

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07LAPAZ3153, VENEZUELA-BOLIVIA: HOW MUCH FIRE BEHIND THE SMOKE?
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07LAPAZ3153.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07LAPAZ3153 | 2007-11-30 23:14 | 2010-12-03 21:30 | SECRET | Embassy La Paz |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHLP #3153/01 3342314
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 302314Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5844
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7362
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4730
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8637
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5864
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3082
RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 0486
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 3284
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 3718
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 5067
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5719
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0326
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0749
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T LA PAZ 003153
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR VE CU BL
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA-BOLIVIA: HOW MUCH FIRE BEHIND THE SMOKE?
REF: A. LA PAZ 3013
¶B. LA PAZ 3119
Classified By: Ecopol Counselor Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 b and d.
¶1. (C) Summary. A common cry among opposition circles is
that Hugo Chavez is pulling Evo's strings, particularly as
Morales forcefully pushes forward to adopt a new constitution
that would provide for indefinite reelection. Evo for his
part does nothing to hide his admiration for Chavez; on the
contrary he acts like a smitten school girl when he is with
Chavez and constantly touts their personal/ideological bond.
But, how much influence does Chavez have? Is Venezuelan
money buying loyalty within the Bolivian armed forces? Are
there sizable numbers of Venezuelan troops in country? Is
Venezuela smuggling arms into Bolivia? While it is difficult
to separate fact from fiction, there is little doubt here
that Evo listens to Chavez, and that the Venezuelan and Cuban
Ambassadors here play a central advisory role. We have heard
enough to indicate that Venezuela is impatient with the pace
of change in Bolivia and is pushing Morales hard to
consolidate his hold on power. The results of Venezuelan
December 2 constitutional referendum may impact Evo's
thinking on how he should proceed with a similar referendum
in Bolivia. End summary
Alleged Venezuelan Coaching on Constituent Assembly
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -
¶2. (C) While the opposition sometimes exaggerates Chavez'
influence over Morales, Brazilian and Peruvian diplomats
based in La Paz assert that it is becoming increasingly
evident that Chavez is pushing Evo to follow Venezuela's
script. These diplomats recounted a GRULAC dinner hosted by
the Cuban Ambassador on November 26, attended by President
Morales (who arrived with the Venezuelan Ambassador), during
which Evo told the group that "there is no going back."
Morales expressed displeasure with how his MAS party handled
the Constituent Assembly process in Sucre but was vehement
that a new constitution must go forward. To the astonishment
of the Latin American diplomats present, the Venezuelan
Ambassador then launched into a 30-minute ramble about the
common history Bolivia and Venezuela share and how their
futures are linked.
¶3. (S) According to the Brazilian political counselor, an
"extremely reliable" source had reported that the Venezuelan
Ambassador was at an Evo cabinet meeting November 29 as the
MAS-led Constituent Assembly was proceeding in Sucre.
Apparently, when a couple of ministers expressed concern
about moving forward unilaterally with the Constituent
Assembly, the Venezuelan Ambassador urged that the government
go ahead. Comment: While we are quite skeptical that the
Venezuelan Ambassador would actually attend a cabinet
meeting, ROAL sources independently place the Venezuelan at
the Palace that day. Whether or not the Venezuelan
Ambassador actually attended the cabinet meeting, Evo meets
regularly with him and undoubtedly seeks his advice. End
Comment.)
Venezuelan Military Presence in Beni Department
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶4. (C) In a discussion with Peruvian, German, Argentine and
Brazilian diplomats here, all expressed concern about a known
Venezuelan military presence in the northeastern Beni
department (bordering Brazil). It is quite public and in
fact touted that a Venezuelan engineer company is building
levies around the Beni capital of Trinidad. Beni local
authorities are, however, convinced that the Venezuelans are
also training Bolivian military in special operations and
have sizable arms caches for a possible further deployment.
The German reported that without a doubt there is a
Venezuelan base in San Borja, but the other diplomats were
dismissive of this information and argued that the Beni
authorities tend to greatly exaggerate. We cannot confirm
that there is a "secret" Venezuelan base at that location and
suspect that the opposition is exaggerating and/or is simply
expressing concern about the Venezuelan military presence.
Our Defense Attach was told by the Mayor of Trinidad on
November 26 that there are 200 to 300 Venezuelans in
Trinidad. The group of diplomats affirmed that the number of
Venezuelans is about 300, but no one is completely certain.
