

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07MADRID1420, C) SPAIN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CUBA (C-RE7-00940)
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MADRID1420.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07MADRID1420 | 2007-07-18 11:56 | 2010-12-17 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Madrid |
VZCZCXRO5963
PP RUEHLA
DE RUEHMD #1420/01 1991156
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181156Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3036
INFO RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0214
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 2921
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001420
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2017
TAGS: PINR PREL SP CU
SUBJECT: (C) SPAIN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CUBA (C-RE7-00940)
REF: A. SECSTATE 92831
¶B. MADRID 1144
¶C. MADRID 1179
Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 b & d.
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Post appreciates INR's careful attention to
the evolving issue of Spain's engagement with Cuba. The
Ambassador and DCM, as well as Washington visitors, continue
to take every opportunity to express to the GOS our
disagreement with its current policy. Additional information
on the relationship, keyed to Ref A's questions, is provided
below. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C/NF) Question A: Foreign Minister Moratinos told the
Ambassador that he and his Chief of Staff Javier Sancho had
initiated the Cuba trip on their own and did not act on
instructions from President Zapatero's office in Moncloa. As
we understand Moratinos' decision-making and leadership
style, he has a certain amount of autonomy and shares with
Zapatero a penchant for sudden, almost theatrical,
announcements that are not widely consulted first. Moratinos
is most likely to resort to these tactics when he feels that
he is not getting the respect that he believes that he
deserves. The specific timing of Moratinos' visit to Havana
may have had to do with a sudden change in Moratinos'
calendar or the felt need to set a new course before the EU's
then-upcoming Cuba deliberations scheduled for June.
Politically, the visit was timed on the eve of regional and
municipal elections held on May 27 and intended to mobilize
the more left-wing base of the ruling Socialist Party (PSOE).
¶3. (C/NF) Question B: Although the opposition Popular Party
has attempted to score domestic political points from
Moratinos' trip to Cuba, the issue has not gained traction
with the public. The Government has more or less
successfully made the case that the previous policy of
isolation was not providing results, and that it was worth
trying something new. The far left supports engagement with
Cuba, and the center-left isnt focused on Cuba.
Furthermore, most of the Spanish public, including more
right-wing elements, are opposed to US sanctions against Cuba
and there remains an abiding affection and nostalgia for
Cuba, Spain's last major colony. Even right-of-center
leaders like Manuel Fraga, a pillar of the conservative
element in Spain, have met Fidel Castro. The bottom line was
that there was no political downside for the Zapatero
government in approving Moratinos' initiative. It is true
that most of the senior "Cuba hands" in the Foreign Ministry,
including Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Trini
Jimenez, Political Director Rafael Dezcallar and Director
General for Latin America Javier Sandomingo, opposed the
Foreign Minister's decision to travel to Cuba. However, once
the decision was made, these senior officials have loyally
promoted the new policy approach.
¶4. (C) Question C: The media splits along ideological lines,
with conservative newspapers La Razon and ABC harshly
criticizing GOS actions on Cuba. Even El Pais, which tends
to support liberal policies and the current government, has
been relatively critical of Moratinos trip, particularly the
failure to meet with dissidents and the lack of discernible
results.
¶5. (C) Question D: For details on the first session of the
bilateral human rights dialogue, please see ref B's readout
of DCM's conversation on June 11 with MFA Political Director
Rafael Dezcallar, who had just returned from leading Spain's
delegation to Havana. The GOS professes that it will exert
"strong pressure" on human rights issues through this
dialogue, and has sought to persuade us that the US can
expect to see measurable results. The EU has offered to Cuba
to a similar "comprehensive dialogue" and invited a Cuban
delegation to Brussels to discuss details, but we are not
aware that Cuba has responded at this time.
¶6. (C/NF) Question D (cont'd): MFA has announced that it will
hold another dialogue session in September. MFA Deputy DG for
human rights Fernando Fernandez-Arias (protect) told poloff
that the Cubans proposed holding it in NYC at the time of the
UN General Assembly. Dezcallar went along with this against
the objections of Fernandez-Arias and the Spanish Ambassador
to UN. Fernandez-Arias noted that the Spaniards would face
certain problems with a NY meeting, including: where to hold
the meeting; how to keep the meeting from taking place
between Perez Roque and Moratinos; how to avoid being
outsmarted by the Cubans during the incredibly hectic week;
how to keep the Cubans from creating a media circus; and how
to avoid the Spain-Cuba meeting becoming the focus of any
US-Spanish bilateral talks. He also said that the Cubans
were irritated that Spain issued a statement regretting the
MADRID 00001420 002 OF 002
loss of the UNHRC Special Rapporteur for Cuba, but that the
Spanish replied that they really did regret losing it. The
Cubans promised to make certain gestures, including opening
access to the Red Cross, once the UNHRC mandate went away.
¶7. (C) Question E: MFA insists that it maintains a robust
policy toward the dissidents, and notes that MFA DG for Latin
America Sandomingo met with Cuban dissident groups in Madrid
on June 19 to explain GOS policy. According to MFA, he
described the "frank and constructive" environment of
Dezcallar's meeting in Havana and emphasized that "all
issues" were on the table. Dissidents including Raul Rivero
and Cuba Democracia Ya leader Rigoberto Carceller attended
the meeting, but criticized the GOS policy. Carceller said
"I don't doubt that they have talked about everything in
Havana, but I don't think that they will achieve any
results." The Madrid-based dissidents insisted that the
Spanish government meet with dissidents in Havana whenever it
meets with the Cuban government.
¶8. (C) Question F: Updated information on major Spanish
business interests in Cuba is detailed in Ref C. Most Spanish
businessmen, regardless of political persuasion, are
interested in Cuba. It is certain that Spanish companies
seek to influence GOS decisions on Cuba, but they do so
discretely in order to avoid possible Helms-Burton
complications. It is likely that Spanish companies limit
their possible lobbying to the economic dimension of the
relationship. As discussed above, the Zapatero government is
engaged with the Cuban regime, so it is not likely that
Spanish firms are needed as conduits between Havana and
Madrid. Press reports indicate that Repsol has won the right
to prospect for oil in a number of blocks off the coast of
Cuba, but there are no publicly available numbers on how much
money, if any, Repsol has spent on physical oil and gas
exploration in Cuba.
¶9. (C) Question G: The Ministry of Economy & Finance and the
Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade do influence the
economic dimensions of Spanish Cuba policy, particularly with
respect to debt forgiveness negotiations and export credits.
These ministries prefer to use economic criteria in making
Cuba-related decisions but will bend to foreign policy
considerations, particularly if the Office of the Presidency
insists. The Office of the Presidency's Economic Office has
not been active on Cuba policy as far as we know, but it
certainly could be.
¶10. (C) Question H: On March 11, 2007, the Cuban government
formally asked the GOS for debt relief negotiations, for the
Spanish Export Credit Agency (Cesce) to grant export credits
again for Spanish exports to Cuba, and to renegotiate a
Bilateral Investment Treaty. Since then, there has been
little discussion on the status of these issues. We do know,
however, that the Ministry of Economy's preference is to use
Paris Club criteria in determining how much Cuba debt Spain
should forgive/renegotiate - we know that the Ministry is
prepared to deal on a portion of the debt. With respect to
export credits, Cesce reports to the Ministry of Industry.
This Ministry is so far not convinced that Cuba meets the
normal criteria for reestablishing export credits. It is
worth noting, however, that despite the absence of export
guarantees, Spanish exports to Cuba went from Euros 489
million in 2005 to Euros 692 million in 2006. We do not know
the status of the negotiations on a possible Bilateral
Investment Treaty.
¶11. (C/NF) Question I: Spain considers itself the EU opinion
leader on issues related to Latin America. It does not
willingly take advice from any other country on Cuban issues,
but as the recent debate over the EU Common Policy shows, it
can be forced to back down by concerted action by other EU
members. It is useful, in Embassy Madrid's opinion, to
develop alternative voices within the EU to challenge alleged
Spanish leadership on Cuba policy when this leadership
appears in conflict with the EU's own common policy and
broader stated goals of support for democracy and human
rights.
¶12. (C) Question J: As was widely reported in the press in
early June, Spain tried and failed to lift the EU sanctions
on Cuba. It may try again in the future, particularly if it
can show results from its engagement with the Castro regime.
AGUIRRE