

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09PARIS1465, GUINEA: AMBASSADOR MOLLER'S CONSULTATIONS IN
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09PARIS1465.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09PARIS1465 | 2009-10-30 17:21 | 2010-12-09 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHFR #1465/01 3031721
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301721Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7449
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001465
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019
TAGS: PREL PINS PINR KDEM GV FR
SUBJECT: GUINEA: AMBASSADOR MOLLER'S CONSULTATIONS IN
PARIS (OCTOBER 29-30)
Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, 1.4 (b/d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: French officials generally agreed with U.S.
Ambassador to Guinea Patricia Moller on the need for the
international community to develop a visible process or
framework on Guinea that could lead to a transition to a
democratic government, with Burkina Faso President Campaore's
intervention a possible vehicle for forming such a process.
Presidential Africa Advisor Andre Parant plans to travel to
Ouagadougou for meetings with Campaore on November 2, where
Parant will offer France's support. While agreeing that
junta leader Dadis Camara had to be removed from power, they
believed that Dadis could be part of the solution to the
problem if handled properly through the right combination of
"carrots and sticks." The French were encouraged by the
African Union's October 29 decision to take a firm stance on
Guinea, and they believed that the AU, following ECOWAS's
lead, could play a useful role in resolving the crisis in
Guinea. Once the transition process gains traction, France
is prepared to commit resources and expertise, especially for
reforming Guinea's military. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) U.S. Ambassador to Guinea Patricia Moller, met,
separately, with MFA AF A/S-equivalent Stephane Gompertz and
Presidential Africa Advisor Remi Marechaux on October 30,
following her meeting on October 29 with MOD Africa Analyst
Jerome Spinoza. AF-watcher attended the meeting with
Marechaux; AF-assistant attended the meetings with Gompertz
and Spinoza. MFA Guinea desk officer Ann'laure Hare attended
the meeting with Gompertz.
Meeting with Gompertz (MFA)
---------------------------
¶3. (C) Gompertz began by asking what Ambassador Moller
planned to do concerning her credentials. She replied that
she would not present her credentials to the Dadis government
and, if pressed, would say that she would do so only when a
democratically-elected government was in place in Conakry.
Gompertz explained that France's recently arrived Ambassador
(Jean Graebling) had similarly refused to present his
credentials. The CNDD Foreign Minister informed Graebling
that, as a result, Graelbing would have no access to regime
officials. Gompertz observed that Ambassadors Graebling and
Moller would be in similar situations. He and Ambassador
Moller looked forward to close working relations between the
Ambassadors Graebling and Moller in Conakry.
¶4. (C) Gompertz noted the AU's October 29 communique on
Guinea, which he deemed very helpful. He commented on EU
efforts to develop travel bans and asset freezes. Ambassador
Moller said the USG was taking similar steps.
¶5. (C) On the broader issue of next steps, Ambassador Moller
stressed ultimate priority of avoiding a melt-down in Guinea,
with which Gompertz agreed. To accomplish that, Ambassador
Moller said that it was imperative for the international
community to establish a process or framework -- the more
visible the better -- to show that there was a serious
commitment on moving Guinea away from the abyss and towards
an acceptable democratic transition, which could be centered
on African institutions such as the AU or ECOWAS, with the
support and participation of other members of the
international community.
¶6. (C) Gompertz agreed, and he said that Burkina Faso
President Campaore, who had already taken up a mediator's
role, could be the focus of such an effort. Gompertz said
that Presidential AF-advisor Andre Parant was going to
Burkina Faso and would meet with Campaore on November 2, to
discuss Guinea as a first priority, and also Niger. Gompertz
indicated that Parant would try to encourage movement on
Campaore's part, although Gompertz noted Campaore's
preference to move deliberately. He also mentioned that
Campaore had personal economic interests in Guinea (as he had
in many other African countries) that would be a factor in
his decision-making. Gompertz encouraged the U.S. to talk to
Campaore.
¶7. (C) Gompertz, while harboring no illusions about Dadis
(describing his as "dangerous" and "insane") nonetheless
believed that Dadis should be part of the solution and not
simply isolated and scorned. He needed to be offered an exit
or a way out. Gompertz mused on the possibility that Morocco
(where the junta has cached much of its wealth) or Libya
could serve as points of exile, although Ambassador Moller
indicated that Morocco had signaled that it was not
interested in hosting an exiled Dadis. Gompertz said that
other factors to be considered were the danger of civil war
(the Forestiers had to be reassured that Dadis's departure
did not signal a return to Peul or Malinke dominance over the
Forestiers) and the need to accommodate Guinea's military.
Gompertz observed that a transition to a democratic
government was essential, in order to avoid a "melt down" or
else a drift into a Zimbabwe-like state, which would be
hardly any better.
¶8. (C) Asked about the departure of French citizens from
Guinea, Gompertz said that about 500 of 1,800 had left
following the GOF's public suggestion that citizens leave
voluntarily rather than wait for a possible evacuation under
emergency conditions. He noted that of the remainder, many
were dual nationals or long-term residents not inclined to
leave in any case. Gompertz said that the suggestion to
leave was more anticipatory in nature and to prepare for the
worst, not an indication that conditions were at an extreme.
(Marechaux claimed that about 800 French, out of 2,300, had
departed, and that there were an estimated 600 known dual
nationals who would likely never leave. He also verified
that the GOF-supported school in Conakry would remain closed
until an acceptable transition government was in place.)
Meeting with Marechaux (Presidency)
-----------------------------------
¶9. (C) Presidential Africa Advisor, Remi Marechaux, who will
travel with Parant to Ouagadougou, echoed many of the points
made by Gompertz. In particular, he noted that it was
important to support Campaore and allow him to lead, even
though there would be frustrations that Campaore wanted to
"maintain leeway" and that the mediation would happen "on
African time." Part of the problem was that Campaore relies
on only 5-6 advisors to assist with all his mediations,
including for Togo and Cote d'Ivoire, and that even FM Yoda
could not speak authoritatively on Campaore's thinking.
¶10. (C) In Marechaux's opinion, Campaore was "scared by the
strength of the international community's strength of
reaction" to the September 28 violence. Therefore, Marechaux
said that in Ouagadougou, Parant would make clear that France
would support Campaore, if requested, on delivering
demarches, providing ideas on the way forward, and even
helping with travel or other logistic requirements.
Marechaux agreed with Ambassador Moller that it is important
to get some visibility on a specific transition plan soon,
but described the situation as still in the "threat stage,"
and that "we still have 2-3 weeks before we need to be
greatly concerned about a lack of progress."
¶11. (C) Marechaux described the sanctions and UN Commission
of Inquiry as "tools" that should not be confused with the
international community's "goals." In creating the sanctions
list, there was a vibrant debate within the GOF, with some
wanting the sanctions to be more targeted to "destabilize"
the junta. Now that the list is, in the end, quite
inclusive, it needs to remain dynamic so that those listed
understanding there is the option of being removed from the
list if they depart the junta and help the transition process
-- a process that leads to the removal of Dadis.
¶12. (C) Parant will also discuss with Campaore the question
of what to do with Dadis, reminding Campaore that he needs to
reach out to countries who might accept the junta leader
should he step down. France also wants Campaore to consider
how to avoid the possibility of an International Criminal
Court (ICC) case against Dadis, which, Marechaux added, would
be a disincentive for the junta to agree to give up power.
Marachaux speculated that perhaps some kind of in-country
court could be established which, in the end, would allow
Dadis and others a way to be relocated.
¶13. (C) Another critical step raised by Marechaux is to plan
for some kind of international observer force, noting the
effectiveness of 50 or so ECOWAS troops who helped during
Togo's 2007 elections by assuring that military forces stayed
in their barracks and by conducting joint patrols with Togo's
police and gendarmes. In Marechaux's opinion, it would be
difficult for Guinean authorities to refuse a similar ECOWAS
plan. However, a large intervention force was not realistic.
¶14. (C) Marechaux stated that reforming the military needed
to be included in the transition plan, and that the U.S. and
France needed to work together on this. He asserted that the
majority of Guinea's military was not implicated in the
September 28 attacks, and that Guinea's gendarme force had
performed well. Dadis may have recruited up to 2,500
fighters from Liberia, but the Guinean forces loyal to the
junta numbered only about 2,000. This left a significant
military to work with. Marechaux raised the idea of possibly
training Guinean troops for UN peacekeeping duty, effectively
reducing the influence of the military in Guinea. Ambassador
Moller remarked that peacekeeping training and deployment had
been a successful strategy in Burundi.
Meeting with Spinoza (MOD)
--------------------------
¶15. (C) Jerome Spinoza at the MOD's Strategic Affairs
Delegation, befitting his position as an analyst, offered a
broader, less operational view of Guinea during his October
29 meeting with Ambassador Moller. Of the three
interlocutors, he was the one who most directly counseled
against demonizing and isolating Dadis. He too shared no
illusions about Dadis but he thought that Dadis was more
reasonable and susceptible to persuasion than others might
think, even if only at the level of self-interest. He
believed that Dadis should be part of any process to end the
junta's control of Guinea and to move to a more acceptable
government. Spinoza agreed with Ambassador Moller's views on
the need to establish a process for channeling Guinea in the
right direction and the need to avoid a complete collapse in
Guinea, which would be bad for Guinea and disastrous for the
region, which was grappling with recoveries in in Sierra
Leone, Liberia, and Cote d'Ivoire. Spinoza acknowledged that
some of his colleagues considered him "pro-junta," but he
said that this was only because he believed one had to work
with the junta rather than isolate it or back it into a
corner where its only choice might be aggression.
COMMENT
-------
¶16. (C) The French clearly welcomed the opportunity to
consult with Ambassador Moller and we expect she will a close
and collaborative relationship with the French in Conakry.
More importantly, in each of her discussions, French
agreement on the need for a visible international process
strengthened, with a focus on Campaore's initiative. END
COMMENT.
¶17. (U) Ambassador Moller has cleared this message.
¶18. (U) Conakry minimize considered.
RIVKIN