

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06MANAGUA2093, SCENESETTER FOR SECDEF RUMSFELD
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MANAGUA2093.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06MANAGUA2093 | 2006-09-22 16:44 | 2011-05-09 16:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Managua |
VZCZCXYZ0020
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHMU #2093/01 2651644
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221644Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 002093
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV MARR OVIP KDEM NU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECDEF RUMSFELD
¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Post welcomes the Secretary of Defense,
the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, to Nicaragua for attendance
at the Seventh Defense Ministerial of the Americas. In
conjunction with the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Minister of Defense of Nicaragua and the United States
Defense Attachi Office, Managua, an agenda has been
developed which addresses regional interests, especially as
they pertain to regional security and stability, upcoming
elections with major political parties, professionalization
of the Nicaraguan Military and status of the Man Portable
Air Defense Systems which the Nicaraguan Armed Forces
currently maintain. This scenesetter offers military
political, and election 2006 overviews. Planned SecDef
activities and itineraries have been coordinated under
separate cover. This cable is organized as follows:
- Military Background
- Political Background
- The 2006 Elections
END SUMMARY.
Military Background
¶2. (U) Formed from the cadres of the 1970Qs revolutionary
phase, the Nicaraguan Armed Forces are based in the
Sandinista Revolution. All of the senior military officers
have their roots in this time period. The last two Chiefs
of the Armed Forces have focused their tenures on the
professionalization of their forces. The issue of
Nicaraguan ownership of thousands of Man Portable Air
Defense Systems (MANPADS) has been an overarching National
Security issue with the USG in terms of limiting, reducing
and, eventually, completely eliminating their stocks of
these weapon systems. While early progress was made with
1000 being destroyed between May and November of 2004, the
goal of achieving 80% reduction of these stocks by the end
of 2005 has fallen woefully short, due in large part to the
passage of Law 510 by the National Assembly that any
further destructions must be initiated and approved by 2/3
(supermajority) of the Nicaraguan National Assembly. In
March of 2005 progress was made in the form of an amendment
to Article 139 of Law 510 which changed this vote from 2/3
approval to one of a simple majority.
¶3. (U) In 1979 the Sandinista National Reconstruction
Government, with the approval of Violeta Chamorro and
Daniel Ortega, expropriated in excess of 60 properties
which were owned by citizens of the United States, Many of
these properties were turned over to the Nicaraguan Armed
Forces for the military to use as they saw fit. This usage
ranged from office spaces to private homes for active and
retired General Officers. To date more than 20 properties
have either been returned to their original owners, or the
owners have been compensated in some manner for the
property. Approximately 36 properties remain under dispute
and in the hands of the Nicaraguan Armed Forces.
¶4. (U) It is recommended that the following issues be
raised both with Minister of Defense Avil Rammrez Valdivia
and Army Chief (CHOD) General Moises Omar Halleslevens
Acevedo:
¶A. Efforts to improve civilian-military relations and
civilian control over the military are appreciated and are
to be commended.
¶B. The USG looks forward to the next destruction of
MANPADS. The USG is pleased to note that the National
Assembly, while requiring a vote to continue destruction,
restructured the passage process to only require a simple
majority (47 of 90 deputies) rather than a supermajority
(56 of 90 deputies) of the Assembly.
¶C. The GON has presented its MANPADS destruction as a good
faith effort towards regional arms limitation through SICA
(the Central American Integration Secretariat). USG
supports this effort and applauds efforts to promote a
Central American security strategy towards regional
security threats, especially terrorism and illegal
trafficking in persons and narcotics. The USG realizes
that these cooperative regional efforts will require
continuing support from the United States.
¶D. The situation involving the property rights of more
than 30 United States citizens whose properties were
confiscated and are being held by the Nicaraguan Army
continues to be of concern to the USG. Steps must be taken
to settle these claims as quickly and equitably as
possible.
¶5. (U) It is expected that the Nicaraguans will raise the
following issues:
MANAGUA 00002093 002 OF 003
¶A. Greater U.S. financial assistance for the Nicaraguan
military. It is suggested that any answer be couched in
terms of acknowledging the challenges facing the country
and the region, but expecting the destruction of MANPADS to
move forward (this last piece may be OBE if the National
Assembly votes for destruction during the September
meetings).
¶B. USG to exert pressure on the Government of Honduras to
destroy its F-5 bomb racks as part of the SICA Arms
Limitation Initiative, which would help Bolaqos maintain
support for the destruction of NicaraguaQs MANPADS.
¶C. CFAC (Conferencia de Fuerzas Armadas-Armed Force
Conference) has been regarded as the mechanism for regional
cooperation, but has limitations. GON is concerned that it
is a military organization and minimizes civilian
participation, as well as the fact that it excludes Costa
Rica, Belize, and Panama. It is suggested that any
response acknowledge the importance of CFAC as it pertains
to regional stability and cooperation, understanding that
civilian oversight and transparency with regional alliances
is a relatively new concept which will take time, effort
and patience to resolve. The countries which are excluded
are so owing to the fact that none of these countries have
standing militaries, yet still face the same threats that
menace the region as a whole, and as such these countries
should be encouraged to participate.
Political Background
--------------------
¶6. (U) Since the inception of democratic rule in Nicaragua
in 1990, political power has been contested between two
majority forces: the Liberals on the right, and the
Sandinistas on the left. The civil war and economic
mismanagement in the 1980s, and the Sandinista giveaway of
government property to party leaders in 1990 (the
"pinata"), turned a significant majority of the population
against the Sandinista Front (FSLN), preventing the FSLN
from winning national elections in 1990, 1996 and 2001.
¶7. (U) Nicaragua's opposition forces came together under
the United National Opposition (UNO) to win the 1990
elections, but soon splintered apart. The Liberal
Constitutional Party (PLC) emerged as the dominant Anti-
Sandinista force.
¶8. (U) Discontent grew within the FSLN after the 1990
"pinata" of FSLN leader Daniel Ortega and Ortega's
continued electoral defeats during that decade. Some
leftist elements broke away from the FSLN during this
period, most notably the Sandinista Renovation Movement
(MRS) under the leadership of revolutionary activist Dora
Maria Tellez.
¶9. (U) The PLC and Arnoldo Aleman emerged victorious in
the 1996 national elections, but were unable to gain a
supermajority in the National Assembly, which would have
allowed the party to name Supreme Electoral Council (CSE)
and Supreme Court (CSJ) magistrates without Sandinista
votes. This situation led to a political pact between the
PLC and FSLN to divide control of the institutions of
government between the two parties, which has continued to
the present time.
¶10. (U) Before the 2001 election, the PLC was able to
bring most of the smaller democratic parties into an
alliance. Aleman personally selected Enrique Bolanos as the
alliance's presidential candidate as well as many of the
National Assembly and Central American Parliament deputy
candidates. Bolanos won the election and instituted an
anti-corruption campaign.
¶11. (U) In 2003, Aleman, who pilfered tens of millions of
dollars from state coffers, was convicted of fraud and
money laundering, stripped of his parliamentary immunity
and sentenced to 20 years in prison. This process caused a
great upheaval in the Liberal ranks and when the dust
settled, a small number of Liberal and Conservative
deputies broke from the PLC alliance to form a new
political caucus to support Bolanos, but the vast majority
remained loyal to Aleman. The disaffected Conservatives and
Liberals, unhappy with Aleman's continued influence in the
PLC, formed the Alliance for the Republic (APRE), a party
loyal to and supported by the Bolanos administration.
¶12. (U) Ortega manipulated the pact with the PLC and
Sandinista control of the judiciary to allow greater
degrees of freedom for Aleman in exchange for concessions
to the FSLN in the CSE and CSJ. He is now allowed to move
about Managua freely under Qmedical paroleQ.
MANAGUA 00002093 003 OF 003
¶13. (U) Having won comfortable majorities since 1990, the
Liberals lost badly in the 2004 municipal elections. The
Sandinistas won 88 of 152 municipalities, the PLC 58, APRE
five, and the PRN one. The Sandinistas claimed victory
with a plurality of the vote in most of their 88
municipalities, with the PLC, APRE and other minor parties
dividing the anti-Sandinista vote.
The 2006 Elections
------------------
¶14. (U) Three candidates emerged in 2005 to challenge the
Aleman-Ortega pact. Excluded from the majority parties by
the two caudillos, Sandinista dissident Herty Lewites broke
from the FSLN to head the MRS ticket, and Liberal dissident
Eduardo Montealegre formed the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance
(ALN) out of PLC dissidents, the PC, PRN, and other small
democratic parties. PLC outcast and prominent Bolanos
Administration official Jose Antonio Alvarado ran as the
APRE candidate.
¶15. (U) The Christian Alternative (AC) party left
Lewites' alliance, changed its name to Alternative for
Change and chose the erratic Eden Pastora as its
presidential candidate. Jose Antonio Alvarado became Jose
Rizo's running mate in the PLC, but APRE joined the ALN.
¶16. (U) The political upheaval did not end in May -- MRS
candidate Lewites died from heart complications in early
July. Lewites' running mate Edmundo Jarquin assumed the
candidacy and MRS leadership convinced popular Sandinista
revolutionary songwriter Carlos Mejia Godoy to accept the
vice presidential nomination. Despite predictions among
some pundits that MRS votes would migrate to the FSLN, or
perhaps the ALN, JarquinQs poll numbers remain similar to
LewitesQ. However, the shift of Liberal politicians back
and forth between the PLC and ALN, depending on their
calculation of personal benefit, continues
¶17. (U) The bad blood caused by the ongoing PLC smear
campaign and RizoQs insistence on remaining a Presidential
candidate, make a union of the liberal parties increasingly
unlikely. With the Sandinistas also divided into two
parties, it appears there will be five candidates on
November 5.
¶18. (U) The latest CID-Gallup-sponsored official poll
released at the end of August showed the following results
for the parties:
FSLN: 29%
ALN: 23%
PLC: 14%
MRS: 14%
AC: 1%
None: 19%
¶19. (U) As with earlier polls, the CID-Gallup poll showed
that the FSLN would lose in a second round and the ALN
would be the likely winner. Thus the FSLN is focusing all
its efforts on a first round victory by leveraging a pact-
inspired change in the Electoral Law that enables a front-
running candidate to win the election in the first round
with only 35 percent if there is a five percent lead over
the next most popular contender.
¶20. (U) On September 13, CNN and Channel 2 co-sponsored a
presidential debate featuring Montealegre, Rizo, Jarquin
and Pastora. Daniel Ortega did not participate, declaring
the debate format "artificial." According to M and R,
113,000 households in Managua watched the debate and
Jarquin was perceived as the winner, followed by
Montealegre. Jarquin, about whom there were initial doubts
because he lacks LewitesQ charisma, continues to perform
well and draw voters from both the FSLN and ALN.
TRIVELLI