

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08STATE43817, syria's clandestine nuclear program
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08STATE43817.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08STATE43817 | 2008-04-25 01:01 | 2011-04-10 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Secretary of State |
Appears in these articles: Yedioth Ahronoth goes out only in |
O 250101Z APR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE
Sipdis
Sensitive
E.o. 12958: n/a
Tags: knnp, dprk, sy, iaea, parm, prel
Subject: syria's clandestine nuclear program
¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 3.
-------
summary
-------
¶2. (SBU) On September 6, 2007, <> destroyed a
nuclear reactor Syria was clandestinely constructing,
we judge with North Korean assistance. The reactor
site was in Syria's eastern desert region in a
location called al-Kibar. On April 24, Executive
Branch officials briefed Congress and the press on
evidence that lead the USG to conclude that the Syrian
facility at al-Kibar was a nuclear reactor being
constructed clandestinely, and therefore in violation
of Syria's NPT-required safeguards agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The
briefing described the basis for concluding North
Korean assistance and why the reactor would have been
ill-suited for any purpose other than plutonium
production for a nuclear weapons program. The
briefings also included information on the U.S. policy
approach following the discovery of the facility and
the Israeli air strike.
--------------
action request
--------------
¶3. (U) Posts should draw from the background
information in para 4 to respond to host government
inquiries on this issue and for press inquiries as
background information only. The points in the White
House press statement in para 5 can be used in full to
address press inquiries on the record.
¶4. (sbu) begin text of background information:
Introduction
- You will recall reports that the Israeli air force
conducted a mission over Syria on September 6, 2007.
- I want to inform you that the purpose of that
Israeli mission was to destroy a clandestine nuclear
reactor that Syria was constructing in its eastern
desert near a place we call al-Kibar.
- The Israeli mission was successful - the reactor was
damaged beyond repair. Syria has completed efforts to
clean up the site and destroy evidence of what was
really there, constructing a new building on the old
site.
- We have delayed sharing this information with you,
because our first concern was to prevent conflict.
- We believe - based on strong evidence - that North
Korea assisted Syria with the reactor at al-Kibar.
- We are working with the North Koreans in the
framework of the Six-Party Talks to focus on North
Korea's role in this proliferation activity, including
as called for in the October 3, 2007, agreement, and
to provide additional explanations as necessary.
- We have now decided that the time has come to share
more information on this issue.
Intelligence
- Our intelligence experts are confident that the
facility the Israelis targeted was in fact a nuclear
reactor of the same type North Korea built
indigenously at its Yongbyon nuclear facility. The U.S.
intelligence community conducted an intensive, months-
long effort to confirm and corroborate the information
Israel provided us on the reactor and to gather more
details from our own sources and methods.
- We have good reason to believe this reactor was not
intended for peaceful purposes.
- First, we assess this reactor was configured to
produce plutonium: it was not configured for power
production, was isolated from any civilian population,
and was ill-suited for research.
- Second, Syria went to great pains to keep this
secret by taking very careful steps to conceal the
Sipdis
true nature of the site.
- Third, by maintaining secrecy and not declaring the
site to the IAEA and providing design information, as
Syria's NPT-mandated IAEA safeguards agreement
requires, Syria undermined the very purpose of IAEA
safeguards - to provide the international community
with the necessary assurance/verification that the
reactor was part of a peaceful program.
- Finally, Syria's concealment and lies about what
happened for months now after the Israeli air strike
is compelling proof that it has something to hide. In
fact, after the attack on the site, Syria went to
great lengths to clean up the site and destroy
evidence of what was really there. If there were
nothing to hide, Syria presumably would have invited
IAEA inspectors, other experts, and the news media to
the site to prove that.
