

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09TOKYO2378, A/S CAMPBELL, GOJ OFFICIALS DISCUSS THE HISTORY OF
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09TOKYO2378.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TOKYO2378 | 2009-10-15 07:08 | 2011-05-04 00:00 | SECRET | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHKO #2378/01 2880708
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 150708Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6819
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHKO/USDAO TOKYO JA IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/USFJ IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T TOKYO 002378
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/J
NSC FOR RUSSELL
DOD FOR OSD/APSA -
GREGSON/MITCHELL/SCHIFFER/HILL/BASALLA/HAMM
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR JA
SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL, GOJ OFFICIALS DISCUSS THE HISTORY OF
U.S. FORCE REALIGNMENT
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James P. Zumwalt; Reasons 1.4 (B
) and (D)
Summary
-------
¶1. (S) A State-DOD delegation led by EAP A/S Kurt Campbell
engaged October 12 with Parliamentary Vice-Minister of
Defense Akihisa Nagashima and officials from the Ministries
of Foreign Affairs and Defense on the historical background
on realignment of U.S. forces and plans to relocate Futenma
Air Station in Okinawa. Nagashima stated that Defense
Minister Kitazawa supported current Futenma Replacement
Facility (FRF) plans, and that bilateral cooperation on three
issues would help to achieve successful implementation of
current realignment plans: (1) noise abatement at Kadena Air
Base; (2) risk mitigation at MCAS Futenma; and, (3)
establishment of environmental standards for U.S. military
facilities in connection with the Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA), to be based on an agreement not subject to U.S.
Congressional approval. Members of the U.S. delegation
countered Ministry of Defense (MOD) Bureau of Local
Cooperation Director General Motomi Inoue's suggestion that
U.S. Marines presence in Guam alone would provide sufficient
deterrence capability in the region, and the airstrips at Ie
and Shimoji islands might be a sufficient complement to
Kadena's two runways in a contingency. They stressed that
relying exclusively on Guam posed time, distance, and other
operational challenges for U.S. Marines to respond
expeditiously enough to fulfill U.S. treaty obligations.
They also underscored that the Chinese military build-up
since the 1995 formulation of FRF plans necessitated access
to at least three contingency runways. MOD Defense Policy
Bureau Director General Nobushige Takamizawa suggested that
the U.S. Government incorporate changes since 2006 on U.S.
capabilities, war plans, and increased coordination with the
Japan Self Defense Force when briefing on the continued
validity of realignment plans to Japanese government
officials and politicians. He also urged the U.S. Government
to cooperate with the Japanese government in explaining
realignment issues to the Japanese public.
¶2. (S) Takamizawa stressed in a lunch meeting subsequent to
the briefing (excluding Nagashima and others) that the U.S.
delegation ought not to take Nagashima's assessement of
current realignment plans at face value and cautioned against
premature demonstration of flexibility in adjusting the
realignment package to be more palatable to the DPJ
Government. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Director
General for North American Affairs Kazuyoshi Umemoto pointed
out that the DPJ Government had not yet finished crafting its
decision-making process for realignment issues, as
stakeholders such as Foreign Minister Okada, Okinawa State
Minister Maehara, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano were
each focusing on different angles. He also noted that DPJ
President Ozawa might possibly involve himself in the
realignment review process. Separately, in an October 13
breakfast meeting, the DCM, EAP/J Director Kevin Maher, OSD
Senior Country Director for Japan Suzanne Basalla, and
Embassy Tokyo POL-MIL Chief presented the same realignment
briefing to Executive Assistants to the Prime Minister
Tadakatsu Sano and Kanji Yamanouchi, stressing that the U.S.
Government shared Japanese concerns on aviation safety risks,
and would continue to demonstrate publicly a patient attitude
on realignment even as it conveyed strong messages to the
Japanese government in private on the implications on the
Alliance from changes to FRF plans. End Summary.
Presentation on Realignment/FRF
-------------------------------
¶2. (C) On October 12, EAP A/S Kurt Campbell, EAP DAS David
Shear, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for
East Asia Michael Schiffer led a State-DOD delegation in
discussions with Parliamentary Vice-Minister Akihisa
Nagashima and a team of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
and Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials on the history of
negotiations on plans to move Futenma Air Station in Okinawa
to the proposed Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) site at
Camp Schwab/Nago. A/S Campbell noted that the U.S.
delegation aimed to provide detailed background on the FRF in
support of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Government's
ongoing review of U.S. force posture realignment. He
elaborated that he had worked on Okinawa issues since the
mid-1990s and that, for the first time in that span,
prospects for significant progress had emerged. Reasons for
confidence included: (1) a strong consensus within the U.S.
