

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06LIMA1358, NEW VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LOBBIES AMBASSADOR FOR
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06LIMA1358.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06LIMA1358 | 2006-04-07 22:43 | 2011-02-22 12:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Lima |
Appears in these articles: www.elcomercio.pe |
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHPE #1358/01 0972243
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 072243Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9676
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3231
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9299
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ APR QUITO 0227
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0401
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6659
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4202
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001358
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PE
SUBJECT: NEW VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LOBBIES AMBASSADOR FOR
HUMALA
Classified By: Ambassador Curt Struble. Reason 1.4(b/d).
1...
id: 59852
date: 4/7/2006 22:43
refid: 06LIMA1358
origin: Embassy Lima
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHPE #1358/01 0972243
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 072243Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9676
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3231
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9299
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ APR QUITO 0227
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0401
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6659
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4202
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001358
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PE
SUBJECT: NEW VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LOBBIES AMBASSADOR FOR
HUMALA
Classified By: Ambassador Curt Struble. Reason 1.4(b/d).
¶1. (C) The Ambassador invited new Vice Foreign Minister
Harold Forsyth over for a one-on-one breakfast April 7.
Forsyth, who according to rumor has the inside track to
become Foreign Minister if Ollanta Humala is elected
President, quickly steered the subject to Peru,s election.
The Vice Minister wanted to solicit the Ambassador,s views
on USG concerns about Humala and to convey reassurance that
an Humala government would not align Peru with Venezuela,s
Chavez.
¶2. (C) Forsyth began by recalling his unusual experience as
a career diplomat and sometime politician. He was among the
protesting diplomats who were forced out of the service by
Fujimori after the 1992 auto-coup. In 1996, he won a
Congressional seat with Perez de Cuellar,s UPP. The Vice
Minister zeroed in on one element in his biography, his role
in co-founding the pro-democracy NGO Transparencia with
Salomon Lerner Ghitis in 2000. From that association, he
said, he developed a close bond of trust with Lerner and is
convinced that the latter would not help someone who would
lead Peru in a radical direction. (Comment: Lerner is one
of Humala,s principle advisors and a key liaison between the
candidate and the business community. During the
conversation Forsyth never specifically referred to any
conversation he has had with Humala. While offering his own
assessment of the candidate, he validated it at several
points by referring to the views of Salomon Lerner rather
than his own experience.)
¶3. (C) Forsyth noted that Peru is a country with a history
and culture unequaled elsewhere in Spanish-speaking America
except Mexico. That and Peru,s enduring national interests
would, Forsyth argued, prevent it from following Venezuela,s
foreign policy lead. Even during the 1968-74 Velasco
dictatorship, he said, Peru had taken care to prevent a
rupture in its relations with Washington.
¶4. (C) Forsyth observed that the Andean Community (CAN) is
in crisis because of the increasing alignment of Bolivia with
Venezuela. He would be representing Peru on Monday, April
10, at a CAN meeting of Vice Ministers to discuss problems
posed by the fact that three members want Free Trade
Agreements with the United States and two do not. Bolivia
did Venezuela,s bidding by circulating a letter before the
scheduled March CAN-EU summit preparatory conference,
objecting that the right conditions did not exist for such a
meeting because of differences within the CAN on trade
policy. Venezuela responded by canceling the meeting with
the EU though it had no right to do so.
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX, letting President Toledo,s signature of an FTA
with the U.S. the following day speak for Peru. Warming to
his point, Forsyth said that Peru is not Bolivia; it doesn't
have Venezuela,s oil and neither can nor wants to alienate
the United States.
¶6. (C) Forsyth asked the Ambassador what concerns the
United States might have about an Humala government. The
Ambassador said that four building blocks form the foundation
of U.S.-Peruvian relations, which are the best they have been
since World War II. They are:
--a common interest in strengthening democracy;
--cooperation against terrorism;
--cooperation in fighting narcotics and other transnational
crimes;
--the commercial relationship and its association with U.S.
efforts to reduce poverty in Peru through economic growth.
¶7. (C) The Ambassador noted that Humala has said he will
abide by the democratic rules of the game. If he wins the
election he will be taken at his word unless actions show
otherwise, but his lack of a track record in government
creates uncertainty. Humala,s military background lends
credibility to his pledge that Peruvian terrorists will be
confronted, but he has not addressed the international
dimension of the problem. Toledo,s actions to help Colombia
deal with the FARC have been exemplary and stand in contrast
to the Chavez government's approach. While Colombia is going
to win against the FARC, there is no question that what its
neighbors do can make the process more bloody, lengthy and
costly.
¶8. (C) In the area of narcotics, the Ambassador observed,
Humala,s proposals are unclear and may be non-viable; for
example, the candidate's call to ban all forced eradication.
Colombia is determined to eradicate coca as a means of
severing the FARC's logistical tail. This will progressively
drive up coca leaf prices in Peru and Bolivia. Unless those
governments show resolve, they will quickly see a huge
displacement of cultivation and trafficking to their
territory. Finally, the candidate's proposal to force
renegotiation of contracts will create friction with all
foreign investors, including those from the United States.
¶9. (C) Forsyth expressed gratitude for these observations.
Rather than addressing them directly, he said that he wanted
to share the reasons why he considers Humala the best option
as President of Peru. "Lourdes (Flores) is a friend of
mine," the Vice Minister said, "but she is very ideological
and inflexible." These characteristics, he predicted, will
lead the country to serious social conflict. "Alan Garcia
denounces Humala for being an unknown. My problem with
Garcia," Forsyth added, "is that he is a known quantity who
has presided over the most disastrous administration Peru has
seen."
¶10. (C) Again citing his confidence in Lerner,s appraisal
and judgment, the Vice Minister expressed confidence that
Humala would prove to be a responsible President, but one who
could make the lower classes feel included. In that
connection, Forsyth predicted that an Humala government would
retain the U.S.-Peru FTA. The Ambassador questioned that
statement, noting that Humala had staked out a pretty firm
position against it. Forsyth insisted on his view,
predicting that the Peruvian Congress will have approved the
FTA by the time the next President is inaugurated and that
Humala would be unwilling to rupture an agreement that has
been implemented (sic, since implementation would not occur
under the most optimistic scenario until January 1, 2007.)
¶11. (C) COMMENT: Forsyth sought to walk a delicate line.
He avoided mention of his own meetings with Humala, though
the relationship is an open secret among insiders. All the
same, it is a bit awkward for a sitting Vice Minister and
career diplomat to acknowledge them directly. Still, he was
on a clear mission to reassure the Ambassador that Humala is
no Chavez. Humala has been making the same case in public,
but his credibility is undercut by the remarkable similarity
his plan of government holds to those pioneered by Chavez and
Evo Morales. It was also interesting that, notwithstanding
his efforts to promote a return to institutional democracy
during the Fujimori years, Forsyth expressed doubts to the
Ambassador that Peru is capable of normal democratic
governance. At the beginning of their breakfast, Forsyth
noted that the middle class is the backbone of democracy
where it flourishes and lamented that Peru has too small a
middle class to provide that backbone. While he at no point
expressed sympathy for authoritarianism, Forsyth was
pessimistic about the near term health of democracy in his
country. END COMMENT.
STRUBLE
=======================CABLE ENDS============================