

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09LONDON118, UK IRAN SANCTIONS ROUNDUP
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09LONDON118.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09LONDON118 | 2009-01-16 10:33 | 2011-02-04 21:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy London |
VZCZCXRO8695
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLO #0118/01 0161033
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 161033Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0935
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 000118
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2019
TAGS: EFIN KNNP MNUC PARM ECON ETTC IR UK
SUBJECT: UK IRAN SANCTIONS ROUNDUP
REF: A. 2008 STATE 133198
¶B. STATE 1760
¶C. 2008 STATE 115523 Classified By: KATHLEEN DOHERTY, ECON COUNSELOR, FOR REASONS 1.4 B & D This message contains Action Requests. Please see paragraphs 3, 11, 13 and 14.
¶1. (S/NF) Summary. British officials are eager to apply additional pressure on Iran's nuclear program. They are pursuing domestic and multilateral options, including possibly broadening the category of products requiring export licenses, imposing EU sanctions on additional Iranian banks, and testing their new legal powers to impose measures on weapons of mass destruction proliferators. Cabinet and Foreign Office continue to press the more cautious HM Treasury to use all the tools at their disposal. According to the British, other EU Member states fear the U.S. is preparing to take commercial advantage of a new relationship with Iran, and subsequently, are slowing the EU sanctions process. End summary.
¶2. (U) The following is a roundup of UK Iran sanctions issues stemming from conversations we have had with HM Treasury (HMT), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Cabinet officials in the January 6-13 time period.
Designation of ASSA Corp (2008 State 133198) ---------------------------------------
¶3. (C) We delivered the ASSA Corp. designation information to FCO and HMT on December 22 (and passed U.S. Treasury's press notification to HMT on December 17.) FCO received a question from a Member of Parliament asking whether the USG and HMG had been in contact prior to the designation of the parent company, ASSA Co. Ltd., which is located in Jersey, (the Channel Islands). We informed the FCO that the above dates were Embassy's first contact with HMG on the issue. HMG works closely with the Jersey authorities and is looking into this case. Action request: HMT has asked if USG holds information about ASSA Co. involvement with Iranian entities through UK subsidiaries. Note: Jersey is an independent Crown Dependency, not part of the UK or the EU, so not bound to follow EU or UK laws or policy. As a Crown Dependency, however, Jersey is technically governed by the Queen, so practically speaking there is a great deal of law enforcement and regulatory cooperation with the UK. In the case of Bank Melli sanctions, Jersey has adopted EU sanctions as its own, and also adopted the vigilance directive. Jersey authorities share UK goals on preventing Iran's proliferation efforts, and UN Security Council resolutions do apply to Jersey and other Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories, again due to the fact that they are possessions of the British Crown. Constitutionally-speaking, HMG has no authority to shut down an entity in Jersey, but practically, cooperation is very close, and HMT told us Jersey authorities do not want to be seen as irresponsible players. Neither Bank Sepah nor Bank Melli have operations in the Channel Islands.
IRISL and Oasis Freight Agency (State 1760) -------------------------------------
¶4. (S) We delivered the IRISL and OASIS Freight Agency Name Changes paper on an informational basis to FCO and HMT officials on January 9 and 12. HMG officials thanked us for the information and said they would share it with other agencies, and consider whether they can submit it for EU deliberations.
Leveraging the FATF Statement on Iran (2008 State 115523) ------------------------ --------------------------
¶5. (C) We followed up with Cabinet and HMT officials to inquire about UK efforts following the October FATF statement on Iran's financial practices, and to further stress our concern about correspondent banking relationships. HMG officials reminded us Paris, Washington and London all cooperated on the FATF statement, and the UK released its own statement to British banks and firms immediately following the October meeting. HMT officials described the new powers HMG has adopted in the Counter Terrorism bill, which allow the UK to pursue measures against WMD proliferators, as flowing from FATF efforts. There are three situations that could initiate UK powers: 1) a strong FATF statement noting the financial risks from an entire jurisdiction; 2) a terrorist finance threat to the UK; 3) a nuclear, chemical or bio threat to the UK. How and when to unleash the powers LONDON 00000118 002 OF 004 depends upon the severity of the threat, HMT told us. Sanctions run the gamut between a requirement for due diligence, to the imposition of systematic reporting of transactions by an entity or sector, to a cease and desist order affecting an entity or a sector. The latter category requires parliamentary approval.
¶6. (C) HMT lawyers are evaluating what evidentiary level will be needed to withstand court scrutiny, with the hope the February FATF meeting will produce a statement strong enough against Iran to allow them to implement their new powers. The stronger the statement, combined with solid evidence, the more powerful the action the UK could take, we were told.
¶7. (C) British government officials (FCO and Department for Business) are also studying whether they can tighten their export licensing rules to impose restrictions on additional items (currently military products and jewels are proscribed), and/or to strengthen language in the statement the government gives to exporters. HMG worries the EU might go after the UK for violating EU trade regulations if the British act unilaterally, but the British have some caveats to those agreements that could help them impose tougher sanctions.
¶8. (C) Regarding correspondent banking relationships, HMT told us there are very few such arrangements still operating in the UK, and what exists is very small. The problems stem from relationships the Russians and other third-country banks maintain with Iran through London-based operations. Many UK banks have pulled out of Iran since the UK's warning following the October FATF statement.
Joint Demarches --------------
¶9. (SBU) HMG was eager to highlight the joint U.S.-French-UK cooperation in delivering joint demarches to several Gulf and Asian countries, and they encouraged us to continue these approaches to certain countries.
Bank Sepah ----------
¶10. (S/NF) HMT officials continue to claim the bank is barely functioning "frozen in almost every way", not engaging in new business, and very little old. Sepah is fully complying with its legal requirements within the UK, so the British government cannot legally take away its license, we were told. HMT has looked at using its new Counter Terrorism powers to declare the London subsidiary of the Tehran-based Sepah a threat to the UK, but has determined that action would be a disproportionate use of its powers. HMT officials suggested the best way to tackle Iranian banks is to cut off all remaining access to Euro Clearing. This would need to be done at the EU-level, and would affect several German banks. The UK is discussing this with other European countries, and suggested we focus our efforts on Germany.
¶11. (S/NF) Action Request: It would be helpful to provide the UK with any precedent where we closed down the "clean" subsidiary of a sanctioned parent. The precedent does not have to be Iran-related, but that would be most effective.
UN Sanctions Resolution -----------------------
¶12. (C) HMT officials believe an additional UN resolution sanctioning Iran at this time would not help their efforts unless it includes new entities or stronger enforcement mechanisms. They said the last resolution, 1835 in September 2008 was not very helpful. If the UN comes through with another weak measure, it could harm EU efforts, the Treasury officials said. Embassy comment: HMT's views contrast somewhat from past FCO statements that maintaining pressure from the UN in the form of ongoing resolutions is more important than the substance contained within. End Comment. HMT also stressed to us the importance of keeping the UN's non-proliferation efforts apart from FATF's financial health focus.
EU Court Challenges to Iranian Designations -----------------------------------
¶13. (S/NF) Action Request: FCO officials told us EU courts are beginning to challenge the EU's designation of Iranian banks and entities. HMG is trying to pursue further EU listings. To go forward, and maintain existing listings, the LONDON 00000118 003 OF 004 UK is asking for more and better public information in the Statements of Cases. Classified releasable information is helpful to build a file, but HMG particularly needs additional information they can use in the public arena. FCO Iran staff told us HMG has requested this through other USG channels, with a target date of January 20. FCO believes this information could boost prospects for February EU action on EU3 proposals, and is keen for the UK and France to present this evidence to other EU member states in advance of the next round of deliberations in early February. Specifically, HMG asked for any information to back up the following claim in the current statement of case on Bank Melli: "Providing or attempting to provide financial support for companies which are involved in or procure goods for Iran's nuclear and missile programs (AIO, SHIG, SBIG, AEOI, Novin Energy company, Mebah Energy Company, Kalaye Electric Company and DIO.) Bank Melli serves as a facilitator for Iran's sensitive activities. It has facilitated numerous purchases of sensitive materials for Iran's nuclear and missile programs. It has provided a range of financial services on behalf of entities linked to Iran's nuclear and missile industries, including opening letters of credit and maintaining accounts. Many of the above companies have been designated by UNSCRs 1737 and 1747." HMG would also appreciate information on the following entities: Bank Mellat, Bank Saderat, Bank Tejara and Persia International Bank. They would appreciate this information by early February, if possible.
FCO: Germans Cool on EU Iran Designations; Fear a U.S. Commercial Edge -------------------------------- -----------------------
¶14. (S/NF) FCO Iran staff also told us German resistance on further designations is spreading to all ministries. Germany, despite its strong public rhetoric, has moved "from advocate to resister" in E3 deliberations, blunting prospects for additional EU designations. FCO interprets the German position to stem from its view that the new U.S. administration's views on Iran are unknown, therefore requiring a "pause for reflection" within the EU. According to the FCO, Germany believes Iran should have additional time to reconsider its own strategic calculations. The FCO and French rejoinder is the opposite view: now is the time to take advantage of any uncertainty Iran may be feeling and escalate multilateral pressure, sharply defining for the Iranian regime the costs of its current course.
¶15. (S/NF) FCO thanked us for sharing the "outstanding" USG Powerpoint presentation on U.S. trade with Iran put together by Washington agencies in early January. The current sense among EU missions in Tehran, FCO told us, is that the U.S. will seek, and benefit from, a sharp jump in trade the moment U.S.-Iran relations are restored. This is many nations' rationale for going slow in generating additional economic pressure on Iran. FCO said UK and French missions in Tehran will continue to advocate against this view with other EU governments, but HMG estimates the USG will encounter this perspective from most other EU members in the coming months.
World Bank ----------
¶16. (S/NF) HMG has heard a rumor Iran will soon request additional money from the World Bank soon. Cabinet Office would like to head this off before it gathers momentum. Action Request: Please provide any information on a possible Iranian request for World Bank money, and a proposed course of action.
Intra-HMG Iran dynamics ----------------------
¶17. (S/NF) In general, the Cabinet Office and FCO are pushing HM Treasury to be more aggressive in interpreting laws and regulations in ways that put pressure on Iran. There are now three monthly meetings on Iran sanctions, including one chaired by Simon McDonald, head of Foreign and Defence Policy, Cabinet Office. The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary are eager to see results in the form of changed behavior in Iran's nuclear program, and are concerned that Iran not be allowed to exploit any differences between Europe and the U.S., or even among EU members themselves, a Cabinet officer told us. Post greatly appreciates Washington's assistance in responding to these action requests. LONDON 00000118 004 OF 004 Visit London's Classified Website: XXXXXXXXXXXX
TUTTLE