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Viewing cable 05PARIS2333, GWOT ASSESSMENT: EMBASSY PARIS FEEDBACK
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05PARIS2333 | 2005-04-07 13:21 | 2010-11-30 16:30 | SECRET | Embassy Paris |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002333
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/PGI (BUCKNEBERG) AND S/CT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2014
TAGS: PTER PREL FR
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: EMBASSY PARIS FEEDBACK
REF: A. STATE 60796
¶B. 04 PARIS 8983
¶C. PARIS 280
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION ALEX WOLFF, FOR REASONS 1.4 B/D
¶1. (S) Summary: U.S.-French cooperation on terrorism is
mature and broad-based. For a number of reasons, including
the memory of terrorist attacks in Paris during the 1980s,
the French bring significant expertise, focus and
determination to their C/T activities, and are valued
partners for a wide range of USG agencies. C/T cooperation
with the USG is largely insulated from the day-to-day
political and diplomatic tussles that can make the French
often difficult allies. Notwithstanding this solid
foundation, Post has outlined three areas where we believe
our C/T objectives can be better served, and proposes
suggestions to implement these objectives. End summary.
---------------------------------
A MATURE, SUCCESSFUL RELATIONSHIP
---------------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Embassy Paris comprises one of the widest range of
USG agency representation anywhere in the world. Many of
these agencies play a role in the remarkably broad
U.S.-France security and counter-terrorism relationship. In
addition to State's Consular, Diplomatic Security, Economic,
Political, and Public Diplomacy sections that each handle
pieces of the terrorism portfolio, other non-State sections
in Paris that deal with the French on terrorism issues
include the DEA, the Defense Attache, a DOJ liaison
prosecutor, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) located
in Paris and in the port cities of Le Havre and Marseilles,
Legatt/FBI, NCIS, OSI, ROAL, a Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) representative, and the Secret Service.
A significant portion of the work of the Embassy's EST office
is now counterterrorism-related. Other non-traditional
security-oriented offices also contribute to counterterrorism
work. For example, the Foreign Agricultural Service Office
liaises with French agriculture authorities on biosafety
risks. In addition, USG personnel are assigned to Interpol
headquarters in Lyon, France's second largest city.
¶3. (S) Two reasons for this breadth of USG representation are
1) France's own outsized role internationally and within the
EU on counter-terrorism issues; and 2) a long-term
institutional desire by the GOF to maintain close relations
with USG C/T professionals. In addition to this permanent
USG presence, delegations from the United States often visit
France to discuss specialized aspects of C/T. Two noteworthy
recent examples were a DOE/NRC/NSC/STATE visit in January on
the protection of nuclear facilities and radiological
materials. The visit has led to the development of the a
multi-year program to share best practices, swap observers at
nuclear security exercises, and collaborate scientifically to
improve passive security measures for nuclear facilities.
Also, in December 2004, then-Secretary of Health and Human
Services Tommy Thompson led an HHS/STATE delegation to a G-8
meeting hosted in France to engage at a deeper level on the
threat of bioterrorism. The ongoing work of the Bioterrorism
Experts Group includes such items as best practices in
protection of the food supply; information sharing on
zoonotic diseases; licensing issues on medical
countermeasures; sharing of information regarding vaccine
availability; and the sharing of national response plans.
France hosted two bioterrorism conferences in April in Lyon:
the first Interpol conference devoted to this subject and a
WHO-sponsored meeting on Biosafety and Biorisks. France
participates actively in these fora and sends experts to
U.S.-hosted biosafety/biorisk seminars in the U.S.
¶4. (S) Internationally, France is a long-standing contributor
of military troops and assistance in Afghanistan and a French
admiral is regularly in the rotation to command Task Force
150, a multinational naval force that patrols the Red Sea and
the Persian Gulf to interdict the movement of suspected
terrorists from Afghanistan to the Arabian Peninsula. French
Special Forces also operate closely with coalition forces in
Afghanistan. It is a key member of the UN's
Counter-Terrorism Committee and the G-8's Counter-Terrorism
Action Group, and it has supported (and co-sponsored, where
possible) terrorist designations to the UN's 1267 sanctions
committee. Bilaterally, France recently signed two updated
agreements on extradition and counter-terrorism cooperation,
and cooperates closely on Container Security Initiative (CSI)
and airline security issues. Domestically, France continues
to hold in pretrial detention 6 of the 7 ex-GTMO French
citizen detainees (the seventh was declared not an enemy
combatant by the Department of Defense). All six will be
charged with "terrorist conspiracy," which has a maximum
sentence of ten years. Most recently, terrorism
investigating judges and prosecutors successfully argued for
the conviction of Djamel Beghal and five accomplices arrested
in 2001 on suspicion of planning to bomb the U.S. Embassy in
Paris. Beghal and his five accomplices were convicted on
March 15 and all received jail sentences. Other significant
C/T operations include the dismantling of a local cell of
"French jihadists to Iraq," a raid on and continuing
investigation of the MEK presence in France, the dismantling
of a GICM cell, and the near-destruction of ETA support cells
in the south of France. Additional examples are reviewed in
ref B.
