

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09DAMASCUS251, SYRIAN SCORE CARD: NO GRAND BARGAINS, BUT POSITIVE FIRST
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09DAMASCUS251.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09DAMASCUS251 | 2009-04-06 13:01 | 2011-02-11 08:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Damascus |
VZCZCXRO0563
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0251/01 0961301
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 061301Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6203
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0787
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0583
EUMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DAMASCUS 000251 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT PARIS FOR WALLER LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2029 TAGS: PREL KPAL PTER IZ LE IS SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN SCORE CARD: NO GRAND BARGAINS, BUT POSITIVE FIRST
STEPS REF: A. DAMASCUS 192 B. DAMASCUS 193 C. DAMASCUS 194 D. DAMASCUS 195 E. DAMASCUS 196 F. DAMASCUS 198 G. DAMASCUS 227 H. DAMASCUS 218 I. BAGHDAD 847 J. DAMASCUS 206 K. DAMASCUS 245
Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b and d.
¶1. (S/NF)
Summary: Four weeks after Acting NEA A/S Feltman and NSC NENA Senior Director Shapiro met with Syrian FM Muallim (refs A-F), Syria has taken some positive steps to facilitate more normal Embassy operations, named an ambassador to Lebanon, and sent Muallim to Baghdad to discuss enhanced security cooperation. But Syria has not responded positively (nor, in the near term, is it likely to do so) to U.S. concerns about Syrian arms supplies to Hizballah, Syria's continuing support of Hamas at the expense of the Palestinian Authority, running foreign fighters in Syria, and maintaining close ties to Iran. From a Syrian perspective, U.S. "gives" include easing of export control restrictions on safety-of-flight technology, restoring more normal access to the Syrian ambassador in Washington, and making positive statements about the importance of engaging Syria. Syrian officials are waiting for signs that Washington will make Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations a priority, ease economic sanctions beyond just waiverable exceptions, and return an American ambassador to Damascus. Both sides can claim they have made positive (if token) gestures as an ante to another round of discussions, leaving ample room to pursue steps that would significantly improve prospects of acquiring a new and more secure U.S. embassy compound in Damascus. At this point, however, Syria is proceeding as cautiously as Washington. End Summary.
--------------
Syrian "Gives"
-------------
¶2. (S/NF) Keeping score with Syria can be a subjective task which may distract from two core questions: (1) what is it that we want; and (2) how do we know we're on the right track? Roughly a month into a period of re-engagement, both sides can claim they have taken positive gestures. However positive these steps might be, further Syrian actions are necessary to achieve U.S. objectives. From the Syrian side, we see some progress on:
-- Embassy operations. On March 26, the Syrian MFA notified Embassy Damascus that the American Language Center could re-open; this "give" was in response to a specific request made by Acting A/S Feltman (Ref G). In addition, the Syrian MFA and its Embassy in Washington conducted a top-down review of some 70 pending official visa applications for U.S. CDS and TDY personnel and issued 35 of them in a short period time. These include visas for a New Embassy Compound team, which visited Syria March 23-27 and surveyed several alternative sites that were presented to the Syrian MFA. (Since the initial review, approximately 70 additional U.S. visa applications have been submitted.)
-- Iraq: Embassy sources reported FM Muallim's plans to propose enhanced security cooperation with Iraqi leaders during a March 25-26 trip to Baghdad (ref H). According to Embassy Baghdad, Muallim pitched the idea of enhanced information sharing through established liaison channels (ref I). These actions, while positive, do not translate into actions against foreign fighter networks in Syria. Nor do they necessarily represent a desire to address key Iraqi security concerns. But Muallim's trip may provide a basis
DAMASCUS 00000251 002 OF 005
for exploring a trilateral U.S.-Iraqi-Syrian security dialogue.
-- Hamas: While it is difficult to tell how much effort Damascus is expending to moderate Hamas's position in ongoing Palestinian reconciliation talks with the PA, it appears that Hamas is no nearer to adopting Quartet principles than it was on March 7. In advance of the March 29-30 Arab League Summit in Doha, the Syrian MFA was telling the Embassy informally that Syria viewed the U.S. insistence on Quartet principles as unrealistic (ref J).
-- Iran: Asad continues to assert the importance of Syria's relations with Iran and even tried to promote Iran's friendly intentions toward the Arab world during the March 29-30 Arab League Summit in Doha. At the same time, Syria has clearly pursued a strategy to reduce intra-Arab tensions over Iran by acquiescing in a very public reconciliation with Saudi Arabia and with Bashar al-Asad's tour of Gulf states after the Doha summit.
-- Lebanon: The March 25 announcement of the appointment of a Syrian Ambassador to Lebanon (and Lebanese agrement) represented an overdue payment of President Asad's September 2008 commitment to French President Sarkozy to send an ambassador to Lebanon by the end of 2008. Otherwise, the picture remains mixed. In several press interviews, Bashar's rhetoric has not varied far from the markers established by FM Muallim on March 7: Syria supports a sovereign and independent Lebanon and favors June 7 legislative elections be held on time, in a peaceful and democratic manner. Hizballah, Bashar maintains, represents a legitimate resistance movement and cannot be disarmed absent a comprehensive peace framework. While there is anecdotal evidence suggesting Syria is trying to restrain Hizballah from revenging Imad Mugniyah's February 2008 assassination, there are also signs that Syria is facilitating delivery of weapons to Hizballah that could provoke Israel to strike. Some observers have cast Bashar's recent remarks on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (politicization of the Tribunal will result in destabilization of Lebanon) as a (barely) concealed threat. Syrian officials continue to argue in favor of a national unity government as the only guarantee for post-election stability in Lebanon; they claim French, Saudi, Egyptian, and UK support for this position.
-- Peace talks with Israel: Syria continues to express an interest in resuming indirect peace talks with Israel, but Bashar has remarked in a recent interview that any future peace deal with Israel would not extend to matters outside Syria's borders. Hizballah, Hamas, and Iran, he said, would have to be dealt with in comprehensive peace talks. At the March 29-30 Arab League Summit, Asad proposed language that would "de-activate" the Arab Peace Initiative (API) until Israel accepted it. This plan failed to gain support, but represents ongoing dissatisfaction with continuing to hold out the API in the wake of the Gaza crisis.
-- Murad Case: In response to Acting A/S Feltman's request for Syrian attention to this case, the MFA head of Consular Affairs received Charge and CONGEN in the first such meeting in four years (ref K). Though previous U.S. ambassadors have raised this case with FM Muallim, and the Department with Syrian Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Mustafa, the most recent Syrian response is "this is the first time we have heard of this case." Post will continue to pursue the matter and believes the MFA opening offers an opportunity, but thus far the Syrian government has shown little inclination to do more than going through the motions on this case.
--------------------------
Syria's View of the Ledger
--------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) Syrians, too, are keeping a tally of "asks" and
DAMASCUS 00000251 003 OF 005
"gives," exercising care not to attach too much value to U.S. gestures or do anything that would drive up the price of what they want. Syrian officials credit the Obama Administration's positive rhetoric, including towards Iran, with establishing a more constructive environment. MFA officials have told us that Syrian Ambassador Moustafa's more regular contacts with NEA have made it easier to grant Embassy appointment requests (e.g., to discuss consular issues, like the Murad child abduction case.) Charge's request to make an introductory call on D/PM Abdullah Dardari, a normal ambassadorial-level contact, was deflected with an MFA-engineered appointment with a lower-ranking official. (Charge is holding out for Dardari.) Acting A/S Feltman's follow-up on a pending export license matter related to a safety-of-flight request was happily received (and MFA officials acknowledge the action is now in their court, a rarity in and of itself.)
¶4. (S) While Syrian officials are wary of mentioning it, Embassy contacts suggest that the government here is waiting for more substantive gestures from Washington, such as:
-- Further discussions on how to revive the Golan track. While official rhetoric has sought to play down Syria's eagerness, we have heard informally that there is a strong desire for the U.S. to signal its willingness to engage on renewed Israeli-Syrian negotiations. Some Embassy contacts suggest the regime is waiting to see whether and how the U.S. broaches this subject with the new Israeli government as an indicator of Washington's real intentions. Many Syrians see the absence of a stop in Damascus on Senator Mitchell's initial "listening" trips to the region as a contradiction of the President's statements regarding engagement. While Syrians have not asked for a Mitchell visit explicitly, the lack of one has become even more irksome after Special Envoy Holbrooke's recent hand-shake with his Iranian counterpart in the Hague.
-- More flexibility on export licenses: The Embassy has seen a dramatic upswing in the number of Syrian and foreign businesses seeking our advice for medical equipment and software, primarily Oracle software.
-- The possibility of waivers under existing sanctions: FM Muallim and others warmly received Acting A/S Feltman's pledge not to use safety-of-flight technology as a political lever. Now, however, Syrians with a working knowledge of Syrian Air's desperate need for new planes are asking how far away the USG might be from considering waiver requests to the Syria Accountability Act's ban on sale of products with more than 10 percent content of U.S. origin.
