

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2601, LEBANON: A/S WELCH'S MEETINGS WITH PM SINIORA ON
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BEIRUT2601.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BEIRUT2601 | 2006-08-12 13:01 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beirut |
Appears in these articles: not yet set |
VZCZCXRO8980
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2601/01 2241301
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121301Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5011
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0065
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002601
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2016
TAGS: IS LE MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: A/S WELCH'S MEETINGS WITH PM SINIORA ON
AUGUST 11
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C/NF) Over the course of three hours in two meetings on
August 11, PM Fouad Siniora made steady, but incremental
movement toward accepting the most recent draft language of
the UN resolution. His strongest objections were directed
toward the specific use of chapter 7 to authorize the
multi-national stabilization force, and what he considered
insufficient language regarding Shebaa. Siniora said he
could not accept a direct call for chapter 7 authorization
for "UNIFIL plus," because Nabih Berri claimed to feel it
impinged on Lebanon's sovereignty. Siniora did, however,
tentatively agree that the UN resolution could use "chapter
7-type language" as long as it didn't specifically state it
was a chapter 7 authorization. Concerning the issue of
Shebaa Farms, Siniora acknowledged it was "a Syrian/Iranian
creation," but that did not eliminate the critical need to
specifically address it in the resolution. He listened
carefully to a suggestion that Shebaa might be treated in a
"side letter," as well as in the EOV language that would be
made by the Secretary, but still, he would not commit
himself. In the second meeting, Siniora finally agreed to
text changes that allowed a closing of the gap on what he
referred to as "Chapter 6.999" language and informed the
Assistant Secretary he would have a decision on the treatment
of Shebaa later in the evening. Finally, the Prime Minister
wanted assurances that Lebanon's "state of siege" would be
lifted upon cessation of hostilities. End summary.
¶2. (C/NF) A/S Welch and the Ambassador met with Prime
Minister Fouad Siniora at the Grand Serail for 90 minutes in
the morning and for a similar period late in the afternoon on
August 11. Senior advisors Mohammad Chatta and Rola
Nouraddine attended both meetings, as did Deputy Legal
Counsel Jonathan Schwartz and poloff (notetaker). In the
morning meeting, the Prime Minister appeared to try to put
his guests on the defensive with a charge that none of his
requests for State Department assistance had really helped,
specifically referring to the on-going situation with
Lebanese JSF forces pinned down in the village of Marjaayoun.
The A/S pushed back hard and the meeting settled down to
business.
¶3. (C/NF) The Assistant Secretary explained to PM Siniora
that both Lebanese and Israeli negotiators were insisting the
other side was somehow gaining all the advantage with recent
changes made to the draft resolution. This attitude was
seriously complicating the effort to close the gap. Siniora
retorted the Israelis were deliberately concealing the fact
that they had achieved a major political victory -- a
northern border that would be disarmed -- but were trying to
obtain even more.
¶4. (C/NF) Future Movement and parliamentary majority leader
Saad Hariri unexpectedly joined the participants in the late
afternoon session. MP Hariri voiced his concerns and opinion
on a number of issues, but for the most part played an
advisory role.
SHEBAA
------
¶5. (C/NF) PM Siniora reiterated his earlier charge that the
Government of Israel was "blackmailing" his government on the
issues of Shebaa and the timing of IDF withdrawal from
Lebanese territory. He claimed GOI, in fact, realized they
were obtaining a considerable victory with the effective
disarmament of Hizballah -- and with it a secure northern
border. Siniora conceded in straightforward language that he
understood Shebaa was an Iranian/Syrian creation, but charged
that Israel's "intransigence" would put Lebanon back into the
tender mercies of the Iranians (and Syrians).
¶6. (C/NF) He re-emphasized his requirement that the draft
contain some language that would allow him to go to the
Lebanese people and say the end result was "somehow worth the
country's heavy price paid in lives, suffering, and material
loss." Lebanon, he said, has suffered for the West's proxy
war against Iran, so Lebanon deserves something in return.
He used the earlier U.S. statement that the status quo ante
was unacceptable, and argued that just treatment of Shebaa
would create the conditions to achieve that goal. He said
BEIRUT 00002601 002 OF 003
that somehow Shebaa must be put on the international agenda
-- which A/S Welch and the Ambassador argued had happened, at
least regarding delineation, with the existing language.
CHAPTER 7
---------
¶7. (C/NF) According to Siniora, it was Nabih Berri who was
the principal roadblock to using chapter 7 to authorize the
proposed international stabilization force, now viewed by the
Lebanese as "UNIFIL plus." Berri reportedly feels chapter 7
will enable UNIFIL to carry out significant operations
independent of the Government of Lebanon. The Assistant
Secretary explained that unless a robust international force
SIPDIS
could act with initiative and confidence, there were two
serious consequences: few nations would commit troops to
such a force, and the Government of Israel would have little
confidence the force could carry out its difficult mission.
¶8. (C/NF) The Prime Minister considered these reasons and
gave tentative (albeit reluctant) approval to the idea that
the resolution could use actual language that is typically
associated with Chapter 7 resolutions, but warned that it
would be extremely difficult for Lebanon to accept a specific
chapter 7 authorization.
¶9. (C/NF) At the close of the session, Siniora asked the
A/S to return for a final meeting later in the afternoon.
When he confirmed that A/S Welch was meeting next with Berri,
Siniora asked that three points be emphasized with the
Speaker: the proposal to handle chapter 7 authorization, US
suggestions regarding Shebaa, and an explanation of how the
period between cessation of hostilities and the actual
cease-fire would be "refereed."
SECOND MEETING BEGINS WITH SHEBAA
---------------------------------
¶10. (C/NF) At the outset of the second meeting, Siniora
stated that both sides were "now at the moment of truth."
The Assistant Secretary suggested that instead of focusing on
a line-by-line review of the proposed text, it would be far
better to nail down two issues that the Secretary believed
were the last major gaps in the soon-to-be-introduced
resolution: Shebaa, and control of the borders to prevent
weaponry from reaching Hizballah, especially in the interim
period between cessation of hostilities and a full cease-fire.
¶11. (C/NF) The Assistant Secretary made it clear that
trying to force additional Shebaa language into the
resolution at this point would be a "deal breaker." In fact,
A/S Welch noted, the French-proposed bracketed language
regarding Shebaa in the draft resolution had to be dropped,
in order to help ensure Israel won't reject the resolution
outright. He conveyed to Siniora the Israeli contention that
Olmert's government had gone as far as it could. The
advantages of mentioning Shebaa in the Secretary's upcoming
EOV, as well as the ability of the UN SYG to use the
resolution's language to deal with the issue in a serious way
appeared to influence the Prime Minister, who said he would
consider the argument in the hope that, what he could not get
from the resolution, he could point to in the Secretary's EOV.
CONTROL OF THE SY/LE BORDERS
----------------------------
¶12. (C/NF) Siniora agreed that the period between the
cessation of hostilities and full cease-fire would be
"precarious," principally because Hizballah was expected to
withdraw and allow the LAF and UNIFIL to flow into the area
south of the Litani. This process, already difficult, would
be made immeasurably more so if Hizballah was able to
re-supply its depleted stock of weaponry from its suppliers
in Syria. For this critical reason, the Assistant Secretary
noted the arms embargo language of the draft resolution and
asked the Prime Minister to consider ways to strengthen the
border crossing points with elements of the expanding UNIFIL
force, or some other means, perhaps with technical assistance.
¶13. (C/NF) The Prime Minister stated he wanted nothing more
than to see Hizballah disarmed and their supply of weaponry
severed. While Siniora pointed out there would be political
risks involved, he also noted that the resolution's draft
language (OP-13) provided an opening for such assistance, and
BEIRUT 00002601 003 OF 003
said he would consider ideas. But Siniora was reluctant to
ask UNIFIL to help.
COORDINATING UNIT AT UNIFIL
---------------------------
¶14. (C/NF) Concerning Siniora's request that someone act as
a referee during the fragile interim period before the
international augmentation force shows up, the Assistant
Secretary noted that Nabih Berri suggested using the 1996
SIPDIS
cease-fire agreement as a model for rules-of-engagement. He
argued, however, that even though this was a creative
approach, it would be preferable to stick with the
resolution's draft language, specifically that no offensive
operations would be permitted. Additionally, the pressure in
the admittedly problematic interim period would be eased
considerably once "UNIFIL plus" deploys in force.
¶15. (C/NF) In order to facilitate the monitoring function
and telescope the deployments of LAF and "UNIFIL plus" into
short a period as possible, the Assistant Secretary proposed
that a "coordination unit" be immediately established at
UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura, which would serve as a nexus
where both violations and deployment issues could be
coordinated and resolved. Although PM Siniora was clearly
uncomfortable with the idea of IDF and LAF officers
discussing issues, he accepted the argument that some form of
coordination center, with UNIFIL as referee, was necessary.
CLOSE, BUT NO CLOSURE
---------------------
¶16. (C/NF) With helo flight constraints exerting serious
pressure on the time remaining, Mohammad Chatta finally
brought up the "siege" of Lebanon. With Siniora and Hariri
in apparent agreement, the senior advisor stated that both
the Beirut airport and the maritime ports of Lebanon had to
open as soon as possible, preferably upon cessation of
hostilities. Not only was it a critical necessity to
re-supply the country now entering its fifth week of war, but
it was a sensitive sovereignty issue that would greatly
affect the perception of a just peace.
¶17. (C/NF) A/S Welch stated that he understood the
ramifications, but emphasized that "verification" of cargo
was an inescapable issue. PM Siniora indicated that while
some form of international inspection was acceptable, the
naval and air blockade of his country had to be end
immediately.
HOW WILL LEBANON REACT TO RESOLUTION
------------------------------------
¶18. (C/NF) PM Siniora said that if a resolution was brought
before the Security Council that night, he and Berri would
study the final language and then decide whether to "accept
it, or refuse all or part of it." The Siniora government
plans to hold a special session of the Council of Ministers
on Saturday, August 12, to discuss and presumably
endorse/reject the UN resolution.
¶19. (U) A/S Welch did not review this cable, but authorized
its release.
FELTMAN