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Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI401, SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF GENERAL WILLIAM WARD TO LIBYA, MAY 21 REF: TRIPOLI 202 TRIPOLI 00000401 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TRIPOLI401 | 2009-05-18 15:49 | 2011-01-31 21:30 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli |
VZCZCXRO7122
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDBU RUEHDU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHMR RUEHNP RUEHPA
RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0401/01 1381549
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181549Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4828
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1468
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0818
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0942
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0880
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5358
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000401
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR CDR U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/18/2019
TAGS: OVIP WWARD PREL PGOV MARR MASS MCAP KPKO PINR
AU-I, CD, SU, LY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF GENERAL WILLIAM WARD TO LIBYA, MAY 21 REF: TRIPOLI 202 TRIPOLI 00000401 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1.(C) Summary: The two months since your last visit to Tripoli have been marked by key developments in the U.S.-Libya bilateral relationship and in regional security affairs. Your meeting with Muammar al-Qadhafi will afford a key opportunity to engage at the strategic level, explain U.S. Africa Command's mission and potentially mitigate possible Libyan obstruction of the Command's efforts on the continent. Al-Qadhafi is unlikely to become a vocal supporter of U.S. Africa Command, but his tacit acquiescence to its mission will be critical to deeper engagement. His desire for a successful chairmanship of the African Union could afford a useful point of leverage to gain quiet acceptance of U.S. Africa Command's efforts. During then-Secretary Rice's September 2008 visit, al-Qadhafi warned that U.S. military intervention on the continent concerned Africans and could encourage popular support for terrorism. Africa, he said, would be "greatly comforted" if U.S. Africa Command continued to base its operations in Europe. Your meeting with Foreign Minister Musa Kusa is a chance to engage in both a strategic discussion and a dialogue about specific potential areas of cooperation, which he can cast in terms palatable to Libya's leadership. National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi met with Secretary Clinton and National Security Advisor Jones, as well as the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security and the Deputy Director of CIA, during his April 21-24 visit to Washington. He asked for greater defense cooperation, speedy resolution to Libya's request to procure lethal military equipment and greater support for counter-terrorism (CT) and border security efforts. He reiterated Libya's aversion to membership in Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), saying the Tripoli-based Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the North Africa Standby Force (NASF) obviated TSCTP's mission. Your meeting with Muatassim will afford an opportunity to discuss specific cooperation opportunities and programs, including NASF. End summary. Key issues: -- Meeting with Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi -- Al-Qadhafi's Tenure as African Union Chairman: Promise & Peril -- Musa Kusa's growing Africa portfolio; -- Meeting Muatassim al-Qadhafi after his Washington visit; -- Engagement opportunities: North Africa Standby Force/Chad-Sudan Border Force; -- Lethal weapon sales to Libya
MEETING WITH LEADER MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI
2.(S/NF) Al-Qadhafi is a famously mercurial interlocutor: his comportment ranges from quiet and difficult to engage - he will sometimes go so far as to avoid eye contact altogether - to holding forth in rambling, non-linear fashion. He is keenly focused on African issues and credible reporting suggests that he genuinely aspires to be the founding father of a United States of Africa. He will be interested in hearing your views, but will be suspicious of U.S. Africa Command's potential ulterior motives and wary of how those could complicate his own efforts to strengthen his leadership role on the continent. As in his meeting with then-Secretary Rice, he will likely prefer a strategic and even philosophical discussion rather than an exchange focused on details.
3.(S/NF) Al-Qadhafi views himself as a man of particular historical importance and has long sought to leverage leadership of Libya into a more prominent trans-national role. His interest in Africa dates to the late-1980's and early 1990's, when it became clear that efforts to posit Libya as a leading Arab state were unlikely to succeed. Al-Qadhafi prides himself on Libya's humanitarian activities on the continent, which are primarily focused on improving conditions for women and children. In the mid-1970's, Libya established the Tripoli-based World Islamic Call Society (WICS), an educational institution mandated to provide Arabic language and religious training to foreign candidates for the Islamic clergy as a means to propagate more moderate iterations of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Al-Qadhafi and senior regime officials often point to WICS when claiming that Libya was ahead of the international community in recognizing the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism (invariably described as "Wahhabism") and moving to actively counter it. Libya also has significant commercial investments in sub-Saharan Africa, and has leveraged those as TRIPOLI 00000401 002.2 OF 003 part of its "dinar diplomacy" approach to managing relations on the continent.
4.(S/NF) In public remarks, al-Qadhafi excoriates European states for having colonized Africa and strongly argues against external interference in internal African affairs. He is marginally less strident in private and has negotiated a colonial compensation treaty with Italy and accepted EU assistance to counter illegal migration and bolster border security; however, a defining event for his regime was the expulsion of U.S. and British forces from the Wheelus and al-Adem airbases, respectively. The presence of non-African military elements in Libya or elsewhere on the continent remains a neuralgic issue for al-Qadhafi. In a meeting of CEN-SAD intelligence chiefs in Tripoli earlier this week, Libya's new External Security Organization Director decried as latter-day colonialism Western attempts to "interfere" in African security and intelligence affairs and argued that Africans could and should undertake counter-terrorism and intelligence efforts themselves. (Note: Despite that stated position, Libya seeks "support" in the form of training and equipment. End note.)
5.(S/NF) That said, Libya recognizes that African peacekeeping and regional security forces are poorly trained and equipped and may be amenable to U.S. assistance in these areas. Another area of potential cooperation is de-mining: we have proposed U.S. assistance (under UN auspices) for Libyan de-mining efforts. The UN is waiting for al-Qadhafi's approval (some contacts say he is reluctant to give up extensively mined zones on the Chadian and Egyptian borders) and is concerned that a DoD/U.S. affiliation could complicate the effort. Libya's recent efforts to persuade Tuareg tribes in the Libya-Chad-Niger-Algeria-Mali area to surrender their arms and publicly spurn cooperation with al-Qaeda elements in the Sahel is another potential area to explore, although he will likely resist offers of U.S. military cooperation in what he views as his backyard.
AL-QADHAFI'S TENURE AS CHAIRMAN OF THE AFRICAN UNION
6.(S/NF) Al-Qadhafi's chairmanship of the African Union represents the fulfillment of a long-term, closely held personal goal and coincides with an important period for the regime. Significant political events in 2009 also include the tenth anniversary of the Sirte Declaration that brought the AU into being, Libya's non-permanent UNSC chair, the likelihood that longtime Africa hand Ali Treiki will serve as President of the UN General Assembly, and the 40th anniversary of the bloodless coup that brought al-Qadhafi to power. Libya will seek to use al-Qadhafi's chairmanship to aggrandize him and promote his United States of Africa proposal; some sub-Saharan states appear to have already written off 2009-2010 as a "lost year" in terms of AU initiatives. That notwithstanding, it will be important to show appropriate deference to him and his perceived leadership role on the continent. Despite his warnings against Western interference in Africa, al-Qadhafi needs his AU chairmanship to be seen as a success - a potentially useful opening for increased engagement. When possible, crafting programs that give Libya a symbolic leadership role reduces the chance that al-Qadhafi will play the spoiler.
MUSA KUSA'S EXPANDING AFRICA PORTFOLIO
7.(S/NF) Musa Kusa was named Foreign Minister just before your last visit, and was dual-hatted as External Security Organization (ESO) chief for several weeks before a new External Security Organization Director was named. (Note: The extent to which Kusa has relinquished control of day-to-day intelligence operations remains unclear. The new ESO Director, Abuzeid Dorda, is a former Prime Minister and most recently served as the Chairman of the high-profile Housing and Infrastructure Board; however, he does not have experience in intelligence and security issues. End note.) Kusa frequently travels with Muammar al-Qadhafi and is a principal advisor on security matters. He is Western-educated - he holds an M.A. from Michigan State - and is seen as a strong supporter of re-engagement with the West. The Ambassador and GRPO have met him frequently and he has played a prominent role in U.S.-Libya relations and, more broadly, in Libya's foreign affairs. Since becoming Foreign Minister, he has assumed several portfolios previously held by other prominent regime figures, notably replacing Dr. Ali Treiki as point man for Chad-Sudan mediation. Kusa co-chaired a May 3 meeting in Doha with Qatari leaders at TRIPOLI 00000401 003.2 OF 003 which the two governments signed a normalization agreement, and co-chaired with the Qatari Minister of State a March 15 meeting in Tripoli aimed at uniting smaller Darfur rebel factions to facilitate peace talks with the Government of Sudan.
8.(S/NF) Kusa is a key mentor for Muatassim and served as his "minder" during the latter's first trip to the U.S. in September 2007 to attend the UN General Assembly. Muatassim made his latest trip without Kusa, but the two likely consult extensively on matters of security and intelligence. Kusa previously served (circa 2004-2006) as a mentor to Muatassim's brother and potential rival to succeed their father, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, and reportedly remains close to him. Kusa is the rare Libyan official who embodies a combination of intellectual acumen, operational ability and political weight. Promoting specific areas of cooperation with him is an opportunity to have him cast that message in terms palatable to Libya's leadership.
MEETING MUATASSIM POST-WASHINGTON
9.(S/NF) Muatassim visited Washington to meet high-level representatives from State, DoD, DHS, NSC and the CIA in late April. His talking points will be familiar to you: 1) Libya and its regional partners need U.S. training and equipment to adequately secure its borders and fight transnational terrorism; and 2) Libya has not been adequately compensated for its decision to give up its WMD programs and abandon terrorism in 2003. He stressed that Libya is anxious for a U.S. response to its request to procure lethal and non-lethal military equipment, and for resolution of the eight C-130s in Marietta, Georgia. State and DoD interlocutors urged him to initiate the proposed Political-Military Dialogue - the first round is provisionally scheduled to take place later this year at the Assistant Secretary-level - and noted that it is the appropriate venue in which to articulate a plan for bilateral military cooperation, to include procurement. Your Libyan interlocutors will be listening for a reaffirmation of a willingness to move the military component of the bilateral relationship forward.
SPECIFIC ENGAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES: STANDBY & BORDER FORCES
10.(S/NF) While in Washington, Muatassim again demurred when pressed on Libya's potential membership in TSCTP. He argued that the Tripoli-based (and Libyan-controlled) CEN-SAD already performs TSCTP's proposed mission and has the additional benefit of being led by African countries. In your last meeting with him, Muatassim asked for training and technical assistance for the North Africa Standby Force (NASF). Discussing specifics of proposed NASF-AFRICOM cooperation and stressing that capacity building is a major component of TSCTP would be helpful. In his meeting with Secretary Clinton, Muatassim characterized Darfur and the Chad-Sudan conflict as Libya's biggest security threat. Libya's efforts on Chad-Sudan include Libyan command of a 2,000-member border monitoring force (1,000 troops from both Chad and Sudan). While results of Libya's mediation have been mixed, proposing AFRICOM cooperation with the force may be an opportunity to demonstrate AFRICOM's capacity building focus to a skeptical Libyan audience. An additional issue to raise with Muatassim is proposed U.S. support for de-mining efforts under UN auspices.
TECHNOLOGY & WEAPONS SALES TO LIBYA
11.(S/NF) Muatassim raised the issue of the eight C-130s in Georgia with State's Political-Military (PM) office. PM said the U.S. would look favorably on requests for new aircraft (C-130J's), but the USG position remains that there will be no compensation for the old aircraft and Libya should work directly with Lockheed Martin to resolve the matter. He inquired about the status of Libya's outstanding requests for lethal and non-lethal equipment, warning that Libya would pursue acquisitions in other foreign markets if the USG is unable to respond soon. State and DoD have draft responses for many of the items, but some sales will be blocked due to ITAR concerns. The Embassy has submitted a draft end-use and transfer agreement to the MFA to enable some of the sales, but training Libyan procurement officials on U.S. legal requirements is essential to enable proposed sales. CRETZ