

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06SAOPAULO810, IMPROVING POLL NUMBERS BUOY OPTIMISM OF ALCKMIN'S CAMPAIGN COORDINATOR
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SAOPAULO810.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06SAOPAULO810 | 2006-07-28 16:36 | 2011-03-05 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Consulate Sao Paulo |
VZCZCXRO4353
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0810/01 2091636
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281636Z JUL 06
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5472
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6546
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2690
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2365
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 2086
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1811
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2926
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7311
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 3053
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 2519
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SAO PAULO 000810
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE PASS USTR FOR MSULLIVAN
STATE PASS EXIMBANK
STATE PASS OPIC FOR MORONESE, RIVERA, MERVENNE
NSC FOR FEARS
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/SHUPKA TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND DDOUGLASS DOL FOR ILAB MMITTELHAUSER SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD USAID/W FOR LAC/AA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ECON EAGR BR
SUBJECT: IMPROVING POLL NUMBERS BUOY OPTIMISM OF ALCKMIN'S CAMPAIGN COORDINATOR
REF: (A) BRASILIA 1441;
(B) SAO PAULO 734;
(C) SAO PAULO 647 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY
------- SUMMARY -------
¶1. (SBU) Opposition presidential candidate Geraldo Alckmin's campaign coordinator told Consul General that the campaign is coming together well and that support for Alckmin is growing, as reflected in recent polls. Joao Carlos Meirelles said that critical alliances at the state level are firming up. The campaign will publish its comprehensive platform and government program on August 9 and then flood the airwaves when the period of free radio and television advertising begins August 15. Meirelles acknowledged that social programs like "Bolsa Familia" give President Lula an advantage among lower-class voters but believes Lula also has significant vulnerabilities, notably among farmers hurt by the Lula administration's agricultural policies. The election, he said, will go to a second round, in which "voters don't choose a person, they reject a person," and Lula's high negatives will doom him. This optimistic scenario is only to be expected from Meirelles, who was talking positively even back at the beginning of June (ref C), when Lula's lead in the polls exceeded 25 points, but he is likely correct in predicting that Alckmin will narrow the gap between now and the October 1 first-round balloting, and that the second round opens up new possibilities. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (U) Consul General (CG) and Poloff met July 27 with Joao Carlos de Souza Meirelles, overall campaign coordinator for opposition candidate Geraldo Alckmin (see ref C). Meirelles said the campaign was going very well and repeated some of his observations from our previous meeting with him. The polls, he reiterated, are merely exercises in name recognition, and Lula's name is universally known in Brazil, especially because of the constant media exposure he has received in recent months. In that context, the improvement in Alckmin's numbers -- in early June, polls showed him trailing by 25-30 points; now it's closer to 15 -- is surprising and encouraging. Meirelles estimated that perhaps 40 percent of the population nationwide now knows who Alckmin is, with much work remaining to be done in the northeastern and the center-west regions.
--------- ALLIANCES ---------
¶3. (SBU) Meirelles described the consolidation of alliances at the state level, which he said will be key to electoral success. Alckmin's Social Democracy Party of Brazil (PSDB) is allied with the Liberal Front Party (PFL) and the smaller Popular Socialist Party (PPS). The alliance is particularly strong in the densely populated south and much of the southeast. In some states - he mentioned Santa Catarina as an example - they have an ad hoc alliance with the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). Meirelles acknowledged problems in certain states, notably Maranhao in the northeast and Rio de Janeiro. Nevertheless, he contrasted the alliance's strength with Lula's coalition, which in addition to Lula's Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT) includes only the Communists and the small Brazilian Republican Party (PRB) of Vice President Alencar. The PT was not even able to bring its traditional Socialist allies on board. While Lula himself is broadly popular, Meirelles said, his own party is not particularly strong even in the northeast ("only one governorship, in Piaui, and they might not hold that"), and his alliance is not likely to be
SAO PAULO 00000810 002 OF 003
able to deliver votes, especially with his own party's image so badly tarnished by scandal.
