

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07BOGOTA32, STRUGGLE OVER LAND CONTINUES TO FUEL COLOMBIAN
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07BOGOTA32.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07BOGOTA32 | 2007-01-04 18:47 | 2011-04-03 12:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bogota |
Appears in these articles: http://www.elespectador.com/wikileaks |
VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBO #0032/01 0041847
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 041847Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1687
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7334
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 8552
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN LIMA 4620
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 9860
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5277
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000032
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL ECON CO
SUBJECT: STRUGGLE OVER LAND CONTINUES TO FUEL COLOMBIAN
CONFLICT
REF: BOGOTA 8793
Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer.
Reason: 1.4 (b,d)
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (U) Rural land development is a source of conflict in
Colombia; repeated land reform efforts have been
unsuccessful. A proposed new law aimed at facilitating rural
development and promoting land distribution has led to
complaints by human rights groups that it could legalize
illegal land seizures by paramilitary and other illegal armed
groups. Some studies estimate that paramilitary and
narcotics traffickers may control at least 10 per cent of
Colombia's land. End Summary
--------------------------
Centuries of Land Conflict
--------------------------
¶2. (U) Armed conflict and land disputes are historically
intertwined in Colombia. Jesuit academic Father Fernan
Gonzalez explains that Colombia did not follow the common
latifundia pattern in which enormous colonial land grants
were later distributed to peasants through agrarian reforms.
Rather, Colombia's peasants colonized frontier areas and
developed unclaimed land. As their land acquired value,
rural elites would use political power and violence to seize
it. This forced campesinos to move to more remote areas
where the cycle would continue. Gonzalez said two factors
explain why this pattern has continued for decades: large
areas without strong state presence and the absence of
serious agrarian reform that provided campesinos with clear
land title. Despite the increasingly urbanized nature of
Colombia society, Gonzalez said the land issue remains key
since almost 15 million Colombians continue to live in rural
areas.
---------------
Failed Policies
---------------
¶3. (U) Colombia's land reform efforts over the past forty
years have had little success. The Instituto Nacional
Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria (INCORA) isthemost
ambitious program to date. INCORA's goal is to promote
reform, largely through subsidizing the sale of land by
wealthy landowners to cooperatives. The cooperatives are
supposed to develop the land and increase productivity. The
World Bank and USAID criticize the program because: (1)
projects are generally chosen without legally required
technical and economic analyses, (2) the program has not
implemented an efficient process for developing resettlement
projects, (3) the program distorts land values because owners
factor the subsidy into their asking price, and (4) if
cooperatives cannot productively use land, legal restrictions
placed on program beneficiaries make it very difficult for
them to resell it.
------------------------------------
A New Proposal with Problems
------------------------------------
¶4. (C) The GOC is considering a new, comprehensive, rural
development law. Luis Orozco, deputy director for social
issues of Colombia's land titling agency, the Instituto
Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural ("INCODER"), told us the bill
would harmonize a large number of existing laws, accelerate
distribution of land to disadvantaged groups, and encourage
productive land use. He said it would also help integrate
Colombia's rural economy into the global economy. The
proposal passed two Senate readings in 2006. Two House
readings, which are not expected until mid-2007, are required
before it would become law.
¶5. (C) The bill would also increase INCODER's power at
INCORA's expense by giving it a monopoly on developing,
approving, and implementing resettlement projects. INCODER
contends these enhanced powers would enable it to more
effectively promote rural development. Critics argue this is
politically problematic, because INCODER is widely accused of
corruption. Its officials are reportedly involved in
land-for-votes schemes, and the media recently linked Luis
Ortiz, INCODER's former director, to paramilitaries. Human
rights groups and many rural residents claim the organization
works with paramilitaries to facilitate land seizures, but we
cannot substantiate or disprove these charges. Ministry of
Agriculture counselor Lorena Garnica, who helped draft the
bill, told us it would reduce the possibility of corruption
by making INCODER more transparent and clarifying its
responsibilities.
¶6. (C) The bill's most controversial provision, which would
have made it easier to acquire legal ownership through
"adverse possession," was deleted in the Senate after heated
debate. Orozco, Garnica, and bill sponsor Senator Manuel
Guillermo Mora told us the provision's purpose was to help
disadvantaged groups obtain title to land they already
occupy. In contrast, the left wing Polo Democratico party
and human rights groups such as the Colombian Commission of
Jurists claimed the provision would help paramilitaries
legalize land seizures and forced "purchases" from indigenous
and Afro-Colombian groups. Garnica said opposition to the
provision was politically motivated. She explained that
existing law already permits adverse possession in the same
circumstances, and that land reserves for indigenous and
Afro-Colombian groups are constitutionally protected from
adverse possession. Moreover, indigenous and Afro-Colombian
lands cannot legally be sold. Still, the Polo party was
successful in having the provision dropped during the second
Senate reading.
¶7. (C) Other provisions of the bill were also removed. For
example, it was supposed to facilitate INCODER's capacity to
fast-track reallocation of confiscated narco-properties to
campesinos. While the government can already do this, the
authority is not extensively used because the current law is
complex, time consuming, and makes government officials
personally liable if courts later overturn confiscations.
The bill would have made confiscation and reallocation more
efficient. This provision was stricken by the Senate,
apparently at the request of INCODER, to minimize potential
liability for itself and employees.
----------------------------------
Illegal Armed Groups and Narcotics
----------------------------------
¶8. (U) The World Bank reported that Colombia's land
inequality sharply increased in the past 20 years. This is
mainly due to large narco-purchases and forced "sales" to
illegal armed groups. A 2005 analysis by the UNDP reports
that there are 4 to 5 million hectares of "narco-landholding"
spread throughout Colombia that could be subject to
confiscation. This constitutes between 4 and 5 per cent of
Colombia's total land area. There has been widespread
criticism that the government has confiscated only a minute
fraction of the land it could: over the past fifteen years,
less than 150,000 hectares have been seized by the government
and virtually none sold.
¶9. (C) Paramilitary "purchases" are significant, especially
in the rural, north coast region. Paramilitary leader Jorge
40's recently confiscated computer reportedly contains
information on "purchases" of between 2.5 and 6 million
hectares in the region (reftel). Other paramilitary leaders
have acquired land on the Pacific Coast. There are claims
that paramilitaries are displacing Afro-Colombian communities
to develop lucrative palm oil plantations. The USG checks
all recipients of assistance carefully to ensure that no USG
funding directly or indirectly assists those who
illegitimately acquired land. Assistance has been refused to
some palm oil farmers on these grounds.
¶10. (U) In addition to "purchased" land, paramilitaries,
drug lords, and the FARC all repeat the centuries old pattern
of seizing land from campesinos or taking control of it and
forcingcampesinos to work for them. Between two and three
million peasants are estimated to have been violently
displaced by illicit armed groups seeking to control
territory and/or narco-cultivation in the past decade. This
"counter agrarian reform," as political scientist Francisco
Leal Buitrago describes it, has largely taken place in rural
areas where state presence is weak and land title ambiguous.
FARC seizures have generally been concentrated in the south
and east of the country.
-------
Comment
-------
¶11. (U) Any redistribution of land held by drug lords or
narco-terrorists is complicated by poorly defined land title
and fear of retribution. Colombia's rural areas lack good
cadastral surveys. Tradition establishes boundaries, and
rural residents "know" which family owns what land. Without
adequate plats defining land boundaries, title is ambiguous
and the perception of land inequality is reinforced.
Returning illicitly acquired land to original owners is
difficult, since they never had clear legal title.
Additionally, campesinos fear that if they accept land from
the government, then the previous "owners" will seek revenge
and try to retake the land. Lastly, failure to clearly
demarcate land held by indigenous and Afro-Colombian
communities undermines their ability to enforce the legal
protections afforded them by the Constitution. End Comment
WOOD
=======================CABLE ENDS============================