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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05BOGOTA3863, COLOMBIA COPES WITH CHAVEZ
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05BOGOTA3863 | 2005-04-22 15:47 | 2011-03-21 09:00 | SECRET | Embassy Bogota |
Appears in these articles: http://www.semana.com/wikileaks/Seccion/168.aspx |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
id: 31335
date: 4/22/2005 15:47
refid: 05BOGOTA3863
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: SECRET
destination: 05BOGOTA1531|05BOGOTA555|05SECSTATE43965
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
----------------- header ends ----------------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 003863
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2013
TAGS: PREL PTER MARR MASS VE CO GOV
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA COPES WITH CHAVEZ
REF: A. SECSTATE 43965
¶B. BOGOTA 555
¶C. BOGOTA 1531
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) This cable responds to Ref A taskings regarding
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's activities and Colombian
responses.
¶2. (S) Summary: Border incidents, Venezuela's harboring of
the FARC and ELN FTOs, and a potential arms race have done
much to mobilize opinion leaders against Chavez. President
Uribe has remained steady in the face of these events, yet
has not hesitated to pursue Colombian FTOs in Venezuela.
Trade, development projects, and some bi-national commissions
have resumed, after resolution of a contretemps over the
arrest of FARC "FM" Rodrigo Granda. At least one "Bolivarian
group" exists in Colombia, but neo-Bolivarian revolutionary
ideology remains muted. End Summary.
------------------
Harboring the FARC
------------------
¶3. (S) It is well known in Colombia that FARC and ELN FTOs
maintain camps in Venezuela. The GOC has presented specific
and correct -- though not complete -- information to the GOV
regarding FARC camps and activities in Venezuela on more than
one occasion, including by MFA Americas Director Mauricio
Baquero in person during the Granda crisis (paras 10 and 11).
FARC guerrillas captured in Catatumbo, Norte de Santander
Department report, for example, transport in GOV military
aircraft, for refuge, rest, and recuperation in Venezuela.
The GOV has declined to acknowledge the existence of the
Colombian Guerrillas in Venezuela. In the wake of the
massacre of six Venezuelans in September 2004, apparently by
the FARC, Chavez denied harboring any Colombian illegal armed
actors. These denials continue.
--------------------------
Bolivarian Group Comes Out
--------------------------
¶4. (C) The GOV and Venezuelan Embassy have been silent
regarding the application of "Bolivarian" revolutionary
ideology to Colombia. The only group to make itself public
-- after four years of clandestine existence -- is a
"Bolivarian Circle" in Cucuta, capital of Norte de Santander
Department, perhaps emboldened by the
Uribe-Chavez-Lula-Zapatero summit in Venezuela the previous
week (March 29). Bogota's El Tiempo reported the group to be
composed of leftist intellectuals, lawyers, and labor
leaders. Group members claimed that the Colombian border was
Chavez country, and that no one identified with President
Uribe. They also expressed fear of violent reprisal. Their
first public (though not avowedly Bolivarian) activity was a
2003 screening of a film celebrating the failure of the 2002
anti-Chavez coup. None of the 250 invited local politicians
and public figures showed up. One circle-member acknowledged
corruption and militarization of the GOV as weaknesses of the
Chavez regime, despite his Bolivarian loyalty.
¶5. (C) The GOC has made no formal comment regarding the
Cucuta or any other Bolivarian group. The MFA's Baquero
(protect) noted that the Venezuela-Colombia Border had its
own culture and that many residents carried identification
cards from both countries. He commented that just as
Colombian illegal armed groups operated in Venezuela, it was
understandable that Bolivarian circles would cross the border
into Colombia. He speculated that other Bolivarian groups
existed in Colombia farther from Venezuela, but said that he
had no specific knowledge. Del Rosario University political
scientist Vicente Torrijos told poloff that Bolivarian
organizations were incipient in Colombia and that an academic
research unit was needed to put forward a non-leftist
Bolivarian ideology.
-------------------------
Uribe Takes the High Road
-------------------------
¶6. (C) The GOC has been consistently calm and measured in its
public comments on Chavez. FM Barco noted privately that
Chavez is consolidating his power and acknowledged his close
ties to Fidel Castro, but intimated that since he is in
place, the GOC must deal with him. Under press questioning,
she acknowledged Fidel Castro's part in overcoming the
impasse generated by the Granda affair.
¶7. (C) Incursions: On March 20, 2005 Venezuelan soldiers from
the Hunter Battalion based in La Fria, Tachira State,
allegedly entered Guaramito, Norte de Santander, searching
for contraband gasoline. Colombian National Police (CNP)
Commander Jose Henao was quoted that the operation was
unauthorized and now in the hands of the MFA. MFA
Sovereignty Director Mauricio Gonzalez noted that gasoline
costs ten times as much in Colombia and that some smuggling
is to be expected. He dismissed the helicopter overflight,
but said that the MFA and MINDEF were in contact with
Venezuelan counterparts and were investigating the alleged
incursion. Gonzalez noted that rivers dry and change course,
leading to land and sovereignty disputes, which he
characterized as frequently inadvertent, and stressed that
"mechanisms" were in place to handle border complaints.
¶8. (C) The GOC responded calmly to the arrest in May 2004 of
some 90 purported Colombian paramilitaries near Caracas.
President Uribe called for a complete investigation, and
welcomed the actions of neighboring countries to prevent
illegal activities of Colombians abroad. FM Carolina Barco
met with Chavez in Caracas, who subsequently calmed down,
though he continued to blame then Colombian Army Commander
General Martin Carreno, who is from Cucuta where many of the
arrested Colombians were hired. Uribe retired Carreno in
November 2004. The GOC handled earlier Venezuelan military
incursions into La Guajira Department in a similarly measured
manner.
------------------------------------------
But Goes After the Guerrillas in Venezuela
------------------------------------------
¶9. (S/NF) The DATT reports that the Colombian army quietly
maintains a 100-man counter-guerrilla company in Zulia State,
Venezuela across from Colombia's La Guajira Department
searching for FARC Secretariat member alias Ivan Marquez.
Colombia Military Intelligence is running covert operations
inside Venezuela and has arranged with Venezuelan police and
military for the capture and delivery of more than 30 FARC
and ELN members operating in Venezuela.
¶10. (SBU) The Granda Case (Ref B): The GOC announced on
December 14 the arrest of FARC international liaison chief
Rodrigo Granda in the border city of Cucuta. Granda stated
that he had been detained in Caracas and spirited out of
Venezuela. A FARC communique in late December and relentless
investigation by Bogota daily newspaper El Tiempo, published
in January 2005, forced the GOC to acknowledge a Venezuela
component to the operation. A crescendo of GOV complaints
culminated in Chavez's recalling his ambassador from Bogota,
suspending bi-lateral development projects (most notably the
Venezuela-Colombia-Pacific pipeline), impeding cross-border
commerce, and demanding an apology and a one-on-one meeting
with Uribe.
¶11. (C) Uribe consistently euphemized the situation -- "The
problem is not with Venezuela; it's with the FARC" -- and
called upon regional leaders to resolve the impasse. The
dust had largely settled by the time the two presidents met
in Venezuela on February 15. In that meeting Uribe got a
statement against terrorism, reactivation of bi-national
commissions, and full resumption of commerce and joint
development projects. Chavez got Uribe to visit and to
express admiration for Simon Bolivar as an inspiration for
peaceful coexistence in the region.
¶12. (S/NF) The arrest of FARC leader Juan Jose Martinez, aka
"El Chiguiro" (a species of rodent), in Venezuela is another
case in point. According to the DATT, El Chiguiro's arrest
resulted from a GOC operation, oiled by a 20 million peso
(USD 8,500) payoff to GOV authorities. (It was not, as
presented in the press, a collateral result of a GOV
investigation into the kidnapping of U.S. major league
baseball player Urgueth Urbina's mother.)
--------------------------------------------- -
Commercial Ties and Joint Economic Development
--------------------------------------------- -
¶13. (S) Venezuela is Colombia's second trade partner after
the United States. In 2004 Colombian exports (mostly
manufactured goods) to Venezuela doubled, and Venezuela went
from a slight export surplus (mostly raw materials) to a
major trade deficit with Colombia. Contraband commerce
includes weapons, AK-47 ammunition (as reported by DATT), and
gasoline from Venezuela; drugs and rustled cattle from
Colombia.
¶14. (C) In their November 2004 meeting in Cartagena,
Presidents Uribe and Chavez heralded progress in negotiations
for a pipeline to provide Colombian gas to Maracaibo and
subsequently Venezuelan gas to Colombia. They also proposed
a "poliducto" to bring Venezuelan oil to Colombia's Pacific
Coast (for possible export to China). At the time
politicians close to Uribe told us, surprisingly, that the
personal relationship between Uribe and Chavez was strong.
Cartagena meeting press conference banter appeared to reflect
this rapport. The Cartagena joint declaration followed
September and November 2004 Transport Minister meetings and
called for bridge, water, and road development.
¶15. (C) Deputy FM Camilo Reyes enthused (Ref C) over the
resumption of bi-national commissions in support of such
initiatives (as agreed upon by Uribe and Chavez in their
February 15 meeting). Sub-committees of the fifteen-year-old
Presidential Commission for Frontier Integration (COPIAF) had
been meeting regularly to discuss economic, commercial,
environmental, educational, and communications affairs. The
full plenary will meet in Venezuela in May after a two-year
hiatus. Normally FMs lead the delegations. The MFA's
Gonzalez said that private sector commercial participants
will outnumber government officials and academics.
¶16. (C) Bi-national plans for pipelines, roads, and
electricity-sharing have been underway for some time, and
they are back on track after settlement of the Granda affair.
The MFA's Baquero noted, however, that Chavez's wholesale
replacement of personnel in various ministries has impeded
progress on joint development projects such as pipeline
design. He declined to label the Bolivarian replacements as
incompetent, noting rather that the new personnel would have
to catch up.
