

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07LAPAZ3262, MILITARY STANDDOWN MORE LIKELY THAN HEAVY HAND
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07LAPAZ3262.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07LAPAZ3262 | 2007-12-14 23:21 | 2010-12-03 21:30 | SECRET | Embassy La Paz |
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHLP #3262/01 3482321
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 142321Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5974
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7435
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4800
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8713
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5939
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3153
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 3355
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 5138
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5790
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0399
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0818
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2027
TAGS: ASEC PREL PGOV PINL VN CU BL
SUBJECT: MILITARY STANDDOWN MORE LIKELY THAN HEAVY HAND
REF: A. LA PAZ 3261
¶B. LA PAZ 3119
Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Summary: Over the past couple of days statements from
military leaders have taken a conciliatory tone and moved
away from the confrontational rhetoric from Armed Forces
Commander General Wilfredo Vargas. Vargas relayed a message
to the Ambassador that his troops would only intervene in
"Media Luna" opposition states if leaders clearly break with
the constitution, for example by declaring independence. The
Vice President echoed a similar message in a December 14
meeting when he told the Ambassador that the government is
not planning a state of siege or military action unless it is
required to defend government offices or protect the people.
Although the military is making plans to deploy 70 additional
companies to opposition-led departments (states), military
planners have told us that President Evo Morales has given
them instructions not to incur civilian casualties. Field
commanders continue to tell us they will require a written
order from President Morales if asked to commit violence
against opposition demonstrators. Even with such an order,
commanders are prepared to stand down and confine their
troops to barracks. Imposing a police state on rebel
departments presents several difficulties: the military views
this as strictly a police function; the military does not
presently have the supplies or logistics in place to conduct
such an operation; many key officers have ties with the
opposition departments in the Media Luna; and the military
knows based on past history that they will be held
accountable. An influential senator told us the opposition
is not nearly as concerned with military heavy handedness as
they are with altiplano police and mysterious "foreign"
fighters. End Summary.
Vargas: With Evo or Against Evo?
--------------------------------
¶2. (S)xxxxxxxxxxxx asked Military
Group Commander on December 13 to tell the Ambassador that in
case of confrontations in opposition-led "Media Luna"
departments (states), troops would be deployed in the same
manner as during the violent November 23-24 Sucre
demonstrations: troops would protect military and government
property, but would not enforce a crackdown on civilians.
This contradicted xxxxxxxxxxxx' December 7 public statement that
"the true cowards are in the (opposition-controlled) Media
Luna" and that the military would "defend the homeland" in
Santa Cruz to ensure "the security of all." Although he
called for increased political dialogue, xxxxxxxxxxxx laid the
blame for any conflict in the future squarely with the
opposition for provoking and misinforming Bolivians, without
offering "any substantive solutions." But now xxxxxxxxxxxx has
changed his tune, saying he would only use the military to
quell civil disorder if the opposition acted in a clearly
unconstitutional way, for example by declaring independence.
He did not consider the proposal of autonomy statutes to be a
clear violation of the constitution. xxxxxxxxxxxx did stress,
however, that he would not tolerate insubordination or coup
plotting within his ranks. The Ambassador was also assured
by Vice President Garcia Linera on December 14 that the
government would not declare a state of siege or use the
military unless it needed to defend government offices or
protect people.
¶3. (S) That xxxxxxxxxxxx made his highly-political comments xxxxxxxxxxx angered many
commanders. Many commanders were also critical of xxxxxxxxxxx, as they feared it
opened the military to charges of taking political sides
beyond its institutional role.xxxxxxxxxxxx
¶4. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx had been,xxxxxxxxxxx a supporter
of U.S.-Bolivian military relations. Although he continues
to cooperate enthusiastically with us at a working level,
xxxxxxxxxxx his
public comments in the last few months have irritated
Bolivian military officers and raised eyebrows within the
Embassy. When given an opening to defend us regarding
conspiracy charges, he only said the charges should be
investigated. When given a chance to opine on Morales'
celebration of Che Guevara,s 1967 rebellion and criticism of
Bolivian troops, he said everyone has the right to their own
opinion.
Setting the Groundwork for Possible Military Action
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶5. (C) Government rhetoric calmed somewhat this week, with
officials including Morales making empty overtures about
dialogue and stressing that the opposition, not the
government, is pushing the country to conflict. But
government officials also warned that if dialogue failed and
opposition "sedition" continued, the government would have no
choice but to use force. "The state is disposed to use
institutions of force to preserve internal order and
democratic stability," said Government Minister Alfredo Rada.
Rada's Vice-Minister Ruben Gamarra said the government would
not allow department or civic officials to "threaten the
unity of the country" as a matter of constitutional
obligation. Gamarra said the military also supports this
position. The Vice President also told the Ambassador that
"the president and I must guarantee the country's integrity
and stability." The Ambassador made clear that the United
States supports a united and democratic Bolivia.
Military Leaders Stress Calm and Police Role
--------------------------------------------
¶6. (C) On December 12, the military spoke for itself, backing
away from confrontational remarks. Minister of Defense
Walker San Miguel confirmed that the armed forces were on
alert, but said the motive was to protect public and private
property, not to quell unrest. San Miguel told the press the
police are responsible for maintaining civil order, not the
military. San Miguel discounted any possibility of declaring
a state of emergency in opposition departments and criticized
"paranoid" opposition leaders for asserting that President
Morales had ordered an imminent "militarization." (Note:
Opposition rumors include appointing military officers
temporarily to state and city civilian leadership positions.
End Note.) San Miguel explained although there had been no
troop mobilizations, the military remains "concerned." Army
Commander Freddy Bersatti said he hoped God would guide
opposition leaders to make good decisions "for the peace and
coexistence of all Bolivians."
Military to Retreat from Civilian Confrontations
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶7. (C) Planning of troop deployments to opposition
departments was conducted December 7 and 8 and continued to
be refined this week. Participating commanders told us the
deployment would involve 70 companies. Army Chief of Staff
Gen. Freddy Mackay, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Daniel
Salazar, and Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Ernesto Roca are the
chief planners.
¶8. (S) A senior military planner told DAO December 13 that
President Morales wants the military to be careful to avoid
violent confrontations with demonstrators if called upon to
support Bolivian police. Despite public bravado, the planner
said Morales understands deaths will erode political support.
He confirmed some units have already deployed to key
locations throughout the Media Luna to secure gas lines,
public utilities, and government buildings. The planner said
the units would not be armed and would incorporate local
indigenous to minimize the potential for conflict. If the
opposition attempts to take these strategic locations by
force, the military would retreat.
Santa Chavez to Fund Bolivian Deployments
-----------------------------------------
¶9. (S) Until recently, it was unclear how such a deployment
would be funded. However, military contacts said December 13
that $5 million became available this week to fund an
increased military presence in opposition-led departments and
another $1.3 million had been allocated for non-lethal
supplies, such as riot-control gas. The money was supposedly
freed up from Venezuelan sources, but this is not confirmed.
It will take time, at least two weeks, before the new funding
results in equipped troops on the ground in opposition
departments.
¶10. (C) Supply and logistics issues continue to be an
operational impediment to any proposed military crackdown,
and it may take months before the new funding resolves these
shortcomings at remote posts. Bolivia has not spent any
money on ammunition in two years, and the capacity to quickly
move troops remains in doubt. xxxxxxxxxxx told xxxxxxxxxxx he had
only two trucks and enough fuel to send his single plane on
one reconnaissance mission.
Venezuelan Cash and Foreign Fighters
------------------------------------
¶11. (S) xxxxxxxxxxx said Morales understands he risks
losing the military if he pushes them into a police force
role. Because of this, he felt Morales would rely on the
police from the altiplano and "volunteers from other
countries" to combat opposition forces should an open
conflict develop. xxxxxxxxxxxx said Cuban hospitals could easily
be "converted to barracks," but had no idea how many
Venezuelan and Cubans would be willing or available to fight
for Evo's government.
¶12. (S) Military contacts are concerned a few rogue
commanders might obey orders to enforce a police state, their
loyalty greased with Venezuelan pay-offs. They asserted
Venezuelan money would also make it difficult for the
high-command to refuse such orders. Although Venezuelan
"bonuses" have cemented some loyalty, it has also created
much resentment in the mid- and lower-ranks and cost the high
command significant legitimacy. According xxxxxxxxxxx and field
commanders, there is also a high degree of frustration with
the perceived meddling of Venezuelan advisors in the internal
functions of the military and of overtly political statements
and actions of the high command (such as Army Commander
Bersatti's decision to wear a red poncho in solidarity with
the violent, pro-government Red Ponchos group a year ago).
Mixed Signals on Holiday Troop Strength
---------------------------------------
¶13. (C) Although planning and funding appear to be in place,
the military was sending out mixed signals as to its
intentions. There has been no order to extend assignments or
cancel leave, as would be expected prior to a major military
undertaking. About 70 percent of the army's conscript force
will be rotating during the first two weeks of January.
Allowing inexperienced troops to transfer into the bulk of
Media Luna enlisted positions, rather than keeping its
existing troops in place, might signal that the government
does not anticipate a major conflict in the near-future.
