

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 03ANKARA3694, DEFINING THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY: GENERAL STAFF AND GOVERNMENT STRUGGLE WITH THEMSELVES AND EACH OTHER
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #03ANKARA3694.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
03ANKARA3694 | 2003-06-06 14:28 | 2011-03-22 15:30 | SECRET | Embassy Ankara |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
061428Z Jun 03
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003694
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS TU
SUBJECT: DEFINING THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY: GENERAL STAFF AND GOVERNMENT STRUGGLE WITH THEMSELVES AND EACH OTHER
REF: A. ANKARA 2521
¶B. ANKARA 2666
¶C. ANKARA 2122
¶D. ANKARA 1350
¶E. ANKARA 0418
¶F. 02 ANKARA 7682
¶G. 02 ANKARA 7683
¶H. ISTANBUL 0776
(U) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Chief of the General Staff (TGS) Ozkok's
attempt to smother disgruntlement in senior ranks and at the
same time to warn ruling AK party against perceived
anti-secular trends has achieved neither goal. While
tensions between the military and AK, and within each, will
continue, we see no likelihood under the current
constellation of forces for the military to force a change of
government. End summary.
¶2. (C) Chief of the TGS Ozkok's May 26 political warning in
the form of a briefing for selected newspaper journalists is
yet more evidence that the TGS is very unhappy:
-- Unhappy within itself (Ozkok is being pressed by a group
of six to eight senior officers who hold what a broad range
of journalist, political, and national security analyst
contacts characterize for us as "Eurasianist, status quo,
keep-military-procurement-secret" views; other TGS officers,
such as J-5 chief of agreements Air Force MG Ajar, who is
well connected to Ozkok, told us he agrees with the
assessment that Ozkok is too soft on AK).
-- Unhappy with the AK government, which proclaims itself
conservative-democratic, but which the TGS and most of the
rest of the Kemalist Establishment (presidency, most of the
judiciary, bureaucracy, main opposition CHP, and large
majorities of the media and academe) charge is both
incompetent and carrying an Islamist torch.
-- Unhappy with the fact, flexibility, and speed of change in
the world.
-- Unhappy with change at home, where social change from
below, a growing freedom of debate about many hitherto taboo
subjects, and the government's attempt to avoid submitting
its newest package of EU Copenhagen Criteria-related reforms
to the military-dominated NSC for review all suggest that, as
ordinary Turks consider where their country should go, the
Turkish military is beginning to lose its position as the
ultimate arbiter of republican probity.
¶3. (S) As many contacts -- among them premier national
defense analyst Faruk Demir -- have reminded us, we should
put Ozkok's latest remarks in the context of a longer series
of TGS statements and growing military discomfort (refs A-F
stretching back to October 2002). Ozkok's aims on May 26
were six-fold:
(A) To cut the legs off the press reports, originating in the
May 23 issue of Kemalist "Cumhuriyet" that "young officers"
are very uneasy about AK party and the AK government's goals.
"Young officers" is a phrase redolent of the May 27, 1960
coup, engineered by young officers against both the
government of the day and senior commanders, and Ozkok was
determined (1) to end public speculation that his tenure is
under question in the officers' ranks and (2) to restore
discipline in the ranks -- his use of an oblique Ottomanesque
phrase ("kerameti kendinden menkul kimseler", roughly
equivalent to "Lord Muck miracle workers") to demean his TGS
critics made his message to them all the blunter.
(B) While acknowledging that the TGS is not monolithic in its
discussions of "ideas", to reject all speculation that there
are differences of view or any polarization in the TGS (note:
to protect his image as chief of the TGS, Ozkok felt he had
to assert that there is no difference of view in the TGS, but
others, including MG Acar, readily admit to us that there is
a heated debate, especially concerning Turkey's direction on
the EU, relations with the U.S., and what to do about AK
party).
(C) To declare that the TGS and AK government are not on the
same wavelength.
(D) To affirm that the TGS as a whole is "uneasy" with the
current political situation.
(E) To reject any discussion of a coup "under this roof" (the
TGS) but to leave the journalists, and thus the public at
large on alert (1) by emphasizing that the armed forces will
continue its secularist struggle "to the very end" within the
constitutional framework; and (2) by warning that the
February 28 process (the "post-modern" coup that brought an
end to the Islamist Erbakan government in 1997) is a cause
and effect relationship, and "with the reasons for February
28 continuing, its effects will continue."
(F) To defend himself against the charges -- which appear to
originate with the high-ranking generals aligned against him
-- that he is too democratic and Western-oriented to be a
strong guardian of core "secularist" values; Ozkok said that
his attachment to democratic values and the benefits of
having served in Western billets strengthen his ability to
defend core values.
¶4. (C) Ozkok's briefing has produced sound and fury, but
uneven effect.
¶5. (C) First, press and private commentaries have been as
openly critical of the military's heavy-handedness as we
recall ever having experienced in Turkey. Not one of the
journalists, analysts, politicians or businessmen we have
talked to since the briefing sees a coup as possible under
current circumstances, or even desirable. However, Demir
emphasized that the way Ozkok broached the coup subject
leaves the door open should the AK government's performance
cause widespread and sharp discontent, thereby eroding the
resilient support Erdogan and AK continue to have in
Anatolia. Some see Ozkok's position as lessened or, more
broadly, the military's ability to intimidate politicians and
the public as diminished. Emblematic of this latter view is
the comment we heard from a major crude oil and molasses
shipper, who expressed the hope that this controversy marks a
definitive turning point toward full democracy and civilian
control.
¶6. (S) Second, senior generals' objections to Ozkok's more
patient, reasonable line appear not to have abated. Our
defense and national security contacts identify seven of the
generals opposed to Ozkok as Land Forces Commander Yalman,
Jandarma Commander Eruygur, First Army Commander Dogan,
Aegean Army Commander Tolon, Second Army Commander Turkeri,
and NSC SecGen Kilinc, with Buyukanit described as playing it
both ways. Buyukanit's anti-American/anti-Western remarks at
a May 29 conference in Istanbul (ref H) lend weight to
classifying him in this group. Cengiz Candar noted to us May
29 a report that on May 28, General Dogan, in speaking at a
memorial service for a recently deceased army colleague,
deliberately used the inflammatory "young officers" phrase in
a way which would underscore continuing defiance of Ozkok.
¶7. (S) The carrying power of this group remains a subject of
debate. Three contacts (Faruk Demir, a military affairs
journalist, and a center-right politician with close ties to
high-level retired generals) have separately told us they
have heard that this group of generals aims to give Ozkok a
memorandum demanding that he resign or submit to their view
and get tough with AK. At the same time, MG Acar told us he
sees no possibility of an "open rupture" within the military.
Moreover, Ozkok has the opportunity to put his own stamp on
the military this year. He can retire two of this group (who
also opposed his nomination as CHOD) in summer 2003, and two
more in summer 2004. He will promote a significant number of
three- and four-star generals and can change up to 80% of the
senior TGS staff this year.
¶8. (C) Third, P.M. Erdogan has publicly admonished those who
would seek to foment AK-military tensions and privately
acknowledged that it is essential to support Ozkok, although
he told Cengiz Candar he is at a loss how to do so. AK
deputy party chairman Firat affirmed to us May 30 that
Erdogan is searching for a modus vivendi. At the same time,
Justice Minister Cicek; Firat; and other AK M.P.s such as
former Erdogan chief of staff Comez, deputy parliamentary
group chairmen Ipek and Ergin, and human rights committee
deputy chairman Torun, have each reiterated to us in the past
few days that the party will press ahead with its new EU
harmonization reform packages. Ipek emphasized that the NSC
is merely an advisory body and the fiery Torun asserted that
the party is ready "to go down like Menderes" (the P.M.
removed in the 1960 coup and hanged in 1961) to defend its
reforms against the military. However, most of our AK
interlocutors admit that they will have to slow the pace
owing to TGS and NSC objections to specific reforms.
¶9. (C) Comment: Ozkok and Erdogan appear to be strange
bedfellows as each grapples with lack of coherence and
discipline in the ranks below and both try to figure out a
modus vivendi with the other through weekly one-on-one
meetings. Each tries to give direction to the divided
institution (military high command, parliamentary majority)
he relies on for authority and power.
¶10. (C) Given Erdogan's political savvy and the strong
protection afforded him by his continuing solid support
across Turkey, we see no evidence that a coup, direct or
politically-engineered, is likely under current
circumstances. However, aside from the pressures Ozkok
faces, his and Erdogan's challenge in finding a
mutually-compatible way forward is compounded by the
following factors in AK: Erdogan's self-imposed isolation and
consequent dearth of fresh information from outside; the
uneven level of competence among party vice chairmen and
parliamentary group deputy chairmen (whips); static-filled
communications between party and government on the one hand
and parliamentary group on the other; factions which render
the party a coalition in itself; controversy over whether the
party's candidates for management positions in the
bureaucracy are sufficiently competent or loyal to secular
precepts; and questions over the party's intentions in
pursuing certain draft legislation (e.g., right to set up a
prayer room -- of any denomination -- in every apartment
building). See ref (F) and septel.
¶11. (C) What is clear is that Ozkok's briefing neither
satisfied those in the military who oppose his approach nor
intimidated AK. The tensions between the military and AK,
and within each institution, will continue and affect
Turkey's ability to set itself on a consistent course in any
direction.
PEARSON