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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09PARTO40301, U) Secretary Clinton's March 25 Conversation
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09PARTO40301 | 2009-04-03 17:28 | 2011-02-21 12:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | US Delegation, Secretary |
Appears in these articles: http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/secretaria-de-estado-pide-a-embajada-evaluacion-de-calderon |
VZCZCXRO9333
OO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUCNAI #0003/01 0931728
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031728Z APR 09
FM USDEL SECRETARY//MEXICO//
TO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
200714
2009-04-03 17:28:00
09PARTO40301
US Delegation, Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
VZCZCXRO9333
OO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUCNAI #0003/01 0931728
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031728Z APR 09
FM USDEL SECRETARY//MEXICO//
TO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARTO 040301
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019
TAGS: OVIP CLINTON HILLARY PREL SNAR MX
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's March 25 Conversation
with Mexican President Felipe Calderon
Ref: White House 0813 dated 03/21/09
¶1. (U) Classified by Uzra Zeya, Deputy Executive
Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. Reason 1.4 (d).
¶2. (U) 03/25/09, 1 p.m., Mexico City, Mexico
¶3. (U) Participants
U.S.
The Secretary
Charge Bassett
A/S Shannon
Laura Pena, Senior Advisor to the Secretary
Dan Restrepo, Senior Director, National Security Council
Mexico
President Calderon
Foreign Secretary Espinosa
Amb. Sarukhan
U/S Rico
Presidential Advisor Fernandez de Castro
¶4. (C) Summary: During an extremely cordial
conversation with Secretary Clinton, President Calderon
emphasized his personal commitment to providing security
for Mexican citizens, pressed for greater U.S. actions
against arms trafficking, conveyed concerns about how the
issue of Cuba will be treated at the upcoming Summit of
the Americas, and discussed his ideas for global action
on environmental issues. Secretary Clinton praised
Calderon's commitment and leadership, acknowledged U.S.
co-responsibility for the drug war, and pledged U.S.
partnership against organized crime. President Calderon
encouraged the United States to re-assume its key role in
the region and expressed his personal admiration for
Secretary Clinton's leadership. He closed by expressing
appreciation for President Obama's decision to visit
Mexico. End Summary.
¶5. (C) President Calderon's aides tried several times
to interrupt his animated conversation with Secretary
Clinton, which lasted 1 hour 45 minutes and included a
15-minute one-on-one session, but he waved them off time
after time. He opened by expressing his admiration for
Secretary Clinton, confessing that he attended her 1998
appearance at Davos and submitted the written query,
"Would you consider running for President?" Secretary
Clinton said she was delighted to see him again, and
conveyed her appreciation for his commitment and courage.
The United States, she continued, recognized its co-
responsibility for the current situation, and would stand
shoulder to shoulder with Mexico until the battle was
won. Secretary Clinton added that it was a personal
priority for her to work on the broad relationship and
have positive outcomes.
--------
SECURITY
--------
¶6. (C) President Calderon acknowledged that our agenda
is broader than security, but turned to that topic as the
most urgent. His personal commitment was to leave his
successor a secure Mexico with credible institutions free
of the taint of corruption. To succeed he needed U.S.
support, and suggested renewing the assault weapons ban.
He said that there was a clear correlation between the
lifting of the ban in 2004 and Mexico's current
situation. During the six years of the Fox
administration, Mexican forces captured 3,000 assault
weapons. In the last two years, they confiscated 16,000,
with no end in sight. The availability of assault
weaponry had contributed to the cartels' new aggression
against government forces. A second factor was cartels'
expanding interests. While they still fought for access
to the U.S. market, they were increasingly seeking to
control the growing Mexican drug market, as well. The
combination of assault weapons and an increased
imperative for geographic control prompted the dramatic
increases in violence Mexico had recently witnessed. The
third factor was the Mexican government's increased
pressure on the cartels.
¶7. (C) Calderon cited the situation in Ciudad Juarez as
a case in point. Ciudad Juarez was important to the
cartels as a launching point into the United States, he
said, but it was also a growing metropolis with a
potentially lucrative drug market. The cartels' battle
for this territory had driven homicide rates up to record
levels. President Calderon said he had made the decision
to flood the city with federal forces and take over
security while pressing the city and state governments to
convert their local police into effective patrolling
units and to do more against common crime. In just a
month, violence in Ciudad Juarez had fallen by 73
percent, but this progress had to be sustained.
¶8. (C) Calderon said that a second priority should be
to cut U.S. drug consumption. Mexico was working to halt
the supply -- the United States needed to cut demand.
This led to the third priority -- cutting money flows to
the cartels. Calderon assessed that direct action to
interdict bulk cash coming from the United States to
Mexico would also strangle the cartels and their
operations. Mapping money flows and sharing that
information would help both countries interdict cash more
effectively and shut down the institutions facilitating
cash transactions. Mexico, he conceded, would have to do
more to check inbound travelers and vehicles, ideally
reaching a near 100 percent inspection rate through non-
invasive (NIIE) means. That might not be possible with
existing technology, he admitted, but deploying more NIIE
machines along more points of the border would be very
helpful.
¶9. (C) Calderon said he appreciated the change in the
tenor of USG officials' remarks in recent weeks, and
hoped that trend would continue. Suggestions by eminent
U.S. government officials that Mexico was unable to
govern its territory or risked becoming a failed state
did incalculable damage, not just to Mexico's image, but
to its efforts to confront organized crime. These
statements caused law enforcement officials to lose hope,
helped motivate local officials to surrender to
intimidation, and discouraged citizens from supporting
the government's efforts. On the other hand, he opined,
such statements led criminals to believe the government
would fail, and gave them renewed confidence to continue
to confront the forces of order. Calderon said he needed
the support of the Mexican people, and he needed them to
believe the rule of law would triumph.
¶10. (C) Secretary Clinton responded that her message
was one of co-responsibility and cooperation. She was
personally committed to making sure both countries
succeed. The United States would do its share. In the
coming weeks, AG Holder and DHS Secretary Napolitano
would visit Mexico to further this important dialogue.
The Obama Administration had announced on March 20 a
series of new measures along the U.S. border to impede
smuggling or arms and cash into Mexico. The Secretary
said she could not be confident that an assault weapons
ban would be passed by Congress, but she was confident
the Administration would use every means to aggressively
enforce existing law. She offered to share ideas with
Mexico on demand reduction in both countries. She
affirmed the Administration's absolute confidence that
Calderon would succeed in his efforts, and that the
United States would be with him every step of the way.
¶11. (C) President Calderon thanked her, noting that he
appreciated the announcements made on the 20th, but
adding that moving the National Guard to the border would
pose a problem for Mexico. Turning back to Mexico's
situation, he commented that the cartels were more
aggressive in confronting Mexican institutions than ever
before. They were more openly intimidating elected
officials, and more brutally killing Mexican law
enforcement personnel. They had undertaken terrorist-
like acts, including throwing a grenade into a crowd of
civilians last September. Mexico had to face evidence
that corruption extended to all levels. The cartels had
a strong distribution network in the United States,
Calderon noted, and unchecked they could start to apply
the same tactics in the United States. Mexico had to
face the harsh truth about corruption in the Attorney
General's office; the United States should be concerned
that the massive volume of drugs, money, and weapons
flowing across the border could imply corruption problems
on the U.S. side, as well. Calderon said that both
countries needed to coordinate efforts closely to be
successful. The President expressed some frustration
with the pace of Merida deliveries, while noting his
appreciation for the partnership the Merida Initiative
represented.
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THE REGION
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¶12. (C) President Calderon observed that, while there
were many sensitivities in Mexico to working too closely
on security matters with the United States, the nations
of Central America did not face the same political
constraints. Mexico was concerned by the vulnerabilities
in Guatemala and other Central American nations where
security, judicial, and even democratic institutions were
weak and susceptible to corrupt influences. In
Guatemala, almost half the security forces had been
forcibly retired by the prior president, leaving its
security situation difficult at best. The United States
should focus regional Merida assistance on these most
vulnerable countries.
¶13. (C) President Calderon then went on to express his
hope that the United States would re-assert its
leadership role in the region, using the Summit of the
Americas as an important opportunity. The region was
eager to meet President Obama, and excited to hear his
vision of U.S. policy towards Latin America. Calderon
confessed that a recent meeting with Summit host Prime
Minister Manning of Trinidad and Tobago had left him
concerned that Manning would try to force the Cuba issue
at the Summit. Calderon said he had advised against
this, arguing the United States and Cuba needed to work
out their issues bilaterally first, before the region
engaged. Calderon did not think Manning was persuaded,
describing the leader as seduced by the idea of making
history with this issue.
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THE WORLD
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¶14. (C) Secretary Clinton noted U.S. appreciation for
Mexico's leadership role in the G-20, and especially its
early call for replenishing the international financial
institutions. Calderon pointed out that the Inter-
American Development Bank was one of those institutions
that needed replenishing, and should not be overlooked.
¶15. (C) Calderon continued that he and President Obama
had many things in common, and one was a "green" agenda.
Calderon noted this was another personal passion of his.
The global community set goals for the environment, but
didn't create mechanisms to make those goals attainable.
Calderon discussed his ideas for regional "clean energy"
markets, and for the creation of a "green fund" that
would provide incentives for nations who successfully
actualized plans to reduce emissions. Secretary Clinton
said that Mexico's vision on the range of issues
affecting the environment, renewable energy options, and
climate change was greatly valued, and for that reason
President Obama wished to invite him to a Major Economies
Forum on Energy and the Environment in Italy this July
(reftel). President Calderon noted that, as Secretary of
Energy and earlier, as President of the Development Bank
(Banobras), he had approved wind energy and biogas
programs across Mexico. Now those programs were models
of their kind. Secretary Clinton told him she was
pleased to be visiting Mexico's showcase biogas plant in
Monterrey, drawing a warm smile from the President.
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NEXT STEPS
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¶16. (C) Calderon summed up the discussion by noting
that our two countries need a broad strategy to focus on
security, competitiveness, and the range of bilateral
issues. He said that we should build strategic alliances
in areas like healthcare, where U.S. demand could be met
by Mexican supply. Calderon noted he had shared these
ideas with President Obama, and very much looked forward
to discussing them further in April. He reiterated again
how honored Mexico was to receive the U.S. President.
Secretary Clinton thanked Calderon for his time and
leadership, and again pledged her personal commitment to
concrete results in the relationship.
CLINTON