

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09SANJOSE624, COSTA RICA'S FIRST FEMALE PRESIDENT? SCENESETTER
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09SANJOSE624.
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSJ #0624/01 2081948
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271948Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1065
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000624
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN; WHA/PPC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR PREL CS
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA'S FIRST FEMALE PRESIDENT? SCENESETTER
FOR THE 2010 ELECTIONS
Classified By: CDA Peter M. Brennan for reason 1.4 (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: With Costa Rica's presidential primary season
now over, the stakes are set for the February 2010 national
election. For the first time in Costa Rican history, a
female candidate, Laura Chinchilla from the Partido
Liberacion Nacional (PLN), has a strong chance to become
President. Chinchilla, who was President Oscar Arias's
vice-president before declaring her candidacy, handily won
her party's hotly-contested June 7 primary election. The
other two major-party candidates, Otton Solis from the
Partido Accion Ciudadana (PAC) and former-President Rafael
Angel Calderon from the Partido Union Social Cristiana
(PUSC), are both political retreads who starkly contrast with
Chinchilla's "fresher" public persona. In addition, Calderon
has an ongoing legal case stemming from 2004 corruption
charges. END SUMMARY
----------------------------------------
THE REAL GENERAL ELECTION? PLN'S PRIMARY
----------------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) In some ways, PLN's June 7 primary had all the
appearances of a general election, from the large turnout of
over half-a-million voters, to the fact that whomever emerged
as the winner would be the favorite to win the 2010
presidential elections. Additionally, it was the only
presidential primary that had an open, country-wide election
in which all Costa Ricans could vote. While San Jose Mayor
Johnny Araya, Chinchilla's chief adversary in the PLN
primary, had led in the polls through March, Chinchilla had
overtaken Araya by May 2009. Most of those polls gave a
small advantage to Chinchilla going into the primary, though
many experts still believed that Araya's well organized
campaign might actually surge ahead for an election day
victory.
¶3. (C) Araya's popularity sprang from his accomplishments as
mayor of San Jose, not the least of which was his general
managerial efficiency in Costa Rica's hectic capital (despite
consistent rumors of corruption, which haunted him throughout
the campaign). He also brought a subtle form of
traditionalist populism to the race, running on a slogan of
"the power of the people" and targeting those that have felt
left behind in Costa Rica's trend toward modernization and
economic development over the last decade. Araya also
appealed to those who, at some level, weren't ready to vote
for a woman for president. Araya's biggest appeal, however,
might have been that of an alternative to the PLN's "Arias
faction", of which Chinchilla was considered a member.
¶4. (C) Despite high approval ratings, there is a small core
of voters who strongly dislike President Arias and his
brother Rodrigo Arias, considering them oligarchs who
"rigged" the 2003 constitutional amendment process which
permitted Arias to run again; the 2006 national elections;
and even the 2007 CAFTA referendum, to pursue their own
agenda. Araya presented himself as an alternative to Arias's
hand picked successor, Chinchilla, who had publicly stated
that she would continue the policies of the Arias
administration if elected. Some experts we spoke with
immediately before the June 7 primary, including pollsters
from CID-Gallup, believed that these factors, along with a
well organized voter-mobilization push, might spur Araya to
victory.
¶5. (C) However, Chinchilla pushed through to a surprisingly
comfortable victory, winning the popular vote by thirteen
percent (55 percent to Araya's 42 percent, with former
Minister of Public Security Fernando Berrocal winning the
remaining 3 percent). We believe that her victory came about
due to two major wells of support--women voters and those
seeking continuity of the Arias period--as well as a bit of
old-fashioned mud-slinging. As the country's first female
Vice-President, and the first female with a legitimate chance
of becoming president, Chinchilla used a backbone of female
supporters to power her campaign and present herself as a
"new" political player--despite years on the political scene.
¶6. (C) Additionally, by tying herself closely to the Arias
government, Chinchilla was able to take a share of credit for
the successes of the administration, and benefited from the
Arias political machine's ability to mobilize supporters and
resources. Chinchilla also was very successful through
surrogates, at hitting at Araya for alleged corruption
(including linking him to disgraced former-president and
current PUSC candidate Calderon) without it being linked
directly to her campaign. The end result was a smashing
victory that confounded doubters and firmly positioned her as
the front-runner in the general election.
-------------------------------------
PAC'S "CLOSED PRIMARY" DELIVERS SOLIS
-------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Despite challenges by two younger, fresher faces in
the party (politician/economist Epsy Campbell and businessman
Roman Macaya), quasi-populist PAC founder Otton Solis easily
won PAC's "closed" primary on May 31. Solis, who is running
for president for the third time in a row, will be
Chinchilla's major competition in the general election.
While Chinchilla presents voters with an option for a
continuation of the moderate, pro-trade policies of the Arias
administration, Solis promotes a left-of-center,
protectionist agenda which was highlighted by his vocal
opposition to the CAFTA-DR agreement. Solis still maintains
that he would attempt to renegotiate the trade agreement if
he were elected president.
¶8. (C) In contrast to the PLN's open primary, PAC required
that all would-be voters register with the party to be
eligible to vote in the primary. Perhaps showing the waning
popularity of the party, just over twenty-two thousand voters
participated in the primary, despite sixty-seven thousand
actually registering to vote. PAC's turnout came in stark
contrast to the more than five-hundred thousand Costa Ricans
who took part in the PLN primary and meant that the PLN's
third place finisher, Berrocal with, three percent of the
vote, won almost as many votes as Solis.
9 (C) If Solis hopes to have a chance at victory in 2010, he
now needs to unite not just his own party, but also put
together a wider "opposition coalition" to support him.
While there have been signs that he might be able to bring
together other leftist parties, he still faces a challenge in
creating excitement for his (third) presidential campaign and
finding a way to appeal to voters at a time when PAC appears
to be losing steam. Additionally, Solis is sometimes his
campaign's own worst enemy, with frugal/austere political
spending policies, a traditional skepticism of modern
campaign styles (he eschews public opinion polls and new
media) and a dislike for fundraising, which he views as
damaging to the clean and ethical image he seeks to project.
-----------------------------------------
THE ONCE AND FUTURE PRESIDENT? NOT LIKELY
-----------------------------------------
¶10. (C) The conservative Partido Union Social Cristiana
(PUSC), the final major piece in the Costa Rican political
scene, is a party in disarray. While the party was in power
only four short years ago, today some Embassy contacts
question whether it will survive past the next elections.
Deepening its crisis, PUSC party leaders (now down to mostly
calderonistas) selected former-President Rafael Angel
Calderon to be its presidential candidate at its June 26th
national convention. Calderon is currently on trial for
corruption (charges widely believed to be true), and faces
possible imprisonment if convicted. According to polls, over
70 percent of Costa Ricans hold an unfavorable view of him,
though most analysts concede that he could possibly win up to
15 percent of the popular vote in 2010--if he's not a
convicted felon before then.
------------------------
MUCH STILL UP IN THE AIR
------------------------
¶11. (C) While Chinchilla is widely considered to be the
front-runner, the actual elections are nearly seven months
away--plenty of time for mistakes to be made. Chinchilla will
have to work to unite her own party behind her, and has
already gone a long way in reconciling with Araya and his
supporters. Under an agreement the two former adversaries
have reached, a number of Araya supporters will be included
among PLN's National Assembly candidate list. However, Araya
recently put speculation that himself would run for a seat to
rest, stating that his possibly candidacy stood in the way of
any reconciliation agreement with Chinchilla. Chinchilla and
Araya have both publicly hinted at a possible ministerial
post for Araya in a Chinchilla administration.
¶12. (C) Solis will probably try and unite a number of small
leftist parties behind his candidacy and work to develop a
focus and effective message for his campaign. Calderon,
though unlikely to prevail, will probably focus on trying to
win his court battle and then reviving his moribund party.
In doing so, his goal will likely be to make a decent showing
in the presidential elections, but more importantly pick up
some National Assembly seats for his key supporters (his
wife, Gloria Bejarano heads the list of PUSC National
Assembly candidates). Finally, all the candidates will
choose their first and second vice-presidential running
mates, and work on formalizing their party's candidate lists
for Congressional seats. In short, though Chinchilla begins
the general campaign with an advantage, much could change
over the next seven months.
----------------------------------------
COMMENT: BETWEEN THE FUTURE AND THE PAST
----------------------------------------
¶13. (C) Barring some unforeseen occurrence, the election
should come down to a basic choice between Chinchilla and
Solis, with the former looking ahead to "the future" and the
latter gazing back towards "the past". In the race itself,
Chinchilla has a distinct organizational and financial
advantage. Her team has already been through a serious
primary challenge, which forced her to hone her message and
her tactics. Her campaign relies on a host of modern polling
and tracking data, makes use of robo-calls, hosts
sophisticated real-time on-line chats with supporters and has
a solid fundraising machine. If Chinchilla does go on to the
win, she would not only be the first female to hold the
office, but also a welcome continuation of the Arias
administration's U.S.-compatible policies. Her election
would provide needed continuity on a number of important
policy fronts, from international trade and infrastructure
development to public security and environmental protection.
This would provide the USG it's best opportunity to continue
pursuing our foreign policy goals in relation to Costa Rica,
and see Costa Rica continue its role as a close U.S. ally in
Central America.
¶14. (C) Solis's path to the presidency relies in part on
external factors. His best chance of victory entails a
criminal conviction for Calderon, which would leave Solis as
the only viable alternative to the PLN and Chinchilla
(describing the situation, one analyst we spoke with said a
free Calderon is "the best friend the PLN has"). In this
scenario, Solis might be able to siphon off votes from the
hard-core PUSC loyalists, who would never vote for a PLN
candidate. Solis is also counting on appealing to the "anti"
vote--made up of traditionalist Ticos resistant to change and
skeptical about the transformations the country has gone
through over the last 8-10 years. Support from these sectors
combined with support from PAC and other smaller parties
might possibly be enough to push Solis over the top in
February--or it might not. While Solis came close to winning
the last election in 2006 (losing by only one percent to
Arias), he and his message have become a bit stale,
especially in comparison to the "fresh" and "new" Chinchilla.
Solis' campaign, in comparison, is also fairly
rudimentary--his campaign manager recently told us that he
"thought he had convinced Solis to do some polling before the
election this time", providing a stark contrast to the
Chinchilla campaigns mountains of data.
¶15. (C) If Solis were to somehow win, large question marks
exist over how he would actually govern. Taken at his word,
Solis would attempt to renegotiate or even repeal CAFTA-DR,
which might scuttle the agreement in its entirety. But
questions also abound as to what he would do in other
sectors, including his stated distrust of international
investment and what focus, if any, he would put on addressing
Costa Rica's deteriorating security situation. Regardless, a
Solis-led government would be less predictable and less
reliable in support of U.S. interests, and might again detour
Costa Rica from its path towards socio-economic development.
END COMMENT.
--------------------
ELECTIONS TIME-TABLE
--------------------
¶16. (SBU) The following are the next key milestones for the
2010 elections:
8/7/2009 - Deadline for public officials to resign their
posts to run for a seat in the National Assembly
(Embassy sources report that Minister of Finance
Guillermo Zuniga and Minister of Justice Viviana
Martin are among those government officials
planning to resign and run for National Assembly
seats)
10/1/2009 - General election campaigns legally begin
10/23/2009 - Deadline for registration of presidential
candidates
12/16/2009 - Start of two-week "Christmas Truce" in
campaigning
1/7/2010 - Civil Registry finalizes the voter rolls
2/4/2010 - Final day of official political campaigning
2/6/2010 - Start of three-day prohibition on alcohol sales
2/7/2010 - Election Day
4/4/2010 - Second round of Presidential voting (only
necessary if no candidate wins more than
40 percent of the vote)
5/1/2010 - First session of new Legislative Assembly begins
5/8/2010 - Inauguration of new President
BRENNAN