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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06PARIS1966, FORMER PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING ON A TROUBLED
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06PARIS1966 | 2006-03-27 16:28 | 2011-02-10 08:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
Appears in these articles: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/documents-wikileaks/article/2011/02/09/wikileaks-les-visiteurs-de-l-ambassade_1477418_1446239.htm |
VZCZCXRO2980
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #1966/01 0861628
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271628Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5635
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001966
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ELAB FR EUN PINR
SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING ON A TROUBLED
FRANCE, UPCOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, AND NEXT STEPS FOR
THE EU
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a March 21 meeting with the Ambassador,
Former President Valery Giscard d'Estaing characterized the
current social upheaval in France over the First Employment
Contract as the latest episode in France's deep-seated
resistance to change ("in no way pre-revolutionary"). He
argued for change through the creation of prosperity --
either through "shock treatment" or more incremental steps --
as the only way forward. Giscard seemed to view a Segolene
Royal/Dominique Strauss-Kahn ticket as representing the
center-left's best chance for victory in the 2007
presidential elections, although these two mainstream
politicians might have difficulty obtaining the support of
the Socialist party's left wing. While clearly not enamored
of Nicolas Sarkozy, whom he viewed as lacking in true
presidential stature, Giscard was convinced he would be the
candidate on the center-right, barring some unforeseen crisis
that would allow Chirac to continue. Giscard argued that
French voters are not anti-EU but are anti-enlargement. He
asserted that they will be prepared after the elections to
vote again on the EU constitutional treaty or renegotiate the
existing text, but worried that the UK is drifting away from
Europe. He lamented the absence of a true European leader,
with the potential exception of German Chancellor Merkel, but
described the Franco-German relationship as a rock for the
ages. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) The Ambassador met March 21 with a relaxed,
expansive, and incisively insightful former centrist
President Valery Giscard d'Estaing to discuss the current
wave of unrest sweeping across France in opposition to the
First Employment Contract (CPE), the domestic political scene
in the run-up to the 2007 presidential elections, and next
steps for Europe.
CPE AND FRENCH AMBIVALENCE TOWARD CHANGE
----------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Asked for his assessment of the current wave of
strikes and demonstrations in reaction to the CPE, Giscard
explained that regular bouts of turbulence were the norm for
France since the French Revolution and reflected the deep
reluctance, even resistance, of French society to change.
This partly reflected France's history as a nation of
hard-working, taciturn farmers, not open to the world, who
had little in common with the free-traders of the Netherlands
or the UK. While French society had produced its own "model"
and could claim a glorious past, the fact was that its model
was now obsolete, and no longer capable of producing economic
growth. Giscard described a society on the defensive,
characterized psychologically by negativism and rejection of
anything new. This, as much as anything else, had played a
role in French rejection of the EU constitutional treaty, and
it was at play now in widespread opposition to the CPE.
¶4. (C) Calling the CPE "unnecessary but acceptable in
substance," Giscard noted that two-thirds of the
demonstrators, namely employees in the public sector and
civil servants, would not be affected in any way by the CPE.
He characterized business as largely silent. (Comment: In
fact, business leaders tend to see the CPE as a small, if not
sufficient, step forward. End comment.) Giscard predicted
that the demonstrators would gradually exhaust themselves
over a period of three to four weeks, also in conjunction
with a gesture by the government to soften the law. While he
did not rule out the possibility of a general strike (Note:
The next day of strike actions is March 28, but the unions
have stopped short of calling for a "general strike." End
note.), Giscard was categorical that France is not/not in a
pre-revolutionary mood. (Comment: This is an assessment that
tracks widely with that of pundits, who see reaction to the
CPE as focused on preserving privileges rather than effecting
change. End comment.)
2007 ELECTIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE CENTER-LEFT
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶5. (C) Giscard refused to make any firm predictions about
the outcome of the 2007 presidential elections, although he
repeated the conventional wisdom that the French tradition of
protest against the government in office would tend to favor
the center-left Socialist Party (PS). Asked about Segolene
Royal's current lead in the public opinion polls, Giscard
said she was "brilliant" (of the same ENA class as PM
Dominique de Villepin and her companion and PS First
Secretary Francois Hollande), by no means a political
SIPDIS
extremist (he noted her father was a retired Colonel and her
brother a member of the far-right National Front), honest,
and presented well on television. Giscard thought Royal's
strategy of not speaking out too much on the issues was the
PARIS 00001966 002 OF 004
correct one for the moment, as this allowed her to appear as
a vessel for voters' hopes for change. At the same time,
given her lack of high-level governing experience, Giscard
thought Royal would do well to consider naming in advance her
choice for PM in order to run as a ticket.
¶6. (C) Giscard cited Dominique Strauss-Kahn as the logical
choice from the standpoint of experience and capability, but
noted that Strauss-Kahn represented the mainstream at a
moment when the left wing was becoming increasingly vocal.
Giscard believed Royal's strategy of appealing to the center
was correct overall in the context of winning the presidency,
but perhaps premature at this stage of the nomination
process. At a minimum, Giscard opined, Royal should drop her
frequent references to Tony Blair, as this risked
antagonizing the left wing. Asked about other possible PM
candidates, Giscard disparaged former PM Lionel Jospin as
stiff and repetitious (he continued to push his book and had
no new ideas) and thought him unlikely to accept anything but
the presidency. Giscard dismissed former PM Laurent Fabius
as a shameless opportunist, in an age when voters demanded a
certain honesty from politicians. Giscard offered former
Culture Jack Lang as one possibility, especially vis-a-vis
the left wing of the party, given his credentials with
intellectuals. Less kindly, however, Giscard characterized
Lang as a "brilliant" culture minister, provided one
understood "culture" as "entertainment." He not only
appeared to be, but indeed was, a lightweight, and certainly
not a statesman, Giscard declared.
FRANCE IN NEED OF A THATCHER?
-----------------------------
¶7. (C) Asked whether France's perpetual sense of being in
crisis might finally encourage voters to support more radical
change, Giscard said he saw a need to make people happier
through increased prosperity, and cited former Spanish PM
Aznar as having convinced the Spanish electorate that
prosperity would not be possible without reform. But he also
held out the possibility of an even more radical,
Thatcher-like "shock treatment," which he claimed only the
center-right could administer given the center-left's
enduring attachment to a large public sector. After
reflection, however, he suggested that the government might
best take a number of quick, pragmatic actions after the
elections -- with no one step being seen as radical in and of
itself and thus below the threshold of public consciousness
and programmatic doctrine -- to reduce the wealth tax, drop
taxes on main private residences (all Frenchmen want to own a
house, he said), or refraining from replacing half of all
retiring civil servants.
¶8. (C) Asked to what extent the center-right should stand
for change, Giscard was cautious and, citing the French mood
described above, commented that the elections would be won by
persuading voters to say "no" to the left rather than "yes"
to the right. He thought the center-right was well
positioned to claim that the socialists were soft on security
and had no real proposals for reducing unemployment. In sum,
according to Giscard, it would be a mistake to run too
overtly on a reformist ticket. In that regard, he noted that
Sarkozy had stopped using the word "break" with the past,
which was widely perceived as too radical.
SARKOZY THE ONE?
----------------
¶9. (C) Giscard characterized Sarkozy as the center-right's
leading candidate for the presidential elections -- although
he had to assume that President Chirac was still holding out
hope for a serious international crisis to lead to the
"demand" that he continue to lead France. Giscard thought it
helpful to Sarkozy's candidacy that he was associated with
toughness on security and immigration issues, while
characterizing Sarkozy's economic record as weak. Giscard
also cautioned that Sarkozy's "hyperactivity" could be
perceived as dangerous. Asked if Sarkozy would make a good
president, Giscard noted that Sarkozy lacked the pedigree
that the French people had come to expect, and characterized
him as a sort of French "Clinton" in that regard. He
acknowledged difficulty in perceiving Sarkozy as a figure of
historical dimensions, notwithstanding his brilliance.
Giscard hinted that Sarkozy might not survive more than a
single term.
¶10. (C) Asked to compare Sarkozy to PM de Villepin, Giscard
said he wanted to avoid directly criticizing the Prime
Minister of a current government. He nonetheless judged
Villepin to be more a poet than a politician, although he
admired his energy and personal accomplishments. Giscard
concluded with the observation that the three most important
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political offices in France would be up for grabs in 2007:
President, Prime Minister, and Mayor of Paris. (Comment:
Given the near certainty that neither Sarkozy or Villepin, if
elected, would choose the other as Prime Minister, this would
leave the Mayor of Paris as the consolation prize. Giscard
apparently saw no obstacle in the fact that the center-right
UMP party, through a primary election, had just chosen
Francoise de Panafieu to run against PS incumbent Bertrand
Delanoe. End comment.)
NEXT STEPS ON EUROPE
--------------------
¶11. (C) Calling the failed referendum on the EU constitution
a "catastrophe" for France and Europe, Giscard accused the
government of badly managing the issue. He recalled his
attempt a month before the referendum to convince President
Chirac to withdraw the referendum and to replace PM Raffarin
instead and, before that, his effort to convince Chirac not
to hold a referendum at all. Giscard insisted that the
majority of those who voted "no" had voted against the
government and Chirac -- especially many on the center-left
who had been forced to support Chirac in the second-round
2002 election against Jean-Marie Le Pen). Moreover, Giscard
asserted, "although the USG does not seem to want to
recognize this," widespread unease with EU enlargement also
played a significant role. Giscard claimed, citing poll
data, that the French public favored either re-approving the
existing text or renegotiating it slightly, although this
probably could not occur until after the 2007 presidential
elections. (Comment: Giscard has a personal stake in
preserving as much of the existing text, which he largely
wrote, as possible. End comment.)
¶12. (C) As for the future, Giscard judged that the real
problem would be not France but the UK, which he described as
"moving away from Europe." Giscard noted in this regard that
the UK business and financial communities appeared to be more
focused on Australia, China and the U.S. than Europe, perhaps
because they perceive Europe as too complicated and less
dynamic. Giscard also lamented the absence of authentic
European leaders, with the potential exception of German
Chancellor Merkel. He made clear his belief that such a
leader need not necessarily be French, German, or British.
¶13. (C) Asked whether reports of increasing Franco-German
differences portended a drifting apart of these two
countries, Giscard declared that this was happily not the
case. Waxing emotional for the only time in the meeting, he
said the two peoples now saw each other as partners,
notwithstanding the suffering of the past (he evoked his own
family's losses in wars against Germany, citing his
grand-father's death in the trenches of WWI and his
father-in-law's experience in a deportee camp in WWII). He
stated that when French delegations attend international
meetings, they feel most comfortable with the Germans. This
might appear strange, he concluded, but it was true.
¶14. (U) Giscard briefly mentioned his plans for traveling to
the U.S. in the fall.
COMMENT
-------
¶15. (C) Notwithstanding his critical acumen (it is
impossible not to admire how sharp he remains), Giscard's
arguments themselves reflect France's contradictory desire
for change and preserving the status quo, or for effecting
change by increment and stealth rather than offering the
public clear policy choices. By that measure, PM de
Villepin's platform of "change in continuity," as represented
tangibly by the CPE, should have enjoyed more success. It is
hard to square Giscard's judgment that reform should be
implemented incrementally stealthily (Villepin's strategy)
with his call for a "shock treatment" for France (that only
Sarkozy could provide). Similar considerations pertain to
his judgment that winning elections is more about
discrediting the opposition than by running on a platform for
the future.
¶16. (C) Giscard mostly spoke in English, with a few
digressions in French, in a manner that can only be described
as sometimes elliptical but in which the choice of words
always appeared deliberate and precise. As in past meetings,
Giscard demonstrated his deep knowledge of European and U.S.
history (he is currently reading a biography of Thomas
Jefferson, whom he finds not very typically American) and
geography. As he has done with previous Ambassadors, Giscard
complained about the exaggerated stature Americans give to
Lafayette -- whom Giscard dismissed as a "self-promoting
member of the lower aristocracy" -- at the expense of the
PARIS 00001966 004 OF 004
contributions to American independence made possible by the
policies of the French government and the actions of the
French fleet, including a Vice-Admiral d'Estaing Giscard
counts among forbears.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton