

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09QUITO885, Engaging Civilian Leadership to Improve Mil to Mil Relations
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09QUITO885.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09QUITO885 | 2009-10-15 20:53 | 2011-04-14 20:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Quito |
Appears in these articles: http://www.eluniverso.com/2011/04/14/1/1355/cable-229888.html |
VZCZCXYZ0031
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHQT #0885/01 2882053
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 152053Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0195
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/USSOUTHAF DAVIS MONTHAN AFB AZ
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0045
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0065
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ NOV LIMA 0071
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000885
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/10/15
TAGS: PREL MASS PARM PTER KHDP EC CO
SUBJECT: Engaging Civilian Leadership to Improve Mil to Mil Relations
REF: QUITO 829; QUITO 708; QUITO 616
CLASSIFIED B...
id: 229888
date: 10/15/2009 20:53
refid: 09QUITO885
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09QUITO616|09QUITO708|09QUITO829
header:
VZCZCXYZ0031
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHQT #0885/01 2882053
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 152053Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0195
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/USSOUTHAF DAVIS MONTHAN AFB AZ
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0045
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0065
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ NOV LIMA 0071
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000885
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/10/15
TAGS: PREL MASS PARM PTER KHDP EC CO
SUBJECT: Engaging Civilian Leadership to Improve Mil to Mil Relations
REF: QUITO 829; QUITO 708; QUITO 616
CLASSIFIED BY: Heather Hodges, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(A), (D)
¶1. (C) Summary: The Embassy is receiving mixed signals regarding
the Ecuadorian military's willingness to continue historically
strong cooperation. Likely causes are: instructions by civilian
leadership to lessen dependency on the U.S.; a lack of information
and communication within the Ecuadorian military; political
posturing; and fewer financial resources. Engaging the military's
civilian leadership, even when the Ecuadorian uniformed military
attempts to keep issues within their own channels, will need to be
a central part of the Embassy's strategy to improve military
cooperation. End Summary.
Military to Military Relations Skittish
¶2. (C) The Ecuadorian military has recently displayed skittish
behavior toward engagement with the U.S. military, expressing
apparently earnest requests for cooperation in certain sectors,
while rejecting cooperation in other areas. An example of the
former would be the numerous requests the Joint Command of the
Ecuadorian Armed Forces has sent for assistance in the destruction
of munitions and arms (Ref B), and its hosting of a delegation from
Washington to perform an assessment of the GOE's munitions, weapons
and storage bunkers. The Joint Command requested that the U.S. not
only destroy the munitions, but also train its personnel and assist
in paying for upgrades to its facilities. The Ecuadorian Army's
northern border units have maintained good working relations with
the Embassy for the past two years, most recently in the
development of riverine capacity and training.
¶3. (C) In contrast, despite over ten years and approximately $4
million in support for a TPS-70 radar in Ecuador's northern border
region, Ecuadorian Air Force (FAE) Commander Brigadier General
Rodrigo Bohorquez refused to allow U.S. Air Force technicians
access to make repairs on the radar in August, 2009. Bohorquez
subsequently sent an official memorandum complaining that the USG
failed to provide operational and maintenance support for the
radar, even though a 1998 U.S.-Ecuadorian bilateral agreement
clearly stated that the GOE was responsible for the operations and
maintenance of the radar. (Note: Due to the above, and the lack
of commitment to the radar by the GOE, U.S. Southern Command has
discontinued USG support of the radar. End Note.)
¶4. (C) Throughout the transition of the Forward Operating Location
(FOL) at Manta, the Ecuadorian Air Force (FAE) was very
cooperative. However, it is likely that the Ministry of Defense
and other civilian leadership gave instructions to the FAE to keep
quiet about any positives from the ten-year relationship with the
U.S. at the FOL. Instead, civilian leaders and a parliamentary
committee sought to smear the U.S. presence and contributions. The
GOE did not attend the July 17 FOL "last flight" tribute ceremony
(Ref C), and did not invite the Embassy to attend a last minute
ceremony marking the transfer of the FOL to Ecuador on September 18
(Ref A).
¶5. (C) In the same schizophrenic vein, Navy Commander Admiral
Aland Molestina asked the Embassy's Naval Attache to initiate a
request to formalize information sharing between the Ecuadorian
Navy and USG, with the ostensible justification that this would
ensure onward cooperation if the commander were replaced in the
near future. We understand that the real reason for the request is
Molestina's fear that his informal cooperation with the U.S. on
narcotics trafficking leaves him exposed to political and legal
attack, as happened in February against police units cooperating
with the USG. (Note: The Embassy MilGrp is working with U.S.
Southern Command to review the potential impact such an initiative
may have on our bilateral cooperation, and counternarcotics
information sharing between Ecuador and the Joint Interagency Task
Force (JIATF) South. End Note.)
Increasing Civilian Leadership (and Control)
¶6. (C) The Correa government has placed an increasing number of
political appointees in the Ministry of Defense so as to establish
civilian control over the Armed Forces. Perhaps the biggest change
in leadership occurred on January 2009 with the appointment of Vice
Minister of Defense Miguel Carvajal to the position of Coordinating
Minister of External and External Security. Several uniformed
military have noted to us that initiatives were harder to get
approved after Carvajal's appointment, not just because of an
additional layer of approval, but mostly because of Carvajal's
leftist ideological leanings. Initial concerns and uncertainty
among senior military officers regarding promotions and assignments
have calmed, especially after the August 10 presidential
inauguration. However, senior officers are still adjusting to the
increasing level of control exerted by the civilian leadership.
Why the Mixed Message?
¶7. (C) The conflicting messages regarding the Ecuadorian
military's willingness to pursue cooperation with the U.S. are
likely the result of several factors:
-- Directives from civilian leadership to lessen dependency on the
U.S. Defense Minister Ponce said during his April 2008
inauguration that the MOD would review all cooperation with the USG
to determine what cooperation could be directed elsewhere, and has
repeated this mantra since.
-- Lack of information. The Ecuadorian military and civilian
leadership often do not share information, and have limited trust
in each other. The military and its leadership are often also
unaware of the overall bilateral relationship the U.S. shares with
Ecuador, even in terms of security cooperation.
-- Political posturing/survival. Now that it is clear that Correa
has staying power, military leaders know their options are either
to visibly cooperate with their civilian leaders, or lose their
careers.
-- Financial crunch. The GOE has turned to China, Russia and other
countries prepared to offer financing or barter payment to fund the
purchase of weapons and/or equipment.
Forward Strategy
¶8. (C) While mixed signals make cooperation more challenging, the
Embassy has developed a strategy to remain engaged with the
Ecuadorian military. Using the experience of our renewed
cooperation with the Ecuadorian National Police, we will allow
pressure to build from within the Ecuadorian military on the GOE
political leadership for the broad, quality-based assistance only
the USG provides. This strategy will be implemented as follows:
-- Embassy will require that requests for assistance by Ecuadorian
military counterparts will need to be in writing, and when
appropriate, channeled through the Ministry of Defense.
-- Cooperation will be reviewed to determine the degree of U.S.
benefit in the proposal, and whether the Ecuadorian military is
using assistance effectively and as originally agreed. Absent high
marks under these criteria, that cooperation may be discontinued or
the GOE's request for assistance denied. For example, as described
above, assistance for the TPS-70 radar was cut. Due to a lack of
access to the Ecuadorian military's northern border units, the
Military Group relocated its counter drug Joint Planning Assistance
Team officer from Coca to Ibarra.
-- Areas of cooperation that are very much in the USG interest that
we will want to continue include the following: renewing the
exchange of diplomatic notes to provide protections for TDY
military personnel in Ecuador; a Section 1033 Memorandum of
Understanding to allow assistance to the military's
counternarcotics efforts along Ecuador's northern border; and
cooperation in the destruction of missiles and munitions as well as
humanitarian demining.
¶9. (C) At the same time, the Embassy will take the following steps
to improve military to military relations, and protect longer term
access:
-- The Embassy Country Team will increase engagement with the
military's civilian leadership to attempt to increase the comfort
level of civilians in working with the USG. The Embassy will begin
by providing information via meetings and briefings on our
bilateral cooperation, in security, development and other areas.
-- The Embassy intends to use visits, both Ecuadorian civilian and
military leaders to the U.S., as well as U.S. civilian and military
leaders to Ecuador, to discuss security cooperation.
-- The Embassy will pursue civilian-military seminars, as well as
short-term training opportunities in areas of interest to the
Ecuadorian military, such as weapons and munitions handling,
humanitarian demining, etc.
-- The Embassy will also propose funding under Section 1207 to
assist the Ecuadorian security forces to secure Ecuador's northern
border region and to promote civilian leadership of the military
and police, and to improve GOE interagency coordination.
¶10. (C) Note: These strategies and initiatives to regain full
cooperation with the Ecuadorian military may prove more difficult
than with the Ecuadorian National Police, since DefMin Ponce seems
more inclined to follow Security Minister Miguel Carvajal's lead,
and is less likely to stand up for the military's interests. End
Note.
Comment
¶11. (C) Maintaining positive military-to-military relations is
important to achieving USG objectives in Ecuador. Our historically
good relations have provided excellent counternarcotics and
counterterrorism information, and operational access. Moreover,
some leaders within the Ecuadorian military are sincerely focused
on improving the military's ability to combat narco-trafficking and
to repel the encroachment of illegal armed groups such as the FARC
into Ecuador. Working with the civilian leadership of the
military, even when the Ecuadorian uniformed military attempts to
keep issues within their own channels, will need to be an integral
part of the USG's engagement strategy in Ecuador.
HODGES
=======================CABLE ENDS============================