

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09MANAMA660, GRADING BAHRAIN'S PARLIAMENT
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MANAMA660.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09MANAMA660 | 2009-11-18 13:54 | 2011-02-18 21:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Manama |
VZCZCXRO1473
RR RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0660/01 3221354
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 181354Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9022
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000660
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM BA
SUBJECT: GRADING BAHRAIN'S PARLIAMENT
REF: MANAMA 342
Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY -------
1.(C) As Bahrain's parliament nears the end of its second full session since being restored in 2002, it has lived both up, and down, to expectations. Parliament, particularly the elected lower house, remains a work in progress, but has shown signs of growth and evolution over the past seven years. By bringing in the mainstream Shia opposition, and providing a forum for public debate, the parliament has helped bolster internal stability and security. End summary. ---------- BACKGROUND ----------
2.(C) Following the death of Emir Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa in 1999, Emir (now King) Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa embarked on a program of reform and reconciliation with Bahrain's Shia majority. Restoring the parliament suspended since 1975 was a major element of that program. Originally a unicameral body, King Hamad gained approval in a national referendum in 2000 for a bicameral parliament in which he appoints the forty members of the upper house (Shura Council) while the forty members of the lower house (Council of Representatives) are elected by popular vote. Shia parties boycotted the first election in 2002 and remained outside the legal political system until the mainstream Wifaq party decided in 2005 that it would enter the fray for the 2006 election cycle. Wifaq won seventeen seats, amidst allegations that elements within the government had orchestrated a campaign of gerrymandering and vote tampering to prevent it from securing a majority. Sunni Islamist parties (the Salafist Asala, the Muslim Brotherhood's Minbar Islami, and Mustaqbal) won nineteen seats, while Sunni independents took the remaining four. MPs are now gearing up for the 2010 election cycle. ------------------------------------ LIVING UP, AND DOWN, TO EXPECTATIONS ------------------------------------
3.(C) From the government's perspective, parliament has done what it was intended to do. It has contributed to internal security and stability by giving the Shia opposition a forum in which to air its grievances, and it has devolved much of the traditional tribal problem-solving, formerly handled by the Al Khalifa family, down to MPs. Moreover, in the eyes of Bahrain's leaders, it has achieved these aims without what they view as the chaos of the Kuwaiti parliamentary experience. Ruling and business elites will often cite Kuwait's volatile parliament as the reason why Bahrain must proceed slowly and maintain constitutional limitations on the body's power. They fear that a Kuwaiti-style legislature would be unworkable here due to Bahrain's sectarian divisions.
4.(C) The appointed Shura Council is the most direct of those limitations. Chosen personally by the King, its members are considered to be the wise men (and women) of Bahrain and above the influence of the popular demands of the street. According to the Foreign Minister, the King uses his appointments of Shura members to balance out underrepresentation in the elected Council of Representatives. (For example, because only one woman was elected to the lower House, the King appointed 10 women - including Christian and Jewish members - to the upper house.) The Shura Council acts as a check on the Council of Representatives in so much as it must review and approve bills passed by the elected MPs before they can go to the King for ratification.
5.(C) The Bahrain of 2009 is a far cry from the unrest of the 1990s. State security courts have been abolished, street protests are considerably fewer and less violent, and Wifaq, as a legal, parliamentary opposition, has proven its ability to channel most Shia political energy into non-violent protests. Since its 2005 decision to join the parliamentary political process, Wifaq has portrayed itself as a loyal opposition and has won the quiet respect of the interior ministry for its ability to organize peaceful demonstrations of tens of thousands of supporters. The party's leader, Ali Salman, has told us unequivocally that Wifaq will continue to participate in parliamentary politics because he believes there is more to gain in the long run by participating than by boycotting.
6.(C) MPs have in many ways taken on the role of tribal MANAMA 00000660 002 OF 003 elder, receiving constituents in their weekly majlis meetings to hear their complaints and address their needs. While constituents bring legitimate grievances over bureaucratic delays in public housing or social services, many expect their MPs to provide jobs, cars, even cash, as the traditional elders did. In this respect, the government has deflected many of these demands away from the royal family and ministries, and onto the elected members of parliament.
7.(C) From the voter's perspective, parliament appears less successful. The elected Council of Representatives, in particular, has been subjected to stinging public criticism from all quarters for wasting its time and energy on less-than-serious topics. For example, as the first tremors of the global financial crisis were felt here, MPs rushed to condemn a scheduled performance by Lebanese pop diva Haifa Wehebe, debated the harmful influence of witchcraft, and vowed to ban both pork and alcohol. Sectarian squabbles between Sunni and Shia MPs also consumed much of the past year. Shouting matches and walkouts paralyzed the lower house for several weeks. Wifaq MPs have complained to poloffs that even when they try to focus on those issues that matter to their constituents (naturalization of Sunni expats, housing, unemployment), they have a difficult time explaining to the voter in the majlis how their efforts have improved his situation. Without a majority, Wifaq is often unable to produce tangible results, and the rejectionist Shia fringe uses that to portray Wifaq - and the parliament - as ineffective. ---------------------------- DOING WHAT A PARLIAMENT DOES ----------------------------
8.(C) Despite all this, there are signs that the parliament is learning how to behave as a genuinely representative body. Within the limited scope of their powers, elected MPs have shown a dogged determination to exercise an oversight role by insisting on questioning ministers in open session - though challenging the authority of Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman is a red line no MP would dare cross. In one case, the Foreign Minister was questioned over a meeting with his then-Israeli counterpart Tzipi Livni. In another, Wifaq's Ali Salman went toe-to-toe with Minister for Cabinet Affairs Ahmed bin Attiyatallah Al Khalifa, forcing him to admit that the government had grossly undercounted the population. A Shia minister received a censure over allegations of corruption. He was subsequently eased out of the ministry into a "without portfolio" role.
9.(C) Similarly, MPs fought for, and won, a government concession on the budget. When the proposed budget did not include a BD 50 million provision for "inflation relief" (essentially cash payments to low income families), MPs in the lower house insisted on its inclusion and sent an amended version up to the Shura Council. The Shura stripped the provision and returned the original budget back to the Council of Representatives. The Finance Committee, led by Wifaqi Abduljalil Khalil, built a consensus that crossed party and sectarian lines, and re-inserted the "inflation relief" provision. With six months having passed, and the budget stymied in parliament, the government faced a choice: convoke a National Assembly (both chambers sitting together for an up or down vote) to ram the budget through, or compromise. In the end, the King intervened to provide the BD 50 million, on the condition that MPs agreed to drop the provision from next year's budget. Khalil later told poloff, with barely-contained delight, that "we made them blink!" --------------- LOOKING FORWARD ---------------
10.(C) Aside from a few public statements encouraging Sunnis to work together in the 2010 election, MPs from the Sunni blocs have been tightlipped about their election plans so far. Wifaq MP Jasim Husain has said several times over the course of the past few months that he believes there will be changes in the makeup of the party in the next parliament. Saeed Al Majed, an advisor to Ali Salman, outlined many of those changes in a June meeting with poloff (reftel). Comments from these Wifaqi insiders indicate that Wifaq will stand fewer religious candidates in 2010, opting instead for more technocrats like Khalil and Husain. According to Al Majed, assuming the constituencies remain unchanged from 2006, Wifaq will win eighteen seats at most. ------- COMMENT ------- MANAMA 00000660 003 OF 003
11.(C) In broad terms, Bahrain's seven-year-long parliamentary experience has been successful. It has provided an open, albeit controlled, forum for the Shia opposition to press its demands and engage with the government on controversial issues. Wifaq's 2005 decision to enter the political arena, and its stated commitment to participate in the 2010 election, is a noteworthy achievement.
12.(C) On a more practical level, there are positive signs that the process is maturing, but there is clearly much room for improvement. Winning inclusion of the "inflation relief" provision marked the first time the elected, lower house had managed to force the government's hand on a high-profile issue. It remains to be seen whether elected MPs, so often bitterly divided along sectarian lines, learned from that process how to work effectively across the aisle. So far, those divisions have generally prevented, particularly the Wifaqis, from delivering on their constituents' demands. Should the makeup of the 2010 parliament shift more toward technocrats and away from Islamists, we might expect a more professional tone of debate. Islamists will, however, likely continue to dominate the elected chamber. ERELI