

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09SANAA2227, SA'ADA, MONTH FIVE: IS SALEH SERIOUS ABOUT ENDING
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09SANAA2227.
VZCZCXYZ0782
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHYN #2227/01 3501508
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 161508Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3400
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SANAA 002227
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PREF SA YM
SUBJECT: SA'ADA, MONTH FIVE: IS SALEH SERIOUS ABOUT ENDING
THE WAR?
REF: A. SANAA 2176
¶B. SANAA 2190
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY. A week after ceasefire negotiations between
the ROYG and the Houthis broke down, bombing continues apace
in war-torn Sa'ada governorate. President Saleh continues to
send signs that he is still committed to a military end to
the conflict and attempts at reaching a political solution to
date have been less than serious. Meanwhile, the civilian
death toll has mounted, with locals alleging that a single
Saudi airstrike in Razah district on December 13 killed
dozens of people. With Saudi Arabia's continuing involvement
in the war and regional support for Yemen against the Houthis
riding high during the Gulf Cooperation Council talks
December 14-15, Saleh appears less likely than ever to accept
anything but a full military defeat of the Houthi rebels.
END SUMMARY.
NEGOTIATIONS: ALL TALK?
-----------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Despite earlier reports that President Saleh was
seriously considering a political solution to the conflict,
negotiations ) at a standstill since at least December 7 )
have been replaced by renewed military efforts to rout the
Houthis (Ref A). In a cycle that has been repeated
throughout the five-year course of the war in Sa'ada, any
mediator whom Saleh perceives as "too close" to the Houthis
) from Presidential Advisor for Sa'ada Affairs Mohammed
Azzan to former Minister of Local Administration Abdulkader
al-Hillal ) is quickly discredited and pushed out of
negotiations. An animated Saleh used the occasion of a
December 9 meeting with D/D CIA Steve Kappes to criticize
al-Haq party chairman and Houthi mediator Hassan Zayd and
vowed to continue the war until the Houthis are beaten or
accepted the ROYG's five-point ceasefire proposal, long the
ROYG's stated condition for ending fighting (Ref B).
¶3. (S) On December 14, however, presidential advisor Dr.
Abdulkarim al-Eryani told the Ambassador that he believed
that in early December, Houthi leader Abdulkarim al-Houthi
had personally signed off on the five-point proposal, which
was then given to Saleh. (Note: Eryani said that he had not
personally seen the proposal with Houthi's signature, but had
been told about it. End Note.) In a December 16 meeting
with the Ambassador, Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and
Security Rashad al-Alimi said that although the ROYG would
theoretically accept a signed ceasefire agreement from the
Houthis, "The problem with the Houthis is that what they say
on the outside is completely different than what they are
thinking on the inside. The Houthis will not really concede
to a peace agreement while they believe they are strong.
They are not yet ready to surrender because they are not weak
enough." He indicated that the ROYG needed to keep hitting
the Houthis militarily in order to bring them to a point
where they would submit to a political settlement, which
Alimi confirmed was the real endgoal.
FULL STEAM AHEAD
----------------
¶4. (S/NF) With political talks on the back burner, the ROYG
has once again turned its full attention to its military
campaign in Sa'ada. In its attempt to put a permanent end to
the rebellion, the ROYG has turned to regular ground forces,
heavy air force bombardment, tribal militias, intelligence
and even special forces trained for counterterrorism
missions. President Saleh, addressing a group of "popular
forces" in Dhamar City on December 15, praised both regular
and irregular (tribal) recruits from Dhamar and Beidha
governorates, and promised even the irregular troops that
they would "have a place" in the official army camps after
they completed their duties in Sa'ada, where they were soon
to be sent. (Note: The ROYG has long relied on irregular
tribal militias as proxy fighters in the war against the
Houthis. End Note.) One platoon from the ROYG's elite
Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) remains in Sa'ada City, trying
to help the Ministry of Interior's Central Security Forces
rid the governorate's capital of Houthi fighters (septel).
Local media reported bloody street battles continuing in
Sa'ada City as of December 15. The National Security
Bureau's (NSB) Colonel Akram al-Qassmi told PolOff on
December 14 that NSB's officers were working "long hours" in
nearly round-the-clock operations to get better intelligence
on the Houthis.
¶5. (S) Yemen's strategy appears to be focused on taking
advantage of Saudi involvement to trap the rebels between
Saudi and Yemeni forces, according to NGA imagery and
analysis from mid-December. Although the Houthis are
battered and war-weary after four months of nonstop fighting,
they continue to register victories against Saudi and Yemeni
forces. Local media reports, confirmed by sensitive
reporting, indicate that dozens of Saudi soldiers have been
captured by the Houthis, who then use their uniforms and
weapons. While Deputy Prime Minister Alimi told the
Ambassador that he hoped this could be "the beginning of the
final stage" in the war against the Houthis and said that the
rebels had "sacrificed a lot" in operations across the Saudi
border and Sa'ada City, he acknowledged that the ROYG still
had a ways to go before they could declare an end to the
campaign.
AMIDST MORE DEATHS, ACCUSATIONS FLY
-----------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) Civilian as well as military casualties continue to
mount, according to local media reports, with a single
airstrike in Razah district on December 13 allegedly taking
as many as 70 lives and wounding up to 100 others. Houthi
media outlet almenpar.net has blamed Saudi warplanes for the
attack, which the ROYG quickly took credit for, denying Saudi
involvement. Houthi and Iranian media reported that U.S.
warplanes had directly bombed various regions of Sa'ada
governorate in "over 28 air raids" in Razah on December 14
and 15, a story later picked up by local and pan-Arab media.
(Note: This is the first time that the Houthis have alleged
direct U.S. involvement in the war. Previous claims were
limited to materiel and intelligence support to the ROYG and
SAG. End Note.) On December 15, local media carried a
Houthi statement alleging that 120 prisoners of war (NFI)
were killed and 44 others injured in what they claimed were
U.S. airstrikes on Houthi headquarters in northern Sa'ada.
Al-Bayan and Reuters correspondent Mohammed al-Ghobari told
PolOff on December 16 that the Houthis, feeling more
desperate and crunched by Yemeni and Saudi forces, were
making claims of U.S. involvement in the war to distract from
their heavy losses in the first weeks of December.
¶7. (SBU) Massive displacement of the local population
continues across Sa'ada, Amran, Hajja and al-Jawf
governorates, escalated by the pace and scale of Saudi
bombing in northern Sa'ada. The latest ROYG and UN estimates
put the number of IDPs over 200,000 by January 2010, the
highest to date in the five-year war. (Note: UNHCR estimated
that 175,400 IDPS were spread across Amran, Hajja, Sana'a,
Sa'ada, Jawf governorates and the Saudi border area as of
November 22. Of those, 75,000 IDPs remained in embattled
Sa'ada. End Note.) Minister of Planning and International
Cooperation Abdulkarim al-Arhabi used a December 14 meeting
with donors and the UN to beg donor countries to help the
ROYG "cope with the humanitarian situation in Sa'ada."
Security of and access to areas with IDP populations is still
incredibly poor, Human Rights Watch's Gerry Simpson told
PolOff on December 15.
THE GULF'S GOT YEMEN'S BACK
---------------------------
¶8. (S) Yemen joined Saudi Arabia in using the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) summit in Kuwait on December 14-15
to drum up support for its war against the Houthis.
According to Kuwaiti al-Watan newspaper, the GCC countries
discussed the need to use the "GCC Peninsula Shield," a
multinational quick-reaction force, against the Houthi rebels
and similar threats. Islah Secretary General Abdulwahab
al-Ansi told the Ambassador on December 15 that the ROYG was
"playing the Houthi card and the Iranian card" with not only
the U.S. but also the Gulf states, all of whom are concerned
over Iranian expansionism. Ansi, who was involved in
mediation efforts in Sa'ada dating back to 2004, questioned
Saleh's seriousness about ending the war at a time of
increased Gulf support for the ROYG. "Does he even want a
solution in Sa'ada?" Mohammed Naji al-Shaif, a Bakil tribal
confederation leader with close ties to Saleh, told EconOff
on December 15 that direct Saudi involvement in the Houthi
conflict had come as a tremendous relief to Saleh. With the
Saudis involved and the conflict seemingly one of regional,
not local concern, Saleh would seek to prolong, rather than
shorten, the ROYG,s campaign in order to draw more Saudi
military funding and deflect domestic political pressure,
according to Shaif.
COMMENT
-------
¶9. (S) Despite earlier indications of Saleh's willingness to
consider a political solution to the Houthi conflict, recent
events suggest that the president, sensing a new wave of
regional support and perhaps some Houthi blood in the water,
has redoubled his commitment to a military rout of the
rebels. Even with what was allegedly a signed ceasefire
agreement from Abdulmalik al-Houthi accepting all of the
ROYG's required concessions, Saleh chose not to call an end
to hostilities, either out of mistrust of the Houthis, or a
belief that they are starting to weaken. Instead, he and his
regime have upped the anti-Iran rhetoric, sent more troops to
the battlefield, sought to buy significant caches of new
weaponry and embraced Saudi Arabia's ongoing involvement.
Unfortunately for Saleh, facts on the ground appear to have
changed very little as the entrenched insurgency continues to
rage with Sa'ada's civilians caught in the crossfire. END
COMMENT.
SECHE