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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06MANAMA409, LUNCHEON WITH KING HAMAD
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000409
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM BA IR REGION OFFICIALS POL BILAT
SUBJECT: LUNCHEON WITH KING HAMAD
Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe. Reason: 1.4 (b)(d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) King Hamad, during a March 13 luncheon, had high
praise for the U.S. and its positive role in maintaining
stability in the Gulf. "Without you," he stated, "we'd be
squashed." He made clear his concern for Iran, both as a
regional power and as a meddling force inside Bahrain. Iran
can be expected to bluster, but it is important to stand
strong and deal with Iran from a position of strength.
Kuwaiti Amir Shaikh Sabah's initial tour of the Gulf (he
visited Bahrain March 12) was aimed in part at continuing his
mission of improving relations between Saudi Arabia and its
smaller GCC partners. The King lamented that his
relationship with the UAE was not as personal or as close
following the death of Shaikh Zayid. Domestically, the King
welcomed expected participation by leading Shia opposition
society Al-Wifaq in this year's parliamentary elections, and
recounted that he had recently tried to encourage one of the
few remaining opposition figures still in exile in London to
come back. He stated that it was high time to pass a family
law aimed at providing legal protection to women in Bahrain.
-----------------------------
U.S.-BAHRAIN RELATIONS STRONG
-----------------------------
¶2. (C) King Hamad invited the Ambassador, NAVCENT Commander
Admiral Patrick Walsh, and DCM for a private lunch at Safriya
Palace on March 13. Also attending on the Bahraini side were
Minister of the Royal Court Shaikh Khalid bin Mohammed
Al-Khalifa, Minister of Interior Shaikh Rashid Al-Khalifa,
and Benagas Chairman (and brother-in-law of the King) Shaikh
Hamad Al-Khalifa, all close confidants of the King.
¶3. (C) King Hamad opened the discussion by welcoming
Bahrain's strong relationship with the United States and
praising the important positive role that the United States
has played over the years in maintaining stability in the
Gulf region. Turning to Admiral Walsh, the King noted the
U.S. Navy's long presence in Bahrain and the vital role it
has played in preserving Bahrain's security in a difficult
regional environment. "We feel we are protected by your
presence," he said. "Without you, we would be squashed."
Returning to this theme later in the conversation, he also
had high praise for the U.S. military equipment that the U.S.
has provided to Bahrain under FMS/FMF programs. Other
countries might be able to match the U.S. in terms of price
and quality, he stated, but nobody comes close in terms of
support.
------------------
WORRIES ABOUT IRAN
------------------
¶4. (C) Throughout the conversation, the King made clear his
concern for Iran, both as a regional power and as a meddling
force inside Bahrain. Iran is a concern to all GCC
countries, he stated, but the spotlight is always on Bahrain.
Bahrain still hears claims that Bahrain is a part of Iran.
Even though this issue was settled by the United Nations
(through a UN-organized referendum in 1970), the issue is
still raised. There are many Iranians in Bahrain (he
presumably meant, in addition to Iranians, Bahrainis of
Iranian origin, or "Ajam"). Isa Qassim, one of the most
prominent Shia clerics in Bahrain, goes to Iran every few
months and spends considerable time there (he just went again
last week). Shaikh Khalid interjected that one reason Isa
Qassim travels to Iran is to court favor with the Iranian
religious hierarchy in hopes of being anointed with a higher
religious title. He aspires, Shaikh Khalid said, not simply
to become an ayatollah, but to be proclaimed "wilayat
al-faqih," something Shaikh Khalid doubts will ever happen.
¶5. (C) In dealing with Iran, the King said, it will be
important to stand strong, and negotiate from a position of
strength. He said that we can expect lots of bluster from
Iran, but that if pressured it will back down. Nonetheless,
he was worried that Iran, if it decided to retaliate, would
hit back at Bahrain. "It can't hit America," he said, "but
we are nearby and it knows that we are the closest of
allies." When he met Iranian President Ahmadi-nejad at the
OIC meeting in Mecca recently, he told him that the region
had already had three wars and did not need another.
Ahmadi-nejad smiled, but made no response.
¶6. (C) The King noted that many Shia complain that there are
no Shia in the military leadership of the country. This is a
question of loyalty, he stated. As long as Khamenei has the
title of Commander-in-Chief, Bahrain must worry about the
loyalty of Shia who maintain ties and allegiance to Iran.
--------------------------------------------- --------
FRICTIONS WITHIN THE GCC -- IT'S ALL ABOUT THE SAUDIS
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶7. (C) The King noted that Kuwaiti Amir Shaikh Sabah had
passed through Bahrain the previous day as part of his tour
of GCC countries to express appreciation for their support as
he assumed the position of Amir. Also on his agenda was an
effort to continue the mission assigned to him by the GCC to
try to improve relations between Saudi Arabia and its smaller
GCC partners. This was especially important now given the
difficult regional environment. The King expressed some
frustration that the Saudis, given the relatively large size
of their country, continue to let grievances with their GCC
partners fester. Saudi Arabia, he said, should be the one to
bring the GCC countries together, not divide them. The
biggest problem is Saudi relations with Qatar, as Saudi King
Abdullah remains personally hurt by Al-Jazeera. And Saudi
Arabia still has territorial issues with the UAE.
¶8. (C) On the UAE, the King lamented that his relationship
with the new UAE ruler is not as close as it had been with
Shaikh Zayid. He said that Dubai ruler Mohammed bin Rashid
had not handled the Dubai Ports issue well, especially by
allowing talk of possibly canceling the Boeing purchase or
moving 10 percent of its dollar-denominated investments into
euros. Bahrain has heard "no" from the U.S. from time to
time in the past, he said, but it has never let it damage the
relationship. (Comment: Shaikh Zayid was believed to have
been financially supportive to Bahrain as a country and to
the Al-Khalifas as a royal family. It is quite likely that
this support has been reduced or dried up, adding to the
King's disappointment that the ruler-to-ruler relationship is
not as close as it was under Shaikh Zayid. According to the
Saudi Ambassador here, a third reason for Shaikh Sabah's trip
to the Gulf was to reassure fellow GCC leaders who were not
pleased by the precedent set by the involvement of Kuwait's
parliament in Shaikh Sabah's accession to Amir. End
comment.)
--------------------------------------------- ------------
BAHRAINI ELECTIONS: LOOKING FORWARD TO SHIA PARTICIPATION
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶9. (C) King Hamad welcomed participation by leading Shia
opposition society Al-Wifaq in this year's parliamentary
elections, and discussed the fact that there is a clear split
in Al-Wifaq. There are those moving towards contesting the
elections under the leadership of Shaikh Ali Salman, and
those who refuse to participate as exemplified by Hassan
Mushaima. "We welcome those who want to participate," he
stated, while some will continue to oppose participation out
of their own self interest.
¶10. (C) The King pointed to the case of London-based
opposition leader Said Al-Shehabi, who refused to return to
Bahrain when most of the other opposition leaders in exile
did after the reforms were announced in 2001. The King said
that he recently sent a Shia emissary to London to engage
with Al-Shehabi and encourage him to return and open up a
business. The King said that he would even offer Al-Shehabi
a Ministerial position, but he refused. (Comment: There is a
precedent for that. Dr. Majid Al-Alawi returned after many
years in exile, and is now Minister of Labor. End comment.)
The King stated that Al-Shehabi is no doubt quite happy and
comfortable in London, where he continues his opposition
activities and is well funded by the Iranians. He has lived
in his home village of Diraz, the King added, and most surely
does not find it as attractive as London.
¶11. (C) The King expressed some frustration with the
continuing demonstrations in Bahrain, which though small in
size make things seem worse than they are in terms of
stability. These people could be part of the system if they
wanted, he stated. He noted that Shia activist Abdul Hadi
Al-Khawaja had been so eager to paint the government in a bad
light that he had erroneously accused the government of
forcefully detaining two teenage girls during a demonstration
on March 11. The allegation brought great embarrassment to
the family when the missing girls turned up the next day to
say they had not participated in the demonstration and had in
fact been at a friend's house.
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FAMILY LAW -- TIME TO DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE
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¶12. (C) The King discussed the topic that has dominated the
news in Bahrain in recent days -- the submission to
parliament of the draft family law aimed at providing legal
protection to women in Bahrain. The King stated that it was
high time to deal with this issue. It was needed to provide
legal protection for women and not have this left to the
discretion of individual religious scholars who could
interpret Sharia family law arbitrarily. There must be
standards and clear guidelines, and that is what the law is
designed to do.
¶13. (C) The Ambassador asked about opposition to the law as
voiced by some Shia clerics and evidenced by the large
demonstration against the law last November. The King noted
that there were really two laws, one for the Sunni (Maliki)
sect and one for the Shia (Ja'fari) sect. Religious scholars
from both sects were consulted and contributed to the
drafting of the law. "If the Shia deputies don't approve,"
he stated, "we'll move forward with the Sunni version alone."
He was quite confident that the Sunni version, at least,
would pass.
MONROE