

Maximiliano Korstanje

*Government
Procedures
and Operations*

A Difficult World

*Examining the Roots
of Capitalism*

F. D. N. Y.

NOVA

GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES AND OPERATIONS

A DIFFICULT WORLD
EXAMINING THE ROOTS
OF CAPITALISM

No part of this digital document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means. The publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this digital document, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained herein. This digital document is sold with the clear understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, medical or any other professional services.

GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES AND OPERATIONS

Additional books in this series can be found on Nova's website
under the Series tab.

Additional e-books in this series can be found on Nova's website
under the e-book tab.

GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES AND OPERATIONS

A DIFFICULT WORLD
EXAMINING THE ROOTS
OF CAPITALISM

MAXIMILIANO KORSTANJE



Copyright © 2015 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher.

We have partnered with Copyright Clearance Center to make it easy for you to obtain permissions to reuse content from this publication. Simply navigate to this publication's page on Nova's website and locate the "Get Permission" button below the title description. This button is linked directly to the title's permission page on copyright.com. Alternatively, you can visit copyright.com and search by title, ISBN, or ISSN.

For further questions about using the service on copyright.com, please contact:

Copyright Clearance Center

Phone: +1-(978) 750-8400

Fax: +1-(978) 750-4470

E-mail: info@copyright.com.

NOTICE TO THE READER

The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers' use of, or reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works.

Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication.

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS.

Additional color graphics may be available in the e-book version of this book.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Korstanje, Maximiliano

A difficult world : examining the roots of capitalism / Maximiliano Korstanje.

pages cm. -- (Government procedures and operations)

Includes index.

ISBN: ; 9: /3/856: 5/674/2"(eBook)

1. Capitalism--Philosophy. 2. Capitalism--Social aspects. I. Title.

HB501.K586 2015

330.12'2--dc23

2015026398

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. † New York

CONTENTS

Foreword		vii
Acknowledgments		xi
Introduction		xiii
Chapter 1	Mobility on an Immobile World: The Analysis of the Film the Island	1
Chapter 2	The Future of Technology	7
Chapter 3	Crossing the Boundaries of Empire	19
Chapter 4	The Logic of Risk	33
Chapter 5	Exploring the Anglo Protestant Cosmology	47
Chapter 6	Terrorism, Work-force and Labor	57
Chapter 7	Discussing Terrorism, Isolationists vs. Interventionists	79
Chapter 8	The Principle of Exemptionalism in America	91
Chapter 9	The Society of Terror	111
Epilogue:	The Allegory of Violence in the Age of Terrorism	129
References		133
About the Author		135
Index		137

FOREWORD

The present book looks at American exceptionalism from below, or at least from the southern part of the Americas. Of course American exceptionalism does not really mean *American* exceptionalism. It means the exceptional status claimed by the United States in world affairs. Therefore, the author, Professor Maximiliano Korstanje, is not writing about the part of America where he is from, because Argentina, his native country, neither claims nor exercises any kind of exceptionalism. Right from the beginning, then, it should be clear that the term, ‘American exceptionalism,’ is misleading, and it is so in more than one way. Korstanje explores the topic from several different angles. He ties together the Calvinism of the first English settlers in present day New England in the United States with the development of world capitalism and twenty-first century imperialism. He argues that the three are interdependent and should be understood as potentiating each other.

In current rhetoric, the United States is the indispensable nation. Why? Because US heads of state and their allies, minions, and hangers-on have said so. The rhetoric is accepted, or at least not challenged or contradicted by other national leaders, because the United States is the world’s hegemon. Its political power flows from its military power and the fact that it is the center of the world system of capitalism. Moreover, and this is the importance of Korstanje’s argument, the United States exercises its power while at the same time claiming its moral superiority which justifies whatever it does. Aggressive wars, subversion, torture, and other infamies are okay so long as it is the United States that perpetrates them. That is the essence of so-called American exceptionalism.

As this book shows, it has always been so, going back to seventeenth century New England. Early New England colonists, variously called Pilgrims, were avowedly religious colonists. Their purposes came from doctrinal disputes with the Church of England. They mixed their reformism with their version of Calvinism, espoused and expounded by such New Englanders as John Winthrop (1587-1649), Increase Mather (1639-1723), his son Cotton Mather (1663-1728), and Jonathan Edwards (1703-1748). They are also known as Puritans as they were associated with Protestant efforts to purify established churches in Europe. Korstanje brings out its relevance to today’s global capitalism, relying on Max Weber’s well-known thesis about the link between Calvinism and capitalism in his *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* first published in 1905. The thesis emphasizes several Calvinist precepts: the doctrine of predestination, the notion that souls are saved only by God’s grace and not by anything people do in their lives, and that the saved are recognizable because of their worldly success. Weber linked these to the Puritan notion that people’s duties

were to act as caretakers of the world, and that they had to enhance the earth by making it increasingly fruitful. The relevance to all this for American exceptionalism goes back to the concept of the Pilgrims' settlement in New England as a City on a Hill. The phrase comes from John Winthrop's 1630 sermon, *A Model of Christian Charity*, in which he said, "We shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us." Today, the United States uses this history as a rationalization for claims of moral superiority.

The problem is that no matter what those early Pilgrims may have thought in the seventeenth century, in the twenty-first century such moral claims by US leaders smack of hypocrisy and bald propaganda. In one sense, the eyes of at least some people were on the United States, as Hitler modeled Nazi policies on Jews and Slavs on US policies toward the native peoples and peoples kidnapped from Africa—namely, genocide and slavery. So, the City on a Hill did provide a moral exemplar, through perhaps not as John Winthrop had in mind.

To get back to the present, US imperialism has been an essential part of the strategies of global capital and the ruling class. That is why it is the indispensable nation, because its state apparatuses, especially those that rely on violence, are essential for extracting profits. Although the term 'American Empire' gets bandied about—and forgetting for the moment the misnomer of American in place of United States—the United States does not have an empire. It has no colonies in the strict sense of the term, and in fact eschewed colonization, except for those that were thrust upon them, like Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. But a lack of colonies does not mean absence of imperialism. US imperialism has always been hegemonic instead of ruling, partly because of the White supremacy of the United States—it would never tolerate incorporating non-Whites, even as colonies—and partly because colonies are not cost effective, thereby cutting into profits. Secondly, and more importantly, there is no US empire, because the United States is merely the executive arm of the global empire of capital. It is capital that is the real imperial entity, not the United States, or any other country or combination of states like NATO.

In its capacity as capital's executive branch, the various state apparatuses of the United States murder millions, torture, employ death squads directly within the United States where local police murder hundreds every month, and indirectly in other countries like Colombia, Honduras, and Ukraine. The United States uses its military and nuclear weapons to terrorize the world. It develops and cavalierly sends biological and chemical weapons to the four corners of the earth. It promotes the use of toxic pesticides and environmental depredations from mineral and fossil fuel extraction by transnational businesses like Monsanto, Chevron, and Exxon-Mobil. It does these things because it can, and because it serves the interests of those who make money from this US brand of imperialism. It ignores and disparages all manner of international humanitarian laws. For instance, most countries ratified the international Convention against Genocide within a few years of its formulation in 1948. It took the United States until 1984 to ratify it, and then with exceptions and provisos. The same can be said about the international Convention against Torture. When the International Court of Justice sanctioned the United States for mining Nicaraguan harbors, the United States ignored the ruling. The moral stand espoused by US politicians is barely a fig leaf, for its amoral, maybe immoral would be better, state actions.

In sum, the US claim to exceptionalism has nothing to do with morality, unless as Mark Twain said, the morals are those of an alderman. The exceptionalism is about the needs of

global capitalism: the need to exploit the human capacity to create value and the need to extract as much wealth from the earth as possible for the benefit of the owners of capital.

Geoffrey Skoll
Department of Criminal Justice
Buffalo State College, NY, US

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost author wants to thank professor Emeritus Geoffrey Skoll by his generosity in contributing to the argument of this book as well as writing the forewords. Errors are on my charge and responsibility. Besides my wife Maria Rosa Troncoso by his patience with me I afford to write this long-simmering project and my Children Benjamin, Olivia and Ciro. Some good friends as Jose Musa Dibe and Sergio Fernandez helped me in discussing the asymmetries and inequalities of late-capitalism. Though they do not come from the academy, this reflect what important are light-hearted talks.

INTRODUCTION

Over years, many sociologists, anthropologists, and historians have devoted their lives to explaining the essential nature of capitalism. Karl Marx referred to “commodity fetishism,” Werner Sombart “bourgeois mentality,” Weber “bureaucratic logic,” Oswald Spengler “the dictatorship of money,” Theodor Adorno “industrial society,” Walter Benjamin “the return of the flaneur,” Michel Foucault “the economy of truth,” David Harvey “Destructive creation,” Ulrich Beck “Risk Society” and others have employed diverse metaphors to explain the current social ethos. However, today we have not a single capitalism, but variously constituted capitalisms. One differentiation is a cultural dichotomy between Anglo and Hispanic cultural matrixes. This differentiation, which was discovered by Max Weber, persists today in many aspects of social life. Weber’s interest was focused in the world of the Reformation. Weber left a legacy to those scholars who are concerned about today’s trends in capitalism. His questions opened debates about what factors determine this socio-economic system. Peter Berger (1987) acknowledges that though some of Weber’s points are troublesome to empirically validate, any theory on modernity should take them seriously.

Today the world lives in a society of terror, with a pervasive atmosphere of distrust encouraged by US propaganda, in which the future interpellates itself. The citizenry has accepted some neoliberal policies, but they spurn others. I have written this book in English, although a native Spanish. The exercise represents an attempt to visit other cultures, languages, and grammars to help understand the self through the lens of the Other. This book represents an effort to explore the culture of capitalism and social Darwinism as it has been perceived by a Latin-American observer. It gives a fresh perspective to a wide range of selected scholarly literature, which has stagnated or reached contradictory evidence of what capitalism is. Without exploring Anglo-democracy (which has set the pace for a new empire based on fear and extortion), we are blind to understand capitalism. It is sometimes the term used to denote a radical shift, a rupture between two types of contrasting cosmologies. Capitalism in North America developed from a Protestant world, which is derived from ancient Norse mythology where predestination played a vital role. Max Weber overlooked the Norse roots when he restricted predestination to Calvinism. This tradition is much older than Weber thought. Since Anglo cultures eschew or deny knowledge what is written in the heaven, destiny, they turn to technology. They put faith in technology to help predict the future and not incidentally organize labour to reduce risks to investors while ideologically claiming to protect people. This secular view places human beings in a backwards relation to transcendence. The role of God has been occupied by risk, which serves as a mediator among

commodities, capital, and persons. Usually, we imagine that terrorism is one of those evils that civilized societies have to face since the onset of a new millennium. Some scholars see in terrorism a sign of social bond decomposition. Terrorists are resented because they were relegated to peripheral zones of economies. Their nations have been oppressed by the US empire. Nonetheless, terrorism and work are the two sides of the same coin. At time of organizing labour, capitalist societies legalized the human relationships according to the attachment to an occupation. The US embraced many European migrants to strengthen its workforce, but promptly recognized their ideas were counter-productive for the overall system. The pioneer anarchists in the new land faced a dilemma. Some supported the organization of labour unions, while others used terrorist assassinations of American and European authorities. The state used its monopoly of force to control anarchism while it used violent repression against unions and proletarian movement. Today the same logic persists, even though it is disguised. Like terrorists, labour leaders appealed to similar tactics of extortion, speculation, and uncertainty in their struggle against capital. If today thousand of international travellers are strand at an airport without any type of assistance because a strike, it is not very different from a terrorist attack. Of course, the aftermath of both events varies, but the logic of the discourse persists. In one case, tourists as capital holders are inconvenienced, and on the other, victims are killed. The perpetrators of 9/11 and other terrorist attacks learned their tactics from modern management literature in the most prestigious Western universities. They, terrorists, have learned the lesson the force and threats win the day.

This book offers two core arguments. First, the concept of predestination as developed in Calvinism is associated with the predestination of Norse Mythology. Secondly and most importantly, it is impossible to understand capitalism without risk. The need to foresee the future has become connected to the sentiment of fear, which has recently, especially in the twenty-first century, created a culture of fear. The cosmology of risk and fear is based on the precautionary principle manifested in capitalistic commerce. We live in a difficult world, because it embraces complexity as a primary value. David Harvey (1989), continuing the discussion on Weber, said that post-modernity started in response to the radical shift of economies after the oil-embargo of 1973. Harvey's diagnosis explores the connection between space, social bonds, and economy. The lack of resources to maintain Fordist production altered the industrial economies and all social relationship as well. With the decentralization of politics, authority, and legitimacy; knowledge became more and more fragmented. Nowadays, the understanding of events is determined by what Science says. This capitalized 'Science' is big, official science with the ideological approval of the institutions of state and capital.

In this respect, Geoffrey Skoll addressed a methodological debate in his book *Dialectic in Social Thought* (2014). He argued that the social sciences have evolved on basis of a dialectics, in which the person as an object of study appeals to a third object to understand its being in the world. From Marx to Weber the founders of social thought have used dialectics in their studies. Skoll's argument points out that outside of society, the agent has no significance, while society loses its reason to exist without human agency. Owners of capital need workers as in turn workers need owners. To overcome the conflicts those dialectics engender, Skoll suggests that the social order is based on a triadic structure. The process of negotiation between two or more pillars alludes to the existence of a third, where the dialectical relationship is based negotiations. In view of this, he discusses not only the legacy of

dialectic in social sciences, but to what extent the social is rooted in the dialectic. Skoll proposes that social thought sheds light on the world by employing Hegel's dialectic, because society is dialectic by its nature. Among the scholars who recognized this were Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx, both of whom devoted considerable time and effort to elucidate the invisible ties that keep society united. From distinct viewpoints both Marx and Freud acknowledged the reification of reason as a primary of social structure. Freud emphasized neurotic self-deception; Marx focused on the mystification of political economy. As in society, the constitution of the self corresponds to a reification of the relation between rules and drives. What Ego was for Freud, Capital is for Marx. The ghost in the machine of capitalism is that capital mediates between production and workers just as ego corresponds with the interplay between repression and reason. Starting from the premise that any social diagnosis about the problems of reproduction of society is biased on dialectics, there is an epistemological aporia in the study the human behavior, which raises two questions: How can society be a unified object? And how are human beings social in nature?

The allegory of the city has been used by sociologists and anthropologists, who have examined the capitalist ethos by focusing their analyses on social bonds. Any metropolis condenses the accumulation of human resources, capital and production, and it expresses the dialectics of machines and the work force. Skoll notes, following Marx, that dialectics and social ties are inextricably intertwined. This argument reveals two interesting points. First, the triad of dialectics thought has been applied to social understanding by thinkers from pragmatism to nihilism. Second, the modern social order is based on the dialectics generated by a monopoly of meaning in which capitalism serves as the dominant ethos. Social analysts have pointed out that the capitalist world view exploits agency to an irreversible stage of collapse. The legitimacy of states consists in creating a third object to divert attention from this fundamental capitalist trajectory. For example, in contemporary politics, terrorism can be understood as a "commoditization of fear" (Skoll 2011) in which the exhaustion of local resources by capitalism creates the conditions for the current condition of crisis. Terrorism diverts attention from real problems produced by capitalism and its inevitable collapse. As a concept which can be manipulated, fear may be commoditized to exert a disciplinary mechanism whereby the citizenry accepts policies which they otherwise would reject. Terrorism and similar abstractions serve the interests of the elite.

"Security and terrorism are bound together in a dialectical process of mutually defining each other; they create each other in economic and environmental turmoil. What the process produces is the national security state, continual terrorist incidents, and an ever growing market for security goods and services. Despite its apparent self-generating dynamic, the terrorism dynamic is part of a larger whole with links to the economic process and the biophysical environment. Terrorism, like anti-Communism and crime fighting are political faces of larger social processes" (Skoll 2014, p. 166).

The commodification of communism became embedded with neo-conservatism in Reagan-Thatcher epoch which roughly began in 1980. Zygmunt Bauman and David Lyon (2013) envisage the decline of social bonds concomitant with sociology as an academic discipline as the primary reason for the current crisis. That is, they see the discipline of sociology fading to irrelevance as social bonds become increasingly tenuous. In contrast Skoll envisages seems to be that this parlous state of disorder derives from the workings of late capitalism which heads toward the world capitalist system's bifurcation and subsequent devolution into chaos. This raise interesting questions such as: How is risk or fear associated

with the capitalist ethos? What is the role of democracy in the global market? Might terrorism undermine the basis of democracy?

To respond these points correctly, it is necessary to explore the world of the European Reformation in the sixteenth century, which paralleled the Enlightenment and the birth and growth of United States. The latter is and what some historians consider the new empire of commonwealth. As Weber puts it, we cannot imagine the cultural values of entrepreneurship, which coined capitalism, ignoring United States. Capitalism represented global and expansive forces that today encompass developed and underdeveloped countries alike. The present introductory section discusses the extent to which the Anglo-Saxon countries of northern Europe constructed a cosmology of the world that not only rationalized a great gap in the organization of labour, but paved the way for the advent of capitalism. This book examines the vast concerns of the cultural process that made the United States and the main problems in understanding its politics. In current times, terrorism, global disasters, and climate change are some of the challenges posed to humankind in the next centuries. In the Americas, the adaptability of English and Hispanic speaking countries varies according the ways these risks are contemplated. Broadly speaking and definitely over generalizing, in the United States and Canada, risk has a positive value, whereas in the south, risk avoidance is more important. These differences are related to the respective world views from northern European, versus southern European traditions.

Are risk and exceptionalism interlinked? North Americans abroad experience an inflation of risk perception, which seems to be the dark side of the US claims to its exceptionalism. That is, the United States government claims the right to flout international law, breach human rights across the globe, assassinate people anywhere on earth, and deploy advance military presences, and so on. US citizens then face a degree of risks, or at least a perception of risks, from possible retaliation.

The present project alludes to the archetypical image of closed destiny of the German tribes from ancient times. In this respect, Max Weber was not incorrect showing the association between capitalism and the Reformation. Capitalism built on certain aspects of Norse Mythology and Viking adventurism. In contrast to an honour-based value system with its concomitant shame culture that had developed in the Mediterranean, the Norse and northern European tradition developed a guilt society which individualized failings. No matter how just or dangerous, the fate of warriors in the battlefield was marked by Odin's design, instead of their own ingenuity such as that of Odysseus coupled with fearless daring do. The Valkyries only picked up the fallen soldiers following the mandate of Odin. Unlike Greek myth, In the Norse tradition, fate was determined, which later found expression in the Calvinist concept of predestination. The northern cultures tended to develop a closed view of a future where actions cannot be altered. Some of critics of Weber pointed to Venice as an exception to the rule. If his diagnosis was correct, why did these Catholic states adopt capitalism? They argued that the ideological framework of capitalism was not rooted in Protestantism, as Weber put it, but in Norse Mythology. This is the reason why Weber has no clear answer to explain how Catholic Venice became the first centres of capitalism (Arrighi 1994). Indeed, Venetian capitalism owed its preconditions to the Vatican-organized crusades. As a form of organizing the social life and work, capitalism did not only flourish in Northern Europe until the seventeenth century and its industrial development in England in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Defining the origins of capitalism has been difficult for social scientists, but not for mainstream economists who treat it as *sui generis*. Although a clear diagnosis of the issues still depends on many scattered studies, there is general consensus that capitalism developed in the West from a lengthy evolution that distinguished modern civilization from earlier ones, but also placed us on a city on a hill. This perspective, far from being scientific, leads towards “ethnocentrism.” Archaeologists realize that much of what today we consider modern was anticipated by extinct civilizations.

Capitalism, in Weber’s term, can be defined as a cultural process with legal-rational logic, which is based on control. It has modified almost all social institutions of the industrial world. While many scholars romantically criticize the market as the demon of capitalism, they defend democracy and nation state, both of which are products of the capitalist mode of production. This suggests that we do not understand the horizons and scope of capitalism.

Since its independence Latin America blamed civil government for ineptitude in managing fiscal affairs. A great variety of intellectuals, writers, and scholars (from Marxists to Keynesians) imagine the state as the only actor capable of protecting the citizens from the depredations of capital markets. From this viewpoint, capitalism plays a negative role by loosening the social bonds and, reorganizing labour according to capital owner’s interests. Instead of thinking of the nation-state as conducive to capitalism, they build an image of post-Keynesian state as a barrier to capitalism’s worst exploitations. In this point, the divergence between European and Latin American Marxism enlarged (Centeno 2002). Latin American critics blame US and financial interests for their encouragement of sovereign indebtedness. For example, Susana Murillo (2008), an Argentine philosopher says that neoliberalism articulates a hegemonic discourse, promoted by US, to exert a financial indoctrination in the global capitalist periphery. Here, corruption plays a pivotal role, as state officials lined up with the Washington consensus to stipulate that the state should be disarticulated and business and finance deregulated. Citing inefficacy and corruption, neoliberals stressed the importance of introducing the market logic in public affairs. This changed the old paradigm proposed by contractual philosophers who considered the public life on basis of laws that should protect to everyone, without exception. Per her argument, neoliberal so-called flexibility generated a neo-decisionism in which the state of exception reigns. In the absence of military coups—which in the past had served to protect capital and militate against democracy (Loveman and Davies 1997)—became discredited in public opinion in the 1980s; the only solution was a radical change in the way society is structured. The State was increasingly criticized and questioned by NGOs as well as other pressure groups. The trouble was that the Washington consensus was efficient because it combined bloody dictatorships with corporative regimes that stimulated consumerism. In Latin America, the consensus by apathy, an apt sobriquet invented by Murillo, referenced the disappearances of the years of dictatorships, which could not be expunged or illuminated even when democracy returned. Immunity granted officials and the policy of moving on without confronting the past made hostages of the citizenry suppressed through indifference the failures of democracies. In the vacuum created by official denial of junta atrocities, promoted theories and pseudo-scientific studies aimed at dismantling the social welfare functions of the state. She points out that that the hegemonic powers, spearheaded by the US, and their financial organizations played a vital role in disciplining the semi-peripheral counties and promoted an ideology of acceptance of poverty as a natural outcome of industrialization and progress. If poverty in the medieval imaginary was the home of Christ, for modernist thought it became the necessary condition of life

(Murillo 2008). By naturalizing the economic asymmetries, proper to capitalism, neo-decisionism as in the thought of Carl Schmitt, elucidated by Giorgio Agamben, proclaims the social difference among human beings should be mitigated to avoid the social conflicts, but not eradicated.

The industrial powers which maintain hegemony over the periphery have changed their disciplinary mechanism of control. The violence of the 1960s and 1970s gave way to new, friendlier ways of ideological indoctrination which presented a new paradigm: the socio-technical view. One characteristic of the socio-technical paradigm emphasizes skill-training over education in critical thinking and values. Training in skills has become the goal of secondary socialization in these new corporate democracies. This shift in educational goals is a form of externalization in which the civil polity is made to bear the costs of preparing future workers. Unlike other moments when violence pivoted the agenda in Latin America, the financial elite realized that ideological repression is a more efficient to ensure political stability. Therefore, the social conflict should be commodified into new policies disguised as products. Protest can take the form of a T shirt with a message on it, instead of popular dissent in the streets. The economic catastrophe that whipped the economies of Latin American countries caused the World Bank and IMF (International Monetary Fund) to change the tactics. From 2001 onwards, for example, in Argentina the doctrine of accountability of state whereby officials should be prosecuted by the citizenry was based on the need to fight against corruption, ensure homeland safety, and reduce poverty (Murillo 2008).

Unlike America where neoliberalism proposed a stronger state, in Latin America this ideology fostered the idea that the state should have only a night watchman kind of role. Its ideological organs made it central to popular discourse about politics. A consequence of this neoliberal viewpoint is to sow uncertainty in all spheres of daily life. Despite the enormous public relations emphasizing improved security for citizens, people feel more insecure. At the same time, a discourse of security is conducive to increased control by economic monopolies. This is one of the contradictions embedded in neoliberalism (Murillo 2008). It denigrates the states ability to provide for the common weal while at the same time it encourages bolstering the national security apparatuses. The contributions of Murillo's argument is that the current inflation of dangers portrayed daily in the media, is a tactic of neoliberal institutions to deter social change. Nevertheless, Murillo's main argument rests on a central fallacy. Is neoliberalism the dark side of capitalism?, what is the role of state in this process?

Murillo's ideological discourse is aligned with the rest of Latin America's intelligentsia. One of the most troublesome aspects of Latin American allegations against the US, is their exaggerated nature. Historically, the state was a last shelter for Latin American scholars before the advance of industrial capitalism. In order to present a convincing defence of this thesis, as Fillipi documented, it is necessary to adopt a biased view of Marxist theories in which the state is the equivalent of politics (Fillipi, 1988). Any criticism beyond the hegemony of state entails, from this viewpoint, the end of politics. Any pressure group which promotes an atmosphere of conflict against the state is viewed as a group that denies the nature of politics. Pro status quo, neo-Marxists in Latin America understand that states should monopolize politics and public space. Nonetheless, the state is only a form of organization, but that does not define what the political is. There are many forms of living the politics beyond the paradigm of nation-state. It was the the physiocrats of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who proclaimed that law was the only way of achieving the happiness for

all. The physiocratic economic theory was an expression of growing capitalism in which markets and production supplanted the dynastic ambitions of monarchs. Both the physiocrats and the liberal such as Adam Smith who supplanted them recognized that markets needed state regulation.

Max Weber shifted the terms of debate and analytic framework by arguing that capitalism is not based on gains or profits but on a cultural value rooted in rationality and control. Historically, bureaucratic logic succeeded traditional and charismatic modes of authority. It was this framework that gave him the basis for finding capitalism in the Protestant ethos. The state for Weber plays a similar role to that of the market by disciplining individual minds to live according to capitalist values. As bureaucracy, legal-rational authority, and capital markets inevitably lead to an iron cage in which capitalism must continually reproduce its own original conditions of existence. In this process of capitalist reproduction—which should be understood as the reproduction of capitalist relations of production—the state is not a shelter. As Foucault (an anti-Marxist who is profusely cited by Murillo) maintains, the state is the bulldozer of market with its economy of truth (Foucault, 2006). Once the capitalist class gained ascendancy laws and national constitutions are oriented to protect the interests of the owners of capital. Laws legitimize the state's monopoly of force which is exerted over bodies—which is a brief summary of Foucault's biopolitics over which so many intelligentsia enthuse.

The configuration of nation-state corresponds with the efficacy of market in subordinating agrarian economies to a highly concentrated capital accumulation. Murillo simply ignores how capitalism has been embedded not only in class conflict, but has suffused and structured the cultural values of the West. Market and state are the two side of the same coin. At bottom, the capitalist ethos is always accepted, because the bureaucratic logic is never questioned. Unfortunately, Murrillo never explains why Latin American countries have experienced serious problems in their economies over the last two decades.

Alternatively to the Murilloesque analysis, Anglo-Saxon economists see extractive institutions developed by the conquest in Latin American as the main reason for Latin American economic backwardness. Far from being objective, these studies assume the doctrine of economic Darwinism endemic to the neoliberal ideology. They fail to acknowledge that extractivism was and continues to be systematically applied to ruin agrarian economies worldwide. Moreover they ignore the so-called democratic governments of the capitalist center, especially the United States, encouraged political instability (even military coups) in the Cold War period. Is extractive institutions the reason why Latin America faces cyclic economic problems?

Liberal thinking says yes. On one hand, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the wealth of nations depends not only on the degree of political stability, the nature of its social institutions. Those countries that concentrate power in few hands, lack competition among stakeholders. They simplify their critique by setting up a model of two types of institutions. On another, they call the extractive type institution which concentrates power in a small minority that exploits the resources of society in its favor. Extractive political institutions are relying on non-democratic governments and the lack of private property. On contrary, inclusive institutions avoid monopolies by vesting power in a broader way, renewing administrations according to popular voting. Unable to extract the resources of others, this model encourages the strengthening of the market. As a result of this, wealth and prosperity must be inevitably reached by the citizenry (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).

“Similarly, extractive economic institutions are synergistically linked to extractive political institutions, which concentrate power in the hands of few, who will then have incentive to maintain and develop extractive economic institutions for their benefit and use of the resources they obtain to cement their hold on political power. These tendencies do not imply that extractive economic and political institutions are inconsistent with economic growth.... What is crucial however is that grow under extractive institutions will not be sustained...the synergies between extractive economic and political institutions create a vicious circle, where extractive institutions, once in place, tend to persist. Similarly, there is a virtuous circle associated with inclusive economic and political institutions. But neither the vicious nor the virtuous circle is absolute” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 430-431)

Beyond the lack of scientific rigor of this argument, Acemoglu and Robinson developed an “Anglo-Centric” model, where the superiority of nations is defined by means of specific criterion as income per capita, or the produced wealth. The tendency for few people to profit more and more money is not duly addressed in their argument. Besides, the success of nations to prosper does not necessarily depend upon the income produced by private capital owners. Many non-Western societies can be juxtaposed to criticize serious social pathologies of the West, such as drug abuse, insomnia, emotional distress, alcoholism, and so forth. That is, an economically-based evaluation of prosperity fails to take account of the quality of life of a community. Also, Anglo-centrism leaves out the pervasive role of social Darwinism which historically has produced poverty and social exclusion. Lester Thurow concurs.

“While it is easy to calculate per capita GNPs, it is notoriously difficult to make precise standard-of-living comparisons among countries. In each country, individuals naturally shift their purchases toward those items that are relatively cheap in that country. Tastes, circumstances, traditions and habits differ. Individuals do not buy the same basket of goods and services. What is necessity in one country may be luxury in another (Thurow, 1980: p. 5)

Serious epistemological problems surfaced that have tainted the outcome of social sciences over decades. What is capitalism?, what are the factors that determine its evolution?, is capitalism and risk inextricably intertwined?, are of course some of the questions we will unravel in this puzzle.

In order for us to overcome the conceptual limitations to understand politics and capitalism, it is necessary to launch toward new paradigms and theories. This book provides, in this vein, nine chapters, which may be read separately or as parts of a unified argument.

Chapter 1 begins with a synopsis of the movie *The Island*. The ensuing analysis shows that this film lays bare the roots of modernity in regard to life expectations in the manipulation of clones. It is set in a future near world where human beings revolutionized the health care system by creating clones which serve as repositories of organs. The sense of what human means is defied in this new system when two individual rebels tried to escape. *The Island* is partly a metaphor for the dichotomy of mobility in which some groups are privileged to be mobile, but others are strictly controlled to be subordinated. It also but alludes to the sense of safety, which some psychologists have considered to be based on early childhood attachment. The self elaborates a fixed meaning of safety by projecting its love by care-takers (mothers). The sense of place is always a product of this logic. The relationship between babies and mothers exerts considerable influence in adulthood. One of the aspects of modernity corresponds with the instability of what we consider stable and safe. As *The Island*

shows, we are all increasingly immobilized in an ever changing world. Thus, social institutions are constantly recycled and reinvented. Technology has played a pivotal role in expanding the cultural values of Anglo-societies as those of mobility, tourism, and democracy while closing those opportunities for non-white migrants who are knocking their doors. The current meaning of globalization is open in one direction, but closed in the other.

The second chapter discusses the extent to which technology engenders new risks. Originally, technology was presented as the only thing capable of making life safer. It represented the material realization of the human desire for transcendence and abundance. An inherent contradiction is immanent in the development of technology. Technology, which was created for protecting human beings, works as a runaway train creating new risks as it rolls along. A discussion between two scholars, Anthony Giddens and Cass Sunstein, highlights the definition and ranges of risks. They ask whether risk is an objective probability or only a discursive construal. For his part, Sunstein calls the attention to the problem of mass media, which irresponsibly situates agenda in political power. He argues that the state should not listen to all populist demands, because lay people are not familiar with the scientific consequences of risks. Subject to the ideological manipulation of some pressure groups, the citizenry is controlled by the imposition of toxic emotions, like fear. Giddens argues that risk is rooted in the logic of capitalism. The process of embedding through mobility has created the inflation of risks. What frightens people may be or may be not an illusion, but nevertheless the replication of capital depends on that. Risk and capitalism in this vein are inextricably intertwined.

The third chapter is oriented to the problem of fear inside US. If mobility has positioned Americans on the top of the pyramid, it engenders serious problems whenever they are targets of terrorist attacks. Being American abroad becomes a risky situation. The ideology of capitalism did not create terrorism, but expanded a discourse where traditional societies were demonized. Religion and faith are seen as residual values of fundamentalism. In a more secularized world, travellers and tourists face the dilemma of their own ethnocentrism. On one hand they feel superior to others by displaying the technological means for moving, but on the other, their belief in their own exceptionality leads them to panic.

The fourth chapter delves into the economic logic of risk, which was created to control social change. Nowadays, risk perception studies have emphasized a quantitative perspective which uses complex mathematical algorithms. I argue that such studies are conceptually flawed because of their use of high level abstractions without clear methodological justification. The studies see not to recognize that causes of risk are not important except as they impact of societies. For example the terrorism narrative promoted by the United States allows certain practices at time it prohibits others. After 9/11, many consumers turned to insurance seeking to expand their current policies but this reduced notable the circulation of weapons in USA. Since the demand of these taboo-objects was reduced, their value arisen. As a result of this, the aristocracies that have higher purchasing power, monopolizes the possession of these inalienable possessions. The sense of safety in America is a function of the consumption of certain goods and services, while the state reserve its monopoly of others. The discourse of risk cuts through the circulation of goods and services and channels consumption into specific circuits. The social agents, as Foucault put it, are disciplined by risk in order for the society to keep and increase her production. Those goods that constitute commerce are protected by the discourse of risk, which has been materialized in insurance. Like taboo, it protects scarce resources by promising indemnification for losses.

Chapter 5 exposes the cultural reasons why Anglophone countries are prone to study risks, while romance language ones are not. The ethos of Protestantism paved the ways for a closed-future, which stimulates in Anglo countries a need to develop technology. It allows them to colonize the future to know if they stand in the book of salvation. Some future-oriented societies reject the death to preserve their economic order. As a result of this, they are rushed to extend the life, sometimes improving the conditions of life-expectancy. These societies or communities have developed a bad and pejorative notion of what does death mean. Children and babies are protected as the stepping stone of the social fabric. Rather, other communities that are based on custom, history and religion confer to future a minimal role. These present-oriented communities the life is a question of existence, and death accepted as a part of life. Children are often sacrificed to nuance the god's courage. As an instrument, sacrifice is of paramount importance to keep the prophylaxis of all society. Starting from the premise that tragedy or disasters are triggered by gods, sacrifice is an act of choice, the last act of free choice where people and gods celebrates a new covenant.

The sixth and seventh chapters explore the problem of terrorism, democracy, and labor unions. In recent decades, scholarly literature has focused on the impacts of terrorism on tourism and hospitality industries. These chapters explore the viewpoint that tourism and terrorism are dialectically related by questioning the idea that tourism is a peace keeping mechanism. Rather, tourism is a disciplined form of terrorism. Tourism is a tolerated form of exploitation based in law. Fundamentally, spectacle and exploitation underlie both tourism and terrorism. There is a brief review of the history of anarchism, and its relationship with labor unions and terrorists. It points to the notion of Johann Most and his propaganda of the deed. For example, Most did not hesitate to advocate killing children and women at restaurants. Today when people use tactics of terror, at the bottom, they have learned from the lessons of the state. Understanding, not demonizing, the nature of terrorism is a good way to understand the contemporary political landscape. Workers, but not terrorists, are legalized by the law of the state. This chapter reminds us that the tourism industry and labor in general are terrorism by other means.

The rest of the book is takes up a critique of American exceptionalism, and the view that the United States is a city on a hill. The notion is derived from the Calvinist precept of predestination and the Puritain ideal of establishing a pure society in the New World. This Calvinist-American Puritain doctrine appeals to a narcissism that underneath comes from the fear of existence. In traditional tragic narratives the hero assumes his unfortunate fate to mediate between gods and humans. Heroes do not have an easy life. Their trajectory is marked by shadows, suffering, and disgrace. The manifest destiny which appeals to the virtue of hero, requires a purifying purge, followed by rebirth in which the bad nature of body expiates to achieve the grace of the gods. Suffering in the tragedy symbolizes the resistance and defiance of humans before the arbitrariness of the gods. In its city on a hill version of national exceptionalism, the US becomes the protector of the world. While the American ideology of manifest destiny opens some avenues, it closes others. Heroes are touched by the gods, and while a gift, they are also condemned by it.

Following this, the last section discusses two major books, *Olympic Ceremonialism and the Performance of National Character, from London 2012 to Rio 2016* (R Tzanelli) & *Terrorism and Hostage Taking in the Middle East* (W. A Ruwayha). As a conclusion, I argue that the cultural values of terrorism are part of capitalist system.

REFERENCES

- Adorno, T. W. (1987). Late capitalism or industrial society? *Volker Meja, Dieter Misgeld, and Nico Stehr, German Sociology*, 232-47.
- Acemoglu, D & Robinson, J (2012) *Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity and poverty*. New York, NY: Crown Publishing
- Bauman Z & Lyon, D (2013). *Liquid Surveillance, a conversation*. New York, Willey & Son.
- Benjamin, W. (1999). The return of the flâneur. *Selected writings*, 2, 1927-1943.
- Beck, U. (1992). *Risk society: Towards a new modernity* (Vol. 17). London, Sage.
- Berger, P. L. (1987). *The capitalist revolution* (p. 166). Aldershot: Wildwood House.
- Centeno, M A (2002) *Blood and Debt. War and nation state in Latin America*. Pennsylvania, PE: The Pennsylvania University Press.
- Fillipi, A. (1988). *Instituciones e Ideologías en la Independencia Hispano-americana*. Buenos Aires: Alianza Editorial
- Foucault, M. (2006) *Seguridad, Territorio, Población: curso en el Collage de France (1977-1978)*. Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Harvey, D. (1979) *The conditions of Posmodernity. An inquiry into the Origins and Cultural Change*. London, Blackwell.
- Marx, K. (2000). The Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret. *The Consumer Society Reader*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Skoll G (2014) *Dialectics in Social Thought*. New York, Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Sombart, W. (1913). *Der bourgeois: zurgeistesgeschichte des modernen wirtschaftsmenschen*. Berlin, Duncker & Humblot.
- Spengler, O. (1988) *La Decadencia de Occidente. Bosquejo de una morfología de la historia universal*. Madrid, Espasa Calpe.
- Thurow, L C (1980) *The Zero Sum society: distribution and the possibilities of economic change*. New York, NY: Penguin Books.

Chapter 1

MOBILITY ON AN IMMOBILE WORLD: THE ANALYSIS OF THE FILM THE ISLAND

Psychology has shown that punishments and rewards influence the way the ego perceives its environment as well as what Freud called the reality principle. Accordingly, the evolution of the ego depends not only on how frustration is channelled, but also how gratification is conceived (Freud, 1988; Bowlby, 1989; Spitz, 1969; Winnicott, 1989; 1996; Fairbairn, 1962; Reich and Schmitt, 1998; Skinner, 1984; Mead, 1999; Eriksson, 2000). The home is supposed to provide a secure base even in adulthood. The dichotomy between work and leisure has accompanied the life in US, and the home is associated with leisure. Therefore, when they leave home, some travellers suffer a radical change of identity (Karlegger, 2007).

The present chapter examines of the film, *The Island*, starring Ewan McGregor and Scarlett Johansson (2005). This movie is the story of a couple of clones who try to escape from the quarters where they were confined. This work not only focuses on the ethical dilemma of cloning, but also on the conceptual dissociation between the escape and tourist travel. In this context, the desired travel (touristic) corresponds with a disciplinary instrument to control the clones and reduce the degree of conflict so they can better fulfil their reason for existence: they serve as providers of fresh human organs to citizens. Clones, it is important to note, are not considered humans or full citizens. Clones are maintained to provide organs to those who are real citizens. This chapter examines the roots of rules and behaviour and but also the notion of security as developed by J. Bowlby (1989).

The Island was released by Warner Brothers 2005, based on a story by Caspian Tredwell-Owen who also collaborated on the screenplay. It was directed by Michael Bay. Ewan McGregor stars as Lincoln Six Echo a clone produced from the Scottish automotive designer, Tom Lincoln, who needs a liver after suffering viral hepatitis. Scarlett Johansson is Jordan Two Delta, the clone of Sarah Jordan who is a supermodel for an important brand. They and the rest of the inhabitants of the compound are all clones, ostensibly for persons who are rich and famous like Tom Lincoln and Sarah Jordan. Residents of the compound are told that they must be restricted there because the rest of the world is too contaminated by radioactivity. Some residents get to leave the compound to go to The Island, a utopian paradise. Those who get to go are selected through a lottery. In fact, they are sent for organ harvesting, surrogate motherhood, or other biological uses.

The clone project is managed by Dr. Merrick who combines techniques of psychiatry to keep conflicts under control and the residents in ignorance. Clones who win the lottery not

only are special but symbolize the dichotomy between hospitality versus hostility. Although clones do not have problems fulfilling their basic needs, there is a strong and rigid circle of control of the way people interact each other. Being selected to travel to the Island is the equivalent of the state of exception people experience when surviving a traumatic experience. Merrick's compound alternates the most bloody authoritarian policy rooted in biotechnology, with a hospitable atmosphere of friendship, where people do not scramble for the environmental resources.

The radioactive contamination serves as a taboo and as an efficient instrument of indoctrination and total control on clones. Since they, the clones, never emerge from the compound, there is no way to test the validity of Merrick's discourse. The taboo-as-object is strong enough to mould the clone's expectations inside the compound. It functions as a truth regime as it determines the horizons of what can be done or not. The Island represents not only a far away prize which can be reached only once in a life time, but it also exhibits the mythical archetype of lost paradise. The island may be equated to our sense of heaven—the last ticket we are able to buy before we die. Winners to the island are given the sense of being special. This exclusivity depends on the power the island exerts on the behaviour of clones. It parallels our belief in divine will (wish), which disciplines human hopes, and restricts curiosity. In the real world, outside this movie, suicide is prohibited both by religion and secular controls. One of the most troubling aspects of religions and their reluctance to accept suicide is to forbid the exploration between death and life. Lay people may not explore beyond the secure base simply because the taboo-as-object exerts the necessary influence to keep travellers under control. If radioactivity plays a crucial role in deterring escape by clones so also the religious taboo on suicide keep control on human beings in life. Death is the last travel.

Clones are socialized to think they are free human beings. They are led on by their desire to travel to a paradisiacal island where hedonism flourishes. This symbolic new baptism, or rebirth, in the Island exhibits a rite of passage which is negotiated by each clone according to their original needs. Of course, when clones think they would travel to a new home, really they are terminated to extract their organs which the original needs. Although the candidate to go to the Island is already determined, administrators of the compound make it appear that clones are selected by random lot. To some extent, the Island plays a double function: it keeps control over the clones while at the same time it re-channels their desires and hopes by a lottery. The physical displacement resembles an award, which symbolizes the founding mythical order of life. A type of heaven in a future moulds our practices and acts. Every lottery is a lie, a simulacrum that dissuades the clones from resisting their destiny. The original citizens paid for the organs they need. Clones are excluded from the legal protection of civil and criminal law, simply because they are not legal persons, and the system is organized for them to be systematically killed. The message seems to be clear the death of one serves to give life to others. Every clone plays the role of being an organ supplier in this imaginary society.

In the movie, Lincoln discovers the truth and escapes with Jordan who had been chosen to go to the Island. They return to lead a rebellion that will reveal the problems of a society which manipulates human cloning. The movie emphasizes that in the clones' world access to stable citizenship is subject to the way death is administered. A clone is created to cover the healthy needs of their original. Clones lack not only autonomy, but also citizenship and rights.

Clones are grown based on a false belief. Conflict is controlled by means of a myth, which is narrated during all their lives as part of their basic socialization,

What lies beyond the compound seems dangerous; what is inside is perfect death. In this discussion, the Merrick compound can be likened to mother's womb, the secure base that gives all resources and security to the self. Although this setting is not real, experiences and hopes are moulded following the archetype of heaven. Travels, here tourist travels, not only play a pivotal role by reducing social conflicts to tolerable levels, but they configure the social imaginary to obscure the cruel realities where human beings consume clones. The story ends with Jordan and Lincoln starting a Diaspora, a real travel to nowhere, a setting fraught with hazards and problems. Once Dr. Merrick is killed, thousands of clones escape from the complex recalling the archetype of Plato's cave. Although Michael Bay seems not to be a director with a profound social sensibility, this movie is based on a solid argument that questions the world of cloning, and an ethical message where travel, as a social construct, plays a crucial role. The message of this film is structured in keeping with a way of thinking inherent in modern society. The expansion of life, the quest for zero risk, and the conception of death as the last travel to achieve are important factors in the discourse. In the movie, being special is determined by random, as in the lottery to go to the Island, but in the real world, privilege is determined by money. In *The Island* the world is presented as a dangerous place which threatens the existential safety of self. Bay criticizes our invented sense of security, but also such other institutions such as tourism and the uses of science for cloning and tendentious medical discourse. Tourist travel becomes an instrument of disciplinary power where everything that does not match with this ideologically constructed world is treated as the outside. At bottom, perception is more important than real safety. If home is a safe place, travel carries risk of death while at the same time it represents an opportunity to really live. Tourist travel reproduces the cultural and material values that keep society and its economy functioning.

As Jean Baudrillard (2003) observed, one of the most disgusting aspects of terrorism seems not to be associated simple violence against bodies, but the fact people choose their own suicide. In real world modern politics terrorists are represented as iniquitous whose acts of egoism oppose life. This viewpoint draws on images rooted in the American style of life. One of the first scholars in describing the pastoral idea of America was Leo Marx. The discovery of new World was fraught with dichotomies and inconsistencies for the social imaginary. On one hand, it signaled to the frustrations of highly stratified pre-industrial England. Many colonists abandoned the European metropolis to find a new land, pristine and pure for the spirit. The old oppressions were left behind. The Americas represented a new opportunity to make things better. This discourse, as Marx reveals, stems from the incongruence of wilderness and corruption. Although the new continent was a land of prosperity and wealth, at the same time it represented a serious risk for new European colonists. The untamed land climate and the presence of aborigines were threats to European colonization. The concept of Heaven or Eden as an exemplary centre mediated between these two contrasting images. As in *The Island*, life in America can be seen as a cocoon, a paradise in the desert, where dwellers are not free but all their basic needs are provided.

Marx goes on to say

“To describe America as a hideous wilderness, however, is to envisage it as another field for the exercise of power. This violent image expresses a need to mobilize energy, postpone

immediate pleasures, and rehearses the perils and peruses of the community. Life in a Garden is relaxed, quiet, and sweet, like the life in Virgil's *Georgics*, but survival in a howling desert demands action, the unceasing manipulation and mastery of the forces of nature, including of course human nature (Marx, 1964: 43).

This metaphor, which common in American literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, glorified the expansion of technology in the United States. The introduction of trains especially stimulated debates about whether to embrace or reject technology. The pristine state of nature that blessed America, unlike industrial Europe, should be preserved, but without technology, the expansion of life, and realization of America's manifest destiny was almost impossible. Conditions of life demanded the intervention of technology into the virginity of nature. Marx is not wrong when acknowledges that the pastoral doctrine of Eden was needed to resolve the contradictions a virgin land that needed to be conquered with technology. Certainly, the legacy of John Locke was of paramount importance to accept the paradigm of civilization in the new World. The two meanings of America were synthesized by means of work, this means by improvement. Referring to Virginia historian, plantation owner and politician Robert Beverley Jr. (1667-1722), Marx writes, "*When Beverley calls Virginia one of the Gardens of the World, he is speaking the language of myth. Here the Garden stands for the original unity, the all sufficient beauty and abundance of the creation. Virginia is an Edenic land of primitive splendour inhabited by noble savages. The garden, in this usage, joins Beverley's own feelings with that yearning for paradise which makes itself in virtually all mythology. But when Beverly says that there are two few gardens in Virginia, he is speaking about actual, man-made, cultivated pieces of ground. This image is also an emblem of abundance, but it refers to abundance produced by work or, in Beverley's idiom, improvement*" (p. 85).

Marx says that the master symbol of this country was rooted in the "emblem of felicity," (p. 85) which constitutes the great enterprise of all Americans. The myth of green garden suggests a new mode of belief, where the striving nature of country and happiness converges. Although Marx's argument is convincing, he was examining only the literature about Virginia, which although important, was not the entire country. To the north, Massachusetts, the other British colony, represented the industrial force of United States. Two cosmologies, which later will encounter each other in the Civil War, developed diverse views. Virginia is more associated with the aristocratic, cavalier way of life, focused on the blessings of nature and environment, whereas Massachusetts was more egalitarian and Calvinistic, and developed an industrially oriented ethos of work and technology.

REFERENCES

- Baudrillard, J. (2003). *The spirit of terrorism and other essays*. London, Verso.
- Bowlby, J. (1986). *Vínculos Afectivos: formación, desarrollo y pérdida*. Editorial Morata, Madrid.
- Bowlby, J. (1989). *Una Base Segura: aplicaciones clínicas de la teoría del apego*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidós.
- Eriksson, E. (2000). *Ciclo Vital completado*. Barcelona, Editorial Paidós.

-
- Fairbairn, W. R. D. (1962). *Psychoanalytical of the Personality studies*. Buenos Aires, Ed. Hormé.
- Freud, S. (1988). *Freud: obras completas*. Volumen XIII. "Más allá del principio del Placer." Buenos Aires, Editorial Híspamerica, pp 2507-2541.
- Karlegger, M. (2007). "La Problemática del viaje como desafío para la Ética." *Factótum. Revista de Filosofía*. Número 5. Edición Viajes y Viajeros. Disponible en <http://www.revistafactotum.com/>. Pp. 92-97.
- Marx, L (1964) *The Machine in the Garden: technology and the pastoral ideal in America*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Mead, G. H. (1999). *Espíritu, persona y sociedad*. Barcelona, Editorial Paidós.
- Reich, W. & Schmitt, V. (1998). *Psicoanálisis y Educación*. Buenos Aires, Atalaya Editorial.
- Skinner, B. (1984). *Walden Dos: hacia una sociedad científicamente construida*. Barcelona, Ediciones Martínez Roca.
- Spitz, R. (1996). *El Primer año de vida del niño*. Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Winnicott, D. 1989, *Realidad y Juego*. Barcelona, Editorial Gedisa.
- Winnicott, D. (1996). *El Hogar: nuestro punto de partida*. Barcelona, Editorial Gedisa.

Chapter 2

THE FUTURE OF TECHNOLOGY

From Chernobyl onwards scholars, pundits, and assorted commentators have criticized the role of technology as it impacts human life. In seminal book on the sociology of risk, Ulrich Beck (2006) argued that accidents under some conditions were the result of inadequate manipulation of technology. If modern society had been based on a Fordist mode production, Chernobyl marked the turning point of a new era where risk predominated. By means of risk, capital found the necessary conditions for replication. Although, technological advances, such as computers and the internet are ostensibly aim at making the world safer by mitigating and controlling the risk, the fact is that they also contribute to creating new risks, which go beyond the control of society. This point of view has been examined by social scientists since Beck's book first came out in German in 1986. Today the question remains unresolved: Does technology and technological advance threaten or a benefit humankind? Ecological concerns are perhaps where the contradictions of technology are most vivid.

This chapter explores the connection between technology and risk. Its point of departure is a discussion between Cass Sunstein (2003) and Anthony Giddens (1991, 2011). While Sunstein argues that fears are determined by cognitive shortcuts, Giddens considers risk to be a result of technology. Giddens is a critic of confidence in technology, although he praises its benefits. Sunstein is convinced that risk is a product of human ignorance and inaccuracy in the decision making process. Two views, two alternatives are juxtaposed in a debate that has not been finished to date. Technology plays a pivotal role in organizing not only behavior but also the society itself. Undoubtedly, technical advances have blurred the connection between time and space, facilitating many things for people. Among the benefits of technology applied to health for example, we have,

- Lights and electricity revolutionized space and time.
- The life expectancy has increased.
- Education has been extended.
- Risk, disasters, and other dangers may be mitigated by means of technology.

G. Amar (2011) argues that the evolution of technology has made life safer in many ways. One realm where it has enhanced safety is travel. The current meaning of mobility seems to be something other than a technique, but rather involves s a spirit of a kind of social bond that connects the Self with territory. Technology allows a re-discovering the principle of

‘religance.’ This neologism refers to the anthropological sense of place. The principle of religance that circumscribes the subject to the community may create new technologies, more sustainable for an ecology that improves our quality of life. Amar argues that innovation would play a pivotal role in the industry of mobility worldwide. Amar is convinced that there are two ways of moving. If we evaluate the problem of mobility in terms of space-time, we need to conclude that technology has made life faster, but not safer. Rather, Amar adds, there is surfacing a new manner of transport, where people are experiencing the something he calls time-substance which fabricates sentiments about visited places. This new type of mobility has recreational goals which produce long lasting and satisfactory experiences (Amar, 2011: 17).

Technology can also serve to mitigate and forecast or prevent disasters. In opposition to this, P. Virilio (1996; 2007) says that technology acquires a negative tendency because it expands the process of alienation and blurs the boundaries of heritage and nationhood. On the arts of Motor, Virilio says that mass media is framing and controlling the sense of reality. Today, hyper-reality has succeeded reality as media replace experience. Human perception has been captivated to see only events that never have happened, but also those in the future. As social primates humans have a tendency to communicate with others, and consequently they adapt their behavior to specific social environs. Events that are geographically dispersed are nonetheless broadcast on screens synchronized in seconds. The acceleration of mobility triggered an inevitable confusion between present and future. As a result of this, technology leads to a decline of trust and social bonds.

H. Marcuse (1991) believed that technological societies are basically used to create alienation and social control. At the same time that technology advances, liberty is being sacrificed. The dependency of human beings on the newest technique not only paves the ways for the advent of a new ideology, but also depersonalizes the workers in favor of capital (Marcuse, 1991). Marcuse’s criticism did not prosper until the development of Adolf Huxley, who written a book entitled *Brave new World*. In this valuable novel, Huxley introduces readers to a discussion where society is defined as a set of embodiments based on abstract ideas. This novel represents an acid criticism to techno-world. Given the demographic decontrol in urban areas, Huxley envisaged that technology would be efficient in controlling human beings as machines. As a result of this, democracies would be converted to governments bound to totalitarianism (Huxley, 2006).

D. Barney (2007) has presented a model to understand the role of technology and its effects on democracy and political life. Although technology largely ignores ethical questions, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that technology is a social construction, whose ends are based on imposing specific discussions. The problem of technology is that any question is answered before being formulated. Proponents of technology have criticized this view by saying it transcends the boundaries of culture and ethnocentrism. Technology in a globalized world permits changes and different postures directly to a trans-humanism. This would entail a more democratic and fairer society (Hughes, 2004). In this vein, the British journalist Guy Sorman admits that detractors of more technological development are more interested in preserving the status quo than in exploring the benefits of development. Technology for Sorman is good, positive, and emancipatory. Enemies of technology are reluctant to acknowledge or permit progress (Sorman 2002). Sorman claims they prefer to confuse public opinion by inventing risks that do not exist.

Nevertheless, academics have agreed that in some circumstances, technology may engender some risks, which if not duly evaluated, lead to future states of emergency. Chernobyl is one of the most vivid examples. Panic breeches the natural barriers to strategic risk management. Unless otherwise resolved, minor risk creates serious disasters by its cascade effects.

SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

Intuitively, science and technology are related, but the nature of the relationship seems to vary depending on philosophical and theoretical perspective. A. Cuevas distinguishes three important theoretical schools: a) the hierarchal model proposed by econometrics, b) non-hierarchal models proposed by sociology, c) a mixture of agent and system recently developed by the theorists of complexity (cybernetics). While each model is characterized by focusing on the diverse effects technology exerts on human behaviour, the fact is that the connection between technology and science depends upon its application. Technology is based on two significant elements, artefacts and technique. Scientists employ the later to make the epistemology of science, while the former ones are preferred to generate knowledge. To expand the current understanding of the issue it is important to conduct interdisciplinary research. Every discipline developed historically a particular definition of the technology. It is important to remind that those groups who have access to new techniques have substantial advantage in dominating others who are relegated to already existing technology. Of course, sometimes technologies may be harmful to the common well being. In view of the pattern of differential access to new technologies is humankind going towards a techno-dictatorship as Huxley predicted?

P. Virilio (2010) was one of the pioneers who anticipated this problem. In his book, *University of Disaster*, he warns that the advances in technologies and mobility have created new forms of displacements and blurred the relation between time and space. Based on modern transport, people have access to any geographical point of this globe in hours. The time of waiting has changed forever. Travelers now are moved by the indifference and visual consumption, there is not genuine contact in the visited lands. In the past history was experienced as a continuity of ordered events, but instaneous, electronically facilitated communication in real time puts people all over the world into a simulated simultaneity. A consequence is that citizens have been transformed in consumers. The sense of history as continuity has been emptied, and replaced by a fragmentation of events, dispersed everywhere, and broadcast continually. The knowledge that used to characterize labor the university has been polarized into de-localize territories. Based on an ongoing future that never makes room for the presentiment of disaster, the University of Disaster announces the eschatology of neurosis, according to Virilio. Virilio argues that everything happens at the same time in hyper-reality without logical sequence. The world stage is represented outside the planet, in an exo-earth. The days of science, as an all-encompassing instrument based on rational understanding, are over. Transformed into an exo-science, it promotes the simultaneous globalization of fear. Sciences like biology and astronomy are eclipsed by the “eternal present.”

Virilio also accuses science for its failure to create an ethic of life. Virilio argues that science has become in an economic-modeling geek which is conducive to the exploitation of people. More interested in protecting the interests of elite, Science now has changed forever its guiding philosophy. The belief in achieving a more secure world has set the pace to the need of prevention for capital owners do not loose their profits. Virilio recognizes that modern Science has lack its own spirit and self-criticism, and instead has increasingly become an ally of the market. His main thesis may be exemplified in the following excerpt: “we might note a recent project whereby detection of major risks is reversed, since the computer in question is involved in producing said major risks. At the end of 2006, IBM effectively decided to build the most powerful super calculator in the world, to do so, it will use processors capable of up one million billion operations per second, accelerating by as much the reality of the disastrous progress in weapons of mass destructions... which prompts personal question: after having resorted to meteorologists and other climatologists to calculate the economic risk of catastrophe, will the insurance and reinsurance companies one day have to call on the army and their new strategists to detect major ecological risk of nuclear proliferation” (p. 18)...

TECHNOLOGY, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND REFLEXIBILITY

Some social analysts have focused on the role of experts who control technology. Zygmunt Bauman (2009) emphasized hedonist consumption that leads modernity. Anthony Giddens puts the same problem in another way: the experts who frame and deal with risks. Unlike past times, today consumers are familiar with the product they buy but this point is secondary, that knowledge is based on a process of reflexivity (Giddens 2011). What characterizes social life in late modernity seems to be the complexity of capitalism that re-structures the connection between institutions with their agents. From this view, the hegemony of scholars that characterized the life in the Middle Ages, has reasserted itself in the reflexivity of education. This is the reason behind the problem of inflations in risk perception. Pre-modern societies saw in witchcraft a valid instrument for predicting the future. Modern societies resort to statistics to validate the policies of the state, and to represents purported reality for society. Modern reflexivity has the capacity to create many realities depending of the purchasing power of consumers. “Modernity’s reflexivity refers to the susceptibility of most aspects of social activity, and material relation with nature, to chronic revision in the light of a new information or knowledge. Such a information or knowledge is not incidental to modern institutions, but constitutive of them ... because many possibilities of reflection about reflexivity exist in modern social conditions” Giddens (1991: 20). In a subsequent book dedicated to ecology, Giddens (2011) insists that the technology currently at the disposal of humankind had been thought to make of the earth a better world, but this has not happened. Instead, technology exerts pressures that lead to deteriorating conditions of life. Modernity can be compared to a runaway train.

Even if Giddens glossed over this point, in fact accidents are based on randomness. Unless otherwise resolved, accidents would have been other things. To some extent, society may be compared with a system. Although capitalism has constructed a rational basis of control over almost all human possible interactions, the fact is that minor variables which

have not been taken into account may collapse the whole system. This paradox opens the door towards a new thesis respecting technology. Contingency, uncertainty, and randomness are inextricably intertwined. C. Perrow says that when accidents happen, a similar event will be repeated at least six times. We are daily facing serious, imperceptible threats that do not materialize in an accident. Following this, the circles of control tend to be petrified so as not to monitor these minor risks, which sooner or later cause the disaster. The technical perspective not only ignores this reality but also thinks erroneously that risk may be controlled by technological machinery.

Technology, quite aside from this, serves for making cyber-terrorism or to coordinate bloody riots. Some specialists agree that the uncontrollable riots in United Kingdom were organized by face book and other cyber-nets. They it is important for state to exert censorship on the contents of what people write and read through the web. Undoubtedly, technology seems to be a double-edged sword. Technology plays a pervasive role because on the one hand it can make life easier, but on the other can produce serious threats. Surely, technology opens the doors to a paradox. Is democracy able to solve the problems of risks?

K. Erikson (1994) reminds us that disasters are not caused by technology without human intervention. His book describes the involvement of social factors as the key to human economic asymmetries that facilitate disaster. Capitalism and its injustices may be the worst disaster people may face. Risk derives from the lack of trust in others. The case of East Swallow, Colorado, described in the third chapter, serves as a clear example of his argument. This town was advised in 1985 by a gas company that they had found a spill which threatened the population. This spill did not generate any damages in the short term, but further along effects over residents became increasingly dangerous. The intangibility of gas fumes in combination with the rise of continuous fears left residents of East Swallow in a full state of crisis. Erikson goes on to say in his report

“The residents of East Swallow who were exposed to the effects of the gasoline spill complain – with considerable justice, one has to assume - that the value of their homes has declined precipitously as a result of recent events. In one sense, of course, that is a financial matter and outside the scope of this report: plaintiffs have invested large amount of capital into the dwelling they occupy, and they are understandably concerned about the safety of those investments. For many, maybe most of them, it is not just a matter of losing a valuable possession; it is a matter of placing life’s saving at risk” (Erikson, 1994: 116).

The two factors that most concerned workers were:

1. A broader and exacerbated feeling of uncertainty about the health of family and relatives as well as the safety of their homes. These aspects represented one of main reasons for psychological distress in the population. On the one hand, they dreaded to leave their own households because things could worsen during their absence. This means an explosion or a disaster of similar caliber. On the other hand, they were aware of the serious implications of not leaving the affected zone: a gradual and inevitable intoxication from the gas.
2. The second motive for distress was associated with the possibility of losing the place in which they invested so much money and effort. This phenomenon seems to be well described in the context of disasters. For example, in moments of crisis many evacuation procedures fail because the personnel come across residents who are reluctant to abandon their homes. The symbolic power of home in the construction of

our identity is unquestionable, but in this case study things seem to be a bit different. Certainly, spills of gas can turn into a more frightful hazard that affects a wide range of social activities and of course workers were in part responsible for those damages; sadness, desperation and panic were some of the feelings Erikson noticed during his interviews.

One of the relevant aspects that terrified the whole population in this zone was the unpredictability of the next disaster. Metaphorically speaking, trapped between the devil and the deep blue sea workers were in a terrifying situation. In addition, this terrible situation implicitly triggers new relations of support among neighbors. Affected persons looked to their community for the strength enough they have not the chance to locate in their home. Erikson assumes that whereas home emotionally represents the place where family lies, neighborhood plays a secondary role in the socialization process. Since home did not warrant any kind of ontological security lay-people deposited their trust in the neighborhood as a second option.

Ulrich Beck (2006) argues that in the past, disasters were seen as the result of human errors, after Chernobyl, Beck adds, the boundaries between classes and liabilities were blurred. The process of reflexivity not only is erasing the basis of classes, but also place humans being in an egalitarian conditions respecting to the danger. Modern risks not only were developed in a globalized way but also jeopardized the stability of the whole system. These types of new risks installed the configuration of a new social order without recognition of classes or property. Information was the key factor to perceive and intellectualize a risk. As a result of this, logic of appropriation--which characterized classical mercantilism in past decades--is being replaced by its own antithesis, the logic of disavowal. It is not surprising that privileged groups hide collateral damages as a product of non-sustainable consumption. Their practices are supported thanks to the intervention of science and journalism. The underlying problem seems to be that duties and responsibilities are globalized at the same time humankind exhausts the non-renewable resources on earth as well as polluting the ozone layer. Beck fears superficiality whenever the risk is trivialized. The former is a result of the omission of the latter. After further examination, Beck explains that in "traditional society of classes" the groups replicate certain criteria of social distinction according to the style of consumption. In the era of industrialism societies structured their solidarities based on property, blood relatedness and status. Surely, Beck's argument is contradicting the evolution of history since he intentionality understands capitalism in the history of capitalism. As a result of this, his outcomes falls under what scholars dubbed "ecological fallacy" which explains beforehand what he likes to see.

Basically, Beck is concerned about the degradation of environment because of toxic wastes. Since this new kind of perceiving modernity obliges countries to combine efforts for solving daunting risks, the quality of community is being gradually transformed. In the passage from one to another type of society, concepts such as equality, richness and democracy are substituted by security, conflict and fears. Beck's development of risk seems comparable to Bauman's treatment of fear. For Bauman, human beings have the ability to elaborate secondary emotions characterized by being "socially and culturally" recycled. This is different for other animals which only feel basic fears triggered by concrete dangers. The problem of risk in Beck acquires a new nature in Bauman as secondary fear. Even though modern States weave their legitimacy on basis of their abilities to give stability, protection, and security to citizenry, under some situations they subordinate these functions to the

market. Nonetheless, it is not surprising to realize that risks are not emotions. The former are conditioned by uncertainty and probability, while the latter ones follow tactics of adaptation. The temporal nature of life that illustrated the guidelines of medieval times has been replaced by the rejection of death. This means that today living is a more important time than dying. In a process that Bauman denominates *deconstructionism* of death, the West is experiencing a gradual panic to die. But this sentiment is not necessarily linked to death itself. Rather, this appeals to the fact of being abandoned, silenced or forgotten. The visual imaginary today recognizes those who want to live forever.

The main thesis in Bauman is that rationality leads directly to the future, but in the future risks are unreal; they are discourses or fictions functional to the consumption machinery. The fictionalized and visually consumed states of disasters not only open the doors for contingency but also for indoctrination. This was the example of Hurricane Katrina, which revealed two relevant aspects of racial discrimination. First and foremost, the majority of victims were blacks or Latin Americans living in situation of unpreparedness. These actors were excluded from the promise of Uncle Sam long ago. Secondly, the disaster took place in New Orleans many years before Katrina. This example helps readers to understand how modern disasters are screened by late-capitalism. It is hypothesized that modern bureaucracy not only affects the responsibility for actions in the different ways but also subordinates emotions into a secondary role. On the threshold of twentieth century, the ethical was replaced by instrumentality. Once the ability to consider how to use it rationally have deteriorated, advances of technology have the effect of reducing the costs of evasion. However, evasion is not liberty, and suspension of ethics contributes substantially to the fragmentation of common links. Risk applied to technology seems to be a slipperier matter. Some hints are given by Giddens (1991) and Sunstein (2003) with respect to the modern aversion of risk associated with postmodernism.

From immemorial times, human beings have been subject to the will of nature. The advent of modernity changed forever the relationship of societies to the environment. The rise of temperature produced by industry and transport, the green-house effect, has shifted the climate in a radical way that resulted in mega-hurricanes, droughts, or floods. These disasters not only shocked public opinion worldwide but also hit one of the most powerful nations, the United States. After Katrina, American public opinion was skeptical about the conditions and effects of global warming in our daily life. In this context, one question was whether global warming is a real hazard or a fake? In his book, the *Politics of Climate Change* (2011) Giddens questions why most people, most of the time, act as though a threat of such a magnitude can be ignored. Giddens argues that the problem of ecology becomes a paradox:

“It states that, since the dangers posed by global warming aren’t tangible, immediate or visible in the course of day-to-day life, many will sit on their hands and do nothing of a concrete nature about them. Yet waiting until such dangers become visible and acute – in the shape of catastrophes that are irrefutably the result of climate change- before being stirred to serious action will be too late (Giddens, 2011, p. 2).

To our ends, the problem of global warming highlights the nature of risk and its subjective nature. Now, while many people are afraid of flying in an airplane, they do not hesitate to smoke or engage in any other high-risk behavior. Almost all climate experts agree that human action is responsible for the situation while others, largely in the pay of big

business, dispute these claims. Given this argument, the decentralization process that accelerated the hierarchal order of society does not appear to be sufficient to prevent the negative aftermath of climate change. Of course it is clear how people do not change because others do not, which is the tragedy of the commons. While only governments can tackle the problem of climate change by intervening directly in the current levels of green-house emissions, money interests prevent their effective actions. Only an international coordination is the only way to cope with natural catastrophes.

Unfortunately, the Giddens warns that time is running out. His assumptions about the market, lead us to consider that trade and market can be part of the solution. The market, controlled and guided by the state, may play a pivotal role in reducing the greenhouse effects in coming years. The question of climate change is associated with problems in energy security.

“The energy needs of the industrial countries have created most of the emissions that are causing global warming. The rapid economic growth of developing nations, especially in China and India, given their immense population size, is putting further strain on available energy sources, as well as increasing the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere” (p. 7).

The volume of green house gases to atmosphere is growing year to year which requires an immediate change in the kind of energy used. As a form of risk, climate change opens the doors for a new opportunity as well. In the first chapter, Giddens recognizes the influence of Fourier who was the pioneer in discovering how the energy forms can affect the climate. After a careful review of the numbers about the rise of temperature, Giddens says that probabilities of sea levels increase, as well as population control, will cause serious and severe natural disasters. The topography of earth will change and with this, some scholars state that humankind will face serious resource-related wars and ecological mass-migration. Of course, there is a minority who are more skeptical about the effects of global warming. For these scholars, such as Singer and Avery cited by Giddens (2011), the climate is experiencing a moderate alteration which by the way is not being provoked by human action. Geologists have warned about the probabilities that each 1500 years sun spot variation can subtly affect the climate in the planet. This does not mean any radical alteration for us or even a negative scenario. Life as we know will surely continue. Sociologically speaking, in the time of extreme frights and apocalypse, global warming seems to be only one of many global threats. Quite aside from this, Giddens recognizes the global warming arouses controversy, and criticism would play a pivotal role to define and understand the problem.

Following this reasoning, the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) procedures and conclusions are not only weak but also lack of scientific basis:

“Skepticism, to repeat, is essential to the scientific method, and there is some skeptics who are prepared to submit their work and their claims to the same rigorous process of examination by critics that they (rightly) demand of the mainstream scientific community. The trouble is that the majority are not, setting up a double clear standard. Attacks on science, or individual scientists, cannot only become quite vicious, but proceed in quite another dimension from that of science as such” (p 25).

Among those tactics by the media to dissuade public opinion from the coming disaster are: a) present pseudo-experts who are scientists, but lack credentials in the field they are

handling; b) give a sense of division whenever there is basic agreement by exercising censorship against one of the two sides; and c) pick and show evidence selectively to create an argument about the event. Humankind is in danger if substantial changes in policies are not followed. A safe level of atmospheric carbon dioxide is 350 ppm, and now the level is higher than this limit, Giddens adds. What can we make of this problem? Giddens acknowledges that scientists agree the climate is being changed while skeptics, many of them are not climate scientists, do not publish their views in peer-reviewed journals. Giddens overtly states "*I am not a scientist. It is up to the scientific community to assess the ideas of the activists and decide how much weight to attach to them*" (p. 31).

The philosophy of this work exemplifies how the problem of global warming is not necessarily just intertwined with the effects of carbon, but to the dependency of industrialized nations on oil. After the war between Arab league and Israel in the 1970s, the developed countries experienced a new situation in the production of energy. This event led certain European and Latin American countries to take up different strategies to replace oil with other, local forms of energies. The United States endeavored to take control of the Middle East, first and foremost in support of Saudi Arabia, in its quest for oil and gas. The American interest in the Middle East not only engendered some long-simmering conflicts, but also posed serious problems for oil and gas reserves. What is most important in this case, does not seem to be the effects of global warming, which Giddens accepts are controversial, but the social problems involved in the war for resources that oil creates.

Taking his cue from C. Sunstein's works, Giddens explains convincingly that there are two types of definitions regarding these ecological problems that range from weak to strong. The former refers to the need of regulation aside from the existence of a real damage while the latter one connotes that any action should be taken only if hard evidence of the risk exists. To what extent, technology may liberate humankind from risk or aggravates the problem seems to be an open question. In sharp contrast with Giddens, Cass Sunstein (2003) develops a new conceptual framework to understand the inflation of risk and the inability of the state to reverse the situation. Of course, the work of this American lawyer and Whitehouse adviser has certainly suffered different influences. Undoubtedly, beyond his prolific career, his efforts to understand modern risk are better explained after reading *Risk & Reason* (2003), where the logic of risk is placed under the lens of rational scrutiny. Considering Sunstein in opposition to Giddens may be a clear mistake. Instead, both provide complementary views to connect the problem of risk with the state and law.

To return to the questions in the introductory section, Sunstein describes the sniper in Washington DC who randomly killed more than 10 passers-by in 2002. Under some circumstances, the sentiment of widespread fear in society can generate major undesirable effects. Generally, the events or news our eye captures are spectacularly exaggerated by our own emotions or fabricated by mass media. Ranging from terrorism to strange, lethal flu, public opinion often misjudges the correct probabilities for apocalyptic disasters. However, less attention is given to other more important aspects that kill thousands of citizens annually such as traffic accidents, strokes, and protein-poor diets. This seems exactly to be the primary issue of study in Sunstein's project, case-by-case discussed throughout his book.

Sunstein realizes that there are two social mechanisms to magnify risk perception: a) the availability of a heuristic and b) probability neglect. The former refers to the mental disposition for reminding us about the similarity of events with lower probabilities of realization. When this happens, the social imaginary overestimates the danger by

broadcasting a state of alarmism to the rest of society. These irrational behaviors lead people to a sentiment of panic that prevents a rational orchestration of policies. The latter, probability neglect, is enabled when citizens, more sensible to the effects of disasters, neglect the probabilities.

Sunstein examines the paradox of risk and complexity whenever the state echoes automatically the claims of its citizenry. By this token, Sunstein clarifies an approach to cost/benefit method that allows experts and officials to determine what are risks should be focused on, and under what conditions the state should intervene. This assumption is based on an old belief that social agents behave following the irrational dictates of feelings. As a result of this, people often think of taking short cut to validate their previous assumptions, but they thereby generate new risks. Sunstein's valuable text is structured into ten chapters where the author deals with the problem of global warming and ecology. From many perspectives, Sunstein aspires to set forth a new model to help practitioners and policy makers to make the correct decisions. If the law is strong, the state and jurisprudence should follow only those claims that represent more benefits than costs. A clear and deep evaluation of cost and benefits is more than important for an efficient administration. Of course, much criticism has been widely leveled against this book. Beyond the criticism of his argument woke up, respecting to his liberal view on cost-benefit balances, (Baron & Dunoff 1995; Sinden 2004; Korstanje, 2012), it is interesting to discuss Sunstein's response to the current state of risk inflation. Why we over-valorize some risks while others are covered?

To a greater or lesser degree, Sunstein acknowledges that the magnitude of costs sometimes is not clearly defined or is at least very hard to see. Secondly, this model trivializes the role of social patrimony and can be misunderstood as an effort to install a new dictatorship based on expertise and rational knowledge. To these critiques, Sunstein argues that state should protect its citizens by making good decisions and evaluating with rational instruments the alternatives. To overcome the current climate of populism that characterizes the modern world is one of the challenges any state should face.

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

Sunstein's approach is persistently aimed at exploring two aspects of risk, perception and its effects, while focusing on the role played by trust which bridges alternatives to forecast those potential risks. A correct evaluation of risks allows experts and officials to make correct decisions to deter a catastrophe. Sunstein's argument has two errors. First, Sunstein tries to describe a problem from a one-sided gaze. Risk, calculation, and democracy are social constructions that are connected with the expansion of capitalism. The cost/benefit model will generate more risks, because it ignores the real nature of risk. Basically, risk is not a result of citizen's ignorance, but a gradual process that allowed the replication of capital. Secondly, the United States and its deliberative functions should not be considered as an ideal democracy because in many senses the form of its organization is not an enough to determine democratic life. If in ancient Greece the democracy allowed citizens to reject an arbitrary law, in modern society this faculty is impossible. The concept of democracy is strictly applied to the autonomy between powers and popular voting. Furthermore, Anglo-democracy, historically speaking, resulted from two important social forces: mass consumption and freedom. The

medieval institution of charity was a serious obstacle for industrialism. This last movement encouraged a scripted sentiment of liberty so the citizenry can sell its productivity across long distances if necessary. The old Catholic institution of charity that protected people set the pace to paid work. As a result of this, the social bonds started to experience a gradual fragmentation. This re-structuration was accelerated by the combination of other secondary factors such as industrialization, mobility, the dissociation between time and space, and democracy. To some extent, money worked as a mediator connecting people that had nothing in common or lacked of previous familiarity. With the introduction of risk in modern life, insurance companies, originally created to absorb risks, employed the interest rate to increase the volume of capital. The dangers travelers would face to carry goods from one to another point of the globe, from the eighteenth century onward, determined the final transaction price. Risk was functional to the expansion of mercantilism and later capitalism. Besides, each society develops particular forms of living democracy according to a sentiment of autonomy that alternates between efficiency and institutionalism. For example, Latin American societies have constructed a shared meaning of democracy prioritizing particular questions of personal well being rather than the autonomy of the institution as in England or United States. What is noteworthy to mention here is that democracies in these countries are circumscribed by a high degree of political conflict and instability while the Anglo world has more stable forms of organizations based on the hegemony of few corporations. This does not mean one type is preferable or better than others or that United State is the only democracy that other countries should aspire to emulate. Unfortunately, Sunstein is unable to break with a widespread sentiment of Democracy-centrism.

Last but not least, anthropology revealed long ago, the function of taboos was to protect some parts of local economies. Like risk, taboo works as an economic mechanism that facilitates trade in one direction while banning the commercialization of some goods in another. Risk, thus, operates by the introduction of a discourse, mediated and disseminated by religion, journalism and experts, where some practices or goods are strictly prohibited. Comparatively, risk confers on some groups the monopoly of using certain goods to gain more legitimacy or to dissuade others. While some properties may be widely exchanged depreciating their value, others are banned but strongly requested. The value of the latter goods is so exorbitant that they become inalienable possessions. Furthermore, those actors that monopolize the possession of these taboo-goods enhance their prestige and gain further legitimacy than others. This generates an economic asymmetry between the citizens. To set a clear example, terrorism was defined as the main risk for America and West for the twenty-first century. As a social construction, the narrative of terrorism facilitates certain goods to be consumed and reserves others. The rates of insurances for airplanes have risen from 9/11 onwards whereas the gun trade has proliferated on US soil. Another example: as a result of aristocracy's pressure, the demand for sacred-taboo goods slumps. At the same time, privileged groups reserve for themselves the usage and application of the taboo-goods at their discretion. Risk cuts social interaction at one point and allows a redirection in the opposite direction to discipline the citizenry. From this perspective, risk not only appears to be functional to the current economy but also for the reduction of legal ambiguities. What both Sunstein and Giddens ignore is that the proliferation of risk cannot be mitigated by means of calculation, rationally, or democracy simply because they are part of the problem, not the solution.

REFERENCES

- Amar, G. (2011). *Homo Mobilities. The new era of mobility*. Buenos Aires, La Crujia.
- Bauman, Z. (2008). *Liquid Fears contemporary society and its liquid fears*. Buenos Aires, Paidos Editorial.
- Barney, D. (2007) *One Nation Under Google*, Toronto: House of Anansi Press.
- Baron, J. B., & Dunoff, J. L. (1995). Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory. *Cardozo L. Rev.*, 17, 431.
- Beck, U. (2006). *Risk Society, towards a new modernity*. Buenos Aires, Paidos
- Cuevas, A. (2005). "The many Faces of Science and Technology relationships." *Essays in Philosophy*. Vol. 6 (1): article 3.
- Erikson, K. (1994). *A new Species of Trouble. Explorations in disasters, trauma and community*. New York, Norton and company.
- Farris, J. (2005). "Philosophy regarding technology." *Essays in Philosophy*. Vol. 6 (1): article 5.
- Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and society in The late modern age*. California, Stanford University Press.
- Giddens, A. (2011). *The Politics of Climate Change*. Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Hugues, J. H. (2004). *Citizen Cyborg. Why democratic societies must respond to the redesigned human of the future*. Cambridge, West-view Press.
- Huxley, A. *Brave New World*. London, Harper Perennial Modern Classics.
- Korstanje, M. E. (2012). Una introducción al pensamiento de Cass Sunstein: Riesgo y racionalidad aplicable a la realidad Latinoamericana. *A Contracorriente*, 9(3), 291-315.
- Marcuse, H. (1991) *One Dimensional Man. Studies in ideology of advanced industry society*. London, Routledge.
- Perrow, C. (1999). *Normal Accidents. Living with high risk Technologies*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Scott-Ruse, M. (2005) "Technology and the Evolution of the Human, from Bergson to the philosophy of Technology." *Essays in Philosophy*. Vol. 6 (1): article 27
- Sinden, A. (2004). Cass Sunstein's cost-benefit lite: economics for liberals. *Columbia Journal of Environmental Law*, 29(2), 192.
- Sorman, G. (2002). *The Progress and its enemies*. Buenos Aires, Emece.
- Sunstein, C. R. (2002). *Risk and reason: Safety, law, and the environment*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Virilio, P. (1996) *El Arte del Motor: aceleración y realidad*. Buenos Aires, ediciones el Manantial.
- Virilio, P. (2007). *Ciudad Pánico: el afuera comienza aquí*. Buenos Aires, Libros el Zorzal.
- Virilio, P. 2010. *The University of Disaster*. Oxfordshire, Polity Press.

Chapter 3

CROSSING THE BOUNDARIES OF EMPIRE

FROM ETHNO TO ANGLO-CENTRISM?

Some Latin American critics have blamed US interventionism for subordinating their autonomy to the geopolitical interests of the continent. For them, the US violates many human rights in the name of democracy and freedom. Some voices have widely criticized US imperialism which is predicated on the belief that their country is unique, special, and outstanding. This sentiment of exemplarity leads the US government to avoid allegations against its international agenda. After all, America is still the most democratic nation and its example should be adopted or imported by other nations (Wildman, 1996; Fitzgerald, 1986; Dworkin, 1996; Gutmann, 2001; Krehbiel, 2010; Coleman, 2010; Altheide, 2002; Skoll, 2009; Bellesisles, 2010). Not surprisingly, the dilemma of terrorism as it has been formulated by international affairs specialists woke up an old Anglophone alliance formed by the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Are English speaking countries more sensitive to global threats, or simply it deals with an imperial plot oriented to strengthen the hegemony over the world? Some so-called terrorism experts who serve as fear mongers equate Islamist militancy with a pathogen. Emulating the arithmetical models of biology to monitor the evolution of virus outbreaks with potential terrorist cells (Stares and Yacoubian, 2009), these pseudo-scholars assert three relevant points:

- a. The preliminary stage of propagation of Islamism should be found and eradicated;
- b. The passive receptor of this new disease of terrorism needs protection;
- c. A clear diagnosis of the environment where Islamism terrorism appears is vital to prevent potential attacks against the US.

The allegory of terrorism, on US soil allowed fighting against political enemies in Europe or any other geographical point and control of working class leaders. The red scare during the Cold War assisted the financial elite in maintaining the social order capitalist society. Whereas some scholars question the validity of an elite modeled on that of Great Britain, it would be safe to say that the exemplarity enunciated by founding parents of this country merits further attention. Baltzell (1991) says that any society needs its aristocracy as well as guiding values to survive. He questions the idea that Anglo Saxons have formed a strict and tight aristocracy consolidated after WWII. Not only mass-migration has overwhelmed the

Anglo ethnicity, even inside aristocracy, but also its power and legitimacy declined after the 1960s. Today, Baltzell argues, the WASP (White Anglo Saxon Protestant) is important as a social imaginary even if it is not reflective of social reality. This happens because aristocracies are not open groups where everybody can enter; they are restrictive and exclusive, but subject to change. This leads middle class citizens to conjecture and form biased beliefs about elites. As ruling elites, aristocracies are in ongoing movements and shifts. More inclined to the sociology of Tocqueville than Marx, Baltzell acknowledges that the concept of a Protestant establishment should be reconsidered. His validations were simpler than thought. If the French nobility rejected the inclusion of talented people to be part of aristocracy, Americans emulated the British style by accepting others groups. Gradually, the influence of the elite in US has been changed. The power has been passed to different hands. Democracy, Baltzell urges, played a vital role by amalgamating aliens to the American elite. For that reason, it is almost impossible to assume WASP hegemony, as some neo-Marxists argue. Although I am partly in agreement with Baltzell, what would be interesting to debate is to what extent, the Anglo-Saxon discourse went throughout American minds, even in the decline of aristocracy. Taxes in inheritance, which are imposed by governments, accelerated the social fragmentation of elite. Once the father dies, descendants sold their properties to others wealthier neighbors.

“If the inheritance tax atomizes established family power, the income tax makes it far more difficult for the new men of power and ambition to establish new families. While the bank account and community roots create family strength and continuity, corporate loyalty and the expense account life may have quite the opposite effect. The new manager virtually marries the corporation, which, in return, provides him with a generous expense account life, especially, when away from home, retirement benefits replace private savings, make it increasingly hard for him to resign, and encourage and other-directed conformity in his slow struggle to the top (p. 52).

An additional point of entry in this discussion should be added. Baltzell ignores that once a group is consolidated, its founding cultural values are stable over time, even suffering the miscegenation of new incomers. WASP values are not only present in the language Americans speak, but in their political institutions. Though he is right when he affirms that American aristocracy has changed from the US inception, it is no less true that the Protestant spirit has remained. In this vein, Norbert Elias (1998) was the first to caution about the connection between racism and sacrifice. From his view, social discrimination consists in exacerbating some in-group characteristics to enlarge the gap between God's chosen people and the rest. Elias adds that it is not enough to belong to this privileged group. Its members are subject to a set of diverse rites to validate their membership, which means continual testing. The pride of uniqueness seems to be combined with a much broader symbolic sacrifice. This stance is present not only in American cultural discourse, but also in the archetype of mobilities. Moving away from home is, for Americans, an act of profound fear. To some extent, tourism frames the situation for many cultures to enter in contact. Sometimes this encounter is troublesome; sometimes it is not. This raises the question of what does being American abroad mean?

Contrary to what many scholars think, the Anglo-centrism of the US was not been triggered by 9/11, it was coined a long time before that event. From McCarthyism, the red

scare and Cold War, the world was a hostile place for Americans. This chapter explores the book *Being American Abroad* authored by the Anthropologist Robert C. Temple in 1961. In this document, it is clear how the archetype is being constructed in American culture. The costs of being part of good boys open the doors towards a new type of imperialism where mobility, materiality, and democracy are inextricably intertwined.

To decipher Anglo-centrism, four key factors are necessary: a) democracy as a style of life, b) the degree of materiality as a criterion of privilege and progress, c) the supremacy of America over other cultures, and d) the fear of being American abroad. One might speculate that unlike England, which was pressured to deal with other neighboring countries, the United States has grown in isolation, with Canada to the north and Mexico to the south. This reality not only engendered an autochthonous and pure version of English but also a closed view of others; a sentiment of uniqueness which is reflected in its international policies and the way Americans see the rest of the globe.

POLITICS

In his *What is the United States? ("Que es Estados Unidos?)*, professor Fernandez de Castro (2008) considers that Mexicans and Latin Americans have constructed a pervasive archetype of America. The US is hated for their one-sided interventions, but admired for the style of life that characterizes US society. This raises the question of how much the political structure and progress of this country gravitates in other parts of the globe. Historian Bernard Baylin highlights the political structure of America based on a legacy given by British Empire that combined liberty and tolerance with authoritarian practices. History is witness to how England expanded its domination to overseas territories by means of violence and fear, but in its metropolis they tolerated the speech of citizenry, the right to commerce, and respect for institutions. Therefore, its colonies such as the US developed a strange fascination for conspiracy theories, which leads them to intervene in the local politics of other countries but at the same time claims democracy as the main ideal of nation. Any American who feels proud not to be tainted by the declining British corruption leads the colonies to ruins (Baylin, 1965).

Therefore, American elites adopted fear as an instrument of dissuasion inside and outside the state. This is exactly the argument presented by R. Freeland to understand the process of McCarthyism. The psychological fear was already introduced by the British Empire in the country, but the elite manipulated politics to deter the advance of labor unions and communism in the workforce. Far from being a democratic country, the US, Freeland adds, laws were systematically designed to protect the interests of financial corporations. For a long time, the Supreme Court neglected the rights of workers and African Americans which were accorded to the interests of White Anglo Saxons. Whenever the stability of this system was on danger, political persecution and conspiracy theories served to put things in a straight.

In contrast with Baylin (1965) and Freeland (1985), J. F. Revel (2002) says that the sentiment of Anti-Americanism as a form of idolatry is a projection originated by Europe. The United States plays a pivotal role in configuring the international politics of the world. These policies were supposedly aimed at expanding the ideals of democracy and tolerance. However, some countries, like France, project their own authoritarian sentiment against US.

Of course, 9/11 and the conception of preventive wars were for Revel a big error for Bush's administration, but this does not invalidate the liberal culture of US. The fact is that the US gets support, admiration, and aversion at the same time. Its role as a super-power situates America between the wall and blue sea. On one hand, European countries accede to the US its role as a unique state that maintains order, but on the other, sees these types of policies as expressions of Anglo-imperialism.

In his book *Of Paradise and Power*, Robert Kagan (2004) noted that America separated from Europe because of their divergence of interests in the world. While Europeans wanted to cement a new civilization where trade and peace would be commonplace, the US adopted model of the Hobbesian State by expanding military campaigns to those countries which it considered a threat.

“Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Imanuel Kant's perpetual peace. Meanwhile, the United States remains mired in history exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international law and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might” (Kagan, 2004: 4).

This situation came from the enthrallment of George W. Bush's administration by neo-conservatives, or radical conservatives. They conceived of the world like the Puritans as a dangerous place, fraught with hazards and conspiracies against the US. Following this principle, a preventive attack is the best form of defense. Neo-conservatives use the ideology of terror to impose policies (Weisberg, 2008). Robert Reich writes,

“Radcons have blended Christian fundamentalism and right-wing moralism into their larger worldview. Unrestrained sex, they believe, unleashed evil that hides inside human beings. It threatens the social order. Therefore it must be controlled. The evil sexual impulses inside us have to be disciplined, just as evil forces from outside have to be. The war on sexual deviancy is, in this respect, a lot like war on terrorism” (Reich, 2005: 58).

The question of why American feels so special seems to be unstudied in academic literature. Michael Ignatieff argues that the United States has historically constructed a social bond which is based on the respect and trust in civic institutions. Americans not only valorize free speech but also democratic government along with opportunities to maintain rights and duties within their nation. The concept of human rights, coined after the WWII, came from the professed desire to extend American style liberty to the world. Nonetheless, from its inception, human rights posited the United States as the only country whose moral superiority allows it to ignore the resolutions of UN (United Nations)US politicians feel they are exempt from accusations of human rights violation (Ignatieff, 2001). This principle of exceptionalism that characterized the early political life in America was finely ingrained the Puritan religious matrix, and it paved the way for liberal democracy to betray its own foundations. If America is exempted from standards expected from other states, alluding to its principle of self-determination as a stepping stone of democracy, but paradoxically it intervenes in other countries where human rights are supposedly violated. This engenders a serious ethical problem because US takes on the role of Empire. In consequence, the American tourists who

travel around the world are attacked by the resentment their country engenders. The boundaries between home and abroad are deepened by the fear (Korstanje, 2013). The global American travelers keep their privilege to belong to the most civilized nation of the world, but this sentiment of exclusiveness has its costs. Any tourist serves as political actor who communicates a message to others.

THE PROTESTANT ETHOS

Max Weber envisaged the connection between religion and labor. He pointed out that Calvinist and Catholic's cosmologies constructed different models of the world and work. While Catholicism viewed human acts as prerequisite for salvation, Calvinism saw salvation as determinative of human behavior—i.e., “saved” people acted in ways other than the rest of humanity. Calvinist doctrine taught that salvation was determined by the Life-book in Heaven. Catholicism interpreted salvation as a consequence of acts in the earth (Weber, 1964; 1995; 1958). Weber saw a connection between concepts of salvation and economy. The organization of labor as well as the process of territorialization follows cultural archetypes that structure political authority and valorize labor. The political structure direct show surplus value from labor is distributed.

E. Fromm explored the Calvinist ethos in the configuration and consolidation of Nazism. Since the idea of salvation is embedded with the doctrine of future, people accept not democratic forms of authority, but exclusionary forms of identity. Fromm was trying to explain how the fascist movements in the first third of twentieth century consolidated their power in Europe. In his view, Nazism came from Protestant logic, but also American rationale. Nazism is based on the instrumentality it denounces. On the final pages of his book, Fromm points to problems of capital with respect to democracy. The Calvinist ethos entails a deep anxiety, because people cannot know if they are among the chosen for salvation. This is how predestination predisposes the mind to sadism and escape (Fromm, 2005). By this way, S. Coleman (2013) insisted that Protestant culture tends toward dissociation between religious and political order. The redemption of sins lead, as Coleman adds, to dissociate earth from heaven. Though this belief was already enrooted in Catholicism, it was adopted by Anglo-Saxons as a valid source to understand future. As a dangerous place to dwell, the world should be expiated and renovated by means of fear and grace (Coleman 2013)

In a compact and interesting work, Paul K Conkin (1976) revealed the connection between Puritanism and science in early United States. In New England, religious beliefs dominated the first and second generations, which partially laid the foundation of the country, these ideas somehow mutated and replicated over years. There are continuities between the first reformers of faith and the philosophical pragmatism of Peirce, James or Dewey. The sense of philosophy given by Protestants is based on two major issues, the quest for betterness and beauty and the role of destiny. Conkin recognizes that one of the most troubling methodological problems to assess the impact of reformation in US is the mass migration. Thousands of European migrants provided their own faith, which in other terms was mingled with Anglican faith. Luther and Calvin were for them archetype to follow in moments of uncertainty. Quite aside from any ideology, Puritans realized that to become a good Christian, one should read the writings of Calvin. The heart of life was the omnipotence

of God and the inferiority of men. The needs of grace were determined not only by suffering but by renovation. Emulating the redemption of Christ who died to forgive all human sins, Calvinists looked for signs of sin and salvation.

“The much-maligned, largely misinterpreted doctrine of predestination reflected Calvin’s profound piety and his sharply polarized view of God and man. But the doctrine of predestination coexisted with, or even complemented, a defense of human liberty and an almost exaggerated emphasis upon human responsibility. God, as the eternal ground of all being, existed the primary cause of all things. Nothing existed apart from or in opposition to Him. In this extreme of pious respect, or self-abnegation, Calvin embraced a demanding theodicy. He did not intend any cause-effect type of determinism. The crucial demand of the doctrine of predestination was a denial of substantive evil. All things depended on God, contributed to His ends, and were redeemed in their ultimate purpose (Conkin, 1976: 7).

According to Conkin, in Calvinism, the Edenic fall was functional to God’s wish and therefore to His eternal glory. Nevertheless, the reality of God entailed the self-depreciation of his creation, humankind. The cosmos was considered a vast creation in which everything that people can do is determined by the divine plan. Conkin would say that piety consists of a totalizing expression of what God wants. This philosophy stemmed from the Calvinist view on predestination. Unlike Judaism or idealist Christians, Calvinists maintained the intellectual impossibility of learning the transcendence of eternity.

Puritans saw wealth as a sign of salvation, because “only rational and responsibility expressed the will of God. Puritans condemned the accidental, which defies the balance between the two extremes. On one hand, they believed in a closed future, unalterable by human will, but at the same time God gave to human beings diverse instruments to know on the future. Therefore, economic justice, meaning wealth, was seen as an expression of the grace of God. Conkin would on to accept that

“The doctrine of a calling, so vial to all Calvinist, was full of promises and pitfalls. At its best, it dignified all labor, forbade all exploitation, and required an atmosphere of economic freedom. It placed a real rewards for labor outside the wealth acquired or the product created... the puritan tried to return social respect, community approval, and religious sanctions to the ordinary task of life” (p 29).

It is false, in these terms to equate wealth with salvation. Their philosophy of life, rather, was oriented to respect harmony, balance, and reconciliation. Wealth expressed the moral freedom, needed for workers to be selected as part of a chosen people. This led the Calvinist Puritans of New England to an excess of instrumentality. One of the waves of this doctrine flourished in the moral philosophy of Emerson, the others more pragmatist, which is based on trades and business, emerged in the thought of Franklin and Adams (Conkin 1976).

Phillip Greven (1988) argues that the Protestant temperament was of paramount importance to establish a cultural archetype in America. He delineated a model with three subtypes with each one representing different forms of adaptation to life: a) evangelical, b) moderate, and c) genteel. Evangelicals were dominated by an underlying hostility to the self and all worldly manifestations. Moderates preferred to accept the body’s desires as part of the life. Evangelicals, so-called born against, over-valued the experience of a new birth because the world is a dangerous place to live. Always considered as at war, evangelicals are viewed

by mainstream religions as extremists who prioritized the spirit over some other expressions. Moderates constructed a more ambivalent world view. Accepting sin as a form of evolution, moderates see salvation as something gradually achieved. The third category in Greven model, the genteel, how indifference to the preoccupations of moderates and evangelicals. The genteel feel comfortable in this world. Like mankind, the world as a whole is fine, even if personal salvation is not taken for granted.

In Protestant evangelism rebirth is achieved by means of piety and daily life; grace is predetermined by the book of Heaven. The evangelical cosmology has two relevant aspects: fear and love. These recurrent themes emulate the filial relation between gods and humanity. Forming two persistent poles within the American psyche, evangelical cosmology was replicated from generation to generation. One of the main problems of evangelical discourse seems to be its proneness to violence and conflict as points of rupture between self and others. Particularly and to any threats, Americans have developed a symbolic cocoon with respect to a world which remains hostile in their cosmology. With the passing of time, it generated a strong ethnocentrism that over-valORIZED the inner life and the pride for themselves, but pathologically engendered a terrible fear for everything beyond the boundaries of the United States.

Geoffrey Skoll (2009) has argued that Americans and other Anglophones, especially those in Britain and the settler countries, Australia and Canada, have produced a culture of terror. With a focus on the United States, I argue that the culture of fear has evolved from the kind of fear associated with the anticommunist hysteria in the years following the Second World War and its predecessor Red scares to its current incarnation of the terrorism obsession. While recognizing popular participation in constructing this culture of fear, we further re-consider the fact that elites in the centers of world capitalism have fostered its construction with planning and deliberation. The psychological fear is conducive to keep in control the conflict and unionization in America.

THE RISK OF BEING AMERICAN ABROAD

Recent research has shown that Americans are more prone to risk perception than other nationalities. Dominguez, Buguette, and Bernard (2003), explain that 9/11 was the main event that determined a strange fear in the US for visiting overseas destinations. As a result of the international affairs in the Middle East, Americans and Britons have developed more aversion to visiting international destinations than other groups. Although the results of this investigation are not determinative, other studies validated their main thesis. Sacket and Botterill (2006) found that Anglo-phone tourists post 9/11 perceived major risks for becoming victims of terrorism than before. Americans (72%) saw major risks in foreign travel, while among the British it was 42%. Similar outcomes are showed by Ertuna and Ertuna who confirm that nationality is a reliable variable to predict risk behavior; according to their cited papers, researchers find a connection between perception of risk and nationality. Communicated by the media, risk is gradually constructed according to cultural values, which are ingrained in the national consciousness. Being American or British carries a meaning of a special position with respect to other nationalities. Ertuna and Ertuna found that Anglo-tourists developed a strange sensibility for trauma and negative events whenever a compatriot

was a victim. It seems as though the audience weaves a certain type of solidarity with victims of terrorism as broadcast by the media.

More critically, David Steiner (2007, 2009) has suggested that even though nationality may be a predictable variable for risk perception in some contexts, further examination is needed. Alternating empirical research with a rich bibliographic interpretation, Steiner argues that the place of residency has more predictability than nationality. Based on the fact that 9/11 installed fear everywhere, no matter what the national affiliation of tourist, he considers that the constant bombardment of terrorism-related news creates an atmosphere that sensitizes people to potential threats. Americans conceive of fewer risks than other groups (Steiner, 2007; 2009). Fuchs and Reichel (2004) conducted an innovative investigation to conclude that religion plays a crucial role in perceiving risks. Nationality would have few correlations on risk-perception unless mediated by religion. Catholics and Protestant were more prone to risk perception than other religious groups as Catholics, Buddhist and Muslims.

Fuchs, Uriely, Reichel, and Maoz (2012) explain that ideology is a good resource to intellectualize danger in the human mind. The first factor that causes fear is the boundaries between familiarity and the unknown. In this sense home gives security to the self, which is broken whenever it crosses national boundaries. The concept risk or threat seems to be individually determined by political attachment. Republicans would experience, under this logic, greater fears than Democrats at time of visiting Arab countries.

Last but not least, interesting studies have focused on the effects of 9/11 and the effects of terrorism on the US tourism industry. From this viewpoint, tourism policy makers contend that terrorist attacks are seen as act of violence perpetrated in urban contexts, or in populated cities. As a result, tourist fluxes are not stopped in context of uncertainty, but rather they change according to destinations linked to rural areas. The proximity of citizens to ground-zero or the inhabitants of urban cities were more sensible to terrorism news than farmers or people who live in rural zones. Even so, many Americans traveled to rural areas to spend their holidays after this tragic event. This happens simply because we have the ability to reconfigure our perception to avoid those destinations like the affected place (Floyd et al. 2004; Floyd and Pennington-Gray, 2003; Wong & Yeh, 2009; Woods et al. 2008). Korstanje and Olsen (2011) have examined the genre of horror movie to consider that 9/11 not only has created a serious shock to American culture, but also has changed the making of terror in cinema. Based on a deep examination of movies as *Hills Have Eyes*, *Hostel*, and *Texas Chainsaw Massacre*, Korstanje and Olsen argue that Americanism exhibits a combination of pride and fear. At one and the same time, American tourists are viewed as the center of good civilization, but their own dwelling in this world is compromised by sadists whose main satisfaction is the torture of innocents. The principle of evil seems to be inextricably intertwined with the lack of hospitality. Given this as a backdrop, the world beyond the boundaries of US is presented as a dangerous place to visit. This leads to the creation of a deep-seated ethnocentrism that audiences cannot see with clarity, but affect how the other non-American is constructed. The concept of risk and terrorism as it is being exploited by Hollywood may create serious problems in the collective psyche of United States.

THE ANGLO-CENTRISM IN THE BOOK OF ROBERT TEMPLE

To give a little introduction on Temple's career, we may say that Robert C. Temple was an anthropologist with fluency in six languages. Per his trajectory and experience, he worked in many countries with diverse cultures and customs after he left Yale University. Interested in the psychology of tourists, he published *Americans Abroad* (1961) to explain the culture shocks by Americans when travel abroad. This book is meant to give practical suggestions for travel, and unintentionally is example how American ethnocentrism works. Examining Temple's tips, helps in understanding ethnocentrically determined perceived risks in modern, mobile society.

At the end of WWII the US appeared as the primary winner. Many Americans started to travel worldwide, as tourists, businessman, diplomats, and so forth. In doing so, these citizens represented America to the world. According to Temple, one of the aspects that makes Americans exemplary and special is democracy:

“Turning up in every part of the globe, these Americans are our informal representative to the other peoples of the world. What we are and what our democracy means will be judged by their action and reaction long after the formal speeches and actions of politicians have been forgotten. This was not always so, and once John Doe, an American living in a foreign country, might have been looked upon by the people about him as just another foreigner, with little or no reference to his national background”(p. 8).

For Temple like many other social scientists at the time, democracy is a positive cultural legacy from the US to the civilized world. Therefore its citizens should display a special virtue which only is given to the chosen people. in Temple's argument, the United States seems not to be judged by its failure or success in international policies but by its tourists abroad. American tourists should avoid becoming the bad stranger. The book is full of examples and situations to show the civil virtue of what it means to be a good American. Temple says that one of the first obstacles to overcome the language barrier. Temple acknowledges that some Americans are reluctant to learn languages other than English, but fluency in another language facilitates learning foreign customs, thereby opens up new opportunities for businesses. Temple's book illustrates the role played by money in US culture. The degree of materiality, as Weber put it, depends on the needs of demonstrating to be part of “selected peoples.” To cover his ethnocentrism, Temple expresses concerns for those compatriots who have not devoted time to get other experiences. The quest for novelty seems to be important to give up the prejudices of home.

In this vein, Temple writes

“There are certain fundamental experiences which have to be met by everyone who leaves his own country to live elsewhere. Going abroad means giving up home in spiritual as well as physical sense; it means acquiring a new kind of education; it means adopting new attitudes and points of view about foreigners and their ways; it means assessing one's own values in light of other's people's value and standards”(p 15).

Nonetheless, all this advice was aimed at those Americans who opted to live in other countries home. What does Temple say about the tourists? Typically, he says, tourists are

fascinated by how poor people live in peripheral countries. Along with curiosity, Americans are inclined to scorn them, and at the same time gain a feeling superiority.

“Slumming is neither possible nor intelligent. As Americans, living in a technically advanced, affluent society, we tend to downgrade those peoples of the world who have not participated in the industrial revolution and whose economies are inadequate to their population’s needs”(Temple 1961, p 21).

The US had the advantage of vast lands and a rich economy that flourished with industry to provide continual development and national wealth. The sense of Americanness is explained by Temple as an archetype of science, hard work, and recreation; always contrasting the differences between the White-Anglo model and aboriginals in other countries. Temple ignores or tries to ignore in US that many aboriginal reservoirs continue to exist as ghettos. Temple explains why the US is the most democratic country in the world in the chapter entitled, “Special Luggage labeled American,” the author recognizes that democracy is not a perfect system of government, noting that judges can be bribed or the activities of some minorities are restricted, but indeed in US, but he claims “Most judges can’t be bribed, few men sell their votes; the majority of Americans reject attempts to limit minority rights; and while a poor man may rarely lunch with a rich one, both can do pretty much what they like otherwise” (p30).

What this excerpt is not taking seriously is hundreds years of racial and ethnic discrimination, genocide of the indigenous population, the repression of the black population and the ghettoization of cities. It is not the goal of this chapter to judge if American is good or bad, but only to focus on the cultural elements which make Americanness an archetype of identity. Not all citizens in the US have read Temple’s book, but it reflects the imaginary of how America sees itself and the others. This book is a representation of American culture. For that reason, it is self explanatory about American life and its connection to the fear of strangers. When they travel as tourists, Temple adds, Americans should understand that the visited lands are not populated entirely by barbarians. To know more about exotic countries, Americans should read their magazines or national publications to capitalize the experience of other travelers. They should make themselves aware of whether a place is safer or dangerous as well as the things they can or cannot do. Temple conceives of traveling as an art, in which the traveler develops new abilities to deal with transportation, new customs, hostile migration officials, and other problems. As we see, the primary concern of this book is the implicit view that the world seems to be a hostile place. Thus, knowledge and know-how facilitate the symbolic resources to mitigate the lapses such as the validation of a passport at the migration office. Guidebooks are of paramount importance to gain familiarity about destinations. A coherent interpretation of the destination country should be kept in mind at time of purchasing the ticket. Temple gives the example of a friend who traveled to Beirut buying his ticket in Israel and was rejected once he arrived because he was accused of being Zionist spy. Nations of travelers (this means Israel, the US or the UK at the point of sale of the ticket) may affect how dangerous may be the final destination. If Americans go to a destination a country with tense relations with the US, probabilities of suffering an attack rise. Being American abroad is often a display of privilege because it symbolizes US supremacy from the material perspective, and it paves the ways for terrorist attacks which are based on resentment. These two elements are present in the Anglo-archetype promoted by tourism-related industries.

To our ends, succeeding chapters in Temple's book offer many examples of people who have traveled to Europe, Latin America, and Asia. Being American compares favorably with other peoples, because of a relatively higher income, a higher level of education, and of course, because Americans are presumably opens to learning other cultures. However, this way of constructing the Other leads US citizens to a bipolar logic where the "us" is superior to the them. The financial elitism, connected as it is to the Calvinist notion of selected for the salvation, brings serious problems for tourists in countries economically comparable to the US. Whereas Americans are not responsible for the policies followed by US, the ethnocentric logic upends the connection between cause and effect, conferring responsibility to tourists. This can be seen in a current guidebook (Temple, 1961) which presents Middle East as dangerous destinations for Americans. Tourists become involuntarily ambassadors of their own country. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that this ethnocentric discourse was not created by 9/11. It was present long before, but 9/11 closed the hermeneutic circle between a frightened American citizen and the construction of Otherness.

To understand the pervasive logic of ethnocentrism, two major assumptions arise. On one hand it promotes the exemplary nature of certain groups or ethnicities over the rest. The limits of uniqueness determine an exclusionary circle of belonging, which is symbolically justified by certain fabricated virtues. Valorizing American tourists is a subtle way of accepting the hegemony of US and its democracy in the world. However, being part of the elite has its costs. Whenever Americans cross the borders of their country, they face many risks. From terrorist attacks to a crime, destinations are classified according to the importance of Americanness and the safety for them.

Last but not least, this discourse neglects the importance of the Other unless by the lens of the own culture. It places American sat the pinnacle of desirable tourists. Far away from being a mere fiction, it recalls the plots of horror movies such as *Hostel I* and *II* where American tourists were first hosted and then tortured by a criminal network operating in Eastern Europe. Millionaires paid huge sums to torture a tourist. The movies' dialogues construct the world as a hostile place, and implicitly argue that the victims' value depended on their nationality. Americans were on the highest priced.

TRAVELS IN TURBULENT TIMES

Far from being simple idiots who travel as Maccannell and Boorstin put it, tourists work as ambassadors of their own culture, state, and politics. They carry a message to local hosts. This encounter, which is prepared by the rite of hospitality, may be fraught with tense moments and problems for both sides. Tourists speak not only by what they say, but also by their silence. Each nation constructs a special discourse, a story which is told and retold time and again to understand the world. This narrative is an ethnocentric discourse. To a major or lesser degree, all identities and nations developed their own national discourse, their own view of themselves and others. Travels and tourism put two or more of these discourses at odds. In this research I have examined how the Anglo-American discourse valorizes the Americanness, and at the same time it engenders a frightful view of the world. Understanding the fears of American abroad as it stands in Temple's book, we can expand our comprehension of how political ethnocentrism has been woven. Highlighting his main

limitation and contradictions, focuses on the pervasive logic of Americanism, which alternates between fear and pride in situating American as the highest expression of Western values. Nonetheless, one of the costs Americans run is the danger of being targets of attacks or acts of hostility. As noted in this work, this sentiment was constituent of American culture from its onset. Like the British colonization, the international policies of US in the world have been seriously questioned worldwide. The freedom people feel in homelands does not correspond with the hard line this country takes in international affairs. Sometimes with some reason, sometimes exaggerated, claims against citizens of the US are determined by social resentment and unhappiness originated from peripheral poor countries. Tourists may ignore this reality, but they are educated with the premise to be good citizens. Any hostile expression against America is understood as an attack on democracy. Only few voices start to imagine things are not as easy as the US government said. As part of a great misunderstanding, American tourists replicate the logic of their governments. They are double victims, from their state and terrorism. The conceptual framework outlined above helps to explain how the Protestant archetype engenders competitive conflicts. It also introduces an ideological construct that conflict serves to invent enemies to regulate the internal loyalties of citizenry.

REFERENCES

- Altheide, D. (2002). *Creating Fear: News and the Construction of Crisis*. Hawthorne NY: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Bailyn, B (1965) *The Origins of American Politics*. New York, Vintage Books.
- Baltzell, D. E. (1991) *The Protestant Establishment Revisited*. New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers.
- Bellesisles, M A. (2010). *1877: America's Year of Living Violently*. New York: The New Press.
- Boorstin, D. (1962). From traveler to tourist: The lost art of travel. *The image: Or what happened to the American dream*, 77-117.
- Coleman, S. (2013). "Actors of History? Religion, Politics, and Reality within the Protestant Right in America." *Religion, Politics & Globalization*. Lindquist, G. & Handelman, D. New York, Berghan Book., pp 171-188.
- Conkin, P. K 1968. (1976) *Puritans and Pragmatists, eight eminent American thinkers*. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
- Domínguez, P, Burguette, E & A. Bernard. (2003). "Efectos del 11 de Septiembre en la hotelería Mexicana: reflexión sobre la mono-dependencia turística." *Estudios y Perspectivas en Turismo*, 12 (3-4): 335-348.
- Dworkin, R. (1996). *Freedom's Law: the moral reading of the American Constitution*. Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
- Elías, N. (1998). *La Civilización de los Padres y otros Ensayos*. Bogotá, Editorial Norma.
- Ertuna, C. Ertuna, Z. I. (2009). "The Sensitivity of German and British tourists to new shocks." *Tourism Review*. 64 (3): 19-27.
- Fernández de Castro R. (2008) "Introducción." (pp 7-16) *En Qué Es Estados Unidos?* R. de Castro Fernandez & Blackmore H. México, Fondo de Cultura Económica.

- Floyd, M. y L. Pennington-Gray. (2004). "Profiling Risk: perception of tourist." *Annals of Tourism Research*, 31 (4): 1051-1054.
- Floyd, M. et al. (2003). "The Effects of Risk Perception on Intention to Travel in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001." In *Safety and Security in Tourism: relationships, Management and Marketing*, (Eds)
- Fitzgerald, F. (1986) *Cities on a Hill*. New York, Simon & Schuster.
- Freeland, R. (1985). *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: foreign policy, domestic politics, and internal security 1946-1948*. New York, New York University Press.
- Fuchs, G. & Reichel, A. (2004). "Cultural Differences in tourist destination risk perception: an exploratory study." *Tourism*. 52 (1): 21-37.
- Fuchs, G, Uriely, N. Reichel, A. y Maoz, D. (2012). "Vacationing in Terror-Stricken Destinations: Tourists Risk Perception and Rationalizations." *Journal of Travel Research*
- Fromm, E. (2005) *El Miedo a la libertad*. Buenos Aires, Paidós.
- Glassner, B. (1999). *The Culture of Fear: Why Americans Are Afraid of the Wrong Things*. New York: Basic Books.
- Greven, P. (1988). *The Protestant Temperament. Patterns of child-rearing religious experience, and the self in Early America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gutmann, A. (2001) "Introduction." In *Human rights, as politics and idolatry*. Michael Ignatieff. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pp Vii-xxviii
- Hall, M. Timothy, D. and Duval, T. New York, Haworth Hospitality Press.
- Ignatieff, M. (2001) *Human Rights. As Politics and Idolatry*. New Jersey, Princeton University Press, pp. 3-53
- Kagan, R (2003) *Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order*. New York, Vintage Books.
- Krehbiel, K. (2010). *Pivotal politics: A theory of US lawmaking*. University of Chicago Press.
- Korstanje, M. E., & Olsen, D. H. (2011). The discourse of risk in horror movies post 9/11: hospitality and hostility in perspective. *International Journal of Tourism Anthropology*, 1(3), 304-317.
- Korstanje, M (2013) "Empire and Democracy, a critical reading of Michael Ignatieff." *Nómadas: revista crítica de Ciencias Sociales y Jurídicas*. Número 38 (II): pp.69-78.
- MacCannell, D. (1976). *The tourist: A new theory of the leisure class*. Univ of California Press.
- Reich, R. B (2005) *Reason, why liberals will win the battle for America*. New York, Vintage books.
- Revel, J. F. (2002). *Anti-americanism*. San Francisco, Encounter Books.
- Sackett, H. and Botterill, D. (2006). "Perception of International Travel Risk: an exploratory study of the influence of proximity to terrorist attack." *E-review of tourism Research*. 4 (2): 44-49.
- Skoll G. (2009). *Contemporary Criminology and Criminal Justice Theory. Evaluating justice Systems in Capitalist Societies*. New York, Macmillan.
- Stares, P & Yacoubian M (2009) "Rethinking the War on terror." In *Leashing the Dogs of War*. C. A Crocker, F. O. Hampson, & P Aall. Washington DC, US Institute of Peace Press, Pp 425-434

- Steiner, C. (2007). "Political instability, Transnational Tourist Companies and Destination Recovery in the Middle East after 9/11." *Tourism and Hospitality Planning & Development*. 4 (3): 169-190.
- Steiner, C. (2009). "Political risk, violent political unrest and Foreign Direct investment in the Tourism Industry." *Geographisches Institut. Papers of C. Steiner*. Disponible en http://www.staff.uni-mainz.de/steinec/Publikationen/Steiner_VPU-Tourism-FDI_1009_WP.pdf.
- Temple, R C (1961) *Americans Abroad*. New York, Sterling Publishing.
- Weber, M. (1958). *Essays in Sociology*. New York, Oxford University Press.
- Weber M(1964). *Economía y sociedad: esbozo de sociología comprensiva*. México, FCE.
- Weber M (1995) *La Ética Protestante y el Espíritu del Capitalismo*. Barcelona, Península.
- Weisberg J (2008) *The Bush Tragedy*. New York, Random House.
- Wildman, S. M. (1996). *Privilege revealed: How invisible preference undermines America*. New York, NYU Press.
- Wong, J. Y. y Yeh, C. (2009). "Tourist Hesitation in Destination decision Making." *Annals of Tourism Research*, 36 (1): 6-23.
- Woods, J. et al. (2008). "Terrorism Risk Perception and Proximity to Primary Terrorist Targets: how close is too close?" *Research in Human Ecology*. 15 (1): 63-70.

Chapter 4

THE LOGIC OF RISK

INTRODUCTION

Psychology and psychiatry today have become in an instrument of replicating risk intervening in the social situations of self. However, this intervention does not tackle all environmental factors that create the risk, unless only indoctrinating the self. This begs two interesting questions, are we witnessing an inflation of risk?, is the risk connected to economies, in what way? In United States, almost 6.2 million of citizens experienced a phobia disorder while this problem ranges adults from 18 to 54 years old. Some statistics reveals that 1 in 23 people suffer phobias, which represents 4.25% of the population¹. G. Nardone emphasizes that the reasons behind panic attacks, phobias and obsessive-compulsive disorder are polysemic and circumscribed to previous working definitions. Under such circumstances, Nardone (2009) argues that psychological structures follow complex and unabated interests. Whenever psychologists examine the patient's pathology, they access only a memoirist past which is elaborated by subjects following symbolic and emotional dynamics. This recall is no other thing than an insight on the motivational forces of behaviour irrespective of how the facts happened. Clinical diagnosis sometimes reinforces the previous assumptions creating a depiction of reality. The hegemony of therapists in questions to fears and phobias is troublesome because prevent the interdisciplinary research. Anthropology following this has something to say along with the connection of taboo and risk. Even, S. Freud was an expert in ethnological studies that advanced too much thanks to anthropology legacy.

This part of the book explores not only the legacy of Freudian as well as Marxian developments respecting to the fetishes, but also reconsiders everything what has been written in specialized literature respecting to risk. It encompasses a discourse that allows the collapse of economy. What we will discuss throughout this work, is in what manner. To our end, risks are not probabilities of hazards, dangers, or losses, but narratives serving to modify human behavior. He raises several areas of behavior as illustrations: terrorism, automobiles, and local, interpersonal crime (Korstanje 2011; 2012). Freud and Marx have devoted considerable attention to the pervasive role of rituals, totems. At the time, Marx wrote of totems and fetishes mainly from the perspective of political economy, Freud delved into their

¹ Source. Phobia Stats. 2009. Available <http://www.fearofstuff.com/phobia-stats/>

psychological import. We argue that Marx and Freud dealt with the same thing and in similar ways. Their common argument pointed to totems and fetishes as things and practices functioning to ward off anxiety. Also, they both treated totems and fetishes as promoters of illusion, one from the psychological and the other from the political perspective. Totems and fetishes represent ways people try to ward off anxiety, and they function as building blocks of illusions. The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and *man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life* [emphasis added], and his relations with his type (Marx and Engels 1848:207).

Nonetheless and despite the compulsion to face reality, bourgeois social relations rely on mystifying the real conditions of life, because the bourgeoisie—that is the haute bourgeoisie and owners of capital—need to mystify the people who produce capital. Owners need to promote illusion so they can keep their dominating position in the social hierarchy. They know that if the mass of people caught onto the game, their privileges would not long survive. The bourgeoisie mystify as a means of defense of their position. Freud wrote about totems and fetishes from a psycho-economic perspective, but he did so in two respects. He wrote several books devoted to social, as opposed to individual psychology, and these books mainly analyzed the origin of religion. He attributed the origins of religion to totemism. He also wrote about totemic defenses in the form of fetishes with respect to individual, intrapsychic economics. Totems and fetishes memorialize and defend against anxiety. They act as screens against memories, totems for social memories and fetishes for the personal. In Marx's terminology, totems and fetishes take the form of political economic institutions and commodities, respectively. For both Marx and Freud, totems and fetishes defend the status quo by concealing reality.

TOTEMISM AND RELIGION

Most of Freud's explicitly social thought deals with religion. Religions are belief systems distinguished from other kinds of belief systems in that they are based on faith and authority. They are systems rooted in meanings. In his last full length treatment of religion, *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), Freud forced to explain Judaism and certain character traits attributed to Jews as a people. His specific aim holds less importance for the present than the logic he used to achieve it. Freud neglected certain objections to his earlier *Totem and Taboo* (1913), and made a point of reaffirming what he had written previously (1939:131). He insisted in briefer form what he had argued at length in 1913. He synthesized it as follows. The original human society took the form of a horde or band. Every male was the leader's sons; all females were his property, either wives or daughters. The leader encircled his authority with violence, including death or castration. At some point, the brothers united to overpower their father. The rebellion was fueled by hatred and fear alloyed with feelings of reverence, and these two

emotions together prompted a desire to take his place. The desire for liberty holds the social order. To forestall continual intra-group warfare, the brothers took several steps. They erected a totem, a representation of the father, and accorded it a sacred character. Freud drew attention to the double meaning of ‘sacred.’ “It is the pervasiveness which in general dominates the relation to the father. [The Latin] ‘*sacer*’ means not only ‘sacred,’ ‘consecrated,’ but also something we can only translate as ‘infamous,’ ‘detestable’ (e.g., ‘*auri sacra fames*’). “Execrable hunger for gold.” Virgil, *Aeneid*, VI 816” (1939:121 and n.). Totemism, following the ideas of William Robertson Smith, Freud said was the primary form of religion. In agreement with Emile Durkheim (1912), this sacred character defines religion. It is pivotal for understanding his pronouncement that religion was a social kind of neurosis.

“What is sacred is obviously something that may not be touched. A sacred prohibition has a very strong emotional tone but has in fact no rational basis. For why, for instance, should incest with a daughter or sister be such a specially serious crime—so much worse than other sexual intercourse?” (Freud 1939:120)

Totemism and its later religious stems, according to Freud, from carries the power of prohibition through symbolic effect—that is, it forces the ego to inhibit action toward a desired aim, not through reality testing, but through meaning. Basing this line of thought somewhat further, but not I think violating Freud’s intent, is that incest and its positive charge, exogamy, are the primary social norms. Their force is exhibited by the totem, a kind of fetish for the inhibited drives and around which later religious embellishments build their doctrines. Through this logic, Freud develops his conclusion that religion is neurosis writ large.

“From that time [Totem and Taboo, 1913] I have never doubted that religious phenomena are only to be understood on the pattern of the individual neurotic symptoms familiar to us—as the return of the long since forgotten, important events in the primeval history of the human family—and that they have to thank precisely their origin for their compulsive character and that, accordingly, they are effective on human beings by force of the historical truth of their content” (1939:58).

Religion, for Freud, encompasses the dialectical struggle and the inherent discontent of the human condition. With all its observable trappings, its symbols, rituals, doctrines; religion tells the tale of not only human history, but the continuous conflict among three moments of being human: the biophysical, the psychological, and the social. They all condition each other. When speaking of humanity, the pure organism shows an impossibility. Mind and society are not add-ons, they are essential. Freud gave a central role to religion in his social thought, because, like neurotic symptoms, religion represents, albeit in distorted, condensed, displaced, and symbolic forms the phylogenetic history of human sociality. Moreover, religion reveals the connection between ontogeny and phylogeny. That is, religion recapitulates what individual confessors experience in their personal early histories.

Humans orchestrate through childhood in more or less the same way because of epigenetic predispositions in human physiology. For instance, humans are born with small heads, because they have to fit through the birth canal. Consequently, much human brain development occurs after birth. The developmental needs of the brain go along with a lengthy dependency period. Post-birth brain development coupled with a lengthy period of physical

development and years of biologically necessary dependency mean that human socialization accounts for a great part of mental and psychological development. Throughout this development humans develop an enculturated ego. That ego defends the organism from trauma. It uses a variety of defensive mechanisms to deal with external reality, to be sure, but more pertinently, to deal with internal threats. It tries to serve the id, which demands drive satisfaction, whilst simultaneously, it serves the superego's prohibitions and tries to avoid punishing emotions such as guilt. The ego's defenses appear in dream work and the forms of neurosis, and these are the same as the empirically accessible functions and structures of religion: condensation, displacement, and symbolization (really image formation). Dreams and symptoms represent these defenses as symbols (hysteria), rituals (obsessional neurosis), and rationalizations. The last of course is humanity's natural way of dealing with life, as humans may not be rational animals, but they are definitely rationalizing animals. Dreams, neuroses, and religion all present dramas. In the case of the latter two, the same drama repeats continually.

Freud posed a primeval drama, his story of the primal horde, to account for religion. Despite its impossibility in ethnological terms, the vital horde drama does resemble the oedipal drama. In fact, it more than resembles it; it is a reenactment of it. But which came first, oedipus or the primal horde? To respond that question Freud displays a special dialectic, due to a clear answer would be to put the horse before the cart. They occur together; they condition each other, and they explain each other. Early humans, assuming for the moment they are anatomically modern humans, *Homo sapiens sapiens*, fantasized the primal horde drama. True, maybe occasionally some early human groups actually enacted it, but that occurrence is no more necessary than the actual seduction of children by parents, because unconscious processes do not distinguish between thought and external reality. Nevertheless, they either enact it or fantasize it, *because* they have superegos and egos that have formed as a result of their individual oedipal dramas. Freud's primal horde drama finds reenactment in small groups with regularity. Therapy groups, task groups, committees, not the least academic committees, disclose it all the time (Bion 1961; Parsons and Bales 1955). They are not compromised in a religious ritual, rather religious rituals use the drama as part of their institutionalized forms. The reenactment of the horde happens as shared oedipal experiences. The primal father, threatening, domineering, and adored re-occurs regularly in ordinary social life.

For Freud, fetishism seems to be a perversion that prevents neurosis. The fetish symbolizes the phallus. Fetishists choose any number of different kinds of objects as phallic representations. They choose according to the peculiar particulars of their personal, psychological biographies. The choice of object seems to be less important than its function: it wards off anxiety and stimulates sexual excitement. In his clinical work, Freud re-discovered that the fetish, in whatever form it takes, represents a missing penis (1905, 1927). The fetish works as a solution to the castration complex, which involves anxiety about castration. The fetish reassures the fetishist that s/he will not be castrated and that women really have penises. Formation of the fetish depends on disavowal: pretending what was seen was not seen. At the same time the reassurance of the missing women's penis is displaced onto the fetish object. The fetish arouses sexual stimulation because if castration is not a risk, then the fetishist is free to indulge his or her sexual fantasies. Castration complex also lies at the base of totemism, because the totem represents an overcoming of the castrator—the

primal father. Both the totem and the fetish allay anxiety in non-neurotic ways that is they do not produce neurotic symptoms.

Freud defined and described anxiety as a signal of danger. “Anxiety is a reaction to a situation of danger. It is obviated by the ego’s doing something to avoid that situation or to withdraw from it. It might be said that symptoms are created so as to avoid the generating of anxiety” (1926:128-9). The difference between fear and anxiety, between realistic and ego determined reactions, versus unrealistic imagined fears lies at the bottom of symptoms, fetishes, and totems. Whereas neurotic symptoms and fetishes are individualistic, totems are social. Totems are culturally shared symbolic representations of common experiences. According to Freud, the Oedipus complex and castration anxiety are part of normal human development. It is in that sense that they are shared. Totems and religion in general, for which the totem is the template, solve by condensing, displacing, and symbolizing human problems into a particular image. Because they have a social and cultural foundation, they give rise to institutionalized reinforcements—churches for example. At certain times and in certain places, questioning the bases of religious institutions amounted to heresy, which was suppressed often violently. The heretic converts anyone who would question or dispute the narrative of the totemic religion. Such heretics pose a threat to the established social order, because they call into question the neat solution the totem has offered. The totem emulates mass scale the economic problem of how to inhibit human drives by repressing and displacing them onto the totem. Marx offered an analysis about a different level of economy, not the psycho-economic but the political economic.

MARX AND THE FETISHISM OF COMMODITIES AND CAPITAL

Marx first used the concept of fetish to refer to economic things in a series of articles in 1842. He relied on the exposition of religious fetishism by Charles de Brosses (1760), Auguste Comte’s materialist treatment of the stages of religion (1841), and Ludwig Feuerbach’s analysis of Christianity (1841). The premise is that religious belief and practices involve investing material objects—statues, painted rocks, bits of bone, and so on—with supernatural powers. For a Western version, consider the power attributed to holy water, or in medieval times, to pieces of the “True Cross.” Evident to the outside observer, but not to believers, is that the fetish object has power because and only because people have invested it with powerful qualities. In this respect, Freud’s sexual fetish object, and religious fetish objects operate similarly. The fetishistic shoe, to use one common example, arouses sexuality because and only because the fetishist has attributed sexual powers to it. Marx stressed that the fetish solves a political economic problem—namely, the problem of how to get the masses of people to accept the predominant social order, despite what their senses tell them. In this way Marx’s fetish functions the same as Freud’s. Despite what his eyes tell him, the fetishist solves the problem of castration fear and yearning for forbidden desires. The effect of both kinds of fetish results in continued domination; the sexual fetish by the law of the primal father who threatens castration, and political fetish by laws of the society.

Famously, Marx confirmed about commodity fetishism, whereby products of human labor takes supernatural powers over people’s minds and their relationships with each other.

“A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men’s labor appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of their labor; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labor is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labor. This is the reason why products of their labor become commodities” (Marx 1867:77).

Two burning pending points remain. First, how did this happen, and second, for what purpose? In answer to the first question, Marx reconstructed an historical dialectic that remains outside the main import of this essay. Marx’s response to second question, nevertheless, is brief. Mystification of the social relations and products of people’s labor serves owners, because, of course, their own status of ownership depends on the very same mystification. That is, elites in a social order use all their advantages to defend against the producing classes from realizing that their subordinate position is neither equitable nor natural. Although brief, his answer needs further clarification.

The key to the transformation of things people adduces into commodities lies in the fact that people do not produce commodities for each other or even for themselves. They reproduce commodities for a market. Under the tutelage of capital the market becomes an impersonal institution in which things find their trading equivalence through other things, most commonly mediated by money. The character of this capitalist market assumes a clear form when securities exchange for other securities untouched by human hands as computerized, online trading takes over more and more of capital markets. Consequently, social institution of the market seems to order economic relations among people, and at the same time it obscures two facts. People in interaction with each other created and continually create the market. Second, ownership and therefore the possibility of exchange itself is a social creation. As Sean Sayers put it, “Social relations are thus not established directly between people, but indirectly via a relation between things, or rather the economic value bestowed on things within the economic system” (2011:59-60). Last but not least, and this aspect is crucial to Marxian analysis, human labor is not individualized work, but social from beginning to end. To clarify, Marx distinguished between human labor and the subsistence activities of non-human animals.

“The practical creation of an objective world, the fashioning of inorganic nature, is proof that man is a conscious species-being, i.e., a being which treats the species as its own essential being or itself as a species-being. It is true that animals also produce. . . . But they produce only their own immediate needs or those of their young; they produce one-sidedly, while man produces universally . . . they [animals] produce only themselves, while man reproduces the whole of nature . . . hence man also produces in accordance with the laws of beauty. . . . Such production is his active species-life. Through it nature appears as his work and reality . . . he can therefore contemplate himself in a world he himself has created. . . . Consciousness, which man has from his species, is transformed through estrangement so that species-life becomes a means for him. . . . (3) Estranged labor therefore turns man’s species-being—both nature and his intellectual species-powers—into a being alien to him and a means of his individual existence” (Marx 1844:328-9).

The preceding is Marx’s view of the observation that culture provides humanity’s primary ecological niche. Humans dwells in a world they themselves create, and they attain consciousness through their own creations, most noticeably that of language. This last is also

something Freud observed (1923). People labor to make language. Language is necessarily a social product; there is no such thing as an idiosyncratic language. Moreover, language is not a once and for all kind of thing, but people make it *continually* through their linguistic interactions, and they continually change it, as historical linguistics shows. The English written by Geoffrey Chaucer, for instance, appears foreign to present day Anglophones: as language so all of human productive activity. Except in the case of certain writings for sale, musical and other performances, and so on, most people do not think of language, their talk and writing, as a commodity. However, as soon as it is turned into a commodity, it takes on the fantastical character of the fetish. Consider a best-selling novel or song. It becomes private property. The creator's labor becomes estranged, alienated, as it becomes the property not only of the author, but also various business enterprises, publishing houses and the like. This begins to appear natural, but it is most unnatural. It is unnatural because the author was not the sole creator of the linguistic work. S/he used the materials fashioned by all humanity throughout human history. The work becomes alienated by turning into a commodity. In time, however, the commodity can revert to a form that is less alienated. It can become a classic. Therefore, for example, the writings of Plato, Shakespeare, or Confucius begin to reassert their social character. That is, they become public property, part of humanity's cultural heritage. Although this negation of the alienation, to use a Hegelian turn of phrase, provides food for thought, the immediate purpose of this essay focuses attention on the alienation through commoditization. The fetish of the commodity conceals the process of alienation. It places in place of shared ownership, a common cultural heritage, a market value. That market value is liable to appropriation. Various actors appropriate it in the form of profit, which they claim to own, and subsequently convert into capital. In the *Grundrisse* (1973), Marx's outline for what became *Capital*, he described the process of alienation.

“The social character of activity, as well as the social form of the product, and the share of individuals in production here appear as something alien and objective, confronting the individuals not as their relation to one another, but as their subordination to relations which subsist independently of them and which arise out of collisions between mutually indifferent individuals (Marx 1973:157).

Commodity fetishism goes hand in hand with the totemism of the market. The market is treated as a *sui generis* kind of thing as if early trade relations among tribal peoples or the markets of medieval Europe differed only by technological advances from the markets of Wall Street, the City of London, and others. Everyone must worship the totem of the market else they starve. Marx was clear about it, rejecting this natural market in favor of an historical particular change, which he called primitive accumulation. He was not referring to the accumulation of wealth in ancient societies, and even less so in non-state societies, in which some individuals gain wealth while others persist in poverty. He adduced primitive accumulation as the starting point for the production of commodities and expropriation of profit through the wage system. He likened it to original sin in theology (1867:713).

The crucial factor that creates alienated labour with the coming of capitalism is the predominance of commodity production and wage labour (Sayers 2011:90). This is the original sin, or in Freud's imaginative reconstruction of the primal family, the displacement of the primal father by a band of brothers who then erect a totem both to commemorate their triumph and prevent the primal father's reinstatement. In Freud's case, the totem is erected to

ward off anxiety about castration and deflect guilt for the imagined crime of killing the father. In the Marxian scenario, the totem of the market obscures a different crime. “*The starting-point that gave rise to the wage-labourer as well as to the capitalist was the servitude of the labourer*” (Marx 1867:715). The crime is theft of the earth, the commons, and subordination of the workers from whom the capitalist extracts surplus value—the value they produce over and above that needed for their own subsistence and reproduction. Precapitalist societies may have stratification, a class hierarchy, actual slavery, and other forms of inequality and inequity, but they do not mystify extraction of surplus value as a result of workers’ servitude. The servitude is quite open and clear to view by everyone involved.

“In precapitalist societies work is an autonomous activity which for the most part directly meets the needs of the household and locality. With the coming of capitalism, work itself becomes a commodity, undertaken for wages. People no longer work for themselves, but for another, and their activities are owned and controlled by that other, by capital [emphasis added]” (Sayers 2011:91).

Note that what Sayers says is not that in precapitalist societies no one worked for another, because, of course, slaves worked for their masters and serfs worked for their lords. The one for whom workers labor under capitalism is not a person, but a thing—capital. Capital is the master fetish where the chief totem is the market.

TOWARDS TO THE ECONOMY OF RISK

A diverse studies have been focused on the risk from many perspectives, however few has explained its economical nature. Certainly, Beck reminds that we live in a context where the hierarchal order has set the pace to a reflexively logic. The institutions that characterized the life in earlier centuries such as family, Church and State have been emptied. What today remains as the stepping stone of social bondage is the risk (Beck, 2006). The sense of community is oriented not only to the perception of risk but also a new way of making politics (Beck, 1998). The concept of bio-politics is of paramount importance to understand how the risk is enrooted in late-capitalism. Certainly, criminals engender the notion of legality while enemies (terrorist) are lacked of any rights. This belief has created a climate of insecurity where the vulnerability of citizens is subject to the right of stronger (Soyinka, 2005).

To what extent societies have been worked and what factors influence on social bondages were questions that concerned almost all thinkers. From Hobbes to Spinoza, philosophy showed how the competence and fear converges in sentiments of preservations. Since people are fright to experience the war of all against all, the legitimacy of violence is aligned to a third party, the state. Following this explanation, this stance illustrated E. Durkheim to develop a theory of solidarity which explains the labour division defined previously not only the economies but also other important institutions. Durkheim argues convincingly that two logics depend upon the assignation of roles, organic and mechanic. Totems play a pivotal role in creating a bondage that allows the society to be together. Durkheim divides the world in a dichotomy, vital mind and industrial spirit. Whereas the primitive tribes distinguish from industrial ones because of a scarce specialization of labour

and a higher trust, Durkheim envisaged how the advance of modernity will progressively create a decline of social bondage (Durkheim, 1982). Even though the French philosopher was widely criticized by ethnologists and anthropologists, his thesis inspired to S. Freud, B. Malinowski and M. Sahlins in the construction of taboo. B. Malinowski inferred that primitive cultures in Oceania based their legitimacy in view of the circulation of goods. Some goods were moved in one direction while others circulated in the opposite side. From this view, the circulation of goods explained not only the economy in a community but also its forms of politics. Malinowski's outcomes will be reassumed by A. Weiner and M. Sahlins. These intellectuals confirm that the interchange of goods defined the type of solidarity. Besides, the ways of understanding strangeness are founded in the system of trade. Undoubtedly, Weiner is not wrong when affirmed that those object fabricated by women become in alienable possession which configure the power of man. While some objects are commoditized and circulated elsewhere with a high mobility others are kept in few hands to gain further strength. The males have monopolized their hegemony of public life while females have been pushed to intimacy of home. For that, the material asymmetries seen in the public life are legitimated by those goods elaborated by females. Rather, for S. Freud (1997) the mystery of social bondage was associated to the role played by taboo, as a mechanism oriented to protect the life in one sense. Generally, Freud considered the phobia as a mechanism that prevented the ambiguity and personality fragmentation. In this token, the circularity of economies was circumscribed to the presence of taboos. His main thesis is that taboo bans the practices in one sense while promote other practices in other. These prohibitions are expressed whenever a subject avoids the contact with the taboo-object. Based on the idea that taboo means "sacred-fear," Freud acknowledges that these restrictions are more than important for society. Its function is to protect the society of the surfacing glitches that threaten the economy. Similarly, M. Douglas wrote that lay-people is coming across with a multiple situations of dangers in their life which should be selected for reducing the degree of anxiety. The sacred-spaces not only evoke protection and isolation but also danger. The world of norms makes the life more stable and facilitates the understanding of ambiguity. By means of the taxonomic classifications, societies poses in circulation myths, legends and stories that exemplifies the danger. As a disciplinary mechanism, taboo and risk operate in protecting those species, objects or resources which cannot be used. In M. Foucault, risks should be understood as a controlled threat that makes possible the social life. In homology to a vaccine, which denoted an inoculated virus, the risk is linked to the crisis. Whether the discipline draws the strategy, the security regulates the legal scaffolding to exert control on social interaction (disciplinary normalcy). The risk, in this vein, reduces and mitigates the impacts of dangers to the extent to condition the circularization of goods. In doing so, societies accept and adapt to the presence of certain threats and incorporate them to their habits. Also, Foucault's contributions are more than important because reveals that we live with risks in our daily life.

To date, the risk perception studies have emphasized too much in a quantitative perspective combining complex mathematical algorithms very difficult to catch. In other circumstances, these studies are conceptual with high abstraction without a clear methodology. Following Malinowski theory, we strongly believe that societies can be studied by their construction of risk because it precedes a discourse to legitimate the hierarchal order. Historically, the sense of risk was created to denote the prices of merchandises carried by the transports. Inherently linked to the trade, risk augments whenever the capital rises. The

benefits of certain acts, advantages or disadvantages are marked by the risk which confers to some groups some goods while others are strongly restricted. In perspective, also the discourse of risk connotes the trade in other direction banning the circulation in another. Risks are not questions of probability or objectified dangers, but mere narratives that modify the human behaviour. The causes of risk are not important unless by their impacts of societies. In the following lines we will explain what has been discussed to here in clear examples to expand the reader understanding. Terrorism as a narrative allows certain practices at time it prohibits others. After 9/11, many consumers went to insurance officers to expand their current policies but this reduced notable the circulation of weapons in USA. Since the demand of these taboo-objects was reduced, their value surfaced. As a result of this, the aristocracies that have higher purchasing power, monopolizes the possession of these inalienable possessions. The sense of safety in America is functional to the consumption of certain services or goods, while the State reserve in its own the monopoly of others. To put this in brutally, the discourse of risk cuts the circulation of inalienable possessions rechanneling the consumption in specific circuits. The social agents, as Foucault put it, are disciplined by risk in order for the society to keep and increase her production. Those goods that found the trade are protected by the discourse of risk. Like taboo, it protects those scarce resources. Another example will help understand these remarks. Cars industry and climate change have been themes that concerns the public opinion of the planet but at some extent, the gases emitted to atmospheres are being increased annually. There is a clear dissociation between what people say and do. Unless otherwise resolved, this dichotomy has been explained by the combination of diverse models. Almost all they fall under the idea of a paradox. From our model, we will see this is not a dilemma. The cars productive forces & chains rest on the fordist legacy and cultural values associated to competence, speed and mobilities. Given this, one might find in the market countless models of cars, in diverse colours, prices and years. Starting from the premise that price not only determines the consumer status but also its role under the societal order. Most certainly, each car in street denotes a risk for State in terms of contamination. Modern cars uses fuel based on hydrocarbons that affect seriously the atmosphere accelerating the climate change. One might think that the advance of technology made the life safer but at the same time contributed to generate new risk. This assumption characterized the literature of risk-related research. However, we see how the green house effects, supposedly produced by cars, and are created to protect the existent and exhausting reserves of oils. The discourse of global warming facilitates the aristocracies to monopolize the control over the oil reserves. The danger produced by the masification of cars elevates the prices of oil which falls under the control of status quo. When the situation of oil in Middle East is more critical, the system places more cars in street. This policy apparently irrational is aimed to legitimate the existent forms of productions based on hydrocarbons. There is no paradox unless if we assume risk is a question of perception. Risk does not entail a social shift but replicates the present ways of production of certain society. The privileged groups make from risk a disciplinary mechanism to legitimate their practices. Here the ecological discourse engenders a pervasive message, for one hand, it encourages the usage of cars and consumption of oils, non removable resources, to monopolize the control of reserves, but at the same time alludes to ecological risk to promote a change that never occurs. The risk, from our thesis, promotes the circulation of some massive goods (cars following our examples) while prohibits others which give to keepers more power (oil). Mass objects are of easy accessibility and cheaper because

precisely they justify the circulation of inalienable objects. For that reason, sociology denounced that the climate change is not generating the sufficient change in industrial societies. We are rushed also to speak of an economy of risk.

Korstanje (2011; 2012) mentions three examples of risk in the modern world: terrorism, crime, and automobiles. Before examining each, the notion of risk needs definition. In early capitalism, sometimes identified as mercantile capitalism, trade served as the main way to accumulate capital. Trade, especially long distance trade in the early modern period, the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries, involved great risks and concomitantly, even greater profits when successful. Banking and insurance arose to cover both possibilities, with the merchants of Venice acting as models. Recently, two social theorists have proposed a different concept of risk, and they do so in two slightly different ways. Nonetheless, both agree that risk, at least the way they conceive it, is a recent phenomenon, dating from the advent of late modernity, sometime in the latter part of the twentieth century. Ulrich Beck (1986) and Anthony Giddens (1990, 1991, 1999) both say risk is a product of late modernity in which human made hazards replace natural hazards as the main threat to well being. The hazards of environmental degradation—for example, nuclear disasters, global warming, and contamination of water and air—come from human activity and pose greater threats than non-human induced dangers. The difference between the two lies in the different importance they attach to social status. Beck says that modern risk has replaced class stratification, whereas Giddens recognizes that degrees of risk differ according to people's status in the prevailing social hierarchy. For present purposes, these differences are minor. Neither focuses on the three sources of risk identified by Korstanje (2012).

What with the US declaration of a war on terror, terrorism has assumed the publicly touted cynosure of risks and anxiety. Crime has run a close second, sometimes with little to distinguish them, since the US government has criminalized individuals deemed as terrorists because they oppose US policies, such as invasions of various strategic countries around the world, Iraq and Afghanistan most notably. Interpersonal crime assumed the mantle of a major risk in late modernity largely through the efforts of various reactionary politicians in the United States and Great Britain along with certain other strategic political ploys in other countries. Richard Nixon ran on and won the presidency of the United States in 1968 by relying on a platform devoted to curbing crime in the streets, by coded reference to which he meant racial minorities and those who opposed the US invasion of Vietnam. He won the presidency by saddling his opponent with being soft on crime. George H. W. Bush successfully employed the same tactic in 1988. Both Nixon and Bush rested on a racial code in which they associated crime with racial minorities, especially Black Americans. Using terrorists as scapegoats keeps less obviously racial as the terrorism label attaches mainly to a religion—Islam. In the United States, however, most adherents are Black Americans, and their co-religionists tend to be inter-connected with people hailing from Asia and especially the Middle East where US military and economic strategic interests abide. The totem connected with this kind of political culture is security. US policy has increasingly advanced a national and international policy of a national security state. The advantage of the national security state for the ruling class involves both diversion of public attention, and policies aimed at cementing the position of the ruling class while enriching them further at the same time. Automobiles present themselves as a remarkably clear example as the commodity as fetish. Especially in the United States, cars have long been associated with masculine sexuality. A common cultural assumption is that having a fast and sleek car attracts women.

Risks of terrorism and beget counter-terrorism. Risks of interpersonal crime, or at any rate, individual crime such as stealing the goose from the commons, beget domestic security apparatuses—increased policing, surveillance, and a brisk industry in home and business protection services, not to mention a growing private prison industry. Terrorism and interpersonal crime represent quintessences of alienation. In both, people attack each other as means to ends. Terrorists attack to gain some political advantage. Criminals attack their victims for economic advantage or revenge. Both types of attackers may also pursue terror and crime for other purposes, but politics economic gain, and revenge figure prominently for both types. Automobile culture represents social alienation in a different fashion. It secludes people within steel armor as they speed along their way. Individuals do not greet each other by waves or tips of the hat, calling out greetings, smiling, or giving social acknowledgement in other ways. Contrast travel by automobile with that of various forms of public transportation—trains, planes, or buses. Recently, the emergence of SUVs as the personal vehicle of choice, show the marketability of security in transport, regardless of how actuarially inaccurate the claim might be. In fact, public transport is far safer than any kind of automobile.

REFERENCES

- Beck, U. (1992). *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, translated by Mark Ritter. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- Beck U. (2006). *La Sociedad del riesgo, hacia una nueva modernidad*. Buenos Aires, Paidós.
- Bion, W R. (1961). *Experiences in Groups and Other Papers*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Brosses, C. (1760). *Du culte des dieux fétiches ou Parallèle de l'ancienne religion de l'Égypte avec la religion actuelle de Nigritie*. Paris: NP. <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k106440f/f2.image>.
- Compte, A (1896/2000). *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, Volume 3, translated by Harriet Martineau. Kitchener, ON, CA: Batoche Books.
- Douglas, M. (1992). *Risk and Blame*. Routledge, Nueva York.
- Douglas, M (2007) *Pureza y Peligro: un análisis de los conceptos de contaminación y tabú*. Buenos Aires, Nueva Visión.
- Durkheim, E (1995). *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, translated by Karen E. Field. New York, Free Press.
- Feuerbach, L (2008). *The Essence of Christianity*, translated by George Eliot. Walnut, CA: MSAC Philosophy Group, San Antonio College.
- Foucault, M. (2006). *Seguridad, Territorio y Población. Curso en el Colegio de France - 1977-1978*. Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Freud, S (1964). *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, edited and translated by James Strachey, 24 vols. [SE]. London, UK: Hogarth Press.
- Freud S (1905). *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*. SE 7:112-243.
- Freud S (1913). *Totem and Taboo*. SE 13:1-162.
- Freud S (1923). *The Ego and the Id*, translated by James Strachey. SE 19:13-59.
- Freud S (1926). *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety*. SE vol. 20:87-178.

- Freud S (1927). Fetishism. *SE* vol. 21:149-157.
- Freud S (1939). *Moses and Monotheism*. *SE* vol. 23:3-143.
- Giddens, A. (1990). *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Giddens, A. (1999) Risk and Responsibility. *Modern Law Review* 62(1):1-10.
- Giddens, A. (1999). *Consecuencias de la Modernidad*. Madrid, Alianza Editorial
- Herzer, H. (2008). *Con el Corazon Mirando al Sur. Transformaciones en el sur de la ciudad de Buenos Aires*. Buenos aires, Espacio Ed.
- Hobbes, T. 2004. *Leviatán*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones el Libertador.
- Korstanje, M. (2011). "Reconnecting with Poverty: new challenges of disasters Management." *International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment*. Vol. 2 (2): 165-177
- Korstanje, M. (2012). "Introduction to the thinking of Cass Sunstein : risk and rationale applied on Latin-American reality." *A Contracorriente. Revista de Historia Social y Literatura en América Latina*. In press.
- Luhmann, N. (2006). *Sociologia del Riesgo*. Mexico, Universidad Iberoamericana.
- Malinowski, B. (1967). *Hacia una Teoria de la Cultura*. Buenos Aires, Sudamericana.
- Malinowski B. (1986). *Los Argonautas del Pacifico Occidental*. Barcelona, Planeta.
- Marx, K. (1842a). The Leading Article in No. 179 of the *Kölnische Zeitung*. <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1842/07/10.htm>.
- Marx, K (1842b). Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood. <http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1842/10/25.htm>.
- Marx, K (1975). Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. In *Early Writings*, translated by Rodney Livingston and Gregor Benton; introduced by Lucio Colletti, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, pp 279-400.
- Marx, K (1967). *Capital Volume 1: The Process of Capitalist Production*, edited by Frederick Engels; translated from the third German edition by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling. New York, NY: International Publishers.
- Marx, K and Engels F. (1983). *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, translated by S. Moore. In *The Portable Karl Marx*, Edited by Eugene Kamenka, 203-241. New York, NY: Penguin Books.
- Mauss, M. (1979). *Ensayo sobre los dones: motivo y formas del cambio en las sociedades primitivas*. Madrid, Tecnos.
- Nardone, G. (2009). *Fears, Panics and Phobias, a brief therapy*. Barcelona, Herder.
- Parsons, Talcott and Robert F. Bales. 1955. *Family, Socialization, and Interaction Process*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Sahlins, M. (1972). *Stone Age Economics*. London, Routledge.
- Sayers, S. (2011). *Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Weiner, A. (1992), *Inalienable possessions: the paradox of keeping-while-giving*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Chapter 5

EXPLORING THE ANGLO PROTESTANT COSMOLOGY

WHY COMES OUR CURRENT SENSE OF THREAT?

In my experience as author, editor and reviewer, I found a correlation to risk perception and cultural backgrounds. As long as my career, I discussed in conferences, events and Congresses that England historically has constructed its power, not only by imposing trade and its language to the colonies, but also a “culture of fear.” Whether google is consulted, by keying “disaster,” almost 151.000.000 records would be pulled out. Doing the same for “desastre,” this cipher halved. In this vein, the following table is self-explanatory, revealing that Anglo-speaking countries are prone to risk.

Table 1. Entries on Google

Language	Spanish	English
Disaster / Desastre	19.500.000	151.000.000
Risk / Riesgo	83.200.000	527.000.000

Furthermore, in the English speaking countries, there is a vast offer in graduate, postgraduate even doctorate degree related to disaster-studies. Universities as Delaware, St Andrews focus on the study of risk and terrorism. Others countries which have experienced disasters as Chile/Haiti seem not to be interested in risk-related research.

As this backdrop, the following chapter explores the connection of Anglo-culture with risk, its concerns respecting to the foreclosed future that leads to develop instrument of forecasting as never before. If the Mediterranean cultures, coined the Latino-archetype, were based on piety and sacrifice, the Anglo-countries have deposited on the future much expectative. Equally important is to discuss why some countries are risk-oriented, while others are not, as well as the role played by some cultures as leaders of technology while others are excluded.

As explained, Weber’s legacy inscribed into a gap between Protestant and Catholic cosmologies. The protestant logic would be determined by the sense of predestination (Weber, 1964; 1995; 1958). The roots of capitalism are based on the stimulation of competence among citizens, who devote their resources to show themselves they are special (Fromm, 2005). At a first glance, As Coleman puts it, the lack of certainness respecting to

salvation led Protestantism, unlike other religious waves to develop a strong attachment to politics (Coleman 2013).

Since Protestantism has developed a negative image of the external world, its hopes of salvation were in predestination. The war for the redemption of souls became one of the concerns of evangelicals once arrived to the US. This sentiment, which combined fear and love, formed the American character and a particular way of producing politics (Greven 1988).

Recently, Korstanje (2012) suggested that Weber did not take the wrong way in diagnosing capitalism derived from Reform, but he opted to an easy explanation in lieu of delving into the Norse Mythology. Unlike others forms of mythologies, in Norse Culture Walkyrias, were sent by Odin to embrace all fallen warriors. They know beforehand who will fall, even before the involving victim. This paved the ways for the advent of the predestination principle, Luther and Calvin will develop in their theologies. Unlike other cultures as Greece, where events resulted from a previous human decision making process, in Norse Mythology, human beings are minimized to the extent of accepting a closed-view of future. If Agamemnon embraces the sacrifice of his daughter to defeat Troy, he is aware of his freedom to opt for one or another way. For the ancient Norse culture, fate is given to mortals to be accepted and followed as it has been revealed. Untouchable for Protestants, the future never can be changed. As explained, the sense of predestination is older than Weber's presupposed. By the way, E. Dodds (1997), sees in the Greek world the point of indetermination. Parents are fitted against sons are at odds but in all circumstances, the future is drawn by the practices and things that people accomplish in this world. Gods are only divine advisers.

In middle Ages, Catholic Church monopolized not only the production of knowledge but served as a platform of consult to gain understanding of the world. This was radically changed whenever a strong quake hit Lisbon in 1775. This disaster not only was the epicenter of secularization but the birthday of the Science. Its effects evidenced serious problems in the existent-already Faith to forecast similarly events in the future. Philosophers of the caliber of Voltaire or Rousseau questioned seriously the dogmatism of Catholicism in presenting a God that may protect people in all conditions. This quake dissipated the idea God as a benefactor questioning that God not necessarily should be the good-doer we have learned (Nigg, 1995; 1996). Although many scholars have seen Lisbon's earthquake as the launching platform of modern Science, less attention was conferred to the fact that this new embarrassment surfaced in German countries; of course, whose mythology emphasized on the pre-destination's principle.

THE NATURE OF RISK

Time permits the classification of experiences, to serve as moral guidelines in times of uncertainty. Whenever events are not framed, or cannot be framed, risk surfaces. First of all, risk connotes a social narrative enrooted in a situation of danger. But risk is not real, this represents a future condition. Whenever the danger takes places in forms of disasters, or emergencies risk disappears (Douglas & Wildavski, 1983; Douglas, 1992). This is exactly the way insurance policies works in modern world. Lay-people are promoted by experts to buy

insurance based only in a precautionary doctrine. Any insurance-policy cannot be bought once the risk has been transformed in a real danger. As debated in earlier chapters, U. Beck acknowledges that the modern society is linked to an on-going risk because the grounding social institutions that regulated the social life are in decline. While religion, education and economy not only has changed but also are in process of disappearance, other new types of mediators emerged. Risk connotes an interesting mediator (like money) to connect people otherwise would not be familiar. Without risk, society would disintegrate in question of years (Beck, 2006). Thus, the concept of future seems to be inextricably intertwined to risk.

In his valuable book, *the Transformation of Intimacy*, A. Giddens (1997) sheds light on the ways both sexes, males and females, men or women have re-developed novel tactics of negotiation and self-identity. Giddens openly argues that the sex, as any other human practices, is structured in the economical forces. Whenever the marriage was driven to fertility issues, women have a defined role, subordinated but protected by men. Although in these times the mother-death was a common-placed thing, their ontological security was based on a much wider reproduction-stricken force. At some point, the modernity extended the expectance of life, modifying not only the role played by women but their security in births. As a result, women, emancipated to patriarchal order, were equalled to men. The fertility, as a mediator between the family and the production of goods, sets the pace to new forms of sex-induced conflicts. The classical sense of marriage, as we known, was based on a covenant among two defined genres. This pact signalled to cultural values linked to tradition, lore and past. The introduction of modernity and self-reflexibility not only gives to lay people further information about sex, but also makes from it a science. When women were liberated of their reproduction-oriented role, the sexuality has transformed in a plastic-sexuality, based on the pleasure as a primary concern. Paradoxically, this objectified the women, in a commodity, to be sold in pornography moulded and framed under male's desires. What today is important to debate is the radical shifts are lovers facing. Unlike passion, the romantic love resulted from the advent of future-oriented view that accompanied the surface of modernity. The romantic love may be narrated as a fiction, which is based on a future. Under some circumstances, this process would generate addictive behaviour because the lover lives its life in illusory spheres, but in others it inflicts panic if the loved-other is absent. Addictive behaviour alludes to sex as a form of enhancement and escapement, reinforcing the equality but in economical terms. Now, women struggle in similar conditions with men, but unfortunately deriving in results in the upsurge of domestic violence.

