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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07TELAVIV64, SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 13-15
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07TELAVIV64 | 2007-01-08 16:38 | 2010-11-28 18:00 | SECRET | Embassy Tel Aviv |
VZCZCXRO2156
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #0064/01 0081638
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081638Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8615
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000064
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV IS KWBG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 13-15
VISIT TO ISRAEL
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)
¶1. (S) Madam Secretary, internal tensions among GOI leaders
have intensified since your last visit and have reached the
point that there appears to be little coordination or even
dialogue among the key decision makers. Therefore, we will
need to be sensitive to perceptions that we are favoring one
faction over another. The divisions at the top here are part
of an increasingly gloomy public mood, with a new corruption
allegations making headlines virtually daily, and a growing
sense of political failure despite Israel's strong economy
and a sustained success rate in thwarting suicide attacks.
Prime Minister Olmert's approval ratings were only 23 percent
in the latest poll, and Israeli interlocutors across the
political spectrum are speaking openly of a crisis of public
confidence in the country's leadership at a time when
Israelis feel an urgent need for strong leadership to face
the threats from Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hizballah.
OPTIMISM ERODING
----------------
¶2. (S) The year 2007 has started off badly for Israelis.
The good feeling generated by PM Olmert's long-delayed
December 23 summit meeting with Abu Mazen quickly dissipated
under the weight of reports of a new settlement in the Jordan
Valley (now suspended by Peretz), continued Qassam rocket
attacks on Sderot and neighboring kibbutzim, foot-dragging on
both sides in implementing the transfer of tax revenues, lack
of progress on the release of Cpl. Gilad Shalit, and the
unpleasant atmospherics of the January 4 Olmert-Mubarak
summit, which was overshadowed by a botched IDF daylight raid
in the center of Ramallah in which four Palestinians were
killed.
¶3. (S) The Ramallah operation, which was authorized by the
IDF's West Bank commander without informing the Minister of
Defense, served as a stark reminder of the lack of
coordination between Israel's military and its civilian
leadership. When it comes to Israel's strategy for dealing
with Palestinians, it increasingly seems that military is
military, civilian is civilian and never the twain shall
meet! Despite Olmert's belated embrace of Abu Mazen as a
peace partner, there is growing concern that moderate Arab
willingness to maintain the embargo on Hamas may be eroding,
and that Fatah may fail to muster the popular support it will
need to depose Hamas, whether at the ballot box or in the
streets. Meanwhile, the upcoming release of the results of
the Winograd Commission's investigation of the Lebanon war
hangs like a sword of Damocles over the heads of Olmert,
Defense Minister Peretz, and IDF Chief of General Staff
Halutz. Peretz and Halutz have both publicly stated that
they will resign if the Commission holds them responsible for
serious errors in the conduct of the war, but Olmert has
refrained from public comments. Olmert is also awaiting the
results of several separate investigations involving
corruption allegations, any one of which could further damage
him severely, if not force his resignation.
¶4. (S) While Israeli anxiety over a possible dramatic shift
of U.S. policy as a result of the Iraq Study Group's report
has been allayed by statements by you and the President,
there continues to be deep uneasiness here that the
Baker-Hamilton recommendations reflect the shape of things to
come in U.S. policy. Israelis recognize that U.S. public
support for the Iraq war is eroding and are following with
interest the President's upcoming articulation of the
revamped policy, but they are deeply concerned that
Israeli-Palestinian issues not become linked in American
minds to creating a more propitious regional environment for
whatever steps we decide to take to address the deteriorating
situation in Iraq.
¶5. (S) Iran's nuclear program continues to cause great
anxiety in Israel. Given their history, Israelis across the
political spectrum take very seriously Ahmadinejad's threats
to wipe Israel off the map. Olmert has been quite clear in
his public comments that Israel cannot tolerate a
nuclear-armed Iran, a position stated even more emphatically
by opposition leader Netanyahu, who compares today's Iran to
Nazi Germany in 1938. Despite the worst-case assessments of
Israeli intelligence, however, there is a range of views
about what action Israel should take. The MFA and some of
the think tank Iran experts appear increasingly inclined to
state that military action must be a last resort and are
taking a new interests in other forms of pressure, including
but not limited to sanctions, that could force Iran to
abandon its military nuclear program. The IDF, however,
srikes us as more inclined than ever to look toward a
military strike, whether launched by Israel or by us, as the
only way to destroy or even delay Iran's plans. Thoughtful
TEL AVIV 00000064 002 OF 003
Israeli analysts point out that even if a nuclear-armed Iran
did not immediately launch a strike on the Israeli heartland,
the very fact that Iran possesses nuclear weapons would
completely transform the Middle East strategic environment in
ways that would make Israel's long-term survival as a
democratic Jewish state increasingly problematic. That
concern is most intensively reflected in open talk by those
who say they do not want their children and grandchildren
growing up in an Israel threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran.
LIVNI RISING
------------
¶6. (C) FM Tzipi Livni is frustrated by Olmert's continued
refusal to coordinate closely, and -- perhaps with an eye on
polls showing her popularity at over double the level of the
Prime Minister -- suggested to a Ha'aretz interviewer in late
December that she would challenge Olmert for the prime
ministership if he continued not to give her his full
backing. In the same interview, Livni provided an outline of
her thinking, but not a detailed plan, on the way ahead with
the Arabs, including negotiating an interim agreement with
the Palestinians in which the separation barrier would serve
as the border, and refusing to engage with Syria unless Asad
takes steps to end support for terrorism and distances
himself from Iran. Livni's policy adviser has confirmed to
us that she has engaged in her own discrete discussions with
Palestinians, but very much in an exploratory mode. Livni
told Senators Kerry and Dodd that she doubted that a final
status agreement could be reached with Abu Mazen, and
therefore the emphasis should be on reforming Fatah so that
it could beat Hamas at the polls. MFA officials tell us that
Livni is also focused on the need to keep Hamas isolated.
She and her senior staff have repeatedly expressed concern
that some EU member-states are wobbly on this point.
Meanwhile, Livni is keenly aware that unlike Olmert, she has
little to fear from the Winograd Commission report (nor is
she tainted by the corruption allegations that dog Olmert).
Her incipient bid to take Olmert's place could become more
serious once the report's preliminary conclusions are
released next month.
SHIFTING VIEWS ON SYRIA
-----------------------
¶7. (S) Olmert and Livni agree that negotiations with Syria
would be a trap that Damascus would use to end the
international pressure on it and to gain a freer hand in
Lebanon. While they see public relations downsides to
dismissing Syrian peace overtures out of hand, they continue
to insist that no negotiations will be possible until Syria
reduces its support for terrorism and/or takes direct steps
to secure the release of Israeli prisoners held by Hamas and
Hizballah. Olmert and Livni are supported in that view by
Mossad chief Dagan, who takes a dim view of Syrian
intentions. A significant part of the security
establishment, however, appears to be reaching the conclusion
that it is in Israel's interest to test Asad's intentions --
possibly through the use of a back channel contact -- and to
seek to wean him away from Tehran. They are joined in that
view by Defense Minister Peretz, much of the Labor Party and
the Israeli left, who argue that Israel cannot afford to
refuse to at least explore Asad's offer to negotiate, often
comparing that stance to Golda Meir's much-criticized
decision to spurn Sadat's offer to negotiate, which then led
to the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Press reports January 5 stated
that the defense establishment had recommended to Olmert that
he open an exploratory channel to Damascus in two months, a
timeline reportedly linked to the completion of reviews of
U.S. policy toward Iraq and the Middle East, as well as to
clearer indications of Abu Mazen's intentions and
capabilities vis a vis Hamas.
PERETZ-OLMERT TENSIONS
----------------------
¶8. (C) According to leaks from a recent Labor Party
leadership meeting, Amir Peretz said that he feels completely
disconnected from Olmert. Ever since Peretz' telephone
conversation with Abu Mazen which infuriated Olmert, the two
reportedly barely speak to each other. Television news
reports on January 4 trumpeted rumors that Olmert had decided
to remove Peretz as Defense Minister and replace him with
former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who has already announced
plans to challenge Peretz for the Labor Party's leadership in
late May primaries. Even though the Prime Minister's Office
almost immediately denied the reports, there is little doubt
here that someone in the PMO was behind them. While much of
the Labor Party feels that Peretz has been a failure, both as
Defense Minister and as Party Secretary General, and Peretz'
popularity with the general public has hit rock bottom, Labor
TEL AVIV 00000064 003 OF 003
members widely condemned the media trial balloon, which they
saw as an unacceptable attempt by Olmert's advisers to
intervene in their party's leadership contest. In any event,
the incident is yet another indication of the intense degree
of personal rancor and dysfunction prevailing at the top of
the GOI.
PERETZ AND SNEH OUR AMA PARTNERS
--------------------------------
¶9. (C) Notwithstanding the GOI's internal discord, there is
some good news in our efforts to nudge the GOI toward
improvements in Palestinian quality of life issues. Despite
his political woes, Peretz has proven himself a serious
partner in our efforts to implement the Agreement on Movement
and Access (AMA) and more generally in a slow but steady push
by the MOD to force a reluctant IDF to accept steps to reduce
barriers to Palestinian movement and to revive the
Palestinian economy. Deputy Defense Minister Efraim Sneh,
who will likely accompany Peretz to your meeting, has emerged
as the point man for these efforts. Sneh shares Peretz'
conviction that Israel's security stranglehold on the
Palestinians is "winning the battle but losing the war," but
Sneh, who in a decades-long career served as a military
governor of the West Bank, commanded an elite combat unit,
and took part in the famed Entebbe raid, also has both an
intimate knowledge of the Palestinians and a combat
commander's credibility with the IDF that Peretz sorely
lacks. Your meeting with Peretz provides an opportunity to
express appreciation for his and Sneh's efforts and to
encourage them in their struggle to bring recalcitrant
elements in the IDF to heel. The more progress we can
achieve with them on AMA implementation now, the easier it
will be to achieve meaningful results with both parties in
the coming year.
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Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
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JONES