

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07MANAGUA178, LACAYO: FSLN INTEREST GROUPS COMPETE FOR DOMINANCE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MANAGUA178.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07MANAGUA178 | 2007-01-23 15:43 | 2011-04-25 19:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Managua |
Appears in these articles: http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2743916.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2743919.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2743922.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2752792.aspx |
VZCZCXRO5825
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #0178/01 0231543
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231543Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8722
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0899
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 000178
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL ENRG EPET
SUBJECT: LACAYO: FSLN INTEREST GROUPS COMPETE FOR DOMINANCE
REF: MANAGUA 0155
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).
¶1. (C) Summary: Antonio Lacayo, secretary minister of the
presidency during Violeta Chamorro's presidency and her
son-in-law, believes that the power struggle among competing
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) interest groups
will "test" the new Ortega government and could be exploited
to the opposition's advantage. He recently warned the
Ambassador that Ortega is intent on mounting a "parallel
government" operating outside of public scrutiny, but
believes the opposition holds the key to counter this trend.
End Summary.
Ortega Set on Mounting Parallel Government
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (C) In a January 18 meeting with Ambassador, DCM, and
PolCouns, Antonio Lacayo warned us that President Ortega is
determined to mount a parallel government that will operate
outside of public scrutiny. Lacayo, who served as Violeta
Chamorro's secretary minister of the presidency and is her
son-in-law, described Ortega's new cabinet as "a group of
largely unqualified, incapable novices". Their loyalty to
Ortega is unequivocal, but they will exercise no significant
influence. Citing Education Minister de Castilla as a case
in point, Lacayo observed that the minister's double
discourse has the population reeling, and even pro-Sandinista
education union ANDEN has criticized de Castilla. Lacayo
recounted how in the course of a week de Castilla had
proposed eliminating school cafeterias, and then reinstated
them. Similarly, the minister declared educational autonomy
"dead" and ordered parents to refuse to pay any
administrative school fees; days later, however, de Castilla
announced that parents will be responsible for holding fund
raising events to contribute to their children's schools.
¶3. (C) As for Health Minister Maritza Cuant, Lacayo
highlighted the fact that she was quick to correct the FSLN's
pre-election opposition to abortion of any kind and is now
openly opposing the penalization of abortion. As for
National Energy Institute (INE) director David Castillo, "he
is totally crazy," declared Lacayo, while new Energy Minister
Emilio Rapacciolli is one of the capable few in the new
cabinet. (Comment: The FSLN has traditionally openly
supported therapeutic abortion; its change of heart in the
lead up to the November 2006 national election was clearly a
political ploy to gain more votes and ingratiate the party
with the Catholic Church. (Note: The January 22 editions of
Nicaragua's dailies La Prensa and El Nuevo Diario both
featured Managua Archbishop Leopoldo Brenes' comments that
the FSLN should remember its campaign position against
abortion.)
¶4. (C) According to Lacayo, another reason for Ortega's
delay in standing up his cabinet and the lack of transparency
surrounding the process is his inability to deliver on his
campaign promise to appoint women to 50% of the government
positions. Lacayo reported that GON "Zero Hunger" director
Orlando Nunez had apprised him of the dilemma -- many capable
women work for NGOs and are unwilling to sacrifice their
generous salaries to take a much lower paying government job,
especially if Ortega delivers on his promise to halve the
salaries of senior government officials.
So, Who is in Charge?
- - - - - - - - - -
¶5. (C) Depicting President Ortega as a "disorganized sort
with absolutely no sense of time," Lacayo believes that
Ortega will not be engaged in the daily goings on of his
government. He ventured that the increasingly evident
rivalries and divisions among Sandinista leaders close to
Ortega will further complicate the Ortega government. Lacayo
listed four main currents: Ortega's wife Rosario; his new
senior economic advisor Bayardo Arce; Managua Mayor Dionisio
"Nicho" Marenco; and, the ever-present Lenin Cerna, still a
power to reckon with, even though he is not to Rosario's
liking. Lacayo opined that in the scheme of things,
Rosario's influence is on rise, recounting that while a year
ago Tomas Borge had ordered Rosario to "shut up," today he
would not dare to confront her.
MANAGUA 00000178 002 OF 003
¶6. (C) Comment: The other shadow power figures in Ortega's
government will be Miguel D'Escoto, Alvaro Baltodano, Manuel
Coronel Krautz and Mohammed Lashtar. Marenco's presidential
ambitions could eventually trump his loyalty to Ortega.
While National Assembly Deputy Edwin Castro and Foreign
Minister Samuel Santos (and probably Nicaraguan
Ambassador-designate to the United States Arturo Cruz) lie
within Rosario's camp (considered the more "moderate" and
"intellectual" wing), National Assembly President Rene Nunez
appears closer to Bayardo Arce. Lacayo predicted that the
power struggles among these camps will test the new Ortega
government and suggested that these tensions could be
exploited to the opposition's advantage. End Comment.
