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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09PANAMA58, PANAMA: LEFT WING DON QUIJOTE TILTS AT CLOSED
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09PANAMA58 | 2009-01-21 14:02 | 2011-04-11 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Panama |
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHZP #0058/01 0211402
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 211402Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2870
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2750
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 1971
RHMFISS/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000058
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA: LEFT WING DON QUIJOTE TILTS AT CLOSED
POLITICAL SYSTEM
Classified By: Ambassador Barbara J. Stephenson for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) A "symbolic" effort to open the Panamanian Political
system is how Juan Jovane described his independent campaign
for president. Jovane told POLOFF on November 25 that while
he did not expect to be allowed to run, he wanted to open the
system up to independent candidates who could mount popular
left-wing campaigns in the future. Jovane described the
ability of independents to run for the highest office as
critical to the democratic stability of Panama, that might
otherwise become vulnerable to violent or anti-democratic
movements in the future. He noted his campaign had split the
left into democratic and non-democratic blocks. Separately,
Professor Olmedo Beluche noted on December 5 that Jovane's
campaign could help Balbina Herrera's campaign, by
positioning her more to the center of the ideological
spectrum. End Summary.
-------------------
A Symbolic Campaign
-------------------
¶2. (C) University of Panama Economics Professor Juan Jovane
- a former advisor to the Sandinistas, former head of the
Panamanian Social Security System, and a left-wing leader -
has launched an independent campaign for President. Backed by
a diverse array of left-wing groups, Jovane is challenging a
1983 amendment to the Panamanian electoral law that restricts
the right to run for president to representatives of "legally
recognized political parties." Jovane told POLOFF November 25
that he knew he would not be allowed to run in the May 3
presidential elections. He said his real aim was to force a
reform of the electoral law to allow independent candidates
to run for president in the future. Jovane asserted that such
a key reform would allow the democratic elements of the left
to integrate themselves into the political system. He further
asserted that the requirements for registering a political
party in Panama were so onerous that only the rich could
afford to meet them, thus disenfranchising those who would
vote for popular left-wing parties. (Note: To register a
political party in Panama, a prospective party must get the
signatures of 4% of the electoral roles, approximately 60,000
people at present, while meeting strict requirements as to
geographic distribution. Additionally, those individuals who
register must sign up at Electoral Tribunal (TE) offices as
the registration books may only rarely be taken into the
field. Also, registration cannot already be members of other
parties, meaning that new registrations must come from the
ranks of unregistered independents. End Note) Jovane said he
had been approached by members of the Panamanista Party to
work with them, but had refused because he was trying to make
a point, not a deal. Jovane said he had spoken to TE Judge
Gerardo Solis, who said that his petition would be taken up
when the political parties and the TE met to consider reforms
to the electoral code, which normally happens the year after
each election. Jovane said he did not trust this process,
because it was the political parties themselves who ran it,
and he was trying to undermine their control of the system.
¶3. (C) Olmedo Beluche, one of Jovane's main supporters and
President of the Popular Alternative Party (PAP), a self
described "Bolivarian" party that has not yet acquired enough
signatures to be legalized, told POLOFF December 5 that the
PAP was the most organized group in the "ideologically broad"
coalition supporting Jovane. He said the Jovane campaign was
challenging Article 233 of the Electoral Law, that dated from
1983 and required that candidates for president represent
legally recognized parties. He explained that recent
electoral reforms had opened up the possibility of
independents to run for mayor and National Assembly deputy,
but not for the presidency. Beluche said they were
challenging the law everywhere they could: by asking the TE
to rule that Jovane's candidacy was legal; by getting the
Supreme Court to declare the rule unconstitutional; and by
asking the National Assembly to change the law. (Note: On
December 16, the TE rejected Jovane's request to register his
andidacy in a two-to-one vote. Solis was the dissenting
vote. The Supreme Court challenge was admitted by the Court,
but arguments have not been heard yet. There has been no
movement in the National Assembly, nor is there likely to be
any movement. End Note) He said their best hope was that the
Supreme Court would throw the law out. That would require the
TE to set the rules for independent candidates, probably
involving a certain number of signatures. Beluche was
confident that they could get the signatures and would be
able to actually launch a campaign. He said that they would
concentrate their campaign on the need to liberalize the
rules for forming political parties, which might help the
PAP, and the rules and assistance for the participation of
independents in election.
---------------------------------
The Dangers of Political Sclerosis
---------------------------------
¶4. (C) Jovane said the restriction on independents running
for president was dangerous, because it prevented new ideas
from entering the political arena. Without any new or popular
ideas to vote for, people ended up voting "against"
candidates as an act of protest. Jovane argued that this
phenomena explained the constant alternation in power after
every election. He asserted that this situation could
eventually give rise to a radical movement that would
challenge the closed political system in an anti-democratic
or violent manner. Jovane said he saw his candidacy as an
opportunity to prevent that outcome by offering a "grand
pact;" Jovane would encourage the "people" to support
democratic change, in return for which the traditional
parties would agree to an electoral law reform that would
make it possible for progressive candidates to participate in
the elections as independents. Jovane asserted that his
campaign had divided the Panamanian left by calling for
participation in the democratic process, with the PAP, the
General Center of Panamanian Workers (CGTP) labor union, and
various intellectual and activists supporting him.
-----------------------------------------
Balbina - Between a Rock and a Hard Place
-----------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Asked about the campaign of Revolutionary Democratic
Party (PRD) presidential candidate Balbina Herrera, Jovane
said she had real problems due to the fact that the
progressives neither trusted her or believed she was really
progressive, while the right-wing did not trust her either,
fearing she was progressive. He said Balbina had failed to
define herself politically, allowing her enemies on either
side to discredit her as leftist and as a centrist
respectively. Beluche said he had heard rumors that some
members of the PRD believed a Jovane candidacy could help
Herrera's campaign. With Jovane in the race, Herrera would no
longer be the most left wing candidate, helping her position
herself more to the center. Beluche said some in the PRD also
believed that Jovane might drain protest votes from
Martinelli, helping Herrera if the election were close.
Beluche asserted, however, that Jovane might also undermine
the PRD's de facto hold on the left-wing vote, weakening the
party in the future.
------
Naive?
------
¶6. (C) Political analyst Alfredo Castillero, a moderate
opposition commentator, told POLOFF November 26 that Jovane
was an "interesting person", with whom one could have a very
interesting discussion about economics, but added that he was
politically "nave" in his left wing politics, and especially
about the degree to which his "companeros" had the same
reformist agenda as he did. He said all anyone needed to do
to make Jovane his friend was to raise his fist in the
socialist salute. Castillero said Jovane had been
"incompetent" as administrator of the Social Security System,
and had appointed leftists though out the administration with
more concern for their political credentials than for their
competence.
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The Anti-Democratic Left
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¶7. (C) The radical organizations grouped in the National
Front for the Defense of Economic and Social Rights
(FRENADESO), including the radical construction workers union
SUNTRACS, are not supporting Jovane's campaign. In numerous
opinion pieces in La Estrella, the Panama City daily
broadsheet, FRENADESO Coordinator and SUNTRACS Secretary
General Genaro Lopez has attacked all the candidates,
including Herrera, and has called for abstention in the
election and a popular mobilization in favor of a Constituent
Assembly. Referring to FRENADESO and SUNTRACS, Jovane called
their idea of a popular insurrection in Panama "silly."
¶8. (C) Castillero asserted that the supposedly distinct
organizations that made up FRENADESO, including SUNTRACS, the
Federation of Revolutionary Students-29 (FER-29), and the
Panamanian Popular Coordinator of Human Rights (COPDEHUPA)
were all actually run by the same leadership, and had evolved
from the National Liberation Movement-29 (MLN-29), formed
from Maoist and Castroist organizations in the 1970s.
Castillero said he realized all the organizations had
interlocking leaderships when he sought their input on a
human rights report. He said the real power in the movement
now rests with SUNTRACS, due to its role as a construction
worker union in the midst of a construction boom and the fact
that it has deep pockets drawing on two percent of every
union member's pay check. He said SUNTRACS had ample funds
and could engage in effective civil disobedience due to its
ability to mobilize workers for street protests and
demonstrations. Jovane criticized SUNTRACS for not taking
into account that the global crisis would probably result in
a slow down in the construction industry, and a reduced
capacity for popular mobilization among construction workers.
University of Panama Professor Antonio Mendez, also a leader
of the PAP, told POLOFF December 5 the same story of the
evolution of these groups, calling them dogmatic,
doctrinaire, and alienated from reality. He said they were
only interested in grand gestures such as general strikes and
road closings, but were unable to follow them up to create
any lasting changes. He said many of the democratic left-wing
leadership had abandoned FRENADESO over this issue in the
past. In a July 23 meeting Beluche had implied that these
groups, and not the PAP, were receiving Venezuelan financing.
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Comment
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¶9. (C) Jovane is a strange figure in Panama's politics. A
quiet and thoughtful man in person, he has a political
reputation among Panama's elites akin to Lenin. Castillero's
analysis of him as a radical naive is far closer to the
truth. Nevertheless, his campaign has been given a lot of
coverage by the media, who have treated him as a
disinterested campaigner on behalf of political reform. The
restriction against independent presidential candidates seems
to have little overt support anymore, and it seems likely it
will be cast aside in the future, either by the Supreme Court
or by the National Assembly. This is not likely to take place
before the election, however, as a radical change in the
rules this late in the electoral process would tend to
undermine the credibility of the process.
¶10. (C) Jovane's warning that the Panamanian political
system needs to provide a democratic opening to the left is
not getting a lot of media attention. Panama's political
parties have no real policy differences among themselves,
other then how to treat the Omar Torrijos/Antonio Noriega
period. Martinelli's campaign based on change is a one trick
pony, similar to the change pony President Torrijos rode once
in 2004. A credible and moderate left wing alternative is a
glaring weakness in the political fabric that could, in the
middle term, strengthen the hand of undemocratic elements
like FRENADESO/SUNTRACS. The passionate denunciation of these
groups by Mendez, from a very left-wing perspective,
indicates the danger Jovane, Beluche and Mendez (all of whom
are well paid college professors) see if no credible
democratic left-wing alternative is allowed to develop in
Panama. Castillero made a direct correlation between
Venezuela's political system prior to Chavez, and Panama's
current party centric system, as an indication of where
things could go.
¶11. (C) Jovane's analysis of what ails Herrera is spot on.
Herrera has failed to define herself throughout the campaign
on purpose, hoping to be all things to all people. She wanted
to lock up the left-wing vote with her radical past, and the
independent centrist vote with her steady bureaucratic
trajectory since the reinstatement of democracy. Instead, she
has been discredited among the left for her steady
bureaucratic trajectory, and among the independent centrists
due to her radical past. The damage is now too great for a
Jovane candidacy to help push her image to the center. His
candidacy, and the further radical FRENADESO/SUNTRACS
opposition to it, does make the argument that Herrera is
"Chavez in a skirt" seem absurd. Beluche's PAP is the only
openly Bolivarian party, and FRENADESO/SUNTRACS are the
mostly covert collaborators with Chavez. All denounce Herrera
as an establishment figure with no credible social
credentials.
STEPHENSON