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Viewing cable 09NAIROBI656, PROPELLING THE REFORM PROCESS IN KENYA: MEETINGS
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09NAIROBI656 | 2009-04-02 13:55 | 2011-03-02 22:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Nairobi |
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHNR #0656/01 0921355
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021355Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9054
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0503
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 6458
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 3232
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3165
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3025
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 5448
C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 000656
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2039
TAGS: KDEM KE PGOV PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: PROPELLING THE REFORM PROCESS IN KENYA: MEETINGS
WITH KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger for
reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d)
FROM THE AMBASSADOR
¶1. (C) Summary. On March 23 I met separately with the
National Intelligence Chief, the Foreign Minister, and the
President,s permanent secretary to press on implementation
of the reform agenda. I called attention to growing concerns
at senior levels in Washington regarding insufficient
progress. I emphasized our support for Kofi Annan's
continued engagement and made clear that, while we recognize
that the culture of impunity will not be reversed overnight,
we expect to see results on key reform issues. These three
interlocutors will undoubtedly brief President Kibaki. I am
also meeting with key officials close to PM Odinga to convey
the same message. These meetings are part of our continuing
efforts to propel the reform agenda, which also include
vigorous public diplomacy and outreach to civil society, the
private sector, religious groups, and the media, among other
steps. End summary.
¶2. (C) On March 23 I met separately with three key senior
officials to make clear U.S. concern regarding insufficient
action to advance implementation of the reform agenda to
which the coalition government committed itself. The three,
the head of the National Intelligence Service Michael
Gichangi, Foreign Minister Moses Wetangula, and Presidential
Permanent Secretary and head of the civil service Francis
Muthaura, are to one degree or another close to President
Kibaki and will undoubtedly brief him on my message. (I am
reaching out separately to officials linked to Prime Minister
Odinga, and I will follow up by seeing the President and PM
directly.)
¶3. (C) My message was essentially the same for all three. I
emphasized, among other points, growing concerns at senior
levels in Washington regarding the slowing of implementation
of the reform agenda. I told them that we strongly support
Kofi Annan,s continued involvement. I recognized that
significant progress was made during the first eight months
of the coalition government, but noted that progress has
slowed now that the government is up against the hard issues
related to tackling the culture of impunity: holding
accountable perpetrators of post-election violence and taking
actions against corruption. I highlighted particularly the
need to move forward on the following key issues:
constitutional revision, the setting up of the independent
electoral commission, the establishment of the local Special
Tribunal on post-election violence, specific actions against
corruption, and movement on police and judicial reforms. The
U.S, I made clear, shares the expectations of the Kenyan
people that the coalition government must follow through on
its commitment to the reform agenda. I noted that I have
written to both President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga on
the reform process issues. I emphasized to them the need to
reach out to civil society, the private sector, religious
groups, and the media to work in an inclusive way to advance
reforms. I pointed out that the partnership between the U.S.
and Kenya is based to a substantial degree on shared
democratic values. The coalition government should not take
this partnership for granted. The U.S. and others who
supported the coalition agreement were not supporting the
status quo, but rather a commitment to launch a process of
fundamental change to address the underlying causes of the
crisis and to help Kenya build stronger, more inclusive, and
more transparent democratic institutions. We understand that
the culture of impunity will not be reversed overnight, but
the reform agenda will begin the process of fundamental
change. I noted increased concerns about extra-judicial
killings and increased threats to human rights activists. In
that regard, I expressed concern that the government has not
accepted our offer to have the FBI help in investigating the
murders of the two human rights activists. (PM Odinga
accepted the offer, but the police have refused to sit down
with the FBI, and the Foreign Minister subsequently wrote us
declining the offer.) I pointed out that the AGOA forum
planned for August is a big opportunity, but noted that it
will not be fully successfully for Kenya unless progress has
been made on political and economic reforms before then.
I also made clear to all three that the U.S. ) despite the
way that some seek to distort the picture ) is neither
pro-Odinga nor pro-Kibaki. We are pro-coalition government.
