

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06SAOPAULO1038, WHA PDAS SHAPIRO'S MEETINGS IN SAO PAULO REF: BRASILIA 1996 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SAOPAULO1038.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06SAOPAULO1038 | 2006-09-27 16:34 | 2011-03-05 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Consulate Sao Paulo |
VZCZCXRO2246
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #1038/01 2701634
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271634Z SEP 06
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5819
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6877
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2784
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2471
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 2164
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1871
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 3041
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7457
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 3146
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 2578
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAO PAULO 001038
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE PASS USTR FOR SCRONIN/MSULLIVAN
STATE PASS EXIMBANK
STATE PASS OPIC FOR MORONESE, RIVERA, MERVENNE
NSC FOR FEARS
FEARS USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/SHUPKA TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND JHOEK SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD USAID/W FOR LAC/AA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL EINV ETRD SOCI ECON BR
SUBJECT: WHA PDAS SHAPIRO'S MEETINGS IN SAO PAULO REF: BRASILIA 1996 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY
------- SUMMARY -------
¶1. (SBU) During a September 18-21 visit to Sao Paulo to attend the WHA ELO Conference, WHA PDAS Charles Shapiro met with a series of experts on questions of foreign policy, international trade, and socio-economic issues. Private sector representatives painted a gloomy economic picture, noting the lack of investment needed to sustain a higher level of growth. Many interlocutors criticized President Lula's foreign policy as "ideological" rather than national interests-based. Another complaint was that the government doesn't consult with the private sector on trade issues, and the existing consultative mechanisms are inadequate. Representatives of FIESP made a strong argument for seeking resolution of Doha Round trade issues and outlined their lobbying efforts in support of continued GSP benefits for Brazil. Experts on public education outlined initiatives under way to improve Brazil's badly broken education system. Ambassador Shapiro was also briefed by a Sao Paulo state official on federal, state, and municipal cash transfer programs. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (SBU) Ambassador Shapiro used his meetings to elicit information and perspectives on whether Brazil was interested in moving towards a deeper relationship with the United States culminating over time in a strategic partnership; the extent to which Brazil as a country was truly interested in free trade; and the effectiveness of the government's anti-poverty programs. He met with former Ambassador to the United States Rubens Barbosa; several Amcham Board members; the foreign trade director of the Sao Paulo State Federation of Industries (FIESP); a businessman allied with Lula; and the state social development coordinator. He also lunched with a group of experts on foreign policy and trade and another on social development. In all his meetings, the unfolding "dossier" political corruption scandal was a topic of lively discussion; most hoped it would increase the likelihood of a second round to the election, but most still believed that President Lula would ultimately win.
RUBENS BARBOSA - STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP POSSIBLE, BUT NOT IN THE NEAR TERM
¶3. (SBU) Rubens Barbosa, former Ambassador to the United States (and Alckmin supporter), believes that there exists a solid framework for strengthening U.S.-Brazil relations and moving in the direction of a strategic relationship if the political will to do so is present, but he doubts it will happen if Lula is re-elected. Foreign policy, he said, is the area of the greatest difference between Lula and opposition candidate Geraldo Alckmin, because Lula has politicized the Foreign Ministry. Brazil's acquiescence to Venezuela's accession to Mercosul without its first fulfilling the necessary conditions is an example of GoB mismanagement. Nevertheless, Barbosa believes Lula is trying to moderate Hugo Chavez, although the results may not be visible now. While the U.S.-Brazil relationship has only "small problems," he continued, it could be much stronger. If Lula is re-elected, the private sector will put pressure on the government to reopen dialogue with the U.S. The USG should take the initiative to open up areas of cooperation, beginning with trade. Unfortunately, he said, the GoB doesn't consult with the private sector on trade negotiations, and the official fora for such consultations don't work well. Trade and investment form the focus of U.S.-Brazil relations, but U.S. investment in Brazil is down, leading to lower GDP growth rates. In order for the country to remain competitive and advance, it needs to grow by 5-7 percent per year, whereas the actual rate is closer to 3
SAO PAULO 00001038 002 OF 004
percent.
AMCHAM - NEED INVESTMENT TO GENERATE SUSTAINED GROWTH
¶4. (SBU) According to four members of the AmCham Board -- Joseph Tutundjian, Arthur Vasconcellos, Geraldo Barbosa, and Adhemar Altieri -- who breakfasted with Ambassador Shapiro on November 19, Brazil is the most modern country in the region and could act as a moderating influence on other countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia, but has not done so. The government is preoccupied with internal problems. Due to its debt situation and fiscal constraints, the government is unable to provide the needed investment, and business is reluctant to invest because of infrastructure problems, high interest rates, an overvalued currency, and a low rate of savings. Large companies like Gerdau Steel are unable to grow more in Brazil and are now investing in the U.S. and elsewhere. Without growth, Brazil will resemble Mexico, a large economy but retarded in growth, which aggravates underlying social tensions. Growth requires investment, and investment requires tax, social security, labor, and political reforms. Lula apparently recognizes the need for reform and has been talking about it in private with businessmen, but not talked much publicly. Four years from now, Brazil will have to find a capable leader to succeed Lula, because his Worker's Party (PT) has no apparent candidate.
FIESP - CONCERNED ABOUT GSP BENEFITS
¶5. (SBU) Roberto Gianetti de Fonseca of the Sao Paulo State Federation of Industries (FIESP), Brazil's most important and influential business organization, outlined the organization's activities in helping combat piracy and lobbying on behalf of private sector interests. He defended Brazil's position on agricultural subsidies in the Doha round. FIESP supports free trade, but its constituency, which includes agribusiness, fears that if meaningful movement on agriculture is deferred, the opportunity may be lost. He acknowledged that Brazil needs to amend its constitution and change its laws to remove protection from some sectors of the economy, but insisted that agriculture must be part of the equation. Prospects would be much better if Alckmin were elected President, but if Lula is re-elected, Gianetti believes Doha Round negotiations will collapse. He does not believe Lula wants to undertake reforms. Like Ambassador Barbosa, he believes the GoB acted irresponsibly in allowing Venezuela into Mercosul. Gianetti listed two ideas that he thought would improve bilateral relations: working more closely on Doha Round issues, and cooperation on developing markets for ethanol. Gianetti was particularly concerned over what will happen if the U.S. does not renew Brazil's GSP benefits. FIESP representatives are meeting with key U.S. Congressmen to urge favorable treatment for Brazil. If Brazil loses GSP, U.S. companies won't benefit, he asserted, but rather China.
EXPERTS CRITICIZE "IDEOLOGICAL" FOREIGN POLICY
¶6. (SBU) Ambassador Shapiro attended a lunch hosted by the CG with former Foreign Minister Celso Lafer, private consultant Mario Marconini, Ricardo Lacerda of Citibank, and Economics Professor Roberto Macedo. They asserted that Lula is implementing a leftist foreign policy to compensate for his orthodox economic policies, though Lula himself is more conservative than some of his senior foreign policy officials like Marco Aurelio Garcia and Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes. Celso Lafer complained that for the first time Itamaraty's influence had been diluted with Garcia supplanting the foreign minister as Lula's most influential foreign policy advisor. The group was especially critical of Lula's mismanagement of Mercosul and Venezuela's accession, and his handling of Bolivia. While they believed that Lula would likely win the election - though it might require a second round - they noted he will lack a majority in Congress and will have trouble governing and passing reform measures. Lula's government has benefited from favorable world
SAO PAULO 00001038 003 OF 004
economic conditions that won't last forever, and could face real problems over the next four years.
PRO-LULA BUSINESSMAN OFFERS A DIFFERENT VIEW
¶7. (U) Lawrence Pih, CEO of the large grain milling company Moinho Pacifico, director of "Businessmen for Lula," and a formerly close associate of Lula, offered a different perspective. He said that much of the corruption in Brazilian politics had begun in Fernando Henrrique Cardoso's (FHC) presidency, and that Lula's government had been better than FHC's. With respect to the future, Pih acknowledged that Lula (who he assumes will be re-elected), will face a difficult situation in Congress, because his party won't have a majority. Lula's first priority will be to develop a solid base in Congress, and will then be able to address reforms, especially political reform. Education will also be a priority. Looking towards his legacy, Lula will want to make the economy grow faster and address social inequality, but he will have tough time with the opposition. Lula, he asserted, wants closer ties to the United States, but many of the people around him do not. He thinks Lula is also beginning to see Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales in a different light, but will wait until after the election to change his approach to them. Pih acknowledged that Lula has no heir apparent, and that for Sao Paulo mayor Jose Serra and Minas Gerais Governor Aecio Neves will compete for the PSDB nomination in 2010, and one of them will likely be elected president. He commented ironically that on economic issues, Serra may be more "leftist" (i.e., statist) than Lula.
BRIEFING ON CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS
¶8. (U) PDAS Shapiro visited the Sao Paulo State Secretariat for Social Development and Assistance. There he met with a team led by Social Development Coordinator Maria Camila de Mendonca, who oversees all cash transfer programs operating in the state. Mendonca outlined an interlocking web of social protection programs operating at national, state, and local levels and aimed primarily at the poorest individuals and families, those who have low education levels and limited access to health care. The federal program, Bolsa Familia, grew out of the Bolsa Escola and three other programs developed during the administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. This program, which covered 6.7 million families in 2004, has grown to reach 11 million families. Beneficiaries are required to keep their children in school and ensure they get vaccinations and medical checkups. Low-income families are eligible to receive the equivalent of between USD 10 and 50 per month depending on family size and number of children in school. The funds come from the federal government -- beneficiaries receive a card to withdraw money from the Caixa Economica Federal -- but the program is administered by the municipalities.
¶9. (U) Local secretariats for education and health are tasked with reporting on compliance with conditions. Mendonca said these reports are often delayed or unreliable; accordingly, it is difficult to provide effective enforcement. Furthermore, she said that to date there have been no reliable studies on the extent to which the transfer programs are effective on moving poor families out of poverty and into the formal economy. Each of the states has its own programs to complement Bolsa Familia, as do many municipalities. These vary considerably in coverage and quality. Bolsa Familia covers roughly 1.2 million families in Sao Paulo state. The state's program, Citizen Income, is designed like Bolsa Familia, with similar conditions, and covers 175,000 families and provides up to about USD 30 per month, paid out of state-owned Nossa Caixa. The state's youth action program assists young people between the ages of 15 and 24 who are out of school or at risk of dropping out. In addition to these, the city of Sao Paulo also has a program, Family Action, which currently covers some 30,000 families. Depending on circumstances, some families may benefit
SAO PAULO 00001038 004 OF 004
from more than one program.
PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGED ON EDUCATION
¶10. (U) PDAS Shapiro, CG, and Poloffs lunched with several private sector and NGO leaders involved with education programs and other initiatives to combat poverty. Norman Gall of the Braudel Institute, Eduardo Bom Angelo of Brasilprev, and Luiz Norberto Paschoal of the Educar Foundation outlined the challenges facing education in Brazil. Too much attention, they said, is devoted to the university system and not enough to primary and secondary education. Ideally, five percent of GDP should go to primary and secondary education where intervention can make a difference, but the actual figure is much lower. Furthermore, most of the budget goes to building new facilities and paying salaries, and not enough to improving quality. Schools in Sao Paulo are overcrowded to the point that some have to operate in three shifts and on Saturdays. The result is that many poor students drop out or are unprepared for university, and the Brazilian private sector suffers from a lack of educated, well-qualified workers, which ultimately affects competitiveness.
¶11. (U) The business community has developed initiatives to improve the situation. Notably, on September 6, civil society, business, and government launched the Everyone for Education Commitment, with a broad range of corporate and civic sponsors and five objectives to be achieved by Brazil's bicentennial in 2022. In addition, the Senna Foundation implements initiatives that target children at risk of failing and helps them overcome difficulties and remain in school. The Braudel Institute runs reading circles for disadvantaged children. The AmCham's Institute for Quality Instruction (IQE) is working to ensure that teachers are better trained and prepared. In addition to these, the Consulate's PAS section has organized a project that funds exchanges of school principals, enabling them to share experiences and techniques.
¶12. (U) Despite these promising efforts, Paschoal noted that it is difficult to get the public interested in the debate over improving the education system. While candidates for public office discuss education in general terms, they have offered few concrete proposals. For this reason, federal, state and municipal governments tend to apply band-aids to the existing system rather than try to reconfigure it as is needed. Participants expressed hope that whoever is elected president would appoint a prominent business leader as Minister of Education. That said, they believed that private sector involvement in education is greater than elsewhere in the region.
COMMENT: PATIENCE REQUIRED
¶13. (SBU) With the exception of Pih, our interlocutors actively support the opposition. Even so, their analysis was disheartening: the Brazilian economy cannot sustain growth above 3 percent without dealing with some very basic structural inefficiencies, public education is Brazil is a disaster that attracts little interest from any of the candidates (or the public), and "conditioned cash transfers" in fact are not conditioned but are programs by the federal, state and municipal governments to curry favor with poor voters. The word we heard most often in advising us how to engage with Brazil was "patience." END COMMENT.
¶14. (U) This cable has been cleared by PDAS Shapiro and coordinated with Embassy Brasilia.
MCMULLEN