

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09OTTAWA1, NEVER APOLOGIZE": PM HARPER'S GOVERNING STYLE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09OTTAWA1.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09OTTAWA1 | 2009-01-02 13:20 | 2011-05-01 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Ottawa |
Appears in these articles: http://aptn.ca/pages/news/2011/05/01/residential-school-apology-consensus-rare-moment-in-centralized-secretive-harper-minority-rule-u-s-diplomatic-cable/ |
VZCZCXRO8703
OO RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHMT RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #0001/01 0021320
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021320Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8950
INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
id: 185546
date: 1/2/2009 13:20
refid: 09OTTAWA1
origin: Embassy Ottawa
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08OTTAWA1495|08OTTAWA1574|08OTTAWA1577|08OTTAWA1586
header:
VZCZCXRO8703
OO RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHMT RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #0001/01 0021320
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021320Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8950
INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000001
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR CA
SUBJECT: "NEVER APOLOGIZE": PM HARPER'S GOVERNING STYLE
REF: A. 08 OTTAWA 1495
¶B. 08 OTTAWA 1574
¶C. 08 OTTAWA 1586
¶D. 08 OTTAWA 1577
Classified By: DCM Terry Breese, reason 1.4 (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Stephen Harper's reputation
as a master political strategist is somewhat tattered in the
wake of November's stunning near-fatal mis-step to abolish
public financing for all political parties. However, at
least on the surface, he remains unbowed and unapologetic.
Relying on an extremely small circle of advisors and his own
instincts, he has played the game of high-stakes, partisan
politics well, but his reputation for decisiveness and
shrewdness has been tarnished by a sometimes vindictive
pettiness. With only a few exceptions, he has not built the
bridges to the opposition typical of a minority PM. Moving
from surpluses to deficits, he will face new imperatives in
the changed economic and political landscape of 2009 to adopt
a more conciliatory and inclusive approach. However, this
will go against the grain for such an instinctively combative
Prime Minister. End summary.
Blow to reputation
------------------
¶2. (C) Canadians have had fifteen years to get to know
Stephen Harper as Reform Party MP (1993-1997), head of the
free enterprise National Citizens Coalition (1997-2001),
leader of the Canadian Alliance (2002- 2003), Conservative
opposition leader (2004-6), and Prime Minister
(2006-present), but he remains an enigma to most Canadians
(including many Conservatives). Supporters and detractors
alike have labeled him a master strategist and cunning
tactician, as well as an extremely partisan but paradoxically
pragmatic ideologue. He calls himself a realist. However,
his reputation as a peerless political chess-master is now
somewhat in tatters, following what most perceive as an
atypical near-fatal miscalculation over a Fall Economic and
Fiscal Statement (ref a) that lacked economic credibility and
proposed the elimination of per vote public subsidies for
political parties. Faced with an opposition revolt, Harper
first unusually retreated on the latter proposal, and then
bought time by proroguing Parliament on December 4 to avoid a
loss of a confidence vote on December 8.
Party first
-----------
¶3. (C) As Conservative leader, Harper has pursued two key
objectives: welding the fractured Canadian conservative
movement into one cohesive Conservative Party of Canada
(CPC); and, positioning the CPC to replace the Liberals as
Canada's "natural governing party." He succeeded in the
first goal by imposing discipline and coherence, dangling the
prospect of a majority government, and centralizing power to
an unprecedented degree in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO).
He has made no secret of his desire to win a majority
government, or of his determination to occupy and redefine
the political center. As he recently told reporters, "if
you're really serious about making transformation, you have
to pull the center of the political spectrum toward
conservatism . . . we're building the country towards a
definition of itself that is more in line with conservatism."
In a separate year-end interview, he underscored that his
goal since becoming leader has been to create a strong party
"that can not just win the odd election but can govern on an
ongoing basis." Until now, that strategy has rested on
winning additional seats in Quebec, but the setbacks in the
province during the October election and Harper's
denunciations of Quebec separatists during the early December
mini-crisis may necessitate a change in direction.
¶4. (SBU) In 2007, former Harper strategist Tom Flanagan set
Q4. (SBU) In 2007, former Harper strategist Tom Flanagan set
out his "Ten Commandments of Conservative Campaigning" that
read like a prescription for Harper's governing style: party
unity; discipline; inclusion (reach out to ethnic
minorities); toughness; grassroots politics; persistence;
and, technology (fundraising and grassroots motivation). On
the policy side, moderation, "incrementalism," and
communication. Conservatives, Flanagan noted, "must be
willing to make progress in small, practical steps . . .
sweeping visions . . . are toxic in practical politics."
Moreover, with five parties on the field, he warned there was
little room for niceties; elections would "not be just street
fights, but all-out brawls."
Governing the country, closely
------------------------------
¶5. (C) In office, Harper has rarely made the compromises
typical of a minority PM, nor built the bridges and informal
OTTAWA 00000001 002 OF 003
channels that usually get things done in a minority
Parliament. In his first term, he practiced confrontation
over cooperation, governing in a kind of faux
majority-minority style that humiliated the already weakened
official opposition Liberals (a task made easier by the often
hapless performance of then-Opposition leader Stephane Dion).
He reached across the floor only twice: in March 2008 to
achieve bipartisan consensus on the extension of Canada's
military mission in Afghanistan through 2011; and, in June
2008 to resolve the Indian Residential Schools issue. More
typical was his free use of confidence votes on a series of
legislation to force passage of his agenda under threat of an
election, and his fait accompli in 2006 recognizing the
Quebecois (i.e. not Quebec province) as a nation within a
united Canada, a step that took both his own party as well as
the opposition by surprise.
¶6. (C) Tight focus on the leader and close-hold of
information have been the hallmarks of Harper's governing
style. Initially, strict discipline and scripting made sense
for a new government on probation, whose members had almost
no experience in power. However, Harper has centralized
communications and decision-making within the PMO (an ongoing
trend since the 1970s) to an unprecedented degree, according
to commentators familiar with the public service and
Conservative insiders. "The Center" (PMO and Privy Council
Office) is clearly the arbiter of even the most routine
decisions.
¶7. (C) For their part, cabinet ministers have mostly kept
on message and in the prime minister's shadow. Since July,
under new Chief of Staff Guy Giorno and communications
director Kory Teneycke, media access to ministers has been
loosened, but ministers are still on a short leash. At a
December conference, one Minister of State confessed
privately that he did not "dare" to deviate from his
pre-approved text, even though fast-moving events had already
overtaken his speech. Discussions with Conservative caucus
members over the past year have also made it clear that they
are often out of the loop on the Prime Minister's plans,
including key committee chairmen in the House of Commons.
Many senior Conservatives admitted that they were stunned to
hear about the ban on public financing of political parties
in the Fall Economic Statement; neither the Cabinet nor the
caucus apparently had any clue this was even part of the
long-range agenda, much less subject to an immediate
confidence vote.
Inner, inner circle
-------------------
¶8. (C) Harper's inner circle appears extremely small.
Notoriously hard on staff (Harper burned through a series of
communications directors as opposition leader, and once
reportedly told an aide that he liked to see the "fear" in
the eyes of prospective employees), Harper seems to operate
largely as his own strategist, tactician, and advisor. Often
described by observers as self-consciously the "smartest guy
in the room," he has tended to surround himself with
like-minded people. As a result, some insiders say he lacks
staff willing or able to act as an effective sounding-board
or check his partisan instincts. Following the departure in
July of long-term advisor and chief of staff Ian Brodie and
communications director Sandra Buckler, their replacements
Giorno and Teneycke are known as highly partisan veterans of
two controversial majority Ontario provincial governments
that polarized public opinion.
¶9. (C) In cabinet, pundits consider Environment Minister
Jim Prentice, Transport Minister John Baird, and Foreign
QJim Prentice, Transport Minister John Baird, and Foreign
Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon to have Harper's confidence.
However, few, if any, ministers appear to be genuine
confidantes. Unlike former Conservative PM Brian Mulroney,
who famously called his MPs when their kids were sick and
kept their loyalty even when his personal popularity plunged
to historic lows, Harper lacks the personal touch. He
appears to keep his caucus in line more through respect for
what he has accomplished and with the power and authority
that comes with the position of Prime Minister -- and as the
party's best hope for a future majority -- than through
affection or loyalty. He has worked to quiet the party's
socially conservative rank and file, and to marginalize
contentious issues, such as same-sex marriage and abortion,
notably at the party's November policy conference in
Winnipeg. He will next have to win their acquiescence to
upcoming deficit spending -- anathema for western Canadian
conservatives -- for a new stimulus package. Realistically,
however, they have no credible alternative to Harper or the
CPC at this point, which will help to keep the party base
loyal.
Expect surprises
----------------
OTTAWA 00000001 003 OF 003
¶10. (C) After almost three years in power and facing a
changing economic and political landscape for 2009 (ref b),
Harper's new agenda is probably also still evolving. The
2008 Conservative election platform, the November policy
convention, and the 2008 Speech from the Throne provided few
insights, obliging Harper-watchers to parse his comments and
actions for clues about his future direction. Harper has
typically concentrated almost exclusively on short-term
election planning horizons, giving his government a sometimes
improvisational air. Some commitments (such as revisions to
the Anti-terrorism Act and new copyright legislation) have
languished, while others (notably his about-face on his
election pledge not to run a deficit, and his current
proposal to inject up to C$30 billion in fiscal stimulus in
FY 2009-2010) have been surprise reverses. Harper has also
not been bound by party orthodoxy. On December 22, he filled
the Senate with 18 unelected Conservatives and directly named
a Supreme Court justice, contradicting long-standing
commitments to an elected Senate and parliamentary review of
Supreme Court appointments (refs c and d).
¶11. (C) According to one insider, Harper "likes surprises,"
not least to keep the opposition off balance. For the
opposition, Harper's unpredictability has been more dangerous
due to his fierce partisanship and his willingness to take
risks. Harper and senior Conservatives prefaced the 40th
Parliament with calls for greater conciliation, a new "tone,"
and a common resolve to work together to tackle the economic
crisis. However, the government's provocative Economic and
Fiscal Statement immediately revived the bitterness and
threat of an election that had hung over the parliament until
the prorogation. Opposition leaders claimed that the PM had
"poisoned the well" and broken their trust. As one national
columnist noted, the Statement "amounted to a declaration of
war."
¶12. (C) The opposition's ability to turn the tables with a
proposed coalition in turn apparently caught the PM by
surprise, as was perhaps the rumored unwillingness of the
Governor General to rule out this option against his advice.
His ensuing passionate attacks on the "separatist" coalition
undid much of the progress the Conservative party had made in
Quebec. Harper was able to retake the initiative by seeking,
and gaining, a prorogation until January 26, but in year-end
media interviews he remained unapologetic. He denied that he
had acted like a "bully" in provoking the crisis, adding
"it's our job . . . to put forward things we think are in the
public interest."
¶13. (C) In anticipation of the 2009 budget, PM Harper has
somewhat uncharacteristically reached out to the opposition
for input, opened channels to new Liberal leader Michael
Ignatieff, and appointed an eminent persons Economic Advisory
Group with some Liberal representation. He told CTV that his
plan is to focus on the economy and "find some consensus" in
Parliament, but he also made it clear that, if his political
rivals defeat him in January, he will have "no choice" but to
ask for an election: "if the decision of Parliament is that
they don't support the government people elected, then I
think, the only -- in my view -- constitutionally,
politically, morally, the only reasonable thing to do at that
point is for some other government to get a mandate from the
Canadian people."
¶14. (C) In the changed economic and political landscape of
2009, PM Harper will face new imperatives to adopt a more
conciliatory and inclusive approach. However, this will go
Qconciliatory and inclusive approach. However, this will go
against the grain for such an instinctively combative Prime
Minister.
Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada
WILKINS
=======================CABLE ENDS============================