

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09TOKYO2329, PRIME MINISTER HATOYAMA'S FOCUS ON CHINA
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09TOKYO2329.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TOKYO2329 | 2009-10-07 09:01 | 2011-05-04 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXRO4172
RR RUEHDT RUEHPB
DE RUEHKO #2329/01 2800901
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 070901Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6662
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 7311
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 9142
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 0615
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 6798
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC
RHMFISS/USFJ
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 002329
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/J
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019
TAGS: PREL CH JA
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER HATOYAMA'S FOCUS ON CHINA
REF: A. TOKYO 600
¶B. TOKYO 984
TOKYO 00002329 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: CDA James P. Zumwalt for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Prime Minister (PM) Yukio Hatoyama has
made Sino-Japanese ties a foreign policy priority as he seeks
to establish political footing abroad. A key policy
challenge facing his new Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-led
coalition government is maintaining the current political
goodwill between Japan and China and advancing the still
somewhat amorphous concept of a ""mutually beneficial
relationship based on common strategic interests."" The PM
set the policy tone early when, in the run-up to the August
30 general election, he publicly declared his longstanding
opposition to official visits to Yasukuni Shrine. Press
statements and recent speeches suggest that Hatoyama sees
regional mechanisms, mainly his much-publicized ""East Asia
Community"" (EAC) concept, as a way to realize his China
policy objectives and to enhance ties beyond traditional
bilateral frameworks. The PM, however, must weigh the
diverse set of views within his party as well as those of DPJ
Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa, whose perspective on China in
the past has shaped the party's public position on the issue.
Potential limits to cooperation with Beijing exist, despite
Hatoyama's outreach efforts. Japan continues to search for
ways to hold frank discussions on key concerns such as
Chinese military modernization and longstanding maritime and
territorial disputes. END SUMMARY
¶2. (C) One of the key policy challenges facing the new
DPJ-led coalition government is advancing the policy
initiated by Prime Minister Hatoyama's immediate predecessors
to improve relations with China. Tokyo Embassy interlocutors
agree that Sino-Japanese ties have improved markedly since
the tension-filled years of former Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi. Since 2006, Japan and China have held several
high-level meetings at bilateral, trilateral, and
multilateral venues, deepened trade ties and economic
interdependence, and accelerated military confidence-building
discussions on issues such as disaster relief and antipiracy.
Japan's China observers, however, cite longstanding maritime
and territorial disputes, divergent interpretations of
Japan's wartime past, China's poor food and product safety
record, and the country's growing military, economic, and
political regional and global influence as underlying strains
that continue to bedevil overall ties and test Prime Minister
Hatoyama and his government.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Adopting Finer Points of Previous Administrations
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶3. (C) Keenly cognizant of China's increasing economic and
political importance and mindful of the sensitivities
inherent in the relationship, Hatoyama has made Sino-Japanese
ties a foreign policy priority as he seeks to establish
political footing domestically and abroad. He appears to be
following a somewhat reliable blueprint mapped out by his
immediate predecessors, Taro Aso, Yasuo Fukuda, and Shinzo
Abe. Although universally panned for their leadership
limitations, the troika of former prime ministers maintained
smooth ties by stressing the importance of high-level
dialogue and visits, and by avoiding visits to the
controversial Yasukuni Shrine--the commemorative resting
place of Japan's war dead, including 14 class A war
criminals. Aso himself met Chinese leadership multiple times
during his short tenure. In this way, Hatoyama's approach to
China can be considered an area of policy continuity with the
Aso government.
¶4. (C) Hatoyama set the policy tone early when, in the run-up
to the August 30 general election, he publicly declared his
longstanding opposition to official visits to Yasukuni
Shrine. In August, during the Shrine's fall festival, the
DPJ leader publicly stated his intention not to visit the
Shrine and underscored his preference for all Cabinet members
to do the same. Hatoyama's decision to appoint Katsuya Okada
TOKYO 00002329 002.2 OF 004
as Foreign Minister (FM) also resonated positively with
China, given Okada's stance on Japan's wartime
responsibility, MOFA officials told U.S. Embassy Tokyo.
""Japan must properly assess the fact that it embarked on that
wretched, foolish war,"" Okada has declared in the past.
¶5. (C) Hatoyama has sustained his policy focus on China since
becoming prime minister. In his first press conference as
the nation's leader on September 17, Hatoyama called for
building a ""relationship of trust"" with China. He expounded
on this ideal during the September 21 meeting with Chinese
President Hu on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New
York. The two leaders agreed to deepen bilateral ties and
make the relationship ""more substantive,"" according to press
readouts and Embassy MOFA contacts. Hatoyama underscored the
importance of acknowledging and overcoming differences. On
history-related issues, for example, he conveyed support for
then Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama's 1995 statement of
""regret and remorse"" over past Japanese militarism. On
disputed offshore gas fields in the East China Sea (ECS),
Hatoyama proposed creating a ""Sea of Fraternity,"" to which Hu
responded by raising his own calls for a sea of ""peace,
friendship, and cooperation"" as well as the advent of
long-awaited bilateral negotiations, postponed since both
sides signed a joint development agreement in June 2008.
Hatoyama will continue these efforts to improve relations
during his October 10 trip to Beijing, where he is scheduled
to meet Hu again on the margins of the second trilateral
Japan-China-South Korea Summit (septel).
¶6. (C) Embassy sources tell us that Chinese officials are
responding positively to Hatoyama's gestures. Beijing
invited Hatoyama to visit China in September, MOFA officials
told Embassy Tokyo. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao sent a
congratulatory message to Hatoyama on September 16 calling
for stronger bilateral relations ""starting from a new
historic threshold."" Wen expressed hope the two countries
could work together to push for ""fresh developments."" ""As
neighbors, efforts to deepen the mutual trust and cooperation
between China and Japan are in keeping with the fundamental
interests of both nations and their people,"" the Chinese
Premier stated.
--------------------------------------------
East Asia Community as Means to Manage China
--------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Press statements and recent overseas speeches suggest
that Hatoyama sees regional mechanisms, including his
much-publicized ""East Asia Community"" (EAC) concept, as a way
to realize his China policy objectives and to enhance ties
beyond traditional bilateral frameworks. Although his EAC
vision lacks granularity at this early stage and has been the
subject of much media criticism for being ""unrealistic"" and
""outdated,"" Hatoyama is still pitching the idea to regional
counterparts, most notably to Hu during their meeting on
September 21. He told Hu that the ""Community"" would be based
on a ""fraternity spirit"" in Asia. The PM sees China as the
key to jump-starting the EAC ideal and appears more sanguine
than other leaders about tackling political issues as they
relate to a potential Community. Hatoyama told Hu that
resolving the countries' prolonged disputes could be the
starting point, according to MOFA China Division officials.
Hatoyama's ""Sea of Fraternity"" vision and efforts to
strengthen existing partnerships, to China and ASEAN member
countries for example, could serve as the foundation for the
broader Community idea, other MOFA officials add. Tsuyoshi
Yamaguchi, a DPJ lawmaker and member of Deputy Prime Minister
Naoto Kan's National Strategy Bureau (NSB), has told us that
he (Yamaguchi) is working on building momentum and fleshing
out the EAC idea by focusing on a few concrete cooperative
initiatives with China and Korea. For example, Yamaguchi is
considering pursuing ECS development as an ""Asian project.""
¶8. (C) Speculation abounds about the content and overall
composition of the framework as well as Chinese receptivity
to the EAC, but one consistent message from our interlocutors
TOKYO 00002329 003.2 OF 004
has been that the EAC is a long term vision and that the
concept does not necessarily exclude the United States.
Hatoyama stressed this point during his first press
conference as prime minister. The specifics are still
developing, but the EAC would ""not lessen the importance of
U.S.-Japan relations,"" senior DPJ member Kozo Watanabe told
us. MOFA Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Director General
Akitaka Saiki has downplayed U.S. concerns about the idea as
well. Having briefed Hatoyama multiple times on Asia policy,
he assured Embassy Tokyo that the new administration wants
the United States to play a major regional role.
¶9. (C) In his remarks October 7 at the Foreign
Correspondent's Club, Okada reiterated that a strong alliance
with the United States and better relations with Japan's
neighbors can be pursued simultaneously. Okada outlined his
vision of the EAC as comprising ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea,
Australia, New Zealand, and India. The United States is not
excluded in the same way Japan does not feel excluded from
the EU or NAFTA, he said. The upcoming Japan-China-Korea
Summit in Beijing provides a chance to expound on the EAC
concept, Okada added. Initially, the focus should be on
deepening economic interdependence and cooperation on energy,
environment, and public heath. Some MOFA officials reiterate
Okada's point that only energy-, health-, and
environment-related issues will fill the main agenda to
start. During his September 28 meeting with Chinese Foreign
Minister Yang Jiechi in Shanghai, FM Okada mentioned that
policy coordination should begin in these three areas before
gradually transitioning to more politically sensitive issues,
according to MOFA's China managers. However, some Embassy
contacts, such as DPJ foreign policy expert and Vice Minister
for Internal Affairs and Communication Shu Watanabe, describe
the EAC concept as nothing more than an effort to increase
people-to-people contact. Economic integration and other
hard topics will not move forward, Shu Watanabe insists.
