

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05OTTAWA1104, SCENESETTER: CANADA AND THE SPP
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05OTTAWA1104.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05OTTAWA1104 | 2005-04-13 11:57 | 2011-04-28 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Ottawa |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 001104
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
STATE FOR WHA, E, WHA/CA, EB/TPP/BTA/EWH, L/LEI
DHS OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (MARMAUD)
STATE PASS USTR (CHANDLER, SHIGETOMI)
USDOC FOR 4320/ITA/MAC/WH/ONIA/BASTIAN/WORD/FOX
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON ETRD ECIN PREL CA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: CANADA AND THE SPP
REFS: (A) Ottawa 268; (B) 2004 Ottawa 3431 (C) Ottawa 940;
(D) Ottawa 1029 (E) Ottawa 999
¶1. (U) This is the first in a series of cables offering
Mission views and background information on elements of the
Security and Prosperity Partnership. This cable outlines
some political and economic factors in Canada that may
affect progress toward SPP goals.
¶2. (SBU) Summary: The Security and Prosperity Partnership
has met with applause from major groups within Canada,
although some interest groups are critical. On the security
side, we are building on the solid foundation of the Smart
Border process, and Canadian policy will continue to be
driven by the desire to meet U.S. security needs to keep the
border open and moving.
On the prosperity side, the government's course is less well-
charted. A growing anxiety about Canada's continued access
to U.S. markets has fueled a lively debate over the last few
years on how to build on NAFTA, and business groups have
welcomed SPP as the first step on that road. Regulatory
cooperation enjoys broad support from business but will
continue to raise sovereignty concerns among traditional
opponents of freer trade.
Despite GOC commitment to SPP, there are management and
political obstacles on the Canadian side to early major
results. They include potential resistance from the
agencies responsible for making the regulatory changes;
weaknesses in the Canadian regulatory process, and growing
threats to survival of the Martin government. Finally, the
SPP prosperity agenda does not address the elephants outside
the tent: Canadian frustration with NAFTA dispute
settlement and the continuing ban on live cattle imports.
SPP will therefore not necessarily be seen as a major win
for Canada, and the Martin government has not attempted to
sell it as a "big bang" breakthrough. However, a set of
pragmatic and balanced deliverables could create momentum
for continuing and perhaps tackling bigger challenges
through the SPP process.
The Security Agenda: Broad Support, Hard Problems
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶3. (SBU) A broad consensus, and developed bilateral
framework, supports the objectives outlined in the security
agenda. The Smart Border Action Plan, initiated in 2001,
created a successful framework for systematically addressing
border issues. The Smart Border concept enjoys broad
support among business and local governments on both sides
of the border as well as in Ottawa, and has been an
important element in rebuilding public confidence that
security and trade can go hand in hand. The current
government has aggressively reorganized Canadian security
and border agencies and has backed up its commitment to
border security with CAD 1 billion in new funding for border
security in the 2005 budget.
¶5. (SBU) For the GOC, the hardest part of the border
equation will be addressing infrastructure bottlenecks,
which result as much from trade growth as from new security
requirements, while balancing the interests of a multitude
of provincial, municipal and private stakeholders. The
difficulty of finding popular and affordable solutions to
infrastructure problems makes it likely that the GOC will
continue to look for procedural fixes, such as reverse
clearance and other proposals to move processing away from
the border, some of which may be problematic for us.
Canadian entry procedures for goods also continue to
concentrate processing on the border, making entry more
cumbersome than under the U.S. system.
¶6. (SBU) While ministers have repeatedly expressed their
determination to prevent terrorist attacks on the U.S. from
within Canada, and have allocated considerable resources to
maritime and aviation security, so far they seem to be less
concerned about potential dangers coming north by land. DPM
McLellan is resisting calls from Canadian customs and law
enforcement unions to beef up or streamline its balkanized
border apparatus, divided between unarmed customs officers
and thinly spread RCMP detachments responsible for
enforcement (Ref C).
Prosperity Agenda: A Path Less Clear
--------------------------------------------- --
¶7. (SBU) For the past few years, Canadian officials,
academics and private sector representatives have been
conducting a lively debate on the future of Canada's trade
policy. After ten years of NAFTA, which have shifted
Canada's economy onto an even more pronounced North-South
axis, few people here doubt that relations with the U.S. are
central to Canada's future as a trading nation. The GOC's
efforts to expand markets elsewhere, which include
negotiating initiatives with various Asian and Latin
countries as well as a nebulous framework agreement with the
EU, cannot substantially alter that reality. At the same
time, early, rapid trade gains under NAFTA have moderated;
Canadian exports to the U.S. began to stagnate in the new
millennium and have only recently returned to 2000 levels,
and the rising Canadian dollar has generated anxiety about
future export trends. Having absorbed the early benefits of
NAFTA, many Canadians have begun to focus on its
shortcomings, notably its failure to restrain U.S.
antidumping and countervailing duty actions (despite the
fact that this was never an element of the agreement).
