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Viewing cable 08TALLINN326, ESTONIA CHARTS LEGAL, MILITARY FUTURE OF CYBER
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08TALLINN326 | 2008-09-22 14:07 | 2011-02-22 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tallinn |
VZCZCXYZ0010
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTL #0326/01 2661407
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221407Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY TALLINN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0819
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2616
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0191
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE
9/22/2008 14:07 CONFIDENTIAL
C O N F I D E N T I A L TALLINN 000326
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/NB, EEB/CIP and INR/EC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS TINT NATO RU GG EN
SUBJECT: ESTONIA CHARTS LEGAL, MILITARY FUTURE OF CYBER
WARFARE (INCLUDING APPLICABILITY OF NATO'S ARTICLE V)
Classified by: DCM Karen Decker for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: In the wake of the August cyber
attacks against government websites in the Republic of
Georgia, Estonia has provided both material and technical
assistance to Tbilisi. Lawyers at the Cyber Center of
Excellence in Tallinn have produced a legal analysis of the
status of cyber warfare under NATO's Article V. The
Ministry of Defense (MOD) is prioritizing strategic-level
cyber defense planning, and the MOD's forthcoming 2008
Cyber Defense Strategy will clarify lines of authority and
create trip-wires to declare a national security threat
during a future attack. Various Estonian experts all agree
on one thing: Georgia was the latest victim of this new
form of warfare, and the attacks are getting more effective
each time. Estonia continues to lead international
thinking on the cyber issue, having positioned itself as a
niche expert on cyber defense based on its combination of
past experience, a high level of IT expertise and
dependence, and a small country's inevitable fears for its
existence. End Summary and Comment.
¶2. (C) BACKGROUND: In April and May 2007, Estonia grabbed
international headlines as it suffered from coordinated,
massive, and potentially crippling distributed-denial-of-
service attacks (DDOS) from the cyberspace. The attacks of
2007 were a wake-up call for national cyber security in
much the same way as the January 2006 Gazprom cut-off of
Ukraine was on energy security. For a period of about ten
days in late April/early May 2007, key websites of the
Government of Estonia (GOE) and private banks could not
function, or had intermittent availability, and the country
was forced to cut itself off temporarily from the World
Wide Web. Both the financial cost of these attacks, and
the parties ultimately responsible, are still unknown. The
former - if known by banks such as swedebank and SEB
Uhispank - is guarded; but the latter is widely assumed
both by the GOE and many cyber security experts to be a
network of Russian hackers guided and funded by the
Kremlin. As the story goes, these hackers used popular
Russian blog sites to instruct willing 'patriotic hackers'
to assist in punishing Estonia for the GOE's decision to
move the WWII-era Bronze Soldier monument. In addition to
enlisting 'script kiddies' who did nothing more than click
on links provided to them, or pass along a line of
malicious code, this core group of hackers acted as 'bot-
herders' thus magnifying their impact by exploiting scores
of 'bot.net' or 'zombie' computers to send DDOS attacks
unbeknownst to their users. Estonia's ad-hoc defense in
April 2007, led by its national Computer Emergency Response
Team (CERT) was to first increase the capacity of state
websites to handle the massive volume of traffic, and then
- as a last resort - to pull the plug to the outside world.
Learning from Experience, and Passing it on...
--------------------------------------------- -
¶3. (C) Now fast-forward to the cyber attacks on Georgian
websites in July/August 2008. (NOTE: The cyber attacks
actually preceded the August 8 Russian ground assault into
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, starting with a July 21 mild
DDOS attack against the Georgian presidential website. END
NOTE.) In the wake of these attacks, the GOE has been at
the forefront of the response to assist Georgia, and the
ensuing debate within NATO and the EU on the meaning of the
attacks. The GOE response has taken the form of (1)
applied expertise, (2) legal thinking about how to
characterize and respond to cyber warfare, and (3)
strategic defense planning on institutional responses to
cyber war. In addition to humanitarian and financial aid,
Estonia immediately sent two cyber-security experts from
its CERT to assist the Georgian CERT for roughly ten days.
Meanwhile, the Estonian Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of
Excellence (CCDCOE) began an analysis of the implications
of cyber warfare both under international law and NATO
Article V. (NOTE: The CCDCOE currently has experts from
four of the 15 NATO members who have expressed a desire to
be Sponsoring Nations, including the United States. END
NOTE.) At the same time, the MOD's forthcoming 2008 Cyber
Defense Strategy will propose new institutional structures
to deal with future attacks.
Estonia's CERT Mission to Georgia
---------------------------------
¶4. (C) EmbOffs met with Hillar Aarelaid, Director of CERT-
Estonia for his read on the recent assistance mission to
Georgia. Aarelaid recapped the profile of the cyber
attacks on Georgia: the country's internet satellite or
microwave links which could not be shut down (inside
Russia) were simply bombed (in southern Georgia). The
ensuing DDOS attacks, though intense for several days, had
less impact on commerce and government than in Estonia last
year, where over 90 percent of the public banks online, and
the GOE convenes virtual cabinet meetings. Yet the attacks
on Georgia were more sophisticated than those against
Estonia, and did not repeat the same mistakes. For
example, in 2007, the 'zombie-bots' flooded Estonian
cyberspace with identical messages that were more easily
filtered. The August 2008 attacks on Georgia did not carry
such a message.
¶5. (C) Although Aarelaid stressed that CERT-Estonia does
not have the full picture yet, he offered some assessments
of the CERT-Georgia response. Roughly "ten years behind"
Estonia, CERT-Georgia "did some stupid things" such as
failing to keep archives of collected network flow data,
which would have provided material for forensic analysis of
the attacks. However, they wisely did not waste time
defending GOG websites, he said, but simply hosted them on
Estonian, U.S. and public-domain websites until the attack
was over. (Steps, according to the CCDCOE, which could not
have been taken without the lessons learned from the 2007
attacks against Estonia.) Aarelaid felt that another cyber
attack on Estonia "...won't happen again the same way..."
but could be triggered by nothing more than rumors. For
example, what could have turned into a run on the banks in
Estonia during the brief November 2007 panic over a rumored
currency devaluation was averted by luck. Money transfers
into dollars spiked, he explained, but since most Estonians
bank online, these transfers did not deplete banks' actual
cash reserves. In terms of improving responses, Aarelaid
felt that "We are fighting a global threat locally..." but
acknowledged this may be unavoidable since, by their
nature, cyber attacks require both a real-time response and
a high degree of trust among those coordinating the
defense, seemingly impossible at the international level.
Although CERT-Estonia currently has a permanent staff of
only four, Aarelaid said he "...could hire about 200 extra
people in an hour..." if needed to respond to a future
attack.
Civil Law, Criminal Law or Article V?
--------------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) On the legal front, experts at Estonia's CCDCOE
quickly prepared a scholarly analysis of the possible legal
responses to cyber warfare. In "Cyber Attacks Against
Georgia: Legal Lessons Learned" the CCDCOE confronted two
of the biggest challenges to (A) determining whether a
cyber attack rises to the level of a national security
threat and (B) assigning responsibility to a state actor
who could then be the object of a legal or military
response. The report examines the potential status of
cyber attacks as an act of violence from the view of the
Geneva Conventions, the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and
NATO Article V. The authors acknowledge at the outset the
complexity of a situation where "...states use private
companies to conduct cyber attacks and thus grant the
nation deniability..." Since the North Atlantic Treaty
itself does not define an 'armed attack', the report falls
back on examinations of international law. It states that
both level of damage inflicted by a cyber attack, and the
intent of the perpetrator would factor into whether a DDOS
rises to the level of 'violence'. Considering finally the
intent of the attack, its resulting damages, destruction or
deaths (i.e. due to paralyzed emergency response networks)
and the ability of its attribution to a willing state
actor, the CCDCOE concludes that "If all questions are
answered affirmatively, there is a strong basis for
application of Article V [to cyber attacks]."
Institutional Responses: MOD and Strategic Planning
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶7. (SBU) Estonia's Ministry of Defense (MOD) takes cyber
defense very seriously. In a 2007 address to Estonia's
Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), Minister Jaak
Aaviksoo likened a massive DDOS as "...the modern
equivalent of a 19th century naval blockade of a nation's
ports." In a September 2008 address to a CompTIA/OSAC
seminar on cyber security, Aaviksoo again put the threat of
cyber attacks in existential terms: "At a basic level, life
and liberty depend upon your ability to control the space
around you. Threats from cyberspace are national security
threats, and cyber warfare is here to stay." In response
to the attacks on Georgia, former Prime Minister Mart Laar
called on Estonia immediately to "...create state
structures for the anticipation and control of information
attacks." That is, to get better at confronting the
propaganda that accompanies a cyber war aggressor's attempt
to blind its enemy to what is happening, and drown out
competition in the battle for world opinion.
¶8. (C) In a meeting with EconOff, XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX, outlined MOD's position
on cyber defense and Article V. (NOTE: XXXXXXXXXXXX went to
XXXXXXXXXXXX and served as XXXXXXXXXXXX at the
Estonian embassy in XXXXXXXXXXXX prior to taking up his
current position. END NOTE.) MOD needs much better cyber
intelligence, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, since even the CERT sees only
a small percentage of overall internet traffic in Estonia.
Banks such as swedebank here are often used for "test runs"
of the latest, third-generation cyber attacks before these
methods are used against larger western banks. While MOD
does not take a position on whether cyber attacks should be
subject to Article V, XXXXXXXXXXXX did outline three important
considerations. First, a clear state actor is not
necessarily a pre-requisite for invocation of Article V
(witness NATO's response to the attacks on the United
States on September 11, 2001). Second, there cannot be
different standards for invoking Article V depending on the
victim's ability to respond. Thus, having a cyber defense
capability sufficient to thwart otherwise-crippling DDOS
attacks should not affect the Article V umbrella. And
third, there must be a clear idea of what Article V
collective defense would mean in response to cyber attacks.
Would it mean other members agree to host the targeted
government's websites on their servers, or other measures?
¶9. (C) While this debate continues within NATO and the
international community, MOD is taking steps to improve its
domestic response capability. Its forthcoming 2008 Cyber
Defense Strategy will recommend a range of measures to
increase international cooperation, raise awareness and
improve the effectiveness of national cyber defense. A key
recommendation is for the creation of a 'Cyber Security
Council' under the structure of the GOE's national security
committee which reports directly to the Prime Minister.
During a future cyber attack, and with input from the CERT,
private banks and others, this committee would make the
call whether a given cyber attack - which after all occur
all the time at low levels - rises to the level of a
national security threat. This committee would also
clarify who has the authority, for example, to unplug
Estonia from the internet. In the case of the 2007
attacks, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted, it was simply one technician who
decided on his own this was the best response to the
growing volume of attacks.
PHILLIPS