

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD516, LITTLE MOVEMENT ON RECONCILIATION
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ISLAMABAD516.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09ISLAMABAD516 | 2009-03-12 04:28 | 2010-11-30 21:30 | SECRET | Embassy Islamabad |
VZCZCXRO7081
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #0516/01 0710428
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 120428Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1820
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 3529
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9963
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 9858
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4586
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 5932
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1219
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 6896
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 5823
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
Thursday, 12 March 2009, 04:28
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000516
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK
SUBJECT: LITTLE MOVEMENT ON RECONCILIATION
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 506 B. ISLAMABAD 508
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
¶1. (C) Summary. In a last-ditch effort to reduce tensions with the Sharif brothers ahead of the start of the lawyers’ march on March 12, President Zardari offered Pakistan Muslim League (PML) leader Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain the post of Senate leader if PML would form a government with the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in Punjab but will do little to pacify Nawaz Sharif or the lawyers. Shujaat is considering the deal, which will be sealed by the March 12 vote in the Senate; it could end governor’s rule in Punjab--if Shujaat can keep the PML forward block in line. Other compromise efforts have failed, although the UK High Commission is probing for the various parties’ positions in advance of a possible HMG mediation effort. After seeing Interior Minister Malik and Awami National Party leader Asfundyar Wali Khan, Ambassador will see Shujaat March 11 and the Sharifs on March 12.
¶2. (C) Amid reports of possible targeted killings and Mumbai style attacks during the march, the GOP began arresting Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) members and some civil activists. Interior Minister Malik assured Ambassador he had no plans to arrest the Sharifs or key civil society leaders like Aitzaz Ahsan, but caveated this by saying he might have to arrest Imran Khan or others “who did not obey the law.” Lawyers and JI activists already have begun infiltrating Islamabad; if a significant number of demonstrators cannot enter the capital, we expect protests in multiple areas, especially in Punjab, beginning March 12. Accordingly, we are issuing a Warden Notice March 11.
¶3. (C) During Ambassador’s fourth meeting in a week with Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Kayani on March 10, he again hinted that he might, however reluctantly, have to persuade President Zardari to resign if the situation sharply deteriorates. He mentioned Asfundyar Wali Khan as a possible replacement. This would not be a formal coup but would leave in place the PPP government led by PM Gilani, thus avoiding elections that likely would bring Nawaz Sharif to power. We do not believe Army action is imminent. We do believe Kayani was laying down a clear marker so that, if he has to act, he can say he warned the U.S. in advance and gave us ample opportunities to pressure both sides to back down. Kayani is trying to leverage what he considers predominate U.S. influence over Zardari, instead of seeking a direct confrontation that could provoke an unhelpful civil-military clash.
¶4. (C) Two weeks ago, Zardari was staring at victory on all fronts; today, he recognizes he must compromise with the Sharifs and might well be looking over his shoulder at the Army. Even if the lawyers’ march fizzles--and it may--Nawaz retains the high moral ground in public opinion and can continue attacking a now weakened Zardari. We should encourage Zardari to continue efforts to ease tensions and ask the Saudis and the UAE to weigh in with their respective allies. This could be a protracted process. End Summary.
Mediation/Confrontation/Collapse
--------------------------------
¶5. (C) There are three political scenarios in play as tensions between President Zardari and the Sharif brothers rise ahead of the start of the lawyers’ march on March 12: mediation/accommodation, which resolves the Sharifs’ disqualification from holding public office, ends governor’s rule in Punjab and addresses the judicial issue; confrontation, which leads to violence and possible Army intervention; and a fizzled march that sets the stage for continued conflict.
Mediation/Accommodation
-----------------------
¶6. (C) On March 11, Awami National Party (ANP) leader Asfundyar Wali Khan described to Ambassador and Polcouns his
ISLAMABAD 00000516 002 OF 004
mediation efforts with Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam leader Fazlur Rehman over the past week. Zardari, he asserted, agreed to request a review of the Supreme Court decision disqualifying the Sharifs, said that after a positive outcome to that review Shahbaz Sharif would be reinstated as Chief Minister Punjab, and agreed to a conference to discuss restoring the judiciary. In return, Nawaz should delay the lawyers’ march.
¶7. (C) Nawaz reportedly agreed but then changed his mind and demanded reversal of the court decision, an end to governor’s rule in Punjab and reinstatement of the former Chief Justice. Under pressure, Nawaz relented and agreed to the judicial conference idea but offered only to ask the lawyers to consider postponing the march, and said all this had to be accomplished in a day. Asfundyar noted that it was impossible to demand a immediate review of a Court decision that had not been formally issued. He told Nawaz that he would win the next election and should just be patient; by pressing now, he threatened a political vacuum that would be filled by the Army. This time, warned Asfundyar, Nawaz might not be sent into a comfortable exile. Nawaz refused to budge.
¶8. (C) Asfundyar said that Zardari was surrounded by advisors who were not politicians, so he was not being encouraged to compromise; Nawaz’s chief advisor was Chaudhry Nisar who, with the Sharif brothers disqualified, stood the best chance of being the next PML-N Prime Minister. Nawaz had provoked the Court by launching a campaign over the doctored exam scores of the Chief Justice’s daughter, and this had prompted the ruling against Shahbaz. Asfundyar attributed the crisis 70 percent to Nawaz and 30 percent to Zardari. In Asfundyar’s view, there was an absence of trust on both sides, and what was needed was a cease-fire in which to conduct reasonable negotiations. If the march fizzled, there could be time to work out a compromise; if the march sparked violence, there was “nothing to do but pray.”
¶9. (C) Asfundyar welcomed the idea of UK mediation but said it was the U.S. view that counted most. He also urged that we contact the UAE to pressure Zardari and the Saudis to pressure Nawaz to back off. ANP had seen PML-N members distributing cash envelopes to a stream of supporters this week; like Zardari, Asfundyar said he believed the money was coming from the Saudis. Asfundyar was open to continue mediating if asked. He reminded Ambassador that Zardari had offered him the job of Prime Minister immediately after the February 2008 elections.
¶10. (C) In a separate meeting with Ambassador and Polcouns, UK High Commissioner Brinkley said he had received approval to approach the various sides, discern their bottom lines, and report back to London. HMG had not yet decided whether to take on any role of mediator or guarantor. The UK planned to make a public statement today urging the parties to resolve their differences democratically and eschew violence. Brinkley was scheduled to see PM Gilani and possibly Zardari and Shahbaz Sharif on March 11, and Chief of Army Staff General Kayani and Asfundyar Wali Khan on March 12.
¶11. (C) Late on March 11, the PML confirmed press reports that the PPP had reversed course (Ref B) and now had offered Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain the post of leader of the Senate if PML agreed to join PPP in a coalition government in Punjab. Shujaat will meet PM Gilani later March 11; on March 12, the newly constituted Senate would vote on a party leader. If the deal goes through, it would end governor’s rule in Punjab but it is unclear if a PPP-led government will reduce tensions. It remains unclear, however, if Shujaat can hold on to his 28-35 member “forward block” of Nawaz supporters to seal this deal. Without the PML forward block, the PPP cannot form a government.
Confrontation
-------------
¶12. (C) In a March 11 meeting with Ambassador and Polcouns, Interior Minister Malik described his efforts to mediate with the lawyers to convince them to hold a peaceful march outside of Islamabad, but he said the lawyers so far have spurned the GOP’s proposals. Malik plans to block roads into Islamabad
ISLAMABAD 00000516 003 OF 004
beginning March 13. Ambassador warned that efforts to arrest the Sharifs or high-profile activists like Aitzaz Ahsan would not be well received in Washington or elsewhere. Malik denied he had any intention of arresting the Sharifs or Aitzaz but qualified this by saying “unless they do not stop, but I will tell you first. I have to maintain law and order.” He said he might have to arrest Imran Khan and some JI activists. (Note: On March 10, Punjab police began arresting 200-250 JI student activists and low-level PML-N workers. Mission contacts report many activists already are going underground. Neither the Sharifs nor Aitzaz Ahsan have been arrested. Geo TV News, which the GOP has criticized for being anti-government, disappeared from cable TV. See septel for updates.)
¶13. (C) Malik said he had received serious threat information regarding a Mumbai style attack in Karachi on March 13-14 by the Jandallah group that previously had attacked the U.S. Consulate. There were also reports of a proposed targeted killing, against whom was unclear. JI leaders were giving their students “black coats” so they could look like lawyers and already were infiltrating Islamabad. Malik expected crowds of at least 4,000-5,000 in the capital, even with road closures.
¶14. (S) In four conversations with Ambassador this week, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Kayani hinted that, however reluctantly, he might have to urge Zardari to resign, if conditions deteriorate. He did not offer any red lines. Kayani indicated that Asfundyar Wali Khan or someone else broadly acceptable might be an appropriate replacement for Zardari. We do not believe Army action is imminent, but we do believe Kayani was laying down a marker that, if he had to intervene, the U.S. had been forewarned and given many opportunities to avoid intervention by pressuring both Nawaz and Zardari. Kayani made it clear that regardless of how much he disliked Zardari, he distrusted Nawaz even more. The scenario Kayani hinted at was one in which he would pressure Zardari to resign (and presumably leave the country). This would not be an official Army “coup;” it would leave the PPP government led by Prime Minister Gilani in place and preclude the need for elections that likely would bring Nawaz to power.
¶15. (S) Kayani hinted at disquiet among his corps commanders who believe Zardari is corrupt and has not been paying enough attention to Pakistan’s economic and security challenges. ISI DG Pasha highlighted to Ambassador his concerns about Zardari’s alleged corruption on the flight to the U.S. for the strategic review, and we have multiple sources demonstrating Army complaints about Zardari. Kayani believes the U.S. has the most influence over Zardari, and he knows we are Pakistan’s most important ally, especially for increasing the capacity of the Pakistani Army. Kayani told Ambassador he has talked directly to Zardari, but he does not appear to have conveyed the seriousness of Army concerns about Zardari or the security situation vis a vis the march. (Note: Kayani may be seeking to avoid a confrontation that would prompt Zardari to make a disastrous decision to try and oust the COAS.)
A Fizzle
--------
¶16. (C) At this point, everything appears to rest on the outcome of the lawyers’ march. PML-N does not have a proven reputation for putting demonstrators on the streets, although JI does. By applying the road closure/detention tactics that worked for Musharraf in 2007 to stop pro-Nawaz demonstrations, the government might be able to avoid a serious clash this time. But if a policeman fires into the crowd or a terrorist attacks protesters, all bets are off.
¶17. (C) There is also the likelihood that the march will not occur as scheduled. Blocked from Islamabad, there could be multiple flash points in the Punjab, early demonstrations in Islamabad, and a series of confrontations with the police. This could be a protracted clash of wills.
¶18. (C) Comment: Two weeks ago, Zardari was staring victory in the face after negotiating a PPP win in Senate elections, setting Nawaz up for an entirely legal
ISLAMABAD 00000516 004 OF 004
disqualification, and looking toward successful Friends and Donors meetings that would provide the financial support needed to bolster his sagging popularity. By over-reaching to make a grab for Punjab without doing his homework on vote counting in Punjab, Zardari now needs to compromise with the Sharifs and might well be looking over his shoulder at the Army. Even if the march fizzles, Nawaz retains the high moral ground in the public’s eyes and will use it to continue attacking a weakened Zardari. Zardari needs to win back the military’s confidence.
PATTERSON