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Viewing cable 06PARAMARIBO343, INCREASED VENEZUELAN ACTIVISM IN SURINAME HAS
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06PARAMARIBO343 | 2006-06-09 18:55 | 2011-01-31 15:00 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Paramaribo |
VZCZCXRO4185
RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL
RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHPO #0343/01 1601855
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 091855Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8408
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0009
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1554
RUEHBR/USDAO BRASILIA BR
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARAMARIBO 000343
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/CAR-LLUFTIG, WHA/PDQEDETTER, APRUITT
DEPT FOR INR - RCARHART
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: DECL: 06/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ENRG KCRM MARR SOCI SCUL VE
NS
SUBJECT: INCREASED VENEZUELAN ACTIVISM IN SURINAME HAS
MIXED SUCCESS
REF: A) PARAMARIBO 175 B) PARAMARIBO 286 C) PARAMARIBO 155
D) 05 PARAMARIBO 723 E) 05 PARAMARIBO 414 F) 05 PARAMARIBO
527 G) 05 PARAMARIBO 687 H) 05 PARAMARIBO 783
Classified by Ambassador Marsha E. Barnes, reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Venezuela's profile in Suriname is on the
rise thanks to economic initiatives such as PetroCaribe, a
joint Cuban-Venezuelan health care assistance program, and
a steady public relations campaign by its Embassy over the
past year. Despite this heightened engagement, Venezuela's
activism is not blindly well received, however, as some
recognize the more obtrusive edges of PetroCaribe or are
otherwise disappointed by supposed largesse. Local media
also carry unvarnished views on conditions in Venezuela
with some regularity. By positioning himself as defender
of the less developed countries in the hemisphere, GOV
President Hugo Chavez strikes a chord with many Surinamers
who bristle at perceived outside interference by larger,
richer countries in their affairs. Surinamers, though,
typically center their passion against the Dutch and not
the U.S. Venezuelan activism here will likely further
increase, and if Chavez ramps up aid to Suriname, his
ability to influence may well follow; NDP opposition party
leader Desi Bouterse is already a fan. End Summary.
----------------------------------------
ECONOMIC TIES: PETROCARIBE AND FISHERIES
----------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Venezuela's most high profile initiative in Suriname
is the PetroCaribe agreement. Implementation, however,
appears further off than officials from both sides are
publicly claiming (See ref A). Some GOS officials are
concerned that it will lead to increased political
indebtedness to Venezuela, according to Terrence Craig,
Head of the Americas Desk at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA). The Finance Minister is reportedly
uncomfortable with the increased debt levels resulting from
PetroCaribe's financing scheme and a GOS proposal to use
its proceeds to create a social fund designed to provide
low interest home mortgages. The director of the state oil
company, Staatsolie, has serious reservations about the
role his enterprise is expected to play, as it would be
positioned to be a storage and transport facility,
undermining its business model to grow as a supplier.
¶3. (C) In its impatience to complete the PetroCaribe deal,
Venezuela is refusing to renew a 1986 fisheries agreement
that expired in June 2005 until a PetroCaribe delivery
schedule is finalized, according to Craig. Specifically,
the GOV is declining to sign a fuel clause allowing low
cost Venezuelan fuel for Surinamese fishing vessels until
Suriname commits to PetroCaribe's final steps. Craig said
the GOS is dismayed at this negotiation tactic even as the
GOS seeks to restructure the fisheries agreement to make it
more beneficial for Suriname, which, according to critics,
has received very little from the deal.
¶4. (U) The GOV paid for 15 Surinamese import companies to
attend the South American Conference on Trade and
Investment held in Caracas from May 15-19, aimed to explore
commercial opportunities and ease interregional South
American trade. An additional 45 companies were invited to
attend at their own expense.
--------------------------------------------- -----
POLITICAL RELATIONS SOLID, BUT DIFFERENCES REMAIN
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶5. (SBU) Political ties between the GOS and GOV can be
considered solid, but neither side sees the other as a
primary partner. Craig said deepened political cooperation
still awaited the renewal of a formal bilateral
consultation mechanism that has been defunct since 2002.
In public statements on his country's political relations
with Suriname, GOV Ambassador to Suriname Francisco
Simancas emphasized Venezuela's backing of Surinamer Albert
Ramdin's successful drive to become Assistant Secretary
General of the Organization of American States (OAS) along
PARAMARIBO 00000343 002 OF 004
with help provided to Suriname in its bid to join the
Community of South American Nations. Pending topics of
discussion include Suriname becoming a signatory to the
CARICOM-Venezuela cooperation agreement, the establishment
of a direct flight between Paramaribo and Caracas, and the
proposal to build a city square in honor of Simon Bolivar
in Paramaribo.
¶6. (U) Suriname and Venezuela appear to be at direct odds
concerning the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA),
which Suriname supports and Chavez actively opposes.
Surinamese President Ronald Venetiaan said late in 2005
small economies have less luxury to engage in debate that
delays successful integration than countries with large
domestic markets like Venezuela (and Brazil and Argentina).
¶7. (C) Ideologically, the populist politics of President
Chavez resonate with the long ago leftward leanings of many
in Suriname's current leadership who still view
strengthening South-South relations favorably. Entering
the fold of Chavez's Bolivarian Alliance, though, is not
on the GOS agenda. Chavez does have an ideological ally in
Desi Bouterse, the leader of Suriname's single largest
opposition party, as well as a former military dictator,
murder suspect (See ref C) and convicted narcotics
trafficker. Bouterse, who sent Chavez a personal letter of
congratulations after the 2004 referendum, has a large
poster of Chavez hanging prominently in his office with the
quote Against Imperialism for a Free Venezuela, seen
recently in a front-page newspaper photo.
¶8. (C) A Bouterse confidant privately claimed just before
the May 2005 election that if Bouterse's NDP party were to
win, he would align Suriname more closely with Chavez.
Bouterse supposedly made a number of trips to Venezuela to
secure financial support for his 2005 election campaign,
despite an outstanding Interpol warrant for his arrest.
Fears of possible Chavez support to Bouterse and his party
in the run up to Suriname's next election may drive the GOS
to accommodate Chavez more than it might otherwise, lest it
lose its already slim parliamentary majority.
--------------------------------------------- --------------
HEADLINES FOR FREE EYE CARE PROGRAM AND DISASTER ASSISTANCE
--------------------------------------------- --------------
¶9. (U) A joint Cuban-Venezuelan program to provide free eye
treatment and surgery for low income Surinamers has been
garnering positive headlines for both countries since it
began in October 2005. (See ref D). The Venezuelan Embassy
provided key financial and logistical support in the
initial stages of the program, although with the recent
opening of a Cuban Embassy, it is not clear that Venezuelan
role will continue.
¶10. (U) During Suriname's recent flooding disaster, a GOV
delegation arrived to great fanfare to assess needs then
left the next day without making a commitment. Eventually,
the GOV donated 20,000 barrels of fuel for planes,
helicopter, and boats. It also reportedly plans to donate
14 tons of humanitarian supplies, including rice,
children's clothing, medicine, tools, school supplies, and
an electric pump.
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HITS AND MISSES OF VENEZUELAN PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶11. (SBU) Through public relations and cultural outreach,
the GOV has been raising its profile and spreading Chavez's
message in Suriname, especially since the arrival of public
relations coordinator and former Al-Jazeera employee
Herminia Fernandez one year ago. (See ref E). Upon her
arrival last year, Hernandez said the GOV would conduct
journalist training, but to our knowledge, no significant
formal trainings have taken place. There are increased
numbers of press releases and newspaper articles covering
or promoting Venezuelan positions, projects, and events.
One paper ran a GOV press release in February justifying
the Venezuelan vote against the IAEA resolution concerning
Iran's nuclear program.
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¶12. (U) The Venezuelan Embassy's largest print propaganda
effort is a glossy 2-4 page color English language
newspaper dubbed The Venezuelan Emblem. It features
articles praising Chavez and his policy achievements and
criticizing the U.S. and Chavez's domestic political
opponents. It also highlights Venezuelan activities in
Suriname, such as optimistic predictions for the closing of
the PetroCaribe deal. The Embassy sponsors a 30-minute
Spanish language radio and TV program bi-weekly on four
local broadcasters named Venezuela Presente, which covers
political, economic, and social news with a Venezuelan
slant.
¶13. (U) Venezuela's relatively large cultural center is
popular among Surinamers and a significant part of the
GOV's public diplomacy outreach. The center offers
inexpensive Spanish language, dance, and art lessons, and
often hosts art exhibitions, sport competitions and film
festivals. The Venezuelan Embassy in Suriname also has a
newly designed website, www.suriname.gob.ve, to promote its
efforts. The website houses biographies of the Ambassador
and DCM.
¶14. (U) The GOV suffered a public relations setback when
local media reportedly widely on a Surinamese delegation's
nightmare experience at the August 2005 World Youth
Festival in Caracas. (See ref F). Delegates returned home
bitterly complaining to the press of horrible logistics
failures and the propagandist and pro-Chavez political
nature of the conference, saying they felt duped and
misinformed. Despite their bad experience, Suriname's youth
representatives are not adverse to further offers of
training and travel. For example, out of the ashes of the
festival, grew an exchange program between the Venezuelan
state of Carobobo and Suriname.
¶15. (SBU) Other public diplomacy setbacks for Venezuela
include the occasional sharp editorial enumerating the
failures of President Chavez's government in print media
(See reftel G), and a documentary-style series on Venezuela
with quite negative factual commentary on the country's
social and economic situation on local TV.
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LAW ENFORCEMENT AND MILITARY COOPERATION
----------------------------------------
¶16. (C) There is very limited cooperation between the GOV
and GOS in the law enforcement realm. Our police and
prosecutorial contacts complain of a lack of Venezuelan
aggressiveness in combating the flow of narcotics through
the region, and some see Venezuela as the region's weakest
law enforcement link.
¶17. (C) Military cooperation between the two countries
remains limited to exchanges and training, but is
expanding. Pilot training on Casa 212 aircraft to members
of the Surinamese air wing is planned for later this year.
The first Surinamer graduated from the Venezuelan Military
Academy in 2005 and Suriname has another spot this year.
The GOV offered a Coast Guard development assistance
program for two years in a row, but the GOS deemed the GOV
plan inappropriate for Suriname because it was based on
Venezuela's own civil authority system. (NOTE: A U.S.
military delegation also recently visited Suriname for
consultations on possible USG assistance in developing a
Coast Guard or other maritime enforcement presence. The
Dutch have held discussions on and off with Surinamese over
the last several years regarding establishment of a Coast
Guard. End Note.)
¶18. (C) Venezuala's armed forces took center stage during
Suriname's 30th independence anniversary in November 2005
with paratroopers parachuting into the middle of the main
ceremony. (See ref H). Chavez was supposedly scheduled to
attend, as he had in 2000, but canceled at the last minute.
Surrounding the festivities, Venezuelan Defense Attache
Orlando Alvardo Osorio decorated the Commander of the
Surinamese Armed Forces, Colonel Ernst Mercuur, with the
Venezuelan army's second highest honor for his service and
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professional achievements.
¶19. (U) In December 2005 parliamentarian Ruth Wijdenbosch,
a senior member of President Venetiaan's NPS party, in
speaking about her opposition to Suriname's signing an
Article 98, said that if Suriname were to lose U.S.
military assistance, she would push for closer ties with
Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina to replace U.S.
cooperation.
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COMMENT
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¶20. (C) By positioning himself as a hero of independence
and a leader willing to stand up to bigger, richer
countries, Chavez appeals to Surinamers, many of whom
resent their former colonial power, the Netherlands, and
would like to see more Chavez-style rhetoric and actions
employed against it. This admiration for Chavez is more
visceral than intellectual. Suriname is likely to remain
receptive to increased Venezuelan engagement, hoping that
it will lead to cheap oil and assistance, both financial
and materiel. Surinamers are not uniformly unsceptical,
however, and the case of PetroCaribe shows that Venezuela
may face some resistance from those leery of deals with
strings attached. Under the current government, it is not
likely that Suriname's increased engagement with Venezuelan
will mean a detoriation of relations with the U.S. Given
the close ties of Bouterse, the leader of the largest
single party, the government may feel a need to watch its
flank and take a more flexible approach to ties with the
GOV.
BARNES