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Viewing cable 06SAOPAULO526, GANG WAGES WAR ON SAO PAULO POLICE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06SAOPAULO526 | 2006-05-15 20:28 | 2011-02-11 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Consulate Sao Paulo |
VZCZCXRO5227
OO RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0526/01 1352028
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 152028Z MAY 06
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5054
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6195
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 2919
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7098
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2570
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2233
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 1976
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2794
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEAWJC/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEABND/DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAO PAULO 000526
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/WHA, DS/ICI/PII, DS/DSS/OSAC, WHA/BSC
NSC FOR CRONIN
DEA FOR OEL/DESANTIS AND NIRL/LEHRER
DEPT ALSO FOR WHA/PDA, DRL/PHD, INL, DS/IP/WHA, DS/DSS/ITA
BRASILIA FOR RSO AND LEGAT; RIO DE JANEIRO FOR RSO SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD SENSITIVE SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KCRM SOCI SNAR ASEC BR
SUBJECT: GANG WAGES WAR ON SAO PAULO POLICE
REF: A) Sao Paulo 42;
(B) 05 Sao Paulo 975;
(C) Sao Paulo 319
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The notorious Sao Paulo organized crime gang First Capital Command ("PCC") waged a deadly and brutal assault against the police over the weekend, killing 44 officers and injuring another 27 in up to 180 attacks across Sao Paulo state. The police, in turn, killed 23 suspected criminals, and 15 deaths were also reported in numerous related prison riots. Amazingly, only two civilians not suspected of criminal activity were killed, and one of those was with an officer during an apparent assassination. Simultaneously, major riots broke out in 71 Sao Paulo state prisons, and ten in prisons in two other southern states. Thus far we have no reports of Americans involved in any of the incidents, although one AMCIT is in custody in a prison that experienced a riot but is now considered under control of authorities. PCC targets were initially limited to police and other security personnel, but overnight on Sunday (May 14), 61 public buses were torched and ten banking facilities were attacked with incendiary devices, mostly Molotov cocktails.
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Other than mass transit delays for lack of buses and occasional police roadblocks, Sao Paulo functioned normally during daylight working hours on Monday (May 15), but as the day progressed more businesses closed early as random attacks on busses continued. Congonhas Airport suspended activity in the afternoon due to a bomb threat, but no device was found. The governor of Sao Paulo has declined federal assistance to quell the attacks, insisting that state forces have the capacity to handle the situation. This wave of violence was primarily motivated by the transfer of key PCC leaders from various prisons around the city of Sao Paulo to higher security facilities in the outreaches of the state. The PCC is apparently sending a message that it remains as powerful, if not more so, than the police, and that its demands cannot be ignored. The police, for their part, are on high alert, but are still reeling from the ferocity and scope of the attacks, which are unprecedented in local history. END SUMMARY.
----------------------------------------- PCC WAGES ALL OUT WAR ON SAO PAULO POLICE -----------------------------------------
¶3. (U) Beginning on the evening of Friday (May 12) and continuing throughout the weekend, police officers and their facilities came under vicious attack, presumably by Sao Paulo's notorious organized crime gang known as the First Capital Command ("Primeiro Comando de Capital," or "PCC"). The PCC is thought to have orchestrated the attacks -- unprecedented in scale -- in retaliation for the transfer of several of its key leaders from prisons in and around the city of Sao Paulo to facilities in the outlying regions of Sao Paulo state. So far, reliable statistics indicate that up to 180 separate attacks across Sao Paulo state have left 81 dead and nearly 50 injured. Those killed include 44 police officers, 23 suspected criminals, and 15 prison inmates. Only two civilians not suspected of criminal activities have been reported killed, one of whom was the girlfriend of an off-duty police officer. Both were killed while riding in his car, apparently the victims of a planned assassination.
¶4. (U) Simultaneously, rebellions broke out in 71 of Sao Paulo's 144 prison facilities. The PCC and its allied factions exercise vast control over inmates in most of Sao Paulo's prisons, hence the prison riots and assaults on police and municipal targets appear to be two elements in a coordinated PCC offensive. Images from news broadcasts showed some facilities clearly in the control of the inmates, who set fires and took to the roofs. As of 9:00 p.m. Sunday night (May 14), the State Prison Authority reported ongoing riots in 46 facilities, with hostages reported in each. (NOTE: Brazilian prison riots often include hostages, who are generally visiting family members. Thus, it is unclear how cooperative, and perhaps complicit, these hostages really are with their supposed captors. Hostages such as prison officials and other prisoners often filmed by news crews being beaten or otherwise tortured are more obviously genuine. END NOTE) Riots also broke out in at least
SAO PAULO 00000526 002 OF 004
four prisons in each of the states of Parana and Mato Grosso do Sul, some of which have been resolved by the use of police "shock troops" and/or negotiations.
------------------------------------------- NO AMCITS KNOWN AT RISK; CITY CLOSING EARLY -------------------------------------------
¶5. (SBU) No Americans are known to have been involved in any of the attacks, and only one is known to be in a prison that was the scene of a riot, but the State Prison Authority reported that this facility was back under government control by Sunday evening, and officials told us that no deaths were reported there. Americans or American interests (and foreigners in general) in Sao Paulo have not/not been targeted by the violence, nor has any particular service or location frequented by Americans. Air flights ran normally throughout early Monday afternoon (May 15), but Congonhas Airport, which primarily serves domestic flights, was the target of a bomb threat that resulted in suspended activities in the afternoon. No device was found. Road systems remained largely clear up until the evening hours, with reports of an additional five to seven empty buses set on fire during the day. However, due to continued reports that circulated throughout the day that the government was ordering a curfew or advising people to stay indoors, many businesses released employees early, and some schools and universities closed. Consequently, traffic congestion picked up earlier than normal for Sao Paulo's rush hour, with widespread gridlock an immediate result as evening fell.
--------------------------------------------- --- PCC TARGETS EXPANDED TO INFRASTRUCTURE AND BANKS --------------------------------------------- ---
¶6. (U) Initially, the crime wave was limited to attacks on individual police officers, both on and off-duty, and to police and other public security facilities, including one fire station where a firefighter was killed. Most of the attacks occurred in outlying neighborhoods of greater Sao Paulo, but also in isolated incidents throughout the state from the coastal beach haven of Guaruja to the small city of Franca on the state's northeastern border with the state of Minas Gerais.
¶7. (U) But overnight Sunday (May 14), 61 public transportation busses were set afire after passengers were ordered off, and more than ten bank offices or bank ATM machines were damaged by incendiary devices, mostly Molotov cocktails. The attacks may have been an attempt to disrupt transportation and business functions for the beginning of the work-week in Sao Paulo, Brazil's financial center. If so, the attacks proved marginally successful regarding public transportation; six bus companies refused to operate Monday morning (May 15), delaying or preventing workers living in mostly outlying areas of Sao Paulo from getting to work. But while long lines of people were seen at many bus stops, traffic flowed mostly as normal through Sao Paulo, and Consulate sections reported only seven of nearly 300 staff absent due to transportation issues. Calls to the banking community indicate that the sector is taking no particular action regarding security or operations, and currently is not concerned that it is being targeted other than in crimes of opportunity. However, throughout the afternoon, reports continued of buses being set afire, and of businesses closing early to send employees home (see paragraph 5 above).
------------------------------- HAPPY MOTHER'S DAY FROM THE PCC -------------------------------
¶8. (U) The series of attacks, which is being described throughout Sao Paulo as a state of war, is the most recent in a long line of audacious and deadly attacks and riots carried out by the PCC (see reftels). Born in the state's prisons in 1993, the PCC is a criminal organization blending elements of street gang, drug cartel, and mafia. It is highly organized along almost corporate lines (ref B), and continues to be run from within the state's prisons by Marcos Wilians Herbas Camacho, aka "Marcola," a 39-year old
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convicted bank robber serving a 44-year sentence. Using cell phones (ref C) and a network of message runners that may include family members and possibly even lawyers, Marcola consolidated control of an estimated 90 percent of the drug and contraband trade within Sao Paulo state's 144 prisons between 2001 and 2002, and then expanded his organization beyond prison walls to the poorer neighborhoods and favelas scattered throughout greater Sao Paulo city, running drugs, guns and contraband, and imposing taxes on unlicensed businesses (ref B). The daily newspaper Estado de Sao Paulo estimated yesterday that the PCC's monthly take is now one million reals, or almost $500,000 USD, doubled in the last three years by activities outside of prison.
