

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07HELSINKI689, SCENESETTER: PDAS VOLKER'S SEPT. 13-15 VISIT TO
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07HELSINKI689.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07HELSINKI689 | 2007-09-07 13:24 | 2011-04-24 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Helsinki |
VZCZCXYZ0008
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHHE #0689/01 2501324
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071324Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3730
INFO RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 4186
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0949
UNCLAS HELSINKI 000689
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/MELISSA BUCK AND EUR/NB KEITH ANDERTON
AND KATIE GARRY
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: FI PREL PGOV MARR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: PDAS VOLKER'S SEPT. 13-15 VISIT TO
HELSINKI
REF: A. HELSINKI 416
¶B. HELSINKI 639
¶C. HELSINKI 682
SUMMARY / INTRODUCTION
----------------------
¶1. (SBU): The Embassy warmly welcomes you to Helsinki and
views your visit as a key opportunity to advance the most
important issues on the US-Finland agenda. Afghanistan
and NATO top the list, as both are the subject of intense
domestic political discussion right now. Many in the new
government are eager for Finland to increase aid and
troop commitments to NATO/ISAF, but they face a tough
political battle with the opposition and with NATO
skeptics within their own governing coalition. A similar
debate surrounds a pending decision on joining the NRF.
Your public and private messages can help tip the
Afghanistan and NRF arguments in a positive direction.
Your official meetings offer opportunities to bolster our
already strong collaboration on Kosovo and, perhaps, to
chart a more dynamic course on Russia, democracy in the
Near Neighborhood, and Finland's 2008 OSCE Presidency.
On the public diplomacy side, NATO and Afghanistan will
again be key, and we also stand to make some headway with
strong messages on climate change, missile defense and
the Middle East. "Watch-out fors" include lethal weapons
for Afghanistan, which has become politically very
difficult here, and insistent requests by the Finns for
POTUS and SecState meetings. END SUMMARY.
AFGHANISTAN
-----------
¶2. (SBU) Finland's solid contributions to NATO/ISAF and
to Afghan reconstruction will continue; our challenge now
is finding ways to help the GOF do more. Afghanistan
will receive $12 million in annual assistance for at
least the next six years, and the GOF is finalizing the
transfer of most if its 104 peacekeepers from a
Norwegian-led PRT in Meymaneh to the Swedish-led PRT at
Mazar-al-Sharif. We hope to see Finland increase its
troop commitments, with a view toward taking leadership
of the Mazar PRT in 2009. The Finns embed a small,
highly effective civilian liaison team at Meymenah that
targets development projects to support the PRT and which
has won kudos from US commanders in Afghanistan for its
effectiveness in building local community support for the
PRT's efforts. Taking leadership at Mazar in 2009 would
allow Finland to implement that model there.
¶3. (SBU) Domestically, Afghanistan is the subject of an
intense political debate right now. At the time of your
visit, the government will be finalizing a major report
that examines all aspects of the security situation and
makes recommendations on how/if Finland's role there
should expand (Reftels A and B). The MOD and MFA would
like to see increased troop contributions to NATO/ISAF,
PRT leadership in 2009, and more development and
counternarcotics assistance. Conservative Party members
of government -- led by FM Ilkka Kanerva and MOD Jyri
Hakamies -- support these recommendations, but are
running into increasingly vocal opposition not only from
outside government, but also from the NATO nay-sayers
within the governing coalition (in particular the Center
Party). We intend to include some of these skeptics in
the events on your schedule; your public and private
comments to them indicating the value the US attaches to
Finland's current contributions; how impressed we are
with Finland's PRT-CMO coordination model; and the
importance to Washington of what Finland is doing in
Afghanistan will be extremely timely and can help
influence the autumn debate in a positive direction.
"WATCH OUT FOR" NO. 1: LETHAL WEAPONS TO AFGHANISTAN
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶4. (SBU) Washington and Kabul have long hoped that
Finland would make a lethal weapons donation to support
the Afghan security forces. However, this issue has
become political poison here and threatens to derail our
efforts to get Finland to do more in Afghanistan.
President Halonen adamantly rejects the idea, and PM
Vanhanen is clearly uncomfortable with it. Even
Conservatives like Hakamies, who personally support a
donation, have backed away, recognizing that pressing too
hard could cause Halonen (and probably even Vanhanen) to
veto their efforts to have Finland do more in Afghanistan
in other areas. At this juncture, we should avoid
pressing the Finns for a lethal donation that could
derail our efforts to achieve other important goals such
as more troops, more aid, and PRT leadership.
NATO AND THE NRF
----------------
¶5. (SBU) Finland has EU Battlegroup commitments through
mid-2008, but the MOD and MFA see Finnish participation
in the NRF as a good complement to the Battlegroups -- a
view we have actively supported. Conservatives in
government would like nothing better than to join Sweden
in formally announcing that Finland will join the NRF at
NATO's Global Force Generation conference in November, in
hopes of standing up troops for the Danish-led NRF in
¶2010. Unfortunately, the die-hard NATO naysayers in
government (Center Party) and in opposition (about half
the Social Democrats and some smaller parties) who
adamantly oppose Finland's joining NATO have now begun
alleging that the NRF is simply a 'slippery slope' to
NATO membership. Their argument is of course specious,
and messages you deliver that (1) point to how the NRF
can complement EU Battle Group participation and (2)
clarify that NATO membership and NRF participation are
entirely separate decisions will help keep this debate
fact-based.
