraq,
Zapatero has been unable to turn popular opposition to
Aznar's Iraq policy (which brought millions of Spaniards into
the streets in February and March 2003) into support for his
candidacy. On February 12, Zapatero said that if elected, he
would withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq in July if the
mission had not been turned over to the UN by that date.
Zapatero misses no opportunity to call the war "illegal and
immoral" and to denounce Aznar for ignoring Spanish interests
by allying Spain with what Zapatero calls "the most
conservative US Administration in history."
Role of Aznar
¶7. (C) The manager of the PP's national campaign, Gabriel
Elorriaga (who is also State Secretary for Public
Administration), told us in late January that one of the
major challenges for the PP in the campaign is how to deploy
Aznar. Elorriaga conceded that the PP needs to be careful
not to overshadow Rajoy or antagonize the Socialist ranks and
provoke greater Socialist turnout. Nonetheless, thus far,
and consistent with his personal style, Aznar has been out in
front ) and far more on the attack than Rajoy. On February
10, in a typical jibe, Aznar declared that the Socialists
have no coherent leader or party and are not fit to govern
Spain. He demanded that Zapatero tell Catalan Socialists to
break their coalition with the Catalan Republican ERC, whose
leader, Carod Robira, met with ETA leaders in France in early
January.
¶8. (C) Zapatero continues to focus his criticism largely on
Aznar, rather than Rajoy. Rajoy's strategists tell us
privately that this suits them just fine because the Iraq
issue in particular is identified with Aznar, rather than
Rajoy. Thus Aznar takes the heat while Rajoy enjoys a
widespread reputation, even among Socialists, as more of a
bridge-builder, with a far less dominating personality than
Aznar.
¶9. (C) Some in his own party have criticized Rajoy, a
veteran of eight years in key Ministerial portfolios in
Aznar's two governments, for conducting an overly scripted
and risk-averse "rose garden" campaign. Rajoy has resisted
pressure from the Socialists to publicly debate Zapatero, for
example. Others point out, however, that Spaniards vote
according to party lists, not necessarily on personalities --
a key difference between the Spanish and US systems -- and
therefore the lack of a high profile is not necessarily a
negative for Rajoy.
Absolute Majority: the Numbers and Turnout
¶10. (C) The PP needs 176 seats in the 350-seat Congress of
Deputies (lower house) to form an absolute majority. In
2000, the PP won an absolute majority of 183 seats. In 1996
the PP won 146 seats and formed a coalition government. Some
of the 1996 coalition partners, such as the Basque
Nationalist PNV, would not enter into a coalition with PP
today.
¶11. (C) PP campaign manager Elorriaga told us he was
confident the PP would win at least 171 seats this time and
said that if the campaign went well, the PP could hope for an
absolute majority, although he conceded this would be
difficult. Elorriaga believed that the 183 seats the PP
received in 2000 represented the PP's electoral ceiling. He
doubted they would reach it in 2004 given the eight years of
PP government and the natural desire of the public for a
change.
¶12. (C) Should the PP fall four or five seats short of 176,
Elorriaga said they can count on the Canary Coalition (a
regional Canary Islands party) to cover that margin. Beyond
that, coalition formation becomes problematic for the PP.
Most PP analysts believe that CIU, the moderate Catalan
nationalist party (which had 15 seats last legislature),
would be willing to work out a deal with the PP, if it came
to that. However PP strategists are not sure this would
happen and would like to avoid this contingency.
¶13. (C) PP strategists and other analysts, including
Elorriaga, focused on the issue of voter turnout. Elorriaga
told us that the PP wanted to mobilize its people but avoid
public gloating that could antagonize the Socialists and
mobilize them against the PP. He said polls before the 1993
general election had been favorable for the PP but that the
PP had committed the error of holding large rallies on the
eve of the election that, ironically, mobilized the
socialists against them and helped cost the PP the election.
Elorriaga said that over-confidence was a major danger for
the PP.
The Alternative to a PP Victory: Government of the Left
¶14. (C) The likely alternative to a PP victory is a
coalition of the Socialists and the Left Union (Communists)
supported by nationalists such as the Basque Nationalist
Party (PNV). Zapatero has stated that he would not seek to
form a government unless the Socialists get the most votes
nationwide. Nonetheless, many analysts believe that if it
came to it, the Socialists would lead such an "anybody but
the PP" coalition. The PSOE sought to do it in the Madrid
region last October and have done it in the Balearic Islands
and elsewhere.
Comment
¶15. (C) The percepction in Spain is that the March 14
election remains the PP's to lose. Despite polls that show
that a majority of Spaniards favors the idea of a change in
government, the PP has enjoyed a solid lead for months. The
Socialists, as a consequence of their disunity and weak
leadership, have been unable to capitalize on a general
desire for change. However, there are a few wildcards that
have the potential to change the equation. These include
possible large Spanish casualties in Iraq and a possible
backfiring of Rajoy's cautious approach to campaigning and
his unwillingness to debate Zapatero. Nonetheless, as it now
stands, the majority of analysts, including many Socialist
contacts, expect the PP to form the next government. What
they do not agree on is whether the PP will receive an
absolute majority. The polling is inconclusive. If Zapatero
can prevent the PP from gaining an absolute majority ) which
would involve the PP's loss of at least 8 seats ) he might
be able to claim some victory and remain PSOE leader. Should
the PP win an absolute majority, the knives among the
Socialists may well come out for Zapatero. A resounding
PSOE electoral defeat, were it to occur, might well bring
calls for one of the longtime Socialist barons, such as Bono
from Castilla La Mancha or Chavez from Andalusia to come to
the PSOE's rescue.
MANZANARES