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Viewing cable 04BOGOTA3103, THE FUTURE OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY STRATEGY
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
04BOGOTA3103 | 2004-03-02 22:05 | 2011-04-29 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Bogota |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
id: 14498
date: 3/2/2004 22:05
refid: 04BOGOTA3103
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
----------------- header ends ----------------
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 003103
SIPDIS
SECSTATE FOR WHA/AND,INL,DRL//
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR PHUM CO TAGS
SUBJECT: THE FUTURE OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY STRATEGY
(ISS) PROGRAM REF: MSG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA/112201Z JUNE 03
SUBJ INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY STRATEGY CONFERENCE (ISS)
WRAP-UP
REF: MSG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA/08 JULY 03 SUBJ IMPACT FROM
LACK OF FUNDS ON THE INFRASTRUCTURE
SECURITY STRATEGY (ISS) PROGRAM
¶1. SUMMARY: THE EMBASSY COUNTRY TEAM RECENTLY COMPLETED
ALMOST A YEAR AND A HALF OF WORK IN ARAUCA DEPARTMENT. IN
THAT TIME THE US HAS TRAINED ALMOST A BATTALION AND A HALF OF
COUNTERGUERRILA SOLDIERS, CONDUCTED NUMEROUS MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE VISITS, AND ESTABLISHED A COMBINED INTELLIGENCE
CENTER. HOWEVER, TRAINING FOR GROUND FORCES WILL END IN
DECEMBER 2004, AS THE FUNDS WILL BE COMPLETELY EXPENDED. THE
HELICOPTER PACKAGE DESIGNED TO COMPLEMENT THE GROUND
COMPONENT TO ESTABLISH AN AIR-GROUND QUICK REACTION FORCE
WILL NOT FULLY ARRIVE UNTIL MARCH 2005. THIS WILL LEAVE THE
PROGRAM HALF WAY TOWARDS ITS INTENDED GOAL. THE COUNTRY TEAM
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS PROGRAM SHOULD BE EXTENDED FOR A YEAR AT
A MINIMUM TO ALLOW EFFECTIVE AIR GROUND INTEGRATION TRAINING
AND AT A MAXIMUM FOR THREE YEARS TO ACCOMPLISH THE LONGER
TERM GOAL OF SECURING THE ENTIRE PIPELINE AND SURROUNDING
INFRASTRUCTURE. //END SUMMARY.
¶2. DISCUSSION: IN RESPONSE TO 170 ATTACKS ON THE CANO
LIMON OIL PIPELINE THAT SHUT DOWN THE PIPELINE FOR 247 DAYS
IN 2001, THE US AND COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENTS HELD SEVERAL
BILATERAL CONFERENCES TO ASSESS THE SITUATION AND DEVELOP A
LONG TERM RESPONSE TO THESE TERRORIST CHALLENGES (THIS
PIPELINE CURRENTLY PRODUCES APPROXIMATELY 97,000 BARRELS A
DAY, EARNING AN ESTIMATED ONE BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR OF WHICH
THE COLOMBIAN ECONOMY RECEIVES ROUGHLY 85 PERCENT). AS A
RESULT OF THESE MEETINGS, THE US CONGRESS ALLOCATED USD 99
MILLION FOR THE PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN
ARAUCA DEPARTMENT. THE COUNTRY TEAM, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE
COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT, USED THE APPORTIONED FUNDS TO PURCHASE
A HELICOPTER PACKAGE AND INITIATE A PLANNING ASSISTANCE AND
TRAINING PROGRAM IN NOVEMBER 2002. THE INTENT OF US SUPPORT
IS TO ENABLE COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES TO TAKE A MORE
PROACTIVE APPROACH TO SECURING THE PIPELINE AND OTHER VITAL
INFRASTRUCTURE. THIS CONCEPT PLACES HEAVY EMPHASIS ON
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, OPERATIONALIZING THAT INTELLIGENCE
INTO ACTIONABLE PLANS, AND RESPONDING WITH QUICK REACTION
FORCES.
¶3. TO DATE THE ISS PROGRAM HAS SUCCEEDED IN TRAINING OVER
SIX COMPANIES CAPABLE OF RAPIDLY RESPONDING TO INTELLIGENCE,
EXECUTING EFFECTIVE PATROLLING TECHNIQUES, AND CONDUCTING
URBAN OPERATIONS. THESE CAPABILITIES HAVE ALLOWED THE BRIGADE
TO GREATLY REDUCE ATTACKS AGAINST THE PIPELINE (DOWN TO 18
AND 32 IN 2002 AND 2003 RESPECTIVELY) WHILE ALSO HELPING
RESTORE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN THE DEPARTMENT. THE PLANNING
AND ASSISTANCE ROLE OF THE US SPECIAL FORCES (USSF) PERMITTED
THESE HIGHLY SKILLED SOLDIERS TO PROVIDE ADVICE ON HOW TO
IMPROVE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, THIS
IS MORE THAN A USMILGP PROGRAM, IT IS A MULTI-AGENCY EFFORT
WITH OFFICES FROM NAS, ORA, AND USAID PROVIDING CRUCIAL
SUPPORT. THE COLOMBIANS, WITH THE SUPPORT OF US SERVICE
MEMBERS, WERE ABLE TO OPERATIONALIZE THE INTELLIGENCE GAINED
FROM THE
ORA-FUNDED COMBINED INTELLIGENCE CENTER. NAS HAS BEEN HEAVILY
ENGAGED WITH THE COLOMBIANS REGARDING INCOMING AIRCRAFT,
WHILE USAID ASSISTED WITH THE DELIVERY OF SCHOOL SUPPLIES
THAT WERE DONATED TO LOCAL SCHOOLS.
THE INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) CAMPAIGN IS ANOTHER SUCCESS
STORY AND A STRONG REINFORCING EFFORT TO THE OPERATIONS AND
INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES. ALREADY THERE HAVE BEEN TWO MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE VISITS (OVER 4700 MEDICAL AND DENTAL PATIENTS
TREATED), A VETERINARY ASSISTANCE VISIT, REPAIR PROJECTS FOR
A MEDICAL CLINIC AND SCHOOLS THAT HAS ENCOURAGED THE LOCAL
POPULACE TO LOOK TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT FOR HELP IN PROVIDING
BASIC NECESSITIES. A ROBUST PYSOP PROGRAM THAT RELIES ON
RADIO, LEAFLETS, AND POSTERS HAS ENCOURAGED THE TOWNSPEOPLE
AND CAMPESINOS TO RESIST TERRORIST ACTIONS WITHIN THEIR AREA
AND ALSO TAUGHT THEM HOW TO REACT TO A TERRORIST ATTACK. THE
IO PROGRAM HAS DECREASED CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE WITH SECURITY
OPERATIONS AND IMPROVED HUMINT SOURCES AS THE MESSAGE OF WHO
REALLY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR NEGATIVELY AFFECTING THE
CIVILIANS, STANDARD OF LIVING AND SENSE OF SECURITY HAS BEEN
EFFECTIVELY TRANSMITTED. THE ISS PROGRAM HAS ALSO HELPED
WEAKEN THE NARCOTERRORISTS, STRANGLEHOLD ON LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS.
¶4. THE PROBLEM: THE GROUND ELEMENT OF THE ISS PROGRAM WILL
TERMINATE IN DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE EXHAUSTION OF THE
ALLOCATED FUNDS, AND THE OVERALL PROGRAM WILL CEASE SHORTLY
AFTERWARDS WITH THE MISSION ACCOMPLISHING BUT A SMALL PART OF
THE OVERALL VISION.
¶5. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: THE ISS PROGRAM WAS DESIGNED TO
FUNCTION AS AN INTEGRATED GROUND AIR OPERATION SUPPORTED BY A
PLANNING AND ASSISTANCE TEAM FROM A USSF COMPANY.
UNFORTUNATELY, DUE TO CONTRACTUAL DELAYS THE AIR COMPONENT (8
HUEYS AND 2 BLACKHAWKS) WILL NOT FULLY ARRIVE IN COUNTRY
UNTIL MARCH 2005 AT THE EARLIEST AND WILL NOT BE READY FOR
AIR-GROUND TRAINING UNTIL JUNE 2005. WITH USSF TROOPS
SCHEDULED TO DEPART IN DECEMBER 2004 (WITH THE END OF FUNDS
FOR GROUND TRAINING), THIS WILL HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE
AIR ASSAULT TRAINING BETWEEN AIR AND GROUND UNITS AS THE
LEADERS AND MEN OF BOTH COMPONENTS WILL NOT HAVE HAD THE
OPPORTUNITY TO RECEIVE APPROPRIATE TRAINING FROM USSF FORCES.
WHILE USMILGP-BOGOTA HAS WORKED TO AMELIORATE THIS PROBLEM BY
HAVING UNITS IN ARAUCA TRAVEL TO TOLEMAIDA FOR ABBREVIATED
AIR ASSAULT TRAINING (WHERE OTHER COLOMBIAN PILOTS ARE
UNDERGOING BASIC ROTARY WING TRAINING FOR THE PLAN COLOMBIA
HELICOPTERS), THE FACT IS THAT THIS TRAINING DOES NOT
ENCOMPASS THE ENTIRE BRIGADE, COVERS ONLY THE BASICS, AND IS
NOT CONDUCTED WITH THE PILOTS WITH WHOM THEY WILL CONDUCT
OPERATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, THE ABSENCE OF USSF TRAINERS WILL
ALSO MEAN THE 18TH BRIGADE STAFF (HIGHER HEADQUARTERS IN
ARAUCA DEPARTMENT) WILL NOT RECEIVE PLANNING ASSISTANCE FROM
US EXPERTS ON HOW TO BEST INTEGRATE THIS NEW MOBILITY
CAPABILITY INTO COMBAT OPERATIONS. FINALLY, MOST OF THE
EQUIPMENT FOR THE GROUND UNITS WILL NOT ARRIVE UNTIL THE FALL
OF 2004.
¶6. THE US PRESENCE HAS HAD A POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE
SECURITY SITUATION AND THE COLOMBIANS HAVE ADJUSTED TO
COMPENSATE FOR THE LACK OF HELICOPTERS, HOWEVER, THE
NARCOTERRORISTS HAVE COUNTERED THESE EFFORTS BY GOING AFTER
ELECTRICAL TOWERS AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE. THIS NEW
DIRECTION OF ATTACK HAS EXCEEDED THE COLOMBIANS CAPABILITY TO
RESPOND TO ATTACKS ON NUMEROUS TOWERS IN THE REGION WITHOUT
THE USE OF ROTARY WING ASSETS. NEVERTHELESS, THIS IS ANOTHER
EXAMPLE WHERE THE USSF STRUCTURE IS CURRENTLY ASSISTING THE
COMMANDER AND HIS STAFF WITH DEVELOPING NEW WAYS TO LESSEN
THE IMPACT OF THESE ADDITIONAL ATTACKS--A CAPABILITY NOT
AVAILABLE AFTER 31 DECEMBER 2004.
¶7. AS TO THE LONGER TERM PROBLEM, BOTH THE US AND
COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENTS SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT THAT
SPECIFIED THE OBLIGATIONS OF EACH GOVERNMENT. THE US
GOVERNMENT HAS DILIGENTLY AND RESPONSIBLY WORKED TOWARDS
FULFILLING THESE OBLIGATIONS. TRAINING FOR THE GROUND UNITS
IS ON TARGET TO HAVE TRAINED AT LEAST THREE (OUT OF SIX)
COUNTERGUERRILLA BATTALIONS OF THE 18TH BRIGADE AND PROVIDED
CONTINUAL PLANNING AND ASSISTANCE TO THE 18TH BRIGADE STAFF.
THE HELICOPTER PROGRAM IS ON TRACK TO PROVIDE THE REQUIRED
INFRASTRUCTURE, HELICOPTERS, PILOT AND CREW TRAINING.
HOWEVER THE VISION AS STIPULATED IN THE MOA, SHOULD
ADDITIONAL FUNDS BECOME AVAILABLE, IS THAT THE PROGRAM WOULD
ENHANCE THE PROTECTION OF THE ENTIRE PIPELINE. THE ISS
PROGRAM HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL, AND THE US GOVERNMENT SHOULD
REINFORCE THIS SUCCESS BY ENSURING THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY
DEVELOPS A MATURE AND WELL ROUNDED CAPABILITY TO REACT TO
ATTACKS EXECUTED BY NARCOTERRORISTS.
¶8. RECOMMENDATIONS:
¶A. NEAR TERM (PHASE 1): THE ISS PROGRAM SHOULD BE EXTENDED AT
LEAST AN ADDITIONAL YEAR, UNTIL THE END OF THE 1ST QUARTER
FY06, IN ORDER TO ENABLE GROUND FORCES TO TRAIN WITH THE AIR
ASSETS PROVIDED TO THE 18TH BRIGADE BY THE US GOVERNMENT.
THIS WILL ENSURE THE COLOMBIANS BECOME PROFICIENT IN THE
PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS TO SUPPORT
THE PIPELINE PROTECTION INITIATIVE.
(1) THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD EXECUTE THESE SPECIFIC TASKS:
(A) INTEGRATION OF GROUND AND AIR COMPONENTS
(B) EXTEND SUPPORT TO NORTE DE SANTANDER DEPARTMENT
(C) CONTINUE SUPPORT FROM KM 0 TO KM 178, AS THIS IS THE MOST
VULNERABLE AREA TO ATTACK BASED ON HISTORICAL AND CURRENT
RECORDS.
(2) WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE COST TO EXTEND THE PROGRAM FOR AN
ADDITIONAL YEAR (JAN-DEC 05) AND TO TRAIN AND PARTIALLY EQUIP
ADDITIONAL UNITS WILL BE:
(A) $5.50M FOR TRAINING AND TRAINING AMMUNITION
(B) $1.00M FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
(C) $0.50M FOR FP INFRASTRUCTURE
¶B. LONG TERM (PHASE 2): IN THE SPIRIT OF THE MOA BETWEEN OUR
GOVERNMENTS, WHICH IS BASED ON A LONG TERM APPROACH, TO
SECURE THIS IMPORTANT INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION INITIATIVE IT
IS RECOMMENDED THAT THIS PROGRAM BE FUNDED UNTIL 2007.
CONTINUATION OF THIS MISSION WOULD ALSO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT
TIME FOR THE EXTENSION OF INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL
PLANNING TO THE NORTH ALONG THE PATH OF THE PIPELINE.
(1) THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD EXECUTE THESE SPECIFIC TASKS:
(A) EXTEND SUPPORT AND INTEGRATION OF PIPELINE AND OTHER
SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCURE TO THE COAST.
(B) TRAIN AND ASSIST UNITS ALONG THE PIPELINE BASED ON A
THOROUGH STUDY OF THE SITUATIONAL AND INTELLIGENCE PICTURE OF
THE AREA TO INCLUDE THE STANDING MISSIONS OF THE UNITS,
TERRAIN, AND ENEMY TACTICS.
(C) CONTINUE SUPPORT FROM KM 0 TO KM 178 OF THE PIPELINE FOR
THE REASONS STATED IN PHASE I.
(2) THE ANTICIPATED COST OF THIS PROGRAM WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:
(A) JAN-DEC 06:
$5.50M FOR TRAINING AND TRAINING AMMUNITION
$3.00M FOR EQUIPMENT
$2.00M FOR INFRASTRUCTURE
$1.50M FOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT
(B) JAN-DEC 07:
$5.50M FOR TRAINING AND TRAINING AMMUNITION
$3.00M FOR EQUIPMENT
$0.50M FOR FP INFRASTRUCTURE
$1.50M FOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT
(C) THE DIFFERENCE IN COSTS BETWEEN 2005 AND YEARS
2006-2007 REFLECTS THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH TRAINING
ADDITIONAL UNITS AND AT NEW BASES AS THE PROGRAM EXTENDS TO
THE NORTH WHEREAS THE 2005 FUNDS ARE FOR A CONTINUATION OF
THE ONGOING TRAINING (AND INTEGRATION OF THE AIR COMPONENT
INTO MILITARY OPERATIONS). THE FORCE PROTECTION MONEY FOR
2005 IS TO INSURE THE BASES IN NORTE DE SANTANDER DEPARTMENT
HAVE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF PROTECTION FOR US FORCES
PROVIDING PLANNING AND ASSISTANCE FOR ONGOING OPERATIONS, BUT
IS NOT INTENDED FOR A CONTINUAL US PRESENCE. THE
INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS IN 2006 ARE FOR A CONTINUAL US PRESENCE
(AS IN SARAVENA) AND IS FRONTLOADED SO ALL INFRASTRUCTURE
IMPROVEMENTS ARE COMPLETE PRIOR TO 2007.
¶9. YOUR PRIMARY POC AND SPONSOR IS LTC DANIEL GETTINGS,
COMMERCIAL TEL (571) 266-1208.
DRUCKER
DRUCKER
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