

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2615, STRENGTHENING A SHAKY CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES --
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BEIRUT2615.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BEIRUT2615 | 2006-08-14 15:48 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beirut |
Appears in these articles: not yet set |
VZCZCXRO9879
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2615/01 2261548
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141548Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5040
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0079
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002615
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2026
TAGS: PREL MOPS PTER EAID LE SY IS
SUBJECT: STRENGTHENING A SHAKY CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES --
AND A TEETERING GOL
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (SBU) This message contains a non-exhaustive list of
initiatives that we suggest the USG support, in the first
days of the fragile cessation of hostilities forged by U.S.
leadership in UNSCR 1701. We seek to strengthen the GOL and
move Lebanon toward a permanent cease-fire. After the U.S.
success in getting UNSCR 1701 adopted unanimously, we see
other steps as essential to translate the diplomatic progress
into lasting improvements on the ground.
¶2. (C) Despite the silencing of the guns, few of our
Lebanese contacts are optimistic about the cessation of
hostilities that entered into force today, 8/14. Most people
cite two parallel dangers: first, Israel is expected to
define the prohibition on "offensive military operations"
more narrowly than the average Lebanese would see as
reasonable. We have told our contacts that Israel will
continue its surveillance activities and use all means to
disrupt suspected resupply of weapons and strategic goods to
Hizballah. Second, Hizballah, while likely to suspend (at
least initially) rocket attacks into Israel, may lick its
wounds momentarily before resuming attacks against Israeli
positions inside Lebanon. Hizballah can easily --
intentionally -- provoke Israeli force protection operations
that will be seen by the Lebanese as excessive.
¶3. (C) Thus, despite the cessation of hostilities,
Israeli-Hizballah fighting could easily spin out of control,
with both sides perhaps crossing the informal red lines the
next time around (e.g., Hizballah fires rockets into Tel
Aviv, Israel destroys Lebanon's power plants or hits GOL
institutions, etc.). Even lower-level fighting would make
many countries reluctant to step forward with troop
contributions for the beefed up UNIFIL force that, upon
deployment, triggers the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.
And that, we would guess, is exactly what Hizballah and its
Iranian and Syrian backers desire: no additional UNIFIL
troops, no LAF deployment to the south, no IDF withdrawal,
and no Hizballah disarmament.
¶4. (C) At the same time, the Lebanese cabinet is
approaching a moment of truth. With a cabinet meeting on
exactly how to implement UNSCR 1701 postponed, ministers will
soon -- upon LAF deployment with UNIFIL -- have to say once
and for all whether they will stand up to Hizballah and
insist on disarmament, first in the south and eventually
everywhere. As we will explore in other messages, the
cabinet's 8/12 unanimous acceptance of UNSCR 1701, while good
news, is less solid than it appears. Yet the continued IDF
presence in south Lebanon makes it difficult for the
non-Hizballah members of the cabinet to unify behind
immediate disarmament of Hizballah, lest they be accused of
collusion with an Israeli occupation. We do not
underestimate the ability of Lebanon's political class to
muddle through by relying on the ambiguity of various
interpretations. But the cabinet might easily collapse over
UNSCR 1701, with far-reaching, and mostly negative, political
and security implications for Lebanon.
¶5. (C) We believe that we can reinforce the cessation of
hostilities and build public support for the requisite
Hizballah disarmament if we can show some changes on the
ground now. In many ways, for most Lebanese, today feels
like yesterday, despite the cessation of hostilities: people
remain distracted by the need to find gasoline, milk, and
other essentials; people worry about the destabilizing impact
of the IDPs who have no homes to reclaim; businesses cannot
import essential supplies or export products; travel in and
out of Lebanon remains difficult and open only to those who
have no fear of transiting Syria -- to name only a few of the
hardships of daily life here. Israel may hope that these
deprivations move more people away from Hizballah, but, with
the cabinet now behind UNSCR 1701, people should start to
feel some relief as an incentive to go further.
¶6. (C) To build momentum for the more permanent cease-fire,
we suggest that the USG support some initiatives now, to
demonstrate that there are initial benefits to subscribing to
the cessation of hostilities -- and that normal life can
gradually be restored as implementation of UNSCR 1701 moves
forward. The sticks for non-compliance remain clear:
ongoing Israeli military presence in south Lebanon, defensive
Israeli measures that will strike Lebanese as offensive, and
the ongoing Israeli air and sea blockade. With those sticks
obvious to all, we believe that the international community,
BEIRUT 00002615 002 OF 003
under USG leadership, should offer some carrots now. Our
ideas, most of which deal with access and safety, follow:
-- Immediate opening of an air shuttle for passenger travel
between Beirut and (probably) Amman. We have discussed this
idea before, and now we hope it can be implemented. Given
that the Israelis have, we understand, expressed confidence
in Jordan's security procedures, we suggest that Lebanon's
national carrier, Middle East Airlines, be permitted to begin
operating passenger shuttles multiple times a day between
Beirut and Amman (assuming the Jordanians would be amenable).
If we could inform the Lebanese even today that runway
repairs and munition-clearing could commence now, this
shuttle could start operating on one of the runways within
days. We can also broker Israel's acceptance of Lebanon
starting longer-term runway repair and replacement of
destroyed fuel tankers now. We can at the same time make it
clear that more general aviation traffic depends on the GOL
having effective plans to prevent arms, money, and alien
smuggling via the airport.
-- Immediate lifting of the sea blockade for fuel tankers
and automatic clearances for shipments of grain and
humanitarian deliveries (perhaps from recognized sources) to
Lebanon, with the UN required to inform the Israelis. The
Israelis would retain the ability to stop suspicious
freighters at the sea embargo line for inspection. As with
the airport, this partial opening of sea lanes would provide
some relief to Lebanon while maintaining a strong incentive
-- the potential full reopening -- for the GOL to improve its
security procedures at the port.
-- Large-scale Mine Action activities: On the first day of
the cease-fire, Lebanon already suffered casualties when
IDPs, returning home, encountered unexploded ordnance. With
the long-standing U.S. leadership in Mine Action activities
in Lebanon (and given that we are held largely responsible
for Israeli weaponry, whether of U.S. origin or not), we
could play an important role in providing safety for people
returning to the south that would have a major impact on
public opinion here. The UAE has also announced a resumption
of its mine-clearing program. We recommend a vast increase
in USG funding for Mine Action activities, to be announced
immediately and used as quickly as possible.
-- Immediate deployment of a planning unit to UNIFIL.
UNIFIL is going to play the key role in coordinating the
IDF's withdrawal and the LAF deployment, yet UNIFIL in its
current incarnation does not have sufficient planning
capacity. If the French are expected to play a key role in
the beef-up UNIFIL authorized in UNSCR 1701, perhaps we could
encourage the French could send a planning unit to Naqoura
now. If the French are not available, someone else should
provide competent military planners. UNIFIL and LAF
deployment needs to be done right, and that requires
planning. The initial planning meeting held today by UNIFIL
Commander Pellegrini was encouraging (with the Lebanese and
Israeli generals eventually sitting in the same room,
although talking through Pellegrini), but UNIFIL needs more
planning power.
-- Providing transitional housing materials for IDPs --
which could in many cases be done through local purchases,
thus helping Lebanon's economy overall. It is already clear
from spontaneous traffic jams today that IDPs who are from
the south want to go back home. (The UN counted 1200 cars an
hour heading south out of Beirut, each averaging five people,
on the main road alone.) Many of them are going to discover
that their houses have been damaged, some severely, by the
fighting. Purchases (or shipments, for items not in stock in
Lebanon) of building materials such as, wood, corrugated
steel and plastic sheeting would enable residents to move
back home, by permitting them to make at least part of their
houses habitable. As part of this, we should accelerate the
delivery of basic cooking utensils and cooking gas as well.
-- Focus on reopening hospitals and medical clinics in the
south. This will entail working with NGOs and others to
ensure that staff can return safely to hospitals, that fuel
supplies are sufficient for generators, and that medical and
other supplies are delivered.
-- Transfer of UN security responsibilities from the UNICEF
representative to either the UN Humanitarian Coordinator (our
first choice) or the UNSYG's Personal Representative to
Lebanon. While this is an internal UN organizational matter
BEIRUT 00002615 003 OF 003
that would not be noticed by the Lebanese, it is in fact critical to the ability of the Humanitarian Coordinator to
work effectively. Currently, the UN's Designated Security
Officer (DSO) for Lebanon is housed with UNDP and temporarily
placed with UNICEF. This means that the HC cannot prioritize
relief staffing needs. Given our lack of confidence based on
prior experiences in both UNDP's and UNICEF's local
representation, we suggest that the USG quietly suggest to UN
headquarters that the DSO be housed either with the HC or in
the office of Geir Pedersen. (While Geir Pedersen is
bureaucratically senior to HC David Shearer, there is no
formal link between their critical operations. But,
according to both, Pedersen and Shearer work well together,
having done so for years in the West Bank during the second
Palestinian Intifada.)
-- Shipment to Lebanon of military-style trestle and Bailey
bridges, to restore key traffic linkages. Until Lebanon
begins to take seriously its responsibilities under UNSCR
1701 to control arms smuggling, the Israelis will be
reluctant to allow the restoration of all transportation
linkages. But, in coordination with the Israelis, we and
others could provide some emergency, military-type steel
spans as temporary replacements in some areas quickly.
-- Work on a private-sector initiative that could bring U.S.
business representatives -- with as many Lebanese-Americans
as would be willing to participate -- to Lebanon in
September, to look at how U.S. business consortia might be
willing to participate in Lebanon's reconstruction, both by
adopting certain projects to finance and by finding economic
opportunities to create local jobs. While this initiative
would be (for security reasons) kept at arm's length from the
USG, initiatives sponsored by the American business community
will have far-reaching impact by providing hope to the
Lebanese people that Lebanon's international connections,
like its infrastructure, can be repaired.
¶7. (C) Over the longer term, we need to be prepared for
reconstruction and job creation in the areas of the country
hardest hit by the fighting -- which means in the areas of
the country where Hizballah's infrastructure and support was
strongest, such as the south. To beat out the Iranian
funding that will surely flow in, we will need to be
generous, flexible, and quick. Our strategy should be to
strengthen the GOL and its institutions, in order to counter
the "state-within-a-state" charitable institutions Hizballah
had used (with Iranian financing) to garner support. We will
send ideas septel on the longer term, but in general we
believe we should focus on some infrastructure work, some
housing guarantee financial programs, and much related job
creation. One complication we will face: how to use our
assistance to reduce support for, and reliance on, Hizballah,
while ensuring that we stick to USG rules about not helping
those associated with terrorist organizations.
FELTMAN