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Viewing cable 09MONTERREY102, NUEVO LEON?S EFFORTS TO REFORM STATE AND LOCAL POLICE HAVE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09MONTERREY102 | 2009-03-04 21:56 | 2011-02-10 12:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Consulate Monterrey |
Appears in these articles: http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2011/02/10/index.php?section=politica&article=006n1pol |
VZCZCXRO5484
PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHMC #0102/01 0691819
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 042156Z MAR 09 ZDS
FM AMCONSUL MONTERREY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3571
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHCD/AMCONSUL CIUDAD JUAREZ 0071
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGD/DTS GUADALAJARA
RUEHGD/AMCONSUL GUADALAJARA 0115
RUEHHO/DTS HERMOSILLO
RUEHHO/AMCONSUL HERMOSILLO 0049
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEHRS/DTS MATAMOROS
RUEHRS/AMCONSUL MATAMOROS 0261
RUEHRD/DTS MERIDA
RUEHRD/AMCONSUL MERIDA 0276
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 4624
RUEHMC/AMCONSUL MONTERREY 9137
RUEHNG/AMCONSUL NOGALES 0013
RUEHNL/DTS NUEVO LAREDO
RUEHNL/AMCONSUL NUEVO LAREDO 0222
RUEHTM/DTS TIJUANA
RUEHTM/AMCONSUL TIJUANA 0103
195277
2009-03-04 21:56:00
09MONTERREY102
Consulate Monterrey
SECRET//NOFORN
VZCZCXRO5484
PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHMC #0102/01 0691819
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 042156Z MAR 09 ZDS
FM AMCONSUL MONTERREY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3571
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHCD/AMCONSUL CIUDAD JUAREZ 0071
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGD/DTS GUADALAJARA
RUEHGD/AMCONSUL GUADALAJARA 0115
RUEHHO/DTS HERMOSILLO
RUEHHO/AMCONSUL HERMOSILLO 0049
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEHRS/DTS MATAMOROS
RUEHRS/AMCONSUL MATAMOROS 0261
RUEHRD/DTS MERIDA
RUEHRD/AMCONSUL MERIDA 0276
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 4624
RUEHMC/AMCONSUL MONTERREY 9137
RUEHNG/AMCONSUL NOGALES 0013
RUEHNL/DTS NUEVO LAREDO
RUEHNL/AMCONSUL NUEVO LAREDO 0222
RUEHTM/DTS TIJUANA
RUEHTM/AMCONSUL TIJUANA 0103
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 MONTERREY 000102
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - Classification
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/4/2019
TAGS: SNAR KCRM ASEC CASC PGOV MX
SUBJECT: NUEVO LEON?S EFFORTS TO REFORM STATE AND LOCAL POLICE HAVE
NOT BEEN EFFECTIVE
MONTERREY 00000102 001.4 OF 005
CLASSIFIED BY: Bruce Williamson, Consul General, Monterrey,
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. The state of Nuevo Leon has instituted many
changes to clean up its state and municipal police forces,
including annual lie detector tests, the creation of an
integrated municipal police force called Metropol, and the
construction of a high technology C-4 CCTV monitoring center.
The state, and one municipal, police force are also utilizing
the Plataforma Mexico system to share information, and these
entities are eager to obtain assistance from the Merida
Initiative. Despite these actions, results in terms of reducing
common crime are mixed. Civil society and security experts have
not seen any real improvement in the quality and reliability of
state and municipal police, and the Nuevo Leon Secretary of
Public Security has no confidence in the municipal police
forces. Meanwhile, neither the state nor the local police forces
dare to interfere with the drug cartels. End Summary.
State and Local Police Infiltrated by Drug Cartels
¶2. (C) The state of Nuevo Leon?s lucrative drug trafficking
routes are controlled by the Gulf/Zeta cartel, except for the
wealthy suburb of San Pedro (where the Consulate families
reside) which is under the Beltran Leyva branch of the Sinaloa
Cartel. There is no doubt that the Nuevo Leon state and local
police have been substantially compromised by the Gulf/Zetas.
The GOM?s National Center for Evaluation and Control of
Confidence tested police nationwide with medical, psychological,
toxicology, and polygraph examinations and measured their
wealth. The Center found that it could not provide a positive
recommendation for 60.4 of Nuevo Leon?s federal, state and
municipal police, right in line with the national average of
61.4%. Similarly, Nuevo Leon Secretary for Public Security Aldo
Fasci estimated that 50% of the state and city police forces
were infiltrated by drug cartels.
¶3. (S/NF) In the past, post law enforcement representatives were
able to provide informational assistance to the state police on
several successful state police operations against organized
crime. However, this stopped with the 2006 assassination of
Marcelo Garza y Garza, the head of the state investigative unit.
Post officials see Garza?s replacement as a figure who has been
compromised by the Gulf/Zeta cartel. Note. Post law enforcement
officials have a good working relationship with state police on
non-drug matters, such as pursuing fugitives or protecting the
Consulate. End Note. Moreover, although there have been over 200
executions in the last three years, including over 40 police and
soldiers, none of these cases has been solved. One knowledgeable
contact states that Nuevo Leon Secretary Fasci is isolated
within his own office, since his lieutenants in reality report
to his corrupted underlings.
¶4. (SBU) According to statistics from the state attorney
general?s office, crime rates were generally stable in 2008,
although economic crimes are now trending upward. The total
number of premeditated homicides declined 7% from 2007 to 2008,
partially reflecting the relative peace between the drug
cartels. The drug cartels actively contested Nuevo Leon until
mid-year 2007, so while there were 107 executions in 2007 that
number fell to less than 45 in 2008. The record on other crimes
is mixed with simple robberies (-8%) and robberies of businesses
(-0.5%) both declining, and home burglaries (+2%), robberies of
people (+16%) and car thefts (+20%) all increasing. Following an
upward trend the last half of 2008, in January 2009 there have
been sharp increases in economic crimes such as simple robbery
(+56%), home burglaries (+102%), robberies of businesses (+65%),
robberies of people (+138%), while car thefts continued to rise
(+18%) and premeditated homicides were up 5%. The public
statistics on kidnappings are not reliable, since few cases are
reported and Mexican law does not classify most abductions as
kidnappings as under U.S. law. Local businessmen think that
MONTERREY 00000102 002.4 OF 005
there have been substantial increases in extortion and
kidnapping, at least some of them linked directly to cartel
members.
The Good: Plans and Actions to Reform Local Police Forces
¶5. (SBU) Nuevo Leon Governor Jose Natividad Gonzalez Paras has
repeatedly promised new programs to clean up the police forces,
including annual polygraph tests, higher levels of education for
police recruits, improved coordination with municipal police
forces, and more federal resources. In addition, four
metropolitan Monterrey PAN mayors proposed creation of Metropol,
a new integrated municipal police force, including uniform
requirements, salaries and equipment. The PAN mayors later
agreed to include the PRI Mayors in their plans, and the PRI
Governor Gonzalez Paras adopted the Metropol plan for the entire
Monterrey Metropolitan area. The Metropol plan now includes
creating a joint unit composed of different municipal police
forces to respond to crime, as opposed to the normal
preventative function of Mexican municipal police.
¶6. (C) State and local police also use technology to increase
police effectiveness. President Calderon inaugurated the C-4
(Center for Communication, Command, and Control) built by the
wealthy suburb of San Pedro in September 2008. The San Pedro C-4
is impressive, and 300 cameras enable San Pedro police to
monitor the entrances and exits into the city and analyze crime
trends to deploy the police more effectively (e.g. moving police
to areas and times when burglaries are likely to occur). San
Pedro Secretary of Public Security Rogelio Lozano contends that
the cameras are effective because they cannot be corrupted.
Meanwhile, the C-4 operators must pass special confidence
testsand are not permitted to bring cell phones into the
facility,. Both Secretary Lozano and a member of the Citizens
Security Advisory Council think that the C-4 discourages crime
in San Pedro, since the criminals know that they are being
watched. San Pedro statistics show that crime is stable or
falling slightly since the C-4 came into operation. The state of
Nuevo Leon is currently building a C-5 (so-called because it
will coordinate the C-4s). However, the C-5 was originally
scheduled to be completed by October 2007, but due to repeated
delays, state officials now hope that it will open in summer
¶2009. Apparently, Northrop-Grumann served as a prime contractor
for this facility.
¶7. (SBU) Nuevo Leon and San Pedro police both praise Plataforma
Mexico, which shares information about crime throughout the
country. The San Pedro C-4 is linked to Plataforma Mexico, so
San Pedro police can instantly analyze cars license plates in
minutes to determine if they were stolen, including in other
states. Nuevo Leon Secretary Facsi also stated that Plataforma
Mexico information has helped them solve crimes and avoid hiring
police with criminal records elsewhere in Mexico. State and
local police are also very eager for assistance through the
Merida Initiative, but have not yet seen any funds.
The Bad: Promising Reforms Bring at Best Mixed Results
¶8. (C) Despite all his efforts, Nuevo Leon Secretary Facsi does
not think that he has made progress cleaning up the Nuevo Leon
state and municipal police forces. Fasci does not think that
annual polygraphs are effective, since he has seen the ?fear in
the eyes? of the polygraph examiners, who may ignore the actual
results. He noted that he has seen a number of cases where
compromised police have passed all of the required confidence
tests. Facsi also faces a deficit of officers, since his state
police only number 7,000, 2,000 below their authorized strength.
Nuevo Leon screens police candidates, and only 200 of 1,000
applicants passed the initial confidence tests to enter the
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police academy. Fasci finds that he must keep moving his
commanders around to maintain their effectiveness, before they
fall prey to bribes and influences. He thinks that police
commanders are only at maximum effectiveness for only three
months, and he has moved some commanders around five times.
Facsi does not have any confidence in the municipal police
forces. The state police have weekly strategy meetings with the
military, CISEN, and the federal police, and Fasci excludes
local police because he doesn?t trust them. . (Note: ironically,
local military commanders say the same about the state police,
i.e., they exclude them from their planning sessions because
they don?t trust them.) Facsi also complained that his forces
need better arms to fight the cartels, but he did not want the
municipal police to upgrade their weapons, noting that when the
Gulf/Zeta cartel sponsored demonstrations against the military,
the municipal police forces did nothing to stop them.
¶9. (C) San Pedro Secretary of Security Lozano was far more
optimistic, claiming that he has weeded out 300 of his 500
officer police force through polygraphs, drug and psychological
tests. Although Post law enforcement officials consider the San
Pedro police force to be the most reliable and best equipped,
they still think that it is compromised by organized crime and
unwilling or unable to move against drug cartels. Similarly, a
prominent member of the San Pedro Citizens Security Council, who
met monthly with Lozano, did not think that the San Pedro police
had improved substantially, although she did think that the San
Pedro C-4 had been effective in reducing common crime.
¶10. (C) Poloff has met with an organizer of the citizens? march
for security, security consultants and academics, and none
believe that there have been real improvements in the
reliability of local police forces. For example, one security
consultant reported that in the city of Guadalupe the commander
took the new police recruits to a narco-warehouse to collect
their share of the money. A contact with close ties to the
police said that the police only use the confidence tests to
harass the officers they don?t like, not to clean up the force.
In addition, in June 2008, the day after Nuevo Leon Governor
Gonzalez Paras urged citizens to file complaints against
kidnapping, a jewelry owner and his son were kidnapped from
inside the Guadalupe municipal police station and a state police
station while filing complaints. The kidnappers encountered no
resistance from the police. Indeed, there were 60 state police
stationed nearby with weapons and body armor, but they reported
to the newspaper that they were ordered not to intervene. None
of the police involved were disciplined. In some cases the
municipal police actively assist the cartels. For example,
federal police and the Mexican military liberated a three year
old victim of a kidnapping, and found that the kidnappers were
seven police from the rural town of Salinas Victoria. They also
found money, backpacks and other evidence at a safehouse
indicating that these municipal police were helping organize the
narco-funded demonstrations against the Mexican military.
Similarly, Post law enforcement officials believe that Guadalupe
municipal police actively assist the Gulf/Zeta cartel in
kidnapping and holding victims. Similarly, in the suburban town
of Juarez, the police basically serve as an auxiliary for the
Gulf Cartel.
¶11. (C) Metropol was originally designed by four PAN mayors who
only included neighboring PRI towns grudgingly. Metropol was
designed to provide uniform standards for the municipal police
forces to improve their effectiveness, and Nuevo Leon Secretary
Facsi said that the municipal police will have minimum pay of
$666 per month. However, independent observers dismiss Metropol
as a political stunt. For example, Javier Hernandez, a United
Nations official posted to Nuevo Leon for a project to observe
crime rates, said that Metropol systems have never been
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evaluated to see if they were effective and that the whole
effort is just political theater. San Pedro Secretary Lozano,
one of the original architects of Metropol, now seems
disenchanted, since the Metropol concept has been changed to
include joint police forces, apparently under the control of the
state.
¶12. (C) In contrast, most civil society observers think that
Plataforma Mexico and the C-4 are reasonably effective in
controlling common crime. Nuevo Leon and San Pedro utilize
Plataforma Mexico, which they say helps them track down
criminals, but the rest of the municipal forces are not
connected to Plataforma Mexico. Indeed, Plataforma Mexico is
limited because it only includes data from federal crimes or
state crimes where the state requested assistance from the
federal government. The PGR recently conducted a search for Post
on Plataforma Mexico, but warned that for state crimes, such as
murder or kidnapping, Post would have to ask each state since
nationwide data was still not available. Others are less sure of
the value of Plataforma Mexico. One contact with close police
ties, argued that the police do not actually use the Plataforma
Mexico intelligence and that the C-4 does not analyze any
information. Lozano argues, however, that Plataforma Mexico
permits local police to stop cars with no license plates or
stolen cars, which can be used by drug cartels to commit crimes.
In our view, neither Plataforma Mexico nor the San Pedro C-4
have hindered cartel operations.
The Ugly: Impunity for the Drug Cartels
¶13. (C) Comment. In Nuevo Leon the drug cartels do not fear the
state and municipal police; instead, clean police officers are
afraid of the cartels. Over the last three years over 40 police
and soldiers have been executed by the drug cartels, and none of
the cases has been solved. Indeed, a recent case illustrates how
the drug cartel members are protected, but not the police.
During the recent narco-demonstrations, a policeman arrested one
of the leaders, a zeta cell leader. The zetas threatened him
within 10 minutes, and two days later they executed him after he
dropped off his children at their school. In contrast to the
cartels, who tried to get their leader released, we understand
that the police have decided not to investigate the murder of
their fellow officer (see reftel B).
¶14. (C) Comment continued. It should be noted that Mexican
federal and state constitutions often tie the hands of the state
and local police. While Nuevo Leon has many thousands of
preventive police, they are prohibited by law from investigating
crimes. Most street crimes in the U.S. are solved by patrol
officers who follow up routine leads and are empowered to make
warrantless arrests. Mexican street police are in large part
deterred from exercising basic police investigative techniques
either by law or though coercion. Some minor constitutional
modernization would have to be considered to make police reform
a reality.
¶15. (C) Comment continued. Since 93% of Mexico?s police forces
and are state and municipal police, honest and professional
state and municipal police forces are critical to success in the
battle against drug cartels. Several political leaders have
recently approached Poloff to request USG help, arguing that
unless trends change Nuevo Leon could become a state fully
controlled by the drug cartels. Nuevo Leon Secretary Facsi and
several civic leaders argue that the U.S. should help through
the Merida Initiative, making Nuevo Leon a positive model. Local
leaders note that technology alone will not solve the issue, as
the state and municipal police will need to become professional
(including higher salaries) to become assets in the battle
against drug cartels. Starting state police officers only earn
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$500 per month (commanders make $1,000 per month), so their
salaries would need to be increased substantially before they
could become a professional force. Unfortunately, truly
reforming the police is a long-term process and in many ways
Nuevo Leon leaders haven?t even taken the first necessary steps.
End Comment.
WILLIAMSON