

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09BEIJING2731, FOURTH PLENUM: XI NOT APPOINTED TO CMC; NO
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BEIJING2731.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BEIJING2731 | 2009-09-23 11:08 | 2010-12-28 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing |
VZCZCXRO2243
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #2731/01 2661108
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231108Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6194
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 002731
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2034
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MARR KDEM CH
SUBJECT: FOURTH PLENUM: XI NOT APPOINTED TO CMC; NO
SIGNIFICANT REFORMS
REF: BEIJING 2533
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.
Reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Although contacts expressed surprise that
Vice President Xi Jinping was not appointed Central Military
Commission Vice Chairman at the four-day Fourth Plenum of the
Seventeenth CCP Central Committee that concluded September
18, most cautioned against reading too much into the decision
and all stressed that it did not imply significant discord
within the Party. Several contacts noted that Party
leadership dynamics and China's political situation have
changed since 1999 when Hu Jintao was appointed to the CMC
and it is not possible to extrapolate Xi's political
trajectory from past practice. All contacts agreed that,
despite not being appointed to the CMC at the Fourth Plenum,
Xi Jinping is still the clear frontrunner to succeed Hu
Jintao. Some attributed the deferral of Xi's appointment to
leadership uncertainty that Xi's appointment was the right
move at the right time. There was consensus among our
contacts that, despite a communique touting "intra-Party
democracy" and anti-corruption initiatives, the Plenum was
essentially devoid of substantive reforms and will not result
in any significant policy initiatives. Although the Plenum
made no decisions on the future of Xinjiang Party Secretary
Wang Lequan, contacts unanimously predicted his political
career is "finished." End Summary
Plenum Communique
-----------------
¶2. (C) The Fourth Plenum of the Seventeenth Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) Central Committee concluded September 18. In
keeping with past practice, an official Xinhua news agency
statement announced the release of a CCP communique outlining
the conclusions of the Plenum. The Xinhua summary of the
communique noted that the Plenum had approved a "Decision"
calling for increased "intra-party democracy," party building
and anti-corruption initiatives in the face of urgent
domestic and international challenges. The communique
included a reference to the importance of addressing ethnic
policy, termed "nationalities work" (minzu gonzuo), and
promoting "ethnic unity." The text of the Decision itself
was not publicly released. The communique noted that
President Hu Jintao had delivered an important speech to the
Plenum outlining the challenges confronting the party. It
highlighted the role of Xi Jinping, who delivered an
"explanation" of the Decision to party members. Unlike the
Fourth Plenum of the Sixteenth Central Committee in 1999,
there was no mention of personnel decisions in the communique
following this plenum. The widely anticipated appointment of
Xi Jinping as Vice Chairman of the Central Military
Commission (CMC) was not included in the document. Following
the Plenum, the fourth plenary session of the CCP Central
Commission for Discipline and Inspection (CCDI) took place on
September 19 and also took up the discussion of
anti-corruption initiatives, specifically personal financial
declarations for Party members.
Lack of CMC Appointment Surprising but Not Significant
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶3. (C) Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Professor of
Public Policy Dong Lisheng on September 21 told PolOff that
he had been very surprised by the decision not to appoint Xi
to the CMC. Dong noted that the Plenum was the sole venue
for such personnel decisions and the outcome of this year's
Plenum meant that Xi would not receive the CMC appointment in
the near term. He discounted speculation, particularly among
the Hong Kong press, that Xi's appointment would only be
deferred until after the October 1 National Day celebrations
noting that the Party would not use such unorthodox means to
effect such an important personnel decision. Separately, on
September 21 Guangming Ribao Senior Editor Dong Yuyu agreed
that the issue of Xi's CMC appointment, if it had ever been a
subject at the Plenum, had been deferred for the near term
and would not be revived until 2011 at the earliest.
¶4. (C) Communist Party member, Renmin University Sociology
Professor and Vice Dean for Undergraduate Education Hong
Dayong on September 21 cautioned against overemphasizing the
1999 precedent and reading too much into the decision not to
elevate Xi. The political dynamics of the Party had changed
greatly, and past models of political transition were of
little utility in the current environment. Guangming Ribao
BEIJING 00002731 002 OF 004
editor Dong Yuyu emphasized that there was no established
system dictating the content and pace of Plenum personnel
decisions. Many had incorQctly surmised that because Hu
Jintao had been appointed to the CMC at the Fourth Plenum of
the Sixteenth Central Committee, Xi Jinping had to be
appointed at the same juncture. However, perceptions of the
importance of this perceived precedent were inaccurate.
CASS's Dong Lisheng emphasized that a primary factor in
deferring the appointment was likely Xi's short tenure as a
member of the Politburo. Dong Lisheng noted that when Hu
Jintao was appointed to the CMC in 1999 he had already been a
Politburo member for seven years. In contrast, Xi had only
been appointed to the Politburo two years earlier.
Xi Still the Frontrunner
------------------------
¶5. (C) Guangming Ribao's Dong Yuyu stressed that Xi Jinping
was still the frontrunner to succeed Hu Jintao in 2012 and,
in his own opinion, had a "sixty-percent chance" of
succeeding Hu in the Party Chairmanship, Presidency and CMC
Chairmanship. He noted that the decision to defer Xi's
elevation to the CMC was likely made in order to provide him
more time to develop as a Party leader. The Party was also
looking to protect itself by affording Xi "less time to make
mistakes" in that capacity before eventually taking the CMC
Chairmanship. Fang Jinyu, recently retired Beijing bureau
chief of the Nanfang Ribao Media Group, told PolOff September
14 that Xi remained the only feasible candidate by virtue of
his political pedigree and backing by Jiang Zemin, Zeng
Qinghong and other retired cadres and that Li Keqiang was not
a realistic competitor.
No Discord within the Politburo
-------------------------------
¶6. (C) CASS's Dong Lisheng said that, in his view, the
decision was the result of the Party leadership's
determination to "keep its options open" but did not imply
intra-Party discord. Guangming's Dong Yuyu stressed that the
failure to elevate Xi did not suggest power struggles within
Party leadership. On the contrary, the leadership was united
as never before around the principles of protecting its power
and the individual vested interests of Party leaders.
Deferring the appointment of Xi to the CMC was a function of
the Party's more cautious attitude in general rather than any
significant disagreements within the Politburo.
CCP-PLA Issues
--------------
¶7. (C) Renmin University's Hong Dayong noted that the CCP
leadership had to be "cautious in how it manages the
military" and Xi Jinping still lacked the requisite
experience at the highest levels of the Party leadership for
this role. Huang Shan, Deputy International Editor of
Caijing Magazine, on September 17 (during the Plenum)
emphasized that the Party was conscious of its "lack of
authority over the military," particularly in the wake of the
much publicized confrontation between Premier Wen Jiabao and
the PLA during reconstruction efforts after the Sichuan
earthquake and that this issue would inform the outcome of
the Plenum. Chen Jieren, News Director at Youth.cn, a news
website operated by the Communist Youth League and the nephew
of Politburo Standing Committee Member He Guoqiang, on
September 9 told PolOff that conservative members of the PLA
were among the leading critics of the response to the
Xinjiang riots and of the policies of President Hu and
Premier Wen; this was causing much introspection within the
Party. Guangming's Dong Yuyu noted that this theme had been
presaged in a speech by Hu Jintao during a July 24 Politburo
study session at which he called for the development of
"military-civilian integration" (junmin rongheshi fazhan).
Dong speculated that this initiative could suggest that the
Party was considering new options for the composition of the
CMC, including a formulation whereby both Xi Jinping and Li
Keqiang could be jointly named as Vice Chairmen in the future.
Plenum without Substance
------------------------
¶8. (C) Guangming Ribao's Dong Yuyu noted that in other
aspects the Plenum had developed exactly how he had expected,
with no meaningful changes to the Party's fundamental
approach to reform and ideology. Echoing references by other
contacts (reftel) to Hu Jintao's statement that the Party
BEIJING 00002731 003 OF 004
would "avoid distractions" (bu zheteng), Dong noted that the
process of drafting the Plenum conclusions had been ongoing
for the past year and the decision not to deviate from
existing policies had been reached long before the Plenum
convened. The one significant exception was the inclusion of
the reference to "nationalities work" in the communique, Dong
Yuyu said, which had been included recently in response to
the unrest in Xinjiang. However, like the other purported
reform initiatives, this would not translate into any
substantive adjustments to ethnic policy. A loosening of
policies in Xinjiang and Tibet would create a backlash
against the Party by the Han majority and was therefore
politically untenable.
Party Leaders Lack Mandate for Reform
-------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Speaking to PolOff September 17 (during the Plenum),
Caijing editor Huang Shan predicted that the significant
dilution of the political authority of individual Chinese
leaders would inform Plenum outcomes. The lack of a clear
political mandate meant there could be no substantive
political reforms at the Plenum or in the near term. The
Party had adopted a "wait and see" approach to reform in
general and was "absolutely unwilling" to consider any
meaningful changes to party ideology or policy. Although the
Party was aware that social unrest was a potential challenge
to its legitimacy, it would address the issue exclusively
through economic policy rather than political reform.
¶10. (C) CASS scholar Dong Lisheng echoed Huang Shan's
comments, noting that that the need for consensus informed
all major Party decisions and was the reason for the lack of
any substantive policy initiatives during the Plenum. He
noted, however, that the tenor of the Plenum reflected
significant dichotomy within the Party's outlook. On the one
hand, the Party remained confident that its policies had
successfully guided China through the global financial crisis
and had maintained economic growth and general political
stability. Guangming's Dong Yuyu echoed these comments,
stating that the Party had a confident (zihao) outlook and
was touting international praise for the "Beijing model" of
economic development as legitimizing its mandate. Both Dong
Lisheng and Dong Yuyu individually noted, however that on the
other hand the Party was obsessively preoccupied with
perceived threats to its hold on power. In this context, the
Party's overarching near-term goal was the preservation of
the status quo, and it would therefore avoid any policy or
reform initiatives that could potentially have "unforeseen
consequences."
¶11. (C) CASS's Dong Lisheng discounted the communique's
references to "intra-party democracy" as restatements of the
general principles outlined during the Seventeenth Party
Congress. He predicted that the anti-corruption measures
discussed during the Plenum would also not result in any
substantive measures to bring rampant graft under control.
Dong Lisheng noted that, despite the renewed discussion of
personal financial disclosure statements during the CCDI
plenary session, disclosure regulations for high-level cadres
had been on the books since 1995 but had not been enforced.
Guangming's Dong Yuyu noted that the reason that financial
disclosure statements had been discussed at the CCDI session
instead of the full Plenum was because they were impossible
to implement.
Wang Lequan Finished
--------------------
¶12. (C) All contacts agreed that Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
Region (XUAR) Party Secretary Wang Lequan would be replaced
in the near term. CASS scholar Dong Lisheng noted that the
unprecedented spectacle of ethnic Han Urumqi residents taking
to the streets to demand Wang's resignation shortly after a
visit to the XUAR by Hu Jintao could not go unanswered.
Caijing Magazine's Huang Shan suggested that Wang would be
reassigned to a semi-retirement position as a National
People's Congress Committee Chairman around the beginning of
the 2010. Politburo member nephew Chen Jieren noted that the
frontrunners to replace Wang included Hunan Party Secretary
Zhang Chunxian, Tibet Party Secretary Zhang Qingli, and
Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu. Chen noted that the
Party's decision on Wang's replacement would be an important
indicator of how it planned to proceed in Xinjiang. The
appointment of Zhang Qingli or Meng would suggest a more
hardline, security-focused approach.
BEIJING 00002731 004 OF 004
HUNTSMAN