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Viewing cable 06TELAVIV2961, RES POL AMB DCM
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06TELAVIV2961 | 2006-07-30 17:33 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tel Aviv |
Appears in these articles: not yet set |
null
Carol X Weakley 08/01/2006 02:37:21 PM From DB/Inbox: Carol X Weakley
Cable
Text:
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 02961
SIPDIS
CXTelA:
ACTION: DAO
INFO: RES POL AMB DCM
DISSEMINATION: DAO
CHARGE: DAO
APPROVED: DAO: WCLARK
DRAFTED: DAO: WCLARK
CLEARED: NONE
VZCZCTVI713
RR RUEHC RHEFDIA
DE RUEHTV #2961/01 2111733
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301733Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5272
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-6//
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 02961
SIPDIS
CXTelA:
ACTION: DAO
INFO: RES POL AMB DCM
DISSEMINATION: DAO
CHARGE: DAO
APPROVED: DAO: WCLARK
DRAFTED: DAO: WCLARK
CLEARED: NONE
VZCZCTVI713
RR RUEHC RHEFDIA
DE RUEHTV #2961/01 2111733
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301733Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5272
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-6//
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002961
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR PTER KPAL KWBG IS LE
SUBJECT: ZELIKOW AND GILAD DISCUSS TRAITS OF INTERNATIONAL
FORCE FOR SOUTHERN LEBANON, IDF PROGRESS, WAY AHEAD
CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES; REASONS: 1.4 (B
AND D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: MG (RES) AMOS GILAD, ISRAELI MOD ADVISOR
FOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS, TOLD COUNSELOR ZELIKOW
29 JUL 06 THAT INTERNATIONAL FORCE MUST BE EMPOWERED TO
ENFORCE CEASEFIRE AS NECESSARY, TO DEPLOY FROM BLUE LINE
NORTH TO NAHR AL LITANI, IF NOT NAHR AL AWALLI, AND TO
TRAIN THE LEBANESE ARMY. NOTED PROGRESS SHOWN TO DATE
AGAINST HIZBALLAH, MADE CASE FOR OPERATIONS SEVEN TO TEN
MORE DAYS TO HIGHLIGHT HIZBALLAH AS SERIOUSLY WEAKENED AND
TO DEAL WITH KATYUSHA THREAT. END SUMMARY.
-----------------------------------------
EUROPEAN FEEDBACK ON INTERNATIONAL FORCE;
NOW ISRAEL'S TURN
-----------------------------------------
¶2. (C) COUNSELOR AND SENIOR POLICY ADVISOR TO SECSTATE
ZELIKOW EXPRESSED TO MG (RES) AMOS GILAD, ISRAELI MOD
ADVISOR FOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS, HIS DESIRE TO
COMMUNICATE TO GOI CURRENT STATUS RE INTERNATIONAL FORCE
FOR SOUTHERN LEBANON FOLLOWING HIS DISCUSSIONS IN ROME,
BRUSSELS, LONDON, PARIS, AND ANKARA, AND TO FIND OUT WHAT
ISRAEL HAS ACHIEVED THUS FAR IN THIS CAMPAIGN, WHAT HER
FURTHER GOALS ARE, AND WHAT SHE NEEDS TO ACHIEVE THEM. IN
ISRAEL'S OPINION, WHAT ARE THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE, AND WHAT SHOULD THIS FORCE BE
EXPECTED TO DO? ZELIKOW REQUESTED A GRANULAR SENSE OF THE
SITUATION SO AS TO ENSURE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IS
AS USEFUL AS IT CAN POSSIBLY BE.
---------------------------------
WHAT ISRAEL HAS ACHIEVED TO DATE;
WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE
---------------------------------
¶3. (C) GILAD RESPONDED THAT THERE IS A GAP BETWEEN THE
IMAGE OF ISRAEL'S SUCCESS (I.E., LACK OF) AND THE REALITY
ON THE GROUND (MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN IS REALIZED). FOR
EXAMPLE, GILAD CLAIMED, HAIFA WAS NOT ATTACKED TODAY
BECAUSE HIZBALLAH NO LONGER POSSESSES THE CAPABILITY TO DO
SO. 220 MM ROCKETS HAVE NOT BEEN FIRED FOR FOUR DAYS. TOO,
ISRAEL DEALT HIZBALLAH'S STRATEGIC (LONG RANGE) ROCKETS
CAPABILITY A BIG BLOW THROUGH THE USE OF SENSITIVE
INTELLIGENCE TO LOCATE LAUNCHERS HIDDEN IN HOUSES AND HIT
THEM (PART OF THE PRE-PLANNED TARGET SETS) IMMEDIATELY ON
THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. CURRENTLY, 50 PERCENT OF 220
MM AND FAJR 3 LAUNCHERS ARE DESTROYED FOLLOWING LAUNCHES.
THUS, THE PERSONNEL WHO ARE EXECUTING THE LAUNCH HAVE COME
TO REALIZE THEY HAVE A ONE IN TWO CHANCE OF NOT LIVING TO
LAUNCH AGAIN. IDI PERSONNEL ESTIMATE NOW THAT THEY HAVE
DESTROYED MOST OF THE ZILZAL LAUNCHERS (THIS ESTIMATE
QUOTED AS BASED ON VERY SENSITIVE INFORMATION), 80 PERCENT
OF THE 220 MM LAUNCHERS, AND 60-70 PERCENT OF THE FAJR 3
LAUNCHERS.
¶4. (C) CONDUCT OF GROUND OPERATIONS IS MUCH EASIER GOING
THAN JUST THREE DAYS AGO (A REFERENCE TO THE LOSS OF NINE
SOLDIERS, EIGHT OF THEM AT BINT JUBAYL) AND CERTAINLY TWO
WEEKS AGO. IN THE LAST 24 HOURS, 26 HIZBALLAH HAVE BEEN
KILLED IN BINT JUBAYL, 70 TOTAL IN THIS TOWN OVER THE
COURSE OF THE CAMPAIGN. ESTIMATES ARE THAT JUST 30
HIZBALLAH REMAIN THERE. THESE 100 TOTAL HIZBALLAH (70
KILLED OVER THE COURSE OF THE CAMPAIGN PLUS THE 30 THAT
REMAIN ALIVE) ARE/WERE SPECIAL FORCES, HARD TO REPLACE, AND
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KIDNAPPING OF THE TWO SOLDIERS. ACROSS
THE AOR, IDF HAS KILLED 50-80 HIZBALLAH IN THE LAST THREE
DAYS. HIZBALLAH COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITIES HAVE BEEN
DEALT SOME BLOWS, BUT ARE STILL FUNCTIONING. IDF ASSESSES
THAT NASRALLAH IS FULLY BRIEFED AND CURRENT.
-------------------------------
WHAT THE SHOOTING IS ALL ABOUT:
HIGH STAKES
-------------------------------
¶5. (C) GILAD COMMENTED THAT THIS IS NOT A WAR BETWEEN
HIZBALLAH AND ISRAEL, BUT RATHER BETWEEN ISRAEL AND AN
EXTENSION OF IRAN. AT THIS MOMENT, SYRIA AND IRAN ARE
ENCOURAGED. IF ISRAEL DOES NOT CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATE TO
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE ARAB WORLD, THAT
SHE HAS SUBSTANTIALLY WEAKENED HIZBALLAH MILITARILY (HE
CONSIDERED THIS WOULD TAKE SEVEN TO TEN MORE DAYS),
NASRALLAH WOULD EMERGE A HERO AND UNDERWRITE HAMASSTAN AND
HIZBALLAHSTAN. SPECIFICALLY, SEVEN TO TEN DAYS WOULD ALLOW
ISRAEL TO DEAL WITH THE KATYUSHAS. CONTRARILY, A CEASEFIRE
TOO EARLY WOULD PRESERVE THE ACHIEVEMENT AND IMAGE OF
HIZBALLAH AS HAVING STOOD UP TO ISRAEL. GILAD SAID THIS
SCENARIO REMINDED HIM OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR. "WE CANNOT
END WITH THIS IMAGE. WE MUST FINISH." GILAD DID NOT CONFIRM
THAT FUTURE LARGE SCALE GROUND OPERATIONS WOULD BE
CONDUCTED TO "TAKE OVER THE LITANI", BUT HE SAID SUCH
OPERATIONS WOULD TAKE NO MORE THAN FOUR DAYS IN HIS
OPINION. HE OBSERVED THAT LARGE SCALE GROUND OPERATIONS
AND OPERATIONS OF SPECIAL FORCES (SMALL UNITS) ACROSS
VARIOUS LOCATIONS IN THE SOUTH COULD BE SEEN AS ONE IN THE
SAME.
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THE CHALLENGE
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¶6. (C) ZELIKOW STATED THAT HIZBALLAH, POST HOSTILITIES,
MUST BE PERSUADED THAT IT SHOULD HENCEFORTH SHUN MILITARY
ACTION AND EMBRACE POLITICAL ACTION AS THE WAY AHEAD. GILAD
RESPONDED THAT HIZBALLAH KNOWS IT IS WEAKENED MILITARILY,
BUT IT IS MAINTAINING A BRAVE FACE. THE CHALLENGE IS TO
INSURE THE LEBANESE PEOPLE AND THE WORLD COME TO KNOW IT.
HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NO ONE WILL BELIEVE IT AS LONG AS 90
ROCKETS PER DAY LAND IN ISRAEL. ZELIKOW REMARKED THAT
ISRAEL MUST POSITION ITSELF TO TELL A GOOD STORY PRIOR TO
THE UN RESOLUTION - ISRAEL HAS DEALT THE AGGRESSOR,
HIZBALLAH, A CRIPPLING BLOW. BUT, THERE IS A FINE LINE TO
BE STRADDLED HERE. IF HIZBALLAH IS BEATEN UP TOO MUCH,
THIS EFFORT WILL HAVE AN OPPOSITE, UNDESIRED EFFECT, I.E.,
SWING THE SYMPATHY VOTE, PARTICULARLY THAT OF THE ARAB
WORLD, IN THEIR DIRECTION.
