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Viewing cable 06THEHAGUE380, DUTCH MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06THEHAGUE380 | 2006-02-21 11:37 | 2011-01-18 17:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague |
Appears in these articles: http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2011/01/18/amerikanen-de-aivd-keek-neer-op-nctb/ |
VZCZCXRO3488
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTC #0380/01 0521137
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 211137Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4874
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTC/AMCONSUL AMSTERDAM 0391
RHMFIUU/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 000380
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/UBI, S/CT, D/HS, INL
HOMELAND SECURITY FOR DSEQUEIRA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2011
TAGS: PTER PINR PINS PGOV NL
SUBJECT: DUTCH MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE
COUNTER-TERRORISM REGIME, BUT WEAKNESSES REMAIN
REF: A. THE HAGUE 368
¶B. 05 THE HAGUE 2705
¶C. 05 THE HAGUE 2648
Classified By: GLOBAL ISSUES CHIEF SUSAN GARRO
FOR REASONS 1.5(B) and (D)
¶1. (C) Summary: The GONL has taken important steps since 2001
to bolster its ability to counter terrorism. It has passed
tough new legislation, revamped institutional structures,
strengthened the security of critical infrastructure, and
devoted substantial personnel and financial resources to the
counter-terrorist (CT) effort. Still, the country remains
vulnerable due to its large, alienated Muslim population, the
prominent roles its armed forces have played in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and the large volume of passengers and cargo
passing through Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The Netherlands,
traditional consensus model of government has complicated the
development of an effective counter-terrorist regime. The lack
of a single, identifiable authority empowered to act in the
event of an attack remains a significant weakness. This cable
reviews Dutch counter-terrorism efforts and highlights
strengths and weaknesses. End Summary.
-------------------------------------
Public Perceptions and Political Will
-------------------------------------
¶2. (U) Unlike France, Spain, Britain, and other European
countries that faced terrorist threats long before September
11, 2001, the Netherlands has had little such experience in
recent decades. Terrorism was not even mentioned in statutes
as a separate criminal offense until 2001. Since then, the
Netherlands has adopted several legislative and administrative
measures that permit authorities to act against suspected
terrorists before they carry out an attack. The November 2004
murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a young Dutch-born Muslim
extremist focused political attention on the fact that the
Netherlands faces a growing threat from domestic as well as
transnational terror groups. Its large Muslim population --
the second largest in western Europe in percentage terms -- is
largely unassimilated and alienated, and some Muslim youth are
susceptible to radicalization. Since the murder, the GONL has
moved to strengthen its CT capability and to closely monitor
the activities of suspected domestic terror groups.
¶3. (C) The most recent assessment submitted to Parliament
established the threat level in the Netherlands as
"substantial." This is the second highest of the four threat
levels, and is defined as a "realistic threat that the
Netherlands will experience a terrorist attack." According to
the assessment, the threat comes primarily from domestic
terrorist networks, though the role of international actors is
also important. Cabinet ministers have made numerous public
statements highlighting the potential for terror attacks, and
urging residents to be alert to suspicious activity. Dick
Schoof, Director General of Safety and Security in the
Interior Ministry, told us in late 2005 that Dutch officials
are working in a "nervous system," more alert than ever to
threats, but also more prone to over-reaction. A blue ribbon
committee tasked with advising the government on how to
improve its CT organizational structure, criticized the
government for reacting "hyper-sensitively" to security, and
for being too focused on specific incidents; the Brinkman
Committee concluded that the Netherlands was not yet
adequately prepared for a terror attack or major disaster.
¶4. (U) Opinion polls indicate that two-thirds of the Dutch
population fear a terrorist attack in the Netherlands within a
year. Public responses to calls for vigilance have highlighted
weaknesses in the government´s preparations for handling tips
from the public, including a lack of clear guidance on how or
where to report threats. To redress this, the GONL is
developing a national publicity campaign to raise public
awareness of government´s efforts to combat terrorism, and the
actions the public can take to prevent it. The creation of a
national call center to receive reports of suspected terrorist
activity is under discussion.
¶5. (C) Public perceptions of an emerging threat have also
shifted the balance between privacy -- long considered
sacrosanct by the Dutch -- and security. For example,
following an incident last spring at a public event in
Rotterdam, the police sent SMS text messages to 17,000 mobile
phones that had been present at the venue and posted photos of
attendees on the internet to solicit information from
bystanders. The absence of public criticism signaled a new
readiness to allow authorities access to personal data for law
enforcement purposes. Police ability to monitor Internet and
e-mail accounts is extensive, and is used with greater
frequency, with virtually no public objection.
---------------------------
Counter-Terrorism Structure
---------------------------
¶6. (U) There are three institutions with primary
responsibility for counter-terrorism: the Office of the
National Counter Terrorism Coordinator (NTCB), the civilian
intelligence service (AIVD), and the national police (KLPD).
NCTB
----
¶7. (U) The NCTB became operational in January 2005. Its
mandate is to coordinate all GONL counter- terrorism efforts,
including setting policy and recommending legislation and
resource allocations, and to facilitate cooperation between
intelligence, police, and prosecutors. After the London
attacks, for example, it was the NCTB that decided how the
Netherlands should respond. The NCTB is also responsible for
developing the periodic National Terrorist Threat Assessment.
The agency has a staff of 80 drawn from Justice, Interior,
Defense, Transportation, police and intelligence. It is headed
by a senior civil servant, Tjibbe Joustra, who has put his
strong bureaucratic skills to work to get the NCTB up and
running.
¶8. (SBU) A major weaknesses is the fact that the NCTB reports
to two ministers -- Justice and Interior. Despite the
designation of the Justice Minister as the CT coordinating
minister, with overall authority for coordinating government
response in the event of an attack, the Interior Minister
exercises considerable control over key elements of the
government´s CT tool kit, including the national police and
the civilian intelligence service. The Brinkman committee
recommended the merger of the Interior and Justice Ministries
into one "Department of Security," or alternatively, the
establishment of two new ministries, one for Security and one
for Administration and Law. Given political sensitivities,
government debate on the proposal has been deferred until
after the 2007 national elections.
¶9. (C) The NCTB is regarded with skepticism by AIVD, the Dutch
civilian intelligence service. Tensions escalated in late 2005
over accusations by the Dutch civilian and military
intelligence services that NCTB is simultaneously treading too
far into the intelligence field, and excluding the services
from the counter-terrorism dialogue.
¶10. (C) Despite these difficulties, the NCTB has helped to
strengthen Dutch counter-terrorism capabilities. It has
identified weaknesses in Dutch preparedness and proposed
solutions. In response to growing use of the internet for
radicalization and terrorist recruitment, for example, the
NCTB is developing a new cyber terrorism center, expected to
be operational by March 2006. (Note: Post has requested a
Science Fellow expert in Internet technology to coordinate
with this center. End Note.) National Counter Terrorism
Coordinator Joustra told us in January that he was satisfied
with the progress so far in establishing his agency and
strengthening the Netherlands´ counter terrorism capacity. He
said that from his perspective, the most important development
in 2005 was that "nothing happened," meaning that despite the
continuing threat, there had been no terrorist incidents.
Joustra said that two of his priorities for 2006 were
launching the public awareness campaign in February and
ensuring the effective operation of the cyber terrorism
center. He noted that more work was also needed on identifying
the sources of radicalization, as well as a stronger focus on
finding solutions.
National Police
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¶11. (C) The country,s national police service (KLDP) has
expanded and redirected its counter-terrorism efforts by
establishing a central counter-terrorism unit at police
headquarters and placing counter-terrorism experts in each of
the country,s 25 regional police districts. The KLPD
THE HAGUE 00000380 003 OF 004
reports to the Interior Minister, and is responsible for
everything from highway traffic control to trafficking in
persons. But KLPD chief Peter van Zunderd maintains that
counter-terrorism is his top priority. The number of CT
analysts assigned to the KLDP has doubled over the past year,
and the KLDP is engaged with the intelligence services in
preventive actions, including the closure of PKK training
camps, increased surveillance of radical Dutch mosques, and
the arrest of suspected members of the Hofstad group, a
loosely knit Muslim extremist group. The KLDP and some
regional police forces have also employed overt surveillance
techniques, referred to as "disturbing," to keep tabs on key
individuals and mosques believed to have radical tendencies.
¶12. (SBU) The KLPD also oversees the DKDB, the police unit
assigned to protect the royal family, senior politicians and
diplomats. Prior to September 11, the DKDB focused primarily
on the royal family, while the Prime Minister and other
ministers often walked or rode bicycles to work unaccompanied.
That has changed. The DKDB now provides close protection to
several ministers, at least two parliamentarians who have been
threatened by Muslim extremists, and a number of diplomats,
including the U.S. Chief of Mission and the Consul General in
Amsterdam. DKDB staff has more than doubled in recent years,
from 200 to 450. A confidential proposal by the Justice
Minister, leaked to the press in October 2005, calls for all
Dutch Parliamentarians and other VIPs to be included on a
national list of high-risk persons and buildings to receive
special protection.
¶13. (U) The Special Interventions Unit was established in June
2005 to bring together special police and military units to
respond rapidly to terrorist incidents. The new unit was
prominently and successfully deployed in the October 14
arrests of seven members of the Hofstad group believed to be
preparing imminent attacks on Dutch politicians and government
buildings.
Civilian Intelligence Service
-----------------------------
¶14. (C) Like the national police, the AIVD intelligence agency
has sharpened its focus on counter- terrorism since 2001.
Roughly 80 percent of the AIVD´s growing resources are now
devoted to counter-terrorism. The current staff of 1,100 is
due to be increased to 1,500 over the next several years. The
service regularly monitors activities at several mosques in
Amsterdam, Rotterdam and other major cities, cautions Muslim
clerics who foment radicalization, and provides evidence that
can be used for deportation of radical clerics. Three
foreign-born imams accused of promoting the radicalization of
Dutch Muslims were expelled in 2005 after losing deportation
appeals. AIVD has done a credible job identifying and
monitoring radical organizations, including the Hofstad Group.
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Structural Weaknesses
---------------------
¶15. (C) Despite devoting greater attention and resources to
both the police and intelligence services, shortcomings are
still evident. In particular, coordination continues to be
problematic. An interagency information sharing center, known
as the "info box," established to facilitate information
sharing among the police, intelligence services, the national
prosecutor´s office and the immigration service has been
criticized by some police officials as ineffective. While KLPD
Chief van Zunderd hails the mechanism as a significant
advance, other Embassy police contacts have complained that
the "info box" is more like a "black hole," and that
information flows in only one direction, from the police to
the AIVD. Some Interior Ministry officials complain that
regional police forces do not share information readily with
each other or with the KLDP. Nevertheless, many
counter-terrorism experts agree with politicians and senior
police officials that information exchange between the
services has improved. The coordinated arrests of Hofstad
group suspects in mid-October provided an indication of
improved coordination between the KLDP, AIVD and the Public
Prosecutor´s office, all of whom had been monitoring the
activities of the group.
¶16. (SBU) Dutch authorities have also been plagued by the
failure to retain in custody a number of prominent terrorist
suspects detained by the police. For example, alleged Hofstad
group leader Samir Azzouz was acquitted in April on charges of
plotting attacks on government buildings in 2004, because the
prosecution was unable to produce sufficient evidence of
"terrorist intent." His acquittal was upheld on appeal in
November. Azzouz was rearrested on October 14, along with six
other alleged Hofstad group members, on charges of planning
attacks on Dutch politicians and government buildings. Two of
those arrested have been released pending trial, reportedly
due to insufficient evidence to keep them in preventive
custody. Prosecutors have expressed confidence that they will
be able to win a conviction this time against Azzouz, who will
be tried under the provisions of the tougher 2004 law that
made membership in a terrorist organization a criminal
offence. Additional proposed legislation (ref c) is expected
to address some, but not all of the weaknesses in the GONL´s
ability to successfully prosecute terrorist suspects.
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Comment
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¶17. (C) The Dutch have made significant progress toward
constructing an effective counter-terrorism regime. The
recognition, inside and outside the government, that the
Netherlands is vulnerable to a terrorist attack has generated
political and societal support for the institutional changes
and resource allocation needed to strengthen the government´s
capacity to combat the threat.
¶18. (C) Despite the progress, weaknesses remain. Chief among
these is the absence of clear lines of authority. Government
decision-making on CT issues is slow and cumbersome, with
occasional public disagreements within the governing coalition
about policy priorities. Coordination among the various
government entities with counter- terrorism and public
security responsibilities is problematic. The nascent
information sharing mechanisms between intelligence and police
services need strengthening. Additionally, the Netherlands
needs to make significantly more progress on integrating its
large and largely alienated Muslim population to substantially
reduce the threat of radicalization and home-grown terror
attacks.
BLAKEMAN