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Viewing cable 09SANJOSE499, COSTA RICA: SHIP VISITS IN A TIME OF INFLUENZA
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSJ #0499/01 1681920
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171920Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0936
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUWDQAC/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUWDQAA/CCGDELEVEN ALAMEDA CA PRIORITY
RXFEAH/COMNAVSOUTH PRIORITY
UNCLAS SAN JOSE 000499
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/PPC AND P/M
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR FPA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MARR SNAR CS
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA: SHIP VISITS IN A TIME OF INFLUENZA
REF: A. San Jose-SOUTHCOM JAG email of 6/2/2009 (NOTAL)
¶B. San Jose-WHA/CEN email of 5/22/2009 (NOTAL)
¶C. 2009 San Jose 947 (NOTAL)
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: USN and USCG ship visits to Costa Rica should now
be able to resume, thanks to an agreement reached June 2 with the
GOCR on the use of a health questionnaire introduced to track
possible H1N1 cases. Starting in mid-May, the Health Ministry had
insisted that disembarking crew members complete and sign the
questionnaire, which is required of all visitors to Costa Rica.
Because providing such personal information to a foreign government
violates USN policy, Navy ship visits were suspended.
Atlantic-based (District 7) USCG vessels followed suit. The
curtailed visit of the USS Kauffman (FFG 59) to Limon highlighted
the problem, generating negative publicity and political pressure
which may have persuaded the Health Minister to accept a compromise.
As of June 2, disembarking USN and USCG crew members must still
complete the H1N1 questionnaire, but they may use a number from a
ship's roster to identify themselves; no names or signatures will be
required. The GOCR will not see the roster, which would be retained
by the CO. As long as the Health Ministry can contact the ship or
relevant USN and USCG authorities later, should there be H1N1 cases
possibly related to a ship visit, then that will be sufficient for
the GOCR. The test case will be the next port call, but we are
hopeful that USN and USCG ship visits, important and tangible
examples of U.S.-Costa Rica civilian-military cooperation, will
continue unimpeded. END SUMMARY
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
¶2. (SBU) U.S. ship visits to Costa Rica have long been complicated
by two factors. The first is the strict interpretation of the 1949
constitutional requirement that the national legislature approve
visits in advance by "armed" vessels (including USCG cutters). The
second is the long-running and well-known Costa Rican sensitivity to
foreign military presence or activities. Since a bilateral maritime
cooperation agreement was concluded in 1998, and the USG helped
equip the Costa Rican coast guard in 1999-2001, we have gradually
overcome most Costa Rica concerns about USCG visits; legislators and
the public generally understand coast guard-to-coast guard
cooperation.
¶3. (SBU) Visits by USN vessels have remained more problematic, again
due to two factors. On the Costa Rican side, some (mostly
opposition) legislators still complain about "warships" putting into
Costa Rican ports. On the USG side, USN force protection concerns
mandate that no personal information (i.e., crew lists, crew member
signatures or SSNs) can be provided to a foreign government.
Because Costa Rican immigration authorities normally require such
information, USN ship visits to Costa Rica became very rare.
¶4. (SBU) Through steady, quiet diplomacy, we have worked through
most of these problems. The Embassy, NAVSOUTH and the GOCR
(Immigration Directorate) crafted a local solution which addressed
the immigration and force protection concerns. Despite some
reluctance when the peace-promoting Arias administration took office
in 2006, VIP visits to USN and USCG vessels, regular briefings to
senior GOCR personnel and key legislators, and two visits by GOCR
security ministers to SOUTHCOM and JIATF-South abated most
suspicions and misunderstandings about the Navy's role in support of
counternarcotics and law enforcement missions. Indicative of the
progress, there were 23 USCG and four USN port visits to Costa Rica
in 2008. One of those, to Golfito in November, featured a VIP visit
to the USS Underwood (FFG 36), replete with briefings and a boarding
demonstration for the Minister of Public Security and key
legislators, including members of the opposition. The Kauffman's
visit was the first official port call by a USN warship to Costa
Rica in nine years (Ref C.)
---------------------
THE KAUFFMAN "CRISIS"
---------------------
¶5. (SBU) The H1N1 crisis seemed to threaten much of that progress,
with the first cases in Central America appearing in Costa Rica. To
help deal with the crisis, the Ministry of Health introduced a
mandatory questionnaire in May for everyone arriving from abroad to
Costa Rica; the questionnaire is intended to identify anyone who may
be carrying/have been exposed to the influenza, and to help track
them later, should new outbreaks occur in the country. The
international airports are using the questionnaire, cruise ship
passengers are supposed to, and the Health Ministry expected the
crews of visiting USCG or USN vessels to do the same. The USS Gary
(FFG-51) and the USS Carr (FFG-52) were able to visit Golfito (on
the Pacific coast) in early May before the H1N1 questionnaire was
fully in use, providing important training opportunities for the
Costa Rican coast guard and conducting some community relations
activities.
¶6. (SBU) The visit of the USS Kauffman was a different story,
however. The ship was to make a long-planned stop in Limon, Costa
Rica's major Caribbean port, May 19-23. As one of the neediest
areas of Costa Rica, and a development priority of the Arias
administration, Limon was deliberately targeted for the visit, the
first by a USN vessel to that city since 2006. The crew was
prepared for fairly extensive community relations activities, and
the community was prepared to welcome them (thanks to Embassy public
diplomacy preparations). We were also preparing a VIP visit to the
ship so that additional legislators could see the U.S. Navy first
hand. The Health Ministry insisted that the H1N1 questionnaire be
used for this visit.
