

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06SANTIAGO2661, SEARED BLEU: THE SOCIALIST CONVICTIONS OF
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SANTIAGO2661.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06SANTIAGO2661 | 2006-12-29 12:56 | 2011-02-24 07:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Santiago |
VZCZCXYZ0018
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSG #2661/01 3631256
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 291256Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0635
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2773
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 1607
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 3445
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0035
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1227
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ DEC LIMA 4869
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 1631
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 002661
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL CI
SUBJECT: SEARED BLEU: THE SOCIALIST CONVICTIONS OF
MICHELLE BACHELET
REF: SANTIAGO 2432
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Kelly for reasons 1.4 (b and d)
------------
Summary
------------
¶1. (C) Eight months into her term as Chile's President, the core socialist principles that guide Michelle Bachelet are very much in evidence. Her administration's first budget emphasized increased spending on education and health care and she has expended much political capital on social issues such as the ""morning after"" contraceptive. In the international arena, Bachelet's initial inclination is to adopt positions of brotherly solidarity, including those with an ""anti-imperialist"" tint. In the case of the UNSC vote, for example, Bachelet preferred a vote for Venezuela until Chavez' various blunders, strong domestic opposition, and steady, persistent US persuasion, made it untenable to do so. She favors collectivist solutions to problems - the country is awash with commissions - and noted that investigations into corruption allegations did not diminish the inherent virtue of the State.
¶2. (C) Bachelet likely maintains in her heart ambivalence towards capitalism and too close ties to the American ""hegemon,"" a gut instinct that may sometimes frustrate USG policymakers on issues such as IPR. But intellectually Bachelet understands that Chile's future lies in moderation, contrary to the currents that have moved the continent towards the populist left. At the recently concluded Cochabamba summit, for example, Bachelet acknowledged the benefits of globalization (to Chavez' visible discomfort) and her government remains committed to free market principles, tight fiscal policies, and Chile's growing web of free trade agreements. We will continue to stress to her and her team the importance of innovation and investment, keys to the regional leadership role we feel Chile should assume. End summary.
-----------------------
Pink on the Inside
-----------------------
¶3. (C) Go to one of Santiago's better restaurants specializing in meats and one option for how meat is cooked is ""bleu"" - seared on the outside but rare inside. Nine months into her administration, it is clear President Michelle Bachelet is politically bleu - a moderate with fundamentally socialist core beliefs that will sometimes bloom into full evidence. Bachelet's first official act after taking the presidential oath was to sign legislation mandating free health care for the elderly. Her first budget posits a 10.6 percent increase in spending on education alone and overall spending on domestic programs (health care, education, and infrastructure) is set to increase by 11 percent. The President's tendencies were evident as well in a social issue that dominated news headlines for much of the winter - her proposal to make the so-called ""morning after pill"" available to under age of majority girls, without the consent of parents. Bachelet's stance put her squarely at odds with the influential Catholic Church an offended many within a society that is still conservative - albeit slowly changing - when it comes to traditional ""family values."" In the end, she was forced to table the proposal.
--------------------------------
Michelle & Hugo 4ever?
--------------------------------
¶4. (C) The press here still runs occasionally a photo of a visibly pleased Bachelet receiving a quick rub on the shoulders from Hugo Chavez at the 2006 European-South American summit in Vienna, and notes her warm interactions with the Venezuelan president at other high-visibility functions. Coupled with Chavez' repeated declarations that he is a committed ""michellista"" (most recently at the December 200 Cochabamba summit of South American leaders), coy analysts posit a political ""love affair."" Ideologically, Bachelet is sympathetic to much of the rhetoric and some of the politics found on the left. At th risk of delving too far into easy pop psychology, Bachelet is a child o the 60's. At the November 2006 APEC summit in Hanoi, she revealed that she had visited Vietnam in the mid-1970's, and fondly reminisced about her days marching in the streets against the U.S-led war in Vietnam. Bachelet lived in exile for several years in then-communist East Germany. And, of course, her father, an air force general who remained loyal to Allende, was tortured and died in one of Pinochet's prisons, not long after the coup that was facilitated - at least those of the left sincerely believe - by the USG.
¶5. (C) The President's collectivist worldview is reflected as well in her embrace of regional solidarity she is loathe to move Chile out in front of the pack or to make moves that risk offending her brother states."" (Comment: To be fair, that caution also speaks to a Chilean national character trait.) This was most in evidence during th debate leading up to the UNSC vote. We believe - based on comments we received from well-placed contacts in the Foreign Ministry (including a nearly despairing FonMin Foxley), the office of the Presidency, and others who know Bachelet's mind - that she truly wanted to cast Chile's vote in favor of Venezuela and Chavez. It was only after the many Chavez blunders, strong domestic opposition from the Chilean public, the opposition and members of her own coalition, bolstered by a low-profile USG campaign over the course of seven months, that Bachelet recognized that a vote for Venezuela would be a serious error, and gave Foxley the nod for an abstention.
--------------------------------------------- ------------
We're the Government, and We're Here To Help
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶6. (C) Bachelet's early months in office were rocked by street protests led by high school students protesting the woeful state of Chile's educational system. She was heavily criticized for a tentative respons deemed inadequate in the face of street violence. Some in this still male-dominated society pointed to her reluctance to use force as a womanly"" weakness. Others attributed it to the ""natural attribute"" of a socialist hesitant to employ the State's security apparatus. Bachele was able to finally bring matters under control with the promise of the formation of a commission - to include student leaders some of whom are barely in their teens - to study the problem and propose solutions. Si months later, that commission and its eighty-one(!) members has yet to conclude its work and, indeed, have not even agreed on the nature of th problem.
¶7. (C) Forming commissions - inclusive of all segments of society as is feasible - to address issues seems to be the default position of the Bachelet government) one wag bewailed that the country was ""awash in commissions."" Recently formed commissions have studied pension reform and the allegations of corruption arising out of the Chiledeportes scandal (reftel). When the latter released its report suggesting the adoption of some thirty measures to address the problem of corruption in government, Bachelet herself announced the package. In a revealing comment on her socialist worldview, the President allowed tha corruption was an issue, but then provided a ringing endorsement of the State's involvement in the life of the citizen: ""I am not one of those who believe that reform of the State signifies its weakening to reform the State the first thing to do is believe in the State.""
-----------------------
A Necessary Evil
-----------------------
¶8. (C) The ""inner Michelle,"" the president who has shown a remarkable ability to connect with the everyday person on the street - the Ambassador has seen examples of this empathy up close - reinforces the conceit of the Chilean center-left that it is more ""caring."" That quality helps explain that despite a sometimes first rough year office, including charges that she is indecisive, that many on her team of advisors are inexperienced, and that her government is uncoordinated, the most recent polls have Bachelet's approval ratings at fifty-six percent, nearly the equal of where she stood on inauguration day nine months ago.
¶9. (C) Blessed with charisma, Bachelet also has a pragmatic side. And that characteristic allows her to embrace - or at least accept - concepts and policies normally anathema to the left. She is quite familiar with the United States, having lived and studied there and has voiced admiration for certain aspects of U.S. society and its people. At the Cochabamba summit she stated - before an unhappy Chavez - that globalization was here to stay and that properly managed it brought concrete benefits to the world's disadvantaged. With no experience in the business world, indeed no ""feel"" for the concerns of business, Bachelet has nonetheless had the good sense to allow her top-notch Minister of Economy to adhere closely to the sound fiscal policies of her predecessors. Chile's economic growth in her first yea has been respectable if not spectacular. And she has smartly allowed FM Foxley and other true believers in free trade to continue past Concertacion governments' policy of negotiating FTA's with virtually every country under the sun.
¶10. (C) But her lack of familiarity with commerce - and her innate belief that it arises out of man's baser instincts - also means she and her administration can be a hard sell on policies of importance
to the USG, such as protection of IPR, for example. That the protection of pharmaceutical patents prejudices the poor through higher prices, or that copyright infringement of movies and music is a victimless crime, permeates the worldview of many of our contacts withi the Bachelet administration. There is a frustrating disconnect between that stance and that one which declares, as Bachelet did recently in an end-of-year essay published in the ""The Economist,"" that Chile seeks access to better health care and new technologies.
-------------
Comment
-------------
¶11. (C) On a continent that has drifted to the populist left, and with anti-U.S. invective on the rise, Michelle Bachelet remains committed to pursuing moderate, responsible social and economic policies. Regardles of core convictions that would normally suggest closer alignment with Chavez and his ilk, Bachelet recognizes that correct, respectful, and even close ties with the U.S. are in Chile's long-term interest. Even if she were to try to reverse course, a majority of Chileans, half her coalition and the entire opposition - which won 47 percent of the vote in January - would seek to stop her.
¶12. (C) The larger question is whether her somewhat antiquated faith in the power of the State to solve all evils will allow her to move quickl enough to address the problems that Chile faces. Bachelet now has little more than three years to go, having lost her first year to the distraction of protests, allegations of corruption, the death of Pinochet, and a steep learning curve. As a Mission, we will continue to urge Bachelet and her key advisors to take those steps that will foster innovation and attract investment, thereby assuring Chile of the economic growth and democratic consolidation we hope leads as well to a more active regional leadership role.
KELLY