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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09RANGOON205, BURMA'S GENERALS: STARTING THE CONVERSATION
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09RANGOON205 | 2009-04-02 07:33 | 2010-12-12 21:30 | SECRET | Embassy Rangoon |
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHGO #0205/01 0920733
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 020733Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8841
S E C R E T RANGOON 000205
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/DAS MARCIEL AND EAP/MLS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM
SUBJECT: BURMA'S GENERALS: STARTING THE CONVERSATION
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Larry Dinger for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
Summary
--------
¶1. (S) As the review of U.S. policy regarding Burma
continues amid signs that the military regime wants to engage
with Washington, we offer some thoughts about the senior
generals, what motivates them, what they might want from
engagement, and what the U.S. might place on the table.
Burma's military machine is top-down, xenophobic and utterly
focused on preserving national unity. At the same time,
senior generals are embarrassed by their international pariah
status and crave respect. Some are concerned with Burma's
ever-growing dependence on China and its geostrategic
location amidst historical foes. Others, having seen a
glimpse of the international community's benevolence
following Nargis, no doubt wish for a lifting of sanctions
and economic assistance. No matter the motivations, a
dialogue with Burma's senior military leaders will be slow,
frustrating, and, within the U.S., politically charged.
While dialogue is unlikely to yield major, near-term
political outcomes such as changes to the constitution, it
might sow seeds for future change by illustrating to the next
line of leaders what an improved relationship with the U.S.
could look like. Above all, a dialogue could lead to
tangible benefits for Burma's long-suffering people, a
worthwhile goal in itself. End summary.
How do they think?
------------------
¶2. (S) All major decisions in Burma are made at the very
top. Senior general Than Shwe, Vice Senior General Maung
Aye, and their inner circles call the shots. Than Shwe's
dominant personality is keenly felt. Subordinates appear to
share only good news, leaving the senior generals potentially
ignorant of many realities. In this information vacuum, the
generals continue to pursue their "roadmap to democracy" and
ruinous, top-down economic policies. While self interest
clearly is a factor in their thinking, it would be a mistake
to think they are motivated exclusively by self-enrichment.
These are true believers who are convinced they are divinely
entrusted in the tradition of the Burmese "warrior kings"
with doing what is best for the country and the people. They
feel they are simply misunderstood by the outside world.
¶3. (S) These are career military men, most with combat
experience in Burma's past internal conflicts, who value the
unity and stability of the state as a top priority. The
senior generals assert, and seem genuinely to believe, that
the military is the only guarantor of that unity and
stability. Thus, they see a dominant role for the armed
forces in governance to be essential. The senior generals
inculcate this military ethos, indoctrinating new cadets to
be "the triumphant elite of the future."
¶4. (S) Since only very senior career military men make real
decisions, such men would need to participate in any serious
engagement effort with the civilian-led U.S. The Burmese
military would be far more comfortable at the table in a
mil/mil environment, their comfort zone.
¶5. (S) The generals see themselves as devout Buddhists.
State media have recently inundated the public with scenes of
senior generals and their families consecrating the
newly-constructed Uppatasanti Pagoda in Nay Pyi Taw, a
replica of Rangoon's legendary Shwedagon Pagoda. Of course,
such acts of Buddhist merit-making have a public relations
aspect, but they also do reflect a philosophical base.
¶6. (S) Families matter. The senior generals spoil their
children and grandchildren. They seek to protect their
families--some were sent to Dubai in September 2007 to ride
out the Saffron Revolution protests and crackdown. The
generals also seek to ensure a firm financial footing for
their families' futures through lucrative positions at home
and bank accounts offshore. The application of our visa bans
against the generals' immediate family members irritates.
¶7. (S) Western rationality is not always apparent in regime
decision-making. Than Shwe reportedly relies on favored
soothsayers. We hear one such seer advised moving the
capital to the interior because Rangoon would be subject to
street disturbances and a horrific storm. Numerology also
factors in. Witness the overnight shift to a currency
divisible by nines in 1987 and the release of 9,002 prisoners
last September, reportedly to ensure an auspicious 2009.
Such decision methods may sound strange to us, but they are
everyday elements in the lives of many Burmese.
¶8. (S) The senior generals are xenophobic. They don't seem
to understand foreigners and certainly don't trust them,
particularly those who challenge their legitimacy. This may
be a reason why Than Shwe reportedly abhors Aung San Suu Kyi,
who grew up overseas, married a UK citizen and then returned
to Burma to challenge the military's authority.
Historically, the Burmese have fought wars with all their
neighbors, including China, India, and Thailand. While the
current regime relies heavily on China for investment, trade
and support in international institutions and accepts a
degree of Chinese advice as a consequence, it is very
unlikely that the senior generals would defer to Chinese (or
any outsider's) demands on core issues, particularly on the
military's central role in governance.
¶9. (S) The generals are paranoid about the U.S., fear
invasion, and have a bunker mentality. Past U.S. rhetoric
about regime change sharpened concerns. One rumored
explanation for Than Shwe's decision to move the capital to
Nay Pyi Taw, far from the coast, was supposedly to protect
from a sea-borne invasion force. The regime was truly
convinced the U.S. was prepared to invade when a helicopter
carrier sailed near Burmese territorial waters for
humanitarian purposes after Cyclone Nargis last May.
¶10. (S) Than Shwe and his colleagues view the current
period as one chapter in Burma's long history. They profess
that democracy requires a guided process of "gradual
maturity." They believe the U.S. and the West in general are
trying to force democracy on a country that is not yet
developed enough to handle it. This is more than a cynical
excuse to retain power. They think they know best.
¶11. (S) At the same time, the generals are proud and crave
the acceptance of the international community. They hate
being subject to sanctions and aspire to be treated with the
respect accorded other world leaders, including some
authoritarian ones. Interactions with key foreign visitors
and Burmese attendance at international fora always make
headlines in the government newspaper.
Why might the regime want to talk now?
--------------------------------------
¶12. (S) Indications are that the senior generals are hoping
for a fresh USG approach and are willing to explore
engagement. Even before the U.S. elections, the generals
were testing the waters. Last August, they suggested a
senior U.S. military official should visit Burma. More
recently, they have made clear they want conversations in
Washington and have asked to upgrade from Charge d'Affaires
to Ambassador for that purpose. They recently suggested
narcotics and POW/MIA issues might be useful topics for
initial discussion. They provided unusually high access
when EAP/MLS Director Blake visited Burma last week. What
motivates the desire to talk?
¶13. (S) When the U.S. response to Cyclone Nargis last May
was a major humanitarian effort rather than a much-feared
invasion, the generals were reportedly surprised and
gratified. More broadly, some senior leaders have drawn a
lesson from the Nargis response that international
humanitarian assistance can be valuable. Some in the military
are nervous about an overdependence on China; all recall the
difficult history with that looming neighbor. President
Obama's engagement theme intrigues. The generals want the
international respect that a more normal relationship with
the U.S. would bring. They feel a degree of pain, or at
least irritation, from sanctions, and want relief. It may be
that some neighbors, ASEAN leaders, maybe even the Chinese,
are urging the generals to try dialogue.
¶14. (S) Also, it is entirely possible that the most senior
generals are looking for an escape strategy. Retirement has
never been an option for Burmese leaders. Historically,
Burmese kings or generals and those close to them either have
died in office, been killed, or been deposed and imprisoned.
The current senior generals are getting old, but they have no
desire to be held to account for what the outside world
perceives as their crimes against the people. Than Shwe
reportedly has mentioned to some interlocutors, including
Indonesian President Yudoyono, his strong desire not to
appear before an international tribunal. All the top
generals undoubtedly want assurances that, if they
voluntarily step aside, they and their families will retain
their assets and will not be prosecuted.
What might the regime propose?
------------------------------
¶15. (S) Senior generals likely perceive that they have
already made concessions. They allow foreign embassies and
cultural units like the American Center to operate. They
have received high-level UN visits, including four thus far
in 2009. They have committed to a "roadmap to democracy,"
drafted a constitution, held a referendum, and announced
elections. They have released some political prisoners,
including several high-profile ones like Win Tin, though not
yet Aung San Suu Kyi.
¶16. (S) We should not expect significant progress on
political core issues in the near term. The regime is very
unlikely to reverse course on its "democracy" roadmap, to
rehash the 1990 elections or to revisit the new constitution.
The senior generals will not leave the scene willingly
unless they are confident of their own safety and of
financial security for themselves and their families.
¶17. (S) Some possible offers:
--The regime might accept some tweaks to the election
process; a degree of international observation is reportedly
already on offer.
--They might relax some terms of ASSK's current detention.
--They could possibly be persuaded to release some political
prisoners in advance of the elections. At a minimum, they
might consider resumption of ICRC access to political
prisoners.
--The regime would likely seek cooperation on perceived
win/win issues like counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism,
anti-trafficking, economic-policy advice, and disaster-risk
reduction. They likely would relish mil/mil and law
enforcement training opportunities.
--There also may be willingness to make concessions on
lower-profile issues that affect the operation of our
Embassy, such as visas, increased in-country travel
permission, and an expansion of our presence to include a
re-opening of the former U.S. consulate in Mandalay and/or a
USAID mission to oversee humanitarian assistance.
--Symbolic gestures carry much weight with the Burmese. The
regime has already signaled it wants to upgrade its COM in
Washington from Charge to Ambassador. It aspires for the
U.S. to use the country name "Myanmar," not "Burma."
If the U.S. engages, what might we raise and offer?
---------------------------------------------
¶18. (S) Any engagement effort would likely take time, not
just one meeting or two, but a series of encounters that,
ideally, would gradually build confidence and a willingness
on the Burmese side to open up. That is the "Asian way." In
the early stages, it would be useful to dispel any regime
concern that the U.S. intends to invade or dominate. We
should hint that Burma stands to gain from decent
relationships with the outside world and that there are
alternatives to reliance on China. When leaders change their
ways they can have a fruitful relationship with the United
States based on shared mutual interests.
-- Still, it would be important up front to reiterate key,
long-term themes: the need to release political prisoners,
including ASSK, and initiate genuine dialogue.
-- Early on, we should accent shared mutual interests, such
as the win/win topics mentioned above: counter-narcotics;
trafficking in persons; disaster risk reduction; and remains
recovery from WWII, with a note that U.S.-facilitated
training in such areas could be possible.
-- The effects of the worldwide economic recession offer
opportunities. Burma's economy is suffering. Positive
political steps from the regime side could lead to an easing
of broad-based economic sanctions, spurring growth and
diversification in Burma's economy. We could dangle World
Bank and IMF technical assistance and, with progress, loan
packages. We could consider revisiting current restrictions
on the ability of UNDP to work with low-level GOB entities.
With sufficient progress, the sanctions specifically targeted
at the regime and its cronies could be on offer, too.
-- We should make clear our desire to provide increased
humanitarian assistance (outside of regime channels) to help
meet crying needs. Unstated but true: such aid would subvert
the regime both by building civil-society capacity and
illustrating to the grassroots in Burma that the outside
world helps and the regime doesn't. We should seek regime
cooperation on the Rohingya issue, offering USG assistance to
build livelihood opportunities in Northern Rakine State.
-- We could formally open a PD outreach center in Mandalay,
utilizing the U.S. consulate that closed in 1980.
Countrywide, we could offer increased educational exchanges.
Those who studied in the U.S. even many years ago retain fond
memories and view the U.S. in a positive light. Access to
quality education is priority one for Burma's citizens.
-- We could consider accepting the country name "Myanmar."
"Burma" is a vestige of colonial times that actually elevates
the Bamar majority over other ethnic groups. Practically
everyone inside uses the term Myanmar, as do all countries in
Southeast Asia, though the NLD has thus far refused to bend
on that topic.
-- We could accede to the regime request to upgrade their
COM in Washington from CDA to Ambassador.
Comment
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¶19. (S) Some propose that getting started at a better
relationship is more important than insisting on
difficult-to-achieve democracy and human-rights outcomes in
the near term. In that view, U.S. regional and global
interests should drive Burma policy. Others remain adamant
that to demand less than the right democratic and
human-rights outcomes would be to sacrifice the efforts of
Nobel-laureate Aung San Suu Kyi and others in a wishful
expediency. Any walk down the road of dialogue will require
great patience and thoughtful judgments about how much to
offer and how much to demand. The regime's inclination
toward engagement is surely driven by its own perceived
interests (reducing sanctions, achieving respect, modulating
China's influence). However, the senior generals likely see
rapid movement to the West's democracy and human-rights goals
as downright dangerous. Still, one never knows how flexible
the other side will be until negotiations begin. Also, the
looming 2010 elections may be an opportunity. The process
will be flawed, but an aspect may be stage one of a
transition toward a next set of (mostly military) leaders.
U.S.-Burmese dialogue now could signal to that next
generation what a positive relationship with the U.S. might
offer, planting seeds for future change.
¶20. (S) Given the likelihood that major successes on the
democracy front will be slow in coming, we believe it
important for the U.S. to undertake a long-term effort to
build the groundwork for future democracy. Per our MSP, we
want to follow up on post-cyclone aid with a broader
humanitarian-assistance endeavor. If properly designed, such
assistance builds the basic capacity of people at the
grassroots to survive and to think beyond mere subsistence to
political goals. Such aid is subversive more directly as
well: recipients understand who helps them (international
donors) and who doesn't (the regime). In this context,
"humanitarian" aid can encompass health, non-state education,
micro-finance, and other local initiatives, all with
civil-society capacity-building components. The U.S. should
also focus on elements within the regime that show genuine
interest in our regional priorities. The units involved in
counter-narcotics, anti-trafficking, and infectious-disease
efforts would be good places to start. They have shown
willingness to act appropriately, but they need training.
Aside from contributing to our regional goals, assisting such
elements might encourage some broader re-thinking of regime
attitudes toward the Western world.
DINGER