

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE2, NETHERLANDS: SHELL DISCUSSES BUSINESS IN IRAN
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09THEHAGUE2.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09THEHAGUE2 | 2009-01-02 09:03 | 2011-01-20 07:00 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy The Hague |
VZCZCXRO8572
RR RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTC #0002/01 0020903
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 020903Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2377
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHTC/AMCONSUL AMSTERDAM 4074
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000002
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2019
TAGS: ENRG EPET ETTC PREL NL IR
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: SHELL DISCUSSES BUSINESS IN IRAN
REF: A. STATE 125579
¶B. THE HAGUE 276
¶C. 07 THE HAGUE 935
Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Andrew Mann, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: The Dutch government agrees that doing
business with Iran poses risks for Dutch companies, and it
will continue to discourage new investments there. Shell has
again pushed back its investment decision on the Persian LNG
project, this time until late 2010. However, Shell's go-slow
approach in Iran belies seething frustration at the perceived
ineffectiveness of sanctions against Iran. The company sees
Iran's nuclear activities continuing while Chinese and other
firms seal long-term energy deals in Iran at the expense of
Western energy security interests. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- -------
GONL WARNING DUTCH FIRMS ON RISKY BUSINESS WITH IRAN
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶2. (C) EconOffs delivered ref A points during a December 8
meeting with Simon Smits, Director of Economic Cooperation at
the Foreign Ministry. (Note: In summer 2008, Smits, a career
diplomat, completed a two-year secondment at Shell where he
focused on government relations in the company's hot zones.
The secondment was part of an ongoing program in which a
Dutch diplomat works at Shell's headquarters in The Hague and
a UK diplomat works at Shell's London offices. End note.)
Smits reiterated what he had told us before: although Shell
maintains a footprint in Iran, the company cares immensely
about its reputation and has therefore backed off its
Iranian ventures. He added that Shell would never want to
jeopardize its huge investments in the U.S. by violating
the Iran Sanctions Act, which factors into all its decisions
on Iran. As for Philips, Smits was not as familiar with its
business interests in Iran but he would be surprised if they
were active there. He said the Dutch government repeats
over and over to Dutch companies that they must stick to the
international regime on Iran. Smits assured us that in
light of our demarche and national measures efforts,the
Dutch government would continue to exert pressure on the
private sector to abstain from clinching new deals with Iran.
EconOffs also shared ref A points with Philips and with
trade and export control officials at the Ministry of
Economic Affairs; reporting on Philips' reaction will follow
septel.
------------------------------
SHELL OFFERS DETAILED RESPONSE
------------------------------
¶3. (C/NF) EconfOff met December 15 with John Crocker
(protect), Shell's Head of International Government
Relations, and his colleague Roelof van Ees to discuss ref A
points. Crocker, who briefs the Department regularly,
stressed Shell's commitment to its international obligations
and its opposition to Iran's nuclear activities. He also
described Shell's frustration with the current approach to
Iran sanctions, which it sees as both ineffective in stopping
Iran's nuclear ambitions and detrimental to Western energy
interests.
--------------------------------------------- -------
SHELL: WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAN WILL REDUCE TOTAL OUTPUT
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶4. (C/NF) From Shell's perspective, shutting down completely
international oil companies' (IOCs) engagement with Iran's
energy sector is counterproductive. Crocker attributed this
to the Iranian regime's absolute focus on the short-term,
they pay attention to consequences that will hit tomorrow at
the latest. Drawing on Shell's experience, he described
Qthe latest. Drawing on Shell's experience, he described
opposing methods to develop Iran's gas fields. For IOCs,
developing a new field today would require a $10-25 billion
investment using advanced technology. This would maximize
the field's long-term recovery rate and profitability, but
output would be lower in the first decade as a result and the
field might not generate positive cash flows until 2025. On
the other hand, if the Iranians develop a new field on their
own or with a Chinese partner, they will use poorer
technology. This would accelerate near-term recovery -- the
overriding concern of Iran's leadership -- but limit the
field's total output to only 20 percent of recoverable gas
reserves.
--------------------------------------
STATUS OF SHELL'S LNG INTEREST IN IRAN
--------------------------------------
THE HAGUE 00000002 002 OF 003
¶5. (C/NF) Crocker provided an update on the Persian LNG
(PLNG) project in Iran. (Note: Shell has a 25 percent stake
in the project, Repsol 25 percent, and National Iranian Oil
Company (NIOC) owns 50 percent. End note.) Shell and the
other parties signed an initial agreement in 2004. A final
investment decision (FID) had been expected at the end of
2006, which then slipped to mid-2008. According to Crocker,
Shell's FID is now delayed until late 2010. He said Iran
blames the delay on Shell's backtracking for political
reasons. Crocker agreed Shell had dragged its feet on
purpose but added that Iran bore responsibility for its
operational incompetence and its attempts to change the
agreement's terms. He said the additional two-year delay
from 2008 to 2010 stems largely from changes in how the
project's construction will be contracted -- instead of
having one large subcontractor build the multi-train
terminal, the contract will be split up into several
components. Crocker said Shell, Repsol, and NIOC continue to
work on the design and evaluation phases of their respective
parts of the PLNG project. He said Shell would make its FID
in late 2010 taking all factors, including political ones,
into account. If the project moves ahead after that point,
Crocker said LNG deliveries would commence by 2015-16 at the
earliest.
--------------------------------------------- -
SHELL DISMISSIVE OF CATALYTIC CONVERTER THREAT
--------------------------------------------- -
¶6. (C/NF) Crocker was skeptical that the supply of catalytic
converters to Iran's refineries was a significant issue. He
was unaware of Shell's sales of catalytic converters in Iran.
He said the U.S. should know that it is not in the
regime's interest to upgrade its refineries, as well-placed
individuals profit handsomely from the export of Iranian
crude oil at market prices and re-import of refined products
at heavily subsidized rates. Crocker suggested that because
of this lucrative arbitrage scheme, it was in the interest of
Iran's rulers for the refining sector to remain incompetently
managed.
----------------------------
SHELL'S FRUSTRATIONS IN IRAN
----------------------------
¶7. (C/NF) Crocker vented several frustrations Shell has
concerning Iran's behavior and the international sanctions
against it:
-- Iranian Indecision: Crocker said the Iranians are not
clear on what they want for their natural gas; their strategy
depends on whom one speaks with in Tehran. Some key
officials want to export LNG, others want to export gas via
pipeline, and others still want to keep all the gas for
future domestic use. He said this internal confusion created
an uncertain environment for IOCs.
-- Double Standard for China: Crocker said Shell was dismayed
by the lack of U.S. government criticism of China after
Sinopec signed its 2007 deal with Iran to develop the
Yadavaran field. According to Crocker, this underscored
Shell executives' fear that western IOCs will get shut out of
Iran long-term to the benefit of Chinese, Russian, and even
Indian firms who disregard American and European pressure and
make lucrative investments in Iran's energy sector with
impunity. He claimed that Tehran was crawling with Chinese
eager to do business with Iran.
-- Level Playing Field: Crocker said Shell would welcome
another UNSC Resolution on Iran that levels the playing
field by imposing broader trade sanctions on Iran and
forcing Chinese and Russian firms to comply. In Crocker's
Qforcing Chinese and Russian firms to comply. In Crocker's
view, this would be more effective than just targeting the
finance and energy sectors in bringing pressure against the
Iranian regime and it would also reduce the IOCs' competitive
disadvantage.
-- U.S. Holds the Key: Crocker lamented that P5-plus-1
overtures would not be attractive to Iran unless they
included the carrot of a clear timetable for better relations
with the U.S. He said the Iranians don't want better
relations with Europe, nor do they want ten years of talks
with the U.S.
¶8. (C/NF) Despite Shell's fraught experience in Iran, Crocker
concluded this has not deterred the company from a long-term
presence there. He compared Iran to Venezuela, Russia,
Nigeria, and Iraq -- other potentially unstable and
dangerous places where Shell and other IOCs do business.
THE HAGUE 00000002 003 OF 003
¶9. (C/NF) Biographical Note: Crocker worked with the UK
Foreign and Commonwealth Office for several years, mainly in
the Middle East, before moving to Shell ten years ago. He
gained operational experience managing Shell's business in
Oman before coming to headquarters to oversee government
relations.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶10. (C/NF) In our dialogue with the Dutch government and
private sector on finance and trade measures to combat Iran's
nuclear activities, they express frustration that
international sanctions are only as strong as their weakest
link, i.e., Russia, the Gulf states, and -- especially --
China. The Dutch think they are doing their fair share to
implement sanctions effectively (and they see far higher
trade volumes with Iran coming from Germany, Italy, and
France). The Dutch will continue to be a dependable partner
on Iran sanctions, but excluding them from the national
measures dialogue (as occurred in early December) undercuts
their ability to support our position on a bigger stage. END
COMMENT.
CULBERTSON