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Viewing cable 06DAMASCUS531, THE MUSLIM BROTHERS IN SYRIA, PART II: COULD THEY
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDM #0531/01 0401606
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091606Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7022
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0628
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000531
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KISL KDEM SY
SUBJECT: THE MUSLIM BROTHERS IN SYRIA, PART II: COULD THEY
WIN AN ELECTION HERE?
REF: A) DAMASCUS 0517 B) 05 DAMASCUS 1231 C) 05
DAMASCUS 1286 D) 05 DAMASCUS 1377
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.
¶1. (U) This is the second of two cables that assess the
potential power of the Muslim Brothers in Syria.
¶2. (U) PART II. REASONS FOR THE EXAGGERATED ESTIMATES OF
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD INFLUENCE
¶3. (C) Summary: Most estimates of potential Muslim Brother
support range between ten and thirty percent of the Syrian
population, with many contacts insisting that even these
estimates are inflated. Nonetheless, a non-MB, moderate
Islamist political bloc, possibly allied with Syrian
businessmen, which combines "the power of money" and "the
Islamic street," could do very well in any free elections in
Syria (although current conditions indicate that the
likelihood of such a scenario is fairly remote). Contacts
insist that the Asad regime -- highly unlikely to allow such
elections -- has contributed in a variety of ways to the
perception of exaggerated potential influence of the Muslim
Brothers in Syria. End Summary.
¶4. (C) MB/SIMILAR-GROUPING SEEN TAKING 10-30 PERCENT:
Taking into account minority demographics (35 percent of the
Syrian population), Islamist cleavages, and other details
(see Ref A), most observers here assess that the Muslim
Brothers, or another Islamist group representing them, could
attract a maximum of 30 percent support in Syria. Many, like
recently released Damascus Spring detainee XXXXXXXXXXXX (who had
a dalliance with the MB for a year in the mid 1960's and
knows them well) argue that an MB-oriented political grouping
in Syria would get no more than ten percent.
¶5. (C) MINORITY VOTE COULD BLOCK EXTREMISTS: While most
agree that Syria's compact minorities could and would prevent
any MB or other radical Islamist electoral takeover (assuming
free elections), there is less consensus about the impact of
this minority vote if a more moderate Islamic bloc, led by
the current Islamic establishment, allied itself politically
with merchant/business elites in the major cities. Political
observers as diverse as XXXXXXXXXXXX, a influential Sunni
sheikh at the XXXXXXXXXXXX institute, and XXXXXXXXXXXX, a
Christian Ba'athist reformer, insist that a moderate
Islamist-businessmen bloc (not including the MB or other
radicals) would be unbeatable in any free elections because
of the combination of money and "the Islamic street." That
Islamic street would be controlled by the Islamic network of
mosques and institutes run by people like XXXXXXXXXXXX and
establishment Sunni sheikhs. XXXXXXXXXXXX insists that while
that the Christians, for example, would not vote for "the
Islamists," they would, under the influence of money and
advertising, vote for "the merchants." (Comment: We have
received no indication from our business contacts that such a
political coalition is viewed as viable at the present time.)
¶6. (C) EXAGGERATION OF MB POWER CONTINUES: Despite the
constraining factors, the potential electoralappeal of the
Muslim Brotherhood (or some repackaged party resembling it)
continues to elicit fear and exaggerated assessments of what
would happen in any democratic scenario in Syria. One
generally well-informed contact insisted that MB support in
any free elections "would be massive." These assessments
have been buttressed by alarmist scenarios that
fundamentalism is somehow "taking over" in Syria. Much of
the exaggeration has been unintentional, while some of it
(from quarters sympathetic to the SARG) has been deliberate.
¶7. (C) EXAGGERATION FED BY RISE OF ISLAMISM: A critical
element leading to this exaggeration has been the Islamist
revival that has occurred in Syria, as it has throughout much
of the Arab world over the past few decades. A small part of
that growth in religious feeling, as reflected in Syria, has
been fundamentalist in nature, fed by SARG despotism,
economic despair, the conflict in Palestine, revulsion at
regime cronyism and corruption, and other factors including,
more recently, the war in Iraq and the sense among some in
the Muslim community that the U.S.-led war against terror
represents part of a "crusade against Islam." Some
fundamentalist groups have taken up arms in Syria (usually as
a part of efforts to join the insurgency in Iraq) and in the
past year, have been exposed to episodic, violent SARG
crackdowns. (Note: The most recent incident occurred in
early February, on the outskirts of Damascus, with SARG
security forces reportedly killing one armed fundamentalist
and confiscating weapons and explosives.)
¶8. (C) However, most of that Islamist wave in Syria has not
been violent or even fundamentalist. It is true that the
number of people attending Friday prayers seems to have risen
substantially, that the number of young women wearing the
Islamic scarf (hijab) continues to increase at a similar
rate, and that Islam in general is a more powerful force in
public life in Syria than it was 40 years ago (for a review
of this rise in Islamist sentiment in Syria, see refs A, B,
and C.)
¶9. (C) MB POWER EXAGGERATED BY LACK OF FREEDOM: There are
other factors that have also contributed to the exaggerated
sense of potential political power of the Muslim Brothers.
Many argue that over forty years of authoritarian Ba'athist
rule have contributed to this exaggerated sense of how
powerful the Muslim Brothers must be. According to Christian
MP XXXXXXXXXXXX, Syrian political players do not fear the
Islamists. If there were freedom and elections, their real
weaknesses would show. In XXXXXXXXXXXX’s view, academics and
journalists, among others, have misread the Syrian political
scene in making their assessments of the MB's power.
Dissident XXXXXXXXXXXX concurs, noting that "in the shadow of
freedom, they are weak. They can't really do politics. They
have no political program," as opposed to a religious agenda,
he insisted. According to human rights activist XXXXXXXXXXXX, if the MB were as powerful as many think, they
would not have repeatedly altered their political program
towards less extreme positions to try to make themselves more
palatable to Syrians.
¶10. (C) Contacts assert that the maximalist projections of
MB potential power are based on current assessments of the
appeal of Islam in Syrian society today and are inevitably
inflated because the SARG has systematically suppressed any
secular political or cultural organizing. As XXXXXXXXXXXX notes,
"there are 10,000 mosques in Syria where Muslims can gather
at will to discuss issues. If I get together with five
secular people in my home, the government breaks it up and
threatens to arrest people." According to this view, the
Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic trends in Syria have
profited from a situation of tolerance for "anything Islamic"
in society (except overt political organizing) and
intolerance for anything secular. Even the assessment that
the Muslim Brotherhood -- or some repackaged grouping that
would include them -- could get as much as 30 percent of the
vote in any free election held is false, argue many, caused
by the media, by the government, and by the "forced absence"
of secular forces. Recently released Damascus Spring
detainee XXXXXXXXXXXX, with a background in pan-Arabist
politics, assessed that whatever vote total the Muslim
Brotherhood received in any initial free elections (he
posited 20-25 percent), that support would drop by 50 percent
in subsequent elections, in the face of democratization and
political competition from secular groups once again able to
organize on a level playing field.
¶11. (C) REGIME ALSO CONTRIBUTING: While most observers
would agree that political despotism has quietly nourished
conservative Islamist political tendencies, others see a more
active SARG hand, led by the security services, manipulating
the internal scene to encourage the perception that only the
secular Asad regime stands between a takeover by the Islamist
hordes. Most observers point out that the rise in Islamism
in Syria has occurred under a secular government that is
carefully manipulating Islamist tendencies -- as it did in
the run-up to the February 4 riots in Damascus -- to send the
message to the West that the Asad regime is a bulwark against
a fundamentalist takeover. While the SARG is focused and
relatively aggressive in its efforts to suppress armed
fundamentalists in Syria, some contacts insist that the
security services regularly meet separately with different
groups, encouraging fundamentalist tendencies on the one
hand, for example (while suppressing them -- even violently
-- on the other), or pressing religious leaders to push a
certain message in the mosques (while SARG officials position
themselves to appear as secularists struggling to counter a
surge of religious conservatism).
SECHE