

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07SANJOSE873, PARADISE BY CANDLELIGHT: COSTA RICAN POWER FAILURE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07SANJOSE873.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07SANJOSE873 | 2007-05-09 22:16 | 2011-03-21 16:30 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy San Jose |
VZCZCXYZ0008
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSJ #0873/01 1292216
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 092216Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7939
INFO RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 4906
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 3601
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 3782
UNCLAS SAN JOSE 000873
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EINV ECON SENV ENRG CS
SUBJECT: PARADISE BY CANDLELIGHT: COSTA RICAN POWER FAILURE
REF: SAN JOSE 00653
¶1. (U) This is another installment in our ongoing series explaining
why Costa Rica is not quite paradise. These cables seek to paint a
realistic picture of the challenges faced by Costa Rica. Travel
brochures don't tell the entire story.
¶2. (U) SUMMARY. Costa Rica's electrical generation system collapsed
on April 19 as the country suffered its first nation-wide blackout
in six years. Parts of the nation were without power for the next
24-48 hours. Rolling blackouts (except on weekends and holidays)
began on April 26. The collapse resulted from the combination of a
severe dry season as well as the failure of the National Electrical
Institute (ICE), Costa Rica's state power and telecom monopoly, to
both adequately maintain its own equipment and to invest in
increased capacity. ICE initially stated that power shortages were
likely to continue unless the state regulator allowed a 23 percent
rate hike. Meanwhile, businesses in Costa Rica suffered. While
President Arias announced the end to rolling-blackouts on May 4,
experts from General Electric tell us there are no quick or easy
solutions to Costa Rica's long-term problem of a lack of spare
capacity. END SUMMARY.
It All Comes Crashing Down
--------------------------
¶3. (U) On Thursday April 19, Costa Rica's electrical power system
failed just after 8:00 PM local time, triggering a country-wide
blackout that lasted for one and a half hours. Parts of the country
were without power for the following 24-48 hours. According to ICE,
the state-owned power and telecom monopoly, the collapse was due to
the combination of a "rainy-season" with very little rain that has
left the country's hydroelectric resources at 25 percent of normal
capacity and the breakdown of three turbines and two major
transformers over the course of two weeks. This, coupled with an
ever-increasing demand led to a situation where demand outstripped
capacity, leading to a system-wide shutdown of the grid.
Can't Meet Current Demand
-------------------------
¶4. (U) Over the last five years, ICE has not adequately invested in
its electrical generation capacity, as projects in the works for
years continued to face delays. Environmental groups have derailed
or postponed plans for two major hydroelectric projects planned in
environmentally sensitive areas. Major thermal (fuel-burning)
projects have also faced delays. For the last fours years ICE has
planned on constructing a 120-megawatt plant in Garabito. According
to the original timeline, the plant should have already been in
operation. Construction has not yet begun due to contracting
disputes (not unusual in Costa Rica).
¶5. (U) Costa Rica has long prided itself as a "green" country that
makes extensive use of non-thermal sources of electrical power and
has a history of using renewable sources to provide the vast
majority of its power. While that is still true, over the last two
years there has been a dramatic increase in the use of thermal
generators as well as purchases of electricity from neighboring
countries. Previous to 2006, approximately 6 percent of the
electricity consumed in Costa Rica came from thermal generators. In
2006 this figure had risen to 20 percent as Costa Rica purchased
more of its power from suppliers in Panama.
¶6. (U) This shift toward the increasing use of thermally-generated
electricity came as the price of oil also rose, dramatically
increasing the cost to ICE of generating electricity from thermal
sources. It costs ICE an average $0.03 per kilowatt-hour to produce
electricity in hydroelectric plants, $0.14 from their thermal
plants, and between $0.08-0.13 per kilowatt-hour to import
thermal-generated electricity (not including transportation costs)
from neighboring countries. Due to its own power shortages, Panama
is no longer exporting electricity to Costa Rica.
¶7. (U) In the first three months of 2007, ICE has already exhausted
86 percent of the USD 66.3 million budgeted to run the country's
diesel-fired electrical generators for the entire year. After the
power outage of April 19, ICE requested the state Regulatory
Authority for Public Services (ARESEP) to approve a 23 percent
increase in electrical tariffs to pay for the purchase of
thermal-generated power. ARESEP denied the request, stating that
ICE must explain how the electrical system was allowed to fall into
disrepair in the first place. In response, ICE began implementing
rolling blackouts on April 26.
Can't Meet Future Demand, Either
--------------------------------
¶8. (U) While Costa Rica has not adequately invested in new
electrical generation projects and is currently unable to purchase
power from Panama, electrical demand has continued to grow at an
average rate of 6 percent a year. Over the last year, Costa Rica's
economy grew by 7.9 percent. Manufacturing and Foreign Direct
Investment (largely in the form of construction in costal areas)
served in large part to fuel this growth, increasing their rate of
real growth by 12.5 percent and 14.8 percent respectively in 2006.
The rapid increase of manufacturing and construction has placed new
demands on Costa Rica's stagnant electrical power generation system,
leading to a situation in which ICE will need to invest USD 7
billion (USD 500 million annually over the next 14 years) to
effectively double power capacity by 2021 and meet projected demand.
Before the crisis, ICE had no finalized projects to increase
electrical generation capacity during the next two years.
The Cost of the Energy Crisis
-----------------------------
¶9. (U) News reports have already put the economic impact of the
current energy crisis at anywhere from USD 20-100 million. The U.S.
multi-national paper company, Kimberly-Clark, reported that the
power outages from April 19-20 cost the company USD 174,652. Intel
lost a reported 150,000 microchips that were on its production floor
when the power failed. News accounts have been rife with stories of
private businesses closing their doors during the rolling blackouts
and losing clients and production capacity.
What Comes Next?
----------------
¶10. (SBU) To cut through the maze of speculation and conflicting
blame, Embassy officials met with four experts from General Electric
on May 2. While lauding Costa Rica's efforts to use renewable
sources for the majority of its power production (80 percent), the
experts stated that Costa Rica's current crisis is due to a failure
to maintain any reserve thermal capacity that could be brought fully
online when circumstances warrant. Now, Costa Rica is faced with a
situation where they need to make critical decisions in a short
period of time to prevent recurring power crises in the coming
years. The GE team said their company had seen this crisis coming
for years, but their approaches to the GOCR (the latest in December
2006) had been ignored or rebuffed.
¶11. (SBU) Even if ICE were to purchase new thermal turbines
immediately, it would normally take 24-36 months to receive and
install them, leading to another 2-3 years of annual energy
shortages at the end of the dry season. GE said that there are
several alternatives to meet Costa Rica's immediate energy needs in
the next 1-2 years, while the longer-term capacity is being
delivered and installed. GE originally intended to offer Costa Rica
the option of delivering truck-borne turbines in the next 60-90 days
to meet the country's short-term energy needs but was rebuffed.
Instead, on May 4 President Arias announced that the rains had
sufficiently filled the reservoirs and a new hydroelectric turbine
was brought online ahead of schedule. As a result, according to
Arias, there is no need to continue the rolling blackouts.
¶12. (SBU) The GE experts said that for any short-term solution to
succeed, Costa Rica also needs to simultaneously purchase additional
thermal generators. The experts informed the Embassy that due to
increasing worldwide demand for power generation equipment, Costa
Rica has a very short window of opportunity to place orders for
equipment that could be delivered and installed in time to prevent
outages next year. The largest impediment to this solution,
according to the industry experts, would be the failure of ICE and
Costa Rican government to move rapidly in making and implementing
decisions.
COMMENT
-------
¶12. (U) Costa Rica's energy crisis has not come as a great surprise.
Experts and press have repeatedly warned over the last two years
that ICE needed to adequately invest in new capacity to avoid the
current situation. Unfortunately, this was not done. The lack of
real development of the sector, coupled with the general slow-moving
decision-making process in Costa Rica does not bode well for Costa
Rica's future energy security. While the beginning of the rainy
season may have filled the reservoirs and brought a temporary end to
the current rolling blackouts, only difficult and
uncharacteristically quick action by the GOCR and ICE over the next
few weeks, which now seems highly unlikely. Originally, the Arias
administration drafted an emergency decree to give ICE and the GOCR
more flexibility to quickly make timely and necessary decisions.
However, the emergency decree was never signed, and there is no
indication that Costa Rica is currently pursing long-term solutions
that could forestall what will probably be even worse energy crises
during the next few years.
LANGDALE