KOSOVO
------
¶6. (SBU) Kosovo is one of Finland's highest foreign
policy priorities. The GOF has been one of our
staunchest allies and has worked hard behind the scenes
to ensure EU unity in support of Ahtisaari's final
status. Finland has more than 400 troops on the ground,
provides extensive aid, and is actively engaged in the
CFSP Planning Mission. The GOF is quietly becoming
concerned that the lack of a way forward may begin to
undermine international efforts and will not support
delays beyond the current Troika-led negotiating period
(Reftel C). The GOF has not made a national decision as
to how it will react at the end of the current
negotiating period if Kosovo unilaterally declares
independence, and is adamant about not publicly
discussing any kind of Plan B. That said, officials
will welcome an exchange of views on this and will be
open to Washington's latest thinking.
RUSSIA, DEMOCRACY AND THE NEAR NEIGHBORHOOD
-------------------------------------------
¶7. (SBU) The general views of the USG and the GOF are in
close harmony when it comes to support for democracy,
civil society and human rights in Russia and Europe's new
neighborhood. Finland is already engaged in some
activities that complement US Freedom Agenda goals,
including support to environmental NGOs in Russia;
educational exchanges in Russia and Belarus; and funding
for the International Humanities University for
Belarusian exiles in Vilnius. GOF leaders have hosted
high-level meetings with Belarusian opposition leaders,
with Serb moderates, and with pro-democracy forces in
Ukraine and the Caucuses. The Estonian Bronze Statue
crisis also emboldened the GOF to move away from the
traditional Finnish propensity to acquiesce to Russia on
tough issues. Indeed, under the new government the GOF
has begun publicly to challenge Moscow's policies and
actions in ways the previous government eschewed. The
GOF is recognizing the need to speak out on heavy-handed
Russian trade practices -- especially on energy issues
and timber tariffs which directly affect Finland. Most
recently, MOD Hakamies used his Sept. 5-7 visit to
Washington to identify Russia as Finland's single most
important security challenge.
¶8. (SBU) Many Finns, however, are not yet fully
comfortable with challenging Russia, and there is
lingering reticence about taking too high profile a role
in pressing for greater democracy elsewhere. You can
nudge interlocutors in the right direction by expressing
appreciation for what Finland (and certain Finns, like
Ahtisaari and EU Commissioner Olli Rehn) have done in
these areas; by encouraging greater US-EU and US-Finland
coordination in dealing with Russia; by encouraging Finns
to play an even more active role in showing public
support for pro-democracy leaders; and by urging high-
level Finnish visits to countries where they can reach
out to democratic forces -- with Belarus, Ukraine and the
Balkans being perhaps the best fits in this regard.
FINLAND'S 2008 OSCE PRESIDENCY
------------------------------
¶9. (SBU) Finland's agenda for its Presidency has some
positive elements, as well as others that are of less
interest. In the latter category, for example, Finland's
announced focus on European inland waterway issues is
less than stirring from a US perspective; however, by
emphasizing our priorities we can encourage more
leadership in other areas. One option is democracy.
Finns can be counted on to focus heavily on the good work
the OSCE does with election monitoring and institution
building, although the GOF will need active support from
us and other like-minded countries in countering the
efforts of certain OSCE members to weaken the
Organization in these areas. On a particularly positive
note, the Finns have told us that they intend to use
their Presidency as a springboard to become more involved
in promoting democracy and freedom within many member
states -- an initiative that, with the right
encouragement, could have a very positive impact on our
Freedom Agenda priorities (see above).
"WATCH OUT FOR" NO. 2: HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS
------------------------------------------
¶10. (SBU) The Finns will use their OSCE Presidency (as
well as other issues) to press for S-Kanerva and POTUS-
Halonen meetings. While the S-Kanerva meeting in June
was very successful for both sides, you will want to be
prepared to urge the Finns to be realistic about how
difficult it is to schedule these high level visits.
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
----------------
¶11. (SBU) We have programmed a heavy dose of PD into your
schedule, including an on-the-record speech (Topic:
"Finland, NATO and Afghanistan"), a "background" lunch
roundtable with leading editors and columnists, and an
on-the-record session with the electronic media and print
journalists. As noted above, your messages on NATO/ISAF
and the value the US places on Finland's doing more in
Afghanistan are the most timely and topical at this
moment. In addition, there will be strong interest in
the Administration's newest efforts to confront climate
change; in terrorism and other security-related issues;
and in your general assessments of the trans-Atlantic
relationship, NATO/EU cooperation; the US role in the
Middle East Peace Process and, to a lesser extent, Iraq;
and the current policy environment in Washington. All
your PD events offer a good opportunity to present the
facts surrounding Missile Defense, and the Finns will be
particularly interested in whatever you can share
regarding US efforts to create a dialogue with Russia.
HYATT