

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06PARIS1031, SEGOLENE ROYAL DISCUSSES STRATEGY FOR 2007, TRIP
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06PARIS1031.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06PARIS1031 | 2006-02-17 16:14 | 2011-02-10 08:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
Appears in these articles: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/documents-wikileaks/article/2011/02/09/wikileaks-les-visiteurs-de-l-ambassade_1477418_1446239.htm |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001031
SIPDIS
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
AND EB
DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON
SUBJECT: SEGOLENE ROYAL DISCUSSES STRATEGY FOR 2007, TRIP
TO U.S. WITH AMBASSADOR
REF: A. (A) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 17
¶B. 2006
¶C. (B) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 10
¶D. (C) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 6
¶E. (D) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR JANUARY 20
¶F. (E) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR DECEMBER 19
¶G. 2005
¶H. (F) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 23
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: In a February 8 meeting with Ambassador,
Socialist Party (PS) presidential hopeful, current media
darling and president of the Poitou-Charentes region Segolene
Royal left no doubt as to her determination to win election
as president of France in 2007. She matter-of-factly
assessed her high poll numbers, expressing the conviction
that her focus on family, school, and social services issues,
along with her popularity among ordinary people, make her a
potent political force. (Current polls show that Royal could
make a formidable candidate in France's presidential
election, now 14 months away. These polls show she is one of
only two or three contenders that over half of voters now say
they could be willing to vote for as president.) Conceding
that "polls are not elections (ref D)" but adding that "they
stop being in error about six months before the elections,"
Royal expressed optimism that her popularity would hold until
then -- and for six months thereafter, notwithstanding the
predictions of pundits to the contrary. Royal went to
considerable lengths to express her openness and friendliness
towards the U.S. and mentioned the possibility of visiting
Washington during an upcoming trip to New York to speak at
Columbia University. End summary.
A DISARMINGLY DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL HOPEFUL
-----------------------------------------
¶2. (C) In her discussion with Ambassador Stapleton and
Embassy officers on February 8, Segolene Royal lived up to
her image as an uncommonly charismatic, subtle and determined
politician. She very matter-of-factly reviewed her
sustained, high poll numbers (ref C) and made no bones about
her intention to pursue the presidency so long as "other
people think it's possible for me." Unaffectedly applying to
herself the term "willful" often used about her by
detractors, Royal said she was determined to stay in the
presidential race until eliminated or victorious. (Comment:
According to a recent biography of Royal, she wanted to test
the waters by running in 2002, and rues having allowed
herself to be discouraged from doing so by fellow PS
heavyweights. In this biographer's account, she is
determined to stay in there to the end this time around. End
comment.)
"I'M THE ONE TO BEAT" FOR THE PS NOMINATION
-------------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Royal betrayed no qualms about her ability to shape
to her benefit the process that is leading to the PS's
selection of a candidate for 2007 by primary vote among party
members next November. In contrast to her public remarks
about securing the PS nomination, where she often quotes
former president Mitterrand in saying that, in politics "you
have to give time to time," Royal was much more direct with
the Ambassador, shrugging off the chances of her more senior
rivals in the PS by pointing out that, "I'm the one to beat."
(Note: Among PS party members, who will be the only voters
in next November's party primary, Royal's current popularity
ratings nearly double those of her nearest rival, former
prime minister Lionel Jospin. The popularity of Royal, as a
potential presidential standard bearer has risen steadily
among party members since last summer (ref F). Among the
public at large, she also far outpaces Jospin and other PS
heavyweights in current polls as the most preferred PS
presidential candidate. End Note.)
¶4. (C) Royal said that the attraction of winning -- with her
as the standard-bearer most clearly able to deliver victory
-- was a powerful galvanizer of opinion among party members.
She judged that her relatively junior standing as a party
leader and alleged lack of qualifications need not stand in
the way of her garnering enough support to win from among the
party's 130,000 card-carrying members. Briefly reviewing her
electoral and governmental record, she believed her
experience was more than adequate to overcome any qualms
party members (and thereafter, voters) might have about it.
(Note and comment: Royal has been elected to the National
Assembly four times; has served junior minister for the
environment, junior minister for elementary education and
junior minister for families, children and the handicapped.
Most recently (in 2004) she won the presidency of the
Poitou-Charentes region, beating the hand-picked candidate of
then Prime Minister Raffarin. Royal's is a distinguished
record of achievement and experience. What issue there may
be over her qualifications within the PS has to be seen in
light of, for example, former prime minister Laurent Fabius'
experience as prime minister, president of the National
Assembly, head of the PS party group in the National
Assembly, minister of economy and finance and regular
re-election to parliament since 1978. Since the February 8
meeting, it has become obvious that former prime minister
Jospin, in many ways the party's most senior figure, is
actively seeking the nomination (ref A). End Note and
comment.)
GOLD-PLATED IMAGE PLUS FAMILIES-SCHOOLS-NEIGHBORHOODS
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶5. (C) Royal outlined a carefully crafted strategy designed
to cast her as the candidate of safe change -- i.e., the
candidate who answers best French voters' simultaneous
eagerness for change and fear of it. Royal said that she
believed "people want a new kind of political discourse."
This conviction, she continued, was prompting her to skip the
political talk shows and deliberately focus instead on the
family, school and environmental issues that are her strength
and "are what matter most to ordinary people." She argued
that her focus on "soft" social services issues, coupled with
her very positive public image, her sterling center-left
credentials and proven effectiveness as a grass-roots
politician, make her a potent political force. Royal said
that the core of her candidacy is "having the courage to have
confidence in the voters."
NOT A LOT OF POLICY SPECIFICITY
-------------------------------
¶6. (C) Royal spoke in very general, indeed, rather vague,
terms about what she stands for as a presidential candidate.
(Comment: Given her popularity, it is probably not in her
interest to furnish policy prescriptions at this time lest
she alienate potential supporters. End comment.) She
described a crisis of confidence among ordinary French people
who, she said, "are prey to a feeling of decline." She
evoked how prospects for those in the middle class are
shrinking, for their children even more so. She pointed to
narrowing the quality gap between France's elite schools and
its regular schools and universities as key to
re-invigorating upward mobility in French society. She also
criticized the Villepin government's emphasis on employment
as the engine of upward mobility, lamenting the
"destabilizing effects" for family life of the increased job
insecurity implicit in many of the government's employment
initiatives. Royal said that she would like "to lead a
national project" that would succeed by renewing "hope in the
people." Implicitly addressing criticism directed against
the absence of a program, Royal noted that the successful
record of the Jospin government didn't prevent him from
losing in his bid for the presidency in 2002, concluding that
"you don't win elections on your record or your program" but
rather on the expectations generated by a candidacy.
OPENNESS TO THE U.S.
--------------------
¶7. (C) Though she did not dwell on foreign policy issues,
Royal did make an effort to convey openness towards the U.S.
Echoing the remarks of other political interlocutors across
the board, she duly noted her opposition to the U.S. invasion
of Iraq but went to considerable length in assuring the
Ambassador that a socialist government would "never have
actively campaigned against the U.S. in Africa," for example,
and would have handled differences in a more understanding
and less confrontational manner than President Chirac and
then-FM de Villepin. Royal recalled, with evident fondness,
her work organizing the 1981 Versailles Summit between
Presidents Reagan and Mitterrand. This was her first
experience with presidential-level diplomacy and apparently
involved liaising with the U.S. Secret Service; Royal
expressed her surprise, at the time, discovering the massive
logistical underpinnings required by such events. Royal also
made clear, through a reference to watching "Desperate
Housewives," that she did not reject American popular
culture. Royal did not augment her friendly sentiments
toward the U.S. with any vision for U.S.-France relations.
She did suggest a need "to find France's place in the world,"
with the GoF showing less arrogance in how it speaks to the
world. The latter factor, she suggested, had played a role
in the defeat of France's 2012 Olympics candidacy.
¶8. (U) Royal said she would be visiting the U.S. soon,
probably in the context of accepting an invitation to speak
at Columbia University in New York this spring. She
mentioned the possibility of also visiting Washington at that
time. The Ambassador said he would be pleased to work with
her and her staff to design an appropriate program.
COMMENT
-------
¶9. Royal clearly believes her determination, concern for
ordinary people and uncommon mix of strengths as a candidate
make her a real contender, notwithstanding the predictions of
pundits and her political rivals that the "Segolene
phenomenon" will not last. Opponents, whether from
center-right (with the exception of Interior Minister
Sarkozy) or her own center-left, either insist on her
"unfitness" for the job (ref D) or suggest she is a stalking
horse for a "draft" of former PM Jospin. Although it is not
unfair to be skeptical about Royal's staying power or even
her qualifications, it is also true that much of the
disparagement of her stems from envy of the popularity of a
female upstart, who is also challenging the unwritten rules
of the political establishment. It is also undeniable that
Royal has managed to tap into the feelings of an electorate
looking for change.
¶10. Royal appeared to be well disposed towards the U.S.
That said, as is the case for many on the left of the French
political spectrum, it would be a mistake to translate a high
comfort level with American culture into approval for a wide
range of U.S. polices, foreign and domestic. Royal has only
made brief trips to the U.S. as a tourist. End comment.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton