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Viewing cable 09MEXICO193, THE BATTLE JOINED: NARCO VIOLENCE TRENDS IN 2008
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09MEXICO193 | 2009-01-23 23:12 | 2010-12-02 21:30 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Mexico |
R 232312Z JAN 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4721
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
HQ USNORTHCOM
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
NSC WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T MEXICO 000193
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 01/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINR SNAR KCRM MX
SUBJECT: THE BATTLE JOINED: NARCO VIOLENCE TRENDS IN 2008
REF: A. CIUDAD JUAREZ 22
¶B. MEXICO 3586
¶C. MEXICO 2371
¶D. MEXICO 3498
¶E. MEXICO 3779
¶F. MEXICO 1766
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay.
Reason: 1.4 (b), (d)
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) 2008 set a new record for organized crime-related
homicides with more than 6000 killings. Violence in Mexico
suddenly provided fodder for U.S. and international media
with commentators suggesting worse to come. While the death
toll is already at disturbing levels, and there are no signs
violence will taper off anytime soon, we will continue to
evaluate information or evidence that would suggest the
cartels have decided to up the ante significantly by
undertaking mass-casualty attacks on civilians,
systematically attacking GOM officials or institutions or
targeting USG personnel. Internecine struggles among the
cartels and GOM counter narcotic successes have increased the
costs of doing business and account for most of the up-tick
last year. Frustrated traffickers, seeking to diversify
profit-making activities through kidnappings and extortion,
account for more. End Summary.
----------------------------------
Drug-Related Homicides on the Rise
----------------------------------
¶2. (C) Few killings in Mexico are thoroughly investigated,
and determining which are truly related to organized crime
remains an inexact science, but Mexico's Attorney General's
office's year-end estimate stands at 6262. Other GOM
authorities put the toll from organized crime slightly
higher. SEDENA reports that drug-related killings
represented roughly 17% of all homicides last year, while the
National System of Public Security (SNSP -- part of the
Public Security Secretariat (SSP)) estimates a total of
approximately 10,700 intentional homicides.
(S/NF) Table I: Organized Crime-Related Killings, By Year*
--------------------------------------------- ----------
2005 1855
2006 2489
2007 3038
2008 6380
----------------------------------------
*Source: SEDENA
(S/NF) Table II: 2008 OC-Related Killings, By Month*
--------------------------------------------- -----
Jan 282
Feb 283
Mar 417
Apr 320
May 496
Jun 531
Jul 540
Aug 587
Sep 526
Oct 847
Nov 843
Dec 708
--------------------------------------------- ------
*Source: SEDENA
--------------------------------------------
Spike in Violence Concentrated at the Border
--------------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Violence continued to be concentrated in a few key
states, and in 2008 there was a spike in drug-related
killings in the northern border territories. An estimated 41
percent of these homicides took place in Chihuahua and Baja
California states and largely in two urban areas, Ciudad
Juarez and Tijuana. (see MEXICO 3586). Sinaloa continued to
rank among the most violent states with approximately 1048
(or 18%) of these killings. The surge in violence along the
border stems largely from the intensified struggle among
cartels over a few lucrative land crossings to the U.S. In
particular, the January 2008 arrest of cartel leader Alfredo
Beltran Leyva sparked a serious rift among the Gulf, Juarez
and Sinaloa (Pacific) cartels, which is being played out
viciously in Ciudad Juarez. (See MEXICO 1766) In Tijuana,
rival factions of the weakened Arellano Felix Organization,
one of which is backed by the Sinaloa cartel, are battling
for control.
--------------------------
Changes In Cartel Behavior
--------------------------
¶4. (SBU) Beyond its broadened scope, the nature of cartel
violence changed in 2008: organized violence was
characterized by significantly increased brutality, a callous
disregard for the potential for collateral damage and more
frequent targeting of soldiers and police. Mexico's drug
trafficking organizations (DTOs) have also more frequently
orchestrated violence to send intimidating messages to
security forces, the Mexican public and the body politic.
¶5. (SBU) Incidents, such as the August beheadings of 12 in
Yucatan, the execution style killing of 24 on the outskirts
of Mexico City in September, late fall killings of soldiers
in Monterrey and Guerrero in late December contributed to
growing public unease here and garnered media attention
abroad. Several first-time-ever incidents involving grenades
and improvised explosive devices (such as the notorious
Independence Day grenade attack in Morelia, the shooting and
undetonated grenade attack on the US Consulate in Monterrey,
the use of improvised explosive devices in downtown Mexico
City and Sinaloa, and a grenade attack on police cadets in
Jalisco) demonstrate that not only have the cartels
successfully expanded their arsenals, but at least some
elements have developed a tolerance for inflicting civilian
casualties.
¶6. (SBU) Cartels have also expanded their use of violence to
intimidate. Beheadings and the prominent placement of
dismembered bodies in public places, relatively rare two
years ago are now common throughout the country. The late
night grenade/shooting attack on our consulate in Monterrey
was obviously designed to send a message, although no
individual or group has ever claimed responsibility. More
explicit was the January assault on the Monterrey offices of
Televisa, accompanied by a message telling the broadcaster to
do a better job reporting on corrupt public officials.
Attacks such as these remain sporadic so far, and we have
insufficient indications whether they mark a new trend or
not.
¶7. (SBU) Despite these sporadic attacks, Mexico's drug war
continues to primarily impact security forces and those
linked directly or indirectly to the drug trade. The
civilian population in some urban areas along the border
remains bunkered down with some of those who have the money
either sending their children to school in the U.S. or
relocating entirely to minimize risk. In much of the rest of
the country, though, the civilian population not involved in
the drug trade remains essentially insulated from the
violence, though not from its effects.
--------------------------------------------- --------
Police Killings Increase Along With Overall Death Toll
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶8. (SBU) SEDENA estimates that at least 522 civilian law
enforcement and military personnel were murdered last year,
compared to 315 in 2007.
(S/NF) Table III: Drug-Related Military/Police Homicides:
2007* 2008**
(% of total)
AFI 22 (6.9) 5 (1.0)
PFP 12 (3.8) 37 (19.7)
State
Police 62 (19.8) 110 (21.1)
Ministerial
Police 63 (20.0) 14 (2.7)
Municipal
Police 120 (38.0) 305 (58.4)
Military 27 (8.6) 51 (9.8)
Other 9 (2.9) Unavailable
--------------------------------------------- -------------
Total 315 522
CENAPI (Mexico's Center for Information, Analysis and
Planning) statistics
**SEDENA statistics
¶9. (C) Increased confrontations between security forces and
criminals is one explanation for the increasing killing of
security forces personnel. GOM authorities argue that
killings are no longer just score-settling among bad cops,
but increasingly the consequence of the government's
aggressive fight against the cartels. Some analysts we have
spoken to agree. However, they also note that with few
exceptions the majority of deaths are not the result of
direct confrontations. They argue that the crackdown on
police corruption has put compromised police officials in the
position of either being prosecuted or breaking their
established agreements/arrangements with the cartels. Hence,
some of those who presumably choose the latter course are
being punished brutally. (See MEXICO 2371, 3498)
¶10. (SBU) It is worth noting that police victims (at all
levels of government) represented eight percent of all 2008
killings believed to be drug-related, a figure slightly lower
than the percentage in 2007. The vast majority of victims
continue to be state and municipal law enforcement officers.
Senior level, federal police killings were still rare
occurrences in 2008. The most high-profile death remains the
May killing of Edgar Millan Gomez, the country's
highest-ranking federal police officer.
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Targeting of Soldiers An Ominous Sign
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¶11. (S/NF) There have been notable incidents of horrific
violence against soldiers, including a string of slayings of
enlisted men in Monterrey in October and the systematic
decapitation of seven troops in Guerrero (see MEXICO 3779).
The theory that those killed in Guerrero were rogue soldiers
involved in drug trafficking has been discounted, suggesting
the cartels have begun to target soldiers to exact revenge
for successes registered by the military and attempt to
undermine the institution's resolve. The Monterrey and
Guerrero killings immediately followed successful military
operations in the respective regions resulting in seizures
and arrests. Whether such tactics will have a chilling
effect remains to be seen. Sources tell us that while some
soldiers are more fearful, many others are keen to strike
back at the cartels with greater resolve. SEDENA and SEMAR
have instructed regional commanders to implement force
protection counter-measures to reduce the risk of future
incidents.
----------------------------------------
U.S. Personnel and Institutions Targets?
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¶12. (C) We have observed a significant up-tick in threats,
as well as incidents of surveillance, against USG personnel
and properties over the last three months. All threats are
treated seriously and precautions taken; fortunately, none
has come to fruition.
¶13. (S/NF) On October 12, unknown persons fired gunshots and
tossed an un-detonated grenade at the U.S. Consulate in
Monterrey. The attack occurred after hours, no one was
injured, and little damage occurred. No message was left and
we have uncovered no useful intelligence regarding the
authors or their motives. One unsubstantiated report cited a
source claiming a senior Gulf cartel leader ordered the
attack. However, with little hard evidence, no attempt to
claim credit and no follow on incident to date, the
possibility remains that this was an isolated, possibly even
impulsive, attack not likely undertaken at the behest of
senior cartel leaders.
¶14. (C) While the cartels have not yet directly targeted USG
law enforcement or other personnel, they have shown little
reticence about going after some of our most reliable
partners in Mexican law enforcement agencies. Ten close DEA
law enforcement liaison officers have been killed since 2007,
seven of whom were members of Special Vetted Units.
Similarly, within the past two years 51 close FBI contacts
have been murdered. More than sixty of Mexico's best law
enforcement officers in whom we have placed our trust and
with whom we have collaborated on sensitive investigations,
shared intelligence and in many cases trained and vetted have
been murdered by the cartels. We do know from sources that
cartel members have at least contemplated the possibility of
doing harm to both our personnel and institutions, but we
frankly don't know enough about how DTO members think and
operate to know what factors might trigger a decision to
mount such an attack, but the potential threat is very real.
¶15. (C) We assess that the threat to U.S. personnel could
increase if the violence continues to escalate and more
high-level government officials and political leaders are
targeted. Also, a reaction may be triggered if traffickers
perceive their losses are due to U.S. support to the GOM's
counter-narcotics efforts. We will continue to monitor
potential threats to U.S. personnel from organized criminal
gangs and be alert to information that suggests drug
traffickers increasingly see the U.S. hand as responsible for
their losses.
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A Measure of Success?
---------------------
¶16. (C) While attributing last year's significant spike in
violence to its own successes marks an effort by the Calderon
administration to put the best face possible on a grim
situation, there is also considerable truth to the assertion.
President Calderon's counter-narcotics team has scored
significant successes, particularly in the last 12 months.
Record numbers of weapons and drugs have been seized, key
members of drug cartels have been arrested and/or extradited,
cartel sources inside government institutions have been
arrested ) including a former Deputy Attorney General and
the head of Interpol in Mexico. The GOM has disrupted cartel
operations in meaningful ways; in year-end reports SEDENA and
SEMAR reported that together they have reduced the maritime
trafficking of illicit drugs by 65 percent and cut direct air
transit of illegal drugs from Colombia by 90 percent.
According to collaborative sensitive reporting, the January
2008 arrest of Alfredo Beltran Leyva split the Pacific
Cartel, and accentuated antagonism between that DTO and the
Gulf organization which caused the spike in violence in
Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and Baja California (see also MEXICO
1766). In addition to these rifts, frustrated traffickers
have turned to kidnappings and extortion to compensate for
the loss in drug-trafficking revenue, expanding their reach
and impacting a greater number of bystanders who have no
involvement in DTO activities. These kinds of impacts bring
home to ordinary Mexicans the nature of the struggle here.
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Outlook
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¶17. (C) Mexican authorities and law enforcement analysts
predict that violence will likely get worse before it gets
better. Recent truce rumors notwithstanding, there is
currently no indication that the violence will soon abate;
CENAPI reports 280 killings for the first 20 days of January.
The cartels have shown themselves to be remarkably
innovative, vicious, and resilient when aggressively
confronted. Given their powerful weaponry and deep
penetration of the country's security institutions, further
attacks against security forces and government officials seem
all but inevitable. However, while violence remains at
unacceptably high levels here, we have no reason to believe
at this point that it will escalate either quantitatively or
qualitatively.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
BASSETT