

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08SOFIA305, BULGARIA NEEDS U.S. SUPPORT TO BREAK AIR FORCE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08SOFIA305.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08SOFIA305 | 2008-05-14 11:08 | 2011-05-05 19:00 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Sofia |
Appears in these articles: http://www.bivol.bg/wlarmy.html http://balkans.blog.lemonde.fr/2011/05/05/et-la-bulgarie-renonca-aux-corvettes-francaises/ http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2011/05/05/1085393_kak_se_pileiat_pari_v_otbranata/ |
VZCZCXRO3898
OO RUEHBW
DE RUEHSF #0305/01 1351108
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141108Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5040
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0609
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0976
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000305
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FROM AMBASSADOR BEYRLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA NEEDS U.S. SUPPORT TO BREAK AIR FORCE
DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIA
Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C/NF) Summary. Rapidly losing capability, the
Bulgarian Air Force is in dire need of modernization, but
meaningful transformation is made impossible by Bulgaria's
overwhelming dependence on Russian airframes. The use of
aging Russian aircraft not only limits Bulgarian
capabilities, but maintains a crippling dependence upon
Russia for parts and maintenance. Russia has routinely
withheld these in order to exert pressure and extract
favorable decisions. Bulgaria is keenly aware of this
dependency and is reaching out to allies for suggestions on
affordable, NATO-interoperable airframes.
¶2. (C/NF) Four outcomes are possible: 1) Bulgaria has no
Air Force, 2) it has a weak and Russian-dependent force, 3)
it cobbles together a fleet of limited capacity with European
fighters such as Swedish Grypens, 4) it adopts a U.S. fighter
and becomes a capable, interoperable ally in air operations.
A U.S. multi-role fighter is the only option that will enable
Bulgaria to have an effective Air Force over the longer-term.
Transitioning Bulgaria to a U.S. airframe would drastically
improve Bulgaria's capabilities and draw our two armed forces
into even closer cooperation. Most critically it would
eliminate Russian influence over an entire section of the
Bulgarian military and reduce its leverage over the Ministry
of Defense as a whole. Post has requested DOD provide a
concrete proposal to the Bulgarians for acquisition of a U.S.
aircraft, with the goal of formally presenting this to the
Bulgarians during high-level meetings this summer. End
Summary.
CURRENT CAPABILITIES
¶3. (C/NF) Saddled with pre-1989 equipment and doctrine, the
Bulgarian Air Force is poorly led, poorly funded and
increasingly unable to perform effectively as a NATO ally.
Their transport fleet is small. It was recently bolstered
with the addition of one C-27J, but the rest consists of a
handful of old non-NATO compatible Soviet AN-12s. With the
exception of 12 non-combat capable Eurocopter AS 532 Cougars,
the helicopter fleet is also in poor shape with only six
MI-17s (equivalent to the Russian MI-8 HIP), six Bell
206B-3,s and two operational MI-24 HINDS. Worst off is
Bulgaria's tactical fighter fleet. Bulgaria maintains a
handful of MiG-21s which will retire by mid-2009. They have
12 fully mission capable Su-25s but have budgeted very
limited funds to fly them this year ) less than 10 hours per
airframe. The Bulgarians rely entirely on 12 aging MiG-29s
to do all NATO Air Policing. As a result, they were forced
to sign a ten million dollar contract with Russia for
depot-level maintenance work required to keep them flying.
THE PROBLEM: DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIA AND MiGS
¶4. (C/NF) The MiG airframe is the major obstacle to the
transformation of the Bulgarian Air Force. It limits
Bulgaria's capabilities, but more significantly it fosters an
unhealthy dependence on Russia. Because it is still using
Cold War aircraft, Bulgaria lacks western operational
instructions, relying instead on outdated Soviet tactics,
techniques and procedures (TTPs) and logistics. Virtually
nothing in the Bulgarian Air Force has moved forward since
¶1989. Because of the MiG airframe, the Bulgarian tactical
Air Force is forced to maintain a robust relationship with
Russia simply to keep their tactical fleet in the air. This
allows Russia tremendous influence over Bulgarian Air Force
policies, operations and procurement decisions. So long as
Russian aircraft remain the backbone of the Bulgarian Air
Force it cannot fully transform, modernize or integrate into
NATO.
THE SOLUTION: U.S. AIRFRAME
SOFIA 00000305 002 OF 003
¶5. (C/NF) Transitioning away from Russian aircraft would
have a far-reaching impact on Bulgarian military
modernization. The specific capabilities of a new airframe
would be secondary to NATO interoperability and the
development of a strong relationship with the United States
Air Force. Bulgaria has begun this process in its other
services. The purchase of a used Belgian Frigate was a
catalyst for transformation of the Bulgarian Navy. Through
Belgian partnership, Bulgarian ships and crews, once entirely
wedded to Russian equipment and doctrine, are now NATO
certified and currently participate in major NATO exercises
in the Mediterranean. The Bulgarian Army has benefited from
the provision of U.S. equipment and vehicles and has
transformed itself considerably through its ongoing
participation in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
Bulgarian Air Force, however, remains stuck in 1989.
¶6. (C/NF) Bulgaria knows it can not continue down this
path. It is committed to maintaining a tactical Air Force
and is actively searching for an affordable multi-role
fighter. It is in our interest to ensure that Bulgaria
chooses a U.S. solution. Moving the Bulgarians to a U.S.
fighter would reduce Russian influence over Bulgarian defense
policy, integrate Bulgaria further into NATO and ensure a
long-term strategic relationship with the United States. A
switch to a European fighter such as the Eurofighter or
Swedish Grypen would be an improvement, but still clearly a
second-best solution since none of the Europeans have a
history of providing the technical, logistical and tactical
support Bulgaria desperately needs. It is not a coincidence
that Bulgaria's NATO neighbors Greece, Turkey and Romania
have all opted for U.S. airframes. Additionally, switching
to a European fighter only addresses short-term needs and
does not offer an eventual bridge the Joint Strike Fighter,
the only long-term outcome that would enable Bulgaria to fly
and fight effectively and interoperably with the United
States.
¶7. (C/NF) Bulgaria has approached the United States
formally in multiple forums requesting information on
available U.S. aircraft. Many top Bulgarian officials are
anxious to transition to a U.S. fighter as soon as possible,
but Russian ties run deep and staying with a Russian fighter
has traction in other circles. European countries have
expressed interest in selling aircraft to Bulgaria and have a
strong lobby. Bulgaria is a special case due to its limited
funds, Russian dependence and critical need for technical and
logistical support. Presenting the Bulgarians with the
standard approach we roll out for other wealthier allies will
not work, but a comprehensive, affordable, sustainable U.S.
offer with full U.S. government support will almost certainly
succeed. Time is short because the Bulgarians are reaching
the decision point: to stay with the Russian MiGs into an
unforeseeable future, or transition to a new aircraft.
¶8. (C/NF) Previous US Navy and USAF efforts have laid a
good foundation. Now more vigorous DoD contact is needed.
In addition to a concrete offer to present to Bulgarians, a
senior DoD visit for this specific topic in the next few
months would be highly valuable. Finally, we understand that
release of the Joint Strike Fighter to Bulgaria has not been
approved. We need to revisit that decision. This Embassy
was not consulted in the original decision, and we still do
not have clarity on the criteria or decision-making process
that led to that determination.
¶9. (C/NF) Final Comment: Bulgaria has proved itself a
steadfast ally and reliable partner in international
security, currently ranking as the fourth largest EU troop
contributor in Iraq. Within many Bulgarian institutions,
however, and particularly among the military, there is a
split between younger transatlantic thinkers and older
"default-Russia" forces. It is crucial that we make efforts
now to empower those forces inclined to look toward NATO and
the United States. The Bulgarian Air Force is at a
crossroads. Decisions made in the upcoming months will
SOFIA 00000305 003 OF 003
determine whether Bulgaria ends up with no Air Force, a very
limited capability force, or a fully effective and
interoperable force with a deep connection to the United
States. A U.S. commitment to identify an appropriate
multi-role fighter will lead to a broad institutional shift
inside the Bulgarian Armed Forces and pay very large
dividends in the future. Inaction is an invitation to
Russia, already a dominant force in the Bulgarian energy
sector, to continue to exercise control over significant
sections of Bulgarian defense. It is likely this issue will
be raised when the Bulgarian Prime Minister travels to
Washington and meets President Bush next month. High-level
engagement from Washington prior to this meeting will be
crucial to developing a mutually beneficial proposal and
ensuring a positive final outcome. End Comment.
Beyrle