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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05BEIRUT2153, THE NEW AND IMPROVED NABIH BERRI SAYS THE RIGHT
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05BEIRUT2153 | 2005-06-30 14:59 | 2011-04-08 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beirut |
Appears in these articles: http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/8639 http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/8636 http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/8635 http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/8637 |
O 301459Z JUN 05
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8545
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 002153
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN/POUNDS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2020
TAGS: PREL KDEM PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: THE NEW AND IMPROVED NABIH BERRI SAYS THE RIGHT
THING ON REFORM, NEED FOR QUIET ALONG BLUE LINE
REF: BEIRUT 2104
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) Newly re-elected Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri,
opening a 6/30 meeting with the Ambassador, growled about
alleged USG attempts to "veto" his candidacy. But after this
initial scratchy start, Berri turned uncharacteristically
friendly and polemics-free, saying he wanted to set aside
politics to talk realities: Lebanon must have reform.
Lebanon will need assistance in that reform. U.S. and
international community support, even conditional, is needed
and welcome. Responding to the Ambassador's questions about
the seriousness of his new-found advocacy of reform, Berri
said (twice), "just watch me," vowing that Parliament will be
active in keeping the government publicly accountable. On
cabinet formation, Berri said that the Hizballah-Amal bloc
"should" get six seats of a 24-member cabinet but would
accept five only. Claiming that he wanted to schedule the
cabinet's vote of confidence "immediately," he worried that
President Lahoud would delay cabinet approval. Berri
rejected the Ambassador's complaints about his references to
U.S. encouragement of Palestinian settlement in Lebanon, and
he highlighted the fact that he had not explicitly criticized
UNSCR 1559 in his Parliamentary address. Berri thought that
UNSCR 1559 implementation should start with action against
Palestinian militants, not Hizballah. On actions in the
south, Berri, while repeating the familiar (and tiresome)
Lebanese claims to Sheba'a Farms, agreed that Hizballah
should not provoke the situation. He promised to use his
influence in an attempt to calm the blue line. End summary.
"WHY DID YOU WANT TO VETO ME?"
------------------------------
¶2. (C) In a 6/30 meeting with the Ambassador, newly elected
Parliament Speaker Berri initially went into his
characteristic attack mode: why had the USG attempted to
veto his candidacy? It must be so, Berri said, since the
Lebanese press has reported it. Expressing astonishment that
Berri believed what he read in Lebanese papers, the
Ambassador responded that the USG was supporting a process by
which the Lebanese, not foreigners, choose their leaders.
The USG hopes that the Lebanese will choose leaders who can
produce the types of reforms the Lebanese people want and
need, but it is not up to us to say who those leaders should
be. After some back-and-forth needling, Berri accepted the
Ambassador's words by offering chocolates wrapped in a
portrait of the Speaker himself (which can be removed and
used as a sticker, allowing images of Berri's smiling face to
be affixed conveniently to any surface). "And you think I'm
not sweet?" Berri cracked to the startled Ambassador.
THE BORN-AGAIN REFORMER
-----------------------
¶3. (C) Berri said that he wanted to put politics aside and
"not repeat my positions and you repeat your positions."
Claiming to speak candidly, he said that he was serious in
his Parliamentary address when he emphasized the need for
reform (reftel). He vowed to oversee an activist Parliament
that holds regular committee and full plenary sessions on
government performance. The Parliament must be the "public
watchdog," Berri said, emphasizing public accountability.
The Ambassador noted that Berri was describing a far
different Parliament than the one he had overseen before, and
he asked Berri about the general skepticism that greeted
Berri's public references to reform. "Just watch me," Berri
said, vowing to push through reform. Lebanon very much needs
U.S. and international support for its reform program. The
Ambassador cautioned Berri that he should expect that, given
the experience of Paris II, Lebanon should expect that any
international support will be conditional on the
implementation of reforms. Of course, Berri responded, "and
we will do it."
¶4. (C) The Ambassador asked Berri why he was suddenly a
convert to the cause of reforms. "I have always been with
reforms!" Berri, in a facts-be-damned moment, insisted.
Before, there was no reason to try to push for reform, given
the fights between Prime Minister Hariri and President Lahoud
and the intervention of the Syrians. Nothing as possible.
But now, the Syrian withdrawal makes everything possible.
The Syrians can no longer block change. "People say I'm
pro-Syrian," Berri complained. "But who wasn't? We had to
be!" Berri said that he will "never" be "anti-Syrian." He
said that Lebanon cannot be ruled from Syria, but, likewise,
Lebanon cannot be ruled as an enemy of Syria. The Ambassador
said that the USG looked forward to working with genuine
reformers, but he cautioned that we will base on our
assessments on actual reform. "I said, just watch me," Berri
said. He noted that he would be giving his "first" interview
on Lebanese television in more than a decade later that
evening, "and you'll hear me talk about reform."
QUICK CABINET FORMATION NEEDED,
WITH FIVE SEATS TO AMAL-HIZBALLAH
---------------------------------
¶5. (C) The Ambassador asked Berri about the cabinet
formation. Berri said that he expected Fouad Siniora would
be tapped by mid-afternoon as the Prime Minister-designate.
He said that he strongly supported quick government formation
-- "we need this immediately!" -- and would be willing to
call Parliament into session as early as Saturday (7/2) for a
vote of confidence, if Siniora could be ready by that time.
"We can't afford a vacuum," Berri said (without a hint of
shame that he had closed down Parliament since February,
single-handedly creating a legislative vacuum). But he did
not think the cabinet formation would move that quickly. He
expected there to be a "war of the 'thirds,'" with President
Lahoud "fighting for the right" to name at least one-third of
the cabinet members. Berri said that he would not insist on
the traditional Speaker's "one-third." Instead, he would use
the ratio of Hizballah-Amal's electoral strength of 33 seats
(out of 128) in the Parliament. This means that Hizballah
and Amal should have one-quarter of the cabinet seats, or 6
in a 24-member cabinet. But, to give Sa'ad Hariri more
flexibility, Hizballah and Amal together will ask for only
five seats, Berri said. Michel Aoun, with 21 MPs (including
his allies), should have three or four seats. The Ambassador
noted that the Speaker was assuming that Siniora intended to
form a national unity govenrment. What would the Speaker do
if Siniora attempted to form a majority cabinet with only his
electoral allies? Berri said that Siniora was not thinking
about this option and that Lebanon was not "ready" for this,
"not yet." Berri said that he also advocated having a
cabinet of "professionals," not MPs, but he conceded that
Siniora was likely to include at least some MPs.
U.S. SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIAN "IMPLANTATION,"
AND UNSCR 1559 -- NOT-SO-SUBTLE NUANCES
-------------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Turning back to Berri's speech before the Parliament
(reftel), the Ambassador said that the U.S. was weary and
annoyed at having to deny repeatedly the canard that U.S.
policy is aimed at settling the Palestinian refugees
permanently in Lebanon. Berri knows very well that this is
not the case, the Ambassador said, and we were not happy to
hear him raise this allegation again. "I never said that it
was U.S. policy!" Berri responded. "You didn't listen to
me!" Producing a copy of his speech, Berri repeated the
paragraph in question, which warned of waves from the U.S.
Congress and European parliaments promoting this idea. Berri
said that we could not "deny" that U.S. Congressional
representatives, "including that one last summer" (i.e.,
Christopher Shays), had said that the GOL should give the
Palestinians citizenship. Berri said that his worry was that
congressional statements could easily become U.S. policy, so
he needed to issue a warning loudly and clearly. Asking
Berri to drop all public discussions of the fictitious U.S.
support for Palestinian implantation, the Ambassador said
that he doubted many people understood the separation of
powers in the U.S. Government as well as Berri seemed to.
¶7. (C) Berri also urged the Ambassador to review his speech
to recognize that there was "no reference at all" to UNSCR
¶1559. Berri said that "you know" he rejects UNSCR 1559.
But, out of deference to Lebanon's traditional respect to
international law, he did not explicitly complain about UNSCR
¶1559. The Ambassador responded that his implied words were
clear enough and not welcomed. Sounding more curious than
argumentative, Berri asked the Ambassador how the USG would
"force" the implementation of UNSCR 1559, when sending the
Lebanese Armed Forces against Hizballah would surely
destabilize the country. The Ambassador responded that the
international community did not want to see Lebanon
destabilized. Yet we did not want the fear of
destabilization to lead to paralysis when it comes to UNSCR
¶1559. Ideally, rather than imposing an external solution, we
would like to support and encourage a serious Lebanese
process aimed at implementing UNSCR 1559. But the ongoing
clashes in the Sheba'a Farms area demonstrates the importance
of UNSCR 1559 implementation. Berri mused that "maybe we can
start with" taking some kind of action against Ahmed Jibril's
PFLP-GC.
SHEBA'A CLASHES: BERRI PROMISES
TO TRY TO HELP CALM SITUATION
--------------------------------
¶8. (C) Berri then asked the Ambassador what he knew about
the clashes in the Sheba'a Farms area. While emphasizing
that he was still working from initial reports, the
Ambassador noted that it seemed as though the clashes began
with an infiltration by Hizballah members south of the Blue
Line. Berri did not dispute this interpretation and said
that he generally "trusted" UNIFIL's chronology and analysis
more than either Israel's or Hizballah's. Berri and the
Ambassador then sketched out maps to illustrate what each
thought had happened at Sheba'a. Berri said that, while he
believed firmly that Sheba'a Farms belongs to Lebanon, he was
opposed to any provocations that could expose Lebanon to
Israeli retaliation. Presented with several theories by the
Ambassador about what Hizballah's motives were, Berri said,
in seeming candor, that he did not know exactly why Hizballah
would decide to move now, "but there might be many reasons."
In any case Berri agreed that it was important to calm the
area, and he promised to use what influence he has in getting
Hizballah to observe a cease fire. Asked by the Ambassador
about the impact of Iranian elections on Hizballah, Berri
commented that Hizballah members "are celebrating." He
promised to "talk about Iran" with the Ambassador at a later
date.
¶9. (C) The Ambassador asked Berri why Hizballah Secretary
General Nasrallah was now trying to reopen the 1923 borders
by making reference to the "seven villages" lost to Palestine
when the French and British Mandate authorities charted
Lebanon's southern border. Berri described the "seven
villages" argument as a "joke" that the "Lebanese won't
accept." The Ambassador pointed out that Walid Jumblatt and
even Berri himself had echoed Nasrallah's claim to the "seven
villages." Berri went into a long monologue about land
ownership in 1923 to argue that, indeed, the "seven villages"
were Lebanese. But Berri said that he was opposed to
re-opening 1923 borders.
COMMENT
-------
¶10. (C) While we have no illusions about his sincerity, the
new and improved Nabih Berri is certainly a more tolerable
interlocutor than the previous, unpleasantly polemical model.
Let us hope that Berri was shocked into more constructive
positions by the quantity and ferocity of publicly stated
opposition to his return as Speaker. His talk of public
accountability was unexpected music to our ears. He'll
probably continue to sing a pleasant reform tune for some
time, but we -- and the Lebanese people -- will remain
skeptical until we see improved performance in the Parliament
and in his own behavior. We suspect, however, that he will
continue to use objectionable language about Hizballah and
the Blue Line, and we are bracing ourselves for his
television appearance tonight.
FELTMAN