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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09PANAMA61, PANAMA POST: THE SHAKE-UP EDITION
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09PANAMA61 | 2009-01-21 15:39 | 2011-04-12 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Panama |
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHZP #0061/01 0211539
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 211539Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2876
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000061
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA POST: THE SHAKE-UP EDITION
Classified By: Classified by Deputy Chief of Mission David Gilmour for
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (SBU) Welcome to the third edition of the Panama Post, a
collaborative effort between Embassy Panama's Political
Section and the Open Source Center (OSC). Having last left
our readers before the holiday season lull, the Panama Post
is happy to report that the politicians and those who care
about them are back in force and ramping up for three months
of non-stop general election campaigning. Candidates are
defying conventional wisdom, allies are lining up with
perceived winners and juicy nuggets of political information
have been flying across our desk blotters. In this edition
of Panama Post, our headlines are:
- Martinelli's VP-from Patriotic Union (UP), but not the one
you expected
- MOLIRENAs drop Varela to save themselves
- Balbina Herrera - It's all about me
- Torrijos drags Balbina down - in more ways than one?
- PRD: How to pin down Martinelli?
If you haven't yet created your Open Source account, log on
to www.opensource.gov and set up an account for daily updates
on issues, regions or countries of your choice. OSC analysts
provide not only daily translations of timely news stories
but also analysis of open source media.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Martinelli's VP-from UP, but not who you expected
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶2. (SBU) Ricardo Martinelli, Democratic Change (CD)
presidential candidate and current front-runner announced
January 12 that he had picked Leopoldo Benedetti, a Patriotic
Union (UP) National Assembly delegate from Colon, as his
Vice-presidential running mate. The CD board is expected to
rubber stamp this nomination, thereby fulfilling Martinelli's
promise to the UP to select one of its own for VP.
¶3. (SBU) Martinelli's pick of Benedetti surprised political
observers, most of whom had expected him to pick a
high-profile party member such as UP President Jose Raul
Mulino, former Panamanian First VP Guillermo (Billy) Ford or
UP VP Anibal Galindo. There was also talk of Martinelli
picking an independent, such as TV personality Lucy Molinar.
Benedetti, 65 years old, has served two non-consecutive terms
as a low-profile but well-respected member of the National
Assembly representing Colon. Benedetti, who in his
legislative career has either been in opposition or a minor
alliance partner of the governing party, has no legislative
accomplishments to his name, and no national following.
Benedetti has, however, been a stalwart advocate through
thick and thin for the national government to complete the
Panama City-Colon highway, perhaps the top political issue
for Colon province. Benedetti does have an impressive
political machine in Colon, which could help Martinelli to
draw votes in the populated, but often overlooked, Caribbean
city. His machine is built upon the support of 21
representatives, precinct or circuit-level local politicians.
¶4. (C) COMMENT: Rumors abound that Martinelli will try to
further consolidate the UP alliance by supporting Billy Ford
as Panama City Mayor. These rumors that have been sparked by
cryptic comments from Martinelli during the UP convention
that he "had a surprise" for Ford and that Ford's "political
career is not over." The UP already has an official
candidate for PC Mayor - Ivan Blasser - though he is not
doing well. Panama City is also rife with rumors that a
"rift" has opened inside UP. Don,t believe the hype! Ahead
of PRD Presidential candidate Balbina Herrera by at least 13
point and benefiting from a powerful bandwagoning effect that
is drawing opposition leaders to his cause, Martinelli is in
the cat-bird seat. Mulino and Galindo are likely annoyed and
irked, but have nowhere else to turn at this point. By
selecting Benedetti, Martinelli fulfills his commitment to UP
to name a UP member as his running mate and outflanks Mulino
and Galindo. By holding out the prospect for a "surprise"
for Ford, Martinelli keeps Ford in the fold as well.
Additionally, by naming UP candidate for a National Assembly
seat Guillermo Ferrufino as his "social policy" tsar,
Martinelli harnesses a bit of this former model and current
TV personality,s aura and demonstrates his commitment to
integrate UP into his team.
¶5. (C) Just in: Martinelli and Panamenista Party
presidential candidate Juan Carlos Varela engaged in detailed
discussions, sequestering themselves in the sun room of the
Ambassador's residence during the Embassy's Inauguration Day
event. The Panama Post understands that a tentative
agreement was reached under which Varela would become
Martinelli's VP running mate, Benedetti would step aside, and
a united opposition slate -- minus Moral Vanguard of the
Party (VMP) -- would present a consolidated front against the
governing Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD). Ermerging
from the sun room, Martinelli and Varela acknowledged that
they had achieved a rapprochement (this was their first
meeting in public in a few months) and prounced their
commitment to bring real change to Panama. Benedetti, also
present at the reception, noted that he was not an
"egotistical man" and was prepared to do what was necessary
to foster that change. Former Panamenista primary
presidential nomination contender Alberto Vallarino noted
privately in an aside that he had been tapped to serve as a
"bridge" to bring together the Panamenista and CD parties.
Parties and candiates must make formally declare their
intention to run for office with the Electoral Tribunal by
February 2. Stay tuned.
--------------------------------------------
MOLIRENistAs drop Varela to save themselves
--------------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Members of the National Liberal Republican Movement
(MOLIRENA) overwhelmingly confirmed their leadership's
decision to join Martinelli's alliance at its convention on
January 11, with 562 of 569 delegates voting in favor. This
confirms the decision made by its National Executive
Committee (CEN) on December 23 to leave the Panamenista
alliance, headed by candidate Juan Carlos Varela, and join
instead to the surging Martinelli. The MOLIRENAs, who have
59,693 members, are the Panamenistas traditionally ally,
though they had been formally allied with the Panamenistas
for only a month before abandoning them. Varela's team
publicly dismissed the importance of this move, but rumors
are flying that Varela is being pushed by the old-line
leaders to change strategy immediately to reverse his
precipitous fall in the polls.
¶7. (C) "Both Alberto Vallarino and Mireya Moscoso are
working behind the scenes" to get Varela to step down,
according to MOLIRENA leader Olimpio Saez, a former
legislator and Ambassador told the Panama Post on January 6.
Saez characterized Varela as a "stubborn" candidate who
refuses to step aside, despite the fact that he has known
since November that his candidacy was going nowhere. Saez,
who was an early proponent of the MOLIRENA-Panamenista
alliance, called publicly for the MOLIRENAistas to switch
their allegiance to Martinelli's CD in order to save the
party. Roberto Henriquez, Vice-president of CD, echoed this
fact in a January 7 conversation with POLOFF, in which he
said that 80% of MOLIRENA would eventually support
Martinelli. The MOLIRENA members switched their allegiance
to Martinelli to save their party, asserted Henriquez.
(NOTE: According to electoral law, a party must receive 4%
of votes cast during an election to remain an officially
recognized party. MOLIRENA needs to be allied to a popular
candidate to have any hope of getting that many votes, and
remain a party. END NOTE) Though MOLIRENA does not bring
much to Martinelli's alliance, MOLIRENA's departure from its
alliance with the Panamenistas is more than symbolic.
Polling agency Unimer reported on January 12 that 58 percent
of its total sample believed that MOLIRENA's break with the
Panamenistas would negatively affect Varela and a whopping
60.4 percent of Panamenistas themselves believed the same.
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Balbina Herrera - It's all about me
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¶8. (C) Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) Presidential
candidate Balbina Herrera, despite also being party
president, had created a "parallel structure" of
"inexperienced PRDs" and was ignoring other PRD candidates
further down on the ticket, said Leandro Avila, popular San
Miguelito National Assembly member and former PRD majority
leader in a January 7 conversation with the Panama Post.
According to Avila, Herrera was stoking dissension in the PRD
by refusing to campaign for anyone but herself, and has made
it clear that other PRD candidates were on their own
financially and politically. In response, the PRD's "petit
committee" of San Miguelito met December 29 and decided not
to campaign for Herrera, but to focus their energies on
getting at least 7 of 9 National Assembly members elected.
(Note: San Miguelito. Panama's second largest municipality,
is a heavily populated, electorally important district that
is overwhelmingly poor and pro-PRD.) San Miguelito PRD
members were also planning to "retrench" in the face of a
likely Martinelli victory. "If by February 15 she doesn't do
any better in the polls, Martinelli will be President," said
Avila.
¶9. (C) COMMENT: Herrera's primary contender and now VP
running mate, Juan Carlos Navarro, though he lost the
nomination, was more successful at securing victories in the
PRD primary for his candidates further down the ticket.
Indeed, Herrera's primary coattails were practically
nonexistent. Navarro assiduously used his presidency of the
Panama Mayors Association and advocacy for greater
decentralization to build a nationwide base of support. It
is not clear that Navarro will or is even inclined to
mobilize this network of down-ticket PRD candidates to
Herrera's cause.
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Torrijos drags Balbina down - in more ways than one?
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶10. (C) Balbina Herrera's "continuity" message is killing
her, because the people are very dissatisfied with the
Torrijos government, said Roberto Henriquez told POLOFF.
According to Henriquez, Herrera lacks a "coherent message"
and has, along with Torrijos, been dragged down in the public
mind by stagnant wages, the high cost of food and
electricity, and the decline in public services. According
to Avila, there is more to this story than just the factthat
Herrera and Torrijos are members of the ruling party.
Torrijos was "doing everything he could to ensure that
Herrera would lose and that Torrijos would control the
National Assembly," Avila asserted. Ostensibly, Torrijos
wanted to control the National Assembly so that a PRD
majority would be able to "amend the law for him to come back
in five years instead of ten."
¶11. (C) COMMENT: Panamanian law requires a former President
to wait ten years (two terms) before running for president
again. Avila asserted that Torrijos was buying National
Assembly votes by allowing companies involved in highway,
bridge and other government projects to overcharge the
government. Presumably these companies are either owned by
National Assembly members, or their family members, or their
supporters, although Avila did not say this directly. Post
has no independent confirmation of Avila's assertions. To
change the Constitution, Torrijos would need the current
National Assembly and the next National Assembly to approve
the same constitutional amendment.
---------------------------------
PRD: How to pin down Martinelli?
---------------------------------
¶12. (C) "The PRD is terrified of Martinelli, they don't know
what to do against him," according to Saez, noting that the
PRD had not been able to drive the debate in recent weeks.
Herrera and the PRD have accused Martinelli in several forums
of trying to "buy" the election, and have posted anonymous
posters in Panama City touting that claim. Martinelli
responded aggressively, turning this theme back on Herrera by
taking out full-page ads in most leading newspapers stating
"Balbina Herrera: You cannot buy decent Panamanians."
Further, the CD has filed a complaint with the Attorney
General on behalf of a person who claims that the PRD
threatened her and offered her cash for information about
Martinelli.
¶13. (C) COMMENT: Henriquez told POLOFF that the key with
negative attacks was to immediately and aggressively respond,
something that the CD publicity machine is clearly doing.
Henriquez noted that Varela had failed to follow this rule
when CD attacked him, and that had led to his fall in the
polls.
STEPHENSON