

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06TOKYO442, JAPAN CONDUCTS NUCLEAR TERRORISM DRILL AT PLANT ON
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06TOKYO442.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06TOKYO442 | 2006-01-27 03:26 | 2011-05-07 05:00 | SECRET | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXRO3639
RR RUEHHM RUEHPB
DE RUEHKO #0442/01 0270326
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 270326Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7872
INFO RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 4236
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 6891
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 7289
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 000442
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/J
DEPT FOR ISN/NESS BURKART AND COMELLA
DOE FOR NNSA AOKI, GLASER AND C.STONE
NRC FOR KANE AND R.WAY
DOD FOR DTRA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2015
TAGS: ENRG JA KNNP TRGY
SUBJECT: JAPAN CONDUCTS NUCLEAR TERRORISM DRILL AT PLANT ON
SEA OF JAPAN COAST
REF: A. 05 TOKYO 6816
¶B. 05 TOKYO 5222
¶C. 05 TOKYO 5052
¶D. 05 OSAKA KOBE 367
¶E. 05 TOKYO 689
TOKYO 00000442 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: EST Minister-Counselor Joyce Rabens for 1.4 b, d-h
--Summary--
¶1. (C) On November 27, the GOJ conducted a one-day
large-scale drill to respond to a potential act of nuclear
terrorism under the auspices of the Protection of Citizens
Law or PCL. The drill focused on the Mihama Nuclear Power
Plant (NPP) that is located on the Sea of Japan coast in
Fukui Prefecture. The staged attack and the subsequent
events were all part of the first ever on-site drill
conducted by the GOJ under the PCL, which sets into place
measures that all levels of government are required to take
to protect Japan's citizens when attacked by a foreign
country or responding to a large-scale terrorist attack. The
drill involved nearly 2,000 participants that included
government officials, police, Self-Defense Forces, industry
employees and local residents. Because the drill focused
primarily on evacuating local residents and strengthening the
emergency response system, all available information
indicated that there was no component to the drill resembling
a Force-on-Force (FoF) exercise. The drill itself went very
smoothly, as the actions that various officials were required
to take were listed down to the finest detail with no
surprises thrown in. Several nuclear emergency officials
commented that this made the exercise a bit unrealistic.
¶2. (S) Japan took positive steps forward to boost physical
protection at its nuclear facilities in 2005 when a national
DBT took effect on December 1. Though this drill fell under
the auspices of a different law, the drill did make clear
that the GOJ is beginning to recognize that external threats
do exist to its 54 units scattered throughout the country.
Coordination between the prefectural governments and local
police on security issues will have to be strengthened if
Japan is to better prepare itself for such attacks as that
envisioned in the drill scenario. Though authorities would
not publicly admit that any specific country was in mind when
the drill was planned, some participants from Japan's nuclear
industry admitted that North Korea fit the bill perfectly.
Fukui Governor Nishikawa is concerned that there is a real
threat from North Korean saboteurs and ship intrusions to the
prefecture's 15 units. End Summary.
--Terrorists Attack Mihama: the Stage for the Drill--
¶3. (SBU) On November 27, the GOJ conducted a one-day
large-scale drill in response to a potential act of nuclear
terrorism under the auspices of the Protection of Citizens
Law (Kokumin Hogo Hou) or the PCL. The drill focused on the
Mihama Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) that is located on the
Wakasa Bay on the Sea of Japan coast near Tsuruga City in
Fukui Prefecture. The Mihama NPP is a pressurized water
reactor (PWR) facility operated by the Kansai Electric Power
Company (KEPCO) with three generating units and two central
control rooms. Total generating capacity for the plant is
1,666MW and the plant site area totals 586,000 square meters.
The plant is located on a small land outcropping and is
surrounded by water on three sides. It is connected to
Tsuruga Peninsula via a narrow bridge that is open only for
SIPDIS
the use of plant employees and contractors. The peninsula is
also home to the nearby JAEA-run Monju Fast Breeder Reactor
and JAEA's Fugen Plant that is currently in the state of
decommissioning. Other NPPs such as the Tsuruga, Takahama
and Ohi plants are within a 30-minute to one hour drive of
Mihama.
--Catching the Terrorists was Assumed: Over-scripted Drill
Focused on Evacuations--
¶4. (SBU) The staged attack on the Mihama NPP and the
TOKYO 00000442 002.2 OF 004
subsequent events were all part of the first ever on-site
drill conducted by the GOJ under the auspices of the
Protection of Citizens Law (PCL). The PCL was established in
June 2004 and went into effect in September of the same year.
The Law sets into place measures such as the provision of
warnings and evacuations that the national, prefectural and
local governments are required to take to protect Japan's
citizens when attacked by a foreign country, when expecting
an attack by a foreign power, and when responding to a
large-scale terrorist attack. Public service organizations
such as local bus and train companies are required to
cooperate with evacuation related activities, and other
organizations such as the media and utilities are also called
on to assist the government. Under the Law, prefectural
governments are required to have plans in place by the end of
JFY2005 that include details on how to evacuate local
populations if one of the above three events were to occur.
