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Viewing cable 06THEHAGUE834, AIVD REPORT...
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06THEHAGUE834 | 2006-04-18 05:45 | 2011-01-17 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy The Hague |
VZCZCXRO5897
RR RUEHAG RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ
RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTC #0834/01 1080545
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 180545Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5414
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000834
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/UBI, S/CT, D/HS, EUR/PGI, INL
JUSTICE FOR OIA - JFRIEDMAN
DHS FOR OIA - DSEQUEIRA
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER PINR PINS PGOV NL
SUBJECT: AIVD REPORT...
60789,4/18/2006 5:45,06THEHAGUE834,"Embassy The Hague",UNCLASSIFIED//FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY,,"VZCZCXRO5897
RR RUEHAG RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ
RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTC #0834/01 1080545
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 180545Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5414
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000834
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/UBI, S/CT, D/HS, EUR/PGI, INL
JUSTICE FOR OIA - JFRIEDMAN
DHS FOR OIA - DSEQUEIRA
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER PINR PINS PGOV NL
SUBJECT: AIVD REPORT ON EMERGING TRENDS IN RADICALIZATION
AND VIOLENT JIHAD IN THE NETHERLANDS
¶1. (U) SUMMARY. The AIVD, the Dutch civilian intelligence
service, issued a report March 30 on the terrorist threat in
the Netherlands, entitled ""Violent Jihad in the Netherlands:
Current Trends in the Islamist Terrorist Threat."" The
report concludes that the terrorist threat in the
Netherlands now comes primarily from decentralized local
networks based in the country, and that a process of
""autonomous radicalization,"" primarily through the Internet,
is replacing top-down recruitment by charismatic leaders as
the principal source of radicalization and incitement to
violent action.
¶2. (U) A trend toward ""virtualization of jihad,"" in which
extremist groups use the Internet to spread the ideology of
violent Jihad, maintain contacts, and obtain training is
also noted. The report highlights an increasingly prominent
role played by radicalized young women and Dutch converts
among extremist groups in the Netherlands. The report
argues that countering the terrorist threat requires a wellbalanced,
comprehensive effort that promotes integration,
encourages the Islamic community to resist radicalization,
and represses terrorist groups. End Summary.
¶3. (U) The report is part of a periodic series of AIVD
reports on terrorist trends. The full text has been emailed
to EUR/UBI, S/CT and INR. ""Violent Jihad"" examines
four trends in Islamic terrorism in Europe and the specific
situation in the Netherlands. The trends identified are: a
shift from external foreign terrorist threat to an
indigenous, or home-grown, terrorism, which the AIVD terms
""European jihad;"" a top-down process of decentralization and
local implantation of jihadist networks; an ""opposing but
complementary"" grass-roots process of radicalization and
emergence of local jihadist networks; and the
""virtualization of jihad,"" in which the Internet has become
the primary mechanism for dissemination of radical Islam and
recruitment for Jihad.
¶4. (U) In the Netherlands the principal terrorist threat is
now from decentralized local networks based in the
Netherlands. These groups are comprised primarily of young
Dutch Moroccans between 15 and 25 years old, often of Berber
background, who are seeking their identity and status in
Dutch society. The recruitment and radicalization of young
Muslims born and bred in the Netherlands takes place
principally through the Internet. ""Top down"" recruitment by
charismatic leaders in mosques has largely been replaced by
""bottom up"" radicalization by groups of youths who discover
radical Islam together, and incite each other to join the
armed struggle. The AIVD refers to this phenomenon as
""autonomous radicalization.""
¶5. (U) According to the report, factors that play a role in
radicalization and the willingness of young Dutch Muslims to
use violence include frustration and dissatisfaction with
their social position. They identify with neither the
traditional Islamic culture of their parents nor secular
Dutch society. Even relatively well-educated Dutch
Moroccans are often dissatisfied with their place in
society, in part as a result of discrimination and high
rates of unemployment. Young second and third generation
Dutch Muslims from other ethnic backgrounds are also seeking
their identities within Dutch society, but undergo the
process of radicalization to a significantly lesser extent
than Dutch Moroccans. Radicalized young women are playing a
more prominent and activist role in Jihad groups in the
Netherlands than in other European countries. There is also
a high profile group of Dutch converts to Islam among the
radicalized networks. (COMMENT. Convicted Hofstad Group
member Jason Walters is a dual national American Dutch
convert. End COMMENT.)
¶6. (U) The attraction of radical Islam for Dutch Muslim
youth has grown since the 2004 murder of Theo van Gogh. The
report stresses, however, that most radicalized youth adhere
to non-violent forms of political Islam; only as small
minority join violent Jihad groups. Receptiveness to
radicalization and readiness to engage in violent action,
which the AIVD terms ""jihadization,"" results from a
combination of youths' fixation on ""pure"" Islam as described
in extremist websites and chat rooms, and dissatisfaction
with local and international political and social
circumstances, such as perceived discrimination against
Islam in the West and the war in Iraq.
THE HAGUE 00000834 002 OF 003
¶7. (U) Jihad networks in the Netherlands are driven
primarily by domestic political events and have a strong
focus on Dutch socio-political issues. The report stresses
that in contrast to local networks in other European
countries, which tend to seek ""soft"" targets frequented by
large numbers of civilians, Dutch groups tend to target
individual politicians -- such as outspoken parliamentarians
Aayan Hirsi Ali and Gert Wilders -- and opinion leaders they
consider to be ""enemies of Islam.""
¶8. (U) The AIVD has identified 10 to 20 loosely organized
Jihad networks in the Netherlands. The Hofstad Group is the
best-known Dutch local network. A network may have a
permanent core of one or two persons surrounded by a limited
number of active supporters, but it can also consist of
dozens of people around a changing core group. Most Jihad
networks operating in the Netherlands are comprised of
European born individuals with Islamic backgrounds.
Although these local groups often have contacts with other
local and international groups, they are normally not
controlled by external groups, but act instead on their own
initiative in response to local developments.
¶9. (U) According to the AIVD, radicalization often develops
into ""jihadization"" during small, informal discussions.
Sometimes a charismatic leader plays a central role. For
example, a Syrian preacher was initially the main
inspiration for the Hofstad Group, though other group
members, in particular van Gogh murderer Mohamed Bouyeri,
also made ideological contributions to the radicalization
process. Many local networks in the Netherlands are heavily
influenced by ""neo-Takfir"" ideology, which the AIVD
describes as a European adaptation of the extremist Takfir
Wal Hijra ideology developed in Egypt in the 1960s. The
relatively simplistic, often incoherent ""neo-Takfir""
ideology justifies the use of violence against nonbelievers.
In addition, the report notes the evolution of a
local Dutch variant on radical Islam; though it does not
lead directly to violent action, it does appear to lower the
threshold for advocating Jihad. The ""neo-Takfir"" networks
are almost all interlinked to some extent, according to the
report. Some individuals linked to local networks are
planning to travel to Iraq or other conflict areas to join
the Jihad there, but most are focused on conducting Jihad at
home.
¶10. (U) In addition to these ""home grown"" groups, there are
a number of locally established internationally oriented
networks, which are controlled from abroad, or in which
foreign recruiters living in the Netherlands play a key
role. There are a limited number of transnational networks
in the Netherlands, according to the AIVD. The report
downplays the role of Al Qaeda as a ""strategic mastermind""
steering worldwide Jihad networks and preparing attacks,
suggesting it has instead become a ""brand name"" and
inspiration for decentralized Jihad networks that take
action based on local conditions.
¶11. (U) The report raises the concern that the local
networks will increasingly link up with international
Jihadist elements. It states that the highest threat comes
when the experience and methods of international networks
are linked with the youthful enthusiasm for martyrdom of the
local networks. There is some evidence that local networks
in the Netherlands are going through a continuous learning
process, and thus becoming more ""professional."" For
example, the arrests and trials of Hofstad Group members
have made them aware of police and AIVD strategy and
tactics, and they have since displayed more sophistication
in protecting their Internet communications.
¶12. (U) Moving from the specifics of the violent threat from
Jihad networks to broader societal effects, the report
stresses that radicalization not only raises the threat of
terrorist attacks in the short term, but also jeopardizes
social cohesion and solidarity in Dutch society, and
ultimately poses a threat to the democratic order of the
country. It posits that an effective counter-terrorism
policy must be linked to promoting integration and
mobilizing resistance within the Islamic community against
radicalization, as well as the implementation of measures to
prevent radicalization and repress terrorist individuals and
networks.
THE HAGUE 00000834 003 OF 003
¶13. (U) The report concludes that the Jihad threat might
diminish if the Netherlands succeeds in reversing the trend
of radicalization and ""Jihadization."" To accomplish this,
it stresses, it is crucial to achieve a balance between
protecting citizens from terrorism and preventing
unjustified anxiety and social polarization, particularly
since the latter could stimulate further radicalization.
¶14. (SBU) Comment. The AIVD report provides a thoughtful
review of developments in the terrorist threat in the
Netherlands. In documenting the social and psychological
roots of the on-going processes of radicalization and
receptiveness to violent Jihad among Dutch born Muslim
youth, it makes clear, as AIVD Director van Hulst states in
his foreword, that the terrorist threat is ""increasingly
rooted"" in Dutch society. By highlighting the need for a
strong effort to promote integration and avoid further
polarization to counter the threat, the report makes a
useful contribution to the on-going policy debate about how
to respond effectively to the threat posed by ""home-grown""
Muslim extremists without demonizing all Muslims in the
Netherlands. END COMMENT.
BLAKEMAN