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Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI40, LIBYA POSTPONES GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS, WALKS BACK FROM WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND PRIVATIZATION PLANS
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TRIPOLI40 | 2009-01-22 12:41 | 2011-02-01 21:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli |
Appears in these articles: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/libya-wikileaks/ |
VZCZCXRO2760
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTRO #0040/01 0221241
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 221241Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4339
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4862
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000040
SIPDIS
DEPT NEA/MAG (JOHNSON), INR (HOFSTATTER)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EFIN SCUL EPET PHUM KDEM LY
SUBJECT: LIBYA POSTPONES GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS, WALKS BACK FROM WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND PRIVATIZATION PLANS
REF:
A) 08 TRIPOLI 227,
B) 08 TRIPOLI 719,
C) 08 TRIPOLI 699,
D) 08 TRIPOLI 896 ,
E) 08 TRIPOLI 842,
F) 08 TRIPOLI 917,
G) 08 TRIPOLI 936,
H) TRIPOLI 0017,
I) 08 TRIPOLI 889,
J) TRIPOLI 0022
CLASSIFIED BY: GENE A. CRETZ, AMBASSADOR, U.S. EMBASSY - TRIPOLI, U.S. DEPT OF STATE. REASON: 1.4 (B), (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A SESSION OF THE GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (GPC), LIBYA'S SUPREME LEGISLATIVE BODY, THAT WAS TO HAVE CONVENED IN EARLY JANUARY TO REVEAL PLANS FOR PRIVATIZATION AND GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING, HAS BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL FEBRUARY/MARCH, OSTENSIBLY BECAUSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ONGOING EVENTS IN GAZA. PRIVATELY, CONTACTS TELL US THAT THE VISION FOR REFORM ARTICULATED BY MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI LAST MARCH HAS BEEN SIGNIFIANTLY MODIFIED. HE IS EXPECTED TO ANNOUNCE THAT A CONTROVERSIAL PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT DISTRIBUTION OF OIL WEALTH HAS BEEN "POSTPONED" AND THAT GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING HAS BEEN "MODIFIED". AT THE SAME TIME, THE GOL HAS BEEN FORCED TO RECALCULATE ITS NATIONAL BUDGET IN LIGHT OF FALLING OIL PRICES AND RECONSIDER THE EXTENT OF HIGH-PROFILE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DESIGNED THAT WERE TO BE COMPLETED IN TIME FOR THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE REVOLUTION IN SEPTEMBER 2009. QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER PUTATIVE HEIR APPARENT SAIF AL-ISLAM AL-QADHAFI, SON OF MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI, WILL TAKE A MORE FORMAL GOVERNMENT ROLE, TOGETHER WITH RELATED REPORTS THAT A CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS FOR ILL-DEFINED "KEY POSITIONS" MAY BE IN THE OFFING, CONTRIBUTE TO THE SENSE THAT THE REGIME IS IN THE MIDST OF ONE OF ITS PERIODIC PERIODS OF POLITICAL FERMENT. IN THAT REGARD, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND EVENTS IN GAZA ARE, FROM THE GOL'S PERSPECTIVE, WELL-TIMED AND AFFORD A REGIME HAMPERED BY LIMITED BUREAUCRATIC CAPACITY ADDITIONAL TIME AS IT STRUGGLES TO ADOPT A PLAN FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) SENIOR GOL CONTACTS TOLD US IN CONNECTION WITH THE PUTATIVE TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON IN EARLY JANUARY OF NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER MUATASSIM AL-QADHAFI (SON OF MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI) THAT A SESSION OF THE GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (GPC) WAS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE JANUARY 10-13 IN SIRTE. IN ADDITION TO A WIDELY ANTICIPATED CABINET SHUFFLE, IT WAS EXPECTED THAT MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI WOULD ANNOUNCE DURING HIS CUSTOMARY ADDRESS TO THE GPC PLANS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE DRAMATIC PROGRAM OF PRIVATIZATION AND GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING HE ADVOCATED AT THE LAST GPC SESSION IN MARCH 2008 (REF A). IN THAT SPEECH, AL-QADHAFI CALLED FOR THE SYSTEM OF GENERAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES THAT HAVE FORMED THE BASIS OF GOVERNMENT SINCE THE LATE 1970'S TO BE DISMANTLED BY THE END OF 2008, AND FOR THE DIRECT TRANSFER OF OIL REVENUES TO LIBYANS AND FOR RADICAL PRIVATIZATION OF LIBYA'S LARGELY STATIST ECONOMY. VIRTUALLY ALL SOCIAL SERVICES WOULD BE PRIVATIZED AND MOST GOVERNMENT JOBS WOULD BE ELIMINATED; THE PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE THE LAST VESTIGES OF LIBYA'S CREAKY HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS WAS PARTICULARLY WORRISOME FOR ORDINARY LIBYANS, FOR WHOM CRADLE-TO-GRAVE SUBSIDIES HAVE TACITLY CONSTITUTED COMPENSATION FOR POLITICAL QUIESCENCE. GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS SESSION POSTPONED; PROPOSED REFORMS TO BE SCALED BACK
¶3. (C) IN CUSTOMARY FASHION, DATES FOR THE JANUARY MEETING OF THE GPC WERE NOT FORMALLY ANNOUNCED AND, IN THE EVENT, THE SESSION WAS NOT HELD. UN RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE BRIAN GLEESON TOLD THE AMBASSADOR ON JANUARY 12 THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM TWO GENERAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE SECRETARIES (MINISTER-EQUIVALENTS) ON JANUARY 11 THAT THE JANUARY SESSION OF THE GPC WOULD NOT BE HELD AT ALL; THE NEXT SESSION OF THE GPC WOULD BE THE REGULARLY SCHEDULED MEETING IN MARCH. (NOTE: THE LIBYAN SYSTEM NOMINALLY CALLS FOR TWO SESSIONS OF THE GPC IN A GIVEN YEAR - ONE IN JANUARY, AT WHICH THE PERFORMANCE OF THE CABINET-EQUIVALENT DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR IS REVIEWED, AND ONE IN MARCH, AT WHICH THE ANNUAL BUDGET AND PROGRAMS OF WORK ARE ESTABLISHED. END NOTE.) GLEESON'S CONTACTS TOLD HIM THE DELAY WOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE ONGOING CRISIS IN GAZA, AND THAT AL-QADHAFI WOULD ANNOUNCE IN MARCH THAT THE PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM HAD BEEN "POSTPONED" IN LIGHT OF SAGGING OIL PRICES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS. IN ADDITION, THE GENERAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES (MINISTRY-EQUIVALENTS) FOR HEALTH, BASIC EDUCATION AND HIGHER EDUCATION WOULD NOT/NOT BE DISMANTLED AT THE MARCH SESSION OF THE GPC. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BRITISH COUNCIL WAS ALSO TOLD THAT THE GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS WOULD NOT MEET UNTIL MARCH AND THAT THE GPC FOR BASIC EDUCATION WOULD NOT BE DISMANTLED. DELAY PARTLY PROMPTED BY NEED TO RECALCULATE NATIONAL BUDGET IN LIGHT OF FALLING OIL PRICES
¶4. (C) SEPARATELY, MFA SECRETARY FOR ARAB AFFAIRS MUHAMMAD TAHER SIALA TOLD THE AMBASSADOR ON JANUARY 13 THAT THE GPC SESSION HAD BEEN POSTPONED IN PART BECAUSE THE GOL HAD TO RECALCULATE ITS ENTIRE NATIONAL BUDGET. BUOYED BY PRICES WELL IN EXCESS OF USD 100 PER BARREL IN MID-2008, THE GOL HAD CALIBRATED ITS OPERATING BUDGET FOR 2009 AGAINST A PRICE PER BARREL OF USD 65; HOWEVER, WITH ACTUAL PRICES CURRENTLY IN THE RANGE OF USD 35-40 PER BARREL, GOL OFFICIALS WERE NOW SCRAMBLING TO RECALCULATE THE ENTIRE BUDGET AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OUTLAYS AGAINST A PRICE POINT OF USD 40-45 PER BARREL. SIALA OFFERED THAT THE GOL HAD HAD TO "RECONSIDER" (I.E., REDUCE) THE SCOPE OF CERTAIN INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, AND THAT THE EXTENT OF PRIVATIZATION AND GOVERNMENT RE-STRUCTURING THAT WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN LINE WITH AL-QADHAFI'S VISION HAD ALSO BEEN "MODIFIED". HE CONFIRMED THAT THE JANUARY SESSION OF THE GPC HAD BEEN CANCELLED, AND THAT A SINGLE SESSION OF THE GPC WOULD BE HELD IN LATE FEBRUARY OR EARLY MARCH. AL-QADHAFI UNHAPPY THAT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IMPACTED BY SAGGING OIL REVENUES
¶5. (C) STRESSING THE SANCTITY OF LIBYA'S BUDGET ALLOCATION PROCESS AND DECRYING CLAIMS THAT IT WAS LESS THAN TRANSPARENT, SIALA SQKEY GPC SECRETARIES (MINISTER-EQUIVALENTS) HAD RECENTLY REJECTED A PROPOSAL BY AL-QADHAFI TO "BORROW" FROM LIBYA'S SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND TO OFFSET BUDGET DEFICITS AND AVOID SCALING BACK INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. (NOTE: AFTER YEARS OF LITTLE TO NO SPENDING ON HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE, THE GOL INITIATED A MASSIVE CAMPAIGN OF PROJECTS IN 2007, MANY OF WHICH ARE SUPPOSED TO BE COMPLETED IN TIME FOR THE SEPTEMBER 1, 2009 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MILITARY COUP THAT BROUGHT MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI TO POWER AS SYMBOLS OF THE TANGIBLE BENEFITS OF THE "AL-FATAH REVOLUTION" AND THE JAMAHIRYA SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE. END NOTE.) SEPARATELY, xxxxxxxxxxxx(STRICTLY PROTECT) TOLD US THAT SHUKHRI GHANEM, CHAIRMAN OF LIBYA'S NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION, WAS ASKED BY AL-QADHAFI ABOUT TEN DAYS AGO WHETHER THERE WERE ANY ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF OIL-GENERATED REVENUE THAT COULD BE TAPPED TO PRECLUDE DELAYING INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. GHANEM'S ANSWER WAS THAT THERE WERE NOT, AND THAT FLAT OIL PRICES WOULD CONTINUE TO HURT LIBYA'S REVENUE STREAM, WHICH IS ALMOST ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON HYDROCARBON EXPORTS. MODIFICATION OF POLITICAL-ECONOMIC REFORMS FORETOLD
¶6. (C) THE TIMELINE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF AL-QADHAFI'S VISION HAS SLIPPED SEVERAL TIMES ALREADY. IN MARCH 2008, HE SAID PLANS WOULD BE ANNOUNCED AT HIS REVOLUTION DAY SPEECH IN AUGUST AND WOULD BE EFFECTED BY YEAR'S END; HOWEVER, HE DISAPPOINTED HOPES THAT HE WOULD ANSWER KEY QUESTIONS ABOUT GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING, PRIVATIZATION AND POLITICAL REFORM AND INSTEAD FOCUSED ON BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH ITALY AND THE UNITED STATES (LIBYA HAD AT THAT POINT JUST SIGNED A COLONIAL COMPENSATION TREATY WITH ITALY AND AN AGREEMENT TO COMPENSATE U.S. VICTIMS OF TERRORISM). COMING CLOSE ON THE HEELS OF A MAJOR ADDRESS IN MID-AUGUST BY HIS SON (REF B), SAIF AL-ISLAM AL-QADHAFI (WHO DECLARED THAT MOST GOALS OF HIS POLITICAL-ECONOMIC REFORM EFFORT HAD ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED AND ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS BOWING OUT OF POLITICS), THE REVOLUTION DAY SPEECH LEFT OBSERVERS AND ORDINARY LIBYANS UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE EXPECTED PACE OF GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATIZATION (REF C).
¶7. (C) PRIVATELY, SENIOR GOL OFFICIALS TOLD US AS EARLY AS SEPTEMBER 2008 THAT THE EXTENT OF PRIVATIZATION AND GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING WOULD BE LESS DRAMATIC THAN WHAT AL-QADHAFI INITIALLY PROPOSED, PARTLY BECAUSE OF BITTER DEBATE ABOUT THEIR FEASIBILITY, AND PARTLY BECAUSE OF ONGOING CONTRETEMPS BETWEEN REFORMIST AND OLD GUARD ELEMENTS. AS REPORTED REF D, IN A MEETING BROADCAST ON STATE-OWNED TELEVISION IN NOVEMBER, SENIOR GOL OFFICIALS OPENLY DISAGREED WITH AL-QADHAFI ABOUT HIS PROPOSED REFORMS, EXPRESSING CONCERN THAT DIRECT DISTRIBUTION OF OIL WEALTH WOULD FUEL INFLATION, DEVALUE LIBYA'S CURRENCY, CREATE A BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT AND ERODE REAL INCOME LEVELS WITHOUT CONTRIBUTING TO INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY. STRIKING A POPULIST TONE, AL-QADHAFI BLASTED THE OFFICIALS, CLAIMING THAT THEY WANTED TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO TO KEEP THEIR POSITIONS AND CONTINUE PROFITING FROM CORRUPTION, AND INSISTED THAT THE PROPOSED REFORMS BE IMPLEMENTED. DESPITE AL-QADHAFI'S RHETORIC, THE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR, MINISTER OF ECONOMY-EQUIVALENT, MINISTER OF LABOR-EQUIVALENT AND THE HEAD OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND NATIONAL PLANNING COUNCIL PRIVATELY TOLD US THAT PRIVATIZATION AND GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING WOULD BE DELAYED CONSIDERABLY AND WOULD BE LESS AMBITIOUS THAN THE VISION AL-QADHAFI ARTICULATED (REFS E, F). SUCCESSION, A DRAFT CONSTITUTION AND POTENTIAL ELECTIONS ADD TO FERMENT
¶8. (C) MORE RECENTLY, CONTACTS HAVE TOLD US THAT A DRAFT LIBYAN CONSTITUTION CIRCULATED RECENTLY MAY BE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AT THE GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (REF G), PERHAPS OFFERING ANOTHER REASON TO DELAY THE SESSION. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SOCIETY OF LIBYA TOLD P/E CHIEF THAT A REVISED ITERATION OF A DRAFT CONSTITUTION HAD BEEN CIRCULATED TO A SPECIAL CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE IN MID-NOVEMBER FOR REVIEW, AND WAS EXPECTED TO BE FORWARDED TO THE BASIC PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES IN EARLY 2009 BEFORE BEING SUBMITTED TO THE GPC FOR CONSIDERATION AND POTENTIAL RATIFICATION. YUSUF SAWANI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, TOLD THE AMBASSADOR ON JANUARY 15 THAT THE GROUP - WHICH LARGELY COMPRISED ACADEMICS AND OTHER INDIVIDUALS OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT AND IS HEADED BY A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE, MET IN LATE DECEMBER AND AGREED TO CIRCULATE THE DRAFT TO THE BASIC PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES "IN THE SPRING" FOR REVIEW. SAWANI SAID THE DOCUMENT WOULD BE DESCRIBED AS A "CONSTITUTION" (A PHRASE THAT HAS PROMPTED CONTROVERSY AMONG OLD GUARD MEMBERS, WHO CLAIM THAT NO SUCH DOCUMENT IS NEEDED OR APPROPRIATE IN THE JAMAHIRIYA SYSTEM), AND THAT THE GROUP'S UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT IT WOULD BE A "TEMPORARY" OR "TRANSITIONAL" DOCUMENT THAT WOULD EVOLVE OVER TIME.
¶9. (C) AL-QADHAFI ADDED FURTHER FUEL TO THE FIRE OF SPECULATION ABOUT WHAT MIGHT TRANSPIRE AT THE GPC SESSION WHEN HE TOLD KEY REGIME FIGURES IN LATE DECEMBER (REF H) THAT LIBYA WAS ENTERING "A NEW POLITICAL PERIOD" AND WOULD HOLD ELECTIONS FOR "SOME KEY OFFICES SOON". REGIME FIGURE xxxxxxxxxxxx WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING, TOLD xxxxxxxxxxxx (STRICTLY PROTECT) THAT "IT WOULD HAVE BEEN EASIER IF HE (AL-QADHAFI) HAD JUST TOLD US THAT THERE WOULD BE ELECTIONS TO FINALLY GIVE SAIF AL-ISLAM A POSITION". xxxxxxxxxxxx STRESSED TO AL-WASH THAT HE DID NOT REASONABLY EXPECT ELECTIONS ANYTIME SOON, AND SPECULATED THAT AL-QADHAFI'S INTENT WAS TO GET SENIOR REGIME FIGURES THINKING ABOUT THE IDEA SO THAT IT WOULD COME AS LESS OF A SHOCK IF AND WHEN ELECTIONS WERE ACTUALLY ORGANIZED. xxxxxxxxxxxx AND OTHER WELL-INFORMED CONTACTS ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT SAIF WILL BE TAPPED FOR A FORMAL GOVERNMENT POSITION AT THE GPC (HIS ONLY CURRENT POSITION IS AS HEAD OF A QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION); HOWEVER, THE DRUMBEAT OF SPECULATION THAT HE WILL BE GIVEN A MORE FORMAL ROLE AS PART OF AN EFFORT BY THE REGIME TO PAVE THE WAY FOR HIS EVENTUAL SUCCESSION HAS INCREASED IN RECENT WEEKS. FINALLY, BUSINESSMAN xxxxxxxxxxxx(STRICTLY PROTECT) RECENTLY RELAYED TO US REPORTS THAT NEW LEGISLATION WOULD BE INTRODUCED AT THE MARCH GPC SESSION TO RESTRICT THE SIZE OF COMPANIES AND AMOUNT OF WEALTH INDIVIDUALS COULD ACCRUE. HIS INFORMATION WAS THAT WHILE THE INITIATIVE WOULD BE DESCRIBED AS AN ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURE, IT WAS ACTUALLY DESIGNED TO BREAK UP "MONOPOLIES" THAT WERE PERCEIVED TO BE EMERGING IN CERTAIN SECTORS AND TO REDUCE THE WEALTH AND INFLUENCE OF PROMINENT BUSINESSMEN SUCH AS HUSNI BEY AND HASSAN TATTANAKI, WHO WERE PERCEIVED TO BE POTENTIAL POLITICAL THREATS TO THE AL-QADHAFI REGIME.
¶10. (C) COMMENT: THE SENSE IN TRIPOLI IS THAT THE REGIME IS IN THE MIDST OF ANOTHER OF ITS PERIODIC EPISODES OF POLITICAL FERMENT. THE FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON HOW TO IMPLEMENT AL-QADHAFI'S GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATIZATION PROPOSALS, TOGETHER WITH INCREASINGLY PERSISTENT SPECULATION ABOUT SAIF'S ROLE AND THE RELATED ISSUES OF A CONSTITUTION AND POSSIBLE ELECTIONS, HAVE RAISED DIFFICULT QUESTIONS FOR A REGIME POSSESSED OF LIMITED BUREAUCRATIC CAPACITY. DOMESTIC DISCORD HAS ALSO RECENTLY BUBBLED TO THE SURFACE AGAIN, WITH TRIBAL VIOLENCE IN KUFRA (REF I) AND ATTACKS BY REGIME ELEMENTS AGAINST BERBERS IN YEFREN (REF J). IN THAT REGARD, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND EVENTS IN GAZA HAVE COME AT AN OPPORTUNE TIME FOR A REGIME STRUGGLING TO FORMULATE A PLAN FOR THE WAY AHEAD ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM, GIVING IT A PLAUSIBLE PRETEXT TO POSTPONE PUBLICLY DECLARING ITS HAND. MORE CYNICAL LOCAL OBSERVERS HAVE SPECULATED THAT AL-QADHAFI'S PLAN ALL ALONG WAS TO PROPOSE DRAMATIC REFORMS AS A WAY TO SHIFT THE GOALPOSTS OF EXPECTATION, ALLOWING HIM TO LATER APPEASE RELUCTANT OLD GUARD ELEMENTS BY SCALING BACK THE EXTENT OF THE CHANGES TO SOMETHING CLOSER TO WHAT THEY (AND HE) ARE COMFORTABLE WITH WHILE SIMULANEOUSLY CLAIMING TO WOULD-BE REFORMISTS (INCLUDING SAIF AL-ISLAM) THAT HE DIQS BEST TO OVERHAUL THE JAMAHIRIYA SYSTEM. END COMMENT.
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