

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06SOFIA1560, B-A OIL PIPELINE: SIGNS OF PROGRESS; BULGARIA AND
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SOFIA1560.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06SOFIA1560 | 2006-11-14 10:04 | 2011-04-29 12:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Sofia |
Appears in these articles: http://www.bivol.bg/wlbelene.html http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2011/04/29/1082317_mrusna_energiia/ http://wlcentral.org/node/1722 |
VZCZCXRO8098
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #1560/01 3181004
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141004Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2821
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 001560
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2016
TAGS: ECON ENRG PGOV RU BU
SUBJECT: B-A OIL PIPELINE: SIGNS OF PROGRESS; BULGARIA AND
GREECE SEEK CHEVRON PARTICIPATION
REF: SOFIA 1481
Classified By: AMB. JOHN BEYRLE FOR REASONS 1.4 B & D
¶1. (C) SUMMARY Greek and Bulgarian officials described to EUR
DAS Matt Bryza progress on the Burgas-Alexandropoulis (B-A)
oil pipeline during his November 3 visit to Sofia. The Greek
consortium plans to transfer most of its shares to
international private sector participants, including Chevron,
and the Bulgarians will likely follow suit. In addition, the
pipeline's legal headquarters will be in Luxembourg, which
creates a much more international project than the previous
perception of a solely Russian-controlled venture. The
Bulgarians and Greeks eagerly seek Chevron's participation,
and the active involvement of the USG. END SUMMARY
¶2. (C) EUR DAS Matt Bryza and Ambassador Beyrle met in Sofia
on November 3 with President Parvanov, PM Stanishev, Minister
of Economy and Energy Ovcharov, Minister of Regional
Development Gagauzov, Greek Minister of Economic Development
Sioufas and Turkish Minister of Energy Guler, to discuss
regional energy issues, including the Burgas-Alexandropoulis
oil pipeline.
B-A MOVING AHEAD WITH PRIVATE PARTNERS
--------------------------------------
¶3. (C) The B-A pipeline is making progress in key areas,
despite the lack of an overall political agreement between
the three parties - Russia, Greece and Bulgaria. Greek
Minister of Economic Development (including energy) Sioufas
who was coincidentally in Sofia, was keen to tell Bryza that
the pipeline will be an international one, not Russian, whose
legal headquarters will be in Luxembourg and therefore
subject to EU law and regulation. Sioufas also described
forward motion on the Greek consortium for B-A, where private
companies will assume the majority of the Greek share of the
three-country project, which means private funding as well as
additional expertise and pressure on politicians to make it
happen. Bulgaria will likely follow the Greek model and
apportion equal shares to private companies Chevron and
TNK-BP, and Kazakhstani state oil company Kazmunaigaz. Since
the Bulgarian public is sensitive to foreign ownership, the
Greek model could give the GOB cover, said Gagauzov. The
three countries plan to establish the international project
company by the end of the year.
¶4. (C) President Parvanov confirmed that in the September 4
meeting in Athens, President Putin had explicitly endorsed
"broad participation" in the B-A project, which all present
clearly understood as a green light for foreign players like
Chevron or TNK-BP to take part in the deal on the Greek and
Bulgarian sides. Sioufas suggested Bulgaria should engage in
separate talks with Chevron, TNK-BP and
Kazmunaigaz - something Bulgaria is anxious to do. Bulgarian
Minister of Regional Development Gagauzov requested USG help
in setting up a meeting for the GOB with Chevron's London and
Moscow teams. Sioufas was eager for Bryza and Beyrle to
convey to Chevron the progress to date and Greece's
willingness to work out specifics. President Parvanov called
for increased U.S. presence in the B-A project, saying that
without U.S. government intervention and support, the project
will suffer more delays. Bryza stressed that private
companies must take the lead in determining the commercial
viability of the project, but offered to cooperate with both
Chevron and the GOB to help the parties advance their own
discussions.
¶5. (C) Russia,s desire for its state oil pipeline monopoly,
Transneft, to operate the pipeline raised concerns among the
Greek and Bulgarian officials. Bryza asked how Greece and
Bulgaria planned to protect their national interests if
Russian state-owned oil companies acquire majority ownership
shares of the project and Transneft becomes the pipeline
operator. Sioufas replied that Greece and Bulgaria would
insist that companies from their countries be sub-contractors
and that minority rights be guaranteed, and that
international oil companies (like Chevron) provide the oil
throughput required to secure financing. Sioufas also said
Bulgarian and Greek companies might be co-operators of the
pipeline, along with Transneft. Bulgarian officials
indicated that the GOB will ensure its rights are protected
by setting up international partners for the Universal
Terminal Burgas (UTB), while maintaining some GOB and
ownership of the terminal, said Gagauzov, whose ministry is
officially in charge of Bulgaria's pipeline activities.
Bryza picked up on this international theme and described B-A
as a potential example of Western companies, NATO and EU
member states, and Russia working together on a major energy
project, provided that Bulgaria and Greece structured the
SOFIA 00001560 002.3 OF 002
deal appropriately.
¶6. (C) PM Stanishev relayed his frustration that regional
energy projects took so long to develop. He pointed to the
ten-year AMBO discussions which have led nowhere, but felt
both AMBO and the Belene nuclear project must be pursued in
order to keep options open for Bulgaria's overall energy
security. He also mentioned that Bulgaria wanted to maintain
control over the UTB (pumping station) in order to
provide flexibility to build a second oil pipeline in the
future and to keep some control in their own hands.
Ambassador Beyrle stressed that these hands need to be
transparent ones. Bulgaria will seek funding from the World
Bank and others for the UTB.
TURKEY LOOKING FOR U.S. SUPPORT FOR SAMSUN-CEYAN
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶7. (C) Guler made a strong pitch for U.S. involvement on the
Samsun-Ceyan (S-C) oil pipeline, which would compete with
Burgas-Alexandroupolis for the next major increment of
Caspian oil that will be shipped around the Turkish Straits.
At one point, Guler asked Bryza directly if the U.S.
"affirmatively supported" S-C. He described the pros of the
route as having no environmental concerns, unlike the B-A
route, and the existence of a harbor in Ceyan vs. the lack of
harbors or loading/unloading facilities in Burgas and
Alexandropoulis. Guler questioned whether it would be
feasible for the USG to "sponsor" both pipelines, and clearly
pressed Bryza in favor of S-C, pointing to Turkish experience
with BTC. Bryza reiterated what he has told Guler many times
in the past, namely, that the U.S. believes commercial
considerations will determine whether B-A or S-C is built
first, that the U.S. wishes the GOT and other developers of
S-C success in proving the project's commercial viability,
and that eventually, there might be sufficient Caspian oil
available to realize both projects.
AMBO
----
¶8. (C) Some GOB officials feel the AMBO project (Burgas to
Vlore, Albania via Macedonia) is a step ahead of B-A in
organizational planning, with routes mapped out and a
fund-raising plan. But the GOB does not
see any chances of immediate progress without attention from
the big oil companies that can provide the throughput
required to secure financing. Gagauzov, whose ministry
supports both B-A and AMBO, does not feel it is feasible to
have both pipelines starting at the same time, but thinks
they could co-exist in the future.
BELENE
------
¶9. (C) Bulgaria decided to go with the Russian
Atomstroyexport bid, PM Stanishev said, because their
design is newer, which he equated with being more secure.
Stanishev also pointed to "great interest" from France on the
Framatome (Siemens/Areva) Instrumentation and Control portion
of the Russian bid, and stressed the need for German and
French support for EU licensing reasons. He also mentioned
Russian pressure "behind the scenes." When Amb. Beyrle
pitched Westinghouse's proven track record and better prices,
the PM said the GOB was considering how to combine the two
competing bids, and said Minister Ovcharov was trying to
include as many partners as possible. Stanishev was aware of
Westinghouse's good works at Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant.
In a nod to the controversy swirling around Bulgaria's
agreement to close four of six reactors at Kozloduy in order
to enter the EU, Parvanov noted that Bulgaria makes up for
around 50 percent of the electricity shortage in the region,
but will only have enough for its own use once Kozloduy units
3 and 4 are closed on December 31.
COMMENT
-------
¶10. (C) It is clear that Bulgaria and Greece, separately and
together, are trying to come up with practical solutions to
make the B-A pipeline work. We take it as a step toward
commercial viability that the Bulgarian and Greek Governments
are now planning to sell their shares in B-A to private
investors, and to ensure that the venture will be subject to
European laws and regulations. Now might be a good time for
Chevron to reach out to the Governments of Bulgaria and
Greece, and for the USG - in Washington, Brussels and the
three capitals - to prepare for active diplomacy aimed at
aligning our
geo-political interests with commercial realities.
This cable was cleared with DAS Bryza.
BEYRLE