

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08OTTAWA156, CANADA'S NUCLEAR SECTOR: REACTOR SHUTDOWN
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08OTTAWA156.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08OTTAWA156 | 2008-01-31 18:03 | 2011-04-28 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Ottawa |
VZCZCXRO6392
RR RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #0156/01 0311803
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311803Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7227
INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEAEPA/EPA WASHDC
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 OTTAWA 000156
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, OES, EB, AND ISN
DOE FOR P&I, NE AND NNSA
EPA FOR OFFICE OF THE AMINISTRATOR AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
COMMERCE FOR 4320/ITA/MAC/WH/ONIA - WORD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TRGY TBIO PGOV BTIO ENRG CA
SUBJECT: CANADA'S NUCLEAR SECTOR: REACTOR SHUTDOWN
HIGHLIGHTS BROADER CONCERNS
REF: A. 2007 OTTAWA 2276
¶B. 2007 OTTAWA 2260
¶C. 2007 OTTAWA 2255
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. Not for Internet distribution.
¶1. (SBU) Summary. Natural Resources Minister Gary Lunn
removed Linda Keen from the Presidency of the Canadian
Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) late on January 15. (While
no longer CNSC President, she remains a member of the
Commission.) Undoubtedly the government hoped this would wrap
up the two-month drama that began with a routine shutdown of
the NRU reactor in Chalk River in mid-November (reported
reftels), but this seems certain not to be the case. This
episode serves to illustrate several distinct problems
surrounding Canada's nuclear sector.
-- The dependence of half of the global market for certain
short-lived medical isotopes on the operation of a single,
half-century-old reactor.
-- Long-run financing problems facing GOC-owned reactor
supplier Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), and the
government's strategy for the company's future.
-- Staffing and capacity challenges faced by the CNSC, the
nuclear regulator, not just vis-a-vis its current mission,
but also in the face of a possible resurgence of the nuclear
industry in Canada over the coming decade.
¶2. (SBU) Comment: We think that, as a consequence of this
affair, the very real resource and capacity problems of the
Canadian nuclear regulator have gained greater prominence in
Parliament and the public mind, and stand a better chance of
being addressed. The prognosis for AECL, however, may be
darker. This imbroglio has served to highlight the
difficulty AECL is having with its replacement technology
(now eight years behind schedule) for the aging reactor which
produces the medical isotopes and its lack of success in
moving its new power reactor design forward and finding early
customers )- all at a juncture when the GoC has been
considering putting the money-losing company on the auction
block or otherwise divesting itself of it. The affair may
also affect Canada's position as the world's largest supplier
of medical isotopes as other countries, in particular the
United States, consider whether to pursue their own domestic
production capacity. The significant political facets of
this episode are discussed septel. End Summary and Comment.
Overview of CNSC and AECL
-------------------------
¶3. In Canada nuclear regulation is solely a federal
jurisdiction; the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC),
formed in 2000 out of the former Atomic Energy Control Board,
is the independent, quasi-judicial administrative tribunal
and regulatory agency charged with that responsibility. It
reports to Parliament through the Minister of Natural
Resources (Gary Lunn). With roughly 500 employees, the CNSC
has as its principal mandate to "protect people and the
environment from licensed sources of man-made radiation
resulting from the use of nuclear energy and materials." It
also regulates the use of nuclear energy and materials in
line with Canada's international commitments on the peaceful
use of nuclear energy. In a series of reports over the past
eight years Canada's independent Auditor General (AG)
identified a series of challenges facing CNSC, in particular
human resources issues of capacity, recruitment, and
Qhuman resources issues of capacity, recruitment, and
retention of capable staff, and clarification of roles and
responsibilities. In its first audit, in 2000, the AG found
that CNSC's regulatory activities were not based on a
rigorous, well-documented system of risk analysis; and that
only a few CNSC divisions had developed formal approaches to
risk analysis as a basis for proposing regulatory activity.
¶4. (SBU) Canada's federal government owns Atomic Energy of
Canada Ltd. (AECL), a money-losing, 55-year-old reactor
design/supply/service firm. AECL has sold 12 reactors to
Argentina, India, China, South Korea and other developing
countries (the last reactor sale was to China in 1999), but
it is not clear AECL will be competitive for future
international business against U.S. and European competitors,
and even its prospects for domestic Canadian new builds are
OTTAWA 00000156 002 OF 004
very uncertain.
¶5. (SBU) While all reactors now in use in Canada are of AECL
design, only the oldest unit is directly operated by AECL:
the so-called National Research Universal or NRU reactor
built in the early 1950s at Chalk River, Ontario, about 100
miles west of Ottawa. Approximately half of all diagnostic
nuclear medicine procedures performed worldwide depend on
Molybdenum-99 from the NRU reactor; these isotopes are
packaged and distributed by MDS Nordion, Inc. (a private
sector concern spun off from AECL around 1990). Because
these isotopes have half-lives of a few days or less, this
business depends on more or less continuous operation of the
NRU. Construction of two new reactors dedicated to isotope
supply (known as "Maple 1 and 2") and intended to replace the
NRU in that capacity are significantly over budget and over
eight years behind schedule. Current AECL expectations are
that the Maples will come on-line in late 2008 and early 2009.
What Happened?
--------------
¶6. (U) When the NRU was shut down for routine maintenance on
November 18, CNSC inspectors verified that modifications to
the reactor's cooling system called for in an August 2006
licensing review had not been installed. CNSC notified AECL
the NRU was not in compliance with its license and could not
therefore be restarted. AECL did not restart the reactor,
but claimed the modifications were upgrades, not mission
critical, and could be accomplished over a longer period of
time during forthcoming monthly maintenance periods. AECL
claimed it could continue to operate the NRU safely without
the additional equipment, at least as an interim measure.
The impasse between the regulator and AECL extended the
scheduled NRU shutdown from one week to over a month, and the
shutdown would have gone longer had the government not
intervened and temporarily exempted the reactor from CNSC
oversight (through emergency legislation that had all party
support) to allow its restart (ref a).
Medical Isotopes ) No Security of Supply?
-----------------------------------------
¶7. (U) As a result of the extended NRU shutdown, global
supplies of critical medical radio-isotopes dwindled. (Only
five reactors around the world produce these radio-isotopes,
one each in France, Belgium, Netherlands, South Africa, and
Canada.) Since many isotopes have half-lives measured in
hours, any unplanned reactor shutdown easily leads to supply
disruption. The NRU alone accounts for over 50 percent of
global supply of Molybdenum 99, which is the source of
Technetium-99m, the most widely used isotope for diagnosing
disease. Compounding the shortage, the South African reactor
went down for scheduled maintenance in early December.
(Maintenance schedules are coordinated among reactor
operators well in advance, but it had been anticipated the
NRU would be back on-line by the end of November.)
¶8. (SBU) In early December as medical concerns heightened --
the head of the Canadian Medical Association indicated he was
"very concerned" -- Health Canada initiated efforts at some
800 hospitals and clinics to monitor radioisotope shortages
and plan a response. (The government in fact portrayed the
issue as one of public health from the beginning, leading the
Prime Minister to claim in the House of Commons that
QPrime Minister to claim in the House of Commons that
operating the NRU without the safety upgrades posed "no
threat to nuclear safety at all.") The NRU shutdown exposed
the lack of additional production capacity worldwide, and in
particular the vulnerability of the United States which,
although the largest consumer of medical isotopes, has no
commercial production capacity at all for key elements such
as Molybdenum 99. Indeed, Congress has tasked the U.S.
National Research Council to examine further the risks to the
American public due to the lack of domestic production
capacity.
Precarious Finances ) End ahead for AECL?
-----------------------------------------
¶9. (SBU) Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., established in 1951,
is wholly owned by the GOC and has always required subsidies,
which have been trimmed over the past decade even as reactor
sales have gone flat. (The last AECL sales were to China (2)
and Korea (4) in the 1990s.) Indeed, Minister Lunn himself
noted that there has been a "chronic shortage of funding for
OTTAWA 00000156 003 OF 004
AECL going back over 14 years," and the firm's
under-capitalization and poor accounting have been documented
repeatedly by the Auditor General. In an otherwise bleak
immediate market, much hope has been invested in the putative
"nuclear renaissance" expected as a consequence of policies
aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
¶10. (SBU) AECL has been lobbying the Ontario provincial
government and utility firms to spend about C$12 billion on
eight new reactors required to meet the province's energy
needs over the next 20 years. However, a 2007 public
declaration by Ontario premier Dalton McGuinty that AECL,s
heavy-water reactor technology (so-called CANDU for "CANada
Deuterium Uranium", a reference to its heavy water moderator)
was not a shoo-in and that all technologies would be
considered, was a blow to AECL expectations. This distress
was exacerbated when the CNSC decided to discontinue its
"pre-licensing assessments" (citing resource constraints) of
AECL's new flagship reactor design, the Advanced CANDU
Reactor (ACR), which was to be pitched to Ontario. The loss
of this pre-licensing assessment puts AECL at a competitive
disadvantage in marketing the ACR, which has so far cost
about C$300 million to develop.
¶11. (SBU) In November 2007, just before the NRU isotope story
broke publicly, the Conservative federal government announced
a broad review of AECL's future, including the possibility of
selling the company. That long-rumored review is now on hold
due to the turbulence around the isotope affair.
¶12. Comment: This may, however, only be a stay of execution.
There is no shortage of criticism of AECL, fueled by reports
from the Auditor General, not just in 2007, but also in 2002
and 1996, pointing to mismanagement and lack of transparency
as critical and on-going failures at AECL. And contrary to
normal practice, AECL had not previously made the earlier
reports public. Divestment is certainly a political option,
as governments of both parties have participated in the
gradual privatization of, for example, PetroCanada, an
integrated oil company, Air Canada, and the CN railroad over
the past two decades. However, if the ACR fails to attract
Canadian buyers, AECL's financial prospects and its
attractiveness to potential investors are open to question.
End comment.
CNSC Capacity ) Is Confidence Warranted?
----------------------------------------
¶13. (SBU) Since inception, CNSC has struggled with problems
of under-capacity, caught between limited funding, the aging
demographics of nuclear professionals, and a current and
anticipated rise in regulatory demands due to reactor
refurbishments, redesigns, probable new builds, and plans for
waste management. In this case, although the downstream
supply of medical isotopes is not formally the regulator's
concern, Linda Keen's choice to stick to the licensing rule
book suggests that the capacity to assess the broader impacts
of CNSC decisions may have been lacking )- perhaps a direct
consequence of a relatively young organization lacking
sufficient resources. On the plus side, in its most recent
assessment (2005), the Auditor General found CNSC was making
satisfactory progress in implementing its recommendations
from the 2000 audit in areas such as human resource planning
Qfrom the 2000 audit in areas such as human resource planning
and implementation of an integrated, risk-informed approach
to regulatory activities. Comment: The high profile events
of the past two months have clearly served to make Parliament
aware of the regulator's constraints. Given that Canada
cannot do without a nuclear regulator, these events may
compel the government and Parliament to provide additional
resources needed to remedy them, rather than to sweep them
under the carpet yet again. On the other hand, rational
assessment and treatment of these events in the political
domain is anything but assured. End comment.
What Does It All Mean?
----------------------
¶14. (SBU) Despite the resource and organizational challenges
faced by the CNSC and the apparent lack of a robust response
by the regulator in the face of this unique set of
circumstances, the evidence, including assessments by the
Auditor General, still suggests that the CNSC is a capable
and credible nuclear regulator that should retain the trust
of its international peers. Realistically, the government
cannot dispense with CNSC, and may well be forced to find
OTTAWA 00000156 004 OF 004
additional resources to address its identified problems. On
the other hand, the fate of AECL in the wake of this
imbroglio is cloudy. The company undoubtedly lost some
government goodwill, from an already diminished reserve, and
its failure to comply with NRU licensing conditions (i.e.,
the installation of the two back-up cooling pumps) for 18
months certainly will not help the firm's credibility with
prospective customers in Canada, the United States, or
elsewhere. While to the casual observer AECL seems to have
come out of the squabble over NRU relatively unscathed, the
real implications for the company may be far different, and
it is unclear to what extent the government will continue to
support the loss-making firm. In broader terms, this may be
welcome news for AECL's international competitors.
Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada
WILKINS