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Viewing cable 09BEIJING1378, UNHAPPY CHINA": NATIONALISTIC RUBBISH OR CLARION
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BEIJING1378 | 2009-05-21 11:25 | 2010-12-04 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing |
VZCZCXRO9910
PP RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #1378/01 1411125
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211125Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4101
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
CC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 001378
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2029
TAGS: PROP PGOV PREL PHUM CN
SUBJECT: "UNHAPPY CHINA": NATIONALISTIC RUBBISH OR CLARION
CALL TO PRIDEFUL YOUTH?
REF: A. BEIJING 303
¶B. BEIJING 1249
¶C. 08 BEIJING 3546
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor
Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) The book "Unhappy China," a nationalistic
rant against the United States and China's own
supposedly West-worshipping elite, sold briskly in
China following its release in March, but sales
appear to have tapered off. China's official media
have been largely critical of the book. Only a
"small minority" of Chinese citizens subscribes to
the authors' nationalism and anti-Americanism,
numerous contacts have told PolOffs. The book's
radicalism was largely a "ploy" to boost sales, but
will not sway a sophisticated and internationally
oriented Chinese public, many contacts said.
America's image has improved significantly,
including among recent university graduates, thanks
to President Bush's attendance at the 2008 Beijing
Olympics opening ceremony and the election of
President Obama. While most Embassy interlocutors
downplayed the idea that "Unhappy China" enjoyed
high-level Party support, two pro-democracy scholars
theorized that "leftist" leaders find the work
"useful" for nudging the Chinese public away from
Western economic and political models. The only
contact who warned us that nationalism was on the
rise was one of the book's authors, Wang Xiaodong.
Young, educated urban Chinese are "extremely
nationalistic," and the government is wary of them,
Wang told PolOff. End Summary.
UNHAPPY CHINA, HAPPY PUBLISHER
------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) The book "Unhappy China" (Zhongguo Bu
Gaoxing) has been billed as a follow-on to the 1996
book "China Can Say No." Song Qiang, one of the
five authors of Unhappy China, contributed to the
1996 volume. After its release in China on March
12, "Unhappy China" hit the best-sellers list with
over 600,000 copies sold the first month, according
to dangdang.com (one of China's most popular online
bookstores). An April 13 report in China Newsweek
(Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan) put the book's first
month's sales at a more modest 470,000, though the
story notes this was enough to net each of the
book's five authors RMB 1.4 million (USD 206,000) in
royalties. Two months after its release, however,
sales have apparently fallen substantially. As of
May 11, the book failed to register in the top 100
best-sellers on amazon.cn.
PRC MEDIA LARGELY CRITICAL
--------------------------
¶3. (SBU) China's English-language media have mostly
panned the book. On March 25, the Xinhua News
Agency's English-language service issued a report
stating the book had "failed to strike a chord among
average Chinese" and was selling "poorly" at Beijing
bookstores. Chinese-language media, while still
critical of the book's tone, have been less
dismissive of its impact. The China Youth Daily
(CYD), the paper of the Communist Youth League,
published a scathing essay on April 8 that was
widely reprinted on the Internet. The CYD piece
drew the distinction between "healthy nationalism,"
such as that championed by Sun Yat-sen or Gandhi, to
the "narcissistic" (zilian) and "bellicose"
(haozhan) nationalism espoused by the Unhappy China
authors, who brag about China's cultural superiority
and the need for China to take over the United
States' role as world leader. A March 30 Xinhua
story headlined "Unhappy China Shakes the West"
noted the great attention the book had received
abroad. Though the Xinhua article quoted Chinese
scholars who denounced the book's extremist
rhetoric, it also devoted substantial space to the
authors' defense of their work. People's Daily, the
mouthpiece of the Communist Party Central Committee,
has largely ignored Unhappy China, although on April
8 the paper quoted a scholar as saying that while
the views in the book were irrational, China should
allow different voices to be heard. At least one
BEIJING 00001378 002 OF 004
paper, the Beijing Evening News (Beijing Wanbao),
which is published by the Beijing Municipal Party
Committee, has defended Unhappy China. On April 10
the paper ran a blistering editorial accusing Hong
Kong's Phoenix Television of pro-Western bias
because many of the station's guests and
commentators had denounced the book.
INTERNET REACTION LESS HOSTILE
------------------------------
¶4. (SBU) Though Unhappy China has met with mostly
harsh reviews in the mainstream media, Internet
reaction has been more favorable. An on-line
opinion poll conducted by the web portal Sina.com
showed that 70 percent of the survey's 19,000
participants believed Unhappy China discussed
important domestic and international issues and
problems "worthy of deep thought." Twenty-one
percent described the book as "too extreme" and
"opportunistic."
FRINGE APPEAL ONLY
------------------
¶5. (C) Beijing-based contacts universally criticized
the book in discussions with PolOffs. Most
described it as representing only a "small fringe"
of Chinese society and urged the USG not to pay too
much attention to the tome's anti-Americanism. Some
journalist contacts (ref B) saw the book as a "joke"
whose radical tone was meant to shock and sell
books. XXXXXXXXXXXX said XXXXXXXXXXXX
that his first complaint about the book was the poor
quality of the writing. To produce the book,
XXXXXXXXXXXX said, the authors merely recorded
a series of conversations that were then edited into essays.
XXXXXXXXXXXX said even a bad review by the
Economic Observer would have given the book more publicity
than it deserved, so his paper had ignored the book altogether.
XXXXXXXXXXXX), told PolOff XXXXXXXXXXXX
that Unhappy China did not represent mainstream views.
The Chinese public was now much more globalized and
had a better understanding of the world than was the
case in 1996, when "China Can Say No" hit the
shelves. Unhappy China, XXXXXXXXXXXX argued,
thus did not have the same traction as the earlier book.
Nevertheless, in a nod to the high level of public
interest, the Beijing News had devoted a full page
to Unhappy China in its March 28 edition, including
an interview with author Wang Xiaodong and critical
commentary by a scholar.
UNITED STATES' IMAGE ON THE RISE
--------------------------------
¶6. (C) In a conversation with PolOff
XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX, likewise
said Unhappy China represented a minority view and that,
at most, "20 percent" of the Chinese public subscribed to
the kind of nationalism espoused by the authors
XXXXXXXXXXXX said Unhappy China was
mainly a "commercial exercise," with the book'
extremism merely a "ploy" to boost sales.
Nevertheless, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, the book
did appeal to "less educated Chinese."
XXXXXXXXXXXX said the book had not received
support from any individual or faction within the
CCP leadership. The book also did not reflect an
overall rise in nationalism or anti-Americanism in
China. The image of the United States, XXXXXXXXXX
said, was actually quite good thanks to President Bush's
attendance at the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony
and the generally warm feeling Chinese have toward
President Obama.
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX, echoed XXXXXXXXXXXX 's
analysis, saying that the United States' image on college
campuses had improved since the election of President
Obama. XXXXXXXXXXXX said Unhappy China
tapped into the "natural pride" young Chinese felt
at their country's growing power, which seemed even
more evident since the global financial crisis threw
most Western economies into recession. When the
United States was booming economically,
XXXXXXXXXXXX argued, many Americans
BEIJING 00001378 003 OF 004
showed the same air of superiority and sense of power
hat the authors of Unhappy China now displayed.
A TOOL OF LEFTISTS?
-------------------
¶8. (C) In contrast, XXXXXXXXXXXX, and
XXXXXXXXXXXX saw greater political
significance in Unhappy China.
XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said
that given China's tight censorship, such a book
could not have been published without support from
high-level leaders, possibly including President Hu
Jintao himself. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that most
of the criticism of Unhappy China had come from
urban professionals, but the book did resonate with
the wider population. Nationalism, according to
XXXXXXXXXXX, remained a potent force in
China even though society as a whole was
Becoming more mature. XXXXXXXXXXXX believed
that left- leaning members of the leadership did not
necessarily like or agree with the contents of the
book, particularly its foreign policy prescriptions,
but saw it as "useful" for pushing the public more
to the left and reducing popular support in general
for Western economic and political models. Hu
Jintao, XXXXXXXXXXXX argued, was not
necessarily pushing the book but, due to his
background, tended to accept "leftist" ideas as
"normal."
WANG XIAODONG SPEAKS
--------------------
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
AUTHORS' PRO-DEMOCRACY VIEWS CENSORED
-------------------------------------
¶11. (C) Wang repeatedly asserted that nationalists
were supportive of democracy and human rights. When
sovereignty issues were not involved, ordinary
Chinese were not opposed to outside criticism and
agreed that human rights should be improved. "Only
BEIJING 00001378 004 OF 004
the Chinese central government is irritated with
foreign criticism of China's human rights
situation." Wang described himself as a "pro-reform
intellectual," saying his contributions to the book
"clearly" stated his support for "democracy."
Censors, however, deleted most passages in the
original draft regarding democracy or involving
criticism of Chairman Mao Zedong, Wang claimed.
Even so, Wang said, overall he had been surprised at
how much the censors let through. (Note: Song
Qiang, in an interview with Xinhua, also noted that
parts of Unhappy China dealing with domestic
politics were cut in order to ensure publication.)
¶12. (C) In person as in his writing, Wang seemed especially
incensed at the behavior of "so-called liberals" in China
who, he asserted, were really "reverse racists." These
iberals, Wang said, point to the Cultural Revolution as
proof that Chinese people were inherently mean and
wallowed in a self- loathing view of China's inferiority
compared to the West. Far from secretly supporting the book,
Wang asserted, China's government had a "hostile
reaction" to Unhappy China, and the CCP Propaganda
Department had ordered official media to criticize
it. The book, he added, was also "very unpopular at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." Despite the
hostility of the central government, Wang claimed,
the book was selling well, especially among military
officers, local government cadres, and young people.
COMMENT
-------
¶13. (C) The high sales of Unhappy China show that
there is a reservoir of nationalistic sentiment in
China, even though it may not be as large as Wang
Xiaodong describes. Some of this can be attributed
to China's education system, which continues to
stress the "bullying" and "humiliation" China
endured at the hands of Western powers in centuries
past. That the CCP's Propaganda Department
encouraged negative press coverage of the book
indicates the Party remains wary of nationalism
getting out of hand. Nationalists, as Wang argued,
do not necessarily support the Party. However, most
of our contacts believe that Chinese society has,
thanks to increasing contact with the outside world,
undergone change over the last decade that is
causing nationalism to give way to a more positive
sense of national pride. According to these
contacts, the Chinese who warmly welcomed U.S.
women's volleyball coach Lang Ping at the 2008
Olympics (despite the fact that she previously
played and coached for China -- see ref C) now
greatly outnumber "unhappy" nationalists.
WEINSTEIN