

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05PARIS7360, AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MICHEL ROCARD
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05PARIS7360.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05PARIS7360 | 2005-10-27 15:56 | 2011-02-10 08:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
Appears in these articles: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/documents-wikileaks/article/2011/02/09/wikileaks-les-visiteurs-de-l-ambassade_1477418_1446239.htm |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007360
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MICHEL ROCARD
REF: PARIS 7195
Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Former prime minister Michel Rocard received
Ambassador Stapleton October 24. Fresh off the early-October
publication of his new book, "If the Left Had Known," and a
recent trip to China, Rocard sees the November congress of
his Socialist Party (PS) as a historic opportunity. Offering
a historical perspective, Rocard stated that the PS, unlike
its main counterparts in Europe, has never cut itself off
completely with the ideology and politics of "rupture with
capitalism." When in power, dealing with the world as it is,
the PS has been forced to modernize. This was particularly
true during the five years (1997-2002) Lionel Jospin led the
party and government. When out of power, it is pulled back
by the romanticism of its Marxist roots. Rocard described
his historic role in the party as that of the leader of the
modernizers -- in the tradition of Jean Jaures, Leon Blum and
Pierre Mendes-France. He was hopeful that at the Le Mans
Congress in November, the Socialists would make the final
break from the past and emerge as a unified Social Democratic
Party. Rocard was reluctant to pronounce on the Socialists'
stable of presidential contenders, but was skeptical that
Jospin would emerge to rally the party to victory; too many
can not forgive him for having deserted the ship when he
abruptly announced his retirement the morning after his
defeat in the first round of the 2002 Presidential elections.
Rocard expressed the fear and loathing of Nicolas Sarkozy
that is common currency on the left. Dominique de Villepin
is a more acceptable alternative on the right -- even if he
mistakes himself for Napoleon when he is in fact Cyrano de
Bergerac. Rocard, who did not support the war in Iraq, said
that if he had been President, he would have privately
explained his views to President Bush, but then would have
remained with the U.S. Rocard, long chastised by some as "the
American in the party," pronounced anti-Americanism a
minority sentiment historically linked to the Communists and
Gaullists. He advocated a joint effort, in the form of a
European/American think-tank, to identify and address common,
emerging challenges. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) Rocard, like former president Valery Giscard d'Estaing
(reftel), believes that French history provides the keys for
understanding French politics and France's policies.
Rocard's point of departure is France's emergence as a
nation-state. The history of other European nation-states is
that of linguistic communities serving their trade needs.
France created itself by destroying five cultures -- Breton,
Occitan, Alsatian, Corsican, and Flemish. "We are the only
European nation which is the military creation of a
non-homogeneous State. This makes France difficult to govern
to this day. This explains our difficulty in reforming, our
slowness," he said.
¶3. (C) The Socialist Party -- and its historic resistance to
embrace Social Democracy -- is a case in point. Rocard
contrasted the PS with European counterpart parties, noting
that in most countries, a Social Democratic party can expect
about 35 to 42 percent of the national vote. In France,
however, the PS can only count on about 18 to 22 percent,
with the Communists taking about 7 to 8 percent, and parties
of the extreme left a roughly equal number. The need to work
with the Communists, the far left -- and the unformed wing of
the PS, makes it difficult to have "feasible, realistic"
economic policies. Rocard pointed out that in the 25 EU
member states, only the PS, among the main parties of the
European left, had split (and a majority of its electorate
opposed) over the proposed Constitutional Treaty.
¶4. (C) Rocard stressed the importance of the upcoming
November party congress. The French media insist on focusing
on it only as it pertains to the fortunes of the would-be
Presidential candidates. While the Congress will have an
impact on individual candidacies, its significance will
depend on its success in defining the program, even the
identity of the party -- amidst debate and soul-searching
stirred up by the referendum. Rocard listed three important
questions for the party to resolve: Are we Social Democrats?
Are we Europeans? Do we admit at last that the market
economy is not only a reality, but a necessity? While he
thought it possible (and in his view essential) that the
Congress will answer each question in the affirmative, this
is not a foregone conclusion. The party leadership had taken
the right approach in deciding to address the policy issues
before proceeding to the selection of a candidate. It has
created an opportunity for the Socialist Party to finally
emerge as a modern Social Democratic Party comparable to the
SPD in Germany or Labor in Britain. Such a "clarifying
result" would represent the break from the past that Rocard
has long sought. That said, a more tepid result was possible
given the strength of the traditionalists, including those
now centered around Laurent Fabius.
¶5. (C) Rocard clearly did not wish to be drawn out on the
merits or demerits of the possible Socialist candidates for
the Presidency in 2007. Replying to the Ambassador's
question on how the PS could transcend its normal
18-to-22-percent electoral take (in the first round of
Presidential elections) and furnish a winning presidential
candidate, Rocard cited the need for a charismatic candidate
and an attractive platform. This winning combination would
produce a sufficiently strong showing in the first round so
as to obviate the need to negotiate with the Communists and
far left -- thereby increasing its appeal to the moderate
center in the second round.
¶6. (C) Noting a media effort by allies of Lionel Jospin to
position the former Prime Minister as the only figure who
could rally the fissiporous left, Rocard was skeptical.
Rocard, in a fair-minded assessment of Jospin, cited his
historic contribution of opening up the party in the
post-Mitterrand period, a modernization that was cut short by
the defeat in 2002. He cited Jospin's honesty, but saw it as
a political liability: "Jospin can't bear lying. He is a
straight and honest man -- to the point of rigidity. He
refuses to make unfillable promises to the electorate."
Despite Jospin's virtues, his abrupt departure after his
defeat in the first round of the 2002 elections was viewed by
too many in the party and among its supporters as an act of
desertion in the hour of the party's -- and country's --
greatest need. This would likely disqualify him for another
run at the Presidency.
¶7. (C) Rocard was more voluble when discussing the two
Presidential rivals on the right. He compared Prime Minister
Villepin favorably to Interior Minister and Union for a
Popular Movement (UMP) President Nicolas Sarkozy. Even if
Villepin had gained notice by his 2003 speech before the UN
Security Council, not a pleasant association for the U.S. it
is Sarkozy whom we should fear. Villepin "knows the limits
of power." Sarkozy, by contrast, has traveled little, has
minimal foreign language ability, and only a meager interest
in international issues. He employs a language when
addressing illegal immigrants that Rocard characterized as
'borderline racist." In short, "Sarkozy is not safe in his
respect for human rights. He's not Le Pen, but he's a danger
to the balance of the French Republic in its practice of
human rights." By contrast, Villepin shares our common
values concerning human right. In addition, "he is someone
who would never mistake those who are allies with those who
are not" (sic).
¶8. (C) Rocard, however, also expressed his "anger" at
Villepin for the 2003 UNSC speech, which he thought had been
counter-productive, particularly with respect to
then-Secretary Powell. "We should have been supporting
Powell; instead, Villepin pushed him into a corner." Rocard
said that if he had been President of France at the time, he
would have written a four or five page letter to President
Bush at the outset, setting forth his misgivings over a
military solution. The letter would have remained
confidential. Once the U.S. decided to proceed against Iraq,
SIPDIS
however, he would have remained silent, and not led
international opposition as Chirac and Villepin had done.
Rocard joked that Villepin identifies with Napoleon, whereas
he is in fact more a Cyrano de Bergerac character. He is the
inheritor of a proud French oral tradition: "We like to
talk; if you want a silent partner, you should be dealing
with the Finns instead."
¶9. (C) Rocard emphasized to the Ambassador the importance of
not conflating the loud French anti-Americanism espoused by
the Communists and Gaullists with the pro-American sentiment
felt by most French people. "Please don't forget," he said,
"that anti-Americanism has never won a majority here." He
criticized the U.S., however, for not having listened to
"friendly" advice in the lead-up to the Iraq war. The
French, who lost two colonial wars, in Indochina and Algeria,
he said, tried to warn the U.S. that it would be unavoidable
-- "sociologically predictable" -- that the Iraqi factions
would unite against the USG. He emphasized, however, the
necessity for the U.S. to stay the course, warning that Iraq
would descend into civil war if the U.S. left before
2010-2012.
¶11. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question on the
consequences for Europe of the failure of the constitutional
treaty, Rocard said he thought it "less important than many
believe, and not too important to the U.S." There is indeed
a resultant paralysis, but not of the functioning of the EU.
Rather, it has incapacitated the creative energy and
enthusiasm for the European project. "It kills the idea of a
political Europe which you (the U.S.) were afraid of, and
does not change a thing in the integrated market." He
provided his assessment that the current Administration's
support for Europe had been hesitant, and for two reasons:
concern over the possible emergence of Europe as a military
power separate from NATO/US; and, increasing conflict over
economic and commercial issues, which was an unavoidable
result of Europe's development as strong, unitary player in
the international economy.
¶12. (C) Rocard proposed a joint European/American think-tank,
which might fill a current gap -- a place where Europeans and
Americans can together consider the challenges of tomorrow.
Speaking of the growth of India and China, along with all the
other challenges confronting both of us, he said, "We need a
vehicle where we can find solutions for these challenges
together -- so when these monsters arrive in 10 years, we
will be able to deal with them."
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Hofmann