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Viewing cable 06OTTAWA2158, CANADIAN VIEWS ON PRIVACY AND TRANS-BORDER
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06OTTAWA2158 | 2006-07-17 20:20 | 2011-04-28 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Ottawa |
VZCZCXRO1125
RR RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #2158/01 1982020
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 172020Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3177
INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASH DC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 002158
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CAN, EB/IFD/OMA, EB/CBA,
TREASURY FOR IMI:HOEK
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CA ECON EFIN EAIR ECPS
SUBJECT: CANADIAN VIEWS ON PRIVACY AND TRANS-BORDER
INFORMATION SHARING
REF: A. OTTAWA 2149
¶B. OTTAWA 2060 (NOTAL)
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Canada's Office of the Privacy
Commissioner found in a report released June 20 that while
the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has systems and
procedures in place for managing and sharing personal
information with other countries, it needs to improve its
management of privacy risks and achieve greater
accountability, transparency, and control over the
trans-border flow of information (i.e., personal information
that is collected or disclosed across international borders).
The report is available online at www.privcom.gc.ca. In the
past, the federal and provincial privacy commissioners have
expressed concern about the protection of personal health
data on Canadian citizens which a U.S. corporation may be
processing as part of a data services arrangement with a
Provincial Health Ministry. More recently, a provincial
privacy commissioner has raised concerns about certain
medical diagnostic equipment capable of communicating between
hospitals. The patient data would travel from Canada through
a communication node in the United States back to Canada.
Also, a major credit card company recently told the
Ambassador that possible future changes to Canada's
Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing
legislation and tighter controls on cross-border data flows
could jeopardize much of its Canadian business. End Summary.
Border Services Agency on the Right Track, but Needs
Improvement
--------------------------------------------- --------
Background
¶3. (U) The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada,
which operates independently of the GOC and is mandated by
Parliament to act as an ombudsman, advocate, and guardian of
privacy rights in Canada, released its annual report on the
Privacy Act to Parliament on June 20. The report contained
an audit of the "Personal Information Management Practices of
the Canada Border Services Agency" that focused on
"Trans-border Data Flows."
Reasons for the Audit
¶4. (U) In her report, Privacy Commissioner Jennifer
Stoddart pointed to the importance of Canada's exchange of
information with the United States as the basis for the audit
of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). The CBSA
collects personal information about millions of travelers
arriving in Canada that may include detailed financial,
family history, and travel information, as well as personal
identifiers such as social insurance and passport numbers.
Much of this information is retained in an identifiable
format either in hard copy (physical files) or in electronic
databases.
¶5. (U) The Privacy Commissioner stated a number of reasons
for her focus on the flow of information between Canada and
the United States. First, the trans-border flow of personal
information raises serious inherent privacy risks relating to
jurisdictional differences in practices affecting the
protection of personal information, the security of personal
data in transit, and the adequacy of instruments governing
the management of the personal information once it has been
shared. Second, there are clear indications that the
Canadian public is concerned about the trans-border flow of
their personal information to the United States. In a study
commissioned by the Privacy Commissioner in 2004, 75% of
respondents believed that the Government of Canada transfers
Qcitizens' personal information to foreign governments for the
purpose of protecting national security, with 85% of those
surveyed reporting a moderate or high level of concern about
these transfers. In the same vein, many have raised
trans-border concerns about data mining, racial profiling,
direct access to Canadian databases by the foreign
governments (notably the U.S.) and secondary uses of the
information. And third, as law enforcement and national
security organizations around the world collect more
information from more sources about more individuals, and as
they use that information to identify possible threats, there
is a perceived risk of incomplete or inaccurate data leading
to undesirable consequences such as unnecessary scrutiny of
individuals.
OTTAWA 00002158 002 OF 003
Privacy Commissioner's Suggestions
¶6. (U) The report found that CBSA has policies, procedures
and systems in place for managing and sharing personal
information with other countries. However, much can be done
to better manage the CBSA's privacy risks and achieve greater
accountability and control over personal information that
flows across Canada's borders, according to the report:
-- While written requests for assistance from foreign
governments seeking CBSA documents are processed in
accordance with agency requirements, much of the information
shared between the CBSA and the United States at the regional
level is verbal, and not based on written requests. This
contravenes both CBSA policy requiring the creation of a
record when customs information is disclosed and the
Canada-United States Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement
(CMAA) of June 1984 that requires customs requests for
information to be in writing except where pressing
circumstances exist.
-- The CBSA needs a coordinated method of identifying and
tracking all flows of its trans-border data. The CBSA cannot,
with a reasonable degree of certainty, report either on the
extent to which it shares personal information with the
United States, or how much and how often it shares this
information. By extension, it cannot be certain that all
information-sharing activities are appropriately managed and
that they comply with section 107 of the Customs Act, which
provides for protection of customs information and permits
the disclosure of customs information to foreign governments
and institutions in accordance with a written agreement or
arrangement, and section 8 of the Privacy Act, which
addresses when personal information under the control of a
government institution may be disclosed to, among others, a
foreign state.
-- The information technology (IT) and management controls
are sound for the Integrated Customs Enforcement System
(ICES) and Passenger Information System (PAXIS). These
systems contain sensitive personal information about millions
of travelers. Notably, foreign jurisdictions did not have
direct access to these systems. Also, electronic releases of
information to the United States under the High Risk
Travelers and Shared Lookout Initiatives of the CBSA are
transmitted over secure communications channels. However,
opportunities exist to strengthen the controls to further
reduce the risk that personal information could be improperly
used or disclosed.
-- The CBSA has not yet evaluated the effectiveness of the
High Risk Travelers (HRTI) initiative with the United States
because this project has not yet been fully implemented. The
Privacy Commissioner recommends that the CBSA assess the
extent to which inaccurate or incomplete data may affect
individuals or the CBSA's ability to identify, deter, or
apprehend "high-risk" travelers. An evaluation would help
the CBSA demonstrate that the HRTI initiative has achieved
its enforcement and intelligence objectives and, accordingly,
that its collection, use and sharing of vast amounts of
personal information about millions of travelers are
justified.
-- Since the CBSA is a new agency, the time is ripe for it to
build and integrate a comprehensive privacy-management
framework into its day-to-day information handling practices.
In particular, the Privacy Commissioner suggests that the
CBSA work toward updating and strengthening the obligations
QCBSA work toward updating and strengthening the obligations
contained in its personal information sharing agreements with
the United States. The CBSA should also consolidate its
reporting of privacy incidents and look for ways to improve
its mechanisms for monitoring cross-border disclosures of
personal information to foreign law-enforcement agencies and
other institutions.
-- The Privacy Commissioner recommends that the activities
associated with sharing data across borders should be as
transparent as possible. A clear and complete picture is not
readily available with respect to what information is shared
with whom, and for what purpose. As is the case for
departments generally, the CBSA does not provide enough
detail on the trans-border flows of personal information, or
account in a meaningful way for these flows to Parliament and
the Canadian public.
OTTAWA 00002158 003 OF 003
Business Concerns on Possible Changes to Canada's Anti-Money
Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing Laws and on
Trans-border Data Flows
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¶7. (SBU) On June 28, MasterCard Canada CEO Kevin Stanton
called on the Ambassador to explain that MasterCard and other
large, U.S.-based credit card firms (Capital One, CitiBank,
MBNA, Chase and others) are concerned about possible changes
to Canada's anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist
financing laws. Finance Canada is looking at possible
changes, with a view of drafting legislation which could be
introduced to Parliament in the fall.
¶8. (SBU) Changes under study include modifications to "know
your customer rules" which would require Canadian banks and
other financial services firms to better verify the
customer's identity when opening a new account or issuing a
credit card. According to Stanton, Finance Canada is
considering changes that could make portions of MasterCard's
current business model unviable in Canada. At present,
MasterCard largely issues its credit cards through
non-traditional (non face-to-face) means - such as through
phone, internet, or direct mail solicitation - rather than
through personal applications at bank branches. Such
innovations have helped MasterCard to penetrate Canada
effectively even though it entered the credit card market
several years after its major competitor, Visa, which issues
its credit cards through major Canadian banks. Stanton told
the Ambassador that if Canadian credit card applicants in non
face-to-face transactions have to take an added step to
verify their identity through personally providing officials
with a certified copy of a passport, birth certificate, or
other document, most will not bother to complete the process
due to the inconvenience. MasterCard believes that the GOC
should allow the use of reliable third party databases to
verify a customer's ID electronically, rather than in person,
such as is being done in the UK and the U.S. Stanton argued
that this should be an adequate procedure since he did not
think that acquiring a credit card presents the same money
laundering or terrorist financing risk as opening a bank
account, for example.
¶9. (SBU) Moreover, Jennifer Reed, Vice-President of Public
Affairs for Mastercard Canada, pointed out in a letter to the
Canadian Senate Banking Committee on June 21 that Mastercard
already has robust anti-money laundering initiatives in place
to deal with their customer financial institutions which
subjects the institutions to due diligence reviews. The
customer financial institutions must, for instance, have
written anti-money laundering programs in place, including
appropriate customer identification controls. Reed also
wrote that the new legislation would stifle competition by
shutting out new competitors and make it significantly more
difficult for existing issuers without a branch network to
attract new customers.
¶10. (SBU) In his meeting with the Ambassador, Stanton also
outlined his firm's concerns about possible tighter Canadian
controls on trans-border data flows. This is a concern to
MasterCard since virtually all its issuers process and store
their credit card data outside Canada, including in the U.S.
Stanton said that Canada's 2001 Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) will be up
QProtection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) will be up
for review shortly, and he is concerned that there could be
an effort to place specific restrictions on data going to the
U.S., because of an "irrational" fear of U.S. spying.
Stanton noted that no one seems concerned about data being
stored in other countries, such as India. He said that the
federal Privacy Commissioner is under strong pressure from
the Canadian Senate to take a tougher line on U.S. data, but
claims that she privately wants to resist this with U.S. help.
¶11. (SBU) Post reported in refB public comments on the
recent revelations in the U.S. press about the Terrorist
Financing Tracking Program.
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WILKINS