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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06NAIROBI4629, TWO MEETINGS WITH UHURU KENYATTA
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06NAIROBI4629 | 2006-10-27 12:13 | 2011-03-14 21:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Nairobi |
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHNR #4629/01 3001213
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271213Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5153
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 8887
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 4918
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 4418
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1643
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2035
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2013
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 004629
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM ECON KE CH
SUBJECT: TWO MEETINGS WITH UHURU KENYATTA
Classified By: Political Counselor Larry Andre per 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Gliding over the faults of the previous KANU
government, KANU political party leader Uhuru Kenyatta sees a
political landscape marred by the destruction of party
discipline, with ethnic politics an increasingly attractive
and dangerous option for some. The current opposition
squabbling is distracting attention from real issues. Kenyan
politics is about personalities more than anything else.
Kenyatta remains committed to an opposition coalition against
Kibaki in the 2007 elections. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (U) A/S Frazer, Ambassador and PolCouns dined with Uhuru
Kenyatta, head of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and
official opposition chief on the eve of Kenyatta Day, which
celebrates his father's role as Kenya's first president.
Deputy PolCouns and visiting member of the Secretary's policy
planning staff Ted Craig breakfasted with Kenyatta the
following day. This message reports the themes Kenyatta
raised at these meetings. Note: many commentators believe
this Kenyatta Day was the last: if a proposed and widely
favored constitutional change goes through, the holiday will
become "Heroes Day," commemorating a variety of Kenya's
independence leaders. End note.
History as KANU sees it
-----------------------
¶3. (C) Kenyatta questioned whether the oft-cited political
progress in Kenya since KANU's departure from power was real.
Political freedom, he insisted, was increasing anyway under
KANU. A coalition voted out "terrible KANU," he said
ironically, but immediately the head of the coalition
(Kibaki) began acting as if he had been elected as a
stand-alone candidate. He governed not as the head of a
coalition but as the head of his Democratic Party, which
represented only one part of Central Province (Kikuyuland).
Kibaki once in power decided there was no need to change the
"strong Presidency" features of the Constitution he had
campaigned against. Then, seeing that he had lost his
Parliamentary majority, he did what even Moi never did,
"poaching" members of other parties to be part of his
government. After several years of this, there is no party
discipline at all, Kenyatta lamented. Confusion reigns.
People who fought you in the election now support you.
People who were elected under the banner of your party are
now standing with the government and opposing you. Kibaki
was given a golden opportunity in 2002 to bring Kenyans
together and take the country to the next level. He
squandered that opportunity and now we are at a worse state
of affairs than we were prior to 2002, especially as regards
entrenched ethnic sentiments.
Political Observations
----------------------
¶4. (C) Kenyatta made the following observations on political
topics:
THE MOU AND PERSONALITY POLITICS: Kenyatta said he has seen
the famous "MOU" (memorandum of understanding) signed by the
coalition of parties that ran against him as NARC in 2002.
It demonstrates that Kibaki went back on his word. (Note: it
is widely accepted that the main deal of the MOU is that
Kibaki becomes President, with the support of Raila Odinga
and others, and in return agrees to amend the Constitution to
create a weak presidency and a strong Parliament--with Odinga
the obvious candidate for Prime Minister. End note.)
However, Odinga and others could not produce the MOU to shame
Kibaki. That is because politics in Kenya is not about
policies, but personalities. Thus, the MOU is a wide-ranging
deal about who-gets-what more than an agreement on a new
Constitution, and publishing it would embarrass Odinga and
others as much as Kibaki and his inner circle.
KIBAKI'S POLITICAL STRATEGY: The Kibaki administration has
clearly accomplished some good things for Kenya, especially
on the economic front. We cannot take that away from them.
They have locked themselves into the mindset that re-election
is assured by these achievements, ignoring the other side of
the ledger. They have disappointed many. They were shocked
by the referendum loss, never seeing it coming. That same
arrogance will blind them in 2007.
ODM-K COALITION: Coalition politics works in many parliaments
in the world. Odinga is pushing hard for a single "ODM-K"
party. But why should Kenyatta and others abandon parties
they have worked hard to build up? The problem is not
coalitions, but rather dishonest politicians who forget their
promises once elected. When Odinga keeps pushing for the
dissolution of parties, with no clear reason, the question
has to be put to him: what's your real agenda? KANU will
work with the Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-K)
coalition to oppose the government and win the next election,
but will not dissolve. After all, we did not need to
dissolve our parties to win the referendum.
ODM-K'S AMORPHOUS NATURE: What are ODM-K's ideology, plans,
principles, party platform and governing structure? As of
now, we are nothing but a collection of personalities and
their ethnic constituencies. We must move beyond this.
Instead of focusing on who will get what post in some future
government, we must agree on what we want to achieve for
Kenyans. If the ODM-K leadership can work together in a
spirit of give and take, then we will win the next election.
If not, then we won't. So far, no one wants to fully commit
their political organizations to ODM-K unless they are first
assured of getting the top seat. This is a bad sign.
CONSTITUENCY DEVELOPMENT FUNDS--GREAT, BUT...: The bill
establishing these funds was actually passed before Kibaki
was elected. It's a great program--people "who never saw one
copper coin" spent by the government in their communities are
suddenly seeing real spending on their needs. However, there
is no good oversight mechanism, as MPs are each responsible
for funds for their districts. The legislative function
needs to be split from the oversight function. Due to the
collegial relationships among MPs, no one is going to
publicly ask "is the honorable member from constituency X
abusing his fund?" Until this problem is solved, the program
should not be expanded.
ETHNICITY VS NATIONALISM: Kibaki has governed very much "as a
member of a certain ethnic group, shall we say." (Note:
Kikuyu. End note.) The President's raiding of other parties
(for cabinet members) and destruction of party discipline,
without any real set of policies to give his governing
coalition identity, leaves the country more vulnerable than
ever to ethnic politics. "I get called a traitor every day."
(Note: Kenyatta is an ethnic Kikuyu. End note.) We need to
campaign on a theme of Kenyan unity, dropping the traditional
notion of communities taking turns at the national trough.
An enhanced spirit of nationalism and inclusiveness will
increase accountability. Corrupt individuals can no longer
hide behind their communities.
ETHNIC INCITEMENT FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES: Some of my ODM-K
colleagues openly speak of how their communities have been
"slighted by the Kikuyu." This is dangerous language. They
should say "slighted by Kibaki." After all, the average
Kikuyu has received no special benefit from this government,
only the cronies around Kibaki have benefited. No good will
come from encouragement of ethnic warfare. Kibaki with his
access to state resources is in a better position to buy off
community leaders and play ethnic politics than we are. It
is both politically expedient and morally right for us to
avoid ethnic politics. Tensions are such that sparks from
any minor inter-ethnic incident can now ignite an
uncontrollable fire. I am worried.
A NEW CONSTITUTION: Poloff asked if ODM-K would run on the
original "Bomas" draft constitution (which was altered by
Kibaki's government before the referendum). Kenyatta
demurred. Remember, he said, that different groups voted
against the (government-backed) draft constitution for many
reasons. What united them was the "no" vote. ODM-K needs to
work through this issue very carefully, rather than engaging
in its current squabbling.
WILL RAILA RUN: Raila Odinga is about 62, Kenyatta said, so
this is his last real chance, and he will try with every
ounce of his strength to become president of Kenya. He will
push right up to the moment when he sees he simply can't make
it. If that moment comes, as a pragmatist he will look
around and say, "let's cut a deal.
"MOI'S FADING INFLUENCE: While Moi is still very active and
vocal, in fact his influence is fading. This is shown in his
inability to call the shots within KANU even on his own home
turf in the central Rift Valley.
Other Observations
------------------
¶5. (SBU) Kenyatta also offered his views on other topics:
REMITTANCES: Remittances from Kenyans in the UK, U.S.,
Canada and elsewhere have fueled a construction boom in
Kenya. The financial community is discussing the
establishment of financial instruments to entice Kenyans
abroad into participating in that sector as well. Kenyatta
supports a constitutional amendment to grant dual citizenship
to Kenyans.
CHINA: There is a danger that Kenya's policy of increasing
cooperation with China to balance its dependence on western
donors will result in overdependence on China. The award of
an extensive airport upgrade contract to the Chinese will
result in a "Chinese quality" airport, to Kenya's detriment.
Kenyatta averred that China's much appreciated lack of
conditions for its assistance will not last. "Once we are
dependent, the conditions will surely come." A/S Frazer
pointed out the downside of Kenya closely associating with a
country that does not share its political ideals.
Comment
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¶6. (C) Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Kenya's first president, is
among the most perceptive and enlightened of Kenya's
politicians, and a representative of the younger generation.
However, he is a triple outsider at this point. He stands in
opposition to the government, in opposition to most Kikuyus
(who strongly back Kibaki) and in opposition to some of his
principle colleagues within the ODM-K coalition. He also
carries the historical baggage of KANU around his neck. The
party is both widely recognized among Kenyans for bringing
about independence and for committing many abuses against
standards of good governance and human rights. Kenyatta was
in fine form despite his many political woes. He delivered
his views with reason, conviction and charm. We will know in
coming months whether or not his plea for inclusive,
issues-based politics will win over those among his ODM-K
colleagues who are steeped in the traditional politics of
manipulating ethnic voting blocs. END COMMENT.
¶7. (U) Neither Ted Craig nor A/S Frazer cleared this message.
RANNEBERGER