Concern about the "border effect", which predated but was
vastly heightened by 9/11, has shaken Canadian confidence in
the security of its access to its prime export market, and
the BSE crisis and softwood lumber dispute have strengthened
doubts about the ability of NAFTA institutions to protect
Canadian interests.
¶8. (SBU) Arguments about the best course to pursue with the
U.S. have fallen into two major categories: the "big bang"
and the "incrementalist" approach. In the first category,
groups such as the Canadian Council of Chief Executives have
offered a range of ambitious options, including a "North
American security perimeter" in which border and defense
policies would be harmonized in order to allow trade to flow
freely, and a customs union. The incrementalists, who
include the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, have argued that
no political will exists on either side for grand projects,
and that pragmatically addressing individual barriers one by
one would be more feasible and cost-effective. In that
context, the "prosperity" side of the SPP may be seen as an
endorsement of the incrementalist approach.
¶9. (SBU) Regardless of their previous positions, major
business groups have applauded SPP and are eager to support
implementation, particularly since they do not want this
initiative to lose momentum. On the regulatory side, the
private sector is solidly in favor of harmonizing North
American standards to the extent possible. The private-
sector Executive Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation (Ref
B.) told GOC policymakers frankly that the norm should be
development of North American standards, even if that meant,
in many cases, adopting U.S. standards.
¶10. (SBU) This view, however, is not universal. Despite
occasional admissions that some U.S. regulatory mechanisms,
for example in the environmental arena, may well outperform
Canada's, many Canadians tend to assume that Canada is
generally cleaner, healthier and safer than the U.S. (Even
U.S. policies and programs, such as Energy Star, that are
adopted by Canada are often assumed to be of Canadian
origin. In the same vein, Canadian opposition to oil
exploration in ANWR allows many Canadians to feel morally
superior, while ignoring the impact of energy development in
the Canadian wilderness.) The "Smart Regulation" initiative
has already aroused the ire of traditional anti-trade groups
and those concerned about Canadian sovereignty. Sounding a
familiar note, Maude Barlow of the (economic nationalist)
Council of Canadians predicted that SPP would have dire
effects on Canadian sovereignty and the privacy of
individual Canadians. Among other things, she charged that
SPP would "strip Canada of its ability to set safe standards
for its citizens". Mixed press response to SPP also
reflected, along with support for closer engagement,
traditional concerns about sovereignty and distrust of the
U.S.
¶11. (SBU) Aside from lingering pockets of opposition to
economic integration per se, the GOC may also face a
struggle in moving change quickly through its regulatory
apparatus. While Canadian regulatory processes follow a
process similar to that of the U.S., with PCO retaining the
oversight and coordination role of OMB, central coordination
appears to be considerably weaker. Private sector critics,
among them Smart Regulation advisors, charge that current
regulatory processes are too stovepiped and do not generate
adequate outside input, even from other GOC agencies. The
Smart Regulation program envisions various institutional
changes to address this problem, including a stronger
mandate for PCO, but it remains a work in (early) progress.
¶12. (SBU) The domestic political atmosphere may also make
it difficult for the GOC to achieve quick progress on
regulatory issues. Martin's minority government has faced
repeated challenges in recent months, with a no-confidence
measure seemingly always around the corner. In the current
round, explosive revelations from an ongoing public inquiry,
pointing to a pattern of government kickbacks to the Liberal
Party, have already distracted the government and could well
result in a vote of no confidence by the end of the year.
The opposition has already flexed its muscles in other
areas. In a major rebuff, Parliament vetoed a government
order separating International Trade Canada from Foreign
Affairs, leaving Canada's trade negotiators in legal limbo
after almost a year of frantic administrative revamping and
personnel shifts. Growing conflict with provinces over
fiscal issues (ref D) will also affect progress on any
broader regulatory reform program. Provinces, which play a
major role in regulation, may resist Ottawa's attempts to
press them into international commitments.
Conclusion
--------------
¶13. (SBU) Despite these complicating factors, SPP clearly
offers a framework to move forward pragmatically on trade
barriers and irritants and to promote our existing border
agenda. There is potential synergy between SPP goals and
Canada's Smart Regulation initiative. Moreover, SPP can
help fold in and raise the profile of productive bilateral
discussions already underway in areas such as energy,
agriculture and the environment, providing a welcome balance
to endless coverage of trade disputes. We believe it will
remain a priority for the GOC; PCO officials have already
made it clear that they will continue to coordinate and
press Canadian departments for results. (Details on PCO's
plans for organizing the Canadian end of SPP will follow
septel.)
¶14. (SBU) In the long term, an established process, and the
pressure to produce results in advance of high-level
meetings, can help us attack regulatory issues more
systematically. However, in the meantime the inherent value
of stronger regulatory cooperation is likely to continue to
be overshadowed by the elephants outside the tent: the long-
running dispute over U.S. antidumping and countervailing
duties on softwood and the continued closure of the border
to live cattle imports, which are sapping enthusiasm for
free trade in some of its strongest former constituencies.
The risk remains that voters affected by major trade
problems will resent a bilateral initiative that appears to
require Canadian concessions but does not deliver on their
big concerns, a point we need to take into account as we
develop the SPP agenda.