

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 10PRISTINA84, KOSOVO CELEBRATES SECOND ANNIVERSARY WITH SUCCESSES AND
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10PRISTINA84.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10PRISTINA84 | 2010-02-17 15:34 | 2010-12-09 21:30 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Pristina |
VZCZCXRO5933
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHPS #0084/01 0481534
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171534Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9735
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1362
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1924
RHFMIUU/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUZEJAA/USNIC PRISTINA SR
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 PRISTINA 000084
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, INL, DRL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM EAID SR KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO CELEBRATES SECOND ANNIVERSARY WITH SUCCESSES AND
CHALLENGES
PRISTINA 00000084 001.2 OF 005
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Kosovo celebrated the second anniversary of its
independence on February 17. These two years have seen political
stability that has allowed the country to create legitimate new
institutions, including the Constitutional Court and the Kosovo
Security Force, and to start fulfilling its Ahtisaari Plan
obligations, such as decentralization. Challenges remain, and
Pristina and the international community must focus on moving the
country towards eventual membership in the Euro-Atlantic
institutions that will act as a guarantor of Kosovo's viability and
security. Progress towards European Union membership and a role
within NATO will require a concerted focus on building institutions,
strengthening the country's system of justice, protecting its
multi-ethnicity, and developing its economy. In each of these
fields, Kosovo has been active in laying foundations for progress.
However, we cannot ignore that work remains. Political parties need
to move beyond their regional bases for support and cooperate better
in pursuit of national goals. The GOK, with more effective support
from EULEX, needs to build on its initial reforms in the justice
sector and intensify its anti-corruption efforts. Pristina, with
the help of the international community, wants to replicate the
success of decentralization in southern Kosovo that empowers Serb
communities and extend the same hope to northern Kosovo, where
Belgrade maintains an illegal stranglehold on municipal governance.
The GOK must use its string of economic reforms and privatizations
as a springboard to motivate private-sector growth. Eventual
membership in the European Union and other Euro-Atlantic
institutions will mitigate the challenge that Kosovo's small size
poses. The largest threats to this agenda come both from Belgrade
and the risk that Brussels will not use its influence there to
compel Belgrade's greater cooperation in allowing Kosovo to develop
and strengthen. END SUMMARY
KOSOVO AT TWO YEARS
-------------------
¶2. (SBU) The Republic of Kosovo turned two years old on February 17.
It has been two years marked by a number of successes. Most
notably, we have seen peace and government stability. Kosovo has
taken responsibility for ensuring its own democracy with elections
that it ran on its own for the first time since the end of the
conflict. Serbs in southern Kosovo participated in these elections
and are starting to accept that their survival runs through Pristina
rather than Belgrade. More Serbs, in fact, cast ballots in Kosovo's
municipal elections in November 2009 than in the illegitimate
parallel elections for local Serbian institutions that took place
throughout the year. New institutions, like the Constitutional
Court, are standing up and starting to earn respect as legitimate
bodies. Internationally, Kosovo has secured membership in both the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and recognitions of
Kosovo's independence now stand at 65 countries. At the
International Court of Justice, Kosovo (supported by many in the
international community, including the United States) presented a
strong case to challenge Belgrade's contention that the country's
independence fails to accord with international law, and we expect
that even an ambiguous opinion from the Court will open the door for
more states to recognize the country's independence.
¶3. (SBU) In short, Kosovo has much to celebrate on its independence
day. We must not forget, however, that Kosovo is a nascent state
that still confronts challenges. Its stability is laudable, but
its political scene is fractious as inexperienced political parties
tend to elevate narrow interests above national goals. The legacy
of conflict and socialism has weakened its institutions, and its
economy remains a work in progress. Kosovo continues to look to the
international community for guidance, and it sees in this advice a
path that will lead to eventual membership in the Euro-Atlantic
community of nations, an end-goal that will act as a guarantor of
the country's independence, viability, and stability. In helping
Kosovo ultimately realize both European Union and NATO membership,
we need to focus our efforts in fostering the state's institutions,
developing the rule of law, promoting its multi-ethnicity, and
strengthening its economy.
BUILDING INSTITUTIONS
PRISTINA 00000084 002.2 OF 005
---------------------
¶4. (SBU) Kosovo's two largest parties -- the Democratic Party of
Kosovo (PDK) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) -- have
coexisted in stable government since national elections in November
¶2007. This stability has allowed the GOK to focus on several
post-independence institution building projects: embarking on
decentralization, standing up the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), and
creating the Constitutional Court, among others. The results have
been positive. We have seen Serbs turnout in large numbers to elect
Serb candidates for mayor and municipal assemblies in the new,
Ahtisaari-mandated, Serb municipalities. The KSF has broken ties
with the legacy of the Kosovo Liberation Army and is showing a
commitment to becoming a multi-ethnic force with its new pan-Kosovo
recruitment campaign. The Constitutional Court has earned
legitimacy as the final arbiter of elections-related disputes.
¶5. (SBU) The stability allows us to focus on critical economic
projects -- like the New Kosovo Power Plant and the privatization of
the state telecom, Post and Telecom of Kosovo -- with a stable
government partner focused on work rather than campaigning. It also
gives us time to encourage Kosovo politics to move beyond its
post-conflict paradigm, when all parties focused on independence to
the exclusion of other considerations. Left-right policy dimensions
do not yet exist here. The large political parties have not yet
developed policy platforms that extend beyond reaffirming promises
to their core supporters. The LDK still sees itself as the
standard-bearer for late President Ibrahim Rugova. The PDK and the
Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) are outgrowths of the KLA
and continue to appeal to regional support bases. These lingering
identities too often obfuscate priorities and encourage leaders, at
times, to forget that national interests must take precedence.
IMPORTANCE OF THE RULE OF LAW
-----------------------------
¶6. (SBU) On February 16, President Sejdiu appointed new Supreme
Court judges and prosecutors. This action builds on a years-long,
continuing process of vetting for professional competence judges and
prosecutors. The vetting process involves both Kosovo and
international community arbiters, and the GOK's full acceptance of
the results shows a commitment to developing an independent
judiciary that will start to fill the gaps that exist in Kosovo's
rule-of-law institutions. A similar process of interviews and
testing went into the selection of the Constitutional Court justices
last year, and we have seen this court grow in legitimacy over the
past several months. It has already had its own minor Marbury v.
Madison moment, exercising unchallenged authority over legislation
that controls the funding of the state radio and television
broadcaster. Although the ruling has invited critics and
controversy, none of these critics has questioned the role that the
Court has played. This is a significant step in shoring up the
independence of the country's judicial institutions.
¶7. (SBU) There remains a need for more progress. In January of this
year one of Kosovo's most widely read newspapers noted in an
editorial that Kosovo's system of justice needs deep reform. The
GOK, too, recognizes that it faces a challenge in developing its
legal institutions, and the Prime Minister has adopted a legislative
strategy for the year that prioritizes the rule of law. It is a
strategy that will modernize and reform the court structure,
invigorate the country's prosecutorial ranks, and create an
institutional foundation where objectivity has an opportunity to
flourish. Concurrent with this legislative strategy, the GOK --
with more active assistance from EULEX -- will need to strengthen
its anti-corruption efforts, a difficult challenge in a country this
small, where businesses often claim a political patron. Despite the
inherent difficulties, our institution-building efforts must
prioritize the rule of law and the fight against corruption. The
public needs to feel confident that laws apply to everyone. EULEX
needs to step up its activity and deliver long-promised arrests of
high-ranking corrupt public officials, or we run a risk that our
rule-of-law reforms will fall flat and leave the public with a
perception that the government is little more than a kleptocracy.
A MULTI-ETHNIC STATE
PRISTINA 00000084 003.2 OF 005
--------------------
¶8. (SBU) Kosovo has made a strong start in fulfilling its promises
under the Ahtisaari plan to empower Serb communities. Serb mayors,
following municipal elections in November 2009, now hold office in
the new municipalities of Gracanica, Klokot, and Ranilug. In
Strpce, a pre-existing municipality where the Serb majority refused
to participate in the November 2007 elections, a new legitimate Serb
mayor has taken significant steps to undo the influence of the
illegal parallel municipal government that answers to Belgrade. In
Pristina, the central government is devolving more authority to all
municipalities, giving local residents a louder voice in shaping
their communities' future. Most refreshing is that that the GOK
continues to focus on these Serb communities, providing them with
significant new resources in the 2010 budget that will allow them to
strengthen the new municipal structures and develop their
infrastructure.
¶9. (SBU) In northern Kosovo the challenges surrounding integration
are greater. Belgrade's legitimacy outstrips Pristina's in the
northern municipalities of Leposavic, Zubin Potok, and Zvecan, but
it may not be as unchallenged as Belgrade would like us to think. A
municipal preparation team (MPT) is now working in the planned new
municipality of North Mitrovica, which will hold a special election
later this year to select its inaugural government. This MPT is the
GOK's first step in building on the success of its decentralization
efforts in the South. It has adopted a comprehensive approach to
the North that entails an incremental "hearts and minds" campaign to
win greater support from northern Serbs to work with Kosovo
institutions. The illegal parallel institutions that control the
North are little more than fronts for organized crime, and the
region has become stagnant. The Serbs north of the Ibar River
consistently point to the absence of the rule of law there, and this
could prove to be the tool that begins their acceptance of Pristina
-- if the GOK and EULEX, together, can make meaningful progress in
shutting down the criminal networks that dominate throughout the
North. Pristina can offer hope, but it cannot achieve success on
its own. The Europeans need to contribute. EULEX needs to crack
down on organized crime, and Brussels must use the lure of EU
integration to compel Belgrade to play a helpful role in returning
law and order to northern Kosovo. Pristina cannot return hope to
the North if the international community will not stop Belgrade from
interfering in the region's development.
ECONOMIC REFORMS AND PRIVATE SECTOR GROWTH
------------------------------------------
¶10. (SBU) At the central level Kosovo has laid a strong foundation
for economic reforms. In recent months the Assembly has adopted a
debt law that sets rational limits on the amount of debt that the
country can incur and should allow Kosovo to pursue a sovereign
credit rating that will permit it to finance its development. The
IMF has provided guidance on a Central Bank law that will both
strengthen the institution and open opportunities for more
development assistance. And, the GOK is demonstrating an ever
improving control of its budgetary process, delivering a
comprehensive and reasonable 2010 budget to the Assembly that
prioritizes critical needs. Amid these steps, privatization
continues. The GOK hosted a pre-bid conference for representatives
from three pre-qualified consortia interested in entering into a
public-private partnership for the Pristina Airport which we expect
will attract a 100 hundred million Euro investment, with a contract
awarded in April. Further cause for optimism is on the near horizon
with the upcoming privatization of the Kosovo Energy Corporation and
development of a new 500MW power plant that will put an end to the
rolling blackouts that still affect the country. When this plant
comes online, industry will find a more inviting environment for
setting up business.
¶11. (SBU) These important steps do not mask Kosovo's current
economic woes that leave many Kosovars without work. With an
unemployment rate of greater than 40 percent, the economy is
suffering. There is little industry, the private sector is
underdeveloped, and the country's greatest natural resource --
lignite -- is underutilized due to a dilapidated power
infrastructure. At present, the government remains the primary
PRISTINA 00000084 004.2 OF 005
engine that drives the economy, a model that is not sustainable.
Government contracts for road-building projects help to provide
temporary employment, but they do not offer the longer term economic
stability that the country requires. In the coming years, both the
government and the international donor community need to redirect
their efforts towards projects that will spark greater dynamism and
diversity within the private sector. The central reforms that have
occurred -- and will continue throughout the rest of the year --
provide hope that Kosovo will soon feature a strong economic
framework where private sector growth will necessarily follow.
EURO-ATLANTIC INSTITUTIONS
--------------------------
¶12. (SBU) Kosovo's small size presents a challenge for its survival,
a challenge that the international community can help surmount with
its Euro-Atlantic institutions. The lure of these institutions --
in particular, the European Union and NATO -- are tantalizing
opportunities that focus the attention of the GOK. With a small
population where family and klan ties provide dominant affiliations,
Kosovo is susceptible to corruption that will retard development.
On the security front, Kosovo is currently a NATO protectorate, but
those forces are beginning to withdraw, and Kosovo leaders are
wondering whether or not the small (no more than 2500 active members
according to the Ahtisaari Plan) and lightly armed Kosovo Security
Force (KSF) can fill the void that KFOR will leave. The antidote
for both of these problems is membership within the European Union
and NATO, and this Euro-Atlantic orientation is the primary issue
that unifies the country's dueling political forces around a core
national vision.
¶13. (SBU) Prime Minister Thaci, daily, expresses his commitment to
readying Kosovo for EU consideration, and he regards the next
European Union Progress Report on Kosovo, due in June, with a mix of
anxiety and optimism. He wants to show the electorate that his
leadership is bringing Kosovo closer to Brussels, and he wants to be
the person who brings EU visa liberalization to Kosovo. Over the
longer term, the country needs EU membership as an outlet for its
young workforce and as a unified market for exports. It also needs
to define its future relationship with NATO. Every Kosovar desires
full membership in an institution second only to the United States
in the hagiography of Kosovo's recent history. The limitations that
the Ahtisaari Plan places on the Kosovo Security Force are going to
prove contentious over time, especially once KFOR withdraws
completely. Without an agreed and viable connection to NATO, we run
the risk that unofficial militias will again develop out of fear
that the country is unable to defend itself from aggression.
COMMENT:
--------
¶14. (SBU) Kosovo's independence has been a success story. The worst
fears -- large scale population movements and outbreaks of violence
-- following February 17, 2008, never materialized. The political
scene, while fractious, works together on the big issues, like
decentralization and establishing new institutions. The
international community and the Kosovars, themselves, can feel good
about the positive steps that have occurred over the past two years,
but we cannot ignore the challenges that remain. With each passing
day we need to see the GOK take more responsibility for securing the
country's future -- more activity on lobbying for recognitions, more
temperate political debate, greater respect for the rule of law, and
a concerted focus on national interests -- but there remains an ever
present role for the international community. Pristina cannot yet
extend its authority across its entire territory. The International
Steering Group on February 8 gave its blessing to a comprehensive
approach that will bolster Pristina's presence in the North, but
this approach will also require international support. Indeed, each
of the steps towards Kosovo's eventual membership in the European
Union will require international attention, and we need to make sure
that Brussels gives Pristina the same consideration that it pays to
Belgrade. Above all, the progress that Kosovo makes in overcoming
the challenges it confronts should play the determining role in the
country's qualifications for European Union and NATO membership. We
need to keep the GOK's focus squarely on its responsibilities while
reminding our European partners that they too have a role to play.
PRISTINA 00000084 005.2 OF 005
END COMMENT
DELL