In order for the coalition government to work, the Prime
Minister needs to be able to do his job effectively, and
there needs to be good cooperation between Kibaki and Odinga.
¶4. (C) Gichangi (who briefs the President regularly)
acknowledged that the reform process has not moved as quickly
as Kenyans expected. However, he said, politics &is about
realpolitik and the art of the doable.8 Much time has been
wasted in sorting out politics within the coalition
government, he admitted. Politicians are prematurely focused
on the 2012 elections. All of this has generated a lot of
&negativity8 among the Kenyan people, who perhaps had
unrealistic expectations about what the coalition government
would achieve. Meanwhile, the global economic crisis has had
a major impact on Kenya, and this has fueled unhappiness and
unrest, particularly among the youth (two-thirds of the
population). Kenya also suffers, Gichangi said, from "the
Moi hangover of high-handed leadership." Gichangi
recognized the need for the coalition government to do more
on the reform process but, though I pressed, he avoided
specifics. (We know that Gichangi is a bitter rival of Police
Commissioner Ali, and would like to see Ali removed, which
would, we believe, pave the way for police reform.)
¶5. (C) The Foreign Minister,s points were similar to those
made by Gichangi. He acknowledged that the coalition
government is at a moment of truth and must &get its act
together.8 He said that Kibaki and Odinga planned to bring
ministers together in April for a retreat focused mainly on
the issue of how to proceed with respect to the reform
agenda. Our lengthy discussion produced nothing new.
¶6. (C) Among knowledgeable Kenyan observers, Muthaura is
considered to be virtually a &shadow president,8 so much
power does he wield. Muthaura argued that the reform agenda
is in fact moving forward and was defensive on the specific
issue of corruption. He maintained that the coalition system
of each ministry having a minister from one party of the
coalition and an assistant minister from the other party in
effect introduced a &checks and balances8 system that
contributes to greater transparency and accountability. He
noted that the budgeting process is done by professional
civil servants and not open to a lot of manipulation
(conveniently overlooking the fact that much corruption is
alleged to take place in the ample "off budget" budget). He
alluded to a couple of additional anti-corruption steps the
government may take, such as out-sourcing audits of state
corporations. He stressed that President Kibaki is fully
committed to "fast tracking" implementation of the reform
agenda, in concert with PM Odinga. (While the fast-tracking
part is not credible, Odinga has repeatedly told me that he
has a good working relationship with Kibaki.)
¶7. (C) During the course of a long and candid discussion,
I challenged Muthaura on most of these points with the
bottom-line being that ) if things are going on in the
reform process as Muthaura alleges ) then this needs to be
explained to the Kenyan people. That was a point that
Muthaura took, admitting that the coalition government has
done a terrible job of presenting its accomplishments, and
the challenges it faces, to the Kenyan people. (Interesting
) and probably coincidentally -- Kibaki subsequently began a
systematic tour of the entire country intended to lay out
what the coalition government is doing, including how it is
addressing the impact of the global economic crisis.)
Muthaura also agreed with me that both the President and
Prime Minister "need to send the right signals." In that
regard, he said that President Kibaki will set a clear agenda
to move ahead on reform when he addresses Parliament when it
reconvenes the latter part of April. I told Muthaura that
one "right signal" would be reaching out to civil society
to hear and take into account their concerns about the need
to strengthen the proposed legislation to establish the
Special Tribunal in order to make it more independent and
credible. Having civil society on board would increase
pressure on Parliamentarians to support the legislation.
Muthaura agreed on the utility of doing this.
¶8. (C) Muthaura said that he would brief the President
regarding U.S. concerns that the reform process is not moving
quickly enough. Kibaki will hear the same message through
Gichangi and Wetangula as well.
¶9. (C) These meetings are part of our continuing efforts to
propel the reform agenda, which also include vigorous public
diplomacy and outreach to civil society, the private sector,
religious groups, and the media, among other steps.
RANNEBERGER