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Viewing cable 09QUITO145, FOREIGN MINISTER ON REBUILDING BILATERAL RELATIONS
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09QUITO145 | 2009-02-27 17:35 | 2011-04-07 07:30 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Quito |
Appears in these articles: http://www.eluniverso.com/2011/04/07/1/1355/cable-194442.html |
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHQT #0145/01 0581735
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 271735Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0094
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 7984
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 3407
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ FEB 1430
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 3051
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL IMMEDIATE 4124
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2266
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T QUITO 000145
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019
TAGS: PREL SNAR EFIN EC
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ON REBUILDING BILATERAL RELATIONS
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION, WITH AN IDB SIDE NOTE
REF: A. STATE 17841
...
id: 194442
date: 2/27/2009 17:35
refid: 09QUITO145
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: SECRET//NOFORN
destination: 09QUITO103|09QUITO113|09QUITO126|09STATE14726|09STATE17841
header:
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHQT #0145/01 0581735
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 271735Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0094
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 7984
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 3407
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ FEB 1430
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 3051
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL IMMEDIATE 4124
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2266
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
----------------- header ends ----------------
S E C R E T QUITO 000145
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019
TAGS: PREL SNAR EFIN EC
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ON REBUILDING BILATERAL RELATIONS
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION, WITH AN IDB SIDE NOTE
REF: A. STATE 17841
¶B. BOWEN-HODGES E-MAIL 2/25/09
¶C. STATE 14726
¶D. QUITO 126
¶E. QUITO 113
¶F. QUITO 103
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Heather Hodges. Reason: 1.4 b
and d.
¶1. (S/NF) Summary. Foreign Minister Falconi told the
Ambassador on February 26 that Ecuador wanted to move beyond
the difficulties created by expelling two U.S. diplomats and
continue counternarcotics cooperation. He said that the GOE
is developing ideas on how the two countries can continue to
work through vetted law enforcement units. The Ambassador
formally protested President Correa's public announcement
that one of the expelled diplomats was the CIA station chief.
She expressed willingness to explore how we can continue to
support special law enforcement units, but stressed that
there are certain necessary conditions. Falconi briefly
touched on Ecuador's hope for G-7 support for several pending
loans from the InterAmerican Development Bank, to which the
Ambassador did not reply. End summary.
¶2. (C) The Ambassador was invited to meet with Foreign
Minister Fander Falconi on February 26. The initial reason
for the meeting was that Falconi was having a series of
individual meetings with G-7 Ambassadors to discuss financing
from the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) (reftel a).
However, the morning of the meeting the Foreign Ministry
informed the Embassy that bilateral issues would also be
discussed in the meeting. Falconi invited U/S for Bilateral
Affairs Jorge Orbe to join. EconCouns attended as note-taker.
Bilateral Relations
-------------------
¶3. (C) Falconi, who spoke in a measured, almost somber tone
throughout the meeting, opened by saying that the past 2-3
weeks had been difficult and that fissures had opened in the
bilateral relationship, an implicit reference to the
expulsion of two U.S. diplomats (reftel d-f) and President
Correa's public statement on February 21 that the second of
the expelled officers was the CIA station chief. Falconi
said that the Government of Ecuador wanted to overcome these
issues and move the relationship forward. He said that the
government had several proposals that it would like the
United States to analyze. But before moving on, Falconi
asked the Ambassador whether she wished to say anything.
Formal U.S. Protest
-------------------
¶4. (S/NF) The Ambassador responded that recent developments
had been difficult and surprising, and just when we had
thought the problems were behind us, there were more
surprises. She continued that she had instructions from
Washington to lodge a strong formal protest (ref b) regarding
Correa's announcement that Mark Sullivan had been the CIA
station chief. She said that the announcement violated
worldwide diplomatic practice and broke our confidence in our
ability to cooperate bilaterally. She said Ecuador would
have to work to restore confidence. Falconi said he would
give our message to Correa that afternoon.
IDB Projects
------------
¶5. (SBU) Falconi then raised several areas of cooperation
for the U.S. to consider. The first was the international
economic crisis, which Falconi said had hit Ecuador through
three channels: declining international financial liquidity
for Ecuador, falling exports which were pushing up
unemployment, and reduced remittances. He asserted that this
was creating liquidity problems for Ecuador (i.e., cash flow
management) but that Ecuador remained solvent. He said that
the GOE was looking for IDB financing, and that two of the
loans ($100 million competitiveness program and $500 million
liquidity fund) would require an IMF assessment, with which
Correa was willing to cooperate. He added that there were
investment projects which did not require an IMF assessment
($40 million Petroecuador project, $80 million road project,
and $70 million hydroelectric project). He said that Ecuador
hoped that these projects have the approval of the G-7
nations, given the important role those countries play in the
IDB. The Ambassador made no comment.
Counternarcotics Cooperation
----------------------------
¶6. (C) Falconi then said that Ecuador intended to continue
cooperating with the United States on combating narcotics
trafficking. He said that there was no doubt that there will
be cooperation, and that the only question was the exact form
of the cooperation. He said that it was essential to have a
clear counternarcotics policy working through appropriate
channels. He continued that there would be a ministerial
meeting that afternoon to consider how to structure the
cooperation and that he hoped to have more details on the
GOE's proposal soon.
¶7. (C) The Ambassador replied that so many things had
happened in recent weeks that perhaps the relationship needed
a period without things happening. She continued that before
Sullivan was expelled, her demarche instructions called for
both sides to step back and reflect on the direction we want
for our bilateral relations.
Law Enforcement Units
---------------------
¶8. (S/NF) The Ambassador said that the United States valued
all that it has accomplished with the current and prior
Ecuadorian administrations in combating narcotics
trafficking. She said that the nature of the law enforcement
units that the USG has supported allowed them to work as part
of a worldwide network. She said she was pleased that the
GOE wanted to work things out, but that the GOE needed to
understand that there would be conditions for continued USG
support, since there are certain standards that are applied
worldwide. She asked where things stood with Minister of
Government Jalkh providing a proposal on how the U.S. could
continue to work with the special law enforcement units. U/S
Orbe said that Minister Jalkh would soon present his
proposal.
¶9. (S/NF) Falconi said that Correa would evaluate any such
proposal, which would require transparency. However, they
needed to know from the U.S. what our requirements were and
they would look at them. (Comment: In this part of the
conversation Falconi,s language was quite different from
language used on February 8 when "sovereignty" was a major
theme. Falconi now seemed open to our concerns. End
comment.) Mentioning polygraphs, Falconi turned to Orbe, who
said that Coordinating Minister for Security Carvajal had
suggested, for example, that the U.S. could train Ecuadorian
or third country specialists to conduct the polygraphs.
Falconi stepped in to say that he was not a specialist on
such matters, and that experts from both countries should get
together, and no doubt they would be able to reach an
agreement. The Ambassador commented that that she knew the
Drug Enforcement Administration had been discussing with its
counterparts ways in which polygraphing could be carried out
to the satisfaction of both sides. She cautioned, however,
that depending on the agencies involved with vetted units
that standards might vary and the GOE would have to accept
that.
¶10. (C) The Ambassador repeated that there would be
conditions on U.S. assistance. Falconi seemed willing to
accept conditions as long as the GOE knew what they were.
The Ambassador also made clear that some of our conditions
could be in written agreements, but not necessarily all of
them. Falconi said nothing. The Ambassador noted that in
November 2008 the Drug Enforcement Administration office in
Quito had proposed to General Jaime Hurtado, head of the
National Police, a written agreement on U.S. support for its
vetted units and that Hurtado had not moved forward that
agreement. The Ambassador suggested that we may want
initially to focus on that agreement, but cautioned that each
agency that supports law enforcement units will have its own
specific requirements. The Ambassador asked who would
coordinate this effort for the GOE, and Falconi said that
Carvajal would be the appropriate interlocutor. The
Ambassador said she would consult with the agencies involved
and look for ways for the representatives of the agencies to
meet with designated GOE officials to discuss ways forwards.
She again cautioned that each agency might have different
standards for collaboration. Falconi appeared to understand.
Inform the Foreign Ministry
---------------------------
¶11. (C) In closing, Falconi said that he would like to
prevent a reoccurrence of what transpired when the USG
withdrew support from the police unit that handles contraband
and human trafficking and the letter which provoked Correa's
ire. He asked that the Embassy transmit important
developments through him.
Comment
-------
¶12. (C) Falconi's message was clear: Ecuador wants to get
beyond the problems raised by Correa's outbursts about the
USG role in two vetted law enforcement units. At one point
Falconi commented that he himself had written the national
development plan's social program and in it was a firm
commitment to fighting narcotics trafficking for the good of
the country. They wanted to get back on track. The
Ambassador was firm that the GOE's behavior had caused
serious diplomatic problems and that these will require time
and effort to overcome but she was willing to work with
Falconi on a way forward.
¶13. (C) Correa's outbursts and the subsequent expulsions
were driven by various factors: his hypersensitivity to
perceived slights to Ecuador's sovereignty, electoral
concerns, and a desire to distract attention from the
unfolding "narco-politics" scandal (Ref f). Another
contributing factor was that he did not fully understand what
was happening with the units, due to poor internal GOE
communications and what we believe were deliberate efforts to
provide him partial information calculated to rile him.
Falconi's push to find ways the United States and Ecuador can
continue cooperating on counternarcotics efforts may provide
an avenue to test the GOE's commitment and explore whether
they truly understand the issues involved even now. DEA's
draft written agreement, which contains clear provisions for
vetting, should be a good starting point to see whether the
GOE is serious.
HODGES
=======================CABLE ENDS============================