

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09ASTANA1761, KAZAKHSTAN: POLITICAL ANALYST DISCUSESS "HAWKS AND DOVES"
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASTANA1761.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09ASTANA1761 | 2009-10-02 05:27 | 2011-04-28 09:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Astana |
VZCZCXRO9808
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #1761/01 2750527
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 020527Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6497
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1992
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1361
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2060
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1012
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1423
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1547
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001761
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM SOCI KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: POLITICAL ANALYST DISCUSESS "HAWKS AND DOVES"
AROUND THE PRESIDENT
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Independent political analyst XXXXXXXXXXXX
believes that the elites surrounding President Nazarbayev are split
into two camps -- the "hawks" and the "doves." The hawks, or the
"old guard," believe that the international community can do little
but accept Kazakhstan "as is" because of its vast natural resources
and strategic geopolitical position. The doves, or relatively
progressive forces, strive to create some image (if not always
reality) of progress on liberalization. In his view, Kazakhstan's
political system has grown into a "caste system" that is hard to
penetrate without the necessary family connections, and President
Nazarbayev is growing insulated and aloof. He told us that business
and political elites are growing increasingly "nervous," as they
strive to discern what is happening and what it means for them and
the country's leadership. END SUMMARY.
THE HAWKS AND THE DOVES
¶2. (C) Independent political analyst XXXXXXXXXXXX told the DCM on
September 22 that the political elite surrounding President
Nazarbayev is solidly split into two camps -- "the hawks and the
doves." Hawks are those who believe that Kazakhstan will be accepted
by the international community "as is" because of its vast natural
resources and strategic geopolitical position. The doves are those
"who at least want to create the image of progress," especially for
foreign audiences. President Nazarbayev makes all the major
political decisions, but his decisions depend on which group has his
ear. Kazakhstan's implementation of the "Madrid Commitments"
illustrates this dichotomy, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. In his view, former
Foreign Minister Tazhin had Nazarbayev's full backing when he
committed at the 2007 OSCE Ministerial to liberalize Kazakhstan's
laws on political parties, elections, and the media. However, "the
hawks got the President's ear" and convinced him that any major
legislative changes would destabilize the country's political
situation. As a result, "all you got were cosmetic changes," said
XXXXXXXXXXXX.
¶3. (C) The hawks, in XXXXXXXXXXXX’s view, are the "old guard" --
remnants of the Soviet power machine who remained close to President
Nazarbayev as he rose to power. XXXXXXXXXXXX, and other contacts, named
Akhmetzhan Yesimov, the mayor of Almaty, and Nuratay Abykayev, First
Deputy Foreign Minister, as "the head hawks." Yesimov, who is
rumored to be Nazarbayev's distant cousin, has served as the Deputy
Prime Minister, the Minister of Agriculture, and was Kazakhstan's
Ambassador to Belgium from 1998 to 2001. Abykayev, whom one
interlocutor called "the gray cardinal," was Kazakhstan's Ambassador
to Russia from 2007 to October 2008. Before that posting, he served
as the Speaker of the Senate, Head of Presidential Administration,
and Chairman of the Committee for National Security (KNB). Some
analysts allege that Abykayev was the master-mind behind the 2006
unresolved killing of opposition leader Altynbek Sarsenbay-uly and
his two associates, although the connection has never been proven.
Both Abykayev and Yesimov have had ups and downs in their careers,
but Nazarbayev has always kept them among the top political elite.
Other people who fall into the conservative camp are the former chief
of Presidential Administration Vladimir Nee, Daniyal Akhmetov, the
former Minister of Defense, and Presidential Advisor Yermukhambet
Yertysbayev. (NOTE: Yertysbayev on occasion comes out with liberal
public statements, but our NGO contacts believe he does this more to
create a media sensation rather than to express his own liberal
motivations. END NOTE.) The current chairman of the Committee for
National Security (KNB) Amangeldy Shabdarbayev is also believed to be
a staunch conservative, although the organization itself, according
to XXXXXXXXXXXX, is not a strong force onto itself, but rather a tool
"for the highest bidder," And, reportedly includes in its top ranks
both hawks and doves.
¶4. (C) The doves, in the view of XXXXXXXXXXXX and others, are the
younger generation of Kazakhstan's political and business leaders,
including those with strong business links to the West. Several
interlocutors named Prime Minister Karim Masimov and Timur Kulibayev,
President Nazarbayev's son-in-law, as the "forward-thinking" camp.
XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that "Kulibayev's people are everywhere" -- Energy
Minister Sauat Mynbayev, Temir Zholy president Askar Mamim, the owner
of KazKommertsBank (KKB) Nurzhan Subkhanberdin, and the majority of
the Cabinet are thought to be in his camp. In a July 21 conversation
with the Ambassador, Jay Johnson, Managing Director of Chevron's
ASTANA 00001761 002 OF 003
Eurasia Business, noted that Kulibayev is significantly expanding his
role and influence. Johnson noted that Kulibayev has gone from
occupying a ceremonial role as chairman of KazEnergy, to become
Deputy Chairman of Samruk-Kazyna, and Chairman of KazMunaiGas (KMG),
KazAtomProm, and KazakhMys. Johnson said he is consolidating his
power and control over the economy, although he noted that Kulibayev
still maintains a relatively low political profile. "That's been his
M.O. He's always in the background. He's rarely the number one guy,
out in front." [COMMENT: We hasten to add that none of our many
interlocutors, across the political spectrum, are willing to say that
Nazarbayev is positioning Kulibayev as "successor." END COMMENT.]
POLITICAL CASTE SYSTEM
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX alleged that the Kazakhstani political system -- the
several score top figures who rotate among the top economic and
political jobs within the system -- has calcified into a rigid "caste
system" that is impossible to penetrate unless one has the necessary
family connections. He discounted the role of the younger,
Western-educated elites, who, he says, may "curse the rigid regime"
in private but can do little to change the system. (NOTE: The
government's scholarship program "Bolashak" has educated close to
6,000 Kazakhstani students at Western universities, and many of them
have returned to take positions in the government and in the private
sector. END NOTE.)
¶6. (C) We heard similar ideas from XXXXXXXXXXXX, independent
economist and former opposition politician who held several
high-level posts in the Kazakhstani government in the 1990s.
XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that in the 1990s, Nazarbayev surrounded himself
with "competent individuals" willing to tell him the truth.
However, in recent years, he has grown "insulated and removed."
¶7. (C) Several interlocutors also alleged to us that "government
has grown unpredictable." Chevron's Jay Johnson commented on the
general mood of the government to the Ambassador and said, "There is
such a fight going on now. People are scared to death. There is
such anxiety and uncertainty about what will happen in 2012 (NOTE:
when presidential elections are scheduled to be held. END NOTE) that
it has started to affect our projects." Johnson said that even
mid-level bureaucrats are intimidated by the recent round of firings
and prosecutions. "They see (former KMG president Serik) Berkitbayev
go to jail, (former KazAtomProm president Mukhtar) Dzhakishev go to
jail, (former Minister of Defense Daniel) Akhmetov get fired.
They're just terrified to do or sign anything." He said the
mid-level officials he deals with on a daily basis are afraid of
being held responsible if things go south.
GENTLEMEN, PLACE YOUR BETS
¶8. (C) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Kazakhstan's political and business
elite are preoccupied with the question of Nazarbayev's successor.
"The elites are very nervous," he said, "because they do not know who
to bet on." XXXXXXXXXXXX believes that the old guard would back whomever
Nazarbayev chose, and the successor would certainly need this backing
to survive. However, the business elites, "the young and ambitious,"
do not know with whom to align themselves, and the Presidential
Administration is not offering any clues. XXXXXXXXXXXX used the example
of Russia's oligarchs and Putin -- "Abramovich backed Putin when he
first came to power, while Berezovsky and Khodorkovsky thought they
could operate independently. Everybody here wants to be Abramovich
[super-rich and mostly living abroad] and to avoid Khodorkovsky's
fate" [in prison in Siberia].
¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX sees three possible scenarios for the succession:
first, election of the successor, with Nazarbayev willingly stepping
aside; second, nominal appointment of the successor, while Nazarbayev
maintains the real power and continues to rule from the sidelines;
finally, Nazarbayev's unexpected death without a clear successor,
which forces the elite groups to maneuver for power. The third
option is the worst for Kazakhstan, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. A vicious fight
for control of property and power would surely follow.
¶10. (C) COMMENT: We fully agree that the circle of Nazarbayev's
advisors has its progressive liberals and its retrograde dinosaurs.
This dichotomy has existed since Kazakhstan's independence, and
Nazarbayev has deftly managed a balance between the two groups.
XXXXXXXXXXXX’s version of how the hawks see the outside world may help
ASTANA 00001761 003 OF 003
explain why Kazakhstan sometimes stalls on democratic reform and
liberalization. However, the old guard, while still powerful, is not
omnipotent, and in dealing with the Kazakhstani government, we work
to strengthen and encourage the role of the progressive liberals.
The best way to do that, four our long-term interests -- especially
since Nazarbayev is not immortal -- is through high-level engagement.
END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND