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Viewing cable 09SANJOSE225, COSTA RICA: FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09SANJOSE225 | 2009-03-25 16:58 | 2011-03-14 17:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy San Jose |
Appears in these articles: http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-11/Investigacion/NotasDestacadas/Investigacion2710281.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-11/Investigacion/NotaPrincipal/Investigacion2710282.aspx |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSJ #0225/01 0841658
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 251658Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0634
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0057
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0825
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000225
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/PPC, WHA/CCA AND PRM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2019
TAGS: CS CU PGOV PINR PREL PREF
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA: FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA
REF: A. SAN JOSE 018 (ALL NOTAL)
¶B. 08 SAN JOSE 629
¶C. 08 SAN JOSE 129
¶D. 07 SAN JOSE 1106
¶E. 06 SAN JOSE 1841
¶F. SAN SALVADOR 229
Classified By: DCM Peter M. Brennan for reason 1.4 (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On March 18, Costa Rica re-established full
diplomatic relations with Cuba, ending 48 years of limited
contact. In an open letter to the Costa Rican people and in
his press conference announcing the change, President Oscar
Arias said "the time had come" for "direct and open dialogue"
with the island, adding that the decades of official silence
between the two countries had yielded benefits to neither.
The GOCR's move was characteristically sudden, but not
unexpected; the Arias administration had been mulling this
over for some months. FM Stagno informed the Ambassador "as
a courtesy" two days in advance, making clear that Arias was
inclined to upgrade relations as soon as possible after the
FMLN election win in El Salvador, and before VP Biden's
upcoming visit to Costa Rica. Although maintaining a healthy
degree of skepticism, Stagno believes that the GOCR (and
other regional governments) will be able to work with the new
Cuban foreign affairs team (Rodriguez and Malmierca). Local
media coverage was swift, in some cases critical of the
change in Arias' attitude, but brief. If Arias was hoping
for a significant positive media bounce, he did not get it.
With this announcement, Arias has completed his pledges to
open or improve relations with the Arab world, China and Cuba
during his administration. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- --
PRESIDENT ARIAS: "OPEN PATHS AND BUILD BRIDGES"
--------------------------------------------- --
¶2. (U) After nearly 48 years of limited and strained
relations, on March 18, Costa Rica re-established full
diplomatic relations with Cuba. In a letter to the Costa
Rican people, President Arias said that Costa Rica should be
recognized by the international community for "its friendship
and not for its enmity," and for "its disposition to help and
not for its intransigence." He also said that today's
reality in international relations was far different than
that of 1961 and that Costa Rica should adjust its policy
accordingly.
¶3. (U) With this preamble, President Arias signed an
Executive Order on national television, re-establishing full
diplomatic ties (which had been at the consular level since
1961). Arias said that the time had arrived for "direct and
open dialogue" between the two countries, whether on topics
of common agreement or disagreement. Bringing up Costa
Rica's establishment of relations with regimes far different
from Costa Rica's "way of governance," such as the People's
Republic of China (Ref D), Arias asked in his statement, "How
could we not open relations with a country that is
geographically and culturally far closer to Costa Rica?"
Without giving a specific date, Arias said that "in the next
few weeks" the two countries would be exchanging ambassadors.
¶4. (U) Arias repeated his arguments in an op-ed on March 23,
adding that "Costa Rica can not be the only country in Latin
America that still . . . contemplates the shadow of the
Berlin Wall. Our foreign policy must be coherent and in tune
with the times." He added that re-establishing full
relations with Cuba gave more authority to his long-held
views that the USG should lift the embargo and close
Guantanamo completely. There was no explicit criticism of
Cuba's record on human rights or democracy in any of Arias'
written or verbal comments.
----------------------------------
SUDDEN, BUT NOT TOTALLY UNEXPECTED
----------------------------------
¶5. (C) Over the last nine months, Arias' desire to upgrade
relations became increasingly clear behind the scenes (Refs.
A-B). He told then-HHS Secretary Leavitt in January that
"dialogue was important" among opponents in Central America
during the 1980s conflicts and that talking to the opposition
was key, hinting broadly that he now favored this approach
with Cuba. Arias added that Costa Rica would have to "think
carefully" about its relationship with Cuba (i.e., upgrade
relations) if the FMLN won the March elections in El Salvador
(which they have, Ref F). Expecting the FMLN government to
upgrade ties to Cuba, Arias did not want Costa Rica to be the
only country in Central America without full diplomatic
relations with the island. He added that Cuba might follow
China's path leading to openness in the economy in the short
term and political reforms later.
¶6. (C) FM Bruno Stagno echoed and amplified these arguments
with the Ambassador and DCM on March 16, making it clear then
that an announcement on re-establishing relations was
imminent. Stagno acknowledged that full relations might not
lead to a productive dialogue with Cuba, but at least there
would be official channels for dialogue. He noted that Costa
Rica was already behind; "all" the other Latin American
leaders had visited Cuba and in some cases had signed "very
important" agreements. Costa Rica did not want to continue
to be left out. The FM could see some benefits to being the
last principled opposition in the region without full
relations with Cuba, but on balance, he saw more negatives if
Costa Rica did not upgrade relations. Given some
"interesting" signs that U.S. policy was softening toward
Cuba, and that Stagno thought favorably of new Foreign
Minister Bruno Rodriguez and new Foreign Trade Minister
Rodrigo Malmierca from their service together at the UN, he
judged the time ripe for the change in GOCR policy. Stagno
concluded that the government would consider delaying the
announcement until after VP Biden's visit, if that was the
USG preference.
¶7. (C) When the Department signaled that the USG preferred a
later announcement, but urged the GOCR to act as far in
advance of the Biden visit if Arias wanted to move sooner,
the President went ahead with his plans to announce the Cuba
news after the weekly cabinet meeting on March 18. His
announcement followed the pattern established with the Arias
Administration's sudden move of its embassy in Israel from
Jerusalem to Tel Aviv in 2006, its recognition of China in
2007, and its recognition of "Palestine" in 2008 (Refs C-E).
-----------------------------------
MEDIA CRITICAL; STORY DOES NOT LAST
-----------------------------------
¶8. (U) Although local media initially gave the Cuba news
prominent coverage on March 18, the story had been pushed off
the front pages by the next day. Leading daily La Nacion's
coverage highlighted the contradiction between Arias' harsh
2006 criticism of the Castro regime, which compared it to
Pinochet's "bloody" regime, to his mild comments as he
upgraded relations. During the press conference, an
obviously uncomfortable Arias stuck to the line that "the
time had come for official and normal relations with Cuba,"
without responding directly to reporters' pointed questions
about what Costa Rica would do now to influence Cuba's human
rights record.
¶9. (U) By March 23, the media coverage was less critical.
Leading political analyst (and adviser to PLN presidential
candidate Laura Chinchilla) Nuria Marin wrote in an op-ed
that full diplomatic relations were a "necessary step" in
accord with "new geopolitical realities," that she hoped
would help open Cuba to the world. She applauded the Arias
administration's "pragmatic vision," which had also prompted
the Costa Rican opening with China, and stressed that the
opening with Cuba did not undermine Costa Rica's commitment
to liberty and democracy on the island.
¶10. (U) Most media also reported our statement, which
acknowledged Costa Rica's sovereign decision to upgrade
relations, but expressed our hope that Costa Rica would
advocate for freedom, human rights, democracy, and the well
being of Cuba's citizens. Some media noted that the USG did
not object, and that the news had not taken the USG by
surprise.
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POLITICAL REACTION
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¶11. (U) Reaction from the heads of factions in the National
Assembly were (predictably) mixed. Jose Merino, chief
of Frente Amplio (socialist party), said that the time had
arrived and that the Cold War was long over. Francisco
Molina of the Citizens Action Party (PAC) said that relations
with Cuba should have been opened up at the same time as
China (in 2007). The head of the National Liberation Party
(PLN) Oscar Nunez, the President's party, said that Costa
Rica had a great responsibility to the world to export its
model of liberties and to not be afraid to do it. On the
other hand, the Libertarian Movement chief Luis Barrantes
questioned the "chamelion-like change" of Arias' position.
¶12. (U) Not unexpectedly, the Cuban Consul in San Jose,
Antonio Pardo, welcomed the decision, indicating that the
Castro regime seemed to have no (current) lingering
resentment towards the Arias Administration from the
president's 2006 remarks.
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POSSIBLE IMMIGRATION IMPACT
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¶13. (SBU) Immigration Director Mario Zamora was one
interlocutor who had warned us that a change was coming in
Costa Rican-Cuban relations. He did not view reestablished
relations as positive news, however, and predicted that more
Cubans would now try to get visas to visit Costa Rica. From
an immigration point of view, he noted that:
-- In 2006, over 12,000 Cubans received visas;
-- in 2007 and 2008 respectively, this number dropped to
4,900 and 4,500;
-- the higher number in 2006 was due to a political climate
accepting more Cuban immigration, but changes to immigration
laws since 2006 tightened up "family reunification"
requirements resulting in the lower numbers in 2007 and 2008;
-- Cubans are targets of what Costa Rican immigration
believes to be a well-organized human trafficking network; and
-- Zamora believed a "significant" number of Cubans who come
to Costa Rica intend to move on to the U.S. and that his
office viewed these immigrants more as "economic" rather than
"political."
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COMMENT
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¶14. (C) Costa Rica's upgrade in relations has more to do with
the Arias administration (and indirectly, with its view of
the U.S. administration) than it does about Cuba. The GOCR
did not want to be the "last man standing" in the region
without full diplomatic relations with the island, and
President-elect Funes' announcement of a future upgrade in
Salvadoran relations with Cuba stole a little of Arias'
thunder. Although he had been contemplating re-establishing
relations as another "dramatic" foreign policy gesture, Arias
was clearly more comfortable acting after the new U.S.
administration took office, hopeful of continued softening in
USG policy toward Cuba. Now that Arias has opened the door
to "dialogue" with Cuba, we should press him to work with
other Latin American leaders to develop a more vigorous and
constructive regional role in encouraging Cuba to embrace
democratic rule and human rights.
CIANCHETTE