¶9. (U) In a sadly ironic plot twist, this particular wave of violence seems to have been precipitated by a prison system attempt to forestall an expected prison riot. Police are said to have received intelligence last week that the PCC was planning a large-scale prison uprising on Mother's Day (May 15), similar to a mass rebellion that occurred in 2001. In an attempt to head off the rebellion, on Thursday (May 11), officials moved 756 inmates thought to be influential members of the PCC to high security facilities at the Presidente Venceslau II prison in the interior of Sao Paulo state. It appears the plan was to disrupt the gang's lines of communications and isolate its leadership in advance of Mother's Day, thus preventing the riots from fomenting and spreading throughout the prison system as happens periodically. (NOTE: In another ironic twist, prison officials simultaneously released some 10,000 inmates on weekend furlough for Mother's Day, many of whom are now believed to have been involved in the attacks across Sao Paulo. END NOTE.)
¶10. (U) At the same time, the PCC's Marcola made several peculiar demands of the prison system, including new uniforms, 60 additional television sets for inmates to watch the upcoming World Cup soccer matches, and increased conjugal visits. On Friday (May 12), Marcola and seven other top leaders of the PCC were transferred for questioning to the headquarters of the organized crime unit (DEIC) of Sao Paulo state's police force (Policia Militar), located in Santana on the near North side of Sao Paulo. Within hours, a riot broke out at the Avare maximum security prison, and attacks were launched against police targets throughout that night.
¶11. (SBU) On Saturday (May 13), Marcola was transferred to the maximum security prison at President Bernardes, considered by many to be the most secure prison in Brazil, and the only one in Sao Paulo that is impenetrable to cellular phone transmissions. Nonetheless, the attacks escalated on Saturday night, and given the number of off-duty police officers targeted and killed (including an officer killed while eating with his family in a restaurant, and the burning of a high-ranking officer's car while parked in his garage), it appears the PCC has an intelligence network capable of surveillance and relatively sophisticated planning. Police sources tell us almost 100 weapons have been confiscated thus far, mostly hand guns and rifles or shotguns, and television news footage showed a military-style grenade being recovered from the scene of one attack.
------------------------------------ GOVERNOR DECLINES FEDERAL ASSISTANCE ------------------------------------
¶12. (U) The federal government apparently offered up to 4,000 personnel to help quell the violence in Sao Paulo, but on Sunday, recently ascended Governor Claudio Lembo declined any outside assistance, insisting state officials are capable of controlling the situation. This came in the wake of news reports that while prison and police officials were aware that the PCC was preparing for some kind of criminal activity over the weekend, officials did not fathom the scope and severity of the attacks carried out, and police in the field received no warning of any imminent danger. Colonel Elizeu clair Teixeira Borges, Commandant General of the state's Military Police (NOTE: Brazil's Policia Militar is the country's general law enforcement police force, organized and administered at the state level. END NOTE.) avoided calling the attacks "terrorism," but
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instead, referred to them as cowardly attacks carried out on soft targets such as small, outlying police sub-stations and off-duty officers traveling unarmed and alone. Publicly, officials say they are not willing to negotiate with the PCC, but in the past, prisoner transfers have been rescinded in order to obtain the release of hostages and the cessation of violence. In response to this weekend's attacks, all police stations and sub-stations have been cordoned off and blocked from traffic, protected by groups of officers armed with assault rifles. Some increased police checkpoints were also noted today.
--------------------------------------------- - COMMENT: JUST WHO HAS THE KEYS TO THE PRISONS? --------------------------------------------- -
¶14. (SBU) This extraordinary wave of violence demonstrates just how precarious the prison system is in Sao Paulo, and probably throughout Brazil. It is widely known and publicly lamented that the PCC and other criminals conduct business in and from prison using illicit phones and through messenger services involving friends and associates, but prison administrators and police are at a loss to stop it due largely to widespread corruption of rank and file prison officials in the far-flung system (ref C). Furthermore, the extent to which the PCC is well-organized is notable by the very demands it places and the way it conducts its violent raids. While ostensibly couched as efforts to improve prisoner conditions in the often squalid prisons, many demands, such as the recent request for more televisions, actually help pacify prisoners and solidify the support base of the PCC leadership, and benefits, such as visitation privileges from prisoners' friends and family, in reality help the PCC monitor and administer its operations on the outside. In addition, the bus attacks may serve two purposes for the PCC. The first is obviously to disrupt city services and embarrass the government. But it is also known that the PCC taxes and controls the routes of unlicensed public transport vans and buses (ref B). Thus, given the fact that most of the incidents occurred in poorer, outlying areas of Sao Paulo, and that those most affected by bus closures would rely on the unlicensed transport services, the PCC may also be making a profit while making a statement. END COMMENT.
WOLFE