

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06DAMASCUS1754, C-NE6-00262: KHADDAM'S AND BAYANOUNI'S FAUSTIAN
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06DAMASCUS1754.
VZCZCXRO6450
OO RUEHAG
DE RUEHDM #1754/01 1081301
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181301Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8386
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0014
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0083
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 001754
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PINR PREL PHUM SY
SUBJECT: C-NE6-00262: KHADDAM'S AND BAYANOUNI'S FAUSTIAN
PACT
REF: A. STATE 51913
¶B. DAMASCUS 1698
¶C. DAMASCUS 1692
¶D. DAMASCUS 1357
¶E. DAMASCUS 0392
¶F. DAMASCUS 0311
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Former VP Abdul Halim Khaddam's public
criticism of the regime and his move to ally himself -- via
the National Salvation Front -- with Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood leader Sadreddin al-Bayanouni continue to provoke
the regime and stir tremendous speculation among the public
and the opposition about potential impact in Syria. For now,
given the NSF's uncertain potential, most people are adopting
a "wait-and-see" attitude, a posture not likely to shift in
any fundamental way before the June release of the Brammertz
report. The answers provided below respond to the questions
posed in Ref A. End Summary.
¶2. (S/NF) QUESTION 3 (A): WHAT IS THE REACTION AMONG THE
OPPOSITION, THE PUBLIC AND THE SARG TO KHADDAM-BAYANOUNI
(SMB) COMMON VISION? As detailed in refs B, C, and D, the
reaction of the opposition to the Khaddam-Bayanouni formation
of the National Salvation Front in Brussels has been nuanced
and relatively pragmatic, with one significant disagreement.
The dominant opposition view on Khaddam's decision to join
forces with the MB is that this will increase his
effectiveness and strengthen his efforts to weaken the
regime, although there is uncertainty about how much Khaddam
has been strengthened. Many still feel that his potential as
an opposition figure is greatly weakened by his well-earned
reputation for corruption and his decades-long loyal service
to the Asad regimes. Others like XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX point out that Khaddam has said nothing critical
about Hafez al-Asad and his brutal reign, limiting himself to
criticizing Bashar al-Asad, and that Khaddam has not
apologized for his long service to the regime. XXXXXXXXXXXX also
believes that the NSF's program is too pro-Kurd and risks
creating an anti-Kurd backlash among Arabs in Syria.
¶3. (S/NF) Despite these reservations, the dominant
opposition view, certainly within the Damascus Declaration
(DD) group, is that Khaddam is a useful tool for weakening
the regime, all the more so after his joining forces with
Bayanouni. There is also a sense among the opposition that
the initial "shock" at having to consider Khaddam as an
opposition figure has worn off and people are more willing to
see what he can accomplish. The opposition group that has
coalesced around the DD met on April 6 and decided not to
publicly criticize Khaddam, despite intense SARG pressure to
do so (Ref B). Instead, the group decided to maintain a
relatively vague position that could not be used by the
regime to try to weaken Khaddam, issuing a statement merely
pointing out that the opposition inside Syria was not
connected to Khaddam. Some, like XXXXXXXXXXXX, blamed Khaddam's NSF
initiative on the failure of the internal opposition and DD
signatories to organize and follow up more rapidly after the
issuance of the original Damascus Declaration in October.
¶4. (S/NF) A minority view within the opposition, led by
XXXXXXXXXXXX, pressed for a more publicly critical opposition
attitude towards Khaddam in the run-up to the April 6
meeting. Some activists, such as XXXXXXXXXXXX, have told
us the primary motivation of XXXXXXXXXXXX and his group was
fear of regime retaliation, rather than real opposition to
Khaddam on ideological grounds. Nonetheless, it is true that
opposition figures (and DD activists) such as XXXXXXXXXXXX
held very strong views, prior to the April 6 meeting, about
Khaddam's blemishes (ref D). These people were willing to
grant Khaddam and the NSF a limited role in the opposition
but were strongly opposed to granting Khaddam the leadership
of the opposition. XXXXXXXXXXXX told Polchief that Khaddam is unfit
for such a role and "we have ways to make him fail" if he
tries to usurp such a role. (XXXXXXXXXXXX also speculated that Khaddam may want to try to preserve much of the Ba'athist
regime, aiming to topple merely the Asad family and the
inner-most circle of the regime, but leaving the armed
forces, security services and Ba'ath party intact.) Others,
such as XXXXXXXXXXXX and former MP XXXXXXXXXXXX, thought that fears
DAMASCUS 00001754 002 OF 004
about Khaddam's ambitions were exaggerated, insisting that Khaddam understood the limits of his role.
¶5. (S/NF) THE PUBLIC'S VIEW: The Syrian public's view of
Khaddam and his NSF union with the SMB is harder to ascertain
, with his level of support remaining a matter of conjecture.
The majority view seems to be that his impact to date has
been limited, primarily because of the regime's success at painting him as a corrupt, embittered traitor with foolish,
impractical ambitions of overthrowing the Asad regime. Some
contacts insist, nonetheless, that Khaddam, with his
sustained criticism of the regime carried over various
satellite TV channels (and to a lesser degree via print
media) has made inroads, especially among the majority Sunni
population. XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained recently (ref C) that Khaddam
is attaining quiet "majority support" among Sunnis in cities
other than Damascus, where the Sunni population is
maintaining a wait-and-see attitude towards the former VP.
XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that Khaddam has substantial (also quiet)
support among Ba'athists and among a key group of Alawites,
including former (Hafez al-Asad) regime figures such as
XXXXXXXXXXXX and senior army officer XXXXXXXXXXXX
(ref E). Our best sense is that Khaddam's support so far is
relatively limited among the Syrian public.
¶6. (S/NF) THE SARG'S VIEW: The SARG's reaction to Khaddam
and the NSF has combined hostility and fear. The regime has
apparently complained to the Saudis about their initial
decision to allow Khaddam access to al-Arabiya to air his
regime criticism. Since late December, Khaddam has not had
access to any Saudi-owned media, either satellite or print.
The SARG, as noted, unsuccessfully put pressure on the DD
group to publicly attack Khaddam and the NSF. Despite the
SARG's repeated attempts to dismiss Khaddam as unimportant,
it is clear that his initial efforts, and his success in
joining forces with Bayanouni, rattled the regime and have
kept it on the defensive about his next moves and how much
support he is quietly building. Besides trying to portray
Khaddam as a traitor, the regime has initiated two sets of
legal proceedings against him, one relating to corruption
charges involving transactions and business deals done by
Khaddam or his family, and another charging him with inciting
a foreign attack against Syria and plotting to overthrow the
government. Both moves appear aimed at preventing any
increase in internal support for Khaddam. The government has
also apparently moved to prevent the travel -- and to freeze
the assets -- of at least one former senior official (XXXXXXXXXXXX) reportedly sympathetic to Khaddam. There were
unconfirmed reports of a SARG-compiled list of such officials
banned from foreign travel on suspicion they might constitute
"future Khaddams" or might try to coordinate with Khaddam
(Ref F).
¶7. (S/NF) QUESTION 3(B): ARE KHADDAM AND THE SMB DEDICATED
TO WORKING TOGETHER? IS IT A PARTNERSHIP OR IS THERE A
SINGLE LEADER?: Embassy Damascus's insight into the
relationship between Khaddam and Bayanouni's SMB is
relatively limited, but our best assessment is that it is a
partnership, with both sides contributing. Khaddam, despite
his reputation as an Asad regime henchman, also has a long
history of outreach to Sunni groups in Syria, including
Islamist groups sympathetic to the banned MB. He represented
the wing of the Ba'ath Party that was ideologically committed
to such outreach, believing it essential for secular
Ba'athists and nationalists to increase their "echo" and
grassroots support by attempting to appeal where possible to
the Syrian (Sunni) Islamic masses. Consequently, it is not
totally out of character for him to reach out to Bayanouni
and the SMB. If press reports are to be believed, Bayanouni
has remained steadfast in supporting Khaddam and the NSF
joint venture, despite the wave of criticism he and his group
were subjected to, which charged them with gross opportunism
and being blind to Khaddam's former service to an oppressive
regime.
¶8. (S/NF) QUESTION 3(C): DID EITHER SIDE MAKE A CONCESSION
BEFORE THE PRESS STATEMENT ON A COMMON VISION?: We have no
information on this issue but presume Khaddam and Bayanouni
shared some common objectives, primarily a desire to topple
the Asad regime, and were willing to compromise on their
visions for a future Syria. Both sides' adherence to the
principles of democratic change from within likely
facilitated the blurring and compromise needed to agree on a
DAMASCUS 00001754 003 OF 004
common vision.
¶9. (S/NF) QUESTION 3(D): DID EITHER SMB OR KHADDAM LOSE
CONSTITUENCY SUPPORT BECAUSE THEY WORK TOGETHER? REACTIONS
OF THE "DAMASCUS DECLARATION" GROUPS?: The SMB has more
support in Syria than Khaddam, so it had more to lose from
risking an alliance with him. Many accused Bayanouni and the
MB of unprincipled opportunism for their willingness to ally
themselves with a pillar of the Hafez al-Asad regime that was
responsible for the violent suppression of their movement in
the early 1980's. MB sympathizer XXXXXXXXXXXX characterized
Bayanouni's Khaddam alliance as "a mistake" which is
receiving criticism from SMB members inside and outside
Syria. Others question the SMB's political calculations in
betting on Khaddam and his limited assets, but are waiting to
see if the former VP is able to deliver. Some contacts
believe that the MB did take a hit, at least initially in
their support base in Syria. XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that if one
assumed the SMB had "20 percent street support" in Syria,
then the movement had lost half of it for allying with
Khaddam. Our sense is that as the NSF alliance has endured,
the force of the charge of opportunism has diminished.
XXXXXXXXXXXX's read on Sunni support for Khaddam throughout Syria
seems to indicate that any drop in MB support because of
Bayanouni's move has been temporary. (For Damascus
Declaration group views on the NSF, see paras 2-4.)
¶10. (S/NF) QUESTION 3(E): HOW DO KHADDAM AND THE SMB PLAN
TO CHANGE THE SYRIAN REGIME? VIOLENT RESISTANCE? INCREASING
PRESSURE UNTIL THE REGIME IMPLODES? SOMETHING ELSE?: So
far, Khaddam and the SMB have not given any indication that
they plan to use violent resistance to topple the Asad
regime, a not surprising view given how heavily armed and
well-protected the regime is. Our contacts here remain
puzzled about precisely how Khaddam and Bayanouni can topple
the regime in the absence of some type of outside
intervention. Most believe they want to gradually increase
pressure on the regime, using Khaddam's public criticism and
revelations (or threats of revelations) about embarrassing
regime secrets. Nonetheless, given the weakness of the
internal opposition, in tandem with the fear that the regime
has instilled in any would-be Khaddam/Bayanouni supporters,
and the apparent resilience of the regime's ties to critical
ally Saudi Arabia, which is keeping Khaddam out of its media,
it is unclear how these efforts, by themselves, could unseat
the Asad regime. Apparently, Khaddam/Bayanouni are hoping
Brammertz in June will issue a follow-up UNIIIC report that
will implicate senior regime officials in the killing of
former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri, shaking the foundations of
the regime. Beyond that, they seem to be playing the best
cards that they have and hoping for developments going their
way in the next year or so. The sense that the regime's
legitimacy is slowly draining away is playing in their favor,
while the violence and political instability in Iraq, as well
as resurgent SARG influence in Lebanon, seem to be
undercutting their efforts and reminding many Syrians that
the regime is still a formidable and necessary bulwark
against the threat of instability and sectarian violence.
¶11. (S/NF) QUESTION 3(F): BY SAYING THEY HAVE A COMMON
VISION, DO KHADDAM-SMB HAVE MORE LEGITIMACY INSIDE SYRIA?
SINCE KHADDAM AND SMB CANNOT ENTER SYRIA HOW DO THEY CONTACT
GROUPS IN SYRIA? WHICH GROUPS?: Overall, Khaddam has
certainly increased his legitimacy by allying himself with
Bayanouni. SMB took an initial hit in its support base, we
surmise, given Sunni/Islamist reservations about a
"principled ideological" movement like the SMB joining a
former Ba'athist henchman such as Khaddam. The extent of
that drop in support is unclear, with some contacts pointing
to now-rising Sunni support for Khaddam. The manner in which
Khaddam or Bayanouni maintains contact with government or
opposition insiders is unclear. There are unconfirmed
reports that insiders not restricted by SARG-imposed
restrictions travel abroad under various pretexts and make
contact with one or both of the two external opposition
leaders. Sometimes trusted travelers in Syria carry messages
to Khaddam and Bayanouni (and report back), according to
other contacts. These two leaders also seem to rely on the
steadfast but quiet support of insiders that is not dependent
on regular contact to shore it up. Khaddam seems to have
arranged some support before he left, although it has not
been visible at all, and is suspected only because a few
contacts refer to it (refs C and E).
DAMASCUS 00001754 004 OF 004
SECHE