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Viewing cable 10RABAT8, GUINEA: THE WAY FORWARD
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10RABAT8 | 2010-01-08 11:17 | 2010-12-09 21:30 | SECRET | Embassy Rabat |
VZCZCXRO3317
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0008/01 0081117
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081117Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1026
INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 0018
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0001
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 0657
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 0595
RUEHDS/USMISSION ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0989
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY 0001
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0103
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY 0200
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0139
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL PRIORITY 0107
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY 0061
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0520
RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY 0040
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME PRIORITY 0568
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1183
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0459
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 0057
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RABAT 000008
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF, AF/W, NEA, NEA/MAG AND INR/AA
KINSHASA PLS PASS BRAZZAVILLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2020
TAGS: PINS PGOV PREL PINR GV MO
SUBJECT: GUINEA: THE WAY FORWARD
REF: A. 09 RABAT 1018
¶B. 09 RABAT 1009
RABAT 00000008 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Ambassador Samuel L. Kaplan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) Summary: Following a series of discussions in Rabat
on January 5, Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs Johnnie Carson signaled explicit USG support to
Guinean Defense Minister Sekouba Konate in his bid to lead
the country's transition to civilian rule. A/S Carson, along
with French Presidential Advisor for African Affairs Andre
Parant and Moroccan Foreign Minster Taieb Fassi Fihri, signed
a declaration indicating their commitment to the transition
process based on the plan proposed by ECOWAS facilitator
Blaise Compaore, President of Burkina Faso. Under the
declaration, wounded junta leader Captain Moussa Dadis
Camara, who remains hospitalized in Rabat, would be
prohibited from returning to Conakry as the signatories
pursue his resettlement to a third country. Konate departed
Rabat after meeting with A/S Carson and was expected to make
a public pronouncement in the near future in Guinea
announcing his intention to lead the transition to civilian
rule (Ref A).
¶2. (S) On January 7, King Mohammed VI called Gabonese
President Ali Bongo to request that Gabon host Dadis Camara;
according to the Moroccan MFA, Bongo declined. French
Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner planned to ask Congolese
President Denis Sassou-Nguesso if the Republic of the Congo
would host Dadis, and the GOM requested that we reinforce
that message. Finally, the GOM indicated that it would be
willing to participate in an international contact group
meeting on Guinea in Addis Ababa on January 26 and would
mobilize Arab support -- if an organization other than the
African Union (AU) convened the meeting. End Summary.
-----------------------
Moroccans Set the Stage
-----------------------
¶3. (C) Prior to meeting with Konate, A/S Carson met on
January 5 with Moroccan Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri and
Moroccan Director General for Studies and Documentation
(external intelligence service chief) Mohamed Yassine
Mansouri, the de facto national security advisor. Also in
attendance were Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director
General for Multilateral Affairs and Chief of Staff
Ambassador Nasser Bourita, Ambassador, DCM, and D/PolCouns.
French Presidential Advisor for African Affairs Andre Parant
had met with the Moroccans and with Konate on January 4, and
A/S Carson subsequently briefed French Ambassador Bruno
Joubert.
¶4. (S) Emphasizing Morocco,s goal of finding a way to
stabilize the situation in Conakry, Fassi Fihri reported that
in the past few days Konate had asserted his readiness to
begin the political transition in Guinea. Konate had told
the Moroccans that he would not name a Prime Minister but
would ask Guinean civil society, including the political
parties and the labor unions, to identify a leader until
elections could be held. Fassi Fihri added that Konate
recognized the inseparability of military and political
affairs and the need to disarm the militias and restructure
Guinean armed forces. Konate needed, however, the commitment
of support from Washington, Paris, and Rabat, evidenced by
signature of the declaration, to move forward, Fassi Fihri
said.
¶5. (S) Fassi Fihri went on to explain that Konate saw the
restructuring of the military as a three-to-five year process
RABAT 00000008 002.2 OF 004
before the country could claim to have a professional army.
Konate wished that violence and bloodshed such as seen in
Guinea and elsewhere on the continent would "never happen
again," and he recognized the need for those responsible,
from Dadis to the lowest ranking accomplice, to be brought to
justice either through Guinean courts or, if not credible, through an international tribunal, Fassi Fihri reported. As for the document expressing French, U.S. and Moroccan support for Konate, French Presidential Advisor for African Affairs Andre Parant had already signed it. Fassi Fihri said Konate would "keep it in his pocket" but needed the written assurance of support.
-------------
The U.S. Role
-------------
¶6. (S) A/S Carson and the Ambassador expressed appreciation
for the GOM's leadership on the issue and in the region,
noting the urgent need to set Guinea on the path to stability
and civilian rule. While recognizing the importance of
military restructuring, A/S Carson stressed the need to
address Guinea's economic situation as well by working to
develop a strategy for the country's economic revitalization.
Specifically, A/S Carson suggested that the United States
could seek the establishment of an international contact
group that would encourage economic assistance to Guinea,
engaging the World Bank and the IMF as well. He noted too
that U.S. Africa Command could visit Guinea to assess the
security sector and make recommendations on security sector
reform.
------------
Enter Konate
------------
¶7. (S) After more than one hour, Guinean Minister of
National Defense Sekouba Konate, who had been waiting nearby,
joined the meeting. A/S Carson thanked him for sharing
concerns about the future of Guinea and applauded his efforts
to resolve the situation in the country. He stated that
Guinea is at a crossroads and that Konate's leadership was of
crucial importance and could help ensure the country moved
along the road to stability and progress. A/S Carson
stressed that it was important for the transition to begin
and to lead in the shortest possible time to new elections,
adding that it was similarly important that Dadis not return
and participate in elections. Likewise, it would be
beneficial for Konate to facilitate the presence in Guinea of
a small ECOWAS monitoring group consisting of 30 to 40
diplomats and unarmed military personnel, which would lend
credibility to the transition process. A/S Carson noted
there was much international goodwill toward Guinea, and if
the country chose the path toward stability, economic
development, and civilian government, there would be help
along the way.
¶8. (S) Konate expressed his appreciation for A/S Carson's
message and repeated the importance of having the signed
document verifying support for his efforts. He repeatedly
expressed concern for his own security and for the security
of his country, but stated his readiness to return to Conakry
and put the Ouagadougou Accords in place. It was important
to begin, he said, adding that the violent events of
September 28 could be repeated if efforts were not made to
prevent violence. Konate stated explicitly that he would
engage the Forces Vives and others in support of the
transition and that he would not be a candidate in any future
elections.
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¶9. (S) Konate also stated that he supported a civilian
government of national unity and suggested that opposition
leader Jean Marie Dore serve as Prime Minister until
elections were held but asserted in this regard that he would
accept the decision of the opposition. Konate said the
military would agree to his role in leading the transition,
and he agreed it would be important to show that the army was
not engaged in politics. Claude Pivi (Dadis's half-brother)
and others closely affiliated with Dadis Camara and the junta
would similarly be excluded from participating in the
transition. Pivi was involved in the September 28 massacre,
Konate said, and should go to court (Ref A).
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Whither Dadis?
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¶10. (S) Carson did not meet with Dadis Camara, but discussed
his health with the Moroccans outside of Konate,s presence.
Fassi Fihri told A/S Carson that he has visited Dadis four
times since he was allowed into the country for medical care
(Ref B). According to the FM, Dadis has regained "80
percent" of his faculties, but has difficulty putting more
than five words together without 30-second pauses before the
next phrase or sentence. Fassi Fihri,s conversations with
Dadis had focused mainly on health issues, the FM said, with
Fassi Fihri urging him to fully recover before thinking about
politics and his future. Dadis has, however, expressed the
desire to leave, Fassi Fihri said, and has begun to wonder
why he has not been discharged from the hospital.
¶11. (S) Fassi Fihri and Mansouri suggested that once Konate
made his public pronouncement, Dadis would know he was
finished politically and it would be difficult for him to
return to Guinea. Concerted engagement by Konate with
political forces inside Guinea, and by the U.S. and France
with external forces such as ECOWAS and President Blaise
Compaore, to enlist support for Konate and his leadership
though a transitional period and their positive reaction to a
pronouncement would convince Dadis to go to a third country,
Fassi Fihri said. Konate was explicit that Dadis not be
allowed to return to Guinea and participate in the transition.
¶12. (S) A/S Carson outlined U.S. efforts to identify a
country to house Dadis Camara for the long term, noting that
Gabon, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Libya have been considered.
Fassi Fihri suggested that The Gambia or the Republic of the
Congo (Brazzaville) might be other options.
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The Road Ahead
--------------
¶13. (S) After A/S Carson relayed to ECOWAS facilitator
Blaise Compaore the contents of the meetings, Compaore
expressed his gratitude for the efforts and noted that this
could help break the impasse in Guinea. However, he noted
that Pivi seemed to be running the show in Guinea and asked
rhetorically if Konate would be able to bring the factions
together or whether a Konate pronouncement would bring
greater instability. The real issue for Compaore was whether
Konate would be able to command the support of the military.
Konate's stated intention was to move the country along the
path to economic progress and civilian rule. Konate departed
Rabat for Conakry on January 5.
¶14. (S) On January 7, King Mohammed VI called Gabonese
President Ali Bongo to request that Gabon host Dadis Camara;
according to Bourita, Bongo declined. French Foreign
Minister Bernard Kouchner planned to ask Congolese President
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Denis Sassou-Nguesso if the Republic of the Congo would host
Dadis, and the GOM requested that we reinforce that message.
Bourita told DCM that Morocco it would be willing to
participate in an international contact group meeting on
Guinea in Addis Ababa on January 26 and would mobilize Arab
support -- if an organization other than the African Union
(AU) convened the meeting. Having the AU convene is
unacceptable to Morocco because Morocco is not a member.
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Comment
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¶15. (C) Ambassador Carson,s trip was very productive and
clearly led to forward movement. Konate, who spoke very
softly, repeated several times that he was concerned about
his personal security. For its part, the GOM is anxious to
1) get Dadis Camara out of Morocco and 2) continue to support
the transition and reconstruction processes in Guinea. End
Comment.
¶16. (U) A/S Carson cleared paragraphs 1 and 3 through 13.
¶17. (U) Conakry and Tripoli minimize considered.
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