

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05ANKARA6106, COMBATING EXTREMISM
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05ANKARA6106.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05ANKARA6106 | 2005-10-11 06:59 | 2011-04-06 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Ankara |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 006106
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2025
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL PTER TU
SUBJECT: COMBATING EXTREMISM
REF: A. STATE 159129
¶B. ANKARA 002030
¶C. ANKARA 005496
¶D. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT
¶E. ANKARA 005281
¶F. ANKARA 001551
¶G. ANKARA 001935
¶H. ANKARA 005632
Classified By: A/DCM Thomas Goldberger; reasons 1.4 b and d.
¶1. (C) Summary. Turkey has a reputation for being a
moderate, secular, and democratic country with a Muslim
population. The reality of Islam in Turkey, however, is
more complicated. The State actively represses unofficial
expressions of Islam. Violent Turkish Islamic extremism
does exist. Mission Turkey does not direct our contact
efforts toward "extremists" specifically, but we are
widening our circle of Islam-oriented contacts and seeing
results. End Summary.
¶2. (C) This cable is in response to Ref A.
------------------------------
HOW MODERATE IS TURKISH ISLAM?
------------------------------
¶3. (C) Turkey has the reputation of being the home of
"moderate Islam" because it combines a "secular" political
system with a tolerant strand of Sunni Islam. The reality,
however, is difficult to get a handle on because Turkish
Islam is very diverse and the state actively represses and
controls religious life (Ref B). (Note: Many Turks object
to the "moderate Islam" label for a variety of reasons (Ref
C). End Note.)
¶4. (C) The Turkish state claims that Turkish Islam is
unified, tolerant, and peace-loving. Turkish officials
note that 98 percent of citizens of Turkey are Muslim and
they claim that the small (non-Muslim) minority religious
communities are free to practice their faiths. The
majority of Turks subscribe to the Hanafi school of Sunni
Islam. The Hanafi school is one of the more open-minded
and tolerant strands of Sunni Islam.
¶5. (C) The reality is more complex. Turkish Islam is far
from unified. About 10-15 percent of Turkey,s 70 million
people are Alevis (heterodox Muslim). The Sunni community
is divided into a variety of lodges, brotherhoods, and
religious communities, e.g. Gulenists, Nurcus, National
View, Naksibendis, and Suleymancis. These groups have a
variety of views and practices and some are involved in
extensive business, educational, and political activities.
¶6. (C) Violent Turkish Islamic extremism does exist.
Turkish Hizbollah and the Great Eastern Islamic
Raider-Front (IBDA-C) have conducted a number of terrorist
attacks over the years. According to press reports, around
500 Turks served with Al Qaida and the Taliban in
Afghanistan. IBDA-C members cooperated with Al Qaida to
conduct the 2003 Istanbul bombings against two synagogues,
an HSBC bank, and the British consulate.
¶7. (C) It is difficult to assess exactly how widespread
Islamic extremism extends in Turkey because the Turkish
state actively monitors and represses religious expression
(Ref D). The Turkish state hires and trains all religious
officials (imams and muftis); appoints them to their posts;
and pays their salaries. The state writes the sermons that
most of the imams deliver at Friday prayers; picks which
imam in each mosque gets to deliver the Friday sermon; and
uses undercover intelligence officials to monitor their
activities. State funds are used to construct mosques, but
the state spends no money on Alevi houses of worship,
Jewish synagogues, or Christian churches. All Muslim
school age students are required to take classes in the
Hanafi-Sunni tradition of Islam, regardless of their
personal sectarian beliefs. Non-Muslim students are not
required to take these courses, but alternative courses are
not offered by the state. Private religious classes are
illegal and proselytizing by non-Muslims, while not
illegal, is viewed with great suspicion and actively
discouraged. Pious girls and women are officially not
allowed to wear headscarves in schools and universities, or
in state workplaces.
¶8. (C) Embassy contacts have consistently claimed that only
a tiny minority of Turkish citizens subscribe to extreme,
radical, or violent forms of Islam. A leading Turkish
national security analyst estimates that only about 7
percent of Turkish citizens endorse radical forms of
Islam. Ibrahim Uslu, the general manager of ANAR (the
governing Justice and Development Party,s (AKP) polling
firm) claims that only around 5 percent of Turks are
radical Islamist. In a country of nearly 70 million
people, however, there would be over 350,000 potential
terrorists if only one half of one percent of the
population supported Al Qaida-like terrorism.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
WHAT AKP LEADERS SAY (AND THINK) ABOUT ISLAM AND TOLERANCE
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶9. (C) The Turkish constitution and party law bans parties
formed around sectarianism, ethnicity, regionalism, or
opposition to the "secular" constitutional system. AKP is
officially a "secular" political party. Nonetheless, AKP
is an Islam-oriented political party. The leaders and
grassroots members of AKP largely come from the Refah and
Fazilet parties, banned for Islamic extremism in 1998 and
2001 respectively.
¶10. (C) In general, AKP,s senior leaders make constructive
statements in public about the importance of religious
tolerance. In a 1 May 2005 speech, Foreign Minister and
Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gul called for tolerance and
moderation by stating that, "It is, therefore, of great
importance that based on the fundamental principles of the
Islamic tradition, such as tolerance and moderation, we
take an open-minded, realistic but equally visionary
approach." In recent public statements PM Erdogan and
State Minister (for religious affairs) Mehmet Aydin made
statements criticizing generally the state of the Islamic
world and stressing the importance of religious tolerance
and human rights (Ref E).
¶11. (C) The AKP government, however, also backed a sermon
delivered at Friday prayers in mosques around Turkey in May
2005 that stated that unspecified foreign powers were using
Christian missionaries to undermine Islam (Ref F). State
Minister Aydin repeated these points by releasing a
statement labeling missionary activities in Turkey
"separatist and destructive" and implying that missionaries
are part of an organized effort by foreign governments to
create divisions in the country (Ref G). Aydin was
unhelpful when the Charge d'Affaires recently tried to
discuss this issue with him during a courtesy call (Ref H),
and never responded to Ambassador Edelman,s request to pay
a joint visit to a Protestant church after it was
firebombed earlier this year.
¶12. (C) A variety of Embassy contacts assert that AKP,s
senior leadership does not really believe in religious
tolerance, but merely pretends to support tolerance in an
effort to court Western favor and promote Turkey,s EU
membership bid. AKP,s leaders, especially PM Erdogan, have
repeatedly rejected the notion of "Islamic terrorism."
Many secular Turks have tried to convince us that AKP
leaders are practicing a form of lying or dissembling that
is ethically permissible if intended to protect or advance
the cause of Islam.
--------------------------------------------- ---
MISSION TURKEY,S PROGRAMS IN COMBATING EXTREMISM
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶13. (C) The Mission organizes public diplomacy programming
that supports MPP goals and also addresses extremist trends
in segments of Turkish society. Our goal is not to target
extremists specifically, but to introduce a broad audience
-- many of whom have never met an American -- to our
society, culture, and politics. To this end, we have
opened up new religiously oriented institutional contacts,
including universities. Another opportunity has opened up
with NGOs, a sector that is growing dramatically in Turkey,
especially with Islam-oriented Turks who do not participate
in many civil society organizations due to customs and
culture. By bringing in speakers on the nuts and bolts of
NGO organization or sending Islam-oriented NGO members on
International Visitor programs, we have found a very
receptive audience.
--------------------------------------------- -----------
REACHING OUT TO ISLAM-ORIENTED JOURNALISTS AND POLITICAL PARTIES
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶14. (C) The Mission has made a concerted effort to include
editors and correspondents from Islam-oriented newspapers
in press roundtables with the Ambassador and Mission
officials and representational events. We have targeted
responsible journalists from Islam-oriented newspaper for
International Visitor programs. The Mission has worked
hard to reach a broad audience through existing contacts,
opinion leaders from outside the major cities, and
Islam-oriented Turks.
¶15. (C) Mission officers, of course, meet frequently with
members of the governing and Islam-influenced AKP to
discuss US-Turkish relations and a variety of other
issues. PolOffs have also met with members from Turkey,s
smaller and more radical Islam-oriented political parties
(i.e. Saadet Party and Grand Unity Party). These meetings
-- in parliament (with AKP members), party headquarters in
Ankara, and in regional party offices around the country --
have been very helpful in allowing Mission Turkey to
directly communicate with religious and pious Turks about
U.S. foreign policy, American values, and the importance of
U.S.-Turkish cooperation. Results have been mixed. Some
interlocutors listen carefully and appear to take some of
our points, but others are obviously skeptical about U.S.
policies and motives; prone to conspiracy theory thinking;
and clearly influenced by Islamist-oriented media.
However, in this sense they are no different from other
Turks, who are equally prone to other conspiracy theories.
-------------------------
ENGLISH LANGUAGE PROGRAMS
-------------------------
¶16. (U) Mission-organized English language teaching
programs in Turkey provide abundant opportunities to
introduce civic education and to open the Turkish
educational system to Western-oriented educational
practices and concepts such as critical thinking,
student-centered classrooms, team-building, and conflict
resolution. The placement of American English Language
Fellows in university ELT and English departments and at
military service academies has provided critical exposure
to American culture and values. Placements have included
universities in the conservative cities of Konya, Trabzon,
Gaziantep, and Erzurum.
¶17. (U) English Language Fellows are often the only
Americans young people in some communities have an
opportunity to get to know. After attending prayer
services with a group of conservative female students at
one of the oldest mosques in the city center, a Fellow in
Erzurum spent the afternoon discussing the similarities
between Christianity and Islam in English. The students
noted her appreciation of their way of life and received an
extra English lesson using content-specific language skills
that they might never have heard in the classroom.
---------------------------------
EDUCATIONAL AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS
---------------------------------
¶18. (U) The ACCESS micro-scholarship program provides
direct English-language instruction by the Fellows to
underprivileged high school students who cannot afford to
take private courses. All ten of the FY-06 English
Language Fellows, who are placed in cities around Turkey,
will participate in the ACCESS program, which will reach
300 students.
¶19. (U) International Visitor (IV) Program and other
short-term exchanges involve participation by professionals
in all fields from throughout Turkey as well as government
officials at all levels. Participants consistently report
that they were particularly impressed with the interaction
and relationship between government and citizenry in the
United States and the impact of individual initiative.
Turks regularly participate in projects related to the
judiciary, anti-terrorism, democracy, and diversity and
tolerance in a multi-ethnic society.
¶20. (U) The Fulbright Program, active in Turkey since 1951,
encompasses scholarly exchanges at all levels and is the
Department,s premier educational exchange program. The
Turkish Fulbright program has tripled in size over the last
two years and in FY-06 will receive more USG funding than
any other Fulbright program in the world. After a
concerted effort to diversify the program and reach
under-represented universities, geographic regions and
students from a wide range of backgrounds, more than 400
applications were received from fifty-nine of Turkey,s
seventy-three public and private universities. Almost
two-thirds of them came from women (240 women; 164 men) and one-quarter from universities outside of Istanbul and
Ankara. Up to seventy new fellowships to study in the
United States will be offered to Turkish graduate students
for the academic year 2006-07.
¶21. (U) The Embassy supports the annual American Studies
Association of Turkey conference and organizes seminars on
resources for teaching about the U.S. in order to
strengthen teaching about the United States at Turkish
universities and increase understanding of U.S. society and
values.
----------------------------------
GUEST SPEAKERS AND ARTS PROGRAMING
----------------------------------
¶22. (U) Mission-organized speaker programs address all our
MPP themes and in the past two years have included
presentations by Thomas Friedman on U.S. policy in Iraq
(December 2003); Bruce Hoffman, RAND Washington on
terrorism (March 2004); Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow,
Council on Foreign Relations, on U.S. foreign policy (April
2004); Omar Khalidi, Aga Khan Program at MIT, on Islamic
architecture and mosque design in the U.S. (April 2004);
speakers on the U.S. presidential election; Max Boot,
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, on U.S.
foreign policy (December 2004); historian James Caesar on
anti-Americanism (March 2005); and Rudolph Vecoli on U.S.
immigration policy (May 2005).
¶23. (U) The Harlem Boys Choir, which gave two concerts in
Ankara in April 2005 to standing-room only audiences
totaling more than 2,000, generated extensive positive
press coverage that lauded the Harlem Boys Choir
performances and the multi-cultural nature of American
society.
¶24. (U) The Department,s support for the Istanbul Biennial
September-November 2005 included public education programs
that took U.S. artists and art critics to the conservative
southeastern Anatolian city of Diyarbakir, where they
engaged in lively discussions with audiences on how art
biennials serve as a generator of ideas. They gave
detailed information about their works in this context and
presented examples from other international exhibitions.
Their outreach was particularly directed toward children
and young people, and the interactive nature of the program
allowed local people to be informed about the arts in the
U.S. and to interact personally with U.S. artists.
¶25. (U) Embassy Ankara joined forces with Consulate Adana
to mount a photographic exhibition on religious diversity
in the conservative southeastern Anatolian city of
Gaziantep in a June 2005. The exhibition of forty-four
photographs celebrating the diversity of religious belief
in Anatolia feature the work of a prominent Adana-based
amateur photographer whose photographs covered multi-faith
subjects. Co-sponsored by the Consulate in Adana, the
Gaziantep American Corner, the Gaziantep Rotary Club, and
the Anatolian Journalists Union, the exhibition was opened
on the same day as the OSCE Conference on Anti-Semitism and Intolerance.
¶26. (C) Comment: Turkey,s reputation as a moderate,
tolerant, and secular country is due in large measure to
the oppressive and authoritarian manner in which the State
monitors and controls religion. It is difficult to target
"extremists" because the State has actively repressed
"extremists" and driven almost all unofficial expressions
of Islam underground. As Turkey goes down the road towards
the EU, the reform process will require the country to
liberalize some aspects of the regime that control
religious expression. This could result in an increased
degree of Islamic extremism. But if Turkey is to live up
to its reputation for being a moderate, tolerant, and truly
secular country, then it will have to open up and confront
the hidden and potentially unpleasant realities of some
aspects of Islamic belief and practice in Turkey. End
Comment.
MCELDOWNEY