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Viewing cable 07HELSINKI416, SCENESETTER: FINNISH FM KANERVA,S VISIT TO
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07HELSINKI416 | 2007-06-01 13:04 | 2011-04-24 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Helsinki |
VZCZCXYZ0060
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHHE #0416/01 1521304
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011304Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3412
INFO RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 4079
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4714
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0313
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 0854
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 8633
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 4175
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 3169
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0937
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000416
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS FI
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: FINNISH FM KANERVA,S VISIT TO
WASHINGTON
Classified By: POLCHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
Scenesetter: Finnish FM Kanerva's Visit to Washington
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: FM Kanerva's June 11 visit gives us an
excellent opportunity to capitalize on the new GOF's
stated goal of improving relations with Washington.
Finland has a center-right government for the first time
since 1995, and the right message from the Secretary will
lay out our expectations and help Kanerva and his
coalition turn words into deeds on several US priorities.
Finland has already been a strong partner in many areas;
however, the new GOF shows a willingness to do more to
support ISAF operations in Afghanistan; to promote
democracy in Russia and Europe's near neighborhood; and
to enhance Finland's relationship with NATO. Kanerva
will not promise anything he cannot deliver but, for the
first time in seven years, Finland offers a FM who is
keenly interested in US views and will actively seek out
areas in which the US and Finland can cooperate more
effectively. END SUMMARY.
---------------------------------------
TURNING THE RIGHT INSTINCTS INTO ACTION
---------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Since coming to office in mid-April, Finland's new
government has said literally all the right things
concerning US-Finnish relations. During the Ambassador's
first round of courtesy calls and our early meetings at
other levels, it has become abundantly clear that the new
center-right coalition (Finland's first since 1995) has
all the right instincts. The Cabinet and Parliament's
leadership have stated in the clearest possible terms
that they want to build a warm relationship with
Washington. FM Ilkka Kanerva's visit is timely for two
key reasons: First, the visit gives us an important
early opportunity to spell out exactly which issues are
of the highest priority to us, and to discuss what we
expect from a pro-active friend and partner. Second, the
FM is genuinely determined to undo damage done to the
bilateral relationship by his predecessor. Because
Kanerva is eager to put the tone and substance of the
bilateral relationship back on track, he will be very
receptive to any suggestions Secretary Rice makes for
turning the GOF's stated desire for improved US-Finnish
relations into action.
--------------------------------------------- --
TARGETED AREAS OF COOPERATION: CONCRETE RESULTS
--------------------------------------------- --
¶3. (SBU) With this in mind, the Embassy sees the greatest
opportunities for concrete results with the new GOF in
three areas: (1) increased support for NATO/ISAF efforts
in Afghanistan in the short-term; (2) increased, tangible
Finnish contributions to NATO and other security
operations -- and greater domestic dialogue on NATO
membership -- in the short- and medium-term; and (3)
concrete programs and focused diplomacy to help promote
freedom and democracy in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and
the Balkans.
-------------------------
DOING MORE IN AFGHANISTAN
-------------------------
¶4. (SBU) Finland's solid contributions to NATO/ISAF
peacekeeping operations (PKO) and to Afghanistan's
reconstruction can be expected to continue; our challenge
now is finding ways to help the new government do more.
The GOF currently has 106 peacekeepers on the ground at
PRTs in Meymaneh and Mazar-al-Sharif, along with a small
but highly effective civilian team that supports PKO with
appropriate, targeted development assistance.
Afghanistan is at the top of Finland's list for
reconstruction aid, with $12 million in annual funding
secured for at least the next six years. Finland
recently transmitted to NATO an extensive list of non-
lethal equipment it intends to donate to support both the
ANP and the Afghan National Army (ANA). Looking forward,
targets of opportunity to further enhance Finland's role
in Afghanistan include:
-- MORE TROOPS: The 220-troop engineering batallion will
conclude its mission in Southern Lebanon this calendar
year. The Finns will likely reassign some resources to
other missions in Lebanon and may seek to augment their
presence in Kosovo. However, we should also encourage
them to bolster their current numbers in Afghanistan.
-- PRT LEADERSHIP: Despite the recent death of a Finnish
soldier at Meymenah, political will and public opinion
strongly favor the Finnish mission in Afghanistan. The
MOD is planning for eventual Finnish leadership of a PRT,
and the Secretary may be able to secure an early
commitment from Kanerva that Finland will do so when
either Hungary or Sweden relinquish leadership of their
PRTs at some point over the next 1-2 years.
-- EXPANDING FINLAND'S CIVILIAN CM MODEL: Finland has
very successfully "embedded" a civilian crisis management
(CM) team within the Norwegian-led PRT at Meymenah. The
team identifies development and reconstruction projects
that directly support the PRT, and its work has been
hailed by ISAF as a model for small countries. We should
encourage Finland to "exprt" this model to other PRTs,
particularly if it akes leadership of one.
-- COUNTERNARCOTICS ANDRULE OF LAW: Thanks in part to
the excellent exprence Finland had with the Iraqi
police trainin mission in Jordan (to which Finland
provided 11trainers), it now intends to provide ten
trainersto the new program for the Afghan National
Police (ANP), along with three experts for the NATO-
Russia Council counternarcotics operation. Finland also
contributed $1 million to the Law and Order Trust Fund.
Kanerva will likely be receptive to the Secretary's
suggestions regarding how the GOF could do even more in
the counternarcotics fight.
-- LETHAL WEAPONS DONATION: We understand the new
government is "re-examining" the previous GOF's decision
to reject our request for a donation of AK-47s to support
the ANP and ANA. However, this issue remains politically
difficult domestically. The Finnish opposition (i.e., the
now-out-of-power Social Democrats who scuttled the
donation in the first place) will pounce on it if the GOF
is too aggressive, and President Halonen does not favor
it. If an opportunity to press our case arises, Kanerva
will be forthcoming and welcome our advice. However, our
other goals in Afghanistan are more "do-able" in the
short term, and the GOF may seek to move forward with
other Afghanistan projects before challenging the
opposition and the President on this one.
----------------
NATO COOPERATION
----------------
¶5. (C) While many in Kanerva's Conservative Party
actually favor Finland's joining NATO, their Center Party
coalition partners and President Halonen both oppose
membership. Nevertheless, the new GOF's platform clearly
calls for enhancing Finland's cooperation with the
Alliance. Substantial roles in NATO's Afghanistan and
Kosovo operations will continue, and the Finns are now
sending very positive signals regarding the NATO Response
Force (NRF) and the Strategic Air Consortim (SAC). For
the Kanerva meeting, targets of opportunity on NATO
include:
-- A CLEARER TIMELINE ON NRF: Finland has EU
Battlegroup commitments through mid-2008, but MOD and MFA
sources both see the benefit of complementing Battlegroup
commitments with NRF commitments. The new government
would like to attend the Global Force Generation
conference this fall, and we have urged them to see that
as a good target for making a commitment to the NRF. A
strong statement from the Secretary in support of Finnish
NRF ambitions will help move this process along.
-- ENCOURAGE SAC BUY-IN: The MOD is eager to join the
airlift consortium and sees the advantages for Finland of
doing so. Finland also hopes to produce a letter of
intent before the June 11 SAC conference. A clear
statement from the Secretary on the importance we attach
to the SAC will help Kanerva firm up the political-level
across the GOF.
-- NATO MEMBERSHIP: Long a taboo topic for any
politician in Finland, this issue now appears open for
discussion. MOD Hakamies became the first MOD in Finnish
history to openly proclaim that he favors membership, and
while Kanerva has not said so publicly we know he agrees.
Public opinion polls in Finland do not show majorities in
favor of NATO membership, but the Conservatives
understand that this will only change if the government
shows leadership. As noted, they also face obstacles in
President Halonen and their own Center Party partners,
but a show of support from the Secretary will bolster
leadership instincts on the NATO membership question.
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FREEDOM AGENDA
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¶6. (C) The interests of the USG and the GOF are in close
harmony when it comes to support for democracy, civil
society and human rights in Russia and Europe's new
neighborhood. The government inherits several ongoing
projects that complement US Freedom Agenda goals,
including programs to support NGOs and educational
exchanges in Russia and Belarus. Through bilateral
visits and other diplomacy, the GOF has also begun
reaching out more to opposition leaders in Belarus;
moderates in Serbia; and pro-democracy forces in Ukraine
and the Caucuses. Recent events in Russia and Estonia
have also emboldened the government to move away from the
traditional Finnish propensity to acquiesce to Russia on
tough issues; indeed, Kanerva and others have publicly
challenged Moscow's policies and actions in ways the
previous government eschewed. Finns are not yet fully
comfortable with challenging Russi or taking a high
profile role in pro-democracy rograms that host
governments might view as "vioations of their
sovereignty;" however, there are argets of opportunity
on the Freedom Agenda and romoting democracy in Europe's
New Neighborhood hat might include:
-- COMMON EU POLICIES TOWAR RUSSIA: Kanerva showed
real leadership in calling for a "common EU policy" to
support Estonia and in criticizing Moscow's heavy-handed
reprisals during the Bronze Statue crisis. This was a
clear break from the practice of previous
administrations, which preferred to sit back and let
Brussels take the lead on contentious Russia-related
issues. Bilateral trade difficulties -- including
Moscow's unilateral ban on Finnish poultry imports, a
questionable tariff on wood exports, Russian impediments
to cross-border truck transit -- may further encourage
Finland to step out of its shell and begin pressing for a
tougher EU line in some areas. The GOF is also facing
rapidly building domestic pressure from the Parliament,
the press and civil society to become more outspoken in
urging Russia to improve its human rights record. In
sum, the GOF is realizing that the time-honored "gentle"
approach to Russia no longer produces results that are in
Finland's interest, and that the time has likely come to
join Germany, the Baltics and other EU members who are
pressing for a more united front in the face of Russian
misbehavior. Words of encouragement from the Secretary
and a clear emphasis on the importance she attaches to
improved US-EU coordination in dealing with Russia will
be helpful in pushing the GOF toward showing more
leadership in this area.
-- SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY AND NGOs: Finland continues
to fund several NGOs in Russia that are engaged in
environmental and educational activities near the Finnish
border. There is also significant cross-border
educational exchange. When the Duma passed its infamous
NGO legislation last year, Finland protested through
diplomatic channels and insisted on exemptions to ensure
that the NGOs it funds could continue their work. There
is significant cross-border educational exchange, and
Finland also supports the International Humanities
University in Vilnius for Belarusian exiles through the
EU and bilaterally. The new GOF understands the need to
do more, but is still seeking direction in identifying
the particular nitches it can best fill. Kanerva will be
open to suggestions from the Secretary or others.
-- SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION AND PRO-DEMOCRACY LEADERS:
Senior GOF officials have begun to take a more direct
role in reaching out to pro-democracy leaders, especially
in the Balkans and in Belarus. PM Vanhanen hosted
Belarusian opposition leader Alexandre Milinkevic last
fall; the Finns highlighted support for democratic forces
during the EU-Ukraine Summit that occurred during their
EU Presidency; and President Halonen will host Serb
President Tadic June 2 in an attempt to help bolster pro-
Western forces within Belgrade's new government. Finland
also targets significant development and civil society
funding to Kosovo. The Finns should be encouraged to
play an even more active role in showing public support
for pro-democracy leaders and in visiting countries where
they can reach out to democratic forces, with Belarus,
Ukraine and the Balkans being perhaps the best fits for
Finland. The Secretary may also wish to encourage
similar Finnish thinking on Russia.
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COMMENT
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¶7. (C) Kanerva and the new GOF genuinely want to improve
both the tone and the substance of the bilateral
relationship. Unlike the previous FM, Kanerva will also
listen to our views, seek our advice, and seriously
endeavor to identify where Finland can do more to bolster
cooperation in areas of shared interests. We have also
emphasized that the US is looking for concrete results,
not simply discussions of ongoing processes. Kanerva
understands this, and intends to come to Washington with
something to offer. However, true to the Finnish
character, he also will never promise anything he cannot
deliver. A clear message from the Secretary that
emphasizes her priorities and her ideas for how Finland
can do more will help Kanerva -- both as he seeks to
expand Finland's role in NATO, Afghaistan and Europe's
New Neighborhood, and as he loks to build domestic
support for the new GOF's efort to improve trans-
Atlantic relations.
WAR