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Viewing cable 09SANAA1611, ANOTHER ROYG INSIDER SPEAKS OUT: "HE WON’T LISTEN
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09SANAA1611 | 2009-08-31 08:20 | 2011-04-08 05:00 | SECRET | Embassy Sanaa |
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHYN #1611/01 2430820
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 310820Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2689
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SANAA 001611
SIPDIS
FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR SMOFFATT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR YM
SUBJECT: ANOTHER ROYG INSIDER SPEAKS OUT: "HE WON’T LISTEN
TO ANYONE"
REF: SANAA 1486
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY. Presidential first cousin and
well-connected ruling General People’s Congress Member of
Parliament Mohammed al-Qadhi has joined other prominent
former insiders ) including Tariq al-Fadhli, Mohammed Salim
Basenduah and Hamid al-Ahmar ) in blaming President Ali
Abdullah Saleh for Yemen’s myriad problems, and expressing
doubt that the current regime will ever change its
wrong-headed policies. Qadhi claimed that strengthening
Parliament to serve as a check on the power of the executive
was the last remaining hope to salvage Saleh’s government.
Along with the ongoing war in Sa’ada, the growing threat from
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Yemen’s failing
economy, the very public loss of influential allies like
Qadhi will open President Saleh up to further challenges to
his rule. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (S) Ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) MP, Deputy
Head of Parliament’s Oil and Development Committee and
presidential first cousin Mohammed al-Qadhi joined Islah MP
and powerful tribal sheikh Hamid al-Ahmar (reftel) in openly
criticizing the President and holding him directly
responsible for the country’s woes in press interviews. On
August 17, the Yemeni Socialist Party’s al-Ishtiraki web site
carried public statements by Qadhi accusing the President of
interfering with Parliamentary affairs and blaming him for
the war in Sa’ada and the ongoing restiveness in southern
Yemen. Qadhi, like Ahmar, is among a very small number of
well-connected members of the political elite in Yemen who
enjoy the influence and position to speak more openly than
the rest of the population about President Saleh and his
family members.
CIRQUE DE SALEH
---------------
¶3. (S) In an August 23 meeting with PolOff, Qadhi echoed the
concerns of many of Saleh’s former confidants and advisors
when he described how the President has, over the last 15
years, increasingly shut them out and begun relying solely on
himself or his closest family members in his decision-making.
"Since 1994, he decided that he was the only man capable of
making decisions in this country," Qadhi said. He added that
his father, Abdulillah al-Qadhi, the President’s uncle and
among the generals from Sanhan village who installed Saleh as
president in 1978, had a falling out with the President over
his handling of the 1994 war, although Qadhi himself remained
in close contact with Saleh until recently. "I have tried to
tell him that Yemen has serious problems, but he gets angry
and shuts me out. He and I fight often about his sons. He
doesn’t listen to anyone." Qadhi said that Saleh’s
close-mindedness was reflected even in their home village of
Sanhan, where "five or six people are well-off, and there are
thousands with nothing."
NO HOPE FOR CHANGE
------------------
¶4. (S) According to Qadhi, the President will never leave
office as long as he has a firm grasp on the military and
security services, which are stacked with men from Sanhan.
Although the President is bothered by the fact that he has
lost popularity among the general population in recent years,
it does not really threaten his grip on power, Qadhi said.
As to the succession question, Qadhi was unable to name a
likely or "acceptable" replacement for Saleh. On Hamid
al-Ahmar, he said, "The President has conducted a campaign
against him for 10 years, and at this point, most people
think he’s worse than the President." Qadhi acknowledged,
however, that Ahmar possesses the two things a Yemeni
president must have to be successful ) money, first, and
then political power. Qadhi dismissed members of the
Taiz-based Hayel Saeed family, despite their extensive wealth
and connections, because "they have no political skills."
¶5. (S) Qadhi named GPC MP Hussein al-Ahmar (Hamid’s brother)
and Mohammed Abulahoum, a member of the GPC’s General Council
and a leader of the Bakil tribal confederation, as two of the
strongest reform-minded individuals within the GPC hierarchy.
Qadhi hopes to use the Solidarity Council, a political
action group he founded in early 2009 with Hussein al-Ahmar,
as a tool for compelling the regime to implement badly needed
reforms. "It’s not that powerful yet, but we’re working to
build our strength and become a political party," he said.
The Council will conduct "massive citizen education
campaigns" to inform Yemenis about their rights in a
democratic system, with the goal of mobilizing the populace
to agitate for change through public demonstrations. "We
will start first in Sana’a, and then it can’t be ignored," he
said. "The people of the south will then know that they are
not alone, that people are suffering all over Yemen. The
people in the north are with them, and they will be convinced
to stay with this new unity." Qadhi hinted that if peaceful
demonstrations were unsuccessful in achieving dramatic
change, "we will use other means."
THE PROBLEM WITH PARLIAMENT
---------------------------
¶6. (S) "The crux of the problem in Yemen is that the
Parliament, judicial system and all of the ministries report
directly to the President," Qadhi told PolOff. He argued
that Parliament is totally subjugated by the regime, with its
speaker Yahya al-Raie taking orders directly from President
Ali Abdullah Saleh regarding the topic and tone of
Parliamentary sessions, sometimes only minutes before a
session is about to start. One-third of MPs are uneducated
and unaware of their duties as Parliamentarians and one-third
of MPs are co-opted by the regime and afraid to challenge the
President lest they lose their privileges, according to
Qadhi. The fewer than 100 remaining MPs are comprised of
weak opposition party members and a group of reform-minded
GPC members. He said that strengthening Parliament as a
check on the power of the executive was "the only hope to
save this regime." After Ramadan, Qadhi said, he and other
reformers in Parliament would push to replace the current
leadership ) Raie and his three deputies ) and replace them
with independent MPs willing to challenge the President.
(Note: Ramadan will end in late September. End Note.)
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
-----------------
¶7. (S) Mohammed al-Qadhi is a ruling General People’s
Congress (GPC) Member of Parliament from Sana’a (Hasabah
district), the Deputy Chair of the powerful Oil and
Development Committee, and a member of the GPC’s highest body
) the General Council. He and President Saleh are first
cousins, both from the small village of Sanhan. Qadhi’s
father, Abdulillah al-Qadhi, was among the generals who
installed Saleh as president of Yemen in 1978. Qadhi helped
found the powerful Islah Charitable Association in the 1990s.
He earned a bachelor’s degree in Business Administration and
Public Administration from the U.S. in 1993, and lived in the
U.S. for seven years in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Qadhi is the father of five children. He speaks fluent
Arabic and English.
COMMENT
-------
¶8. (S) Qadhi is the latest of several high-profile political
insiders to speak out openly against the President, a
red-line topic in Yemen less than one year ago. Unlike the
others, Qadhi is the first close family member and Sanhani to
turn on President Saleh. Whether or not Qadhi and other
influential insiders ) including Tariq al-Fadhli, Mohammed
Salim Basenduah and Hamid al-Ahmar ) are truly concerned
about the fate of Yemen, or, smelling blood in the water, are
positioning themselves for a post-Saleh era, their open
criticism and "Saleh must go" attitude are a considerable
departure from the political norm. The public loss of former
friends and allies, coupled with Saleh’s failures in
resolving conflict in Sa’ada, defeating al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula and turning around Yemen’s struggling
economy, are likely to encourage a pile-on effect that will
open him up to further challenges to his rule. END COMMENT.
SECHE