¶7. (SBU) Despite numerous approaches to the Ministry (and up to
Health Minister Maria Luisa Avila herself), and extensive
behind-the-scenes discussions with SOUTHCOM, NAVSOUTH, Navy JAG reps
and even staff in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations in
Washington, a compromise was not reached. Avila held firm that the
questionnaire had to be used, signed and delivered to local GOCR
officials for the ship's crew members, just as for any international
traveler; no one could disembark from the Kauffman without the form.
With the crew unable to leave the ship because of the standoff, the
Kauffman departed on May 21 without conducting the hoped-for
community relations activities.
¶8. (U) Local media gave the shortened visit prominent coverage,
fairly accurately explaining the rules on both sides which had led
to the impasse, but highlighting (thanks to Embassy-provided
details) the opportunity lost for the community. Pro-U.S. and
pro-ship visit legislator Federico Tinoco, Chairman of the
Counternarcotics Committee, excoriated Minister Avila for not being
more flexible. Until the issue could be resolved, all USN ship
visits to Costa Rica were suspended. Atlantic-based (District 7)
USCG vessels followed suit.
-------------------------
HELPS GENERATE A SOLUTION
-------------------------
¶9. (SBU) The publicity and the political pressure may have made an
impact. When the DCM, Acting ODR Chief and Pol/Econ Counselor
called on Avila June 2, she and Vice Minister Ana Cecilia Morice
were very appreciative of on-going USG support and assistance to
Costa Rica, including ship visits, overall counternarcotics
cooperation and CDC help during the H1N1 crisis. Clearly willing to
find a ship visit solution that took into account USN security
concerns, the Minister herself suggested a version of one of the
options earlier suggested by SOUTHCOM JAG. Visiting USN (or USCG)
crew members would fill-in the H1N1 health questionnaire, but they
would use a number to identify themselves and would not have to sign
the form. Using an identification number would be sufficient to
identify crew members later, if needed, and this number would not be
anything official; SSNs or military ID numbers would not be
required. Instead, a visiting ship's CO would keep a simple list of
which crew member had which number, and the GOCR would not see this
list. The numbering could be as basic as 1-200, if a ship's company
numbered that many; the GOCR did not care about the format, Avila
explained.
¶10. (U) Avila made clear that the following were the two most
important issues for the GOCR:
-- all disembarking crew had to fill in the health data on the
questionnaire, in keeping with "international standards," and as a
"self-diagnostic" to consider seriously whether or not they had
exhibited influenza symptoms; and
-- there must be some means to track the crew members later, in the
event of an outbreak possible linked to them. In that instance, the
GOCR would ask the Embassy to check with the ship (or relevant USN
and USCG authorities) to identify the crew members (using the list
kept by the CO) who may have been infected or may have infected
others.
¶11. (SBU) In response to our questions, the Minister reiterated
that no signatures or crew lists would be required. She suggested
that, following the procedure used with cruise ships, any
disembarking crew member could download the GOCR questionnaire from
the internet and fill it out the night before leaving the ship.
This would speed and simplify disembarking procedures. She added
that one questionnaire per disembarking crew member would be
sufficient for a given visit, even if the crew member got on and off
the ship a number of times. Crew members that were not leaving the
ship at all would not have to fill in the form.
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GOCR EXPLANATION (AND JUSTIFICATION)
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¶12. (SBU) The Minister said she was in close contact with the
Pan-American Health Organization, which was on the verge of
upgrading its H1N1 alert, because of the continued spread of cases.
Avila said she expected to see more cases in the United States, and
more in Costa Rica, as the local flu season continues. As she met
with us, her Chilean counterpart emailed her to announce the first
confirmed H1N1 death in Chile. Under these circumstances, Avila
said the GOCR was compelled to leave its H1N1 "tracking mechanism"
(the questionnaire) in place, even for U.S. Navy and Coast Guard
vessels, but she was hopeful the USG would accept her suggestion.
We said we'd confer with SOUTHCOM and Washington and get back to
her. The Vice Minister hoped we could agree quickly enough to
resume US ship visits before the end of June. (NOTE: Avila's
predictions proved correct. The WHO upgraded the global H1N1
outbreak to pandemic status on June 11, and as of June 15, 149 cases
had been confirmed in Costa Rica.)
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COMMENT
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¶13. (SBU) We understand that NAVSOUTH, SOUTHCOM and Coast Guard
District 7 have all accepted Avila's compromise; this is very good
news. It is also well-timed, as the national legislature is about
to vote on the slate of possible USN and USCG ship visits to Costa
Rica scheduled from July-December. From a distance, Avila's initial
(stubborn) stance may have seemed like another case of Tico
hyper-legalism. The highly-regarded minister continues to handle
the H1N1 crisis here well, however, and because of this no doubt
found it difficult at first to make an exception (or to appear to
have made an exception) for the U.S. Navy. The test case will be
the next port call, but we are hopeful that these important and
tangible examples of U.S.-Costa Rica civilian-military cooperation
will continue unimpeded. We say "bring 'em on," with gratitude to
all levels of the USN and USCG hierarchy which helped with this
solution. Our special thanks go to the crews of the Kauffman and
her sister ships for their energetic (and flexible) support for key
Mission objectives here.
CIANCHETTE