Violations of international obligations
- Article III of the NPT requires Syria to maintain
comprehensive safeguards over all of its nuclear
activities. Syria's IAEA Safeguards Agreement requires
Syria to make early declaration of any new nuclear
facilities. Specifically, Syria is legally obligated
to inform the IAEA of such new facilities at the time
a decision is taken to build them. Syria, however,
failed to make such a declaration to the IAEA, or to
provide design information and access during the
reactor's construction intended to allow the IAEA to
verify that design information.
- If North Korea provided technical training, advice,
services or assistance related to the provision,
manufacture, maintenance or use of nuclear-related
items subject to UN Security Council resolution 1718
to the Syrian Government after the effective date of
that resolution (October 14, 2006), this would
constitute a violation of the resolution by both North
Korea and Syria. Paragraph 8(b) of the resolution
requires all member states to prohibit the procurement
from North Korea of nuclear related items contained in
S/2006/814 (which encompasses the control list of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group).
Policy deliberations
- The existence of this reactor was dangerous and
destabilizing for the region, and we judged that it
could have been only weeks away from becoming
operational at the time it was destroyed by the
Israeli air force.
- Specifically, we assessed that once the pumphouse
and pipe system were complete in early August, the
reactor could begin operation at any time. Once
operations began, certainly a military option would
have been much more problematic with radioactive
material present.
- We have long had indications of Syrian covert
nuclear-related interaction with North Korea, and
identified the al-Kibar facility in the fall of 2006
as an enigmatic site. In Spring 2007, we acquired
information that enabled us to conclude that the Al-
Kibar facility was a reactor.
- Information was brought to our attention at that
time by Israeli officials who had conclusive
intelligence that a reactor was being constructed at
that site.
- The Israeli reports were confirmed by our own
independent intelligence and analysis and were
consistent with less definitive information we already
possessed.
- At the same time, we conducted our own intensive
internal policy deliberations regarding what to do
about this disturbing and destabilizing development.
- We discussed policy options with the Israelis, but
in the end Israel made its own decision to destroy the
reactor. This decision was made by Israel alone - they
did not seek our consent. Nonetheless, we understand
Israel's decision.
- <> saw this reactor, and what Syria may have
intended to do with it, as an existential threat that
required it to act to defend itself.
The way forward with syria
- Syria's secret construction of this nuclear reactor
is the latest in a series of unacceptable actions by
the Asad regime.
- Syria is a state that supports terrorism,
destabilizes Lebanon, and is the largest conduit for
foreign fighters and suicide bombers entering Iraq to
kill Iraqis, Americans, and Coalition forces.
- The Syrian Government supports terrorist groups such
as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hizballah, and
others, including by playing host to leaders of some
of these groups.
- Syria is a proliferator in every sense - of
terrorism, of instability to its neighbors, including
Lebanon, and now as a recipient and developer of
dangerous nuclear technology.
- The Syrian regime, in going down this path, has
shown a disregard for the security of the region and
of its own people.
- We call upon the Syrian regime to reveal the full
extent of its nuclear activities, as it is required to
do under the NPT and its safeguards agreement, and
verify that its covert nuclear-related activities have
stopped.
- For better relations with the international
community, in addition to full disclosure and
cooperation regarding its covert nuclear program,
Syria needs to end support for insurgents and foreign
fighters in Iraq, support for Palestinian terrorists,
and interference in Lebanon. If willing to do so,
Syria can expect to be welcomed by the international
community.
The way forward -- six-party talks
- In September 2007, the U.S. began raising its
concerns with North Korea about nuclear cooperation
with Syria. We have also raised this matter with the
other participants in the Six-Party Talks.
- We have made our concerns known to North Korea in a
frank and comprehensive way. The North Koreans have
acknowledged our concerns.
- The North Koreans have stated that there is no
ongoing nuclear cooperation with any foreign country
in violation of applicable domestic and international
laws and treaties, and that there will be no such
cooperation in the future.
- North Korea has agreed to cooperate on verification
activities in line with its past commitments on non-
proliferation, including as stated in the October 3,
2007, agreement, and to provide additional
explanations as necessary.
