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Viewing cable 09PANAMA470, PANAMA: GRAY HULL OPERATION CUTS COASTAL DRUG
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09PANAMA470 | 2009-06-12 17:37 | 2011-04-07 00:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Panama |
Appears in these articles: http://www.padigital.com.pa/periodico/edicion-actual/wikileaks-panama-interna.php?story_id=1027140&codeth=1593 |
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHZP #0470/01 1631737
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 121737Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3486
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2815
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 2022
RHMFISS/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T PANAMA 000470
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA: GRAY HULL OPERATION CUTS COASTAL DRUG
TRAFFICKING ROUTE
REF: A. A: PANAMA 00933/08
¶B. B: PANAMA 00343
Classified By: Ambassador Barbara J. Stephenson for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (S//NF) "Thank you for convincing us to support this
operation. It has really worked," Panamanian President Martin
Torrijos told the Ambassador June 5, referring to Operation
Goal Line Stance (aka Conjuntos-09). This DEA-funded maritime
drug interdiction operation used JIATF-South and Panamanian
National Aero-Naval Service (SENAN) assets (including four
SOUTHCOM donated Nortech boats, two NAS donated interceptors)
to effectively cut the Eastern Pacific littoral drug
trafficking route through Panama from May 19 through June 4.
The key to this operation was the GOP allowing a U.S. Navy
asset, the frigate USS Gary, to patrol in and around its
territorial waters (TTW) with an embarked SENAN officer
coordinating with SENAN interceptor boats. The ship,
stationed off the coast of Panama's Darien province, also
made it difficult for FARC forces based nearby to resupply or
carryout their drug and weapons trafficking operations.
President Torrijos has authorized the operation to continue
until June 26, and Post is working with the incoming
Martinelli government to get open-ended approval to continue
the operation. Vice President-elect Varela told the
Ambassador on May 29 that he would support continuing the
operation under the incoming government. Post strongly
recommends that JIATF-S continue to deploy US assets to the
area for the foreseeable future, given the demonstrated
ability of the deployment to push drug traffickers away from
the coastal trafficking route that is doing so much damage to
our Central American partners. End Summary
------------------
Impressive Results
------------------
¶2. (S//NF) As a result of Operation Goal Line Stance (GLS),
U.S. and Panamanian forces: (1) intercepted two go-fasts
carrying cocaine, one possibly carrying weapons (the cargo
was jettisoned and sank), and two carrying illegal
immigrants; (2) disrupted four go-fasts attempting to
transit; (3) seized 836 kilos of cocaine; and (4) detained 16
suspects and 23 illegal immigrants. Most importantly, from
May 21 to June 4 no go-fast activity was detected in Panama's
Pacific TTW. Indications are that the Drug Trafficking
Organizations (DTOs) in Colombia were aware of the presence
of the U.S. and Panamanian assets, and placed a fishing boat
on station to keep watch. DEA also received reports that
several DTOs were getting frustrated, as multi-ton loads
stacked up on Colombian beaches. The operation also involved
coordination with the Colombian Navy, through TAT Colombia,
and on June 6, as the operation was winding down, five
go-fast boats attempted to break through. While two
succeeded, three were turned around by the Gary and Colombian
naval forces, and subsequently seized by the Colombians. In a
conversation aboard the Gary on June 5, First VP and FM
Samuel Lewis asserted that while the operation was underway,
the murder rate in Panama had plummeted.
----------
Background
----------
¶3. (C) GLS was designed by JIATF-S and the SENAN, following
President Torrijos' approval for a U.S. Navy asset (a "gray
hull" as opposed to a USCG "white hull") to operate in
Panama's TTW (see reftel B). Panama has historically resisted
allowing "gray hulls" the same access to its waters that it
grants "white hulls" due to sensitivities about allowing a
U.S. military presence in the country (see reftel A).
Torrijos was convinced to allow the operation as a test case
on hearing from the Ambassador about the successful
deployment of the USCGC Sherman and USCGC Hamilton off the
Darien from March 15 to March 22, during which period six
go-fasts were seized. In April, the Ambassador explained to
Torrijos that since three times as many "gray hulls" were
available as "white hulls," a dedicated deployment would
require approval for a "gray hull" operation.
--------------------------
Operation Goal Line Stance
--------------------------
¶4. (C) GLS involved the USS Gary and more than ten SENAN
assets patrolling Panama's Pacific littorals (including at
one point all four SOUTHCOM donated Nortech interceptor
boats, two NAS donated interceptor boats, and a USG donated
and NAS refurbished 82' vessel acting as a "mother ship" for
the interceptors) from May 18 until June 7. The Gary
concentrated on the area off the village of Jaque in the
Darien, close to the Panama-Colombia border. SENAN assets
were stationed across the Gulf of Panama. The SENAN's
deployment was paid for with DEA funds, and they would not
have been able to maintain their forces deployed without the
assistance. Most events through the operation took place off
the Darien coast, and in the future a much more modest SENAN
deployment in or near the Darien should be sufficient to
support U.S. assets in the area and allow for an effective
deterrent. During the operation, SENAN achieved a very high
level of operational efficiency, putting more boats in the
water, and achieving better communications with and among
them, then it has been able to do at any point in the last
few years.
