

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09ROME638, FRATTINI TELLS AG HOLDER ITALY FAVORS ACCEPTING
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ROME638.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09ROME638 | 2009-06-04 09:59 | 2011-04-27 11:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Rome |
VZCZCXRO0570
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRO #0638/01 1550959
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 040959Z JUN 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2173
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 4827
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000638
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IT
SUBJECT: FRATTINI TELLS AG HOLDER ITALY FAVORS ACCEPTING
GITMO DETAINEES
Classified By: cda elizabeth l. dibble for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
Summary
--------
¶1. (C) Attorney General Eric Holder (AG) discussed
resettlement of Guantanamo detainees with Italian Foreign
Minister Franco Frattini in Rome May 29 on the margins of the
G8 meeting of interior and justice ministers. Frattini said
the GOI ""profoundly shares"" the President's views on
Guantanamo and identified Italy as one of six EU member
states ""firmly in favor"" of accepting detainees. He shared
his positive assessment of the EU's legal framework to be
considered at the EU JHA ministerial meeting June 4,
including limitations on movements through the listing of
detainee names in the Schengen Information System. Frattini
also proposed that the USG seek a TransAtlantic statement of
principles on human rights and security in the fall under the
Swedish EU presidency as a capstone to the process.
¶2. (C) At a press conference May 30 following the G8
ministerial, Interior Minister Roberto Maroni said, in his
view, ""The European Union ... should reach a unanimous
decision and welcome, only if they so desire, those inmates
that can be put back in jail."" He expressed concern that,
absent detention in Europe, former Guantanamo inmates would
be free to move throughout the Schengen zone and thus
represent an unacceptable increase in terrorism risk. These
public comments, which are not in synch with internal EU
discussions or GOI policy, play to Maroni's political base;
he is a leader of the Northern League political party, which
is tough on security and anti-immigration.
Review of EU Arrangements
-------------------------
¶3. (C) Frattini opened by saying that the GOI was ""on the
same page"" with the United States. He noted that there were
still a number of EU members reluctant or hostile on the
issue of accepting Guantanamo detainees for resettlement,
naming Austria, Germany, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and
the Netherlands. They were ""raising doubts"" in Europe about
the whole undertaking, but Frattini assured the AG ""we will
persuade them"" ultimately. Frattini said Germany was
particularly problematic, with the atmosphere in the
Bundestag quite hot ahead of elections. However he
underlined that the EU was close to a solution that would
accommodate everyone. Frattini said he expected EU Justice
and Home Affairs ministers to reach agreement at their June 4
meeting (""we are 99 percent of the way there"") on a legal
framework which would lay out the conditions for individual
state solutions and proposals vis--vis the United States.
¶4. (C) Frattini described the basic elements of the
framework as: 1) a data-sharing arrangement among Schengen
and non-Schengen states; 2) a voluntary agreement between the
receiving states and the detainees setting terms and
conditions; and 3) a roadmap to integration of the detainees
where they were settled. On the first, once the United
States made a specific proposal to transfer a detainee
""cleared for release,"" that state would circulate the name
and any related data to the intelligence network of Schengen
and non-Schengen states for clearance. Any objections would
have to be on the basis of ""public order or national security
concerns,"" and would affect only the objecting state, i.e.,
that state could refuse circulation of the detainee on its
territory but could not veto such on behalf of any other
state. Flagging the detainee's name in the Schengen
Information System (SIS) would limit the detainee's rights of
movement in Europe, which seemed to be the solution, Frattini
said, to meeting everyone's concerns.
¶5. (C) On the voluntary agreement to be signed between the
receiving state and the detainee's lawyers, Frattini said the
agreement would reference the detainee's USG status as well
as host country conditions. Frattini noted he would have to
set ""preventative conditions,"" such as daily check-in with
local police and notification of any intent to travel. Each
case would have to be treated differently, with some,
perhaps, being forbidden to travel abroad at all. He noted
that Italy would not want to risk a detainee traveling to
Somalia or the Middle East and re-engaging in terrorist acts,
noting the substantial measures the GOI was obliged to put in
place to keep four Palestinians (the Bethlehem Church of
Nativity case) under surveillance since accepting them in
¶2002. As for integration of detainees, Frattini noted
approvingly of news that several detainees settled by the
United States in Albania were now opening legitimate
businesses, saying it was critical that any detainees
accepted by Italy be permitted to take up employment. He
ROME 00000638 002 OF 003
noted that Italy would require as part of the voluntary
agreement with the detainees that they agree not to sue the
United States in Italian courts.
Italian Political Support and Advice
------------------------------------
¶6. (C) AG Holder expressed his deep appreciation for GOI
support of U.S. efforts to bring about an orderly closure of
Guantanamo. He noted that FM Frattini had sketched out a
highly creative approach within the EU to tackle the Schengen
movement issue, and applauded Italy's role in that effort.
Frattini underlined that the Italian government's point of
departure was not legal but political - to show solidarity
with the Obama administration. He noted that the GOI
""profoundly shares"" the President's views on Guantanamo.
With that in mind, he suggested that the United States
consider a political-level TransAtlantic declaration of
principles later in the year, to frame the issue. He
sketched a three-step process: the legal recommendation by
EU JHA ministers on June 4; the EU Foreign Ministers' embrace
of it on June 15; followed by an EU/US Foreign Ministers
meeting in October/November in which ministers would issue a
declaration of Transatlantic principles on human rights and
security, under the Swedish EU presidency. Frattini noted
that such a declaration would be a capstone for the efforts
now under way to lay the legal groundwork for individual
states to work with the United States on transfers. It would
provide the political wrapping for all states and would be a
good signal to the European public, as well. Frattini
offered to raise the issue informally with Swedish FM Bildt,
whom he will see on a visit to Stockholm shortly, and asked
the AG to float the idea in Washington.
¶7. (C) Frattini also said that a number of people,
particularly in Germany, were demanding to know why the U.S.
could not itself take the small number of detainees thus far
identified for transfer (50). Frattini said he told his
colleagues regularly that it was critical that Europe showed
it could be a co-producer of security, not just a consumer.
It was time to share the burden, having criticized the
previous administration so harshly over Guantanamo's
existence.
¶8. (C) Frattini told the AG he had established a restricted
working group within the GOI (chiefs of staff of the MFA, MOJ
and MOI, plus Italian intelligence). In order to facilitate
its work and avoid surprises, Frattini asked that the USG
informally pass to this group the names of any potential
detainees for transfer to Italy ahead of a formal request.
He also asked that the USG share any models it had used for
voluntary agreements, noting he understood the United States
had worked out a draft in transferring some 14 detainees back
to the UK. He asked whether the United States had released
any detainees into the U.S. and whether the AG had shared any
specifics with other European governments. The AG said no to
both questions.
¶9. (C) In closing, Frattini underscored that there were six
European countries (Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Ireland,
Switzerland) ""firmly in favor"" of taking detainees. He said
that they would continue to cooperate closely together and
with the United States. These countries ""should set the
example"" by expeditiously moving to individual agreements
with the United States. once the EU framework was agreed
upon. Frattini confirmed that ""we are ready to do so.""
Separate Treatment of Tunisian Detainees
----------------------------------------
¶10. (C) In a short aside, Frattini said he and others in the
GOI well recognized that the case of the two Tunisian
detainees requested by Milan magistrates for trial in Italy
and the larger Guantanamo issue were wholly separate, and
should be dealt with as such.
Interior Minister Complains Publicly
------------------------------------
¶11. (C) Echoing previous objections on security grounds of
accepting Guantanamo detainees, Interior Minister Maroni told
the press May 30 that he believes the EU must unanimously
agree to accept the detainees and that they should ""be put
back in jail."" Maroni argued it would not be acceptable ""for
me"" if they are free to move within the Schengen zone.
Maroni, speaking on the margins of the G8 meeting of justice
and interior ministers, said the United States had not yet
made a formal request, no detainees had been identified, and
that Italy is considering taking ""not more than two or three.""
ROME 00000638 003 OF 003
Comment
-------
¶12. (C) In his meeting with AG Holder, Frattini was forceful
and adamant in expressing GOI desire to work closely and
collaboratively with the United States, both in shaping EU
opinion and in working out future bilateral arrangements on
individual detainee cases. Notwithstanding Frattini's
helpful leadership on this issue within the GOI and at the
EU, he faces some political pushback from within the
government. The outspoken and powerful Interior Minister
Maroni and his Northern League political party have been
successfully pushing an anti-immigration line within the
government. Maroni has been vocal on several occasions about
his skepticism about the wisdom of the EU and Italy taking
Guantanamo detainees. In his initial phone conversation
congratulating President Obama on his election, Prime
Minister Berlusconi offered Italian assistance in resolving
the detainee issue. During the President's upcoming meeting
with the Prime Minister, it would be helpful to thank
Berlusconi for his government's efforts thus far but also
secure his recommitment to accepting detainees.
¶13. (C) Frattini also advised AG Holder not to attend the
June 4 JHA ministerial because he thought those countries
opposed to the United States on this issue would simply use
his presence as an opportunity to criticize the United States.
¶14. (U) The Department of Justice has cleared this cable.
DIBBLE