

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06REYKJAVIK107, ICELAND: SCENESETTER FOR MARCH 31 DEFENSE TALKS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06REYKJAVIK107.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06REYKJAVIK107 | 2006-03-29 11:16 | 2011-01-13 05:37 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Reykjavik |
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRK #0107/01 0881116
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291116Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2657
INFO RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 0223
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0195
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L REYKJAVIK 000107
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
OSLO FOR DATT AND ODC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2016
TAGS: NATO MARR PREL PGOV KPAO IC
SUBJECT: ICELAND: SCENESETTER FOR MARCH 31 DEFENSE TALKS
REF: A. REYKJAVIK 85
¶B. REYKJAVIK 90
¶C. REYKJAVIK 91
¶D. REYKJAVIK 92
¶E. REYKJAVIK 93
¶F. REYKJAVIK 97
¶G. REYKJAVIK 98
¶H. REYKJAVIK 106
Classified By: Ambassador Carol van Voorst Reason: 1.5 (a) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Since 3/15, when the U.S. announced the
realignment of its force presence at Naval Air Station
Keflavik (NASKEF), the Icelandic government has made its
unhappiness with the decision plain. FM Haarde ) the
government,s key decision maker ) is looking to the 3/31
talks to offer the sort of specificity that will enable him
to tell his party and his public that the Americans are
serious about their commitment to the 1951 Defense Agreement.
Our readiness to offer concrete and credible proposals in
the series of defense talks with Iceland will strengthen
Haarde,s preference (and that of pragmatic bureaucrats and
rising young politicians and other opinion leaders) to seek
continued close security ties with the U.S. Eed summary.
----------------------
UNANTICIPATED DECISION
----------------------
¶2. (C) The Government of Iceland is just now coming to terms
with the news delivered March 15 that the U.S. would be
removing its four F-15 fighter jets as well as combat search
and rescue (CSAR) assets from NASKEF. Governing Independence
(IP) and Progressive (PP) Party luminaries seemed genuinely
shocked that the U.S. would take this step without further
negotiations or a long drawdown calendar. There have been a
flurry of party meetings and town hall, meetings with
residents of the Sudurnes region (where the base is located),
and the subject has been discussed in ministerial calls on
Allied foreign ministers (Norway, Denmark, France and
Germany) and Russia,s foreign minister. The Prime Minister
has appealed to the NATO Secretary General. Although there
has been plenty of criticism from the opposition that the
government should have seen this decision coming, the
governing coalition,s complete lack of contingency planning
indicates its leaders assumed they would have much more time
to prepare the country.
----------------------
REACHING OUT TO EUROPE
----------------------
¶3. (C) In response to what many interpret as U.S. rejection,
Reykjavik is showing new interest in cooperation with the
Europeans. &I think it is clear that in the future, Iceland
will move closer to Europe and farther away from the United
States on foreign-policy issues,8 PM Asgrimsson told
Morgunbladid in late March. Influential Social Democratic
Alliance Chairman Ingibjorg Solrun Gisladottir said it would
be natural for Iceland to rely for defense cooperation on
countries bordering on the North Atlantic: the UK, Denmark,
and Norway. Haarde himself is building bridges to Europe but
not burning any with the U.S.: he is enough of a realist to
know that European governments are unlikely to offer more
than sympathetic noises, and that any European offers of
defense equipment are likely to be on a purely commercial
basis.
¶4. (C) At the same time, a current of resentment against the
U.S. has also been flowing (reftels). The sudden
&unilateral8(to repeat a word embraced these past two weeks
by politicians, pundits, and citizens alike) decision, coming
in the course of what ministers had presented to the public
as ongoing negotiations, is being painted as evidence of U.S.
egotism and arrogance ) even by opposition politicians happy
to see the base close, and ordinary citizens with no
particular interest in the base or even the broader concept
of national defense.
----------------
PLAYING CATCH-UP
----------------
¶5. (C) Only fully independent since 1944, Iceland has little
experience looking out for itself ) or, set in a more
negative light, little sense of answerability for its own
well-being.
¶6. (C) Some in the Icelandic Government (e.g. FM Haarde and
chief defense negotiator Albert Jonsson) are nervous that the
U.S., with limited strategic interest in maintaining any sort
of presence here, will quietly bow out of the 1951 Agreement
(refs A and D). Others (e.g. PM Asgrimsson and Justice
Minister Bjarnason), feeling betrayed by the style and
substance of decisions already announced, no longer trust us
to meet our responsibilities under the treaty (refs G and H).
A third faction (which we believe includes former PM/FM
David Oddsson as well as other Independence Party stalwarts
of his generation) believes Iceland should react to the U.S.
decision by abrogating the treaty themselves and seeking
security elsewhere in the Alliance (ref D). And then there
is the pacifist left (personified by Left Green Party
Chairman Steingrimur Sigfusson), which never believed the
U.S. was a good mate for Iceland and has been only too happy
to crow, &We told you so8 (ref B).
¶7. (C). Asgrimsson and Haarde have reacted quite differently
to the U.S. decision, both in public and private. The PM has
strongly criticized the pace and unilateral character of the
U.S. action, expressing skepticism that the U.S. will offer
serious alternatives to a full-time U.S. presence. In
contrast, Haarde (in the job for only a few months, and with
his ego tied less tightly to past government defense policy)
has taken a more measured tone, expressing regret while
focusing on the need to listen with an open mind to U.S.
proposals and seek to maintain the security relationship.
Haarde has been out of the country much of the time since the
announcement, which has resulted in Icelandic media giving
more play to Asgrimsson,s tough talk than to Haarde,s
forward-looking focus.
---------------
GETTING SERIOUS
---------------
¶8. (C) Within this cacophony is a core of career diplomats
and bureaucrats sincerely interested in a practical
U.S.-Icelandic partnership to confront the challenge of
providing national security in the 21st century. MFA
Political Director Bergdis Ellertsdottir and Defense Director
Jon Egill Egilsson, as well as Justice Ministry Legal
Director Ragna Arnadottir and Coast Guard Director Georg
Larusson, are all serious professionals who know that banging
their fists on tables will not prevent a terrorist attack or
save a drowning sailor.
¶9. (C) Though the working levels of the ministries have been
kept out of the information loop of late (ref D), they will
be present at the March 31 talks. Some among them have even
told us that they are excited to be present at the
creation,, to have their ideas on defense actually influence
their nation,s program choices as Iceland inevitably
develops a more independent security policy. We anticipate
that their relatively pragmatic and worldly approach will
ultimately prevail, in part because a rising generation of
MPs, local mayors, and other decision makers share their
pragmatic approach to security cooperation.
¶10. (C) Icelanders, who lived on a subsistence economy until
the last half century but now enjoy one of the world,s
highest standards of living, are above all practical people.
When they face the fact, as they must do soon, that other
Allies are not going to leap in to replace the defense goods
and services thus far supplied by the U.S., they will sign on
for a new, more evenly balanced course of cooperation. We
can make this evolution easier if we:
-- Offer concrete proposals for follow-on security programs,
of the sort now being worked by OSD, Joint Staff, and EUCOM,
that provide a &visible defense presence.8 Exercises,
rotational deployments, and enhanced information/intel
sharing will also make a strong impression.
-- Follow up the March 31 meetings with a series of detailed
proposals responsive to Icelanders, concerns as expressed in
our face-to-face meetings.
-- Remain attentive to domestic political imperatives. The
U.S. decision to keep some CSAR helicopters here until the
middle of September came as an enormous relief to Icelanders
scrambling to arrange for interim and long-term SAR
capability. Justice Minister Bjarnason said March 24 that he
aimed to propose an interim Icelandic SAR plan within three
weeks and a long-term plan within two months. The Icelanders
will be very interested in the information we supply at the
talks on FMS options. Whether or not Iceland decides to buy
American (and it might make sense for them to simplify
maintenance by buying more of the Eurocopter Puma or Dauphins
they already fly), we must be prepared to put forward some
serious options. Continuing our efforts to be helpful to
local base employees who are losing their jobs will also pay
dividends in public goodwill.
-- Initiate public and private links such as the proposed
Burns op-ed and periodic telephone calls. These public
manifestations of sustained USG interest in Iceland,s fate
would smooth the way for a mutually-beneficial follow-on deal.
-- Encourage them to get educated ) and to accept that they
too have responsibilities for security. Even with the U.S.
remaining its defense guarantor, as a wealthy country and
member of NATO, Iceland will have to pay towards its defense,
and its officials will finally need to do their homework on
security affairs so as to be educated consumers. This means
reiterating longstanding offers to welcome Icelanders to U.S.
service academies, war colleges, and the Marshall Center )
but also making clear that other forms of cooperation will be
contingent upon their developing their own security
expertise.
-- Finally, we should remain unruffled by calls for closer
European security ties, making it clear that the U.S. does
not feel threatened by Icelandic calls for closer security
ties with Europe, either in a NATO or EU context. Indeed, we
welcome burden sharing.
VAN VOORST
van Voorst