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Viewing cable 06DAMASCUS1357, KHADDAM'S NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT GARNERS MIXED
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VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDM #1357/01 0861521
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271521Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7937
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0714
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 001357
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR ZEYA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SY
SUBJECT: KHADDAM'S NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT GARNERS MIXED
REVIEWS
REF: DAMASCUS 0702
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche for
reasons 1.4(b)/(d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The March 17 unveiling in Brussels of
the National Salvation Front (NSF) has received mixed reviews
from civil society activists and other contacts. While
activists distanced themselves publicly from the NSF, some
contacts took a more nuanced position privately, maintaining
that former VP Abdul Halim Khaddam, while not acceptable as
the leader of the opposition, could play a useful role in
weakening the regime. Damascus Declaration signers expressed
varying degrees of concern about the extent to which
Khaddam's effort would divide the opposition and pointed to
differences between the Declaration's program and that of the
NSF. Several also voiced puzzlement and disappointment over
the motivations of the Muslim Brothers in signing on to the
NSF. One contact noted that Khaddam is serving a useful role
in attracting anti-regime support from key Alawite figures
who were pillars in the regime of Hafez al-Asad, while many
contacts simply expressed puzzlement about what Khaddam is
really up to. End Summary.
¶2. (C) The March 17 announcement in Brussels of the
creation of the National Salvation Front (NSF), a
fourteen-member committee of Syrian exile opposition figures
led by former Vice President Khaddam and Muslim Brotherhood
chief Sadreddin Bayanouni, has received mixed reaction from
civil society figures, opposition activists, and other
contacts. A number of contacts noted that the identities of
the majority of the participating exile politicians remain
unknown. Press reports have offered only a limited list of
named participants: Khaddam, Bayanouni, U.S.-based Syrian
National Congress chief Nagib al-Ghadban, U.S.-based Syrian
Liberal National Democratic Party SYG Husam al-Deiri, and
Obeid Nahad, the editor of London-based thisissyria.net.
Press reports noted other signatories included unidentified
representatives from pan-Arabist, liberal, Islamist, Kurdish,
and communist groups.
¶3. (C) ANNOUNCEMENT LONG EXPECTED: The announcement of a
Khaddam/Bayanouni partnership has been expected by local
contacts for several weeks. In late February, key opposition
figure XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff that he had rejected overtures
by Khaddam and Bayanouni to join the front (ref A). Other
activists had expected the announcement to be made on March 9
to mark the 43rd anniversary of the Ba'ath Party's seizure of
power.
¶4. (C) INTERNAL OPPOSITION PUBLICLY DISTANCES ITSELF FROM
NSF: Internal opposition figures quickly distanced
themselves from the NSF. Hassan Abdulazeem, spokesman for
both the Damascus Declaration and the National Democratic
Front, told the regional newspaper al-Hayat that "we have no
connection at all with the Brussels meeting... the
preliminary stand toward what happened in Brussels is that it
was outside the Damascus Declaration framework and has
nothing to do with it." He added that the Damascus
Declaration provisional committee would soon confer on an
official stance vis-a-vis the NSF, with the expanded Damascus
Declaration group scheduled to hold an expanded meeting on
April 6.
¶5. (C) WHILE PRIVATE VIEWS MORE NUANCED: In private,
however, many opposition figures and activists are willing to
entertain the notion of a Khaddam-Bayanouni alliance, with
some even offering cautious praise. Prominent human rights
activist XXXXXXXXXXXX called the agreement a good step for
the opposition movement at large, noting that the Khaddam and
Bayanouni combine Khaddam's "best political connections" with
the MB's bona fide opposition credentials.
¶6. (C) SALVATION FRONT CHALLENGE TO INTERNAL OPPOSITION? A
number of internal opposition figures also described the NSF
as a challenge to a relatively immobile domestic opposition.
In an interview with al-Hayat on March 20, senior opposition
figure and Damascus Declaration signatory Riad al-Turk said
that "the formation of the Front is punishment for the
Damascus Declaration leaders for lagging behind and
hesitating."
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolChief March 23 that, unlike other
opposition figures like Abdulazeem, he does not categorically
reject the Khaddam-Bayanouni initiative, although he does not
accept Khaddam as leader of the opposition. "We don't oppose
him, but our program is different." XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the NSF
initiative contained two critical mistakes. First, its
position on the Kurdish issue goes beyond calling for
nationality for all Syrian Kurds and full cultural rights, to
the point where it will encourage Kurdish separatism and
provoke conflicts with the Arab majority; and second, it does
not make explicit that Khaddam supports democracy in Syria.
¶8. (C) KHADDAM'S ALAWITE SUPPORT: Others like former MP
XXXXXXXXXXXX viewed Khaddam as acceptable as a "bridging
figure" between the opposition and disenchanted regime (and
former regime) elements, noting that he believed Khaddam
understood the limits of his role. XXXXXXXXXXXX also alleged that
Khaddam has important, but thus far silent, support from key
Alawites who served as pillars in the regime of Hafez
al-Asad, including Ali Duba, Ali Zeyout, and Izzedine Nasser.
They believe that "there is no future for the Alawites with
Bashar" and that a Khaddam-led Sunni transition could protect
them from any post-Asad regime. They also see Khaddam as a
figure who would ensure the safety and stability of the
larger Alawite community, said XXXXXXXXXXXX.
¶9. (C) SKEPTICISM ON KHADDAM ALSO PALPABLE: On the other
hand, some activists have criticized the Khaddam-bayanouni
coalition from a variety of sides. Human rights activist and
Islamist sympathizer XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Bayanouni's
decision to join forces with Khaddam is "bad for Islamists
here." Khaddam has, thus far, refused to take responsibility
for his part in the regime's crimes (a point also made by
Turk and others). According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Khaddam's record of
abuses dates back to his governorship of Hama in 1964, when
the first crackdown against the MB took place. He must first
admit his responsibility if "he wants to lead us again."
¶10. (C) FEARS KHADDAM IS SPLITTING OPPOSITION: While
accepting that Khaddam is a useful tool to de-legitimize the
regime, because of the secrets he knows, activist
intellectual XXXXXXXXXXXX said it was clear from the way
Khaddam spoke in interviews that he saw his role in much more
ambitious terms. XXXXXXXXXXXX adamantly rejected any notion that
Khaddam could lead the opposition, insisting to Polchief that
"we have ways to make him fail if he tries." XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed
great puzzlement at what motivated the MB to associate itself
with Khaddam on the NSF, when they had played and continued
to play a critical role in the Damascus Declaration group.
"It doesn't make sense unless Khaddam has a putsch planned,"
said XXXXXXXXXXXX. He criticized the NSF for "splitting the
opposition" and undercutting the Damascus Declaration.
Finally, he expressed concerns that Khaddam wanted to "save
the regime" (the Ba'ath Party and the security services) by
getting rid of Bashar al-Asad and his inner circle. He
described this notion as totally unacceptable to the internal
opposition. While the Ba'ath Party could remain in place to
compete in a post-Asad democratic system, the leadership of
the security services and military would need to be purged so
as to transform them from protectors of a regime into
institutions serving the interests of Syria, insisted XXXXXXXXXXXX.
¶11. (C) Both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX mentioned plans in the next few
weeks for the Damascus Declaration group to form a leadership
group to put in place a plan of action. XXXXXXXXXXXX mentioned plans
to name 17 insiders and eight external leaders, including MB
figures. XXXXXXXXXXXX called these plans critical for the future of
the Damascus Declaration group while XXXXXXXXXXXX was more ambiguous,
hinting with some frustration that perhaps these plans had
been undercut by the NSF announcement in Brussels.
¶12. (C) In the meantime, contacts who speak regularly to
regime leaders continue to express puzzlement at what Khaddam
is trying to do. XXXXXXXXXXXX, a foreign policy analyst, said
that Khaddam is "playing roulette," recognizing that he has
no external military support for a coup and betting that
UNIIIC chief Brammertz will directly accuse Asad in June of
complicity in the killing of Hariri. XXXXXXXXXXXX called this a
bad bet because the Russians "will not allow" things to reach
that level and because even if it happens, Asad has made
clear publicly that he is determined to remain in power and
fight such accusations. Gadfly economist and former deputy
minister XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Khaddam's
capabilities had been overrated. "He can't do anything in
Syria because he has no support."
¶13. (C) COMMENT: As these reactions indicate, the response
to Khaddam's NSF initiative has been all over the map. It is
clear that the former VP continues to cast an imposing shadow
over both regime and opposition figures in Syria, regardless
of dismissals voiced about his lack of external support.
Many attribute the regime's current nervousness (in addition
to worries over Brammertz's intentions) to worries over what
Khaddam has planned and what he might say next. Internal
opposition figures for their part are consumed with fears
that Khaddam may be trying to hijack their largely immobile
movement and may inadvertenly divide and weaken them.
Khaddam also stirs fears among them about a compromise
opposition position that would accept leaving much of the
regime intact. Thus far, Khaddam seems to have stirred up
both the regime and internal opposition figures and even
mobilized them a bit, without, as far as we can tell,
weakening them perceptibly.
SECHE