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Viewing cable 05OTTAWA3732, PRECLEARANCE CONSULTATIVE GROUP REVIEWS POLICIES
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05OTTAWA3732 | 2005-12-22 15:30 | 2011-04-28 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Ottawa |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
221530Z Dec 05
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 OTTAWA 003732
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
FOR WHA/CAN, EB/TRA, AND L/WHA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAIR ECIN ASEC CA
SUBJECT: PRECLEARANCE CONSULTATIVE GROUP REVIEWS POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED--PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The inaugural meeting of the Preclearance
Consultative Group (PCG) took place in Ottawa on December 13.
The U.S. side was represented by the State Department,
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Transportation
Security Administration. Canadian officials were from
Foreign Affairs Canada, Transport Canada, and the Canada
Border Services Agency (CBSA). Terry Breese, Director of the
Office of Canadian Affairs, Department of State, led the U.S.
delegation. Tobias Nussbaum, Director, U.S. Relations
Division, Foreign Affairs Canada, led the Canadian
delegation. This was the first formal review since
conclusion of the Aviation Preclearance Agreement in 2001 of
policies and procedures at the seven air preclearance
facilities in Canada (the eighth will be in Halifax). Issues
raised included congestion at preclearance areas, especially
during peak hours; intransit and progressive preclearance;
and U.S. input ("consultation") to the process of granting
security clearances for Canadian employees having access to
the preclearance areas. Government of Canada (GOC) officials
agreed that a mechanism can probably be developed whereby the
U.S. can check Canadians working in the preclearance areas
against U.S. data bases, though the extent of such
information sharing was not resolved at this meeting.
Several members of the group will meet again soon to address
the immediate concerns of the Halifax International Airport
Authority (HIAA) regarding the installation of radiation
detection equipment at the new preclearance facility there.
Other follow up items will be handled through correspondence
between PCG member agencies. End summary.
-----------------------------------------
A Brief History of Preclearance in Canada
-----------------------------------------
¶2. (U) Following a pre-meeting in Washington in October,
2005, and numerous e-mail and telephone exchanges, the
members of the PCG finally sat down in Ottawa on December 13
to work on a mutually-agreed agenda. The U.S. has provided
preclearance customs and immigration services for passengers
departing Canada for the United States from some Canadian
airports since the 1950's. Being precleared in Canada allows
passengers the flexibility to land in U.S. destination cities
which are not serviced by U.S. inspection agencies. A formal
preclearance agreement was signed by Canada and the U.S. in
1974; that was subsequently updated by an agreement signed in
January 2001 and brought into force in May 2003.
Preclearance is presently offered at seven airports:
Calgary, Edmonton, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Vancouver, and
Winnipeg. Halifax is scheduled to begin preclearance on
October 1, 2006. Although the 2001 agreement authorizes
Canada to offer preclearance at 13 U.S. airports, no
facilities have been opened in the U.S. The 2001 agreement
also stipulated that a Preclearance Consultative Group would
meet on a regular basis to address issues which could not be
resolved at the local (individual airport) level, and that
the PCG should conduct a joint review of the preclearance
program. The December 13 meeting was the first PCG review.
------------------------------
Major U.S. Issues/Agenda Items
------------------------------
¶3. (SBU) Perhaps the foremost concern of U.S. preclearance
personnel is ensuring physical security in the preclearance
area itself. U.S. officers working preclearance are not
armed. They must rely on armed Canadian police officers to
respond if a passenger threatens or assaults them, or must be
forcibly detained, removed, or arrested. Our officers are
also vulnerable to any weapon, explosive, or biological agent
that a would-be terrorist or hijacker might be trying to
smuggle aboard a flight to the U.S. The U.S. position is
that for any new preclearance facilities, or extensive
remodeling of existing facilities, we want baggage and
passenger security screening to be done by Canadian Air
Transport Security Authority (CATSA) personnel in front of,
not after, the preclearance area (see para. 5 also). Second,
many Canadian airport, airline, contractor, and vendor
employees have access to the preclearance area. The U.S. is
concerned that Transport Canada, which grants security
clearances that allow the airport authorities to issue
identification badges, does not have access to all
potentially detrimental information concerning an applicant
for employment. The U.S. wants to ensure that a Canadian
with a record in the United States does not slip through the
Transport Canada background investigation. In addition to
normal criminal checks, which can be conducted by Transport
Canada and CBSA now, the U.S. also wishes to check Canadians
who may work in preclearance areas against CBP and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement records.
¶4. (SBU) In response to U.S. arguments, GOC officials noted
that the GOC has concluded that sharing of an applicant's
name with CBP may not run counter to the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (equivalent to the U.S. Bill of Rights).
However, the GOC believes that supplying extensive biographic
data raises Charter concerns but left date and place of birth
for further consideration. The U.S. side pointed out that
the more data supplied, the less of a problem we will have
with false matches. The GOC offered to work up a model of
exactly how information sharing between Transport Canada and
CBP might work. An issue for Canada is that the GOC might be
put in the position of justifying and explaining why a
Canadian citizen was denied the right to work on Canadian
soil; i.e., the preclearance area. The U.S. noted that there
might be occasions when we would not be able to share with
the GOC the reason why we request a hold on a particular
applicant.
¶5. (U) On the location of CATSA screening, Canadian
officials agreed that security screening will be placed in
front of preclearance facilities at all new or extensively
remodeled airports, a commitment we have been seeking for
some time. Regarding security in general at preclearance
areas, the U.S. noted that access to the area is a problem.
Sometimes non-passengers get all the way back to the
preclearance area without having been asked by airport
personnel for a ticket or boarding pass. It was noted that
at Vancouver airport, the "panic button" in the preclearance
area is not connected to any warning alarm. In addition, the
armed guard stationed at preclearance in Vancouver is in the
secondary area and is unable to view (or react to) what is
happening in primary inspection. The U.S. agreed to document
these and other such incidents in writing and submit them to
the GOC for action.
-------------------
The Case of Halifax
-------------------
¶6. (U) CBP reported that the process for starting Halifax
preclearance in October 2006 is moving forward. CBP approved
the overall building construction plan and has started
procurement of equipment. Recruitment of staff has begun.
There will be 14 to 19 inspectors in addition to the port
director. CBP anticipates that 270,000 passengers per year
will be precleared when the facility opens.
¶7. (U) The status of Halifax preclearance and the opening of
the facility on October 1 raises two issues: radiation
detection equipment for checked baggage, and the provision of
information on checked baggage to CBP inspectors. The U.S.
requirement that all airports use such equipment to inspect
passengers and baggage was issued after construction of the
airport preclearance facility was already approved and
underway. The U.S. requirement for information on checked
baggage has not been accommodated in the Halifax preclearance
facility design blueprints. Finally, the GOC reported that
HIAA is under the impression that CBP will pay for the
radiation detection equipment, but CBP allowed as how it has
not come to a final decision regarding payment for the
equipment. The GOC asked for, and the U.S. side agreed to,
"technical written explanations" regarding both the radiation
detection equipment and checked baggage requirements. U.S.
officials offered to meet soon with HIAA to go over these
requirements. The GOC suggested that the U.S. encourage HIAA
to invite Transport Canada to those meetings as well.
Regarding the opening date of October 1 and radiation
detection equipment, it was pointed out that handheld
scanners could be used until such time as permanent equipment
was installed. The U.S. will take into consideration a later
start-up date (post-October 1) for the permanent radiation
equipment. CBP will provide contact information to HIAA
regarding a company in Texas that manufactures the equipment
preferred by CBP.
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Major Canadian Issues/Agenda Items
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¶8. (U) The GOC raised the issue of congestion at Toronto and
Montreal, particularly during peak periods such as
pre-holiday travel. Canada also raised the question of CBP's
commitment in terms of personnel, equipment, and other
resources to adequately manage renewed growth in passenger
and baggage traffic between Canada and the U.S. now that the
aviation sector is bouncing back from the declines caused by
9/11. Canada pointed out that the successful negotiation of
an Open Skies agreement will further stimulate air traffic
between our two countries. The GOC reported that in a recent
four-hour meeting with Canadian carriers, two hours were
devoted to discussion of the congestion problem. The GOC
said that Canadian carriers had even offered to pay an
additional dollar to CBP from the Air Travelers Security
Charge at preclearance airports for passenger processing.
