

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06LIMA4570, PERU: PRESIDENT GARCIA'S EMOTIONAL AND PHYSICAL
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06LIMA4570.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06LIMA4570 | 2006-12-04 22:44 | 2010-12-16 21:30 | SECRET | Embassy Lima |
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHPE #4570/01 3382244
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 042244Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3201
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
S E C R E T LIMA 004570
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2016
TAGS: PINR PGOV PE
SUBJECT: PERU: PRESIDENT GARCIA'S EMOTIONAL AND PHYSICAL
HEALTH
REF: STATE 189857
Classified By: Ambassador J Curtis Struble for reason 1.4(C).
¶1. (S) This message is in response to reftel request for
information on the emotional and physical health of President
Alan Garcia. Our responses are slugged to the questions in
reftel paragraphs. We do not always have first-hand
information on the questions asked, a fact reflected in some
of our answers below.
¶2. (S) Garcia's overall health appears to be good.
Notwithstanding a strenuous work schedule, he has clearly
gained weight over the past several months. This shows (both
in press photos and private meetings) in his slightly larger
jowls and a growing paunch. Reports of manic depression or
bipolar disorder are impossible to confirm, but rumors in
this connection are widespread. For example, many of our
contacts (with purported first-hand knowledge) say that
Garcia has always been moody, disposed to sudden flights of
enthusiasm, plunges of bad humor, and abrupt changes of mind.
Many of the more damaging rumors appear to have their
origins in the latter part of Garcia's first term, when his
popularity plummeted and the political and security
situations spiraled out of control. According to some
reports, in response Garcia at one point fell into a deep
funk, locked himself behind closed doors and refused public
contact of any kind for days on end. While that report
continues to hound him, there are no indications that it
responds to a long-standing or deep-set dimension of his
psychological or emotional makeup.
¶3. (S) We do not have the names and/or specialties of his
doctors.
¶4. (S) We have no direct information with respect to
medications taken by the president. A number of our contacts
have told us (as though it were an established fact) that
Garcia takes lithium for anti-depression (anti-bipolar
disorder) purposes, but we cannot confirm the veracity of
these reports.
¶5. (S) There is no evidence that Garcia suffers from alcohol
or drug abuse. We understand he does drink socially.
¶6. (S) Persecution, real as well as imagined, has been an
integral part of the president's life. Garcia's father, a
founding member of APRA, was imprisoned for several years for
his political activism. The APRA has been the object of
political persecution during Peru's recent era of military
dictatorships (1968-80), its activities as anti-regime
"democrats" curtailed. Garcia himself chose to leave Peru
after his first term ended in 1990, partly out of fears of
persecution. After one year of exile in Colombia, he fled to
France on hearing reports that he was being pursued by
Fujimori henchmen either for assassination or kidnapping back
to Peru. More recently, as president, Garcia and his son
have been the targets of alleged kidnapping plots. These
experiences have broadly shaped his personal and political
outlook, and exacerbated an innate tendency to keep
information "close-hold," strictly limited to an intimate
circle of advisors.
¶7. (S) A master politician, Garcia has survived and thrived
via the indirect threat, ably playing rivals against one
another and undermining, with cold calculation, the political
bases of potential competitors, including those within his
own party. Garcia's APRA party is also well known as the
most effective political machine in Peru, complete with goon
squads that are dispatched to do various kinds of dirty work
on behalf of its leaders. We have no information that he has
ever issued explicit violent threats or the like. While
there are widespread reports that he is a difficult,
demanding boss and a moody person, we have no information
that he is abusive toward advisors or family.
¶8. (S) According to most reports, Garcia has an extremely
heavy work load and regularly takes on too many tasks. As a
man who lives and breathes politics, at the expense of most
other dimensions of his life, he often works late. It could
almost be said that work is all he does. Moreover, he is a
pure politician in the sense that he has never done anything
but the work of candidate or president, and it is all he
knows how to do. (He has written books, but most critics
understand that is not his gift.)
¶9. (S) Garcia has the reputation of being an acute
micro-manager and very demanding on his staff, even tasking
senior ministers in public and on the spot with various
responsibilities and duties. In the sense that he often
expects Ministers to divine and carry out his will rather
than to generate policy ideas or propose alternative
solutions, he demands the impossible. As for lofty ideas, he
appears to have learned lessons from his first term, lowering
expectations and focusing on pragmatic programs rather than
on large romantic visions. For example, he has no apparent
ambition to change the world, re-order political and economic
realities according to a new "vision" for Latin America, or
create the new socialist specimen or Bolivarian man. The
signal programs of his second term so far -- Sierra
Exportadora, Agua Para Todos, the Decentralization Shock --
amount in many ways to recombining and repackaging diverse
existing tactical poverty reduction schemes (including
USAID's PRA -- Poverty Reduction and Alleviation -- project)
than to pursuing an overriding lofty ambition. At the same
time, most observers see Garcia's strengths as rhetorical
rather than administrative, in inspiring with impassioned and
even poetic oratory rather than in overseeing (prosaic)
projects slowly through their step by step implementation.
¶10. (S) Garcia's public and private persona are, in many
ways, at odds. In public, he tends to strike the majesterial
presidential pose, chest thrust forward, head held high, arms
and hands gesturing in the formal, almost choreographed
manner of the leader. He is also prone to giving long public
lectures, reflecting a know-it-all and superior tone. All
this comes across as pompous and inflated. By contrast, in
private Garcia is a more informal, disarming and even
considerate figure. He is courteous and deferential with
visitors, and an excellent listener, often probing
interlocutors for more detailed information. One aspect on
which there is near universal agreement is that Garcia has a
colossal ego, which can blind him to the merits of good ideas
and alternatives that he himself has not generated. To some
observers, while he is unlikely to repeat the mistakes that
brought Peru close to ruin during his first administration,
the ego is Garcia's Achilles' heel and could have
counterproductive consequences to the current government,
especially if unchecked.
¶11. (S) Garcia's attention span appears to be good, and his
listening skills are excellent. We have no information that
he has difficulty in concentrating, gets confused or is
forgetful. As noted above, there are widespread reports of a
certain emotional volatility, but it is not clear that this
impairs his ability to think or to express himself clearly.
¶12. (S) We have no information about any periods of intense
energy or activity, racing thoughts or incoherence. We have
not noted any tendency to shake, blink or roll his eyes.
¶13. (S) While there are widespread reports that Garcia fell
into a deep depression near the end of his first term (as
noted above), we have no information that that corresponds to
a deep-set emotional characteristic or that it has recurred
regularly since that time. We have no information about talk
of suicide.
¶14. (S) We have no information regarding any decreased need
for sleep or food. A truly gifted orator, he never sounds as
though his speech were hurried or pressured, nor does it
follow a notably illogical flow.
¶15. (S) We have no information about his exercise routine or
diet regimen, nor any dietary restrictions due to ongoing
medications.
¶16. (S) We have no information regarding any compulsive
overeating, shopping, gambling or the like. That said, as
noted above, Garcia has manifestly gained weight since being
in office and is likely a consequence of his eating amply and
well. There are widespread rumors of Garcia's numerous
extra-marital sexual liaisons. Recently, Garcia publicly
acknowledged one of them, with Ms. Elizabeth Roxanne
Cheesman, with whom he had a young child. While he publicly
claimed that this relationship occurred during the brief time
he was estranged from his wife Pilar Nores, some observers
have suggested that it was much more enduring than he had
publicly let on.
¶17. (S) In the interim between the end of his first
presidential term in 1990 and the current term, which began
in July of 2006, Garcia has spent time both abroad and in
Peru. After leaving office the first time, in 1992 Garcia
fled to a kind of quasi political exile in Bogota, Colombia,
where he remained for one year. (Garcia harbors a deep
sympathy for Colombia dating back to that time.) From there,
he fled to France, where he lived for the following eight
years. (From this period, Garcia speaks excellent French and
has a strong personal sympathy for French society and life.)
He returned to Peru in 2001, following Alberto Fujimori's
resignation from the presidency. He was formally separated
from his wife in 2004-5.
STRUBLE