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Viewing cable 07BAGHDAD63, IRAQ'S SUNNI VP DISCUSSES BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN,
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07BAGHDAD63 | 2007-01-07 18:41 | 2010-12-05 12:00 | SECRET | Embassy Baghdad |
VZCZCXRO1455
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0063/01 0071841
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071841Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8965
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000063
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ'S SUNNI VP DISCUSSES BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN,
MODERATE FRONT, SADDAM AND IRAN
REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 0008
¶B. B) 2006 BAGHDAD 4652
¶C. C) 2006 BAGHDAD 4763
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) Summary: In a January 4 meeting with Iraq's Sunni Vice
President Tariq al-Hashemi (Iraqi Islamic Party ) IIP), the
Ambassador briefed him on the new Baghdad security plan and
solicited the VP's support. Al-Hashemi welcomed a new plan
to curb Baghdad violence, requested Shia and Sunni balance
within the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) manning checkpoints,
and agreed that an increased number of MNF-I troops are
needed in order for the plan to succeed. Discussing a
possible cabinet change, the VP said that Prime Minister
Maliki has not approached him about changing any of Tawafuq's
(Sunni Coalition) Ministers or their Deputy Prime Minister.
Al-Hashemi stressed that before Tawafuq agrees to change its
Ministers, the Minister of Defense, Abdul Qadir Mohammed
al-Mufriji, (Sunni ) Independent ) Tawafuq) must be
replaced with another Tawafuq candidate. The VP criticized
the way the GOI executed Saddam and expressed concern that
because of their actions the reconciliation project is now
"dead." On the moderate front, al-Hashemi said that during
his recent trip to Sulaymaniyah with President Talabani he
had agreed to change IIP's conditions (reftel) to a program
for the coalition to address. However, the VP warned, the PM
has been unable to convince Dawa to support the coalition.
The Ambassador and VP discussed how to address the issue of
GOI officials with close ties to foreign countries, such as
Iran, with the VP recommending that the GOI "start from
scratch" and hold new elections. End Summary.
--------------------------------------------- -------
The Baghdad Security Plan: Al-Hashemi Offers Support
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶2. (S) The Ambassador outlined the chief components of the
new Baghdad Security Plan and called on the VP to support the
PM and this plan. First, Coalition Forces (CF) and Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) will pursue anyone who breaks the law.
There will be no sanctuary anywhere in greater Baghdad, the
Ambassador emphasized. Second, Baghdad will be divided into
nine districts overseen by two deputy commanders reporting
directly to a military commander with full authority
operating independently of political pressures. Finally, the
security plan will be accompanied by economic and services
plan. In order to secure Baghdad, the Ambassador said, the
Iraqi Army (IA) will bring three extra brigades to Baghdad,
two from northern Iraq and one from the South, working
alongside an extra US brigade. The coalition will support by
bringing more forces into Iraq and committing additional
forces to be brought in if needed. The details will be
worked out in the coming days.
¶3. (S) The VP responded that National Security Advisor
Muwafuq Rubai'e had already presented the plan to him. "I
gave him four pages of comments," the VP said, and also "sent
a copy to General Casey." He reiterated previous concerns
about Shia-Sunni balance within the ISF, especially at
checkpoints. The Deputy Commander in Karkh should be from
the Ministry of Defense, al-Hashemi stated, and the Deputy
Commander in Rasafa should be from Ministry of Interior. The
VP agreed that more forces, both Coalition and Iraqi, would
be needed to solve Baghdad's security crisis.
--------------------------------------------- --------------
Cabinet Reshuffle: Minister of Defense Needs to Be Replaced
--------------------------------------------- --------------
¶4. (C) The Ambassador asked about the proposed cabinet
change, noting that the PM said Tawafuq wants to change three
ministries but has not provided any substitutions. The VP
scoffed, saying that the PM wants those changes, not Tawafuq.
The PM will not tell us who he wants changed, al-Hashemi
complained, and is choosing to form a committee to review the
issue. One of the changes the PM wants to make, he
continued, is to move Tawafuq's Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs, Rafi'a al-Issawi, to Minister of Health (MoH). The
Ambassador noted that this is a great opportunity for
Tawafuq, since that ministry has been "destroyed" by its
current Sadrist Minister and al-Issawi will be "a hero" for
fixing it. The VP commented that there are "too many guns
and killers" at the MoH and that key people need to be
removed or else al-Issawi "will be killed" by the Jaysh
al-Mahdi (JAM) and Moqtada al-Sadr supporters working there.
¶5. (C) The VP noted that before Tawafuq agrees to any
ministerial changes, Minister of Defense Abdul Qadir
al-Mufriji must be replaced. Tawafuq has sent a clear
BAGHDAD 00000063 002 OF 003
message to al-Mufirji, al-Hashemi said, that he should
resign. "We were forced by the Shia coalition" to place an
independent Sunni in this position, the VP lamented.
However, al-Hashemi said, the PM is the boss, the
Commander-in-Chief, and he is not independent. The Minister
of Defense makes sectarian issues worse by "simply
implementing the PM's ideas," al-Hashemi stressed. His
replacement, therefore, should come from Tawafuq. The
Ambassador noted that the PM has not decided the extent of
his cabinet change and that the Minister of Defense might not
be replaced. Besides, the Ambassador noted, our military
colleagues say al-Mufriji has a good reputation as an honest
and non-sectarian minister.
--------------------------------------------- ------
Saddam's Execution: Reconciliation "Dead" VP Warns
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶6. (S) Turning to Saddam's execution, the VP stated that
nobody had consulted with President Talabani, although he
noted that he had sent Rubaie a letter prior to the
execution. Al-Hashemi commented that Talabani believed his
signature was not required because of a legal statute which
states high tribunal sentences cannot be changed. The
Ambassador noted he had been told the same thing, and that he
had recommended that the PM press the Chief Justice for a
written opinion concurring with this assessment. Al-Hashemi
said he had also suggested that a judge put in writing his
opinion that a Presidential decree was unnecessary.
¶7. (S) The Ambassador then asked the VP whether the PM or his
advisors had approached him before the execution. The VP
said that he had not been consulted, although prior to the
execution he sent a letter to both the PM and Rubai'e sharing
concerns raised by Salah ad Din (SaD) officials during a
December 28 meeting (Ref A). The letter, the VP continued,
requested three days notice to address security issues in
SaD, Saddam's home province, and recommended that the GOI
release Saddam's remains to the SaD Governor for burial.
According to the VP, Rubai'e responded that it would not be
possible to provide three days notice since the PM is keeping
all details "a secret until the last minute." Rubai'e
further stated, al-Hashemi said, that he would try to give
notice at least one hour before the event.
¶8. (S) In addition to the legal issues and returning Saddam's
remains to SaD, the VP said he also spoke to the PM about
rushing through the execution during Eid. According to
al-Hashemi, the PM responded that it was "your Eid, not
mine," and noted that the religious leaders had confirmed
that if Saddam was executed before sunrise it would not occur
during Eid. (Note: Saddam was executed approximately one
hour before sunrise on December 30, the day which Sunni
Muslims began celebrating Eid al-Adha. End Note). The VP
noted that Saddam was executed "as a Sunni, not as a
dictator," and called the execution "the revenge of the Dawa
party." He further commented that reconciliation "was dead"
because of how the execution occurred.
¶9. (S) The Ambassador agreed that many people are upset with
how the execution occurred. When asked why the USG had
released Saddam Hussein when the GOI had not resolved some of
these issues, the Ambassador responded that Iraq had legal
custody of Saddam, although at GOI's request we had physical
custody. "We voiced our concerns," the Ambassador said, but
in the end the PM made the final decision. Based on Saddam's
execution, the VP suggested that MNF-I encourage the PM to
postpone the remaining two executions until reconciliation
has concluded.
--------------------------------------------- ----------------
Moderate Front: IIP Relents on Conditions; Dawa will not join
--------------------------------------------- ----------------
¶10. (C) The Ambassador noted that efforts to form a moderate
front have stalled and asked the VP where IIP stands on their
list of demands which must be met before joining the
coalition. The VP replied that while visiting Sulaymaniyah
with President Talabani, IIP agreed to change their
conditions (Ref B) to an agenda the moderate front would
address. In fact, al-Hashemi said, IIP had issued an amended
statement to this effect and had passed it to Rowsch Shaways
(former Iraqi Vice President and Deputy Prime Minister )
Kurd ) KDP) and current Vice President Adil Abdul Mehdi
(SCIRI). They took the amended statement to the PM,
al-Hashemi said. The problem, the VP continued, is that the
PM has been unable to convince Dawa to join the coalition.
According to the VP, the PM has said that as a political
party leader he cannot join the coalition, but as the PM he
could form a group with the Presidency Council (the President
BAGHDAD 00000063 003 OF 003
and two VPs) and the Council of Representatives (CoR)
speaker, Mahmoud Mashadani. The Ambassador responded that it
would be better if the coalition formed around political bloc
leaders. There could be constitutional concerns if a new
alliance between official positions forms, the Ambassador
cautioned. The VP said that once Abdul Mehdi returns to
Baghdad he is willing to discuss the issue again.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
On Iranian Influence in the GOI: VP suggests new elections
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶11. (S) On the Iranian detainees, the Ambassador commented
that President Talabani called these people his "guests," but
he did not even know who they are, the Ambassador said. The
VP responded that Iran's activities within Iraq and their
connections to GOI officials have not been a secret. "I have
been warning about Iran's influence for some time," he said.
The VP offered his appreciation for General Caldwell's
presentation (Ref C), but noted the General only shared
"things I already knew." The Ambassador asked the VP what
should be done with GOI leaders who are working with Quds
Force operatives. The VP replied that the GOI needs "to
start from scratch," with new elections and needs to
strengthen a weak central government. While affirming his
commitment to democracy and rule of law, the VP noted that
there are "problems" with some of the political partners.
The VP further commented that Iran's reach extends beyond
SCIRI, Badr and the Sadrists. He explained his belief that
CoR Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani (Tawafuq) is also influenced by
the Iranians and noted that several Sunni insurgent and
resistance groups have received Iranian support.
¶12. (S) Al-Hashemi asked the Ambassador about the GOI's
actions once MNF-I released the detainees. The Ambassador
commented that while he shares concerns about Iranian
influence, the GOI took some positive steps during this
incident. First, he said, once MNF-I released the detainees,
the GOI ordered them to leave Iraq and escorted them to the
Iranian border. Second, the MFA issued a statement
announcing their departure and stated publicly that "their
activities had been inconsistent with their diplomatic
status." Third, the GOI has requested an updated list of
Iranian diplomats in Iraq so that in the future it will be
easier to verify diplomatic status. Finally, the GOI is
sending a delegation to Iran, most likely led by Deputy Prime
Minister Barham Salih, to discuss the incident and its
implications. The Ambassador asked why the VP and IIP have
not made a bigger deal about the issue. The VP responded
that IIP is more concerned about reconciliation and that he
fears making a big deal about the Iranians and their ties
with other GOI leaders will hinder the reconciliation effort.
KHALILZAD