¶7. (C) The Ambassador raised concerns regarding Ortega's
choice of former Libyan/naturalized Nicaraguan Muhamad
Muhktar Lashtar as his personal secretary, noting that
Lashtar was a commercial attache at the Libyan embassy in
Managua in the 1980s and reportedly associated with Libyan
intelligence. Lacayo, who shared the Ambassador's concern,
remarked that Pepe Mathus, a former Contra (associated with
the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance, ALN) who has been involved
in some business dealings with Lashtar, told Lacayo recently
that the Libyan Embassy had informed him that Lashtar no
longer maintains any relation with the embassy. PolCouns
shared that Lashtar is reportedly Moammar al-Ghadafi's
nephew.
Disgruntled Convergencia
- - - - - - - - - - - -
¶8. (C) Lacayo related how Edwin Castro had sent a letter to
President Ortega recommending he appoint Convergencia leader
Santiago Rivas as Defense Minister, but Cerna knocked the
idea down and lobbied for wife Marisol Castillo to take the
job. Only vigorous foreign and domestic objections derailed
Castillo's appointment, opined Lacayo. Similarly, Luis
Guzman, another Convergencia member, was not taken into
account, said Lacayo, who added that at one point he was also
affiliated with Convergencia.
Transformation in the Fast Lane
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶9. (C) The Ambassador observed that President Ortega appears
intent on a transformation of state along the lines of the
Chavez model and is quickly trying to pass legislation that
would reduce the role of traditional governmental
institutions. The Ambassador added that Ortega's aggressive
efforts to consolidate power and his association with the
Venezuelan, Bolivian, and Iranian presidents is causing him
to quickly waste the political capital he had gained during
the campaign and following his election.
Stepping Back on Law 290
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶10. (C) Lacayo, who agreed with the Ambassador's assessment,
attributed Ortega's recent decision to retreat a few steps on
some of his party's most egregious proposed changes to Law
290 (including revisions that would have accorded Ortega
direct control over the police and the military) to his
realization that he can only go so far, so fast before the
opposition will dig in its heels. However, Ortega is certain
to try to "score other goals," warned Lacayo.
Ortega's Double Discourse -- A Matter of Money
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶11. (C) The Ambassador solicited Lacayo's views on whether
Ortega is serious in his "double discourse" that he seeks
positive relations with the United States while allowing the
Venezuelan and Iranian presidents to lambaste the United
States as they signed a number of cooperation agreements.
Lacayo's response was immediate: "It's all about the money"
-- Ortega wants to remain within the graces of the IMF, and
with the U.S., EU, Japan, and other donors. Thus, Ortega's
rhetoric during his inaugural ceremonies was relatively
benign. However, because Ortega needs more funds than these
traditional sources can provide to deliver on all of his
campaign promises, he must court Chavez. Ortega knows that
President Chavez saved Cuba, explained Lacayo, adding that
"Chavez is not a revolutionary, he's a gorilla." Fidel
Castro does not even respect Chavez and Daniel possibly might
MANAGUA 00000178 003 OF 003
not even consider Chavez a "true ideological" colleague, but
they both need him, he concluded.
¶12. (C) The Ambassador commented that some of Chavez'
offers are to problems that the Nicaraguans do not have, for
example, the construction of a refinery that will process
much more crude than Nicaragua's domestic consumption
requires. Lacayo replied that the refinery and pipeline are
directed at meeting China's growing energy needs.
Taking Advantage of the New Political Chapter
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶13. (C) Lacayo mused that Ortega's return to power and his
fast-track efforts to transform Nicaragua's political model
has panicked the opposition and opened a new political
"chapter" that offers the divided liberals and other
opposition parties a chance to rally around a common purpose.
He listed lawmakers Wilfredo Navarro, Francisco Aguirre
Sacasa and Jose Pallais as some of the PLC deputies who might
be willing to participate in such an effort with their ALN
and Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) counterparts. Both
Navarro and Aguirre Sacasa hold strong ambitions to run for
president, so their loyalty to Aleman could be compromised,
he explained. Referring to DCM/POL's recent meeting with PLC
caucus chief Maximino Rodriguez, he agreed that Rodriguez
would be another good candidate.
A Bit of Pact History
- - - - - - - - - - -
¶14. (C) Commenting that Aguirre Sacasa claims he is
"different" from his father Francisco Aguirre Baca, Lacayo
related how Aguirre Baca, who resides in the United States,
and Humberto Ortega were the initial intermediaries who set
up the "pact" between Arnoldo Aleman and Daniel Ortega.
Later on, current VP Jaime Morales and Managua Mayor Nicho
Marenco replaced Aguirre Baca and Humberto Ortega as the pact
intermediaries, he explained.
Comment
- - - -
¶15. (C) Lacayo's insights track closely with many of our
other contacts, although he seems out of touch regarding PLC
deputy Wilfredo Navarro; thus far, Navarro has shunned ALN
efforts to seek common ground against Ortega. The fissures
within Ortega's inner circle can be exploited to the
opposition's and our advantage, particularly if the
opposition starts rallying around a common goal to prevent
Ortega from transforming Nicaragua's political model and
remaining indefinitely in power. The media can also help by
informing the public that Chavez' use of Nicaragua as his
bully pulpit against the United States demonstrates his
aggressive, neo-imperialistic intentions for the region.
TRIVELLI