

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 04THEHAGUE1793, EU/US COOPERATION IN THE UNGA AND ON...
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04THEHAGUE1793.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
04THEHAGUE1793 | 2004-07-16 12:55 | 2011-01-25 19:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001793
SIPDIS
IO FOR LAGON; DRL FOR KOZAK; GENEVA FOR DELAURENTIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2014
TAGS: PREL ECON PHUM KDEM AORC NL CH UN
SUBJECT: EU/US COOPERATION IN THE UNGA AND ON...
18800
2004-07-16
04THEHAGUE1793
Embassy The Hague
CONFIDENTIAL
04STATE153876
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001793
SIPDIS
IO FOR LAGON; DRL FOR KOZAK; GENEVA FOR DELAURENTIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2014
TAGS: PREL ECON PHUM KDEM AORC NL CH UN
SUBJECT: EU/US COOPERATION IN THE UNGA AND ON HUMAN RIGHTS
REF: A. STATE 153876
¶B. THE HAGUE 1737
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ANDREW SCHOFER, POLCOUNS, FOR REASONS 1.4
AND D
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Dutch are deeply committed to the Transatlantic
Dialogue, a successful EU Presidency, and leadership during the UN Gene
Assembly that values USG input if not always agreeing with it. In
discussions with DRL PDAS Kozak and IO DAS Lagon on July12 - 13, Dutch
interlocutors acknowledged Chinese backsliding on human rights in the l
six months but did not expect this to influence EU thinking on lifting
China Arms Embargo. Dutch MFA and NGO officials remain terribly
troubled by Abu Ghraib and welcomed USG clarification regarding the
status of Guantanamo prisoners. The Dutch agreed to collaborate on a
US-EU package of agreed language to settle references to contentious
issues in Third Committee resolutions. USDel signaled new flexibility
UN Commission on Human Rights elections, prompting the Dutch to agree t
restart WEOG negotiations. Sudan, Chechnya, Iran, Burma, Turkmenistan,
and Zimbabwe seem likely subjects for Third Committee resolutions, whil
Belarus and Uzbekistan are not. End summary.
¶2. (U) China, Guantanamo, human rights and a range of United Nations
issues were the agenda in The Hague, June 12 - 13, for DRL PDAS Michael
Kozak's and IO DAS Mark Lagon's meetings with Dutch MFA officials. MFA
interlocutors included Special Ambassador for Human Rights Piet de Kler
Deputy Political Director Hermann Schaper, Human Rights Director Adanna
Adema, and Director of the UN Department Karel van Kesteren. The DCM
hosted an NGO reception and Lagon briefed a large group of university
students on U.S. Human Rights concerns and multilateral issues generall
CHINA ARMS EMBARGO AND BACKSLIDING ON HUMAN RIGHTS
¶3. (C) Amb. de Klerk will travel to China soon to review the human rig
situation. Schaper reminded USDel that the EU's embargo was a specific
response keyed to Tiananmen Square. It was not intended as retaliation
for human rights issues generally and was not imposed for military
considerations, although both concerns now prompt the USG push for
maintaining the ban. He admitted Chinese backsliding over the last six
months caused concern but stressed that this in itself was not a
sufficient argument for maintaining the embargo.
¶4. (C) The Dutch said that the next senior EU discussion of China in
September would focus on the last couple of years of Chinese actions.
EU will examine whether their China dialogue has made a difference on t
ground. The Dutch shared elements from the EU decision matrix:
a. The EU does not want the embargo to stand in the way of overall bett
relations.
b. Human rights is but one issue here; the question is more than is t
glass half full or half empty. There are more glasses on the table.
There has been recent backsliding, but overall the situation has improv
over the last 15 years. The embargo was a response to Tiananmen Square
c. The EU does not expect to export its best weapons to China should t
ban be lifted, and it does not want European weapons to be used or
deployed against U.S. forces.
d. What effect would lifting have on the US presidential elections; an
would it lead to Euro-bashing that would embarrass the Dutch EU
Presidency, for example.
