

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08ROME1021, SCENESETTER FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ROME1021.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08ROME1021 | 2008-08-12 14:52 | 2011-02-22 11:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Rome |
VZCZCXRO8705
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRO #1021/01 2251452
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 121452Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0755
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0317
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0678
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0420
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0977
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4436
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE IMMEDIATE 3160
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN IMMEDIATE 9509
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES IMMEDIATE 3306
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0454
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 2955
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0904
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ROME 001021
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV IT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER
4-10 TRIP TO ITALY
ROME 00001...
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C/NF) Summary. Mr. Vice President, Silvio Berlusconi's
government has worked hard over its first months in office to
regain its position as our best ally in continental Europe.
Your September 4-10 visit comes as the Berlusconi government
reconvenes for what promises to be an important legislative
session. Although it has a strong electoral mandate, the
government needs to take decisive steps to revitalize the
economy and reduce budget deficits. Your visit presents an
opportunity to build upon the President's June visit by
encouraging the Berlusconi government to remain focused on
much-needed economic and institutional reforms, while
maintaining the defense capabilities and commitments that are
essential to bilateral and NATO interests.
¶2. (C/NF) Berlusconi's government has taken pains to work
with us, but mandatory budget cuts mean we will need to
coordinate on the specifics. Berlusconi relaxed geographic
caveats for Italian ISAF forces, but we are monitoring
progress on bringing promised police and border guard
trainers into the field. Berlusconi and Foreign Minister
Frattini have been extremely cooperative on Iran, even if
Italy has not been invited to join the P5 1 as they hoped.
Coordination has been very good on Lebanon and Israel, though
we have not yet made the same type of progress on
trans-Atlantic relations with Russia. You will also be
meeting President Giorgio Napolitano, who continues to
exercise his authority with conscientiousness and to be a
stabilizing force in the government -- even when it makes him
unpopular among his colleagues on the center-left. End
Summary.
Berlusconi Government Embarks on Challenging Autumn
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶3. (C/NF) Over his first hundred days in office, Berlusconi
delivered concrete results on election promises. His
coalition's solid majorities in both chambers of parliament
allowed the swift adoption of wide-ranging laws on domestic
security and the budget. Berlusconi intends to pass
significant judicial reforms and devolve more fiscal powers
to the regions between now and the end of the year.
Politicians of all stripes agree that deep institutional
reform is essential. But initial hopes of cross-aisle
cooperation have faded, as the weakened opposition has
signaled its intent to protest budget cuts and changes to the
dysfunctional and deeply politicized judicial system.
An Ally in Economic Decline -- We Can Help Change This
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶4. (SBU) A G8 member and one of the world's largest
economies, Italy's influence is threatened by perennially
slow economic growth. Its economy has grown a full percentage
point slower than the EU average this decade. A burdensome
bureaucracy, corruption, organized crime, a low birth rate,
severe labor market rigidity, a weak educational system, and
a business culture that rewards connections instead of merit
are all factors contributing to stagnation - a condition that
bedeviled both the Prodi government and the Berlusconi
government that preceded it. The slow growth that results
from this mess seriously threatens Italy's ability to be the
kind of ""boots on the ground"" ally that we want it to be.
¶5. (U) To address this economic threat to our alliance, in
2006 the Embassy launched the Partnership for Growth, an
ambitious, multi-faceted effort to spur economic dynamism by
helping move research to market, grow risk capital markets,
support innovation by strengthening intellectual property
rights, and create Italian entrepreneurial role models.
Through our Fulbright Business Exchange and Student Training
(BEST) scholarship program we send young Italian
scientist-entrepreneurs to Silicon Valley for six months of
total immersion in the U.S. entrepreneurial environment. They
come back energized, ready to do in their country what we
have done in ours. Of particular note, almost all costs are
covered by donations from Italian companies. We have also
brought many of the top minds in U.S. innovation to Italy, to
share their ideas on how countries can make progress. We have
created dozens of new, web-based avenues for communication
and idea-sharing between the U.S. and Italy. And through more
than 200 events over the last two years, we have made the
Italian elite understand what needs to be done to put their
country on the path to prosperity.
¶6. (U) We have made tremendous progress. We have strengthened
the hands of those Italians who want to move their country
forward, and in doing so we have greatly improved Italian
perceptions of the United States. I am happy to report that
because of our Partnership for Growth, in Italy, the words
""innovation"" ""growth"" and ""entrepreneurship"" are now usually
associated with the United States of America.
Maintaining a Common Stand on Iran
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶7. (S/NF) We have made great advances in moving Italy solidly
into our camp on Iran. The Berlusconi government has
cooperated fully on EU efforts to apply additional financial
measures against Tehran, despite Italy's disappointment with
not being included in the P5-plus-1. Their concerns have
been eased somewhat by Quint pre-meeting consultations, but
they worry that this mechanism is too informal and ad hoc to
keep them properly informed. Italian adherence to sanctions
has always been complicated by their substantial commercial
interests in Iran, but we will continue to monitor their
economic activities and discourage further energy sector
investments. Sustaining Italian support for sanctions and the
P5-plus-1 negotiations may depend on keeping up early and
high-level dialogue.
Not Seeing Eye-To-Eye on Russia
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶8. (S/NF) Italy's relationship with Russia could become a
point of friction if Italy continues to insist that Russia's
demands on Kosovo, Georgia, Ukraine and Missile Defense get a
fair hearing in transatlantic and international fora. We
have advised them that taking a soft line on Russian actions
against Georgia could damage their credibility. We have also
become concerned by a growing sympathy for Medvedev's calls
for a new security framework to supersede NATO, OSCE, and
CFE. You can let Berlusconi know that public endorsement of
Russia's plans only serves to weaken the alliance.
¶9. (S/NF) The presence of a strong communist party and a
history of leftist governments in Italy gave Russia a degree
of influence not seen in any other Western European country.
More recently, a commercial dependence on Russia,
particularly in the energy sector, and a close personal
relationship between Putin and Berlusconi based on mutual
commercial interests and Berlusconi's preference for dealing
with assertive world leaders appear to be greater motivating
factors in Italy's relations with Russia.
Need for Energy Diversification
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶10. (C/NF) Compared to EU countries further north, Italy is
less dependent on Russia for energy, especially natural gas.
Geography gives Italy access to more resources than other EU
countries, including North African energy. There are already
natural gas pipelines from Libya and Algeria to Italy. An
Algeria-Sardinia-Italy pipeline is being planned. While
Italy's North African connections seem to be good news in
terms of energy security, ENI has recently given Gazprom
access to North African energy resources, in exchange for
increased access to Siberian gas fields. Italy hopes to make
increased use of Liquid Natural Gas, but local environmental
concerns have slowed the construction of regasification
plants. The GOI claims to share our concerns, but in fact
takes comfort in what it perceives to be its special
relationship with Russia. Italy's largest energy company
(ENI -- one-third owned by the GOI) is now a major partner of
Russia's Gazprom, and is building strategically important
pipelines for Gazprom in both the Black Sea and the Baltic.
Many believe that ENI actions in furtherance of its own
commercial goals are also helping Russia tighten its grip on
Western Europe's energy supply.
¶11. (C/NF) At the same time, Italy is taking steps to
diversify its sources of energy. Italy, through the Edison
Company, is a key player in the Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI)
pipeline. The availability of Azeri natural gas is a key
concern, and the EU's Nabbucco pipeline is sometimes seen by
the Italians as a competitor for this gas. Reports that
Russia is courting Azerbaijan in an attempt to buy all of
their gas is a major concern for Italy, since it would mean
the end of TGI.
Basing and Security Cooperation:
A Cornerstone of the Relationship
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶12. (C/NF) Italy remains our most important European ally for
projecting military power into the Mediterranean, Middle East
and North Africa. We have 14,000 U.S. military and DOD
civilian personnel and 16,000 of their family members on five
Italian bases. The GOI has approved the expansion of the base
at Vicenza to consolidate the 173rd Airborne and the
deployment of the USAF Global Hawk UAV in Sicily. Legal
challenges to the Vicenza expansion have been dismissed, and
both projects are on track. COESPU (Center of Excellence for
Stability Police Units), the peacekeeping training center,
has graduated over 1,600 officers from 14 countries and has
just finished training peacekeepers headed to Darfur. We are
now in discussions on locating component commands for AFRICOM
and Italy has signaled that it would like to host the overall
HQ.
Seeking Follow-Through in Afghanistan
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶13. (C/NF) During the President's June visit, Berlusconi
agreed to loosen geographic caveats on Italian ISAF troops
and to send approximately 30 additional Carabinieri trainers
to support the ANCOP program. Control of Kabul has passed
from Italy to France, and Italy intends to transfer a portion
of their 1,200 Kabul-based troops to the Herat district.
Because of budget constraints and large troop commitments in
Lebanon and the Balkans, Italy is likely to reduce the number
of troops stationed in Afghanistan. We would like to see
Italy maintain as many troops as possible in Afghanistan and
to provide more security training and military hardware.
Stronger Support for Israel
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶14. (C/NF) Berlusconi and Frattini proudly and publicly
declare their support for Israel, refuse to consider Hamas a
potentially constructive partner, and support the formation
of an independent, democratic Palestinian state. Frattini
pledged additional aid to train and equip Palestinian police,
but was unable to do so due to budgetary constraints.
Lebanon and Syria: Consultation and Cooperation
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶15. (C) Italy has consistently offered political, financial
and military support to Lebanon, and is the single largest
contributor of troops to UNIFIL (over 2,500), which is
currently under the command of an Italian general.
Berlusconi pledged to maintain and strengthen UNIFIL and FM
Frattini joined his Spanish and German counterparts in
calling for Syria to halt its uncooperative approach to
Lebanon. You can encourage Italy to maintain this
engagement, and to join in our efforts to improve security
along the Lebanon-Syria border.
Expanding Military Cooperation In the Face of Budget Cuts
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶16. (C/NF) The Italian MOD signaled that because of budget
constraints, it may not meet its commitment to pay for 300
flight hours in the NATO SAC C-17 program. After
considerable pressure from SECDEF, the NATO SYG and myself,
Italy agreed to postpone their decision until December. We
are, however, encouraging them to confirm their participation
by mid-September. Your visit is an excellent opportunity to
remind them of the importance of this program to the Alliance.
¶17. (C) Berlusconi is likely to ask for your help on
Finmeccanica's acquisition of U.S. defense contractor DRS
Technologies, a deal worth $5.2 billion. The Italian
government would like to see DRS obtain a Special Security
Agreement from DOD, and will encourage a favorable decision
by the CFIUS. A recent announcement of intentions by
Finmeccanica and Russian Technologies, a Russian para-statal
industrial and defense conglomerate, to enter into a
cooperation agreement has raised some red flags by CFIUS.
Berlusconi may mention Italy's contributions (2 billion
euros) to the Joint Strike Fighter program. He may also
express interest in the USAF Tanker program rebid; the
Italian firm Alenia Aeronautica has partnered with Boeing on
the KC767.
President Napolitano Has Limited Power,
Considerable Influence
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶18. (C) You will also be meeting with President Giorgio
Napolitano. Although his constitutional powers are limited,
Napolitano exercises his authority evenhandedly, evidenced by
the praise and criticism he receives from both the political
left and right. During the collapse of the Prodi government
in January 2008, Napolitano was a calming presence in the
midst of a political maelstrom. Since Berlusconi took
office, Napolitano -- whose roots are in the former Communist
Party -- has been careful to tread a legally sound middle
ground. He signed the controversial immunity law because it
avoids the problems in earlier similar legislation, but also
warned the Berlusconi government not to abuse its decree
powers and instead to hold full debates on new legislation in
Parliament. President Napolitano's seven-year term expires
in 2013.
Comment
- - - -
¶19. (C/NF) Mr. Vice President, Italy has great potential to
become an even closer partner and ally in addressing some of
our most important global interests. But the country is at a
critical juncture, and could be faced with institutional and
economic failure if difficult domestic choices are not made.
Italy's ability to partner with the U.S. will depend above
all on the revival of its economy. Your discussions with
Berlusconi and key leaders can help this administration to
maintain focus and direction on international issues at a
point when their interests could be completely absorbed by
domestic concerns.
¶20. (U) We are pleased that you are coming to Italy at this
time. I am certain that your visit will make an already
robust relationship even stronger.
SPOGLI