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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09CAIRO231, SCENESETTER FOR REQUESTED EGYPTIAN FM ABOUL GHEIT
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09CAIRO231 | 2009-02-09 16:10 | 2011-02-16 21:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Cairo |
VZCZCXRO6435
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #0231/01 0401610
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 091610Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1586
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 000231
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019
TAGS: PREL KPAL EG IS QA IR SY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR REQUESTED EGYPTIAN FM ABOUL GHEIT
MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (S/NF) Madame Secretary, Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit has
been looking forward to meeting you since your nomination was
first announced. The Egyptian leadership, including
President Mubarak, are encouraged by the Administration's
immediate attention to the Middle East and your and the
President's early outreach to them. Overall, the Egyptians
believe they did not receive fair treatment from the previous
Administration and hope to see improvements. Aboul Gheit
likely will explain Egypt's "soft power"--its ability to
influence regional events without benefit of deep pockets.
He likely will focus more on the strategic challenges of the
region--the peace process and Iran--but may also address some
pending bilateral matters. He may ask for your support for
Egypt to be part of an expanded G8 or G20 and press the
candidacy of Egyptian Culture Minister Farouq Hosny for
Director General of UNESCO. He may not raise human rights
(specifically Ayman Nour), political reform, or
democratization; but you should. Aboul Gheit will want to
discuss Gaza, including smuggling and counter-tunneling;
Iran; and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. On Iraq and
counter-terrorism, we and the Egyptians see largely
eye-to-eye; intelligence cooperation is close and effective;
and our military-to-military relationship is durable but
stuck in a force-on-force mindset.
¶2. (S/NF) Summary continued: Aboul Gheit is smart, urbane,
with a tendency to lecture and to avoid discussing Egyptian
failings with all-purpose recourse to Egyptian sovereign
pride. However, because this is his first meeting with you
and it is in Washington, he may be more inclined to listen.
You should thank him for Egypt's continuing regional
leadership, in particular regarding their efforts to bring
about a ceasefire in Gaza, and press him for Egypt to
continue to use their influence and good offices to achieve a
permanent solution to intra-Palestinian infighting and
conflict. You should also stress the need for Egypt to more
effectively insure that Hamas cannot rearm via smuggling
across -- or tunneling under -- the border with Gaza. Aboul
Gheit will press for your attendance at the March 2 Gaza
Donors Conference in Cairo, and may complain about unhelpful
Qatari and Syrian behavior. He will also want to explore US
intentions towards Iran; President Mubarak told Senator
Mitchell during his recent visit here that he did not oppose
our talking with the Iranians, as long as "you don't believe
a word they say." End summary.
------------------------
Respect and Appreciation
------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) In terms of regional affairs, Special Middle East
Envoy Senator George Mitchell struck the right chord during
his recent visit to Cairo when he told President Mubarak that
he was here to "listen and hear your advice." The Egyptians
have long felt that, at best, we take them for granted; and
at worst, we deliberately ignore their advice while trying to
force our point of view on them. You may wish to thank Aboul
Gheit for the vital role Egypt played in bringing about a
ceasefire in Gaza, and its efforts at making it last. You
should ask him what the current state of play is between
Hamas and Fatah and have him describe Egypt's vision of the
future for the Palestinians, both among their factions, and
vis a vis Israel. Note: Although the Egyptians will react
well to overtures of respect and appreciation, Egypt is very
often a stubborn and recalcitrant ally. In addition, Egypt's
self-perception as the "indispensable Arab state" is
contingent on Egyptian effectiveness on regional issues,
including Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq.
-----------------------------------------
Egypt and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict
-----------------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Although Aboul Gheit was never enthusiastic about
the Annapolis Peace process, resolution of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the primary strategic
political goal for the Egyptians. They are proud of their
role as intermediary, well aware that they are perhaps the
only player that can talk with us, the Israelis, and all
Palestinian factions. Mubarak hates Hamas, and considers
them the same as Egypt's own Muslim Brotherhood, which he
sees as his own most dangerous political threat. Since the
CAIRO 00000231 002 OF 004
June 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza, the Egyptians, under the
leadership of intelligence chief Omar Soliman (the de facto
national security advisor with direct responsibility for the
Israeli-Palestinian account) have shifted their focus to
intra-Palestinian reconciliation and establishment of the
Hamas-Israel ceasefire. Soliman brokered a half-year-long
truce last year, which Hamas broke in December, leading to
the Israeli invasion of Gaza. He has recently re-started
those efforts, with the goal of getting Hamas to agree to a
year-long ceasefire, which should give the Egyptians space to
bring about their political goal of Palestinian
reconciliation under a technocratic, non-partisan government
headed by President Mahmoud Abbas.
