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Viewing cable 09SANAA2117, SA'ADA CEASEFIRE DISCUSSIONS UNDERWAY
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VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHYN #2117/01 3271515
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 231515Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3269
INFO RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1706
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SANAA 002117
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL SA YM
SUBJECT: SA'ADA CEASEFIRE DISCUSSIONS UNDERWAY
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Well-informed sources, including one
involved directly in preliminary talks, report that both the
ROYG and the Houthis are looking for a way to stop the
fighting in northern Yemen. While the Houthis apparently
have accepted the RQG's five ceasefire conditions, there is
an impasse as to whether these conditions must be implemented
before a ceasefire is announced or immediately after. The
matter is further complicated by Saudi Arabia's involvement
in the war: Saleh cannot reach a ceasefire with the Houthis
if the SAG is still fighting them, nor will he have much
incentive to do so if the SAG continues to support the war
effort militarily and financially. It is hard to say how far
these ceasefire talks will go, but they are the first serious
effort that we know of to bring the Sixth War to an end
politically rather than militarily. END SUMMARY.
SALEH MEETINGS WITH HOUTHI ENVOY
--------------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Well-informed sources, including some involved
directly in preliminary talks, report that both the ROYG and
the Houthis are looking for a way to stop the fighting in
northern Yemen. Presidential advisor Abdul Karim al-Iryani
told the Ambassador on November 22 that efforts were indeed
underway to agree on terms for a ceasefire. The Houthis have
chosen Hassan Zaid, chairman of the opposition Joint Meeting
Parties (JMP) and native of Sa'ada, to act as their
intermediary with President Saleh. Zaid told PolOff on
November 21 that he met with Saleh on November 19 to discuss
conditions for a ceasefire. According to Zaid, Saleh
insisted that once the Houthis accept the ROYG's five
ceasefire conditions, he would form a commission to woQ out
details regarding implementation of the ceasefire. (Note:
The ROYG's five ceasefire conditions required of the Houthis
are: 1) withdraw from the mountains, remove mines, open
roads, and commit to a ceasefire; 2) withdraw from districts
and refrain from interfering with local authorities; 3)
return seized and stolen military and civilian equipment; 4)
release detainees; and 5) respect the law and the
constitution. End Note.) Iryani confirmed that a mediation
committee is now being formed in the event that hostilities
cease. According to Zaid, Saleh proposed the ceasefire
commission consist of Northwest Regional Commander Ali
Muhsin, Ali al-Jayfi, head of the Giants brigade, and Faisal
Rajab, a southern military commander, while the Houthis
proposed they be represented by Abdulkarim Amir Adim
al-Houthi, Saleh Ahmed Habra, and Saleh al-Samaad.
¶3. (S/NF) Zaid held a subsequent meeting with the President
on November 22 to deliver a letter from Houthi spokesman
Mohammed Abdulsalam agreeing to the five conditions,
clarifying their objectives (such as denying that they want
to re-establish the imamate), and shaming Saleh for "staying
idle while children and women are killed by missiles and
airplanes of the Saudi regime." Zaid told PolOff on November
23 that he emerged from the meeting very disappointed, as
there was no progress or tangible outcome. He reported that,
on one hand, Saleh appeared to indicate that he wanted to
stop the war but could not, because he complained that
Hussein and Hamid al-Ahmar, leaders of the Hashid tribal
confederation, want to keep the war going. Zaid also had the
impression Saleh would not end the war as long as the Saudis
continued funding and supporting it.
CEASEFIRE SEQUENCING UNCLEAR
----------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) One of the elements that remains unclear,
according to Zaid, is the sequencing of the implementation of
the ceasefire relative to the implementation of the five
ceasefire conditions. The Houthis have pledged to implement
the five conditions within a day of the cessation of military
operations. During that time, both parties would open roads,
begin to clear the area of mines, come down from the
mountains, and stop interfering with local authorities.
Iryani told the Ambassador that he believes the essential
first step is for Abdul Malik al-Houthi to publicly announce
the rebels, acceptance of the ROYG's five points. He said
this is the only way Saleh will move forward, since it has
become the government's bottom line for a settlement. A
public statement by the Houthis would enable Saleh to say to
the families of the soldiers who have died and the Yemeni
people in general that the sacrifices they made were not in
vain. (Note: While the Houthis have communicated their
acceptance of the five conditions to the President, they have
not yet made it public. End Note.)
SOLVING THE PROBLEM AT ITS ROOTS
--------------------------------
¶5. (S/NF) Through their intermediary, the Houthis also
presented the President with a list of their conditions for
"guaranteeing a final resolution" to the conflict. (Note:
Iryani confirmed that the Houthis were presenting conditions
of their own for the ceasefire to hold. End Note.)
