

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 87BOGOTA7890, THE GUERRILLA SITUATION: PREPARING FOR WAR?
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #87BOGOTA7890.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
87BOGOTA7890 | 1987-06-09 22:18 | 2011-04-16 00:00 | SECRET | Embassy Bogota |
P 092218Z JUN 87
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7510
INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY LIMA
CIA WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
id: 163
date: 6/9/1987 22:18
refid: 87BOGOTA7890
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: SECRET
destination: 87BOGOTA3997
header:
P 092218Z JUN 87
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7510
INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY LIMA
CIA WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
----------------- header ends ----------------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 07890
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPRP PINS MILI PTER CO
SUBJECT: THE GUERRILLA SITUATION: PREPARING FOR WAR?
REF: BOGOTA 3997
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. COLOMBIA'S GUERRILLA WAR HAS BEEN
QUIESCENT THE LAST FEW WEEKS. THOUGH ARMED CONTACTS
BETWEEN THE VARIOUS GUERRILLA GROUPS AND THE MILITARY
CONTINUE, THE PACE OF MAJOR CONFRONTATIONS HAS
SLACKENED. THE MAIN ARENA OF CONFRONTATION HAS BEEN THE
MEDIA, WHERE THE UNION PATRIOTICA (UP), POLITICAL FRONT
OF THE COLOMBIAN REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES (FARC),
LEVELED CHARGES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AGAINST THE
MILITARY. COLOMBIA'S GUERRILLA GROUPS ARE IN A
RETRENCHMENT PHASE: REGROUPING, FORGING ALLIANCES, AND
RETHINKING STRATEGIES. THE GOC CONTINUES TO
RESTRUCTURE ITS SECURITY APPARATUS AND TO AUGMENT THE
ARMY'S STRENGTH THROUGH RECRUITMENT OF VOLUNTEER UNITS.
THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT BOTH SIDES ARE PREPARING FOR
AN EVENTUAL BREAKDOWN OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE
RESUMPTION OF FULL-SCALE CONFLICT. END SUMMARY.
GUERRILLAS - THE PUBLIC PROFILE
-------------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) WAVING THE HUMAN RIGHTS BANNER: THE FARC AND
THE UNION PATRIOTICA ARE THE ONE COLOMBIAN GUERRILLA
GROUPING POSSESSED OF A MEDIA SENSE. IN RECENT WEEKS,
THEY HAVE USED THE MEDIA TO MAKE THEIR CASE TO THE
COLOMBIAN AND FOREIGN PUBLIC. THE MAJOR THRUST BY THE
UP WAS A MAY 8 PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH EX-PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATE JAIME PARDO LEAL CHARGED OVER 100 MILITARY
OFFICERS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AGAINST UP MEMBERS AND
ACTIVISTS (SEE BOGOTA 6456). THE UP'S CHARGES RESULTED
IN A SWIFT DENIAL AND A NAME-BY-NAME REBUTTAL BY DEFENSE
MINISTER SAMUDIO. PARDO'S THRUST WAS COMPLEMENTED BY
REPORTS OF A PARIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH UP
CONGRESSMAN AND EX-FARC COMANDANTE BRAULIO HERRERA
DECLARED THE UP AND THE PEACE PROCESS TO BE IN DANGER OF
EXTINCTION FROM ASSAULTS BY THE MILITARY AND
MILITARY-SUPPORTED PARA-MILITARY GROUPS (SEE BOGOTA
7001). HERRERA'S PARIS SOJOURN IS PROBABLY THE OPENING
PHASE OF A LARGE SCALE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE
COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT AND SECURITY FORCES. SPECIAL
REPORTING INDICATES THAT THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
(PCC) IS COORDINATING SUCH A CAMPAIGN WITH LEFTIST
GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA AND EUROPE. THE CAMPAIGN IS TO
BE MODELED ON THOSE CONDUCTED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENTS OF
EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND ARGENTINA. ANALOGY BETWEEN
ARGENTINA'S "DIRTY WAR" AND CONTEMPORARY COLOMBIA WILL
BE THE KEY THEME. THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE IS TO
CONSTRAIN GOC ACTIONS AGAINST ANY GUERRILLA GROUP AND TO
FRUSTRATE ATTEMPTS TO SECURE COUNTER-INSURGENCY SUPPORT
FROM ABROAD.
¶3. (U) PARDO ON THE PEACE PROCESS: FOLLOWING ON THE
CHARGES OF MILITARY HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, THE
CONSERVATIVE WEEKLY "GUION" PUBLISHED AN INTERVIEW WITH
PARDO IN ITS MAY 27 EDITION. AFTER THE NOW-RITUAL
DECLARATION OF THE UP'S INDEPENDENCE FROM THE FARC,
PARDO WENT ON TO DENOUNCE THE BARCO ADMINISTRATION'S
CONDUCT OF THE PEACE PROCESS. HE DECLARED THE PROCESS
TO BE IN CRISIS BECAUSE THE GOC LACKS THE WILL TO BUILD
ON THE BASE CREATED BY THE BETANCUR ADMINISTRATION. IN
PARTICULAR, HE CITED THE GOC'S REFUSAL TO NAME AN
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION COMMISSION AS PROOF OF A LACK
OF INTEREST IN PEACE. "THE GOVERNMENT," PARDO
CONTINUED, "HAS NOT MOVED A SINGLE FINGER TO PUT AN END
TO...ARMED CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE
GUERRILLA MOVEMENT OBSERVING THE TRUCE." HE ALSO
CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT CONTENTION THAT THE ARMED
FORCES MUST HAVE FREE ACCESS TO ANY PART OF THE
COUNTRY. CHALLENGED THAT THE TREATY DID NOT CONCEDE
"INDEPENDENT REPUBLICS" TO THE FARC, PARDO COUNTERED
THAT "THE FARC NEEDS A GEOGRAPHICAL SITE, A PIECE OF
EARTH."
¶4. (U) A LETTER TO BARCO: THE UP'S EFFORTS WERE
COMPLEMENTED BY DESPATCH MAY 10 OF A LETTER FROM THE
FARC COMANDANTES TO PRESIDENT BARCO. REVEALING A NEW
AGGRESSIVENESS TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT, THE FARC WARNED
THAT THE FATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS IS IN BARCO'S HANDS.
SIGNIFICANTLY, THE FARC DECLARED THAT THEY DID NOT SIGN
A TRUCE WITH "MILITARISM" AND ARE READY TO JOIN "OUR
PEOPLE WHEN IT DECIDES TO RISE UP AGAINST MILITARISM."
THE FARC'S LETTER CONTAINS AN IMPLICIT THREAT: SHOULD
BARCO BECOME "MILITARISTIC" IN THE FARC'S EYES, THE
GUERRILLAS WILL HAVE THE LEGAL RIGHT TO ABANDON THE
PEACE PROCESS AND RESUME OPERATIONS.
GUERRILLAS - BEHIND THE SCENES MANEUVERING
------------------------------------------
¶5. (C/NF) FARC - STIRRING FROM THE NEST: WHILE THE
FARC'S PUBLIC ORGANS ARE ENGAGED IN TARRING THEIR
GOC/MILITARY OPPONENTS, THE FARC AND COLOMBIA'S OTHER
GUERRILLA ARMIES, SINGLY OR IN CONCERT, HAVE BUSIED
THEMSELVES WITH REORGANIZATION, ALLIANCES, AND STRATEGIC
RETHINKING. AS THE LARGEST GUERRILLA ARMY, AND THE SOLE
GROUP REMAINING WITHIN THE PEACE PROCESS, THE FARC'S
ACTIVITIES COMMAND THE LION'S SHARE OF INTEREST. RECENT
REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT THE FARC IS REDISTRIBUTING
FORCES, POSSIBLY WITH AN EYE TO READINESS IN EVENT OF AN
OPEN BREAK WITH THE GOC. ONE MILITARY SOURCE REPORTS
THAT FIVE ADDITIONAL FARC FRONTS ARE BEING FORMED. IT
IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS PROJECTED EXPANSION REFLECTS
ADDITIONAL ARMED STRENGTH, A REDISTRIBUTION OF AVAILABLE
STRENGTH TO COUNTER GOC INITIATIVES, OR A RESPONSE TO
RIVAL GUERRILLA GROUPS. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE GROWTH IN
FARC STRENGTH SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS,
IT FAIR TO ASSUME THAT THE NEW FRONTS REFLECT
AUGMENTATION OF THE FARC'S ARMED STRENGTH. BY CONTRAST,
OTHER SPECIAL REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT THE FARC IS
CONSOLIDATING FRONTS IN ANTICIPATION OF THE MARCH 1988
ELECTIONS. ANOTHER FACET OF THE SITUATION IS A JUNE 2
REPORT IN "EL ESPECTADOR", BOGOTA'S LEADING DAILY, THAT
THE FARC IS ABANDONING ITS MOUNTAIN HEADQUARTERS AT LA
URIBE AND SHIFTING FORCES TO META AND GUAVIARE
DEPARTMENTS. THIS REPORT REMAINS UNCONFIRMED; GOC
OFFICIALS PLED IGNORANCE WHEN PRESSED BY THE MEDIA FOR
CONFIRMATION. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE FARC WOULD
LEAVE INACCESSIBLE LA URIBE FOR NEW AND UNHARDENED
QUARTERS. ANY SHIFT OF PERSONNEL FROM LA URIBE MAY IN
FACT BE TIED TO THE ACTIVATION OF NEW FRONTS.
¶6. (S/NF) EXTENDING A HAND TO THE EPL: WHILE CONTINUING
TO SPAR WITH THE GOC ON THE PEACE PROCESS, THE FARC HAS
NOT ABANDONED ITS HOPES OF DOMINATING COLOMBIA'S
GUERRILLA MOVEMENT. A MAJOR STEP IN THIS DIRECTION WAS
THE APRIL 4 AGREEMENT WITH THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
(EPL) WHICH CALLED FOR GUERRILLA UNITY, "DEMOCRATIC
CONVERGENCE" AND POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO COLOMBIA'S
PROBLEMS. CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT EACH
SIDE SEES ADVANTAGES FLOWING FROM THE PACT. THE FARC
FORESEES A NOMINAL TRUCE BETWEEN THE GOC AND THE EPL
WHICH WOULD ALLOW INCREASED EPL TO INCREASE POLITICAL
ACTIVITY IN ITS CORDOBA DEPARTMENT STRONGHOLD -- AN
ADVANTAGE FOR THE RADICAL LEFT. THEY ALSO VIEW THE PACT
AS AN INCENTIVE FOR OTHER GUERRILLA GROUPS TO NEGOTIATE
WITH THE FARC. FOR ITS PART, THE EPL SEES THE AGREEMENT
AS A MEANS OF LURING THE FARC OUT OF THE PEACE PROCESS.
THUS, THE AGREEMENT COULD SUCCUMB TO THE DISTRUST AND
IDEOLOGICAL SQUABBLING THAT HAVE KEPT COLOMBIA'S
GUERRILLAS DIVIDED.
¶7. (S/NF) EXTENDING A FIST TO THE ELN: DESPITE SUCCESS
IN FORGING LINKS TO THE EPL, TENSIONS BETWEEN THE FARC
AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (ELN) HAVE ESCALATED.
IN PARTICULAR, THE FARC HAS ACCUSED THE ELN OF MURDERING
MEMBERS OF THE FARC'S UNION PATRIOTICA (UP) POLITICAL
FRONT IN ARAUCA INTENDENCY. THE SITUATION MIRRORS THE
CONFLICTING AMBITIONS OF THE TWO GROUPS IN THAT AREA.
WHILE THE FARC REMAINS INTENT ON MONOPOLIZING POLITICAL
POWER IN ARAUCA, AND USING THE AREA AS A RECRUITING
POOL, THE ELN SEEKS TO DOMINATE THE AREA THROUGH ATTACKS
ON THE OIL PIPELINE. CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING INDICATES
THAT THE ELN DESIRES A MEETING TO RESOLVE THESE
PROBLEMS. IT IS UNKNOWN IF SUCH A MEETING OCCURRED, BUT
NEW DEVELOPMENTS SUGGEST THAT THE FARC AND THE ELN HAVE
TEMPORARILY SHELVED THEIR DIFFERENCES.
¶8. (C) ONE FOR ALL, ALL FOR ONE: THE NEW DEVELOPMENT
SUGGESTING A SUBSUMPTION OF FARC-ELN DIFFERENCES IS THE
GENERAL STRIKE CALLED FOR JUNE 7-9. THIS STRIKE,
DESIGNED TO PARALYZE SEVEN DEPARTMENTS OF NORTHEASTERN
COLOMBIA, WAS JOINTLY SPONSORED BY THE FARC, THE
PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (EPL), THE M-19, THE NATIONAL
LIBERATION ARMY (ELN), AND THE NEWLY-REACTIVATED RICARDO
FRANCO FRONT (A DISSIDENT WING OF THE FARC).
VICE-MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT FERNANDO BOTERO TOLD MISSION
JUNE 9 THAT THE STRIKE HAS NOT ASSUMED THE DIMENSIONS
ORIGINALLY FEARED. URBAN WORKERS HAVE LARGELY IGNORED
CALLS TO TAKE TO THE STREETS. BOTERO ADDED THAT ABOUT
18,000 CAMPESINOS HAVE BEEN MOBILIZED UNDER DURESS BY
THE GUERRILLAS, THREATENED WITH A 20,000 PESO FINE OR
DEATH FOR NON-COMPLIANCE. WHILE SATISFIED THAT THE
STRIKE'S IMMEDIATE IMPACT IS MINIMAL, BOTERO COMMENTED
THAT THE EVIDENT GUERRILLA COOPERATION IN FOMENTING THE
CAMPESINO MARCHES IS DISTURBING (COMMENT: WE SHARE
BOTERO'S CONCERN; WHATEVER THE SUCCESS OF THE CIVIC
STRIKE, ITS PLANNING POINTS TOWARD POSSIBLE GREATER
COOPERATION AMONG THE GUERRILLAS.)
¶9. (S/NF) M-19 -- THROWING THEIR HAT IN THE RING: THE
FARC IS NOT ALONE IN RETHINKING ITS POSITION AND IN
RESTRUCTURING ITS FORCES. CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING
INDICATES THAT THE LONG-UNHEARD-FROM M-19 HAS DECIDED TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE 1988 MAYORAL ELECTIONS. THE GROUP
INTENDS TO ACT THROUGH FRONT GROUPS AND TO SEEK
ALLIANCES WITH MAINSTREAM POLITICIANS AND GROUPS SUCH AS
THE FARC'S UNION PATRIOTICA. THE FARC/EPL AGREEMENT
CITED IN PARAGRAPH (6) IS A PRIME MOTIVATION FOR THE
M-19'S ACTION. IN ADDITION, THE M-19 INTENDS TO FORGE
CLOSER LINKS WITH THE FARC. AS WITH OTHER
INTER-GUERRILLA AGREEMEMTS, SELF-INTEREST ASSUMES A
COMMANDING POSITION; THE M-19 HOPES THAT CLOSER
RELATIONS WITH THE FARC WILL FOSTER JOINT OPERATIONS
SHOULD THE FARC-GOC TRUCE COLLAPSE. IN OTHER
DEVELOPMENTS, THE M-19 IS CREATING NEW URBAN TERRORIST
UNITS IN COLOMBIA'S MAJOR CITIES, AND HAS BEGUN JOINT
TRAINING WITH THE EPL TO REBUILD ITS DEPLETED STRENGTH
ALONG THE CARIBBEAN COAST.
¶10. (S/NF) ELN - PULSO FIRME Y MANO TENDIDA: IN
ADDITION, THE ELN IS NEARING COMPLETION OF A MAJOR
REORGANIZATION OF ITS BOGOTA UNITS. FORMERLY LARGELY
AUTONOMOUS, THESE UNITS WILL NOW BE SUBJECT TO THE ELN'S
NATIONAL DIRECTORATE. GIVEN THE ELN'S REPUTATION FOR
DISCIPLINE, FUTURE ELN ACTIONS IN BOGOTA MAY SEEK TO
HAVE AN IMPACT SIMILAR TO THEIR PIPELINE ATTACKS IN
ARAUCA. REGARDING THE PIPELINE, ON JUNE 1, THE ELN
PROPOSED TO THE GOC A CESSATION OF PIPELINE ATTACKS,
PROVIDED THE GOC MET SEVERAL ELN DEMANDS REGARDING
PETROLEUM EXTRACTION AND EXPORT (SEE BOGOTA 7451).
THESE DEMANDS WERE ROUNDLY REJECTED BY RECONCILIATION
ADVISOR CARLOS OSSA ESCOBAR, WHO DECLARED THAT THE GOC
WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE ITS ENERGY POLICY "WITH AN ARMED
MINORITY INTENT ON ATTACKING THE NATIONAL PATRIMONY."
THE GOVERNMENT - RESTRUCTURING FOR CONFLICT
-------------------------------------------
¶11. (C/NF) MILITARY GROWTH: GUERRILLA EFFORTS AT
RESTRUCTURING HAVE THEIR PARALLEL ON THE GOVERNMENT
SIDE. THOUGH PRESIDENT BARCO REITERATED TO VISITING
GENERAL GALVIN (SEE BOGOTA 7463) HIS BELIEF THAT HIS
REHABILITATION PLAN WILL SAP MUCH OF THE FARC'S
STRENGTH, HE REMAINS INTENT ON EXPANDING THE SIZE,
MOBILITY, AND PROFESSIONALISM OF THE ARMED FORCES.
BARCO BELIEVES (COMMENT: WE AGREE) THAT THE ARMED FORCES
ARE NOT NOW IN A POSITION TO TAKE ON A FULLY-ACTIVE
FARC. HOWEVER, HIS RECENT COMMENTS SUGGEST THAT
ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS ARE BRAKING THE PACE OF ARMY
EXPANSION. IN A JUNE 2 SPEECH AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY,
BARCO STATED THAT HIS GOVERMMENT WOULD PROVIDE THE
"BASIC ELEMENTS" NEEDED BY THE ARMY, BUT ONLY "TO THE
MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE." WHATEVER THE REALITY OF
BUDGET LIMITATIONS, THE COLOMBIANS HAVE DECIDED TO
PURCHASE U.S.-MADE TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS AT A COST OF
$36 MILLION, THOUGH DELIVERY OF THE FIRST UNIT WILL NOT
TAKE PLACE UNTIL LATE 1987. IN ADDITION, THE ARMY HAS
BEEN RECRUITING SOME 2,000 DISCHARGED SOLDIERS FOR
SERVICE IN SPECIAL VOLUNTEER COMPANIES. THESE UNITS ARE
HIGHLY RATED DUE TO THE MEN'S PRIOR EXPERIENCE, AND HAVE
BEEN DEPLOYED IN CONTESTED AREAS SUCH AS CAQUETA
DEPARTMENT. RECRUITMENT OF ADDITIONAL VOLUNTEER UNITS
IS EXPECTED.
¶12. (U) SECURITY RESTRUCTURING: AS A FURTHER STEP IN
COMBATTING THE THREAT POSED BY THE GUERRILLAS AND THE
EROSION OF PUBLIC ORDER, THE COUNTRY'S PRINCIPAL
INTERNAL SECURITY ORGANS HAVE BEGUN MAJOR
REORGANIZATIONS. THE NATIONAL POLICE ANNOUNCED JUNE 2
THE ACTIVATION OF 30 INTELLIGENCE "BRIGADES" DESIGNED TO
DETECT URBAN ACTIVITIES BY GUERRILLA GROUPS, BE THEY
MILITARY OR POLITICAL IN NATURE. FOR ITS PART, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY (DAS - COLOMBIAN
FBI) HAS CREATED THREE NEW COMMANDS DEDICATED TO
SECURITY, EXPLOSIVES AND COUNTER-TERRORISM, AS WELL AS
INTELLIGENCE CENTERS IN BOGOTA, CALI, MEDELLIN, AND
CUCUTA. ACCORDING TO DAS COMMANDER GENERAL MAZA, ALL
UNITS ARE DESIGNED TO COUNTER THE WAVE OF CRIMINALITY,
TERRORISM, AND ARMED SUBVERSION CONFRONTING COLOMBIA.
PROGNOSIS
---------
¶13. (C) AS INDICATED IN MISSION'S LAST ASSESSMENT OF
COLOMBIA'S GUERRILLA SITUATION (REFTEL), THE LEVEL OF
CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA IS EXPECTED TO GROW DURING 1987.
THE STEPS BEING TAKEN BY BOTH THE GOC AND THE VARIOUS
GUERRILLA GROUPS REFLECT THAT EXPECTATION. THE ACTIVE
GUERRILLA GROUPS APPEAR INTENT ON STRIKING THE GOC ANEW
ONCE REDEPLOYMENT AND RETRAINING ARE ACCOMPLISHED.
HOWEVER, THE MAJOR DANGER TO COLOMBIAN INSTITUTIONS AND
U.S. INTERESTS HERE LIES IN THE ATTITUDES OF THE FARC.
EVOLUTION OF EVENTS, OF COURSE, WILL DEPEND ON HOW THE
FARC FORESEES PROSPECTS OF ITS UNION PATRIOTICA
POLITICAL FRONT IN THE MARCH 1988 POPULAR ELECTIONS FOR
MAYORS. CURRENT PROJECTIONS SUGGEST THE UP WILL DO
FAIRLY WELL IN SOME ISOLATED RURAL AREAS, AND MAY ELECT
UP TO EIGHTY MAYORS (OUT OF OVER 1,000), ALL IN
RELATIVELY SMALL TOWNS. BASED ON THIS EXPECTATION, MOST
OBSERVERS HERE THINK THE FARC WILL BE VERY RELUCTANT TO
FORMALLY BREAK THE TRUCE BEFORE NEXT MARCH -- ALTHOUGH
THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE MAY RISE WITHOUT ANY DECLARATION.
BEFORE OR AFTER MARCH, THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE EVENTS IS
WIDE: THE FARC IN OPEN WARFARE, OR STILL-NOMINAL
ADHERENCE TO THE PEACE ACCORDS; THE UP LEAVING THE
CONGRESS, OR STAYING TO USE IT AS A PLATFORM TO DENOUNCE
THE GOVERNMENT. BUT IN OUR JUDGEMENT ALL THESE
SCENARIOS WILL HAVE ONE COMMON FACTOR: HEIGHTENED
VIOLENCE AND INCREASED THREAT TO COLOMBIA'S INSTITUTIONS
AND U.S. INTERESTS.
GILLESPIE
=======================CABLE ENDS============================