

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06MADRID1490, AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MADRID1490.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06MADRID1490 | 2006-06-09 16:46 | 2010-12-02 12:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid |
VZCZCXRO4064
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMD #1490/01 1601646
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091646Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9958
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0234
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 4952
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0422
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0272
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0936
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0314
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 1185
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 0438
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 1916
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0121
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 001490
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV SP
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT
MADRID 00001490 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: DCM Bob Manzanares; reason 1.4 (B) and (D).
¶1. (C) Summary. The Ambassador met with Vice President Maria
Teresa Fernandez de la Vega on June 8 to review bilateral
relations and to discuss regional issues of joint interest,
including developments in Peru, Bolivia, Iran, Syria, and
North Africa. Regarding the CIA flights issue, Vice
President de la Vega said Spain's inclusion in the Council of
Europe report had caught the Zapatero Government totally off
guard and she insisted Spain had nothing to hide on the
issue. She said the Spanish Government felt comfortable that
it could contend with domestic concerns regarding CIA flights
through Spain, asking only that the USG provide Spain any
relevant information to avoid any surprises. De la Vega made
a strong pitch for increased USG-Spanish collaboration on
North Africa (NOTE: FM Moratinos will likely raise this
during his June 19 meeting with the Secretary. END NOTE).
On Iran, de la Vega agreed with the need to maintain a
unified international voice on Iran's nuclear program, saying
Javier Solana was the appropriate interlocutor with Tehran.
She welcomed Alan Garcia's victory in Peru, but lamented that
in Bolivia Evo Morales appeared to be under the direction of
the most negative leftist elements in his administration.
End Summary.
//BILATERAL RELATIONS IMPROVING//
¶2. (C) Vice President de la Vega said she was aware of FM
Miguel Angel Moratinos' upcoming meeting with the Secretary,
as well as MOD Alonso's June 8 meeting with Secretary
Rumsfeld on the margins of the NATO ministerial. She
expressed satisfaction with the improvements in the bilateral
relationship over the last year. The Ambassador agreed that
we had made progress, adding that there was much more that
our countries could do together. The Ambassador
congratulated the Zapatero Government for its handling of the
thorny Catalan autonomy issue. De la Vega said that the
Zapatero administration was convinced that the Catalan issue
was nearing a successful conclusion and predicted that the
June 18 referendum in the Catalan Region would go smoothly
and result in public acceptance of a renegotiated autonomy
statute. The Ambassador reviewed his plans to visit the
Basque Region June 22-23, a visit focused on business issues,
but also including a courtesy call on Basque Regional
Government leader Juan Jose Ibarretxe. Vice President de la
Vega expressed no concern regarding such a visit.
¶3. (C) The Ambassador informed de la Vega of the June 28-29
visit of Education Secretary Spellings, noting Secretary
Spellings' strong background on foreign affairs and lengthy
government career. He said that while he would not normally
suggest Vice President de la Vega meet visiting cabinet
officials, it could be worthwhile to arrange a brief meeting.
De la Vega said she would welcome such a meeting if her
schedule permitted.
//CIA FLIGHTS//
¶4. (C) The Ambassador said that FM Moratinos had recently
advised him that Spain's National Court had accepted a case
filed by a private individual alleging USG wrongdoing in
Spain during the transit of Spanish airports by CIA aircraft.
Moratinos indicated the Spanish Government's desire to give
this issue as low a profile as possible, though, as a
judicial case, the government had a limited capacity to
influence the direction of the case. De la Vega said she was
aware of FM Moratinos' communication on this issue and
expressed confidence that the Zapatero Government could
manage it with little difficulty. (NOTE: According to June 9
press reports, government prosecutors have expressed
opposition to the National Court's hearing of a case in which
there is no evidence of a crime having been committed. END
NOTE).
¶5. (C) By contrast, she said, the Zapatero Government had
been surprised by the Council of Europe report alleging that
Spain "permitted or failed to investigate" the use of
Mallorca as a staging point for the "illegal" transfer of
individuals by the CIA. (NOTE: An MFA spokesperson roundly
denied any involvement by Spain in the illegal transfer of
MADRID 00001490 002.2 OF 003
suspected terrorists. END NOTE). De la Vega said Spain was
prepared to deal with this issue, but wanted to be certain
that it had all the information available regarding the
flights to avoid being caught unprepared. The Ambassador
noted that we too had an interest in preserving our
credibility and were careful to share whatever information we
had and to avoid any actions that might create problems for
the Spanish authorities. De la Vega emphasized that Spain
had no objection to USG intelligence flights through Spanish
territory; they simply wanted to be kept informed and, if
necessary, to be able to demonstrate that they were
exercising proper oversight of foreign aircraft passing
through Spain.
//IRAN, SYRIA//
¶6. (C) The Ambassador recounted his last meeting with
President Zapatero, during which Zapatero identified Iran as
the greatest threat to peace in the Broader Middle East. The
Ambassador said this was precisely the view of the USG and
that this underscored the importance of the USG's historic
decision to directly join the multilateral discussions with
Iran. He said it was vital at this critical phase that Iran
see a united international front, determined to prevent its
production of nuclear weapons. Vice President de la Vega
emphatically agreed, saying Javier Solana was the appropriate
interlocutor to deliver a unified message to Iran. The
Ambassador conveyed a similar message on the need to maintain
the consensus limiting high level contacts with Syria in
order to prevent Damascus from driving a wedge between
allies. Vice President de la Vega agreed on this point as
well.
//PERU, BOLIVIA, ARGENTINA//
¶7. (C) Vice President de la Vega expressed satisfaction with
the "good news" of Alan Garcia's victory in Peru, but
lamented that Bolivian President Evo Morales seemed to be
under the sway of his extreme left Vice President. Without
naming Venezuelan President Chavez, de la Vega indicated
Spain's conviction that other "negative influences" were also
at work in Bolivia. The Ambassador said that Chavez was
certainly eager to exert influence, but that Castro was
likely just as involved, though with more subtlety than
Chavez. De la Vega said that one positive development
resulting from Chavez' meddling was realization by Brazilian
President Lula da Silva that Chavez represented a genuine
threat to Brazilian interests in the region, just as Peruvian
President-elect Garcia, and to a lesser extent Chilean
President Bachelet, understood the nature of the threat.
¶8. (C) The Ambassador asked for Spain's view on whether
Argentine President Kirchner was likewise growing wary of
Chavez. De la Vega said that Kirchner was a special case, in
that he felt a strong affinity towards both President
Zapatero and Vice President de la Vega. She said she
believed Spain could influence his actions in a positive
direction and noted that he would be making a state visit to
Spain in the near future.
//NORTH AFRICA//
¶9. (C) Turning to her previous meeting with the Ambassador,
de la Vega recalled having urged the USG to increase
collaboration with Spain in promoting stability in North
Africa. She asked whether the Ambassador saw any chance of
progress on this issue. The Ambassador said that the USG was
actively considering various approaches on North Africa, in
light of the stalemate on Western Sahara and other sources of
tension. He suggested the Spanish Government present the USG
and other interested parties a detailed explanation of how it
intends to move forward on North Africa and recommend what
others could do to promote such an initiative. (NOTE: Our
sense is that FM Moratinos may raise this issue in his June
19 meeting with the Secretary. END NOTE).
//COMMENT//
¶10. (C) As with the Ambassador's last meeting with Vice
President de la Vega in April, the atmosphere was relaxed and
MADRID 00001490 003.2 OF 003
cordial throughout. The key message being relayed by the
Spanish Government through the nature and frequency of these
meetings is that they want to put bilateral relations on an
even keel. They do not use these encounters to press for a
meeting between Presidents Bush and Zapatero, an objective
they appear to have abandoned for the moment. Instead, the
Zapatero Government seems content to use the Vice President's
channel with the Ambassador to transmit where they see
opportunities for cooperation (Africa, Latin America) and to
assess the USG's view of the overall state of the bilateral
relationship.
AGUIRRE