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Viewing cable 09STATE22067, GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN DEMARCHES ASSISTANT SECRETARY
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09STATE22067 | 2009-03-09 23:30 | 2011-04-28 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Secretary of State |
R 092330Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY ASMARA
AMEMBASSY BANGUI
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMCONSUL AMSTERDAM
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
UNCLAS STATE 022067
COCOM
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AF APER CA IO PGOV PHUM PREL UNC
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN DEMARCHES ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ON ICC ACTIONS
¶1. This is not an action request.
-------------------
SUMMARY
-------------------
¶2. A Government of Sudan (GOS) demarche to the United States
Government(USG) on GOS reactions to the International Criminal
Court's (ICC) decision to arrest the President of Sudan, Omer
Al Bashir, on charges that he directed a campaign of mass
murder, rape and pillage against civilians in Darfur, was
delivered to Acting Assistant Secretary (A/S) for African Affairs
on Thursday, March 5 at 1530 hours. The demarche stated that the
GOS rejects ICC decision and strongly condemns it on the grounds
that the Republic of Sudan is not a member of the ICC, does not
come under ICC jurisdiction and is not subject to ICC rulings.
The demarche argued that the ICC decision is political and
could lead to several negative consequences for peace in Darfur
and in Sudan as a whole. The GOS stated even though existing
arrangements might be affected, it intends to abide by its
obligations under the Geneva convention. The GOS appealed to
peace loving nations to assist in suspending the arrest warrants,
and requested a clear statement of the USG position with regard
to the ICC actions.
On behalf of the USG, Acting A/S for the African Affairs
Bureau of the State Department, Phil Carter, stated that the US
is not a member of the ICC, but sees no need for a deferral of the
ICC actions at this time. Carter noted that while the crimes of
Darfur must be addressed, the USG hopes to look beyond the ICC
actions to focus on areas of common concern such as the CPA and the
Darfur peace process. In this context, Carter demanded that
the decision to expel 13 NGOs from Darfur be reversed or frozen,
and informed the emissaries that a political inertia is
developing, which will constrain the space for bilateral
negotiations, if the GOS does not immediately reconsider its
expulsion actions. The A/S remarked that the GOS actions
negatively impact a current review of US/Sudan relations.
Carter rejected a GOS request for a Washington visit by
Foreign Minister (FM) Deng Alor and Presidential Advisor
(PA) Mustafa Ismael, on the grounds that meaningful dialogue
will only be possible if the expulsions are withdrawn. The
Sudanese agreed to relay the A/S's points to Khartoum and
provide an immediate response.
SUDANESE DEMARCHE POINTS
¶3. The GOS rejects the ICC decision and strongly condemns it.
Sudan is not a member of the ICC, does not come under its
jurisdiction and is not subject to its rulings. The GOS
rejects the ICC decision on the grounds that the decision is
political.
The decision is political for the following reasons:
a. UNSC, which created the ICC, is a political body;
b. The decision to refer the matter to the ICC was done by the
UNSC, which is a political organ; c. The Prosecutor, having
requested an indictment from the ICC, traveled the world to
convince others to support his request; and d. The ICC is
focusing on Africa; there are no other continents where
similar actions with regard to Human Rights are being taken.
¶4. The ICC actions gives rise and will give rise to several
consequences:
a. It will prolong the conflict and not bring about peace;
the ICC should be focused on peace;
b. It attempts to deal with accountability but peace
should be the priority and accountability next - especially
in view of the Sudanese experiences with the CPA;
c. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) announced
yesterday that it has declined to continue the peace
process in Doha/Qatar - the ICC actions sent the wrong
message. Note: On February 17, the Government of National
Unity (GNU - which is led by the GOS) and the Darfur rebel group
JEM signed an "Agreement of Goodwill and Confidence Building
for the Settlement of the Problem of Darfur" in Doha, Qatar.
The agreement is seen as an important step in the renewed
Darfur peace process. End Note.
¶5. The implementation of existing agreements may be affected
by the ICC actions, but the GOS is committed to implementing its
current agreements and protecting all diplomatic and
International staff in the country as per the obligations
under the Geneva convention. The GOS will continue to search for
peace in Sudan ;the GOS believes that this is in the best
interest of the people of Darfur and Sudan. The GOS invites all
peace-loving countries that have already expressed a desire to
bring about peace and suspend the indictment of President
Bashir to continue to seek the withdrawal of the Darfur case
from the ICC;
¶6. The GOS desires to know the US official position with
regard to the ICC decision and a clarification of the various
statements bade on behalf of the USG. The GOS requests that
FM Deng Alor and Presidential Advisor Mustapha Ishmael visit
the US as soon as possible to discuss the ICC related events and
the way forward.
--------------------------
USG RESPONSE
--------------------------
¶7. Acting A/S Carter responded that:
a. The ICC arrest warrant has been on the forefront of
USG/GOS bilateral relations for some time, and the USG has
consistently stated that both governments need to look beyond
the ICC actions to focus on the areas of common concern such as
the CPA and the Darfur peace process;
b. The issues of crimes/impunities in Darfur need to be
addressed, but we must look beyond this to continue to engage.
For those involved in these crimes justice must be done.
The USG hopes that the GOS responds positively to the ICC
concerns;
c. The US is not a member of the ICC. The USG sees no
need for a deferral at this time.
d. The Doha peace process must be made more inclusive;
the USG seeks to engage the GOS on Darfur regardless of ICC
issues. In this context, this has been a very bad day for our
relationship and efforts to maintain flexibility on the areas
of concern between the USG and the GOS;
e. The USG has contacted the Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM) and expressed its concern about JEM comments on
March 4; JEM states that they cannot return to the negotiating
table unless genuine progress is made in the release of
prisoners, which was agreed to in Doha. The USG told JEM
in no uncertain terms to eschew violence, sit at the
negotiating table and not sit behind a Kalashnikov; JEM agreed
to return to Doha after the release of prisoners.
f. The USG is trying to get maximum leverage to make the
peace process work, but the actions of the GOS in expelling
13 NGOs from Darfur is perplexing, contradictory to its own
interests and seriously constrains the space for us to work
in going forward on Darfur. These NGOs, such as CARE,
OXFAM, IRC, with sterling reputations in the field of
humanitarian assistance and the alleviation of suffering were
delivering critically needed services to the people of Darfur,
and the consequences of this action, if not immediately
reversed, will be difficult for both the USG and the GOS;
g. The expulsion of the NGOs is being seen around the world
as a punitive act, in retaliation for the ICC actions.
This response by the GOS is frustrating, as it will limit the
Darfur resolution, negatively impact the Doha peace process
and bring acute suffering to the people of Darfur. Beyond
Dafur this action will negatively impact the ability of the NGOs
to operate elsewhere in the Sudan, and the delivery
of services will be irrevocably diminished. The humanitarian
organizations must remain in place in Darfur. This action
neither helps the GOS and the USG to find common ground
to solve the suffering in Darfur nor does it stabilize the
situation between Sudan and Chad. It is a perplexing, disturbing
action which is difficult to understand. The USG urges the
GOS to reconsider this action immediately, as there is a
political inertia developing for a harsh response, and the
consequences will be irrevocable if the expulsion orders
are not withdrawn;
h. The GOS responses to the ICC actions are not the
restrained responses the USG thought it had negotiated
with the GOS. It is important to note that the USG is in
the process of a policy review with regard to the Sudan,
and these actions negatively impact that review.
GOS ACCUSES NGOs OF FAILED MANDATES
¶8. Ambassador Khoc informed the A/S that all
Sudanese are concerned about the
displaced persons who are helped by the NGOs, but the
GOS is constrained to act this way because the NGOs
have admitted to passing information to the ICC and were
clearly not sticking to their mandate, thus abrogating
the arrangements under which they were allowed to operate.
Ambassador Salah, DCM, elaborated that there are
19 American NGOs in the Sudan and only four were being
expelled, because their mandates should not include
communications with the ICC as this
is political work.
¶9. Acting A/S Carter explained that there is no
evidence that the NGOs admitted to anything, but an
argument that they were not fulfilling their mandate is
unacceptable, as the organizations were not hiding
anything, were not involved in any new political activity,
and any reporting on humanitarian conditions cannot
be considered as politics. He reminded the Ambassador
that to argue now -- 5-6 years later -- that the NGOs
were talking to the ICC and expel them on these
grounds is specious, punitive and unacceptable.
FINAL REMARKS AND ARRANGEMENTS
¶10. Acting A/S Carter made the following concluding
remarks:
a. If the expulsions are implemented it will have
definite implications for the character and content
of our bilateral relations with the GOS and the processes
related to Darfur;
b. The Sudanese request for a visit by Foreign Minister
Deng Alor and Special Advisor to the President of
Sudan Mustapha Ishmael is only meaningful and possible
if the expulsions are withdrawn or frozen in place
until direct dialogue can be achieved.
c. We cannot press JEM to move forward on the next
round of Doha talks until the prisoner exchange is
conducted as agreed. Once this exchange occurs the
USG can help bring JEM back to the negotiating table
in Doha.
¶10. The Sudanese agreed to relay these points back
to Khartoum and to provide an immediate response.
¶11. Acting A/S Carter will call Presidential Adviser
Nafie on March 6 for further discussions.
CLINTON