

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07THEHAGUE1295, NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: EXTENSION REVIEW
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07THEHAGUE1295.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07THEHAGUE1295 | 2007-07-05 16:17 | 2011-01-17 00:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy The Hague |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #1295/01 1861617
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051617Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9745
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2662
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0283
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAFVS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001295
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA, EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: EXTENSION REVIEW
OFFICIALLY BEGINS
Classified By: Am...
"
114457,7/5/2007 16:17,07THEHAGUE1295,"Embassy The
Hague",SECRET//NOFORN,,"VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #1295/01 1861617
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051617Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9745
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2662
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0283
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAFVS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
","S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001295
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA, EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: EXTENSION REVIEW
OFFICIALLY BEGINS
Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) Summary: The GONL sent a letter to the Dutch
Parliament on June 30 noting it will decide this summer
whether to extend its ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The
decision will follow an exhaustive review of all options,
including staying in the mission's current capacity, reducing
its contribution or moving to another location, or even
withdrawing altogether. Cabinet officials have stressed that
""all options are on the table,"" while public statements by
Defense Minister Eimert van Middelkoop in favor of remaining
in some capacity may have tipped the hand of the GONL and
temporarily unsettled the political process. Dutch officials
are cautiously optimistic that the conditions are in place to
arrive at a positive extension decision, but stress that
sequencing is vital: first the review of options, then
consultations with Allies, followed by a decision and
subsequent debate with Parliament. End summary.
Important First Step
--------------------
¶2. (C) Following its June 29 meeting, the Dutch Cabinet sent
a letter to Parliament stating that the GONL will decide this
summer whether it will extend its ISAF mission in Afghanistan
beyond August 2008, and if so, in what capacity. The letter
notes that the Cabinet will investigate the ""options and
desirability of continuing to make a contribution"" to ISAF.
The review will be conducted in accordance with the set
criteria required for parliamentary consent prior to
deploying Dutch troops abroad (""toetsingskader""). The letter
formally begins the Article 100 process -- more importantly,
it means the GONL can formally solicit contributions from
other NATO Allies to team with the Dutch in Uruzgan province.
¶3. (S) In a July 2 meeting with Ambassador Arnall, Pieter de
Gooijer (MFA Director General for Political Affairs)
confirmed that issuing the letter represents an important
step toward a possible extension. Although, for political
reasons, the GONL remains restricted from expressing support
for a particular option, de Gooijer said it ""was fair to say""
that the Cabinet appears to be quietly moving in that
direction. He stressed, however, that there is not yet a
firm consensus within the Cabinet, and some members are still
holding out for significant concessions (e.g., more money for
Defense, a significant mission in Africa for Development).
De Gooijer noted that the six key ministers (the Prime
Minister, two Deputy Prime Ministers, and the ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Development and Defense) will meet on July
12 to consider next steps and hopefully steer the process in
a positive direction.
One Step Beyond
---------------
¶4. (C) Following the June 29 Cabinet meeting, Cabinet
ministers emphasized to the press that ""all options were
currently on the table,"" and that the GONL would decide
whether to extend once the review of options had been fully
completed. During one of the press interviews, however,
Defense Minister van Middelkoop seemingly tipped the hand of
the GONL by noting that ""the political intention is to stay,
be it in a more modest form."" He explained that other Allies
should take more responsibility, and that some tasks could be
phased out to Allies, thereby leading to a trimmed-down Dutch
extension. Van Middelkoop acknowledged that ending the
mission was an option, but ""the intention is to continue in
some form.""
¶5. (C) Van Middelkoop's remarks prompted a firestorm of
criticism from both supporters and critics of the current
mission. Supporters lamented that van Middelkoop hamstrung
the extension review before it started as critics will argue
that any such review will be subjective in nature as the GONL
attempts to achieve van Middelkoop's stated desire to remain
in Uruzgan. Critics worried that van Middelkoop's remarks
might send the wrong signal to NATO and Washington, thereby
lifting them off the hook by telling them it was not
necessary for military planners to initiate contingencies
should the Dutch opt not to extend.
¶6. (C) Following van Middelkoop's remarks, Prime Minister
Balkenende clarified the GONL ""official position"" -- the
Dutch will investigate whether to continue, and if so, ""how
and in what way."" But in no sense had the GONL made any
decision on an extension. He emphasized that ""matters should
be done in the right order,"" and declined to acknowledge any
current political intention to extend. Balkenende added that
the decision should be made with careful consideration of all
arguments -- ""all options remain on the table."" He said the
GONL's decision would be made this summer, perhaps as late as
September, following a ""very intensive process.""
... And a Step Backwards
------------------------
¶7. (C) Van Middelkoop began the July 2 parliamentary hearing
on Afghanistan by backtracking on his earlier comments. He
characterized his remarks as a ""slip of the tongue,"" and
emphasized that the GONL would first review all options prior
to making any decision to extend. Van Middelkoop reiterated
this clarified position on July 3 in a meeting with
Ambassador Arnall. He stressed that ""all options were on the
table"" and that his suggestion that the Dutch remain in a
limited capacity was ""a mistake,"" and not a case of ""being
too honest."" Van Middelkoop said his remarks required an
apology to Parliament, for which he was ""beaten up for 15
minutes,"" and then the Afghanistan debate continued as it had
previously.
¶8. (C) In his meeting with Ambassador Arnall, van Middelkoop
commented on the Dutch participation in heavy fighting around
Chora in the previous few weeks. He said the Dutch had been
""very lucky"" that the Dutch commander on the ground had made
the right tactical decision to stay and fight. Van
Middelkoop also praised the Afghan security forces, noting
that they had ""fought well."" He said there was still some
fighting and instability in the region, which was one of the
major reasons why he was visiting Afghanistan on July 5-6.
¶9. (C) Van Middelkoop also commented on prospects of
persuading the Dutch Parliament to support an extension. He
said part of his challenge with Parliament involves the
position of his predecessor and current parliamentary member
Henk Kamp, who has adamantly stated that the Dutch deployment
in Uruzgan should last for two years, and ""only two years.""
In order to overcome Kamp and others, van Middelkoop said the
GONL must present sound arguments -- ""the military,
political, and financial lines of reasoning all must be
convincing."" Ambassador Arnall commented that van Middelkoop
has more flexibility on the ground than Kamp, to which the
Defense Minister smiled.
¶10. (C) Officially, the GONL does not yet have an opinion on
any particular option. But in private, van Middelkoop said
the best option to extend in Afghanistan probably involves a
more modest contribution with the support of additional
partners. He characterized the partnership with Australia as
good, but said more help was needed from other Allies in
order to convince Parliament. He said the next step was for
he and Foreign Minister Verhagen to travel to NATO and make
the case for additional assistance. He assessed the
political situation on a possible extension as typical
""coalition politics,"" and repeated previously made remarks
that ""we are still in the fog"" regarding an extension, ""but
we are moving in the right direction.""
Parliamentary Hearing
---------------------
¶11. (C) In a three hour parliamentary session o July 2,
parliamentarians from both sides of thepolitical spectrum
raised concerns regarding the heavy fighting around Chora and
subsequent civilian casualties. They initially lambasted van
Middelkoop for his comments regarding the political intent to
extend, but later seemed to accept his apology.
Parliamentarians from the left, including Socialist Harry van
Bommel and Green Left Mariko Peters, said van Middelkoop's
comments will send NATO and Washington the ""wrong signal,""
especially as NATO is ""responsible"" for finding an Ally to
replace the Netherlands -- ""now NATO will think that the
Dutch will extend and plans to replace us will not commence,""
said van Bommel.
¶12. (C) No new arguments were raised during the hearing.
While all members of the parliamentary foreign affairs
committee raised concerns about civilian casualties, all
comments made were reasoned and emotionally restrained. Both
Verhagen and van Middelkoop noted four on-going
investigations (the Dutch military, the UN, ISAF, and Human
Rights Watch) following the fighting in Chora, and promised
to deliver results of the investigations as soon as they
become available. Separately, MFA Task Force Uruzgan
Coordinator Pieter Jan Kleiweg de Zwaan told emboffs July 3
that they expect the Dutch military investigation to be
completed on or around July 10. Privately Kleiweg was
worried that the investigations might contradict one another,
further muddling an already confusing situation.
¶13. (C) Other concerns voiced by parliamentarians included
the cost of the deployment, poppy eradication, and relations
with Pakistan. Both Verhagen and van Middelkoop said it was
""too simplistic"" to classify the Dutch deployment as either a
military or reconstruction mission -- both are necessary in
order to be successful. Verhagen argued that intense
fighting in Chora did not mean that reconstruction in Uruzgan
was impossible. Development Minister Koenders began to lay
the foundation necessary to make the argument later in the
summer and fall that reconstruction was not only possible,
but in fact working in Uruzgan. In response to a question
from Labor Party (PvdA) spokesperson Angelien Eijsink, van
Middelkoop refuted claims made in the Dutch periodical
Elsevier that the Dutch military had released a senior
Taliban leader. He explained that Afghan authorities had
initially made the arrest, and the Dutch offered to hold the
individual briefly before returning him to Afghan
authorities.
Government Strategy
-------------------
¶14. (S) While cautiously optimistic, the working level
continues to emphasize PM Balkenende's message that the GONL
""check all the boxes"" during its review prior to making an
official extension decision. Kleiweg told emboffs July 2
that the six ministers most responsible for making a decision
to extend (Balkenende and Verhagen from the Christian
Democratic Alliance, Deputy Minister/Finance Minister Bos and
Koenders from the Labor Party, and Deputy Minister/Minister
for Youth and Family Affairs Rouvoet and van Middelkoop from
the Christian Union) have already met on several occasions,
and dynamics among the ministers are ""good."" Kleiweg
characterized the ministers as ""moving in the right
direction,"" and deflected suggestions that Finance Minister
Bos might be problematic. He said ""The Six"" will meet again
on July 12 prior to the summer break to discuss various
extension options.
¶15. (C) Kleiweg noted that the Dutch have yet to formally
solicit contributions from other NATO Allies to any Dutch
etension in Uruzgan. He said the GONL first will idntify
options and possible tasks that could be flled by others
prior to approaching Allies. Kleweg acknowledged that the
Dutch are ""picky"" whenit comes to the question of which
Allies to apprach -- any potential partner has to ""speak the
sae language"" and possess a ""similar outlook"" when i comes
to reconstution efforts. He also noteda certain
reluctance on the part of the Dutch miitary to incorporate
elements from yet another mlitary -- but such hesitancy will
need to be overome should the review determine the best
chance f an extension involves teaming with another Ally.
¶16. (C) Once tasks and partners are identified,Kleiweg said
the USG and SACEUR could be helpful in persuading these
Allies to team with the Dutch -- provided the government opts
for an extension. When asked about possibly teaming with
U.S. forces, Kleiweg said the Dutch ""have no problem"" with
U.S. forces under ISAF command. He noted, however, that
OEF/ISAF deconfliction continues to be a sensitive issue in
the Netherlands, especially as the dividing line between the
two becomes more blurry.
¶17. (C) Low public support for both the current mission and
any extension continues to be a problem. Kleiweg said the
GONL is looking at respected ""international voices"" to enlist
to try and influence public opinion. He noted that the GONL
had arranged through NATO the visit of several Afghan
parliamentarians to the Netherlands. While the trip was a
success, Dutch and Afghan media considered the visit ""NATO
propaganda,"" Kleiweg said. He noted that the individual with
the most power to change Dutch public opinion was Afghan
President Karzai, but acknowledged even that might have
changed in recent weeks given Karzai's criticism of the Dutch
military action in Chora. Kleiweg said Karzai intends to
visit the Netherlands in December -- ""hopefully long after
the Dutch have made a decision on extending,"" he added.
Uruzgan Gov. Monib might be another option, although Kleiweg
said GONL relations with Monib are no longer that strong as
Monib appears more interested in events in Kabul than in
Uruzgan, while Monib's travel ban remains problematic. Other
international respected voices might include individuals such
as UN SYG Ban Ki-Moon, Kleiweg said.
Detention Policy
----------------
¶18. (C) Kleiweg told emboffs July 3 that the GONL has
circulated a draft letter among RC-South contributing nations
to the Afghan government requesting greater access for the
Afghan Independent Human Rights Council to detainees held in
Afghan prisons. The draft letter was an action item derived
from the latest RC-South conference held in The Hague in June
¶2007. According to Kleiweg, the GONL, as well as the
governments of Canada, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and
Australia have all approved the draft letter. He inquired if
the USG had reviewed the letter and had any comments; emboffs
said they would check with Washington.
Inter-Governmental Dynamics
---------------------------
¶19. (S//NOFORN) Working level contacts describe the
relationship between Verhagen and Koenders as ""contentious
but not outright hostile."" Instead of direct confrontation,
the two often wage battles through their staffs at the
working level, said MFA Security Affairs Chief Robert de
Groot. That said, when the two ministers agree, the
resulting decision has added weight and is often ""ironclad.""
Van Middelkoop is described as ""the third wheel,"" or the
""inexperienced junior partner"" by working level contacts.
While substantively knowledgeable, his inexperience in the
government is obvious, and he often defers to Verhagen and
Koenders.
¶20. (S//NOFORN) According to working level contacts, Koenders
has a ""voracious apetite"" for information on Afghanistan --
""he want to know how many grains of sand are in Uruzgan,""
said Kleiweg. While he has an almost equal statu to
Verhagen on Afghanistan behind closed doors,Koenders resents
being viewed as subordinate to he other two ministers in
public. ""He cannot stad waiting for two hours to speak
during a parliaentary hearing, and then be restricted to
only tn minutes of speaking time,"" said Task Force Deput
Coordinator Dewi van de Weerde. Working level ontacts also
describe him as incapable of making decision, which could
play into extension consierations.
Comment
-------
¶21. (S) Van Middelkoop's comments -- while seemingly positive
from our perspective -- temporarily unsettled the political
debate on extending. Cabinet members were reportedly
incensed by van Middelkoop's blunder, but his public mea
culpa seems to have appeased naysayers in Parliament.
Despite it, the GONL once again appears to be on the same
page in its efforts to create the conditions necessary to
arrive at a positive extension decision. There is a process
-- an exhaustive review followed by consultations -- that
must be followed in order for this to work, and Balkenende is
shepherding it through. Finance Minister Bos could still
prove problematic, but working level contacts suggest he will
be reasonable. As the Dutch are fond of saying, ""do not
disturb the brooding hen"" -- which we will no doubt hear
often over the course of the summer and into the fall.
ARNALL