One of the pioneers in studying the prominent benefits of technology has been Daniel Bell. His optimism on the promises of technology respecting to the optimization of work (Bell, 1974), was not supported by other colleagues who saw in the same process a big problem (Webster & Robins, 1986; Schiller, 1981; Rifkin, 1998). Detractors of digital age proposed to state to regulate the information trade by the following goals:

- a. Avoid the systematization of work that leads to unemployment.
- b. Prevent act of terrorism because of excessive information-dependency of society.
- c. The excess of technology results in a decline of trust.
- d. Human beings can play to be gods by the manipulation of bio-technology.

In this vein, William Dutton (1998) explains technology exerts today considerable influence on the life of people. However, it is almost impossible to determine if technology

determines social agents or vice-versa. What the specialized literature suggests is that people coactively may select those ITC as their discretion. This process is understood by the previous cognitive framework of user. Therefore, in the digital era we can say technology is not good or bad, it hinges on how and what it is employed for. In the contemporary society, what would be interesting to discuss is the psychological dependency of information. This point begs a more than interesting question. Is risk and technology resulted from the predestination?

We bet that two seniors philosophers as Jean Baudrillard and Paul Virilio will say yes. In the digital times, events occur first on the screen and afterward in reality. The boundaries between fiction and reality have been blurred. The Baudrillard legacy situates capitalism in an enigmatic scenario, where the future plays a vital role. Unlike Max Weber or Werner Sombart, who envisaged an “iron-cage” foreclosed to the advance of logic, Baudrillard opted to see the world from a poetic-view. Based on the premise that theory may be equaled to fiction, his books focused on a fresh literary interpretation to transcend the limitations of science. Mistakenly, some scholars have precluded that Baudrillard was the philosopher of non-sense, obscuring the meaning of events to the extent of claiming polemic assertions as “the Gulf war did not take place.” It is important not to lose sight the concept of reversibility. Originally coined by Greek philosophers, reversibility connotes the possibility to weaken the foundations of system by means of its own functioning. Empires expanded their hegemony by the imposition of force over the colonies, but at the same time a counter-force is gradually undermining their hegemony towards the final collapse.

In other terms, Coulter writes “reversibility is (ironically) a strong antidote to determinism and linear theories of progress. In our time (the time since Barthesian structuralism became pregnant with post-structuralism), reversibility has replaced dialectics” (p. 7). Poets emerge from the ambiguity that comes after success. One of the troubling aspects of post-structuralism is that it destabilizes the horizons of certainty and firm knowledge. Both scholars, Coulter urges, contributed to the understanding of post-structural emptiness in ways that the whole portion of philosophers avoid. In sharp opposition to philosophy that proclaimed the world is predestined by knowledge, Baudrillard acknowledged that the spirit of ongoing uncertainty was rather determined by language. Since any interpretation is open and subject to meaning, any word signifies something different depending on the reader. Nonetheless, both philosophers share commonalities but substantial discrepancies respecting to what “writing” means.

While Barthes saw writing as a limited position to the being simply because I exist beyond what I can write, Baudrillard preferred to take the road of the poetic. Even he argued that intellectuals, in a pejorative way, devoted efforts to legitimate the “empire of meaning.” Condemned to deconstruct its own aura, any text disturbs the conscience but intellectuals are not enthroned to speak in the name of other (Baudrillard, 1994; 1993; 2002).

In his life, Baudrillard struggled to develop an all-encompassing conceptual framework that helped people understanding the acceleration of history that recycled the present history. By comparing the war on terror declared by Bush, minority report, where “precogs” facilitate to police the arrests before the crime to be committed. This notion of legal jurisprudence defies the roman meaning of crime. While Barthes employs the term terror, Baudrillard contends that irony is based on the terrorism of meaning because it makes the system working against itself, as an autoimmune virus.

Recognizing that “nothing can be said about the world,” Baudrillard is convinced that appearances have replaced the meaning, in a type of vertigo of interpretations. The violence of interpretation lies in the impossibility to separate the reasons from effects in the events as the media portrays. News about natural disasters produced by global warming effects is equaled to terrorism and quakes without any kind of distinction. Not only the system of meaning has been altered by capitalism and the media, but upended.

Baudrillard said that West is debating itself in a quandary between real and its double, simulation. However, we live in a moment where the real is framed by the principle of simulation. Since the real cannot override the copy, the hyper-real substitutes the real, at the same time the acceleration of images emptied the pastime. What today we may learn from disasters comes from cinema and the film-industry. In view of this argument, disasters as are often commoditized and sold by the media are not real events, but pseudo-events. The visual technology in the digital times has not only changed the perceptual horizons accelerating the time and space but created the end of resiliency as known today. This striking point represents a fertile ground in potential research in the fields of disasters and risk-management (Baudrillard, 1983; 1993; 2002; 2003). The legacy of Baudrillard reminds us that risk serves, as invention (construal) enrooted in the future, that serves to mould the daily behaviour today. What policy-makers plan, may not occurred as they imagined. At what extent technology accelerated the present and future, is the second interesting point of discussion, wherein Paul Virilio based his last work, *the University of Disaster*.

His theory is aimed at exploring the role of “dromology,” a neologism coined to denote the study of velocity, in late modernity. The advances of technologies and mobilities not only have created new forms of displacements, but also blurred the relation between time and space. As a result of this, Virilio adds, people have fully access to any geographical point of this globe in hours. The time of waiting has changed forever. Travelers now are moved by the indifference and visual consumption, there is not genuine contact in the visited lands. At some extent, *The University of Disaster* not only synthesizes years of investigation, but represents the corollary of a critical thought respecting to mobility and mass media.

The events in past formed the history as a continuance of ordered facts, but the real-time makes people any longer would be able to synchronize watches. Citizens has transformed in consumers. Certainly, the history has been emptied in a fragmentation of events, dispersed elsewhere and broadcasted once and once again. The knowledge that characterized the labor of *University* has been polarized to delocalize territories. Based on an ongoing future that never takes room the presentiment of disaster announces the eschatology of neurosis. In other terms, Virilio argues that everything happens at the same time in the hyper-reality without a logical sequence. The world stage is being represented outside the planet, in an exo-earth. The days of Science, as an all-encompassed instrument based on rational understanding, has changed. Transformed in an exo-science that promotes the simultaneous globalization of fear, biology and astronomy are eclipsed by the “eternal present.” As the previous argument given, the “*University of Disaster*” reminds the “*mea culpa*” of science for its failure in creating an ethic of life. Based on the belief that the global warming is not reversible in the short-run terms, Virilio strongly believes in the importance to analyze the sense of homeland safety and security.

To be protected, the big corporations, banks and capital elite call climatologists and geographers (experts) to design the necessary Catastrophe simulation software that provides some information where the next disaster will take hit. In this vein, a new profession is

uprising, the “economic disaster- modeling-geek.” This expert seems to be more interested in finding and eliminating the risks of businesses than in protecting the environment. The philosophy of the science is today determined by the logicism of digital screens. The simulation of future that characterizes the digital world has replaced the daily life. Of course, this begs an interesting question, what is the role of experts in this process?

The advance of science moved to snail’s pace by prioritizing the quality of knowledge. Its objectivity lies in the observation of facts enrooted in reality. However, things have changed a lot. The digital world has blurred the time, prompting the Science to study thousand of simultaneous events, which do not lead to any coherent logic. The reality is not any-longer the object of scientific research. Virilio’s work inspires a new reflection about the design of disasters in the early modern times. His critique view gives a conceptual model to understand the current “show of catastrophe” televised 24 hours day to a wider globalized audience. Similar in the argument to Baudrillard or Augé, Virilio is convinced that humankind has to come back to an ethic of the science whose concerns have been aimed at protecting the integrity of human beings (Virilio, 2010). The technology expanded the limits of cities towards the border of planet. The contours are drawn while the deep space is situated as the only line of horizon that defines human habitat. Virilio insists on the belief that “the technical consciousness is what you put on the screen.” What is important to discuss here is not the “Techno-phobia,” but “techno-philia” which prioritizes the measure than meaning. The growth of simulation software has been adopted in the domain of education, administration and sports. Basically, these types of tools intend to lead people to the most efficient decision to optimize their performances. It is important not to loose the sight that knowledge only may be understood in accordance to a specific time and space. Without places and present, the information is circulating through the lens of televisions. The problem seems to be that the existent flow of information created by technology, which accompanied the transport in other times, is now the transport itself. Proponents of ecology, climatologists, geographers and other scientists preoccupied in Global warming have no clue in what is going to happen, but they are recruited by insurance companies and corporations to design the next protection-related products in the market (Virilio, 2010). This tendency, which is only facilitated by the concept of predestination, leads societies to develop instruments capable to perform an accurate prediction on the future events.

FROM DREAMS TOWARD THE NIGHTMARE

What has in common George Lucas’s film with ancient Greek mythology? To our end, both are stories reproduced to legitimate the values of societies where they have been engendered. Exploring and deciphering the key factors of Star Wars, or Troy seems to be a fertile ground to expand the current understanding of Anglo-Saxon culture and of course its newest invention, capitalism.

Some of the future-oriented societies neglect death to preserve their economic order. As a result of this, they are pressed to extend the life, sometimes improving the conditions of life-expectancy. These societies have developed a bad and pejorative notion of what does death mean. Children and babies are protected as the touchstone of society. Rather, other communities that are based on custom, history and religion confer to future a minimal role.

These present-oriented communities the life is a question of existence, and death accepted as a part of life. Children are often sacrificed to nuance the God's courage. Used as an instrument, the sense of sacrifice is of paramount importance to retain the prophylaxis of all society, preventing the disaster takes room. Starting from the premise that tragedy are encouraged by gods, sacrifice works as an efficient ritual associated to the freedom of choice, where people and gods celebrates a new covenant a pact to eternal life. The message seems to be clear, if you protect me, I can give my sons Under this model fall the Anglo and Mediterranean cultures. The former oriented to risk and closed-future, the latter to an open future where human being's decision condition the future. As it self, future does not exist without human today intervention. In Anglo-culture where the future is previously pre-determined and humans have no opportunity to turn the destiny. To put this in bluntly, the rite of sacrifice sets the pace to the *needs of protection*. Being under protection is an efficient way to know what will happen, as the narratives of Skywalker and Agamenón have evolved.

Agamemnon wishes to take possession of Troy and is benefited by the opportunity to fight against them after Paris steals Helen under hospitality. Although Troy rejected the invasion over days, it is pressed to behave as politicians and not as a father, this Greek King asked the opinion of experts on how Troy would be conquered. Agamemnon sees the future by means of forecasting technique, and of course the future, though undesired, is revealed. To here, destiny seems not to be pre-determined; it hinges on only upon Agamenón decision. Not only this text shows how the future remains open, but the injustice of killing an innocent infant. The revenge will be acted by Clytemnestra, his wife. What is important to point out here, is that, the king is not forced unless by his own voracity for power. He is deciding, until the last time.

On another hand, it is very interesting turning the attention on Anakin Skywalker's story, which is presented by George Lukas in the film Star Wars, Episode III. The youth Jedi Skywalker should face to be witness of his loved wife's death in a dream. Unlike Agamemnon, Skywalker loves Padme, his wife but death takes room here in a pre-determined manner. Padme is pregnant of twins. The premonitory dreams exhibited to Skywalker opens the doors for the tragedy, but this future scenario has no solution, has escapement. Skywalker is unable to decide the future he likes for Padme. On his dreams, she is dying at time of giving birth two beauty sons. Subject to the obsession of his dreams, Skywalker looks for the eternal source of life to the extent to be seduced by a dark lord Sith, Darth Sidious. Without any result, Joda alerts Skywalker that future goes all times and cannot be determined (genteel temperament). His fears wreak havoc in what Skywalker's mind. With the passing of time, dreams repeat once and once again more vividly. The falls of Skywalker, an epicenter of almost all Star wars episodes, is accompanied with a false belief. Sidious's promises not only are unreal, but also leave Skywalker to the irony of facing what he did. Once transformed, two of his first missions are very disgusting and cruel. He should go Jedi Temple and kill everybody there, even children and pupils. When Padme, certainly, watches the video that reveals what her love husband has done, she desperates to leave dying of sadness. Paradoxically, Skywalker's premonitions make real but simply because of his own obsession. To cut the long story short, although in an ironical way, this version of future for Anakin is foreclosed to its effects. This represents exactly how the Anglo-archetype works in modern times. While Agamemnon elects to kill his daughter, Anakin is not aware as to how to change his predestined future. Dreams given to Anakin should not be changed; even they are beyond

his capacity of deciphering. These two tales, summarized in this notes of research, shows what we have called the cultural difference of risk-oriented and risk-avoider societies.

CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly, Anglo and Latin worlds have created, according to their cultural matrices, diverse tactics to adapt to environment, as the form of understanding the future. While Anglo-countries developed a fascinating attraction to risk and future, the Latin-speaking countries based their idiosyncrasy on poverty and sacrifice. If Catholics opted for the safety of dogma, Anglo Saxons launched to domesticate death. In this process the concept of predestination plays a crucial role. As previous argument given, the Anglo-culture goes to a high sentiment of anxiety because the future is unreachable, any attempts to regulate risk in a future only engenders new worse risks, not contemplated up to date. The sense of predestination alludes to what today has not occurred yet. Technology only helps to mitigate the temporal effects of uncertainty triggered by the orientation to future. This in part obliged to many Anglo countries to be on the top of technological and economic pyramid, as Weber put it, but they ran a big risk. This means the risk of reversibility or self-destruction. Last but not least, while Catholics deposited their expectances in religion and gods, Anglo hates their gods, because precisely they do not know who would be saved or condemned in the book-life. The hereafter is closed to forget the axiom of human death. This is the reason behind the bio-technology made serious efforts in extending life.

REFERENCES

- Baudrillard, J. (1983). *Simulations*. New York, Semiotexte.
- Baudrillard, J. (1993). *The Transparency of Evil: essays of extreme phenomena*. New York, Verso.
- Baudrillard, J. (1994). *Simulacra & Simulation*. Michigan, The University of Michigan Press.
- Baudrillard, J. (2002) *Cool Memories IV*. New York, Verso.
- Baudrillard, J. (2003). *The Spirit of Terrorism*. New York, Verso.
- Beck, U. (1998). *La Invención de lo Social*. México, FCE.
- Beck U. (2006). *La Sociedad del riesgo, hacia una nueva modernidad*. Buenos Aires, Paidós.
- Bell, D. (1974) *The Coming of postindustrial society. A venture in social forecasting*. London, Heinemann.
- Coleman, S. (2013). "Actors of History? Religion, Politics, and Reality within the Protestant Right in America." *Religion, Politics & Globalization*. Lindquist, G. & Handelman, D. New York, Berghan Book., pp 171-188.
- Dodds, E. R (1997). *Los Griegos y lo Irracional*. Madrid, Alianza.
- Douglas, M. (1992). *Risk and Blame*. Routledge, Nueva York.
- Douglas, M y Wildawsky, A. (1983). *Risk and Culture: an essay on the selection of technological and environmental Dangers*. Los Angeles, University of California Press.
- Dutton, W. (1998). *Society on the Line: information politics in the digital Age*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

- Fromm, E. (2005) *El Miedo a la libertad*. Buenos Aires, Paidós.
- Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. California, Stanford University Press.
- Giddens, A. (1997). *The Transformation of Intimacy*. Oxford, Polity Press.
- Greven, P. (1988). *The Protestant Temperament. Patterns of child-rearing religious experience, and the self in Early America*. Illinois, Chicago University Press.
- Korstanje, M. (2012). "Aportaciones de la Mitología Nórdica para comprender la modernidad, revisión de Max Weber." *Historia Actual*. 28 (1): 175-190.
- Nigg, J. (1995). "Disaster Recovery as a social process." *Preliminary Paper #219*. Disaster Research Center, Universidad of Delaware.
- Nigg, J. (1996). "Policy Issues for post disaster mitigation the need for a process." *Preliminary Paper # 244*. Disaster Research Center, Universidad of Delaware.
- Rifkin, J (1998) *The biotech Century: a coming age of genetic commerce*. London, Victor Gollancz.
- Weber, M. (1958). *Essays in Sociology*. New York, Oxford University Press.
- Weber, M (1964). *Economía y sociedad: esbozo de sociología comprensiva*. México, FCE.
- Weber, M (1995) *La Ética Protestante y el Espíritu del Capitalismo*. Barcelona, Península.
- Schiller, H (1981) *who Knows: information in the age of the fortune 500*. New Jersey, Norwood.
- Virilio, P. (2010). *The University of Disaster*. Oxford, Polity Press.
- Webster, F & Robins, K (1986) *Information Technology: a luddite Analysis*. New Jersey, Norwood.

Chapter 6

TERRORISM, WORK-FORCE AND LABOR

During years, sociologists focused on the roots of terrorism and work. Industries as tourism and hospitality are seriously affected by terrorism worldwide. This essay explores the viewpoint that tourism and terrorism are inextricably intertwined. The essay problemizes on the idea that tourism is a peace keeping mechanism. Rather, tourism is a disciplined way of terrorism, a tolerated form of exploitation based on law. Fundamentally, spectacle and exploitation underlies tourism and terrorism. It begins with a brief review of the history of anarchism, its relationship with worker union and terrorists, and the notion of Johann Most and his propaganda of the deed who did not hesitate to advocate killing children and women at restaurants. When terrorists today employ their tactics of terror, at the bottom, they have learned from the lessons of the state. Understanding, not demonizing, the nature of terrorism is a good way to understanding the contemporary political landscape. Workers, but not terrorists, are legalized by. As Michel Foucault (2001) put it, discipline is an instrument of power by means of which events are stripped of their negative effects. Like a vaccine, threats are socially domesticated by discipline. What beyond the boundaries may be demonized may be accepted in the daily life if it is disciplined.

THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT

The climate of shock US after the attacks to Pentagon and New York prompted to officials and experts to write a report, to expand their understanding of terrorism. By reviewing thousands of documents, interrogatories and interviews, this text reinforces the belief that America not only was facing one of its most important threats, but also needs to prevent an attack of this caliber in the future. As a tribute to the victims of this tragedy, it alludes to combine real facts, extracted from verifiable sources with ideological discourses. This is the reason why we have to place this text under the lens of scrutiny. At some extent, the consulted sources are not academic works or published papers in peer review journals, but also governmental reports issued to precise the contexts and reasons of terrorism. A profound and careful reading suggests two important aspects. First and foremost, although there is a massive quantity of dataset, authorities and politicians have no accurate information how terrorists avoided the x-ray machines, which scrutinized the passengers at airports or how

they entered into the cockpit. *“We do not know exactly how the hijackers gained access to the cockpit. FAA rules required that the doors remain closed and locked during flight”* (p 5).

The point of entry in the discussion appeals to the compliance of government in the attack. This theory of conspiracy, which points out some incongruence of approved version of facts, provides with another alternative story of 9/11. Administration would somehow support the intelligence so that terrorists plan the attack (supposedly to expand its economic intervention towards the world). Since this has no empirical validation, the lack of information to understand a coherent argument creates a gap, which is fulfilled by speculations. After all, 9/11 was constructed around a great mystery.

In addition, some of the hijackers not only have their visas expired but also were educated in US and Europe. Secondly, government was not familiar with the attack lest by mass media. CNN was the first media reporting what originally authorities, president and vice-president thought was an accident. The specialized agencies in homeland security, even the FAA headquarters, followed intense protocols in communication that affected a rapid counter-answer to the civil airplanes hijacking. Although both of these observations can be fine, it allowed the adoption of two major policies Bush’s administrations in the years later 9/11. On one hand, the borderlands strengthened and illegal migrants were closely screened, even a great wall was constructed to prevent migration from Mexico. At this stage, many migration forms and requirements and international covenants were indefinitely cancelled and US unfortunately closed its doors to the world. On another, it led to “radical conservatives” to introduce policies to fights against the autonomy of agencies proper of “deliberative democracy.” From its inception, United States has focused considerable attention to the division of powers, as well as the autonomy of agencies to regulate the life of peoples. Starting from the premise that 9/11 resulted from the weakness of central administration to intervene in autonomous institutions, the document appealed to a centralized view of presidency with tight control of all agencies. Of course, this was mandatory simply because they (the Muslim world) hate us. In this excerpt shown below, the report reconstructs a biased image of Muslim world as associated to “radicalism” and fundamentalism.

“We learned about an enemy who is sophisticated, patient, disciplined and lethal. The enemy rallies abroad support to Arab and Muslim World by demanding redress of political grievances, but its hostility toward us and our values is limitless. Its purpose is to rid the world of religious and political pluralism, the plebiscite, and equal rights for women” (p. xvi).

Terrorists not only hate the democracies because their liberty, but also blame United States from all their evils. This extremist view of West leads Bin Laden to operate into thousand and millions of minds. He offers “the eternal salvation” inducing people to commit suicide against American targets. Following this, Americans are the preferred targets rather than any other nationality. The Bin Laden’s ideology is forged in the anti-democratic sentiment.

“Bin Ladin also relies heavily on the Egyptian writer Sayyid Qutb. A member of Muslim brotherhood executed in 1966 on charges of attempting overthrow the government, Qutb mixed Islamic scholarship with a very superficial acquaintance with Western history and thought” (p. 51).

However, what are the sociological reasons why the Muslim world paves as fertile ground to this authoritarian ideas? The document explains that after Mohamad's death, two factions struggled to impose their views of Islam: Sunni and Shia. The former signals to the idea the new leaders should share Mohamad's blood while the latter one refers to the opposite thesis. Personal characteristics of leadership would be enough to guide the faith. This division leads to extremists to think "parliaments" are in opposition to "caliphate" running the risk democracy opens the doors to new rulers who can alter the Islamic world and its politics. To what extent Islam becomes in a "fundamentalist" cosmology depends on its impossibilities to accept democracy as a valid form of government. The rest of the book gives examples and facts which are tergiversated to validate the previously discussed argument. What it ignores is not only that "terrorism" coexists with democracy, but also terrorists learned their tactics and values of extortion from us. Beyond the thousands of victims, who lead us to classify this attack as a criminal act, the document takes the opportunity to instill an ideological message which obscures more than it clarifies. Far from being objective, the document is delineated to cause specific effects in politics and economy as well as producing an ideological explanation of terrorism, conducive to Bush's administration. Beyond the material and live losses, what 9/11 coined was not only a spiral of fear in the citizenship, but the need to impose "the precautionary principle" to prevent next terrorist attacks. Following the old doctrine of radical conservatives, migrating from Reagan's administration, the state devoted considerable attention in resources in undermining the natural defenses of democracy, under the lemma of "lesser evil." As we will discuss in this book, rather, officialdom not only ignored the real anthropological roots of terrorism, but also took advantage of the situation to adopt neo-liberal economic policies that precaritized the role played by the unions in a democratic order. At some extent, terrorism, democracy and consumerism are inextricably interlinked.

THE LIBERTY FOR BUYING

Originally, the first liberal economists envisaged consumption and consumers from a pejorative perspective. Not only by the chaos and social disorganization that uncontrolled consuming generates, but also because it represents a way of destroying wealth. As senior lecturer Kathleen G Donohue (2003) acknowledges in her fascinating book *Freedom from Want*, this was until Franklin D. Roosevelt declared his four freedoms, (fear, speech, religion and want). The former one, freedom from want was not early addressed by Puritanism and Calvinism or by classical liberalism. The era of consumers and liberal consumerism was introduced by the belief the demand was more important than supply. If economy postulated the importance of human division of labor and production as the epicenter for the linear well-fare and progress of nations, modern consumerism upends the message. The attention was focused on poverty and its effects on social scaffolding. As Donohue writes,

"Even the classical liberals turned their attention to eradication of poverty; they continued to emphasize production rather than consumption. If one was entitled to consume only what one had produced, then, classical liberals reasoned, the only way that government could eliminate poverty was by increasing productivity" (p. 4).

Paradoxically, this paves the ways for passing from industrialism to consumerism. Not surprisingly, this paradox has questions respecting to those who would benefit from an productivity enhancement, they would be the capital-owners, who seek their multiplication of profits?, or work-force more interested in protecting their wages? This point divided the voices into two main contrasting tendencies, liberal capitalism, which was a wave interested in protecting the interest of owners, and socialism more prone to coordinating unionization and worker claims. Elegantly Donohue said, it was unfortunate to see how both have failed to solve this paradox.

The frenetic quest for profits led societies to adopt consumer-oriented system of productions which produced what consumers needed. This qualitative view was of paramount importance to understand the radical change America was internally facing; in doing so, the Keynesian policies which fit like a glove. Strong regulatory measures as well as well-fare programs disciplined the citizenship to understand the new dilemma of modern economy, consumerism is the only valid way in order for poverty to be eradicated. The classic mercantilist view of economy that characterized the “producerist” society from 1870 to 1900, established that consumption undermined the wealth of nation. In what forms?

Underpinned in the belief that that the wealth of nations was a question of equilibrium, economists thought that the only manner to boost the economy of a country was at the cost of another country. In this viewpoint, a strong commercial relationship among nations should be organized in view of trade. Whenever, exports supersede imports, the economy rises. However, consumption was one of the main threats of well-being simply because it reduces the goods available for export. Here is one of the ideological pillars of modern capitalism. In the outset of XXth century, economists formulated a curious quandary to overcome the obstacle of poverty. Even if mercantilists conceived a “regulated consumption,” they neglected the thesis that consumption drives the tenets of economy. However a new liberal trend instilled the belief that consumption drives economy, in what resulted that the only pathways for expanding prosperity was enhancing production. To accomplish this task, societies should import and develop strong capital investment accompanied by modern technological machines. Subordinated to this logic, economy compelled to the formation of extractive institutions that protected the profits of elite, while the workforce was pressed to compete for ever-decreasing low-skilled positions. The market gave interesting new opportunities for capital investment (by stimulating mass-consumption), but reducing the genuine growth of society.

After 1940, the freedom from want was related to one of human basic needs and expanded to the world as an unquestionable principle. This was undoubtedly possible because intellectuals have discussed in earlier centuries the importance of consumption as an efficient instrument to reduce pauperism. The financial crisis in 1930 paves the pathways for nations to embrace this paradigm without resistance. Liberals formulated “the new deal of liberalism” to transform American society, even mingling the discourse of consumption with democracy. As Donohue (2003) puts it,

“This new liberal system was not without its detractors. Critics became increasingly concerned that freedom from want was being equated with a right of plenty. And they worried that material plenty was being treated as a precondition of democracy” (Donohue 2003: p. 277)

Ideologically, Americans have felt “superior” to other nations because they are enthralled as the main democratic and prosperous society; although more egalitarian at the surface, American citizens are subject to more work and consumption but less leisure. This happens because, in a pro consumer society, workers are bombarded with emulation and advertising creating the needs to buy. This not only jeopardized their real liberty to choose, but affects seriously to democracy. Detractors of capitalism, who pushed their focus on the arbitrariness of producers, were involuntarily responsible or conducive to the formation of a global society of consumers. Those denunciations on an economy that protect the interests of producers as well as the needs to adopt consumption to break the material asymmetries among classes, were two guiding concepts to embrace a globalized version of capitalism, prone to mass-consumption.

UNDERSTANDING MODERN TERRORISM

The events of 9/11 prompted many countries to adopt policies to reinforce security especially at their borders. Terrorism affected many industrial activities in the United States and beyond. Some specialists focused on the connection between terrorism and international trade (Barro, 1991; Pollins, 1989; Abadie and Gardezabal, 2003; Phillips, 2008). Those countries which had previous problems with terrorism, such as England or Spain, aligned immediately with the United States in a global war against what they called “the axis of evil” (Altheide, 2009; Bassi, 2010). The governments posed terrorism as the great challenge of the next millennium. Terrorism is being employed as a buzz word that inspired movie makers, editorials, journalists, and the culture industries. A clear definition of ‘terrorism’ seems in order, but it turns out not so easy to formulate one. Robertson (2002) articulated a good definition of terrorism as the primary security threat for West in 21th century. Upon review, Pedahzur (Pedahzur et al., 2003) found 22 different definitions used by the US government alone. Quite aside from this, reasons for terrorism are even more diverse. Some neo-conservative scholars point to the weak role of the United States as a superpower in the world. For them, a solution would be to conduct top-down preemptive strikes by the United States in other countries. They point to hate against the West encouraged by Muslims.(Fukuyama, 1989; Huntington, 1993, 1997; Kristol and Kagan, 1996; Vargas-Llosa, 2002; Rashid, 2002; Kepel, 2002; Fritting and Kang, 2006; Keohane and Zeckhauser, 2003; Susstein, 2005; Pojman, 2006). Other scholars point out that 9/11 presented the opportunity for some privileged groups to manipulate the citizenry’s fear to create a new kind of internal indoctrination (Altheide, 2006; 2009; Sontag, 2002; Said, 2001; Holloway and Pelaez, 2002; Zizek, 2009; Bernstein, 2006; Baudrillard, 1995a; 1995b; 2006; Kellner, 2005; Gray, 2007; Smaw, 2008; Fluri, 2009; Corey, 2009; Wolin, 2010; Skoll & Korstanje, 2013; Korstanje, 2013).

Luke Howie (2009) describes how cultural entertainment industries have depicted a pejorative and dangerous image onto Islam that affected thousands of citizens and opened a network of discriminatory practices. At a first glance, Goldblatt and Hu (2005) define terrorism as the illegal use of force or violence against persons or their properties in order to intimidate their government, the citizenship or any other segment of society. However, this modest definition has many problems. Some privileged groups in democracies exert similar

or greater violence against others with downright impunity. Furthermore, R. Bernstein (2006) contends that democracy is more than a ritual accomplished every four years but a style of life. We think actually in democracy as the better government, as Marina Ottaway commented. However, we have no clear to what extent democracy prevents terrorism. It worked as a gift-exchange among nations. It is important not to lose the sight that in developed countries, democracy instills peace and trade, but in other types of economies as Iraq, it brings chaos and extreme violence. The tactic of compulsive democratization led US to create a paradoxical situation. At the time, US and its allies conducted military-forces to ensure the political instability, violent reactions emerge (Ottaway 2009: 603).

“A growing body of evidence suggests that coercive democratization is not a successful strategy in most postconflict situations. Democracy can be developed only in well-established states, capable of exercising authority over their entire territory. Democracy, and in particular the majoritarian democracy to which the international community appears committed, also require a population that shares a common identity, not one deeply fragmented along lines of ethnicity and religion”

In this discussion, Ottaway urges, we have to remind that democracy often entails the government of a majority, and what is greatly feared is the powerlessness of ethnic minorities to be effaced by the apparatuses of state. Underpinned in the proposition that points out the first stage of democracy triggers condition of war and internal conflict, Ottaway acknowledges that “coercive democracy” is problematic in order for state to consolidate peace. What Ottaway ignores, is that terrorism derives from western democracies, in the same way, Muslim terrorists have been educated in the best educational establishments of West. It evidences a connection between terrorism and democracy. Likewise, G. Skoll (2007) agrees with Žižek that terrorism (going inside the democratic system) works as a virus going from one to other hosts to infect an unprepared victim. A. Schmid contends that

“The terrorist victimization is often perceived by the terrorist as a sacrifice. The sacrifice can consist of attaching innocent people from the adversary’s camp or of a terrorist blowing himself or herself up in the midst of a group of guilty enemies. In that case, he sees himself as a martyr. The dimension of martyrdom links it to the activity that some scholars see as the most fundamental form of religiosity: the sacrifice” (Schmid, 2004, p. 210).

It is useful to differentiate between the object of terrorist acts and the resulted target which refers to those whom terrorism is designed to influence, whereas the object is composed of its victims. In the case of asymmetric warfare, the terrorist actors usually want to influence organizational actors by victimizing members of the general populace (Howie 2012; Skoll 2008). Beneath this proposition is that terrorism activates psychological warfare whose strengths are the fear and intimidation. D. Black (2004) argued that terrorism is a highly moralistic act intended to exert social influence. Terrorist attacks express grievances by aggression. D. Handelman complements this view, explaining that terrorists defend often themselves from a much broader violence, rooted in a supra-structure preceding their acts. As Ghandi said, “Poverty is the worst kind of violence.” The self-destruction is at least an act of sacrifice, self-sacrifice for others. For Handelman (2013), terrorism is a result of late modernity, and consists in civilians killing other civilians beyond state control. In doing so, travelers are vulnerable simply because they are caught unwary when they fly from one point

to other. The technology that characterized the West has been directed against it. If the previous form of mass violence went from a state to another state, terrorism seems to be in the opposed pole. It signals to the fight of civilians, against other civilians.

Brian Urquhart (2009) observed that the efforts of US to keep the pace in the world not only have been embraced a wrong paradigm, but also woke up more violence as a result of decolonization process. Instead of trusting in UN and other alliances, US did the best by violating all international laws to prevent the political instability. In sharp contrast to US,

“The United Nations played an active role in addressing the regional conflicts that sprang from rapid decolonization. The independence process gave rise to all sorts of power vacuums, frictions and border disputes that sometimes led to open conflict.” (Urquhart, 2009: 268).

What the world needs is solid limits in the use of force. The process of peace-keeping is subject to many variable and factors. New times, new threats, Urquhart adds. While new threats as failed states, terrorism, new mass destruction weapons arise, states are obliged to found alliances to resolve these glitches. The period of post-war is fraught of conflictive reasons that lead governments to extremism. A reasonable use of force not only is needed but suggested. If new threats request new technique of negotiations, the concept of state pace-building should be placed under the lens of scrutiny.

TOURISM AND TERRORISM IN PERSPECTIVES

One might speculate that tourists promote peace by means of curiosity and face-to-face contact. Tourists are not conquerors. Moved by knowing others, they provide fertile sources for international understanding. Terrorism and other forms of violence exhibit a serious threat to the hospitality and tourism industries. Several studies focused on the relationship of terrorism and tourism as well as the perceived risks of travelers regarding certain foreign destinations (Somnez, 1998; Weber, 1998; Domínguez, Burguette and Bernard, 2003; Aziz, 1995; Floyd and Pennington-Gray, 2004; Gibson, Pennington-Gray and Thapa, 2003; Kuto and Groves, 2004; Essner, 2003). Tourism has been one of the industries most affected by terrorist acts. Terrorism determines the way travelers garner information and draw images of their destinations (Peattie, Clarke and Peattie, 2005). Because of their unfamiliarity with the visited destination, travelers and tourists are often targets of diverse crimes (Araña & León, 2008; Bhattarai, Conway and Shrestha, 2005; Goldblatt and Hu, 2005; Tarlow, 2003; Prideaux, 2005; Yuan, 2005). Some terror cells attack tourists to instill a double message. On one hand, they manage a sentiment of panic in the public opinion of the victims' countries of origin. On the other, they undermine the citizenry's trust in state. Of course, any destination combines risk aversion with risk attraction factors. As Lepp and Gibson (2008) put it, this industry seems to be circumscribed by two contrasting tendencies, the sensation or novelty seeking risk and risk aversion. A type of psychology of tourists plays a crucial role at time of determining the perception of risk. In addition, B. West (2008) considers the terrorist attacks in 2003 to Western tourists in Bali. They have been memorialized by the Australian Press as the archetype of heroism, comparing this event with 9/11. This means that collective memory and crises are inextricably intertwined in the national discourse. Postmodern nationalisms

legitimize travel as a universal benefit to human kind which should be defended at any cost. Similarly, the narrative of terrorism emphasizes that enemies of democracy utilize foreign tourists precisely because of their vulnerability, as acts of cowardice. R. Bianchi (2007) argued that tourism revolves around risk perception, which acts as conducive to the interests of some industrialized nations and to the detriment of the periphery. The ongoing state of insecurity created by the so-called “terrorism” corresponds with a political logic of exclusion and discrimination against otherness. The bridge between tourists from the center and migrant travelers from the periphery has been enlarged. Paradoxically, studies in risk perception themselves threaten the goal of security they encourage. To what extent does terrorism affect the tourism industry? J. M. Castaño (2005) presents the arrival statistics from 2000 to 2003 in some cities that had been targets of terrorist attacks. Questioning the hypothesis that terrorism threatens tourism, he points out that cities as Mombasa, New York, Madrid, London, Bali, and Cairo experienced notable declines in tourism, but they recovered in few months. Terrorism may potentate tourism by means of dark tourism—i.e., terrorism tourism. Castaño argues that tourism as a process is reversible. No matter the original impact on public opinion, given some unspecified time-frame, what today generates scare, tomorrow will entice thousand of tourists.

Hotel chains and tourist attraction staff become targets of attacks because they symbolize the strength of an economic order that causes resentment and exclusion. If the West is named as the cause of all suffering, this diminishes the responsibilities of local Arab elites to give their support to colonial powers. Of course, Aziz is not wrong when says tourism is rooted in the logic of capitalism. These attacks may be labeled as forms of protests, to be re-read with a new and much broader lens. Grosspietsch (2005) contends that under some conditions the acceptance of tourism in tourist receiving countries is troublesome. As a global industry, tourism not only creates a serious economic dependency between center and periphery, but also paves the way for political instability. Terrorism may flourish in these types of landscapes. As in Aziz’ argument, he adds that tourism triggers terrorism, combining a bundle of negative effects on the socio-economic fabric. Although his discussion draws on observations from earlier decades (Britton, 1982), Grosspietsch gives a fresh conceptual framework to understand the problem. Terrorism does not affect tourism, nor is terrorism a result of economic resentment. Tourism is adopted by underdeveloped economies to enhance their production, excluding some ethnicities and producing resentment. But there are collateral damages. Tourism indeed gives further value to the extent that it changes social relationships. Scholars who said that tourism should be protected from terrorism are misdiagnosing the problem.

Historians would agree while in former centuries, terrorist attacks were targeted to very important persons, politicians, presidents and officials. With the passing of time, the degree of security pushed to terrorist to change to other targets. This is however, to our view, part of the explanation. The fact is that the project of modernity that eradicated the ideals of Enlightenment not only changed the importance of lay-citizen in politics but also posed as primary target of international terrorism. The attacks in other times were directed against politicians because it conferred the necessary state of uncertainty to bring the claims. The concept of authority was linear, and top-down. The hierarchies of societies were fixed by power-lords whose desires marked the boundaries between what was bad and good. With the acceptance of modernity, these circles of authorities were undermined so that the people created new circular nets of power. The hierarchal order not only diluted but also radically

shifted to a new form. Following this, tourists as capital holders turned more important than politicians. Their well being exhibits the strength of a nation (Korstanje, 2015). Discursively, those states which cannot protect their citizens abroad are weaker than others who intervene in the protection of their people. Undoubtedly, this discourse closes the hermeneutic circle of imperialism in two senses. Terrorism, on one hand, enables the preventive war that situates US in the lens of international criticism. But what is the role of human suffering in processes like this?

IS HUMAN SUFFERING AN ATTRACTION?

What are the similarities between terrorism and tourism? Wars wake up a much broader sentiment of nationalism (Young-Sook, 2006). The sacredness of certain sites after a terrorist attack or certain battles can be commoditized as sacred places. This aspect might be studied under the name of dark tourism (Strange and Kempa, 2003; Miles, 2002; Stone and Sharpley, 2008; Smith, 2010; Korstanje, 2014; 2015). If, to some degree, tourism tends to mitigate the effects of wars by converting the employed artifacts into sacred objects to be exposed in a showcase, recently sites related to horror, torture, tragedy, battles, and concentration camps have emerged as prime tourist destinations. They have enhanced human morbidity and sadism as primary forms of consumption. Dark tourism resulted from commoditization of two aspects: fear of death and the need to intellectualize contingency and uncertainty. While the human nature to enjoy the spectacle of suffering and death has found expression across history, little is known in specialized literature about this uncanny fascination (Stone, 2005). Reasons why visitors launch to dark tourism as a form of entertainment are manifold: a) it can be considered as a reminiscence of the old fear of phantom during childhood (Dann, 1998), b) or as a new way of intellectualizing the logic of death in West (Stone, 2005), c) as a convergence of four basic emotions related to insecurity, superiority, humility and gratitude (Tarlow, 2005), or even because of d) the advent of social fragmentation characteristic of late capitalism (Rojeck, 1997). Nicole Guidotti Hernandez in her 2011 book *Unspeakable violence*, signals the role played by selective memory not only by ignoring some historical facts, in contrast to the status quo, but to protect the founding values of nation states. Similarly, violence should be defined as a disciplinary effort to control the body. The concept of nation, integral to the political form, nation-state, is based on a biased and engineered history. The places where mass death has taken place are often commoditized to be sold in forms of tales or tour-guided spectacles (Guidotti-Hernandez, 2011).

At the same time, some groups are demonized, others are sacralized. Any museum replicates a tale, fabricated and narrated according to the reigning political-economic interests—i.e., the ruling class. Starting from this premise, Korstanje & Clayton (2012) enumerate some commonalities between tourism and terrorism previously ignored by specialized literature, such as a) the insensibility for the suffering of others, b) the curiosity for places of mass-death, and c) employment of mobile technology and tourist means of transport to perpetrate the attacks. Dark tourism has recently become in a buzz-word applied in several studies and papers. Although its original meaning is aimed at denoting curiosity for suffering and mass death, a lot of polemic has grown around this concept. For some scholars, dark tourism seems to be considered only a way of ritualizing and reminding people death,

memento mori, an important mechanism of social cohesion, now commercialized by means of tourism and hospitality industries. For others, this phenomenon represents a type of repressed sadism, enrooted in the logic of capitalism and gazed-consumption. Why people are being captivated by disaster and suffering of others represents one of the most striking aspects of dark tourism. In recent years, valuable studies have focused on mass death as a form of cultural entertainment for the tourism and hospitality industries, little research has emphasized the anthropological roots of dark tourism or thana-tourism. More interested in analyzing the phenomenon from an industrial managerial perspective, that body of knowledge ignores the role played by the sacredness of death in the process of anthropomorphism that ultimately ends in exhibiting a place of staged authenticity. There would be many forms of interpreting such suffering. One approach suggests that the degree of perceived suffering depends on the role of visitors. D. S. Miller (2008) herself experienced the pain of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans where she is native. Alternating interesting respecting to the connection between disaster and tourism with self-ethnography, her development illustrates how the impacts of disasters in communities take a pervasive nature. On one hand it entices outsider tourists who only want to see what is happening but on the other, it calls for the assistance of a second type of tourists who are interested in helping to the obliterated community. Somehow, tourists developed a strange fascination to gaze the “Other” suffering, in sites as New Orleans or Ground zero in New York. All reminds that the spectacle of disasters is conducive to the interests of status quo.

That way, Miller acknowledges that tourism revitalizes the local economy in the process of recovery. To some extent, the culture plays a pivotal role in the progress of giving sense to unfavorable events. The landscapes after a disaster should be reconfigured in order for survivors to adapt their expectations. Visiting sites where martyrs have died deserves attention for those who were not involved. Tours often are sold beyond the devastated zone by operators and mediators that ignore the reasons behind the event. Tourism not only can be useful for New Orleans to recover the former landscape of the city, but also it hosts thousands of people who take pictures of the suffering of others. A contradiction of this caliber paves the ways for misunderstanding. Her intriguing thesis is that tourism as such does not contribute to the spectacle of disaster, but the role of tourists. Ultimately, if poverty and racial problems generated the material asymmetries that facilitated the effects of Katrina are not placed under the lens of scrutiny, the disaster being repeated is only a question of time. With this perspective, dark tourism can be a part of resiliency or a simple discourse for replicating the logic of capital, or maybe both. The importance of heritage sites in tourism literature has been overemphasized, or has been circumscribed to questions related to profits, management, and financial success. Dark tourism invites responses to irresolvable questions. Why this happens? Could we have prevented a situation like this? Who is responsible for this?

Following this, P. Stone developed a new concept around darkness that refers to the spectrum of dark tourism. Some varying degrees of darkness come from seven types of dark sites ranging from darkest to lightest. One of the most interesting concepts of Stone’s model seems to be associated with the level of attractiveness of certain places. Some sites are fraught with political ideology denoted by their location and authenticity. Based on death and suffering, these sites are historical, and provide tourists with a coherent framework for educational goals. Otherwise, there would be other types of sites created for remembering a certain event that has not taken place within the site of the memorial. These sorts of spaces are heritage-centric, and have less associated political ideology. In addition, Stone typifies

seven diverse products rooted in the curiosity of death which transmit a set of different messages to society: a) dark fun factories (entertainment based on simulated suffering of others), b) dark exhibitions (learning opportunities), c) dark dungeons (penal codes and reinforcement of law), d) dark resting places (romantised sites of commemoration), e) dark Shrines (secondary or peripheral sites of remembrance for victims, f) dark conflict sites (comodification of battles and wars), and g) dark camps of genocide (sites where genocide has been practiced). Every typology of dark sites encompasses a specific discourse transmitted repeatedly to a wider range of tourists who manifest variety in their expectations (Stone, 2006). Dark tourism can be seen as the legacy of a “thanatopic tradition” whose roots cannot be yet determined with accuracy. Some scholars say the current fascination for death stems from Middle Ages and the habit of visiting graves and cemeteries during 18th and 19th centuries (Seaton, 1996; 1999). Others analysts have dwelled on the role played by mass media as the prerequisite for creating tourist spots that concentrate on disasters and human catastrophes (Lennon & Foley, 2000). For some scholars, dark tourism shows a strong dependency on identity and ethnic affiliation, as they confer a group sentiment of belonging and meaningful experience rooted in heritage and lore (Foley & Lennon, 1996; Seaton, 1996; 1999; 2000; Simone-Charteris & Boyd, 2010; Dann & Seaton, 2001; Conran, 2002). Korstanje and Ivanov explain that tourism works as an mechanism of resiliency to digest the effects of tragedy, and to give a lesson to survivors. Although the message of disaster never is duly interpreted, which leads community to repeat the event, authors suggest dark tourism gives a meaning to what in fact is meaningless.

Present conceptual paper explores dark tourism as a sub-type of psychological resilience that helps the community understanding the nature of disasters that operates in the principle of contingency. Museums, battlefields, masterpieces of art, cemeteries, and other zones of disasters refer to events mythically constructed to fulfill economical needs. These sites are commoditized and broadcasted by mass media as mythical archetypes that reinforce the social bondage and cultural values of every society. The state of exemption and admiration these type of objects/places wake up are opposed to the adversities these heroes faced (Korstanje & Ivanov, 2012: 56).

The concept of dark tourism as an expression of human morbidity is illustrative and path-breaking, but false in nature. Tourism is organized not only by stimulating consumption, but also to commoditize spaces. To the psychological need to understand what is happening, the market offers its version. This seems to be exactly what dark tourism represents: a reification of capitalist logic by means of disasters. Tim Ingold (2000) says that capitalism has successfully changed the paradigms of the Enlightenment. The capitalist eye forged the myth the leisure that ostensibly liberates the workforce from its oppression. Ingold explains that the ideological power of capitalism rested on its efficacy to control and mark goods and workers. The former are marked by the price of exchange, fixed at the market. The latter depends on its capacity to consume the fabricated merchandises. Workers move their resources to fabricate precisely the merchandise they will consume in their free time. Last but not least, N. Klein portrays a connection between consumption and disasters. From her perspective, capitalism survives by the combination of destruction for new construction. Disasters not only move a lot of resources which otherwise would be immobilized, but also introduce economic policies which would be rejected by lay people if the disaster would have never have taken place. The

market responds to new climate events such as Katrina with new opportunities to expand businesses and profits (Klein, 2011).

The next section examines how the organization of work has solidified the monopoly of the nation-state of work force. Beyond its boundaries, any attack on the modes of production or any event that jeopardizes the material logic of production or consumption is called terrorism, while in homeland, if the resistance is legalized, it receives the name of a strike. Terrorists employ, as Howie put it, our own forms of movements, transport and touring not only to create fear, but also to impede the modern logic of consumption and production. One of the aspects that terrified Americans in 9/11 was not the attack as such, but that the affordable technological forms of transports were employed as weapons. Therefore, we guess that work should not escape of analysis in the terrorist literature. Once again, anyone who has faced the experience of being stranded at an airport because of workers' strikes will understand the similarities between terrorism and strikes. This does not mean that workers are terrorists, but on the contrary, capitalist states constructed the label of terrorism to discipline its internal economic life. Further, history is witness to how states erected their walls to protect the circulation of merchandise at a first stage. This poses serious problems of exploitation for workers, many of them influenced by anarchist ideologies, coined in Europe. By the actions on bodies, states closed a circle to impose a specific identity. What is the role of work, and worker union in this complex process?

TOURISM IS TERRORISM BY OTHER MEANS

In their seminal book *Union Democracy*, Lipset, Trow and Coleman (1977) realize that worker union represents a vivid contradiction inside the democratic life, because the forms of power and authority are precisely undemocratic. Like many others organizations, unions develop a bureaucratic structure of legitimacy, based on the predictable ability to control their members, where the desires of work-force are arbitrarily monopolized, if not eradicated, by their leaders. Further, on hands of few officials lie the communications on the politics events which are important for workers. A response to the inconsistencies of worker unions, authors say "*the strenuous efforts on the part of many trade union leaders to eliminate democracy (the possibility of their defeat) from their union are, for them, necessary adaptive mechanisms. The insecurity of leadership status endemic in democracy, the pressures on leaders to retain their achieved high status, and the fact that by their control over the organizational structure and the use of their special skills, they can often maintain their office, all help in the creation of dictatorial oligarchies*" (p. 11).

It is interesting not to lose the sight that authors like to set forth an all encompassing theory to explain the problems of some European countries to adopt democracy as a valid form of organization. WWII not only undermined the civic tenets of some nations, but also showed the world, the pervasive nature of democracy, this means how dictatorship's mind may very well co-exist in the Republic for long time. Indeed, the oligarchy seems to be the main problem of democracy and of course its vital contradiction. Worker unions are not democratic institutions, but by their pressure against state, the Republic turns more democratic. On the conditions and social factors which oligarchy surfaces, Lipset Trow & Coleman (1977) explain that the conceptualization of security plays a pivotal role at time of

determining the tolerance of leaders respecting to the political organizations. Democracy is a result of wealthy nations who successfully distribute their income to society. Following this, one might find that income distribution inside the groups of a society would explain their degree of maturity to adopt or reject democracy. To our end, the problem of this theory, as many other American studies, seems to be the over-emphasis given to the question of power as determinant of democracy. Though it exhibits a political nature, as we will see later, democracy was a social resource that organized the political life of the city, and not a resource to exert power. Nor democracy was the needs of renewing authorities, neither the introduction of voting in Old Greece.

In early US, the first migrants struggled with other ethnicities to satisfy the capital owners. The inter-ethnic conflicts, even whites and blacks workers, prevented the unionization throughout the country. In this vein, historian L. Cohen says that the melting pot was organized following asymmetries and differences between workers. Chicago was facing serious limitation to bring 8 working hours to migrants as well as in the fulfillment of salaries claims. The red scare first and political instability among ethnicities later, two worked as mechanism of indoctrination that balked the union of workers. If some worker union organized a strike, other ethnicities (strike-breakers) were adopted to keep on the production. This opens an unnecessary rivalry between new and old workers. For example, many blacks and Mexicans were employed to replace whites and European workers who opted for conducting a strike. Factory-owners fired those workers who presented claims to the labor conditions. The sudden end of first World War left many people unemployed. Promptly, Cohen adds, "the fragmentation of the workforce in steel gradually helped erode the strike." The hostility between whites and blacks has a double effects, one on hand it institutionalized a clear racial division which lasted long time, on another gave to capital owners a fresh workforce to employ in conditions of strikes. Racism and prejudice worked in favor of white-power because it conferred a veil of suspicion among the attempt of worker to unionize (Cohen, 1995: 42). Invariably, greatness of Us was determined by the needs of imposing racism as a form of relation, to white ruling class has hold sway. Nonetheless, what has been the role played by anarchism and mass-migration in these devastating conditions? Ideologically, the designers of capitalism faced serious problems to digest anarchism, in view of the universality this movement proclaimed. If race makes the best to disunite workers, socialism and anarchism pivoted to forge a working consciousness in the new migrants. Wagner Act benefited lay-workers in many fields, but engendered unseen effects on social system.

The history of workers' unions is fraught with violence, blood, and death. Now these organizations seem to be legally recognized. Most of them were historically aligned to leftist political movements coming from Europe, Germany, and Italy. The industrial revolution and industrial capitalism were prerequisite for workers to think in terms of collective organizations. The US American Federation of Labor was founded in 1886. At some extent, the system reserved the right to legalize terrorism, by means of a baptism, conferring a new name. One of the main strengths was the power of negotiation with the owners of capital. James Joll explains that at first anarchists were depicted as dangerous by the ruling class press and the politicians who did their bidding in Gilded Age America. The United States government waged chronic war against unions beginning at the end of the Civil War And continuing until the New Deal of Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s. The first syndicalists that contradicted the state were labeled as terrorists. These workers professed a nonnegotiable

fight for oppressed classes, which have been relegated by the capitalist aristocracies (Joll, 1979). At the end of WWII the American ruling class accomplished a double capitulation domestically and abroad. The famous Marshall Plan worked as a catalyst to undermine the ever-growing worker demands in Europe, while the CIA consorted with gangsters and former Nazis and Fascists to subvert and terrorize workers, their unions, and their political parties (Ganser 2005; Kurkul 1997). Legislation such as the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act restricted the political activities of unions and blunted workers' only weapon against exploitation—the strike. Communism seems not to be the anti-capitalism values it represents, but its potential effects on workers, a threatening influence that would jeopardize the American economy (Robin, 2009; Skoll and Korstanje, 2013).

Brilliantly, G. Skoll considers that the function of state is to maintain the hierarchical status quo by exerting power and violence over populations. In times of low conflict, the legitimacy of the state rests on the market which confers certain stability. Contextually, state resorts to violence to re-establish the threatened order. Similarly, the market mediates among human beings by imposing a state of gratification in lieu of constraints, but the moment the control weakens, fear replaces gratification as motivator to legitimize the ruling order (Skoll, 2007). The United States historically developed a Red Scare not because of the anti-capitalist values of communism, but primarily for its effects on workers. Communism was not just a reaction to the accumulation of capital by the bourgeoisie, but it also gave workers a consciousness, a discourse to guide their fight. The first anarchists and communist migrants surveilled and jailed by many states contributed to the formation of workers' union. States controlled and expelled the aliens but accepted and reorganized their ideas in a manner suitable to the long term interests of capital and the ruling class. Capitalist societies domesticated the dangerous lessons of Marx in two different ways: by creating a wide sentiment of fear of communism and by re-organizing the discipline of workers to the capitalist state (Skoll and Korstanje, 2013).

J. Joll (1979) traces the roots of anarchism to the text of Godwin, Blanc, Proudhon and Bakunin. Their criticism against the state and the hegemony of law paved the way for the advent of a new movement, which postulated the egalitarian nature of human beings. One of the most troubling aspects of states seems to be that many groups are subjugated under its unique power—its monopoly of force. By reducing government to only small units, formed by families, the anarchists thought the problem of asymmetries would be resolved. Joll adds that anarchism came from the advance of capitalism and industrial organization. In view of the premise that production should be based on the work, and not loans, countries as Russia, Germany, and Italy witnessed the upsurge of a new movement that takes from worker's discontents its own strength. While Marx argued for a egalitarianism as a result of the class struggle and mass movements, anarchism predicted a revolution that should start as soon as possible. Anarchists worked hard for their ideas to be adopted in Europe, Latin America, and the United States to organize the workers. Some of their ideas were of paramount importance in forging a consciousness among worker in capitalist societies, but some of them were used by radical groups to perpetrate violent acts, a few of which led to bystanders' deaths and injuries. Others shape in assassinating ruling class leaders. These acts, deemed terrorism, served the state by giving a rationale to ban anarchist activity. Although the work-force embraced anarchist's discourse to make sense of their struggles against capital holders, states labeled strikers as anarchists bent on destroying public order. Eventually states recognized unions as legitimate, but in the United States not until the 1935 Wagner Act. In Russia, some

anarchists choose to lead the revolution within trade unions, while others preferred to spend their time in forming the local communes. Joll (1972: 166) goes on to admit that

” . . . the anarchists, too, were divided among themselves; some were anarcho-syndicalists and placed their hope of revolution in the action of the workers union which would take over the factories. Others were communist anarchists and disciples of Kropotkin, who saw social revolution coming about through the formation of local communes which would then join in a federation.”

While both fought a common enemy, anarchists and communists worked together to defeat the monarchy, but once consolidated in power, the Bolsheviks jailed intellectuals who sympathized with anarchism. In Ukraine, the anarchist guerrilla army was so strong that have existent over two years. Of course, at the time, some intellectuals accepted communism by directing their efforts to improve the labor condition of workers, others plunged into terrorism. The failure of anarchism in Russia pushed many intellectuals to other countries as United States, Argentina, and Brazil, where they worked hard to organize workers. By about 1920, these countries were facing an industrial stage, accelerated by the mass migrations from Europe initiated in former century. Anarchism found a new basis for their claims, beyond the acts of terrorists. Even though the first strikes were bloody and violent, with the passing of years anarcho-syndicalists were legally accepted in societies which not only needed the masses to work, but also sublimated their protests into reified forms of negotiation that for better or worse accelerated the reproduction of capital. Their formerly denounced terrorism was commoditized into negotiations and legally circumscribed strikes. The archetype of revolution, the general strike, was occasionally used in the fight against bosses and capital-holders. General strikes held by workers became the epicenter for future benefits to the work force. States exerted their disciplinary force to exterminate terrorist anarchists, who rejected joining the union organized workers. In the First World War CGT and workers did support the state. The work-force gave their loyalties to nation states no matter the side they took during the war. Two world wars accelerated not only the reproduction of capitalism, but disciplined anarcho-syndicalism almost to its disappearance. Joll, in this vein, explains that anarchism indeed did not disappear, but changed into new forms. History validated the idea that worker union and terrorism has been inextricably intertwined. If tourism continued the logic of labor by other means—as a form of entertainment, alienation or escape—we must accept that the terrorist mindset has survived in syndicalism. Therefore, we do not hesitate to state that tourism is terrorism by other means. Let us remind readers that modern tourism surfaced by the combination of two contrasting tendencies: the technological advance that shortened the points of connection, invention of new machines, and the wage benefits or working hour reduction, proposed by syndicalists. In this respect, modern tourism and mass-consumption would not be possible without the direct intervention of the first anarchists, most of them labeled as terrorists. To the extent that a strike is considered a legal mechanism to present certain claims, while terrorist attacks are discouraged, seems to be a matter that specialists do not examine properly. A closer view reveals that there are similar processes in both, a strike and terrorism. As the vaccine is the inoculated virus to strengthen the body's immune system, strikes are process of dissent and discord that mitigate the negative effects of conflict. After all, strikes are merely the collective effects of workers withholding their labor. There is nothing violent or threatening about them, except to those who depend on other

people's work to sustain themselves—i.e., the owners of capital. In their struggle with workers, the ruling class uses as one of its weapons the construal of strikes as taking consumers as hostages. Whenever passengers are stranded at an airport or train stations because of problems between owners and unions, the sense of urgency facilitates the things for stronger ones. Businesses and terrorism organizations are not concerned about the vulnerability or needs of passengers. The latter one are manipulated as means for achieving certain goals. In a world designed to create and satisfy psychological desires, consumers as holders of money, are of paramount importance for the stability of system. The threat that represents the consumers and the derived economic losses are enough to dissuade owners from the worker's claims. In these types of processes, typified by law, State not only takes intervention mediating between both actors but also is in charge of leading negotiations. Nonetheless, if negotiations fail, the state uses its armed force might to force the workers back to their jobs. An early historical example is the great rail strike of 1877 when federal troops were withdrawn from the occupied former Confederacy to kill strikers, terrorizing the mass of rail workers to end the strike. In doing so, first anarchists opted for terrorist acts, until they were disciplined by states. Once done, their forms of violence were mutated to another more symbolic way of protests, the strike. Capitalism owes much to worker unions, more than thought. Whatever the case may be, tourism has extended to the globe (Naisbitt, 1995), as the well being of industrial societies have advanced. The evolution of tourism, as a mass industry, came from a combination of economic factors, much encouraged by worker unions, such as working hour reduction and a rise in the wages. However, the history of tourism ignores the burden industrialism and technological advances brought by workers. Anarchism not only flourished in industrial contexts, exploiting the worker resentment against owners, but also improved their working conditions. The Thomas Cook Agency has offered travelers who suffer from alcoholism. The prepaid all-inclusive vouchers were for alcoholics who do not handle money (Santos-Filho, 2008; Korstanje, 2011). Industrial societies pave the way for expanding trade in the world, in which tourism plays a crucial role, domestic workers are subject to conditions of exploitation. If anarchism introduced poverty relief in industrial societies, their virulent ideas were not accepted until they were changed to ways acceptable to the state and ruling class. From the ideals of bloody revolution, European societies passed to the working class organizations—unions and political parties. This is the reason why we argue that tourism indirectly resulted from terrorism. Violence exerted by the anarchists was not enough to change the society, or at least its ways of productions, but their ideas not only inspired many artists, but also many syndicalist leaders (Joll, 1979). The history of pioneers in anarchism shows us two relevant aspects. First and foremost, states create their boundaries as a barrier to protect their economies. What inside can be called strike, beyond is labeled as terrorist attacks. Secondly, terrorists, most of them educated in the best Western universities learned our tactics of negotiations, strategies of exploitation and projected to more violent forms of expression.

What happens in strikes at airports when thousands of tourists stranded? First, they are not stranded. They can leave the airport and reschedule their flights, as they are forced to do regularly due to weather and other intervening events about which airlines refuse responsibility toward their customers. The companies' response is simple. They characterize workers as taking hostages, the tourists, because they represent the owners of capital. Although the degree of violence is minimized, sometimes, in these types of circumstances, what is important to discuss here is the fact that worker unions conduct their claims by the

introduction of speculation and coactions, affecting not only the tourist-system but the whole economy. Employers, and the ruling class as a whole, blame unions for the predictable consequences of their own exploitation of both workers and consumers—in other words the masses. The same conditions and ideas that created worker unions, were the same for terrorism. If worker union gave many benefits to work-force, promoting the modern tourism, it is not surprising that tourism is terrorism in a disciplined way. This is the reason why, today tourists are targeted of terrorist attacks. They, tourists, are intertwined with terrorism because they are part and parcel of world capitalism and Western imperialism. Sometimes tourists are attacked by dissident groups as a means to affect national policies. More often, tourists and the tourism industries act as logistical agents in deploying capital exploitation and imperial control. When tourists suffer harm, so-called terrorists (dissidents) get the blame. At a first glance, tourists are “workers” who earned their money enabling a pact to a third person (owner). Their power of consumption situates them as privileged actors of tourist system. They are target not only to strikes, at homeland, but also of terrorist attacks abroad. Nonetheless, if tourism has been expanded by the advance of industrialism, changed by the conditions of labor, first anarchists, whose acts of violence were not successful, envisaged the possibility of organizing the masses, to create worker associations. The original violence mutated to a more subtle form of struggle based on the similar characteristics, the need for hostages, media support, speculation and the appeal to surprise factor. These forms of negotiation were not only learned by terrorists, but also applied in their respective countries to civilian targets, often international tourists. Therefore, we strongly believe that terrorism as it is portrayed in the media is inextricably intertwined with tourism. Tourism is the disciplined expression of terrorism.

REFERENCES

- Abadie, A and Gardezabal, J., (2003), The economic costs of Conflict: a case study of Basque country. *American Economic Review*. 93 (1): 113-132.
- Altheide, D, (2006) *Terrorist and the Politics of Fear*. (1st Ed) Oxford, Altamira Press.
- Altheide, D, (2009), Moral Panic: from sociological concept to public discourse. *Crime and Media Culture*. 5 (1): 79-99.
- Araña, J and León, C, (2008) The Impact of terrorism on tourism demand. *Annals of Tourism Research*. 35 (2): 299-315.
- Aziz, H, (1995) Understanding attacks on tourists in Egypt. *Tourist Management*,. 16: 91-95.
- Bauman, Z. (2007) *Consuming Life*. (1st ed) London, Polity Press.
- Barro, R. (1991), Economic Growth in a cross section countries. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 106 (2): 407-443.
- Bassi, C. (2010) The Anti-Imperialism of Fools: a cautionary story on the revolutionary Socialist Vanguard of England post-9/11 Anti War Movement. *ACME: an international E-journal for Critical Geographies*. 9 (2): 113-137.
- Baudrillard, J. (1995a), *The systems of the objects*. (2cd Ed) Mexico, Siglo XXI.
- Baudrillard, J. (1995b), *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place*. (1st ed) Sydney, Power Publications

- Baudrillard, J., (2006), *Virtuality and Events: the hell of power. Baudrillard Studies*. Vol. 3 (2). July. Available at <http://www.ubishops.ca/BaudrillardStudies/>. Bishop's University, Canada. Version translated by Chris Turner.
- Black, D. (2004). The Geometry of Terrorism. *Sociological Theory*. 22: 14-25
- Bernstein, R. (2006). *The Abuse of Evil. The corruption of politics and religion since 9/11*. (1st ed) Buenos Aires, Katz.
- Bhattarai, K, Conway, D and Shrestha, N. (2005) Tourism, terrorism and Turmoil in Nepal. *Annals of Tourism Research*. 32 (3): 669-688.
- Bianchi, R, (2007), Tourism and The Globalization of Fear: analyzing the politics of risk and (in)security in global travel. *Tourism and Hospitality Research*. 7 (1): 64-74.
- Britton, S. (1982). "The Political Economy of Tourism in the Third World." *Annals of Tourism Research*. 9 (3): 331-358.
- Castaño, J. M. (2005), *Psicología Social de los Viajes y el Turismo*. Madrid, Thomson Ed.
- Chauhan, V. (2007) Safety and Security: perceptions of Tourists visiting Kashmir, India. *Advances in Hospitality and Leisure*. 3: 3-17.
- Churchill, W. (2003). *On the Justice of Roosting Chickens: Reflections on the Consequences of U.S. Imperial Arrogance and Criminality*. Oakland, CA, AK Press.
- Cohen, E. (1990) *Making a New Deal, industrial workers in Chicago 1919-1939*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Conran, T. (2002) Solemn Witness: A Pilgrimage to Ground Zero at the World Trade Center. *Journal of Systematic Therapies*. 21 (3): 39-47.
- Corey, R. (2009) *Fear, the history of Political Ideas*. (1st ed) Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Dann, G. (1998) The Dark side of Tourism: etudes et Rapports. L Aix en Provence. Centre International de Reserches et d Etudes Turistiques.
- Dann, G, & Seaton, A. (2001) *Slavery, Contested Heritage and Thanatourism*. London, Routledge.
- Debord, G. (1994). *The Society of the Spectacle*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. New York, Zone Books.
- Donohue, K (2003) *Freedom from Want: American Liberalism & the idea of the Consumer*. Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press.
- Domínguez, P, Burguette, E and Bernard, A. (2003) Efectos del 11 de Septiembre en la hotelería Mexicana: reflexión sobre la mono-dependencia turística. *Estudios y Perspectivas en Turismo*. 12 (3-4): 335-348.
- Essner, J. (2003) Terrorism's impacto n Tourism: what the industry may learn from Egypt's struggle with al-Gama'a al-Islamiya. *Security and Development*. IPS 688.
- Floyd, M. and Pennington-Gray, L (2004) Profiling Risk: perception of tourist. *Annals of Tourism Research*. 31 (4): 1051-1054.
- Floyd, M, Gibson, H, Pennington-Gray, L and Thapa, B. (2003), The Effects of Risk Perception on Intention to Travel in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001. *Safety and Security in Tourism: relationships, Management and Marketing*. 15 (2).
- Fluri, J. (2009), Foreign Passport Only: geographies of post-conflict work in Kabul, Afghanistan. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*. 99 (5): 986-994.
- Foucault, M. (2001). *The Society must be defended* Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura Económica.

- Fritting, M and Kang, H. (2006) International Terrorism, International Trade and Borders. *Research in Global Strategic Management*. 12 (1): 203-223.
- Fukuyama, F. (1989), The End of History. *The national Interest*. Vol. 16 Summer: 4-18.
- Ganser, D. (2005) *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe*. London, Frank Cass Publishers.
- Goldblatt, J. and Hu, C. (2005) Tourism, terrorism, and the new World for Event Leaders." *E-review of tourism Research*. 3 (6): 139-144.
- Gray, C. S. (2007) The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive war Doctrines: Reconsideration. Department of the Army, Department of Defense, US Government. Available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubid=789>
- Grosspietsch, M. (2005) Can tourism provoke terrorism? *Working Paper Series*. Num. 3. Sustainable Development Through Tourism, University of Munster, Germany. Available at www.sd-tourism.org.
- Guidotti-Hernandez, N. (2011) *Unspeakable Violence. Remapping Us and Mexican National Imaginaries*. North Caroline, Durham, Duke University Press.
- Handelman D. (2013) Self-Exploders, Self Sacrifice and the Rizhomic organizations of Terrorism. In Religion, Politics, & Globalization. New York, Berghan. Pp. 232-262.
- Hoffman, B. (2002) Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism since 9/11. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. 25 (5): 303-316.
- Holloway, J and Paláez, E. (2002) La guerra de todos los estados contra toda la gente. En *Guerra Infinita: hegemonía y terror mundial*. Ceceña, A. & Sader, E. Buenos Aires: CLACSO. Pp. 159-166.
- Howie, L. (2009), A Role for Business in the War on Terror. *Disaster Prevention and Management*. 18 (2): 100-107.
- Howie, L. (2012) *Witness to Terror: understanding the meaning and consequence of terrorism*. New York, Palgrave.
- Huntington, S. P. (1993) *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Oklahoma, Oklahoma University Press.
- Hungtinton, S. P. (1997) *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order*. New York, Touchstone Book.
- Ingold, T. (2000). *The Perception of Enviroment: essays on livelihood, Dwelling and Skill*. London, Routledge.
- Ingold, T. (2011) *Being Alive. Essays on movement, knowledge and description*. London, Routledge.
- Joll, J. (1979). *The Anarchists*. Cambridge, Methuen.
- Keohane, N and Zeckhauser, R. (2003) The ecology of Terror defense. *Journal of risk and Uncertainty*. 26 (2-3): 201-229.
- Kellner, D. (2005) Baudrillard, Globalization and Terrorism: some comments in recent adventures of the Image and Spectacle on the occasion of Baudrillard's 75th birthday. *Baudrillard Studies*. Vol. 2 (1). January. Availabe at <http://www.ubishops.ca/BaudrillardStudies/>. Bishop's University, Canada.
- Kepel, G. (2002) Los Hechos del 11 de Septiembre de 2001. In *El Mundo Después del 11 de Septiembre de 2001*. (Compilación). Barcelona: Editorial Península. Pp. 25-43.
- Kristol, W. and Kagan, R. (1996) Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs*. July /August issue.

- Korstanje, M. (2011). "Mitología y Turismo: la exégesis como interpretación hermenéutica." *Estudios y Perspectivas en Turismo*. 20 (6): 1258-1280.
- Korstanje, M. & Clayton, A. (2012) "Tourism and Terrorism, Conflicts and Commonalities." *Worldwide Hospitality and Tourism Themes*. 4 (1): 8-25.
- Korstanje, M. E. (2013). Ley y democracia en la era del terrorismo. *Nómadas. Revista Crítica de Ciencias Sociales y Jurídicas*, 35(3), 179-188.
- Korstanje, M. E (2014) "Puntos Esenciales del Turismo Oscuro, un debate conceptual." *Grand Tour*. 10: 23-35.
- Korstanje, M E (2015a) The Anthropology of dark Tourism, exploring the contradictions of Capitalism. Centre for Ethnicity and Racism Studies, CERS. Working Paper 22. Available at <http://cers.leeds.ac.uk/working-papers/>
- Korstanje, M (2015b) "The Spirit of Terrorism: tourism, unionization and terrorism." *Pasos: Revista de turismo y patrimonio cultural*, 13 (1): 239-250.
- Kurku, E. (1997) Trapped in a Web of Covert Killers. *Covert Action Quarterly* (winter): 6-12.
- Kuto, B. and Groves, J. (2004) The Effects of Terrorism: evaluating Kenya's tourism Crisis." Pero "como definir un acto "terrorista"? *E-review of tourism Research*. 2 (4): 88-95.
- Lennon, J. and Foley, M. (2000) *Dark Tourism: The attraction of Death and Disasters*. London, Thomson Learning.
- Lepp, A. and Gibson, H. (2008) Sensation Seeking and Tourism: tourist role, perception of risk and Destination Choice. *Tourism Management*. 29 :740-750.
- Lipset, S M, Trow, M & Coleman, J (1977) *Union Democracy: the inside politics of the international typographical Union*. New York, The free Press.
- Naisbitt, J. (1995). *Global Paradox*. London, Nicholas Bready Publishing.
- Miles, W. F. (2002) Auschwitz, Museum interpretation and Darker Tourism." *Annals of Tourism Research*. 29 (4): 1175-1178.
- Miller, D. S (2008) Disaster Tourism and Disaster Landscape attraction after Hurricane Katrina: an auto-ethnography journey. *International Journal of Culture, Tourism and Hospitality Research*. 2(2): 115-131.
- Ottaway, M (2009) "Is democracy the answer? In Leashing the Dogs of War, conflict management in a divided world. C. Crocker, F O Hampson & P Aall (editors). Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace press, pp. 603-617.
- Peattie, S. Clarke, P. and Peattie, K. (2005), Risk and Responsibility in Tourism: promoting sun-safety." *Tourism Management*. 26 (1): 399-408.
- Pech, R. and Slade, B. (2006), Religious Fundamentalism and Terrorism: why do they do it and what do they want? *Foresight*. 8 (1): 8-20.
- Pedahzur et al. (2003) "Altruism and Fatalism: The Characteristics of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists." *Deviant Behavior*, 24 (4): 405-23.
- Phillips, D. E. (2008) Terrorism and Security in the Caribbean Before and After 9/11. *Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development*. 7: 97-138.
- Prideaux, B. (2005) Factors affecting bilateral tourism Flows." *Annals of Tourism Research*. 32 (3): 780-801.
- Pojman, L. (2006) *Terrorism, Human Rights and the case for World Government*. (1st ed) Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield.
- Pollins, B. M. (1989) "Does trade still follow the flag?" *American Political Science Review*. 83 (2): 465-480.

- Rashid, A. (2002) Los Hechos del 11 de Septiembre de 2001." In *El Mundo Después del 11 de Septiembre de 2001*. (Compilación). Barcelona, Editorial Península. Pp. 13-23.
- Reisinger, Y. and F. Mavondo. (2005) Travel Anxiety and Intention to Travel internationally: implication of Travel Risk perception." *Journal of Travel Research*, 43: 212-245.
- Robertson, G. (2002), The Role of military in combating terrorism." Paper presented at second Nato Russia-conference, Moscow, Russia.
- Robin, C. (2009). *Fear, the history of political ideas*. México, fondo de Cultural Económica.
- Rojeck, C. (1997) Indexing, Dragging and the social construction of tourist sights. In Rojeck and Urry, J. (Eds). *Touring Cultures: Transformations of Travel and Theory*. London, Routledge, 52-74.
- Ruwayha, W (1990) *Terrorism and Hostage Taking in the Middle East*. Paris, Self Publication.
- Sackett, H. and Botterill, D. (2006) Perception of International Travel Risk: an exploratory study of the influence of proximity to terrorist attack. *E-review of tourism Research*. 4 (2): 44-49.
- Said, E. (2001) The Clash of Ignorance. *The Nation*. October 4. Available at <http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance>.
- Santos-Filho, Dos, J. (2008) "Thomas Cook: marco da historiografia dominante do turismo: ensaio sociológico sobre o conceito ao fenomeno turistico na historia." *Revista de Investigación en Turismo y Desarrollo Local*. Vol 1 Disponible en <http://www.eumed.net/rev/turydes/index.htm>. Acceso en Aug 10 2010.
- Schmid, A. (1983) *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases, and Literature*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
- Schmid, A. and Jongman, A. (1988) *Political Terrorism*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.
- Seaton, A. V (1996). Guided by the Dark: from Thanatopsis to Thanatourism. *International Journal of Heritage Studies*. 2 (4): 234-244.
- Seaton, A. V (1999) War and Thanatourism: Waterloo 1815-1914. *Annals of tourism Research*. 26 (1): 130-158.
- Seaton, A. V (2000) Thanatourism: entry. In J. Jafari, *Encyclopedia of Tourism*. London, Routledge.
- Skoll, G. (2007) Meaning of Terrorism,. *International Journal for The Semiotics of Law*. 20: 107-127.
- Skoll, G. (2008) Toward a Theory of Terrorism: A Multidimensional Analysis. In *Global Terrorism Issues and Developments*, ed. Rene Larche, New York, Nova Science Publishers, pp 19-60.
- Skoll, G. & Korstanje, M (2013) "Constructing an American fear Culture from red scares to terrorism." *International Journal for Human Rights and Constitutional Studies*. 1 (1): 1-34.
- Simone-Charteris, M. Boyd, S. W. (2010) The Development of Religious Heritage Tourism in Northern Ireland: Opportunities, benefits and obstacles. *Tourism*. 58 (3): 229-257.
- Smaw, E. (2008) From Chaos to Contrarianism: Hobbes, Pojman, and the Case of World Government. *Essays in Philosophy*. 9 (2): 4-18.
- Smith, W. W. (2010), The Darker side of Travel: the theory and practice of dark tourism. *Annals of Tourism Research*. 37 (3): 867-869.

- Somnez, S. (1998) Tourism, Terrorism, and political instability. *Annals of Tourism Research*. 25 (1): 416-456.
- Sontag, S. (2002) „Seamos Realistas. In *El Mundo Después del 11 de Septiembre de 2001*. (Compilación). Barcelona: Editorial Península. Pp. 59-61.
- Sorkin, A.R. (2013) Big Banks May Be Getting Too Big to Jail. *CNBC* (March 12). Online <http://www.cnbc.com/100544660>
- Stone, P. (2005) Dark Tourism Consumption. A call for Research.” *E-Review of Tourism Research (ERTR)*. 3 (5): 109-116.
- Stone, P. and Sharpley, R. (2008) Consuming Dark Tourism, a Thanatological perspective. *Annals of Tourism Research*. 35 (2): 574-595.
- Strange, C. and Kempa, M, (2003) Shades of Dark Tourism: Alcatraz and Robben Island. *Annals of Tourism Research*. 30 (2): 386-405.
- Susstein, C. (2005) *Laws of Fear: beyond the precautionary Principle*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Tacitus, C. (1970). *The Germania*, in *The Agricola and the Germania*, trans. Harold Mattingly, rev. S. A. Handford. London: Penguin Books.
- Tarlow, P. (2003) Tourism Ethics. *E-review of tourism Research*. 1 (3): 39-41.
- Tarlow, P. (2005) Dark Tourism: The appealing dark side of tourism and more. In Novelli, N. (ed). *Niche Tourism – contemporary issues, trends and cases*. Oxford: Elsevier, pp. 47-58.
- Urquhart, B (2009) “Limits of the use of Force.” In *Leashing the Dogs of War. Conflict Management in a divided World*. C. Crocker, F. O Hampson, & P Aall. Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 266-276.
- Vargas Llosa, M. (2002) La Lucha Final.” *En El Mundo Después del 11 de Septiembre de 2001*. (1st ed) Barcelona: Editorial Península. Pp. 53-58.
- Virilio, P. (1991) *La Inseguridad del Territorio*. (3 ed) Buenos Aires, La Marca.
- Virilio, P. (2007), *La Ciudad Pánico: el afuera comienza aquí*. (1st ed) Buenos Aires, Libros El Zorzal.
- Wallace, T. (2007) Went the Day Well: Scripts, Glamour and Performance in War-weekends. *International Journal of Heritage Studies*. 13 (3):200-223.
- Weber, S. (1998) War, terrorism and tourism.” *Annals of tourism Research*. 25 (3): 760-763.
- West, B. (2008) Collective Memory and Crisis: The 2002 Bali Bombing, National Heroic archetypes and the counter-narrative of Cosmopolitan nationalism,. *Journal of Sociology*. 44 (4): 337-353.
- Wolin, R. (2010) The idea of cosmopolitanism: from Kant to the Iraq war and beyond. *Ethics & Global Politics*. 3 (2): 143-153.
- Young-Sook, L. (2006) The Korean War and tourism: legacy of the war on the development of the tourism industry in South Korea. *International Journal of Tourism Research*. 8 (3): 157-170.
- Yuan, M. (2005) After September 11: determining its Impacts on Rural Canadians travel to U.S. *E-review of tourism Research*. 3 (5): 103-108.
- Zizek, S. (2008) El Espectro de la Ideología. In *Mapping Ideology*. Zizek, S. (Editor). Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura Económica, pp. 7-42.
- Zizek, S. (2009) *Violence*. (1st ed) Buenos Aired, Paidós.

Chapter 7

DISCUSSING TERRORISM, ISOLATIONISTS VS. INTERVENTIONISTS

INTRODUCTION

In the recent two decades, a hot debate among scholars by respecting to implications and effects of globalization in the world surfaced. The pervasive role played by globalization and war on terror has been unearthed a cynic dynamic. Whereas early capitalism attributed to the liberal market, trade and connection among different-structured economies, central countries impose serious migration barriers to peripheral migrants (Powell, 2010). The current conceptualization of terror or terrorism must be reconsidered.

A senior scholar, D. Altheide brings into question to what an extent American and British newspapers covered issues related to crime as a subjective trouble (because it connotes to the idea of victimization) while terrorism is labeled not only by an nightmare but also as a real hazard for American and European way (Altheide, 2009). In many perspectives, 11/09 has symbolized and re-signified the manner popular wisdom considers terrorism in US soil and beyond. As it has been discussed in earlier chapters, the discussion here can take two contrasting channels. A couple of thinkers, most of them linked to a major or lesser degree with Government, confirm terrorism still is a great challenge and threat for West. Early or later, West and East should mythically encounter in a final fight for the predominance of power in the World. Of course, attacks on World Trade Center accelerated the times (Fukuyama, 1989; Huntington, 1993; 1997; Kristol and Kagan, 1996; Vargas-Llosa, 2002; Rashid, 2002; Kepel, 2002) (Keohane and Zeckhauser, 2003; Susstein, 2005; Pojman, 2006; Diamond, 2010). To what an extent US should convert in an interventionist power?

Conversely, based on the stimulation of panic to mitigate the counter-effects of global capitalism others more critical scholars do not hesitate to point out WTC and terrorism work as mechanism to create fear in population with the end of generating a self-indoctrination. Since globalization generates a fluent interaction among countries and people, this process blurs the boundaries of identity in respect of self-hood and otherness. Fears not only would encapsulate the subject's attachment to certain Nation-hood but also would lead persons to trivialize the understanding with their neighbors in order for local aristocracies gain more acceptance and legitimacy. Substantially, Mass-Media are represented for global corporations functional to the interests of elites. That way, the terrorism becomes in a new way of

entertainment fabricated and broadcasted by Media as a “spectacle of disaster” (Somnez, 1998) (Altheide, 2006; 2009; Said, 2001; Sontag, 2002; Holloway and Pelaez, 2002; Zizek, 2009; Skoll, 2007; Bernstein, 2006; Baudrillard, 1995a; 1995b; 2006; Smaw, 2008; Pech and Slade, 2006; Corey, 2009; Wolin, 2010).

In addition, it is interesting to note how existent current manipulation of images potentiates the effects of terrorism to the extent a person who had never been experienced a terrorist attack can take fright at being a future target. This means that images created strong links between security and terrorism. Suicide terrorist are mythically depicted as staunch enemies (systematic killer) of development and democracy whose goals are aimed at destroying the Western civilization and its cultural values. This sentiment is often associated to a much broader state of anxiety wherein the subject strongly believes potential terrorist attacks will not be prevented (Howie, 2009). Theoretical appliances of preventive war are self-defeating for US and Europe because not only it posed their economies in a difficult position but also weakens the bridge of a frank dialogue. Totalitarian Regimes historically opted for preventive wars in order for them to gain more power and legitimacy (Gray, 2007). Under this circumstance, this chapter critically contrasts two antagonist perspectives portrayed in the works of Samuel Phillip Huntington and Slavoj Zizek.

Ethnocentrism can be defined as “*the tendency to believe the own cultural values are unique and superior to others.*” At least, this used definition can be read at the dictionary I have on my hands. To be honest, there was not surprising to note this term was originally coined by Anthropology and Ethnology during XVIII and XIXth centuries. At a first glance, colonialism and anthropology were inextricably interconnected. This does not mean necessarily that anthropology paved the pathway for colonialism but at least the former was functional to the interests of the latter. At the beginning of XIX century, first anthropologists were enrooted in the belief that the advance of industrialism not only would be irreversible but also would generate disappearance of many non-western cultures. The first ethnologies, as Harris put it, were lawyers interested in questions of heritage, lineage and patrimony (Harris, 2006). Based on “the yearning of protection” to create a discipline which helps native to alleviate the negative effects of industrialization, pioneer ethnologists and archeologists contemplated the odds to collect as much as possible lore, customs, artifacts, devices and habits of these cultures in bias of extinction. The inception of otherness was ethnocentrically accompanied with a cynic paternalism. Social Scientists were enrooted in the belief that human beings can be differentiated depending on their degree of development. In parallel with the Darwinism and eugenics, anthropology and ethnology insisted on a supposed biological and cultural superiority of ones human beings over others. Following the example of animals that Darwin illustrated, humanity was grouped by different types of races which distinguished each others by a supposed degree of intelligence. For a theory elaborated in North-Europe, it was not surprising to note eugenicists emphasized on the idea whites and Anglo-Saxons showed to have a top-ranked level of intelligence while blacks and Asians were considered less rational or even under the line of humanity. One of the concerns characterized the beginning of anthropology was the compulsory need to protect the non-Western cultures of the inevitable disappearance due to capitalism advance.

Underpinned in the belief that exotic cultures will decline at the time industrialism advances, European paternalism triggered an uncanny obsession in academicians for protecting and collecting devices and artifacts of far Australia, Africa and even South America. This type of paternalism survived long time throughout the European scholarship

but also was the prerequisite for the inception of a new term subordinated discipline applied by the international financial organisms: *the development*. But readers should take attention to the fact that the term development was historically coined by American President Truman who in a political discourse of 1949 said that developed countries should be willing to help and give assistance to those countries wherein population basic needs still remained uncovered. From that day onwards, anthropology of development debated in depth to what an extent while some societies export pleasure and style of life forging a global identity, others societies adopt these guides internally increasing the dependence and shaping new hybrid cultures. This point in part explains the reasons as to why a much more migrants depart from home in search of an opportunity in United States and Europe (Escobar, 1997; Esteva, 2000). In next lines we will put under the lens of scrutiny the works about religion and terrorism of Samuel Huntington.

CONSIDERING RELIGION AS THE CAUSE OF INTER-CIVILIZATION'S CONFLICT

Preliminary, Huntington goes on to say

“In this new world the most pervasive, important and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between people belonging to different cultural identities. Tribal wars and ethnic conflicts will occur within civilizations. Violence between states and groups from different civilizations, however, carries with it the potential for escalation as other states and groups from these civilizations rally to the support of their kin countries” (Huntington, 1997: 28).

His main thesis is aimed at emphasizing on the cultural identities as the prerequisite of social conflagration. After the Second War and Post cold War, cultural identities take form, elaborate and dilute the ethnic cohesion as well as fabricate new targets for the direction of violence. We are witness of how the clash of civilizations envisaged by liberalism can encourage or erodes the scaffolding of societies. With this background in mind, our Harvard's lecturer surmises countries with cultural compatibilities are prone to give cooperation each other while countries with cultural differences also should be ripe to the conflict. After the end of Soviet Union, world has been fragmented in 7 parts which are civilization: Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese and of course West shaped by USA, Australia and Western Europe. Our author considers that the success or failure of democracy as a supreme value depends on to cultural structure of involving countries. For instance, democracy was unfeasible in Middle East because the action of Islam as main religion. Centered on the contributions of F. Fukuyama, Huntington argues that after all the end of history means no other thing than achievements of global democracy. Even though there would remain rests of totalitarian ideologies even within US soil, the cold-war's end signified the triumph of liberal democracy in the world. These seven or eight civilizations alternate forces of integration with forces of disintegration. Religion under these circumstances plays a pivotal role in revitalizing these underlying disparities that leads directly towards conflict and ethnic disputes.

Following this reasoning, Huntington is certainly convinced a civilization can be defined as group imbedded in history.

“The idea of civilization was developed by eighteen-century French thinkers as the opposite of the concept of barbarism. Civilized society differed from primitive society because it was settled, urban and literate. To be civilized was good, to be uncivilized was bad. The concept of civilization provided a standard by which to judge societies, and during the nineteenth century, Europeans devoted much intellectual, diplomatic and political energy to elaborating the criteria by which non-European societies might be judged sufficiently civilized to be accepted as members of European-dominated international system” (ibid: 41).

The fact is that civilization should be seen in plural, to be precisely, as a way of cultural entity. Whatever a society considers of importance such as the technology, norms, values, mythology connote what anthropologists call the culture. For that reason, culture and civilization should be conceptually dissociated. Both share similar functions for social day-to-day life, namely to bring order or at least certain understanding to the events. Civilization seems to be a lapse of creativity based on a previous much broader territorialization and sacralization process. Huntington, in this vein, rejects the classical belief of race as the only requisite of ethnic affiliations. From his view, countries formed by different race can share the same civilization while two dispersed civilizations can share similar racial roots to the extent that

“Latin America, however, has a distinct identity which differentiates it from the West. Although an offspring of European Civilization, Latin America has evolved along every different path from Europe and North America. It has had a corporatist, authoritarian culture, which Europe had to a much lesser degree and North America at all” (ibid, 46).

This simple and ad-hoc definition about Latin American civilization tarnishes his outcomes because of many reasons. First of all, it very hard to affirm a culture can be totalitarian or democratic in fact by a preliminary reading of history. Democracies can be so totalitarian as monarchies and vice-versa. Democracy only is based on a re-shaping of authority. Secondly, he erroneously assumes that Europe had a long Republican tradition while Latin America was certainly submerged in a set of anti-democratic riots or revolutions. That way, the cultural preconditions of a country or a civilization would predispose individual or social personalities. Whether US is recognized to be a democratic society also an American is liberal while an Muslim or a Latin American seems to be authoritarian. Nonetheless, our American scientist is not wrong when insists on the language for an effective criterion of social distinctiveness. This means whereas elite exert influence on populace with respect to certain fashionable tendencies, a foreign language marks the difference between aristocracies and the rest of population.

“Global communications are one of the most important contemporary manifestations of Western power. This western hegemony, however, encourages populist politicians in non-western societies to denounce Western cultural imperialism and to rally their publics to preserve the survival and integrity of their indigenous culture. The extent to which global communications are dominated by the West is, thus, a major source of the resentment and hostility of non-Western peoples against the West” (ibid: 59).

The languages define the identity of native speakers, however, it is a clear mistake to consider a civilization might be determined by certain religion or language. For example, Sami-People and Saxon have coexisted in Sweden by thousand of years. Interrelated by a similar anthropomorphic looks or even certain resemblances in economy and the scaffolding of their families, both ethnic groups do not pertain to the same linguistic root. This would reflect only one thing, resemblance are not scientifically correlative with ethnic affiliation but also only a question of morphological adaptation to the environment wherein these two collectives evolved.

REVISITING THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS

The dialogue and interaction between civilizations which do not have the same characteristics can be a potential reason to trigger future conflicts. In these terms, inasmuch as the tourism, migration or liberal market consolidate their hegemony and power in countries more likelihood to suffer a clash among civilizations. S. Huntington writes

“There is the assumption that increased interaction among peoples – trade, investment, tourism, media, Electronic Communications generally- is generating a common World culture. Improvements in transportation and communication technology have indeed made it easier and cheaper to move money, goods, people, knowledge, ideas, and images around the World. No doubt exists as to the increased international traffic in these items. Much doubt exists, however, as to the impact of this increased traffic. Does trade increase or decrease the likelihood of conflict?” (Huntington, 1997: 67).

The modernization of West is explained by means of interaction among countries. Although the interaction does not facilitate the development in such it transfers techniques of innovation, inventions, and new practices from one society to another. Second difference relates to the fact modern societies are based on industry while traditional ones refer to agriculture as their mainstream industry. Agro-societies monopolize their authority along with the owner of soil. Government and social structure seem to be determined by the economy activities predominate in each society. Rather, industry is less dependant of natural environment and recurs to free-will to justify the channels wherein existent decision-makings and consumption are ushered. Industrial-based communities are prone to embrace democracy as their primary form of government. We have witnessed how expansion of Western has created modernization in the World expanding democracies beyond the European boundaries. Of course, Huntington insisted, with the exemption of Middle East and Muslim-based societies, the problem with terrorism connote a much broader deep-seated issue that represents ongoing rejection of Islam against the Westernization process. These both contrasting values are being disputed in terrorism issues debated in the core of American and European universities.

From this perspective, our Harvard’s sociologist is convinced westernization embraces should be better than proactively reaction.

“In the early phases of change, Westernization thus promotes modernization. In the later phases, modernization promotes de-westernization and the resurgence of indigenous culture in

two ways. At the societal level, modernization enhances the economic, military, and political power of the society as a whole and encourages the people of that society to have confidence in their culture and to become culturally assertive. At the individual level, modernization generates feelings of alienation and anomie as traditional bonds and social relations are broken and leads to crises of identity to which religion provides an answer” (Huntington, 1997: 76).

Thinking the problem of terrorism in Huntington’s terms signals to the fact any difference is reason of conflict and dispute. One might see whether this speech is followed to the end, it is implicitly hypothesized that terrorism not only is a counter-force emerged from Westernization that jeopardizes the freedom and democracy but also it becomes in a social or psychological pathology caused by the resentment. This would erroneously mean that only in traditional societies religions still predominate. The theories of secularized world from the development of Huntington have serious limitations to explain why United States’s government (as the case of Bush) utilizes the religion for their “preventive” war on terror. Whenever, former president George W. Bush referred to North-Korea, Afghanistan and Iraq, he verbalized “the axis of evilness.” “Under what argument Huntington can support his thesis that westernization and religion diverge by different pathways?

The distribution of cultures reflects how the power is distributed. This is because culture is prone to seek for power.

“Throughout history the expansion of the power of a civilization has usually occurred simultaneously with the flowering of its culture and has almost always involved its using that power to extent its values, practices and institutions to other societies” (ibid, 91).

The erosion of West’s power in armies, investment in security and trade seems to be proportional to the increase of East in the same aspects. The declination of West as a ubiquitous civilization is followed with the rise of non-western aboriginal cultures. Huntington overtly says:

“For several centuries non-Western peoples envied the economic prosperity, technological sophistication, military power, and political cohesion of Western Societies. They sought the secret of his success in Western values and institutions, and when they identified what they though might be the key they attempted to apply it in their own societies”(ibid, 93).

In Huntington’s view, the concept of power keeps proximity to the hobessian passage from the state of nature to civilization. State not only monopolizes the use of force, but also has the right in influencing the culture formation. This leads to people in a two-fold nature, aversion and appetite for the properties of neighbors.

The paradox lies in the following situation. At the time, a non-western society made the necessary efforts for democratization a new risk is reactively reopened because dissidents oppose to elites. Anti-western activists are also in power by the same mechanism Western societies promote once democracy is embraced. That way, the propensity for colonial expansion has been surely their bankruptcy of European and West cultures. This striking and interesting thesis has not debated considerably in academy. The resurgence of religion plays a crucial role in the process of nationalisms. Continuous crises of identity triggered by

Capitalism have resulted in a declination of political authority and self-trust. Psychologically, fundamentalism should embrace the religions or part of their doctrines in order for them to prevent or disintegrate the existent but weak social bondage.

In the following excerpt, Huntington would admit that,

“The most obvious, most salient, and most powerful cause of the global religious resurgence is precisely what was supposed to cause the death of religion: the process of social, economic, and cultural modernization that swept across the world in the second half of the twentieth century. Longstanding sources of identity and system of authority are disrupted. People move from countryside into de city, become separated from their roots, and take new jobs or no jobs. They interact with large numbers of strangers and we are exposed to new sets of relationships. They need new sources of identity, new forms of stable community, and new sets of moral precepts to provide them with a sense of meaning and purpose. Religion, both mainstream and fundamentalist, meets these needs” (ibid: 97).

Examining the conceptual limitations of J. Rawls in respect to Civil Disobedience, a concept that will be not developed here and now because of time and spaces issues, P. Moraro brings into question to what extent totalitarian regimes interrelate in complicity with terrorism since both are of course dependant. Terrorism gives to aristocracies the necessary conditions and reasons, in order for a totalitarian State to concentrate the coactions as well as the usage of force univocally not only rivaling with terrorists but also with other dissident voices (Moraro, 2007). That way, Huntington sees in Third World and of course in its relationship with barbarity what he wants to see. Whether civilization and Western is marked by democracy and development, in the other side of river barbarians are characterized by the lack of freedom, totalitarian political regimes with the consequent economic backwardness. After all, famine in world (for his perspective) was not a result of West’s hegemony and injustices created by capitalism but it was circumscribed to cultural incompatibilities of poor States to administer a nation-hood by means of rationalization (this point of view not only nourishes an old discourse, but also reinforces unnecessary stereotypes which balks a scientific reading of this concern). For that reason, a much more complex explanation is needed to unravel to what extent Huntington is right or only revitalizes European prejudices.

With this background in mind, T. Veremis coincides that the Huntington’s account seems to be weak and generalized in the simplification of certain facts projecting mythical prophecies about a final struggle of West and East. Even, what he considers the Islam compounds by a set of different ethnicities in historical disputes with their neighbors for long time. It is surprising to scare for a next clash of civilization whenever the First and Second Wars in Europe generated more than 100 million dead. Following this, Veremis explains that Huntington is mistaken in arguing we are experiencing a conflict of inter-civilization, this conflict keeps intra-civilisational. Starting from the erroneous premise, Western civilization refers to values such as individualism, liberalism, human rights, liberty, equality, democracy, secularization and free markets, the others should be placed in opposition adopting a paranoiac mentality of West vs. East (Veremis, 2009). In view of Lafont’s argument, the concept of self-determination and democracy are not compatible. This means no other thing than at the time democracy organizes other countries and of course the style of life of the new citizens more control and pressure is needed. Starting from the premise that democracy is often characterized by aspirations to freedom, it is paradox to see its own expansion suggests the idea of exerting more co-action. This is the reason why, expansion of democracy is so

authoritarian so those regimes this form of government is geared to fight. Other troubling point of entry seems to be the contrast between global and local perspectives in the formation of democratic regimes. Whether one may argue that democracy encourages the self-determination of citizens in participating into political decision-making and public sphere, this belief paves the ways towards the creation of local forms of government. Otherwise, if we are prone to create a global government encompassing the different local forms of organizations such individual self-determination should be diminished. Anyway, if this happens we will be witnessing the advent of a totalitarian regime (Lafont, 2010).

THE VIOLENCE IN SLAVOJ ZIZEK

The modern propensity to exercise violence under the figure of sovereignty is enrooted to the manipulation bio-power and the principle of shortage which is based on the notion of uncertainty and contingency. That way, Slavoj Zizek thinks that the risk, hazards and fear are functional to aristocracies. From the Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem to the postmodern terrorism, the bourgeois culture characterizes an excess of instrumentalism and rationalization. The symbolic imposition of meaning constitutes as the primary form of violence Western civilization cynically exerts over the rest of globe. Charity, sympathy and victimization play an important role in order for elite to maintain their status-quo. The shocking for disasters, calamities and tragedies prevent people to understand the real reasons, which led towards such a context (Zizek, 2009: 12). The horror of violence strikes back on what is-un-said. Academician's thesis become in ideological texts not necessarily for what they state but for they silenced. Ideology functions as a dream, whereas the credibility of surface remains true, the core is false. The notion of false urgency as Zizek put it, is validated by the empirical observance of last natural and made-man disaster ranging from the current Haiti's earthquake or Katrina's hurricane in US. Whenever these type of tragic events whip to poorer sector of the society, people donate their own properties in assistance of victims or survivors. It is not surprising to see a considerable volume of aid and money is bestowed to peripheral countries in moment of human emergency. Nonetheless, far-away of reversing the miserable conditions these countries stand, these types of assistance campaigns are often aimed at reinforcing the financial dependence. A businessman seems to be more concerned today by helping others than enhancing its profits. However, this is only an illusion, the corporation only appeal to charity as a form of reinforcing the cultural values that made the disaster possible. From this perspective, Zizek distinguishes two sort of violence, objective and subjective. The former refers to the violence exerted by the system by means of ideology, police and State whereas the latter denotes the possibility to identify and demonize to scapegoats to reduce the violence. For example, in America Islamic terrorists are deemed as the responsible of 9/11 attacks (subjective violence), this is the violence they feel in their kin. Secondly, objective violence seems to be invisible because it stems from the intromission of United States's government in Middle East issues. For Zizek, subjective and objective violence are inextricably intertwined. For that reasons, scholars who denounce the violence received by Middle East (enrooted in cultural differences or clash or civilizations not only are completely wrong, they are exerting objective violence).

The figure of evilness reminds us how adorable can be our household reinforcing existent bondage of solidarity. The cynical stance of West in the war on terror consists in stressing the democratic cultural values at the time they expand their frontiers typically as authoritarian states. When the hurricane Katrina visited New Orleans thousand of people were relegated to live in stadiums or even in streets. This natural disaster showed the darkest side of American inequalities on black and Latin American population. Nevertheless, the Mass-Media emphasized on the lootings and resurgence, larceny, assassinations, rapes and other episodes of violence after-disasters. Wasp's racism reappeared on agenda in US declaring the inferiority of blacks to live harmoniously in moment of emergencies. Whatever viewers were experiencing would be a supposed explanation about the aggression inherited to blacks. In this vein, admits Zizek, language amplifies the differences between self and others. Similar remarks can be observed in France after thousand of migrants pushed to security minister leave his appointment. There is a hermeneutic temptation to comprehend the meaning of disrupting events. It is not surprising that who is involved as main-responsible of the disaster intends to provide with a "pseudo-scientific" and acute response in order for populace to clarify the facts. Problems such as natural disaster, terrorism or even virus outbreaks involve West civilization as a primary liable. Anyway, in regards with the religious fundamentalism, Zizek agrees with Huntington that they are moved by resentment. One of the characteristics of Hebrew, Muslim or Christian fundamentalist is the posture of indifference to which they consider "non-believers." Because they have found the pathway to eternal redemption, fundamentalists are not prone to acts of violence neither terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, the way of making politics of Muslim and Christian fundamentalism is a decision in incorrect direction. The atheism seems to be the only which may set free human-kind from the current day-to-day orgy of violence characterizes our societies. The Islamic terrorists has been internalized a so-called inferiority comparing their styles of life with Western. They after all are self-proclaimed fighters of freedom because of unconsciously they need to be liberated from ambiguity. For one hand, terrorists embrace the West's cultures values and technologies as a form of improvement, but for the other they hate West and US because existent ethnocentrism subordinates them in a peripheral position. A self-degrading belief accompanied with an outstanding arrogance of West give as a result the suicide attacks forecasted throughout the audience. The moot point here lies in this type of behavior does not resolve the trouble. In sharp contrast with Huntington, Zizek strongly believes modern democracy is much more authoritarian than Middle East's Regimes. Otherwise, democracy operates with symbolic and ideological instruments. As Castoriadis puts it, the democracy has died after the war of Peloponnese. Basically, whenever a political regime is not built on tolerance the most impressive democracy can be really a camouflaged-totalitarianism. Dogmatic spirits are often concerned about the conflagration between the forces of good and evilness.

After reading Huntington's theses along with the ethnic struggle, the thoughts struck us that he has not the chance to visit a borough Buenos Aires or a European country wherein Muslim and Jews coexist in peace but only this is a speculation. The fact is that his elaborated observations that captivate others cabinet sociologists might be blurred if he would test them with empirical day-to-day facts. For other hand, the line between dictatorships and democracies seems to be tight. Limitations of concepts of democracy and terrorism in Huntington are manifold which have been previously addressed and explained in early sections. The present section explored the linkage between conservative academician

discourses with ethnocentrism. In addition, liberal wave that characterizes not only the thought of Huntington but also of other international scholars else can be represented in the following relevant points:

1. The third wave of democratization has been a result of the previous experience in totalitarian countries with democracy, a type of “yearning of freedom.”
2. Democracy and development should be the best instrument for a fairer redistribution of wealth.
3. It is important for US and Europe, functional to their securities, to expand democracy to emergent countries.
4. Failures in the adoption of democracy or development are product of cultural incompatibilities with rationalization such as the Islam and its own religious values that impede the democracy.
5. The future of Western will be circumscribed to an inevitable clash with East and its resentment.
6. Pseudo-intellectuals are socialized in the belief the nation-hood is a value to be defended.
7. Finally, terrorism must be contemplated as a primary hazard to the style of life in West, a danger which should be eradicated.

Alternating valuable remarks in S. Zizek, the current work substantially emphasized on the main topics nourish the Anglo-discourse in US and beyond, a much broader deep-seated issue which merits to be discussed in next layouts. Anyway, it is important to mention terrorism and religious fundamentalism were concepts that have not been coined in Middle East as popular wisdom erroneously supposed but in United States during XVIII and XIXth centuries as a form of renouncing to the profane way of life and return to fundamental learning of Bible. The war on terrorism begs us to a question which has not properly tackled “to what extent US policies as a Police of the World are less fundamentalist than Iran or North Korea’s ones?” What does it really mean the axis of evilness? After all, American are nowadays scared a bio-nuclear bomb explodes in their soil whereas roughly 45 years back their Government unilaterally and abruptly ended a War bombing civilians situated in the Japan cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki avoiding the political costs this act represented. This point reminds what Zizek said about ideology, Ideology does not represent an illusion as neo-Marxian scholars certainly argued. Rather, ideology seems to be what we do not say about the truth in order for us to legitimate our acts.

REFERENCES

- Altheide, D. (2006). *Terrorist and the Politics of Fear*. Oxford, Altamira Press.
- Altheide, D. (2009). “Moral Panic, From sociological concept to public discourse.” *Crime and Media Culture*. Vol. 5 (1): 79-99.
- Baudrillard, J. (1995a). *The systems of the objects*. Mexico, Siglo XXI.
- Baudrillard, J. (1995b). *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place*. Sydney, Power Publications.

- Baudrillard, J. (2006). "Virtuality and Events: the hell of power." *Baudrillard Studies*. Vol. 3 (2). July. Available at <http://www.ubishops.ca/BaudrillardStudies/>. Bishop's University, Canada. Version translated by Chris Turner.
- Bernstein, R. (2006). *The Abuse of Evil. The corruption of politics and religion since 9/11*. Buenos Aires, Katz.
- Birdsall, N. (2001). "Why Inequality matters. Some economic issues." *Ethic & International Affair*. 15 (2): 3-28.
- Birdsall, N. (2006). "Rising Inequality in the New Global Economy." *International Journal of Development Issues*. 5 (1): 1-9.
- Castoriadis, C. (2006). *What shapes Greece: from Homer to Heraclitus. Seminaires 1982-1983. Human Creation II*. Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Corey, R. (2009). *Fear, the history of Political Ideas*. Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Diamond, L. (2010). "Why are there no Arab Democracies?" *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 21 (1): 92-104.
- Douglas, M. (1996) "Animales anómalos y metáforas animales" en *Estilos de Pensar*, Barcelona: Gedisa. - "Clasificado como Comestible" en *Estilos de Pensar*, Barcelona: Gedisa. - "La broma cósmica" en *Estilos de Pensar*, Barcelona: Gedisa
- Escobar, A. (1997). "Antropología y Desarrollo." *Revista Internacional de Ciencias Sociales*. Número 154. UNESCO.
- Esteva, G. (2000). "Desarrollo." En Viola Andreu (Compilador). *Antropología del Desarrollo*. Barcelona, Editorial Paidós.
- Fukuyama, F. (1989). "The End of History." *The national Interest*. 16 Summer: 4-18.
- Gray, C. S. (2007). "The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive war Doctrines: Reconsideration." Department of the Army, Department of Defense, US Government. Available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubid=789>
- Harris, M. (2006), *The Rise of anthropological theory, a history of theories of culture*. Mexico, Siglo XXI.
- Heidegger, M. (1997). *El Ser y el Tiempo*. Santiago, Editorial Universitaria.
- Holloway, J and Paláez, E. (2002). "La guerra de todos los estados contra toda la gente." En *Guerra Infinita: hegemonía y terror mundial*. Ceceña, A. y Sader, E. Buenos Aires, CLACSO. Pp. 159-166.
- Howie, L. (2009). "A Role for Business in the War on Terror." *Disaster Prevention and Management*. Vol. 18 (2): 100-107.
- Huntington, S. P. (1993). *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Oklahoma, Oklahoma University Press.
- Hungtinton, S. P. (1997). *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order*. New York, Touchstone Book.
- Keohane, N and Zeckhauser, R. (2003). "The ecology of Terror defense." *Journal of risk and Uncertainty*. 26 (2-3): 201-229.
- Klein, N. (2002). *Fences and Windows: Dispatches from the front lines of the Globalization Debate*. London, Hammersmith.
- Kristol, W. and Kagan, R. (1996). "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs*. July /August issue.
- Kepel, G. (2002). "Los Hechos del 11 de Septiembre de 2001." En *El Mundo Después del 11 de Septiembre de 2001*. (Edition). Barcelona, Editorial Península. Pp. 25-43.
- Lafont, C. (2010). "Can Democracy go global?" *Ethics & Global Politics*. 3 (1): 13-19.

- Lucero, J. A. (2001). "Crisis and Contention in Ecuador." *Journal of Democracy*. 12 (2): 1-17
- Miles, R. (1999). *Racism*. New York, Routledge.
- Moraro, P. (2007). "Violent Civil Disobedience and Willingness to Accept Punishment." *Essays in Philosophy*. 8 (2): 1-9.
- Naim, M. (2001). "The Real Story behind Venezuela's woes." *Journal of Democracy*. 12 (2): 1-20
- Pech, R. and Slade, W. B. (2006). "Religious Fundamentalism and Terrorism: why do they do it and what do they want?" *Foresight*. 8 (1): 8-20.
- Pojman, L. (2006). *Terrorism, Human Rights and the case for World Government*. Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield.
- Powell, J. (2010). "Neo-liberalism and Globalization: repetitious inequalities and the implication for a global social theory." *Sincronia: a journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*. Spring. University of Guadalajara, Mexico.
- Rashid, A. (2002). "Los Hechos del 11 de Septiembre de 2001." *En El Mundo Después del 11 de Septiembre de 2001*. (Compilación). Barcelona, Editorial Península. Pp. 13-23.
- Said, E. (2001). "The Clash of Ignorance." *The Nation*. October 4. Available at <http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance>.
- Skoll, G. (2007). "Meaning of Terrorism." *International Journal for The Semiotics of Law*. 20: 107-127.
- Smaw, E. (2008). "From Chaos to Contrarianism: Hobbes, Pojman, and the Case of World Government." *Essays in Philosophy*. Vol. 9 (2): 4-18. Available at www.commons.pacificu.edu/eip.
- Sobhan, R. (2003). "Globalization and the Challenge to democracy." *International Journal of Development Issues*. 2 (2): 1-14.
- Sontag, S. (2002). "Seamos Realistas." *En El Mundo Después del 11 de Septiembre de 2001*. (Compilación). Barcelona, Editorial Península. Pp. 59-61.
- Somnez, S. (1998). "Tourism, Terrorism, and political instability." *Annals of Tourism Research*. 25: 416-456.
- Susstein, C. (2005). *Laws of Fear: beyond the precautionary Principle*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Vargas Llosa, M. (2002). "La Lucha Final." *En El Mundo Después del 11 de Septiembre de 2001*. (Compilación). Barcelona, Editorial Península. Pp. 53-58.
- Veremis, T. (2009). "Clash of Civilizations or International Dialogue? Obituary of Samuel P. Huntington (18 April 1927 – 24 December 2008)." *The Historical Review*. Volume VI: 243-249
- Viola, A. (2000). "La Crisis del desarrollo y el surgimiento de la antropología del desarrollo." *En Antropología del Desarrollo*. Barcelona. Paidós.
- Weitzner, D. and Darroch, J. (2009). "Why Moral Failures precede Financial Crises." *Critical Perspective on International Business*. Vol. 5 (1/2): 6-13.
- Whitehead, L. (2001). "Bolivia and the viability of Democracy." *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 12 (2): 1-12.
- Wolin, R. (2010). "The idea of cosmopolitanism: from Kant to the Iraq war and beyond." *Ethics & Global Politics*. 3 (2): 143-153.
- Zizek, S. (2009). *Violence*. Buenos Aires, Paidós.

Chapter 8

THE PRINCIPLE OF EXCEMPTIONALISM IN AMERICA

To the Latin American's eyes, United States wakes up admiration and hate at the same time. In view of that, it is important not to loose the sight on the fact that Jean Francois Revel warns a sentiment like this derives from a projection of some European countries, as France, to create a much broader anti-American discourse in the world (Revel, 2002). The greater Giant of North is pervasively situated in a hegemonic position, which is adamantly criticized at a later day by peripheries. Under some conditions, scholarship asked for American intervention but in others the country receives much criticism for the elaboration of one-sided policies which reserves the monopoly of force, even defying the resolution of international human rights organisms (Ignatieff, 2001; Buffalo, 2002; Korstanje 2013; Gutmann, 2001; Eco, 2002; Johnson, 2004). In spite of being one of the most financial contributors of UN, IMF and World Bank, United States neglected those protocols when considers they violate its principle of self-determination.

Europe, by the introduction of "colonialism," established an ideological background for legitimizing their submissions to its overseas colonies. The exploitation of the non-European "Others" had a pervasive nature. Sooner, aborigines realized the double moral standards of colonial order. Cruelty, submission and violence were applied in the colonies, while in the core democracy prevailed as a valid system of government. This opens the doorstep to the process of "decolonization," where thousand of peripheral voices claimed to access the same rights "the democracy of their white lords" declared. Mc-Michael explains that imperial powers alluded to the theory of "development" to maintain the dependency between centre and its periphery. The WWII end conjoined to Truman's administration led the United States to implement a wide range credit system to save the world from Communism. This program mushroomed to become in the development theory. As a mega-project, theory of development was coined in 1940 and lasted to 1970. It not only created a food dependency but also accelerated the slum-dwellers and poverty in the peripheral countries. In order for remaking the old division of labor, Imperial Powers induced "Third World" to accept international loans, which were used to industrialize their economies. At the time, under-developing nations adopted capital-intense methods in agriculture ruining the condition of small-farmers, who migrated to urban areas, the US and Europe exported industrialized products. It was unfortunate the effects development left in Africa. The old boundaries of ethnicities the first colonial powers found were never honored once WWII finalized. Many human groups were forced to live together within fabricated limits of new nation-states. This resulted in a lot of

ethnic cleansing, conflicts and warfare that obscured the original ends of financial aid programs issued by IMF or World Bank. Undoubtedly, the inconsistencies of World Bank in administering the development-related programs not only were admitted but also it woke up some nationalist reactions in the non-aligned countries. To restore the order, a new supermarket revolution surfaced: *globalization* (Mc Michael, 2012). As Robert Kagan puts it, it perhaps resulted from the Omnipotence gained by Us after Soviet's collapse (Kagan 2004). The attacks against civilian targets in Sept 11 and the disputes with NATO in Kosovo, Kagan adds, reminded the US on the needs to act unilaterally whenever a threat looms. It was unfortunate there was a change of geopolitical interests respecting to the allies supported by Europe from 90s decade on. At the time Europe retreated to make trade with their neighbours, the US played the role of global Sheriff. Kagan, like many others Americans, centre their diagnosis on the "pre-emption theory," this means, the hopes to prevent an attack of the calibre of 9/11 in the future. The nation-states' relations are based on the symmetry/asymmetry of power or force instead of reciprocity in other fields. Americans not only trust in their own strength, they strongly believe they have a divine mandate to fulfil in the world. See this in the following excerpt,

"The differing threat perception in the United States and Europe are not just matters of psychology, however. They are also grounded in a practical reality that is another product of the disparity of power and the structure of the present international order. For while Iraq and other rogue states have posed a threat to Europe, Objectively they have not posed the same level of threat to Europeans as they have to the United States" (Kagan, 2005: 33)

Whatever the case may be, readers will remind surely the international scandal that generated the led-invasion to Iraq, conducted by Bush's administration, as well as the rejection of Kyoto's protocol to deter the effects of global warming. How can alliance intervene in autonomous nations?

From the original isolationism to the decision of military intervention in the world, three major events marked the life of Americans, Second World War, Vietnam and 9/11. If WWII evidenced the social costs not to take side for Great Britain and France in due course, Vietnam, rather, shows the problems of deciding an invasion abroad. The omnipotence of Yalta, that led US as one of the main powers in international affair, downfalls to the failures in Vietnam. Last but not least, the attacks to World Trade Centre posed again US in the challenge of being the only one Imperial power on feet (Hristoulas & Sotomayor, 2008).

Internally, the government alludes to captivate the loyalties of population by means of diverse pro-war discourses. The tactics alludes to different reactions in the society, sometimes they are applauded, or glorified while others rejected. The discussion between interventionists and isolationists has transcended the boundaries of times, up to date. The former ones signal to the dangers for US to leave an empty space, which may be fulfilled by the enemies of nation. Rather, the latter acknowledges on the importance to occupy the domestic issues first, instead to expand the economy to peripheries. 9/11 undoubtedly brought serious ethical problems for Government because gave to much attention to the position of interventionists. As a result of this, the doctrine of "preventive war" America monopolized the mind of presidency (Griffin, 2004; Gray, 2007; Yoh & Delahunty, 2009, Wirtz & Russell, 2003; Levy & Gochal, 2001; McGoldrick, 2004; Adler, 2006; Crawford, 2003; Korstanje, 2013).

Far away from confirming or rejecting some argument, or making a subjective judgement, this section is aimed at exploring two relevant issues of American ethnocentrism, the sentiment of American exemplarity and the construction of fear. At some extent, the respect and attachment to the law of lay-citizens, is contrasted to the illegal decision of their government. People do not recognize the inconsistencies of their state, considering democracy is the only and best form of government. Frugality, work, and being a good citizen are the founding cultural values of US. Internally, an atmosphere of superiority is based on the access of citizen to capital, by means of the needs to impose a universal ethic to the rest of democratic countries. Externally, the role of US is seriously criticized by the human right agencies (González Uresti, 2008). The sense of manifest destiny paves the ways for the advent of Imperialism, but American this is the paradox do not see themselves as agents of Empire. To nuance the negative effects of interventionists, founding parents alluded to the meaning of freedom and democracy as two main healthy values to be exported to other nations. What would be most than important to discuss here is not if US is not a democracy, but by the fact that Anglo-democracy holds ideologically the American Empire. Do we understand why US should intervene in other contexts, beyond the limits of its territory?

To respond this question, Ruth Wedgwood (2009: 584) explains that the legal jurisprudence of nations varies from culture, language and socio-economic context. Therefore, a universal interpretation of legality is a concept very hard to grasp (even in cases of genocides).

“The halting sources of law and adaptation may no matter much when there is normative consensus around a problem. But the intractability of the law, and the obvious investment in its observance because it is law, may actually inhibit the international community’s willingness to respond to crisis. Differences in legal tradition, style and language may influence the willingness to adapt international law to new problems.”

The common law of Anglo-Saxon countries is almost incomplete, and subject to the socio cultural context, and particular interests. This law seems to be supposed to be the law which is changing according to people’s needs or the magistrates’ interpretation. This “common-law” not only accumulate a strong interest in daily behaviour, but also is based in the tradition of pragmatism and scepticism. The problem lies in its dependency respecting to the power and negotiations faced in the interests of Status Quo. Wedgewood, anyway considers that if any state does not want to participate in an international alliance to prevent “conflict,” it does not represent a crime. However, what remains moral imperative may have the force of law. We understand that what is legitimate relates to the legal (moral) needs of intervening to inhibit genocide-led practices, in a world where states are the primary actors that conduct slaughters against their own community. From its inception, the framers of UN though in creating a collective security instrument to achieve prosperity and peace. Although this was formalized by United States, UN failed systemically to negotiate in a wealth of cases where minorities were persecuted and annihilated. To this an additional problem surfaces, why Americans should pay their taxes for the state takes direct actions in other countries?, is this the root of democracy?, Why has US invaded Iraq unhearing the mandate of UN?

DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND

If we pay attention to the ebbs and flow of history, we will realize that democracy is not an American invention. It exhibits thousand years of existence. However, many political scientists have emphasized on the tolerance as one of the values that encouraged the democracy in America. For them, economic growth, and of course, the expansion of markets pivoted as two main variables to forge liberal values in the administration. This means that the economic development of any nation predicts the possibility to implant democracy successfully. Once the citizen's basic needs are fulfilled, would be concerned by abstract aspirations to make of this life a better place. Commitment, compromise and self-participation in politics field resulted from years of democratic institutions and education. Rather, those nations characterized by populist, demagogies, or authoritarian governments are educated to live in poverty or miserable conditions. Those constraints against the individual liberty affect the modern economies (Lipset, 1959, Dahl, 1971; Bollen & Jackman, 1985; Inglehart, 1997). Culture, as a form of organization, is of paramount importance to understand the problems of backwardness or modernization of countries (Inglehart, 1997). Unless otherwise resolved, if many countries can be adapted to democracy, only few can sustain in the threshold of time. For these scholars, being a democratic country is a sign of prosperity and superiority over other collectives.

This belief was already present in Alexis de Tocqueville's testimonies as well as the first travellers visiting US. The Anglo democracy engendered a double danger, for one hand it posed the destruction of aristocratic order, but at the same time, it gives too much protagonism to majorities (Tocqueville, 2004). Certainly, the US was a complex net of confederations, unions and customs legally articulated around a sacred-text, which is the constitution. Its redaction not only was copied by other incipient nations, but also allowed the expansions of capitalism elsewhere. Its success to become an Imperial power now depends upon the ability to convince the world democracy or elections are the best feasible form of politics. Silvia Nuñez Garcia (2008) understands that United States has made from its love for property and democracy the two key factors of expansion. Nonetheless, at home, serious ethnic disputes among races and ethnicities surface. The principle of richness, wealthy and individuality allow mitigating the problems of inter-ethnic riots. The pride of being American only can be understood under the lens of ideology. Success, unlike in Latin America which is object of envy, represents in America the optimization of resources and the rationale. This turn of mind engenders not only serious economic asymmetries among groups, but also a competitive culture of overexposure.

On a closer look, inequalities, for some constitutionalists, are regulated by the law, and supported by Supreme Court. R. Dworking & Cass Sunstein (1994; 2005) reveals how the interests of elites are protected by judges and courts in detriment of workforce. By means of imposing interpretation of constitutions, judges construct the legal scaffolding of what would be the elite hegemony over other groups. This ranges from the working hours, to racial claims. The subject construction of legality is given by the interests it represents. A. Magaloni Kerpel (2008) pointed out that the judicial system should be understood by the archetype of "common law," this means the individual interpretation of sentences. Unlike Mexico or Argentina were the law is viewed as a set of codes, articulated in "*codigo civil*," in US, the

conception of “common law” confers autonomy to courts to decide on the corporate and business disputes.

Unlike other European countries, England never accepted the Roman law. The same happened in America where the concept of common law pivoted the jurisprudence application in judges. Judges has the ability and freedom to interpret and impose potential reading of the law. The concept of common law gives further importance to precedent, this means other similarly judgments, than the coding itself. Graham Hughes explains that

“The early centuries also exhibited an important phenomenon that has always attributed to characterize common law systems. England developed at a very early date a powerful group of learned lawyers (the Bar), who enjoyed a high status and who were regarded as virtual equals by the judges. The arguments these barristers, as they were calle3d, addressed to the courts are preserved in ancient law report (p. 10).

This system with the passing of time becomes in a contextual argument of adjudication and collection of individual decisions. The fact was that judges not only repeated the sentences according to earlier judge’s views, but also from generation to generation. As a result of this, today, this system applies for criminal justice and civil rights at the same time. Most likely the Anglo doctrine, based on the idea of liberty, rejected the European belief to accept the Monarchy’s desire unilaterally. The common law, Hughes adds, allows the resolution of a much deeper contradiction, by expanding the jurisdiction of jurisprudence respecting the individual will. For Anglo-Saxons, problems are not solved exclusively with the application of code, but in combining other factors as expert’s diagnosis, law-making process, judicial decisions and regulatory state. The common law pays much deference to precedents to leads the judge to follow the earlier sentences. To resolve the possible discrepancies among judges, Supreme Court paves the ways to consolidate an all encompassing view of law while other minor courts delve into less precise or complex issues. Essentially, a system of this caliber encourages the collaboration between judges and lawyers.

C. Menke (2009) confirms that the tragedy starts whenever the citizen diminishes the law, blurring the boundaries of right and persons. In the moment Oedipus realized on his awful crime, he issue a self-judgment on his act. This event not only triggers the misfortune, but also destroys the legal system of the city. If the kind would be subject to the law of the city, he would be exonerated, simply because he did not familiar with his mother and father. Without knowing what he was doing, Oedipus would be immediately reached the forgiveness of tribunal. Rather, Oedipus takes the justice in his hands destroying the legal system of Tebas.

Further, Hazel Blackmore examines the original fears of founding parents the democratic order to be collapsed by the dictatorship of aristocracies. For that way, they created balance and counter-balances forces inside the democratic system to regulate the individual will. The bill of right is one of them but it is not limited to. The division of powers balked the governance in some contexts, but it was posed as a moral obstacle to the power-will; as the previous argument given, the system was designed to introduce inefficiency to strength institutions. Although Blackmore is not recognizing that, democracy as it has been stipulated by English speaking countries, leads to the instrumental speculation and negotiation. This way, all institutions are subject to corporate business holdings which monopolize the loyalties of republicans and democrats. The psychology of Americans valorises the ability to negotiate

with others. In the next sections, we will discuss to what extent this creates the exemptionalism that bring panic and fear.

FOUNDING COLONIZATION AND EXPLORATIONS

Unlike Spain, England colonized Americas appealing to trade and negotiations. The first explorers enter into conflict with aborigines, once some treatises and covenants were not honoured. If Spain deployed its armies to extract local resources and precious metals to the metropolis, United Kingdom appealed to the figure of labour as mechanism to expropriate the lands. For British philosophers as Hobbes and Locke, Spain did the incorrect thing to subjugate aborigines because they violated the respect for other autonomies. Rather, England not only improved the conditions of labour in the land, but also educated to aboriginals to liberate from oppression and injustice. Anglo-culture made from work, its maximum expression of civilization, which merits the right of intervention. Any ethical man can intervene in any unworked land if its goals are aimed at improving the economic conditions of subsistence. Under this premise, US legalized not only the white-led domination at homeland, but also the expansion of its moral values beyond the limits of the country. After all, peace-keeping needed from strong preparedness to war (Slotkin, 1993). From that moment onwards, the labour of land and work were two key factors that paved the ways for American imperialism, as Prof. Anthony Pagden (1997) adds. P. Wald (1993), acknowledges that land's parcelling favoured to the interests of white-lords, excluding a lot of minorities. Although, at its inception, aborigines represented a great obstacle for the commercial expansion of US, they were legally included in the union. However, the white-elite reserved a card for the last time. The lands were declared inalienable by the senate and courts. It conferred to aboriginal groups not only some rights but isolated into closed circles preventing their expansion. Aboriginals were unable to trade off their properties as well as alienated to buy lands beyond the reserve. The Anglo-state upended the classical logics of domination, promoting as well being, what in the bottom was a trap.

The kingdoms of Spain and England colonized America following different archetypes generating a gap between two worlds that are at odds. This is exactly the point that the new book of Professor Nicole Guidotti-Hernández (*Unspeakable Violence*) explores. The main thesis in this valuable research is that violence corresponds with stereotyped forms and practices enrooted in the language that confers to lay-people a coherent framework to enable a selective memory. This valuable book exhibits six terms to label persons and their respective ethnicities. Chicano was coined to denote the Mexican-American who keep politically active struggling for improving their existent rights of Latin American migrants. Indian, rather, refers to describe the natives (aborigines) of North America. Indigenous and Indígena are employed in different contexts. The former signals all Mexican Indians while the latter connotes an ancient root to first people of the Americas. Terms as Latino/a arose in the twentieth century to present people of Latin America. Lastly, Mestiza/o applies on a mixed ethnicity between Spanish, Indian or African.

Given this backdrop, Guidotti-Hernández explains that the racialized violence exerted against the Mexican bodies, which is based on stereotyped discourses, works as an instrument of indoctrination conducive to status quo. For 1885, a Mexican women (Juanita) is lynched in

Downietown, California. This tragedy, like many other else brilliantly examined by the author, should be taken as the epicenter of a much broader discussion about how violence and nationalism converge. Guidotti Hernandez argues convincingly those tourist-magazines that offer Downietown-tour not only are superfluous respecting to the reasons behind this awful crime, but legitimizes the gender-related violence. In this vein, tourism and death may be commoditized to be sold in spectacular stories that visitors consume. Represented as a trivialization of reality, this unspeakable violence is determined by an earlier racial hierarchy. In view of this, she acknowledges that “racial positioning, gender and class alliances were fragile and shifted according to need and economic conditions” (p. 3). Throughout borderlands, these types of violence appeal to an idealized foundation of “national being” that perpetuates the racial asymmetries. It is difficult to reduce a project of the calibre of *Unspeakable Violence* in a review limited to few words, its 375 pages and five chapters give us an all-encompassing way to understand multiculturalism and its guises.

Nation states are formed under process of differentiation and its economic re-organization of territory. Far away of being a site of frank dialogue, stability and understanding, US-Mexico border shows a legacy of territorial disputes and conflict. At the same time, nation-states administrate racism and sexism to control their citizens, who under some circumstances may defy on the economic conditions that sustain the class hierarchy, a much broader selective memory narrates some events over-exaggerating certain aspects of politics but silencing others. Following this argument, it is important not to loose the sight that borders are spaces of multi identities that needs from violence to exist; in so doing, multi-racial communities enact violence each other to perpetuate their own cultural values and amnesia. This book not only presents an innovative thesis respecting to the role played by selected-memory in silencing violence, but also contrasts sharply to the old belief that portrays Anglos and Chicano under the lens of master/slave game.

As itself, race is a concept, constructed and negotiated by elite. Racial mixture, not necessarily means an emancipation of ethnicities. This belief runs the risk to present the Mestizo or Chicano as part of nature, when really they are legacies of a colonial order. In view of this, any movement of resistance is remapped and re configured according to new more acceptable values enrooted in the culture of masters. For example, one could experience certain nostalgia for whose aborigines who had lost their lands, but what the aboriginal evokes still is a concept politically determined y white-power. The centre of hegemony, like ideology, works by the control of what an authentic Indian, Chicano or Mestizo mean. At some extent, scholars and intellectuals have widely contributed to achieve these types of labels.

At time of using the term, mestizo, two contrasting economic structures collide, colonial order vs. nation-state. Mexico idyllically recognizes its influence from aboriginal legacy, but the fact is that, today many aborigines are struggling against their state in order for their rights to be respected. Although the Anglo/Mexican binary has brought the attention of politicians, activists, and journalists over the last years, there is other particularly troubling relationship unresolved between Indians and Mexican State that is ignored. The Aztec (lo indio) past is being selected to denote greatness, power and intervention, even by side of the state over other indigenous groups. Calling to the imperial heritage of Aztec to illuminate the contemporary Mexico, not only Government reserves the monopoly of force against Uncle Sam but also to other ethnicities within its boundaries.

After further review, we found in *Unspeakable Violence* a fertile source to explain how the social imaginaries are often manipulated to introduce policies or reforms that otherwise would be refused; a point which remains unstudied by specialized literature. By the way, this exhibits a solid attempt that provides readers with a conceptual framework to understand the connection of selective memory, violence and nationalism in post-modern times. Critique should pose this research as one of the best book in cultural studies on indigenous people.

Moreover, Jesus Velazco Marquez (2008) suggests that the tension between North and South inside the country is founded on the British colonization. Whenever British Empire arrived to North America, they founded two colonies, Virginia and Massachusetts. The former was signalled to the aristocratic top-down status quo, while the latter developed a more egalitarian view of power. The sanctioned constitution was written in a way that valorises the appropriation of new sites and lands. From the independence, US have faced serious conflicts with neighbouring, first and foremost with Mexico. Two types of cosmologies that characterized diverse styles of life, coexisted peacefully during the time US celebrated the war with other states, but emerged again when the conflict ends. This explains why the US has grown in the dichotomy to stimulate the internal rivalries between North and South, or Whites vs. Blacks, at the time they needed from expansion.

As the previous argument given, Amy Kaplan (1993) explores the American expansionism based in strict opposition to the other silenced motherland, Africa. Americans are not necessarily descent of England, they kept strong liaison with African values. What would be more than important to debate is why these values were historically silenced. The black legacy has fallen into oblivion, as a subordinated inferior race. The English novel, as a literate genre proposed the idealist quest for new undiscovered spaces, to break the hegemony exerted by the centres on its peripheries. The configuration of a unique sense of existence, given by the superiority of Anglo-Saxon archetype (Chase, 1957), was connecting to the imperial discourse. Precisely, why in our own prejudices, we think Empires as all-encompassing organisms; it is our limitation to see the problem as really is. Empires successfully amalgamate other tribes, folks, cultures and nations appealing to a broader universal archetype, whereby all want to belong. Inside, anyway, a great cleavage persists.

As we have already discussed, religion and Anglo protestant matrix were important at time of defining the values of US (Greven, 1998). Not only the sense of closed future, but also the virtue by the labour played a crucial role in the configuration of national being. We have seen as well, how the uniqueness proper of America, shed lights on the way human rights are practiced, the limitations to honour the same institutions they created, and of course, the great contradiction terrorisms represent for American democracy. Now it is the turn to the principle of exemptionalism. In next, we will explore the roots of capitalism by the view of Anglo Knight has of itself, and the surrounding environment. Our thesis is that the sense of exception that characterizes the tenets of American exceptionalism leads involuntarily people to terror.

As Michael Ignatieff (2001, 2005) puts it, one of the great problems to explain the principle of Human rights, is the theory of self-determination and freedom. The United States poses this dilemma at time of being question by international institutions by its own interventions in war zones, but one might speculate this value is historically enrooted in its culture from long time ago. Americans reject any type of dictate when it violates their right to self representation and autonomy. They think, the political issues inside the country should be legislated by Americans. Not other institutions may intervene or intercede for questions of

terrorism or other social problems. This reminds, Ignatieff adds how important democracy is for Americans. However, not all specialists agree to confirm democracy, as Anglos has formulated it, is the best form of government. Robert Castel notes that industrial revolution has liberated the social bond created by classical kinship. These bonds not only were freed, but also rationalized towards mass consumption. The workforce was forged to believe its own liberty as a conquest of worker unions, when indeed they are hostage from their representants and state. With the adoption of democracy, the industrial force introduced novel ideological paradigms to reconfigure the attachment of personhood to its kinship, land and home. Without this radical change, the concept of liberty as it is formulated by the founding parents of US would be impossible. United States, to cut the long story short, is a son of industrial revolution of Manchester. England replicated in US the necessary ideological values to forge a new more decentralized but not for that less successful empire.

Castoriadis, in this vein, alerts that the real democracy has ended after the Peloponnesus war. Many Greek values were tergiversated by capitalism, and England. Anyone who explores the books of C. Castoriadis will surely find a striking and provocative scholar; combining Marxism with an autopoietic view of society proper from psychoanalysis, his texts are examples of a critical approach. What Compounds Greece originally known in French as *Ce Qui Fait la Grèce* contains a diversity of insight studies as to how Ancient Greece deemed the democracy, politics, poesy, arts, philosophy or the perception of otherness. Of course, the perspective Castoriadis follows in his work are incommensurable and this review represents only a primarily glance of such topics.

With an interesting preface of Vidal-Naquet who introduces readers to the World of Castoriadis, it is strongly important to mention our tradition is based on the convergence of two waves; for one hand, Greek tradition emphasizes on the search of truth in a world which has not been exclusively created for being administered by men. For the other, Judaism illustrates how the ambiguity and uncertainty work in day-to-day life. However, the ancient wisdom has nothing to do with modern one. This has been the main thesis of the seminar held during 1982 and 1983 where Castoriadis argues that Judaism and Greece corresponds with two divergent archetypes that shaped the modern ethos of capitalism. That follows, he is convinced that the Greek tradition is born from a disruption with the advent of Homer Chronicles. From that day onwards, the social imaginary experienced a radical shift respecting essence of things and their depiction. The process of acculturation received from Greece some values and surely discarded others. This type of selectivity remind us how Judaism leaves the Astronomy and Mathematics of their neighbor Babylonia and Syria while Romans are strongly interested in learning arts, philosophy and rights but there are no one who is concerned in Greek Geometry. The question as to why civilizations filter some values in detriment of others is unresolved in the development of Castoriadis. Rather, his thesis is that the spirit of Greece was founded on the significance of democracy and legislation. The honor for the law represents the essence of humanity. In *The Odyssey*, whenever Homer visits the land of Cyclopes, he describes their habits and customs as monsters or appalling (with a large eye in the mid of head) without laws, or assemblies where issues can be debated by all members of community. Rules are often for Greek World this aspect that determines the boundaries between humanity and inhumanity. Monstrosity is often associated to an other who does not share the same heritage with respect to politics organizations. Greece undoubtedly saw with certain admiration some barbarians who do not speak Greek but this was not a criterion of exclusion or fear; the term barbarian (*barbaroi*) was not necessarily

pejorative. Of course, this was the case of Persia or Egypt. Both early mentioned countries had laws and a large tradition in legislation that perhaps captivated Greeks. In the seminar of first day of December in 1982, Castoriadis argues that one of the respects that characterized the tragedy is the presence of certainness in the fate of involved hero. Unlike the drama wherein the suspense opens the doors of destiny taking in consideration that hero can avoid to his own death following the principle of contingency, the tragedy is circumscribed to a closed end that involved hero ignores but it is known for the rest of audience or readers. No matter the decision-making process, fate has been determined in the tragedy; things did not happen in other way than done. In a sharp contrast with Christianity which puts emphasis on the role played by god in predestination for humans, Greek mythology does understand that Gods are unable to change the destiny of humanity as well as their own one. Destiny transcends the will of god and human beings.

Here, also, in other words, the lack contingency in tragedies is the reason why Aquiles or Oedipus cannot escape to their “moira” (a term linked to fortune we have already seen). For Ancient Greek, the concept of moira means the immanency of death for all beings. Even, the gods (in their immortality) were not beyond the action of moira (fate). Destiny encompasses everything in homer tradition but mysteriously not the law. One of the characteristics that separate Greece from the rest of ancient mythical structures is the lack of revelation and prophecies about future. Since Greek mythology does not refer to a world created for humans, they comprehend that the body of laws is the only instruments capable to give order in politics fields. Even though, the predestination and divination were two wide-spread customs in order for solicitants to make business or face certain threats, nobody in Greece might have consulted these techniques to promulgate the laws. From this perspective, Castoriadis dwells on in those points that outline the main heritage of Ancient Greece. Among the contributions of this civilization we find the agonal competition for glory and fame, the quest of trust, the tension between essence and presence (doxa and nomos) and finally a determination for democracy. Here a point that merits a certain degree of consideration surfaces, “what is the relation between fate and competition?”

The criticism against the social imaginary is intertwined to indetermination of what never has existed. Greek philosophy wakes up as a counter-act to the explanation of what we call the no-being (nothing). The abyss of what does not exist gains considerable force and acceptance for philosophers because of two reasons. The world created without a specific goal does not warranty to human beings the protection they need. For that it represents a hostile and awful place to be. The only way to face the threats coming from environment is the institution of a covenant between the community’s members. Following this argument, politics depends on the liability of people regarding to the public sphere. The social institutions facilitate the autonomy of citizenship before to the affairs they should daily face. Assembly constitutes the body where persons can debate and legislate about their problems, about the things which jeopardize their own style of life or their institutions (dangers). Castoriadis is one of scholars who note that magistrates in Ancient Greece were randomly chosen. The transference of power to representatives or politicians was not by the institution of popular vote. For that reason, Castoriadis realizes that the democracies do not give certainness about efficiency and efficacy in politics fields. Underpinned in the belief that democracy can assure a well-being for all members of assembly looks to be false; otherwise, this is a modern idea emerged after the distortion of Plato and stoicism about the Republic. Unlike Judaism which promises a better life in heaven, in Greek mythology there is nothing

once dead that encourages an improvement for the bad conditions this world offer. Even if Castoriadis is not able to precise why this rupture occurs only in Greece, he gives a fine excuse about how philosophy and religion changed the politic fields to the extent of shaping the democracy and tragedy. What is innate to Greece is not other thing that the lack of warranty of a betterness before to the representation of no-sense. The religion, for them, put efforts in laws and demos to achieve the necessary steps to transform the environment in a safer site. In this point, Gods are entities who help, guide, prescript or injure humans but do not determine how they can behave. With this background in mind, it is not surprising to see in this belief the prerequisite that cut the boundaries of nature and humanity. Whether humans live in a world that should be conquered by reason and power for survival, the question is (admits Castoriadis) “what can do a person in a world that has not been done for responding his or her doubts?” Ranging from Homer to Anaximander the answer was aimed at outlining the pivotal role played by the *kleos and kydos* –*fame and glory*- as values aimed at encouraging the competence in all perspective of daily life. The excellence is enrooted in the necessity of agonistic fight. People (from poets to philosophers) struggle discursively to impose a thru, a speech, a point of view over others. Democracy is the sign of excellence, and the superiority of elected people. The tenets of civilizations depend on this principle. The attachment of citizen, in Ancient Greece to the king or the law has nothing to do with elections. The senate reserved the right to call an assembly to vote if necessary, the authority of the kind was never questioned. The democracy as today we live, is a modern invention, elaborated by Anglo world where liberty and oppression coexist.

Martin Lipset holds the idea that US administrations developed a strange view on the fight against good and evil, which situated to an expiatory act of liberation. The bonds were liberated by the adoption of free trade and democracy, but constrained only to some alternatives. They were created and re-directed by the inception of psychological needs - lacks. Starting on the dilemma that capitalism reaches the development of human beings, Americans believe in their ethic of work which leads to declare the hostility to the world, to live up-hills in a false ideology of exemptionalism and uniqueness (Davis, 2003; Fitzgerald, 1986; Schlereth, 1990; Howie, 2012; Bacevich, 2008; Bender, 2006; Ignatieff, 2005; Noble, 2002; Voss, 1993; Kammen, 1993; Koh, 2003; Resnik, 2006; Korstanje, 2013a). Unlike the life in Greece, where the man should fight to survive, this viewpoint forged in Anglo-culture, paves the ways for the terror-stricken climate.

AMERICAN NATIVISM

Historically, Anglo-world has developed a negative image from Catholic Church. Though, the cruelties and injustices committed by Spanish conquest, the fact is that Protestantism and Catholicism go on opposite ways. The national discourse works under the dilemma that Anglos Saxons have been called by the destiny to order the world, and for doing so, they should continue with the already-existent policies accomplished. As an Empire, the country encompasses a cresol of races and ethnicities, which not only would strengthen its superiority, but reflects the conditions of multi-culturalism which grant the success of US administrating the world. If founding parents have founded a great nation, with a plenty of other races, this calls the attention on the possibility the same style of life, may be imposed to

the world. Xenophobia only appeared in conditions of uncertainty or financial crises to re-situate the disgruntled working force in their place.

John Higham explains a whole part of problems of xenophobia in US stemmed from nativist and nativism. Focusing on the evolution of this cultural process is a way to understand the symbolic attachment of Anglo-Saxons with their lands. Although nativism has shaped in diverse forms, the fact is that it developed an anti-catholic sentiment which transcended the boundaries of time. Of course it presented serious difficulties to be defined because for some specialist nativism refers to ethnocentrism, while for others does not. The antipathy towards aliens was the cultural stepping stone of the movement but was nuanced according to the political context. War-fares were success mechanism aimed at diluting the ethnocentrism Americans expressed against strangers. Nativist movement and strangers, after all, were brothers-at-arms. What is important to debate is the connection of novelty or literature with the archetype of Anglo-Saxons. Portrayed as an exemplary race which dwelled the Northern of Europe thousand of years back, Anglos were viewed as ideals to follow by novelists and its broader audience in the XIXth centuries.

Higham argues “as the tradition passed into American hands, it preserved its early libertarian emphasis. Although it now ministered to the national ego instead of implementing a constitutional controversy, this romantic cult still stressed, as the supreme Anglo-Saxon virtue, a gift for political freedom. In the Anglo-Saxons, or perhaps the Teutons, has been implanted a unique capacity for self-government and a special mission to spread its blessing” (Higham, 10).

Thereafter, many generations will build a closed idea of democracy that leads all human beings in egalitarian conditions of existence. The freedom and labor were two relevant aspects, introduced by capitalism, which Anglo-culture retrieved of their ancestors. In fact, mass-migration was of paramount importance to solidity the tenets of future workforce in this industrial society. If ethnocentrism accelerated the closure to Anglo natives Americans to outsider world, the sense of Empire, which was ideologically developed by North after the civil war, prompted to amalgamate much different ethnicities under the same dream. Americans started to believe they were superior to other nations, simply because they keep the best of all assimilated cultures. Following this argument, Hegel’s legacy facilitated the things for those who wanted to think synthesis among humans were better than uniqueness. This discourse that pretends universalizes some particular values to the world, at the time others are protected, is one of the aspects that characterizes the imperial US. The white-order not only classified the unskilled migrant workforce according to fixed pejorative stereotypes, but also these marks situated them in their place. Stereotypes served as barriers so that minorities enter in conflict with others. Higham acknowledges the first worker unions saw in Catholic Church a great obstacle to defeat, in the onset of the country. The patriotic symbol of labour and saving, were threatened by the catholic doctrine which proposed that pious and beggars will enter in heaven. Banned the leans and interests, Catholic Church always promoted Christ’s dilemma “give Caesar what belongs to Caesar and give God to what belongs God.” In perspective, we may add, both societies: catholic and protestant have created different ways of interpreting poverty. At the time, catholic proclaimed poverty is the necessary condition to be saved, Anglo-protestant made from working a pre-condition, a token of virtue. If the catholic workers seem not to be interested by salvation because they

know it depends on the present acts, Anglo protestant ones falls into pain. The book of salvation is previously determined by God but remains uncover for human beings. This leads people to experience high degree of uncertainty and anxiety which is channelled by the means of work. Nativism has developed a pejorative opinion on catholic immigrants simply because it has serious problems to digest its religious doctrine. The Anglo-worker sees poverty as a synonymous of laziness, while Catholics understand it is a vital prerequisite for existence.

Basically, one of the upshots of Higham's work is that nativism paves the ways for the advent of American Imperialism. But how? Pro nativist supporters assumed that the amalgamation of races (melting pot) as it has evolved in US has been a success. Given the fact that US showed the world how the best of each race can be distilled to refine a new ethnic-group, the same can be copied in the world. America was in the obligation to expand its civilization of the world. The success of Good America project can be applied to the rest of uncivilized nations. For doing so, training and education would be of paramount importance.

In this vein, David Hollinger calls the attention to the pervasive nature of American ethnocentrism not only to intervene in other countries, but also to create an ethnic pentagon formed by White, Blacks, Latinos, Asian and Aborigines indoors. One of the aspects that characterize the life in US is that these blocs are mutually exclusive. To put this in another way, a Latino, whose father was Irish and mother was Brazilian, should opt only for one ethnicity. At some extent, this capacity to guide the life of the country blurs the identities of many European nations as Germans, Poles, Italians and Jews. The same happens with the other blocs, Navajos and Cherokees are placed in the same group. This system of classification was introduced recently by the scientific view, which needs to order before explaining an event. As the biologist classifies the animals or other species, races can be ordered by means of five main important blocs. Hollinger brilliantly argues that this is a pervasive system because on one hand it allows a black can be protected from white-oppression. One may imagine that Koreans, Chinese and Japanese are more vulnerable one by one than all together; but on another, the sense of race affects the democratic life of people. At the bottom, the social asymmetries by which race or ethnicity have been created is not corrected.

“Race does not serve us at all well, however, when we want to talk about culture. Although the Pentagon has been taken up by multiculturalism as a convenient basis for organizing the deference of cultural diversity, the line dividing the five parts of the pentagon are not designed to recognize coherent cultures. They are designed, instead, to correct injustices committed by white people in the name of American Nation, most but not all of which can be traced back to racial classifications on the basis of morphological traits” (Hollinger, 1995: 36)

This evokes a quandary for aliens simply because they are learned races were social construes designed by their protection. Anglo-ethnocentrism not only makes the same to the world, but also does not change the arbitrary cultural matrix to digest the presence of others. Though, in few words, American dream was the reason why Irish and Englishers have successfully merged, it represented a big cost for blacks, Latinos and Asians. The relationships among these ethnicities (blocs) is not symmetrical, they are subject to question of power and legitimacy. The cultural matrix which ponders the value of some groups over others has been fixed by Anglo-Protestant citizens. Hollinger adds, if US cannot alter its logic

of ethnocentrism, the principle of multiculturalism will be backfired. Are a great portion of American fearful?

THE FEAR IN UNITED STATES

As discussed above, the religious beliefs and norms are conducive to fix the ideological discourse of salvation (Thompson, 1990). Although US seems to be enrooted in an unabated sentiment of uncertainty and fear, which comes from the sense of predestination, it is important to explore the social conditions for that. The psychological fear is sometimes an instrument of indoctrination aimed at legitimating the interests of elites. At the time, worker union claims are diminished, lay people accept policies otherwise would be rejected (Glassner, 1999; Furedi 1997; 2007; Schrecker, 1998; Robin, 2009; Scruton, 1986; Skoll, 2007; 2009; Stearns, 2006). After WWII, the economic support known as Plan Marshall were not only aimed at helping European state to fight against communism, but also deterred the Marxist theories in the syndicalism's mind. The red-scare dilutes many of worker union claims against capital owners, their banks and the politicians (Freeland, 1985). Whenever a group is marked as a threat, Americans learned not to ask for further explanations. This poses Americans directly to vulnerability because they are governed by the fears their state generate (Stearns, 2006). Given this backdrop, Strauss and Howe argue that the culture of politics in US from 60th onwards, has based on two contrasting aspects, the over to the infra protection of children and offspring –child rearing. By means of fear, this country keeps not only its confidence, but also the sentiment of uniqueness. Fear avoids the possibility of fragmentation of the group.

This thesis has been reassumed by Korstanje (2012) by the name of heroic personality. Anyone pushed to think in a tragedy want to feel unique and special in some extent. This generates a double cost, because self is subject to a narcissism that needs from fear to exist. In any tragic stage, the hero assumes its unfortunate fate to mediate forever between Gods and humans. Heroes has not an easy life, they trajectory is marked by a long way of shadows, suffering and disgrace. The manifest destiny which appeals to the virtue of hero, remarking its uniqueness before other mortals, needs a serious purge, a rebirth where the bad nature of body expiates in the grace of Gods. The suffering in the tragedy pretends to emulate the resistance and defiance of humans before the arbitrariness of Gods. Similarly to this view, by means of expiation, US becomes in the protector of the world. But at the time, the manifest destiny opens the roads for certain questions, it closed for others. Heroes not only are touched by the Gods, they all keep a gift, but they are condemned by that.

Francisco Bauza (2007) makes a good comparative study where stipulate some of the characteristics of mythological heroes, which represents the idea of transgression. Heroes defy the ethic fields of times to become in the protagonist of its own fate. The archetype of hero, as formulated by Dumézil (1990), Bauza (2007), Kierkegaard, (2003) consists in the following reasons:

1. Heroes have a divine or royal origin.
2. The secrecy plays a pivotal role in their life.
3. They are condemned to suffer an immense punishment by their sins.

4. They descend to the hells to fight against the forces of evilness.
5. The suffering confers the necessary legitimacy to be the protector for all civilizations.
6. Heroes are subject to the process of apotheosis, which means heroes rise to heavens in body and soul.

As it has been earlier discussed, the feats of heroes are transmitted from generation to generation by the legend. The destiny of hero gives too much importance to fatality to transcend the boundaries of time. As the previous explanation given, the postmodern times are inherently based on a sense of tragic heroism. This discourse makes lay people to believe they partake of something special. As a catalyst instrument that digest psychological frustration, heroism as it has been emulated by American culture, leads people to make wonderful things, to go forward to invent new devices, but knowing first their destiny is subject to death. The postmodern self is determined by the legal rational logic, by where all wills are homogenized into a daily routine. The needs of differentiations, are based in an opposite dynamic, the will of being special which feeds up a covered sentiment of narcissism.

The archetype of hero is valorised by postmodern societies because it provides a sentiment of superiority that nourishes the discourse of nation-state. The fictionalization of tragedy, as it is fabricated by the media, gives to Anglo-culture a pretext to be considered the elected people. Americans enter this way into a double blind logic. On one hand, as debated in earlier sections, they need to control the future to know if they are part of –good boys- but one another, it brings to a broader sentiment of fear. If anonymity confers to self the security of a peaceful life, as the dilemma of Aquiles reminds, the heroism announces the prelude of fatality. To summarize, here one question begs, why Oedipus take the justice in his hands as an ordinary person?, why the King disobey the laws of the city? An answer if necessary, according to what we have discussed, would be because he was not an ordinary man. The divine manifest of his destiny –as the metaphor of Skywalker- links the individual will to God’s desire. The sentiment of exception of Americans follows the same logic. It preserves the privilege to be the top of civilization, expanding their values to the world in order to protect humankind. They assume, in this process, their values are also universal, and should be widely accepted by other nations. In doing so, Americans open the doors for misfortune since places the self to the closed-determination of divinity. Emulating the logic of immolation, their will to make the best for everyone, will produce a great suffering for themselves. Americans will die to live forever. This is exactly the sentiment that creates a greater panic in the society.

REFERENCES

- Adler, D. G. (2006). The law: George Bush as commander in chief: Toward the nether world of constitutionalism. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 36(3), 525-540.
- Bacevich, A. J. (2008). *The limits of power: The end of American exceptionalism*. Macmillan.
- Bauzá, H. F. (2007). *El Mito del Héroe: morfología y semántica de la figura heroica*. Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Bender, T. (2006). The American way of empire. *World Policy Journal*, 23(1), 45-61.

- Blackmore, H. (2008) "Principios Constitucionales." En "Qué es Estados Unidos?" Fernández de Castro & Blackmore H. México, FCE, pp 127-166.
- Bollen, K y Jackman, R. (1985). "Political Democracy and the side of distribution of income." *American Sociological Review*. Vol 48: 468-479
- Bufalo, Del E. (2002). "La Reestructuración neoliberal y la globalización." En *Guerra Infinita: hegemonía y terror mundial*. Ceceña, A. y Sader, E. Buenos Aires, CLACSO. Pp. 39-62.
- Castel, R. (1997). *La Metamorfosis de la Cuestión social. Una Crónica del salariado*. Buenos Aires, Paidós.
- Castoriadis, C. (2006). *Lo Que Hace a Grecia. De Homero a Heráclito*. Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Chase, R. (1957). *The American Novel and its Tradition*. New York, Double day.
- Cheyfitz, E. (1993). "Savage Law, the plot against American Indians in Johnson & Graham's *Lessee v M'Intosh and the Pioneers*." A. Kaplan & d. Pease (Editors). *Cultures of United States Imperialism*. Durham, Duke University Press, Pp. 109-128
- Crawford, N. C. (2003). The slippery slope to preventive war. *Ethics & International Affairs*, 17(1), 30-36.
- Dahl, R (1971) *Polyarchy: participation and Opposition*. New Haven, Yale University Press.
- Danielson, L. (1990) "Tornado Stories in the Breadbasket, weather and Regional identity." *Sense of Place: American Regional Cultures*. Edited by B Allen & T. Schlereth. Kentucky, University of Kentucky Press, Pp 28-39
- Davidson C (1989) "Introduction. Toward a History of Books and Readers" .” In Davidson, C. *Reading in America: literature & Social History*. Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, pp 1-26
- Davidson C (1989) "The Life and Times of Charlotte Temple" In Davidson, C. *Reading in America: literature & Social History*. Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, pp 157-179
- Davis, K. (2003) *American history*. Philadelphia, Harper Collins Publisher.
- De Tocqueville, A. (2004). *Democracy in America* (Vol. 147). Digireads. com.
- Dumézil, G. (1990) *El destino del Guerrero*. Bogotá, Ediciones silgo XXI.
- Dworkin, R. M. (1978). *Taking rights seriously: with a new appendix, a response to critics*. Harvard University Press.
- Dworkin, R. (1996). *Freedom's Law: the moral reading of the American Constitution*. Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
- Eco, H. (2002). "Las Guerras Santas: pasión y razón." En *El Mundo Después del 11 de Septiembre de 2001*. (Compilación). Barcelona, Editorial Península. Pp. 89-103.
- Fitzgerald, F. (1986) *Cities on a Hill*. New York, Simon & Schuster.
- Freeman, M. (2011). *Human Rights. An interdisciplinary Approach*. Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Freeland, R. (1985). *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: foreign policy, domestic politics, and internal security 1946-1948*. New York, New York University Press.
- Furedi, F. (1997). *Culture of Fear: Risk-Taking and the Morality of Low Expectations*. London, UK, Cassell.
- Furedi, F. (2007) *Invitation to Terror: the Expanding Empire of the Unknown*. New York, Continuum.
- Highham, John (1994) *Strangers in the Land: patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925* New Jersey, Rutgers University Press.

- Ignatieff, M. (2001) *Human rights, as politics and idolatry*. New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
- Ignatieff, M. (2005). *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights*. New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
- Glassner, B. (1999). *The Culture of Fear: Why Americans Are Afraid of the Wrong Things*. New York, Basic Books.
- González-Uresti, S (2008) “La Política Exterior: “hegemonía o imperio global?” En “Qué es Estados Unidos?” Fernández de Castro & Blackmore H. México, FCE, pp 263-304.
- Guidotti, Hernández. N. (2011) *Unspeakable Violence*. Remapping Us and Mexican National Imaginaries. Durham, Duke University Press.
- Gutmann, A. (2001) “Introduction.” In *Human rights, as politics and idolatry*. Michael Ignatieff. New Jersey, Princeton University Press. Pp Vii-xxviii.
- Gray, C. S. (2007). *The implications of preemptive and preventive war doctrines: A Reconsideration*. ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA.
- Greven, P. (1988). *The Protestant Temperament. Patterns of child-rearing religious experience, and the self in Early America*. Illinois, Chicago University Press.
- Griffin, D. R (2004) *The New Pearl Harbor: disturbing question about the Bush Administration and 9/11*. Northampton, Olive Branch Press.
- Hollinger, D. (1995) *Postethnic America*. New York, Basic Books.
- Howie, L. (2012). *Witness to Terror: understanding the meaning and consequence of terrorism*. New York, Palgrave.
- Hristoulas A and Sotomayor, A. (2008) “La Política de Seguridad y Defensa: historia, presente y retos.” En “Qué es Estados Unidos?” Fernández de Castro & Blackmore H. México, FCE, pp 304-348.
- Hughes, G (1997) “Common Law Systems.” In *Fundamentals of American Laws*. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Pp. 10-25.
- Inglehart, R. (1997) *Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic and political change in 43 Societies*. New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
- Johnson, C. (2004) *Blowback, costes y consecuencias del Imperio Americano*. Pamplona, Editorial Laetoli.
- Kagan, R (2003) *Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order*. New York, Vintage Books.
- Kaplan, A. (1993) “Left Alone with America” the absence of Empire of study of American Culture.” A. Kaplan & d. Pease (Editors). *Cultures of United States Imperialism*. Durham, Duke University Press, Pp. 3-21.
- Kammen, M. (1993). The problem of American exceptionalism: A reconsideration. *American Quarterly*, 45(1), 1-43.
- Kierkegaard, S. (2003). *Temor y Temblor*. Buenos Aires, Losada.
- Koh, H. H. (2003). On American Exceptionalism. *Stanford Law Review*, 1479-1527.
- Korstanje, M. (2012a). “Aportaciones de la Mitología Nórdica para comprender la modernidad, revisión de Max Weber.” *Historia Actual*. 28 (1): 175-190.
- Korstanje, M. E. (2012). Filosofía del riesgo: Crónica de la Modernidad. *Nómadas. Revista Crítica de Ciencias Sociales y Jurídicas*, 33(1), 323-347.

- Korstanje, M. (2013a) "Huntington & the Liberal Thought, problems of anglo-democracy to understand politics." *Nómadas: revista crítica de Ciencias Sociales y Jurídicas*. Número 37 (I). Enero-Junio 2013. Disponible en www.ucm.es/info/nomadas/
- Korstanje, M. E. (2013b). Preemption and Terrorism. When the Future Governs. *Cultura*, 10(1), 167-184.
- Magaloni Kerpel, A L (2008) "El Poder Judicial" En "Qué es Estados Unidos?" Fernández de Castro & Blackmore H. México, FCE, pp 240-262.
- McGoldrick, D. (2004). *From '9-11' to the 'Iraq War 2003': international law in an age of complexity*. New York, Hart Publishing.
- Mc-Michael, P. (2012) *Development and Social Change*. Thousand Oaks, Sage.
- Menke, C. (2009) *Tragic Play: irony and theater from Sophocles to Becket*. New York, Columbia University Press.
- Noble, D (2002). *Death of a Nation: American Culture and the End of Exceptionalism*. Minnesota, University of Minnesota Press.
- Nord P. (1989) "A Republican Literature_ Magazine reading and readers Late-Eighteen Century New York." In Davidson, C. *Reading in America: literature & Social History*. Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, pp. 114-139.
- Núñez García, S. (2008) "Cultura Política" En "Qué es Estados Unidos?" Fernández de Castro & Blackmore H. México, FCE, pp 93-125.
- Levy, J. S., & Gochal, J. R. (2001). Democracy and preventive war: Israel and the 1956 Sinai campaign. *Security Studies*, 11(2), 1-49.
- Lipset, M. S (1959) "Social Requisites for Democracy: economic development and political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review*. 53: 69-105.
- Lipset, M. S (2000) *El Excepcionalismo norteamericano: una espada de dos filos*. México, FCE.
- Pagden, A. (1997). *Señores del todo el mundo: ideologías del imperio en España, Inglaterra, y Francia (en los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII)*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Península.
- Resnik, J. (2006). Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry. *The Yale Law Journal*, 1564-1670.
- Revel, J. F. (2002). *Anti-americanism*. San Francisco, Encounter Books.
- Robin, C. (2009) *El Miedo*. Buenos Aires, FCE.
- Salvino, D. N (1989) "The world in Black and White." In Davidson, C. *Reading in America: literature & Social History*. In Davidson, C. *Reading in America: literature & Social History*. Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, pp. 140-156.
- Schrecker, E. (1998). *Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America*. Boston, Little Brown.
- Schlereth, T J (1990) "Regional Culture studies and American Culture" *Sense of Place: American Regional Cultures*. Edited by B Allen & T. Schlereth. Kentucky, University of Kentucky Press, Pp 164-174.
- Scruton, D L (1986). *Sociophobics: The Anthropology of Fear*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press.
- Skoll, G. R. (2007). Meanings of Terrorism. *International Journal for the Semiotics of Law*. 20 (2): 107-127.
- Skoll G. R (2009) *Contemporary Criminology and Criminal Justice Theory*. New York, Palgrave.

- Slotkin R. (1993) "Buffalo Bill's Wild West and the Mythologization of the American Empire." A Kaplan & D. Pease (Editores). *Cultures of United States Imperialism*. Durham, Duke University Press, Pp 164-181.
- Stearns, P. N. (2006). *American Fear: The Causes and Consequences of High Anxiety*. : New York, Routledge.
- Sunstein, C. (1994). *The Partial Constitution*. Harvard, Harvard University Press.
- Sunstein, C. (2005) *Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Thompson, J. B. (1990). *Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Strauss, W y Howe, N. (1991). *Generations: The History of America's Future, 1584-2069*. : New York, William Morrow.
- Velasco Márquez J. (2008) "Visión Panorámica de la Historia de los Estados Unidos." En "Qué es Estados Unidos?" Fernández de Castro & Blackmore H. México, FCE, pp. 17-92.
- Voss, K. (1993). *The making of American exceptionalism: The knights of labor and class formation in the nineteenth century* (p. 241). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Wald, P. (1993) "Terms of Assimilation: Legislating subjectivity in the Emerging Nation." A. Kaplan & D. Pease (editors). *Cultures of United States Imperialism*. Durham, Duke University Press, pp. 59-84.
- Weber, M. (1958). *Essays in Sociology*. New York, Oxford University Press.
- Weber M. (1964). *Economía y sociedad: esbozo de sociología comprensiva*. México, FCE.
- Weber M (1995) *La Ética Protestante y el Espíritu del Capitalismo*. Barcelona, Península.
- Wirtz, J. J., & Russell, J. A. (2003). US policy on preventive war and preemption. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 10(1), 113-123.
- Wedgewood, R. (2009) "War and Law" In Leashing the Dogs of War, conflict management in a divided world. C. Crocker, F O Hampson & P Aall (editors). Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace press, pp. 584-599.
- Yoo, J. C., & Delahunty, R. J. (2009). "The 'Bush Doctrine': Can Preventive War Be Justified?" *Harvard JL & Pub Policy*, 32, 843.

Chapter 9

THE SOCIETY OF TERROR

Contemporarily, the flourishing of fear corresponds with the production of media information and the adoption of new technologies. As never before, we live a culture of fear that marked a turning point respecting to other times (Timmermann, 2015). Whilst Latina America poses its concerns in the problem of crime and delinquency (Kessler 2009; Damnert & Arias, 2007), in Anglo-Saxon countries terrorism becomes the main threat (Howie, 2007; 2012; Skoll 2007; Altheide 2004; 2006; Soyinka, 2005; Achcar, 2006; Ignatieff 2013). There is a clear cultural-matrix in Latin and Anglo-culture to understand the risk which was widely examined by Korstanje (2014b; 2015). The reform introduced the concept of predestination, unknown by Catholicism, reconstructing in this way a bridge between present and future. The risks in English speaking countries represent a platform to conquest the future by embracing the “precautionary principle.” The needs of preventing risk, in the local crime or the war against terror has been situated as the main agenda of US government (Gray, 2007; Sunstein, 2002). As Gregory Flaxman & Ben Rogerson observed, “the culture of fear” may be defined as a symptomatology of our contemporary society, even paradoxically living safer than earlier generations. Capitalism has reproduced over last years new tactics to colonize our feelings. The psychological fear, likely, and its logic remain obscure for our understanding. What 9/11 inaugurated, was a deep dissociation between mediated disasters and the probabilities of risk. We are subject to countless threats as car accidents, heart disease, or even cancer, most of them ignored, but what we frighten is terrorism. In terms of authors, “our fears are misplaced” (p. 334). Not surprisingly from Hobbes on, the modern state passed this original fear of death to moderated levels of trust. Logically, fear inoculates changes that help regulating the production and economies within each state. Thus, we need to speak on the “economy of fear” instead of a basic emotion (Flaxman & Rogerson, 2011).

David Altheide confirms,

“The Politics of fear is buffered by news and popular culture, stressing fear and threat as features of entertainment that, increasingly, are shaping public and private life as mass-mediated experience and has become a standard frame of reference for audience, claim-makers, and individual actors. Similar to propaganda, message about fear are repetitious, stereotypical of outside threats and specially suspect and evil others. These message also resonate moral panics, but to also save civilization” (Altheide, 2003: 38).

In this context, a great variety of scholars have addressed the problem of post modernity and fear from diverse angles. In these approaches, there was a strong focus on linking risk with society as Richard Sennett (the corrosion of character), Ulrich Beck (Society of Risk), Giddens (risk and attachment), Sunstein (the laws of fear), Niklas Luhmann (the sociology of risk), Naomi Klein (the doctrine of shock), Diken Bulent (the comedy of terror) or Geoffrey Skoll & Maximiliano Korstanje (the fetish of risk). The conceptual discussion in the ways the academicians understand the crises. If risk is enrooted in the economic system, how may understand the last Wall Street collapse in 2008? Is the introduction of risk conducive to the decline of nation-state?

In this book, we held the thesis that in the society of terror, risk not only alludes to the formation of much broader alliance towards the configuration of the unique state, a type of neo-universalism, based on the industry of hospitality and tourism as it has been anticipated by Kant and Leibniz, but also it gives further legitimacy to elite to change the old meaning of jurisprudence. To set a clear example, terrorism exhibits a fertile ground not only US government undermines its relationship internally with the unions, but also celebrating pacts and covenants otherwise would be rejected. Doubtless, terrorism triggers uncertainty because the state never knows where and when the next attack will hit. It opens the doors to embrace a logic of “preemption,” that leads to a tyranny. In order for the war-machinery works, the state needs a juridical right to intervene in other autonomous states. As Alex Bellamy (2005) puts it, the preventive intervention in the geo-politics fields re-formulates the legal background of nation-states conferring to US the right to take direct action in case of real or potential hazard is found. Beyond the alliance to strengthen the power of inter-states in their war against terror, the United States reserve the legal concept of “self-determination” to intervene in other international scenarios when the homeland security runs some risk. As an allegory, terrorism paves the ways to centralize the international authorities of states into one main power.

THE HOBESSIAN STATE OF NATURE

During centuries, philosophers and social scientists, questioned what the roots of society were. Why do we live in communities?, are we social by nature? As Richard Schmitt wrote, the human nature of human beings is not biologically or sociologically determined. As agents we choose to work with others or alone respecting to our goals and interests (Schmitt, 1995). Long time back, the founding parents of modern philosophy as John Locke or even Thomas Hobbes, formulated similar question in regards to social ties. Although Locke was critical respecting to the role of liberty and natural law in the state making (Locke, 1993), Hobbes appealed to the violence as the epicenter of state. Using the allegory of Leviathan, he instilled a new idea the current body of philosophy was not taking seriously into consideration in these days. Most certainly, he was widely influenced by the civil wars in England (during 1642/1644). The conception of state was not based, like in Locke, in the natural law which gives human the possibility to decide, but in the fear. The making state rests on its ability to instill fear in the hearts of potential insurgents. That way, the human nature is subject to two contrasting emotions. At the time, the needs of expropriating “Others” are unquestionable the fear of violent death leads people to negotiate peace. To avoid what Hobbes called “the war of all against all [bellum omnium contra omnes]” the monopoly of force is conferred to a

third party (Leviathan) (Hobbes 1994). Of course, Hobbes received a lot of criticism by detractors as John Bramhall, or John Wallis. Hobbes developed a utilitarian model that explains the subject from its individuality and egoism alone. This hindsight, a major source in Hobbes, depends on two primary aspects of politics: self-interest and calculation. Far from being a real diagnosis of other types of states, Hobbes projected the pre-modern daily life in England as an all encompassing model applicable to all behaviors and cultures (Skinner, 1964).

This above noted criticism was coined by other senior scholars whose life was devoted to understand the nation-state and its mechanism of discipline, Michel Foucault. Because of time and space, we will not examine his entire career in this review, nonetheless the most salient aspects of his development can be discussed. Foucault's doctoral thesis points out in the problem of madness. Beyond mental illness, pathologies should be understood as social construes, which are enrooted in a political code. Unlike Hobbes, Foucault does conceive the power in a circular manner. Even, the history as we can imagine, it must be defined as the evolution of discourse, of those who had defeated. To cut the long story short, state is founded under what he dubbed "an economy of truth." The law far from being an objective rule, derived from years of exploitation, conquest and distortion. One band colonized and covered others imposing not only its main guiding discourse, but its law, economy and cosmology. To unveil this relation of submission, the social scientist should go to the archive (as an archeologist) where the disciplined voices may emerge. Whether, the panoptic model concentrates scattered situations into a one-sided mechanism of control, history and experts segregate those values which have nothing to do with the vision. The medical-eye, enrooted in the hegemony of science, not only treats the ill-patients in specific spaces but also separates them from the normalcy until the pathology is removed. Before the sickness, a set of expiatory rituals sanitizes the infected persons so that the disciplinary values of societies may persist. By a previous validation of medical reason, the ill person passes from one state to other by the imposition of western values (Foucault, 1996; 2000). The society, Foucault adds, adopts the stability in view of the principle of efficacy and contingency. Any disaster, or big economic problem, is defined in that terms, because affects the society and its idea of omnipotence. The sense of instability produced by disaster may lead the society to chaos. The disciplinary mechanisms are served to regulate the state of disintegration in order for the society does not collapse. Foucault puts as example the homology between virus and vaccine. Any risk is a controlled threat, in the same way, the vaccine is the inoculated virus. Therefore, the sense controllability is given by the created risk where the future of threat is domesticated. If the discipline signals to the application of law to regulate misbehavior, the sense of security articulates policies of contention and management (Foucault, 2006).

Over last years, Zygmunt Bauman has made a brilliant criticism against Foucault and the concept of panoptic. Together David Lyon in a recent book entitled "Liquid Surveillance," Bauman explores the connection between mass-consumption and the dispositif of control affordable by the digital era. One of the main points to understand his work, seems to be the belief that workers have become in commodities whose in egalitarian conditions should struggle to survive. They should compete not only to be elected as a product, but also not to be excluded from the formal trade circuits. It is interesting to discuss to what an extent workers do their best to avoid the symbolic death. Even though, both Lyon and Bauman acknowledge that 9/11 did not create in fact the logic of liquid surveillance, it accelerated the conditions of reproduction. Employing the term adiaforization, as a natural dissociation

between action and ethic fields, Bauman adds that the introduction of technology originally was aimed at mitigating some major risks. However, it has paved the pathways for the advent of actions which are not linked to ethics, the subject at some extent, has not developed any commitment with the consequences its action generates. The other was reduced to be subject to the operationalization of machines, digital instruments manipulated by automats. Any error, any mistake at time of calculating an attack, should be labeled as “collateral damages.” In this vein, Bauman and Lyon allude to what Arendt called, the banality of evil which means the bureaucratization of critiques over reason. Although Foucaultian observations were widely employed to study the social behavior in last decades, authors reply that now things have changed a lot. The old panoptic which suggested that few may watch many people, has set the pace to another reality. Few are gazed by the rest of society. A sense of imposed mobility given to all who can pay for that, but at the same time others are immobilized. The archetype of tourists, as ambassadors of their cultures, or capital owners is contrasted to the future of migrants, who are traced, jailed and deported year by year.

The logic of surveillance, which was deepened by 9/11, accompanied expensive investment to monitor the trajectory of travellers and tourists. The identity of modern-tourist is being validated in a regular basis at time of flying or moving. But this creates a paradox, both authors advise. Thousand years back, walls and cities protected to their citizens from the external threats. The devotion posed on the walls, entailed the preservation of certain rights. The enemy was always a stranger, regulated by the combination of violence and legality. Nowadays, rather, the liquid modernity has diminished the social trust necessary to cohabit with the other. Today, the enemy not only resides in the city, but also enlarged the psychological distance among citizens. The main thesis of this valuable book is that modern citizens adopt the surveillance-related technologies by two reasons. On one hand, it is imperative to control the other which remains to be an undesired guest. On another, used technology marks the citizens as a good person. Those who use technologies of surveillance are exorcised to be labeled as “criminals.” In doing so, undesired guests who cannot pay for these technologies are marked and pushed to the peripheries of the city. This book suggests two significant ideas. First and foremost, the state is unable to protect their citizens because the power was conferred to trade. Modern nation state is obliged to give solutions for problems created elsewhere. This engendered a sense of anomie, by which the citizens feel vulnerable. Secondly, the introduction of surveillance technology makes an unsafe world. The quest of order that characterizes the human existence is determined by the needs of change. The paradox lies in everything what we do, is to create a sense of stability we never will reach before death. If the society of risk imagined by Beck considered the risk as a result of action, the liquid surveillance goes in another direction. This new society does not accept the ethics boundaries between decision and risk, because any decision depends on the digital technology. In view of that, the other was being reduced to a cipher, a number, which are recreated as an object of uncertainty. That way, the technology of surveillance plays a pervasive role. It gives to citizens a reason to fear, offering an alternative but temporal solution. Not only in Beck, but in Foucault and Bauman the problem of risk still remains unresolved. Following the modern reasoning, if the advance of industrialism/modernity declined the social trust, which played a crucial role in the formation of state, one might speculate that today risk mediates between citizens and their institutions.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NATURE OF FEAR

Every culture has developed ways to adapt to its environment. One method is the construction of feared object which serves as a mechanism to adjust social perceptions of danger. Elements which instill fear vary from one society to another (Korstanje, 2011). Fear can be defined as a basic emotion, which protects the survival of an organism. Not just human beings, but all animals experience fear of external threatening stimuli. Alerted by fear, the organism has three possible reactions: paralysis, attack, or withdrawal (Fraisie, 1973; Panksepp, 1982; Levenson, Ekman & Friesen, 1990; Strongman, 1996). Nonetheless, the concepts of behavioral psychology have not embraced by other social sciences. Anthropology has developed its own sense of what fear means. Although, recognizing a strong neurobiological basis that reduces or enhances the fear, ethnologists evaluate the social factors by which some fears are over-valorized while other rejected (Malinowski, 1967). Therefore, culture plays a vital role not only conferring a specific meaning to objects, but also to fears.

Mary Douglas, a pioneer scholar interested in exploring the connection of fear, evil, and risk, argued that psychological fear represents an attempt to react when faced with a hostile situation. To some extent, the preservation of culture is at stake in contexts of uncertainty or instability. When socialized, fear unites a society. Without fear, Douglas added, societies would experience substantial fragmentation (Douglas, 1992). In subsequent studies, Douglas developed a new thesis arguing that risk, danger, and sin are intertwined social constructs. Sin and risk give further legitimacy to the status quo, which would otherwise discredit privileged groups if they did not give solutions to lay people. Risk and sin both provide rationalizations for how the world works. The potentiality of threat provides legitimacy for social solidarity and status hierarchies (Douglas, 2007).

Anthropological perspectives gained less notice in their treatment of the problem of fear for two reasons. First, psychological explanations advanced considerably with recourse to neuro-dynamic explanations for emotions. Second, sociologists tended to devote attention to risk. Consequently, the qualitative meaning and narrative of fear failed to expand to other social areas of study. In psychology, fear represents a basic emotion. Academic psychologists have largely eschewed qualitative approaches to study fear. They have left the study of fear as a subjective experience in the hands of philosophy.

Philosophically, the self experiences anxiety when faced with a decision. Existentialism defined anxiety as a result of freedom or uncertainty. The self opts for a way out of choosing. While fear corresponds with a specific object or stimulus, anxiety has an abstract nature produced by the presence of nothingness (Heidegger, 1997, Kierkegaard, 2003). Following the observations of K. Tierney, risks should be defined as any probability of damage resulting from an event where the integrities of victims are at stake. In recent decades, sociologists have treated risk as a social construction. Within sociology, two contrasting waves have historically discussed the nature of risk (Tierney, 1994). One group explored the probability of harm, focusing on the effects of unseen risk for social systems. Another paid attention to the perception of citizens and the paradoxes this generates (Duclos, 1987). The specialized literature in risk management took the pragmatic perspective that bad evaluations of risk may lead to bad decisions. In this sense, efforts to mitigate risks open new ones (Oliver-Smith, 2002).

Zygmunt Bauman (2011) explained that risks are social constructions to try to control the future. In the Middle Ages, happiness was thought to be restricted to few people, who can attain it only through suffering and expiation. The American Revolution introduced a radical change in the way that happiness was conceived, as suggested by Thomas Jefferson's claim in the Declaration of Independence (1776) that the pursuit of happiness is a self-evident truth of the human condition. This assertion of a global right to happiness broadened its possibilities, but linked the possibility of happiness to freedom and choices. Risk, then, came to regulate the uncertainty of the future, but also conferred on the subject the liability for failure to be happy.

Ulrich Beck has argued that modernity opened new global risks, which were alien to the medieval world view. Chernobyl in the Ukraine was the symbolic of the role played by technology in fabricating new risks. In Beck's view, technology had helped enhance security, but today it generates new and dire risks that threaten human existence. In Beck's "risk society" the old modes of production, which fabricated commodities, have turned into methods that produce risks (Beck, 2006; 2011). One of the limitations in Beck's development consists in ingenuity respecting to the process of class formation. The fact that everyone is in danger in the late-modernity does not imply that higher-classes monopolize their resources to mitigate the produced risks. This means that, among many other things, the introduction of risks does not homogenize society, as Beck notes. It creates a more asymmetrical community between two main classes, those who are exploited and subject to immobility, and another more mobile class that exerts the power. At the same time elite generates new risks to enhance their quality of life, the oppressed workforce is subject to face those risks others created (Skoll & Korstanje, 2012).

Parallel to Beck, Anthony Giddens acknowledged globalization as a project based on two key factors. The first is that money has come to serve as a mechanism of connecting presence with absences, or needs with their satisfaction throughout the world. The second element is a network of experts, who not only evaluate potential risks but also devise ways for mitigating risks. Starting from the premise that experts monopolize the trust of lay people, for Giddens, risk is what society creates to sustain its efficient functioning (Giddens, 1991; 1999).

In opposition to Giddens's argument, Niklas Luhmann has criticized the thesis of risk society because of the increasing alarmism it spreads in public consciousness. Certainly, Luhmann adds, risks always are rooted into a previous profit or benefit, whereby the subject should decide. It corresponds with the principle of contingency. Unfortunately Beck did not contemplate the distinction between risk and threat. While risk signifies a previous decision by the self, threat refers to something external to the self. A terrorist attack, an airplane accident, or a natural disaster are threats, since the victims have no way to reverse the situation. The passengers in an airplane crash have no way of avoiding the harm. In contrast, for the air travel company owner, who opted to reduce costs, the accidents are a risk. Generally, those who make the decision are generators of risks. They are not the same as those who face the risks (Luhmann, 2006). J. Richardson (2010) says that threats which jeopardize society are introduced in the social system by means of knowledge. Risk, in these terms, would be the efforts to intellectualize the future by offsetting costs and benefits. The final decision made on the possibility to face or avoid the damage is given by the degree of contingency, with respect to the problem to be solved (Richardson, 2010). This seems to be the reason why technology designed to mitigate risks under some conditions of uncertainty, generates new risks. A discussion of this nature, coined in the core of social sciences, has not

been duly evaluated in tourism fields. In the next section, some of the more relevant studies in tourism risk are scrutinized. Is technology conducive to create unreal fears, which only have presence in fiction?

Lisa Stampnitzky (2014) researched empirically how sometimes experts not only invent “terrorism” to fix the agenda in public opinion. Terrorism paved the ways for the appearance of a new type of experts, through 70s decade, who were concerned in rationalizing the “terror.” In so doing, they launched to the use of legal rationality, risk management methodologies. The discussion on 9/11 is based today on the needs to implement a new logic that centers on “preemption,” which defies the concept of reason in itself. It begs a pungent question, is terrorism leading our civilization far from reason?

THE TERROR OF TERROR(ISM)

Is terrorism inextricably linked to State? The question whether insurgents lack any representation in government or election system is one of the aspects that characterize terrorism. These cells not only have been excluded from democracy, but also from the parliamentary participation (Piazza; 2007; 2008). This point of entry is very interesting since suggests that terrorism derived from democracy. Nor poverty neither psychological frustration are key factors that explain the radicalization of terrorists. Doubtless, they are political agents who have developed a radical mind respecting to outer world (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Additionally, the problem of mobility, tourism and the current system of transport, which needs from certain level of freedom to work, has been played a fertile ground for bombing or terrorist attacks over the last decades (Diken & Lausten, 2002; Urry, 2007; Korstanje & Clayton, 2012).

Michael Brown alerts that the agenda of security has changed for governments in this new century. We are witnessing specific problems which are not necessarily linked to the classic war-fares or clash among states. We now face new “threats” which are embedded within nation-states. The governments struggle not only to prevent the non-military attacks, as the case of terrorism, but regulating the media without affecting democratic rights. The fact is that the world and economies have changed forever after 9/11, trying to predict what in nature unpredictable is. Even if the obsession for gaining further security remains in United States, In this token, it is important not to loose the sight that there is a strong complicity between terrorists and journalism. The knowledge, which supposedly makes from this life a safer place, becomes in a double-edge sword. To be more precise, Luke Howie argues that terrorism me be defined as more than a political technique or strategies to dissuade the states of certain claims, terrorism is stronger in the witness’s terror.

“Terrorism works this way for witness. If there was one way to describe the outcomes of the research that I have conducted for this book, I would say that terrorism causes people to feel terror. Terror is the name we give to the uncertainty we feel in the feel of global violence in some of the world’s most populous cities. If Terrorism does not cause terror, the it is not terrorism (Howie, 2012: p. 12).

The definition described above is of paramount importance to understand the connection of terrorists and eye-witnesses. Basically, the targets are not necessarily selected to create

mass-death, as many pseudo-specialists suggest, but also to lead an extreme panic in the rest of population. At some extent, promising findings can be obtained if we pay attention to the psychological effects of terrorism in daily life as well as how lay-people intellectualized and changed their behavior post 9/11. At time more attention is given to terrorism, more violence emerges. It begs a more than interesting question, how can we deal with terrorism?, is preventive platform a valid resource in the struggle for peace?

Jean Baudrillard recognizes that late-modernity has destroyed not only the social ties, but the symbolic foundation of society. This apocalyptic thesis leads us to think the boundaries between consumers and their consumed goods have been blurred. The current nature of fear escapes to our biological emotions, rather, it is only enrooted in the future. The allegory of disasters, which today entertain a great portion of western audience, is carefully designed not only to serve as a disciplinary mechanism of control but also to create a “pseudo-reality,” where events set the pace to “pseudo-events.”

“A whole strategy of deterrence that does service today for a global strategy. Steven Spielberg’s recent film, *minority report*, provides an illustration of such a system. On the basis of brains endowed with a gift of pre-cognition (the precogs), who identify imminent crimes before they occur, squads of police (the precrimes) intercept and neutralize the criminal before he has committed his crime ... ruptural events, unforeseeable events, unclassifiable in terms of history, outside of historical reasons, events which occur against their own image, against their own simulacrum. Event that breaks the tedious sequence of current events as relayed by the media, but which are not, for all that, a reappearance of history or Real irrupting in the heart of the virtual” (Baudrillard, 2006: 2; 8).

As Douglas Kellner puts it, Baudrillard is the clear reminder the end of history, formulated by neo-liberal scholars, equals to the end of humankind. For capital owners and global capitalism, history is a serious obstacle to overcome. In the realism of hyper-reality, games are something else than a space of competition, or rivalry, or simply an act of submission, they goes beyond the hegemony of history to break the rules of any game. This was exactly what in 9/11 happened. In this vein, Kellner writes,

“Shortly after September 11 terrorist attacks, Baudrillard wrote a paper *L’Esprit du terrorisme* in *Le Monde*. He argued that the assaults on the World Trade center and Pentagon constituted a strong event, that the attacks were the ultimate event, the mother of all event, the pure event within itself all the events that have never taken place. The event strike, Baudrillard declared, was over and since this time he has continued to focus intensely on the dynamics and happenings of contemporary history ... For Baudrillard, the 9/11 attacks represent a new kind of terrorism, exhibiting a form of action which play the game, and lays hold of the rules of the game, solely with the aim of disrupting it. They have taken over all the weapons of the dominant power. That is, the terrorists in Baudrillard reading uses airplanes, computer networks, and the media associated with Western societies to produce a spectacle terror. The attacks evoked a global specter of terror that the very system of globalization and Western capitalism and culture were under assault by the spirit of terrorism and potential terrorist attacks anytime and anywhere” (Kellner, 2005: 2).

Is terrorism a result of globalization? Kellner, reading Baudrillard, has an alternative answer to this. Although social theorists are accustomed to think globalization as a type of new matrix, an economic matrix based on the encounter of the market, the technology,

tourism, migration with culture, for Baudrillard, globalization represents an attempt to undermine the democracy and human rights. Once globalization cemented a much broader process of homogenization, which means “standardization,” it contradicts the nature of democratic life, the respect for minorities and subjects. To put this in other terms, globalization exhibits a systematic attempt to efface the individual nature of human beings (Kellner, 2005). In this respect, the postmodern state seems to be a creator of paradoxes. By intervening in one direction to prevent the worse others unexpected risks arise. This was for example, what triggered the conflict in Afghanistan that led towards 9/11. As Mohammed Ayob observed,

“It is indeed ironic that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were in large part the direct consequence of the externally induced collapse of the state of Afghanistan, for which the United States bore much of the responsibility. It was the absence of political order in Afghanistan that provided Al-Qaeda with the opportunity and the space to plan and execute the attacks on the United States” (Ayob, 2009: 109)

Nobel Prize in literature, W Soyinka admitted that 9/11 did not surprise him. From that moment onwards, international public opinion (even in Africa) experienced a new climate of fear, in spite of the previous experiences of political terror. Soyinka believes the world has faced extreme situations of panic before 9/11 ranging from Nazism and the Second World War to nuclear weapon testing. One of the aspects of global power that facilitates this feeling of uncertainty seems to be the lack of a visible rivalry once the USSR collapsed. The politic terror promulgated by states diminishes the dignity of enemies. These practices are rooted inside a territory but paved the way for a new form of terrorism which ended in the World Trade Center attacks. It is incorrect to see 9/11 as the beginning of a new fear but as the latest demonstration of the power of an empire over the rest of the world. Mass communications, though, transformed our ways of perceiving terrorism even if it did not alter the conditions that facilitate the new state of war. Soyinka examines the current connection between power and freedom. Unlike classical totalitarian States which are constructed by means of material asymmetries, the quasi-States construct their legitimacy by denouncing the injustices of the World. Quasi-States are not only terrorist cells but also mega-corporations which work in complicity producing weapons for one side or the other. Making profit of human suffering is a primary aspect that characterizes these quasi-states. The uncertainty these corporations engender denies the minimum codes of war by emphasizing the inexistence of boundaries and responsibilities. Once rectitude has been substituted by the right to exercise power, pathways towards a moral superiority are frustrated. Unlike the disaster of the Napalm-bombing of non-combatants by the United States in Vietnam, this new war-on-terror is characterized by targeting innocents as a primary option. In opposition to conventional wars, war-on-terror expands fear under the following two assumptions: a) hits can take place anywhere and anytime, and, b) there is no limits on brutality non-combatants. Wars depend on the capacity to control others based on the principle of power. Governments often need the material resources of their neighbors. Where the expropriation method of capitalist trade fails, war finds success. One might speculate that war should be understood as an extension of economic production (Soyinka, 2005)

In next section, we will discuss the role of the media in the coverage of natural and made-man disasters. It is important to clarify, while the nature between terrorism and disasters

differ, not surprisingly, the ways audience receives the news are alike. Then, the psychological impact of terror in western citizens is handled following the same dynamic.

NATURAL DISASTERS AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Terrorism is not the only affordable resource for the media to create an atmosphere of terror in society. The advent of new century brought unexpected and frightful events as Katrina hurricane, the Tsunami of Sri Lanka, accompanied with the outbreak of a great variety of mortal viruses. Undoubtedly, as Castel puts it, we live in a society where risks are inflated in a way to keep the order within the society.

As the previous backdrop, Marc Abélés explores the role played by nation states and anthropology in the process of globalization. Beyond the discussion whether nation-state has declined or not, Abeles acknowledges that conditions of production not only are more flexible but has reached a hyper-mobility in the world. The digital technology connects now peoples in seconds, distributing information from one to another corner of the globe. However, he adds, global times mean global threats. Terrorism is today accelerating the process creating inter-alliances among states. The cipher of ONGS has been duplicated over the last decades to the extent to work in conjunction to states respecting to preventive policies and programs. The economy of survival paves the ways for the advent of a new type of governance where ONGs plays a vital role in preventing risks or mitigating the effects of disasters. However, at the bottom, the old logic of exploitation, enrooted in the late-capitalism persists. This happens because ONGs are not designed to change the asymmetries between poor and rich countries.

In this token, Naomi Klein (2007) has called the attention to what she dubbed the “shock culture.” Witnessing a new type of economy, which takes disasters as opportunity for new business, Klein explains global leaders not only take the opportunity of crises to impose policies otherwise would be neglected by the citizens, but use fear to undermine the political upheavals and resistances. This new capitalism of disaster is based on two relevant aspects, which deserve our attention in this review. The elite adopt financial assistance from international banks to reinforce their authority over other groups. At so doing, they move to luxuries gated neighborhoods (communities), at the time the whole population lives in relegated zones. Secondly, the application of shock to audience diminishes the psychological resistance of citizens to accept policies that benefits status quo.

M Korstanje (2014) has examined the media coverage of the last quake that hit Chile in 2010. Beyond the condition of life and the great devastation caused by this disaster, Chileans, their government and the media managed a TV Marathon in a couple of hours to get funds in assistance to the survivors. Although the altruism that characterized the show Chile helps Chile [Chile ayuda a Chile], the reasons of disasters were archived under the spectacle of charity. The same elite or businessmen who sold anti-seismic skyscrapers, which were not prepared to face real quakes, never were placed on trial by the government. They not only supported financially part of the destruction they contributed to create, but were covered by the media. This reminds that the spectacle of disasters is aimed at obscuring the reasons why these disasters happen; a type of simulacra where the human suffering becomes in a visual entertainment. Undoubtedly, Paul Virilio has placed a seminal text respecting to this slippery matter.

Although Virilio addresses the question of fear in a variety of his works, the University of Disaster evidences how Science manipulates the concept of risks to protect the interests of market to the extent to compromise the planet. The industry of insurance has expanded a great monopoly over the governance of states. Today, people are more concerned to prevent the effects of next risks, buying the last insurance, than in understanding the real reason of risks. The scientific knowledge produced in XIXth century was aimed at discovering the truth, for enhancing the citizens` quality of life. Rather, this new postmodern science, which receives funds from greatest financial poles of the world, is formatted to research only for investors to gain further profits. Scientists are educated to face, locate and mitigate risks by protecting the interests of profit-organizations (Virilio, 2010).

What this discussion leaves clear is that the adoption of risks, as for example, terrorism or global warming, alludes to the needs of weaving inter-state alliances, which keeps regulated by the global market. Although states keep certain autonomy respecting to their elite decision making process, no less true seems to be that main richer powers have more influence than peripheral countries. Then, whether 9/11 and the successive events show something, it is the possibility of industrial nations to form an international alliances to impose their own interests, visions and perspectives. The creation of risk, as an ideological discourse, is functional to the formation of a unique government (a great Leviathan) that poses its own law, and sovereignty in the world. In the society of terror only one government fixes the agenda of the rest. As debated in earlier sections, in the star wars episode III, the Empire consolidated once the conflict diluted. We need to think twice in this ...

THE LOGIC OF SURVIVING

In ever changing a globalized world, many states have seen the needs of associating to other state simply to survive. Rather, in other occasions, the association is imposed by hegemonic states creating economic asymmetries, which produce serious political instability. Following this, any alliance among states, as *primus inter pares*, supposes the regulation of supra-national institutions whose ends were oriented not only to protect the interests of involving parts but also regulating the negative effects of power asymmetries. The problem, precisely, lies in the fact that strong states reject the possibilities to be controlled by a third party alluding to a so-called decline of sovereignty, while smaller ones denounce the arbitrary policies imposed by super powers as US. England, even for years, resisted its adherence of EU stating cultural and economic incompatibilities with the continent. As Warleigh-Lack put it, what England mourned was the return to its glorious Imperial Past (Warleigh-Lack, 2010). Some of the barriers countries pose to accelerate or deter the integration, sometimes are only allegories that follow other retaliated interests. What is clear is that the archetypes of integrations are not unified up to date. The regional integrations go around diverse directions and in different ways. While some experts focus on the free-trade to create a much deep atmosphere of cooperation among states, others emphasize on their preference on security issues. What should be discussed in regional integration studies is the influence of EU in other markets as NAFTA, Mercosur, and ASEAN. Secondly, scholars should agree a new definition of region, which transcends the classical notion of sovereignty. Any agreement poses a serious challenge or problem of enforcement. The modern theory game has shown the

disputes emerged when two or more parties are oriented to maximize or minimize their interests. Any supranational delegation is resisted by all involving states, even in the NAFTA where the power asymmetries among USA, Mexico and Canada are stronger than other integrations.

Undoubtedly, Laursen proposes a new model to understand the comparative regional integration, based on the needs not to find other more local paradigms beyond the European Union experience. Put this in another way, institutionalism gave a very broad definition to guide human action outside the role played by culture. This theory, pays attention to the questions of surfacing identities and cultural values so that we can understand why some regimes face the institutional reforms successfully while others do not. If we start from the premise that Europe is experiencing an identity re-emerging (European-centrism), one might question how democratic would be this tendency?, are regionalism a sign that denotes the decline of democracy? Is democracy compatible with regional integration?

From Kant onwards, nobody has questioned with profundity on these slippery matters. At a first glance, this excellent books provides a critical view of regional integration theory, based on the belief that power, although many realist scholars do not accept, affects the institutions of democracy generating serious exceptions to rules and norms; exception that are given by the power or economic asymmetries the same movement creates. The dichotomy between small and strong states is given by their sizes, economies, and military-machines. Whilst the former are prompted to associate with other before the threats of globalization, the later takes advantage on their technological hegemony to protect or expand their interests. The 9/11 and subsequent war on terror declared by Bush's administration accelerated the things in one direction, this means the needs of imposing new free-trade agreement with small economies, but at the same time, strengthened the control though the Mexico-US border. The securitization of borders has included concerns not only respecting to terrorism, but drug-traffic, illegal migration and working conditions (Laursen, 2010).

As the previous argument given, it is necessary to delve into the scenario of Latin America, which is self-explanatory. In what is a pungent investigation, N. Chavez sets in motion the idea nations struggle against terrorism not by the destruction it generates, but by stopping the blue-collar workers migrations. It is evidenced a strong connection between 9/11 as a founding event and the international affairs of US. At some extent, perpetrators of this attack not only had a legal residency in US, but also changed the ways this country considered the migration. Simply because they were migrants, the problem of migration was on the agenda of officials. In the same token, the construction of what Chavez calls, the doctrine of national safety appealed to a just state which has the right to intervene in case of future attacks, or potential hazards. Though, drug-abuse and narco-traffic was a big problem to diverse American administrations, 9/11 accelerated the conditions to weave a national discourse about home-land safety.

It is clear how US has historically built its bilateral international policies based on the doctrine of manifest destiny, which conferred to Americans the ethic authority not only to determine what is or not wrong, but to expand its exemplary civilization to other non-democratic nations. The external world is given by some sectors of national politics as something instable, uncertain and hostile. Neo-conservatism, a wave originated by the ideal of preemption war during Reagan's government, migrated sooner to Bush's presidency to occupy privileged appointments. Per the ideology of this movement, US as the strongest power in the world should intervene if necessary any nation with the end of regulating

democracy and peace, even in case of an imminent threat. Of course, this tough policy faced serious problems to overcome Clinton, and Bush father presidency, who were convinced that market and mutual cooperation aid programs will make of the world a safer place not only for everyone. Rather, Neo-conservatism found in the character of George Walker Bush a fertile ground to arrive, but envisaged the opportunity of 9/11 as the platform for US to conduct a preventing war against “terrorism.” Last but not least, Chavez proposes to understand how the discourse of neo-conservatism weakened the democratic institutions of the country to the extent to suffer a profound re-structuration of law and jurisprudence. The construction of homeland safety, Chavez adds, starts from the premise of a potential threat against the vulnerable American citizenry or to the financial powers, in hands of asymmetrical forces which do not respect the classical codes of war. As a consequence, the administration monopolized, controlled any internal or external situation which would be hostile to the government. This changed the ways narco-traffic and migration was monitored to the moment. Bush’s government alludes to the sense of emergency, given by the tragedy of 9/11, to impose policies otherwise would be rejected. The archetype of an instable world helps to legitimate a “preventive war” that allows US direct intervention in autonomous but suspected nations. Though for Ecuadorians, Colombia represents a serious problem to solve, they believe the narco-traffic should be internally controlled. Undoubtedly, post 9/11, Colombia was the excuse of US to show how danger the migration and narco-traffic was for western modern states. Supporting also Colombia in its struggle against narco-traffic is necessary to prevent terrorism. The discourse of neo-conservatism, that way, signals to traffic as a sign of terrorism. The elements of securitization made from worker union, mass migration and narco traffic new threats to defeat. Conducive to the status-quo view, the Patriotic act, reinforced the needs to impose the reason of state on the legal jurisprudence. The individual rights, in the cradle of democracy, set the pace to the urgency of efficiency (Chavez, 2008).

CONCLUSION

After the financial crash of New York that changed the economical geographies of the world, analysts are discussing to what extent the old dichotomy between centre and its periphery is experiencing a new re-feudalization, similarly to the Middle Ages post Roman Empire’s collapse or the main powers are being coalesced into blocs. Far from being circular dynamics, these blocs will be united in only one. Centered on the latter hypothesis, we pose the dilemma of risk, as it has been studied by social scientists, as an ideological discourse consistent to the permeation of market into nation-state. Secondly, risk would serve as a fertile ground to move resources, otherwise would be stagnated, so that elite may centralize and solidify “extractive institutions” to enhance the economic performance. Through the former centuries witnessed a stage of decentralization, where the scattered nations struggle each other to prevail, two World wars and the onset of XXIth, brought another reality. The war of all against all, predicated by Hobbes sets the pace to the war of few blocs to yield a supreme authority over the rest. The theory of globalization is reluctant to explain how the world tends to a centralization of resources and violence. Here we come across with a paradox, if the XXth century posed a lot of states making the war to forge their own identity (as it was the case in Europe and US who participated in two total wars), within the state a

sentiment of nationhood persisted over other counter-reactions. Citizens not only were twinned to embrace a same history and heritage, but also suspended the internal violence against their brothers. At time the boundaries of states were liberated, to adopt globalization as a main doctrine, external states woven more pacts and alliances to protect their citizens, but paradoxically, it created an internal point of conflicts as never before. The economies of post liberal societies had big problem to regulate the conflicts internally. As Big Brother or the Hunger Game, the neo-capitalist state stimulates the extreme competition where the social Darwinism reigns. As a result of this economies precaritize the conditions of life (work) of workforces. The allegory of capitalist systems alludes to the facts that few regulate the life of the whole. Those who participate in this game do not know that only one will be winner, so they are over-confident of their own skills and possibilities. Undoubtedly, this is the illusory discourse of capitalism to keep the workforce under control. Although externally, states decline to make the war as an option to redeem disputes, internally, peoples are pitted against their neighbors. This seems to be exactly the grounds where terrorism operates. As Howie explained, one of the main problems of terrorism is not the surprise-factor, but the tendency to distrust of our neighbors. After all, terrorists are like us, live like us, are similar to us. Gradually, states will tend to coalesce into other state forming stronger structures of powers, while internally a wealth of riots, conflicts and disintegrations will come into effect in the next decades.

REFERENCES

- Abeles, M. (2006). Globalization, Power and Survival: an Anthropological Perspective. *Anthropological quarterly*, 79(3), 483-508.
- Achcar, G. (2006). *The Clash of Barbarisms*. The Making of the New World Disorder. Paradigm Publishers; London: Saqi.
- Altheide, D. L. (2003) "Notes towards a Politics of Fear." *Journal for Crime, Conflict and the media*, 1 (1): 37-54
- Altheide, D. L. (2004). Consuming terrorism. *Symbolic Interaction*, 27(3), 289-308.
- Altheide, D. L. (2006). Terrorism and the Politics of Fear. *Cultural Studies↔ Critical Methodologies*, 6(4), 415-439.
- Ayoob, M (2009) "State making, state breaking, and state failure." In *Leashing the Dogs of War, conflict management in a divided world*. C. Crocker, F O Hampson & P Aall (editors). Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace press, pp. 83-114.
- Baudrillard, J. (1989). *The Transparency of Evil: essays on extreme phenomena*. Barcelona, Anagrama.
- Baudrillard, J. (1995a). *The systems of the objects*. Mexico, Siglo XXI.
- Baudrillard, J. (1995b) *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place*. Sydney, Power Publications.
- Baudrillard, J. (2006). "Virtuality and Events: the hell of power." *Baudrillard Studies*. Vol. 3 (2). July. Available at <http://www.ubishops.ca/BaudrillardStudies/>. Bishop's University, Canada. Version translated by Chris Turner.
- Bauman, Z. (2011) *Society under Siege*. Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Bauman, Z., & Lyon, D. (2013). *Liquid surveillance: A conversation*. Cambridge, Polity Press.

- Beck, U. (2006). *Risk Society. Towards a new modernity: hacia una nueva modernidad*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Beck, U. (2011). "Convivir con el Riesgo Global." *En La Humanidad Amenazada: gobernar los riesgos globales*. D. Innerarity y Solana, J (Editores). Madrid: Paidós, pp. 21-32.
- Bellamy, A. J. (2005). Is the war on terror just? *International Relations*, 19(3), 275-296.
- Brown, M (2009) "New Global Dangers." In *Leashing the Dogs of War, conflict management in a divided world*. C. Crocker, F O Hampson & P Aall (editors). Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace press, pp. 39-52.
- Castel, R. (1983). *From dangerousness to risk*. ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES, (47-4), 119-127.
- Chavez, N (2008) [When the worlds converge, terrorism, narco-traffic and migration post 9/11]. *Cuando Los Mundos Convergen, terrorismo, narcotráfico y migración post 9/11*. Quito, FLACSO Ediciones.
- Dammert, L., & Arias, P. (2007). El desafío de la delincuencia en América Latina: diagnóstico y respuestas de política. *Seguridad y violencia: desafíos para la ciudadanía*. FLACSO, 21-66.
- Diken, B. (2011). "Militaryization as comedy of t(error). *Economía Autónoma*, 4(7), 72-92.
- Diken, B., & Laustsen, C. B. (2002). Zones of indistinction security, terror, and bare life. *Space and culture*, 5(3), 290-307.
- Douglas, M. (1992). *Risk and Blame*. New York: Routledge.
- Douglas, M. (2007). *Pureza y Peligro: un análisis de los conceptos de contaminación y tabú*. Buenos Aires, Nueva Visión.
- Duclos, D. (1987). "Le Risque: une construction sociale?" En J. Fabiani, y J Thyès. *La Societéé Vulnérable*. Paris, *Ecole Normale Supérieure*, pp. 91-92.
- Flaxman, G & Rogerson, B (2011) "The Economy of fear." *Symploke*, 18 (1-2): 333-336.
- Foucault, M. (1992). *Microfísica del Poder*. La Piqueta, Madrid.
- Foucault, M. (2000). *Los Anormales*. Curso en el College de France. 1974-1975. Fondo de Cultura Económica. Buenos Aires.
- Foucault, M. (2006). *Seguridad, Territorio y Población*. Fondo de Cultura Económica. Buenos Aires.
- Foucault, M. (2008). *El Nacimiento de la Clínica*. Siglo XXI. Buenos Aires.
- Fraisse, P. (1973). "Las Emociones." En *Motivación, Emoción y Personalidad*. P. Fraisse y J. Piaget (compiladores). Buenos Aires: *Editorial Paidós*. Pp. 106-187.
- Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern age*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Giddens, A. (1999). *Consecuencias de la Modernidad*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
- Gray, C. S. (2007). The implications of preemptive and preventive war doctrines: A Reconsideration. *ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA*.
- Hobbes, T., (1994). *Leviathan: with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668* (Vol. 2). New York, Hackett Publishing.
- Howie L (2012) *Witnesses to Terror: Understanding the Meanings and Consequences of Terrorism*. Hampshire, Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Ignatieff, M. (2013). *The lesser evil: Political ethics in an age of terror*. New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

- Kellner, D. (2005). "Baudrillard, Globalization and Terrorism: some comments in recent adventures of the Image and Spectable on the occasion of Baudrillard's 75th birthday." *Baudrillard Studies*. Vol. 2 (1). January. Available at <http://www.ubishops.ca/BaudrillardStudies/>. Bishop's University, Canada.
- Kessler, G. (2009). *El sentimiento de inseguridad: sociología del temor al delito*. Siglo Veintiuno Editores.
- Klein, N. (2007). *The shock doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism*. London, Macmillan.
- Korstanje, M. E. (2011). "Why risk why now? Conceptual problems around the risk perception in tourism industry." *Revista Brasileira de Pesquisa em turismo*, 5(1): 4-22.
- Korstanje, M E (2014a). Chile helps Chile: exploring the effects of earthquake Chile 2010. *International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment*, 5(4), 380-390.
- Korstanje, M. E. (2014). "Why Risk-Research is More Prominent in English Speaking Countries in the Digital Society." *International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism (IJCWT)*, 4(1), 8-18.
- Korstanje, M. E. (2015). El papel del riesgo en la configuración de las sociedades anglosajonas. *Estudios Sociales: Revista de investigación científica*, 23(45), 283-307.
- Korstanje, M. E., & Clayton, A. (2012). Tourism and terrorism: conflicts and commonalities. *Worldwide Hospitality and Tourism Themes*, 4(1), 8-25.
- Levenson, R. W.; Ekman, P. and Friesen, W.W. (1990). "Voluntary facial expression generates emotions-specific nervous system activity." *Psychophysiology*, 27: 363-384.
- Laursen, F. (2010) *Comparative Regional Integration. Europe and Beyond*. London. Ashgate Publications.
- Locke, J. (1993). *Two Treatises of Government*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Luhmann, N. (2006). *Sociología del Riesgo*. [The sociology of Risk] México City, Universidad Iberoamericana.
- McCauley, C., & Moskaleiko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways toward terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 20(3), 415-433.
- Oliver-Smith, A. (2002). "Theorizing disasters, nature, power and culture?" In Hoffman, S. and Oliver-Smith, A. (Eds.), *Catastrophe and culture: the anthropology of disasters*. Oxford: *School of American Research James Currey*, pp. 23-47.
- Panksepp, J. (1982). "Toward a General psychobiological theory of Emotions." *The Behavioural and Brain Sciences*. Vol. 5 (407-467).
- Piazza, J. A. (2007). Draining the swamp: Democracy promotion, state failure, and terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern countries. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30(6), 521-539.
- Piazza, J. A. (2008). Incubators of terror: do failed and failing states promote transnational terrorism? *International Studies Quarterly*, 52(3), 469-488.
- Richardson, J. (2010). "The certainty of uncertainty: risk management revisited." *Foresight*. Vol. 12 (4): 47-64.
- Skoll, G. R. (2007). Meanings of terrorism. *International Journal for the Semiotics of Law- Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique*, 20(2), 107-127.
- Skoll, G. R., & Korstanje, M. E. (2012). Risks, totems, and fetishes in Marx and Freud. *Sincronía*, (2), 11-27.
- Sennett, R. (2011). *The corrosion of character: The personal consequences of work in the new capitalism*. New York, WW Norton & Company.
- Soyinka, W. (2005) *The Climate of Fear. The quest for dignity in a dehumanized World*. New York, Random House.

-
- Schmitt, R. (1995) *Beyond Separateness*. Boulder, Westview press.
- Skinner, Q. (1964). "Hobbes's 'Leviathan'." *The Historical Journal*, 7(02), 321-333.
- Stampinsky L (2014) *Disciplining Terror: how experts invented Terrorism*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Sunstein, C. R. (2002). *Risk and reason: Safety, law, and the environment*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Sunstein, C. R. (2005). *Laws of fear: Beyond the precautionary principle* (Vol. 6). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Tierney, K. (1994). "Sociology's Unique Contributions to the Study of Risk." Disaster Research Center, Preliminary Paper, 204.
- Timmermann, F (2015). *El Gran Terror. Miedo, Emocion y discurso Chile 1973-1980*. Santiago, Ediciones Copygraph.
- Urry, J. (2007). *Mobilities*. Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Virilio, P (2010) *The University of Disaster*. Cambridge, Polity Press.
- WarLeigh-Lack, A (2010) "The EU in comparative perspective: comparing the EU and Nafta." In Laursen, F. Comparative Regional Integration. *Europe and Beyond*. London, Ashgate. pp 43-42.

EPILOGUE: THE ALLEGORY OF VIOLENCE IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM

As it has been debated in the earlier sections, capitalized societies seem to develop an uncanny attachment to violence. As R. Tzanelli and M Korstanje have put it, the significance of image management relates to a stage of “museumification,” where wars allow ethno genesis to forge nation-building (Tzanelli, 2008; 2011; 2013; 2014; Korstanje, 2013). Although, international mega events as FIFA World CUP or Olympic Games are selected as targets of terrorism, Rodanthi Tzanelli evinced the contrary. Violence is embedded with our current means of production. In her book, *Olympic Ceremonialism and the Performance of National Character* (2013) she explores the “allegory of Britishness” as an ideological instrument of colonization and control. Historically, Olympic Games have been created to avoid the real war-fare. It activates a type of gift-exchange among involving tribes. However, one of the aspects that cemented the ideological power of capitalism relates to the possibility to create “nation-making up.” This seems to be her points of departure when “the ceremonialism” of London (2012) is placed under the lens of scrutiny. The main thesis of this book is that “cultural industries,” and “tourism” have created a new type of “economies of thought,” which re-shape the national-being according to the interests of market. Those aspects of history which adjusts to the patterns of mass-consumption are selected to become the heritage of “an imagined community,” which commoditized by being consumed by tourist-gaze, leads audience towards an ideological message. Beyond the boundaries of Europe, culture not only is commoditized to be visually consumed by tourism demand, but mobility is presented as a crucial aspect of civilizing process. Movement and progress have been of paramount importance in illuminating West’s life.

In our post-modern times, audience is molded and captivated by tourism and art. Media events re-create a specific allegorical imperative that produces an economy of thoughts. This term may be equaled to the conception of economies of signs proposed by Urry and Lash. According to their argument, the traditional forms of production have been substantially changed. Now merchandises are fabricated with an added value (sign) which determines not only its price of exchange, but also how social relationships are articulated. This engenders a special morality for workers (categorical imperative in Kantian terms). The success of these games does not rest on visual technology, but on the ability to combine categorical with allegorical imperatives. Both ceremonials, Brazilian and British kept the same universal spirit to replicate the logic of capital although it is important not to loose the sight that each one sought its cultural difference as a criterion of attraction.

This allegorical imperative produces “imagined landscapes” to negotiate a new sense of aesthetic. The success of this allegory is given to say others how the world is, what the significant cultural values to follow are. In similarly with Nicole Guidotti-Hernandez, Tzanelli says, that allegorical interlude represents a pervasive tends to imagine history through the eyes of present. In doing so, it resolves a dichotomy between two opposed terms. The archetype of Olympic Games allows the encounter between the universal natures of categorical (ancient games) into the allegorical-imperative (nationhood). The spectacle of Olympic Games are far from being real, but enables a pro-active participation of consumers to achieve a type of “synaesthesia,” which means that the event combines visual arts, emotions, experiences and monetary capital to forge a “character.” The inter-ethnic diversity seems to be exploited to re-create a unique spirit of arts. The main thesis of Tzanelli may be put in the following terms:

“In ceremonies we do not deal with common workers but with spectacles akin to the working-class utopia of tourism-related migrations in which standardized symbols of leisure such as sun and sea function as cultural capital and means of upward social mobility” (p. 16).

What it is paradoxical situation seems to be that at the time, tourism connotes an allegory to transcend all cultures, a type of new global story abound mankind, or “unique experience,” we do not let imagining the conflict is dormant in the core of our “civilized societies.” What is more than important to discuss is to what extent, riots as London 2012, or protests as Brazil 2014 are part of a much broader issue, which is not being studied. We live in conflictive and violent societies every day, which is silenced by the disciplinary mechanism of control monopolized by state and market. Media events or ceremonials as London 2012 offer the utopia that fulfils the frustrations of a “disenchanted” secular world but at the same time, it reinforces the material asymmetries whereby capitalism has expanded. She reminds that at the bottom, we all need to believe in something else than we see. Gods, nations, parents not only are symbolic protectors they are mediators between the centripetal and centrifugal forces of our existence. In other terms, utopias resolve the contradictory nature of life; the paradox of living to witness how others die. This seems to be exactly the stepping stone emulated by hospitality where scarcity and prosperity converge. Tzanelli’s diagnosis on capitalism does not focus on terrorism, but still is useful for our final conclusions.

To cut the long story short, the problem of terrorism depends on the angle it is examined. Normal-wise, we are being educated to think the act of hostage-taking is a practice that defines the Muslim World. The media and the allegory of terrorism intend dissuading audience “terrorism and religion” are inextricably intertwined. Like Tzanelli’s book which discusses the covered violence in our Western societies, another pungent book places the “western cultural values” under the lens of scrutiny.

Within academic circles, scholars discuss to what extent terrorism surfaced over last years as a result of the decline of democracy, or in the dawn of an institutional crisis as never before (Chomsky, 1990; 2002; Skoll 2007). Others focus on the practice of hostage-taking in Middle East as one of the signs that marks how the theory of the clash of civilizations is correct (Huntington, 1996). However, the hostage-taking, as professor Walid Amin Ruwayha shows, is a borrowed practice imported by British and other Empires to Arab countries. In his text, which is entitled *Terrorism and Hostage Taking in the Middle East*, Ruwayha gathers a great variety of documents and official that explains the anthropological roots of terrorism.

The overemphasis of western media in portraying Middle East and Muslim countries as responsible to assist, plan, and exercise terrorism rests on shaky foundations. There is a lot of British Foreign Office documents, which prove how the empire employed retention of relatives or hostages as a mechanism of discipline during its occupation. Therefore, the tactic of cruelty and taking hostage were never limited to Muslim culture, it was adopted by Muslims, once faced the brutality of British Empire. In Ruwayha's view, terrorism resulted from the advance of colonial powers in Asia.

The lack of interest of western scholars for Muslim literature, which offers a rich volume of studies that not only denounce the ebbs and flows of colonialism, but also validates an ethnocentric viewpoint of Otherness, was conjoined to a biased diagnosis of terrorism. Following this discourse, terrorism represents an act of "inhumanity" that defies any type of understanding and respect for life. The terrorist murder, unlike the crime passionnelle, calculates its attack to more vulnerable targets to cause political instability. Opening this book entails a trip towards the classified and secret information proper of colonial order. The merit of Ruwayha consists in triggering a hot debate about the roots of terrorism as they are today understood. The main thesis of this fascinating book seems to be the so called free world still is only free if consumers opt not to be capital owners. Simply, the dictatorship of copyright confers not only legal protection to producers, but also activates a legal jurisprudence to encourage consumption. The thousand million products fabricated in western societies, all them are reserved for being consumed by the workforce. At the time some groups attempt to change this dialectic relation, conflict arises. Inside, the concept of terrorist is fully used by status quo to mark those pressure groups which may cause damage to its privilege position. However, abroad, capitalist societies expand their hegemony by employing the instrument of violence of terrorism; this means extortion, torture, and even hostage-taking. The question whether terrorists (Muslims preferably) are portrayed by the mass media as "stupid or ignorant respecting to western technology and prosperity has been discussed as a part of "Islam-phobia," but less attention was given to the "demonization" of Islam as a war-like religion. Offering a fresh explanation, Ruwayha concurs that both mechanism works together by disciplining the international audience. Colonial powers (United Kingdom, and France) developed a wide system of kidnapping peoples (choosing sometimes hostage-takers) carefully with the end of creating a myth. The resulted stories were specially aimed to discredit some cultural values while exacerbating others. This was exactly what Guidotti-Hernandez dubbed "unspeakable violence." Beyond the fear these mechanism of control generates, states play a pervasive role by cementing the law the new colonized cultures should follow, but placing out of that law, those who are dysfunctional for the order. Although the book is torn between a sharp criticism to Zionism, which leads in some excerpts near to conspiracy and a one-sided argument, interesting points of discussion are highlighted to describe the daily life of Arabs during colonialism, their expectances and problems to understand extortion as a main value of West. Struggling against terrorism, to date, has no great results simply because policy makers, politicians and experts understand the roots of terrorism as a problem of the "Other," or as a pathology proper of undemocratic countries, other cultures which are in dialectical opposition to US. With his achievement and limitations, *Terrorism and Hostage Taking in Middle Age* gives a certain hint to see in the other side of the mirror, conceptualizing that the core of terrorism is not religion, but "extortion." In earlier studies, we have emphasized in the ability of West to build the necessary infrastructure to foment business and wealth. However, as L. Thurow puts it,

capitalism emerged successfully by its ability to allocating gains and losses in a type of sum-zero society where the bigger fish eats the small ones. In a world where winners and losers appeal to state to protect their own interests, extortion mediates to the system not to collapse. Those points some actors sacrifice are in view of the quest for major profit. A lot of the cultural values that shape terrorism are enrooted in the western division of labor (Korstanje, 2015). What still is evident is that, at time Anglo-Empire, and its doctrine of up-hill city, projects its values into a mirror to create a biased diagnosis of terrorism, new policies lead towards the configuration of one stronger monarch (Leviathan) that reigns in the earth for the next centuries.

REFERENCES

- Chomsky, N. (1990). *The culture of terrorism*. Black Rose Books Ltd.
- Chomsky, N. (2002). *Pirates and emperors, old and new: International terrorism in the real world*. London: Pluto Press.
- Guidotti-Hernandez, N. M. (2011). *Unspeakable violence: Remapping US and Mexican national imaginaries* (p. 374). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The class of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New Delhi, Penguin Books.
- Korstanje, M. (2014a). "Review: Dark Tourism and Place Identity." *Journal of Tourism and Cultural Change*. DOI: 10.1080/14766825.2014.892560.
- Korstanje, M. E. (2015). Review of "The 9/11 Commission Report: Final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States. *Essays in Philosophy*, 16 (1): 95-100.
- Lash S & Urry J. (1994) *Economies of signs and space*. London, Sage.
- Ruwayha, W A (1990) *Terrorism and Hostage-taking in the Middle East*. Paris, J. C. I
- Skoll, G. R. (2007). Meanings of terrorism. *International Journal for the Semiotics of Law- Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique*, 20(2), 107-127.
- Thurow, L C (1980) *The Zero Sum society: distribution and the possibilities of economic change*. New York, Penguin Books.
- Tzanelli, R. (2008). *Nation-Building and Identity in Europe: The Dialogics of Reciprocity*. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Tzanelli, R. (2011). *Cosmopolitan Memory in Europe's "Backwaters": Rethinking Civility*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Tzanelli, R. (2013a). *Heritage in the Digital Era: Cinematic Tourism and the Activist Cause*. London and New York, Routledge.
- Tzanelli, R (2013b) *Olympic Ceremonialism and the Performance of National Character, from London 2012 to Rio 2016*. Basingstoke, Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Tzanelli, R. (2014). "Business as Usual? Transforming Brazilian Slumscapes in Hyper-Neoliberal digital Environments." *The Sociological Imagination*, March 15, 2014, unpaginated. Accessed November 26, 2014, <http://sociologicalimagination.org/archives/15057>.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Professor Maximiliano Korstanje

University of Palermo, Argentina

Department of Economics

Larrea 1079

1414 Buenos Aires Capital Federal, Argentina

Email: mkorst@palermo.edu

maxikorstanje@arnet.com.ar

Maximiliano Korstanje is an anthropologist, and senior lecturer at the University of Palermo, Argentina with more than 800 published papers in the world, and 24 books. He is Visiting Research Fellow of the Sociology School at University of Leeds, UK and global associate of the International Society for Philosophers, Sheffield UK. In addition, Professor Korstanje is editor in chief of the *International Journal of Safety and Security in Tourism* and *International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism*. In 2012 he was awarded the certificate of “outstanding reviewer” for the *International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment*, University of Salford, UK. In 2013, the same award was conferred by *Journal of Place Management and Development*, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK for his brilliant role as editorial advisor. Co-editing five specialized journals and as a part of editorial board list of almost 40 journals in his specialization, his biography was included in the prestigious index Marquis Who’s Who in the World since 2010.

INDEX

#

9/11, xii, xix, 17, 20, 22, 25, 26, 29, 31, 32, 42, 57,
58, 59, 61, 68, 73, 74, 75, 76, 86, 89, 92, 107,
111, 113, 114, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 125,
133
9/11 Commission, 57, 133

A

access, 2, 9, 33, 51, 58, 91, 93
accessibility, 42
acculturation, 99
adaptation, 13, 24, 83, 93
administrators, 2
Afghanistan, 43, 74, 84, 119
Africa, viii, 80, 91, 98, 119
African Americans, 21
agencies, 58, 93
aggression, 62, 87
agriculture, 83, 91
airports, 57, 72
alcoholism, xviii, 72
alienation, 8, 39, 44, 71, 84
altruism, 120
ambassadors, 29, 114
American culture, 21, 26, 28, 30, 105
ancestors, 102
anthropologists, xi, xiii, 41, 80, 82
anthropology, 17, 33, 80, 81, 120, 126
anti-capitalism, 70
antithesis, 12
anxiety, 23, 34, 36, 37, 40, 41, 43, 54, 80, 103, 115
appointments, 122
Arab countries, 26, 130
Argentina, vii, xvi, 71, 94
arrests, 50
ASEAN, 121

Asia, 29, 43, 131
asymmetry, 17, 92
atmosphere, xi, xvi, 2, 14, 24, 26, 42, 93, 120, 121
authenticity, 66
authority(s), xii, xvii, 23, 34, 57, 58, 62, 64, 68, 69,
82, 83, 85, 101, 112, 120, 122, 123
automobile(s), 33, 43, 44
autonomy, 2, 16, 19, 58, 95, 98, 100, 121
aversion, 13, 22, 25, 63, 84

B

backwardness, xvii, 85, 94
ban, 70, 114
bankruptcy, 84
banks, 51, 104, 120
barriers, 9, 79, 102, 121
base, 1, 2, 3, 36
basic needs, 2, 3, 60, 81, 94
behaviors, 16, 113
belief systems, 34
benefits, 7, 8, 16, 20, 42, 49, 71, 73, 77, 116, 120
Bible, 88
biotechnology, 2
births, 49
Blacks, 98, 103
blame, xv, 58, 73
blood, 12, 59, 69
blue-collar workers, 122
Bolivia, 90
bonds, xii, xiii, xv, 8, 17, 84, 99, 101
Brazil, 71, 130
Britain, 25
brothers, 34, 39, 102, 124
brutality, 119, 131
building blocks, 34
bureaucracy, xvii, 13
Bush, President George Herbert Walker, 43

Bush, President George Walker, 22, 84, 123
 businesses, viii, 27, 52, 68

C

Cairo, 64
 caliber, 11, 48, 57, 66, 95
 campaigns, 22, 86
 capital accumulation, xvii
 capital markets, xv, xvii, 38
 capitalism, vii, ix, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, xvii, xviii, xix, xxi, 10, 12, 13, 16, 25, 39, 40, 43, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 73, 79, 80, 85, 94, 98, 99, 101, 102, 118, 120, 124, 126, 129, 130, 132, 135
 car accidents, 111
 carbon dioxide, 15
 Caribbean, 76
 case study, 12, 73
 castration, 34, 36, 37, 40
 catalyst, 70, 105
 catastrophes, 13, 14, 67
 Catholic Church, 48, 101, 102
 Catholics, 26, 54, 103
 censorship, 11, 15
 challenges, xiv, 16, 45
 chaos, xiii, 59, 62, 113
 character traits, 34
 Chicago, 31, 55, 69, 74, 107
 child rearing, 104
 childhood, xviii, 35, 65
 children, xx, 36, 53, 57, 104
 Chile, 47, 120, 126, 127
 China, 14
 Christianity, 37, 44, 100
 Christians, 24
 CIA, 70
 circulation, xix, 41, 42, 68
 cities, 26, 28, 52, 64, 88, 114, 117
 citizens, xiv, xv, xvi, 1, 2, 9, 15, 16, 17, 20, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 40, 47, 61, 65, 85, 93, 97, 103, 114, 115, 120, 121, 124
 citizenship, 2, 59, 60, 61, 100
 civil rights, 95
 civil war, 4, 69, 102, 112
 civilization, xv, 4, 22, 26, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 96, 100, 103, 105, 111, 117, 122
 class struggle, 70
 classes, 12, 34, 38, 61, 70, 116
 classical logic, 96
 classification, 48, 103
 cleavage, 98
 climate, xiv, 3, 13, 14, 15, 16, 40, 42, 57, 68, 101, 119
 climate change, xiv, 13, 14, 42
 cloning, 1, 2, 3
 closure, 102
 CNN, 58
 cocoon, 3, 25
 coding, 95
 cognition, 118
 Cold War, xvii, 19, 21
 collateral damage, 12, 64, 114
 collisions, 39
 Colombia, viii, 123
 colonization, viii, 3, 30, 98, 129
 commerce, xii, xix, 21, 55
 commercial, 60, 96
 commodity, xi, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 49
 common law, 93, 94, 95
 communication, 58, 83
 communism, xiii, 21, 70, 71, 104
 Communist Party, 45
 community(s), xviii, xx, 4, 8, 12, 14, 15, 18, 20, 24, 40, 41, 52, 62, 66, 67, 83, 85, 93, 97, 99, 100, 112, 116, 120, 129
 competition, xvii, 100, 118, 124
 complexity, xii, 9, 10, 16, 108
 compliance, 58
 compounds, 85
 comprehension, 29
 compulsion, 34
 computer, 10, 118
 conception, 3, 22, 95, 112, 129
 conceptual model, 52
 conceptualization, 68, 79
 condensation, 36
 configuration, xvii, 12, 23, 98, 112, 132
 conflagration, 81, 87
 conflict, xvi, xvii, 1, 12, 17, 25, 30, 35, 62, 63, 67, 70, 71, 74, 76, 81, 83, 84, 85, 93, 96, 97, 98, 102, 109, 119, 121, 124, 125, 130, 131
 conformity, 20
 Confucius, 39
 consciousness, 25, 38, 52, 69, 70, 116
 consensus, xv, 93
 consolidation, 23
 conspiracy, 21, 58, 131
 Constitution, 30, 106, 109
 construction, 11, 25, 29, 41, 67, 93, 94, 115, 122, 123, 125
 consumers, xix, 9, 10, 42, 51, 59, 60, 61, 72, 73, 118, 130, 131
 consumption, xix, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 42, 51, 59, 60, 61, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 73, 83, 99, 113, 129, 131

contamination, 42, 43
 contingency, 13, 65, 67, 86, 100, 113, 116
 contradiction, xix, 66, 68, 98
 convergence, 65, 99
 cooperation, 22, 81, 121, 123
 correlation(s), 26, 47
 corrosion, 112, 126
 corruption, xv, xvi, 3, 21, 74, 89
 cosmopolitanism, 78, 90
 cosmos, 24
 cost, viii, 16, 18, 60, 64, 103, 104
 course work, 12
 creativity, 82
 credentials, 14
 crimes, 63, 118
 criminals, 40, 114
 crises, 63, 84, 102, 112, 120
 critical thinking, xvi
 criticism, xvi, 8, 10, 14, 16, 65, 70, 91, 100, 113, 131
 cultural differences, 81, 86
 cultural heritage, 39
 cultural identities, 81
 cultural imperialism, 82
 cultural values, xiv, xvii, xix, xx, 20, 25, 42, 49, 67, 80, 86, 87, 93, 97, 122, 130, 131
 culture, xi, xii, xiv, 8, 22, 23, 25, 27, 29, 38, 43, 44, 47, 48, 52, 53, 54, 61, 66, 82, 83, 84, 86, 89, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 111, 115, 118, 119, 120, 122, 125, 126, 129, 131, 133
 customers, 72

D

damages, 11, 12
 danger, 12, 15, 21, 26, 30, 37, 41, 42, 48, 88, 94, 115, 116, 123
 dangerousness, 125
 dark sites, 66
 Darwinism, xi, xvii, xviii, 80, 124
 deaths, 70
 decentralization, xii, 14, 123
 decision-making process, 100
 decolonization, 63, 91
 decomposition, xii
 degradation, 12
 delinquency, 111
 Delta, 1
 democracy, xi, xiv, xv, xix, xx, 8, 11, 12, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 68, 76, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 108, 117, 119, 122, 123, 130
 democratization, 62, 84, 88

democrats, 95
 denial, xv, 24
 Department of Defense, 75, 89
 depreciation, 24
 designers, 69
 destiny, xi, xiv, xx, 2, 4, 23, 53, 93, 100, 101, 104, 105, 122
 destruction, 63, 67, 94, 120, 122
 detection, 10
 determinism, 24, 50
 deterrence, 118
 developed countries, 15, 62, 81
 developing nations, 14, 91
 devolution, xiii
 dialogues, 29
 dichotomy, xi, xviii, 1, 2, 40, 42, 98, 122, 123, 130
 dignity, 119, 126
 direct action, 93, 112
 disaster, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 47, 48, 51, 53, 55, 66, 67, 80, 86, 87, 113, 119, 120, 126
 discrimination, 13, 20, 28, 64
 disorder, xiii, 33
 displacement, 2, 36, 39
 disposition, 15
 dissidents, 73, 84
 dissociation, 1, 17, 23, 42, 111, 113
 distress, 11
 distribution, xxi, 84, 106, 133
 distribution of income, 106
 divergence, xv, 22
 diversity, 99, 103, 130
 division of labor, 59, 91, 132
 DOI, 133
 domestic issues, 92
 domestic violence, 49
 dream, 30, 36, 53, 86, 102, 103
 drug abuse, xviii

E

Eastern Europe, 29
 ecology, 8, 10, 13, 16, 52, 75, 89
 economic change, xxi, 133
 economic development, 94, 108
 economic growth, xviii, 14, 94
 economic institutions, xviii, 34
 economic performance, 123
 economic problem, xvii, 37, 113
 economic relations, 38
 economic theory, xvii
 economics, 18, 34
 Ecuador, 90
 education, xvi, 10, 27, 49, 52, 94, 103

egalitarianism, 70
 egoism, 3, 113
 Egypt, 73, 74, 100
 election, 117
 electricity, 7
 embargo, xii
 emergency, 9, 86, 123
 emotion, 111, 115
 emotional distress, xviii
 enemies, 18, 30, 40, 62, 64, 80, 92, 119
 energy, 3, 14, 15, 82
 energy security, 14
 enforcement, 121
 England, vii, xiv, 3, 17, 21, 47, 61, 73, 95, 96, 98, 99, 112, 121
 entrepreneurship, xiv
 environment, xiii, 1, 4, 12, 13, 18, 19, 52, 54, 83, 98, 100, 115, 127
 environmental degradation, 43
 environmental factors, 33
 environmental resources, 2
 epistemology, 9
 equality, 12, 49, 85
 equilibrium, 60
 erosion, 84
 estrangement, 38
 ethics, 13, 114, 125
 ethnic groups, 83
 ethnicity, 20, 62, 96, 103
 ethnocentrism, xv, xix, 8, 25, 26, 27, 29, 87, 88, 93, 102, 103
 eugenics, 80
 Europe, vii, xiv, 4, 19, 21, 22, 23, 29, 31, 39, 58, 68, 69, 70, 71, 80, 81, 82, 85, 88, 91, 92, 102, 107, 122, 123, 126, 127, 129, 133
 European Union, 122
 evacuation, 11
 evidence, xi, 15, 62
 evil, 22, 24, 26, 59, 61, 101, 111, 114, 115, 125
 evolution, xv, xviii, 1, 7, 12, 19, 25, 72, 102, 113
 exclusion, 64, 99
 executive branch, viii
 exercise, vii, xi, 3, 86, 119, 131
 expertise, 16
 exploitation, xx, 10, 24, 57, 68, 70, 72, 73, 91, 113, 120
 exports, 60
 extinction, 80
 extraction, viii, 40
 extremists, 25

F

FAA, 58
 facial expression, 126
 facilitated communication, 9
 factories, 67, 71
 failed states, 63
 faith, xi, xix, 23, 34, 59
 false belief, 3, 53
 families, 20, 70, 83
 famine, 85
 farmers, 26, 91
 FDI, 32
 fear(s), xi, xii, xiii, xix, xx, 7, 9, 11, 12, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 37, 40, 47, 48, 51, 53, 59, 61, 62, 65, 68, 70, 77, 79, 86, 93, 95, 96, 99, 104, 105, 111, 112, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 125, 127, 131
 feelings, 4, 12, 16, 34, 84, 111
 fertility, 49
 fights, 58
 financial, xv, xvi, 11, 19, 21, 29, 60, 66, 81, 86, 91, 92, 102, 120, 121, 123
 financial crisis, 60
 fish, 132
 flight(s), 58, 72
 floods, 13
 food, 39, 91
 force, v, xii, xiii, xvii, 4, 35, 49, 50, 57, 60, 61, 63, 68, 70, 71, 73, 84, 85, 91, 92, 93, 97, 99, 100, 112
 forecasting, 53, 54
 foreign language, 82
 foreign policy, 31, 106
 formation, 36, 60, 61, 70, 71, 84, 86, 109, 112, 114, 116, 121
 foundations, 22, 50, 131
 framing, 8
 France, xxi, 21, 44, 87, 91, 92, 125, 131
 free choice, xx
 free trade, 101
 free world, 131
 freedom, 16, 19, 24, 30, 48, 53, 59, 60, 84, 85, 87, 88, 93, 95, 98, 102, 115, 116, 117, 119
 freedom of choice, 53
 Freud, Sigmund, xiii, 1, 5, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 44, 45, 126
 funds, 120, 121

G

genocide, viii, 28, 67, 93
 genre, 26, 98

Germany, 69, 70, 75
 global communications, 82
 global leaders, 120
 global warming, 13, 14, 15, 16, 42, 43, 51, 92, 121
 globalization, xix, 9, 51, 79, 92, 116, 118, 120, 122,
 123
 God, vii, xi, 20, 24, 48, 53, 102, 105
 goods and services, xiii, xviii, xix
 google, 18, 47
 goose, 44
 governance, 95, 120, 121
 governments, xvii, 8, 14, 20, 30, 61, 63, 94, 117
 Great Britain, 19, 43, 92
 Greece, 16, 48, 69, 89, 99, 100, 101
 Greeks, 100
 greenhouse gas(s), 14
 grounding, 49
 group characteristics, 20
 growth, xiv, 52, 60
 Guam, viii
 guidelines, 13, 48
 guilt, xiv, 36, 40
 guilty, 62
 Gulf war, 50

H

Haiti, 47, 86
 happiness, xvi, 4, 116
 harbors, viii
 harmony, 24
 harvesting, 1
 hazards, 3, 22, 33, 43, 86, 122
 health, xviii, 7, 11
 health care, xviii
 health care system, xviii
 heart disease, 111
 hedonism, 2
 hegemony, xvi, 10, 17, 19, 20, 29, 33, 41, 50, 70, 82,
 83, 85, 94, 97, 98, 113, 118, 122, 131
 hepatitis, 1
 heroism, 63, 105
 historical reason, 118
 history, viii, xx, 9, 12, 22, 35, 39, 50, 51, 52, 57, 58,
 65, 68, 69, 72, 74, 77, 81, 82, 84, 89, 94, 106,
 113, 118, 124, 129, 130
 Hobbes, Thomas, 112
 homeland security, 58, 112
 Honduras, viii
 hospitality, xx, 2, 26, 29, 31, 53, 57, 63, 66, 112, 130
 hostility, 2, 24, 30, 31, 58, 69, 82, 101
 House, xxi, 18, 32, 126
 human activity, 43

human agency, xii
 human animal, 38
 human behavior, xiii, 23, 33
 human brain, 35
 human condition, 35, 116
 human development, 37
 human existence, 114, 116
 human ignorance, 7
 human nature, 4, 65, 112
 human resources, xiii
 human right(s), xiv, 19, 22, 85, 91, 93, 98, 119
 human will, 24
 humanism, 8
 Hurricane Katrina, 13, 66, 76
 hurricanes, 13
 husband, 53
 hybrid, 81
 hydrocarbons, 42
 hypocrisy, viii
 hypothesis, 64, 123
 hysteria, 25, 36

I

ideal(s), xx, 5, 16, 21, 64, 72, 102, 122
 identity, 1, 12, 23, 28, 62, 67, 68, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84,
 85, 106, 114, 122, 123
 ideology, xv, xvi, xvii, xix, xx, 8, 18, 22, 23, 26, 58,
 66, 86, 88, 94, 97, 101, 122
 idiosyncratic, 39
 illusion, xix, 34, 86, 88
 image(s), xiv, xv, 3, 4, 30, 36, 37, 44, 48, 51, 58, 61,
 63, 80, 83, 101, 118, 129
 IMF, xvi, 91, 92
 immigrants, 103
 immortality, 100
 immune system, 71
 imperialism, vii, viii, 19, 21, 22, 65, 73, 96
 imports, 60
 impulses, 22
 income, xviii, 20, 29, 69
 income distribution, 69
 income tax, 20
 independence, xv, 63, 98, 116
 India, 14, 74
 Indians, 96, 97, 106
 individual rights, 123
 individualism, 85
 individuality, 94, 113
 individuals, xviii, 39, 43
 indoctrination, xv, xvi, 2, 13, 61, 69, 79, 96, 104
 industrial organization, 70
 industrial revolution, 28, 69, 99

industrialization, xv, 17, 80
 industry(s), xx, 8, 13, 18, 26, 28, 42, 44, 51, 61, 63,
 64, 66, 72, 73, 74, 78, 83, 112, 121, 126, 129
 inefficiency, 95
 inequality, 40
 inequity, 40
 inferiority, 24, 87
 inflation, xiv, xvi, xix, 15, 16, 33
 infrastructure, 131
 inheritance, 20
 inheritance tax, 20
 injure, 101
 injuries, 70
 insecurity, 40, 64, 65, 68
 institutional reforms, 122
 institutions, xii, xvi, xvii, xviii, 3, 10, 20, 21, 22, 37,
 40, 58, 60, 68, 84, 94, 95, 98, 100, 114, 121, 122,
 123
 integration, 81, 121, 122
 integrity, 52, 82
 intelligence, 58, 80
 intentionality, 12
 international affairs, 19, 25, 30, 122
 international law, xiv, 22, 63, 93, 108
 International Monetary Fund (IMF), xvi, 91, 92
 international terrorism, 64
 international trade, 61
 intervention, 4, 11, 12, 33, 53, 58, 71, 91, 92, 96, 97,
 112, 123
 intimidation, 62
 intoxication, 11
 invasions, 43
 investment(s), 11, 32, 60, 83, 84, 93, 114
 investors, xi, 121
 ions, 16, 116
 Iran, 88
 Iraq, 43, 62, 78, 84, 90, 92, 93, 108
 Iraq War, 108
 iron, xvii, 50
 Islam, 43, 59, 61, 81, 83, 85, 88, 131
 Islamic world, 59
 Islamism, 19
 isolation, 21, 41
 isolationism, 92
 Israel, 15, 28, 108
 Italy, 69, 70

J

Japan, 88
 Jefferson, Thomas, 116
 Jews, viii, 34, 87, 103
 Jordan, 1, 2, 3

journalism, 12, 17, 117
 journalists, 61, 97
 jurisdiction, 95

K

Kenya, 76
 Keynesian(s), xv, 60
 kidnapping, 131
 kill, 15, 53, 72
 kinship, 99
 Korea, 84
 Kosovo, 92

L

landscape(s), xx, 57, 64, 66, 130
 language barrier, 27
 languages, xi, 27, 83
 Latin America, xv, xvi, xvii, xxi, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21,
 29, 70, 81, 82, 87, 91, 94, 96, 122
 Latinos, 103
 laws, viii, xv, xvii, 21, 22, 37, 38, 99, 100, 101, 105,
 112
 lawyers, 80, 95
 lead, xvii, 2, 9, 10, 14, 16, 23, 52, 59, 63, 71, 79,
 113, 115, 118, 132
 leadership, 59, 68
 learning, 24, 27, 29, 67, 88, 99
 legal protection, 2, 131
 legality, 40, 93, 94, 114
 legend, 105
 legislation, 99
 leisure, 1, 31, 61, 67, 130
 lens, xi, 15, 29, 52, 57, 63, 64, 65, 66, 81, 94, 97,
 129, 130
 level of education, 29
 liberalism, 59, 60, 81, 85, 90
 liberation, 101
 liberty, 8, 13, 17, 21, 22, 24, 35, 58, 61, 85, 94, 95,
 99, 101, 112
 life expectancy, 7
 light, xiii, 10, 27, 49, 135
 linguistics, 39
 liver, 1
 loans, 70, 91
 logicism, 52
 love, xviii, 25, 48, 49, 53, 94

M

machinery, 11, 13, 112

magazines, 28, 97
 magnitude, 13, 16
 majority, 13, 14, 28, 62
 management, xii, 51, 66, 76, 109, 113, 124, 125, 129
 manipulation, xviii, xix, 4, 7, 49, 80, 86
 mantle, 43
 marketability, 44
 Marx, Karl, xi, xiii, 45
 mass, xix, 8, 14, 15, 16, 19, 23, 34, 37, 51, 58, 60, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 70, 71, 99, 102, 111, 113, 118, 123, 129, 131
 mass media, xix, 8, 15, 51, 58, 67, 131
 masterpieces, 67
 material resources, 119
 materials, 39
 matrix, 22, 98, 103, 111, 118
 matter, viii, xiv, 11, 13, 26, 64, 71, 93, 100, 120
 media, xvi, 8, 14, 25, 51, 58, 73, 83, 105, 111, 117, 118, 119, 120, 124, 130, 131
 medical reason, 113
 Mediterranean, xiv, 47, 53
 melting, 69, 103
 melts, 34
 membership, 20
 memory, 63, 97
 mental illness, 113
 mercantilism, 12, 17
 merchandise, 67, 68
 messages, 67
 metals, 96
 metaphor, xviii, 4, 105
 methodology, 41
 Mexico, 21, 45, 58, 73, 74, 88, 89, 90, 94, 97, 98, 122, 124
 middle class, 20
 Middle East, xx, 15, 25, 29, 32, 42, 43, 77, 81, 83, 86, 87, 88, 126, 130, 131, 133
 migrants, xii, xix, 23, 58, 69, 70, 79, 81, 87, 96, 114, 122
 migration, 14, 19, 23, 28, 58, 69, 79, 83, 102, 119, 122, 123, 125
 militancy, 19
 military, vii, viii, xiv, xv, xvii, 22, 43, 62, 77, 84, 92, 117, 122
 minorities, 28, 43, 62, 93, 96, 102, 119
 mission(s), 53, 102
 misunderstanding, 30, 66
 models, 9, 19, 23, 42, 43
 moderates, 25
 Modern Age, 45, 55
 modern capitalism, 60
 modern economies, 94
 modern society, 3, 7, 16, 49

modernity, xi, xii, xviii, xxi, 10, 12, 13, 18, 41, 43, 49, 51, 62, 64, 112, 114, 116, 118, 125
 modernization, 83, 85, 94
 monopoly, xii, xiii, xvii, xix, 17, 42, 68, 70, 91, 97, 112, 121
 moral imperative, 93
 moral standards, 91
 morality, viii, 129
 morbidity, 65, 67
 Moscow, 77
 Moses, 34, 45
 multiculturalism, 97, 103, 104
 murder, viii, 131
 Muslims, 26, 61, 131
 mythology, xi, 4, 48, 52, 82, 100

N

NAFTA, 121
 narcissism, xx, 104, 105
 narratives, xx, 33, 42, 53
 nation states, 65, 71, 120
 national security, xiii, xvi, 43
 nationalism, 65, 78, 97, 98
 nationality, 25, 26, 29, 58
 nation-building, 129
 NATO, viii, 75, 92
 natural disaster(s), 14, 51, 87, 116
 natural hazards, 43
 negative effects, 57, 64, 71, 80, 93, 121
 neglect, 15, 52
 negotiation, xii, 22, 49, 69, 71, 73, 95
 neoliberalism, xv, xvi
 Nepal, 74
 nervous system, 126
 neuroses, 36
 New Deal, 69, 74
 New England, vii, 23, 24
 New Zealand, 19
 NGOs, xv
 Nixon, Richard, 43
 Nobel Prize, 119
 nobility, 20
 non-renewable resources, 12
 North America, xi, xiv, 82, 96, 98
 North Korea, 88
 Northern Ireland, 77
 novelty seeking, 63
 nuclear weapons, viii

O

obsessive-compulsive disorder, 33
 obstacles, 27, 77
 Oceania, 41
 Oedipus complex, 37
 officials, xv, xvi, 16, 28, 57, 64, 68, 122
 oil, xii, 15, 42
 Oklahoma, 75, 89
 omission, 12
 operations, 10
 opportunities, xix, 22, 27, 60, 67, 68
 oppression, 67, 96, 101, 103
 optimism, 49
 optimization, 49, 94
 orchestration, 16
 organ(s), xvi, xviii, 1, 2, 85
 organism, 35, 36, 115
 organize, xi, 70, 71
 otherness, 64, 79, 80, 99
 ownership, 38, 39
 ozone layer, 12

P

pain, 66, 103
 panic attack, 33
 parallel, 80
 paralysis, 115
 parents, 19, 36, 93, 95, 99, 101, 112, 130
 paternalism, 80
 pathology, 33, 84, 113, 131
 pathway(s), 60, 80, 84, 87, 114, 119
 peace, xx, 22, 57, 62, 63, 87, 93, 96, 112, 118, 123
 Pentagon, 57, 103, 118
 per capita GNP, xviii
 permeation, 123
 perpetrators, xii, 122
 personality, 41, 104
 personhood, 99
 Philadelphia, 106
 Philippines, viii
 phobia, 33, 41, 52, 131
 platform, 43, 48, 111, 118, 123
 Plato, 3, 39, 100
 police, viii, 50, 86, 118
 policy, xv, 2, 16, 26, 42, 43, 49, 51, 109, 123, 131
 policy makers, 16, 26, 131
 political enemies, 19
 political instability, xvii, 62, 63, 64, 69, 121, 131
 political parties, 70, 72
 political pluralism, 58

political power, vii, xviii, xix, 84
 politics, xii, xiii, xiv, xvi, xviii, 3, 21, 29, 31, 40, 41, 44, 48, 54, 59, 64, 68, 74, 76, 87, 89, 94, 97, 99, 100, 104, 106, 107, 108, 112, 113, 122
 popular vote, 100
 population, 11, 12, 14, 28, 33, 62, 79, 81, 82, 87, 92, 118, 120
 population control, 14
 population size, 14
 populism, 16
 postmodernism, 13
 poverty, xv, xvi, xviii, xxi, 39, 54, 59, 60, 66, 72, 91, 94, 102, 117
 pragmatism, xiii, 23, 93
 Precautionary Principle, 109
 precedent(s), 95
 predictability, 26
 prejudice, 69
 preparedness, 96
 preservation, 114, 115
 presidency, 43, 58, 92, 122
 president, 58, 81, 84
 pressure groups, xv, xix, 131
 prestige, 17
 prevention, 10
 probability, xix, 13, 15, 42, 115
 producers, 38, 61, 131
 profit, xviii, 39, 119, 121, 132
 project, xiv, 1, 10, 15, 21, 64, 91, 97, 103, 116, 135
 proliferation, 10, 17
 propaganda, viii, xi, xx, 57, 111
 propagation, 19
 prophylaxis, xx, 53
 proposition, 62
 prosperity, xvii, xviii, xxi, 3, 22, 60, 84, 93, 94, 130, 131
 protection, 12, 19, 41, 44, 52, 53, 65, 80, 100, 103, 104
 Protestants, 23, 48
 psychiatry, 1, 33
 psychoanalysis, 99
 psychological development, 36
 psychological distress, 11
 psychology, 27, 34, 63, 92, 95, 115
 public affairs, xv
 public life, xv, 41
 public opinion, xv, 8, 13, 14, 15, 42, 63, 117, 119
 Puerto Rico, viii
 punishment, 104
 purchasing power, xix, 10, 42

Q

quality of life, xviii, 8, 116, 121
questioning, xx, 37, 48

R

race, 69, 82, 97, 98, 102, 103
racial minorities, 43
racism, 20, 69, 87, 97
radicalism, 58
radicalization, 117, 126
radioactive contamination, 2
rationality, xvii, 13, 117
reactions, 37, 62, 92, 115, 124
reading, 15, 30, 31, 57, 82, 85, 87, 95, 106, 108, 118
realism, 118
reality, 1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 21, 24, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 45, 50, 51, 52, 92, 97, 114, 118, 123
reasoning, 14, 82, 114
receptor, 19
reciprocity, 92
recognition, 12
reconciliation, 24
reconstruction, 39
recovery, 66
recreation, 28
recreational, 8
redistribution, 88
reflexivity, 10
reform(s), 48, 98, 111
reformers, 23
regional integration, 121, 122
regionalism, 122
reinforcement, 67
reinsurance, 10
rejection, 13, 83, 92
relatives, 11, 131
religion, xx, 2, 17, 23, 26, 34, 35, 36, 37, 43, 44, 49, 52, 54, 59, 62, 74, 81, 83, 84, 85, 89, 98, 101, 130, 131
religiosity, 62
religious beliefs, 23, 104
replication, xix, 7, 16
repression, xii, xiii, xvi, 28
reproduction, xiii, xvii, 40, 49, 71, 113
requirements, 58
resentment, 23, 28, 30, 64, 72, 82, 84, 87, 88
reserves, 15, 17, 42, 91, 97
resilience, 67
resistance, xx, 60, 68, 97, 104, 120
resolution, 91, 95

resources, xii, xiii, xvii, xviii, 3, 15, 28, 41, 42, 47, 59, 67, 94, 96, 116, 123
response, xii, 16, 38, 68, 72, 87, 106
restaurants, xx, 57
restrictions, 41
retaliation, xiv
retirement, 20
rewards, 1, 24
rhetoric, vii
rights, 2, 21, 22, 28, 31, 40, 58, 91, 96, 97, 98, 99, 106, 107, 114, 117
risk aversion, 63
risk management, 9, 115, 117, 126
risk perception, xiv, xix, 10, 15, 25, 26, 31, 41, 47, 64, 126
risk society, 116
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (FDR), 59, 69
root(s), xi, xviii, 1, 20, 47, 57, 59, 66, 67, 70, 82, 83, 85, 93, 96, 98, 112, 130, 131
rules, xiii, 1, 22, 58, 118, 122
rural areas, 26
Russia, 70, 71, 77

S

sacred objects, 65
sadism, 23, 65, 66
sadness, 12, 53
safety, xvi, xviii, xix, 3, 7, 11, 29, 42, 51, 54, 76, 122, 123
sanctions, 24
Saudi Arabia, 15
scarce resources, xix, 42
scarcity, 130
scholarship, 58, 80, 91
science, xii, 3, 9, 10, 12, 14, 23, 28, 49, 50, 51, 52, 113, 121
scientific knowledge, 121
scientific method, 14
scope, xv, 11
sea level, 14
second generation, 23
Second World, 25, 92, 119
security(s), xiii, xvi, 1, 3, 12, 22, 26, 31, 38, 41, 43, 44, 49, 51, 61, 64, 68, 74, 80, 84, 87, 88, 93, 105, 106, 113, 116, 117, 121, 125
selective memory, 65, 96, 97, 98
selectivity, 99
self representation, 98
self-destruction, 54, 62
self-identity, 49, 125
self-interest, 113
sensation, 63

- senses, 16, 34, 37, 65
 September 11 (9/11), xii, xix, 11, 17, 20, 22, 25, 26, 29, 31, 32, 42, 57, 58, 59, 61, 68, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 86, 89, 92, 107, 111, 113, 114, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 125, 133
 services, xix, 42, 44
 sexism, 97
 sexual deviancy, 22
 sexuality, 37, 43, 49
 shape, 13, 70, 129, 132
 shelter, xvi, xvii
 shock, 26, 57, 112, 120, 126
 shortage, 86
 showing, xiv
 signals, 59, 63, 65, 84, 96, 113, 123
 signs, 24, 129, 130, 133
 simulation, 51, 52
 Sinai, 108
 slavery, viii, 40
 slaves, 40
 social activities, 12
 social behavior, 114
 social change, xvi, xix
 social class, 81
 social conflicts, xvi, 3
 social construct, 3, 8, 16, 17, 77, 115, 116
 social control, 8
 social costs, 92
 social exclusion, xviii
 social fabric, xx
 social hierarchy, 34, 43
 social influence, 62
 social institutions, xv, xvii, xix, 49, 100
 social interaction, 17, 41
 social life, xi, xiv, 10, 36, 41, 49
 social norms, 35
 social order, xii, xiii, 12, 19, 22, 35, 37, 38
 social perception, 115
 social problems, 15, 99
 social reality, 20
 social relationships, xii, 34, 38, 64, 84, 129
 social sciences, xii, xviii, 115, 116
 social situations, 33
 social status, 43
 social structure, xiii, 83
 social theory, 90
 social welfare, xv
 socialism, 60, 69
 socialization, xvi, 3, 12, 36
 sociology, xiii, 7, 9, 20, 43, 112, 115, 126
 software, 51, 52
 solidarity, 26, 40, 87, 115
 solution, xv, 14, 17, 36, 37, 53, 61, 114
 South America, 80
 South Korea, 78
 sovereignty, 86, 121
 Soviet Union, 81
 space-time, 8
 Spain, 61, 96
 specialists, 11, 19, 61, 71, 99, 118
 specialization, 40
 species, 38, 41, 103
 specter, 118
 speculation, xii, 73, 87, 95
 speech, 21, 22, 59, 84, 101
 Spring, 90
 Sri Lanka, 120
 stability, xvi, xvii, 12, 21, 70, 72, 97, 113, 114
 stakeholders, xvii
 standardization, 119
 Star Wars, 52, 53
 stars, 1
 statistics, 10, 33, 64
 steel, 44, 69
 stereotypes, 85, 102
 stimulation, 36, 47, 79
 stimulus, 115
 stratification, 40, 43
 structuralism, 50
 structure, xii, 21, 23, 62, 68, 81, 92
 style(s), 3, 12, 20, 21, 22, 62, 81, 85, 87, 88, 93, 98, 100, 101
 subjective experience, 115
 subjectivity, 109
 subsistence, 38, 40, 96
 substitutes, 51
 suicide, 2, 3, 58, 87
 suicide attacks, 87
 superego, 36
 supernatural, 37
 supplier, 2
 Supreme Court, 21, 94, 95
 surplus, 23, 40
 surveillance, 44, 113, 114, 124
 survival, 4, 82, 101, 115, 120
 survivors, 66, 67, 86, 120
 Sustainable Development, 75
 Sweden, 83
 symmetry, 92
 sympathy, 86
 symptoms, 35, 36, 37
 synchronize, 51
 synthesis, 102
 Syria, 99

T

tactics, xii, xvi, xx, 13, 14, 49, 54, 57, 59, 72, 92, 111
 target, 62, 64, 73, 80
 taxes, 93
 techniques, 1, 9, 83, 100
 technological advances, 7, 39, 72
 technology(s), xi, xix, xx, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18, 42, 47, 49, 51, 52, 54, 63, 65, 82, 83, 87, 111, 114, 116, 118, 120, 129, 131
 temperament, 24, 53
 temperature, 13, 14
 tension, 98, 100
 territorial, 97
 territory, 7, 62, 93, 97, 119
 terrorist acts, 62, 63, 72
 terrorist attack(s), xii, xix, 26, 28, 29, 31, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65, 71, 73, 77, 80, 87, 116, 117, 118, 119, 133
 terrorists, xii, xx, 3, 43, 57, 58, 62, 68, 69, 71, 73, 85, 86, 87, 117, 118, 124, 131
 testing, 20, 35, 119
 therapy, 45
 Third World, 74, 85
 threats, xii, 3, 11, 14, 19, 25, 26, 36, 41, 43, 57, 60, 63, 100, 111, 114, 116, 117, 120, 122, 123
 time-frame, 64
 torture, vii, viii, 26, 29, 65, 131
 tourism, xix, xx, 3, 20, 26, 28, 29, 31, 57, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 71, 73, 75, 76, 77, 78, 83, 97, 112, 117, 119, 126, 129, 130
 toxic waste, 12
 trade, 14, 17, 22, 39, 41, 43, 47, 49, 60, 62, 68, 71, 72, 76, 79, 83, 84, 92, 96, 113, 114, 119, 121, 122
 trade agreement, 122
 trade union, 68, 71
 traditions, xiv, xviii
 training, xvi, 103
 traits, 103
 trajectory, xiii, xx, 27, 104, 114
 transcendence, xi, xix, 24
 transference, 100
 transformation, 38
 transgression, 104
 transport, 8, 9, 13, 44, 52, 65, 68, 117
 transportation, 28, 44, 83
 trauma, 18, 25, 36
 treatment, 12, 34, 37, 115
 trial, 86, 120
 triggers, 12, 62, 64, 95, 112

U

Ukraine, viii, 71, 116
 unconscious processes, 36
 UNESCO, 89
 unions, xii, xx, 21, 59, 68, 69, 70, 72, 94, 99, 102, 112
 United Kingdom, 11, 96, 131
 United Nations, 22, 63
 United States (USA), vii, viii, xiv, xvii, xix, xx, 4, 13, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 33, 42, 43, 58, 61, 69, 70, 71, 76, 81, 84, 86, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 98, 104, 106, 107, 109, 112, 117, 119, 122, 124, 125, 133
 universality, 69
 universities, xii, 72, 83
 urban, 8, 26, 82, 91
 urban areas, 8, 91
 USSR, 119

V

vaccine, 41, 57, 71, 113
 validation, 28, 58, 113
 variables, 10, 94
 Vatican, xiv
 vein, xviii, xix, 8, 20, 27, 41, 47, 49, 51, 69, 71, 82, 87, 97, 99, 103, 114, 118
 velocity, 51
 Venezuela, 90
 vertigo, 51
 victimization, 62, 79, 86
 victims, xii, 13, 25, 29, 30, 44, 57, 59, 62, 63, 67, 86, 115, 116
 Vietnam, 43, 92, 119
 Viking, xiv
 violence, viii, xvi, 3, 21, 25, 26, 34, 40, 51, 61, 62, 63, 65, 69, 70, 72, 81, 86, 87, 91, 96, 97, 98, 112, 114, 117, 118, 123, 129, 130, 131, 133
 viruses, 120
 vision(s), 113, 121
 voting, xvii, 16, 69, 101
 vouchers, 72
 vulnerability, 40, 64, 72, 104

W

wages, 40, 60, 72
 war, 15, 22, 24, 36, 40, 43, 48, 50, 61, 62, 63, 65, 69, 71, 75, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 96, 98, 99, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 117, 119, 122, 123, 125, 129, 131

War on Terror, 75, 89
 Washington, xv, 15, 31, 76, 78, 109, 124, 125
 watches, 51, 53
 water, 37, 43
 weakness, 58
 wealth, ix, xvii, xviii, 3, 24, 28, 39, 59, 60, 88, 93,
 124, 131
 weapons, viii, xix, 10, 42, 63, 68, 72, 118, 119
 weapons of mass destruction, 10
 web, 11
 western culture, 80
 Western Europe, 75, 81
 wilderness, 3
 witchcraft, 10
 withdrawal, 115
 witnesses, 117
 workers, xii, xvi, 8, 11, 12, 21, 24, 40, 61, 67, 68, 69,
 70, 71, 72, 74, 102, 113, 129, 130
 workforce, xii, 21, 60, 67, 69, 94, 99, 102, 116, 124,
 131

working class, 19, 72
 working conditions, 72, 122
 working force, 102
 working hours, 69, 94
 World Bank, xvi, 91, 92
 world order, 133
 World Trade Center, 74, 79, 119
 worldwide, xvii, 8, 13, 27, 30, 57

X

xenophobia, 102

Y

Yale University, 27, 106
 yield, 123