¶10. (C) Although idealistic in tone, Hatoyama's vision subtly
mirrors a general view shared by several Embassy
interlocutors who take a more hardline approach to China.
They stress the importance of using multilateral mechanisms
to ""lock"" China in, encourage Beijing to abide by
international standards and norms, and encircle the country
by strengthening ties to third country neighbors, such as
South Korea and ASEAN. Japan's China observers regularly
cite Beijing's preference to deal with countries bilaterally
often in contravention of global concerns regarding human
rights, rule of law, and democratic processes. They see
Chinese membership in mechanisms such as APEC, the East Asia
Summit, and ASEAN-related groupings as a way, in part, to
compel Beijing to play responsibly and by the rules.
----------------------
Japan as Regional Link
----------------------
¶11. (C) Hatoyama probably envisions his objectives in Asia as
serving the additional purpose of enhancing Japan's role as
link between the region and the United States. Japan can
serve as a ""connector"" between Asia and the United States,
Okada reportedly told Chinese Foreign Minister Yang in
Shanghai on September 28. Hatoyama has sought to assure
concerned parties that an EAC and robust Sino-Japanese ties
do not come at the expense of relations with Japan's most
important ally, despite his much-publicized desire to
reevaluate the parameters of the Alliance. The PM also has
said that improvement in Sino-Japanese ties is a plus for the
United States, just as improvement in U.S.-China ties is a
plus for Japan.
--------------------------------------------- -
Potential Room for Policy Unity Within the DPJ
--------------------------------------------- -
¶12. (C) Some Embassy interlocutors argue that policy cohesion
on issues such as China is more possible than before as the
DPJ matures from a party of sundry political transplants to a
party comprising original DPJ members, starting with the 143
TOKYO 00002329 004.2 OF 004
first-term DPJ Diet members elected on August 30. Absent
concrete policy details, members agree on the importance of
Sino-Japanese ties as part of an overall foreign policy
approach to Asia. Hatoyama's and Okada's inaugural press
conference statements reinforced the main points outlined in
pre-election party Manifesto calls for ""proactive foreign
relations"" and a more ""Asia-centered"" foreign policy.
--------------------------------------
Internal and External Challenges Exist
--------------------------------------
¶13. (C) That said, Hatoyama must still manage ideological
diversity within his party on issues related to China. DPJ
members differ on the extent to which they see China as a
threat, and on the extent to which they view bilateral and
multilateral engagement as a means to curb Chinese influence
in Asia. DPJ members who downplay Chinese military and
political intentions view engagement with China and other
regional neighbors primarily as tool to strengthen ties
within the region. Party centrists and more right-of-center
conservatives see engagement as a way to check and counter
China's growing regional influence (Ref A). There also
exists the preference of some members within Hatoyama's
party, and within the ruling coalition more broadly, to take
a hardline stance against China's human rights record,
particularly in Tibet and Xinjiang, and to support Taiwan
membership in international organizations--a view held by DPJ
member and Defense Ministry Parliamentary Secretary Akihisa
Nagashima and by Deputy Prime Minister Naoto Kan, among
others.
¶14. (C) Hatoyama also must weigh the views of DPJ Secretary
General Ichiro Ozawa, whose perspective on China has, in the
past, helped shape the party's public position on the issue.
Ozawa enjoys ties to China--he meets annually with Chinese
leadership--while at the same time is a large Taiwan
supporter, MOFA officials told Embassy Tokyo. Ozawa was
instrumental in recruiting the newest crop of DPJ Diet
members and is thus in position to infuse his own policy
preferences into China-related issues.
¶15. (C) There are potential limits to cooperation with
Beijing as well, despite Hatoyama's outreach efforts. Japan
continues to call for frank discussions on key concerns such
as Chinese military modernization and longstanding maritime
and territorial disputes (Ref B). The East China Sea and
disputes over the Senkaku Islands remain a ""big problem,""
MOFA's China Division regularly notes. Japanese public
opinion on such sovereignty-related issues, and ongoing
concerns about China's food and product safety record, among
other issues, could further constrain Hatoyama's efforts.
ZUMWALT