

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09KABUL3661, UNCONVENTIONAL SECURITY FORCES -- WHAT'S OUT THERE?
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09KABUL3661.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09KABUL3661 | 2009-11-12 14:56 | 2011-01-24 17:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Kabul |
VZCZCXRO6079
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3661/01 3161456
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 121456Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3164
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCQSAB/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCJACC/USCENTCOM CFACC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEPCJT/CJTF-101 C2X BAGRAM AF
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3873
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 003661
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019
TAGS: MARR PINS PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: UNCONVENTIONAL SECURITY FORCES -- WHAT'S OUT THERE?
REF: A. KABUL 2520
¶B. KABUL 1016
¶C. KABUL 1425
¶D. KABUL 3366
¶E. KABUL 2339
¶F. KABUL 2807
Classified By: AMBASSADOR KARL EIKENBERRY FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) & (d)
¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: While the international community works
to grow the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), local
communities and the Afghan government (GIRoA) are resorting
to various unconventional security forces to protect
communities from insurgents. These forces range from the
U.S.-supported, GIRoA-controlled Afghan Public Protection
Program (AP3, refs A-C) to warlord Mir Alam Khan's Kunduz
militia (ref D), which is reportedly connected to the
National Directorate of Security (NDS) but seems to operate
without government guidance, command or control. Private
security companies, arbakai (local tribal self-defense
forces), and local election security forces round out the
picture, while U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) is laying
groundwork for a GIRoA-backed village guard program known as
the Community Defense Initiative. The proliferation of these
local and private bodies attests to deficiencies in the
strength and quality of regular security forces and a lack of
public confidence in the police. Interior Minister Hanif
Atmar is trying to shape Afghan communities' responses to
insecurity, heading-off the creation of independent militia
forces that could challenge or undermine the ANSF. Atmar
also envisions gradually replacing private Afghan security
companies (PSCs), with a public guard force paid and
controlled by his ministry.
¶2. (C/NF) We believe that until we can build sufficient
ANSF to secure the population, the U.S. should follow Atmar's
pragmatic approach -- that local solutions are permissible
only as a closely monitored and tightly controlled stop-gap
measure tied to ANSF, that can either be demobilized or
merged into the Afghan National Police and Army as those
institutions grow. Otherwise, U.S. support for
unconventional forces (particularly if they prove prone to
manipulation by local power-brokers) could undercut popular
and international support for funding formal security forces
and reinforce a traditional worst practice -- the arming of
ethnic or sub-tribal militias that could divide Afghan
communities and spark additional violence.
END SUMMARY
MOI: KEEP A SHORT LEASH ON UNCONVENTIONAL SECURITY FORCES
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶3. (C/NF) While many senior GIRoA officials -- including
Rural Reconstruction and Development Minister Ehsan Zia,
Defense Minister Wardak and Afghan Army Operations Chief LTG
Sher Karimi -- oppose unconventional security forces in
principle, Interior Minister Hanif Atmar appears to have the
best developed sense among Afghan leaders of how to restrain
them in practice ) not by suppressing them but by shaping
and overseeing them. LTG Jamal Abdulnaseer Siddique, Deputy
Interior Minister for Strategy and Policy, and Atmar's
highest-ranking political appointee, told Pol-Mil Officer
that Atmar wants to use the traditional militia concept but
tame it and bring it under state control. Locals who are
loyal to the government and register their existing arms
could serve as police auxiliaries, receiving food and even
some pay from MOI in return for helping the police. Atmar's
longest-serving advisor, Habib Wayand, explained that the
Minister prefers to encourage small groups linked to local
shuras, rather than large militias that might bite back or
prove loyal to commanders with their own agendas.
¶4. (C/NF) These local auxiliaries must be compensated
individually by the Ministry, not through their commanders,
who could siphon off compensation or use funds to build a
force loyal to themselves. Minister Atmar's model for
local security is the Afghan Public Protection Program
(AP3), in which local shuras select young men who are
vetted by GIRoA institutions, trained by U.S. Special
Forces and paid by MOI for static guard duties, and answer
to local police commanders. Atmar wants AP3 to expand to
other provinces and eventually merge its members into the
KABUL 00003661 002 OF 005
regular police force.
AP3: EARLY SUCCESSES, BUT EXPANSION ON HOLD
-------------------------------------------
¶5. (C/NF) AP3 is not expanding at this juncture, but taking
stock. From March to August, the USFOR-A element known as
Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command
Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) trained and deployed 548 locals as
community guardians in four districts in Wardak province as
part of the AP3 program (ref A). CFSOCC-A has a fifth class
of at least 150 men on hold while it works with MOI to reform
the command and control structure for AP3, establishing clear
lines of authority from MOI to the district level. CFSOCC-A
is also working with Combined Security Transition Command
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to fix food allowance payments and
distribution of cold weather gear. AP3 expansion also awaits
ISAF/ANSF efforts to clear more of Wardak's Seyeedabad
district of insurgents, creating space for AP3 recruitment.
¶6. (C/NF) The guardians have had notable successes -- in
October, they discovered and dismantled eight IEDs, more
than any other ANSF unit in Wardak. Wardak Governor Mohammad
Halim Fedai, in a letter to the Independent Directorate of
Local Governance, states that the additional security AP3
guardians have provided has allowed the provincial government
to step up mobile police patrols; open schools; convene
public meetings; enjoy a significant reduction in rocket
attacks and IED emplacements; ramp up work on the Maydan
Shahr - Bamyan highway; and, reduce travel time on other
highways by deterring insurgents and criminals from shaking
down motorists.
¶7. (C/NF) However, the Governor also complained about
problems with pay and equipment and expressed concern that
AP3 no longer receives the same high-level attention from
U.S. forces and MOI that it did at its inception. He pointed
to confusion over command and control and a dearth of
promised development projects for APPF districts. (COMMENT:
To the extent that AP3 is succeeding, it is because
communities accept the guardians and are willing to put their
young men in uniform, on the government payroll, and under
the authority of the police. In communities with stronger
insurgent support -- such as Wardak's Sayeedabad district --
it may be more difficult for locals to accept police in any
form.
END COMMENT.)
MIR ALAM'S KUNDUZ MILITIA: OVERTONES OF ETHNIC WARFARE
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶8. (S/NF) In July, Kunduz Governor Mohammad Omar asked
Minister Atmar to expand AP3 to his province, but the
Minister was unable to do so as the program was still in its
trial phase. Omar and his NDS chief then asked for the
support of Tajik and Uzbek militia forces under former
Northern Alliance commander Mir Alam Khan (ref D). While
Khan claims that his 500-man militia is under the legal
control of the NDS, he maintains operational control of the
force and distributes its pay. (COMMENT: This is likely a
meaningless distinction -- the Kunduz NDS Chief is Mir Alam
Khan's brother-in-law. END COMMENT.)
¶9. (S/NF) Armed with weapons cached earlier this decade
while Mir Alam Khan participated in Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), his militia has
killed four Taliban commanders and 47 fighters, and captured
20 villages previously under Taliban control. The initiative
is entirely local -- MOI contacts told Pol-Mil officer that
the Ministry was not involved with the Kunduz militia, and
demurred when he asked whether this initiative crossed
Minister Atmar's red-lines on unconventional security forces.
Mir Alam Khan likely does not need MOI support -- reporting
indicates that Vice President Massoud and Marshal Fahim Khan
both support Mir Alam's efforts, which are locally popular as
well.
¶10. (S/NF) Kunduz's demographics -- the province's Pashtun
population, at 36 percent, is the highest in RC-North -- may
account for Tajik and Uzbek anxiety. Pashtuns' exclusion
KABUL 00003661 003 OF 005
from local political power after 2001 may account for their
discontent and support for insurgent groups. In an October
meeting with a senior U.S. military leader, Mir Alam Khan
made an illustrative claim -- that Kunduz's security problems
derived from the DDR and Disarmament of Illegally Armed
Groups (DIAG) programs, which disarmed local (Tajik and
Uzbek) commanders and, in his view, enabled Taliban to enter
the province and local anti-GIROA Pashtuns to assert
themselves.
PRIVATE SECURITY AND PUBLIC GUARDS: ATMAR TAMES A BEAST
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶11. (SBU) Over the next five years, Minister Atmar
envisions replacing Afghanistan's fifty-two registered
private security companies (PSCs) with a public guard
force paid by customers but administered by MOI. The force
would guard private businesses, ISAF supply convoys and
bases, infrastructure, and construction projects. Its size
would vary according to demand but could reach 47,000 above
and beyond the regular police ceiling (currently 96,800,
likely to rise to 160,000 in 2010). While the public guard
concept would leave room for international security
providers with specialized services (e.g. Ghurkha guards
for international organizations and Embassies) it would
effectively nationalize the Afghan PSCs and put their
estimated 30,000 employees under MOI control.
¶12. (C/NF) Atmar's advisors argue that there is precedent
for a public guard in the Faryab 500 (a local police
force in Ghowrmach district, administered from Faryab
province, which is paid for by the Asian Development Bank
to secure a bank-funded portion of Ring Road construction;
ref E), and the Aynak copper mine and Salma (Herat) dam
projects, where Chinese and Indian developers pay police
salaries. Atmar's advisors described his motivations to
us: a public guard would help MOI grow the police force
beyond the level donors are presently willing to fund; it
would be a revenue source for MOI; by controlling pay for
private guards it would lessen competition for ANSF
recruiting; and, it would bring privately-controlled armed
groups under government authority. (COMMENT: There are
practical and political difficulties with the Public Guard
concept. The Faryab 500 are experiencing high turnover due
to irregular payment by MOI. This is in spite of the Asian
Development Bank regularly paying MOI via the Finance
Ministry. Current U.S. law does not allow the military to
contract security from another government. Many Afghan PSCs
are a lucrative source of income for former warlords and
other influential power-brokers, who will likely oppose
nationalization. END COMMENT)
¶13. (C/NF) Atmar's UN advisor told us in October that MOI
had recently bowed to political pressure and licensed 15 new
private security companies (adding to an original list of
39). Several were linked to political power-brokers,
including Mallik Zarin of Konar and Siddique Mojaddedi, the
Meshrano Jirga speaker's son. (Mojaddedi, who ran a PSC in
Australia, also seeks to be Atmar's advisor on the subject --
a move resisted by the Minister thus far.) Several sources
close to Atmar describe him as reluctantly bowing to
political pressure from well-connected security
entrepreneurs, but with a plan to ultimately supplant them.
Atmar's anxiety over Afghan PSCs is part and parcel of his
concern over non-state actors with arms -- such as the Kunduz
militia -- who are privately controlled and owe their loyalty
to paymasters outside of government control.
¶14. (C/NF) ISAF, USFOR-A, and Embassy Kabul are discussing
and will soon raise with Atmar an alternative approach to a
public guard: stricter MoI licensing and regulation of PSCs.
We believe this could meet Atmar,s professed sovereignty
concerns regarding oversight of the PSC function while
avoiding the bureaucratic complications of trying to add the
management of thousands of PSC personnel to a Ministry
already struggling with police growth.
ARBAKAI FOR ELECTIONS AND THE PALACE CONNECTION
--------------------------------------------- --
KABUL 00003661 004 OF 005
¶15. (C/NF) During the first round of this year's
elections, deputized locals worked with ANSF to provide
additional security at polling stations, but their role was
limited and many were not paid as promised (ref F). MOI
contacts assert that the Palace, rather than MOI, was
responsible for paying these local auxiliaries. MOI
sources allege that Presidential advisor and head of the
Independent Directorate for Protection of Public
Properties and Highways Mohammad Arif Khan Noorzai (who
is also Ahmad Wali Karzai's brother-in-law) was in charge
of these efforts. In September, when tribal leaders from
Khost sought government support to pay 100 arbakai
(traditional community security guards who answer to local
shuras) per district, they approached Noorzai rather than
MOI, MOD, or NDS. Noorzai reportedly told elders that the
Palace had no budget to support them. Noorzai's role, and
that of his directorate, are ambiguous, but at least some
Afghans view him as a source of financial support for
unconventional security forces outside of regular security
ministries.
¶16. (SBU) Even without Palace support, some locals are
establishing and funding militia of their own. In the Loya
Paktia region of RC-East (the only region of the country
with a real tradition of arbakai or tribal levies), the
Zazi (Jaji) tribe has raised an arbakai to keep insurgents
out of their communities (septel). Their initiative is a
reaction against insurgent violence, but also reflects their
dissatisfaction with the government, which they do not trust
to protect them.
CDI IN INITIAL PHASE PENDING GIRoA APPROVAL
-------------------------------------------
¶17. (S/NF) CFSOCC-A is conducting survey work and tribal
engagement for its Community Defense Initiative (CDI) a
program whereby U.S. Special Forces (ODA) teams would provide
embedded training, communications equipment and ammunition to
local communities with a proven track record of opposing
insurgents. (CDI would not provide arms, however, as CFSOCC-A
assesses that the communities in question have plenty of
their own, nor does CFSOCC-A intend to provide stipends to
village guards.) CFSOCC-A contends that ODA training and the
ability reliably to call for assistance from ISAF/GIRoA
forces would better enable these communities to exclude
insurgents from their territory and report on their
movements. CFSOCC-A tentatively plans to introduce the
concept in nine districts of Regional Commands South, East,
and West, where ANSF are absent. CFSOCC-A has begun outreach
on CDI to local shuras.
¶18. (SBU) That said, while senior ISAF officers have sought
GIRoA ministers' approval of CDI, and have underscored the
need for transition of CDI to GIRoA oversight, GIRoA has not
formally approved the program. In a meeting on October 27,
the Ambassador briefed National Security Advisor Rassoul on
the parameters of the CDI program. The Ambassador noted that
the program had great merits but would need the firm
approval of the President and the cabinet before
implementation. Rassoul demurred, suggesting that the
Embassy raise the issue with President Karzai, who he said
has concerns over the program. The Ambassador reiterated
that there must be clear, collective Afghan ownership of such
a program. Toward this purpose, we are developing with
USFOR-A a draft agreement on CDI among U.S. Forces
Afghanistan, GIRoA ministries (including the Ministries of
Defense and Interior), and the National Security Advisor,
which includes a commitment for CDI's transition to GIRoA
control. Ambassador Eikenberry has informed U.S. Forces
Afghanistan that he will not authorize the use of 1208
funding, nor the deployment of USG civilian personnel in
support of CDI operations, until GIRoA has signed an
agreement clearly delineating its own responsibility for such
a program (including selection of a lead ministry whose
minister would become personally responsible for the program;
SEPTEL to follow).
COMMENT: SUPPORT AFGHANS' BEST IMPULSES, NOT THEIR WORST HABITS
--------------------------------------------- -----------
KABUL 00003661 005 OF 005
¶19. (C/NF) Insufficient security forces, coupled with poor
police performance and corruption, contribute to locals'
sense that GIRoA cannot protect them, and that the ANSF may,
indeed, sometimes pose a threat. As we strengthen and grow
the ANSF, particularly the police, they will be better able
to earn the people's trust, binding communities to their
government through the provision of security and justice.
However, full ANSF development will take at least four years,
and communities' security needs are immediate. Afghans will
resort to traditional self-defense mechanisms in the
meantime, but unsupervised, those mechanisms can tend in
dangerous directions. Mir Alam's Kunduz militia --
ethnically divisive, controlled by one man, grounded in
contempt for DIAG and the rule of law -- exemplifies a quick
fix with dangerous implications: tactical gains at strategic
cost.
¶20. (C/NF) In contrast, Minister Atmar's policy of shaping
and controlling these local initiatives seems a pragmatic way
of asserting GIRoA's sovereignty over armed persons, along
with a degree of influence. There is a wide gulf between AP3
and the Kunduz militia. Local arbakai could move toward
either pole depending on incentives and the signals we and
GIRoA send. Clear redlines on unconventional security forces
from GIRoA, and clear U.S. support for those redlines could
avert the re-armament of the Afghan countryside that
competing local militias would likely engender.
¶21. (C/NF) Correspondingly, ambiguous U.S. policies, or our
tolerance of or support for un-regulated forces, would
encourage some of the worst Afghan traditional tendencies and
undermine popular and international support for further ANSF
development. It would also raise suspicions of our
intentions among Afghans who perceived themselves as victims
of various militias. The best way to meet local communities'
legitimate security needs while we grow the police and army
is to insist that local security initiatives remain
tightly-controlled by GIRoA and monitored by the
international community. These can remain somewhat
improvisational, as stop-gap measures eventually to be
demobilized or merged into the police and army. The U.S.
should only deploy its resources and prestige in support of
programs that reflect GIRoA's highest standards, not
traditional bad habits.
END COMMENT
EIKENBERRY