

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09SANJOSE298, VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN'S MARCH 30 BILATERAL MEETING
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09SANJOSE298.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09SANJOSE298 | 2009-04-08 21:54 | 2011-04-18 20:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy San Jose |
INFO LOG-00 EEB-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 AEX-00 A-00 CPR-00
INL-00 DEAE-00 DODE-00 DOTE-00 PERC-00 DS-00 DHSE-00
EUR-00 OIGO-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VCI-00 H-00 TEDE-00
INR-00 IO-00 LAB-01 L-00 MOFM-00 MOF-00 VCIE-00
DCP-00 NSAE-00 ISN-00 OMB-00 NIMA-00 PC-01 MCC-00
GIWI-00 ISNE-00 DOHS-00 FMPC-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00
USSS-00 NCTC-00 SHEM-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00 NFAT-00
SAS-00 FA-00 SWCI-00 /002W
------------------5021CD 082204Z /38
O 082154Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0746
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000298
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2019
TAGS: CS EDU OVIP BIDEN JOSEPH PGOV PINR PREL SNAR
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN'S MARCH 30 BILATERAL MEETING
WITH COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT OSCAR ARIAS
Classified By: DCM Peter M. Brennan for reasons 1.4(d)
CORRECTED TEXT.
¶1. (U) March 30, 2009; 0955 am; San Jose, Costa Rica.
¶2. (U) Participants:
USG:
The Vice President
Ambassador Peter Cianchette
Anthony Blinken, NSA to the Vice President
Brian McKeon, Deputy NSA to the Vice President
Dan Restrepo, Senior Director, Western Hemisphere Affairs, NSC
Craig Kelly, WHA PDAS
David E. Henifin (notetaker), Pol/Econ Counselor, Embassy San
Jose
COSTA RICA:
President Oscar Arias
Minister of the Presidency Rodrigo Arias
Foreign Minister Bruno Stagno
Foreign Trade Minister Marco Vinicio Ruiz
Ambassador to the U.S. Tomas Duenas
Ambassador-designate to the U.S. Luis Diego Escalante
¶3. (C) SUMMARY: In a wide-ranging, 45-minute discussion,
President Oscar Arias stressed Costa Rican-U.S. friendship,
and the need for additional USG assistance for education,
counter-narcotics (including helicopters), as well as access
to the Millennium Challenge Account (MCC) or similar
programs. He also called for a new, U.S.-led embargo against
high-tech weapons transfers to the hemisphere and described
the real enemies in the region as "poverty, disease and
illiteracy." Vice President Joseph Biden stressed the U.S.
administration's desire to craft a policy with the region and
not for it, and he underscored USG willingness to listen to
and learn from its friends and neighbors. However, before
the USG could help the region, it had to help itself; the
best way to do so was to re-energize the U.S. economy. On
security assistance, the Vice President expressed hope that
the regional Merida Initiative be continued and perhaps
expanded. On education, he invited Arias to work with him to
develop a regional policy for Central America. The Vice
President said the USG was willing to re-examine the MCC
program, but foreign direct investment would help Costa
Rica's economy more in the short term. Arias gave the Vice
President a letter to POTUS seeking education assistance, and
a detailed proposal to increase assistance for and
cooperation with Costa Rica. END SUMMARY.
---------------
OPENING REMARKS
---------------
¶4. (C) The Vice President stressed the importance of the
upcoming meeting with Central American leaders, and thanked
President Arias for hosting it. Arias noted that Presidents
Daniel Ortega and Manual Zelaya did not attend )- reportedly
pressured by President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela -- and were
missing an important opportunity.
¶5. (C) The Vice President said that he understood, and had
traveled to Chile and Costa Rica "with eyes open." A change
in attitude, in relations with the hemisphere, was needed.
Thus, the primary purpose of his trip was to gain a sense of
what regional leaders were thinking as the hemisphere charted
its course through the economic crisis. VP Biden underscored
that the crisis was also an opportunity to make positive
changes. He told Arias that his meetings with other leaders
in Vina del Mar had been very good, with open discussion
exceeding his expectations.
--------------------------------------------- -
ARIAS: WE ARE YOUR OLDEST FRIEND, AND WE NEED HELP
--------------------------------------------- -
¶6. (C) Arias then launched into a lengthy presentation,
focusing mostly on his international agenda and Costa Rica's
needs for assistance. He noted that Costa Rica was the
"oldest" and "most consolidated" democracy in the hemisphere,
and a long-time friend and ally of the United States. Costa
Ricans liked the United States, and Costa Rica depended on
the U.S. economically, especially for trade, tourism and
high-tech investment which utilized Costa Rica's
well-educated labor force.
¶7. (C) However, despite these advantages, Costa Rica still
needed help. This is why Arias was pushing the Costa Rica
Consensus around the world, which seeks to direct more
foreign assistance to "successful" countries which focus on
"education, health care and environmental protection" instead
of armaments. Arias said it was "unfair" that Costa Rica
"was not poor enough" to qualify for programs like the
Millennium Challenge Account (MCC) while MCC recipients in
Africa, for example, spent considerable amounts on their
militaries.
--------------------------------------
THE REGION NEEDS MORE BOOKS, NOT BOMBS
--------------------------------------
¶8. (C) Arias explained that he was thus also pursuing an
international conventional arms trade treaty, so that
countries -- including some USG aid recipients -- would stop
buying weapons and instead channel additional resources to
education and health. He asked why any country would "sell
arms to human rights violators or dictators."
¶9. (C) Arias saw no need for significant arms purchases in
the hemisphere, and suggested that the Obama administration
consider re-imposing an embargo against high-tech arms
transfers to the WHA region, similar to what was in place
1977-1997. Arias recalled how he and former president Carter
had unsuccessfully lobbied then-president Clinton not to end
the embargo. The result, which permitted the USG to supply
F-16s to Chile, ignited a South American arms race,
eventually including Venezuela, according to Arias.
President Obama's leadership might influence the EU to stop
selling arms to the hemisphere, he added.
¶10. (C) The real enemies in the region, Arias continued,
were "poverty, disease and illiteracy." These could not be
confronted by spending more on arms, but on education, as
Costa Rica had been able to do since abolishing its military.
A seven-year average pupil retention rate was the most
serious threat to the region's security, in Arias, opinion.
Arias handed the Vice President a letter to POTUS requesting
additional USG assistance with education, in the form of
additional Peace Corps or Peace Corps-like volunteers to
teach English as part of Costa Rica's "Costa Rica Bilingue"
national project (which is being run out of the President's
office and which seeks to make the nation essentially
bilingual in English and Spanish by 2017). Education is a
priority for Costa Rica, as "it should be for the region," he
emphasized.
-------------------------
COSTA RICA IS "DIFFERENT"
-------------------------
¶11. (C) The countries in the hemisphere all differ, Arias
continued, but they faced common problems: poor educational
systems, low tax collection (which means fewer domestic
resources for government) and increasingly strapped social
safety nets. It was thus important for Vice President Biden
to visit Costa Rica, which was "different" from the other
Central American nations (i.e., more successful facing some
of its problems). Costa Rica, for example, dedicated six
percent of its GDP to education, and another eight percent to
health care.
--------------------------------
HELICOPTERS TO FIGHT TRAFFICKING
--------------------------------
¶12. (C) Despite the fact that Costa Rica does not have an
army, and its air unit includes "25-year old Cessnas," Arias
pointed to the GOCR's "region-leading" performance in drug
seizures. Facing an increasing threat from regional
narcotics trafficking, he said the GOCR needed helicopters to
supplement its airborne counternarcotics assets. Five
Blackhawks went to Mexico as part of the Merida Initiative,
he noted; "all we need is one". Arias commended the
Secretary's "courageous" acknowledgment in Mexico of U.S.
co-responsibility in fueling the illicit drug and arms trade
in the region.
------------------------------------
VP BIDEN: MUST FIX THE ECONOMY FIRST
------------------------------------
¶13. (C) In response, the Vice President noted that some
countries viewed the United States as "part of the problem,"
while others saw the United States as "the only solution" to
some problems. However, before the USG could help the
region, it had to help itself; the best way to do so was to
re-energize the U.S. economy. "When we stall, you all
suffer," he said. The administration was thus tackling the
urgent economic problems as methodically as possible.
¶14. (C) The Vice President explained that during the election
campaign, he and President Obama had established the goal of
truly helping the U.S. middle class, and not just improving
macroeconomic indicators. The same held true for Latin
America: the Obama administration wants the middle class to
be better off when it completes its first term. "We do not
want the hemisphere left behind," he said. In addition, the
U.S. administration realized it was time for new "rules of
the road" governing the international financial and banking
system.
----------------------------------------
BUT ALSO TACKLE REGIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS
----------------------------------------
¶15. (C) At the same time, The Vice President acknowledged
that "restarting the economy" alone was not enough; the USG
recognized that the region faced a number of other shared
problems that required shared solutions, chief among them
drug trafficking and crime. Drug source or transit countries
that had once been reluctant to confront the drug trade,
since it was "not their problem," now faced serious domestic
consumption problems.
¶16. (C) Vice President Biden assured Arias that the USG well
understood that counternarcotics success in Mexico and
Colombia might press more trafficking and traffickers into
Central America. This was another reason the Merida
Initiative was so important. Depending on the future
domestic economic situation, the USG would like to see Merida
continued and perhaps expanded, he explained. However, the
Vice President reminded President Arias of the difficult
economic situation inherited by the Obama administration,
including a USD 1.3 trillion deficit. Additional USG
assistance may not come easily. The Administration first had
to stimulate the U.S. economy in order to stimulate the
global economy.
-----------------------------------------
FRESH LOOK AT FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND EDUCATION
-----------------------------------------
¶17. (C) In response to Arias, suggestions, the Vice
President said the USG might re-examine the MCC program, in
order to focus it more on needy sectors of society, even in
countries that were doing fairly well, rather than solely on
individual countries in need. Overall, the attitude in the
United States towards foreign assistance was evolving, he
added. The best thing Costa Rica could do in the short run,
however, was to continue to attract foreign direct
investment; this provided the best added value to the
economy.
¶18. (SBU) On education, which was another major topic of the
U.S. election campaign and very important to the Obama
administration, the Vice President invited Arias to work with
him personally to develop a regional approach for Central
America. The Vice President cited this project as a
potentially good example of the USG's intent to develop
policy with the region and not for it. He added that the
administration also hoped to give the Peace Corps a
significant boost in Western Hemisphere countries and around
the world. This would help "capture the energy" of young
Americans eager to serve.
-------------------------------------
CLOSING COMMENTS AND THE &BIDEN8 PLAN
-------------------------------------
¶19. (C) Drawing the meeting to a close, the Vice President
lauded Arias as "an exception" and Costa Rica as a country
which "stands apart." This was a principal reason why the USG
had asked Costa Rica to host the Central American leaders.
"Now is the time for honesty and not diplomacy," the Vice
President added. The administration thus invited
"constructive criticism" from its friends and allies. The
Vice President reiterated that the administration had to
"first focus at home," but looked forward to working with
regional partners on regional problems.
¶20. (SBU) As the meeting broke up, Arias handed the Vice
President the GOCR's new, detailed, so-called BIDEN
(Bilateral Investment Development and Emergency Needs Plan),
which seeks additional USG assistance and cooperation for
development, drug interdiction/law enforcement, debt
restructuring, balance of payment stabilization,
competitiveness, investment, renewable energy development and
English language teaching. (The GOCR released highlights of
the plan to the media after the meeting.)
¶21. (U) The Office of the Vice President cleared this
message.
WILSON