

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06PARIS953, EUR PDAS VOLKER'S FEB 3 MEETING WITH SARKOZY
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06PARIS953.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06PARIS953 | 2006-02-14 17:00 | 2011-02-10 08:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
Appears in these articles: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/documents-wikileaks/article/2011/02/09/wikileaks-les-visiteurs-de-l-ambassade_1477418_1446239.htm |
VZCZCXRO6882
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #0953/01 0451700
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141700Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4253
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000953
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
AND EB
DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON
SUBJECT: EUR PDAS VOLKER'S FEB 3 MEETING WITH SARKOZY
ADVISOR AND FORMER INDUSTRY MINISTER PARTICK DEVEDJIAN
REF: A. (A) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 6
¶B. 2006 AND PRIOR
(WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/EUR/PARIS/INDEX.CFM)
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: EUR Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Kurt Volker reviewed on February 3 with Patrick Devedjian, a
former industry minister and key advisor to Interior Minister
Sarkozy, how a possible Sarkozy administration would likely
approach relations with the U.S. Devedjian said a Sarkozy
administration would make "economic gestures" in connection
with the reconstruction of Iraq to signal -- as much as
domestic French opinion would allow -- France's more active
association with U.S. goals in the region. Devedjian
acknowledged that a Sarkozy victory in 2007 is far from a
sure thing, while discounting Prime Minister de Villepin's
chances of pushing Sarkozy aside as leader of the
center-right governing party. Devedjian acknowledged that
the unexpectedly persistent popularity of Socialist Party
(PS) dark horse Segolene Royal (ref A) was an unforeseen
development that is forcing contenders of both left and right
to revisit their electoral calculations, even if he did not
believe she could win in the end. END SUMMARY.
WHAT TO EXPECT FROM A SARKOZY ADMINISTRATION
--------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) "We will make economic gestures with regard to the
Iraq situation" is how Devedjian expressed what would be a
new French willingness, under a Sarkozy administration, to
more actively support U.S. goals in Iraq. Devedjian, evoking
the strand of anti-Americanism that persists in France and
the widespread public hostility to the U.S.-led invasion of
Iraq, cautioned however that how much France might be able to
do along these lines depended on what would be "politically
possible" at the time. Devedjian did not specify what those
"economic gestures" might be. Comment: Increases in
development aid and, possibly further debt forgiveness, could
be what he had in mind. End Commentg.
¶3. (C) Devedjian used the phrase "Atlanticist and
communitarian" to describe Sarkozy's overall outlook, and to
distinguish it from that of Villepin, which is often
described as "nationalist and Republican." Devedjian
underlined that "we will not be ceding to an anti-American
campaign," notwithstanding the efforts of Sarkozy's opponents
to try and tar Sarkozy as pro-American. Devedjian made clear
that not only would the Sarkozy campaign not engage in any
outbidding of the opposition in anti-Americanism, but that it
would also make every effort to avoid "bringing the U.S. into
our domestic politics."
¶4. (C) In response to PDAS Volker's hope that, at NATO, a
Sarkozy victory might result in useful, operationally
consequential changes in French behavior, Devedjian lamented
that the French press and public "are not interested in
NATO." This has permitted President Chirac, he said, to
conduct French policy in NATO beyond public scrutiny, without
accountability for the consequences. Devedjian suggested
that French institutional reforms proposed by Sarkozy,
specifically, an NSC-like coordinating mechanism for foreign
policy and periodic reports by the president to the
parliament on current issues, could have the effect of
bringing France's NATO policy out of the shadows. This might
eventually lead to a more positive appreciation of NATO's
role by the French public.
LONG, UNCERTAIN ROAD TO 2007
----------------------------
¶5. (C) Getting to a Sarkozy administration in 2007, as
Devedjian soberly acknowledged, was far from a foregone
conclusion. Devedjian believed that Sarkozy's "type of
leadership" -- "the hands-on leadership" seen in Sarkozy's
successful, personal management of the security response to
the urban unrest that swept France last fall, along with the
"rupture" with past practice advocated by Sarkozy -- are what
the French people truly want. Devedjian specified that by
"rupture with the past," Sarkozy primarily means slimming
down a bloated and pervasive state that stifles growth by
taking too big a share of national wealth and which
undermines individual initiative and commercial innovation by
over-regulation of business activity. Devedjian underlined
that voters want "renewal," and he musingly volunteered that
PARIS 00000953 002 OF 003
"Sarkozy on the right, and Segolene (Royal) on the left" were
"the two candidates that would most respond to this desire
for change."
¶6. (C) Devedjian confidently dismissed the possibility of
Prime Minister de Villepin mounting a successful campaign to
replace Sarkozy as the candidate of the center-right in 2007.
Devedjian said that "Villepin and Sarkozy are in agreement"
that some sort of primary process should decide a single
nominee for their party, the UMP. Devedjian observed that
Villepin won't challenge Sarkozy for control of the party so
long as Sarkozy clearly benefits from both firm command of
the party and a healthy public image. He added that Villepin
"has always counted on Sarkozy's self-destruction -- which
he's been counting on in vain since 2002." Devedjian alluded
to Villepin's view that Sarkozy's personality -- somehow, not
presidential -- would in the long run work to shift the
support of the center-right to Villepin.
¶7. (C) Turning to the potential opposition to Sarkozy on the
center-left, Devedjian clucked at the long-running, confused
contentiousness in the Socialist Party (PS) over both who
will lead the party and what the party will stand for in
¶2007. In Devedjian's view, neither Party First Secretary
Francois Hollande nor any of the party's mainstream figures
are likely to make compelling candidates. Asked to assess
the option for the socialists of "bringing back Jospin" --
that is, unifying the divided PS under former Prime Minister
Lionel Jospin -- Devedjian declared that "Jospin isn't the
future, he's the past -- and that's not what voters are
looking for." As for the popular President of the
Poitou-Charentes Region, Segolene Royal, Devedjian said that,
despite her appeal to voters wanting change, "Segolene has no
chance" of winning the PS nomination.
¶8. (C) Devedjian pointed out that Royal had in preceding
days made statements in support of "Blairist" policies to
address some of France's economic problems. "The only other
Blairists in the PS are Kouchner and Bockel," Devedjian
summed up. (Note and comment: Former Health Minster Bernard
Kouchner and Mayor of Mulhouse Jean-Marie Bockel are the PS's
most outspoken "liberals." Adoption of anything resembling
their views is out of the question for the vast majority of
PS party members. Even so, Devedjian's inference is
disingenuous -- Royal is exceedingly popular among party
members. End note and comment.) Reflecting on how Royal's
popularity -- the emergence of her candidacy as a potentially
serious one -- has upset the calculations of contenders on
both left and right, Devedjian joked, "Now that she's wound
up and going, even Francois Hollande must realize she's not
going to quit at his, or anybody else's say so." (Note:
Royal and Hollande have been domestic partners for over 20
years. End Note.) Devedjian reprised the familiar refrain
that Royal's personality, allegedly both disagreeable and
brittle, is not up to carrying the weight of the presidency.
Implying that this unfitness for the job would become evident
in due time, Devedjian said that "Everybody who knows her
knows it, Francois Hollande most of all."
PARTICIPANTS
------------
¶9. (SBU) Devejian was accompanied by the UMP's Director for
International Affairs, Pascal Drouhaut and a staff assistant,
Marie-Celie Guillaume. PDAS Volker was accompanied by POl
M-C and PolOff. Devedjian and Volker parted agreeing to stay
in touch -- in particular, should Devedjian, Drouhaut or
other Sarkozy advisors travel to Washington in the near
future.
SARKOZY'S ADVISORS
------------------
¶10. (C) Sarkozy's inner circle of political allies and
advisors consists of Francois Fillon, Brice Hortefeux and
Patrick Devedjian. Hortefeux is currently Junior Minister
(for Territorial Collectivities) under Sarkozy at the
Interior Ministry. Fillon and Devedjian, who were members of
the government of Jean-Pierre Rafferin, were excluded from
the current Villepin government precisely because of their
closeness to Sarkozy. Under Rafferin, Fillon was Minister of
Education and Devedjian was Junior Minister for Industry.
Both now have positions in the UMP, and devote themselves
full-time to making Nicholas Sarkozy the next president of
France. Fillon tends to take the lead in the fashioning of
Sarkozy's policy proposals, while Devedjian tends to focus on
PARIS 00000953 003 OF 003
tactics for countering other contenders and on strategy for
getting the votes to win. Fillon is considered a likely
candidate for prime minister, with Devedjian at Justice or
Interior, should Sarkozy win in 2007.
¶11. (U) This message has not been cleared by PDAS Volker.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton