

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05TELAVIV4405,
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05TELAVIV4405.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05TELAVIV4405 | 2005-07-15 17:18 | 2011-01-26 10:00 | SECRET | Embassy Tel Aviv |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 004405
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2015
TAGS: PREL KWBG PTER IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) .
¶1. (C) Assistant Secretary Welch, Ambassador Kurtzer, Lt Gen Ward and NSC Director Mustafa met with MGen Moshe Kaplinsky, the IDF Deputy Chief of the General Staff, BGen Yossi Kuperwasser, IDI Chief of Production, and BGen Udi Dekel, Chief of Strategic Planning Branch, in the evening of July 14. The previously planned meeting took place shortly after news came in that a Qassam rocket fired into Israel from the Gaza Strip had killed an Israeli woman in Nativ Ha Asara.
---------------
Recent Violence
---------------
¶2. (C) Reviewing events of the day (July 14), BGen Kuperwasser reported that IDF soldiers killed a wanted PIJ activist with ties to the al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade early that morning in the Rafidiya neighborhood of Nablus. The PIJ organization in Gaza reacted by firing a Qassam rocket that impacted near the Israeli city of Sderot on Thursday morning, causing no casualties. PIJ cells fired additional rockets and mortars at Israeli targets in the Gush Katif settlement block. Hamas was not active during the morning events.
--------------------
Hamas Joins the Fray
--------------------
¶3. (C) Hamas cells, however, joined the attacks after 1200 hrs, firing four mortars and/or rockets that impacted Nahal Oz (inside the Green Line), lightly injuring three IDF soldiers, Kuperwasser explained. Cells also fired rockets and mortars at Israeli targets in and near the Gaza Strip. At approximately 1800 hrs, four rockets struck the Netiv Ha Asara moshav inside Israel north of Gaza, killing the 22-year-old Israeli woman and wounding her boyfriend, Kuperwasser stated. 4. (S) Hamas involvement in the fighting was likely due to two factors, Kuperwasser assessed. First, Hamas was unhappy with how PA President Abbas translated the results of his recent meeting with Hamas leader Khalid al Mashal in Damascus. Hamas believed that Abbas had agreed to allow the "follow-up committee" composed of representatives from the opposition, including Hamas, to participate in operational decisions in running the Gaza Strip through disengagement prior to the PLC elections. Abbas, according Kuperwasser, may have left Mashal with that impression in Damascus, but when Abbas returned home to strong criticism from his own party, advised opposition groups that they would only have an advisory role in Gaza administration. Kuperwasser said he believes that Hamas displayed its displeasure by "welcoming" Abbas' arrival in Gaza on the afternoon of July 14 with the attacks on Israeli targets, thus sending a strong message to Abbas that it would act in any matter it felt appropriate without consulting him. The attacks placed Abbas under enormous pressure. Kuperwasser also acknowledged that Hamas joined the fighting on Thursday afternoon in response to continued IDF operations in the northern West Bank.
----------------------------
PA-IDF Security Coordination
----------------------------
¶5. (S) MGen Kaplinsky characterized overall security coordination with the PA in recent weeks as very good. He stated that there have been three meetings with PA MOI MGen Nasir Yusif's deputy, BGen Jamal Abu Zayd ) one that he attended, and two attended by MGen "Haki" Harel, the IDF chief of Planning Branch. The meetings have been good, he stated, very "sincere," with wide representation from all of the PA security organizations. The two sides agreed to meet every 10-14 days at the operational level, with each meeting followed up by meetings between field commanders. Kaplinsky said that coordination has been good, with both sides talking about specifics on the map. The two sides, he stated, have also agreed to conduct joint exercises (scheduled for early August). Kaplinsky stated that the IDF still intended to meet with PA counterparts next week, despite the ongoing attacks.
¶6. (S) Unfortunately, Kaplinsky stated, despite the good coordination, no results are apparent on the ground. This led him to conclude that the PA counterparts with whom the IDF is coordinating do not have power over forces on the ground. Nasir Yusif's influence on the ground, he stated, is poor. During every meeting with the PA, he said, the IDF drives home the point that it will not disengage under fire. Disengagement, however, has begun and "we are under fire." Kaplinsky gave credit to the PA for its efforts against smuggling tunnels. The PA's inability, however, to arrest Hassan Madhun, the Fatah cell leader responsible for numerous attacks against the Gaza crossing facilities, underscored its overall ineffectiveness. The IDF, he stated, will continue to talk and coordinate with the PA, but it is not happy with the level of PA activity on the ground.
¶7. (S) Ambassador Kurtzer asked Kaplinsky what realistic steps he would counsel Nasir Yusif to take if he were Yusif's advisor. Kaplinsky said he would would first advise Yusif to take action against PIJ. PIJ is a small group, without popular Palestinian support. Nasir Yusif has the capability to challenge PIJ, even with his divided forces. He should stop them from conducting attacks and arrest them. Second, Kaplinsky continued, the PA leadership should provide support to commanders who undertake difficult actions against opposition groups on the ground. It is critical that the PA leadership provide moral and verbal support to its commanders in the field. Kaplinsky's third hypothetical suggestion was to strengthen the "determination" of PA leaders to ensure that orders, once given, are fulfilled. LT Gen Ward concurred, stressing the need to verify that orders have been implemented.
¶8. (S) Welch commended the IDF for its "huge" step forward in coordination with the PA, and stressed the importance of continuing the coordination. Ward underscored that the types of attacks now occurring come as no surprise, because everyone expected opposition elements to attempt to derail disengagement. What matters is not playing into the hands of these elements.
¶9. (S) Welch asked if the PA had contacted the IDF for permission to transfer PIJ member XXXXX from Tulkarm to the PA prison in Jericho. Kaplinsky and Kuperwasser said they were not certain whether the PA had made such a request, but stated that the IDF normally authorized such transfers. Kuperwasser explained, however, that Nasir Yusif's forces did not have control of Saadi. PA Special Forces personnel under Bashir Nafiah were housing him and several other PIJ members in his headquarters in Tulkarm, to the consternation and protest of the local National Security Forces commander.
¶10. (S) Turning to another PIJ figure from Tulkarm, Kuperwasser recounted that PIJ leader Louay al Saadi was released from Israeli prison in January 2004 as part of the Hizballah prisoner exchange deal. Saadi returned to the Tulkarm area and began organizing terror attacks. Kuperwasser said that Saadi is responsible for the February 25 suicide bombing at the Stage Club Tel Aviv, the car bomb that exploded near Mevo Dotan following the Stage Club attack, the killing of a Hermesh resident in a shooting attack on his vehicle an attempt to send two bombers into Jerusalem on May 31, the July 12 suicide bombing in Netanya and car bomb near Shavei Shomron. Kuperwasser said that the PA security forces in Tulkarm had close contacts with Saadi, in an attempt to recruit him and his cell members into the security forces. President Abbas, he said, was aware of the effort and was disappointed that Saadi refused to join, now realizing he cannot be integrated into the PA.
---------------
Netanya Bombing
---------------
¶11. (S) Kuperwasser charged that PIJ cells in the territories maintain close ties with PIJ headquarters in Damascus, which, for example, regularly provides funds, particularly following successful operations. He said that Louay al-Saadi received two payments of $15,000 each following the Stage attack. Damascus also has provided operational guidance to the field. There was a debate within the Damascus headquarters concerning whether it should support the "tahdiya," or calm, Kuperwasser explained, but as far as he knew no instructions were ever sent to the field telling it to cease operations. A couple of days prior to the Netanya bombing, Kuperwasser said that Saadi's organization provided "hints" to the Damascus leadership that it was planning an attack. The IDF was not able to decipher the "hints", but assumes that Damascus did not object to the attack. Following the Netanya attack, the Tulkarm-based cell admitted to the attack in messages to Damascus. Damascus, he said, showed no dismay over the message, and in fact was pleased. In the meantime, the Tulkarm PIJ took responsibility for the attack publicly through Reuters/al Jazira. The Damascus-based PIJ leadership instructed its leaders in Gaza to "clarify" with the PA that it was not/not behind the attack. Likewise, Kuperwasser stated, the Damascus-based PIJ headquarters ordered groups in Lebanon and Syria not/not to talk.
¶12. (S) Following the attack, Kuperwasser continued, President Abbas attempted to convince the Damascus-based PIJ leadership not to admit to being behind the attack. Abbas, according to Kuperwasser, made an enormous effort to reach the Damascus leadership, arguing that admitting to the attack could lead to the collapse of the "cease-fire". PIJ leadership subsequently announced July 14 that it was bound to the "tahdiya" as long as Israel refrained from targeting the group, essentially stating that it was not bound to the cease-fire, Kuperwasser commented. (Note: Abbas issued orders to arrest Saadi on the evening of July 14.)
--------------
Sensitive Time
--------------
¶13. (S) BGEN Dekel commented that we are in a sensitive period, as disengagement has, for all practical purposes, already begun. Details are not important, he continued; the PA must take actions to stop the terror. Kuperwasser pointed out that Abbas had used the word "terror" in his denouncement of the Netanya bombing, his first public use of the word in such a context since 2003. No other PA leaders, however, have followed his lead, he commented. The PA must treat these attacks as terror, if progress is to be made, he said. Kaplinsky closed the meeting by reaffirming the IDF commitment to continue to coordinate with the PA in the hope that the process would lead to results on the ground. 14. (U) A/S Welch, Lt. Gen. Ward and Ms. Mustafa cleared this message. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** KURTZER