

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07MANAMA659, REFLECTIONS ON AL-WIFAQ'S EFFORTS IN PARLIAMENT
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MANAMA659.
VZCZCXRO3592
OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0659/01 1971230
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161230Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7020
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAMA 000659
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL BA POL
SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON AL-WIFAQ'S EFFORTS IN PARLIAMENT
REF: A. REF. MANAMA 476
¶B. REF. 06 MANAMA 1214
Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) In this, al-Wifaq's first legislative session in
Bahrain's Council of Representatives (COR), the society has
fielded inexperienced MPs and endured poor relations with the
government and other political societies as a result of
al-Wifaq's boycott of the 2002 elections. However, al-Wifaq
has built trust among the other COR blocs and the government,
which has allowed it to pass proposals that are held in
common by other blocs. Al-Wifaq supported a 15% public
sector pay increase, income subsidies for those awaiting
public housing, a welfare system, and unemployment insurance.
On the more controversial issues of political rights,
individual freedoms, and constitutional reform, however,
al-Wifaq has seen a lack of support from other parliamentary
blocs, due largely to government influence over them. The
lack of cooperation from the government and other blocs has
led to increasing constituent discontent for al-Wifaq, which
has pushed the party to place a premium on widely supported
standard of living and general services legislation to retain
constituent support. Al-Wifaq also contends with the
rejectionist Haq, which actively discredits al-Wifaq to
advance its own cause. By allowing al-Wifaq to achieve more
results in the COR, the government can continue to bolster
al-Wifaq's legitimacy among its constituents and encourage
participation in government, rather than with Haq. However,
by continuing to limit al-Wifaq,s ability to pass
legislation, the government may risk delegitimizing al-Wifaq
and increasing the credibility of Haq in what may be a zero
sum game between the two Shiite groups. End Summary.
------------------------------------------
Al-Wifaq,s Experience in the First Session
------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Meeting with Emboffs June 19, head of leading Shia
political society al-Wifaq,s 2006 election campaign Jassim
Redha said that he had been dissatisfied with his society's
election candidates because many were religious figures
without political experience. He explained that al-Wifaq
officials had been limited in how much they could influence
the slate of candidates because constituents recommended
candidates to the party. While society officials could veto
a choice, they worried that doing so widely would alienate
constituents. Instead, al-Wifaq accepted the nominations of
religious figures because it needed as many votes in
parliament as possible. The result, according to Redha, has
been a crop of MPs among which only five or six are qualified
and capable of producing results in parliament, while the
rest were elected for religious reasons.
¶3. (C) Al-Wifaq,s boycott of the 2002 elections resulted in
poor relations with the government and participating
political societies. When al-Wifaq,s MPs assumed their
roles in parliament following the 2006 elections, they were
initially faced with the need to repair those relationships.
Regarding the building of trust with the government, al-Wifaq
MP Dr. Jassim Hussein expressed satisfaction at al-Wifaq,s
access to ministers and the ministers, willingness to listen
and act on al-Wifaq,s concerns, with the exception of the
Sunni-dominated Ministry of Defense. (Note: Hussein, a
former Bahrain University professor who currently authors
several economic columns in the local press, told Econoff
July 15 that ministers were afraid not to respond to him.
"They always answer me quickly. They know I can make trouble
for them." End note.) According to al-Wifaq MP Jawad
Fairooz, when they started working with the other societies
in parliament, they found agreement on 40-50% of their
agenda, including raising the standard of living and
improving general services. However, while al-Wifaq had
additional issues on their agenda, Fairooz indicated that the
other societies did not. Thus, in order to gain political
allies and build trust, al-Wifaq chose to focus primarily on
these common issues of wages, housing, welfare, unemployment,
education, and the building of additional health centers.
They delayed pursuing the political reform portion of their
agenda, namely political rights, individual freedoms, and
constitutional amendments.
¶4. (C) Fairooz indicated that al-Wifaq supported a wage
proposal increasing salaries by 15% in the public sector.
Al-Wifaq also supported a bill that provided income subsidies
for those awaiting government housing. For poor families in
need of financial assistance, al-Wifaq supported a one-time
MANAMA 00000659 002 OF 004
BD100 ($265) payout and a monthly BD150 ($398) welfare
payment from the Ministry of Social Development. All three
of these measures have passed the COR with al-Wifaq,s
support and are awaiting a government response. Al-Wifaq
supported an unemployment insurance program approved by the
government by Royal Decree. As it became clear that the
program would include a 1% mandatory deduction from
employees' salaries, al-Wifaq's constituents became
unsettled. (Note: This issue has since become a political
and religious issue and al-Wifaq has clarified that it
supports the program in principle, but does not support
mandatory salary deductions. The deductions began from
June's salary. End note.)
---------------------------------------
Challenges on Controversial Legislation
---------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Political rights and individual freedoms, Fairooz
explained, are points of contention among the parliamentary
blocs. While other blocs do not include these issues in
their agenda, al-Wifaq considers them essential in building a
functioning democracy. Despite low support from other blocs,
al-Wifaq expects to receive drafts of a freedom of assembly
law and a press freedom law in the next session. However,
Fairooz speculated that the government would delay that
process as long as is legally permissible because the
proposed legislation was not supported by the government or
by pro-government blocs.
¶6. (C) According to Fairooz, al-Wifaq considers the eventual
transformation of the government into a constitutional
monarchy critical to the long-term viability of the state.
However, no other bloc shares al-Wifaq,s interest in
constitutional reform, thus limiting their ability to pass
amendments to the constitution. In this parliamentary
session, Fairooz explained, al-Wifaq tested the political
will of the other blocs by submitting two proposals for
changes to the lawmaking process. First, al-Wifaq proposed
to eliminate Article 87, which created a "fast track" process
for laws related to finance or the economy, allowing the King
to enact them by Royal Decree if the COR or Shura failed to
express approval or disapproval of it. (Comment: The GOB's
use of Article 87, though sparing, has been controversial.
Ref. B. End Comment.) Al-Wifaq,s second proposed amendment
was to eliminate Article 109C, which allowed the government
to pass a two year budget instead of an annual budget.
Deleting the article would make the process revert to a one
year budget by default. Fairooz indicated that other blocs
in parliament had agreed to support all three measures in
private discussions, but the support disappeared on the day
of the vote. Fourteen MPs were absent that day, making it
impossible for the proposed amendments to secure the 2/3
majority (27 votes) required for the amendments to move to
the Shura.
-------------------------------------------
Government Response to al-Wifaq Initiatives
-------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) The largest opposition to al-Wifaq,s parliamentary
initiatives is the government and those who benefit from the
status quo. The foundation of this resistance, according to
Jassim Redha, is the parliament's established structure,
which includes the elected COR and the appointed Shura
Council. With a 2/3 approval requirement from both houses to
change the constitution, Redha said that parliament would
only be able to pass such an amendment if the government
supported the changes and appointed reformist members to the
Shura Council. Furthermore, Redha asserted that the Prime
Minister's preference is to show that "majlis democracy" is
better suited to Bahrain than a constitutional monarchy. In
this "majlis democracy," instead of allowing legislation to
work its way through parliament a system of patronage from
the Prime Minister and King allows those capable of gaining
an audience with the royal family to push through change
without involving the parliament and thereby undermining the
parliamentary system. For further evidence of government
resistance to change, Redha cited eight bills and 52
proposals that al-Wifaq initiated, added to 42 bills put
forth by the rest of the parliamentary blocs, to which the
government responded to zero within the parliamentary
session. (Note: The constitution does not require a
government response within the same session, but allows for a
response in the succeeding year's legislative session. End
note.)
¶8. (C) In light of the relationships other parliamentary
blocs had built with each other and the government in the
2002-2006 parliament, Jawad Fairooz indicated that al-Wifaq
was at a disadvantage in trying to form its own coalition and
MANAMA 00000659 003 OF 004
support base within parliament. He said that the Royal
Court's influence over the Sunni parliamentary blocs was so
significant that the Court could deliver "suggestions" to MPs
to vote for or against a particular bill, a concern echoed by
Dr. Jassim Hussein. Examples Fairooz provided were issues on
which al-Wifaq thought it had secured the support of other
blocs in private discussions, but later the blocs voted
against. According to Fairooz, for one such vote a Sunni MP
came from the hospital, where he was scheduled to undergo an
operation that day, in order to cast his dissenting vote. A
second example was of a Sunni MP who left his dying mother to
vote against an al-Wifaq supported bill, causing him to miss
the final moments of his mother's life. Fairooz presented
these as obvious evidence of government influence over the
Sunni blocs, saying that this represents "control" over their
votes.
----------------------
Constituent Impatience
----------------------
¶9. (C) Dr. Jassim Hussein explained that al-Wifaq MPs meet
regularly with their constituents to gauge public opinion of
the society. He felt that while their constituents continue
to support the society and remain dedicated to the
parliamentary process, they are increasingly discontent with
al-Wifaq's inability to pass reform legislation. Mohammed
al-Shaikh and Yousif Zainal, former MPs defeated by al-Wifaq
candidates in the 2006 elections, asserted that al-Wifaq,s
action in this first session was more reactive to constituent
discontent over perceived al-Wifaq ineffectiveness than
proactive. Both cited the last-minute proposal to question
Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Shaikh Ahmed bin
Atiyatullah al-Khalifa on corruption allegations as a direct
response to constituent impatience and displeasure.
¶10. (C) Regarding constituent impatience, Fairooz explained
that the society's constituents are inexperienced in the
political process. He admitted that while al-Wifaq was
building trust with members of the other blocs, progress on
al-Wifaq's agenda was too slow for some of its constituents,
due in part to al-Wifaq MPs' inexperience. Fairooz explained
that al-Wifaq was further distracted from its parliamentary
duties by the need to defuse growing tensions between its
constituents and security forces over continuing
demonstrations. While al-Wifaq MPs felt a sense of
accomplishment at the end of this legislative session, more
tangible action to improve the standard of living and general
services needs to be taken in order to retain constituent
support.
-----------------
The Haq Challenge
-----------------
¶11. (C) Al-Wifaq MPs Dr. Jassim Hussein and Jawad Fairooz
and Dr. Abdul Aziz Abul, an independent Sunni MP who aligns
himself with al-Wifaq on non-religious issues, convey a sense
of urgency that al-Wifaq needs to attain tangible results in
the next parliamentary session to prevent al-Wifaq,s
constituents from changing their allegiance to Haq. Hussein
explained that in the first parliamentary session al-Wifaq
MPs in areas where Haq is strongly supported have already
experienced strong discontent from their constituents. Abul
explained that in his own district a portion of his
constituents felt al-Wifaq was too passive in parliament and
wanted a more hard-line stance in line with Haq. Fairooz
asserted that Haq actively discredits al-Wifaq by claiming it
passes negative laws, such as the 1% salary deduction, so as
to draw al-Wifaq supporters to Haq. Mohammed al-Shaikh
explained that since Haq and al-Wifaq pull from the same
Shiite pool, if current al-Wifaq supporters view the bloc as
inactive, they are likely to reject political participation
and support Haq. Al-Shaikh explained that the more support
Haq takes from al-Wifaq, the harder it will be for al-Wifaq
to achieve political solutions to constituent issues, and the
more likely it will be for Haq to act on its rejectionist
rhetoric.
-------------
Looking Ahead
-------------
¶12. (C) Dr. Jassim Hussein indicated that al-Wifaq intends
to draft concrete proposals on salaries and living conditions
over the summer recess. Jawad Fairooz expressed optimism
over the cooperation al-Wifaq has built with Sunni blocs in
parliament and believed that cooperation would continue in
the next session as al-Wifaq pursues its standard of living
agenda. In addition, he explained that al-Wifaq remained
concerned that working strictly through parliament may take
MANAMA 00000659 004 OF 004
too long or be ultimately too ineffective for the society to
maintain its support base. Thus, he indicated that al-Wifaq
will seek to open channels of communication with the
government outside of parliament so as to use every resource
at its disposal to realize its agenda. Dr. Abdul Aziz Abul
indicated that the al-Wifaq bloc would support a
parliamentary audit of government finances in the following
legislative session; including an approval of the 2004-2005
budget and an inquiry into the 2005-2006 budget.
¶13. (C) Even though al-Wifaq failed to gain enough support
to question Shaikh Ahmed in the closing days of the session,
Jassim Redha indicated that al-Wifaq will renew the call for
an investigation into corruption allegations of Shaikh Ahmed.
Yousif Zainal speculated that the King may reassign Sheikh
Ahmed during the parliamentary recess to a position outside
of COR oversight so as to avoid questioning of his
activities.
-------
Comment
-------
¶14. (C) While al-Wifaq,s inexperience in governance is
itself a significant challenge to realizing tangible
progress, the extent of government resistance to future
al-Wifaq efforts remains to be seen. To create political
legitimacy for al-Wifaq and counter Haq support, the
government has granted al-Wifaq public relations victories
regarding security and Haq. The highest profile such
incident was al-Wifaq leader Shaikh Ali Salman receiving
partial credit for the King's order to drop the criminal case
against Haq's leader, Hasan Mushaima, and Abdulhadi
al-Khawaja on the eve of their trial for promoting change to
the political system through illegitimate means and inciting
hatred of the political system (Ref. A). However, public
relations victories are not sufficient to counter government
efforts to block parliamentary accomplishments. In order to
avoid boosting the profile of Haq and perhaps inviting
increasingly violent demonstrations from the group, the
government could allow al-Wifaq some success in parliament to
reward them and their constituents for participating in the
democratic process.
********************************************* ********
Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/
********************************************* ********
MONROE