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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05MANAMA230, KING DISCUSSES REGIONAL ISSUES WITH AMBASSADOR
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000230
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2015
TAGS: PREL ETRD PGOV PHUM BA
SUBJECT: KING DISCUSSES REGIONAL ISSUES WITH AMBASSADOR
REF: MANAMA 227
Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe. Reason: 1.4 (B)(D)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (S) Bahrain's King Hamad, despite some continuing worries
about Saudi Arabia, expressed optimism about Bahrain and the
region in a wide-ranging discussion with the Ambassador
February 15. He was delighted with the state of the
bilateral relationship and the leadership role of President
Bush. He felt that the positive news on the Israel-Palestine
front and in Iraq will have a beneficial impact in the
region, both politically and economically. On Iran, he
preferred a diplomatic solution, but if Iran did get a
nuclear weapons capability he wanted the U.S. to step in as a
"nuclear guarantor." He put the blame for the Hariri
assassination squarely on Syria. He was no longer worried
about Saudi Arabia blocking the FTA, but lamented continuing
bilateral irritants with the Saudis and Saudi obstruction of
inter-GCC projects such as a Qatar-UAE causeway and a
Qatar-Kuwait pipeline (both of which impact on Bahrain). He
said that Bahrain had decided to let Al-Jazeera open an
office in Bahrain. He indicated that Bahrain will allow
candidates to participate in political parties in the 2006
parliamentary elections.
-----------------
TEA WITH THE KING
-----------------
¶2. (SBU) King Hamad invited the Ambassador and DCM to Safriya
Palace on the afternoon of February 15 for tea and a relaxed
conversation in front of the fireplace (it was an unusually
cold and rainy day in Bahrain). The King was accompanied by
Minister of the Royal Court Shaykh Khalid bin Ahmed Al
Khalifa and Shaykh Hamad bin Ebrahim Al Khalifa, a
brother-in-law and close confidant of the King. The
conversation, which covered a range of domestic and regional
issues, lasted 90 minutes.
--------------------------------
BILATERAL RELATIONS GOING STRONG
--------------------------------
¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador opened the discussion by expressing
appreciation for the King's January 26 letter to the
President. (In the letter, the King expressed full support
for the shared goals in the pursuit of freedom and noted that
"like you, Mr. President, we in Bahrain see the progress made
in Afghanistan, along with the forthcoming elections in Iraq,
and democratic developments in Ukraine as symbols of the
universal desire for freedom, openness and representation.")
The King said that he, in turn, appreciated the response he
had just received from the President, and observed that there
have been two countries -- Bahrain and Jordan -- that over
the long term have consistently sided with and supported the
United States. The U.S. could always count on Bahrain, he
stated. Calling the President a "great leader," he said that
he had always believed in the President from Day 1. What the
U.S. has done in Iraq will change the future of the region.
He was delighted with the successful elections in Iraq.
--------------------------------------------- -----
ISRAEL-PALESTINE: GOOD FOR STABILITY IN THE REGION
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶4. (C) The King spoke at some length on Israeli-Palestinian
developments, expressing satisfaction at the positive turn of
events. This is a good moment, he said, that can be
important for stability in the region. He said that he had
instructed newly-appointed Minister of Information Dr.
Mohammed Abdul-Ghaffar to make sure that official
announcements or statements coming out of the Ministry of
Information do not refer to Israel as the "enemy" or "Zionist
entity." He revealed that Bahrain already has contacts with
Israel at the intelligence/security level (i.e., with
Mossad), and indicated that Bahrain will be willing to move
forward in other areas, although it will be difficult for
Bahrain to be the first. When asked if Bahrain might look
into developing trade contacts at some point, he said that
this would have to await the establishment of "side-by-side"
states. He added that he planned to travel to Jordan on
February 19 to meet with King Abdullah and show his support
for moving forward.
¶5. (C) The King stated that Israeli-Palestinian peace, by
helping stabilize the Middle East, will facilitate economic
growth throughout the region. But he also suggested that,
when the Palestinian question is removed from the equation
and the Arab-Israeli dispute is settled, Iran's ability to
cause mischief will be lessened. The Iranians will no longer
be able to exploit the Palestinian issue for their own
objectives.
------------------------
IF IRAN GOES NUCLEAR....
------------------------
¶6. (S) The King stressed that it was critical that we not
allow Iran to get a nuclear capability. He said that there
are two ways to deal with Iran: through diplomacy or by
force. Bahrain prefers diplomacy. If we get to a point
where Iran has a nuclear weapons capability, he said, then
the U.S. would have to step in and be the "nuclear guarantor"
for the countries of the region.
------------------------------------------
HARIRI ASSASSINATION: BLAME FALLS ON SYRIA
------------------------------------------
¶7. (S) King Hamad left no doubt that he put the blame for the
Hariri assassination squarely on Syria. He said that he had
had dinner with Hariri just 10 days earlier when Hariri was
in Bahrain for the opening of the 10th Islamic Trade Fair.
Hariri had told him that he planned to move to openly oppose
the Syrians in Lebanon in May (after the parliamentary
elections), but did not want to tip his hand before the
elections. The discounted any other theories about who might
have been behind the attack.
--------------------------------------------- --------------
CONTINUING CONCERNS ABOUT SAUDI ARABIA'S RELATIONS WITH GCC
--------------------------------------------- --------------
¶8. (C) The King said Bahrain is no longer worried about Saudi
Arabia trying to block its FTA with the United States (and he
expects no difficulty in ratification from the Bahrain
parliament because of the dust-up with the Saudis over the
FTA). He nonetheless clearly remains disturbed by the way it
played out, by continuing irritants in the bilateral
relationship with Saudi Arabia, and by Saudi attempts to
block cooperative projects between other GCC countries. He
repeated a now familiar litany of Bahraini complaints about
Saudi ill-will towards Bahrain, including the suspension of
the 50,000 b/d oil grant and the cut-off in sales of sand.
(Note: The Crown Prince, in a meeting with Gen. Abizaid the
next day, added a new complaint: the Saudis this year had
restricted the plot of land allocated to Bahraini Hajj
travelers in Mecca.)
¶9. (C) The King said that the Saudis are blocking a proposed
causeway project between Qatar and the UAE and a proposed gas
pipeline project between Qatar and Kuwait, both of which have
an impact on Bahrain. The Qatar-UAE causeway, when combined
with the planned Bahrain-Qatar causeway, would greatly
facilitate travel between the three countries (and, of
course, eliminate the need to transit through Saudi Arabia --
with its implications for women drivers). The gas pipeline
from Qatar to Kuwait would pass through Saudi territorial
waters, and would also include a link to Bahrain. Because of
Saudi objections, the King said, the Kuwaitis are now turning
to the Iranians for gas. (Note: On the gas link to Bahrain,
it is our understanding that the major sticking point is
price to be paid for the Qatari gas.) The King asked if the
U.S. could play a helpful role in getting the Saudis to let
the gas project proceed.
--------------------------------
AL-JAZEERA RETURNING TO BAHRAIN?
--------------------------------
¶10. (C) Although neither the gas pipeline nor the causeway to
Qatar have entered the implementation stage, the King
maintained that relations with Qatar are now excellent. He
joked that with the completion of the causeway, Bahrain would
receive Qatar's money and Qatar would get Bahrain's ideas (on
political reform). As an indication of the improving
relations, he said that Bahrain had now agreed to let
Al-Jazeera open an office in Bahrain. (Note: lthough true,
this is not quite a done deal. The previous Minister of
Information, Nabeel al-Hamer, had strongly opposed an
Al-Jazeera office, and his departure offered an opportunity
to make a gesture to the Qataris. We are told, however, that
the Bahrainis turned down the Qataris' first choice for a
correspondent (the foreign editor and wife of the editor of
the independent Bahrain daily Al-Wasat), and have instead
offered an employee (reportedly not dynamic) at the Ministry
of Information. Al-Jazeera may counter with a proposal to
accept the Bahraini offer if they can have a second reporter.)
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HELP ON DEVELOPING BAHRAIN'S TV/RADIO CAPABILITY
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¶11. (SBU) King Hamad said that he instructed new Minister of
Information Abdul-Ghaffar to seek help from the U.S. to help
Bahrain turn its television broadcasting into a world class
operation. He said that previous Minister Al-Hamer, a former
reporter, was a "day-to-day" person who had no strategic
vision. He had told Addul-Ghafar that he needed a strategic
vision to develop Bahrain's broadcasting industry. (Note:
Abdul-Ghaffar had met with the Ambassador and raised this
issue on February 10 -- reported reftel). It is now clear
that he was acting on instruction from the palace, and not on
his own initiative.)
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DEMOCRACY IN BAHRAIN AND THE REGION
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¶12. (C) The King reviewed the history of democracy in the
Middle East, lamenting that the initial stirrings of
democratic movements in the region had been stifled by the
rise of socialist/Baathist governments in the 1950s and 60s.
With the emphasis in the region on socialist slogans, there
was a move to create single political units and eliminate
political diversity. People no longer understood the concepts
of participatory democracy or diversity of thinking, Now
these outdated political vestiges are being cast away, most
recently in Iraq. We now have an opportunity to encourage
participation in the political process throughout the region.
¶13. (C) This is exactly what is happening in Bahrain now, the
King stated. There still are elements of the old thinking,
such as Baathists connected to the Uruba Club. And there is
the challenge of getting the Shia oppositionists to
participate in the next election. They did not participate
in the 2002 election because they did not like what was in
the Constitution. The government, he said, is telling them
to come out and participate in the 2006 elections. If they
have the numbers and participate, they can get seats in the
parliament and change the Constitution (as the Constitution
permits). He added that, while the last election was based
on participation by individuals, the 2006 election will be
based on political parties. Accordingly, the government is
now drafting a political parties law.
MONROE