- We have been following Syrian/North Korean
interactions since the destruction of the reactor, and
we have not seen the same level of interaction as we
did before the reactor's destruction, however we
cannot be certain all cooperation has ceased.
- We continue to be on alert for signs of any nuclear
cooperation, and any renewed activities.
- We remain attuned to potential North Korean
relationships worldwide, especially given North
Korea's continued proliferation of missiles and other
weapons. We plan to follow up on North Korea's
agreement to cooperate on verification and to provide
further explanations as necessary.
- We are working with the Chinese to establish such a
mechanism within the Six Party framework to address
proliferation concerns.
Conclusion
- We cannot allow the world's most dangerous weapons
to fall into the hands of the world's most dangerous
regimes. This is the policy we have applied with
respect to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, and it is the
policy that we continue to pursue. We are concerned by
the cooperation between regimes that sponsor
proliferation, especially when those same regimes also
sponsor terrorism and foster instability.
- A Syrian nuclear weapons capability would have been
a catastrophic development for the Middle East and the
world. It could spark a nuclear arms race in the
region, and could escalate already high tensions with
unpredictable and dire consequences.
- The international community must come together to
put a stop to dangerous behavior such as this. There
is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot
be tolerated. This episode reminds us of the dangers
of proliferation and that we must rededicate ourselves
and act cooperatively to prevent the spread of weapons
of mass destruction.
End text of background information.
¶5. (u) begin text of press statement:
Today, administration officials have briefed select
Congressional committees on an issue of great
international concern. Until Sept. 6, 2007, the
Syrian regime was building a covert nuclear reactor in
its eastern desert capable of producing plutonium. We
are convinced, based on a variety of information, that
North Korea assisted Syria's covert nuclear activities.
We have good reason to believe that reactor, which was
damaged beyond repair on Sept. 6 of last year, was not
intended for peaceful purposes. Carefully hidden from
view, the reactor was not configured for such purposes.
In defiance of its international obligations, Syria
did not inform the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) of the construction of the reactor, and, after
it was destroyed, the regime moved quickly to bury
evidence of its existence. This cover-up only served
to reinforce our confidence that this reactor was not
intended for peaceful activities.
We are briefing the IAEA on this intelligence. The
Syrian regime must come clean before the world
regarding its illicit nuclear activities. The Syrian
regime supports terrorism, takes action that
destabilizes Lebanon, allows the transit of some
foreign fighters into Iraq, and represses its own
people. If Syria wants better relations with the
international community, it should put an end to these
activities.
We have long been seriously concerned about North
Korea's nuclear weapons program and its proliferation
activities. North Korea's clandestine nuclear
cooperation with Syria is a dangerous manifestation of
those activities. One way we have chosen to deal with
this problem is through the Six Party Framework.
Through this process we are working with our partners
to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula. The United States is also committed
to ensuring that North Korea does not further engage
in proliferation activities. We will work with our
partners to establish in the Six Party Framework a
rigorous verification mechanism to ensure that such
conduct and other nuclear activities have ceased.
The construction of this reactor was a dangerous and
potentially destabilizing development for the region
and the world. This is particularly true because it
was done covertly and in violation of the very
procedures designed to reassure the world of the
peaceful intent of nuclear activities. This
development also serves as a reminder that often the
same regimes that sponsor proliferation also sponsor
terrorism and foster instability, and cooperate with
one another in doing so. This underscores that the
international community is right to be very concerned
about the nuclear activities of Iran and the risks
those activities pose to the stability of the Middle
East. To confront this challenge, the international
community must take further steps, beginning with the
full implementation of the United Nations Security
Council resolutions dealing with Iranian nuclear
activities. The United States calls upon the
international community to redouble our common efforts
to ending these activities and preventing the spread
of weapons of mass destruction in this critical region.
End text of press statement.
¶6. (U) Posts are requested to report any substantive
reactions as soon as possible.
¶7. (U) Minimize considered.
Rice
Nnnn