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Viewing cable 05DUSHANBE1870, MODERATE TAJIK ISLAMIC LEADER KABIRI WAL...
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05DUSHANBE1870 | 2005-11-28 07:02 | 2011-02-03 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Dushanbe |
Appears in these articles: http://www.novgaz.ru/data/2011/010/12.html |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001870
SIPDIS
STATE FOR P, EUR/CACEN, SA, DRL, S/P
NSC FOR MERKEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL KDEM RS TI
SUBJECT: MODERATE TAJIK ISLAMIC LEADER KABIRI WAL...
46151 11/28/2005 7:02 05DUSHANBE1870 Embassy Dushanbe CONFIDENTIAL 05DUSHANBE1828|05DUSHANBE1855|05DUSHANBE1866
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001870 SIPDIS STATE FOR P, EUR/CACEN, SA, DRL, S/P NSC FOR MERKEL E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL KDEM RS TI
Internal Politics SUBJECT: MODERATE TAJIK ISLAMIC LEADER KABIRI WALKS A TIGHTROPE -- RAHMONOV WANTS TO MARGINALIZE HIM; HIS PARTY'S ISLAMIST WING DISTRUSTS HIM REF:
A) DUSHANBE 1866 B) DUSHANBE 1855 C) DUSHANBE 1828
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy Dushanbe. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C)
SUMMARY: First Deputy Chairman of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and Member of Parliament, Muhiddin Kabiri, worries that the government wants to marginalize him and that his pro-Western views alienate a significant wing of his party. He praised Secretary Rice's visit to a Dushanbe mosque and madrassa, but lamented the blackout by Tajik state media of coverage of these events. He said the Chairman of the Lower House of Parliament ordered him never again to wear an orange tie (symbol of "color revolutions"). The Russian Embassy under its new ambassador has severed all contact with the IRPT. He asserted that the current Tajik leadership, increasingly authoritarian, will not allow legitimate new leaders to emerge. The West should carefully find ways to support Kibiri as a new-generation, moderate Islamic leader. This would include giving him greater political exposure at high levels, not just at the usual international seminars and conferences. END SUMMARY
¶2. (SBU) Muhiddin Kabiri, the First Deputy Chairman of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), asked for a November 22 meeting with the Ambassador to discuss his views of Tajikistan's political scene since Secretary Rice's October 13 visit to Dushanbe. REACTION TO THE SECRETARY'S VISIT
¶3. (C) Kabiri requested a readout of the Secretary's meeting with President Rahmonov. The Ambassador assured Kabiri that Secretary Rice had told Rahmonov that the United States wants to SIPDIS see Tajik presidential elections in 2006 that meet international standards. She explained to Rahmonov that clean elections don't happen just on election day, but, equally important, in the long run-up when other politicians need access to the media to get their messages to the people.
¶4. (C) Noting he had just come from a state think-tank roundtable discussion of the U.S. concept of the Central Asian Corridor of Reform, Kabiri asked whether there was a place in that corridor for the IRPT. The Ambassador assured Kabiri Secretary Rice had specifically praised Tajikistan for having SIPDIS the only legal Islamic party in the region taking part in the political life of the nation. He told Kabiri one of the key points of U.S. foreign policy in Central Asia is to find appropriate ways to support traditional moderate Islam and leaders and parties that profess that view.
¶5. (C) Kabiri praised the Secretary for meeting with Tajikistan's political party leaders and especially for visiting the Central Mosque and Women's Madrassa. He added that he and his party were chagrined that the Tajik state media, including the all-important television, had blacked out all coverage of the mosque and madrassa visits. The Ambassador asked Kabiri to pass to his party members his apologies that Tajik security bodies had cleared the neighborhood around the mosque and madrassa of legitimate worshippers during the Secretary's visit. This was especially regrettable during Ramadan. TAJIKISTAN'S "MANAGED DEMOCRACY"
¶6. (C) Kabiri noted that Tajik officials often talk about democracy, but in reality find real democracy a threat to their vide-grip on power, and act to suppress it. He added that the IRPT itself is not as democratic as it should be, but does what it can within current political and cultural constraints. For what has happened to democracy in Tajikistan in recent years, Kabiri explained the opposition's potential to use force at the end of the Civil War motivated the government to cooperate with all opposition groups and was pluralistic out of weakness. Now, the ruling political elite sees no credible opposition, armed or otherwise, and increasingly dismisses any need for continuing dialogue.
¶7. (C) The Ambassador pointed out the Tajik government pays lip service to democracy and pluralism, but increasingly exerts greater control over every aspect of political life. This is neo-Soviet "managed democracy," not real democracy and, unfortunately, is encouraged by Moscow. Kabiri confessed the IRPT at this point would settle for a sort of managed democracy, if it at least had some elements of real democracy, but he fears that the government is becoming increasingly authoritarian.
¶8. (SBU) Kabiri said he had published an article in IRPT's newspaper, "Najot," criticizing the U.S. "double standard" in which the United States supposedly professes support for democratic values, but in fact supports authoritarian regimes in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. However, he noted, the U.S. reaction to the Andijon massacre in Uzbekistan had been an eye-opener. He praised the United States for acting on its ideals. "This did not go unnoticed," he said.
¶9. (C) The Ambassador said President Rahmonov seems to make public statements in support of Islam, but also issues contradictory regulations that undercut this position, like the recent ban on females wearing "hijab" (Islamic headscarves) in public schools. Kabiri agreed and said that such actions are radicalizing the more conservative wing of his party. He claimed that general support for the IRPT in the traditional and conservative parts of Tajik society had surged following this ill-considered edict. TOE THE LINE - AND GET RID OF THE ORANGE TIE
¶10. (C) The IRPT and the Communist Party of Tajikistan (CPT) are the only minority parties in Parliament. Kabiri recounted that Chairman of the Lower House of Parliament Khairulloyev had told him that he (Khairulloyev) is responsible for keeping Kabiri and CPT Chairman Shodi Shabdalov in line - and he doesn't have to worry about Shabdalov.
¶11. (C) Kabiri recounted that he had recently, by chance, worn an orange necktie to a session of parliament. Khairulloyev had pulled him aside and ordered him never to wear it again in public. Kabiri laughed and said he had not intended to make a political statement in support of "color revolutions." He simply has bad taste and lets his wife every morning pick out which tie he wears.
¶12. (C) More seriously, Kabiri said his primary goal as an "opposition politician" is to stay out of prison. Although he speaks out in IRPT press releases and in the party newspaper, he trims his sails in parliament and generally votes with the government. As a result, he has the worst of both worlds. The government, he said, sees him as a dangerous radical, and the more conservative wing of his party sees him as a pro-Rahmonov lackey.
¶13. (C) COMMENT: Although Rahmonov sees the IRPT as a dangerous enemy and tells some Western interlocutors it's a terrorist organization, he also wants to keep the IRPT in the Big Tent, if he feels he can control it. IRPT Chairman Said Abdullo Nuri, dying of cancer, is one of the civil war warlords whom Rahmonov has allowed to become very wealthy. In the world of Tajik politics, that gives Rahmonov control over Nuri. Rahmonov has no such relationship with Kabiri, and is greatly annoyed that he seems to be well received in Western embassies and capitals. Rahomonov does not want to see Kabiri succeed Nuri as IRPT chairman, although the general consensus at this time is that Kabiri is essentially Chairman-in-Waiting until Nuri dies. END COMMENT. RAHMONOV BUILDS NEW FACADE OF SUPPORT
¶14. (C) The Ambassador asked Kabiri for his opinion of the two newly registered parties - the Party of Economic Reform and the Agrarian Party of Tajikistan and why they have appeared now on the political scene (reftels A, B). Kabiri responded that the parties are a calculated political creation by Rahmonov to give the illusion that he has multi-party support and to bolster his claim to "democratic" legitimacy at the same time that he works to marginalize the other real opposition parties.
¶15. (C) However, Kabiri conceded, even if the new parties are artificial, he welcomes them because the more political parties on the scene, the better. They may mutate toward a degree of independence, and in the longer term multiple parties will be able to form various coalitions. (COMMENT: If in fact this is Kabiri's view, it's both generous and naove. Should these new parties not toe Rahmonov's line, they will not continue to exist. END COMMENT.) NEW-GENERATION POLITICIANS CANNOT EMERGE
¶16. (C) The Ambassador asked Kabiri who are the new politicians-in-waiting who could emerge on the national scene - who are making names for themselves and building constituencies, even at the regional and local levels? Who are the bright young leaders we should pay attention to? Kabiri had no optimistic answer. He said that the "big names" from the civil war and post-civil-war period have been co-opted, are now in prison, or are simply shallow non-entities. He suggested someone like Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan Chairman Zoyirov (reftel C) is a real leader with national potential, but no one knows him broadly nationwide. If he could appear on State TV "five times in the next year," he'd have a real constituency. But this will not happen because Rahmonov will not allow it. RUSSIAN EMBASSY NOW A "BLACK HOLE"
¶17. (C) The Ambassador asked Kabiri if he and his party maintain normal contacts at the Russian Embassy. Kabiri said that under previous Russian Ambassador Peshkov, he and his party had "correct" contacts with Peshkov and several other Russian Embassy officials. Since the arrival this summer of Ambassador Abdulatipov, the Russian Embassy has become a "black hole" for the IRPT. No senior IRPT official has met with Abdulatipov, and the Russian Embassy has cut off all contact with the party. Kabiri commented that he is grateful he continues to have access to the U.S. Embassy.
¶18. (C) COMMENT: Rahmonov portrays himself in public statements as the defender of Islam. At the same time, he is working to marginalize the IRPT. Kabiri appears genuinely to be moderate and to understand Western-style democratic politics. For this reason, he is controversial within his party, which has its base of support in the conservative rural sections of the country. He may emerge as the next IRPT chairman when Nuri dies, but this is not a given. Rahmonov and his minions will work to marginalize Kabiri in national politics, and the conservative wing of the IRPT may reject him. In the meantime, the West should carefully find ways to support Kabiri as a new-generation, moderate Islamic leader. This would include giving him greater political exposure at high levels, not just at the usual international seminars and conferences . END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND NNNN 2005-11-28 MODERATE TAJIK ISLAMIC LEADER KABIRI WALKS A TIGHTROPE -- RAHMONOV WANTS TO MARGINALIZE HIM; HIS PARTY'S ISLAMIST WING DISTRUSTS
HIM First Deputy Chairman of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and Member of Parliament, Muhiddin Kabiri, worries that the government wants to marginalize him and that his pro-Western views alienate a significant wing of his party. He praised Secretary Rice's visit to a Dushanbe mosque and madrassa, but lamented the blackout by Tajik state media of coverage of these events. He said the Chairman of the Lower House of Parliament ordered him never again to wear an orange tie (symbol of "color revolutions"). The Russian Embassy under its new ambassador has severed all contact with the IRPT. He asserted that the current Tajik leadership, increasingly authoritarian, will not allow legitimate new leaders to emerge. The West should carefully find ways to support Kibiri as a new-generation, moderate Islamic leader. This would include giving him greater political exposure at high levels, not just at the usual international seminars and conferences.