

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08SANJOSE629, COSTA RICA COZYING UP TO CUBA?
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08SANJOSE629.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08SANJOSE629 | 2008-07-30 19:48 | 2011-03-14 17:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy San Jose |
Appears in these articles: http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-11/Investigacion/NotasDestacadas/Investigacion2710281.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-11/Investigacion/NotaPrincipal/Investigacion2710282.aspx |
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSJ #0629/01 2121948
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301948Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9965
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1128
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0046
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000629
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, WHA/CEN AND WHA/CCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR CS CU
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA COZYING UP TO CUBA?
REF: A. SAN JOSE 432
¶B. 06 SAN JOSE 1841
¶C. 07 SAN JOSE 1106
¶D. SAN JOSE 129
Classified By: DCM Peter M. Brennan for reason 1.4(d).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) The Arias administration may be contemplating
re-establishing diplomatic ties with Cuba. A vocal embargo
opponent in the legislature (a member of President Arias' own
party) seems to have Arias' ear on the issue, arguing that
normalized relations would help open Cuba to democracy.
FonMin Stagno has signaled to local diplomats that a change
is being considered. The GOCR Consul in Havana emailed a
local Cuba-watcher a month ago that ties were "getting
closer." A leading editorial writer told us July 24 that he
is convinced a change is in the wind (and overdue, in his
view).
¶2. (C) The chatter here has been sporadic but persistent: an
opening with Cuba, explained as a move to force the Castro
regime to democratize faster, might be just the sort of
sweeping international gesture Arias is looking for in the
last half of his administration. Such a move would burnish
his credentials with the international (and Costa Rican)
intellectual left; allow him to respond to critics who say he
has been too close to the U.S. during the bruising two-year
fight to ratify and implement CAFTA; and place him back on
the global stage. On the other hand, a drastic reversal in
Cuba policy might be a tough sell domestically, given Arias'
record of vocal criticism of the regime in Havana. Talk of a
Cuba gambit has quieted over the last two weeks, perhaps
because of our recent and widespread soundings on the issue,
but there is still a hum in the background. Given the Arias'
administration's penchant for dramatic, no-notice foreign
policy moves (moving the GOCR Embassy from Jerusalem to Tel
Aviv, recognizing China, establishing relations with the
Palestinian "state," etc.), if a change towards Cuba comes,
it may be sudden.
END SUMMARY.
----------------
WHAT'S THE BUZZ?
----------------
¶3. (C) There has been some political and media buzz about
possible GOCR overtures to Cuba over the last 2-3 months,
coinciding with Fidel's failing health and fade from power.
During a luncheon with Poloffs in early June, legislator
Federico Tinoco (PLN), strongly pro-US and one of the May 21
Cuban Solidarity Day speakers (Ref A), (but also strongly
anti-embargo), floated the idea of a Costa Rican opening to
Cuba. Tinoco intimated that he was shopping the idea
informally around San Jose and in the GOCR. His rationale:
1) All other countries in Latin America had relations with
Cuba and Costa Rica was a lone holdout; 2) Now that Costa
Rica had opened relations with China (to very little domestic
or international hue and cry), why not open up to Cuba?; 3)
Costa Rica already had fairly extensive informal relations
with Cuba, including some 10,000 Cubans in the country (news
to us); and 4) Costa Rica's re-establishing relations would
help further democracy in Cuba. Tinoco maintained that the
idea was more to help the Cuban people than to challenge U.S.
policy.
¶4. (C) Tinoco's musing reminded us of an earlier conversation
in May with Elaine White, former advisor to the Minister and
then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Pacheco
administration (1998-2002). She told us that during her
tenure at the MFA, GOCR foreign policy rested on three sacred
pillars: 1) recognition of Taiwan, 2) maintaining an embassy
in Jerusalem, and 3) not having ties with Cuba. White noted
that Arias and Stagno had already reversed the first two
(Refs B-C). She added that the GOCR could not use "human
rights" as the reason for distancing itself from Cuba, having
recognized the PRC despite the latter's abysmal human rights
record, and she pondered whether that would pave the way for
a return to full GOCR-Cuban diplomatic relations.
