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Viewing cable 06THEHAGUE1292, NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DUTCH FIGHTING ON THE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06THEHAGUE1292 | 2006-06-08 15:52 | 2011-01-17 15:30 | SECRET | Embassy The Hague |
Appears in these articles: http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2011/01/17/situatie-uruzgan-in-2006-ernstiger-dan-bekend/ |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #1292/01 1591552
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081552Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5963
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2612
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0168
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001292
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI, SA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DUTCH FIGHTING ON THE
GROUND AND IN THE HAGUE
REF: THE HAGUE 978
Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Dutch troops in Uruzgan have faced their
first serious military challenge in Uruzgan and, by all
accounts, aquitted themselves professionally. Prime Minister
Balkenende, CHOD Berlijn, Defense Minister Kamp, Foreign
Minister Bot and other senior Dutch officials have all
reaffirmed the Dutch commitment to the ISAF mission and
forcefully dismissed speculation that the GONL might rethink
its plans in light of the changing security situation. At
the same time, public support for the mission is weak, and
the government is likely to face critical questions from
parliament when it is briefed on the mission on June 13.
D-66 minister Pechtold -- whose party opposed the deployment
-- appeared ready on June 6 to reopen debate on the mission
within cabinet, but was slapped down by Balkenende, Bot, and
Kamp, and even criticized by opposition PvdA spokesman Bert
Koenders. Dutch officials have expressed concern, however,
that Dutch views on staffing key ISAF positions and other
critical issues are not being taken seriously by the U.S.,
complicating their efforts to build and maintain political
support for the mission at home. End Summary.
Deployment on Track, and Dutch Already Fighting:
-----------------------------------------------
¶2. (S) An upbeat MOD Director of General Policy Affairs Lo
Casteleijn told Ambassador Arnall June 6 that "all is on
track" regarding the deployment of Dutch troops to Uruzgan
under ISAF. There are now approximately 900 Dutch troops in
the province; this number will grow to 2,000 personnel in the
near future to prepare for the Dutch assuming control, before
dropping back down to approximately 1,600 troops. According
to Castelijn and others, Dutch special forces also were
involved in efforts to retake the town of Chora (29 km north
of Uruzgan’s capital Tarin Kowt), which had fallen to the
Taliban on May 30. Dutch commandos exchanged fire with
Taliban forces on June 1; Dutch Apache helicopters and
coalition F-16s were called in to support the Dutch troops.
The Dutch sustained no casualties. During a press conference
following the incident, Dutch CHOD Gen. Berlijn could not
rule out the possibility of upping the number of Dutch troops
deployed to the region, but dismissed speculation that
Taliban actions would make the Dutch rethink their commitment.
¶3. (S) Hugo Siblesz, MFA Director General for Political
Affairs, told Ambassador Arnall separately on June 6 that the
level of Taliban activity in the province was not beyond the
capabilities of Dutch forces to handle. While he anticipated
some tough questioning from parliament when it is briefed by
the Government on June 13, Siblesz predicted the discussion
would focus on three questions: is the level of violence in
the province within expectations; can Dutch forces handle it;
and will the GONL reconsider the mission? The answers, he
stated unequivocally, would be "yes, yes, and no".
But Politics Threaten to Reemerge:
---------------------------------
¶4. (C) Kingdom Affairs Minister Pechtold said in response to
a question during a June 6 interview on Dutch television that
he could envision the Cabinet reassessing the deployment
decision as a result of the worsening security situation.
(Comment: Pecthold, a member of the minor coalition party
D-66 which opposed the deployment, is currently involved in a
bitter power struggle for control of his party, and
apparently felt such a stand would enhance his standing
within the party.) PM Balkenende immediately called Pechtold
following the interview and demanded that he publicly retract
his remarks; Pecthold complied. Balkenende, FM Bot, and DM
Kamp also made several strong statements in the press
reaffirming the Dutch commitment to the two year deployment.
NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer also said Pecthold’s remarks were
"unhelpful" and cast doubt on the Dutch Cabinet’s commitment
to the mission.
¶5. (C) Several Dutch parliamentarians reacted in exasperation
to yet another instance of apparent mixed messages from the
Cabinet. VVD Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Hans van Baalen
said "loose cannon" Pecthold’s comments were inappropriate,
especially in conjunction with the confusing remarks made by
DM Kamp in May that were "taken out of context" by the Dutch
press (reftel). Even Bert Koenders, foreign policy spokesman
for the largest opposition party in parliament, the PvdA,
publicly condemned Pechtold for seeking to reopen an issue on
which Parliament had already voted. In a meeting with
POLCOUNS on June 7, Koenders added that remarks like
Pecthold’s, he said, "stir the pot" and make it very had for
either the Dutch public or foreign leaders to take the GONL’s
decisions seriously. PvdA, he stressed, supports the
mission, although it continues to have concerns about
maintaining a "firewall" between OEF and ISAF and other
issues related to the deployment.
Upcoming Parliamentary Hearings
-------------------------------
¶6. (C) Parliament will hold hearings on June 13 to discuss
the status of the deployment. MFA Task Force Coordinator for
Uruzgan Pieter-Jan Kleiweg told polmiloff June 7 that the
hearings will focus by and large on the deteriorating
security situation. Kleiweg expected "no problems" but
added that parliamentarians might be more contentious given
Pecthold’s comments. He said it was a shame that the
hearings were not held earlier in May, when they were delayed
due to the Hirsi Ali debacle. Now, parliament has "more to
chew on" he said, including the rise in cost of the
deployment and the inability to remove Uruzgan governor Monib
from the UN 1267 sanctions list.
Dutch Concerns: ISAF Composite HQ and Senior Civilian Rep
----------------------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) In the meeting with Ambassador Arnall, Hugo Siblesz
expressed frustration that Dutch concerns regarding ISAF --
many of which reflected political commitments made by the
government to secure parliamentary support for the mission --
did not always appear to be given the serious consideration
owed to the mission’s third largest troop contributor. In
this regard, he cited specifically the long-standing Dutch
view that giving all senior command positions to the U.S.
created an uncomfortable political situation for the
Balkenende government. Keeping a firewall, or at least the
appearance of one, between OEF and ISAF was a red-line for
the Dutch, and the logical way to achieve this would be to
staff the Deputy Commander (DCOM) for Security position in
the proposed composite HQ with a non-American; i.e., a Brit.
This issue was raised specifically by Dutch CHOD Berlijn in a
May 15 letter to DSACEUR and has been discussed at the
political and working levels, but has not been resolved.
Although Siblesz acknowledged that the U.S. was entitled to
both the ISAF Commander and DCOM positions as the largest
troop contributor, he stressed that showing flexibility on
this point would make it much easier for the GONL politically
while highlighting the international nature of the mission.
Lo Castelijn and MFA Director for Security Affairs Robert de
Groot made similar points with the Ambassador and POLCOUNS
respectively on June 6 and 7.
¶8. (S) Similarly, Siblesz and de Groot expressed concern that
the U.S. did not appear willing to be more flexible with
regard to staffing the position of NATO Senior Civilian
Representative (SCR) in Kabul. Siblesz noted that both the
Dutch and U.S. had put forward qualified candidates for this
position, and that allies were split over whom to support.
While the U.S. candidate clearly had very strong
qualifications for the position, this was not the only
consideration. Again, having the U.S. hold this position in
addition to the ISAF Commander and DCOM positions would
create the strong impression that this was a U.S.-only
mission -- not an allied effort. Allowing at least one of
the three key positions to be filled by a non-American would
make future participation by allies in this or similar
missions more attractive. Separately, de Groot informally
told POLCOUNS that having the Dutch candidate placed in the
SCR position was a higher priority for the Dutch than filling
the DCOM position with a Brit; in his view, having at least
one of the top three positions staffed with a non-American
should be enough to satisfy Dutch concerns.
COMMENT:
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¶9. (S) While the GONL and Dutch military remain firmly
committed to the ISAF III Uruzgan mission, it is unfortunate
that, at the very moment Dutch troops are starting to see
combat, dissatisfaction at the way Dutch interests are being
addressed within the ISAF mission appears to be growing in
The Hague. One of Balkenende’s key arguments in favor of
deployment was that only by participating in such missions
could the Dutch influence Alliance decision-making and ensure
that the Dutch retained a credible voice in NATO. Even if it
is not possible to meet specific Dutch demands in this
instance, serious thought needs to be given to finding ways
to shore up the message that the Dutch are a valued and
important partner.
ARNALL