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Viewing cable 06BOGOTA224, SWISS AMB ON FARC AND ELN PEACE PROCESS
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BOGOTA224 | 2006-01-11 21:20 | 2011-04-29 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bogota |
Appears in these articles: http://www.semana.com/wikileaks/Seccion/168.aspx |
VZCZCXYZ0006
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBO #0224/01 0112120
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 112120Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1109
INFO RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0968
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6468
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 7018
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN LIMA 3093
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8768
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0286
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 8668
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0768
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 3691
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1327
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
id: 49555
date: 1/11/2006 21:20
refid: 06BOGOTA224
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 05BOGOTA12031|06BOGOTA65
header:
VZCZCXYZ0006
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBO #0224/01 0112120
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 112120Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1109
INFO RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0968
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6468
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 7018
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN LIMA 3093
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8768
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0286
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 8668
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0768
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 3691
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1327
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000224
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2016
TAGS: PHUM PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: SWISS AMB ON FARC AND ELN PEACE PROCESS
REF: A) BOGOTA 65 B) 05 BOGOTA 12031
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. Swiss Ambassador Kupfer expressed
disappointment on January 6 with the FARC's rejection of the
Swiss-led international commission proposal for a
humanitarian exchange between the GOC and the FARC. He
reported that, despite the setback, international commission
members (one from France, Spain and Switzerland) would meet
again with the FARC in Colombia in early 2006 to continue
discussions on the same proposal. Kupfer said coordinating
the commission was going along fine for now but the French
continued to do as they pleased. He cited the January 3
announcement that French Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy would
travel to Colombia to discuss efforts to release
Colombian-French Ingrid Betancourt. Kupfer said this was
news to both the Swiss and Spanish. He also said GOC Peace
Commissioner Restrepo was a challenge to deal with and that,
unlike past humanitarian exchange initiatives, the Catholic
Church had little involvement in this one. Kupfer
represented Switzerland, one of the three accompanying
countries, at the GOC-ELN exploratory talks last month in
Havana. He said round two later in January would focus on an
agenda for future talks, and that the roles of the five civil
society guarantors and the three countries would have to be
re-defined. He predicted the GOC will want less involvement;
the ELN more. He said Norway and the ELN pressed for moving
the talks to Europe. According to Kupfer, the ELN is looking
to challenge its placement on the EU terrorist list and wants
to explore funding opportunities in Europe. In the end, both
the ELN and GOC agreed to keep the talks in Havana for now.
Kupfer underscored that, while the Swiss were happy to go
along with that, they would support moving the talks to
Europe if they advanced sufficiently, to enhance their
legitimacy. The ELN's placement on the EU terrorist list
would prove no obstacle to Switzerland if the circumstances
were right. End Summary.
------------------------------
HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE PROPOSAL
------------------------------
¶2. (C) On January 6, polcouns met with Swiss Ambassador
Thomas Kupfer to discuss FARC rejection of an humanitarian
prisoner exchange proposal (ref a), put forward by the
recently assembled "international commission" with
representatives from France, Switzerland, and Spain. Kupfer
expressed disappointment with the FARC reaction, which he
characterized as a "clear and categorical no." He said it
was difficult to find anything positive in the FARC's Dec. 29
communiqu, and complained that the FARC's leaders were
playing politics. First they complained they did not have
the details of the proposal (which Kupfer said they received
weeks earlier on December 15 along with the GOC), and then
they complained they were not accorded sufficient respect
when it was presented (i.e. by email). Kupfer insisted that
the proposal was a good one. "They were stupid to reject it
because they will only have to back down later," he said.
¶3. (C) Despite the setback and low chance of success, Kupfer
said the GOC and the FARC leadership had agreed to another
meeting in Colombia "at the technical level" between
international commission members and the FARC early in 2006,
perhaps in January. He noted that "difficulties with
organizational details" still needed to be resolved,
including the FARC's insistence that the GOC not know where
or when the meeting would take place. Kupfer stressed that
the FARC's attitude was unrealistic and that they had to show
more transparency. He said upcoming discussions would be
based on the proposal already rejected by the FARC.
-----------------------
IMPACT ON U.S. HOSTAGES
-----------------------
¶4. (C) Even if both parties finally agreed to discuss the
possibility of a humanitarian exchange, Kupfer said the
challenges would be overwhelming. FARC negotiators have
added the return of Simon Trinidad and Sonia (both extradited
to the U.S.) as critical to any deal. Kupfer speculated that
the FARC would probably try holding back one or more
Americans in any exchange, something the GOC had refused to
consider. And finally, said Kupfer, the FARC still had not
decided which FARC prisoners held by the GOC could be part of
any humanitarian exchange.
--------------------------------------------- -----------
DEALING WITH THE FRENCH, THE GOC; THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶5. (C) According to Kupfer, Switzerland has the coordinating
lead among the three countries on commission initiatives but
reining in the French continues to be a challenge. "The
French generally do what they want," he said. The latest
surprise was the January 3 announcement out of Paris that
Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy would visit Colombia
soon to discuss efforts to release Ingrid Betancourt. Kupfer
complained that Douste-Blazy would presumably not come
without a new bilateral initiative, something neither the
Swiss nor Spanish knew anything about. The only bright spot,
said Kupfer, was that Spain planned to be much more engaged
in the process.
¶6. (C) Kupfer acknowledged that dealing with the GOC, in
particular with Peace Commissioner Restrepo, continued to be
a challenge. Restrepo's attitude and style were difficult.
He was too forthright and stubborn, unwilling to take advice.
While everyone was more or less in agreement on the role of
the international commission, Kupfer was convinced Restrepo
would seek to limit its involvement when "it could be the
most useful." Kupfer concluded that Restrepo had little
experience in dealing with international community
facilitators and this would complicate matters in any future
negotiation.
¶7. (C) Kupfer noted with surprise that, unlike past
initiatives, the Catholic Church was minimally involved with
the initiative of the international commission. He surmised
that relations between Church negotiator Monsignor Castro and
the presidential palace, in particular Restrepo, were not
good. At the same time, he acknowledged that the Church
remained skeptical the FARC would agree to anything while
Uribe is president, an argument strengthened by the FARC's
most recent communiqu (ref b).
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GOC-ELN ENCOUNTER IN HAVANA
---------------------------
¶8. (C) Kupfer, who attended the December talks in Havana, was
more optimistic about exploratory discussions between the GOC
and the ELN, which will resume later this month. Restrepo
will meet with the ELN's Francisco Galan on January 11 to
prepare for a second round of talks. Kupfer said all the
goals were achieved during the first round: a dialogue was
launched, confidence building began, and a follow-on meeting
was set. Both parties "prudently" avoided trying to create
problems for the other. Round two will still be
"exploratory" and tackle the agenda for future talks. He
noted that in Havana the ELN commander Antonio Garcia at
first appeared distant and uninformed about the reality of
present day Colombia, but is now thoroughly engaged in the
process. Kupfer reported that Galan was more confident than
in previous encounters and exhibited less need to take cues
from Garcia. Kupfer said Evo Morales' election victory in
Bolivia gave the ELN negotiating team a psychological boost
as well.
¶9. (C) Kupfer underscored that the five guarantors were
crucial in getting both parties to Havana but their function
at the negotiating table would now need to be re-defined into
a supporting role. Kupfer predicted that this would be a
problem as the five want to continue as major players. What
was important now, said Kupfer, was a real facilitator in the
process.
¶10. (C) Regarding the three "accompanying" countries (Norway,
Spain and Switzerland), Kupfer said their role, too, would
have to be clarified, both on the political side as well as
on the logistics/accompaniment/facilitation side. The GOC's
approach so far has been, "we're glad you're here and we'll
call you if we need you." Kupfer said Norway in particular
took considerable umbrage at this. The ELN, on the other
hand, wanted the three countries more involved as the process
develops.
¶11. (C) Kupfer also reported some discussion of Brazil
joining as an accompanying country but no decision was taken.
He stressed that the minimal role played by Cuba and
Venezuela, the former as host and the latter as facilitator
for Garcia's travel, was also helpful. It is better to have
them involved this way than sabotaging the process from the
outside, he said.
¶12. (C) According to Kupfer, Norway pressed hard for a
European venue for the second round; Switzerland and Spain
did not. The ELN supported Norway, preferring to travel to
Europe for political and financial reasons. Kupfer said the
ELN complained several times about their terrorist
designation status and wanted a European venue to challenge
it. The ELN also made clear that Europe contained
opportunities for future funding needs. In the end, the ELN
agreed to keep the talks in Cuba, as did the GOC. Kupfer
underscored that, while Bern was happy to go along with the
Cuban venue for now, they would support moving o Europe if
the talks advanced sufficiently, to enhance legitimacy and
chances for success. The EU designation of the ELN as a
terrorist group would prove no obstacle to Switzerland.
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COMMENT
-------
¶13. (C) For now, U.S. redlines are covered, in particular
with the FARC initiative, as the GOC continues to insist that
all American hostages be part of any exchange. However, we
will continue to monitor both processes closely as France and
Switzerland in particular, may begin pressing the GOC to make
further concessions to keep the initiative with the FARC
alive. We agree with the pessimistic assessment of the
Catholic Church that the odds for a humanitarian exchange
between the GOC and the FARC remain low.
WOOD
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