According to a document Zaid gave PolOff on November 21,
these conditions are:
-- The formal announcement of a ceasefire, the cessation of
all mobilization of ground troops, and allowing IDPs to
return to their homes;
-- The release of all prisoners of war and the clarification
of the fates of the disappeared;
-- Actions to address the impact of the war through
reconstructing destroyed infrastructure and compensating
civilians for looted properties;
-- The "normalization of life in Sa,ada" through the
following steps: 1) The army's withdrawal from villages and
farms in order to demilitarize public and private properties
in Sa,ada. (Comment: It is not clear if the Houthis will
allow the military to remain in their posts on mountaintops.
End Comment.); 2) Genuine economic development and delivery
of basic services; 3) Ending cultural and political
discrimination against the Zaydi population; and 4) Allowing
civil servants to return to their jobs and giving them
back-pay for the time they were separated from their posts.
SIMULTANEOUS SAUDI ARABIA TRACK
-------------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) According to NDI Deputy Director Murad Zafir,
reaching a ceasefire has been complicated by the SAG,s
involvement: Saleh cannot announce a ceasefire if the Saudis
are still fighting the Houthis, nor will he have any
incentive to do so if the SAG continues providing cash and
weapons for the war. Zafir told PolOff that the Saudis had
approached Hussein al-Ahmar to serve as a mediator with the
Houthis. Zaid confirmed this, saying Ahmar then called him
to consult about possible terms the Houthis might accept.
(Note: Hussein al-Ahmar has mobilized hundreds of Hashid
tribesmen to fight alongside the ROYG army against the
Houthis. End Note.) Zafir told PolOff on November 19 that
Ahmar had consulted with the Houthis to see if they would
withdraw from Jebel Dukhan in exchange for a Saudi commitment
not to allow the ROYG to attack the Houthis from Saudi
territory. The Houthis reportedly agreed to these
conditions, and Ahmar went to Riyadh to deliver the message.
Zaid said, however, that the Saudis were not willing to give
the Houthis anything in exchange for their commitment to
withdraw from Jebel Dukhan and stop attacking Saudi forces.
(Comment: Post has not been able to confirm these reports
with Ahmar directly. End Comment.) Zafir reported that the
Houthis also chose Rabaea Amin al-Okaimi, a sheikh from Al
Jawf, to serve as a mediator with the SAG. Okaimi is
reportedly in Saudi Arabia at the moment.
¶7. (S/NF) Zafir told PolOff that the Houthis are asking the
SAG to stop military action in Jebel Dukhan, to cease attacks
against the Houthis, and to refrain from allowing the ROYG to
launch attacks against the Houthis from Saudi territory. If
the SAG were to agree, he said Houthis wanted the Zaydi
sheikhs on the Saudi side of the border to guarantee the
terms; they are reportedly very warrior-like tribes that will
keep the Saudi army out of their territories if they have
given their word to do so. Zafir reported that the SAG
agreed to these conditions in principle, but nothing is
official yet.
¶8. (S/NF) Iryani claimed to have no information about a
separate line of communication between the Houthis and the
SAG. He did agree, however, that any ceasefire agreement
between the ROYG and the Houthis would have to be agreed to
in advance by the Saudis and coordinated with their forces so
all hostilities could cease at the same time.
HOPE FROM THE HAJJ
------------------
¶9. (S/NF) Zafir believes that the November 25 beginning of
the Hajj could encourage the Saudis to at least stop their
direct military involvement in the war, as they do not want
to be accused of killing Muslims during that holy time, as
Iran will surely do. Zafir also argues that the Saudis will
have difficulty achieving their goal of clearing a 10
kilometer buffer zone on the Yemeni side of the border -- as
the SAG appears to be attempting to do -- without killing
civilians and inciting anti-Saudi sentiment.
HOW SERIOUS IS SALEH?
---------------------
¶10. (S/NF) Zaid thinks Saleh may just be feigning an
interest in a ceasefire agreement. One reason he believes so
is the people Saleh recommended for the ceasefire commission
)- including Northwest Region Commander Muhsin -- are people
he is rumored to want to get rid of in order to clear the way
for his son Ahmed to become president. (Comment: Since the
beginning of the Sixth War, many analysts have expressed the
opinion that it is an internal proxy war aimed at weakening
potential rivals to the president's son. End Comment.)
According to Zaid, Saleh will get serious about the ceasefire
if he feels the war directly threatens his presidency or his
son's prospects to succeed him, or if the Saudis stop
financing his war. Even if Saleh wanted to stop the war,
however, Zaid is not sure he would be able to, given the
Saudis' involvement and the desire of certain factions with
the SAG to keep it going. "The decision to stop the war is
not in Saleh,s hands. It,s in Riyadh," he said.
COMMENT
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¶11. (S/NF) The ceasefire discussions underway are incipient
but promising nonetheless, if only because they are the first
such discussions since the war began in August. Many Yemeni
analysts believe that Saudi Arabia will make or break them, a
view that would seem to ignore the disinterest each of the
warring parties has shown to date in anything other than a
military solution. END COMMENT.
SECHE