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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07BAGHDAD146, DEPUTY PROSECUTOR DESCRIBES TO AMBASSADOR SADDAM'S
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07BAGHDAD146 | 2007-01-15 08:17 | 2010-12-05 12:00 | SECRET | Embassy Baghdad |
VZCZCXRO7966
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0146/01 0150817
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 150817Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9079
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000146
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: DEPUTY PROSECUTOR DESCRIBES TO AMBASSADOR SADDAM'S
EXECUTION, CONTROVERSIES
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: In a January 6 meeting with the Ambassador,
Deputy Prosecutor Monqith Al-Faroun described Saddam's
execution, including the people present, the cell phone video
and the verbal taunts from guards at the scene. He stated
that he saw two Iraqi officials using their phones and that
once the taunting began he admonished the crowd to stay
silent. The Ambassador questioned the execution's timing -
one hour before Sunni Eid began - to which al-Faroun replied
that religious scholars concluded Eid did not start until
sunrise and therefore the execution could proceed. He
attributed international condemnation for the execution's
timing to the fact that many countries are against the death
penalty. He said that President Talabani did not have the
authority to change a sentence handed down from the Iraqi
High Tribunal which is why he was not asked to sign a decree.
When asked what would be different about the two remaining
executions, al-Faroun replied that only required witnesses -
a prosecutor, judge, a religious leader and the prison
director - would be allowed inside. End Summary.
--------------------------------------------- --------------
HOW IT HAPPENED: LAST MINUTE PLANS, GATHERING THE WITNESSES
--------------------------------------------- --------------
¶2. (C) The Ambassador began the meeting thanking Al-Faroun
for his courage, noting that it was not a risk-free endeavor
"bringing Saddam to justice." He noted that what happened
during the execution "tainted" the entire episode and asked
for the prosecutor's perspective. "We need to look back in
order to look forward," the Ambassador said, referencing the
two other executions still scheduled to occur in January.
Al-Faroun described arriving at the Prime Minister's
Residence on December 29 after he was informed the execution
would occur early the next morning. Included in the planning
and discussions were a group of Iraqi advisors from the PM's
office and other GOI officials, including National Security
Advisor Muwafuq Rubaie.
¶3. (C) Following this meeting, al-Faroun said, the fourteen
officials went directly to the helicopter landing zone, LZ
Washington located in the International Zone adjacent to the
Embassy Annex, for travel aboard a MNF-I helicopter to the
execution site. At LZ Washington American personnel searched
everyone and took the passengers' cell phones, al-Faroun
explained. It was a very "thorough" search, he said. (Note:
The Iraqi officials were searched by U.S. Marshals, who took
the cell phones for operational security reasons and returned
the cell phones once the 14 passengers landed in LZ
Washington following the execution. They also checked to
ensure that no weapons were carried on the aircraft. End
Note). The fourteen officials then boarded two helicopters
for the flight to northeastern Baghdad where the execution
occurred. The Ambassador asked if al-Faroun knew about a van
that allegedly arrived at the execution site with additional
people wanting to witness the execution. Al-Faroun did not
know about the van, but said the only witnesses to the actual
execution were the fourteen that arrived via helicopter and
the guards already at the location.
¶4. (S) Comment: During a final, hasty meeting the evening of
29 December, Dr. Rubaie stated to Ambassador Scobey and MG
Gardner that the GOI had developed a plan for the remaining
logistical details and accepted the responsibility for the
execution. The US would securely transport Saddam to the
site, transfer custody, and potentially help with the
transportation of remains. No US personnel would be present
at the execution or in the adjacent courtyard. The GOI
witness list changed several times prior to the execution and
at one point included 20-30 personnel. MNF-I agreed to fly
14 witnesses from LZ Washington. The GOI ultimately decided
that other witnesses would travel by car. About one hour
prior to the execution an SUV arrived at the base. The
guards manning the base entry point searched the vehicle for
weapons and explosives and then allowed the vehicle to
proceed to the execution building. The vehicle included six
personnel identified by the GOI as their video personnel and
PSD. We do not know if this group was searched by Iraqi
guards at the execution site. It is also unknown which of
the 6 actually entered the execution building as no US
personnel were in the courtyard or building. After the
transfer of physical custody of Saddam inside the holding
cell building, MNF-I personnel moved away from the execution
site to positions around the small MOJ compound. The GOI was
responsible for the execution building, access to the
building and courtyard, and the conduct of the execution.
The GOI's lack of a clear and coordinated plan to control the
witnesses and conduct the execution resulted in a hastily run
and confusing event. End Comment
BAGHDAD 00000146 002 OF 003
--------------------------------------------- -----------
FINAL PLANS: UNTIL THIS POINT, NOTHING IMPROPER OCCURRED
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶5. (C) Al-Faroun and the judge immediately separated from the
group to meet with Saddam, read the verdict and escort him to
the execution room. Al-Faroun said he "sympathized" with
Saddam who entered with his covered head, hands tied and
shaking involuntarily. The judge then read the verdict and
the death sentence. At that point Al-Faroun said, Saddam
became more animated and began speaking, "as if he were still
the President." Once the readings had finished, al-Faroun
explained, the three men, accompanied by four prison guards,
walked down a long corridor lined with the fourteen witnesses
to the room where the execution would occur.
