

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
APECO
ASEC
AMGT
AFIN
APER
ACABQ
AORC
AEMR
AF
AE
AR
AGMT
AU
AY
ABLD
AS
AG
AJ
APCS
AX
AM
AMEX
ATRN
ADM
AMED
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AL
ASUP
AND
ARM
ASEAN
AFFAIRS
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AODE
APEC
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AO
ABUD
AC
ADPM
ADCO
ASIG
ARF
AUC
ASEX
AGAO
AA
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AIT
AADP
ASCH
AORL
AROC
ACOA
ANET
AID
AMCHAMS
AINF
AMG
AFU
AN
ALOW
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ACS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AGR
BEXP
BR
BM
BG
BL
BA
BTIO
BO
BP
BC
BILAT
BK
BU
BD
BRUSSELS
BB
BF
BBSR
BIDEN
BX
BE
BH
BT
BY
BMGT
BWC
BTIU
BN
CA
CASC
CFED
CO
CH
CS
CU
CE
CI
CM
CMGT
CJAN
COM
CG
CIS
CVIS
CR
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTER
CIA
CLINTON
CY
CPAS
CD
CBW
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CDG
CW
CODEL
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CARICOM
CB
CONDOLEEZZA
CWC
CACS
CSW
CIDA
CIC
CITT
CONS
CL
CACM
CDB
CDC
CAN
CF
CJUS
CTM
CBSA
CARSON
CT
CLMT
CBC
CEUDA
CV
COPUOS
CTR
CROS
CAPC
CAC
CNARC
CICTE
CBE
ECON
ETRD
EIND
ENRG
EC
ELAB
EAGR
EAID
EFIS
EFIN
EINV
EUN
EG
EPET
EAIR
EU
ELTN
EWWT
ECIN
ERD
EI
ETTC
EUR
EN
EZ
ETC
ENVI
EMIN
ET
ENVR
ER
ECPS
EINT
EAP
ES
ENIV
ECONOMY
EXTERNAL
EINN
EFTA
ECONOMIC
EPA
EXBS
ECA
ELN
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENGR
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
ELECTIONS
EIAR
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
ENERG
EFIM
EAIDS
EK
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINVETC
ECONCS
EUNCH
ESA
ECINECONCS
EUREM
ESENV
EFINECONCS
ETRC
ENNP
EAIG
EXIM
EEPET
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
ERNG
ETRO
ETRN
EINVEFIN
ICTY
IN
IS
IR
IC
IZ
IA
INTERPOL
IAEA
IT
IMO
IO
IV
ID
IRAQI
IEA
INRB
IL
IWC
ITU
ICAO
ISRAELI
ICRC
IIP
IMF
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
ILO
IPR
IQ
IRS
IAHRC
IZPREL
IRAJ
IDP
ILC
ITF
ICJ
IF
ITPHUM
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
IACI
IBET
ITRA
INR
IRC
IDA
ICTR
IGAD
INRA
INRO
IEFIN
INTELSAT
INTERNAL
INDO
ITPGOV
KWMN
KSCA
KDEM
KTFN
KIPR
KCRM
KPAL
KE
KPAO
KPKO
KS
KN
KISL
KFRD
KJUS
KIRF
KFLO
KG
KTIP
KTER
KRCM
KTIA
KGHG
KIRC
KU
KPRP
KMCA
KMPI
KSEO
KNNP
KZ
KNEI
KCOR
KOMC
KCFC
KSTC
KMDR
KFLU
KSAF
KSEP
KSAC
KR
KGIC
KSUM
KWBG
KCIP
KDRG
KOLY
KAWC
KCHG
KHDP
KRVC
KBIO
KAWK
KGCC
KHLS
KBCT
KPLS
KREL
KCFE
KMFO
KV
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVPR
KTDB
KSPR
KIDE
KVRP
KTEX
KBTR
KTRD
KICC
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KDEMAF
KMRS
KRAD
KOCI
KSTH
KUNR
KNSD
KGIT
KFSC
KHIV
KPAI
KICA
KACT
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCMR
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KNAR
KNUC
KPWR
KENV
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KPRV
KOM
KBTS
KCRS
KNPP
KWNM
KRFD
KVIR
KTBT
KAID
KRIM
KDDG
KRGY
KHSA
KWMM
KMOC
KSCI
KPAK
KX
KPAONZ
KCGC
KID
KPOA
KIFR
KFIN
KWAC
KOMS
KCRCM
KNUP
KMIG
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KJUST
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MX
MCAP
MO
MR
MI
MD
MK
MA
MP
MY
MTCRE
MOPPS
MASC
MIL
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MU
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MZ
MEETINGS
MG
MW
MAS
MT
MCC
MIK
ML
MARAD
MV
MERCOSUR
MTRE
MPOS
MEPP
MILITARY
MDC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MRCRE
MAPS
MEDIA
MASSMNUC
MC
NZ
NZUS
NL
NU
NATO
NP
NO
NIPP
NE
NH
NR
NA
NPT
NI
NSF
NG
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NDP
NEW
NRR
NATIONAL
NT
NS
NASA
NAR
NV
NORAD
NSSP
NK
NPA
NGO
NSC
NATOPREL
NW
NPG
NSFO
OPDC
OTRA
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OSCE
OEXC
OIE
OPRC
OAS
OPIC
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFFICIALS
OECD
OSCI
OBSP
OFDA
OPCW
ODIP
OFDP
OES
OPAD
OCII
OHUM
OVP
ON
OIC
OCS
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PTER
PARM
PREF
PM
PE
PINS
PK
PHSA
PBTS
PRGOV
PA
PORG
PP
PS
PGOF
PL
PO
PARMS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PAK
POL
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PBIO
PINF
PNG
PMIL
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PAO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PTBS
PCUL
PROP
PNAT
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PROG
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
PGOC
PY
PCI
PLN
PDOV
PREO
PGIV
PHUH
PAS
PU
POGOV
PF
PINL
POV
PAHO
PRL
PG
PRAM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLICY
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGGV
PHUS
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PEL
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PBT
PTERE
RS
RU
RW
RM
RO
RP
REGION
RSP
RF
RICE
RCMP
RFE
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RUPREL
RELATIONS
ROOD
REACTION
RSO
REPORT
SENV
SNAR
SCUL
SR
SC
SOCI
SMIG
SI
SP
SU
SO
SW
SY
SA
SZ
SAN
SF
SN
STEINBERG
SG
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SAARC
SL
SEVN
SARS
SIPRS
SHUM
SANC
SWE
SHI
SYR
SNARCS
SPCE
SYRIA
SEN
SH
SCRS
SENVKGHG
TRGY
TSPL
TPHY
TSPA
TBIO
TI
TW
THPY
TX
TU
TS
TZ
TC
TH
TT
TIP
TO
TERRORISM
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TL
TV
TNGD
TD
TF
TP
TFIN
TAGS
TK
TR
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
UNHRC
UG
UP
UNMIK
UNHCR
UE
USTR
UNVIE
UAE
UZ
UY
UNO
UNESCO
USEU
USOAS
UV
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNEP
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDP
UNPUOS
UNC
UNAUS
USUN
UNCHC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCSD
UNDC
USNC
USPS
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05PARIS6576, AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05PARIS6576.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05PARIS6576 | 2005-09-26 14:45 | 2011-02-10 08:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
Appears in these articles: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/documents-wikileaks/article/2011/02/09/wikileaks-les-visiteurs-de-l-ambassade_1477418_1446239.htm |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 006576
SIPDIS
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
AND EB
DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR GM SOCI PINR ECON
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
PRESIDENT JEAN-LOUIS DEBRE -- AN UNRECONSTRUCTED GAULLIST
AND WRY OBSERVER OF THE CURRENT DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: At a September 21 meeting with Ambassador
Stapleton, President of the National Assembly and leader of
the Gaullist faction in the ruling Union for a Popular
Movement (UMP) party Jean-Louis Debre brushed aside
assertions that U.S.-French relations are on the mend and
foresaw, instead of increasing cooperation in the Middle East
and Africa, growing tensions over the putative U.S.
intentions -- he had in mind more U.S. corporations than the
USG -- to supplant French (and European) influence. In the
same vein, he insinuated that U.S. supplanting of French
economic interests in Turkey was sapping French support for
Turkish EU membership and described an enlarged EU as one
that no one (in France) wanted. In general, Debre warned
that French economic woes and loss of markets were reducing
its political options.
¶2. (C) Turning to the recent elections in Germany, Debre
suggested that the gridlocked election results were of less
concern to the French than the stagnation of the German
economy. He interpreted Merkel's slim victory as a rejection
of "ultraliberalism" that would not be lost on the French
domestic political players, while worrying that a grand
coalition would produce ever more radical opposition in
Germany on the extreme left and extreme right. Debre called
France's upcoming 2007 presidential election "the end of a
cycle" for the country, but cautioned that disarray and
divisions across the board on the political scene made it
difficult to foresee how the transition from one political
era to another would play out, or who would win the next
elections. He explained the bitter competition to succeed
President Chirac largely as an older generation of
politicians' last and desperate chance -- given Chirac's long
domination of the political scene -- to run for high office.
End Summary.
Worried about Putative U.S. Inroads
-----------------------------------
¶3. (C) The Ambassador commenced the meeting by noting that
U.S.-French relations appeared to be back on track following
past differences over Iraq. Debre commented that he had
studied carefully A/S Fried's recent interview in Le Monde
but -- in what set the tone for the remainder of the
discussion -- responded that the bilateral relationship
historically had always been difficult and no doubt would be
so again soon, although France had always stood by the U.S.
in times of true need. It remained to be seen, he said,
whether the recent terrorist attacks in the UK would also be
repeated in France. He noted that terrorists were using
their opposition to the Iraq war to justify their attacks,
and predicted that any attack in France would make use of
similar slogans, notwithstanding GOF opposition to the Iraq
war.
¶4. (C) Broadening his sights, Debre posited a "struggle for
influence" between the U.S. and Europe in the Mediterranean
and Africa and complained that Africans were increasingly
citing what the U.S. was doing to try to exact more
concessions from France. Terming the Mediterranean region
essential to French interests, he warned of growing
U.S.-French tensions over Morocco and Tunisia. Under
questioning by a skeptical Ambassador, Debre complained in
particular that U.S. businesses were supplanting their French
counterparts in these two key regions, which he said was
leading also to increased competition for political
influence. Debre focused on Turkey in particular, stating
that France had long had a privileged situation there that
was being undermined by the U.S.; this partly explained
declining French support for eventual Turkish EU membership.
¶5. (C) Debre cautioned that "economic competition, while
natural," risked leading to serious political tensions unless
kept in check. Confronted with the argument that the U.S.
and France needed to work together in the Middle East and
Africa to address the larger challenges of promoting
democratization, good governance, and prosperity, and
confronting the threat of terrorism, Debre responded that
these were "reasonable" arguments, but that political
considerations needed to take economic concerns more into
account. Otherwise, he warned, politics would yield to
emotionalism and demagogy.
¶6. (C) The Ambassador questioned Debre's depiction of the
extent and nature of U.S. influence and wondered aloud why
Debre was more focused on the Mediterranean than on Europe,
where its traditional interests lay. Debre disagreed, saying
that France's future challenges were in the Mediterranean,
given the demographics of the region (especially among the
young) and Europe's declining energy. Europe was essential,
he said, but its historical dynamism had ended with the fall
of the Soviet Union. It had lost its raison d'etre and
changed in essence. No one (in France) wanted the enlarged
Europe that had emerged in recent years; Europe had worked
well only when its members were small in number. It was now
too difficult to come to common understandings on foreign
policy and other issues. Only France, Spain, Germany, and
Italy thought alike. When the Ambassador cited his
experience in the Czech Republic to argue that Europe's new
members were very attached to the EU, Debre complained that
they had taken advantage of others' largesse only to join the
ranks of France's economic competitors.
German Elections and the "End of Ideology"
------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Asked for his assessment of the inconclusive results
of the German elections, Debre described the Franco-German
entente in familiar terms as of critical importance and as
the indispensable engine of the European project. He viewed
CDU leader Merkel as someone perhaps less dedicated to the
centrality of the France-Germany alliance, who favored a
vision of Europe "closer to that of the British." That said,
he judged that the ideological differences between left and
right had, as a practical matter, disappeared in Germany and
in France, citing the French government's current emphasis on
reducing unemployment "socially."
¶8. (C) Contending that the French were much more conscious
of German economic performance than political orientation (he
said the French were "obsessed" with German economic
performance), Debre drew the conclusion that what will
ultimately carry the day in France are German economic
policies that work, not whether it is a free-market or
statist oriented party that implements the policies.
However, Debre said that Merkel's failure to win a clear-cut
victory represented a clear rejection of "ultra-liberalism",
the importance of which would not be lost on French
politicians. He expressed concern that a grand coalition
between the center-left and center-right in Germany could
encourage the growth of radicalism on both wings.
The Domestic Political Scene
----------------------------
¶9. (C) Asked how French politicians were interpreting the
results of the German elections, Debre explained that, "we
have arrived at the end of a cycle." In Debre's view, the
political era dominated by Francois Mitterrand and Jacques
Chirac -- and the kind of left/right differences they stood
for -- was coming to an end. Moreover, "the only important
election in France is the presidential election; all the
others are merely trivial commentary." This, in Debre's
view, explained why so much was being invested by so many in
pursuing the presidency so far ahead of time (the first round
of the election is in April 2007). "Many ambitions were
emerging" as a result of divisions in the political parties,
a changing electorate, and what Debre called "the coming to
an end" of Chirac's leading role in French politics (although
he later denied that he was ruling out a third term for
Chirac). In addition, France's two-round electoral system
(the first round of which, in effect, is an election with two
winners), was tempting even fairly marginal candidates to
believe that under the right circumstances, they could be
winners.
¶10. (C) Debre also noted that the successor generation was
relatively old. The all-or-nothing intensity of rivalries on
both the left (for example, Fabius vs. Strauss-Kahn) and the
right (for example, Sarkozy vs. Villepin) were exacerbated by
the fact that "it's their last shot, or second to the last at
best". (Comment: This is particularly true on the
center-left; almost all the heirs to Mitterrand (former prime
minister Laurent Fabius, former Finance Minister Dominique
Strauss-Kahn, and former Culture Minister Jacques Lang) are
approaching sixty. On the center-right, Villepin and Sarkozy
are both only in their early fifties. Sarkozy, however, has
thirty years of experience in politics and has already served
three times in key ministries and sees no reason why he
should have to "wait his turn" any longer. End Comment.)
¶11. (C) Finally, Debre commented that real ideological
debate was a thing of the past. Returning to his theme that
policy results were more important to voters than a political
credo, Debre lamented the demise of ideological clarity --
left vs. right, Socialists vs. Gaullists -- that had
structured French politics during the cycle now reaching its
end. He said that "things were much simpler then," adding
that the disintegration of this ideological structuring of
the political landscape made it very difficult to foresee how
the current transition would play out over the longer term.
Comment
-------
¶12. (C) We have reported Debre's remarks in detail not
because they represent official GOF policy, but because they
are typical of the persistence of a certain strain of
traditional French thinking and because Debre is so close to
Chirac and now PM de Villepin. That Debre would come across
as an unreconstructed Gaullist, as evidenced by giant
cardboard caricatures of Charles de Gaulle and Chirac
standing in the corner of his office (after all, his father
-- de Gaulle's first Prime Minister, also wrote the 1958
French constitution) was hardly surprising. But his
unvarnished, zero-sum portrayal of U.S.-French relations was
sobering, and illustrates the difficulties the U.S. often
faces in overcoming reflexive French suspicions about U.S.
intentions. His focus on market share as the measure of
international influence and, indeed, politics in general, was
also striking.
¶13. (C) Debre might have added that his observation about
"many ambitions emerging" applies equally to himself and to
his tireless behind-the-scenes efforts in support of
Villepin's goal of displacing Sarkozy as leader of
center-right and the successor to Chirac in 2007. Debre
seemed buoyant and energetic -- a seasoned politician who was
relishing the prospect of upcoming political battles --
specifically, the factional infighting for control of the UMP
between "Gaullists and "Liberals" which is the intra-party
dimension of the Villepin vs. Sarkozy rivalry.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON