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Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI202, SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF GENERAL WILLIAM WARD TO LIBYA,
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TRIPOLI202 | 2009-03-05 12:01 | 2011-01-31 21:30 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli |
VZCZCXRO0540
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0202/01 0641201
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 051201Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4574
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1428
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0788
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0915
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0853
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0025
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0151
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0161
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5100
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000202
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR CDR AFRICOM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/3/2019
TAGS: OVIP WWARD PREL PGOV MARR MASS KPKO LY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF GENERAL WILLIAM WARD TO LIBYA,
MARCH 10-11 CLASSIFIED BY: J. Christopher Stevens, DCM. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1.(C) Summary: Your visit comes two weeks after the most recent Council of Colonels meeting in Tripoli and as Libya is faced with key decisions on its future course in both domestic and African politics. Libya's parliament voted on March 4 to defer a decision on Muammar al-Qadhafi's controversial proposal to distribute the country's oil wealth directly to the people and disband most government ministries. On Wednesday, It also approved a cabinet shake-up with intelligence chief Musa Kusa as the new foreign minister; there were no changes in the military leadership. Last month's election to the African Union chairmanship provides al-Qadhafi with a high-profile platform from which he can trumpet his vision of Africa and rail against Western interference on the continent. Regime officials, and al-Qadhafi in particular, value relationships with high-level Western officials and your visit provides an excellent opportunity to develop the rapport necessary to cultivate future gains here. You are the first COCOM commander to visit Libya since the evacuation of Wheelus Air Force Base - now styled Mitiga Air Base and the airfield at which you will land - in the early 1970s; an historic first coming on the heels of the September 2008 visit of then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the signing of a Mil-Mil MOU in January 2009. End summary. Key issues: -- AFRICOM's mandate -- Transnational terrorism (AQIM in the Sahel/Sahara) and humanitarian assistance -- Technology and lethal weapon sales to Libya -- Libya's African Union chair -- African crises: Darfur, Somalia, Mauritania -- Developing working-level ties LIBYA: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
2.(S//NF) After several years of negotiation, Libya fulfilled its obligations under the Comprehensive Claims Settlement Agreement - providing funds for the victims of Pam Am 103 and LaBelle bombings, among others - on October 31, 2008. The implementation allowed us to move forward on the Mil-Mil MOU, which was signed in Washington in January. It also increased the number of high-level visits between the two countries including Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's two-week trip to the US in November and his brother Muatassim al-Qadhafi's trip to Washington planned for April. Despite the high-level interest in deepening the relationship, several old-guard regime figures remain skeptical about the re-engagement project and some facets of our interaction remain at the mercy of the often mercurial inner circle. Muammar al-Qadhafi started his political life as an ardent Nasserite. He has more recently shifted to Pan-Africanism in an attempt to broaden his influence into countries where support can be purchased less dearly. He very likely believes his own rhetoric that he is a champion for a continent that suffered 400 years of colonization. More pragmatically, the Libyan leadership is wary of foreign influence inside its sphere of influence.
3.(S//NF) While al-Qadhafi has recently seized the African spotlight, the domestic political and economic situation is at a critical juncture as the regime weighs the benefits of modernization and opening to the West with maintaining its grip on government and industry. Al-Qadhafi routinely shifts influence between his lieutenants to keep the power structure unbalanced - a tactic he also employs with his children. Two sons - Saif al-Islam (head of the quasi-NGO Qadhafi Development Foundation) and Muatassim (head of Libya's National Security Council) - are thought to be possible heirs to their father's mantle. Muatassim, with whom you will meet, has been a proponent of improved ties with the US, and is eager to purchase US weaponry. The potential for political turmoil is compounded by prospects for economic reform. The lifting of sanctions and attendant increases in consumer spending have exacerbated the disparity between the elite and the poor. Al-Qadhafi proposed abolishing the General People's Committee system (the ministry system of which he is the author) in favor of distributing oil wealth to citizens in the form of large monthly checks, but the global financial crisis and the dramatic fall of oil prices have caused Libyan policy makers to rethink both their domestic reform agenda and the extent to which they can purchase influence in Africa. The parliament -- "the General People's Congress" -- voted on March 4 to defer al-Qadhafi's TRIPOLI 00000202 002 OF 003 wealth-distribution proposal. It also approved a new cabinet, keeping the prime minister but replacing the foreign minister, Abdulrahman Shalgam, with the head of Libya's External Security Organization, Musa Kusa. No changes were made to the military leadership. AFRICOM'S MANDATE: LIBYA AGAINST BOOTS AND BASES
4.(S//NF) Since the former Secretary of State's visit to Tripoli in September, regime officials have slowly come to terms with AFRICOM as we have explained more of your mission. A clear explanation of AFRICOM's mandate and expected activities on the continent, as well as a two-way discussion on areas of military-to-military cooperation will be welcomed by your interlocutors. Reiterating AFRICOM's support and humanitarian roles while allaying their fears about American troops or bases on the continent is another message they will be keen to receive. While Libya is a strong partner on counterterrorism, the Libyans remain wary of initiatives that put foreign military or intelligence assets too close to their borders. They are unlikely to join the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership, due as much to unwillingness to appear subservient to US interests as genuine distrust of U.S. intentions from certain old-guard regime elements. Negotiations on the Mil-Mil MOU stalled on Libyan insistence that the language include security assurances on par with our NATO obligations. AFRICOM's capacity-building component and support for peacekeeping forces may appease some, but we expect your military interlocutors will use your visit as an opportunity to tie their cooperation to security assurances. TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
5.(S//NF) Libya is a top partner in combating transnational terrorism. The regime is genuinely concerned about the rise of Islamic terrorism in the Sahel and Sahara and worries that instability and weak governments to their south could lead to a "belt of terrorism" stretching from Mauritania to Somalia. Al-Qadhafi prides himself on his recent initiatives with Tuareg tribes to persuade them to lay down arms and spurn cooperation with al-Qaeda elements in the border region; this is an issue worth exploring with him, while being mindful that he will oppose U.S. military activity in what he views as his backyard. He is also proud of his humantarian activities on the continent, which are directed principally on behalf of women and children. Libya recognizes that African peacekeeping and regional security forces are poorly trained and equipped and several diplomats have indicated they would be amenable to continued US assistance in these areas. Al-Qadhafi makes a distinction between "imperialist" countries and "colonizing" ones, but walks a fine line between seeking military assistance from European powers he views as responsible for Africa's ills while keeping a hard line on national sovereignty. Libya's recent "friendship treaty" with Italy held the old colonial power responsible for de-mining circa WWII ordinance still in Libya. We have proposed a US role under UN auspices on de-mining; they await an al-Qadhafi imprimatur before beginning their program and are concerned that a DOD or USG affiliation could make humanitarian assistance a tougher sell. LIBYA SEEKS US LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT
6.(S//NF) Throughout the negotiations to close outstanding compensation claims and re-open to the US, Libyan officials have been keen to purchase US military equipment - both lethal and non-lethal. Muatassim met with then A/S David Welch on the margins of the Secretary's September visit and Libyan officials presented "wish lists" in the context of signing the Mil-Mil MOU. Muatassim accompanied his father on a high-profile trip to Moscow in October to discuss potential deals, but his father's trips to Belarus and Ukraine were seen as an attempt to bring the price-point down for weapons deals. Their wish-lists comprise both lethal and non-lethal materiel and we have told the GOL that sales will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, particularly since not all senior USG leaders who would have a say on the subject have been appointed by the new administration. You are likely to hear two familiar refrains: that the U.S. "owes" Libya security cooperation (read: sales and security guarantees) in return for al-Qadhafi's decision to give up his WMD aspirations; and that the U.S. should return or reimburse Libya for the C130s it purchased in the 1970s which TRIPOLI 00000202 003 OF 003 were ultimately never delivered. In effect, the Libyans have made military sales a key litmus of US trust and future intentions. In response, you might say that the U.S. looks forward to developing the bilateral security relationship and this process will take time; the C130s are a commercial matter best pursued with Lockheed-Martin. LIBYA'S AFRICAN UNION CHAIR
7.(S//NF) Muammar al-Qadhafi's chairmanship of the African Union will be a rhetorical hurdle that AFRICOM must clear throughout the year. However, there is some distance between what al-Qadhafi says and what Libyan officials are willing and able to implement. The Leader is temperamental and makes decisions based on personal relationships. Deference for his leadership on the continent may appeal to him; the perception that the US military knows what is best for Africa will not. He has shown that he is willing to stake bilateral relationships on family honor, first with Saudi Arabia and currently in the ongoing diplomatic row caused by his son Hannibal's July 2008 arrest in Geneva. Despite his vocal rebukes of Western influence in Africa, al-Qadhafi needs his chairmanship to be seen as a success - a potentially useful opening for increased engagement. When possible, crafting programs that give Libya symbolic leadership reduces the chance that al-Qadhafi will play the spoiler. DARFUR, SOMALIA, MAURITANIA: LIBYA'S ROLE
8.(S//NF) The combination of al-Qadhafi's continental ambitions, concerns about the destabilizing potential of militant Islam in the Sahel, and reticence to have foreign troops too near its borders have compelled Libya to insert itself in African crises - to mixed results. It is worth raising the crises with Libya's top leadership to give the US a better picture of Libya's potential action in these theaters. In Sudan, Libya is expected to lead the charge at the United Nations against an ICC prosecution of Bashir. Libya mediated between the governments in N'Djamena and Khartoum and secured an exchange of ambassadors between the two capitals last year. Their support for rebel groups seems to have waned in the past year. The regime is upset that Qatar has diminished what Libya views as its influence in Darfur and al-Qadhafi appears to be shifting from practical diplomacy (and the cash that comes with it) to lambasting the West and Israel for causing the trouble between the Fur and Khartoum. In Somalia, the regime showed modest support for Abullahi Yusuf but shifted to Sheikh Sharif when it became clear he would take power. While al-Qadhafi has defended Somali pirates as "defenders against foreign intervention" in Somalia, Libya's actual policies remain in concert with those of the UN Security Council. Libya supports June elections in Mauritania, but notes that the coup was a "special" coup since the parliament - and therefore the people - support the junta. Al-Qadhafi is engaged personally on the issue and has hosted senior-level Mauritanian officials from both camps in the past week. REGULARIZING WORKING-LEVEL CONTACTS
9.(S//NF) Libyan officials value personal relationships with high-ranking Western officials. However, they lack both a bureaucratic capacity and willingness on the working levels to manage the day-to-day business of bilateral relations. In your meetings with Libya military counterparts, it would be helpful to emphasize the important SAO role of the DAO, highlighting the DAO as the primary address for Mil-Mil engagement. WELCOME
10.(C) We are confident that your visit to Tripoli will open new doors for continued cooperation. Military cooperation is a key metric to determine the extent to which the Libyan government wishes to engage with the US. We hope your visit will assuage the fears of the more conservative elements of the regime while paving the way for AFRICOM's continued success. CRETZ