

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 10ASTANA186, KAZAKHSTAN: OSCE HEAD TAKES ADVANTAGE OF
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10ASTANA186.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10ASTANA186 | 2010-02-12 10:10 | 2011-04-28 09:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Astana |
VZCZCXRO2424
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHTA #0186/01 0431010
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121010Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7396
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2446
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1806
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1422
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2512
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0666
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2003
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1851
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 2274
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 000186
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: OSCE HEAD TAKES ADVANTAGE OF
"POSITIVE MISUNDERSTANDINGS"
ASTANA 00000186 001.3 OF 004
¶1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified. Not for public
Internet.
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: Ambassador Alexandre Keltchewsky, Head of
the OSCE Center in Astana, told the Charge d'Affaires during
a luncheon on February 1 that the OSCE and Kazakhstan have
politely differed over words and perceptions, a tendency that
he called "positive misunderstandings." The dissonance has
allowed the OSCE to take the government at its word, and
raise issues it might not otherwise have been able to discuss
publicly. But, Kazakhstan sometimes uses the differences to
slip past the hard work on its third dimension shortcomings.
Keltchewsky cautioned that this was something member states
needed to watch and counter. Regarding the possibility of an
OSCE Summit in 2010, Keltchewsky recommended a "wait and see"
approach. "Kazakhstan has something to sell," he said. "We
should bargain to make sure we get the best possible price
for it." END SUMMARY.
KAZAKHSTAN'S STRONG PUSH FOR AN OSCE SUMMIT
¶3. (SBU) During a two-hour lunch at the residence of the
Deputy Chief of Mission, the Head of the Center for the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in
Astana, Ambassador Alexandre Keltchewsky, commented on
Kazakhstan's priorities as Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE in
¶2010. He said Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev's top
priority is to convene a Summit of OSCE members, possibly in
Vienna or Madrid. Keltchewsky said that Spain has been very
active in the OSCE and has expressed a willingness to host
the Summit. "Of course," he opined, "we have to be in favor
of a Summit. What else can we say? But it must have
substance and produce results." Keltchewsky was reluctant to
attach conditions to a Summit, but said that Kazakhstan must
meet certain "pre-requisites" to justify the participation of
heads of state. He added, "The question is where, and when,
to hold the Summit," noting that it could conceivably take
place in 2011, although he acknowledged that would "deeply
offend" the Kazakhstani government.
¶4. (SBU) Keltchewsky said that the idea of an informal
Ministerial was suggested by OSCE Secretary General Mark
Perren de Brishambo in Astana in October 2009. Keltchewsky
said that Saudabayev pressed hard for a firm commitment to a
Summit in 2010, and Brishambo proposed holding an informal
meeting with OSCE Foreign Ministers in the middle of 2010 as
a compromise. According to Keltchewsky, Saudabayev was
visibly unhappy with this arrangement, but agreed to it in
the end. "Getting a Summit is (Saudabayev's) only task,"
said Keltchewsky. "He is under orders from the top."
Keltchewsky said he was not opposed to a Summit in principle,
but recommended a "wait and see" approach. "Kazakhstan has
something to sell," he said. "We should not be victims here.
We should not allow Kazakhstan to play us. We should
bargain to make sure we get the best possible price for it."
He said that a "jubilee Summit" to mark the 35th anniversary
of the Helsinki Accords, the 20th anniversary of the Paris
Declaration, and the 65th anniversary of the end of World War
II was not sufficient justification to gather OSCE heads of
state.
¶5. (SBU) Keltchewsky admitted that previous gatherings --
such as the Istanbul Summit in 1999 -- have produced few
tangible results, but he attributed that to international
politics. "The states are playing a game," he said. "They
agree to misunderstand their agreements." He suggested that
a Summit in 2010 could be similar, in that member states
could speak positively about areas of common ground, while
avoiding areas of disagreement.
ASTANA 00000186 002.3 OF 004
EAST AND WEST STILL DIVIDED
¶6. (SBU) In describing the relationship between East and
West since the end of the Cold War, Keltchewsky said that in
his opinion "there has been no -- or very little -- progress
in the dialogue on security matters." Citing Russian
President Medvedev's proposed European security charter,
Keltchewsky said that Russia "completely misunderstands the
Western position on security issues." He said Medvedev's
proposal relies entirely on United Nations resolutions that
are not legally binding, and focuses exclusively on "hard
security" issues to prevent armed conflict, which Keltchewsky
said were not as relevant today.
LOST IN TRANSLATION
¶7. (SBU) According to Keltchewsky, the main priorities for
the OSCE now are economic cooperation, the Human Dimension,
and the rule of law -- not confict prevention. He insisted
that progress and reform in these areas could increase
confidence among member states, even more than military
cooperation. "These are the issues we should discuss at a
Summit," he said. He suggested that there is a persistent
cultural divide between East and West, and noted that the
Russian translation of "Human Dimension" ("gumanitarnoe
izmereniye") does not capture the true meaning of the term,
and can lead to misunderstanding on the issues. Rather than
an emphasis on the inalienable human rights of the
individual, for example, the Russian translation stresses the
rights of a group of individuals who have been granted
protection by the state. "That is totally different from the
Western concept," he insisted. When asked if Kazakhstan's
leadership understood the nuances, Keltchewsky said that
Deputy Foreign Minister Konstantin Zhigalov did, "but he can
only share 50% of it with the top. He has to swallow the
rest, because he knows they won't want to hear it."
"POSITIVE MISUNDERSTANDINGS" OPEN A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
¶8. (SBU) Turning to Kazakhstan, Keltchewsky said that the
country is still best characterized as a newly independent
state, not as an emerging democracy in a state of transition.
"Kazakhstan is the result of the collapse of the Soviet
Union, not an independence movement," he stated.
Nevertheless, he said that the OSCE Center has had some
success in Kazakhstan and has benefitted from a series of
"positive misunderstandings" that have enabled the Center to
work in areas, such as the Human Dimension, that the
government might otherwise not have allowed. For example, he
told the Charge that a government-supported institute, the
Institute of Parliaments, approached the Center asking for
advice and support for a conference on the OSCE. Keltchewsky
understood that the institute simply wanted to promote
Kazakhstan's role as Chairman-in-Office, but he agreed to
provide support nevertheless, and was able to shift the
agenda to focus on the Human Dimension, and invite several
leaders from civil society.
PRESIDENT FOR LIFE
¶9. (SBU) Commenting on the general state of democracy in
Kazakhstan, Keltchewsky said that the situation is "even
worse" now than it was one year ago. He called President
Nazarbayev a "good khoziyan" (boss, or master), gave
Nazarbayev credit for his adroit handling of the large ethnic
minority populations in Kazakhstan, and complimented
Nazarbayev's proposed National Unity Doctrine. He also
suggested that Nazarbayev does not have 100% control over all
of the factions vying for power in Kazakhstan, noting that
the National Security Committee (KNB) and Ministry of
ASTANA 00000186 003.3 OF 004
Internal Affairs enjoy some degree of autonomy. Q(GQp Kazakhstan now that they
are
Chairman-in-Office," he insisted.
GREENQ-Q~U~WQreens are good camouflage," not a legitimate opposition
party. He speculated that the Green PaQQA0e
also claimed that the "St. Petersburg mafia -- including
(Russian Prime Minister Vladimir) Putin -- is much more
liberal than the other mafias in Russia," because of their
exposure to the West, and their degrees in modern economics
and law. (NOTE: Keltchewsky is a French career diplomat
whose family emigrated from St. Petersburg; he served as
France's Consul General in St. Petersburg from 1998-2002.
END NOTE).
DEMOCRACY AND ETHNICITY
¶12. (SBU) Keltchewsky told the Charge that he believes there
is greater potential for political reform among the ethnic
Russian population of Kazakhstan than among the ethnic Kazakh
population. He pointed out, for example, that most of the
leaders of Kazakhstan's civil society organizations are
ethnic Russians. The Charge politely disagreed, noting that
there are many outstanding think tank and NGO representatives
of every ethnicity in Kazakhstan. Further, there is no ethnic
Russian political movement, or community leader, and that it
is likely that ethnic Russians with initiative, ambition, and
skills gravitated to civil society because most of the
leadership positions in government have been occupied by
ethnic Kazakhs.
¶13. (SBU) Talk then turned to the 2009 census, the results
of which were released on February 10. According to the
census, 63% of Kazakhstan's 16.2 million are ethnic Kazakhs,
an increase of 26% since the 1999 census. (NOTE: According
to the census, ethnic Russians comprise 23% of the
population, Uzbeks 3%, Ukrainians 2%, Uigurs 1.4%, Tatars
1.2%, Germans 1.1%, and other ethnic groups 4.5%. END NOTE).
Keltchewsky said the percentage of ethnic Kazakhs was "a
political figure," suggesting the data were manipulated for
political purposes. He also said that if the figures are
correct, then nearly half of the ethnic German population has
left Kazakhstan, "likely the most active and talented half."
THE OSCE AND AFGHANISTAN
¶13. (SBU) When asked what the OSCE could realistically
accomplish in Afghanistan, Keltchewsky admitted that the
ASTANA 00000186 004.3 OF 004
organization did not have an ambitous agenda. "Kazakhstan is
interested in Afghanistan," he said, "only because the United
States is interested." He noted that Kazakhstan has
announced a program of bilateral economic and educational
assistance, and suggested that Kazakhstan could contribute to
efforts to stem drug trafficking, but opined that Kazakhstan
"is in no position to contribute to the stabilization of the
country."
¶14. (SBU) COMMENT: A conversation with Ambassador
Keltchewsky is never predictable, prosaic, or short. He has
a fascinating personal history, and valuable experience, in
the region, but his comments frequently reflect his own
personal, somewhat elitist views than those of the
organization he represents. His vision is understandably
formed by his vantage point, a fact that is worth keeping in
mind as Kazakhstan and the OSCE member states continue to
shape the ambitous agenda the Chairman-in-Office has set for
¶2010. END COMMENT.
SPRATLEN