-- An ambassador: Though FM Muallim studiously avoided any mention of the return of a U.S. ambassador to Damascus in March 7 discussions with Acting A/S Feltman, many Syrian contacts view this deliverable as the key to unlocking more normalized relations, which would include re-opening the American Cultural Center, the Damascus Community School, and permission to purchase land and build a New Embassy Compound.
–
------------------------------------------
No Grand Bargain, But Positive Steps Possible --------------------------------------------
¶5. (S/NF) Given the length and bitterness of the U.S.-Syrian stand off, the relatively short period that has passed since renewal of engagement, and Syria's propensity to withhold deliverables from even its friends until the last possible moment, Washington would be wise to manage its expectations about Syria's intentions. At the same time, given Syria's potential to assist and/or damage U.S. regional interests, there is value in continuing to explore how far the Syrians are willing to go.
¶6. (S/NF) Since March 7, both sides can point to positive
DAMASCUS 00000251 004 OF 005
gestures they have taken as indicators of their good will. Both sides can also point to valuable deliverables held in reserve by the other in order to guard against taking premature steps that the other side might pocket without reciprocity. From the Embassy's admittedly parochial, security-focused perspective, the easiest and least politicized next steps would involve further normalization of operations of embassies in Damascus and Washington. Showing a willingness to expand Ambassador Mustafa's access, demonstrating greater flexibility on application of export licensing requirements under current sanctions, and moving forward with the selection process for an ambassador would signal our seriousness. We believe Syria should understand Washington's intent to initiate these moves in exchange for a restoration of normalcy here (to include cooperation in selecting and buying a site for a New Embassy Compound, fully re-opening the Cultural Affairs Center, and, under specific conditions, re-opening the American School.) Once the outlines of such a deal become clear, we fully expect the Syrian regime to complicate the discussions by introducing new demands that will require high-level Washington attention.
¶7. (S/NF) Substantively, the Syrians are trying to convince us and Baghdad that the door is open to greater security cooperation, and we should pursue test cases to probe their seriousness. Though we should not expect the Syrian regime to comply with all of our requests, the U.S. might propose a trilateral meeting with the Iraqi government at the appropriate levels to see if a more formal mechanism might be established to strengthen border security and pursue foreign fighters. Such a proposal would be consistent with Muallim's remarks during his meeting with Acting A/S Feltman and Senior Director Shapiro.
¶8. (S/NF) Beyond Iraq, we doubt Syria is willing to do more than talk about Hizballah, Hamas, and Iran. We can and should use our expanded access to Syrian officials to raise concerns about potential destabilizing consequences of Syria's harmful association with these actors. The U.S. can do more to press Syria to use its influence as a restraint on specific destabilizing actions by Hizballah and Hamas (e.g., avenging Imad Mughniyah's death and ending rocket attacks in Gaza).
-----------------------------
Bigger Carrots, Bigger Sticks
-----------------------------
¶9. (S/NF) Our best estimate is that, beyond regime survival, the Syrian regime values most its prestige and re-asserting the regional influence it perceives itself to have lost in the last decade. President Asad's rhetoric and his private remarks suggest he attaches a high value to U.S. involvement in peace talks with Israel, and we should put this rhetoric to the test. Asad and some of his advisors continue to express a desire for better relations with the U.S. and we believe they want to avoid a return to the dark days of confrontation with Washington. We are also hearing from a range of well-connected business contacts that Syria urgently wants to purchase civilian passenger planes and would benefit greatly from a U.S. campaign to assure foreign and U.S. banks that dealing with private, unsanctioned Syrian banks is acceptable.
¶10. (S/NF) We recognize it may be premature to suggest Washington consideration of whether, when, and how to deploy such incentives. We believe, however, that signaling U.S. openness to promoting a peace deal between Israel and Syria will undercut Syrian justifications for fomenting violence in the name of resistance to Israeli occupation. At the same time, promoting a substantive negotiation with Israel will provide some incentives that could act as a check on Syria's worst impulses in Gaza and elsewhere. If Washington is serious about convincing Syria to alter its relations with Hizballah, Hamas and Iran, we believe the key to success will
DAMASCUS 00000251 005 OF 005
be attracting the Syrian regime's attention to the unique benefits that, under the right conditions, engagement with the U.S. might ultimately produce, such as more profitable and friendly relations with Iraq, new civilian aircraft, rescinding the Executive Order designating the Commercial Bank of Syria, and ending Israel's 42-year occupation of the Golan. CONNELLY