¶6. (S) The Ambassador asked whether this was the same site
Saddam used to execute Dawa party members. Al-Faroun
affirmed that it was the same place, but noted that it had
also been used for other executions as well. EmbOff
confirmed the location has been used previously and that
Americans constructed the execution platform. Al-Faroun
interjected that the original platform was not built to
proper standards, and that as a result criminals were
suffering during execution. The new platform requires
prisoners to climb a flight of stairs and ensures less
suffering, al-Faroun said. The Ambassador then asked whether
the four guards were members of Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), the
militia loyal to Shia extremist Moqtada al-Sadr. Al-Faroun
replied that as far as he knew they were official prison
guards.
¶7. (C) Rubaie then approached Saddam and asked him if he was
afraid. Saddam responded that he was not afraid, that he had
been "anticipating this moment" since he first came to power,
knowing that as President he had many enemies. Saddam had
been holding a Koran and asked who among the witnesses would
ensure Awad al-Bandar's son received it. Al-Faroun agreed to
take the book and after Saddam handed it to him the guards
retied his hands. Al-Faroun emphasized that up until this
point nothing "improper" had occurred.
--------------------------------------------- ----------
...AND THEN THE TAUNTING, THE YELLING, THE PHOTOS BEGIN
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶8. (S) The guards then began to tie Saddam's feet at which
point he asked who would help him climb the stairs. It was
at this moment, al-Faroun said, that a guard told Saddam to
"go to hell." Al-Faroun raised his voice immediately and
warned people that "he would not allow the guards or
witnesses to speak" to Saddam. He turned around, he said, to
further admonish the witnesses and saw two government
officials openly taking photos with their mobile phones.
¶9. (S) Two guards escorted Saddam upstairs and offered to
cover his head with a hood. Saddam refused. The executioner
explained that the noose could cut his neck and offered him a
cloth to prevent any pain. The prison guards, standing below
the platform watched Saddam as he prayed. Before Saddam
finished, al-Faroun said, one person shouted "Moqtada,
Moqtada, Moqtada." The prosecutor claimed that he again
raised his voice to silence the witnesses. This disruption,
he said, occurred only once and did not delay the execution.
Saddam Hussein died instantaneously. He was removed from the
platform and placed in a bag. A religious leader later
ensured that Saddam's body had been washed according to
Islamic custom.
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CONTROVERSIES - TIMING AND LEGAL ISSUES - AND LESSONS LEARNED
--------------------------------------------- ----------------
¶10. (S) Al-Faroun told the Ambassador that despite the
controversies, he witnessed "a condemned person convicted in
a legal trial" which had proven Saddam "killed thousands."
The Ambassador agreed that Saddam's supporters would use the
execution as an excuse to condemn what had been a fair and
just trial. However, he continued, there were many people
who had been happy to see Saddam brought to justice who were
now upset by how the execution occurred. The Ambassador
asked about the execution's timing, commenting that having
the execution one hour before Sunni's celebrated Eid has
angered some people. Al-Faroun replied that there are both
social and legal opinions about implementing the death
penalty during holidays. The legal opinion, he said, states
that criminals cannot be executed on a holiday. The GOI
examined the timing, he said, and experts concluded that if
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it finished before sunrise it would not coincide with Eid.
The social opinion shared by some members of the
international community, he continued, is that the death
penalty should not be used at any time regardless of whether
it occurs during a holiday. Al-Faroun disregarded this
argument, noting that law "does not take into account
people's feelings."
¶11. (S) The Ambassador stated that some have questioned the
execution's legality given the absence of an "administrative
affirmation" from President Talabani. The Ambassador noted
that if the PM did not believe an affirmation was necessary,
they should have asked Iraqi Chief Justice Medhat to declare
this in writing. The prosecutor responded that under Iraqi
law the President has the ability to reduce sentences for
normal crimes. Saddam's sentence was not presented to the
President because in this instance he had no authority to
commute the sentence. Article 27 of the Iraqi Criminal
Courts law, al-Faroun said, states that sentences issued from
the Iraqi High Tribunal cannot be reduced. The reason for
this, he explained, is because cases prosecuted here are
crimes against humanity instead of crimes against Iraq. An
Iraqi leader, therefore, does not have the authority to
reduce these sentences.
¶12. (C) The Ambassador asked al-Faroun what the GOI will
change in the next two upcoming executions. Al-Faroun
responded emphatically that the only witnesses who will be
permitted are those required by law: a public prosecutor, a
judge, a religious leader and the prison director. This, he
concluded, will prevent unacceptable behavior and unnecessary
controversy.
KHALILZAD