

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09SANAA2117, SA'ADA CEASEFIRE DISCUSSIONS UNDERWAY
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09SANAA2117.
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHYN #2117/01 3271515
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 231515Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3269
INFO RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1706
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SANAA 002117
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL SA YM
SUBJECT: SA'ADA CEASEFIRE DISCUSSIONS UNDERWAY
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Well-informed sources, including one
involved directly in preliminary talks, report that both the
ROYG and the Houthis are looking for a way to stop the
fighting in northern Yemen. While the Houthis apparently
have accepted the RQG's five ceasefire conditions, there is
an impasse as to whether these conditions must be implemented
before a ceasefire is announced or immediately after. The
matter is further complicated by Saudi Arabia's involvement
in the war: Saleh cannot reach a ceasefire with the Houthis
if the SAG is still fighting them, nor will he have much
incentive to do so if the SAG continues to support the war
effort militarily and financially. It is hard to say how far
these ceasefire talks will go, but they are the first serious
effort that we know of to bring the Sixth War to an end
politically rather than militarily. END SUMMARY.
SALEH MEETINGS WITH HOUTHI ENVOY
--------------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Well-informed sources, including some involved
directly in preliminary talks, report that both the ROYG and
the Houthis are looking for a way to stop the fighting in
northern Yemen. Presidential advisor Abdul Karim al-Iryani
told the Ambassador on November 22 that efforts were indeed
underway to agree on terms for a ceasefire. The Houthis have
chosen Hassan Zaid, chairman of the opposition Joint Meeting
Parties (JMP) and native of Sa'ada, to act as their
intermediary with President Saleh. Zaid told PolOff on
November 21 that he met with Saleh on November 19 to discuss
conditions for a ceasefire. According to Zaid, Saleh
insisted that once the Houthis accept the ROYG's five
ceasefire conditions, he would form a commission to woQ out
details regarding implementation of the ceasefire. (Note:
The ROYG's five ceasefire conditions required of the Houthis
are: 1) withdraw from the mountains, remove mines, open
roads, and commit to a ceasefire; 2) withdraw from districts
and refrain from interfering with local authorities; 3)
return seized and stolen military and civilian equipment; 4)
release detainees; and 5) respect the law and the
constitution. End Note.) Iryani confirmed that a mediation
committee is now being formed in the event that hostilities
cease. According to Zaid, Saleh proposed the ceasefire
commission consist of Northwest Regional Commander Ali
Muhsin, Ali al-Jayfi, head of the Giants brigade, and Faisal
Rajab, a southern military commander, while the Houthis
proposed they be represented by Abdulkarim Amir Adim
al-Houthi, Saleh Ahmed Habra, and Saleh al-Samaad.
¶3. (S/NF) Zaid held a subsequent meeting with the President
on November 22 to deliver a letter from Houthi spokesman
Mohammed Abdulsalam agreeing to the five conditions,
clarifying their objectives (such as denying that they want
to re-establish the imamate), and shaming Saleh for "staying
idle while children and women are killed by missiles and
airplanes of the Saudi regime." Zaid told PolOff on November
23 that he emerged from the meeting very disappointed, as
there was no progress or tangible outcome. He reported that,
on one hand, Saleh appeared to indicate that he wanted to
stop the war but could not, because he complained that
Hussein and Hamid al-Ahmar, leaders of the Hashid tribal
confederation, want to keep the war going. Zaid also had the
impression Saleh would not end the war as long as the Saudis
continued funding and supporting it.
CEASEFIRE SEQUENCING UNCLEAR
----------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) One of the elements that remains unclear,
according to Zaid, is the sequencing of the implementation of
the ceasefire relative to the implementation of the five
ceasefire conditions. The Houthis have pledged to implement
the five conditions within a day of the cessation of military
operations. During that time, both parties would open roads,
begin to clear the area of mines, come down from the
mountains, and stop interfering with local authorities.
Iryani told the Ambassador that he believes the essential
first step is for Abdul Malik al-Houthi to publicly announce
the rebels, acceptance of the ROYG's five points. He said
this is the only way Saleh will move forward, since it has
become the government's bottom line for a settlement. A
public statement by the Houthis would enable Saleh to say to
the families of the soldiers who have died and the Yemeni
people in general that the sacrifices they made were not in
vain. (Note: While the Houthis have communicated their
acceptance of the five conditions to the President, they have
not yet made it public. End Note.)
SOLVING THE PROBLEM AT ITS ROOTS
--------------------------------
¶5. (S/NF) Through their intermediary, the Houthis also
presented the President with a list of their conditions for
"guaranteeing a final resolution" to the conflict. (Note:
Iryani confirmed that the Houthis were presenting conditions
of their own for the ceasefire to hold. End Note.)
According to a document Zaid gave PolOff on November 21,
these conditions are:
-- The formal announcement of a ceasefire, the cessation of
all mobilization of ground troops, and allowing IDPs to
return to their homes;
-- The release of all prisoners of war and the clarification
of the fates of the disappeared;
-- Actions to address the impact of the war through
reconstructing destroyed infrastructure and compensating
civilians for looted properties;
-- The "normalization of life in Sa,ada" through the
following steps: 1) The army's withdrawal from villages and
farms in order to demilitarize public and private properties
in Sa,ada. (Comment: It is not clear if the Houthis will
allow the military to remain in their posts on mountaintops.
End Comment.); 2) Genuine economic development and delivery
of basic services; 3) Ending cultural and political
discrimination against the Zaydi population; and 4) Allowing
civil servants to return to their jobs and giving them
back-pay for the time they were separated from their posts.
SIMULTANEOUS SAUDI ARABIA TRACK
-------------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) According to NDI Deputy Director Murad Zafir,
reaching a ceasefire has been complicated by the SAG,s
involvement: Saleh cannot announce a ceasefire if the Saudis
are still fighting the Houthis, nor will he have any
incentive to do so if the SAG continues providing cash and
weapons for the war. Zafir told PolOff that the Saudis had
approached Hussein al-Ahmar to serve as a mediator with the
Houthis. Zaid confirmed this, saying Ahmar then called him
to consult about possible terms the Houthis might accept.
(Note: Hussein al-Ahmar has mobilized hundreds of Hashid
tribesmen to fight alongside the ROYG army against the
Houthis. End Note.) Zafir told PolOff on November 19 that
Ahmar had consulted with the Houthis to see if they would
withdraw from Jebel Dukhan in exchange for a Saudi commitment
not to allow the ROYG to attack the Houthis from Saudi
territory. The Houthis reportedly agreed to these
conditions, and Ahmar went to Riyadh to deliver the message.
Zaid said, however, that the Saudis were not willing to give
the Houthis anything in exchange for their commitment to
withdraw from Jebel Dukhan and stop attacking Saudi forces.
(Comment: Post has not been able to confirm these reports
with Ahmar directly. End Comment.) Zafir reported that the
Houthis also chose Rabaea Amin al-Okaimi, a sheikh from Al
Jawf, to serve as a mediator with the SAG. Okaimi is
reportedly in Saudi Arabia at the moment.
¶7. (S/NF) Zafir told PolOff that the Houthis are asking the
SAG to stop military action in Jebel Dukhan, to cease attacks
against the Houthis, and to refrain from allowing the ROYG to
launch attacks against the Houthis from Saudi territory. If
the SAG were to agree, he said Houthis wanted the Zaydi
sheikhs on the Saudi side of the border to guarantee the
terms; they are reportedly very warrior-like tribes that will
keep the Saudi army out of their territories if they have
given their word to do so. Zafir reported that the SAG
agreed to these conditions in principle, but nothing is
official yet.
¶8. (S/NF) Iryani claimed to have no information about a
separate line of communication between the Houthis and the
SAG. He did agree, however, that any ceasefire agreement
between the ROYG and the Houthis would have to be agreed to
in advance by the Saudis and coordinated with their forces so
all hostilities could cease at the same time.
HOPE FROM THE HAJJ
------------------
¶9. (S/NF) Zafir believes that the November 25 beginning of
the Hajj could encourage the Saudis to at least stop their
direct military involvement in the war, as they do not want
to be accused of killing Muslims during that holy time, as
Iran will surely do. Zafir also argues that the Saudis will
have difficulty achieving their goal of clearing a 10
kilometer buffer zone on the Yemeni side of the border -- as
the SAG appears to be attempting to do -- without killing
civilians and inciting anti-Saudi sentiment.
HOW SERIOUS IS SALEH?
---------------------
¶10. (S/NF) Zaid thinks Saleh may just be feigning an
interest in a ceasefire agreement. One reason he believes so
is the people Saleh recommended for the ceasefire commission
)- including Northwest Region Commander Muhsin -- are people
he is rumored to want to get rid of in order to clear the way
for his son Ahmed to become president. (Comment: Since the
beginning of the Sixth War, many analysts have expressed the
opinion that it is an internal proxy war aimed at weakening
potential rivals to the president's son. End Comment.)
According to Zaid, Saleh will get serious about the ceasefire
if he feels the war directly threatens his presidency or his
son's prospects to succeed him, or if the Saudis stop
financing his war. Even if Saleh wanted to stop the war,
however, Zaid is not sure he would be able to, given the
Saudis' involvement and the desire of certain factions with
the SAG to keep it going. "The decision to stop the war is
not in Saleh,s hands. It,s in Riyadh," he said.
COMMENT
-------
¶11. (S/NF) The ceasefire discussions underway are incipient
but promising nonetheless, if only because they are the first
such discussions since the war began in August. Many Yemeni
analysts believe that Saudi Arabia will make or break them, a
view that would seem to ignore the disinterest each of the
warring parties has shown to date in anything other than a
military solution. END COMMENT.
SECHE