¶4. (SBU) On or about August 9, the campaign will publish its comprehensive platform and governing program, covering some thirteen areas (e.g., health, education, macroeconomy, telecommunications, foreign policy). Thirteen working groups have been developing the program for months; since late June, when the alliance was formalized, PFL and PPS representatives have been participating in the working groups as well. Alckmin delivered an abbreviated version of the government program in his June 11 speech accepting the PSDB nomination (ref B), but the platform will describe in detail how his government will achieve its objectives. Many elements of the program will be featured in the free radio and television advertising spots that begin August 15 and run through the rest of the campaign. It is also safe to assume, Meirelles said, that these spots will target corruption in the Lula administration (the "mensalao" scandal) as well as what he characterized as incompetence and "immobilism."
--------------- SOCIAL PROGRAMS ---------------
¶5. (SBU) CG asked how the Alckmin campaign planned to counteract Lula's advantage in the northeast generated in large part by social programs, especially "Bolsa Familia." This government stipend program now reaches more than eleven million poor families, many of them in the impoverished northeast; numerous pollsters and political analysts have asserted that Lula can count on the votes of Bolsa Familia recipients, as well as those who have benefited from the sharp increase in the minimum wage. Meirelles noted that Bolsa Familia was a PSDB program, begun during the administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), which the PSDB still supports. He expressed the view that the population that benefits from the program is volatile in its voting habits and will not base its vote solely on its receiving a handout from the federal government. He noted further that on August 4, the Alckmin campaign has planned an event in Recife unveiling a program for a new northeast, highlighting its plans for investment in the region. Finally, he stressed the key role of municipalities, especially Mayors, in administering the Bolsa Familia program, and suggested that local alliances may prove more important than the federal government's role in determining voter preferences. Ultimately, he acknowledged, Lula would likely defeat Alckmin in the northeast, but not by nearly as wide a margin as polls currently suggest, while Alckmin held a large advantage in the south and southeast. Alckmin not only still enjoys strong popularity in the most populous state, Sao Paulo, but will benefit from a strong gubernatorial candidate in Jose Serra. Likewise, in the second most populous state, Minas Gerais, he will benefit from the coattails of PSDB leader Aecio Neves, who appears a shoo-in for re-election AS Governor. Alckmin would likely run well in the rural Center-West as well, he said, where "policy errors committed by the Lula administration" had led to an agricultural crisis. On the other hand, Meirelles acknowledged problems in the populous state of Rio de Janeiro which would need to be addressed in order to boost Alckmin's votes there.
------------------------------- LULA'S POSSIBLE VULNERABILITIES -------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) Asked about the impact on the campaign of third-party candidate Heloisa Helena (who got about ten percent in recent polls), Meirelles said it was good for Alckmin. A leftist who had been expelled from the PT, she would take some votes away from Lula and would gain other votes that otherwise would have been null or
SAO PAULO 00000810 003 OF 003
blank. CG asked also about the role of Lula's former Chief of Staff, Jose Dirceu, who recently met with the Landless Movement (MST). Meirelles said that having an individual like Dirceu, who had resigned from government in disgrace and then been expelled from Congress and deprived of his political rights, representing the ruling party in these core social movements, created a very bad image. He also claimed that at the recent Mercosul Summit in Cordoba, Argentina, Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez had expressed support for Lula's re-election. This, he said, was like Chavez's support for Humala in Peru and Lopez Obrador in Mexico, something that was likely to boomerang on Lula, and certainly something the opposition was going to take advantage of at the opportune moment.
¶7. (SBU) The bottom line for Meirelles was that Lula will win the first round, though not by an exceedingly wide margin. In the October 29 runoff, he said, Alckmin will have the advantage, because "in the second round, you don't choose a person, you reject a person," and Lula is known to have high negative numbers.
¶8. (SBU) Asked if former President Cardoso (FHC) would be campaigning for Alckmin, Meirelles said that had not yet been decided. The Lula campaign was trying to portray the Alckmin campaign as a throwback to the FHC years, and the candidate and strategists wanted to wait to see whether it looked like FHC would be more an asset than a liability.
------- COMMENT -------
¶9. (SBU) For Meirelles to talk optimistically is to be expected; nevertheless, much of what he says makes sense. Lula, who does indeed have high rejection numbers, may well have hit his ceiling, and Alckmin is certainly moving up, though he still has a long way to go. The Alckmin campaign does appear to be running much better than it was a month ago, and although Lula remains popular, he does have vulnerabilities. Assuming the election does go to a second round, as appears likely, Lula may still be the favorite, but his victory would by no means be a sure thing. END COMMENT.
¶10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Brasilia.
MCMULLEN