

Currently released so far... 12478 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AU
ASEC
AE
AF
AORC
AEMR
AMGT
ABUD
AFFAIRS
APER
AS
AMED
AY
AG
AR
AJ
AL
AID
AM
AODE
ABLD
AMG
AFIN
ATRN
AGAO
AFU
AN
AA
ALOW
APECO
ADM
ARF
ASEAN
APEC
AMBASSADOR
AO
ASUP
AZ
AADP
ACOA
ANET
AMCHAMS
ACABQ
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APCS
AGMT
AINF
AIT
AORL
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
ADANA
ADPM
AX
ADCO
AECL
AMEX
ACAO
ASCH
AORG
AGR
AROC
ASIG
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
BL
BR
BO
BA
BD
BM
BK
BG
BU
BB
BH
BTIO
BY
BEXP
BP
BE
BRUSSELS
BF
BIDEN
BT
BX
BC
BILAT
BN
BBSR
BTIU
BWC
BMGT
CA
CASC
CVIS
CM
CH
CO
CU
CD
CWC
CI
CS
CY
CMGT
CF
CG
CR
CB
CV
CW
CE
CBW
CT
CPAS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CJAN
CODEL
CIDA
CDG
CDC
CIA
CTR
CNARC
CSW
CN
CONS
CLINTON
COE
CROS
CARICOM
CONDOLEEZZA
COUNTER
CL
COM
CICTE
CIS
CFED
COUNTRY
CJUS
CBSA
CEUDA
CLMT
CAC
COPUOS
CIC
CBE
CHR
CTM
CVR
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CACS
CAN
CITT
CARSON
CACM
CDB
CAPC
CKGR
CBC
EC
EG
EPET
ECON
ETRD
EFIN
EIND
EMIN
ENRG
EAID
EAGR
EUN
ETTC
EAIR
ENIV
ES
EU
EINV
ELAB
ECIN
EFIS
ELTN
EWWT
ECPS
ECONOMIC
ENGR
EN
EINT
EPA
ELN
ESA
EZ
ER
ET
EFTA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EUMEM
ETRA
EXTERNAL
EI
EUR
EK
ERNG
ENGY
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENERG
EINVEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELECTIONS
ETC
EUREM
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EURN
ECINECONCS
EEPET
EXIM
ERD
ENVI
ETRC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EAIG
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
EIAR
EXBS
ECUN
EINDETRD
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINVETC
IZ
IT
IR
IS
IN
IC
IAEA
IO
ICAO
IWC
ID
IV
ISRAEL
IAHRC
IQ
ICTR
IMF
IRS
IDP
IGAD
ICRC
ICTY
IMO
IL
INRA
INRO
ICJ
ITU
IBRD
INMARSAT
IIP
ITALY
IEFIN
IACI
ILO
INTELSAT
ILC
ITRA
IDA
INRB
IRC
INTERPOL
IA
IPR
IRAQI
ISRAELI
INTERNAL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IBET
INR
IEA
IZPREL
IRAJ
ITF
IF
KDEM
KU
KPAL
KNNP
KCRM
KZ
KN
KS
KJUS
KTFN
KSCA
KV
KISL
KPAO
KPKO
KIRF
KTIA
KIPR
KFLO
KFRD
KTIP
KAWC
KSUM
KCOM
KAID
KE
KTDB
KMDR
KOMC
KWBG
KDRG
KVPR
KTEX
KGIC
KWMN
KSCI
KCOR
KACT
KDDG
KHLS
KSAF
KFLU
KSEO
KMRS
KSPR
KOLY
KSEP
KVIR
KGHG
KIRC
KUNR
KIFR
KCIP
KMCA
KMPI
KBCT
KHSA
KICC
KIDE
KCRS
KMFO
KRVC
KRGY
KR
KAWK
KG
KFIN
KHIV
KBIO
KOCI
KBTR
KNEI
KPOA
KCFE
KPLS
KSTC
KHDP
KPRP
KCRCM
KLIG
KCFC
KTER
KREC
KTBT
KPRV
KSTH
KRIM
KRAD
KWAC
KWMM
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMS
KX
KMIG
KRCM
KVRP
KBTS
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNAR
KPWR
KNPP
KDEMAF
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KGIT
KPAI
KTLA
KFSC
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KOM
KMOC
KJUST
KGCC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KO
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KCMR
KCHG
KICA
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KCGC
KWWMN
KPAK
KWNM
KWMNCS
KRFD
MOPS
MCAP
MPOS
MARR
MO
MNUC
MX
MASS
MG
MY
MU
ML
MR
MILITARY
MTCRE
MT
MEPP
MA
MDC
MP
MAR
MASSMNUC
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MD
MI
MEETINGS
MK
MCC
MEPN
MRCRE
MAS
MIL
MASC
MC
MV
MTCR
MIK
MUCN
MEDIA
MERCOSUR
MW
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTRE
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
NO
NATO
NL
NP
NZ
NSF
NI
NH
NG
NAFTA
NU
NASA
NR
NATOPREL
NSSP
NSG
NA
NT
NW
NK
NPT
NPA
NATIONAL
NPG
NSFO
NS
NSC
NE
NGO
NDP
NIPP
NRR
NEW
NZUS
NC
NAR
NV
NORAD
OTRA
OPCW
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPIC
OIIP
OPRC
ODIP
OEXC
OPDC
OSCE
OIC
OSCI
OECD
OFDP
OFDA
OMIG
OPAD
OFFICIALS
OVP
OIE
OHUM
OCS
OBSP
OTR
OSAC
ON
OCII
OES
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PTER
PINS
PINR
PREF
PK
PROP
PA
PARM
PBTS
PMAR
PM
PGIV
PE
PRAM
PHUH
PHSA
PL
PNAT
PO
PLN
PAO
PSA
PHUMPGOV
PF
PEL
PBIO
POLITICS
PHUMBA
PAS
POL
PREO
PAHO
PMIL
POGOV
POV
PAK
PNR
PRL
PG
PREFA
PSI
PINL
PU
PARMS
PRGOV
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
PROG
PORG
PTBS
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PRELP
PSEPC
PGOVE
PINF
PNG
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
POLINT
PGGV
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RELATIONS
RW
RO
RM
RP
ROOD
RICE
RUPREL
RSO
RCMP
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RF
RFE
RSP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
SU
SCUL
SNAR
SOCI
SF
SA
SHUM
SENV
SP
SR
SY
SANC
SC
SMIG
SZ
SARS
SW
SEVN
SO
SEN
SL
SNARCS
SNARN
SI
SG
SN
SH
SYR
SAARC
SPCE
SHI
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SYRIA
SWE
STEINBERG
SIPRS
ST
SNARIZ
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SIPDIS
SAN
TC
TI
TBIO
TH
TSPL
TRGY
TSPA
TPHY
TU
TW
TS
TAGS
TK
TX
TNGD
TZ
TF
TL
TV
TN
TD
TIP
TR
TP
TO
TT
TFIN
THPY
TERRORISM
TINT
TRSY
TURKEY
TBID
US
UK
UNGA
UP
UZ
UNMIK
USTR
UNO
UNSC
UN
UNESCO
UNAUS
UNHRC
UY
UG
UNHCR
UNCND
USOAS
USEU
UNICEF
UNEP
UV
UNPUOS
UNCSD
USUN
UNCHR
UNDC
USNC
UE
UNDP
UNC
USPS
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
UNFICYP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09TOKYO2815, FRF: SENIOR DPJ LEADER SAYS ""NO DEAL"" THIS YEAR
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09TOKYO2815.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TOKYO2815 | 2009-12-09 08:56 | 2011-05-04 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXRO1197
OO RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #2815/01 3430856
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 090856Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8095
INFO RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE IMMEDIATE 1648
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO IMMEDIATE 8343
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA IMMEDIATE 0186
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA IMMEDIATE 7837
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/USFJ IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 002815
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV JA
SUBJECT: FRF: SENIOR DPJ LEADER SAYS ""NO DEAL"" THIS YEAR
Classified By: DCM James P. Zumwalt per 1.4 (b/d)
¶1. (C) Summary: DPJ Diet Affairs Chair Kenji Yamaoka (a
close confidante of DPJ Secretary General Ozawa) told Embassy
Tokyo December 8 that the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)
decision was ""all about managing the Diet."" Until two weeks
ago, he thought the Japanese government would agree to an FRF
deal by the end of the year. However the PM moved too slowly
and now a decision within the year is no longer possible due
to coalition partner intransigence. He said that after the
Upper House elections next summer, the Socialist Democratic
Party (SDP) and People's New Party (PNP) would no longer be
needed in the coalition, and at that point the government
would implement the deal. Yamaoka advised the United States
to be patient. In the meantime, he promised he would pass
the necessary FRF-related budget items so that Japan could
reserve its position on realignment. The DCM pressed for an
expeditious decision, but Yamaoka dismissed our arguments on
the need to move forward this year saying that the decision
had already been made and ""only FM Okada"" was still arguing
for an agreement this year. He acknowledged that this would
present difficulties for PM Hatoyama's relationship with
President Obama and criticized the PM as a ""poor
communicator."" When asked about Okinawa politics, Yamaoka
said that Governor Nakaima would go ahead and sign the
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), but that he could not
win the governor's race next year. In summer 2010, the
Japanese Government would move forward with the FRF plan, and
the new Okinawa governor would have to accept the ""done deal""
of the realignment package. End Summary.
¶2. (C) In a December 8 meeting with DCM Zumwalt and Poloff,
DPJ Diet Affairs Committee Chairman Yamaoka frankly shared
his views on Japan's political situation and issues
surrounding FRF. Yamaoka explained that there were
precedents that PMs had to resign in order to pass the
budget. If the DPJ's coalition partners left the government
over the FRF issue, then the DPJ would lose its Upper House
majority and be unable to pass budget-related bills; Hatoyama
might thus have to resign. Hatoyama's political donation
problem is likely to reach a critical point from the end of
this year to early next year, and Hatoyama is likely to be
attacked in the ordinary Diet session. As the Diet Affairs
Committee Chair, Yamaoka said he would try to delay the
opening of the session as long as possible in order to
deprive the LDP of time to attack Hatoyama's scandals. That
means deliberation of key Diet bills, including the
supplementary budget and regular budget, will be pushed back
and the DPJ will be pressed to handle them all quickly. To
manage this process, the party needs its coalition partners
in the Upper House. Since the UH election will be held in
July, the session cannot be extended. The supplementary
budget and the regular budget have to pass before the UH
election, and key budget items, such as child allowances and
agricultural subsidies must be implemented as well.
Therefore Diet management in the next session was critical to
Hatoyama's success, Yamaoka explained.
¶3. (C) If the SDP continues to threaten to leave the
coalition, the PNP may threaten to do the same to ""increase
its profile,"" Yamaoka continued. The PNP hopes to hold the
casting vote once the SDP is gone, and that means the PNP
will become increasingly vocal about the FRF issue. Yamaoka
explained that the most important issue for the SDP was
Okinawa, for the PNP was the postal issue, and for DPJ SecGen
Ozawa was Diet reform. In order to position themselves
favorably, all three parties will use whatever political
cards they have. If the United States continues to pressure
Hatoyama on the Futenma issue, the Hatoyama Cabinet could
possibly collapse. If the SDP leaves the coalition, Diet
management for the DPJ would be extremely difficult. FM
Okada and MLIT Minister Maehara have no experience in Diet
management, and they cannot be where they are now without
being supported by the ""ship called a coalition."" They do
not understand the politics of the Diet affairs. If they
could put themselves in the PM's position, their judgment
would be different, said Yamaoka. In his view, it is better
for the United States to wait for the political situation to
calm down until after the budget passes and the DPJ's victory
in the July 2010 UH election. If the United States continues
to apply pressure, reiterated Yamaoka, the situation could
further deteriorate. Yamaoka said that haste makes waste,
TOKYO 00002815 002 OF 003
and stated that waiting, in the end, is the best way to
ensure the plan's implantation. Once the DPJ wins the UH
election, the FRF issue can be solved said Yamaoka. Yamaoka
has been discussing the FRF issue with the PM and Chief
Cabinet Secretary Hirano and advising them on the Diet
situation. Yamaoka told the PM if he could meet with the
President in Copenhagen, he should fully explain the current
political/Diet situation and gain his understanding.
¶4. (C) The DCM underlined the need for an expeditious
decision, particularly in light of local Okinawan politics
and our own budget process. Yamaoka said that a decision had
already been made; the only issue that remained was how to
explain to the United States that, by earmarking FRF-related
funds in the budget, Japan was making a de facto commitment
to move forward with the FRF plan as currently envisioned.
Yamaoka made it clear that Hatoyama was not planning to
commit political suicide in order to implement the FRF this
year. FM Okada may think it's okay for Hatoyama to quit if
the FRF deal could be pushed forward, but Hatoyama does not
think so. The more that Okada -- who may think he can
replace Hatoyama -- presses the PM, the more Hatoyama will
consider the political situation and how best to protect his
position. He will not give up the prime ministership for
Futenma, Yamaoka said.
¶5. (C) That said, Yamaoka repeated that he told Defense
Minister Kitazawa to make sure to earmark the FRF and Guam
expenses in the regular budget. Yamaoka said that as the
manager of the Diet business, he would make sure these
government requests passed. Yamaoka hoped that the United
States would implicitly understand that earmarking meant that
the plan would be implemented eventually. Yamaoka also
stated that relevant Cabinet members were being called to the
Kantei not to be told that a decision on the implementation
of the current plan would be made in December, but to be told
that the implementation would not be announced before the end
of the year, although the budget would be earmarked.
According to Yamaoka, PM told this to Okinawa Governor
Nakaima as well; for his part, Nakaima has been pressuring
the PM to move forward with the current plan for the sake of
his own political position, Yamaoka said.
¶6. (C) On Okinawa politics, Yamaoka said that Okinawa would
oppose base issues whenever they are discussed. ""It's all
about opposing for its own sake,"" Yamaoka stated. The
Okinawa gubernatorial election will be held next fall and
incumbent governor Nakaima will lose for sure. Once the new
governor is elected, the FRF issue could hit a real wall, so
the GOJ needed to resolve it before then. If the base
decision were a fait accompli, then the new governor would be
forced to accept that decision. Nakaima knows that he has to
stick the current plan and that's the only way for him to
have a chance to survive politically. As for the Nago
mayoral election, regardless of the outcome, the government
must stick to its plan to implement the realignment
agreement. If Okinawa's will is respected, ""nothing will
ever happen."" The issue of Okinawa politics, therefore, is
not a big deal as long as the government's decision is made
before the gubernatorial race.
¶7. (C) On PM Hatoyama's ""trust me"" statement, Yamaoka
explained that PM meant to say that he would surely move
forward with FRF ""at some point."" Yamaoka expressed his
understanding that the United States took this to mean that
the PM would make a decision within this year, and that
President Obama had ""lost face."" Yamaoka believed that
Hatoyama exercised the wrong political judgment. In
Yamaoka's view, Hatoyama should have clearly promised
President Obama when they met that his government would
implement the current plan. Yamaoka revealed that around
that time, the SDP was under a great deal of political
pressure, as Yamaoka had told them that once out of the
coalition, the SDP would vanish as a political party in the
upcoming election. SDP president Fukushima seriously
considered accepting the DPJ's position; however, when PM and
others moved slowly on FRF, the SDP took the initiative by
holding an anti-base rally in Okinawa. This created the
political momentum for the anti-base elements in the SDP to
oppose the Futenma relocation even if it meant putting the
coalition at risk. Yamaoka critically said that the PM's
lack of leadership and determination led to the current mess.
TOKYO 00002815 003 OF 003
He lost the opportunity to make a political decision by
moving too slowly, Yamaoka said.
¶8. (C) In Yamaoka's view, the best way to break through the
current stalemate is for Washington to understand the current
political situation in Japan and to tell Japan what it would
like to do in search of mutually acceptable ""next best way.""
If PM Hatoyama cannot meet President Obama on the matter,
Yamaoka thought that Japan should send a special envoy to
deliver the message and seek U.S. understanding. He thought
a phone conversation between PM Hatoyama and President Obama
would not be sufficient, as their ""true feelings"" would not
be adequately communicated by telephone.
¶9. (C) Yamaoka added that even if the current plan were
implemented, the Japanese public would not necessarily be
favorable towards U.S.-Japan relations, as the media and
other ""agitators"" would focus on the issue of the coral reef
and environmental destruction caused by the landfill. The
negative image could shake the DPJ government.
Implementation of the current plan meant reduction of the
burden on Okinawa, but politically it could be viewed
negatively. In order to avoid such a situation, Yamaoka said
it was critical to discuss the future direction of the
alliance and make the FRF/Henoko issue as but one of many
issues in the alliance. In doing so, it is also important to
explain to the Japanese public that it is the time for Japan
to reduce its dependence on the United States and try to
assume a greater defense burden.
¶10. (C) On the DPJ's position on the future of the alliance,
Yamaoka explained it had three stages. First, the DPJ should
make it clear to the United States that it intends to bear
much more responsibility in the alliance. Second, the United
States should explain what kind of roles it expected from
Japan within its global strategy. Third, Japan should then
decide its direction and what it can do. The process may
take some time, but Yamaoka said that was what Ozawa wanted
to do. Japan needed to continue to stay under the U.S.
nuclear umbrella and needs to bear more of a burden. The
current public feeling between Japan and the United States is
that while Americans feel overburdened, the Japanese public
feels negative about foreign military forces stationed in
Japan. Yamaoka understood that Japan was very ""spoiled"" and
dependent on the United States and was taking U.S. protection
for granted. Some Japanese think that Japan's security is
none of their business, and therefore, no bases were needed.
Once the UH election is over, Yamaoka thinks the DPJ can
remove the SDP and the PNP from the coalition. The DPJ will
have three years before another national election, and within
the three years, the DPJ should be able to step up
discussions on how to advance the alliance from the post-war
relationship to future-oriented relationship without any
obstacles.
ROOS