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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06PARIS1251, FORMER PRIME MINISTER RAYMOND BARRE SHARES
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06PARIS1251 | 2006-02-28 17:32 | 2011-02-10 08:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
Appears in these articles: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/documents-wikileaks/article/2011/02/09/wikileaks-les-visiteurs-de-l-ambassade_1477418_1446239.htm |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001251
SIPDIS
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
AND EB
DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON
SUBJECT: FORMER PRIME MINISTER RAYMOND BARRE SHARES
INSIGHTS FROM A HALF-CENTURY IN POLITICS
REF: A. (A) PARIS 1113
¶B. (B) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 17
¶C. 2006
¶D. (C) PARIS 953
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) In a February 21 meeting with Ambassador Stapleton,
former prime minister Raymond Barre cautioned against any
overconfidence that right-wing, nativist and xenophobic
sentiment in France might be something of the past. If
anything, in Barre's view, popular reaction to urban unrest
and other recent events may have strengthened this current in
public opinion. Barre said President Chirac's avidity for
power was such that Chirac, circumstances permitting, might
yet decide to pursue a third term in office. Barre called
Interior Minister Sarkozy "courageous" in his willingness to
confront -- and articulate -- the hard choices facing France.
Barre discounted PM de Villepin's chances of winning the
center-right nomination, and criticized the Socialist Party's
"unrealistic ideology" on tax policy, labor market reform and
economic growth. He thought Segolene Royal could win the
Socialist Party nomination if "the French are really fed up
and intent on something new," viewed former PM Jospin has her
most likely rival, and excoriated former PM Fabius's decision
to advocate rejection of the proposed EU constitution to
further his presidential ambitions. Barre was confident that
Europe would overcome its current crisis "like all the
others" because economic interests had always proved stronger
than the "political disagreements of the moment," although he
faulted lack of British devotion to the European idea,
blaming it on the UK's attachment to its privileged
relationship with the U.S. End summary.
KEEPING THE EXTREMES AT BAY, ESPECIALLY THE FAR RIGHT
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶2. (C) Over lunch with Ambassador Stapleton on February 21
former prime minister Raymond Barre articulated a vision for
governing France from the center, keeping policy pragmatic
and on an even keel managing -- indeed, manipulating -- the
ever-present extremes so they don't become powerful enough to
skew policy in ideologically driven, vindictive directions.
He called these extremes -- both the "ideological left" and
the "extreme right" -- "permanent currents in French public
opinion." Barre was particularly firm in cautioning against
the latent strength of the extreme right. Suggesting that
the current of opinion driven by nativist fears and
xenophobic reaction could be catalyzed "around immigration,"
he said these sentiments could boost support for National
Front (FN) leader Jean-Marie Le Pen notwithstanding Le Pen's
advancing age and the fading of his ability as a populist
firebrand.
DON'T WRITE OFF PRESIDENT CHIRAC
--------------------------------
¶3. (C) Barre said he had known Chirac for "forty years" and
that the intensity of Chirac's desire for power was such that
"it would not surprise me if Chirac decided to run again."
In Barre's view, for Chirac -- as for others, like
Mitterrand, who climb to the top and stay there -- "politics
is combat," and succeeding requires "equipping oneself with
whatever it takes." As an example, Barre pointed to Chirac's
"equipping himself" with the mayoralty of Paris and
transforming it into a powerful engine for generating support
for the political machine that was key to Chirac's successful
first election to the presidency in 1995. (Note: Chirac
served as mayor of Paris from 1977 - 1995. End Note.) Barre
added that Chirac's tremendous talent for projecting himself
as a regular guy with whom everyday French people identify
could, under the right circumstances, keep drawing
significant electoral support.
¶4. (C) As unlikely as such a stab at a third term might
seem, Barre said he detected that Chirac was carefully
positioning himself in case. Barre noted the uncommon
prominence in the media recently of Bernadette Chirac, who,
Barre said, "has long enjoyed strong popularity." He also
mentioned a series of articles and video reports that have
appeared lately with details about the Chiracs' adopted
(Vietnamese refugee) daughter and other, positive, aspects of
the presidential couple's private life. Most interestingly,
Barre pointed to Chirac's electoral base in France's rural
and agricultural sector, and observed how Chirac had
carefully engineered an agreement with France's EU partners
that would keep intact the EU's Common Agricultural Policy
(and therefore also the subsidy regime so beneficial to
French farmers) until 2012 -- the very year he would leave
office after a third term.
CHIRAC AND IRAQ -- CHOOSING THE POPULAR
---------------------------------------
OVER THE RESPONSIBLE
--------------------
¶5. (C) Barre was scathing in his criticism of President
Chirac and then Foreign Minister de Villepin's handling of
France's opposition to the U.S.-led invasion of Irak in early
¶2003. Barre said that Chirac, sensing the popularity of
"going against" the U.S., irresponsibly overplayed France's
opposition to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) "just to benefit
from public opinion." In retrospect, Barre implied, the
damage done to the trust that must obtain between two allies
if they are to confront differences and work together
effectively was clearly not worth the temporary lift in
approval ratings Chirac (and Villepin) achieved for
themselves. Barre, adding that he believed the U.S. had
acted precipitously and made a serious strategic error in
undertaking OIF, underlined that France could well have
firmly registered its misgivings as a concerned ally, without
the grandstanding, veto-wielding opposition indulged in by
Chirac and Villepin. Barre speculated that President
Mitterrand would have handled France's misgivings about OIF
in such a subtler, more responsible way. The Ambassador and
Barre agreed that in recent months, U.S.-France relations had
returned to "normal," as a result of careful cooperation
across a range of continuing issues, along with the emergence
of new, shared challenges, particularly in the greater Middle
East.
SARKOZY AND VILLEPIN
--------------------
¶6. (C) Barre placed the current vying among would-be
presidential contenders in the context of what he called "the
problem of France's political class," specifically "their
inability to enlighten public opinion." He excepted only
Interior Minister Sarkozy from what seemed his blanket
pessimism about the political elite's obsessive electoral
competitiveness and lack of talent for leading public opinion
to a better understanding of the challenges and options
facing the country. Even as he called Sarkozy "courageous"
-- in the sense of being willing to confront the hard choices
facing France and un-varnishedly presenting them to the
French public -- he also cautioned that public opinion had
best not be led too brusquely, however honestly. His advice
to Sarkozy would be to "tone down the 'rupture' rhetoric"
lest he frighten away potential support.
¶7. (C) Barre (like most experienced politicians who have
commented to us on the matter) discounts the chances of Prime
Minister de Villepin prevailing in his rivalry with Sarkozy,
unless Sarkozy grievously stumbles -- or is tripped. Very
much tracking with the conventional wisdom, Barre observed
that Sarkozy's control of the ruling Union for a Popular
Movement (UMP) party, and the firm support for Sarkozy among
party members make it difficult for any center-right
presidential hopeful to dislodge Sarkozy as the UMP standard
bearer. However, Barre also added that "people just run on
their own" -- there is nothing preventing someone like
Villepin, if his ambitions should drive him to it, from
putting together an organization and launching himself as
another candidate in the first round of the 2007 election.
Barre also commented that the political enmity between Chirac
(and Villepin) and Sarkozy is of the sort that brooks no
quarter, and implied that Chirac was, as intently as ever,
watching for the opportunity to torpedo Sarkozy's chances of
succeeding him.
ROYAL AND JOSPIN
----------------
¶8. (C) Barre observed that Socialist Party (PS) First
Secretary Francois Hollande was "in a bit of a pickle" --
SIPDIS
caught between the presidential ambitions of his longtime
domestic partner, Poitou-Charentes Region President Segolene
Royal, and his longtime patron in PS, former prime minister
Lionel Jospin. In recent weeks, Jospin has been ever more
overtly "running on the sidelines," alongside the pack of
declared contenders for the PS presidential nomination (ref
B). Barre speculated that "Segolene against Jospin" might be
a face-off the PS might not be able to avoid come its
presidential primary next November. Barre (unlike most
experienced politicians who have discussed Segolene Royal's
presidential prospects with us (refs A and C)) did not
dismiss her chances of staying in the race and winning
election as France's first woman president. Barre said, "if
the French are really fed up and intent on something new,
they could very well vote for her." Barre, however, also
raised the possibility of "the reprise of the 2002 election
that should have been," and indicated that the French
political system's insular inertias and murky deal-making
could produce a "Jospin versus Chirac" second round in 2007.
IDEOLOGY, OPPORTUNISM, AND REASON ON THE LEFT
---------------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Turning his attention to the difficulties that the
center-left PS is having declaring itself a normal,
social-democratic governing party, Barre contrasted the
"reason" of former socialist finance minister Dominique
Strauss-Kahn with the "opportunism" of former socialist prime
minister Laurent Fabius. (Note: Both Strauss-Kahn and
Fabius are among the declared candidates for the PS's
presidential nomination. End Note.) Barre spoke highly of
Strauss-Kahn, insisting on, in Barre's view, the admirable
realism of what would be Strauss-Kahn's economic
policy-making, notwithstanding Stauss-Kahn's "socialist"
political orientation.
¶10. (C) By contrast, Barre was unsparing in his criticism of
Fabius for opportunistically pandering to the ideologically
motivated left of party. (Note: In a transparent effort at
building a base in the left of the party, Fabius was the only
center-left heavyweight to advocate rejection of the proposed
EU Constitution last May. End Note.) Barre reviled Fabius'
decision to "betray his own convictions against the interests
of his country," and advocate rejection of the proposed EU
Constitution in order to further his own presidential
ambitions. Returning to his theme of the importance of
keeping extremes under control, Barre lamented the damage
done to France by economic policies driven "by the
ideological left." In particular, Barre identified misguided
soak-the-rich tax policies and "hyper-Keynesian" fiscal
policies as having stunted business investment and led to
"excessive" -- debt-fueled and unsustainable -- state
investment in social services and infrastructure.
THE BRITISH ARE NOT EUROPEAN AT HEART
-------------------------------------
¶11. (C) Observing that he had been "personally involved in
European affairs since 1959," Barre said that he was
confident that Europe's current crisis over rejection of the
proposed constitution would also be overcome "like all the
others." Barre said that, at each of the regularly occurring
crises that have marked the history of the European
construction, "everybody says Europe is finished." "Not at
all," exclaimed Barre. Notwithstanding the political
differences driving these crises, he averred, the underlying
dynamic of "ever more closely intertwined" economic and
commercial interests always trumps the "disagreements of the
moment." Barre however, added that differences with the
British might make the exception to this rule, observing that
"the British will never be wholeheartedly European." He
suggested that a key part of this lack of genuine commitment
to a political Europe on the part of the British was due to
their wanting to "privilege" their special relationship with
the U.S.
MITTERRAND --"GREAT ADVENTURER" OF FRENCH POLITICS
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶12. (C) Recalling his political battles against Socialist
President Francois Mitterrand -- and returning to his theme
of "politics is combat" that requires "equipping oneself with
whatever it takes" -- Barre called Mitterrand a "great
political adventurer," who commandeered the socialist party
"because he had tried everything else, and this was the only
means" for him to achieve power. Barre, while admitting that
getting to the top and staying there "requires compromising
with financial interests," made a point nonetheless of
insisting on Mitterrand's fundamental integrity. Barre made
clear that he believed Mitterrand (and Chirac) -- while
definitely not personally enriching themselves -- had
knowingly allowed serious financial impropriety aimed at
keeping politically damaging secrets secret and at keeping
campaign war chests full. Even so, Barre said that
Mitterrand remained admirably true to one or two core
convictions, such as his patriotism with regard to France and
his commitment to European integration and its promise of
lasting peace. Mitterrand, according to Barre, subjected all
else to the exigencies of getting into power and staying
there, including his political convictions. "He was a
socialist like I'm the Pope," said Barre of Mitterrand, who
led France's Socialist Party for over a quarter century.
NOTE AND COMMENT
----------------
¶13. (C) Barre is an economist by training who served as
prime minister under President Valery Giscard d'Estaing from
1976 - 1981. Barre unsuccessfully ran for the presidency in
1988, coming very close to edging out Chirac as the
center-right's candidate against Mitterrand. Though
associated with the centrist Union for French Democracy
(UDF), Barre never joined any political party. Barre served
as mayor of Lyon from 1995 - 2001. He eloquently evoked the
"Radical Socialist" (i.e. moderate socialist) civic spirit
that animates the inhabitants of the city, and contributes to
the high quality of life enjoyed by city residents. He also
evoked the city's centuries-long history as a trading and
banking center due to its silk industry, and suggested that
Lyon's success attracting European and globally oriented
companies was in part due to its outward-looking, commercial
heritage. Throughout his discussion with Ambassador
Stapleton, Barre exemplified the realism and probity that
almost made him president notwithstanding his rejection of
political partisanship. End note and comment.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton