

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2511, TFLE01: HAMADEH SEES RESOLUTION OF SHEBAA FARMS AS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BEIRUT2511.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BEIRUT2511 | 2006-08-01 15:37 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Beirut |
Appears in these articles: not yet set |
VZCZCXRO7239
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2511/01 2131537
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011537Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4853
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002511
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2026
TAGS: IR IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: TFLE01: HAMADEH SEES RESOLUTION OF SHEBAA FARMS AS
MEANS TO NEUTRALIZE HIZBALLAH IDEOLOGICALLY
Classified By: Classified by: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: S
ection 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C/NF) On August 1, Minister of Telecommunications Marwan
Hamadeh told the Ambassador and Emboff that there is no need
to get Syrian support for a potential settlement of the
Shebaa Farms issue. Hamadeh expressed confidence that any
agreement for an Israeli withdrawal from Shebaa, whether or
not Syria signs off on it or it is actually implemented on
the ground, could remove a major plank from Hizballah's
propaganda platform. Referring to the 7-point plan presented
by PM Siniora in Rome, Hamadeh offered that this document,
supported by the entire Lebanese Cabinet, could be used as
the basis for an official GOL request for a UN resolution.
On the state of the Lebanese Cabinet, Hamadeh said that there
were no signs of an impending collapse of the government,
noting that some Ministers were hedging their bets for a
post-war, pro-Hizballah orientation. Hamadeh expressed
concern that the under-equipped Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
would be unable to fulfill their role in a post-conflict
peace plan without significant assistance. He argued that
LAF deployment to the south could begin immediately upon a
cease-fire, for Hizballah would not dare to object or block
it. Hamadeh also suggested moving now on a UNSCR regarding
the Hariri tribunal, in order to put Hizballah off balance.
End Summary.
¶2. (C/NF) On the afternoon of August 1, the Ambassador and
emboff met with Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh
at his office in downtown Beirut. Also sitting in on the
meeting was Minister of Displaced Persons Nehmeh Tohmeh.
Hamadeh offered insights into the internal strategizing
occurring in the Lebanese Cabinet regarding a potential UN
resolution that would be passed at the same time as a
cease-fire agreement. Hamadeh stressed the need for quick
action on a UN Resolution, based on the GOL's 7-point paper,
presented by PM Siniora in Rome last week. Hamadeh
strategized that PM Siniora could forward the 7-point plan,
which already has unanimous support from the Lebanese
Cabinet, to the UN in its current form without the need to
bring the issue in front of the Cabinet.
¶3. (C/NF) Noting a summit of Lebanese Christian, Sunni,
Shi'a, and Druze religious leaders earlier in the day which
fully and unconditionally endorsed Siniora's 7-point paper,
Hamadeh speculated that such wide support for the document
could give Siniora adequate political coverage if it was to
be forwarded to the UN Security Council. Any return of the
document to the Cabinet for further discussion would not be
productive, Hamadeh said, "if we go back, we will be lost in
the details." In particular, Hamadeh noted that the Shi'a
ministers, while agreeing to support the 7-point document as
a whole, were interested in re-opening discussion on the
details of point number 5, concerning the deployment of the
UN peacekeeping force.
LEAVE SHEBAA, NEUTRALIZE HIZBALLAH
----------------------------------
¶4. (C/NF) The agreement for the withdrawal of Israel from
Shebaa Farms, said Hamadeh, would, regardless of the outcome,
go far in removing Hizballah's favorite propaganda tool.
Hamadeh offered that Lebanon is, "still hostage to Syria and
Hizballah" as long as the issue of Shebaa can be kept alive
among the Lebanese. Speculating on the contents of a future
UN Security Council resolution, Hamadeh wondered out loud if
it was even necessary for the GOL to get Syria's explicit,
written, and internationally-recognized blessing to negotiate
an Israeli withdrawal from Shebaa. Hamadeh dismissed
concerns that lacking an official, written Syrian declaration
that Shebaa Farms are in fact Lebanese would allow Syria to
reclaim the territory later on and potentially scuttle the
cease-fire along with it. Whether or not Syria agrees to a
potential UNSC resolution, said Hamadeh, is irrelevant. For
Hamadeh, the resolution would need to be drafted in a way
that removes any "alibi" for Syria and Hizballah to keep
Shebaa Farms as a pretext for continued military action.
¶5. (C/NF) Hamadeh sees two possible scenarios resulting from
a UNSC resolution, which would include an Israeli withdrawal
from Shebaa. First, if Syria agrees and does not challenge
Lebanese control over the Shebaa territory, Lebanese
BEIRUT 00002511 002 OF 003
sovereignty would be restored, international forces could
deploy to the region until such time as the Lebanese Army
could mobilize to replace them, and Hizballah would have no
territorial pretext for maintaining its "resistance." In the
second scenario, if Syria rejects the resolution and claims
the territory as Syrian, Israel would stay in Shebaa, the
international force would not deploy, and Hizballah would
still lose its pretext for continued resistance to Israeli
occupation of "Lebanese" territory. For Hamadeh, both
potential outcomes would serve to corner Syria and Hizballah
politically. Hamadeh added that if Hizballah were to reject
this potential resolution, the party would lose face and feel
greater pressure from public opinion, particularly amongst
the Shi'a.
ARM THE LEBANESE ARMY NOW
-------------------------
¶6. (C/NF) Hamadeh indicated that there would be no difficulty
in implementing a UN sponsored cease-fire. Once the LAF is
sent to the South, Hamadeh explained, Hizballah will not
confront it. Hamadeh did express reservations about the
capability of the LAF, due to their limited ammunition
supplies and reliance on old and marginally-serviceable
equipment. Hamadeh offered that support for the LAF is an
equally important part of the eventual post-conflict
stabilization of Lebanon as the make-up of the international
peacekeeping force. If the LAF is to be called on to deploy,
said Hamadeh, the LAF has immediate material needs that need
to be met. Hamadeh suggested that supplies and equipment
could be rapidly transferred to the LAF from NATO reserve
units. Hamadeh stressed that, "the time for high diplomatic
maneuvering is now. The time to strengthen the army is now."
LEBANESE CABINET STILL WORKING TOGETHER
---------------------------------------
¶7. (C/NF) Hamadeh denied rumors that the Cabinet was nearing
collapse, noting that most of the ministers were "playing
(the situation) correctly." Hamadeh said that, "the Cabinet
is solid," and noted that there is a general view that there
is a need for the government to remain in place for the sake
of the cease-fire negotiations and the implementation of any
UNSC resolutions related to the cease-fire. On the
surprising decision to send Greek Orthodox and pro-March 14th
Minister of Culture Tarek Mitri to represent Lebanon at the
UN, instead of the Shi'a, Hizballah-sympathizing FM Fawzi
Salloukh, Hamadeh flatly offered that Berri had agreed to the
arrangement, noting a need for a more polished presentation
in New York. Hamadeh described a significant change in
Minister of Defense Elias El-Murr's demeanor, characterizing
him as playing both sides. Hamadeh said that El-Murr
believes the Hizballah will "win" in the current conflict and
is trying to save himself politically for the post-conflict
sorting-out of the political scene here. Hamadeh recounted
that Siniora was furious at El-Murr at a recent cabinet
meeting for his comments to the media to the effect that,
"the 7 points (of Siniora's paper) do not exist".
¶7. (C/NF) Other ostensibly "pro-Syrian" members of the
cabinet have been surprisingly quiet, Hamadeh said. Minister
of Justice Charles Rizk, an erstwhile ally of President Emile
Lahoud, has been, "playing it better than Elias (El-Murr),"
offered Hamadeh. Rizk has even been pushing forward the
Cabinet's work on the establishment of an international
tribunal to try suspects in the crimes under the purview of
Serge Brammertz's UNIIIC. According to Hamadeh, Rizk has
made great progress, appointing "two good judges." Hamadeh
stressed that they should take advantage of Rizk's openness
to work on this issue. For Hamadeh, now is the time to pass
a resolution to establish the tribunal, as this would serve
to "keep Syria quiet" on the current Lebanese-Israeli
conflict as well as further contain the Syrians in the long
run. Hamadeh was confident that the passage of such a
resolution would not be difficult at the current juncture.
IRANIAN FM MOTTAKI IN BEIRUT
----------------------------
¶8. (C) Hamadeh quoted French Ambassador Bernard Emie
characterizing the visit of the Iranian FM Mottaki to Beirut
as "useful, but not helping a resolution." For Hamadeh, Iran
sees the current events in Lebanon as part of the wider
crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions. Hamadeh said
that Iran is clearly angry with UNSCR 1696 adopted this week.
Iran is "closed" on the Lebanon issue, with all matters
BEIRUT 00002511 003 OF 003
except for a cease-fire said to need political consensus for
implementation. Hamadeh described the Iranian opposition to
the 7-point paper presented by PM Siniora in Rome. Hamadeh
characterized Mottaki as taking particular issue with the
GOL's stance on the resolution of the Shebaa Farms issue and
the deployment of an international peacekeeping force in the
South, adding that the Iranians "are not happy with (Lebanese
Speaker of Parliament Nabih) Berri."
FELTMAN