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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2582, LEBANON: TWO MEETINGS WITH SINIORA NARROW THE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BEIRUT2582 | 2006-08-10 05:37 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beirut |
Appears in these articles: not yet set |
VZCZCXRO6407
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2582/01 2220537
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 100537Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4973
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0924
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0047
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002582
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016
TAGS: IS LE MOPS PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: TWO MEETINGS WITH SINIORA NARROW THE
GAP, BUT HE BALKS AT LETTER TO UN AND REITERATES CALL FOR
BETTER LANGUAGE ON SHEBAA
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C/NF) PM Fouad Siniora clearly understands that time is
short, and he specifically asked A/S Welch about a possible
August 9 Israeli security cabinet decision to expand
operations. Siniora realizes that the French-American
discussions on a draft UNSC resolution are difficult, but he
remains adamant about calling for IDF withdrawal
simultaneously with the deployment of the LAF, as well as a
clear promise by the international community to resolve
Shebaa at some future time. Siniora also understands that if
his Government sends a request to the Security Council asking
for an international force ("UNIFIL plus"), it would greatly
facilitate the adoption of the draft resolution and the
resulting immediate cessation of hostilities. Not
enthusiastic about the idea, Siniora is considering making
this request to UN Secretary General Annan and asked A/S
Welch for more time to discuss the issue with Nabih Berri
later in the day. He opposed asking for Chapter VII
authority and suggested that UNSC imposing Chapter VII would
be problematic. Finally, Siniora asked whether a cessation
of hostilities meant a lifting of the maritime and aviation
"siege" of Lebanon. He was not pleased with the draft's call
for verification procedures, suspicious that the Israelis
would keep the port and airport shuttered indefinitely. End
summary.
¶2. (C/NF) PM Siniora met with Assistant Secretary Welch and
the Ambassador at the Grand Serail for more than an hour at
midday on August 9. A second hour-long meeting was held late
in the afternoon. The Prime Minister was accompanied by
senior advisors Mohammad Chatta and Rola Nouraddine. Deputy
Legal Advisor Jonathan Schwartz and Embassy poloff
(notetaker) also attended the meetings.
¶3. (C/NF) Siniora's demeanor in the late afternoon session
was more analytical and less emotional than in the day's
earlier session. In the later session, there were no
references to Lebanon's ability to withstand continuing
"bombardment" if their conditions were not met. Siniora and
his advisor, Mohammad Chatta, closely parsed the Assistant
Secretary's suggestions and explanations, and at the end of
SIPDIS
the meeting wrote down the exact sequence of events that
would ideally occur in the critical period between the
cessation of hostilities and the deployment of the LAF,
assisted by a considerably strengthened UNIFIL.
FIRST MEETING
-------------
¶4. (C/NF) Following a discussion of GOI concerns and certain
aspects of both the promised LAF deployment to the south and
the make-up of a multi-national stabilization force that
could be at least initially an "enhanced UNIFIL," the
Assistant Secretary relayed to PM Siniora an immediate
message from the Secretary.
¶5. (C/NF) Siniora, when informed that the UNSC draft
resolution under consideration was in serious jeopardy
because of French-American differences and that events on the
ground could soon become even more problematic, paused and
reassessed the situation. As in his previous two meetings
with the Assistant Secretary, Siniora said he absolutely
required two items in the resolution: IDF withdrawal at the
time of cease-fire, and some treatment of Shebaa that could
be presented to the Lebanese people as equitable and just.
A/S Welch explained that the timing of the Israeli withdrawal
would most likely depend on two critical factors: the
effectiveness of LAF deployment to the south, and the date by
which sufficient numbers of an international force (which at
least initially could be "UNIFIL-plus") were deployed on teh
ground.
¶6. (C/NF) Siniora clearly understood A/S Welch's proposal
that to get the draft resolution through the Security Council
as quickly as possible, his Government should consider
requesting the UN Security Council for a heavily augmented
and strengthened UNIFIL. This, A/S Welch explained, would
allow force planning to begin immediately, which would hasten
the arrival of international troops and thus speed the
BEIRUT 00002582 002 OF 003
Israeli withdrawal. Siniora and his two advisors went over
some suggested wording, but would not commit themselves to
any specific language. Their greatest concern was the timing
of the IDF's withdrawal from recently occupied Lebanese
territory.
¶7. (C/NF) PM Siniora stated that he feared that the members
of the Security Council do not yet understand his political
constraints -- nor the full benefit that adoption of his
Cabinet-approved seven points would bring.
¶8. (C/NF) Siniora urged the U.S. and the UN Security Council
not to allow Iran and Syria to sabotage this peace effort.
He said the Iranian Foreign Minister, in a recent visit to
Beirut, had done all he could to undermine the peace effort,
and Siniora was convinced that Iranian pressure continues and
is relentless.
¶9. (C/NF) As the meeting concluded, PM Siniora urged A/S
Welch, in his meeting with Berri, to ensure that the Speaker
clearly understood that withdrawal of IDF is lashed to the
deployment of a multi-national force, which at this stage,
Siniora understands as "UNIFIL plus."
¶10. (C/NF) PM Siniora also emphasized that Berri has to
understand that if the Government of Lebanon deploys the LAF
with "UNIFIL plus," and Shebaa is mentioned, Hizballah has to
disarm south of the Litani.
SECOND MEETING
--------------
¶11. (C/NF) PM Siniora seemed reassured that A/S Welch's
meeting with Nabih Berri had gone fairly well, and
particularly in Berri's professed understanding that
Hizballah would have to disarm in the south. But he also
cautioned that Berri was difficult to pin down and employs
ambiguous language to great effect.
¶12. (C/NF) Siniora accepted A/S Welch's proposition that the
first UN resolution should include almost all the issues that
underlay the conflict: disarmament of Hizballah, an
effective arms embargo to non-state players, a sequenced
withdrawal of both Hizballah and IDF from south Lebanon,
respect for the Blue Line, deployment of the LAF to south
Lebanon, and finally, the insertion of an international force
to assist the LAF -- now centered on a greatly enhanced
UNIFIL.
¶13. (C/NF) Siniora and his advisor, Mohammad Chatta,
carefully noted the sequence of events, particularly in the
fragile gap period between the cessation of hostilities and
joint deployment of the LAF and UNIFIL plus. He expressed
approval that the draft resolution stated that, at least
initially, disarmament of Hizballah would take place only in
the south.
SHEBAA ... AGAIN
----------------
¶14. (C/NF) As he has in every previous meeting, PM Siniora
emphasized the importance dealing with Shebaa, and voiced his
concern the draft still did not recognize this central issue.
He indicated that the draft's current references to Shebaa,
in the context of border delineation, were not satisfactory.
¶15. (C/NF) Siniora listened with care to the argument that
the draft's references to Shebaa gave the UN Secretary
General considerable leeway in addressing the issue, but he
gave no indication that he was ready to concede the point.
A LETTER TO THE UN
------------------
¶16. (C/NF) PM Siniora said he would carefully consider the
Assistant Secretary's advice that the Government of Lebanon,
using the language of last week's Cabinet statement, send a
letter to UN SYG Annan that requested a "UNIFIL-plus"-type
international force for post-conflict stabilization. Siniora
indicated he was very hesitant to send such a document,
because he feared it may negatively affect Lebanon's future
interests. He said he would have a more definitive answer
following discussions with Nabih Berri that evening.
BEIRUT 00002582 003.2 OF 003
¶17. (C/NF) Demonstrating little enthusiasm for sending a
letter, Siniora said that, in any case, he could not ask for
Chapter VII authority. A/S Welch said that Siniora should be
prepared to accept Chapter VII if, as Ambassador Welch
expected, the UNSC included it. Siniora (who in earlier
meetings had indicated that he could never ask for Chapter
VII but would not oppose it if imposed upon Lebnaon) said
that he believed that Chapter VII would be problematic for
him even if he did not request it. He explained that his
letter to the UNSC, by being silent on the Chapter VII
question, would be seen as a set-up for Chapter VII. (Note:
The Ambassador will explore Chapter VII with Siniora, French
Ambassador Emie, and others on 8/10. End note.)
LIFTING THE SIEGE
-----------------
¶18. (C/NF) As the meeting concluded, Siniora asked whether
the current "state of siege" would be lifted upon cessation
of hostilities. When informed that the draft resolution
addressed this issue, but it involved a verification process,
the Prime Minister expressed dissatisfaction. PM Siniora
maintained that a sovereign nation should not be placed under
anyone's inspection regime.
¶19. (U) A/S Welch did not have the opportunity to clear this
cable but has authorized its release.
FELTMAN