Municipal and town governments have an additional year to put
their plans into place. Fukui Prefecture had its plans in
place by late December 2004, far in advance of the deadline,
and was likely selected to host the drill for that reason.
¶5. (U) The drill involved nearly 2,000 participants that
included local and national government officials, police,
Self-Defense Force (SDF) troops, industry employees and local
residents. Its purpose was threefold: to verify the
functionality of emergency measures and cooperation among
relevant authorities and organizations; to verify the
capabilities of these authorities and organizations through
evaluation; and to enhance overall understanding of nuclear
emergency preparedness at all levels of government and among
the Japanese population. The massive exercise focused on
strengthening six areas of response: emergency communications
and information collection; the establishment of an emergency
countermeasures task force; the evacuation of residents;
rescue operations for residents; public notification; and
traffic control procedures in the hazard areas.
¶6. (U) The exercise scenario began with an armed mortar
attack on the Mihama NPP by an unknown number of terrorists
of unknown origin at 0700. The attack damaged Mihama Unit
Number Two and led to the strong potential that large amounts
of radiation were released into the atmosphere. The unit
automatically shut down and the operator informed the
authorities of the abnormalities at the site. At 0715, plant
employees manually shutdown Unit One. (Note: Mihama's Unit
Three is currently shutdown due to an earlier pipe rupture
accident. See reftels C and D). At approximately 0745,
Fukui Prefecture, local municipalities and the national
authorities established their emergency countermeasures task
forces and the prefecture requested the mobilization of SDF
troops per the conditions spelled out in the PCL. Mihama
employees evacuated the reactor building shortly thereafter.
At 0800 a siren sounded throughout the area warning local
residents of the emergency in Mihama. (Note: Neither ESToff
nor any of his companions were able to hear the siren in
Tsuruga City -- it turns out the drill was conducted on the
SIPDIS
assumption that a siren was sounded in the area).
Authorities next ordered the nearby Tsuruga NPP to shutdown
and gave the green light to mobilize SDF troops. At 0920,
government officials held a DVC and at 1010 a joint task
force held its first meeting. Thirty minutes later, five of
the terrorists were spotted in the hills near the plant.
(Note: most of the activities relating to the terrorists were
listed in the official scenario as ""assumed""). In the
following hours, officials were flown in from Tokyo and the
prefectural capital and the joint task force held several
additional meetings with all relevant parties and conducted
press briefings. By 1145 evacuation measures and vehicles
were in place, and within 45 minutes boats, helicopters and
buses with an SDF escort evacuated 70 volunteer citizens to
designated points. Around 1250, three additional terrorists
were spotted in boats off the coast and were captured by the
Japan Coast Guard thirty minutes later. Evacuation
operations were completed by 1500 and evacuees were screened
by medical teams for radiation exposure. At approximately
1600 the drill was concluded and organizers held a press
TOKYO 00000442 003.2 OF 004
conference.
¶7. (C) Registered observers including ESToff -- the only
non-Japanese participant observing the activities -- were
shuttled back and forth by buses to observe the various parts
of the drill, though access was not granted to the plant
controlled areas themselves. ESToff was unable to confirm
firsthand whether the unarmed security force at the plant
actually went through the motions of protecting the plant
from the terrorists. Because the drill focused primarily on
evacuating local residents and strengthening the emergency
response system, all available information indicated that
there was no component to the drill resembling the
Force-on-Force (FoF) exercises conducted in the United
States. Local residents not directly participating in the
drill seemed to continue their regular daily routines and
tourists visiting the area did not appear to be alarmed by
the visible SDF presence. Roadblocks for the drill were
mostly placed off to the side of roads in what appeared to be
an effort by police to not impose the drill on
non-participants.
¶8. (U) In a follow-up article run by the Yomiuri Newspaper, a
moderate paper with national circulation, the paper
criticized the fact that the drill was somewhat disconnected
from the reality on the ground. Most notably, the Yomiuri
said that exercise did not take into account the large
numbers of beachgoers that typically bathe in the waters near
the plant and how these individuals would be evacuated if an
attack were to take place in the summer. The paper also
called for strengthened joint police-SDF training and said
that many local governments underestimate the need to beef up
their ability to cope with a foreign military or guerrilla
attack. The Yomiuri noted that as of the end of November
2005 when the drill was conducted, only Fukui and Tottori
prefectures had completed operation manuals detailing how
authorities would evacuate residents in such an emergency.
--Comment--
¶9. (C) The drill itself went very smoothly. Though the buzz
and whirl of overhead helicopters ferrying evacuees to a
flotilla of Japan Coast Guard ships just off the coast and a
small army of medical officials in masks and gowns with
Geiger counters was an exciting site to see, the drill was a
bit too scripted and perfect. The actions that the various
officials were required to take wQAuQ1Qc+Xjcy officials who were observing the
drill
commented to ESToff that this made the exercise a bit
unrealistic and that it was important to not run drills
strictly according to the scenario. Expressing a somewhat
different opinion, one participant explained that the minute
details were important given the fact that so many players
were involved in the first-time drill -- the simple fact that
the multiple agencies and industry officials were able to
communicate as smoothly as they did was an accomplishment in
and of itself, according to the official.
¶10. (C) Japan took positive steps forward to boost physical
protection at its nuclear facilities in 2005 when a national
DBT took effect on December 1. Though this drill fell under
the auspices of a different law and focused primarily on the
logistics of ensuring that surrounding communities were kept
safe after a terrorist incident at a nuclear facility, the
drill did make clear that the GOJ is beginning to recognize
that, at a minimum, external threats do exist to its 54
nuclear units scattered throughout the country. This
specific drill did not test the operator's security response
to the terrorist attack on the plant. However, there does
appear to be some movement in the direction of introducing
Force-on-Force drills as part of the regulatory structure in
Japan. In planning for bilateral consultations to follow-up
on the August 2005 interagency physical protection
discussions held in Tokyo (see reftel), a MEXT official told
ESToff that the GOJ was planning to create FoF drills for its
TOKYO 00000442 004.2 OF 004
licensees to be used in the future.
¶11. (S) Coordination between the prefectural governments and
local police on security issues will have to be strengthened
if Japan is to better prepare itself for attacks as
envisioned in the drill scenario. A senior nuclear safety
official in the Fukui government -- the prefecture with the
most reactors -- admitted in confidence that his office had
no contact with the local police on plant security issues.
He lamented that the local government could do only so much,
and argued that it was important to involve the SDF in the
protection of the facilities as well. (Note: The Fukui
Prefectural government is significantly involved in
overseeing the nuclear facilities on its territory and
imposes regulatory obligations on the operators in addition
to those set by central government regulators. In this
sense, the above comment is coming from an official in the
most prepared of Japan's prefectures.)
¶12. (S) Though authorities would not publicly admit that they
had any specific country in mind when the drill was planned,
participants from Japan's nuclear industry admitted to ESToff
that North Korea fit the bill perfectly. In an earlier visit
to nuclear facilities in the region, ESToff met with Fukui
Prefecture nuclear safety officials who confided that
Governor Issei Nishikawa was concerned that there was a real
threat from North Korean saboteurs and ship intrusions to the
prefecture's 15 plants. The officials explained that DPRK
subs had been spotted in the area in the past, and noted that
abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents had
occurred from the prefecture's beaches.
¶13. (S) The prefecture's concerns are reasonable given the
location of the plant on the Sea of Japan coast in a
relatively sparsely populated hilly area and the fact that
contract guards at Japan's nuclear facilities are unarmed.
ESToff had visited the Mihama NPP several months prior to the
drill to discuss the pipe rupture accident that occurred in
2004 and to tour the plant's facilities. During that time,
security was present, but appeared to have shortcomings.
Vehicular access is restricted to the main facility, and
pre-registered visitors are asked to park at a public
relations facility that is located on the main peninsula just
on the other side of the bridge. The PR facilities are an
approach that nuclear operators have taken across Japan to
balance the need of relating information on the safety and
economic benefits of the plant to the public, while
increasing plant security by cutting back on the number of
visitors who actually enter restricted areas. After crossing
a first checkpoint and the bridge, visitors are then
processed through a second access point that has movable
barriers and radiation monitoring equipment. At this point a
guard makes a cursory check of the visitor's picture ID.
Plant officials explained that KEPCO was planning to further
boost Mihama's security by installing bag-screening equipment
(similar to those found at airports) to check visitors' bags
at this location.
¶14. (S) Senior plant officials admitted to ESToff that the
plant occasionally has problems with fisherman coming close
to its shores given the fact that water temperatures are
slightly higher near the NPP due to the plant's discharge
water which leads to the growth of larger fish. When this
occurs, plant security usually gets on a loud horn and warns
the fishermen to leave the restricted waters. In addition,
thousands of sun seekers swim in the waters next to the
plant, so it would be fairly difficult to immediately
distinguish something out of the ordinary. These two facts
combined made the Mihama NPP a good facility to hold the
drill at. Officials also admitted to ESToff that the plant's
intruder detection system often has false alarms due to wild
boars and other animals encroaching into the area. On the
day of the visit, ESToff spotted the typical police presence
at commercial nuclear facilities -- a lightly armored police
vehicle with up to six police officers -- some of them fast
asleep. End comment.
SCHIEFFER