

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08SANJOSE31, COSTA RICA -- CAFTA EXTENSION REQUEST LIKELY
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08SANJOSE31.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08SANJOSE31 | 2008-01-17 17:40 | 2011-03-02 16:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy San Jose |
Appears in these articles: http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-02/Investigacion.aspx |
VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSJ #0031/01 0171740
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171740Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9345
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO PRIORITY 1577
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000031
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA, WHA/CEN, WHA/EPSC AND EEB; PLEASE PASS TO
USTR:AMALITO/DOLIVER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018
TAGS: CS ECON ETRD PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA -- CAFTA EXTENSION REQUEST LIKELY
REF: 07 SAN JOSE 2070 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: Classified By: DCM Peter Brennan per 1.4 (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: While the national legislature (Asamblea)
works at full speed to complete CAFTA implementing
legislation, GOCR officials (and the local media) are
openly speculating about a probable entry-into-force EIF
extension. In private, executive and legislative branch
contacts are almost unanimous: there is no way Costa Rica
can meet the March 1 deadline; at least another two months
probably will be needed. In public, President Arias and
Minister of the Presidency Arias are keeping pressure on
the legislature, but the President has acknowledged that
meeting the deadline is "unrealistic". The Arias
brothers are also making clear that should there be an
extension, the PAC-led opposition,s obstructionist
"legislative terrorism" would be to blame. With the public,
and much of the Asamblea eager to get beyond CAFTA to
other hot issues such as public security, the pro-CAFTA
G38 coalition working well in the Asamblea, and the PAC
under fire for its dilatory tactics (septel), Costa Rica
may at last build sufficient momentum to get the CAFTA
job done, although not on time. We anticipate
an extension request after the GOCR takes stock of
progress at the end of January. END SUMMARY.
===============================
LEGISLATURE AT FULL SPEED . . .
===============================
¶2. (SBU) Pro-CAFTA legislators returned to work seemingly
refreshed from their year-end recess and determined to make
progress on the implementing agenda. PLN faction chief
Mayi Antillon seemed pleasantly surprised by the G38,s
discipline and focus when she met with Pol/Econ Counselor
on January 9. Antillon sketched a timetable based on two
sessions a day, under fast track rules, that would grind
through legislation fairly swiftly (by Costa Rican
standards). Her goal is to move quickest (and in parallel)
on the two telecom laws and the UPOV law (which passed its
first plenary vote on January 14), in order to complete the
first vote on these politically controversial topics before
universities (full of potential protesters) resume class
in early February. She also predicted fast action on the
Budapest Treaty. The problematic Libertarian Party (ML)
is cooperating, Antillon added, assuaged by, among other
concessions, the PLN agreeing to form a new
legislative committee on public security (an ML and PAC
priority). Vice Minister of the Presidency Roberto
Thompson also gave an upbeat message to Pol/Econ
Counselor on January 10.
=========================
. . . BUT NOT FAST ENOUGH
=========================
¶3. (C) Antillon,s and Thompson,s best case scenarios,
however, predict the Asamblea approving (in 1st vote) no
more than 3-4 more items of implementing agenda by the end
of January, with all of these likely facing 30-day
Constitutional Chamber (Sala IV) review (forced by the PAC)
before becoming law. (The PAC has already asked that the
UPOV bill be sent to the Sala IV for review.) Even without
Sala-required revisions, these bills would not become law
until March, bringing the grand total of fully completed
items at that time to 6-10 (out of 13 total). Antillon
predicted she could finish all the legislation by April or
May, but this is contingent on maintaining the current
pace in the Asamblea and discipline in the G38. She added
that any extension in the Asamblea would have to be part of
a broader national strategy including a diplomatic
component with the USG and other CAFTA-DR parties, and a
public relations component, both domestic and
international.
¶4. (SBU) ML and PLN party staffers paint a similar
picture. Even with three-a-day and weekend sessions (which
the legislators are likely to resist and which Antillon
hopes to avoid), it is mathematically impossible, they say,
to complete all the implementing legislation by March 1.
ML calculations, in fact, suggest that a six-month
extension might be realistic, given the other work the
Asamblea wants to attend to and upcoming faction leadership
elections in May.
¶5. (C) COMMENT: We agree that an extension appears
inevitable. Under ideal conditions, the Asamblea could
complete the first vote on the seven items now in the
plenary o/a February 20. The 30-day Sala IV review would
still have to follow before the laws were enacted, however,
and the two implementation items not yet in the plenary --
the laws regulating insurance contracts and authors,
copyright protections - would lag even further behind. The
earliest completion date for all the implementing
legislation is therefore sometime in late March or April.
END COMMENT.
============================================
TESTING THEIR ARGUMENTS, TESTING THE WATERS
============================================
¶6. (C) Minister of Foreign Trade Marco Vinicio Ruiz echoed
these views during the Ambassador,s farewell call on
January 7. He opined that an EIF extension would be
required, although he acknowledged that public discussion
of such a request could dampen political momentum in the
legislature. Ruiz said he had already "reached out"
informally to other CAFTA-DR parties to gauge their
reaction to a possible extension request, and asked
rhetorically when would be the appropriate time to make
such a request. The Ambassador urged Ruiz to consult with
USTR on all aspects of the extension issue. (NOTE:
Confirming Ruiz,s comments about "reaching out," the media
here has run interviews with CAFTA-DR officials such as the
Guatemalan VM of Trade and the local Nicaraguan Ambassador
predicting that their countries would respond favorably to
a Costa Rican extension request.)
¶7. (C) The Minister suggested that the U.S. should deal
"differently" with Costa Rica, since the country has
specific characteristics that set it apart from its
neighbors; namely, the three-fold challenge of opening a
state telecommunications monopoly, opening a state
insurance monopoly, and a facing a constitutional review
of all CAFTA-related legislation. Ruiz fretted that the
Sala IV might not be able to handle multiple pieces of
complex, controversial legislation fast enough to complete
its review in the required 30 days.
===============
EXTENSION MANIA
===============
¶8. (C) Despite his caution with the Ambassador, Ruiz
later spoke to the press about an extension, predicting a
two- to four-week delay. His widely-reported remarks set
off a flurry of political and press speculation prompting
hasty spin control by the GOCR and its pro-CAFTA coalition
partners. An exasperated Antillon told Pol/Econ Counselor
that Ruiz had spoken prematurely and without
authorization. Antillon and PUSC faction head Lorena
Vasquez started a chorus of interviews, all stressing that
the G38 would continue to work based on the March 1
deadline. Vasquez and ML chief Luis Barrantes, however,
argued that should it appear that the Asamblea could not
make the deadline, the GOCR should then explore extension
options with the CAFTA-DR parties.
¶9. (SBU) In back-to-back statements released January 8-9,
Minister Arias stressed that the GOCR had not made any
official request, and would continue to view February 29
as the final day to complete legislative work in time for
the March 1 EIF deadline. He stressed the importance of
having CAFTA-DR enter into force, praised the Asamblea for
its hard work, and urged the PAC to respect the results of
the October 7 referendum by not obstructing work in the
legislature. In interviews, both Arias brothers (the
President and the Minister) said a possible extension
depended on the PAC. If that party (and its anti-CAFTA
allies) dropped their delaying tactics, the legislature
could move faster. The GOCR would have a better idea of
progress by the end of January, and if it had to request an
extension, it would do so after that.
¶10. (U) In an interview on January 16, however, President
Arias called the February 29 target date "unrealistic,"
and suggested that the an extension request might come
"in mid-February," depending on the legislative picture
then. He declined to specify how much more time would be
needed (although he had told the media on January 8 that
two more months would be sufficient.)
========
COMMENT:
========
¶11. (C) The specter of another legislative year frittered
away by CAFTA debate seems to have galvanized the GOCR and
the G38 into action. The Arias administration is fully
engaged, has a plan and is sticking to it. The increasing
public and political discussion of the post-CAFTA agenda
(e.g., criminal justice reform, fiscal and concession
reform, the so-called "development agenda," etc.) is a good
sign. Both sides, even the PAC, seem to be yearning
for life after CAFTA. Both sides also acknowledge that
CAFTA-DR will enter into force for Costa Rica at some point.
The questions are how and when. As to how, the GOCR appears
confident enough to rely on its G38 coalition, for now;
a deal with "moderate" PAC members is not in the cards.
As to the when, we should know more when the Arias team
takes stock in late January or early February.
We understand that the COMEX delegation currently in
Washington may raise the extension issue, but we do not
expect a formal, fully-authoritative approach until the
President -- or more likely Minister Arias -- weighs in,
perhaps via a letter to USTR or a visit to Washington.
LANGDALE