----------------
Gaza and Tunnels
----------------
¶5. (S/NF) Smuggling through the Sinai Peninsula and into Gaza
is an old and complicated problem for Egypt. Egypt views a
well-armed and powerful Hamas as a national security threat,
a point driven home in dramatic fashion by the January 2008
border breach when Hamas bulldozed the old border fence and
more than half a million Palestinians poured into Egypt,
unchecked and hungry. Since the closure of the Egypt-Gaza
border following the June 2007 Gaza takeover by Hamas, most
smuggling of consumer goods and weapons has gone underground.
The narrow corridor between Egypt and Gaza is as
honey-combed with subterranean passageways as a gigantic ant
colony.
¶6. (S/NF) Although it is not directly in Aboul Gheit's
bailiwick, belonging more to the security and intelligence
forces, nonetheless the issue of tunnels and rearming Hamas
is the subject of intense scrutiny (by Israel and the
Congress), and sensitivity (by the Egyptians). Long
criticized by Israel for "not doing enough" to halt arms
smuggling via tunnels, the Egyptians have stopped complaining
and started acting. Egypt has increased efforts to counter
arms smuggling by accelerating its $23 million FMF-funded
tunnel detection program along the Egypt-Gaza border and
requesting U.S. support to purchase four backscatter X-Ray
machines to scan vehicles entering the Sinai for weapons and
explosives (note Aboul Ghait may not be of this
EGIS-originated request). Egypt also continues to cooperate
with Israel, especially via intelligence sharing, to prevent
militants from Hamas and other extremist organizations from
crossing the Gaza border, and on thwarting militant activity
in Egypt. Egyptian efforts are all justified under President
Mubarak's pledge that Egypt with "protect its borders."
¶7. (S/NF) Egypt will not take any action that could be
perceived as collaboration in Israel's siege of Gaza, and
they have been hyper-sensitive to any suggestion that
foreigners are assisting them or overseeing their efforts to
counter smuggling. Aboul Gheit publicly distanced Egypt from
our January MOU with Israel to combat arms smuggling into
Gaza, although he knew about it in advance and consulted with
Secretary Rice and me about its contents. The Egyptians do
not want to be stuck holding the Gaza bag, and must be able
to point the finger of blame at Israel for the plight of the
Palestinians. At the same time, Egypt has withstood scathing
and widespread criticism in the Arab world for refusing to
open the Rafah border crossing to supply Gaza. Even during
the height of the December fighting, the Egyptians only sent
medicine and medical supplies through the Rafah border; all
other humanitarian goods went through the Israeli crossing at
Kerem Shalom. They likewise insist that Rafah will only
reopen to handle Gazan travellers when the Gazan side is
under PA control with EU observers according to the 2005 AMA.
¶8. (S/NF) Ultimately, Egypt believes that the only realistic
and viable solution to erode Hamas' power and stop arms
smuggling is the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza
and the opening of Gaza's border to legitimate trade. While
in the short term we can best assist the Egyptians with
technical know-how and training, long term counter smuggling
success will depend on reducing the financial incentives to
smuggling by providing the Sinai Bedouin with legitimate
economic opportunities and by regularly opening the Gaza
borders to trade, thereby reducing economic incentives to
smuggle.
----------------------------------
The March 2 Gaza Donors Conference
----------------------------------
¶9. (S/NF) President Mubarak told Senator Mitchell that he
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wanted to personally invite you to the March 2 Gaza Donors
Conference in Cairo. Aboul Gheit will press hard for you to
accept this invitation. He is keen to keep up the momentum
on Gaza reconstruction and for Egypt to be seen as taking the
lead in helping the Palestinians. It is very important to
him that this conference be at the ministerial level, and he
will be disappointed if you are unable to accept.
-------------
Iraq and Iran
-------------
¶10. (S/NF) President Mubarak enjoys recounting for visiting
members of Congress how he warned former President Bush
against invading Iraq, ending with, "I told you so!" and a
wag of his finger. In addition, there are Egyptian
misgivings about Nuri Al-Maliki and Shia majority rule in
Iraq. Egypt therefore will need additional prodding to
continue to take steps to help rehabilitate Iraq into the
greater Arab world. You should ask Aboul Gheit when he plans
to fully open the Egyptian embassy in Baghdad and exchange
accredited ambassadors with Iraq (the first Egyptian
ambassador to post-Saddam Iraq was assassinated). As for
Iran, Mubarak has a visceral hatred for the Islamic Republic,
referring repeatedly to Iranians as "liars," and denouncing
them for seeking to destabilize Egypt and the region. He
sees the Syrians and Qataris as sycophants to Tehran and
liars themselves. There is no doubt that Egypt sees Iran and
its greatest long-term threat, both as it develops a nuclear
capability and as it seeks to export its "Shia revolution."
Nonetheless, Mubarak told Mitchell pointedly that he did not
oppose the U.S. speaking to the Iranians, as long as we did
not "believe a single word they say." Aboul Gheit will be
keen to hear your description of U.S. intentions towards
Iran. In his conversation with Senator Mitchell, Aboul Gheit
carefully noting he was speaking personally, expressed more
interest into bringing the Syrians into negotiations again;
President Mubarak was not enthusiastic about dealing with the
Syrians at this time.
------------------------
U.S. Assistance to Egypt
------------------------
¶11. (S/NF) The greatest Egyptian outrage a year ago --
Congressional conditioning of $100 million of U.S. assistance
to Egypt -- may now be moot, according to our latest
understanding of the state of play with the FY2009
appropriations language. Beyond the issue of conditioning,
the Egyptians resent the U.S. unilateral decision to cut ESF
in half, from $415 million in FY-08 to $200 million in FY-09,
a level which the Egyptians find embarrassing, not because
they need the money (they say), but because it shows our
diminished view of the value of our relationship. In my
view, it is important to the U.S. to continue an ESF program
aimed at health, education, and poverty eradication to
demonstrate concern for the Egyptian people as opposed to a
strictly military assistance program. Egypt has also been
unhappy with the use of these funds to support democracy in
Egypt. It would be useful if you could urge that Egypt
accept the FY 2009 levels so that we can proceed to program
funds to benefit Egypt, while promising to engage in a
serious review of the conflicts that exist and a desire to
resolve them as soon as possible.
¶12. (S/NF) Concerning military assistance, the Egyptian
political and military leadership feel that they have been
"short changed" by our holding to an FMF level of $1.3
billion, (the same level for 30 years despite inflation), and
which they contrast with increases to our military assistance
to Israel. Finally, Egypt seeks a higher profile in
international financial circles (Finance Minister Youssef
Boutros Ghali was recently named Chairman of the IMF's
policy-setting committee, the IMFC, the first from a
developing country), and Aboul Gheit is likely to ask for
your support to include Egypt in expanded G8 and G20 fora.
---------------------------------
Ayman Nour and Saad Eddin Ibrahim
---------------------------------
¶13. (S/NF) Egypt's political leadership considers our public
chastisement of their treatment of jailed former opposition
Al Ghad party leader Ayman Nour as interfering with internal
affairs and infringement on national sovereignty. Mubarak
takes this issue personally, and it makes him seethe when we
raise it, particularly in public. Aboul Gheit's view is that
we have made Ayman Nour a freedom martyr, and a damaging (and
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distorting) prism through which we view our relationship with
Egypt. Much the same can be said about Saad Eddin Ibrahim,
the outspoken political science professor and democracy
activist who is in self-imposed exile in the U.S. because of
spurious law suits brought against him for allegedly defaming
Egypt. In a negative development in late January, Egypt,s
Attorney General-equivalent took action to advance the only
criminal case pending against Ibrahim. You should press
Aboul Gheit hard on Nour and Ibrahim, and also urge the GOE
to stop arresting other less prominent political activists.
Nour's health is bad and he has served more than half his
sentence; he deserves a humanitarian pardon. You may wish to
lay down a marker for a future discussion on democratization
and human rights concerns. You might note that although you
and the President want to improve the relationship, Egypt
could take some steps to remove these very volatile issues
from the agenda.
------------
Farouq Hosny
------------
¶13. (S/NF) Egypt has mounted a full-scale international
campaign to support the candidacy of Culture Minister Farouq
Hosny for Director General of UNESCO. The Arab League and
the African Union have already publicly stated their
commitment to Hosny, and the Egyptians believe they also have
the support of several Europeans, notably the French. Aboul
Gheit will also seek US support -- or, at least, not to
actively oppose -- the candidacy of Farouq Hosny as the next
Director General of UNESCO. The U.S. informed him last year
that we could not support the candidacy and urged Egypt to
put forward another name. Abould Gheit will argue Hosny's
merits for facing down the Islamic extremists who want to
narrow the space in Egypt for artistic expression. U.S.
objections have been to statements Hosny has made that
"Israel had no culture. . .it stole cultural ideas from
others and claimed them as its own" and other objectionable
remarks. If we plan to derail the Hosny candidacy, we must
provide a credible alternate, preferably an Arab and/or
Muslim.
SCOBEY