

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06SAOPAULO276, CARDINAL HUMMES DISCUSSES LULA GOVERNMENT, THE OPPOSITION, AND FTAA REF: (A) 05 SAO PAULO 405; (B) 05 SAO PAULO 402 (C) 02 BRASILIA 2670
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SAOPAULO276.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06SAOPAULO276 | 2006-03-14 19:42 | 2010-12-14 06:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Consulate Sao Paulo |
VZCZCXRO8600
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0276/01 0731942
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141942Z MAR 06
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4655
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 5815
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 2762
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6898
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2091
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0200
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0915
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2442
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 1858
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1605
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2641
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0489
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 2316
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SAO PAULO 000276
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
ROME PASS VATICAN
STATE FOR WHA/BSC, EUR/WE, AND DRL/IRF
STATE PASS USTR FOR SULLIVAN/LEZNY
NSC FOR SCRONIN
DEPT OF TREASURY FOR FPARODI
USDOC FOR 332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWARD USDOC ALSO FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/EOLSON/DDEVITO/DANDERSON STATE PASS EXIMBANK STATE PASS OPIC FOR DMORONESE, NRIVERA, CMERVENNE DOL FOR ILAB MMITTELHAUSER
TAGS: PGOV PREL SCUL ETRD ECON ELAB BR
SUBJECT: CARDINAL HUMMES DISCUSSES LULA GOVERNMENT, THE OPPOSITION, AND FTAA REF: (A) 05 SAO PAULO 405; (B) 05 SAO PAULO 402 (C) 02 BRASILIA 2670
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.
------- SUMMARY -------
¶1. (U) During a March 10 courtesy call by Consul General, Claudio Cardinal Hummes spoke at length of the successes and failures of the Lula government; shared his views on the competition between Sao Paulo Mayor Serra and Governor Alckmin for the presidential nomination of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB); and stressed that contrary to popular belief, the Catholic Church as an institution does not oppose the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and in fact sees such agreements as necessary, but believes that any agreement must be thoroughly discussed and equitable for all parties. End Summary.
--------------------------------------- LULA GOVERNMENT: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, BUT DISAPPOINTMENT TOO ---------------------------------------
¶2. (U) Consul General (CG), accompanied by Poloff, paid a courtesy call March 10 on Dom Claudio Cardinal Hummes, Archbishop of Sao Paulo and leader of the Catholic Church in Brazil. When queried on his views on the current political scene, Hummes said Lula's government has been an important milestone for Brazil: a democratic government led by a worker, with major accomplishments to its credit such as macro-economic stability, improvement of Brazil's international image, and payment of the country's foreign debt. Obviously, not all has been so positive. The Cardinal knew Lula from the time when both were working in their respective fields in the ABC (Santo Andre, Sao Bernardo dos Campos, Sao Caetano do Sul) industrial suburbs south of Sao Paulo during the time of the military dictatorship (see ref A for complete biographic information), and he knew Lula wanted to do more on the social front to improve conditions for workers and the poor. He knew for a fact Lula was disappointed not to have created more jobs. "Bolsa Familia" (which involves conditional transfer payments to the poor) was a good program; it was true, as critics had pointed out, that it didn't lift people out of poverty, but it was effective as an emergency measure for the very needy. The fundamental problem, Hummes said, was that Brazil hadn't grown enough. High interest rates and high taxes had prevented it from keeping pace with other emerging economies like China, India, and Mexico. If this could be changed, Brazil would be ready to move forward.
¶3. (SBU) Then there was the corruption scandal. Lula didn't deserve this, said Hummes. This was not to say that he really hadn't known anything of what was going on, as he claimed. But Lula had been badly served by people around him with their own agendas, especially former Chief of Staff Jose Dirceu. That agenda was to maintain the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT) in power, an objective that required a great deal of money. To Dirceu, the ends justified the means. Dirceu, who is a very rational, astute political operator, wanted to be Lula's successor, and he used the powers of government, including the more than 20,000 jobs to be filled by presidential appointees ("unjustified in a democracy," Hummes said) to that end. Ironically, Dirceu's activities were eventually exposed by Roberto Jefferson, (a federal deputy in a government-allied party who was implicated in corruption and then began to implicate others, and was himself eventually expelled from Congress), "who was himself not a hero of ethics."
¶4. (SBU) Hummes was not certain Lula would even stand for re-election. "There's probably a 70 percent chance he will. He personally opposes re-election and always has. He thinks it would be much better to have a longer term, five or six years, but only one term. I also think this would be much better for our democracy." Hummes also opined that holding elections every two years -- federal and state elections alternative with municipal - was too disruptive and made it difficult for the government to accomplish anything.
---- PSDB ----
¶5. (SBU) CG noted that Lula's recent resurgence in opinion polls posed a serious challenge for the opposition PSDB. Cardinal Hummes agreed, pointing out that there are many similarities between the PT and the PSDB. "Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) brought the PSDB closer to the PT in many ways. And then Lula, when he came to power, adopted some PSDB policies. They have to be in conflict with each other for you to be able to see the differences." The party had too many good candidates, Hummes said, an abundance of talent that dates back to its founding. In 2002, the party had trouble deciding on Jose Serra as its nominee; finally, FHC had to step in and designate him. The Cardinal knows both PSDB presidential pre-candidates and talks regularly with both. In his view, the problem with a Serra candidacy is that if he runs and loses, the PSDB will have lost the Mayorship of Sao Paulo, its great window on national politics. Alckmin, though not as well known outside Sao Paulo, could be a great national surprise. Hummes opined that Alckmin could give Lula a better run for his money in the impoverished northeast, since Alckmin would appeal more that Serra to the lower classes. Even if he should lose to Lula, the PSDB would then still hold the Mayorship of Sao Paulo. Thus, the rational decision would be for Alckmin, but the Cardinal recognized that politics isn't always rational. He noted also that Minas Gerais Governor Aecio Neves had wanted to run this time, but decided not to because he was a sure bet to be re-elected as Governor of Minas but was less certain he could beat Lula.
¶6. (SBU) During a second term, Hummes predicted, Lula would be more moderate than Serra would if elected. Lula was not much of an adventurer and wouldn't take risks, the way great leaders and governments do. Serra is by temperament much bolder, and has always opposed the conventional "neo-liberal" macro-economic policy implemented first by FHC and subsequently by Lula.
-------------------------- CHURCH DOES NOT OPPOSE FTAA ---------------------------
¶7. (SBU) CG raised the issue of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), noting that the U.S. remains interested in negotiating an agreement even though the Lula government is still less than enthusiastic, and inquired into the Church's position. The Cardinal replied that there is no institutional opposition on the Church's part to this type of agreement. The world is clearly becoming more integrated, and nations can no longer afford to isolate themselves or stand on nationalism. Brazil, for example, is a strong supporter of Mercosul, but the community is very fragile, due in large part to Argentine economic problems. The FTAA must overcome traditional beliefs that it is another vehicle for the U.S. to exploit Latin American poverty. Many in the region are unable to believe that a just agreement can be reached. Nevertheless, though it won't be easy, it is necessary for the parties to keep trying. Hummes expressed the view that President Lula is trying to help overcome the "old thinking" wherein others, especially the United States, were blamed for Brazil's problems. The Church as an institution, he reiterated, has not opposed FTAA and would not do so. Individual Brazilian bishops or groups of bishops might have, or NGOs affiliated with the Church. Perhaps a study group presented recommendations to the National Conference of Bishops of Brazil (CNBB) opposing FTAA, and these might have been published and characterized as an official Church position. But the CNBB itself had never adopted a resolution against FTAA, and the Church does not oppose free trade agreements in general or the FTAA in particular. The Church, he said in conclusion, does consider it important that any negotiated agreement be fully aired and discussed publicly, and be fair to all the parties. CG replied that the USG is aware that all such agreements must be acceptable to both (or all) sides, because otherwise they will not be sustainable.
------- COMMENT -------
¶8. (SBU) Over the past six months, numerous Brazilian interlocutors from both the government and the private sector have advised us that the Church's opposition to an FTAA agreement was an important factor in the negative public opinion that in turn influenced the GoB's reluctance to move forward with negotiations. Ref C reported that in July 2002 CNBB was spearheading a National Campaign Against the FTAA, which, among other things, published a "scurrilous, error-filled 42-page pamphlet attacking the proposal and vilifying the 'imperialist' United States." Post is not in a position to determine, so long after the fact, whether the campaign and pamphlet were the work of the CNBB itself or of some of its more radical members. In September 2002, the Social Pastorate of the Catholic Church co-sponsored (along with the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), the PT, and some 30 other NGOs) an unofficial anti-FTAA referendum. If the Cardinal's characterization of the Brazilian Church's official position is accurate - and we do not doubt his word or his knowledge of Church affairs - then that official position has long since been drowned out in the public mind by the vocal, negative views on FTAA of some priests, bishops, and influential lay people. That said, the fact that the Church does not in fact oppose an agreement may prove useful in the months ahead. More generally, Hummes's insights into the current Brazilian political scene are well-informed and lucid, and it is clear he is following the situation closely and is in contact with all the major players. End comment.
¶9. (U) This cable was cleared/coordinated with Embassy Brasilia. McMullen