---------------------------------------------
Media, Opinion Leaders Close Ranks with Uribe
---------------------------------------------
¶17. (C) Border incidents, Venezuela's harboring of the FARC
and ELN FTOs, and a potential arms race have done much to
mobilize opinion leaders against Chavez. The right is openly
critical, and the left has not been willing to make public
statements in his favor. Independent Democratic Pole (PDI)
Congressman Gustavo Petro claimed the firm U.S. stance on
Chavez revealed a bias against regional economic and
infrastructural integration, and asserted that the Granda
affair was an Uribe reelection ploy. These comments garnered
no public support, even from Bogota Mayor (and PDI founder)
Luis Eduardo Garzon, who, when asked about Chavez, said that
military politicians, right or left, were not to his liking.
In private meetings with poloffs, Garzon has been critical of
Chavez.
¶18. (U) Javierana University historian Martha Marquez views
Chavez as a classic populist for his direct relation with the
lower classes and nationalization of resources. She felt the
jury was out on Chavez's rejection of "savage neoliberalism."
-------------------
Visas and Migration
-------------------
¶19. (U) The GOC does not require visas of entering Venezuelan
citizens unless they plan to work, nor do initial business
visits require a visa. Immigration for Latin-Americans
requires one year's residence under a formal resident visa.
Far more Colombians reside in Venezuela than Venezuelans in
Colombia. Movement across the border has traditionally been
fluid, notably among Wayuu indigenous, whose territory
transcends the border between Colombia's La Guajira
Department and Venezuela.
---------------
Border Security
---------------
¶20. (S/NF) Military relations have been gradually worsening,
though bi-national police cooperation is somewhat better.
The last Bi-national Frontier Commission meeting (COMBIFRON)
took place in March 2001. Chavez canceled the September 2001
meeting after a dozen years of relatively successful military
and police cooperation. Venezuela is the only bordering
nation with which Colombia has no COMBIFRON. Subsequent
cross-border military communication has varied by region and
commander. General Matamoros, Commander of the COLMIL 18th
Brigade, engaged in a harsh verbal exchange with his
Venezuelan counterpart following an exchange of small arms
fire between their troops (no casualties reported) in Arauca
Department some six months ago. COLMIL First Division
General Mario Montoya, whose area of responsibility includes
the border Departments of La Guajira and Cesar, has had staff
talks with his Venezuelan counterparts.
¶21. (C) In a December meeting in Venezuela, GOC MOD Jorge
Uribe and GOV MOD General Jorge Luis Garcia agreed to
semiannual meetings to combat narco-terrorism and drug
trafficking and to "correct errors." No date has been set
for the next MOD meeting, but it is to take place in
Colombia. Despite Uribe's apparent satisfaction with the
outcome of the March 29 summit, Chavez remained unwilling to
resume the COMBIFRONs.
-----------------------
Venezuelan Arms Buildup
-----------------------
¶22. (C) Uribe, Chavez, and later Spanish President Rodriguez
Zapatero have put the best face on Venezeulan arms purchases
(Russian helicopters, assault rifles, and possibly Migs;
Brazilian attack aircraft and possibly radar; Spanish
military transport aircraft and corvettes; and maybe even
some North Korean missiles). The presidents say the weapons
will promote internal security, narcotics interdiction, and
border control -- and deny that the arms race posited by the
press will ensue.
¶23. (S/NF) The DATT reports that the COLMIL already feels
out-gunned along the Venezuelan border, however, and is
gradually moving up armored vehicles. The Russian rifles use
the same ammunition for which the FARC now pays top dollar,
and their use by Venezuelan forces makes for a potential
increase in supply and decrease in cost on the Venezuelan
black market.
¶24. (C) The GOC has expressed interest in buying 155 mm
howitzers, and Israeli Spike anti-armor missiles. (Venezuela
has AMX 30 tanks; Spain under Rodriguez Zapatero canceled an
AMX tank sale to GOC based on an offer by the previous Aznar
government.) The COLMIL wants to get its M113 armored
personnel carriers back on the road and mount machine guns
and or missiles on them.
¶25. (C) Colombian Senate President Humberto Gomez Gallo
publicly criticized Spain's billion dollar arms sale to the
GOV during President Rodriguez Zapatero's visit. Editorial
comment characterized Rodriguez Zapatero's participation in
the four-president summit in Venezuela as a cover for the
billion dollar arms sale. The MFA's Baquero (protect)
allowed that Chavez's arms purchases bore watching, but
rejected the possibility of a Venezuelan invasion.
----------------------
Ideology and Diplomacy
----------------------
¶26. (C) The March 29 summit pitted Uribe's center-right
ideology against Chavez and two other leftists. Uribe wanted
the declaration to say that terrorism causes poverty. The
others wanted a statement that poverty causes terrorism,
which Uribe rejected as justifying the actions of the illegal
armed groups operating in Colombia. The compromise document
noted that poverty caused a variety of social ills including
violence, and that terrorism, in Colombia, caused poverty (by
inhibiting investment, etc.).
WOOD
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