

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06GENEVA2654, LITTLE PROGRESS AND MUCH CONFUSION AND FRUSTRATION \
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06GENEVA2654.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06GENEVA2654 | 2006-10-19 13:15 | 2011-03-13 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | US Mission Geneva |
Appears in these articles: http://www.letemps.ch/swiss_papers |
VZCZCXRO4453
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHGV #2654/01 2921315
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191315Z OCT 06
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1433
INFO RUEHZJ/HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0840
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0462
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3846
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0494
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1548
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 5885
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0482
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0525
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0484
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0394
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 5267
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0619
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 0304
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 0290
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1734
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 1950
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 0280
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0583
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4138
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 2695
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2368
2006-10-19 13:15:00 06GENEVA2654 US Mission Geneva CONFIDENTIAL 06USMISSIONGENEVA2654 VZCZCXRO4453\
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV\
DE RUEHGV #2654/01 2921315\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH\
P 191315Z OCT 06\
FM USMISSION GENEVA\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1433\
INFO RUEHZJ/HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0840\
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0462\
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3846\
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0494\
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1548\
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 5885\
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0482\
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0525\
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0484\
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0394\
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 5267\
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0619\
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 0304\
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 0290\
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1734\
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 1950\
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 0280\
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0583\
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4138\
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN\
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 2695\
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2368 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 002654 \
\
SIPDIS \
\
SIPDIS \
\
IO FOR DAS M. LAGON, DRL FOR DAS E. BARKS-RUGGLES \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016 \
TAGS: PHUM UNHRC
SUBJECT: LITTLE PROGRESS AND MUCH CONFUSION AND FRUSTRATION \
LEAD TO ADJOURNMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL'S SECOND SESSION \
\
GENEVA 00002654 001.2 OF 004 \
\
\
Classified By: PolCouns Velia M. De Pirro for reasons 12958: 1.4 (b)(d) \
\
\
Summary \
-------- \
\
¶1. (C) The Human Rights Council's second session was \
adjourned without achieving much after three weeks. It is to \
resume November 27-28, when it will deal with 44 resolutions \
tabled by members when it became apparent that little of \
substance would be achieved. The Council's failure was due \
in part to growing pains of a new body, but most of the blame \
was laid by members on unpredictable, often obscure, and \
confusing management by HRC President Luis Alfonso de Alba. \
His preference for small group meetings and closed sessions \
of the Council, from which observer States and NGOs were \
excluded, drew criticism from non-members and regional \
groups. De Alba's penchant for setting aside modalities and \
rules without explanation resulted in confusion and \
frustration among delegations. The level of discontent was \
clearly evident on the last day of the session when four \
GRULAC delegations delivered statements condemning the HRC's \
failure to deal with serious situations and criticizing the \
lack of predictability and transparency in the Council. The \
only success was the increased participation by NGOs in the \
inter-active dialogue with Special Procedures despite efforts \
by Cuba, China and Russia to block their involvement. U.S. \
engagement was welcomed by most delegations seeking to build \
a Council better able to address serious situations. \
Planning for the third session is underway among Geneva \
delegations. Success in addressing issues of concern to the \
United States and its partners will depend on early and \
concerted action in capitals. End Summary. \
\
Little Progress \
--------------- \
\
¶2. (SBU) Expectations for the second regular session of the \
Human Rights Council were mixed and not particularly high. \
The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) expected to \
continue its anti-Israel focus and attention on the issue of \
religious intolerance. The Western (WHRG) and the Latin \
American (GRULAC) groups hoped to address at least one urgent \
situation -- Sudan/Darfur. The bulk of the session was to be \
devoted to the reports of the Special Procedures mandate \
holders. This segment was seen by many delegations, \
especially Norway, India, Canada and the Latin American \
members, as successful. This was in large part because NGOs, \
supported by the WHRG and GRULAC, gained ground in being \
allowed to participate in the inter-active dialogue with the \
Special Procedures despite repeated efforts by Cuba, China, \
Russia and Belarus to disallow any participation by civil \
society. The rapporteurs' reports held few surprises since \
their written reports had been publicly available for many \
months. In addition, the rapporteurs, their working methods, \
and biases were well known to States. Consequently, \
interventions by the concerned States were predictable, \
focused on the shortcomings of the reports or the working \
methods of the rapporteurs. The only exceptions were \
virulent personal attacks by the Cuban and Belarussian \
delegations on the rapporteurs dealing with their countries, \
and the report on the Israel-Lebanon war which drew fire from \
all sides. \
\
\
GENEVA 00002654 002.2 OF 004 \
\
\
Much Frustration with the President and the Process \
--------------------------------------------- ------ \
\
¶3. (SBU) While the inter-active dialogue was seen as \
generally successful, HRC President Luis Alfonso de Alba's \
management of the Council drew criticism. His unpredictable \
wavering between strictly applying or completely setting \
aside agreed modalities for the meeting caused confusion and \
grumbling from delegations. Discussions with the Council \
Secretariat revealed equal uncertainty among staff charged \
\
SIPDIS \
with supporting the Council. Dissatisfaction with de Alba \
increased over the course of the session as he insisted on a \
"substantive" consensus omnibus resolution on the reports and \
recommendations of the Special Procedures, but failed to \
provide adequate guidance or information on how he planned to \
arrive at a text. Most delegations tried to work with de \
Alba to avoid the Commission's practice of over 100 \
individual resolutions on the reports. It was, however, \
apparent from the start that consensus on the recommendations \
was impossible given States' objections to those that applied \
to them. Nonetheless, De Alba insisted on an omnibus \
resolution and even broadened it to include new initiatives. \
In pursuit of agreement to his plan, de Alba held small group \
meetings and closed sessions of the Council, excluding \
observer States and NGOs. His preference for working behind \
closed doors and the resulting lack of transparency quickly \
drew the ire of delegations, including the United States. In \
meetings with Ambassador Tichenor, De Alba rationalized his \
actions by saying that he needed flexibility to operate. \
Distrust increased, however, as regional groups felt excluded \
from the process and de Alba began to consult with the EU \
presidency, the NAM (presently chaired by Cuba) and the OIC. \
Unhappiness with the HRC President and growing doubt that the \
Council would yield concrete results, led delegations to \
table 44 resolutions by the last week of the Council. A \
U.S.-led draft resolution on democracy was ruled to be too \
late to be accepted in the unpredictable swings of de Alba's \
gavel. \
\
Consensus or Nothing \
-------------------- \
\
¶4. (SBU) De Alba called for a consensus resolution covering \
new initiatives, but excluding those that in his view were \
covered by an almost agreed "generic" text on the Special \
Procedures reports. Poorly managed negotiations, lack of \
transparency and general confusion on how de Alba would deal \
with 44 resolutions basically led to an impasse. In an \
apparent effort to have something concrete to point to, de \
Alba proposed a consensus presidential statement on 4-5 of \
the key issues and transferal of other resolutions to the \
November session of the Council. The first draft circulated \
by de Alba was not so much a consensus text as a compilation \
of issues of interest to certain delegations or groups. \
Three items drew on OIC language dealing with religious \
intolerance (without mention of religious freedom), Israeli \
settlements and construction of the wall, and the situation \
in Lebanon. The Sudan/Darfur language was drawn from the EU \
resolution, and the paragraph on right to development was \
taken from Cuba's resolution on behalf of the NAM. Aware \
that the text would not gain consensus, de Alba chaired an \
abbreviated morning session during which a generic text on \
the inter-active dialogue was adopted. He also announced that \
follow up to previous Council resolutions would be part of \
\
GENEVA 00002654 003.2 OF 004 \
\
\
the agenda of the third session. Comment: The latter was a \
sop to the OIC, which had threatened to call a vote against \
transferring the tabled resolutions to the November session \
unless its resolutions focused on Israel were addressed. End \
comment. In a meeting with de Alba, Ambassador Tichenor and \
IO DAS Mark Lagon raised U.S. opposition to the lack of \
balance in the statement's treatment of Middle East issues \
and religious intolerance. They also called on de Alba to \
exercise greater transparency and predictability in his \
consultations and management of the Council. \
\
¶5. (SBU) The second draft included only changes requested by \
the OIC to toughen sections of concern to its members. It \
also included a new item on humanitarian law at the request \
of the Swiss delegation, which had already indicated its \
intention to support the text. Reaction in the Western Group \
to both texts was mixed and showed once again the group's \
inability to act in concert. Non-members United States, \
Australia, Canada, Norway and New Zealand opposed the texts \
and warned against making consensus the goal of the Council \
rather than protecting and promoting human rights. Canada, a \
member of the Council, also made clear its opposition to the \
text. The Canadian delegation, obviously uncomfortable, was \
under instructions from Ottawa to break consensus on its own \
if necessary. The EU was engaged in an internal struggle \
between opposition to the text and fearing censure if it or \
the Western Group were blamed for the Council's failure. In \
the end, "nothing is better than a bad text" became the motto \
for all groups. In the closing session the President \
announced that consensus had failed and that all tabled \
resolutions would be taken up at the resumption of the second \
session of the Council November 27-28, and that the third \
session would begin two days late on November 29. \
\
GRULAC Challenges President \
--------------------------- \
\
¶6. (SBU) In a surprising move that drew comment from all \
delegations, at the conclusion of the session the delegations \
of Peru, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina made statements \
condemning the Council's failure to address the crisis \
situation in Sudan/Darfur and criticizing the lack of \
transparency and predictability in the Council's operations \
-- a direct hit at de Alba's management of the Council. \
While Peru's statement could reflect the Peruvian PermRep \
Manuel Rodriguez Cuadros' resentment at having had to step \
aside in June so de Alba could take the presidency, \
interventions by usually more reserved GRULAC members \
highlighted the level of discontent in the Council with de \
Alba's presidency. Similar statements noting the Council's \
failure to deal with serious human rights situations were \
made by Ambassador Tichenor and India. The Finnish \
Presidency had a statement and was on the list of speakers, \
but opted not to deliver a statement. A Finnish delegate \
claimed that they changed their minds not to encourage the \
OIC to speak. Since no one from the OIC was on the speakers' \
list and the session was drawing to a close, the Finnish \
excuse rings hollow. \
\
Comment: U.S. Role \
-------------------- \
\
¶7. (C) The United States delegation, headed by Ambassador \
Tichenor and supported by Washington-based staff, including \
\
GENEVA 00002654 004.2 OF 004 \
\
\
IO DAS Mark Lagon, actively engaged during the three-week \
session. In an effort to demonstrate U.S. support for \
country- specific mandates as well as the thematic mandates \
focused on civil and political rights, USdel delivered \
statements and participated in the interactive dialogue with \
rapporteurs. (Statements are accessible on Mission Geneva's \
website.) The United States' engagement in the session was \
welcomed by most delegations as a sign that the USG was \
serious in trying to help shape the Council into a more \
effective body than the Commission. U.S. leadership in the \
Western Group was particularly welcomed by non-EU partners \
frustrated by the EU's inability to arrive a strong unified \
positions and its penchant for delivering often weak general \
statements. Media interest was tamer during this session in \
part because this session did not produce much in the way of \
drama or reportable news, but also because reporters and \
their editors are starting to see the Council as little \
better than the Commission. As the AP bureau chief put it, \
"The Council is making itself marginal." That being said, \
U.S. statements received good coverage in the wires. USG \
views were thereby well-disseminated. \
\
¶8. (C) Planning for the third session of the Council is \
underway within regional and other groups. Ambassador \
Tichenor hosted Community of Democracy Convening Group \
ambassadors October 13 (septel) and hosted select African \
Group ambassadors October 17. JUSCANZ has commenced a series \
of weekly meetings to assure that it is not hampered in \
achieving shared goals by the EU's cumbersome coordination \
process. These preparations only address, however, issues \
from the perspective of Geneva-based delegations -- 44 \
pending resolutions, the need for more predictable and \
transparent working methods for the Council, and the \
importance of reaching across regional lines to assure that \
the Council can respond to concerns beyond those of the OIC. \
Progress on the Council's foundations and working methods as \
well as concrete actions that address emerging or serious \
human rights situations will require action in capitals \
either separately or jointly with like-minded partners. \
While this message has focused on the difficulties resulting \
from HRC President de Alba's imprecise and often ambiguous \
management of the Council, it is important to keep in mind \
that determined and coordinated action by the United States \
and its partners can positively influence the work of the \
Council. It requires, however, early planning on focused \
objectives. \
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
TICHENOR \