

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE196, SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S MARCH 31 MEETING
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09THEHAGUE196.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09THEHAGUE196 | 2009-03-23 10:38 | 2011-01-17 00:00 | SECRET | Embassy The Hague |
VZCZCXRO6964
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTC #0196/01 0821038
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 231038Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2688
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 000196
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: PREL OVIP PINR MOPS PHUM AF NL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S MARCH 31 MEETING
WITH DUTCH FM VERHAGEN
Classified By: Charge d'Affaire...
198269,3/23/2009 10:38,09THEHAGUE196,"Embassy The
Hague",SECRET,,"VZCZCXRO6964
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTC #0196/01 0821038
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 231038Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2688
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 THE
HAGUE 000196
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: PREL OVIP PINR MOPS PHUM AF NL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S MARCH 31 MEETING
WITH DUTCH FM VERHAGEN
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael F. Gallagher for reasons 1.5(b
,d)
Madam Secretary:
--------
Overview:
--------
¶1. (S) Your participation in the Afghanistan conference and
the March 31 meeting with Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime
Verhagen is well-timed to advance key U.S. priorities,
particularly in securing Afghanistan. Verhagen and the whole
Dutch government remain among our strongest allies, but Dutch
domestic politics threatens to limit progress on our common
agenda. On Afghanistan, Verhagen faces an uphill battle to
convince parliament and the Dutch people to continue combat
missions after 2010. At stake is the deployment of 1,700
Dutch troops in Uruzgan, one of the toughest provinces in
Afghanistan. By agreeing to host the Afghanistan conference,
Verhagen is taking the first step to extend the Dutch
commitment. The Foreign Minister said the Netherlands had
been asked to host the conference due to the success of its
comprehensive (&3-D8) approach in Uruzgan.
¶2. (C) Verhagen is a skilled politician, having previously
served in parliament as party spokesman for the Netherlands,
largest political party, the center-right Christian Democrats
(CDA). Accordingly, Verhagen is extremely close to Prime
Minister Balkenende and is trusted to take the lead on
foreign affairs while most of the Dutch government is focused
on the economic crisis. The weak governing coalition --
which includes CDA, the center-left Labor Party (PvdA), and
the small Christian Union (CU) -- is held together less by a
common vision than by fear of electoral losses if the
government were to collapse ahead of the next scheduled
election in 2011. Despite these divisions, Verhagen and
Balkenende have successfully steered the Dutch government
toward an active foreign policy that largely aligns with our
interests.
¶3. (C) Verhagen plans to use his bilateral meeting with you
to start building a close working relationship. He wants the
new Administration to see the Netherlands as a reliable
partner with the U.S., sharing many of our goals. We
recommend you focus discussions on Afghanistan and human
rights (including Guantanamo) (paragraphs 5-11), but other
possible topics are also discussed below (paragraphs 12-17).
¶4. (SBU) 2009 marks the 400th anniversary of Henry Hudson,s
&discovery8 of the Hudson Valley and New Amsterdam in 1609.
The Dutch government and the city and state of New York have
planned a yearlong celebration (New York 400 ) NY400)
honoring our strong bilateral ties and stressing our ""shared
DNA"" -- including our values of freedom, democracy,
entrepreneurship, diversity, and tolerance. You may wish to
comment on our joint history and shared future when you meet
Verhagen, especially when you talk to the press.
-----------
Afghanistan
-----------
¶5. (C) The Netherlands is a small ally making a big impact in
Afghanistan since 2001. They are the fourth largest aid
donor in Afghanistan. Ranked by percentage of their military
forces deployed, the Netherlands is the second largest
military contributor in Afghanistan )- proportionally they
are making three to four times the contribution of France or
Germany. And Dutch soldiers are deployed to the most
dangerous parts of Afghanistan. However, the Dutch are
considering dramatically scaling back their combat presence
in 2010, perhaps to just a few hundred soldiers, and
concentrating more on development assistance.
¶6. (C) Although the public supports its soldiers in the
Q6. (C) Although the public supports its soldiers in the
field, involvement in Afghanistan is not popular in the
Netherlands. Thus far the Dutch have lost 18 soldiers. The
2007 decision to extend the Dutch military deployment was
prolonged and politically difficult. Any government decision
to stay engaged in Afghanistan past 2010 will be even more
difficult to sustain. Among the challenges is a Dutch
perception that they have done more than their share. Many
political leaders supported the previous deployment decisions
with statements that another NATO ally would replace the
Dutch at the conclusion of their tour. Dutch opinion leaders
are also concerned about the effect of the deployment on
military readiness and recruitment. Often cited is the
shortfall of 7,000 personnel in a 42,000-member service. The
Dutch are also daunted by reports that the ISAF mission is
THE HAGUE 00000196 002 OF 004
failing to bring security to the Afghan people, and that
development assistance programs are ineffective. The public
at large is skeptical that the situation in Afghanistan
presents a threat to Europeans. Finally, although casualties
have been relatively light by U.S. standards, their emotional
impact on a small country with limited recent combat
experience cannot be overstated. In April 2008, for example,
the country was shocked to learn of the death of First
Lieutenant Dennis van Ulm on the same day that his father,
General Pieter van Ulm, was sworn in as the new Dutch Chief
of Defense.
¶7. (C) Such traumatic events have not swayed Verhagen and PM
Balkenende's commitment to the NATO/ISAF mission and the
Afghan people. In 2009, just as in 2007, we expect that both
Verhagen and Balkenende will be strong and effective allies
in winning support from the parliament. The support of the
Labor Party, particularly Development Cooperation Minister
Koenders, will be essential. The Dutch are expecting a
request through NATO for continuing military support, but it
is important the request come in the form of consultations
among equals rather than through public pressure, which would
backfire with the Dutch public and politicians. The
Afghanistan Conference this month will do a great deal to
show that the Dutch are not only active participants but
leading members in the review and strategic planning process.
Your meeting with Verhagen will further emphasize this
point. Other &selling points8 for the public will be (1)
recognition that Afghanistan poses a clearly defined threat
to international stability and (2) an improved military
strategy that shows that we can and will prevail. Most
importantly to the Dutch public, perhaps, will be concrete
success stories that we are creating a better life for the
Afghan people. Finally, Dutch policy-makers believe in the
&3D8 approach and welcome your effort to integrate defense,
development, and diplomacy. A previous Dutch commander of
Task Force Uruzgan argued that the Dutch 3D approach can
&make the Taliban irrelevant8 by winning hearts and minds.
¶8. (C) The Dutch will be interested in the U.S. analysis of
Pakistan,s role in solving the Afghanistan quandary. After
suspending aid to Pakistan in 2008, the Dutch expect to
provide as much as 112 million euro in development aid to
Pakistan over the next three years, with the timing of a
public announcement yet to be determined. The government
will continue to watch political developments there closely
out of concern the government may not live up to its
democratic commitments.
---------------------------
Human Rights and Guantanamo
---------------------------
¶9. (S) Verhagen has made human rights a priority for the
Dutch government and his hallmark as Foreign Minister. The
Dutch are anxious to work closely with us on human rights
issues and welcome the return of the U.S. as an observer to
the Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva. The Dutch are
serving a second consecutive term on the Council, and while
they share our frustration with the results, Verhagen will
probably encourage you to seek an HRC seat in 2009 or 2010.
In addition, Verhagen may suggest a joint U.S.-Dutch
initiative to counter violence against women or to attack
child labor. The Dutch are also trying to salvage the Durban
review conference on racism, including by circulating an
abbreviated draft that removes references to Israel that are
offensive to us and the Dutch. Perhaps the best opportunity
Qoffensive to us and the Dutch. Perhaps the best opportunity
for expanding cooperation is in the area of development
assistance. The Netherlands is the world,s sixth largest
aid donor, providing over 4 billion euro ($6.1 billion)
annually, and Dutch programs are rated as highly effective
compared to other nations.
¶10. (S) Verhagen has been critical of Guantanamo, and did not
lose an opportunity to raise his concerns about Guantanamo
with the previous administration. The Dutch parliament,s
debate and fierce criticism of Guantanamo have permeated the
Dutch press and public,s perceptions. Closing Guantanamo,
therefore, will go a long way toward improving Dutch
skepticism of U.S. policies on human and civil rights.
Verhagen publicly saluted the President,s decision to close
Guantanamo, but he also publicly told Parliament that the
Dutch government has no plans to accept detainees.
Nonetheless, Verhagen,s personal staff recommended that you
raise the issue with him privately, to encourage him to stay
open to the idea of supporting an EU proposal to help the
United States. A less difficult alternative for the Dutch
than accepting detainees would be providing funding to assist
with the transfer of detainees to third countries. With an
eye to the future, FM Verhagen is funding a two-year study of
THE HAGUE 00000196 003 OF 004
the nexus of human rights, humanitarian law, and use of
force, thus aiming to resolve the knotty legal issues
surrounding Guantanamo.
¶11. (SBU) Finally, Verhagen may ask you about U.S. support
for the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Dutch are
proud of serving as the &home of international law8 and
hosting many international legal institutions such as the
International Court of Justice. If you or the President
chose to make a major announcement on the ICC, or U.S.
commitment to international law and human rights, no setting
in Europe would be more appropriate than The Hague, the
Netherlands.
------------------------------
Other Issues - Economic Crisis
------------------------------
¶12. (U) The Dutch financial sector has been hit hard by the
global financial crisis, due in part to exposure to U.S.
mortgage-backed securities and other toxic assets. The
government has responded assertively with several measures to
assist banks and their customers, most dramatically by
nationalizing the Dutch operations of Fortis Bank and by
providing capital to ING and guaranteeing part of its U.S.
mortgage portfolio.
¶13. (U) The Dutch real economy is struggling. After 2
percent GDP growth in 2008, the latest official estimate is a
3.5 percent contraction in 2009. Dutch exports are expected
to decline by 12 percent this year, a major blow to this
trade-dependent economy. The Port of Rotterdam, Europe's
largest, has already seen a 15 percent decline in port
traffic since October. Several Dutch industry giants have
announced layoffs. The current unemployment rate of 3.9
percent is forecast to climb to 5.5 percent in 2009 (still
considerably lower than the EU average). The GONL has passed
two stimulus packages and is expected to announce a third
shortly.
¶14. (U) An invitation to the G-20 summit in London is a major
win for the Dutch, who fought hard to be included in the
November 2008 Washington G-20 summit. Although not a G-20
member, the Dutch argued successfully that they play a major
role in the international financial system (for instance, it
is an active member of the Financial Stability Forum). Now,
with a second invitation, the Dutch hope to have assured
their seat at the table for future G-20 events. At the
London summit, we can expect the Dutch to support Germany and
other key member states in a call for much broader financial
regulation ) but to refrain from supporting new stimulus
packages until the results of current stimulus measures can
be determined. They will support the G-20,s expansion to
include more developing countries. In keeping with their
reputation, the Dutch will also stress open markets and free
trade. They have called on fellow EU Member States to avoid
protectionist measures, and they were highly critical of the
proposed ""Buy American"" provisions in the U.S. Recovery and
Reinvestment Act. The Dutch have repeatedly expressed their
hope to see the economic crisis spur the U.S., China, India,
and others to make the concessions necessary to conclude the
WTO Doha Round
¶15. (SBU) Prime Minister Balkenende and his cabinet enjoyed
widespread public support in late 2008 for their quick
intervention in the financial sector. However, domestic and
international criticism of the GONL's cautious, incremental
approach to the crisis has gathered steam in recent weeks.
Balkenende,s cabinet continues to consult closely with
parliament, labor, and industry on the way forward. While
Finance Minister Wouter Bos, the politically savvy Deputy
QFinance Minister Wouter Bos, the politically savvy Deputy
Prime Minister and leader of the Labor Party (PvdA), has
taken the lead on the Netherlands, international response to
the economic crisis, Foreign Minister Verhagen has been less
visible on this issue.
-----------
Middle East
-----------
¶16. (SBU) Verhagen will welcome your readout on the Middle
East; he is eager to play a constructive role. With an eye
toward supporting a peace agreement, the Dutch participate in
the Gaza maritime interdiction initiative to stop arms
smuggling and thereby address Israel,s security concerns.
Along with the Danish, the Dutch have proposed resurrecting
the EU Gaza-Egypt border monitoring mission. At the same
time, the Dutch push for greater access for humanitarian aid
in Gaza. The Dutch are substantial donors to Gaza economic
development and governance initiatives, providing 72 million
THE HAGUE 00000196 004 OF 004
euro in 2008.
¶17. (S) The Dutch strongly support the UN sanctions regime
against Iran and quickly follow up on efforts to curtail
proliferation activities. The Dutch reported that sanctions
are starting to work -- slowly )- although they are not
targeting the right people. Nonetheless, the Dutch believe
there is substantial interest among Iranian parliamentarians
for an exchange with U.S. counterparts. The Dutch are
willing to deepen our U.S.-Netherlands cooperation on
information-sharing on Iran. On Syria, the Dutch welcome
U.S. outreach to Syria and agree that the U.S. and the EU
will get more from the Syrians if we keep a united front as
we push for a peace agreement with Israel, a secure and
stable relationship with Lebanon, and an end to support for
militants.
GALLAGHER