-------------------
Pressuring the FARC
-------------------
¶5. (S//NF) In designing GLS, a secondary intention was to
put pressure on the FARC 57th Front camp near Guayabito, on
the Darien coast, where 57th Front Deputy Commander Luis
Fernando Mora, aka "Silver," has his base of operations.
Silver runs a drug trafficking and logistics network for the
FARC based on his ability to move goods up and down Panama's
coasts from his beach front camp. The area of operation of
the Gary was in this area, making it very hard for the FARC
to move drugs, weapons and other supplies either to their
camp, or into or out of Colombia. Post has received
information from sensitive sources that the operation
substantially impacted the ability of the FARC to conduct
drug trafficking, and that a prolongation of the naval
presence could seriously impact Silver's operation.
---------------------------------
Support of the New Administration
---------------------------------
¶6. (S//NF) The Ambassador briefed Vice President-elect and
Foreign Minister-designate Juan Carlos Varela on the success
of the operation during a May 29 visit to the USNS Comfort.
Varela expressed his support for continuing the operation
under the incoming administration to suppress drug
trafficking and to weaken the FARC in the Darien.
-----------------
Visiting the Gary
-----------------
¶7. (C) On June 5, Torrijos, Lewis, SENAN Director Rigoberto
Gordon and the Ambassador visited the Gary to be briefed on
the operation and see the Gary first hand. Following his
briefing, President Torrijos praised the operation and the
positive effects it was having on crime in Panama City. He
noted that the view of his government was that Panama's
security problems were law enforcement-related, and that this
operation had demonstrated that law enforcement means were
the best way to confront DTOs and the FARC. Torrijos
personally thanked the crew, noting that they were protecting
the U.S., Panama and all of Central America at the same time.
While on board, Torrijos authorized JIATF-S to back fill the
Gary with a second gray-hull until June 26. He specified,
however, that he did not want to turn the country over to
President-elect Martinelli on July 1 with a "gray hull"
operating in Panama's TTW.
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Gray-hull Guidelines
-----------------==--
¶8. (SBU) The standing rules for gray-hulls in Panama's TTW
now stand as follows: Gray-hulls may only operate regularly
in Panama's TTW as part of a specific authorized operation,
and should have a SENAN shiprider on board. Other gray-hulls
may enter Panama's TTW on the specific request of the GOP to
assist SENAN, or if they are chasing a suspect vessel into
Panama's TTW, as long as they have the oral permission of the
SENAN Director or his immediate subordinates as relayed to
JIATF-S or USCG D-7 or D-11 by TAT Chief Panama.
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Thanks/Kudos
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¶9. (SBU) Post would like to thank OSD, SOUTHCOM,
JIATF-South, USNAVSO, and our colleagues in the Department
for their support of the short-fuse request to support
Torrijos' visit to the Gary. We would also like to give kudos
to the Captain, officers and crew of the Gary, including the
USCG LEDET, who did a fantastic job briefing the delegation.
The concern and dedication they showed to their mission was
one of the key take-aways for the delegation, and placed the
role of gray-hulls in counter-drug operations in just the
right perspective. Congratulations and thanks to all!
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Comment
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¶10. (S//NF) This operation has been a great success. From a
political perspective, we overcame resistance to accepting
the presence of U.S. Navy vessels in Panamanian TTW - and did
it with such style we earned the President's gratitude
instead of resentment. It was also a home run from an
operational perspective: the suppression of all drug
trafficking activity in Panama's TTW for over two weeks
proves that with available assets the USG and our partners
can push drug trafficking away from Central America's
littoral waters. As RADM Nimmich, outgoing JIATF-S commander,
told the Embassy's Country Team on January 15, the littoral
drug trafficking route is so destructive of the societies of
the Central American countries where it is taking place that
it is putting their very stability at risk. This operation
has shown that it is possible to block this route, at least
with regard to Panama, by using a USN asset in close
coordination with host nation assets, and with close
coordination among neighboring countries. Post notes that
JIATF-S has agreed to back-fill the Gary with the USS Carr,
and encourages JIATF-S to consider making the deployment
ongoing while Post works with the GOP to strengthen the SENAN
to a point where it can take over this responsibility.
However, Post notes, however, that the critical importance
that sea based air assets have played in the success of this
operation calls into question the likelihood that Panama will
be able to take full responsibility for policing its own
waters without USG support any time soon.
STEPHENSON