However, a senior military planner told DATT that keeping the
conscripts from rotating would be "more trouble than it is
worth" and that new troops would be more motivated. He also
anticipated an order canceling leave before December 19.
Another potential tripwire: graduations at the military
academy in Cochabamba Department were moved up four days to
December 12.
Field Commanders Set to Stand Down
----------------------------------
¶14. (S) Although xxxxxxxxxxx and others in the high command may be
coy, many field commanders continue to tell us they will not
participate in violence against opposition demonstrations.
xxxxxxxxxxx was on hand when a high-ranking civil defense
officer told the commander in Tarija Department to demand a
written order from President Morales if asked to take action
against opposition leaders or demonstrators. If they
received such an order, the officer advised non-compliance
and a post lock down to commanders from Cochabamba, Santa
Cruz, and Tarija. The civil defense officer told MILGP
Commander he expects commanders will not use force.
¶15. (C) xxxxxxxxxxx told Emboff that
Minister of Government Rada contacted the Navy leadership
when violent protests broke out in Cobija, Pando on November
30 and asked the Navy to step in and enforce order (Note:
the Navy is the strongest military branch in the department
of Pando). Navy commanders said they would comply when
provided a signed order from Morales. Rada never called
back. xxxxxxxxxxxx told PolOffs the air force in
Cobija was similarly requested to take control of the
civilian airport, requested a written order, and never got
one.
X-Factors: Institutionalism, Regionalism, and Wives
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶16. (C) xxxxxxxxxxx told us despite government and high-command
rhetoric about the military's "constitutional role," most
commanders thought the government violated the law and the
constitution by excluding the opposition from key sessions of
Congress and the Constituent Assembly and, therefore, "have
no right to invoke the constitution." A strong commitment to
institutionalism would require a rock-solid constitutional
argument before commanders would participate in any action
that could be considered "political."
¶17. (C) xxxxxxxxxxx said commanders ultimately place loyalty to
their region above all other considerations. Although most
commanders are originally from the altiplano, they have spent
most of their careers stationed in the Media Luna. He said
many officers worked with the same opposition leaders the
government might call on them to unseat, a prospect he found
"very unlikely." Many altiplano officers marry in the Media
Luna and have family there. As for the large minority of
officers from the Media Luna, including himself, Suarez said
there is "no way any of us are going to attack our own
people." Rather, he said, they would side with the
opposition if forced to take sides.
xxxxxxxxxxx "Divided" Military Won,t Intervene
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶18. (C) xxxxxxxxxxx told PolOff
December 14 the opposition did not believe the "divided"
military would repress them, but were more concerned about
irregular pro-government militias organized and financed by
Venezuelans and Cubans. xxxxxxxxxxx, however, provided no details
on the supposed paramilitary organizations. xxxxxxxxxxxx said, in
any event, he expected no violent stand-off with the
government before January as both sides are "disorganized."
Comment:
--------
¶19. (C) The best the government can hope for if it gives the
order to bust opposition heads is sporadic and half-hearted
compliance from a minority of commanders. Although they can
be expected to protect government infrastructure and
transportation, most commanders are likely to sit out any
violent confrontation with opposition forces. Consistent
with out November assessment (Reftel B), we continue to
believe the military will choose to ignore orders that are
not solidly linked to their constitutional role, in writing,
or that requires them to spill Bolivian blood.
¶20. (C) Despite bravado from field commanders, DAO expects
them to frame any potential insubordination as "selective
non-compliance" to their superiors. Although field
commanders may be anxious about day after scenarios if they
disobey orders, it would be difficult for the government to
replace "insubordinate" officers, particularly if officers
refused such orders en masse. It is unlikely the government
would find more loyal commanders in the lower ranks,
uncertain if rank and file troops would recognize them, and
unclear if such an overly political reorganization would be
tolerated by the high command. Unlike his erstwhile ally
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Evo does not have a network
of personal friends within the military (although his
Presidency Minister Juan Quintana does), and the military is
leery of taking on any role considered remotely political.
The military fears above all a repeat of the bloody
military-civilian conflicts in El Alto in 2003, which brought
down the Goni government. Many commanders are still bitter
about the fallout from those events and believe the military
took the risks and the blame for political decisions.
¶21. (C) xxxxxxxxxxx remains an enigma. Some commanders suspected,
at least xxxxxxxxxxxxxx, that he might be
sympathetic to a coup. He is widely characterized as an
"opportunist" xxxxxxxxxxx. Under intense pressure from both political sides,
he plays both sides. We cannot expect him to stand behind
his assurances. End Comment.
GOLDBERG