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Viewing cable 09ANKARA1100, TURKEY: PUTIN VISIT AND THE ENERGY AGENDA
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09ANKARA1100 | 2009-07-31 04:45 | 2011-04-12 13:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Ankara |
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHAK #1100/01 2120445
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 310445Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0370
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5677
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 6083
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001100
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2019
TAGS: ECON ENRG PREL RS TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: PUTIN VISIT AND THE ENERGY AGENDA
REF: A. ANKARA 315
¶B. ANKARA 289
¶C. ANKARA 253
¶D. ANKARA 111
¶E. ANKARA 4
Classified By: Econ Counselor Dale Eppler for reasons 1.4 b, d
¶1. (C) Summary: Russian Prime Minister Putin will visit
Turkey on August 6 with an agenda heavily focused on energy
issues, including: extension of the Westline gas contract;
Southstream; Bluestream II; Russian oil for the proposed
Samsun-Ceyhan Bosporus bypass pipeline; and the long-delayed
Russian nuclear power plant construction bid. While GOT
sources deny these are being negotiated as a package, they
say there are linkages between them. For example, the GOR
proposed a protocol that would allow it to build the
Southstream pipeline through Turkish Black Sea waters, and
the Turks have asked for Russian oil throughput for
Samsun-Ceyhan in exchange. The Putin visit will force the
GOT finally to make a decision on the Russian nuclear power
plant bid, and we think the most likely scenario is an
acceptance of the Russian bid at a much reduced price. The
GOT has stopped mentioning Bluestream II in public and
private comments, so we do not expect substantive
announcements about that project during the visit. The GOT
sees Russia as key to regional energy policy and wants to
engage the Russians without appeasing them. They hope with
time and patience to convince the Russians to drop their
zero-sum approach to energy policy and engage in "responsible
cooperation." End summary.
¶2. (C) Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin will make a
one-day visit to Turkey on August 6. His visit will be
preceded by a meeting August 4-5 of the Turkey-Russia Joint
Economic Commission, co-chaired by Deputy Prime Minister
Sechin and Energy Minister Yildiz. As of July 17, many
details about Putin's visit, including whether it will be
held in Istanbul or Ankara, had not been decided, according
to Aysa Osafoglu at MFA's Russia desk. MFA understands that
the GOR is awaiting a decision from Putin's office on his
venue preference. The working assumption is the visit will be
in Ankara.
¶3. (C) The agenda for the visit will be heavily
energy-focused. Osafoglu said MFA does not expect substantive
discussions on political or security issues. Vural Altay,
MFA Deputy Director General for Energy Affairs, said July 17
that the energy agenda includes: extension of the Westline
contract expiring in 2011; Russian oil for the Samsun-Ceyhan
bypass pipeline; Bluestream II gas pipeline; the Southstream
gas pipeline; and a final decision on the long-delayed
Russian nuclear power plant bid. Altay denied that these
were being negotiated as a package deal, but admitted that
there are some "linkages" between them (though he declined to
specify what those linkages were). Concerning the Westline
contract extension, Altay said they were receiving "positive
signs" from the GOR. Altay said Russia is not interested in
providing gas to Nabucco "at this time," but may change its
position once the pipeline becomes more real.
Southstream and Samsun-Ceyhan
----------------------------
¶4. (C) MFA Deputy Undersecretary Feridan Sinirlioglu
explained one of the agenda linkages on July 29. Sinirlioglu
said the GOR was taken by surprise when the Nabucco IGA
signing happened in July. Immediately afterwards, Deputy PM
Sechin came to Ankara to ask the GOT to sign a protocol that
would allow Russia to build the Southstream pipeline through
Turkish Black Sea territorial waters. Sinirlioglu said the
proposed protocol "served only Russian interests," and that
Sechin was "shocked" when the GOT asked for something in
return: oil throughput for the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline.
According to Sinirlioglu, closing this deal depends on the
Russian response. Sinirlioglu also emphasized the very high
USD 17 billion cost of Southstream, and indicated real doubts
about whether the line actually would be built.
The Nuclear Bid
---------------
¶5. (C) In September 2008, a Russian-led consortium (the
state-owned AtomStroyExport, InterRAO UES and the Turkish
firm Park Teknik) were the sole bidders in a tender to build
Turkey's first nuclear power plant (see refs D and E for more
details). The bid was found technically acceptable in
December 2008. The sole remaining barrier was the price: the
Russians offered US 21 cents per kilowatt hour, which was
deemed far too high by the GOT and Turkish commentators. The
consortium subsequently reduced their offer to 15 cents, and
we understand that the GOR has offered to drop it to 12
cents. A Russian embassy contact told us July 4 that they
will drop the price to 10 cents if that is what it takes to
close the deal, and that the GOR very much wants the contract
and expects the deal will be concluded during Putin's visit.
¶6. (C) Energy Minister Yildiz said July 29 that the GOT was
at the point of making "key decisions" on the nuclear bid,
but declined to give any specifics. At this point, a
rejection of the Russian bid would have to come from the
Council of Ministers and be based on price. Comment: We have
heard from different sources that AK Party deputies are not
happy with the Russian proposal, in part due to doubts about
Russian technology. GOT officials in both MFA and the
Ministry of Energy have told us they do not like the deal
because of Turkey's already heavy energy dependence on Russia
and AtomStroyExport's spotty record on completing projects on
time. However, Yildiz has told us that Turkey must have the
electricity from the nuclear plant by 2017 and that Turkey
should have moved on nuclear power a decade ago and it is up
to this government to deliver it. It would be very difficult
for the GOT to give Putin an outright "no" on the bid during
his visit. Thus, we believe the most likely scenario is GOT
acceptance of the Russian bid with a price drop to 10 cents
per kilowatt hour. Given that the Russians very much want
the nuclear deal, the GOT also could be linking accepting the
Russian bid to, e.g., a reduction in the price of gas in the
Westline contract extension. A less likely (but still
possible) scenario is that the GOT continues to negotiate
with the Russians in hopes they will give up on the bid,
while moving forward on the second nuclear tender -- which
they have promised will be in a much more investor-friendly,
public-private partnership format. End comment.
Whither Bluestream II?
---------------------
¶7. (C) In early July, DDG Altay told us with some enthusiasm
that Bluestream II discussions were advancing and that the
project would bring an additional 8 BCM into the Turkish
market, reducing Turkey's need for gas coming through
Ukraine. In discussions on July 17, however, he only
mentioned Bluestream II in response to a a direct question of
whether it was on the agenda, and he had no comment at all
about the status of the talks. Similarly, Bluestream II has
dropped out of recent newspaper articles describing wthe
agenda for Putin's visit, and neither Sinirlioglu nor Yildiz
mentioned the project in recent meetings. Comment: We take
this as an indication that there will be no substantive
announcements about Bluestream II during the Putin visit.
End comment.
Turkey's Russia Strategy
-------------------------
¶8. (C) Sinirlioglu told us that the GOT sees Russia as key to
regional energy policy. This is a much stronger, more
assertive Russia than in the 1990s. "We need to accomodate
Russia, but not appease it." He agreed that the Russian
"power politics" approach has not changed yet, and that
Russia needs to understand that not everything is zero sum
game. It will take time and patience to convince Russia that
they stand to gain from "responsible cooperation."
Sinirlioglu emphasized that Turkey does not want to be
dependent on Russia, and noted in particular that Turkey buys
too much of its natural gas -- 65 percent -- from Russia,
Similarly, DDG Altay said that the GOT invited Russia to the
Nabucco IGA signing ceremony not because they expected the
Russians to send a delegation, but because they wanted to
signal that Nabucco is not intended to isolate Russia. (See
refs A, B and C for more on Turkish energy policy with
Russia.)
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
JEFFREY