

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06MEXICO858, PRI DISSIDENTS SPEAK OUT
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MEXICO858.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06MEXICO858 | 2006-02-15 20:34 | 2011-04-05 01:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Mexico |
Appears in these articles: http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/eu-dudaba-de-la-viabilidad-del-pri/ |
VZCZCXRO8786
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0858/01 0462034
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 152034Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9010
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
53190
2006-02-15 20:34:00
06MEXICO858
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
VZCZCXRO8786
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0858/01 0462034
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 152034Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9010
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
TAGS: PGOV PINR MX
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 000858
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR MX
SUBJECT: PRI DISSIDENTS SPEAK OUT
Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR WILLIAM H. DUNCAN, R
EASONS: 1.4(B/D).
¶1. (C) Summary: In order to broaden our understanding of the
dynamics within the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI),
over the past two weeks, poloff met with three dissidents
within the party's congressional faction, two of whom had
just announced their defection from the party. In frank
conversations, our contacts described a party held hostage to
the personal agenda of presidential candidate Roberto
Madrazo. While the party appears to have achieved a thin
veneer of unity, this unity could easily be fractured if the
party's legislative lists do not satisfy the ambitions of key
activists, or if Madrazo's candidacy continues to languish in
the polls. While much could happen in the four and one-half
months remaining until election day, our conversations with
these PRI dissidents confirm the impression that the party
leadership's apparent willingness to subjugate the PRI's
broader interests to Roberto Madrazo's troubled candidacy
could have serious long-term consequences for the party. End
summary.
----------------------------------------
Madrazo Has Two Months To Turn It Around
----------------------------------------
¶2. (C) On February 14, poloff met with Senator Genaro
Borrego of Zacatecas, the most-high profile dissident within
the PRI's congressional delegation. A founding member of
Everyone United Against Madrazo (TUCOM, for its Spanish
acronym) faction within the PRI, Borrego reiterated what he
told us last October: that under no circumstances would he
ever support Madrazo, whom he characterized as "corrupt." He
said that while the party superficially had unified around
the candidate, this unity was "fragile" and "artificial."
Confirming what we have heard from numerous other sources,
Borrego said that Madrazo's day of reckoning would come in
March, when the party would finalize its legislative lists.
He said that given the numerous competing promises that
Madrazo has made to various allies, inevitably some important
PRI leaders would find themselves omitted from the lists,
possibly posing a severe test to party unity. He speculated
that if, by mid-April, Madrazo had not risen to a solid
second place position in the polls, many in the party would
quietly abandon his campaign as a lost cause, forging
alliances with other parties to protect their own interests.
He said it was difficult to predict what effect a second
consecutive defeat in the presidential contest would have on
the PRI, intimating that in the wake of such a defeat, many
party members might seek a political home elsewhere,
threatening the party's future.
¶3. (C) Borrego blamed the poor state of Madrazo's campaign
largely on the candidate himself, noting that his on-going
feud with teachers' union leader Elba Esther Gordillo and his
own long-tarnished reputation make his candidacy a very tough
sell. Nevertheless, he discounted press reports that some in
the party were seeking to replace Madrazo, saying that both
party rules and Madrazo's own dominance of the PRI's
machinery made such a move virtually impossible.
-------------------------------------------
A Climate of Insecurity Could Favor the PRI
-------------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Notwithstanding the difficult electoral scenario
Madrazo now faces, Borrego said there were three factors that
could work to his advantage. First, he noted that the
current climate of public insecurity might lead the
electorate to vote their fears, leading them to favor the
candidate -- i.e., Madrazo -- whom they viewed as more
heavy-handed and ruthless. Borrego also noted that low voter
participation would favor the PRI, as a low turnout would
magnify the effect of the party's base of loyal voters (voto
duro) which, although shrinking, is still much larger than
that of the two rival parties. Grinning, he insisted that
Mexico's performance in the soccer World Cup could have an
unpredictable but significant effect on the national mood,
noting that the quarterfinals would be played 1-2 days before
the election.
-----------------------------------
Madrazo Casting Local Leaders Aside
-----------------------------------
¶5. (C) Deputy Benjamin Sagahon Medina, a former teacher and
indigenous leader in San Luis Potosi, told poloff that his
position in the PRI had been tenuous ever since he voted
against the "desafuero" of then Mexico City Mayor Andres
Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO). In the wake of that vote, he
found himself increasingly frozen out of the party, asserting
that recently, he and some five other dissident deputies were
MEXICO 00000858 002 OF 002
threatened with expulsion. He told poloff that faced with
that possibility, he decided to abandon the PRI and to join
the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD). He returned to his
home district two weeks ago and called an open meeting of
supporters to seek their support for his decision. He claims
that the great majority of the approximately 1,400 supporters
who attended the meeting -- including numerous lifelong
PRIistas -- ratified his decision to leave the party and
support AMLO. He predicted that at least five other PRI
deputies would defect in the next few months.
¶6. (C) Deputy Laura Reyes-Retana of Coahuila explained her
recent decision to defect from the PRI quite bluntly, telling
poloff: "I don't like Roberto Madrazo." She criticized his
leadership style as authoritarian, adding that he favored
party elite at the expense of local leaders like herself.
She said that she expected a number of additional defections
from the ranks of PRI deputies, including at least four of
the approximately 20 deputies aligned with Elba Esther
Gordillo. While those who are offered posts in other parties
will announce their defections publicly, those who are not
courted by other parties will leave quietly. She said she
expected the PRI to delay announcing its legislative lists
until after the PRD and PAN finalized theirs, so that
disappointed PRIistas will have less incentive to defect.
-----------------------
An End to Party Loyalty
-----------------------
¶7. (C) Reyes-Retana described Madrazo as a poor leader, who
had contributed to the balkanization of the party. She said
that in the past, loyal PRIistas would support the party's
presidential candidate even at great personal sacrifice.
However, she said Madrazo's ruthless and self-interested
management of the party penalized, rather than rewarded,
those who put party interests ahead of personal interests.
When asked about her own political plans, Reyes-Retana said
she planned to support AMLO, who she described as a
"disaffected PRIista" like herself. She noted that AMLO was
considerably more moderate than the PRD as a whole, for which
she has little enthusiasm. While she expected AMLO to win
the election, she noted that the PRI remained capable of
electoral chicanery.
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
Comment: Can a Third Place Candidate Afford to Burn Bridges?
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
¶8. (C) Neither Deputy Sagahon nor Deputy Reyes-Retana were
ever party heavyweights, so taken individually, their
defections hardly represent a major blow to the Madrazo
campaign. Likewise, Senator Borrego's considerable influence
within the national party has been waning for years.
However, strong grass root support has always been a key
element in the PRI's traditional formula for electoral
success. Each of the three undoubtedly commands a
considerable degree of loyalty within their respective
constituencies, and each may well have influence over
thousands of votes. Moreover, we suspect that the dissidence
and defections reflected by these three candidates is being
replicated, albeit quietly, in numerous other legislative
districts across Mexico, and that this phenomenon may
intensify once the party's legislative lists are published.
It is difficult to see how a third place candidate can
possibly gain ground by cavalierly alienating local party
leaders.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity
KELLY