Government and U.S. military; (2) Congressional budgetary
commitment to realignment plans; and, (3) support from local
elected leaders in Okinawa. A/S Campbell added that the DPJ
Government had the right to review details of realignment as
an integral component of the Alliance, and he offered the
U.S. Government's best judgment as to the way forward.
Vice-Minister Nagashima thanked the U.S. delegation and
expressed hope that both sides would seize the opportunity to
build a more robust relationship.
¶3. (S) The discussion shifted to an interagency-coordinated
presentation by OSD Senior Japan Country Director Suzanne
Basalla on the history behind FRF plans. Basalla's briefing
focused on the strategic context for U.S. force posture
realignment, ranging from commitments under the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty through efforts to transform the Alliance
with the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). She
included an explanation as to the necessity of maintaining
U.S. Marine aviation capabilities in Japan and, in
particular, Okinawa. The presentation then turned to reasons
that the proposed consolidation of Marine and U.S. Air Force
air capabilities at Kadena Air Base (now favored by several
DPJ Government leaders) was unworkable, due to operational
and political factors. Basalla also reviewed the rationale
for the planned FRF's V-shaped runways. She concluded by
discussing the continuing validity of assumptions that
underlay the decision to locate the FRF at Camp Schwab on the
outskirts of Nago City.
Nagashima's Response: Three Items for a Realignment Package
--------------------------------------------- --------------
¶4. (S) Following Basalla's presentation, Vice-Minister
Nagashima noted that internal MOD assessments on FRF
resembled conclusions drawn by U.S. Government. He added
that Defense Minister Kitazawa was a ""realistic person who
was one of the strongest supporters"" of current FRF plans
among Ministers involved in the realignment review.
Nagashima added that he and Kitazawa had recently visited
Okinawa, where they learned of difficulties with proposals to
move the FRF either off-island or out of Japan. The
Vice-Minister explained that, whereas the DPJ Government had
not decided its direction on realignment, bilateral
cooperation on three issues would help to achieve current
realignment plans. These issues included: (1) noise
abatement at Kadena Air Base; (2) an ""out-of-the-box""
approach to risk mitigation at MCAS Futenma; and, (3) an
environmental package connected to the Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA). Nagashima observed that the Okinawan
people ""strongly desired"" progress on the third issue and
that the Hatoyama Administration had a significant
""environmental orientation."" He elaborated that Japan wished
to establish environmental standards for U.S. military
facilities that would be based on an agreement not subject to
U.S. Congressional approval. This agreement could use the
U.S.-Germany SOFA and the U.S.-ROK environmental protocol as
precedential models. Political events over the coming year
would also bear upon realignment, according to Nagashima. He
explained that the January 2010 Nago City mayor's election,
the July Upper House election, and the November Okinawa
Prefectural Governor's election would make clear ""what
Okinawans think on basing issues."" Of these three events,
the Nago City mayor's election would be critical. Nagashima
observed that the Japanese government would have to set a
clear direction on the Alliance, inclusive of the three
issues he mentioned, prior to the mayoral election in order
to realize current realignment plans.
¶5. (S) A/S Campbell and DASD Schiffer responded that the
U.S. Government, like the Japanese government, cared about
environmental stewardship and energy efficiency. A/S
Campbell pointed out that U.S. allies regarded the U.S.-Japan
SOFA as the gold standard among basing agreements, and he
counseled against moves to review simultaneously every aspect
of the Alliance. He added, however, that the U.S. side would
be able to demonstrate flexibility on the three issues raised
by Nagashima if Japan were to decide that this approach to
realignment were correct. He offered to take back to the
U.S. Government the Japanese recommendation to work together
on environmental issues, an area in which ""much good could be
achieved."" DASD Schiffer added that there were ways to
address environmental issues without SOFA revision. The
U.S.-ROK process for environmental assessments and base
returns, for example, stood outside the SOFA. He concluded
that the U.S. Government would be willing to explore similar
potential approaches with Japan and to be a good partner on
the environment.
Reasons to Stay in Okinawa
--------------------------
¶6. (C) Japanese citizens often debated the reasons that the
U.S. Marines remained in Okinawa, remarked Motomi Inoue,
Director General of the MOD Bureau of Local Cooperation.
Would not the U.S. Marine presence in Guam be sufficient to
maintain deterrent credibility in East Asia and to respond to
Taiwan contingencies, he asked hypothetically. Inoue noted
that a military helicopter pad was under construction at
Andersen Air Base in Guam, where, he believed, up to 60
rotary wing aircraft could redeploy temporarily. He
commented that this facility, plus high-speed naval vessels,
might enable the U.S. military to respond with sufficient
speed to regional emergencies. U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ)
Deputy Commander Major General John Toolan explained that the
Guam option presented time, distance, and other operational
challenges, using the example of disaster relief. Following
the recent Indonesian earthquake, U.S. Marine helicopters
based in Guam would have been unable to reach disaster-hit
areas, and helicopters placed on ships would have taken four
days to arrive, he noted. The Marines in Okinawa, however,
had been able to self-deploy to the disaster area.
Contingencies
-------------
¶7. (C) Inoue also posed hypothetically that, if the U.S.
military required three airfields in a contingency (a point
raised by A/S Campbell), airstrips at Ie and Shimoji islands
might be a sufficient complement to Kadena's two runways,
obviating the need for the FRF at Camp Schwab. MajGen Toolan
responded that the Japanese government was still assessing
the needs of the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) regarding
airstrips, particularly in the context of China's military
build-up. Until the Japanese completed that assessment, the
U.S. side would have difficulty knowing the facilities that
would be available for use. EAP/J Maher observed that the
runways at Ie and Shimoji would not be sufficient on their
own, but would require the full complement of support
facilities, including for refueling and maintenance, to be
useable by U.S. forces. Japanese discussion of contingency
air fields often overlooks this requirement, he added. Naha
Consul General Greene noted that, as Japan worked through its
National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), it would be
important for both sides to de-conflict expectations on
Shimoji options.
¶9. (S) A contingency would dictate that all U.S.-controlled
airfields in Japan be used at maximum capacity, not just two
or three, remarked DASD Schiffer. He elaborated that there
might be contingencies related not just to Situations in
Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ), but also to the defense of
Japan itself. This possibility was clear in war plans that
the U.S. side had earlier provided to select Japanese
officials, and Schiffer offered to provide those briefs again
to appropriate counterparts. He also related this issue back
to realignment, noting that the redeployment of Marines in
their entirety to Guam would not give the U.S. military the
flexibility and speed necessary to meet its Security Treaty
obligations to Japan. MajGen Toolan added that the briefs
cited by DASD Schiffer required additional information from
the Japanese government, an issue that could be addressed
through improved bilateral planning.
¶10. (S) The dramatic increase in China's military
capabilities necessitated access to at least three runways in
a contingency, noted A/S Campbell. In the 1990s, it had been
possible to implement contingency plans for South Korea and
China using only two runways in Okinawa, Naha and Kadena.
The most significant change between 1995 (when the Special
Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) plans for the relocation
Futenma Air Base had been formulated) and 2009 was the
build-up of Chinese military assets, explained A/S Campbell.
This fact, which was now a driver of U.S. military
assessments for the region, was implicit in Basalla's
presentation and could not be discussed publicly for obvious
reasons, he added.
Incorporating Changes
---------------------
¶11. (C) DG Takamizawa recommended that the U.S. briefing on
the FRF should incorporate changes since 2006 regarding U.S.
capabilities and war plans. New factors, such as the planned
deployment of MV-22 (Osprey) aircraft, high-speed vessels,
and increased military coordination with the Japanese side,
should be taken into account in explaining the continuing
validity of realignment plans. As a second point, he noted
that the DPJ Government placed a premium on
information-sharing and transparency. The understanding of
government officials and politicians is not enough, said
Takamizawa. The Japanese government also sought cooperation
from the U.S. Government in clarifying the contents of
realignment to the Japanese public.
MOD and MOFA Read-out on the Presentation
-----------------------------------------
¶12. (S) In a private read-out over lunch immediately
following the FRF presentation, MOD DG Takamizawa cautioned
the U.S. side not to take excessive comfort in Nagashima's
assessment of current realignment plans. The Vice-Minster
had been much tougher in his questions on FRF during internal
MOD sessions, and he was aware that A/S Campbell had spoken
about realignment the previous evening with State Minister
for Okinawa Seiji Maehara (a proponent of Kadena
consolidation). Takamizawa added that the U.S. Government
should also refrain from demonstrating flexibility too soon
in the course of crafting an adjusted realignment package
palatable to the DPJ Government. On environmental issues,
for example, perceptions of U.S. Government flexibility could
invite local demands for the U.S. side to permit greater
access to bases and to shoulder mitigation costs for
environmental damage.
¶13. (S) MOFA DG Umemoto noted that the DPJ leadership was
still working out internally its process for deciding on
realignment. Foreign Minister Okada had been rigid in his
reservation on FRF, and Okinawa State Minister Maehara had
been aggressive in ministerial discussions (the latest
occurring on October 9), given his claim as an expert on
Okinawan issues. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport, and Tourism (MLIT), which Maehara also led, would
be a significant player on the realignment review, though
less so in terms of budget outlays for Okinawa. According to
Umemoto, the role of Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano
in the ministerial discussion was also increasingly
significant, in light of his close relationship with Prime
Minister Hatoyama. Hirano, however, was not versed on
Okinawan affairs and appeared to be taking a more legalistic
view of the responsibilities shared by the ministries in
reaching a decision on realignment. Umemoto added that
although Foreign Minister Okada did not wish DPJ power-broker
Ichiro Ozawa to play a role on realignment, Ozawa was
pondering his possible involvement in the realignment review,
given the serious political implications of possible blunders
on FRF. Another important factor in the review was the
Social Democratic Party (SDP), whose influence in Okinawa
would suffer if FRF location issues were resolved. DG
Takamizawa added that Ozawa was the only person who could
persuade the SDP to change coalition agreements on Okinawa
and give the party something in return.
Briefing for Prime Minister's Office
------------------------------------
¶14. (C) In an October 13 breakfast, OSD Senior Country
Director Basalla, EAP/J Director Maher, the DCM, and POL-MIL
Chief also presented the FRF briefing to Tadakatsu Sano and
Kanji Yamanouchi, both Executive Assistants to the Prime
Minister. Sano focused on the fact that land returns south
of Kadena as a part of realignment would reduce the area
controlled by U.S. military bases from 19 percent to 12
percent of Okinawa's total land area. He also noted that
although the majority of the Japanese public recognized the
strategic value of the Alliance, the immediate social
challenges and safety concerns faced by the Okinawan people
regarding the bases would weigh significantly on the DPJ
Government's realignment review. Sano argued that a more
immediate solution was required to prevent the possibility of
aviation accidents in urban areas, similar to the 2004 U.S.
military helicopter crash at an Okinawan university. Sano
added that there was ""aggravation"" at the perception created
by the Japanese media that the U.S. side had become
inflexible in realignment discussions. The U.S. participants
at the breakfast responded that the U.S. Government shared
Japanese concerns on aviation safety risks. DCM also
commented that U.S. officials would continue to express
patience in public about realignment, while relaying private
messages to the Japanese government about the serious
implications that changes to FRF plans would have for the
Alliance.
Participants to October 12 Briefing
-----------------------------------
¶15. (U)
U.S.:
A/S Kurt Campbell, EAP
DCM James Zumwalt, Embassy Tokyo
DAS David Shear, EAP
DASD for East Asia Michael Schiffer, OSD/APSA
MajGen John Toolan, Deputy Commander, USFJ
Japan Director Kevin Maher, EAP
POL M/C Robert Luke, Embassy Tokyo
Senior Country Director for Japan Suzanne Basalla, OSD/APSA
Consul General Raymond Greene, ConGen Naha
SA Mark Tesone, EAP
COL Jeffrey Wiltse, Director, J-5, USFJ
POL-MIL Chief Joseph Young, Embassy Tokyo (notetaker)
Interpreter
Japan:
Akihisa NAGASHIMA, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, MOD
Nobushige TAKAMIZAWA, Director General of Defense Policy, MOD
Motomi INOUE, Director General of Bureau of Local
Cooperation, MOD
Kiyoshi SERIZAWA, Director, Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
Division, MOD
Takafumi FUJII, Director, Director, Okinawa Local
Cooperation, MOD
Taro YAMAOTO, Director, Strategic Planning Office, MOD
Notetaker
Interpreter
Participants to October 12 Lunch
--------------------------------
¶16. (U)
U.S.:
A/S Kurt Campbell, EAP
DCM James Zumwalt, Embassy Tokyo
DAS David Shear, EAP
DASD for East Asia Michael Schiffer, OSD/APSA
Japan Director Kevin Maher, EAP
POL M/C Robert Luke, Embassy Tokyo (notetaker)
Senior Country Director for Japan Suzanne Basalla, OSD/APSA
Japan:
Kazuyoshi UMEMOTO, Director General of North American
Affairs, MOFA
Nobushige TAKAMIZAWA, Director General of Defense Policy, MOD
Takehiro FUNAKOSHI, Director, Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
Division, MOFA
Kiyoshi SERIZAWA, Director, Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
Division, MOD
Hiroyuki NAMAZU, Director, Japan-U.S. SOFA Division, MOFA
Participants to October 13 Breakfast
------------------------------------
¶17. (U)
U.S.:
DCM James Zumwalt, Embassy Tokyo
Japan Director Kevin Maher, EAP
Senior Country Director for Japan Suzanne Basalla, OSD/APSA
POL-MIL Chief Joseph Young, Embassy Tokyo (notetaker)
Japan:
Tadakatsu Sano, Executive Assistant to the Prime Minister
Kanji Yamanouchi, Executive Assistant to the Prime Minister
¶18. (U) A/S Campbell has cleared this message.
ROOS