

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06USUNNEWYORK1254, INDIA AND THE U.S.: BILATERAL TIES NOT REFLECTED
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06USUNNEWYORK1254.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06USUNNEWYORK1254 | 2006-06-21 22:04 | 2011-03-20 01:00 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | USUN New York |
Appears in these articles: http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1554016.ece |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUCNDT #1254/01 1722204
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 212204Z JUN 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9405
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 0769
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0689
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 1165
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU IMMEDIATE 0121
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1363
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 0659
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0584
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 2184
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001254
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON AORC KUNR UNSC IN
SUBJECT: INDIA AND THE U.S.: BILATERAL TIES NOT REFLECTED
IN MULTILATERAL FORA
REF: A. 2005 NEW DELHI 8799
¶B. 2005 USUN NEW YORK 2635
Classified By: Amb. John R. Bolton. E.O. 12958. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
¶1. (C) Summary and Comment. India's positions on key issues of importance to the U.S. in New York do not appear to have kept pace with the increasingly strong bilateral ties developing in New Delhi and Washington. India is perceived as one of a handful of countries (which includes Egypt, Pakistan, Brazil and South Africa) that lead the opposition to U.S. policies in multilateral debates. In particular, India has emerged as the most consistent and acerbic critic of the Security Council in what is an increasingly poisonous atmosphere in GA-UNSC relations. India's efforts to position itself as a leader of the NAM/G-77 appear directly related to its aspirations for a permanent seat on the Security Council. Well-informed contacts, including New Delhi's partners within the G-4, say that India ""in it for the long haul"", believing their influence within the organization and their claim to membership among the global powers will only grow in coming years. This cable is the latest in a series of USUN reporting on key opponents to U.S. priorities at the UN. Below are details on India's positions in relation to key U.S. priorities at the UN over the past year. End Summary and Comment.
¶2. (C) A statistical analysis of India,s 2005 UNGA voting record illustrates that India is often in opposition to U.S. positions. India,s 2005 voting correlation with the U.S. on recorded votes was 19.40%. On Middle East issues, India,s voting correlation with the U.S. was 5.90%; on disarmament and arms control issues, 39.30%; and on human rights issues, 11.80%.
A Thorn in the UNSC's Side
--------------------------
¶3. (C) India,s behavior in New York is widely perceived to reflect its desire to establish bona fides as a leader of the developing world in support of its campaign for a permanent seat on the Security Council. Significant, from our perspective, is the rhetoric that Indian Permanent Representative Nirupam Sen deploys in order to rally support from the general membership. Sen's arguments consistently attack the Charter-based rights of the Security Council and the P-5 in particular. He routinely characterizes the P-5 as an exclusive club attempting to perpetuate an historical dominance within the international community that no longer reflects reality and does not acknowledge rising powers. (His statements along these lines, particularly as they coincide with the Administration's efforts to achieve an historic nuclear deal with India, strike us as terribly anachronistic.)
¶4. (C) Sen is also one of the most persistent advocates of the idea that the Security Council is ""encroaching"" on the authority of the General Assembly (GA). The Indians have characterized vital U.S. priorities in the Security Council on counter-terrorism and non-proliferation (including UNSCRs 1373 and 1540) as ""norm-setting"" that should be reserved for the General Assembly (2005 USUN 2635). In a June 5 GA debate on mandate review, Sen argued that the Security Council has no legal authority under the Charter to establish international tribunals, including ICTY and ICTR.
¶5. (C) Comment: We believe that part of Sen's approach simply reflects his own personal views. One of India's G-4 partners suggested to us privately that Sen was an ""unreformed Communist."" This view seems to be corroborated by Embassy Delhi's reporting on divergences between New Delhi and New York (2005 USUN 8795). However, we believe the aggressive approach towards the Security Council, and the P-5 in particular, is also part of a calculated effort to deepen inter-organ hostility as means to build support for dramatic reform of the Security Council's membership. Sen said it explicitly last November: if the General Assembly wants to change the way the Council operates, it needs to change the permanent membership. By taking such aggressive ""anti-P5"" positions, India is establishing itself as an outsider willing to stand up to the current P-5 if admitted to the club. End Comment.
ECOSOC and Development
----------------------
¶6. (C) India's role in development and humanitarian issues, while unhelpful in certain specific areas, has been less pronounced than Egypt's or Pakistan's. In the long-running negotiations on ECOSOC reform and development resolutions resulting from the September 2005 Summit outcome document, India has been intermittently engaged and has made only occasional comments. No Indian sits on the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on System-wide Coherence
SIPDIS (while both Egypt and Pakistan do). On environmental matters, U.S. and Indian interests are often in line. In the ongoing informal consultations on the framework of the UN's environmental activities, for instance, both the U.S. and India have argued in favor of the current decentralized approach to international environmental governance and have opposed EU-inspired efforts to transform the UN Environment Program into a specialized agency with greatly expanded powers. As a credible, major voice with the G-77, India can -- when it wishes -- use its influence with other developing countries to work for acceptable compromises. As spokesperson for the G-77 in negotiations on the Second Committee resolution on Globalization (A/60/204) last fall, India brokered important compromises between the U.S., EU and G-77 positions, and was quite confident of its ability to deliver the agreement of the rest of the G-77 with their suggestions.
¶7. (C) That said, India has been a key G-77 player staking out extreme positions at odds with U.S. goals on trade and IPR (in most cases patent rights for pharmaceuticals). The Indian delegation often utilizes old-fashioned statist terminology on global economic issues that does not appear to reflect views of India's booming private sector. Friendly G-77 contacts reported that during last fall's negotiations on the Second Committee resolution on International Financial System and Development (A/60/186), for example, India strongly resisted efforts within the group to craft compromise language as it battled with Pakistan for leadership on these issues. In the recent negotiations on the political declaration for the May 31-June 2, 2006 High Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS (USUN 1068), India led the G-77 in staking out inflexible and problematic positions on trade and IPR.
Human Rights Council and Social Issues
--------------------------------------
¶8. (C) In Third Committee deliberations on human rights and social issues, India generally has not gone out of its way to be unhelpful. Similarly, as the world's largest democracy, India has worked constructively with the U.S. to set up the UN Democracy Fund (contributing $10 million). This cooperativeness was highlighted by the personal appearances of President Bush and the Indian Prime Minister together at the UN for the inauguration of this fund. However, given its position as an influential developing world democracy, India also could have played a more proactive and supportive role bolstering other U.S. pro-democracy positions in the Third Committee. Whenever faced with a choice between aligning with other democracies or with other developing countries, India will side with the developing world's interests, presumably out of reluctance to disrupt group cohesion and a wish to retain their influence within the G-77. As part of the Convening Group of the Democracy Caucus, India went along with other Conveners in watering down U.S.-proposed language that would have stressed the need to elect only democratic countries to the Human Rights Council (HRC). In the negotiations leading to the creation of the HRC, much of India's efforts focused on ensuring geographic distribution of seats in favor of the Asian Group, though India did not seek to obstruct progress on other issues.
Worsening the General Assembly - Security Council Split
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶9. (C) In negotiations that led to the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), India allied itself with Pakistan, Brazil, South Africa and other G-77 leaders in seeking to curb Security Council influence. It argued against permanent membership for the P-5 on the PBC's Organizational Committee and pressed (successfully) to add an additional GA membership category. In arguing that the Security Council had demonstrated itself unable to address post-conflict peacebuilding, Sen claimed that the Security Council, at the end of the first Gulf War, had ""imposed de facto treaty obligations on states without their consent"" at a time when Iraq ""could not be considered to be an imminent threat to peace and security."" As was the case with the HRC, so also with the PBC: India has been a quiet but persistent architect of moves to reapportion the geographic distribution in Asia's favor, for instance working with Egypt to forge an alliance with Africa to lock out other regions in the fight for seats, particularly at the expense of WEOG.
¶10. (C) India was the leading advocate of General Assembly action to ""demand"" the Security Council produce more than one recommendation for Secretary-General this year (USUN 1065). The Indian campaign was predicated on exploiting the divide between GA and the Security Council and seemingly designed to only further widen the gap.
¶11. (C) In an October 2005 Fourth Committee debate on a comprehensive review of peacekeeping operations, India stood out by focusing its remarks on criticism of the Security Council. The Indian representative said the problems stemming from peacekeeping were linked to an ""unrepresentative Council"" and not to a lack of money or personnel. He accused the UNSC of lacking the will to act and when it did act, inadequately so.
Personalities or Policies
-------------------------
¶12. (C) An example of India's unhelpful behavior occurred in the December 2004 Fifth Committee proceedings in which the Indian delegate was particularly destructive in the negotiations on the creation of the UN's Department of Safety and Security (DSS), the establishment of which was a high priority for the United States, EU, Japan and others (known as the ""Extended Group"") following the bombing of the UN Office in Baghdad in 2003. India, along with Egypt, formed the core and driving force of the ""like-minded group"" (LMG) whose primary purpose was to dilute and, if possible, derail the establishment of the new office. The LMG also included Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica, Venezuela, China and Pakistan. The main elements of the LMG negotiating position were to provide as little capacity for leadership as possible to the new Department (in number and level of posts), to arbitrarily not approve the security officer posts for UN duty stations around the world, and to disable the Threat and Risk Assessment Unit at Headquarters (without which the DSS capacity and effectiveness would have been crippled). Though the LMG had no mandate to represent the G-77 as a whole, any public or private opposition from members of the G-77 to the LMG was swiftly and forcefully ended by India and Egypt. Public shouting matches between the LMG and other G-77 delegations were commonplace, and anecdotes of behind-the-scenes verbal and physical intimidation by India and Egypt dominated much of the negotiating session (2004 USUN 2932).
¶13. (C) While the position and negotiating tactics of the LMG as a whole were a source of frustration to the Extended Group, the antics of India deserve particular attention. The Indian delegation was the driving force of the LMG and often referred to as the ""brains"" of the group. Although the UN Secretariat provided the Fifth Committee more than 100 pages
SIPDIS of supplemental information to justify the purpose and resources of the DSS, the Indian delegate repeatedly berated the Secretariat for not providing adequate information. Contrary to all evidence, the Indian delegate consistently defied the logic of the proposal, asserted that there was no security expertise sought in the planning stages of the proposal, and maintained that there was no increased level of threat to the UN and its personnel. Although the Indian delegate always claimed to be serious about ensuring the safety and security on UN personnel and premises, the actions of the delegate were in direct contravention to that sentiment.
UN Reform
---------
¶14. (C) One area in which India has been consistently unhelpful to the U.S. is UN management reform. Early on, India was one of a handful of countries that signaled their opposition to significant or rapid progress on management reform and improvement of the working of the organization. India's Sen asserted that ""what are required are not new structures and posts but systems and sustained managerial attention "" (USUN 2304). In September 2005 discussions on management reform in the Outcome Document, India, along with Pakistan, Egypt and Mexico, argued that proposals to give the Secretary-General greater flexibility and freedom in the
SIPDIS daily management of UN affairs were actually designed to diminish the role of the GA. In a stance clearly aimed to curry favor with the G-77 and NAM countries, India argued that any reforms that challenged the GA's prerogatives were unacceptable (USUN 2111).
¶15. (C) In September meetings of the Committee on Conferences, the G-77 led by India (along with Egypt, Jamaica, Nigeria, Syria) frustrated the efforts of WEOG countries by making repeated interventions to request additional resources without any financial accountability to solve any conference management issues and made clear that no efficiency measures or reforms could proceed prior to the approval of the General Assembly (USUN 2406).
¶16. (C) In late October budget meetings India (as did Egypt and Cuba) used the occasion to refute the need for budget reform and to attack U.S. positions (USUN 2554). The Indian statement focused on the need to fund mandates without having a ""pre-determined"" budget level in mind, said that the proposed budget demonstrated that the SYG had managerial flexibility and that the ""General Assembly is the only truly democratic body in the United Nations"" and that ""we should strive to ensure that it remains that way and that the proprieties of the vast majority of its membership are reflected in the Regular Budget.""
¶17. (C) As we have previously suggested (USUN 1037) India remains a leader of a G-77/NAM interest in redistributing power away from the major contributors, the P-5, the Security Council and the Secretariat to the G-77-dominated UNGA. And in this respect, India is taking the wrong side of three issues of importance to the U.S.: resolutions to lift the budget cap without any meaningful reforms, &requiring8 the Security Council to recommend more than one name from which UNGA will choose the next Secretary-General, and a resolution locking in minimum levels of development assistance by member states.
BOLTON