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Viewing cable 09DAMASCUS252, CODEL LYNCH MEETS ASAD, MUALLIM
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P 061302Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6208
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000252
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR WALLER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL KWBG IS SY
SUBJECT: CODEL LYNCH MEETS ASAD, MUALLIM
Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires Maura Connelly for reasons 1.5
(b & d).
1.(C) Summary: CODEL Lynch met President Bashar al-Asad,
Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallim and Presidential Advisor
Bouthaina Sha'ban on Sunday, April 5. Asad asked for
increased U.S. engagement with Syria and outlined an overlap
in U.S. and Syrian interests in the region -- particularly in
Iraq, where he said both countries sought peace and
stability. On the issue of foreign fighters, Asad claimed
the U.S. had failed to follow up on Syria's willingness to
cooperate on border security, then suggested that the foreign
fighters had moved their base of operations from Syria to
"chaotic" Lebanon, and later compared the Syria-Iraq border
situation to that on the U.S.-Mexican border. In the end,
Asad declared that the only way to stop foreign fighters was
to disrupt their logistical support, and that border measures
would not succeed unless political stability were achieved
within Iraq. On the Golan track, Asad suggested that the
issues were "not complex," and said talks hinged on the will
of Israeli leaders to return occupied lands and on U.S.
willingness to facilitate negotiations. The Gaza situation
was more complex, Asad said. He chided the U.S. for its
unwillingness to engage Hamas, and suggested the U.S. follow
Syria's example of "political pragmatism" in this regard.
Asad said he saw no point in reconstruction of Gaza without a
lasting truce, which could only be predicated on a complete
lifting of the Israeli embargo. Palestinian reconciliation
was a precondition for the peace process, he said.
2.(C) Asad claimed that the global spread of terrorism and
militant ideology was a greater threat than the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, and pointed to Pakistan as a
particular source of worry for the SARG. When pressed on
WMD, Asad assessed that "no one would use them," with Muallim
adding that the U.S. should stop arming Israel if it wished
to defuse the Middle East arms race. Asad offered himself as
an honest broker and peacemaker, and -- portraying Syria as
an island of stability and secularism in a sea of regional
conflict -- insisted that his true aim was to improve the
quality of life of the Syrian people through increased
economic opportunity. He portrayed regional political issues
as a distraction from this goal. Regarding the possibility
of a new Embassy compound, Muallim jumped in to "clarify"
that there are three possible sites for the NEC, and that the
DCS campus was not/not one of them. End summary.
3.(U) Representative Stephen Lynch (D-MA), Co-Chair of the
Task Force on Terrorism and Proliferation Financing, House
Financial Services Committee and the Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform, and Representative Robert Inglis
(R-SC), member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and
the House Science & Technology Committee, met President
Bashar al-Asad, Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallim, and
Presidential Advisor Bouthaina Sha'ban on Sunday, April 5.
--------------------------------
ASAD WANTS MORE DIALOGUE WITH U.S.
--------------------------------
4.(C) Lynch opened the meeting by noting the Obama
Administration's emphasis on engagement as a means to tackle
tough issues, and expressed his own hope that the U.S. and
Syria would begin this "serious work." Asad responded that
Syria was "ready to cooperate," and cited the Syrian-Turkish
relationship as a model for cooperation. He said U.S. and
Syrian interests overlapped in many areas, though "our points
of view differ." Asad opined that the "human condition is to
disagree," but that this should not stop parties from trying
to solve political problems. Asad suggested that further
Syrian-U.S. dialogue should first focus on issues "where we
agree," and subsequently move on to areas where U.S. and
Syrian positions diverged.
5.(C) Asad pressed the U.S. to speed up its engagement with
Syria. "We have had only one dialog, with (A A/S) Feltman,"
Asad complained. "We need more." He stressed that the U.S.
must move quickly, for "what we talk about today will not be
viable next month." Asad also professed to be a regional
honest broker: "When we say no, it means no; when we say
yes, it means yes. We are respected for this."
-------------------------
IRAQ AND FOREIGN FIGHTERS
-------------------------
6.(C) U.S. and Syrian interests were aligned, Asad said, in
that both countries sought regional peace and stability.
Where we differ, he explained, is in our "perceptions and in
our cultural approaches," particularly with regard to Iraq.
Making the case that Syria's overriding regional concern was
the spread of instability from across the border, Asad
exclaimed that "a curse in Iraq is a curse in Syria,
regardless of the status of U.S. forces there."
7.(C) Lynch told Asad that he had visited the Iraqi city of
Al-Qa'im, along the border with Syria, and that the flow of
foreign fighters across this and other border locations
continued to undermine stability in Iraq. Asad claimed Syria
had been trying to hold a dialogue on security issues with
the USG since 2004, but that the USG had failed to follow up
while, at the same time, it portrayed Syria as the
uncooperative party. "It was a game," Asad stated. He then
raised the September 2008 "suicide bombing" in Damascus as
evidence that Syria faced a serious terrorist threat and
therefore had an undeniable interest in countering foreign
fighters. Finally, Asad referred to problems along the
U.S.-Mexican border as evidence that border patrols, alone,
did not solve problems. Lynch countered that, in his
opinion, problems along the U.S.-Mexican border did not
compare to those along the Syria-Iraq border, particularly
with regard to smuggling and terrorism.
8.(C) Asad replied that the Syrian-Turkish border was more
problematic, in historical terms, than Syria's border with
either Lebanon or Iraq. Yet this same Turkish border had a
relatively light troop presence, he said. "The Turkish
border is the most controlled border, because we control it
from inside, politically, not with armaments." For al-Qaeda
"sleeper cells" in Syria, he continued, crossing the Iraqi
border was the "easiest part" of their effort. The U.S. and
Syria should aim to disrupt terrorist networks within Syria
and Iraq by disrupting their logistical support, Asad said.
Lynch responded that "a more thorough and constant
commitment" was needed to fight the flow of terrorists across
the Syrian-Iraqi border. Asad countered that political
stability inside Iraq would do more to stop the flow of
foreign fighters than any tightening of border controls.
"This is where we can help," claimed Asad.
------------------------------------
LEBANON NOW BASE OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS
------------------------------------
9.(C) Asad said that he and Iraqi PM Nuri al-Maliki had
discussed the foreign fighter issue at the recent summit, and
that Maliki had said that foreign fighters were moving to
northern Lebanon. "This is because there is now chaos in
Lebanon, and this chaos is fertile soil to grow terror," Asad
explained. Asad also claimed that Iraqi officials were now
saying that those who still seek to infiltrate Iraq through
the Syrian border are al-Qaeda-affiliated Iraqis, and not
"foreign" fighters. On Syrian-Lebanon relations, Asad curtly
noted that Syria had opened an embassy in Lebanon, and
Lebanon had followed suit in Damascus. Asad added he had
appointed an ambassador who would arrive in Beirut "in two
months' time."
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GOLAN
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10.(C) Inglis asked Asad how Syria and other states in the
region defined Israeli "occupation," and what effect this had
on peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority, and between Israel and Syria. Asad replied that
"occupation is occupation -- what the U.S. does in Iraq is no
different from what Israel does in Golan, except that the
U.S. isn't building homes there." Asad reiterated the Golan
issue was "not complex" -- Syria recognized Israel "in their
land, just not in ours." He said that forward movement on
the Golan track "is about the will of the Israeli leaders and
the role that the U.S. can play," and could be "solved
politically."
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GAZA AND HAMAS
--------------
11.(C) The Gaza track, and the position of Hamas, was more
complex, Asad said. Calling on the U.S. to engage and
"encourage" Hamas, Asad stated that "negative pressure
produces a weak and artificial product." Hamas had been
democratically elected in a process observed and verified by
former President Carter himself, Asad argued. He pointed to
Syria's "political pragmatism" in allowing Hamas leaders to
reside in Syria, despite what Asad termed as Syria's
"long-term problem with the Muslim Brotherhood." He asserted
that Hamas leaders' exposure to Syrian political culture had
softened their militantcy.
12.(C) On the current Gaza situation, Asad called for an
"urgent truce" and an across-the-board lifting of the Israeli
embargo, and warned that the ongoing humanitarian crisis was
giving militant Islamists a foothold in the region.
Concerning reconstruction, Asad said that he favored
establishment of an independent authority to disburse funds.
He claimed that Syria and Qatar had managed to fund
non-partisan reconstruction projects in Lebanon, and
suggested that Palestinian reconstruction might be modeled on
this example. Asad questioned, however, whether there was a
point in undertaking a reconstruction effort before peace was
achieved, as anything re-built would surely be "destroyed
again" without a lasting truce. Asad said he supported
immediate, humanitarian aid to assist the Palestinian people
in the interim.
13.(C) Palestinian reconciliation was a precondition for
moving the peace process forward, Asad said, stressing
Syria's "pragmatism" vis-a-vis Hamas. The Palestinian track
was important to the Golan track, and "this is why we are
involved with Hamas." He added that "isolation does not
work." Asad questioned U.S. thinking on Hamas's refusal to
recognize Israel. "We (the Syrian government) do not
recognize Israel verbally, but when we sign an agreement with
them, we recognize them formally. We don't have to say it --
it is a form of informal recognition. You cannot expect more
of Hamas, because -- politically -- it does not work." He
also claimed that the USG had missed an important opportunity
in 2006 when it failed to recognize the significance of
Khaled Mesha'al's acceptance of the 1967 line. "This was
recognition (by Mesha'al) of the two-state solution, and the
U.S. did not seize it," he said.
--------------------------------------
PROLIFERATION OF WMD ... AND IDEOLOGY
--------------------------------------
14.(C) Inglis asked Asad how the U.S. and other countries
could bring a sense of stability to the Middle East, so that
the drive of individual states to possess weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs) is reduced. Asad replied that the
proliferation of terrorist ideology is as dangerous, if not
more dangerous, than the proliferation of WMD. "Terrorism
spreads today like information spreads across the Internet,"
Asad said. At several points during the conversation, Asad
asserted that the spread of militant Islam in Pakistan
threatened the entire world and was a particular worry for
Syria. He said the U.S. needed to understand that terrorists
do not respond to force. "If people think they are going to
die, they have nothing to lose," Asad said. "They become
fearless. They think, 'I can do what I want with my body.'
You must analyze and understand this ideology," he lectured.
Softening, Asad praised President Obama's recent remarks to
the Iranian people, in particular his having "wished the
Iranians a 'happy feast'." He told CODEL members that they
"must understand how much good this did."
15.(C) When pressed on the issue of WMD, Asad stated that,
"in practical terms, no one would use them, because it would
destroy everything." This doomsday scenario would provide
sufficient deterrent, he maintained. Asad asserted that the
key to reducing the sense of threat in the region "lies with
those who hold occupied land," adding, "We do not (occupy
others' land)." Muallim interjected that the "U.S. must stop
arming Israel" if it wished to defuse current tensions, and
said the current U.S. approach in the Middle East was "like
trying to talk to Pakistan without considering India."
------------------------
PROSPERITY THROUGH PEACE
------------------------
16.(C) Questioned directly about Syria's objectives, both
domestically and regionally, Asad replied that above all, he
was working for economic growth and an improved standard of
living for the Syrian people. These aims, he said, could
only be achieved by building peace in the region and fighting
extremism. Without regional peace, Asad warned, the next
generation of Arabs "would know only desperation." Referring
to Hamas, Hizbollah and others, Asad said "these
organizations we have in Syria are a result of a no war, no
peace situation" in the region. Portraying Syria as an
island of stability and secularism in a sea of regional
conflict, Asad said U.S. actions in Iraq had "complicated"
his country's efforts to achieve their peaceful ambitions.
17.(C) Regarding the current state of the Syrian economy,
Asad joked that many Syrians were "thanking their incompetent
government" for an economic system so backward that it
remained relatively untouched by the global financial crisis.
"We cannot stay isolated, however," Asad said, and pointed
to the launching of the Damascus Stock Exchange as one small
step toward economic reform.
--------------------
NEW EMBASSY COMPOUND
--------------------
18.(C) CODEL members raised the issue of the new Embassy
compound. "If we are to make a commitment" to engage Syria,
Lynch explained, "we need to know that you are going to pave
the way for a safe and reliable situation for our people."
Asad assured the CODEL that his government wanted to help the
USG in securing a location for a new chancery, and that the
SARG had abandoned its original idea of grouping diplomatic
compounds together in a distant suburb of Damascus. Asad
said he knew a State Department team had recently visited
Damascus to examine possible locations for a new Embassy
compound. Muallim quickly jumped in to state that there were
three possible sites for a new Embassy compound, and that
"the school is not one of them -- it would be impossible."
Muallim then addressed Asad directly, explaining to the
President that the Embassy would have to work through his
Ministry with Damascus municipal officials to ensure that any
new construction "fits with the municipal plan."
19.(U) Charge' d'Affaires Maura Connelly accompanied CODEL
members to this meeting, as did several congressional staff
and econoff.
ΒΆ20. (U) CODEL Lynch authorized release of this cable.
CONNELLY