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Viewing cable 06PARIS1720, FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER RICHARD: INSIGHTS ON EU
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06PARIS1720 | 2006-03-17 15:51 | 2011-02-10 08:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
Appears in these articles: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/documents-wikileaks/article/2011/02/09/wikileaks-les-visiteurs-de-l-ambassade_1477418_1446239.htm |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001720
SIPDIS
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
AND EB
DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON MARR
SUBJECT: FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER RICHARD: INSIGHTS ON EU
AND NATO, AND ON DOMESTIC FRENCH POLITICS
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) In a meeting March 9, Ambassador Stapleton and former
defense minister Alain Richard exchanged views on the roles
of NATO and the ESDP, on the steady continuity in France's
defense policies under Richard's successor (current Defense
Minister Michele Aliot-Marie), and on French domestic
politics. On NATO-ESDP, Richard rehearsed familiar arguments
that NATO should restrict itself to more high-end military
operations and leave civilian-military operations to the EU.
He deplored President Chirac's involvement in domestic
political issues in Cote d'Ivoire and UN reliance on France
(and the UK) in dealing with African crises. Acknowledging
his support for former economy minister Dominique
Strauss-Kahn in the 2007 presidential contest, Richard
criticized Segolene Royal for lack of substance and
discounted her support within the Socialist Party, and viewed
former PM Jospin as lacking the necessary fire in the belly.
By contrast, he predicted that Nicolas Sarkozy would obtain
the governing party's nomination but asserted that the
nervousness Sarkozy inspires in some voters could lead to the
victory of a more reassuring candidate of the left. Richard
criticized Chirac as anti-European in temperament. He
lamented President Chirac's and then-Foreign Minister de
Villepin's confrontational tactics towards the U.S. early
2003, while also underlining his fundamental agreement with
Chirac and Villepin's policy of keeping France on the
sidelines with regard to regime change and its aftermath in
Iraq. END SUMMARY.
NATO/ESDP
---------
¶2. (C) Opening with a review of differences between U.S.,
and French and European, views on the appropriate
intervention roles for NATO and the EU, Richard lamented that
NATO-EU cooperation often "seemed to resemble NATO-EU
rivalry." Consistent with the government's current policy,
Richard maintained that the real purpose of NATO should be
high-end military action, not "soft" peacekeeping and/or
humanitarian missions. He complained that the (U.S.-driven)
direction of capability development in NATO -- contingency
planning and force generation for "soft" missions -- was
gradually encroaching on EU turf, where France sees the
primary mission of the evolving European Security and Defense
Policy (ESDP). Richard worried that NATO was "expanding" in
such a way that it might eventually make ESDP superfluous.
¶3. (C) Richard argued that ESDP is unlikely to move from
debate to deployability unless EU member states step up to
making the investments required to create mission-ready
military capability. This would not happen, however, until
EU states were given more direct responsibility for dealing
with crises -- otherwise, they'll "just keep counting on the
U.S. to act and take them off the hook." Richard said that
certain changes in Europeans' operational practice could
facilitate greater assumption of responsibility by EU states,
for example the creation of multinational HQs to replace the
current national HQ setup for operations in which more than
one EU state participates, which would force EU member states
to "burdenshare responsibility for the outcomes."
CONTINUITY IN FRANCE'S DEFENSE POLICIES
---------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Richard noted that the overall direction of France's
defense and security policies had continued along the lines
set during his own tenure as defense minister (1997 - 2002).
Richard praised his successor, Michele Aliot-Marie for
"staying the course" with regard to professionalization and
ever greater readiness and deployability of France's armed
forces. He noted the bi-partisan consensus throughout
France's political establishment for these policies --
indeed, on foreign affairs and defense matters in general.
He praised Aliot-Marie for recognizing, as he had, the need
for senior officers to have international experience, and the
need to keep French troops prepared to work well in
multi-national or coalition operations.
GREATER EU CAPABILITY DOES NOT UNDERMINE NATO
--------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Richard said that France is encouraging other EU
member states to engage in similar, qualitative and
quantitative, improvement of military capability. Richard
believes that, though there has been considerable
improvement, in France and in other EU states, in overall
military capabilities (he cited Germany in particular), much
progress could still be made. Richard underlined that such
progress in EU states' capability would never outstrip the
capabilities institutionalized in NATO, nor would such
improvements "compete with NATO" in any way. In Richard's
view -- as in the view of many French security and defense
analysts -- the range of failed state and humanitarian crises
likely to require responses that have a military dimension
will in all likelihood increase in coming years, which calls
for building as much capability as possible, whether under
the auspices of NATO or the EU or European states
individually. Note: Embassy DATT pointed out to Richard that
German military capability has in fact been cut during
recent years, and that increasing instances of operational
deployment of German contingents gives the, erroneous,
impression of increased capability. End Note.
CHIRAC'S MISTAKES IN IVORY COAST
--------------------------------
¶6. (C) Richard criticized President Chirac for breaking what
Richard opined should be a cardinal rule for guiding
decisions about French involvement in sub-Saharan Africa:
never get involved in African domestic problems; intervene
only when French strategic interests are at stake. Richard
went on to criticize the way the international community and
the UN (and specifically Kofi Annan) "depended on France"
(and to a lesser degree, the UK) to take care of problems in
Africa. Richard added that political problems in Africa "can
almost never be solved" since agreements reached to solve
them are, according to Richard, all to often immediately
ignored by the parties to them. Richard welcomed increasing
U.S. military cooperation in the region, agreeing that the
increased numbers of U.S. military attaches and other
programs (many emanating from EUCOM) would be good for the
region.
INTERNAL FRENCH POLITICS -- CENTER-LEFT PS
------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Richard is a member of the French Socialist Party's
(PS) 306-member National Council which elects the members of
the party's National Bureau and its National Secretariat
(executive committee). A member of the party's most moderate
faction, Richard is close both to former prime minister
Lionel Jospin and former economy minister Dominique
Strauss-Kahn. Richard said that the party -- at the
instigation of party National Secretary Francois Hollande --
had erred in putting off selection of its 2007 presidential
nominee until November 2006. In Richard's view, the other
principal parties' candidates will, well before next
November, have established themselves and their messages in
the public eye. Richard said he suspected that Hollande put
off the date of the PS's nomination decision for as long as
possible in order to preserve his own chances for nomination,
based on the calculation that other would-be nominees might
well fall out of the race or that internecine struggles would
allow him to emerge as a compromise.
¶8. (C) Richard discounted, but did not dismiss, the chances
of Poitou-Charentes Region President Segolene Royal of
mounting a winning bid for the PS nomination and the
presidency thereafter. "Because you have to wonder what is
the substance -- the solidity -- of her popularity." Richard
said that he doubted that Royal's current high-standing in
opinion polls would hold, particularly through the upcoming
season of hardball campaigning. Nonetheless Richard
described Royal as both determined and skillfully aiming to
use her popularity to "impose herself on the party members"
(who will be voting for the party's nominee in November).
¶9. (C) Skewering former prime minister Laurent Fabius as
"suffering from a deficit of sincerity," Richard acknowledged
his support for Strauss-Kahn. Richard observed that the
upcoming party primary, among the PS's roughly 125,000
"aging" members (nearly half of whom are also elected
officials of one sort or another), remained a wide-open
contest. In Richard's analysis, Royal can now count on about
"10 to 15 percent of the votes," and "Fabius has between 20
and 25 percent," which "leaves the 70 percent remaining" to
be won or lost in the primary campaign, most of whom he
claimed opposed Royal. Richard said that the campaigning
among the party members would be long and tough, and that
Strauss-Kahn had been, and planned to remain -- particularly
assiduous in his courting of party members between now and
November of this year.
¶10. (C) Citing what he called "the guts factor," Richard
wondered aloud if Jospin, as much as he might want to be
drafted as the party nominee, really had the stomach for a
political fight to the finish against -- in the scenario
Richard assumed most likely -- Interior Minister Nicolas
Sarkozy. Citing Jospin's lackluster performance as a
candidate in 2002, and his sudden retirement in a pique
following his unexpected defeat in the first round of the
2002 election, Richard said he had to have doubts about
Jospin's electability. However, Richard also added that in a
face-off against Sarkozy, Jospin might well prove the more
reassuring, indeed, presidential, figure, able to capitalize
on the French electorate's fear of change, particularly
brusque change. As Richard put it, "Sarkozy has enormous
qualities -- but not the one of being reassuring to anybody."
The one thing that Richard said he was sure of is that the
PS would, in the end, unite behind the candidate who emerges
victorious, if scarred, from the party's nomination
competition.
INTERNAL FRENCH POLITICS -- CENTER-RIGHT UMP
--------------------------------------------
¶11. (C) Richard, tracking with the views of nearly every
professional politician who has commented to us on the
subject, stated bluntly that Villepin would not be able to
displace Sarkozy as the nominee of the ruling, center-right
Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party. In addition,
Richard suggested that the "Matignon syndrome" -- the way the
prime ministership in France chews up its incumbents and
their popularity -- would sink any chances Villepin might
hope he may have to run for the presidency.
THE CENTER-LEFT CAN WIN
-----------------------
¶12. (C) Overall -- while being careful to concede this could
be wishful thinking on his part -- Richard said that voters'
tendency to "throw the bums out," along with their misgivings
about Sarkozy, gave the center-left a good chance of winning
in 2007. Richard added that "it was no longer possible to
say one thing during the campaign and do another once
elected" and that far-reaching change for France was
inevitable. Richard admitted that he was at a loss as to how
the PS could project itself and its candidate as standing for
"safe change" if running as the party of the status quo
against the risk of "real change" as promised and intended by
Sarkozy.
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
------------------
¶13. (C) Richard said that the French system of government
was evolving quickly, largely due to the unintended
consequences of shortening the presidential term to five
years. According to Richard (and quite few other observers)
the Fifth Republic is moving towards a garden-variety
"presidential system." The new five-year presidential term,
with legislative elections following immediately after the
presidential elections, increases the likelihood of one party
holding both the presidency and the parliamentary majority.
Both president and parliamentary majority are likely to be
elected on the basis of a common program, with the result
that the president will become responsible for managing the
government's execution of that program.
FUTURE OF EUROPE
----------------
¶14. (C) Richard lamented the French public's rejection of
the proposed EU Constitutional treaty last May 29. He placed
part of the blame on Chirac's lukewarm commitment to Europe.
He described Villepin and Chirac as more nationalist than
European, and went on to criticize Chirac as overly
opportunistic, and lacking the consistency necessary for
forging productive, long-term relationships with France's
European partners. Richard added that Chirac had severely
damaged his credibility with the EU's new member states when
he rudely admonished them to "shut up," with regard to
France's opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Richard acknowledged that such French attitudes have served
to increase nationalism in the new member states, and added
that this nationalism, and the suspicion of Europe that goes
with it, "particularly in conservative Poland", promise
difficult times ahead for comity among the member states of
the EU.
U.S.-FRANCE RELATIONS
---------------------
¶15. (C) Richard said that even though the French political
establishment is prone to opposing the U.S., the French
public remains attracted to the U.S. Like nearly all French
political figures -- speaking to us in private on the subject
-- Richard decried "the folly" of Chirac and then Foreign
Minister de Villepin's grandstanding opposition to the U.S.
and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Richard said Chirac and
Villepin's actions may have offered a "couple of weeks of
psychic satisfaction" to the French, but at the price of
undermining France's influence and standing on the world
stage. Again, like so many French political figures who
lament the antics of Chirac and Villepin in early 2003,
Richard also insisted that he believed the U.S. made a
grievous strategic mistake in going into Iraq. Richard
underscored his respect, indeed, love, for American ideals,
and described at length his -- and his compatriots' --
admiration for the dynamism of America. He also complimented
American expertise, saying that, "on any subject, you have
the best experts -- including on Iraq." But he wondered aloud
why the U.S. had "ignored its experts and made such a big
mistake." The meeting ended with a discussion of the changes
wrought by the attacks of September 11, 2002 on American
perception of threats to U.S. security.
COMMENT
-------
¶16. (C) Fluent in English, lucid and brimming with dry wit
and good humor, Richard exuded self-confidence and
competence. His genuine attachment to the U.S. was evident,
as was his concerned perplexity with regard to why -- in
Richard's view -- the U.S. was not better prepared for Iraq.
Although Richard's comment about Sarkozy's inability to
reassure voters was on the mark, it is also true that the
Jospins and Strauss-Kahns he finds more reassuring also
belong to his own political generation. END COMMENT.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton