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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW1562, PUTIN, PIKALEVO, AND THE FAILURE OF THE POWER
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09MOSCOW1562 | 2009-06-15 11:18 | 2010-12-01 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXRO8748
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #1562/01 1661118
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151118Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3792
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001562
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR RS SOCI
SUBJECT: PUTIN, PIKALEVO, AND THE FAILURE OF THE POWER
VERTICAL
REF: A. MOSCOW 1538
¶B. ST PETERSBURG 00068
¶C. MOSCOW 00180
Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle. Reason: 1.4 (d).
¶1. (C) Summary. The events two weeks ago in the northwestern
town of Pikalevo, in which frustrated workers in three small,
idled plants blocked a federal highway to draw attention to
their plight, demonstrated the failures of Russia's "vertical
of power" and gave insight into the balance of power within
the elite (Ref B). That the impasse required the involvement
of Prime Minister Putin -- the man "responsible for
everything" in Russia -- illustrated the weakness of the
federal system, in which poorly connected governors have few
levers to influence the Moscow-based financial industrial
groups close to the Kremlin. Moreover, none of the
institutions designed to protect citizen interests
functioned: labor unions, political parties, or even state
institutions like the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service could not
bring about a solution (even after President Medvedev
reportedly told the Leningrad Oblast Governor Serdyukov to
fix the problem in March). Experts are divided on the logic
behind Putin's decision to make a public spectacle out of
Pikalevo, but nearly all see his involvement after an
independent demonstration by ordinary citizens as a likely
catalyst for more localized protests by other dissatisfied
groups, seeking to attract the Prime Minister's attention in
the coming months. End Summary.
The System Failed
-----------------
¶2. (C) The economic crisis is testing the "Putin system" of
administration, established during 8-years of strong economic
growth to establish central control over the county and
maintain socio-economic stability. The points of pressure are
found in widely dispersed "one-company towns" across Russia,
where less efficient and less advanced companies,
particularly in metallurgy and machine building, are failing.
As such, the chances of localized protests -- a "bunt" of
frustrated workers -- are increasing, potentially creating a
crisis of confidence within the tandem.
¶3. (C) The Pikalevo situation highlighted the weakness of
Russia's federal structure. After Putin's reforms, governors
serve at Moscow's pleasure and are judged less by their
effectiveness as leaders or ability to solve local problems
than by their resolute support for central authorities
(demonstrated in their management of regional elections to
secure the party of power, United Russia) and their ability
to maintain political and social stability. According to
XXXXXXXXXXXX, political and tax reforms over
the past years have curtailed the governors' influence
over the budget and reduced their authority to make
decisions without Moscow's approval.
Economic prosperity, fueled by high energy prices, helped to
mask the weakening of regional leadership; the crisis had
made it more acute.
¶4. (C) The case with Leningrad Oblast Governor Serdyukov
in connection with Pikalevo illustrates the problem of
ineffective regional leadership. XXXXXXXXXXXX blamed
the Serdyukov's incompetence and the local mayor's
"unprofessionalism" for allowing the problem to fester.
XXXXXXXXXXXX had a more positive assessment
of Serdyukov, but noted that a "second tier" governor had no
ability to tell the well-connected Deripaska what to do –
- only the heavyweights had sufficient authority to challenge
members of the tandem's inner circle. No matter what the
assessment of Serdyukov "the man," his loyalties remained
primarily tied to keeping Moscow's favor, leading him to cover
over the deteriorating situation in Pikalevo by emphasizing
new investment projects, like the Nissan factory that Putin
opened on June 2.
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also has identified a second element
that led to Pikalevo: a crisis of dialogue between the political
leadership (vlast) and society, in which any attempt to draw
attention to serious problems are treated as a threat to the
system and the regime. XXXXXXXXXXXX
noted the fate of Yuriy Onoprienko, the Speaker of
the Khabarovsk Kray legislature, who was fired by United
Russia after deputies there sent a letter to Putin requesting
that tariffs for energy not be increased because of the
economic crisis. Similarly, XXXXXXXXXXXX drew the ire
of the pro-Kremlin press and almost faced charges of
"extremism" XXXXXXXXXXXX. Now, he and others who have
criticized the tandem's anti-crisis package are finding
MOSCOW 00001562 002 OF 003
themselves vindicated, although without any recognition from
the authorities. The regime has also shown little tolerance
for criticism from society; last December Moscow-based OMON
police forces used force to dispel protests in Vladivostok
against increased tariffs on imported automobiles. Deputy
Prime Minister Igor Sechin dismissed the protests as the
actions of "scoundrels" while United Russia Duma officials
insinuated that the presence of Japanese flags by the
protesters signaled instigation from overseas (Ref C).
¶6. (C) Ultimately, commentators argue the crisis at Pikalevo
resulted from the shortcomings of the tandem's crisis plan,
which emphasizes maintaining employment (even with
substantially reduced salaries) over accepting the pain of
economic restructuring of inefficient and unprofitable
enterprises. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us "the factories should be
closed" and he admitted that Putin's solution does not solve
the problem of a lack of demand for aluminum -- the catalyst
behind the plants' closure. Thus far, the administration's
response has been to demand more action on the part of
regional and local leaders to follow through with the plans
to maintain employment and stop wage arrears.
¶7. (C) After Pikalevo, the central leadership made no
reassessment of its strategy, but instead used the whip to
put more pressure on regional leaders to follow through with
the "stability" agenda. Medvedev on June 10 threatened
regional leaders with dismissal if they fail to get wage
arrears and unemployment under control -- telling them to
"stop hiding under the table" and take charge of negotiating
with industries and workers' collectives. Kremlin ideologue
Vladislav Surkov told a conference of municipal heads that
government at all levels should become "more open" and
engaged in dialogue with society. However, as
XXXXXXXXXXXX explained to us, this anti-crisis policy
rests on a fragile social compromise, in which businesses keep
workers on the books, albeit with reduced pay and hours;
local and regional elites trumpet low unemployment; and
the populace patiently accepts the cuts in the hopes of
improved wages "after the crisis." As in the Pikalevo case,
that comprise can break down quickly if an owner's fears
about consequences for letting arrears pile up or firing
staff are less than the possible gains for letting uneconomic
enterprises collapse. Ordering governors to be more assertive
does little to provide them political power to actually follow
through on the assignment, especially against powerful oligarchs.
Large and in Charge
-------------------
¶8. (C) Putin's intervention in Pikalevo also raised questions
about balance of power within the tandem. XXXXXXXXXXXX
asked why Putin, and not Medvedev, was dispatched to the town
an issue that many here are puzzling over. Some argue,
XXXXXXXXXXXX, that the showdown between Putin and Oleg
Deripaska was staged political theater. Since the money to revive the
BazelTsement came through government loans in an agreement
between the two before the visit, XXXXXXXXXXXX saw no reason
for the Prime Minister to go to Pikalevo except to show the masses
his ability to battle the hated oligarchs. (XXXXXXXXXXXX also
claimed that the proposal to nationalize the three plants in Pikalevo
was a conspiracy between Deripaska and the two United Russia
deputies who drafted the proposal, since Deripaska would have loved to
unload the debt-ridden and inefficient firm on the taxpayers.) In an
earlier conversation with Embassy, XXXXXXXXXXXX had argued
that he saw Medvedev as confidently in control and serving as "the"
President of Russia, suggesting that he sees Putin's involvement as a
way of asserting his continued political importance.
¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX's argument runs against the conventional
wisdom that Putin remains the fulcrum of power in the tandem.
Others explained the Prime Minister's intervention as another
illustration of Putin's continued position as the arbiter
amongst the Kremlin clans. Indeed, Medvedev had given
Serdyukov clear instructions to resolve the impasse over
BazelTsement in March, but did not follow through to see that
his instructions were implemented. We do not know if Medvedev
himself directed Putin to take action in Pikalevo, or was
even apprised of the Prime Minister's intentions. Whatever
the case behind the scenes, Putin's intervention provided a
clear signal to the elite and society that he remains the
tandem's decision implementer. As XXXXXXXXXXXX
described it, Putin's trip to Pikalevo showed that "he's the tsar, he
decides all problems."
¶10. (C) The laurels of the "tsar" come with heavy
responsibility and nearly all independent observers agree
that Putin's intervention will have the likely consequence of
MOSCOW 00001562 003 OF 003
more localized protests. The success of the Pikalevo workers'
highway blockade provides a model for other disgruntled or
frustrated workers in other "one-company towns" to attract
top-level attention to their problems. Medvedev's caution to
the governors June 10 that the center will no longer send
"someone" to resolve local issues had far less flash than
Putin's actions on June 4.
Comment
-------
¶11. (C) Putin's Pikalevo intervention, followed by his
surprise announcement that Russia would drop its independent
bid for WTO accession in lieu of a joint bid with Kazakhstan
and Belarus (Ref A), has put the Prime Minister in the
spotlight at the expense of Medvedev. Medvedev appears to be
playing "catch up" through his tough talk to the PolPreds
(his representatives to regional blocs) on June 10 and a
photo op sighting down the barrel of a sniper scope in
Makachkala (after the murder of the head of the local
Internal Affairs Minister). Pikalevo served to confirm the
stereotypes about the two men -- Medvedev is a man of words,
hobnobbing with Western businessmen in St. Petersburg; Putin
is the man of action, setting the oligarchs straight in the
provinces. Neither appears to see fully the systemic problems
inherent in the Putin system, but Medvedev at a minimum seems
more open to hearing a broader range of criticism. Putin
apparently retains his conspiratorial worldview, even
muttering about the Pikalevo protest being the result of
forces colluding to stop him from coming to the town. If the
situation deteriorates in the coming months with a surge of
localized protest, Medvedev may be in a better position to
promote a reform agenda that tackles the underlying issues,
rather that papering over problems with a diminishing pot of
government money.
BEYRLE
..