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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2508, TFLE01: AOUN PARROTS PIAF: "JE NE REGRETTE RIEN"
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BEIRUT2508 | 2006-08-01 12:34 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Beirut |
Appears in these articles: not yet set |
VZCZCXRO6992
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2508/01 2131234
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011234Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4849
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002508
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2016
TAGS: IS LE MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: TFLE01: AOUN PARROTS PIAF: "JE NE REGRETTE RIEN"
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C/NF) Former General Michel Aoun displayed a stubborn
refusal to face the reality of Hizballah's renegade status in
Lebanon. Far from holding Hassan Nasrallah accountable for
the violence that began with Hizballah's attack on July 12,
Aoun said that as long as the fighting continued, all of
Lebanon must rally behind the force engaged with the
Israelis. The FPM leader did offer general support for PM
Siniora's 7-point approach to cease-fire negotiations, but
then made the interesting claim that the most critical issues
had already been addressed in his February 6 communique with
Hassan Nasrallah. In an awkward attempt to straddle the
fence, Aoun insisted he was not really in an alliance with
Hizballah, but then proceeded to tear down the "inconstant"
leaders of March 14 -- Siniora, Walid Jumblatt, Saad Hariri
-- who in his view did not deserve the "confidence" of the
Lebanese people. The implication (although never stated
explicitly) was that Nasrallah is a more trustworthy partner.
When specifically asked to explain the events of July 12, he
confessed he simply did not understand how it had all
happened. End summary.
A TALE OF TWO AUTHORS
---------------------
¶2. (C/NF) In an August 1 meeting with the Ambassador and
poloff, Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun tried to
explain how he could have authored two very disparate
articles that appeared within 24 hours of each other in the
Wall Street Journal and the pro-Syrian newspaper As-Safir.
Aoun said the strongly pro-Hizballah views expressed in
As-Safir on July 30 and his balanced exposition of the causes
of the present conflict in WSJ on July 31 were actually
consistent with each other, if one understood his commitment
as a Lebanese citizen.
¶3. (C/NF) He insisted that all Lebanese were now compelled
to support those forces (Hizballah) that were confronting
Israel. As a result, the former general maintained that he
could dispassionately analyze the root cause of the conflict,
while continuing to express his support for Hizballah. Given
Israeli crimes, he simply had no other choice.
CONSEQUENCES FOR HIZBALLAH
--------------------------
¶4. (C/NF) When asked whether Nasrallah's cynical posing to
his colleagues in the National Dialogue just days before the
outbreak of hostilities warranted consequences, Aoun dodged
the question. Instead of a simple answer, Aoun postulated
the current hostilities didn't need to happen -- if Lebanon's
political leaders had heeded the results of his earlier
discussions with Hizballah (that produced the February 6
joint communique) and had come to grips with three basic
issues, a common approach to the Government of Israel may
have produced stabilizing results.
¶5. (C/NF) As he has on numerous occasions, Aoun referred to
the communique's treatment of Shebaa Farms, prisoners in
Israeli custody, and the weapons of Hizballah. He insisted
that the underlying issues remain the same and implied that
Siniora's 7-points are simply a reiteration of his earlier
positions.
¶6. (C/NF) When the Ambassador persisted in whether he and
his Free Patriotic Movement would confront Nasrallah's
deliberate and unilateral decision to involve Lebanon in a
painful war, Aoun merely said that once hostilities cease, he
would put the "necessary" questions to Hizballah's leader.
Aoun casually stated that "everyone has the right to ask
questions," but then argued that while the fighting
continued, all other considerations had to be aside.
SUPPORTS UN ACTION, BUT THEN CRITICIZES MARCH 14
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶7. (C/NF) Turning another inquiry on its head, Aoun said
his "cooperative alliance" with Hizballah should be viewed in
the same light as other politicians' interactions with the
organization. After all, he pointed out, it was Siniora that
invited Hizballah to be part of his Government, while FPM was
kept in the political wilderness last June when the Cabinet
BEIRUT 00002508 002 OF 002
was formed. In a similar vein, Aoun emphasized that it was
Saad Hariri who spent long hours in closed discussions with
Hizballah's leader, while the results of his deliberations
resulted in the public document of February 6. And finally,
he recounted the on again/off again relationship of Druse
leader Walid Jumblatt.
¶8. (C/NF) Aoun argued that at one time or another all the
pro-reform March 14 leaders had sought to find common ground
with Hassan Nasrallah, and yet he was the only politician who
had paid a price. Aoun used this logic to conclude that
March 14 leaders did not enjoy the "confidence" of the
Lebanese people and this condition would handicap the
Government's efforts to reach an equitable cease-fire. The
Ambassador noted that, whatever flirtations Jumblatt and
Hariri once engaged in with Nasrallah, at least they now saw
clearly who Nasrallah was and what he represented. Aoun did
not respond.
¶9. (C/NF) Despite his mistrust (and evident low regard) for
the Siniora Government and its political allies, Michel Aoun
did state that he supported the current effort in the UN
Security Council to achieve a cease-fire. But he couldn't
help getting in a final comment that the current situation
could have been avoided if his policy suggestions had been
considered by Siniora, Hariri, and Jumblatt, who are "all the
same."
THE DAY AFTER
-------------
¶10. (C/NF) Aoun stated he hoped the divergent political
forces in Lebanon could work together to rebuild a "broken
country," but he repeated his conviction that he could not
trust those whose leadership -- meaning the March 14 majority
-- had not prevented the present "catastrophe." Michel Aoun
maintained he has always sought the conditions that many
Lebanese politicians now say they support: the return of
prisoners, the return of Shebaa, and the "integration" of
Hizballah's weapons into the LAF. In that regard, he stated,
there was convergence between himself and the Government.
But in closing, he once again expressed his concern that the
Government was not really up to the task.
COMMENT
-------
¶11. (C/NF) For those who hoped the tragedy of the current
crisis might be the catalyst to inject some sanity in Michel
Aoun's relationship with Hizballah, this meeting proved a
disappointment. In what was essentially a disjointed,
repetitive, and often contradictory performance, Aoun
displayed the qualities that engender so much antipathy and
distrust among Lebanon's political class. He rarely admits a
mistake or miscalculation and through exquisite twists of
logic, always manages to replay his diplomatic/political
"triumphs" and interpret other leaders' efforts as feckless
and ill-conceived.
¶12. (C/NF) His still-strong support in Lebanon's Maronite
community (albeit less than when he arrived at Beirut
International last May and told his crowd of avid supporters
to "shut up") makes him a political force that could
materially assist in the pro-reform effort to achieve a
stable, democratic state. But his resolute refusal to see
Hizballah for what it is -- and his dismissive criticism of
any other political leader -- has placed him in political
limbo from which he stubbornly resists every opportunity to
escape.
¶13. (C/NF) We have noticed developing fissures in the FPM
movement and strong disagreement with Aoun's policies in his
second-tier of advisors, but Aoun's lack of movement toward
the country's other pro-reform leaders implies that the
post-conflict political scene may be as contentious as it was
on July 11. We agree with him that the Shia community in
Lebanon cannot be ignored and cannot be made to feel defeat
as a community. But, unlike Jumblatt and Hariri, Aoun has
not yet awakened to the fact that Nasrallah has used him.
End comment.
FELTMAN