¶5. (SBU) On June 24, during an MFA overview briefing to
senior members of the diplomatic corps, Stagno answered a
point-blank question about relations with Cuba from the
Russian Ambassador by saying that the GOCR was open to talk
to the Cubans and did so from time to time, but that nothing
"formal" was in the works.
------------------------------
THE CUBA WATCHERS ARE WATCHING
------------------------------
¶6. (C) With Tinoco's and White's reasoning on our minds, and
the Cuba buzz continuing in the background, we canvassed some
contacts in and outside of government. Adriana Nunez,
Cuban-born and -exiled PLN faction press chief in the
legislature, who has had her finger on the pulse of Cuban
issues here, told us on July 15 that the GOCR Consul in
Havana, Jose Maria Penebad, visited San Jose about a month
before for medical reasons but stayed on for consultations
with the MFA. After his return to Havana, Penebad wrote
Nunez from his personal email account to tell her that ties
were "getting closer." Nunez believes the GOCR would make
such a move sooner rather than later, with the uneventful
opening to China the likely turning point in the Arias Team's
thinking. She said that President Arias had never had much
of an internal "discourse" on Cuba, except to say that he
would not re-engage with Cuba while Fidel was in power. With
Raul now in control, Arias may have an out, according to
Nunez.
¶7. (C) Nunez said that several of Arias' advisors have been
encouraging him to re-establish full ties and that the MFA
may have been deliberating doing so since late 2007. She
based this on a couple of indicators. First, after the Cuban
consul in San Jose vocally criticized Arias during last
year's CAFTA debate and October referendum, Havana replaced
the consul. Second, toward the end of last year, a group of
legislators took an official complaint they prepared
regarding a Cuban political prisoner to the MFA to forward to
Geneva. When the "denuncia" made its way
"upstairs" to the FonMin's desk, it was stopped and the MFA
said it could not get involved. Nunez took this as a sign
that the MFA did not want to be seen by Havana as
participating in the complaint. She also noted that earlier
this year the GOCR announced it was going to "shortly"
establish diplomatic relations with a Caribbean country and a
country in the Middle East. (NOTE: Aside from the quirky
recognition of the "state" of Palestine, Ref D, there have
been no new diplomatic ties established by the GOCR thus far
in 2008.)
¶8. (C) According to Nunez, Arias would most likely couch a
re-establishment of ties in terms of contributing to the
opening of Cuban democracy; showing solidarity with the other
Latin American countries; and expanding the benefits of
cultural/educational/professional exchanges. Costa Rica
already benefits from large numbers of Cuban doctors, many of
whom work in the Costa Rican national health system. Though
Arias is known for his large ego and his role as a
peace-broker, both Nunez and think-tank member Constantino
Urcuyo doubted that Arias would try to insert himself as a
mediator between the U.S. and Havana, in regards to the
embargo, for example. Urcuyo said Arias' motivation would be
something "more simple," possibly -- as Nunez and Urcuyo both
indicated -- another attempt to re-burnish his credentials
with Costa Rican leftists. (COMMENT: Urcuyo also mused on the
possible impact of the GOCR's Petrocaribe membership (septel)
on ties with Cuba. Would Chavez push San Jose closer to
Havana? END COMMENT.) Nunez believes that the GOCR will
strike quickly whenever it changes policy towards Cuba. She
bases this (with justification) on the Arias administration's
surprise announcements about the embassy in Israel and
recognition of China.
-----------------------------
BACKING OFF THE BUZZ, FOR NOW
-----------------------------
¶9. (C) The Cuba buzz has quieted recently, but has not died
altogether. In mid-July, French Ambassador Jean-Paul Monchau
told the DCM that he had asked Stagno directly about the GOCR
normalizing relations with Cuba. Stagno admitted they had
been working on it, telling Monchau that the GOCR had cooled
to the idea after the Cubans "insulted" the Europeans and
started going after dissidents again. On July 21, we asked
legislator Evita Arguedas (Independent, married to a Cuban
exile) whether she had heard anything definite about a
normalization of relations. She told us she had also heard
chatter, but nothing definitive. She did not discount the
idea, however, and stated that "where there is talk, there is
a reason."
¶10. (C) Other leading legislators including PLN faction Chief
Oscar Nunez and PUSC faction chief Lorena Vasquez told us
they have heard nothing from the Executive on changes
vis-a-vis Cuba, but both acknowledged the Arias
administration would not necessarily inform or consult the
legislature in advance, based on the China example. Both
also opined that it might be a tough sell for Arias
domestically, given the Costa Rican people's strong support
of human rights and (as Vasquez put it) general dislike for
Cubans. Ever the PLN loyalist, Oscar Nunez was confident the
Costa Rican people would follow Arias' lead in the end. "If
they trust him on anything, it is on foreign policy," he
said.
¶11. (C) On July 22, we followed up with Adriana Nunez who had
asked Rodrigo Arias, Minister of the Presidency, by email if
the GOCR was planning to re-establish ties. According to
Nunez, Arias responded that it was "within the realm of
possibilities" but he indicated that the matter had been
"paralyzed" for now due to "other problems." (COMMENT: We
assume this refers to the local scandal involving possible
unethical government use of BCIE funds, which has been
occupying a great deal of space in the local press, and
perhaps the new membership in Petrocaribe. END
COMMENT.)
¶12. (C) At the MFA, both Antonio Alarcon, Stagno's Chief of
Staff, and Alejandro Solano, Deputy Director of Foreign
Policy, had heard nothing about a prospective change in Cuba
policy. Neither could foresee relations being normalized in
the next two years, and Alarcon also noted the possible
political difficulties in selling a change in policy to the
Costa Rican public. However, recalling the way the China
decision was handled, Alarcon promised there would be "no
surprises" to the USG should the GOCR open to Cuba; the MFA
would let us know in advance.
¶13. (C) In a long, private conversation with us on July 18,
Tinoco himself seemed to have backed off. At first he did
not want to talk about the issue (convincing us that he had
indeed been pushing for relations with Cuba). He then
reprised his early arguments about Latin American solidarity,
the moderate reaction to establishing ties to China, and the
hoped-for positive Costa Rican influence on the regime.
Pushing back firmly, we noted that Cuba is not China, and
that Costa Rica is not like all other Latin American
countries: Havana would turn full Costa Rican relations into
an endorsement and a reward, long before appropriate and
sufficient democratic changes had been made. We added that
even the EU had established benchmarks for improved behavior
by the regime. We concluded that an opening to Cuba by Arias
now, with Petrocaribe in the works and following the
president's critical comments about the U.S. in Iraq and the
lack of USG assistance and attention to the region, might be
hard to explain to Washington. We also cautioned Tinoco not
to expect wholesale, immediate changes in USG Cuba policy
should a Democratic administration be elected in November.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶14. (C) We have not heard the last word on this.
Paraphrasing legislator Evita Arguedas, where there is this
much smoke, there is probably a little fire. On July 24,
Armando Gonzalez, editorial page chief of leading daily "La
Nacion" told us that he is convinced a change remains in the
wind (and is long overdue). At an appropriate moment,
establishing full diplomatic ties with Cuba might be just the
sort of sweeping international gesture Arias seeks in the
last half of his administration, to place him back on the
world stage, burnish his leftist credentials and allow him to
show some distance from Washington. It would make more sense
for him to postpone such a significant policy
shift until after CAFTA implementation in October and the
U.S. elections in November, but he may be tempted to move
sooner.
BRENNAN