

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06SEOUL2399, FOREIGN MINISTER BAN'S UNSYG CAMPAIGN WEATHERING
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SEOUL2399.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06SEOUL2399 | 2006-07-18 10:41 | 2011-04-28 22:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Seoul |
VZCZCXRO1854
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHUL #2399/01 1991041
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181041Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9164
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 6141
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0714
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0553
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0520
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0273
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SEOUL 002399
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR CHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREL UN KS KN
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER BAN'S UNSYG CAMPAIGN WEATHERING
DPRK STORM
REF: A. SEOUL 2000
¶B. SEOUL 1329
¶C. SEOUL 969
¶D. SEOUL 166
¶E. SEOUL 1034
¶F. SEOUL 509
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) Five months into his official campaign for UN
Secretary General, FM Ban continues to seek international
SIPDIS
support for his candidacy and to demonstrate his commitment
to human rights and UN management reform. He reports no
major opposition at this point, but is worried that without a
sign of encouragement from the U.S., his candidacy could
still falter. Ban hopes to gain from the perception that it
is "Asia's turn" to fill the SYG post. Remaining hurdles
include whether the North Korean issue further deteriorates
on his watch, whether other Asian candidates enter the race
and receive backing from P-5 members, and whether
ROK-Japanese tensions play a significant role in blocking or
undermining a regional consensus on his candidacy. COMMENT:
A consummate diplomat, Ban finds himself at the top of his
chosen career largely because of his ability to get along
with others. While his staff emphasize his "reform"
credentials, Ban has not had to deal with large-scale
restructuring at the Ministry. However, Ban is among the
most recognized of MOFAT's American experts, and seems
naturally sympathetic to all things American. We have no
doubt Ban's relations with the USG would be same if he were
the UNSYG. END COMMENT AND SUMMARY.
.
MAKING THE ROUNDS
-----------------
¶2. (C) Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon has visited 14 of the 15
UNSC member countries this year and reports that he has
received generally favorable results. The one remaining
country is Japan, which is scheduled to chair the Security
Council in October (see para 10). On multiple occasions, Ban
has told the Ambassador that he perceived or heard strong
private support from several UNSC members: Argentina, Congo,
France, Ghana, Greece, Peru, Slovakia, and Tanzania (refs
A-D). He recognized, however, that he needed to distinguish
between "diplomatic niceness" and genuine shows of support.
Most of his interlocutors have strongly supported an Asian
for the next SYG, he reported.
¶3. (C) While Ban was accompanying President Roh Moo-hyun to
Africa in March, Seoul announced that the ROK would increase
its Overseas Development Assistance to the continent from $31
million to $100 million by 2008. According to our Foreign
Ministry contacts, President Roh also used the occasion of
his visit to Africa to request support for Ban's UNSYG
candidacy (ref E). Ban probably hopes that South Korean aid
would increase African receptivity to his campaign.
.
STRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS AND UN REFORM
------------------------------------
¶4. (C) In late June, Ban attended the inaugural session of
the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva, to which South
Korea was elected a member, and gave an address that
emphasized a few themes representative of his UNSYG
candidacy. As a South Korean whose country was defended
during the Korean War by the UN Command, he was particularly
committed to the ideals of the United Nations, namely peace
and stability, development, and human rights and democracy.
Seoul supported the establishment of the HRC as an
improvement over the UN Human Rights Commission. He
emphasized his and Seoul's focus on UN modernization and
reform. Finally, despite private demarches to avoid
country-specific motions in order to make this first session
procedural, Ban publicly took the surprising step to directly
criticize North Korean human rights practices and called on
Pyongyang to engage in a human rights dialogue with the
international community. In the past, Seoul had gone out of
its way to abstain or avoid UN votes on North Korean human
rights. Ban's HRC speech may have been an attempt for Seoul,
and Ban, to take a step toward addressing the criticism that
Seoul had turned a blind eye to the human rights situation in
North Korea.
¶5. (C) In other fora, Minister Ban and Foreign Ministry
officials have insisted that Ban attaches special importance
to UN management reform. Ban has told the Ambassador that
since his days as First Secretary at the ROK Mission to the
United Nations in 1978, he has believed that the UN needed
management reform. He pointed to ROK efforts that, he said,
were instrumental in strengthening the role of the President
of the General Assembly, as another example of his and South
Korean efforts to support UN reform.
¶6. (SBU) Key aides to Minister Ban in conversations with the
Embassy (ref F) have pointed to Ban's accomplishments in
reforming the ROK Foreign Ministry to show his commitment to
management reform. Ban strengthened term limits for South
Korean ambassadors by reducing the number of missions they
could head to two from three or four. He implemented a
retirement age of sixty for Ministry officials. He reduced
the time allowed foreign service officers returning from
posts abroad to look for a new job in the Ministry to four
months from the previous one-year period. These, his aides
said, were strong decisions that were unpopular among senior
MOFAT officers. In addition, Ban initiated weekly press
conferences, the only South Korean minister who did this, and
this showed confidence in his ability to manage a range of
issues, they said. Ban's media presence reportedly earned
him a nickname akin to Mr. Teflon (the "slippery eel"),
because journalists could ask Ban anything and he was so
unflustered.
¶7. (U) In June, the Foreign Ministry sponsored a two-day
conference in Seoul titled, "International Seminar on the
United Nations in the 21st Century: Challenges and Reform" at
which Ban expressed concern over the obstacles to UN
management reform. His view was that the key to healing
political rifts was genuine dialogue among all the
stakeholders. In May, he delivered a speech to the Council
on Foreign Relations titled "Restoring the Vitality of the
United Nations" in which he insisted that the UN was
"overstretched and fatigued" and urged more action to
strengthen transparency and accountability. He said the next
UNSYG should be a harmonizer who demonstrated leadership by
example, as his career demonstrated.
.
DEEP EXPERIENCE WITH ALLIANCE AND UNITED NATIONS
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶8. (SBU) Since entering the Foreign Ministry in 1970, Ban
has held key positions focused on the U.S.-Korean
relationship and the United Nations. His U.S.-related posts
include: Counselor and Consul General in the ROK Embassy in
Washington (1987-1990); Director-General of the North
American Affairs Bureau (1990-1992); Minister of the ROK
Embassy in Washington (1992-1994); Deputy Minister for Policy
Planning (1995); Senior Secretary to the President for
Foreign Policy and National Security (1996-1998); Vice
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2000); Adviser to the
President for Foreign Policy (2003); and finally Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Trade starting from 2004. His UN
experience includes: First Secretary to the ROK Mission to
the United Nations (1978-1980); Director of the UN Division
at the Foreign Ministry (1980-1983); Ambassador to Austria
(1998-2000) during which time he also served as Chairman of
the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (1999); and Ambassador
to the United Nations (2001-2002) during which he also served
as Chief of Cabinet to the President of the 56th General
Assembly of the United Nations (2001).
.
DPRK TENSION COULD RAIN ON BAN'S PARADE
---------------------------------------
¶9. (C) North Korean nuclear and missile activities have
complicated Ban's attempt to share credit for improving
inter-Korean reconciliation. In early July, Ban canceled a
visit to Mexico and El Salvador, just a day prior to the DPRK
missile launches, due to "outstanding diplomatic issues,"
that unnamed Ministry officials told reporters was code for
DPRK missile launch preparations, deadlocked Six Party Talks,
and increased tension with Japan over maritime surveys in the
disputed waters near the Liancourt Rocks. UN Security
Council internal deliberations over a response to the DPRK
missile launch have also cast Ban in an unfavorable position
of being involved but not central to UN action because Seoul
is one of the few relevant parties not on the Council.
.
JAPANESE POSITION UNCLEAR
-------------------------
¶10. (C) The increased level of political sparring between
Seoul and Tokyo over North Korea and the Liancourt Rocks has
intensified the question whether Japan would support or not
work against a Ban candidacy. Ban admitted to the Ambassador
in April that leaving Japan as the one country he had not
visited since declaring his UNSYG ambitions was
"conspicuous," especially because Japan was slated to chair
the Security Council in October. The appropriate
opportunity, he said, had yet to present itself. Some of
Ban's senior aides have opined that Japanese leaders might be
reluctant to take a public stand against Seoul's candidate to
avoid exacerbating anti-Japanese sentiments in Korea. The
aides assessed that it would also be hard for Tokyo to vote
against Ban, especially if he emerged as the leading Asian
candidate.
.
BAN: USG AND CHINA ARE THE KEYS TO UNSYG
----------------------------------------
¶11. (C) Ban has emphasized to the Ambassador that all of his
interlocutors assessed that the most important voices were
from the United States and China. Ban believed that China
still wanted an Asian UNSYG, but may have switched its
strategy from seeking a consensus candidate to multiple
candidates, in case the consensus candidate failed and Asia
lost its chance. Therefore, China's official position,
according to Ban, was that all four major Asian candidates
were qualified and acceptable. Ultimately, Ban opined, the
race would hinge on the position of the United States and
China. In a July 18 conversation, he for the first time
voiced concern that, if the U.S. stayed non-committal much
longer, his candidacy could falter (details septel).
COMMENT
-------
¶12. (C) "Harmonizer," "consensus-seeker," and even "Mr.
Teflon" are the most common descriptions of Ban Ki-moon. A
consummate diplomat, Ban now finds himself at the top of his
chosen career largely because of his ability to get along
with others. This is not to belittle his intellectual depth
or his obviously sophisticated understanding of the issues.
Rather, it is to point out that Ban is a very skilled
diplomat, excellent at forging compromise solutions and
maintaining good control over his organization--all in the
service of his political masters. In the Blue House, Ban has
worked, got along with and been rapidly promoted by three
very different presidents: Kim Young-sam, a hot-tempered
conservative with very limited knowledge of most policy
issues; Kim Dae-jung, a global political figure, very
comfortable in all aspects of foreign policy; and, finally,
Roh Moo-hyun, a high-school graduate, newcomer to the
international scene, but with strong views and firm
conviction.
¶13. (C) A product of elite Korean education, Ban has not
held a job outside of the ROK Foreign Ministry system. While
Ban's staff emphasize his "reform" credentials, we doubt that
he's ever had to face a serious cut in the Ministry's budget,
because given the enormous growth in the Korean economy,
there has not been a need to trim expenditures or personnel
in the Korean Foreign Ministry. Simply put, Ban has not had
to deal with restructuring, or have to seriously think about
getting rid of large pieces of his organization.
¶14. (C) However, on one credential we have no doubt. This
is Ban's view of the United States in general and the USG in
particular. Among the most recognized of MOFAT's American
experts, Ban has completed three tours in the United States,
two in Washington and one in New York. He has also worked on
U.S. issues at the Ministry and the Blue House. Ban
understands completely American people, values, and
government. More important, he is naturally sympathetic to
all things American. This is quite typical of well educated
Koreans of his age. Their formative experience was the
Korean War, and they remain convinced that the U.S. is a
benign power, with shared ideals and goals for the region and
the world. When we need something from the South
Koreans--ranging from sending Korean troops to Iraq to
resolving base issues for USFK--we turn to Ban. He has
always been sympathetic and helpful. We have no doubt Ban's
relations with the USG would be same if he were the UNSYG.
VERSHBOW