¶5. (C) PDAS Kozak disputed the Dutch assertions regarding China's
improved human rights record and shared recent examples of China's
unfulfilled commitments. A dialogue without results was pointless, he
stressed. Regarding Tiananmen, Chinese restraint from running people o
with tanks in recent years could not justify lifting. He suggested the
should take a closer look at the status of those who were punished for
Tiananmen, if resolution of that issue is the threshold for lifting.
¶6. (SBU) USDel and NGO reps, meeting later at the DCM's residence,
brainstormed ideas for trying to use public opinion to deflect what loo
like a pending EU decision to lift the ban. One idea that resonated wa
to hold a European NGO forum on the Chinese human rights situation earl
in the fall.
GUANTANAMO AND OTHER DETAINEES IN THE WAR ON TERROR
¶7. (C) Dutch MFA officials and NGO reps remained terribly troubled b
what happened at Abu Ghraib and were clearly hungry for the latest
information on the status of all detainees (ref b). Discussions of the
new Cuba resolution in ECOSOC (ref b) led to thinking about how to a
discussion of how improve Dutch and EU public opinion, including
development of new public affairs products or informal visits to
Guantanamo by an EU or EU Presidency rep. USDel did not commit to thes
proposals but promised to study options.
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
¶8. (U) UN Priorities for 59 UNGA
The USG's UNGA priorities paper has inspired the EU to devise a concise
working paper of their own, the Dutch told us. They promised to study
UNGA priorities (septel) and offered to review the EU list with us late
in the week as well (septel).
¶9. (C) Working together at the UNGA - Third Committee
USDel committed to sending the EU a draft package of agreed language to
settle references in resolutions to contentious issues in the Third
Committee, including how to refer to the International Criminal Court,
death penalty, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, among
others. The Dutch agreed to vet our draft at the EU's September COHUM
(working group on human rights) and to arrange a bilateral meeting, if
needed, to work out problems. This might be in Brussels on or about
October 1, or in Warsaw around the same time.
¶10. (C) Country specific issues included:
- Sudan: We agreed to wait to see what the Security Council would do
before considering Third Committee action to follow on the UNCHR
resolution. (Sudan is discussed in more detail below).
- Burma: We agreed there is a need to have Third Committee action.
- Turkmenistan: The EU wondered if it made sense to table another
resolution this year. Not doing so might send the wrong signal. On th
other hand, we are trying to streamline the UN agenda. The EU suggeste
we could run one last resolution and announce that henceforth we would
focus on action in the UNCHR.
- Zimbabwe: USDel offered to support any British action in New York if
they want to have a resolution there.
- Belarus and Uzbekistan: We agreed that there is no need for Third
Committee action since rapporteurs have been already been assigned.
UN REFORM
¶11. (C) Reformed and better UN
Geopolitical reality and strategic practicality inspire the Netherlands
devotion to the multilateral system with an active, constructive, and
reformed UN at the center, Schaper said. The upcoming review of the
Millennium Development Goals is a natural deadline for UN reforms. DAS
Lagon assured him that the US is as committed to building up the UN as
have been to reforming it, however we cannot single-handedly reach the
goal of a UN living up to its original purposes.
¶12. (C) The Dutch do not want UN reform to stall over Security Council
enlargement. They favor, eventually, one EU seat. The MFA working lev
however, opposes Germany's SC seat bid, but publicly the MFA has had to
along for now. On voting, the Dutch have proposed to SYG Annan a votin
weight system as follows: 1/3 based on being a member of the UN; 1/3
based on population; and 1/3 based on the total amount of assessed and
voluntary contributions to the UN.
¶13. (U) Community of Democracies/Democracy Caucus
In courting the wary Dutch to become involved, we reassured them that t
Democracy Caucus (DC) would augment, not compete, with traditional,
long-standing groups. Admitting the idea has theoretical merit, the Du
remained curious about how the Caucus would admit borderline members.
noted that UN PermRep Danforth cited the DC in his confirmation hearing
and thought it a useful tool not limited to use in human rights but als
good for development issues, UN reform, and so on.
UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACTION FOR COUNTRY SPECIFIC CONCERNS
¶14. (C) UNCHR Elections
We signaled U.S. readiness to restart negotiations over an agreed WEOG
slate for UNCHR elections, with new flexibility on forgoing membership
two years, rather than one, out of 21. Van Kesteren, co-chair (with th
Canadians) of earlier negotiations on this issue, agreed to explore
restarting negotiations based on this welcome information. He added th
the U.S. might end up having to relinquish three years to get a deal.
added that, after the Security Council, membership on the UNCHR was a
valuable prize for many states. DAS Lagon reported the French seemed
prepared to work it out so WEOG could focus on substance and discourage
the current practice of vote trading with undesirable countries from ot
regions. Finally, van Kesteren fingered Austria as a problem country t
insisted on maintaining their position based on the established pattern
Commission membership.
¶15. (C) Sudan
The Dutch felt the time was ripe for a SC resolution on Sudan. There w
serious problems with both sides and sanctions might be appropriate. I
reviewing the earlier, troublesome Geneva negotiations on the Sudan
resolution and what to do in the Third Committee, the Dutch predicted N
York discussions would again be a triangle between the U.S., EU and
African Union (AU). USDel urged the EU to avoid surprises like the dea
it cut with the AU behind our backs on the last day of talks in Geneva.
We agreed it would be useful to try to split the AU members by peeling
South Africa and other AU members chafing under the AU's lowest common
denominator protection of Sudan. There was consensus not to let
discussion of the genocide question delay or thwart more immediate
action.
¶16. (SBU) NGOs suggested that finding a political solution should be m
higher on the agenda. The rep from Doctors Without Borders complained
that the NGOs are under new threats because both government and rebels
object to their perceived sharing of information from the field with th
outside world. PDAS Kozak regretted that information sharing caused
problems, and said it is important for the GOS to know we are collectin
facts so as to hold them accountable.
¶17. (SBU) Chechnya
NGOs believed the international community has increasingly abandoned
Chechnya and that the situation has become more criminalized in the las
four years. Dutch MFA officials had earlier admitted that the EU has a
bloody nose on this intractable issue. PDAS Kozak reassured NGOs tha
we raise Chechnya with the Russians all the time and have not let
terrorism get in the way of promoting human rights.
¶18. (C) Iran
The Dutch reported a meeting the EU had in Teheran three weeks ago wher
academics and officials discussed police, prisons, and the legal system
Discussions were much more uni sono than half a year ago since
opposition parliamentarians were absent. There are serious questions n
whether to continue the dialogue and there will be a decision by early
October, they told us. The Dutch reminded USDel that they see the
non-proliferation issue as part of a broader relationship with Iran tha
includes expanding business opportunities.
MEETING WITH UNIVERSITY STUDENTS
¶19. (U) DAS Lagon had a cordial dialogue with 25 student leaders from
Dutch universities who asked about the U.S.'s lack of participation wit
the ICC, its support of Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its
perceived unilateral approach to the war in Iraq, and its treatment of
human rights in the broader war on terrorism. Praising the EU's cultur
of dialogue as a model for other nations, Lagon cautioned that American
realpolitik is a reaction to a belief that the rest of the world has a
less mature approach to international relations. Lagon warned that tha
an extended process of seeking consensus often delayed urgent action.
Rejecting allegations of U.S. unilateralism, Lagon described America's
involvement in many multilateral efforts. Public diplomacy could rever
impressions of American unilateralism and build greater consensus for U
actions. He suggested exchange programs, greater awareness by American
politicians of their global audiences, and discussions such as the one
was currently having were important elements in such a strategy.
COMMENT
¶20. (C) Commitment to the Transatlantic Dialogue underlies much of the
Dutch UN agenda during their EU Presidency. Their exchanges with the
USDel were productive, showed flexibility and receptiveness to US ideas
and a drive to find consensus while doing their duty for national and E
positions. Their promise to work more closely on the Sudan human right
resolutions in New York was welcome and signaled good intentions on the
wider range of issues. On the other hand, their narrowing of the China
arms embargo debate to Tiananmen Square left us little room to argue th
larger human rights and military points of the issue. Immediately on
Guantanamo and longer term in general, the Dutch public remains recepti
to fresh public diplomacy efforts providing information they can use to
justify alignment with U.S. positions.
RUSSEL