

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09BRASILIA41, THE FX2 COMPETITION -- THE GLIDEPATH TO SUCCESS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BRASILIA41.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BRASILIA41 | 2009-01-09 19:49 | 2010-12-05 12:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Brasilia |
VZCZCXRO3655
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0041/01 0091949
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 091949Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3280
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8907
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7090
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3332
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000041
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA AND PM, DEFENSE FOR DEPSECDEF, USDP, USD AT&L
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2019
TAGS: PREL ETTC MARR BR
SUBJECT: THE FX2 COMPETITION -- THE GLIDEPATH TO SUCCESS
REF: A. 08 BRASILIA 1589
¶B. 08 BRASILIA 1373 AND PREVIOUS
¶C. BRASILIA 34
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel. Reason 1.5 (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The Boeing F18 Super Hornet has had
success in establishing itself as a strong candidate to be
Brazil's next generation fighter but still faces strong
political opposition. To succeed, the USG and Boeing will
need a coordinated strategy aimed at highlighting the Super
Hornet's advantages, correcting misinformation and building
confidence in the USG's support for the purchase. Ideally,
this will involve ongoing outreach from the USG at high
levels to the key Brazilian decision makers. See Paragraph 9
for specific recommendations. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) As reported in ref a, the Boeing F18 Super Hornet
has become a serious option in Brazil's fighter competition,
and is acknowledged by contacts in the Brazilian Air Force as
offering the best plane for a competitive price. Although
these factors will continue to weigh in Boeing's favor, the
Super Hornet cannot at this point be considered the favorite
in the competition. There continues to be a strong
preconception among many in policy circles that a purchase
from France would be in Brazil's best interest, a view
strengthened by the recent, well-publicized visit of
President Sarkozy to Rio. Even though Sarkozy did not add
any new substance to the "strategic partnership" (deals to
sell helicopters and submarines were already well-known), the
optic of the Presidential visit has worked in Dassault's
favor.
¶3. (SBU) In the last week, there has been new focus in the
Brazilian press on the fighter purchase, including some
positive statements from Boeing officials and accurate
reporting that the Rafale's high price and limited
capabilities have caused it to lose every foreign sale for
which it has thus far competed. French representatives have
tried to spin the Rafale's dismal performance in the global
market to be the result USG political pressure rather than
the aircraft's shortcomings. The continuing challenge for
Boeing in press reporting is the ongoing assumption that
there is a risk to choosing the Super Hornet that the USG
will exercise some sort of "veto" over the sale at a later
date.
ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL BID
----------------------------
¶4. (C) As noted in reftels, the FX2 decision will not be
based on the capabilities of the aircraft selected and will
only be marginally influenced by the price. Brazilian
decision makers will be looking at the offers of the
competitors to determine which will benefit Brazil,
particularly Brazilian defense industry. Boeing, with its
worldwide business and access to commercial aircraft
production will have an attractive offer, but faces a
challenge. Both Dassault and Saab are offering essentially
new planes, not yet in production. They are therefore able
to offer Brazil whatever role it wants in the fabrication of
the planes, not just the final assembly that Boeing will
offer.
¶5. (C) Ref b highlighted the critical importance of
technology transfer. With current efforts in Washington to
approve technology sharing to the fullest extent possible, we
expect Boeing will have a strong offer by the Feb. 2 deadline
to respond to the Request for Proposal (RFP). It will be
vital, before the final response goes forward, to ensure that
it meets all Brazilian requirements. As noted in ref b, it
will be critical for the Boeing offer to keep open the
possibility of integrating Brazilian made weapons on the F18
at some point. Given the huge emphasis the new National
Defense Strategy places on support to Brazilian industry,
excluding any opportunity for indigenous products to be used
would be a major blow to Boeing's chances.
¶6. (C) It will be as important as approving the tech
transfer itself to overcome the assumption that the USG can
step in at a later date to restrict the transfer. While we
can explain that we stopped transfer of F16s to Venezuela
because of setbacks in democratic governance and interference
in the security of neighboring states -- circumstances
BRASILIA 00000041 002 OF 003
unthinkable in the Brazilian context -- the Brazilians tend
to take the fact that we stopped the transfer as evidence
that the United States is an unreliable supplier. To combat
this assumption will require ongoing high level USG
assurances, both directly to the Brazilian leadership and
publicly, that we can foresee no circumstance in which we
would restrict the transfer of fighters to Brazil. As the
State Department is perceived by Brazilians as the most
likely source of a potential veto, it will be critical for
high level Department involvement in this effort.
¶7. (C) In ref b, post reported on the Brazilian Air Force's
likely requirements for financing of the new fighters. With
the USG's long experience in Foreign Military sales, it
should be possible to work out a set of financing
arrangements that would offer an advantage over the
competition, especially since Boeing believes its aircraft
will have the lowest life cycle costs.
KEY PLAYERS
-----------
¶8. (C) The strongest supporters of the Super Hornet are
likely to be the military leadership, in particular Brazilian
Air Force chief Brig. Junito Saito, who we believe perceive
the Boeing offer as the best deal on the best aircraft and
see the United States military as the better choice of a
partner going forward. We may also be able to garner support
from Brazilian industry, including Embraer, if Boeing can
offer strong prospects for longer-term cooperation and mutual
profit. While the initial review of the proposals will be
done by the Air Force, final decisions will be made at higher
levels of the Brazilian government. The final decision will
be made by President Lula, who is likely to take a more
pragmatic view of which offer would most benefit Brazil, but
will also be swayed by arguments regarding how the purchase
will affect Brazil's standing as an independent global power.
In making a recommendation to Lula, Defense Minister Jobim
will play the key role at the policy level. While Jobim has
a good relationship with the USG, he has been a strong public
supporter of the strategic partnership with France. Foreign
Minister Amorim and Minister for Strategic Planning Roberto
Mangabeira Unger will also have a say; both see a purchase
from the U.S. as leading to an undesirable "dependency."
Finally, presidential advisors, including Civilian Household
Minister Dilma Rousseff and Foreign Policy Advisor Marco
Aurelio Garcia, will likely serve as sounding boards for Lula
as he makes a decision.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------
¶9. (C) As we look to the next three to four months as the
key period in which the fighter competition may be won, there
are several opportunities for the USG to maximize our chances:
-- The key step for the USG over the next month will be to
get the question of technology transfer right. While the
Brazilians will not get the keys to the proverbial candy
store, there should be enough sweeteners in Boeing's offer to
make the case that the Super Hornet includes the best tech.
The offer must also address the key points raised in ref b
(source codes, weapons integration, etc.).
-- Once the RFP response is in, we should be prepared to
raise the FX2 at every high level contact with Brazil. There
has been a perception that USG support is weak that needs to
be countered. The most effective way of doing so would be to
have President Obama make a strong statement advocating the
Super Hornet to President Lula at the earliest opportunity.
The President Elect's outstanding popularity with Brazilians,
the personal affinity that Lula has publicly expressed, and
the high expectations for relations with the new U.S.
Administration will ensure that his advocacy will have an
impact.
-- We should follow up the RFP response submission with
visits from appropriate officials to reassure the Brazilian
government of USG support for Boeing's proposal. Ideally,
this would begin with an interagency team (State, OSD, DTSA,
SOUTHCOM) visit in February at Assistant Secretary level to
try to put to rest the notion that there could be a USG veto.
Visits should include a public diplomacy component.
-- Government to government efforts should be supplemented
BRASILIA 00000041 003 OF 003
by improved outreach to highlight the advantages of the Super
Hornet and counter misinformation campaigns from the other
competitors that the USG will not be a reliable partner.
-- Washington agencies should be prepared to receive BRAF
finance representatives in February to discus likely
Brazilian requirements.
SOBEL