

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06BRASILIA1910, BRAZIL: GOB OFFICIALS COMMENT ON REFUGEE CASE OF SUSPECTED FARC TERRORIST
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BRASILIA1910.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BRASILIA1910 | 2006-09-12 13:20 | 2011-01-04 00:00 | SECRET | Embassy Brasilia |
VZCZCXRO3666
OO RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1910/01 2551320
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 121320Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6608
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 5652
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 3918
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4256
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 3427
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE PRIORITY 5410
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY 2830
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO PRIORITY 7982
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORTY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001910
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY - INFO ADDRESSEES ADDED
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER SNAR BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: GOB OFFICIALS COMMENT ON REFUGEE CASE OF SUSPECTED FARC TERRORIST
REF: A. STATE 139878 B. BRASILIA 1511 C. BRASILIA 1613
BRASILIA 00001910 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary. Charge and PolCouns delivered ref A demarche to senior GOB officials, stressing USG concerns about the 14 July 2006 decision by Brazil's national refugee commission (CONARE) to grant refugee status to suspected FARC terrorist Francisco Antonio Cadena Collazos (refs B and D), despite an outstanding extradition request for Cadena from Colombia's government (GOC) and Brazil's obligation to deny safe haven to terrorist under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Antonio de Aguiar Patriota and other senior Ministry of External Relations (MRE) officials said the decision by CONARE had been complex and laborious, with "humanitarian" factors weighing heavily. They indicated CONARE, with strong encouragement from the UNHCR representative, had not regarded Cadena as a "terrorist" but as a refugee from an "internal armed conflict," which they claim is the approach that consistently has been taken by CONARE to more than 300 other Colombians settled in Brazil as refugees. Luiz Paulo Barreto, CONARE's president and the second-ranking official in Brazil's Justice Ministry, told PolCouns that the committee had deliberated for nearly a year (vice the 30 days typical in other refugee cases), had considered the GOC legal case against Cadena as weak, saw the timing of the 2005 extradition request for Cadena (who has lived in Brazil since 1992) as driven by election politics in Colombia, and had researched Cadena's history in vain for any indication that he was a FARC military commander instead of the ideological commissar, priest and political representative he claims to be. Despite credible reporting to the contrary, Barreto denied there had been political pressure on CONARE to grant refugee protection to Cadena, and said he would be prepared to revoke Cadena's refugee status "in a minute" if (1) Cadena is caught in a lie in his petition, (2) does not fulfill the conditions of his status, (3) the GOC appeals to CONARE with compelling additional information. Barreto also said he would be willing to personally receive and assume responsibility for protecting any USG intelligence information regarding Cadena that has a bearing on his refugee claim and his history with the FARC in Colombia. End summary.
Foreign Ministry Demarches ----------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) DCM (serving as Charge at the time) made ref A demarche to Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, MRE Under Secretary for Political Affairs, on 4 September. DCM SIPDIS stressed that the CONARE decision appeared at odds with Brazilian commitments under UNSCR 1371. Patriota did not appear to be very familiar with the details of the Cadena decision, but indicated he had discussed it with Foreign Minister Amorim and others. He said that, according to the MRE representative in CONARE, the UNHCR representative in CONARE had pressed hard to grant refugee status, in what had been an extensive and "impassioned" process in the commission. He noted that some of the key considerations were "humanitarian" -- i.e., that Cadena has lived in Brazil peacefully for over 15 years and has a Brazilian wife and child.
¶3. (SBU) PolCouns followed up with a second demarche on 5 September to the MRE's Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, Ambassador Maria Luiza Veotti. Veotti was joined by Marcus Fagundes, Chief of the OAS Division and an alternate representative for the ministry on the CONARE board. PolCouns emphasized that the USG had no intent to interfere in Brazilian legal processes, but noted USG dismay with the Cadena decision and questioned how the GOB could square this decision in view of its obligations under UNSCR 1371.
¶4. (SBU) Veotti emphasized that CONARE classified Cadena as a refugee, and is not a beneficiary of political asylum. Refugee status is granted solely and independently by CONARE,
BRASILIA 00001910 002.2 OF 003
which includes GOB representatives from the justice and foreign ministries, as well as UNHCR and civil society and faith-based NGOs. Political asylum is a national process, in which the GOB would be directly involved, but Cadena's request was for refugee status, and was sent to CONARE. As a refugee in Brazil, Veotti affirmed that Cadena cannot be extradited, and the judiciary's role at this stage is essentially passive, she said. If refugee status is revoked for any reason by CONARE, extradition can again be contemplated by the courts. Veotti reiterated Patriota's description of the CONARE deliberation as a laborious one in which humanitarian issues emerged as paramount. She said it was important to note that CONARE "never defined or characterized Cadena as a terrorist," but rather as a Colombian "involved or affected by the internal armed conflict in his country, and who feared death, harm or persecution, in accordance with the 1951 UN definition on which CONARE bases its proceedings. " This is the same context in which CONARE has approached other Colombian refugee seekers in Brazil, she added. PolCouns noted that he would be seeing the president of the CONARE board that adjudicated Cadena's appeal, and Veotti urged poloff to seek more detailed clarifications in that meeting.
CONARE President ----------------
¶5. (C) Justice Ministry Executive Secretary (Deputy Minister-equivalent) Luiz Paulo Barreto met with PolCouns on 6 September to receive ref a demarche and discuss the Cadena issue. Barreto, in addition to being the senior career legal officer at the ministry, is the President of CONARE and chairs its deliberations. Barreto is a long-time and cooperative contact of the Embassy on a range of law enforcement and counter-terrorism issues. Requesting confidentiality on our part, and breaking the official SIPDIS silence that normally surrounds CONARE decisions on refugees, he outlined the factors weighing in CONARE's handling of Cadena's refugee appeal: -- Barreto said the committee regarded the GOC allegation and extradition request against Cadena as legally specious. Noting that the crime alleged had been committed in 1991, and that the extradition request to Brazil had been lodged only in 2005, Barreto claimed the case appeared to hinge entirely on the testimony of one recently-revealed witness, who Brazilian sources indicate has had his sentence reduced in Colombia and received financial compensation in exchange for accusing Cadena. CONARE interviewed Cadena extensively, and he denied the murder allegations and claimed that he was in Venezuela on the date of the 1991 attack on the Colombian National Police base in which the murders occurred. Barreto acknowledged that Cadena had no one to corroborate his denials. -- Barreto said CONARE viewed the GOC's interest and timing in pursuing Cadena's extradition as being driven by domestic political factors in Colombia. Barreto said that Cadena had resided in Brazil since 1992, but that during that time he had returned on occasion to Colombia, in some cases with the consent of the GOC. Barreto said the GOB had official information, supported by Cadena's own testimony, that Cadena has occasionally served in a negotiator role between the GOC and FARC, most recently in 2000. CONARE questioned why previous GOC administrations had seemed to regard Cadena as innocuous or even tacitly supported his role as a dialogue facilitator, allowing him to enter and leave Colombian territory, but the Uribe government -- in an election year -- had suddenly sought extradition. Barreto claimed that the GOC and Colombian Embassy's interventions with CONARE regarding the case had virtually ceased when Uribe was re-elected. (Comment: That is a specious argument given the fact that refugee status was granted to Cadena less than 2 months after Uribe's re-election. End comment.) -- Barreto said the GOB, including its intelligence service and military, had assisted CONARE over several months in "exhaustively researching" Cadena's history in Colombia with the FARC, and had found no information that supported GOC allegations that Cadena was a FARC field commander capable of
BRASILIA 00001910 003.2 OF 003
leading an attack on a military base. Cadena claims to have been a political commissar, teacher, and priest for FARC in Colombia, and later an informal representative for the group in Brazil, but not a combatant, much less a commander. Barreto claimed the information developed by CONARE and the GOB could not disprove that position (he noted the only picture the GOB had obtained of Cadena in FARC uniform is 30 years old and shows him holding a bible in one hand and a gun in the other). -- Barreto noted that there are 350 Colombians living in refugee status in Brazil, re-settled after successfully convincing CONARE that they faced threats related to the country's internal conflict if they returned. Some have been resettled at GOC requests, others have applied for refugee status on their own, and they come from the ranks of the Colombian security forces, paramilitaries and guerrillas, as well as ordinary citizens. These include, Barreto said by way of a contrasting example to Cadena, two former Colombian army soldiers who killed FARC commanders during a fire fight, but who could not be guaranteed safety from reprisals by the GOC once they demobilized. Noting that CONARE took nine months to consider the Cadena case - versus the one month timeframe for most refugee decisions - Barreto said the committee had painstakingly weighed all the information. But in the end, he claimed Cadena had made a convincing case to CONARE that he faced a well-founded fear of death at the hands of paramilitary elements should he return to Colombia, which overshadowed the GOC allegation and extradition request, which appeared questionable on several points to CONARE, as noted above.
¶6. (C) In response to a direct question from PolCouns, Barreto indicated that CONARE had not suffered political pressure from any source in evaluating the case. He added that Cadena's status in Brazil is contingent on his fulfilling his obligations as a refugee (i.e., no further political activism on Brazilian soil, rupture of his ties to FARC), and that if CONARE were to be presented with compelling evidence that Cadena had lied in any aspect of his petition, Barreto would recommend to the committee "in a minute" that his status be revoked and the legal path opened for extradition. Barreto indicated CONARE is open to further appeals and new information from the GOC about the case. He also invited the USG to provide any relevant information it might have regarding Cadena directly to Barreto, undertaking to personally assume responsibility for appropriate security and handling of the information should it involve intelligence sources and methods.
¶7. (S/NF) Comment. The GOB officials demarched, especially Barreto, provided a cogent explanation for the Cadena decision, although from our perspective not a particularly credible one. They evidenced understanding for the points in our demarche, were frank and not defensive in their reactions, and had ready answers that seemed to reflect an exhaustive deliberative process conducted within the expected UNHCR parameters. None of that changes our view, per previous sensitive reporting, that the CONARE decision was driven largely by heavy pressure from the very top of the Brazilian government, and that the GOB members of CONARE ultimately yielded to that pressure (we think the UN and NGO members were likely disposed in that direction in any event). That said, if the GOC is prepared to fight this, it needs to develop the strongest, most detailed possible legal case against Cadena on the specific charges relating to his alleged command of the attack on the CNP base in 1991 and the two deaths that resulted. Coupling that with any further information or intelligence that the GOC or USG assets can develop on Cadena's history in FARC military actions would also be useful.
Sobel