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Viewing cable 09DJIBOUTI1425,
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09DJIBOUTI1425 | 2009-12-27 12:42 | 2011-02-03 21:30 | SECRET | Embassy Djibouti |
VZCZCXRO5862
RR RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDJ #1425/01 3611242
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 271242Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1173
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DJIBOUTI 001425
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF, AF/E, AND AF/RSA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER
AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2034/12/27
TAGS: MOPS MASS PREL PGOV PHSA PTER DJ SO ER AG
1.(S) SUMMARY. Meeting with visiting AF DAS Wycoff following the conclusion of the December 7-8 IGAD ministerial on Somali and Sudan, Foreign Minister Youssouf concurred that both security and political measures were necessary to restore stability to Somalia. While declaring that Djibouti was facilitating a shipment of Algerian arms to the TFG to bolster is security capacity, FM Youssouf highlighted that President Guelleh had underscored in private to the TFG FM and Deputy PM that the TFG needed to deliver basic services in order to build its credibility among Somalia's populace. Noting Somali President Sheikh Sharif's "weakness" in public diplomacy, FM Youssouf discussed Djibouti's efforts to support Somalia's intellectuals, including paying salaries to authors from the Somali diaspora. Youssouf said the GODJ did not believe the TFG should foreclose the possibility of dialogue with Hassan Dahir Aweys, whose leadership within Hizbul Islam was being questioned; however, dialogue with al-Shabaab's terrorist leadership was "out of the question." END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- -----
PIRACY AND TERRORISM: SYMPTOMS OF SOMALIA'S CRISIS
--------------------------------------------- -----
2.(C) On December 9, visiting AF Deputy Assistant Secretary Wycoff, accompanied by Ambassador and DCM, met with Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf. Referring to IGAD's just-concluded December 7-8 33rd Council of Ministers meeting on Somalia and Sudan, hosted by Djibouti, FM Youssouf began by noting that the "intricate problems" of the Horn of Africa made it difficult to obtain meaningful consensus. The 20-year-old conflict in neighboring Somalia lacked any "real rationale," Youssouf said. There was no justification for the December 3 suicide bombing in Mogadishu (ref A), which he attributed to an ethnic Somali Danish national who had been in Mogadishu for only one month, but had been "brainwashed by al-Qaida elements."
3.(C) In response to DAS Wycoff's overview of USG policy on Somalia, FM Youssouf stated that terrorism and maritime piracy were symptoms of a crisis in Somalia, which could not be tackled by "strong measures" alone. Political measures, such as the Djibouti Peace Process (DPP), were also needed. Both on-shore and off-shore measures were required to combat piracy, including training for Somalia's coast guard, and engaging with Somaliland and Puntland to ensure that neither benefitted directly or indirectly from piracy. Djibouti was facilitating the delivery of speedboats for Puntland, following visits by President Faroole and Puntland's interior minister. Djibouti was also working with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to serve as a regional center for counter-piracy, Youssouf said. Wycoff noted that the USG continued to support the DPP and advocated improved effort by the TFG to expand its political base of support through a reconciliation and outreach process.
4.(C) Youssouf said that according to Kenyan FM Wetangula, some 176 pirate attacks on commercial vessels (off the coast of Somalia) had generated $120 million in ransom, thus making piracy "a profitable business"--not just for Somalis but others, including, reportedly, a UK bookkeeper in Nairobi.
--------------------------------------------- ---
DJIBOUTI 00001425 002 OF 004 PUSHING THE TFG TO PROVIDE SERVICES AND SECURITY
--------------------------------------------- ---
5.(C) The multiple components to the Somalia crisis required multiple, concurrent lines of effort, Youssouf said. The GODJ was privately pressuring the TFG to be more dynamic and proactive, and to deliver basic services
-- such as security and water - in order to build credibility among Somalia's population. FM Youssouf said that the previous day (December 8), President Guelleh had told TFG FM Ali Ahmed Jama Jangeli, and TFG Deputy PM and Minister of Finance Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, that winning sustainable support from the populace, not the international community, was key. During the IGAD Ministerial, Uganda's deputy foreign minister had told the TFG that it needed to focus on fostering patriotism, not seeking helicopters, noting that Ugandan guerillas had fought in the bush for eight years without a salary. Meanwhile, popular support for al-Shabaab continued to erode. Youssouf asserted that al-Shabaab had falsely denied responsibility for the December 3 suicide bombing, because it feared that student casualties would lead to a popular backlash against it.
---------------------------------------
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: A WEAKNESS OF THE TFG
---------------------------------------
6.(C) DAS Wycoff reviewed USG support for Somalia and the TFG, including the provision of technical support to bolster the TFG's public diplomacy efforts, including assistance to Radio Mogadishu. Noting that Somali culture was predominantly oral, and that illiteracy was high among armed Somali youths, FM Youssouf agreed that radio messaging was key. Public diplomacy was a weakness of President Sharif, Youssouf said. Djibouti sought to develop Somalia's intellectuals, Youssouf said, noting that Somalia's PEN Club was headquartered in Djibouti. Djibouti's President Guelleh had assisted authors from Somalia's diaspora, even paying them to produce publications and radio programming.
-----------------------------
MILITARY SUPPORT FROM ALGERIA
-----------------------------
7.(C) In his meeting with the TFG FM, Guelleh had also underscored the strategic necessity of the TFG holding areas liberated from al-Shabaab. As the TFG was incapable of sustaining a conventional war with the requisite supply and logistics chain, the TFG needed to wage a guerilla war against al-Shabaab, as al-Shabaab itself was doing, Youssouf said.
8.(S) FM Youssouf stated that Algeria was providing 30 tons of arms to the TFG; the shipment was currently in Dire Dawa (Ethiopia), and would arrive in Djibouti December 9 or
10.The TFG had previously considered delivery by road, but was concerned about theft. Wycoff urged that care be taken in handing over the arms to avoid their being misappropriated, noting that the USG worked through AMISOM to try to ensure best use was made of any lethal equipment provided. Noting that Djibouti had previously shipped weapons to the TFG in April and June (ref B), FM Youssouf stated that Djibouti would ship the Algerian arms on to the TFG only to specific locations when specified by President Sharif. DJIBOUTI 00001425 003 OF 004
--------------------------------------------- ----------
TFG CAN WORK WITH ASWJ AND PUNTLAND, BUT NOT AL-SHABAAB
--------------------------------------------- ----------
9.(C) DAS Wycoff reviewed the USG approach to the TFG. The U.S. would continue support of Djibouti's effort to train additional TFG troops, but the USG, EU, and other partners must do more to coordinate efforts. While partners had been focused on the security sector, a military solution alone was insufficient; ways had to be found to build on the DPP to promote political solutions. However, the USG opposed any effort to undercut or replace the Djibouti Peace Process. DAS Wycoff highlighted USG opposition to Eritrea's efforts in this area, as well as to Eritrea's intransigence regarding its border dispute with Djibouti. It was important to impose sanctions on Eritrea as a regional spoiler, in order to effect change in the GSE's policies. Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) appeared to be a potent force, but needed to work within the Djibouti Process and to partner with the TFG against common enemies.
10.(C) FM Youssouf said he was pleased to observe that the USG and GODJ shared the same assessment and goals regarding Somalia. He hailed the strong partnership between Djibouti and the United States, noting that the Djibouti benefitted from the U.S. military presence at Camp Lemonier; it was not a "one-way" relationship.
11.(C) FM Youssouf concurred that the TFG would generate political gains by taking in the ASWJ. The TFG had signed an agreement with the ASWJ, he said; President Sheikh Sharif had even proposed that ASWJ join Somalia's government. However, this was stymied by ASWJ's demand that thousands of ASWJ militia be absorbed immediately into Somalia's national security forces
-- a demand that could not be met, as President Sharif could not commit to pay them all salaries.
12.(C) Noting that some Arab states had called for negotiations with Hassan Dahir Aweys, FM Youssouf commented that while Eritrea backed Aweys, his leadership was being contested within Hisbul Islam. Nevertheless, the GODJ had advised TFG President Sharif "not to close that door." On the other hand, Youssouf rejected the possibility of political discussions with al-Shabaab's current leadership. Following the death of Saleh Nabhan, Harun Fazul (from Comoros) had assumed responsibility as the "operational mastermind" for terrorist attacks and was now spending more time in Somalia, Youssouf said. Dialogue with al-Shabaab was thus "out of the question."
13.(C) As for Puntland and Somaliland, Youssouf said one could envision a future political framework for Puntland (e.g., a federal system). However, he cautioned against the TFG rushing into a "volatile situation" in Somaliland. Due to recent electoral issues, Somaliland authorities had not only lost credibility, but also threatened Somaliland's tranquility.
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SUB-CLAN DYNAMICS WITHIN THE HAWIYE -----------------------------------
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14.(C) Questioned about internal dynamics of the Hawiye clan, FM Youssouf observed that whereas in the past the Hawiye had engaged in a power struggle with other major Somali clans (like Abdullahi Yusuf's Darod), following their ouster from Mogadishu after Siad Barre's regime, there was now conflict within the Hawiye clan itself. The major factions within the Hawiye comprised three groups:
-- Hawiye from the most "anarchic" rural areas, who had never before lived in urban areas, but who looted cities, had a "kill or be killed" philosophy, and who now controlled Mogadishu;
-- the business community, who controlled the ports and Somalia's fishing fleet, and who fought against the warlords, with their own militia and bodyquards; and
-- farmers on previously state-controlled farms, who had continued for several years to export bananas internationally. Generally, Hawiye/Abgal hailed from Mogadishu, while Hawiye/Habr-Gedir came from Mogadishu's outskirts.
15.(C) These three groups, Youssouf continued, maintained a rough equilibrium for many years. U.S. intervention in 2006, during which the USG armed and equipped some warlords, interfered with the "semblance of harmony" that previously existed among these three groups. The Islamic Courts Union took advantage of the ensuing chaos in Mogadishu, which then led to Ethiopia's intervention.
16.(C) The "backbone" of Somali behavior and conflict remained clan-based, Youssouf said, as illustrated by the in-fighting among Somali subclans within the Hawiye. Youssouf noted that the Djiboutian military's training earlier this year of TFG recruits (ref C), aimed at fostering unit cohesion and Somali nationalism, as Djiboutian authorities recognized that, at the beginning, recruits formed cliques on the basis of sub-clans, and even feared attacks from members of the same clan if they were from different sub-clans.
¶17. (C) Questioned about possible international mediation support for internal Somali dialogue, such as the use of African mediators or negotiation support teams, FM Youssouf said they could assist, but cautioned that internal reconciliation could not be effected by external actors. Rather, such reconciliation depended first on identifying grievances, which was a task only Somalis themselves could lead. Genuine reconciliation would occur only when a Somali layman chose peace rather than conflict, a process independent of outside experts.
¶18. (C) COMMENT. An ethnic Afar within the majority ethnic Somali Djiboutian government, Foreign Minister Youssouf often is more outspoken than other Djiboutian senior principals in his criticism of Somali clan dynamics. Nevertheless, FM Youssouf's observations demonstrate the wide range of support that Djibouti is providing to the TFG in neighboring Somalia: running the gamut of paying salaries to intellectuals from the Somali diaspora, counseling the TFG on the delivery of basic services, to training TFG troops, and even facilitating the shipment of arms. All these activities underscore that promoting stability in Somalia is a key national security objective for Djibouti, as it is for the USG. END COMMENT. 19. (U) DAS Wycoff cleared this message. SWAN