----------------
AREAS TO IMPROVE
----------------
¶5. (S) As noted in ref C, France often appears to react
differently to terrorism and radical Islam depending on its
distance from it. Within its borders, the GOF reacts
proactively, with speed and firmness. Elsewhere in the
world, it is much more equivocal. Political and diplomatic
considerations carry substantial weight, and sometimes trump
security considerations. A good example of this is continued
French intransigence within the EU on Hezbollah. It sees the
EU's listing of Hezbollah as a bad idea for Lebanon's
political stability and therefore, it continues to hold a
firm line against listing, despite a growing openness within
internal security circles to acknowledge that Hezbollah has
committed terrorist acts and should be considered a terrorist
organization. An approach that combines convincing the GOF
of a case's merits and, where necessary, isolating France
diplomatically offers the best chance of success, although in
this particular situation, it will prove difficult to
overcome the firm conviction of President Chirac and others
that designating Hezbollah is a bad idea. Nevertheless,
France's intelligence and security services must be persuaded
by the existing evidence that Hezbollah is a terrorist
organization. Presenting the GOF with evidence of Hezbollah
involvement in terrorism in the West Bank and Gaza is
particularly important, as the GOF cannot overlook
Hezbollah's efforts to destroy the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process. Having the Palestinian leadership weigh in with the
French at a high level would be important as well; up to now,
the French have maintained that only the U.S. and Israel are
pressing them on Hezbollah, while the Palestinians remain in
the background on the issue. Second, France must be isolated
within the EU Clearinghouse. A number of EU countries hide
behind France's strong opposition, but if they are peeled
away, France may be more amenable. In general, France does
not like to be seen publicly as blocking consensus, a fact
that worked to our advantage in finally convincing the EU to
designate Hamas.
¶6. (S) The Embassy believes that a gap in French C/T planning
is its development of mass-casualty emergency response. The
GOF understands they have improvements to make and have begun
to conduct exercises to build and test their emergency
response capabilities. However, France could benefit from
observing the USG crisis simulation exercises. Post would
recommend, therefore, for the invitation (where possible) for
a GOF official to observe USG exercises and simulations. One
good recent example is the inclusion of two high-level French
officials as observers to the TOPOFF 3 simulation in the U.S.
Expanding on this worthy initiative, Washington might
consider inviting French officials as observers to other,
similar simulations in the U.S. and abroad, to include USG
training programs with other countries (such as those
referenced in Jakarta 4212). The French can be prickly if
given the impression that they need to be "trained" and in
addition, giving them decision-making roles is often best
avoided. One way to overcome these issues is to focus on
"professional exchanges" and invite them to observe
USG-organized emergency response simulations and allow them
to translate best practices to the French system. In
addition, Post will work to procure invitations for the USG
to observe French-led crisis simulations.
¶7. (S) As mentioned in para 1, U.S.-French C/T cooperation is
largely removed from daily political and diplomatic
pressures. One reason for this is that GOF counter-terrorism
is itself separated from the rest of the government.
France's intelligence-related agencies and coordinating
bodies - of which the DST, the RG, the DGSE and the SGDN are
primary examples - all deal with terrorism (although the DST
has a primary role domestically), but their investigations
and cases are guarded carefully and rarely shared with the
rest of the GOF. Similarly, the renowned terrorism
investigating judges - led by Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere -
operate in a different world than that of the rest of the
judiciary. In short, the GOF counter-terrorism community is
highly professional, but insular and centralized in Paris.
Because of this, judiciary and police services not directly
involved in counter-terrorism (but who may play an indirect
support role) have a largely insufficient understanding of
USG counter-terrorism policy and the judicial/investigative
procedures that frame this policy. To replace working-level
and upper management, France's counter-terrorism community
draws upon the available pool of judicial and security
professionals, many of whom have little understanding of the
U.S., its judicial/law enforcement system, and its law
enforcement organizational structure and resource
allocations. We need to reach these judicial and security
professionals as they begin their careers, and not only when
they enter the counter-terrorism community, sometimes with
already-formed prejudices. To this end, Post proposes
approaching the National Magistrate School, other
professional academies, and programs for already serving law
enforcement officials with offers to deliver lectures on U.S.
approaches to terrorism and law enforcement. We would
request assistance from Washington in developing these
proposals. Although in this case, results would probably not
be immediate, in the long run, the USG would have much to
gain by exposing French judicial and security professionals
to the U.S. counter-terrorism and law enforcement system at
an early stage in their careers.
LEACH