We understand that the Venezuelans have exclusive control
over Venezuelan flights and cargo, and exercise an inordinate
amount of control over the military portion of the Trinidad
airport.
Beni on Venezuelan Mystery Flights:
We're Not Gonna Take It, Anymore
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶5. (S) Defense Attach also met with Trinidad Mayor Moises
Shiriqui following a meeting between Beni Department Prefect
Ernesto Suarez and Beni Mayors. The Mayor brought up the
0100 arrival of a Venezuela C-130 cargo plane at the Beni
airport November 24, which local authorities suspected was
shuttling arms. After unloading seven large wooden crates,
the plane immediately departed. Authorities told the media,
which were forced to leave shortly after the landing, that
the boxes contained medical supplies. (Note: We have not
been able to determine what is in the crates. End note.)
¶6. (C) Prefect Suarez announced publicly November 29 that
Venezuelan planes would not be allowed to land at Trinidad.
If provided advance landing notice from the government, local
authorities plan to block the runway with vehicles in order
to prevent any Venezuelan plane from landing or taking off.
(Note: Official Airport hours are between 0800 and 2200.
There is a history of opposition accusations the Venezuelans
are shipping in arms, perhaps destined for nefarious
pro-government groups. The opposition also complained about
an early morning Beni stopover by Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez as an affront to Bolivian sovereignty. Ref A. End
Note.)
Will Evo Turn To Comandante Chavez?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶7. (C) The Peruvian political counselor was extremely
concerned that Venezuela, at Evo's invitation, would
intervene militarily in Bolivia to back Morales should he be
unable to exercise control over the opposition departments of
Beni, Pando, Tarija and Santa Cruz. The Peruvian believes,
and the Brazilian agreed, that the rank-and-file military
will not/not use lethal force against fellow Bolivians. We
too share this assessment (Ref B). The Peruvian and
Brazilian both commented that funds coming in from Venezuela
to the Bolivian military do not flow down from the senior
ranks, and therefore, there is much resentment. The top
military commanders, however, are opportunists that will
follow Evo's orders out of self-interest. In fact, Generals
Vargas, Bersatti and Trigo are reportedly fighting to stay in
their jobs, causing further disgruntlement among those who
would like to move into their positions. So, there are
strong indications that the military is split and could be
quite reticent to follow orders. Hence, with no Bolivian
military to enforce Evo's will, Peru fears he will turn to
Chavez.
Chavez Stirs the Pot
- - - - - - - - - -
¶8. (SBU) Chavez's November 27 statement that the U.S.
"empire" is "promoting violence" in order to overthrow the
Morales administration builds on a constant barrage of
inflammatory statements indicating a willingness, or perhaps
an eagerness, to send Venezuelan troops to Bolivia to bolster
his erstwhile ally. Chavez's October 14 threat to turn
Bolivia into Vietnam should "oligarchs" attack Morales
provided the opposition with traction for long-standing
complaints of Venezuelan "imperialist" designs. Morales
defended the remarks in November 4 magazine article. Both
leaders reiterated and expanded upon the Vietnam remarks
during their November 10 addresses at the Ibero-American
Conference in Chile, where Chavez warned Bolivian supporters
of the United States ("pitiyanquies") that any attempt to
remove Morales would be met with "a thunder of rifles and
machine guns." Questions over possible Venezuelan
involvement in the October 18 Bolivian military takeover of
Santa Cruz's Viru Viru Airport further ignited criticism of
the Bolivian-Venezuelan relationship. Venezuelan
"imperialism" has stayed in the headlines since, fed by
heated exchanges between opposition and government officials,
an alleged attack on the Venezuelan consulate in Santa Cruz,
and a scandal involving $11 million in missing Venezuelan
micro-credit loans.
Comment
- - - -
¶9. (C) The opposition's cries of Chavez the big bad wolf are
over the top, but they are right when they express concern
that Evo is getting advice from the Venezuelans and Cubans.
With checks and doctors, the Venezuelan and Cuban ambassadors
are doing what they can to bolster Evo and push his change
program. For example, it is estimated that Evo has
distributed around $60-80 million in Venezuelan checks to
municipalities since he came to office. That said, beyond the
financial support and advisory role, we find little hard
evidence to support the prospect of actual Venezuelan
military intervention in Bolivia. The opposition will
continue to point to Chavez to discredit Evo and are hoping
that a victory for the "no" vote in Venezuela's referendum
will give Evo pause about proceeding with his. Likewise, the
opposition fears that if Chavez wins, he will embolden Evo to
push ahead
GOLDBERG