¶9. (U) Continuing on congestion, Canada pointed out that at
the Toronto preclearance area the morning rush hour lineup,
when flights are most dense, can be 90 minutes long. Pre-
and post-holiday air travelers are also subjected to long
waits. The U.S. replied that there must be a coordinated
effort by members of the airport council (e.g., airport
administration, CBP, CATSA, and the carriers) to reduce
congestion. Scheduling most flights of the day during a
two-hour morning period, the time considered most popular
with travelers, will of course lead to crowding at that
preferred flight time and should be addressed by the airport
council. CBP pointed out that sometimes it isn't responsible
for the congestion. At Vancouver airport, for example, CBP
periodically stops processing because CATSA cannot handle the
passenger flow.
¶10. (U) Regarding future growth and the commitment of
resources, the GOC offered to share with the U.S. studies it
has undertaken on airport growth rates. For its part, CBP
explained that it has developed models for the staffing of
preclearance facilities. CBP's models incorporate best
practices and also examine the most efficient use of
resources at preclearance facilities. CBP's staffing models
are not generally releasable, but CBP will share them with
the GOC. The U.S. will feed GOC data on projected growth
into CBP staffing models. The two sides expressed confidence
that application of the studies and staffing models will
enable the two governments to direct the other players
involved in airport councils to create conditions to both
avoid congestion and meet the demands of anticipated growth.
The GOC will encourage Canadian airport authorities and
carriers to form councils to work with CBP and CATSA.
¶11. (SBU) The GOC raised the issue of complaints about the
preclearance process/procedures. Canadian travelers complain
about being "detained" in secondary inspection, and the lack
of adequate advance information regarding their right to
withdraw their application to enter the United States once
the preclearance process has started. Foreign Affairs
receives about four complaint letters per month. CBP replied
that there is a customer satisfaction form available on which
travelers can register their comments about preclearance,
including complaints. A passenger can also ask at any time
in the preclearance process to speak with a supervisor, and
that request will be honored. It was suggested that more
signage could be displayed concerning a Canadian's right of
withdrawal. (Note: There are signs in the primary
inspection area, but not in the secondary area. End note.)
CBP offered to send directives to the preclearance ports
informing officers of their rights and obligations concerning
withdrawal. CBSA also undertook to restart training for CBP
officers on how Canadian law applies to the right of
withdrawal. Finally, the U.S. agreed to take action on
complaint letters received by the GOC, and to provide a
written response when appropriate.
¶12. (U) Canada asked that CBP officers be better informed
about the process whereby they must register with Foreign
Affairs Canada on arrival in country, and apply for an
identification card that is issued by the Protocol Office of
Foreign Affairs. The officers should also be sure to apply
for renewals of passports and work permits prior to their
expiration, and to return their identification cards at the
end of their assignments in Canada. The U.S. side said that
this issue is being addressed. Port directors and Embassy
Ottawa are making sure that officers are aware of these
requirements.
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Intransit Preclearance
----------------------
¶13. (U) Canada and the U.S. agreed to a joint review of
intransit preclearance, whereby passengers from domestic
Canadian flights, as well as foreign passengers from
international flights, arrive at a preclearance airport and
are processed for U.S.-bound flights. Intransit is
operational in Vancouver and works well. Domestic and
international passengers on their way to the U.S. share the
same secure transit facility. The GOC limits the number of
carriers (to four) whose passengers can apply for intransit
preclearance when they arrive in Vancouver. If CBP finds an
international intransit passenger inadmissible to the U.S.,
that passenger is turned over to CBSA, not returned to the
carrier for repatriation. To allow CBP to inspect
international intransit passengers with adequate time, the
carriers fax the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS)
data to CBP well before the arrival of the plane in
Vancouver. Toronto and Montreal want to begin intransit
preclearance, in 2007 and 2008, respectively.
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"Progressive Preclearance"
--------------------------
¶14. (U) Canada and the U.S. had finalized pre-9/11 an MOU
for a pilot project for progressive preclearance under which
passengers could be cleared by CBP in Ottawa who were
transiting Toronto or Montreal for U.S.-bound flights. Under
that plan, an aircraft would carry only cleared passengers on
the domestic leg who were U.S.-bound. At the December 13 PCG
meeting, the U.S. agreed to review the pilot and reply. A
major challenge in Toronto and Montreal will be sterile areas
with adequate security--and size--to hold transit passengers.
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa
WILKINS