

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06AMMAN3564, SOCIALIST PARTY LEADER ON HOW PS-LED FRANCE WOULD
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06AMMAN3564.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06AMMAN3564 | 2006-05-21 08:53 | 2011-02-10 08:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Amman |
Appears in these articles: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/documents-wikileaks/article/2011/02/09/wikileaks-les-visiteurs-de-l-ambassade_1477418_1446239.htm |
VZCZCXRO1868
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHAM #3564 1410853
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 210853Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0506
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 004247
SIPDIS
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
AND EB
DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR IZ JO
SUBJECT: SOCIALIST PARTY LEADER ON HOW PS-LED FRANCE WOULD
APPROACH U.S.: "NEITHER BLAIR NOR CHIRAC"
REF: PARIS 3725
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) Socialist Party (PS) First Secretary Francois
Hollande and PS National Secretary for International Affairs
Pierre Moscovici briefed the Ambassador June 8 on the
turbulent race for the presidential nomination within the PS
and the hurdles facing the party as it looks to next year's
presidential and legislative elections. Hollande underlined
that, notwithstanding Poitou-Charentes Region President
Segolene Royal's commanding lead today in polls, both among
the public at large and among PS members, PS members'
convictions as to which PS leader "is best placed to beat
Sarkozy" could well change between now and the PS's
presidential primary in November. Hollande nonetheless
believed the primary would produce a clear cut result,
"probably in just one round." Asked what might be expected
from French foreign policy under a socialist government,
Hollande used the phrase "neither Blair and Chirac" to
characterize an overall stance towards the U.S. that would
not be uncritically supportive, but also not be gratuitously
obstructionist. On Europe, Moscovici stressed that a
Socialist president and government would be much more
pro-Europe than President Chirac and the government of Prime
Minister Dominique de Villepin. END SUMMARY.
ATMOSPHERICS
-------------
¶2. (C) Over breakfast with the Ambassador at the residence
on June 8, Socialist Party (PS) First Secretary Francois
Hollande and PS National Secretary for International Affairs
Pierre Moscovici were confident, optimistic and dismissive of
the drumbeat of media reports that insist that frictions and
divisions within the PS will make it difficult for the party
to close ranks behind a single candidate for the 2007
presidential race even after the party primary next November.
UPCOMING ELECTIONS WILL BE HARD FOUGHT
--------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Hollande and Moscovici predicted that the 2007
presidential and legislative elections would be particularly
hard fought because neither of the two major parties "can
count on more than 30 percent of the electorate." (Note: The
center-left PS and the center-right Union for a Popular
Movement (UMP) are the preponderant parties in a political
spectrum that includes the small, centrist Union for French
Democracy (UDF) party along with a range of micro parties.
Indeed, if the pattern of past presidential elections holds
in 2007, there will be over a dozen candidates competing in
the first round of the election. End note.) Hollande
suggested that, since neither of the major parties can aspire
to majority status, the UDF might well find itself with
leverage beyond its size, particularly if in the legislative
elections that follow the presidential election, neither the
PS nor the UMP win a near majority of seats. Hollande added
that, in both the presidential and legislative elections, the
Communist Party (PC) and other far-left parties "would vote
against the right," but not join in any socialist government
in the event of a PS-led legislature.
¶4. (C) Hollande expressed his firm conviction that the PS
was well-positioned to win both the presidential and
legislative contests, but that both elections will be
extremely close. Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, barring
an unexpected reverse, would be the center-right's candidate,
and -- according to Hollande -- will benefit from the active
support of President Chirac, "if Sarkozy is nice to him."
That is, according to Hollande, if Sarkozy agrees to look
after Chirac loyalists and, by implication, Chirac himself.
(Note: Chirac will lose his immunity from prosecution upon
leaving office; corruption charges for political financing
activities dating from before he became president remain
pending against him. End note.) Hollande said that he did
not believe that Chirac would prefer to see the PS candidate
take the presidency rather than see Sarkozy become his
successor. Even so, Hollande also spoke of the bitterly
personal, "fratricidal" rivalries on the center-right,
comparing them to the less personal, more ideological
rivalries in his center-left, PS.
THE CHALLENGE OF REFORM WITHOUT A MANDATE
-----------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Hollande said that whoever wins the presidency in
2007, the electoral system and divisions in the electorate
are such that the victor will not have a "mandate for
reform," and certainly not a mandate in the majority
rule/winner-takes-all "American" sense of the term. This
meant that reforms would come slowly, if at all. However,
Hollande also ruled out the possibility of a president from
one party and a parliamentary majority from another, saying
that he believed the back-to-back presidential and
legislative elections would both reflect the voters' decision
for change. This would help, Hollande said, to bring about
some significant reforms, albeit slowly.
UPBEAT ABOUT THE STATE OF THE PS
--------------------------------
¶6. (C) Hollande was bullish and buoyant about the state of
the PS. He pointed to the party's recent consensus on its
"project for 2007" -- a platform statement that all the
party's presidential hopefuls agreed to with little argument
-- as evidence of the party's stability and unity, even as he
allowed that it would not be binding on the various
candidates. Hollande and Moscovici agreed that recent
meetings to hammer out the platform were, by PS standards,
rather non-eventful, and the press coverage of rejection of
proposals by Royal and others "highly exaggerated."
¶7. (C) Hollande proudly underlined the policy statement's
call for enhanced social programs, while admitting, when
pressed, that implementing everything it calls for might
prove a little "expensive." (Comment: Indeed, differences
over the likely cost of the PS's electoral program (Hollande
cites the figure of 30 billion Euros, whereas Strauss-Kahn
has said the price tag is closer to 50 billion) are sure to
fuel controversy over the proposal and PS candidate's
commitment to implementing it if elected. End Comment.)
Hollande added that the electoral program's "social
dimension" could help the PS attract center-right "Gaullist
voters" disaffected with the UMP's free-market liberalism.
PREDICTS A ONE-ROUND PRIMARY
----------------------------
¶8. (C) Hollande confidently predicted that the PS would
unify behind whoever wins the primary in the interest of
victory -- though he conceded that primaries can sometimes
weaken rather than strengthen a candidate. He defended the
November date for party's choosing of a candidate, saying
that, had the candidate been chosen now, he/she would have
been subjected to a potentially crippling drumbeat of
criticism from the right. Hollande also confidently
predicted that the PS's November primary would produce a
clear cut winner, "probably in just one round." Hollande
said that, above all, party members "want a winner" and will
therefore support the candidate most likely to beat Sarkozy
in a putative, second round run-off.
ROYAL
-----
¶9. (C) Hollande strongly implied that that candidate could
easily be Royal, saying that if the primary were held today,
"she will win and be the candidate," barring a sharp downturn
in her popularity in the pitiless triage of an intensifying
presidential campaign.
Hollande noted that Royal is not part of the traditional
party establishment, and commented that the attacks against
her have only served to make her all the more popular.
Referring to her opponents among the socialists, Hollande
said that those who resented her sudden success, and took
cheap shots at her, were as a practical matter, "acting as
her allies." Hollande wondered out loud if her popularity
would last, accurately identifying that as the key question
about her candidacy. Several times he mentioned the
unpredictability of politics, making clear that he believed
much could happen between now and next May's first round of
the presidential election that could turn upside down "the
givens of today." In particular, Hollande evoked how a major
international crisis -- he gave Iran as an example -- might
completely change the dynamics of the upcoming elections.
CAREFUL NOT TO RULE OUT HIS OWN CANDIDACY
-----------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Hollande was careful to make clear that he too was
prepared to run as a unifying candidate, but only if it
seemed to him he would be likely to win the party primary --
hands down in the first round. He was categorical in ruling
out that that he would not/not run "out of pride" or "to get
10 percent of the vote." (Comment: Clearly, the only
circumstances under which Hollande would be likely to win big
in the primary, is if Royal for some reason drops out. End
Comment.)
FABIUS
------
¶11. (C) Hollande contrasted his "team player" attitude with
what he dismissively called former prime minister Laurent
Fabius' "accountant" mentality, saying, "just because 20
percent of the party supports him, he thinks that entitles
him to 20 percent of whatever the party does." Almost as an
afterthought, Hollande added "no matter what, Fabius will
run."
EUROPE
------
¶12. (C) Moscovici said that a PS administration would be much
more pro-Europe than President Chirac and Prime Minister de
Villepin (see also reftel). Both Hollande and Moscovici saw
a need to use Europe to consolidate defense industries and
reduce defense expenditures through economies of scale.
Hollande noted sardonically that France was unable to sell
its fighters and tanks to anyone. Moscovici saw a need for
an increased parliamentary role in policy-making related to
Europe, complaining that there was currently too much power
concentrated in the presidency. Hollande described the
absurd situation where the prime minister, who does not
participate in European Council meetings, represents the
government during the question-and-answer sessions in the
National Assembly to defend policies set by the President.
Hollande did not disagree with timeline set by Chirac and
German Chancellor Merkel for getting Europe back on its feet
in 2007-2008, noting the importance of the Franco-German
tandem and saying that, if the effort failed, it would take
another 4-5 years to come up with something new.
¶13. (C) Both Hollande and Moscovici made clear they that they
believed Chirac had no credibility for proposing anything now
to advance the European project, and both dismissed the idea
that the rejected constitution could be subjected to a second
referendum or, worse in their view, passed through
parliament. Holland and Moscovici agreed something new would
be required "to get Europe moving again," but they had
nothing specific to suggest. In the interim, Moscovici
suggested, it might be possible to use Croatian accession to
introduce a few institutional reforms that could be approved
by the parliaments of member states. Hollande dismissed
Sarkozy's ideas for having the six largest EU members states
play a leading role in setting policy, saying they were based
on outmoded ideas of "great powers" setting policy for
"little powers.".
FRANCE ) U.S. RELATIONS
-----------------------
¶14. (C) Hollande gave a slightly different version of the
argument we usually hear that, while the French at a large
disagree with the U.S. intervention in Iraq, Chirac and
Villepin should nonetheless not have confronted the U.S. so
openly. Hollande argued that Chirac erred by not making it
clear from the beginning how far he was prepared to go to
oppose the U.S. If Chirac had communicated more clearly how
strongly he felt about the matter, it would not have led to
the false impression that France might come along in the end.
Moscovici repeated his calls for dialogue aimed at
attempting to find agreement when the U.S. and France should
differ, adding that differences should be the exception and
not the rule. Hollande said he wanted a French foreign
policy more firmly rooted in universal values, such as
support for democracy, rather than the highly personalized
approach which characterized the Chirac years.
COMMENT
-------
¶15. (C) The are those among the PS's heavyweights, --
Strauss-Kahn, Fabius and their supporters -- who believe that
Hollande is subtly, successfully shaping developments so that
the PS candidate will wind up being either Royal or himself.
Commentators and party insiders refer to this pair of
possible outcomes as the "popularity" and "institutional"
options. In the case of the first, Royal successfully uses
her popularity with the public to impose herself on the party
as its candidate. If, however, Royal and her popularity
should for some reason falter, revealing a deeply splintered
party with no attractive candidates (the situation before her
emergence as the clear front-runner), then the
"institutional" option -- turning to the party leader to lead
the party in the election -- could become a viable one.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON