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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09LAGOS74, NIGERIA: IJAW YOUTHS "TAKE BACK THE STRUGGLE" AT
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09LAGOS74 | 2009-02-19 06:05 | 2011-04-06 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Lagos |
VZCZCXRO6277
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHOS #0074/01 0500605
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 190605Z FEB 09
FM AMCONSUL LAGOS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0508
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0128
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH AFB UK
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEWMFD/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LAGOS 000074
SIPDIS
STATE PASS NSC FOR BOBBY PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PM EPET ECON KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: IJAW YOUTHS "TAKE BACK THE STRUGGLE" AT
YENAGOA MEETING
REF: A. REF: LAGOS 066
¶B. 08 LAGOS 479
¶C. 08 LAGOS 475
¶D. 08 LAGOS 449
¶E. 08 LAGOS 386
¶F. 08 LAGOS 385
¶G. 08 LAGOS 367
¶H. 08 LAGOS 328
¶I. 08 LAGOS 313
Classified By: Consul General Donna M. Blair for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)
¶1. (U) Summary: Over 3,000 Ijaw youths, led by Dimieri von
Kemedi and other drafters of the Kaiama Declaration, met in
Yenagoa, the capital of Bayelsa State on February 6 to "take
back the struggle" for solutions to the problems of the Niger
Delta. According to Kemedi, the youths issued a strong
communique (posted on the Ijaw Youth Council Website
www.iycworldwide.org) stating that any Ijaw youth who failed
to depart the militant camps within three months would be
considered a criminal. The Federal Government has not
responded to a proposal, submitted by Bayelsa State five
months ago, to disarm the militants (who Kemedi defined as
youths with weapons) and to grant them amnesty. In light of
the Federal Government's failure to act, Bayelsa State will
assist the youths by providing a program reorienting them to
life in civil society and providing them with jobs; because
there is no guarantee that the security agencies will not
arrest militant youths attending the programs, youths who
have never taken up arms will also participate. Like Delta
State, which has enjoyed an extended period without conflict,
Bayelsa State appears to have established a workable proxy
for amnesty that will allow militants to abandon criminality
and become gainfully employed. It remains to be seen whether
the efforts of state governments, in the absence of Federal
Government commitment to amnesty, a viable program of
disarmament for militant youths and demilitarization of the
Niger Delta via withdrawal of the JTF, will be sufficient to
bring peace to the Niger Delta. End Summary.
¶2. (SBU) Over 3,000 Ijaw youths from every state in the
South-South gathered in Yenagoa, capital of Bayelsa State on
February 6, to "take back the struggle" for solutions to the
problems of the Niger Delta, Dimieri Von Kemedi, Director of
the Bayelsa State Office of eGovernance and Public
Procurement, told Pol-Econ Chief on February 7. Organizers
of the meeting included Kemedi, Felix Tuodolo and other Ijaw
youths who drafted the Kaiama Declaration in 1998, many of
whom he had not seen in some time, Kemedi said. In
attendance for the opening ceremony were representatives of
the Niger Delta Ministry, and Bayelsa State Governor Timipre
Silva, who gave the opening speech, according to Kemedi.
(Note: A February 4 article about the planned conference in
the Guardian, listed, in addition to Tuodolo, other key
figures in the Kaiama Declaration: T.K. Ogoriba, Asari
Dokubo, Oynifie Jonjon, Dan Ekpebide, Were Digifa, Kingsly
Kuku, Udengs Eradiri, Mike Wemebowei, Ebelo Jeremiah, Maxwell
Oko, Sam Ogbuku, Demieri Von Kemedi, Famous Daunemigha,
Patterson Ogun, and Jude Tabai. A February 3 article in the
Business Times said Asari Dokubo, at a rally in Buguma,
Rivers State, urged Kalabari youths to give up violence,
kidnapping and other criminal acts, and asserted that neither
the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), which he
heads, nor the Ijaw Youth Council, engage in criminal
activities. End Note)
Ijaw Youths To Quit Camps
-------------------------
¶3. (C) Kemedi said that he was pleased that the Ijaw youths
agreed on the issues and ratified the strong language of the
communique issued at the conclusion of the conference. Ijaw
youths will leave the camps within three months, Kemedi said,
and anyone found within the camps after the close of the
three month period will be considered a criminal. However,
these youths have guns ("the generally understood meaning of
militant", Kemedi said), and will need a way to dispose of
them. Five months ago, Bayelsa State presented the Federal
Government with a fully articulated plan for disarming the
LAGOS 00000074 002 OF 003
youths, but the Federal Government has not responded. In the
absence of action by the Federal Government, Bayelsa State
will take the initiative to help the youths who walk away
from the camps, he said. The State is not able to undertake
a formal disarmament program, which can only be conducted by
the Federal Government, according to Kemedi. Nonetheless,
Bayelsa State has prepared a program through which religious
leaders, trained in 2008 by an NGO called ALPHA from the UK,
will work with the youths to help them to reorient themselves
to life outside the camps. (Ref E) Without assurances from
the Federal government on amnesty, however, there is no
guarantee that the state security agencies will not arrest
youths as they go through the program. As a result, Bayelsa
State plans to include both youths coming out of the camps
and others who have never been in the camps in each training,
making it more difficult for the security services to
identify former militants, Kemedi said.
"Even I Had a Hard Time Sorting Out MEND"
-----------------------------------------
¶4. (C) In a conversation during Poloffs February 4 visit to
Yenagoa, Kemedi said that even people like himself, "who
should have known what was going on", had had a difficult
time sorting out just who was in the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Now he knows that
MEND is just an email address, Kemedi said, and he believes
that erstwhile MEND spokeserson Jomo Gbomo is Henry Okah, a
professional arms dealer, whose sole purpose was to create an
atmosphere conducive to his business, and who seduced others
by offering them a credit line with which to buy arms.
(Note: Okah is currently in jail and suffering from kidney
ailments. He also took up arms dealing as part of his
overall activities with MEND. End Note) With Okah in jail,
it appears "Jomo Gbomo's" words are not as dramatic, nor as
well-chosen as in the past. Moreover, whereas in the past
Jomo Gbomo used to predict events, which would then take
place, now the person using that name is able only to issue
pronouncements after events occur, Kemedi said. (note: We
do not not know if Kemedi's prediction that the Jomo Gbomo
was Okah is correct and if this is correct, we do not know if
one or several people have taken his place as the reported
MEND spokesperson. End Note)
Claims No Attacks on Oil in Bayelsa Since 2007
--------------------------------------------- -
¶5. (C) In the February 4 conversation, Kemedi said that, to
his knowledge, there have been no attacks, with the exception
of the attack on Bonga, on oil facilities by militants in
Bayelsa since 2007. This was the result of what Kemedi
called "a very untidy process". (Comment: Kemedi is likely
referring to payments by Bayelsa Governor Silva to militant
leaders in the state. (Ref F) End Comment) Attacks on oil
installations in Rivers State are down as well, he said,
because the emphasis has shifted to kidnappings for ransom
(by militants and criminals), and to offshore piracy. On
kidnapping, Kemedi said, the views of the people in the
villages have changed. In the past, they helped the
militants by hiding their kidnapping victims within the
villages; they no longer do that, and instead cooperate with
the security agencies because they see the kidnappings as a
threat to the community. Because attitudes have changed, the
militants are unable to recruit as easily as they did before.
¶6. (C) However, the militants are only half of the problem
in the Niger Delta; the other half is the military, he said.
The military wants to remain in the Niger Delta because they
profit enormously from money charged for escorting illegally
bunkered crude and from money extorted in the name of
providing security on the roads. The Joint Task Force (JTF)
foot soldiers are not the only ones who profit; the
Commissioner of Police, the Director of the State Security
Service, the military all line up at the Governor's door
asking for "favors", Kemedi said.
FG "Not Interested" In Resolving Niger Delta Crisis
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LAGOS 00000074 003 OF 003
¶7. (C) The Federal Government is not interested in
resolving the crisis in the Niger Delta; there are too many
powerful people benefiting from the crisis to have it end,
Kemedi said. There is no money in the budget to develop the
Niger Delta. No effort has been made to address the problem
of illegal bunkering; the ships that come in to pick up the
crude are not small, and could easily be identified and dealt
with if the Federal Government wanted to do so, Kemedi said.
In response to the report of the Technical Committee on the
Niger Delta, the Federal Government has set up yet another
committee to report on the report. This is why the
South-South itself must do everything in its power to bring
an end to the crisis, Kemedi said.
States Find Ways Around FG Failure on Amnesty
---------------------------------------------
¶8. (C) As a result, the states will find a way around the
question of amnesty, which only the Federal Government can
grant. What the states can control is employment, he said.
Once the states create employment opportunities, militants
and non-militants alike will be able to take advantage of
them. Kemedi himself says he is no longer interested in the
percent of derivation that goes to the states. Bayelsa State
has done a study that shows that the state has the potential
to earn as much revenue from shrimp and fisheries projects as
it does from oil, Kemedi noted. Bayelsa is sending 50 youths
to Denmark for seamanship training, and has purchased a
number of Danish ships which will be shipped to Bayelsa to
help create employment.
¶9. (C) Comment: That it took Kemedi, who with hindsight says
he "ought to have known", let alone the Ijaw youths in the
creeks, time to figure out how they had been misled and
manipulated is not surprising; television and internet access
is available only in Bayelsa's larger towns, and cellphone
access is intermittent at best, especially in the destitute
riverine villages. Notwithstanding, they have had it figured
out for some time; we have reported since August 2008 that
the militants were ready to lay down their arms, and the
Bayelsa State proposal went in to the Federal Government
months ago, according to Kemedi. The Federal Government's
failure to act, like its failure to develop the area
economically, and its failure to interdict the ships that
carry stolen crude, lends credence to the contention that the
Federal Government does not want to solve a problem from
which many high level people benefit.
¶10. (C) Comment Continued: The Federal Government's failure
to respond on the issue of amnesty has forced Bayelsa State
to contrive a proxy for amnesty that allows militant youths
(by Kemedi's definition, "youths with guns") to leave the
camps, reorient themselves to a life in civil society and,
alongside youths who have never taken up arms, begin one of
the new jobs the state is creating for them. Delta State has
had a similar proxy for amnesty in operation for some time.
Militant youths have jobs patrolling the creeks as part of
the Delta Waterways Commission, or in one of the projects or
local offices established by the Delta State Oil Producing
Areas Commission (DESOPADEC) (Ref A). Job creation, coupled
with the election of an Ijaw local government chairman for a
Warri local government area, has led to a comparatively
peaceful period in Delta State. It remains to be seen
whether the efforts of state governments, in the absence of
Federal Government commitment to amnesty, a viable program of
disarmament for militant youths and demilitarization of the
Niger Delta via withdrawal of the JTF, will be sufficient to
bring peace to the Niger Delta. In Ambassador's February 10
meeting with the new Niger Delta Minister, it appears
unlikely that the Federal Government is getting its act
together to better address Niger Delta issues anytime soon.
End Comment.
BLAIR