

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07TELAVIV867, ISRAELI TRANSPORTATION MINISTER MOFAZ ON IRAN AND
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07TELAVIV867.
VZCZCXRO0881
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHTV #0867/01 0800614
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 210614Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0116
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000867
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR KPAL KWBG SY LE IR IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI TRANSPORTATION MINISTER MOFAZ ON IRAN AND
NORTH KOREA, LEBANON AND SYRIA, AND THE PALESTINIANS
REF: TEL AVIV 831
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (S) During a March 14 meeting devoted to a variety of
issues, Israeli Transportation Minister Shaul Mofaz praised
the latest session of the U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogue, and
noted that he would soon begin preparing for the next session
scheduled for May 7-8 in Washington. Mofaz, who has the GOI
lead on the Strategic Dialogue, said he hopes to meet with
Under Secretary Burns when he visits Israel the second half
of April. Mofaz asked about U.S. thinking on the way ahead
on Iran's nuclear program, and said that he will likely
discuss Iran during his visit to China the week of March 18.
Mofaz considered the agreement with North Korea on its
nuclear program encouraging, and expressed his hope that Iran
is watching and will realize the benefits of renouncing its
own nuclear program. Mofaz urged that more work be done by
the international community to address gaps in UNSCR 1701
implementation that are allowing Hizballah to rebuild its
capabilities in Lebanon. He expressed skepticism that a
Palestinian National Unity Government will accept the Quartet
principles, and lamented that Iran's role in Palestinian
affairs has dramatically increased since 2002. Nevertheless,
Mofaz agreed that it is in Israel's interest to keep the
Karni crossing open as much as possible, and noted his
understanding that payment problems that caused recent
Palestinian strikes, which closed the crossing, had been
resolved. Reftel addresses Mofaz's comments about
negotiating an Open Skies agreement. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- --------
U.S. - ISRAEL STRATEGIC DIALOGUE AND ASSISTANCE TALKS
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶2. (S) Mofaz, who led the Israeli side in the January 2007
session of the U.S. - Israel Strategic Dialogue,
characterized the session as a very good one and said that he
would begin preparing for the next session (to be held in
Washington May 7-8) in the coming weeks. He asked about the
Ambassador's participation in recent U.S.-Israel discussions
on the future of U.S. assistance to Israel -- specifically
whether the U.S. has plans to increase its support for
Israel's defense. The Ambassador replied that discussions
focused mainly on the Israeli economy and its relationship to
Israel's security needs, and noted that specific assistance
requests were not discussed. The Ambassador noted that it
might be wise to link future defense assistance to other
policies, such as U.S. loan guarantees to Israel had been.
The Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. loan guarantee
program to Israel has been very successful in maintaining
sound fiscal policies even when governments change.
Ambassador Jones stressed that the discussions with the
Israeli side were positive, and that the U.S. side reiterated
America's strong commitment to Israel's security.
¶3. (C) The Ambassador noted that Under Secretary Burns is
planning to visit Israel during the second half of April.
Mofaz said that he will want to meet with the Under Secretary
while he is in Israel to consult on the agenda for the next
Strategic Dialogue.
-----------------------------------------
IRAN: MOFAZ LIKELY TO DISCUSS IT IN CHINA
-----------------------------------------
¶4. (S) Mofaz said Iran was the main issue during the last
round of the Strategic Dialogue, and expressed his
understanding that U.S. policy is to implement tougher
sanctions against Iran, and pursue a second UNSC resolution.
He wondered if a second resolution would widen the sanctions
called for in UNSCR 1737, or call on UN member states to
implement unilateral sanctions against Iran. The Ambassador
clarified the U.S. is looking at additional sanctions under a
UNSC resolution, and is also encouraging partners to apply
unilateral sanctions against Iran. He noted the Under
Secretary's recent discussions with the P-5 1 Political
SIPDIS
Directors, and U.S. efforts to get the Germans to stop
providing export credits to companies doing business with
Iran.
¶5. (S) The Ambassador noted Under Secretary Joseph and
Assistant Secretary Rood's recent visit to Israel and their
discussions with a GOI interagency team on nonproliferation
TEL AVIV 00000867 002 OF 003
and arms control issues. He stressed that their talks
followed-up on many of the issues that were considered during
the Strategic Dialogue. Mofaz said that he believes that
financial sanctions against Iran are working. The Ambassador
confirmed this, observing that UNSCR 1737 sent a message to
the international business community that doing business with
Iran could become increasingly risky.
¶6. (S) Mofaz asked about China's current position on Iran,
noting that he would be in China the week of March 18 to
discuss transportation issues with Chinese officials. He
said he will spend four days in China, and added that he was
responding to an invitation issued to him while he was
Defense Minister. Mofaz said that he will meet with the head
of a parliamentary committee that deals with Iran, and so
will likely end up discussing Iran while he is there. The
Ambassador observed that if the Chinese want to preclude the
U.S. from taking more energetic action in Iran -- as their
public posture suggests -- it would be in their interest to
be more cooperative with the U.S. diplomatically.
-----------------------------------------
NORTH KOREA: MOFAZ HOPES IRAN IS WATCHING
-----------------------------------------
¶7. (S) Mofaz asked about the latest agreement with North
Korea. The Ambassador noted that bilateral talks had been
held with the North Koreans, and that the dialogue appeared
to be proceeding well. He stressed that the U.S. is
committed to dismantling North Korea's nuclear reactor, news
which Mofaz welcomed. The Ambassador added that part of the
strategy is to convince the North Koreans that the U.S. has
no hostile intent, and that North Korea could ultimately
benefit from renouncing its nuclear program. Mofaz said that
he hoped that Iran is watching the situation closely and will
decide to follow suit.
--------------------------------------------- -
LEBANON AND SYRIA: MOFAZ URGES MORE TO BE DONE
--------------------------------------------- -
¶8. (S) Turning to Lebanon, Syria and UNSCR 1701, Mofaz
claimed that there is no effective embargo on arms going into
Lebanon, and that Syria has moved long-range rockets into
Lebanon. He complained that Hizballah has not been
"dismantled," that neither the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
nor UNIFIL have tried to enter areas that are currently
controlled by Hizballah, and that no timetable for the return
of the kidnapped Israeli soldiers has emerged. Mofaz said
that he told Secretary Rice and Under Secretary Burns during
his visit to Washington in September that Hizballah will
spare no effort to topple the Siniora government in Lebanon.
He pointed to Hizballah's activities over the past few months
as evidence of this effort, and warned that it will continue.
Mofaz urged that more pressure be applied to Syria, Iran and
Hizballah, and cautioned that the international community
will not keep its forces deployed in southern Lebanon for 5-6
more years: "Hostilities will start up again one day. It is
just a matter of time." Mofaz said that as Deputy Prime
Minister, he is privy to daily intelligence reports, and that
he is seeing increasing indications that Al Qaeda and the
Islamic Jihad are active in Lebanon.
¶9. (S) The Ambassador noted that the U.S. wants to provide
military equipment to the LAF, and that equipment lists have
been provided to the Israeli Prime Minister's Office and the
MOD for review. He said that the list includes encrypted
radios, night-vision goggles (NVGs), and anti-tank weapons
that are less capable than those already possessed by the
LAF. The Ambassador urged that Israel agree to allow this
equipment to be turned over to the LAF. Regarding NVGs,
Ambassador Jones stressed that a recent audit determined that
all NVGs previously supplied to the LAF had been accounted
for. He added, "We are confident that the LAF will honor our
restrictions on our equipment, and that we can address any
concerns you may have about specific equipment items." The
Ambassador stressed that the USG wants to strengthen the
GOL's capabilities so that it can stand up to Hizballah and
other militias. Mofaz cautioned that, according to Israel's
information, at least fifty percent of the LAF are Shia. He
warned that this could make it difficult for the LAF to
confront Hizballah.
¶10. (S) The Ambassador noted that Israeli Defense
Intelligence Research Division Chief BGEN Yossi Baidatz's
recent briefings at the UN on Israel's perspective of the
situation in Lebanon were very well received and will help
member states to recognize that arms smuggling continues and
TEL AVIV 00000867 003 OF 003
the situation along the Syrian-Lebanese border remains
problematic. The Ambassador stressed that it would be useful
and greatly appreciated if Baidatz could make the same
presentation to the Germans, as it would demonstrate that
they need to do more on border security. Mofaz said that he
is convinced that such information sharing is very helpful,
and that what is needed is to build "common understanding" of
a problem. Mofaz noted that IDF Planning Division Chief Ido
Nehustan had been in France a month earlier and had shared
the same information with the French, although not in as
great detail.
--------------------------------------------- --------------
MOFAZ DOUBTS PALESTINIAN NUG WILL ACCEPT QUARTET PRINCIPLES
--------------------------------------------- --------------
¶11. (S) Mofaz noted his skepticism that any Palestinian
National Unity Government (NUG) would accept the Quartet
principles and move in directions that Israel wants. He
added that he cannot imagine that Fatah and Hamas will agree
to work with each other -- even over the long run: "Hamas is
much stronger than Fatah in Gaza. They hope to gain power in
the future. I do not see Abu Mazen taking control of Hamas.
Khaled Meshal has incredible power, and he is getting
direction from Iran." Characterizing the last ten years as a
"lost decade" in the Palestinian Authority (PA), Mofaz
complained that Abu Mazen suffers from a weak personality,
while influence from the outside is increasing. He observed
that eight years ago, Iran had no influence in the PA, while
now, its influence is significant. Mofaz recalled that
Iran's role was revealed when the IDF seized the Karine A in
January 2002, and found it loaded with Iranian weapons
destined for the PA.
¶12. (S) The Ambassador stressed that the U.S. is fully
committed to the Quartet principles, and is withholding
judgment on the NUG until it is formed. He stressed that
solving the Israel-Palestinian crisis sooner rather than
later would be in Israel's interests, especially as its own
intelligence suggests that Hamas is urgently seeking weapons
systems of the kind that Hizballah is receiving, and is
sending its operatives to Iran for training. The Ambassador
observed that the Saudi Initiative may be a way to expand the
peace camp in the region and bring moderate Arabs around to
support peace with Israel. Mofaz expressed concern that
there appears to be nobody in Fatah who could serve as a
leader of the PA after Abu Mazen. The Ambassador noted that
Secretary Rice would be in Israel shortly and press for
SIPDIS
progress on peace.
---------------------------------------------
MOFAZ IN FAVOR OF KEEPING KARNI CROSSING OPEN
---------------------------------------------
¶13. (S) On the Karni crossing, Mofaz said that his ministry's
only role is to provide funding for the workers in order to
extend the crossing hours as promised by PM Olmert, and that
he is in favor of keeping open the crossing at night. He
said that agreement had recently been reached that extended
hours would start in mid-April. He added that the number of
cargo trucks passing through the crossing in both directions
had steadily increased in recent months. The Ambassador
agreed, noting that the USG was closely monitoring the truck
flow. He stressed that unemployment that results from
shutting down the Karni crossing only helps Hamas in Gaza.
Mofaz agreed.
********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
JONES