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THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE CONCEPT
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¶7. (C) ZELIKOW POINTED TO CORE REQUIREMENTS THAT MUST BE
MET TO SUCCESSFULLY EXIT THIS CONFLICT - A POLITICAL
FRAMEWORK, CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, RAPID
INTRODUCTION OF LEAD ELEMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE
(THE REMAINDER OF WHICH MUST FOLLOW QUICKLY), AND FINALLY,
A VIABLE CEASEFIRE. THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE MUST BE ONE
THAT HIZBALLAH AGREES NOT TO ATTACK (OR IT WILL NOT COME),
AND IT MUST HAVE ROBUST RULES AND BACKING WHICH DERIVES
FROM A UN RESOLUTION THAT MANDATES DISARMAMENT AND NO
ATTACKS ACROSS THE BLUE LINE. ALSO, GOL MUST UNDERSTAND THE
ROLE THEY PLAY IN DISARMAMENT.
¶8. (C) GILAD RESPONDED THAT THE NEW MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE
ABSOLUTELY MUST BE CHAPTER SEVEN OPERATIONS ELIGIBLE,
RESEMBLE THE INTERVENTION FORCE OF NATO, AND MUST ESTABLISH
A PRESENCE AT NINE DIFFERENT SYRIA-LEBANON BORDER CROSSINGS
(SPECIFIC CROSSINGS TO BE PASSED AS FOLLOWUP) TO PRECLUDE
IRAN AND SYRIA'S RESTORATION OF HIZBALLAH'S WEAPONS
INVENTORY FOLLOWING CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES (OR ALL WILL
HAVE BEEN FOR NOUGHT), AND MUST TRAIN THE LEBANESE ARMY.
HE COMMENTED THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY COULD CLAIM TWO
RELATIVE SUCCESSES - SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS AGAINST AL QAIDA
IN LEBANON AND AGAINST PFLP-GC. THESE PAST AREAS OF SUCCESS
MIGHT PROVE CRITICAL IN FUTURE IF HIZBALLAH, IN THIS NEW
ENVIRONMENT AND WITH NEW RULES OF THE GAME, LOOKS TO THE
PALESTINIANS TO TERRORIZE IN THEIR STEAD. GILAD EXPRESSED A
DESIRE THAT THIS FORCE, REGARDLESS OF BEDDOWN LOCATION, BE
EMPOWERED TO ACT ACROSS ALL OF LEBANON IN ORDER TO DEAL
PROPERLY WITH THE STRATEGIC LONG RANGE ROCKET THREAT.
TURNING TO PERSONNEL MAKEUP, HE ENCOURAGED ARAB OR MUSLIM
PARTICIPATION, PERHAPS TURKISH OR JORDANIAN, TO HELP
LEGITIMIZE THE FORCE.
¶9. (C) ZELIKOW DESCRIBED THIS PROPOSED FORCE AS LESS
RESEMBLANT OF AN INTERVENTION FORCE AND MORE A MULTI-
NATIONAL FORCE WITHOUT A LEAD COUNTRY OR LEAD ORGANIZATION,
SOMEWHAT BLURRY IN THIS REGARD, BUT WITH A REAL COMMANDER
AND A REAL HEADQUARTERS. THE EU AND NATO MIGHT PROVIDE
PLANNING ELEMENTS, THE BRITISH, FRENCH, ITALIANS, AND
SPANISH MIGHT PLAY ROLES, AND THE U.S. MIGHT SERVE AS
ENABLERS (LOGISTICS, INTELLIGENCE, AND AIR SUPPORT) FROM
OFF SHORE. REGARDLESS OF END COMPOSITION, THIS FORCE MUST
BE HIGHLY COMPETENT AND HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL. IF GOL, GOI,
U.S., EVERYBODY BUT HIZBALLAH AGREES TO THE LAYING ON OF AN
INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, THEN HIZBALLAH
WILL REVEAL ITSELF VERY PUBLICLY AS THE PARTY STANDING IN
THE WAY OF PEACE. ZELIKOW COMMENTED THAT SINIORA HAS
REVIEWED THE DOCUMENTS AND HAS A STRATEGY - TO TAKE AWAY
HIZBALLAH'S EXCUSE IN LEBANESE POLITICS AND TO POLITICALLY
ISOLATE THEM. SHAABA FARMS, HOWEVER, IS A NETTLESOME ISSUE.
¶10. (C) GILAD WORRIED THAT THE MONEY (IRAN WOULD PUT AN
UNLIMITED BUDGET AGAINST THIS) THAT WOULD FLOOD INTO
LEBANON POST CONFLICT WOULD NOT BE CONTROLLED PROPERLY AND
THAT APPROPRIATE APPARATUSES SHOULD BE PUT IN PLACE TO DO
SO. OTHERWISE, THE DAWA WOULD REBUILD THE SOUTH AND IRAN'S
INFLUENCE WOULD PENETRATE EVEN MORE DEEPLY.
¶11. (U) COUNSELOR ZELIKOW DID NOT CLEAR ON THIS MESSAGE.