

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09BUENOSAIRES1235, C) ARGENTINA: CFK'S FIRST TWO CABINET CHIEFS SAY KIRCHNERS'
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BUENOSAIRES1235.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BUENOSAIRES1235 | 2009-11-20 16:53 | 2010-12-01 12:00 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Buenos Aires |
VZCZCXYZ0035
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBU #1235/01 3241653
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 201653Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0071
INFO MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCQSAB/USSOCOM INTEL MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 001235
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2034/11/20
TAGS: PGOV PINR AR
SUBJECT: (C) ARGENTINA: CFK'S FIRST TWO CABINET CHIEFS SAY KIRCHNERS'
SHELF-LIFE WILL EXPIRE IN 2011
REF: BUENOS AIRES 1026; BUENOS AIRES 301
CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Kelly, DCM, DOS, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (C) Summary: Over the past six weeks, we have held several
conversations with President Fernandez de Kirchner's first two
Cabinet Chiefs, Alberto Fernandez and Sergio Massa. Both believe
that the Kirchners, despite their recent political successes,
cannot win re-election in 2011. They disagree on whom is next in
line: Fernandez thinks that the next President will be Vice
President Julio Cobos, while Massa believes that Senator Carlos
Reutemann will prevail. Both ex-Cabinet chiefs are (separately)
plotting their futures in a post-Kirchner political landscape.
Massa expanded on earlier comments to us (ref a) on life with the
Kirchners, describing ex-president Nestor Kirchner as a "monster"
and a "psychopath." End Summary.
¶2. (C) We have had several conversations with the first two
Cabinet Chiefs of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK), Alberto
Fernandez and Sergio Massa. The Ambassador had an introductory
meeting with Alberto Fernandez, who served as Cabinet Chief in both
Nestor and CFK's administrations, on October 28, and DCM lunched
with Fernandez on October 2. The Ambassador and DCM also had
dinner with CFK's second cabinet chief Sergio Massa and his wife,
city councilor-elect Malena Galmarini, at the home of Massa's
former Casa Rosada aide, businessman Jorge O'Reilly, on November
¶12. In each of these conversations, the two prominent Peronists,
who during their tenures in the Casa Rosada worked every day with
the Kirchners to run the Argentine government, were quite frank in
expressing their estrangement from the Kirchners and their
pessimism about the first couple's political prospects.
Alberto and Massa Agree: Kirchners Will Lose in 2011
¶3. (C) Massa said that the Kirchners have no chance to capture the
presidency in 2011. When asked to estimate their chances, Massa
replied, "zero." He also discounted the view that the Kirchners
would extend their rule through Chavez-style governance. Massa
said that, for all of its problems, Argentina is not Venezuela.
Its society remained too literate, too middle class, and too
"temperate," and its economy is far more complex and diverse than
Venezuela's oil monoculture. Argentina, he said, would not abide
the Kirchner's attempts to consolidate power through more
autocratic rule. The result of their hardball tactics after the
midterm elections, he argued, was even more negative ratings in the
polls.
¶4. (C) Fernandez predicted that Nestor would be the Kirchners'
presidential candidate in 2011. He claimed that Nestor has a
better reputation for competence than CFK. Fernandez told the DCM
that his soundings on CFK's potential run for re-election
invariably provoked reactions of alarm and exasperation.
¶5. (C) But Nestor cannot possibly win, continued Fernandez,
comparing the former president to Carlos Menem circa 1999. He said
that, like Menem ten years ago, Kirchner could hope for no more
than 20 percent of the votes in the first round of the presidential
election. These voters, he continued, are Kirchner
"fundamentalists" whose votes reflect ideological affinity or
association with the various political machines (controlled by
piqueteros, labor leaders, etc.) that remain loyal to the Kirchner
project. Fernandez said that, because Kirchner at this point in
his political career has zero attraction to independent voters, he
could expect to win no more votes in the second round of elections
than he would in the first. Fernandez predicted that Nestor would
run and CFK would increasingly govern from the Left, as that "is
the only constituency that remains to them." He added, though,
that such a strategy was doomed to fail -- "the Left on its own
can't elect anyone to the Presidency in this country," he said.
Alberto and Massa Disagree on Next President
¶6. (C) Massa identified Santa Fe Senator Carlos Reutemann as the
likely presidential winner in 2011. He said that Reutemann's
strategy of lying low was prudent, not a blunder or sign of
indecision as often portrayed in the press. With Reutemann quiet,
the Kirchner machine was focused on pummeling Vice President Cobos
and Buenos Aires Mayor Mauricio Macri. The onslaught, he argued,
would damage both of those potential opponents to a Reutemann
candidacy. When the race really begins, Reutemann would be
well-placed to obtain the Peronist nomination and steamroll the
rest of the field. Massa said that the Peronist race would not
begin in earnest until May 1, 2010, when he said five large
Peronist rallies would mark May Day for the first time in years.
¶7. (C) Alberto Fernandez identified Vice President Cobos as the
next president of Argentina. Fernandez noted that Cobos continues
to be the most popular politician in the country, and is conserving
his advantage intelligently. He expected that Coalicion Civica
leader Elisa Carrio, the runner-up in the 2007 election and a
bitter rival of Cobos, would run in the first round and win a
maximum of 12 percent of the vote, deflating the Vice President's
first-round numbers, but Cobos would come out on top. "It's his
election to lose," concluded Fernandez. He took issue with Massa's
view that Peronists would prevail once they united behind a
candidate. Fernandez, a long-time Peronist activist who headed the
party apparatus in Buenos Aires city for many years, said that his
party only controls the loyalty of 38 percent of the electorate.
Given the Kirchners' continuing control over the party apparatus,
the Peronist candidate, even if it ends up being someone with a
last name that is not Kirchner, would not appeal to non-Peronist
voters in 2011. The party's presidential prospects in the coming
election were therefore, in Fernandez's view, poor.
Massa: Nestor is a Monster and Psychopath
¶8. (C) Massa was scathing in his criticism of the first couple,
especially Nestor. Though he made light of press reports that he
and Kirchner came to blows at the campaign bunker in the pre-dawn
hours after their mid-term defeat last June, he called Nestor "a
psychopath," "a monster," and "a coward" whose bullying approach to
politics masks a deep sense of insecurity and inferiority.
(Massa's wife registered such alarm at these uninhibited comments
that he asked her to "stop making faces at me.") He disputed the
argument that Nestor deserved credit as a savvy tactician,
describing the ex-president as blunder-prone and so convinced of
his own brilliance that he was certain to keep making mistakes.
(We've heard similar comments from Fernandez on Nestor's faltering
political judgment -- ref b.) He said that Nestor could not
relate to others outside the narrow gauge of his own political
ambitions: "Kirchner's not a perverse genius," Massa concluded.
"He is just perverse."
¶9. (C) Massa described his twelve-month term as Cabinet Chief as
an ordeal, as he struggled to deal with a controlling presidential
spouse and a "submissive, withdrawn" President "who would be much
better without Nestor than she is with him." He said that, during
his tenure at the Casa Rosada, he decided to do the Oprah-like
daytime TV show hosted by grand dame Mirtha Legrand. On the set
minutes before the show's taping began, he received a call from
Nestor instructing him to walk off the set because the apolitical
Legrand "was an opposition figure." Massa told him he would do the
show unless his official boss CFK, who was travelling abroad,
instructed him otherwise. He then received three successive calls
from Cabinet members pleading with him not to do the show. Massa
did not follow their advice.
Both Focusing on Post-Kirchner Future
¶10. (C) As for his own plans, Massa confirmed that he plans to run
in 2011 for governor of Buenos Aires province, which could pit him
against midterm winner Francisco de Narvaez, incumbent Daniel
Scioli and labor strongman Hugo Moyano. Massa said that he will
announce his candidacy on the third week of January, the week when
(largely vacationing) Argentines buy the most newspapers.
Fernandez also commented on the Buenos Aires race, opining that
Scioli's political moment had passed. Calling the governor "a nice
guy," he observed that Nestor had used him (by grabbing him as his
slate-mate in the province during the midterms) and then cast him
aside. "Scioli is trapped, and he knows it," Fernandez said.
¶11. (C) Fernandez remains politically active as well. He told
the DCM that he is talking to many political figures within and
outside Peronism, including Cobos and the fellow would-be Peronist
kingmaker, ex-President Eduardo Duhalde. Within the party, he
expressed particular interest in the 40-year-old governor of Salta
province Juan Manuel Urtubey. He said that, despite his belief
that Cobos is likely to win the presidency, he is counseling
Urtubey to throw his hat in the ring. He says that the campaign
strategy would be to nudge Nestor out in the first round for second
place, and then emerge as the Peronist candidate in the run-off
against Cobos. (Comment: It appears that Urtubey, once regarded
as a reliable Kirchner ally, is listening. He agreed to host
Fernandez in a much-photographed visit to Salta on November 14,
fueling speculation that the two were plotting a presidential run.)
Comment: Common Views, Divergent Paths
¶12. (C) Massa and Fernandez have much in common, from their
unique experience in CFK's cabinet to their active roles in the
burgeoning anti-Kirchner movement within Peronism. They are both
generally pro-American in orientation. They do not, however, work
together very closely, and their futures seem quite different.
Fernandez, 50, is low-key and content to operate in the background
while others take the spotlight. The most that he seems to aspire
to is success in behind-the-scenes political kingmaking, which
could restore him to his former status as the country's most
influential political consigliore. Massa, 37, the younger man by
more than a decade, has more ambitious plans. He hopes to win the
Buenos Aires governorship and, eventually, the Argentine
presidency.
MARTINEZ