

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09SANAA1611, ANOTHER ROYG INSIDER SPEAKS OUT: "HE WON’T LISTEN
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09SANAA1611.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09SANAA1611 | 2009-08-31 08:20 | 2011-04-08 05:00 | SECRET | Embassy Sanaa |
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHYN #1611/01 2430820
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 310820Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2689
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SANAA 001611
SIPDIS
FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR SMOFFATT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR YM
SUBJECT: ANOTHER ROYG INSIDER SPEAKS OUT: "HE WON’T LISTEN
TO ANYONE"
REF: SANAA 1486
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY. Presidential first cousin and
well-connected ruling General People’s Congress Member of
Parliament Mohammed al-Qadhi has joined other prominent
former insiders ) including Tariq al-Fadhli, Mohammed Salim
Basenduah and Hamid al-Ahmar ) in blaming President Ali
Abdullah Saleh for Yemen’s myriad problems, and expressing
doubt that the current regime will ever change its
wrong-headed policies. Qadhi claimed that strengthening
Parliament to serve as a check on the power of the executive
was the last remaining hope to salvage Saleh’s government.
Along with the ongoing war in Sa’ada, the growing threat from
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Yemen’s failing
economy, the very public loss of influential allies like
Qadhi will open President Saleh up to further challenges to
his rule. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (S) Ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) MP, Deputy
Head of Parliament’s Oil and Development Committee and
presidential first cousin Mohammed al-Qadhi joined Islah MP
and powerful tribal sheikh Hamid al-Ahmar (reftel) in openly
criticizing the President and holding him directly
responsible for the country’s woes in press interviews. On
August 17, the Yemeni Socialist Party’s al-Ishtiraki web site
carried public statements by Qadhi accusing the President of
interfering with Parliamentary affairs and blaming him for
the war in Sa’ada and the ongoing restiveness in southern
Yemen. Qadhi, like Ahmar, is among a very small number of
well-connected members of the political elite in Yemen who
enjoy the influence and position to speak more openly than
the rest of the population about President Saleh and his
family members.
CIRQUE DE SALEH
---------------
¶3. (S) In an August 23 meeting with PolOff, Qadhi echoed the
concerns of many of Saleh’s former confidants and advisors
when he described how the President has, over the last 15
years, increasingly shut them out and begun relying solely on
himself or his closest family members in his decision-making.
"Since 1994, he decided that he was the only man capable of
making decisions in this country," Qadhi said. He added that
his father, Abdulillah al-Qadhi, the President’s uncle and
among the generals from Sanhan village who installed Saleh as
president in 1978, had a falling out with the President over
his handling of the 1994 war, although Qadhi himself remained
in close contact with Saleh until recently. "I have tried to
tell him that Yemen has serious problems, but he gets angry
and shuts me out. He and I fight often about his sons. He
doesn’t listen to anyone." Qadhi said that Saleh’s
close-mindedness was reflected even in their home village of
Sanhan, where "five or six people are well-off, and there are
thousands with nothing."
NO HOPE FOR CHANGE
------------------
¶4. (S) According to Qadhi, the President will never leave
office as long as he has a firm grasp on the military and
security services, which are stacked with men from Sanhan.
Although the President is bothered by the fact that he has
lost popularity among the general population in recent years,
it does not really threaten his grip on power, Qadhi said.
As to the succession question, Qadhi was unable to name a
likely or "acceptable" replacement for Saleh. On Hamid
al-Ahmar, he said, "The President has conducted a campaign
against him for 10 years, and at this point, most people
think he’s worse than the President." Qadhi acknowledged,
however, that Ahmar possesses the two things a Yemeni
president must have to be successful ) money, first, and
then political power. Qadhi dismissed members of the
Taiz-based Hayel Saeed family, despite their extensive wealth
and connections, because "they have no political skills."
¶5. (S) Qadhi named GPC MP Hussein al-Ahmar (Hamid’s brother)
and Mohammed Abulahoum, a member of the GPC’s General Council
and a leader of the Bakil tribal confederation, as two of the
strongest reform-minded individuals within the GPC hierarchy.
Qadhi hopes to use the Solidarity Council, a political
action group he founded in early 2009 with Hussein al-Ahmar,
as a tool for compelling the regime to implement badly needed
reforms. "It’s not that powerful yet, but we’re working to
build our strength and become a political party," he said.
The Council will conduct "massive citizen education
campaigns" to inform Yemenis about their rights in a
democratic system, with the goal of mobilizing the populace
to agitate for change through public demonstrations. "We
will start first in Sana’a, and then it can’t be ignored," he
said. "The people of the south will then know that they are
not alone, that people are suffering all over Yemen. The
people in the north are with them, and they will be convinced
to stay with this new unity." Qadhi hinted that if peaceful
demonstrations were unsuccessful in achieving dramatic
change, "we will use other means."
THE PROBLEM WITH PARLIAMENT
---------------------------
¶6. (S) "The crux of the problem in Yemen is that the
Parliament, judicial system and all of the ministries report
directly to the President," Qadhi told PolOff. He argued
that Parliament is totally subjugated by the regime, with its
speaker Yahya al-Raie taking orders directly from President
Ali Abdullah Saleh regarding the topic and tone of
Parliamentary sessions, sometimes only minutes before a
session is about to start. One-third of MPs are uneducated
and unaware of their duties as Parliamentarians and one-third
of MPs are co-opted by the regime and afraid to challenge the
President lest they lose their privileges, according to
Qadhi. The fewer than 100 remaining MPs are comprised of
weak opposition party members and a group of reform-minded
GPC members. He said that strengthening Parliament as a
check on the power of the executive was "the only hope to
save this regime." After Ramadan, Qadhi said, he and other
reformers in Parliament would push to replace the current
leadership ) Raie and his three deputies ) and replace them
with independent MPs willing to challenge the President.
(Note: Ramadan will end in late September. End Note.)
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
-----------------
¶7. (S) Mohammed al-Qadhi is a ruling General People’s
Congress (GPC) Member of Parliament from Sana’a (Hasabah
district), the Deputy Chair of the powerful Oil and
Development Committee, and a member of the GPC’s highest body
) the General Council. He and President Saleh are first
cousins, both from the small village of Sanhan. Qadhi’s
father, Abdulillah al-Qadhi, was among the generals who
installed Saleh as president of Yemen in 1978. Qadhi helped
found the powerful Islah Charitable Association in the 1990s.
He earned a bachelor’s degree in Business Administration and
Public Administration from the U.S. in 1993, and lived in the
U.S. for seven years in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Qadhi is the father of five children. He speaks fluent
Arabic and English.
COMMENT
-------
¶8. (S) Qadhi is the latest of several high-profile political
insiders to speak out openly against the President, a
red-line topic in Yemen less than one year ago. Unlike the
others, Qadhi is the first close family member and Sanhani to
turn on President Saleh. Whether or not Qadhi and other
influential insiders ) including Tariq al-Fadhli, Mohammed
Salim Basenduah and Hamid al-Ahmar ) are truly concerned
about the fate of Yemen, or, smelling blood in the water, are
positioning themselves for a post-Saleh era, their open
criticism and "Saleh must go" attitude are a considerable
departure from the political norm. The public loss of former
friends and allies, coupled with Saleh’s failures in
resolving conflict in Sa’ada, defeating al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula and turning around Yemen’s struggling
economy, are likely to encourage a pile-on effect that will
open him up to further challenges to his rule. END COMMENT.
SECHE