

ROUTLEDGE STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT

The Cultural Contradictions of Anti-Capitalism

The Liberal Spirit and the Making
of Western Radicalism

Daniel Fletcher



Daniel Fletcher's *The Cultural Contradictions of Anti-Capitalism* is an outstanding cultural history of the globalised present that sheds new light on the relationship between the liberal capitalist spirit and anti-capitalist radicalism. Reading Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* and Hardt and Negri's *Empire* through the lens of the history of the liberal spirit, Fletcher shows how the cultural contradictions of the contemporary global capitalist system, comprising both a dynamic ultra-modern tendency towards over-coming and a socialistic democratic idealism concerned with establishing connection, mean that the post-modern left will need to rethink its visions of the future if it is to ever escape its liberal, capitalist pre-history.

Mark Featherstone, *Senior Lecturer in Sociology,
Keele University, UK*

Daniel Fletcher analyses in intricate detail the origins and development of the bourgeois ethos of self-emancipation, caught as it is between contradictory tendencies towards *being-with* and *being-over*. This highly original work opens a new vista on the agony which Western radical culture has dragged itself into.

Ronnie Lippens, *Professor of Criminology,
Keele University, UK*

Daniel Fletcher provides a compelling theoretical and philosophical analysis of left-wing radicalism. This is an important book. Those who read it will understand the importance of engaging in a more reflexive and informed debate concerning cultural resistance, global capitalism and social change.

James Hardie-Bick, *Senior Lecturer in Sociology and Criminology,
University of Sussex, UK*

This book importantly traces the emergence of the anti-capitalist ethos back via five key stages in the development of the Western bourgeois-individual spirit, to which this book argues the anti-capitalist ethos remains inextricably wedded. In doing so, the book offers a welcome rereading of Deleuze and Guattari's arguments regarding desire, showing that much that goes under the header of left-wing activism actually bypasses indigenous and working class populations in spite of its own arguments to the contrary. This book is required reading for anyone seeking to understand the conundrums of contemporary political struggles.

Ingrid Hoofd, *Assistant Professor, Department of Media and
Culture Studies, Universiteit Utrecht, UK*



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

The Cultural Contradictions of Anti-Capitalism

Does contemporary anti-capitalism tend towards, as Slavoj Žižek believes, nihilism, or does it tend towards, as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri believe, true egalitarian freedom?

Within *The Cultural Contradictions of Anti-Capitalism*, Fletcher presents an answer that manages to tend towards both simultaneously. In entering into contemporary debates on radicalism, this innovative volume proposes a revised conception of Hardt and Negri's philosophy of emancipatory desire. Indeed, Fletcher reassesses Hardt and Negri's history of Western radicalism and challenges their notion of an alter-modernity break from bourgeois modernity. In addition to this, this title proposes the idea of Western anti-capitalism as a spirit within a spirit, exploring how anti-capitalist movements in the West pose a genuine challenge to the capitalist order while remaining dependent on liberalist assumptions about the emancipatory individual.

Inspired by post-structuralism and rejecting both revolutionary transcendence and notions of an underlying desiring purity, *The Cultural Contradictions of Anti-Capitalism* offers new insight into how liberal capitalist society persistently produces its own forms of resistance against itself. This book will appeal to graduate and postgraduate students interested in fields such as: Sociology, Politics, International Relations, Cultural Studies, History, and Philosophy.

Daniel Fletcher is an independent researcher and writer living in the West Midlands, England.

Routledge Studies in Social and Political Thought

For a full list of titles in this series, please visit www.routledge.com/series/RSSPT

- 118 Groundwork for the Practice of the Good Life**
Politics and Ethics at the Intersection of North Atlantic and African Philosophy
Omedi Ochieng
- 119 Theories of the Stranger**
Debates on Cosmopolitanism, Identity and Cross-Cultural Encounters
Vince Marotta
- 120 Deciphering Goffman**
The structure of his sociological theory revisited
Ramón Vargas Maseda
- 121 Planet Utopia**
Utopia, Dystopia, and Globalisation
Mark Featherstone
- 122 Weber, Schumpeter and Modern Capitalism**
Towards a General Theory
John Love
- 123 The Cultural Contradictions of Anti-Capitalism**
The Liberal Spirit and the Making of Western Radicalism
Daniel Fletcher
- 124 Peter Berger on Modernization and Modernity**
An unvarnished overview
Robert Bickel
- 125 Imaginaries of Modernity**
Politics, Cultures, Tensions
John Rundell

The Cultural Contradictions of Anti-Capitalism

The Liberal Spirit and the Making of
Western Radicalism

Daniel Fletcher

First published 2018
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group,
an informa business*

© 2018 Daniel Fletcher

The right of Daniel Fletcher to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN: 978-1-138-20774-5 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-46121-2 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman
by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

<i>Figure</i>	viii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	ix
<i>Note</i>	x
Introduction: overview and key theoretical argument	1
1 Perspectives on contemporary radicalism: transcendence and the immanentist break	26
2 A short history of bourgeois self-emancipation: from Spinoza to Locke and onwards	45
3 May 1968: towards the limits of self-emancipatory radicalism	65
4 Varieties of self-emancipatory experience: French and Anglo-Saxon cultures of self-emancipation	83
5 Deleuze and Guattari: self-emancipatory philosophy in the '68 era	103
6 Hardt and Negri on postmodernisation: self-emancipatory radicalism in the politics of the multitude	121
7 Flexible re-institutionalisation: from revolutionary anti-capitalism to transnationalist alter-globalism	139
<i>Conclusion</i>	159
<i>Bibliography</i>	175
<i>Index</i>	185

Figure

0.1 The exacerbation of the liberalist contradiction

21

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Mark Featherstone for his invaluable support during the development of this research project. The many discussions and debates we have had, and his gentle pointers in the right direction, have been critical in helping me to develop my ideas and arguments. I also thank James Hardie-Bick for his very important contributions to discussions in the early years of formulating this project. I must thank Joe Andrew for guiding me towards postgraduate study; I never would have believed I could do it without his enthusiastic encouragement. I would also like to thank Jan Aart Scholte for the time he took to discuss the Building Global Democracy (BGD) programme with me, and more generally for the insightful discussions on democratic principles I had with him. Thank you also to Ronnie Lippens and Scott Wilson for helping me to refine the articulation of my ideas and arguments. Thank you to C. McNamee for once believing in me. Finally, thank you to my family for your continuous love and support and, most importantly, for keeping me grounded in the real world.

Note

A large section of Chapter 2 appeared in slightly different form in an article published in Issue 13.1 (2016) of the journal *Fast Capitalism* ('Anti-Capitalist Resistance in the Liberalist Context').

Introduction

Overview and key theoretical argument

This book is not especially Hegelian. As should become clear below, the concept of social and cultural change that I put forward within it is inspired by a broad Hegelian idea of dialectical struggle and contradiction, but it is far from a study of Hegel and his philosophy. Nevertheless, as I developed the central proposition on which this book is based, I could find no better quote to summarise the basic conviction that began to drive my research forward than the following one from Hegel:

No man can overleap his own time, for the spirit of his time is also his spirit.
(In Magee, 2010, 262)

This book is an analysis of the spirit of certain forms of left-wing radicalism that have cultural roots in the Western world. With loose inspiration from the quote from Hegel, my goal is to place this spirit within the context of its wider cultural spirit, and to understand it, if you will, as spirit within a spirit – as an ethos or disposition that is marked by, and ultimately heavily dependent upon, a wider ethos or disposition. To state my basic proposition upfront, I understand, as the title of the book suggests, the ‘liberal’ spirit of Western society as the dominant or hegemonic spirit within which the spirit of this radicalism sits, and I suggest that as a result such radicalism is ultimately made or forged in the spirit of a wider liberalist spirit, even though the radicals I analyse are often anti-capitalist and attempt to ‘overleap’ the liberal spirit because of this spirit’s association with that which anti-capitalism is anti (capitalism, of course). To be a little more specific, I argue that anti-capitalism has played and continues to play a key role in radicalising the spirit of Western–liberal culture, and that in doing so, it brings out the central cultural contradiction that defines this spirit. Before I move on to set out my argument in more detail, though, it is important to establish what type of groups and movements I am referring to when I talk about ‘anti-capitalism’.

This book has emerged out of doctoral research that I began in September 2010. At the time, the world was still reeling from the global financial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession, and events were unfolding rapidly as I conducted my research. I had initially planned to reassess the anti-capitalist activism, or

what was sometimes referred to as the anti-globalisation or alter-globalisation activism, which had emerged in the wake of the Seattle protests targeting the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Ministerial Conference of 1999. However, through 2011, with the emergence of the Indignants Movement in Europe, and the Occupy movement in the United States and Britain, it became increasingly clear that I would have to shift my focus to the more contemporary movements that were responding to the latest crisis of global capitalism.

The 17th of November 2011 epitomised the protest mood of the period. On the evening of the 17th, *Newsnight*, one of the flagship news programmes of the British Broadcasting Company's BBC2 television channel, ran a feature that linked various political demonstrations from around the globe that were occurring at that time. After analysing the escalating protests for democracy in Syria, the programme went on to discuss the day's Occupy protests in New York – which had by this stage been rumbling along for two months – linking them to the ongoing Occupy camp outside St Paul's Cathedral in London and other protests that day in Athens, Madrid and elsewhere in Europe. Paul Mason, Economics Editor for *Newsnight*, was on the programme to place the protests within the context of the continuing economic crisis that had engulfed the globe. He noted that we had witnessed four years of uninterrupted crisis, and suggested that the waves of protest were a reaction to the breakdown of the politico-economic system. Mason explained that many of the demonstrators believed that what this breakdown highlighted was the inability of the politico-economic system to function for what they were calling the 99%; the vast majority of the public who suffer from cuts in government spending, while the elite 1% – including those who ran the banks that instigated the crisis with their reckless lending and investments – remain rich and powerful. The demonstrators were united in their opposition to the gross inequality and instability that they saw as developing from the selfishness and ruthlessness inherent in the neoliberal economic system – a system supported, bailed out, and developed by political elites who merge into that system. Mason noted that the Occupy protesters had refused to suggest a political program of change because they refused to answer to power on power's terms. With many of the protesters being anti-capitalist or in opposition to the entire politico-economic system, the last thing they wanted was to be rushed into filtering a diverse movement into a political party, thereby conforming to a political process that they felt was unrepresentative, corrupt and totally unfit for their purpose. The protesters wanted to be seen as part of the 99% – the everyday people who needed to challenge the elite 1% not by playing their hierarchising political game but by producing alternative channels of resistance; developing a new civil society wherein the people participate in developing democracy for the people. In rejecting politics in its current state, the protesters were developing a cultural resistance movement that was searching for a new way of life.

With their refusal to answer to power on power's terms, the demonstrators played out the new way of life that they were searching for in the public squares and arenas that they occupied and inhabited. Although the 2011 cycle of struggles

was made up of a diversity of protest groups and movements, the squares and arenas that the groups made their own were marked by common cultural features. As noted, groups of demonstrators rejected the need to organise themselves into formal parties or organisations, and in doing so they displayed an overriding aversion to systems that concentrate power in the hands of group leaders. Indeed, demonstrators lived together, discussed and debated on the streets without any clear leaders. They were committed to a process of participation in which all individuals would have an equal right to contribute towards the development of group ideas and decisions. The demonstrators, then, experimented with forms of direct democracy and egalitarianism that could challenge the ‘representative’ democracy and competitive capitalism that defines the Western nation-state.

In doing so, however, I argue that the demonstrators were drawing on a spirit of individual liberty (even if only subliminally) that Western nation-states are dependent upon. They embraced a radicalised notion of such liberty, drawing out a liberalist emphasis on equality amongst individuals to insist that no overriding individual or authority could subject others to their leadership and power. For the demonstrators, each individual should retain his or her freedom to participate and contribute as an equal, and, through such participation and contribution, would maintain his or her autonomy within the group or community that he or she helps to forge. I would say, then, that with their radicalised notion of individual liberty, the indignants and occupiers invoked a Western tradition of *left-libertarianism*. In this book, I take a notion of left-libertarianism as my starting point, but I do not offer a history of left-libertarianism as a political ideology¹ – to do so would require a whole other book exploring the convoluted history between the West’s liberalism, anarchism and communism.² I will instead focus on outlining the emergence of the West’s broad left-libertarian spirit, exploring the place of left-libertarianism within its Western-liberal context. To do this I shall delve back towards the origins of the modern West in order to explore the emergence of its basic cultural and philosophical tendencies.

Before, though, I jump into discussion of the origins of the modern West, I should explain that in following left-libertarianism back into history, I stop off in the 1960s to focus on the emergence of the contemporary form of left-libertarianism. In doing so I offer analysis of the West’s social and political upheavals of the 1960s, arguing that it was during these upheavals that today’s anti-capitalist spirit began its emergence from within the West’s cultural dynamics. During the 1960s, radicals and progressives in the West, particularly those from the student youth and the bourgeois avant-garde, attacked the Western bourgeoisie’s traditional culture of ‘respectability’ and dreamed of a world of radical individual freedom and egalitarianism, gazing towards a libertarian version of communism. However, I suggest that, in the 1960s, as in the current era’s demonstrations, a particular type of anti-capitalism was emerging that rejected the bourgeois status quo but not the underlying liberal-bourgeois dynamics that animated the West’s socio-economic system. Indeed, I suggest that it was precisely the evolution of these dynamics in the 1960s that made possible the emergent type of anti-capitalist reaction against the bourgeois

status quo. As the post-war Western system became increasingly geared towards a pervasive individualist and entrepreneurial striving, it stirred up self-emancipatory, anti-authoritarian reactions against the self-preservationist, elitist tendencies of the established bourgeoisie, producing both left-libertarian anti-capitalism and right-libertarian anti-conservatism. Left-libertarian anti-capitalism has been burgeoning since the 1960s, and its culture of resistance heavily marked the protests of 2011. However, the establishment the contemporary anti-capitalist movement challenges is not the establishment of the 1960s. The new ‘neoliberal’ establishment is a post-1960s establishment that draws off the spirit of right-libertarianism to forge a new type of ‘meritocratic’ conservatism. What we find ourselves with in the current era, then, is two libertarian movements that oppose each other by drawing off a self-emancipatory liberal-bourgeois culture in different ways.

The self-emancipatory culture of the libertarian left owes much to the particularly radical movements of 1960s France. Out of the French radicalism of this period emerged an influential anti-authoritarian philosophy that sought to conceptualise the dynamics of the protests of the 1960s. The authors of this philosophy were Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Deleuze and Guattari developed a theoretical perspective that they called schizoanalysis, and Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalytic perspective closely informs this book’s conceptualisation of contemporary anti-capitalism. Their perspective is based upon an ontological notion of desire in which desire is the driving force of emancipatory social transformation. For Deleuze and Guattari, as indissoluble forces of human will-power, desires are constantly coming into being – always becoming real. It is the becomings of desire that break open static social formations to unleash human potential.

In this book, I intend to build on Deleuze and Guattari’s project by tracking the dynamic processes of desire through the development of anti-capitalism after the 1960s. While I aim to demonstrate that anti-capitalist sentiments have been emerging as part of Western culture since the beginnings of Western capitalism in the Medieval period, I still contend that a critical breakthrough occurred in the 1960s, when what scholars such as DeKoven (2004) and Hardt and Negri (2001) call a ‘postmodern’ ethos of anti-capitalism emerged from within Western modernity (Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy being one of the most radical expressions of this postmodern[ist] ethos). I shall explore how postmodernist movements of the 1960s (which developed into the 1970s) opposed the West’s modern social order – despite the fact that they built on, rather than overrode, the modern Western legacy – by bringing out liberal-bourgeois dynamics that underpin the development of the modern West. I argue that the left-libertarian movements of the 1960s emerged through the West’s increasingly influential undercurrent of individual striving to challenge modern traditions of rational hierarchy, organisational discipline, and formal and mass representation through established parties and unions. To radicals of the 1960s (and 1970s) such traditions were increasingly experienced as intolerable, for they stifled the possibilities for the individual to freely create and produce, freely associate, and freely contribute towards the development of new social movements.

At this point I must pause to note that it may be clear to readers familiar with Deleuze and Guattari's ideas that, while I have just suggested that this book's conceptualisation of contemporary anti-capitalism is closely informed by Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis, I am interpreting schizoanalysis in a way that it was not meant to be. Schizoanalysis was designed to undermine capitalist notions of individual identity or self-centredness with notions of schizo flows that break open and decentre unified selves, yet I am implicating schizoanalysis in the emancipation of the self in the context of a Western society geared towards the individual. I shall come back to this contrarian interpretation later in the introduction, when I shall set out the way in which I think schizoanalysis implies or hinges upon an ethos of self-emancipation.

After the initial postmodern eruption of the 1960s, emergent anti-capitalist activists worked through their projects in the early 1970s, which culminated in a series of utopian explorations of, and experimentations with, alternative ways of being. After the radical energies of early 1970s utopian movements were burnt out and/or became absorbed into the mainstream, anti-capitalist movements began to wane, and a new neoliberal settlement began to emerge in the late 1970s. We shall see, however, that contemporary left-libertarian or postmodernist anti-capitalist movements began to re-emerge, in fresh and vibrant forms, in the 1990s in reaction against the entrenchment of the global neoliberal order. In the wake of the Zapatista uprising in Mexico in 1994, networks of anti-capitalist groups running across Europe and the Americas began to develop, and the groups' activism broke through in the aforementioned (and infamous) 1999 Seattle WTO protests. After a number of other high profile demonstrations in the early 2000s targeting the international institutions of global capitalism, anti-capitalism witnessed an interlude that coincided with the 'war on terror', but the global economic crisis from 2008 onwards incited the re-energising of left-libertarian movements. Through all this anti-capitalism could not be defined by any one coalition, group, network, gathering, party, or unity – it was defined by developing and shifting coalitions and collectives: by a plethora of activists of many different types who were directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, linked through a struggle against the global economic system and the national and international institutions that support that system.

Before I move on to set out how I link the emergence of contemporary left-libertarian/postmodernist anti-capitalism to Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis, I must point out that it is not particularly new to conceptualise contemporary anti-capitalism from a schizoanalytic perspective, for this is essentially what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri do in *Empire*. First published in 2000, Hardt and Negri's *Empire* gave expression to the emergence of what the authors themselves understood as postmodernist anti-capitalism (although as we shall see, they do not simply embrace 'postmodernity' or the postmodern condition as such), and the authors explicitly based their conceptualisation of political struggle on Deleuze and Guattari's notion of emancipatory desire. Hardt and Negri envisioned a worldwide multitude of people embracing emancipatory desires: the

members of the multitude, through desiring ever-new connections, were unleashing global flows of egalitarian sociability to undermine the divisive, anti-social power structures of a pervasive, global capitalist Empire.

Despite their immense contribution to the conceptualisation of postmodernist anti-capitalism, Hardt and Negri reanimate a theoretical conflict opened up by Deleuze and Guattari and other post-structuralist writers in the 1960s and 1970s. In this period, emergent anti-authoritarian or libertarian notions of communism proved controversial with leftist activists who were more comfortable with established, modern leftist traditions. Many socialists of the period of a Marxist-Leninist mould were hostile to Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of desire, for they saw in it an ethos of self-indulgence that drew from capitalist individualism (see Dosse, 2010, 207). When Hardt and Negri re-energised this philosophy of desire in the early 2000s, they faced similar criticisms from prominent socialists like Slavoj Žižek, who rejected the idea that the new 'postmodernist' leftism was positive and progressive. As we shall see in Chapter 1, Žižek argues that the contemporary anti-capitalist movement does not and cannot revolutionise the politico-economic system because instead of developing a clear ideology with which it can oppose the fundamentals of capitalist/liberalist individualism, it is too preoccupied with creating 'events', whose carnivalesque features hint at the movement's self-indulgence and narcissism. Ultimately, Žižek suggests, contemporary anti-capitalism has reached an impasse, incapable of detaching itself from the capitalist logic of accumulation and reproduction.

As suggested earlier, in this book, I argue that postmodernist anti-capitalism emerges out of Western-liberal culture and that it consequently carries within itself a self-emancipatory ethos. As a result, I argue, like Žižek, that the contemporary left struggles to detach itself from the culture that marks capitalism. Žižek, however, does not think, as I do, that the contemporary capitalist system is premised on self-emancipatory desire – he focuses instead on capitalism's dependence on a nihilistic death drive. It is necessary at this point, then, to be clear on how I distinguish the emancipation of the self from the emancipation of nihilistic drive. As we shall come back to in Chapter 1, Žižek's criticisms of Hardt and Negri's philosophy of desire are rooted in the Lacanian Marxism that developed in 1960s France. Lacanian Marxists suggest that Deleuze and Guattari and subsequently Hardt and Negri conflate desire with drive; the Lacanians focus on desires not so much as corporeal forces rooted in the unconscious (that is, not so much as Deleuze and Guattari and Hardt and Negri do), but as ego-induced commitments to certain causes or objects, which channel primal drives towards human projects. Lacanian Marxists believe that through the development of a conscious sense of self individuals can overcome the isolating and (self-) destructive tendencies of their primal drives, committing themselves to the desire for the "object-cause" of communism and the dissolution of selfishness or self-centredness (see Dean, 2013, 100–101).

When Deleuze and Guattari wrote their first book together, *Anti-Oedipus*, (first published in France in 1972), they wrote specifically in reaction against

the psychoanalysis employed by Lacanian Marxism, which, they suggested, was rooted in the repressive dynamics of bourgeois asceticism. Deleuze and Guattari argued that, like the conservative bourgeoisie, psychoanalysts feared or were ashamed of their animal bodies, therefore they denigrated its power by reducing it to chaotic, dangerous drives. The authors suggested that psychoanalysis set up a human tragedy wherein the civilising power of the human mind struggled against the primal drives underlying it; the mind desiring or longing for the collective object that it lacked, which could save it from the self-destructive tendencies of the human body. In contrast to Lacanian psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari insisted that the human body does not lack anything, for it desires in a positive, proactive way, constantly producing connections in a social world without being driven to isolation and/or destruction. For the authors, Lacanian psychoanalysis's notion of a desire of lack led into a negative embrace of self-repression, with the 'disciplined' individual struggling to overcome his or her lack by restraining his or her bodily urges. An emerging sense of self-discipline ultimately created a sense of self-control that reinforced the power of the bourgeois, centred subject/self. Deleuze and Guattari, rooting their schizoanalytic philosophy of emancipation in the yearnings of Friedrich Nietzsche, championed the unconscious as a factory churning out life-affirming desires or forces of human will-power. Nevertheless, they insisted that the unconscious, while life-affirming, was not essentially focused on the 'needs' of the biological unit or organism in which it was located; that is, it was not selfish, but connected the biological entity with the flows of life or the beings of the natural world. Deleuze and Guattari proposed, then, an open-ended biological singularity rather than a self-preservatory biological organism. The human being was to be seen not as a fixed organic structure programmed to serve itself, but as an accumulation of flexible organic desiring-machines, or as a supple assemblage of assemblages, which opened out to all the objects and energy flows within the material world.

In this book, however, I argue that Deleuze and Guattari proposed a paradox that is similar to the one that Lacanian Marxism seems to be caught in: while Lacanian Marxism seems to suggest that we overcome self-centred identity by finding and working through our self-centred identity, Deleuze and Guattari seem to suggest that we overcome our existence as biological organisms simply by being biological organisms, or perhaps to put it more revealingly, in spite of the fact that the human animal is intricately organised or coordinated for itself, it overcomes its self-organisation simply by embracing its self-organisation. As I shall come back to in Chapter 5, there seems to be a utopian turn in Deleuze and Guattari's conception of human emancipation whereby the human animal bypasses its constitution as a series of interconnecting organs working together for the human being's perpetuation and propagation, and miraculously emerges through its unconscious desires as a positive *body without organs*. The positive body without organs is without the organism's selfishness or self-centredness, being totally open to the world and plastic in its production of shifting and limitless states of being.³ In this book I reject this utopian turn and insist that Deleuze

and Guattari's notion of emancipation remains premised on the individual will-power or the self-perpetuating forces of the human organism. As I shall discuss especially in Chapters 2 and 6, Hardt and Negri follow in the footsteps of Deleuze and Guattari by implicitly premising their struggle for emancipation on the self-assertions or the will-power of autonomous individuals who have a natural or in-built aversion to overarching authority. Hardt and Negri strongly denounce statist and/or totalitarian versions of communism in their championing of a libertarian or anti-authoritarian version, sharing with much liberal philosophy a natural aversion to the subsuming of individuals within the 'greater good' or the 'general will', and thereby championing self-determination over any ideological imperative for collective action. Here Hardt and Negri seem to take for granted the individual as the unit of autonomous action.

In this book, then, I argue that Deleuze and Guattari's and Hardt and Negri's philosophies of desiring struggle radicalise the liberal-humanist struggle for individual freedom or will-power, attempting to liberate the human organism – or the biological 'self' – from subordination to external power.⁴ To a certain extent, I build on Žižek's suggestion that a form of vitalism is essential to Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of desire, but I understand this vitalism in terms of proactive, self-empowering, and self-enriching desires that cannot be reduced to sporadic, short-circuiting bursts of drive. I understand the human being's self-affirming will-power as the product of a sophisticated human organism, and as being constituted by a complex of interacting emotions, feelings, and/or subjective tendencies. Each human self is a unique collection of biological structures that constitute the human being as a self-perpetuating and self-propagating organism of will-power, and I will argue, in building on and tweaking (and some might say perverting) Deleuze and Guattari's and Hardt and Negri's ontology, that out of this will-power emerges a desiring process which, in a Western-liberal cultural context, is marked by a particular self-emancipatory ethos; an ethos that I will clearly set out later.

Before I set it out, though, I must emphasise that, as some of the earlier comments suggest, while I root left-libertarian anti-capitalism in a Western-liberal cultural context, I do not intend to fall back on Lacanian Marxist criticisms of the postmodernist turn, which contrast 'genuine' socialist oppositions to capitalism with left-libertarianism's complicity with capitalism. Instead I attempt to work through (while exposing implications and assumptions in) Deleuze and Guattari's and Hardt and Negri's philosophies of desire in order to illuminate both traditional (or 'modern') socialist and left-libertarian invocations of will-power and self-emancipation. As alluded to earlier, the Lacanian Marxists propose a certain type of self-transcendence, but I argue that the proposition is caught in a paradox in that it implicitly depends upon centring self-identity in the overcoming of centring self-identity. Indeed, I contend that by emerging out of the cultural dynamics of Western modernity, Lacanian Marxist ideals and criticisms of postmodernist anti-capitalism are permeated by the self-perpetuating impulses of a self that is controlling and limitative in its drive to establish power over social dynamics.

In Chapter 1, I link Lacanian Marxism to a broad Western tradition of idealist philosophy. I suggest, in keeping with Deleuze and Guattari's and Hardt and Negri's arguments, that while such idealism opposes what is seen as the dangerous embrace of unfettered corporeal freedom, it turns to conservative bourgeois notions of hierarchical power and self-establishment in order to do so. Lacanian Marxists in particular are zealously opposed to individualism, but they cherish their autonomous rejections of capitalism (or the power of their individuality or individual mental capacities) as they struggle to establish their selves' abilities to 'guide' the people in what amounts to a project for collective self-actualisation. As shall be suggested in Chapter 1, idealists invoke a self-centred ego in order to distance themselves from the dynamics of raw struggle, with elite or 'enlightened' egos transcending or raising themselves above the chaotic masses, who are seen to be trapped in cycles of nihilistic drive. What emerges from this conception of transcendence is a general political vision, exemplified by Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, which is ambivalent towards spontaneous, popular self-organisation, and which sways towards authoritarian notions of paternalistic disciplining bodies that order and structure popular struggle. Such disciplining bodies, it seems, inevitably become dominated by the enlightened or transcendent egos that emerge to forge an overbearing superego that holds a new 'emancipatory' social order in place. I argue that ultimately, while Lacanian and libertarian anti-capitalists draw their notions from different strands of Western-bourgeois culture, and while both broad groups have played and continue to play an important role in challenging and disrupting the culture of the bourgeois establishment, neither group can transcend or diametrically oppose the Western-bourgeois culture out of which they emerge.

In insisting on the inevitability of culturally-situated radicals drawing their vitality from the spirit of the society that they have grown through, I draw much inspiration from the radical post-structuralist perspective employed by Ingrid Hoofd (2012) in her critique of certain forms of contemporary anti-capitalism that have emerged within the alter-globalisation movement. Hoofd focuses on three forms of activism – new media activism, no-border activism, and climate change activism, labelling such forms of activism "viral" because of the way in which they seek to spread an ethos defined by unfettered interconnections through the world system. Such activism would (largely) fall under what has been labelled in this introduction as contemporary left-libertarian or postmodernist anti-capitalism. Hoofd is critical of such activism because of its failure to reflect upon the way in which it recycles a liberal-humanist, economic spirit of active agency, with activists under its sway driven by an unyielding will-power to overcome all boundaries in the spreading of their hegemonic Western culture. Hoofd links the self-assertive zeal of viral activism to Hardt and Negri's philosophy of desire, which, she suggests, is bursting with liberal-humanist notions of the creative subject-agent who is capable of breaking free from all constraint.

Hoofd calls for increased self-reflection within the alter-globalisation movement and invokes Derrida's perspective of deconstruction as a means by which to

develop it. As a passionate alter-globalist activist, Hoofd attempts to affirm alter-globalist ideals of “democracy and freedom” with critical reflection, *inhabiting* the “humanist tension” within alter-globalisation activism in order to deconstruct activist ideals (see *ibid.*, 16–17). Through this deconstruction, it becomes easier to recognise the assumptions and taken-for-granted impulses that may need to be challenged or reformulated in order for the movement to continue to move forward in the way that it tries to. Hoofd notes (*ibid.*, 19) that for Derrida;

the reproductive force of any ideology resides in the suppression of its internal contradictions. This suppression comes about through declarations of faith towards a certain belief system, which universalises such a belief system in order for the activist subject to self-actualise itself.

For Hoofd, then, alter-globalist activists have a tendency to invoke a perfect or pure ideal or state of existence to justify their cause, and they gain great strength and conviction from this invocation to drive forward their activist movement. However, the activists “*cannot help but commit* to a historically and culturally limited perspective” (*ibid.*, italics in original), and as a result they cannot help but carry within their movement the contradictions that mar the neoliberal (and for Hoofd humanist) push towards individual freedom or agency.

Hoofd suggests that through their commitment to individual freedom, alter-globalist activists are caught between the self-gratification that activists gain through activist empowerment, and the commitment to democracy and the “love for the other” that the activist cause should be based on (see *ibid.*, 22). Here Hoofd faces up to something like the aforementioned paradox of radicals embracing forms of Western-bourgeois self-affirmation in order to overcome such affirmation; Hoofd notes that deconstruction requires a problematic “double affirmation” (see *ibid.*, 21–22). That is to say, in order to pursue the ideals of democracy and freedom, activists first embrace the premise of the emancipatory power of the subject-agent who is capable of overcoming all limitations – the subject-agent on which neoliberal globalisation and exploitation is based. It seems that for Hoofd – who critiques and deconstructs alter-globalist activism through an “ambiguous expression of love for the spirit of [the] project” (*ibid.*, 22) – the only way forward here is to face up to the double affirmation, for one of the most effective ways to affirm and enrich the democratic spirit is to challenge unreflective embraces of it, which may blindly carry forward and reproduce neoliberal forms of power that are buried within it (see *ibid.*, 21). In following a similar line of critical analysis to Hoofd, as the author of this book, I sincerely hope that it will not be read as an attack on or dismissal of the ideals of contemporary anti-capitalism or alter-globalism. Rather than undermine contemporary radicalism, the book intends to *inhabit* the culture of it, as well as the history through which its culture has developed, in order to critically reflect upon how such radicalism can work to maximise the potential of its spirit within a spirit.

Ultimately, Hoofd calls for a deceleration of alter-globalist activism in order to help protect the world from the spread of Western culture and the underlying exploitative currents of neoliberalism that flow through that culture. In Chapter 7, we shall see that Hoofd's protectionist stance towards non-Western parts of the world is part of a strong Western tradition and still contains within itself a powerful Western notion of proactive intervention – indeed, Hoofd is not unreflective about this, deconstructing her own calls for deceleration by noting how she invokes humanist narratives about the *urgent* need to *act* in order to make her call to *slow down*. In any case, from the point of view of this book what is interesting is the way in which Hoofd deconstructs Hardt and Negri's philosophy of desire when critiquing the utopian visions of no-border activists, who have been heavily inspired by Hardt and Negri's philosophy. Hoofd suggests that Hardt and Negri's philosophy is based on the assumption of a desiring nature that unites all of humanity (see *ibid.*, 71). She criticises this assumption as a form of essentialism that romanticises the European humanist. For Hoofd, although Hardt and Negri's desiring multitude is supposed to be a heterogeneous mixture of centreless subjects, it is actually envisioned as a collection of individual units who are self-constituting and constantly struggling to express their "individual 'free will'" (*ibid.*). In this book, I intend to build on Hoofd's analysis of Hardt and Negri's ontology while reformulating it somewhat. I will argue that Hardt and Negri's essential or 'natural' human desire can be split into two facets; one that the authors clearly express and champion – a *being-with* facet of desire, and one that is explicitly rejected but implied and sometimes depended upon through their writings – a *being-over* facet of desire. Together, these two facets of desire constitute the basis of the Western-liberal self-emancipatory ethos that was referred to earlier.

In this book, I contend that in their wholehearted embrace of anti-capitalist activism, Hardt and Negri, following in the vein of Deleuze and Guattari, have reduced desire to a *purely positive*, communistic force, setting up free-flowing, emancipatory desire as *the* immanent force of the material world, and the Real of human being out of which revolutionary social transformation emerges. I argue, then, that for Deleuze and Guattari and Hardt and Negri, when freed human desires have only a *being-with* potential, which is to say that they produce a proliferating series of horizontal connections between human beings, other sentient beings, and all the other natural and/or machinic assemblages of the cosmos. When human beings live through their revolutionary being-with desire, they produce no hierarchies of order or power; they produce only new forms of being-together with others, with new forms of shared feeling, shared experience, and, ultimately, new forms of being-in-common.

Nevertheless, in Deleuze and Guattari's and Hardt and Negri's conceptions, human desires for power or dominance over other beings and assemblages do exist and penetrate through the social system. For the authors, then, there is a *being-over* desiring potential existing in the world, but it is conceptualised only as a *purely negative*, anti-communistic force. Deleuze and Guattari and Hardt and Negri conceptualise being-with desire as the essential, immanent force of human

being, while conceptualising being-over desire as a virus-like, invasive force; it is the product of an external, artificial social (capitalist) system that turns desire back on its own being in the production of its own monstrous power structures. Being-over desire, then, is a secondary force, for it can only react against the connections produced by being-with desire – the desire of Real being. For the authors, being-over desire is the inverted form of being-with desire; its absolute Other, its ultimate enemy. It represents the ultimate perversion of the life-producing forces of being-with desire, being capable only of stifling the flows of life and sucking the life out of desire's being-with connections. This is why Deleuze and Guattari, as we shall see in Chapter 5, understand being-over desire, or what they call “reactionary” or “fascistic” desire, in terms of “anti-production”: being-over desire *cannot produce* the desiring flows of life, but can only sabotage such flows by twisting life-enriching connections towards its cancerous accumulations. Being-over desire, then, has no Real being at all; it is anti-being, it is death to being-with's life. I postulate that this ‘dualistic’ concept⁵ of positive versus negative desire masks the real relationship between the seemingly oppositional forces, and that only from a more thoroughly post-structuralist perspective can we begin to see how ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ desire emerge as two immanent, essential forces from within the Western-liberal cultural context.

As noted earlier, I argue that being-with and being-over desire constitute the basis of the Western-liberal self-emancipatory ethos. Deleuze and Guattari and Hardt and Negri played a key role in giving expression to a radical spirit of left-libertarianism that was rooted in this ethos. This ethos is tantamount to the general spirit of Western-liberal culture, which I referred to at the beginning of this introduction. While you might think of the influence of this spirit by thinking about assumptions and approaches with regards to individual freedom and potential that run through Western society and Western social life, it is most revealing to think about this spirit or ethos as, in essence, an unconscious spirit of being, or way of being, or set of desiring tendencies, through which Western individuals tend to experience life and build life. Up to this point I have discussed the desires which, I argue, constitute *the basis* of the self-emancipatory or liberalist way of being, but I have not delved into the way in which these desires are animated in order to constitute *the way of being itself*. In order to do this, I must discuss how this way of being became hegemonic in Western society, that is, how it came to be the dominant way of being in the West, or how it came to be the way of being that has the most pervasive influence on what Westerners take for granted. And in order to do this, I must discuss how the hegemonic classes of the West, that is, the bourgeois classes, became defined by the self-emancipatory ethos, and how they spread this ethos through the social strata of Western society – and even, and increasingly, through the social strata of the world, as the Western bourgeois classes have established their culture as hegemonic through the world.

In this book, then, by situating the contemporary anti-capitalist ethos within a broader economic, political, social, and philosophical contextual history, I shall argue that the ethos cannot be separated from a pervasive bourgeois ethos that

characterises our Western-dominated global society. I shall argue that the rise to power of bourgeois classes in the West from the Medieval period onwards is premised on a burgeoning self-emancipatory ethos that orientates human will-power towards self-proliferation through an embrace, or a taking in, of the material world. As alluded to earlier, there are two key aspects or facets to this self-emancipatory ethos. In the first instance, the ethos emerges out of bourgeois material interests for self-advancement, so initially it incites *being-over* desires that orientate the individual towards expanding power over, and possession of, the beings, and/or machines, and/or natural phenomena of the material world. However, as soon as this sprawling being-over dynamic was animated by the bourgeois struggle, it began to open up towards another dynamic, which emerges with the being-over dynamic to constitute a contradictory self-emancipatory ethos. As the bourgeois classes began to spread self-proliferation and self-enrichment through the world through their being-over desires, they began to desire to take in the world by *living through and with the world*, rather than take it in to subjugate it. Consequently they began to incite *being-with* desires that orientated the individual towards an expanding array of associations and commonalities with the beings, and/or machines, and/or natural phenomena of the material world. As the bourgeois classes, then, grew through their burgeoning self-emancipatory ethos from the Medieval period onwards, they became increasingly torn between the two desiring facets of their ethos. The facets *directly contradicted each other*, yet both contributed to feelings of self-empowerment and self-proliferation by opening bourgeois individuals up to the world, and enriching such individuals within the world, in differing ways. While the facets remain essentially irreconcilable, *with neither being reducible to the other*, both can contribute to the strength of individual will-power or the sense of individual empowerment, and so a ‘flourishing’ self-emancipatory individual is likely to animate both facets of desire simultaneously and/or to embrace one facet of desire only to bring out the opposite facet.

I argue that Deleuze and Guattari and Hardt and Negri shy away from the way in which the being-with desires of their revolutionary project emerge out of the bourgeois self-emancipatory ethos. This ‘shying away’ is entirely understandable, because in their embrace of a being-with desiring process they are *genuinely repulsed* by the desiring other – the being-over Other – that they are struggling against. As we shall see in Chapters 5 and 6, both sets of authors celebrate the way in which ‘revolutionary’ desire, or what I am conceptualising as being-with desire, *detritorialises* established social orders; that is, they celebrate the ways in which this desire breaks down all the divisions, segmentations, traditions, prejudices, and social structures or institutions that keep the ruling elite in power. However, in their euphoric immersion in an emergent being-with process, the authors fail to fully reflect upon how the deterritorialising tendency emerges out of the initial being-over desires of bourgeois individuals seeking to break down all barriers in the conquering of the world and the rival desiring beings within that world. While it is true that bourgeois elites continually seek to *re-territorialise*,

as opposed to deterritorialise, social relations as they turn self-emancipation into self-preservation, the real power of the bourgeois classes lies in their deterritorialising tendencies to open the world up to the self. As touched on earlier and as we shall return to, the breakthrough of the self-emancipatory ethos from the 1960s onwards has brought out contradictory deterritorialising tendencies in the West – both right-libertarianism’s possessiveness and left-libertarianism’s egalitarianism.

Deleuze and Guattari’s and Hardt and Negri’s alienation of negative, anti-real, being-over desire is a product of their embrace of the being-with culture of left-libertarian movements with cultural roots in the 1960s. Such left-libertarian movements develop a highly reactionary spirit in their repulsion from the contradictory being-over desires that they are in intimate contact with. ‘Reactionary’ is a term normally preserved for right-wing movements reacting against change, but when used here to describe a radical left-wing movement, its meaning is inverted. Radical left-libertarian movements react against the establishment’s resistance to change to embrace the opposite; total openness to new possibilities and connections. In their reaction, the movements attempt to cut themselves off from the being-over facet of bourgeois desire, even though it is essential to the immanent desiring ethos that constitutes their way of being. Although the label ‘reactionary’ will occasionally be used in this book to help explain the zeal for revolutionary purity within left-libertarian movements, the reader should constantly bear in mind the aforementioned inversion of its traditional meaning, for its use is not designed to denigrate left-libertarian movements, or to suggest that they have a secret right-wing agenda. Indeed, I intend to demonstrate that the radical embrace of being-with desires propagated by left-libertarian movements has played a critical role in the development of liberal democracy, channelling egalitarian notions of free association and commonality towards the mainstream to prevent Western civilisation’s collapse into outright anarcho-capitalism or outright bourgeois-patrician oligarchy. Nevertheless, I will highlight the problematic relationship between being-over and being-with processes both within and between movements in Western society. As shall be explored in chapter 5, Deleuze and Guattari themselves recognise that desires in radical movements can quickly swing from one pole to the other – from the ‘revolutionary’ (or being-with) pole to the ‘reactionary’ (or being-over) pole, and vice versa – and I contend that this is because of the way in which such movements carry forward the ‘negative’ power-seeking potential of the bourgeois self-emancipatory ethos within their ‘positive’ self-emancipatory projects. Again, it is critical to emphasise here that I am *not* suggesting that the positive project can be reduced to a hidden negative agenda, but I *do* suggest that the negative forces cannot simply be externalised as bad forces ‘out there’, which emerge to corrupt the positive essence of desiring radicalism. I argue that a bourgeois self-emancipatory ethos brings out *two contradictory facets of desire that are both Real in and of themselves*.

I contend, then, that the development of the West’s liberal-democratic mainstream is driven forward by two oppositional but strangely interdependent desiring undercurrents that both overwhelm each other and emerge within one another in their

interplay. I shall explore how these contradictory desiring forces have converged in liberal-democratic societies that have developed institutions in which egalitarian human rights rub up uneasily against rights to possession and competition. Social dynamics emerge through the struggles for both equality and possession and institute themselves in shifting social structures. When a particular desiring process constituting a social dynamic has reached a particular pitch, it may produce a breakaway movement – a postmodernist anti-capitalist transgression, for instance – which may force emancipatory reform on established institutions. Nevertheless, even a postmodernist anti-capitalist transgression cannot entirely separate itself from the liberal-democratic mainstream, for it remains bound up with the mainstream's self-emancipatory notions of free choice, free association, and productive self-constitution. The transgressive movement remains premised on the immanent forces of desire that are constituted in the Western-bourgeois cultural context, and because of this, it carries forward desire's power-seeking potential within its very being and can quickly merge into the mainstream liberal-democratic culture which it grows with and to some extent through.

I would like to make it absolutely clear here – although I hope I have already made it reasonably clear – that when I refer to the influence that the liberal-democratic mainstream has on radical movements, or to the role of the 'liberal spirit' in the making of Western radicalism, I do not intend to suggest that radical movements can be reduced to some dominant liberal ideology, nor that they simply reproduce the central tenets of such an ideology. As stated earlier, when I talk about a liberal (or liberalist) spirit I am not referring to a central liberal belief system that defines radical movements; I am referring to an unconscious or underlying ethos which, I argue, has a liberalist 'feel' or character because of its constitution through desires which can be understood as self-emancipatory. The various versions of liberalism that exist as mainstream or dominant political philosophies emerge out of this ethos but none of them represent the incarnation of it. I argue that mainstream liberal philosophies emerge *along with* various radical Western philosophies out of the West's underlying self-emancipatory ethos. As stated, this ethos can be understood as a general way of being. Such a way of being should not be understood as some core or fixed being, but as an orientation of being: as a *tendency* to be in a certain way. Mainstream liberalist movements tend to be more conservative because they are constituted through a less deterritorialised self-emancipatory tendency, whereas marginal or emergent 'liberalist' movements tend to be more radical because they are constituted through a more deterritorialised self-emancipatory tendency. This book, then, is not about the reproduction of a core liberalism, but is about the process of change that the West has gone through and is still going through as its key tendency develops or unfolds, playing itself out through Western social life. It is about the evolution of the self-emancipatory tendency or ethos through the movements that have brought out or deterritorialised self-emancipation.

Because I focus on a liberalist ethos rather than on liberalism per se, in this this book I do not attempt an exhaustive study of 'liberal' philosophy or politics.

Instead, I am deliberately selective. My aim is to highlight some of the social or cultural movements in Western history that have played a key role in bringing out the liberalist or self-emancipatory ethos, and to analyse certain key aspects of key philosophies that have emerged with the social or cultural movements to give expression to their tendencies. In particular, I will focus on five key stages in the development of Western liberalist culture: the beginnings of bourgeois hegemony in the Italian city-states of the Medieval period, the beginnings of liberal-capitalist culture in the Netherlands and the Anglo-Saxon world in the seventeenth century, the rise of revolutionary democratic movements in Anglo-America and France in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the postmodernist break in the United States and France in the 1960s and 1970s, and the emergence of contemporary anti-capitalism and alter-globalism in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Through the analysis of these historical stages I shall argue that the liberalist struggle for ‘property’, which took off in the Netherlands and the Anglo-Saxon world in the seventeenth century, began to open up the aforementioned contradiction of self-emancipatory desire by linking individual advancement to mutual interest and the common good, propagating a spirit of human rights and free association that could not simply be reduced to the struggle for individual possession – even though it could not detach itself from this struggle either. It is worth pointing out here that through an insistence on the essential contradiction of the liberalist ethos, I will criticise various leftist analyses which attempt to detach the Anglo-Saxon liberal-capitalist tradition from democratising traditions. I attempt to demonstrate that it is simply not viable to hold that liberalist traditions largely attempt to hold back alternative democratising movements in the defence of individual possession, for movements for radical democratisation have consistently emerged through liberalist culture; movements which remain marked by a liberalist ethos of self-emancipation and which draw on deterritorialising being-with and being-over desires to various degrees.

By focusing on the links between liberalist culture and egalitarianism, I am putting myself on a collision course with Marxist thinkers. Indeed, a Marxist’s initial reaction to the theory that I have proposed so far will likely be that I am focusing only on the bourgeois experience of social transformation, and am ignoring the history of working-class struggle for change. First, I admit that I home in on the Western-bourgeois experience of social transformation. However, this is not because I believe that the working or marginalised classes, in the West or elsewhere, are not interesting or that they have not contributed to positive social development. Rather, I build on the Marxist insight that the dominant classes are able to set the agenda for social relations and cultural tendencies, and as it is the bourgeois classes that have come to dominate the West and increasingly the world, it is important to understand the hegemonic cultural ethos that these classes have spread. Nevertheless, some Marxists reading this book may view it as not Marxist at all, or even anti-Marxist, because of the way in which it rejects the Marxist dichotomy between liberal individualism and egalitarian democracy. Indeed, it is no doubt true that I present a perspective that is at odds with both

traditional Marxist interpretations (for a contemporary example of such an interpretation, see Roper, 2013) and libertarian Marxist interpretations (like Hardt and Negri's) which suggest that progressive social transformation emerges through the diametrically oppositional struggle between working-class democratising movements and the bourgeoisie's possessive liberal-capitalism. While both these types of interpretation set up bourgeois social and cultural conditions as the alien Other that the working classes react against in their struggles for emancipation and equality, in this book I insist that such interpretations propose an unrealistic distance between the working and dominant classes and/or 'the people' and 'the system'. Indeed, I would go further, and suggest that such interpretations tend to romanticise the working classes by assigning to them some essence that remains untainted by the culture of the bourgeois system. As someone from a working-class background, I am uncomfortable with such romanticisations, which seem to me to drift towards bourgeois indulgences on how radicals would like the working classes to be. That is to say, the radicals project their idealised vision of themselves onto the working classes, imagining super-human strugglers with some eternal being of resistance that is ultimately in some sense beyond the reaches of bourgeois power, no matter how pervasive that power is.

I believe that too often students from working class backgrounds, like myself, who become socialised into the West's factories of social and cultural capital production, i.e., universities or academies, are lured in by the seductive 'them and us' logic of Marxist narratives of working class versus bourgeois class, or as is increasingly popular to say, the people versus the system (as if the system is somehow devoid of 'Real' people and their 'Real' desires and ambitions). Too often, I think an explicit Marxist expression of absolute opposition to the system is bought into without adequate reflection on the extent to which this expression is rooted in universities or academies that play a critical role in the formation and propagation of bourgeois culture. My point here is not to say that Marxism *simply reproduces* elite bourgeois ideas of power because of its rooting in bourgeois social institutions, but to emphasise that Marxism, even with its genuinely radical anti-bourgeois and anti-capitalist sentiments, is a product of a cultural context and seems to depend upon the general self-emancipatory ethos of the bourgeois classes. Marxist notions of absolute opposition to the system remain rooted in a radicalised bourgeois notion of overcoming, and as I shall highlight in this book, Marxists often conflate and/or confuse their own desires for self-empowerment with the interests of the people. In any case, I am sure that for its insistence on the links between working-class and bourgeois struggles for equality and emancipation, this book will be derided by some Marxists as a liberal-humanist attempt to draw the working classes back into a 'reasonable' or 'moderate' bourgeois struggle for liberal-capitalist democracy. Nevertheless, as suggested, this book is fully focused on the emergence of leftist radicalism, and I contend that it is not anti-Marxist to understand radical movements within the limitations of their class-based social and cultural contexts.

The criticisms of Marxism that are made in this book, then, are made, in a certain post-structuralist way, *in the spirit of Marxism, and not in spite of Marxism.*

As we shall see in Chapter 6, Hardt and Negri embrace the post-structuralist label, and, in a similar vein to myself, do so not in spite of Marxism, but in order to push Marxist analysis further. The authors focus on the ways in which bourgeois elites reproduce capitalist forces and relations of production, but they break down the traditional Marxist distinction between the economic base and ideological superstructure of society by exploring how, especially within contemporary or postmodern capitalism, bourgeois power penetrates so deeply into the cultural elements of society that the superstructure blurs into the economic base, with all of human life becoming geared towards the production and reproduction of capitalist norms of possession and accumulation. In this conception, bourgeois power penetrates through society so deeply that even the biology of the people is shaped and inclined towards a bourgeois way of being – the capitalist system then, according to Hardt and Negri, produces and reproduces *biopower* (a term they borrow from Foucault). At this point, however, Hardt and Negri follow in the vein of Deleuze and Guattari to invoke a utopian inversion (while insisting it is not utopian) and argue that the capitalist system has no real biopower at all, because it only reacts to the emancipatory desiring struggles of the essentially anti-capitalist people. In this book, I reject this utopian inversion, and insist that popular and radical struggles for democracy in the West – and increasingly in non-Western parts of the world as what Hardt and Negri describe as capitalist Empire increasingly pervades, with all its associated cultural baggage, the world’s social networks – really have been fundamentally marked by the bourgeois way of being that produces and reproduces capitalism. However, as explained above, I understand the bourgeois way of being differently to how Hardt and Negri do. Rather than reduce it to capitalism’s vampirish or ‘dead’ logic of accumulation, I understand it as a living self-emancipatory or liberalist ethos, which is defined by a desiring contradiction that simultaneously enriches and undermines capitalism as it develops.

A key point to re-emphasise here is that the liberalist ethos is understood as a contradictory *tendency of being*, not as a being that produces a fixed underlying identity that all bourgeois or bourgeoisified individuals can be reduced to. As a tendency it becomes absorbed into class traditions, cultures, and movements that develop within certain socio-economic contexts. As it becomes absorbed, it does not simply override or consume existing cultures, but increasingly aligns cultural traditions and interests with a certain way of experiencing the world and feeling within the world. In the West it has become a hegemonic cultural tendency that tends to shape the direction of social movements, but through its integrations into such movements it does not simply pacify them in the name of bourgeois interests – the bourgeoisie are never in control of the tendency that they depend upon and propagate. By becoming part of new movements and cultures, the tendency plays a role in the constitution of new energies, dynamics and social orientations, and through this process of integration and reconstitution great social change develops in the long-term. Again, it is suggested that cultural spirits or movements develop within a wider spirit, with only sudden or miraculous cultural transcendence ruled

out. Nevertheless, I would emphasise that the liberalist tendency has become increasingly fundamental to the Western way of life; it is not something that the Western working class – and increasingly not even the working classes of the traditionally non-Western world – are external to, for the working classes have been, and continue to be, incorporated into the Western world of immanence through a globalising bourgeois biopower.

Importantly, I hold that a radical interpretation of bourgeois cultural hegemony can help to provide a more grounded explanation of why so many intellectuals emerge from Western or Western-style academies seeking to transform, even bring down, the Western capitalist system, even though, as alluded to earlier, such academies are critical institutions in the capitalist system, playing a critical role in the production of bourgeois or ‘privileged’ levels of social and cultural capital. This ‘more grounded’ explanation does not need to propose a self-indulgent idea of an ‘enlightened’ state that allows intellectuals to transcend their social conditioning. I suggest that Western intellectuals have a tendency to be conditioned to develop notions of self-emancipation through their training for membership within the intellectual elite of the bourgeois system. They gain their status as pioneering mechanics and engineers of the self-emancipatory ethos – the ethos that individuals depend upon in order to rise up the social strata in Western and Westernised societies. As ‘pioneers’, they have a tendency to develop, push forward, and radicalise the bourgeois ethos, turning bourgeois self-emancipation against itself and joining with other groups or classes in radical movements premised on being-with notions of self-emancipation.

Note here that I have been referring in this this introduction to the being-with radicalism of the *bourgeois classes*. I have been using ‘bourgeois classes’ as a general label for middle classes, but with a focus on the radicalising middle or bourgeois classes – my main focus is not on the traditional, conservative middle classes, who are often confusingly understood as the epitome of ‘bourgeois’. I do not use the label ‘bourgeois’, then, to describe conservative traits, but on the contrary, to draw attention to the role middle classes play in societal transformation through their invocations of self-emancipatory power. I also think, with a nod to Marxist theory, that it is important to distinguish between bourgeois or middle classes and the ‘bourgeoisie’, the latter being the chief owners and overseers of the means of production. Such a distinction can be used to emphasise that it is often sections of the middle classes that work as a self-appointed ‘progressive’ cultural vanguard in conjunction with the working and marginalised classes to challenge the position of the establishment and/or the ruling bourgeoisie, in the process stirring up anti-capitalist sentiments that can run counter to bourgeois material interests. But there is no idealisation of such middle classes here, only a statement on the fact that the middle classes, particularly, as shall be discussed in Chapter 6, professional classes that generate much of their power or status through their cultural capital – such as intellectuals, scientists, artists, spiritualists, journalists, and civil society activists – have a tendency to radicalise the bourgeois-liberalist ethos as they challenge the power of the ruling or haute bourgeoisie. In challenging

that power and potentially empowering themselves in the process, the radicalised middle classes are often driven by self-interest as much as by desires for equality with the people. Indeed, in radicalising a bourgeois ethos that remains constituted by the contradiction of being-with and being-over desire, such middle classes help to reinforce bourgeois power as much as they undermine it.

As discussed, Deleuze and Guattari present horizontal, free-flowing desire – or what amounts to being-with desire – as the immanent force that opposes transcendent social structuration, and for the authors, there is no real contest between the immanent and transcendent force, because transcendent structuration is not a Real force at all, only an empty force infecting and perverting the Real immanent forces of emancipatory desire. As we shall see in Chapter 5, in rejecting the idea of the immanent and the transcendent as real conflicting counterparts, Deleuze and Guattari reject the idea of dialectal struggle (and Hardt and Negri build on this rejection). However, considering the reconceptualisation of desiring struggle I have outlined previously, it seems appropriate to reintroduce a dialectical perspective, although not a version of the popularised Hegelian dialectic that Deleuze and Guattari reject. Instead, the concept of dialectical struggle I envision is inspired by Žižek’s reinterpretation of the Hegelian dialectic⁶ (though Žižek, as a Lacanian Marxist, would have little time for the particular dialectic of desire I propose in this book). I argue that instead of two oppositional forces that work their way towards a higher-level synthesis, what we see through the development of the bourgeois self-emancipatory ethos is the deterritorialisation of two facets of desire that are both interdependent and irreconcilable. When I suggest that desiring radicalism forces reform on the liberal-democratic mainstream, I am not suggesting that the new settlement is somewhat closer to social perfection. Instead, I aim to demonstrate that the settlement remains always unstable; indeed, any positive democratisation impressed on the mainstream by being-with desiring radicalism can always spark the competitive being-over desires that both emerge from within the being-with dynamic and rise to challenge it. This book, then, aims not to illuminate the unfolding of an ideal liberal synthesis in Western society, but instead aims to *outline the history of the exacerbation of the West’s liberalist contradiction*, which reached new extremes following the postmodernist break of the 1960s and subsequent neoliberal revolution of the late 1970s. In Figure 0.1, I have tried to represent this process of exacerbation in diagram form, attempting to illustrate how it is rooted in a Western-bourgeois ethos of self-emancipation. This diagram, in fact, represents the theoretical model that I will attempt to demonstrate the usefulness of through an application of it to an analysis of the development of Western culture.

In this book, then, I argue that Western anti-capitalism develops through an immanent process of bourgeois contradiction. I would like to re-emphasise here, for I do fear being misinterpreted as presenting some type of crude bourgeois determinism, that I do not *simply reduce* all popular struggles to bourgeois struggles. Instead I highlight the fact that even though the bourgeois classes tend to lead, or at least culturally lead, struggles against the ruling elite or establishment,




Figure 0.1 The exacerbation of the liberalist contradiction

the being-with radicalism of bourgeois movements has been continually absorbed and turned against bourgeois classes by working and aspirant classes who have pushed forward a democratising agenda in line with their own interests. Without such popular involvement and emergence in self-emancipatory struggles, democratisation would be fatally undermined, for the middle classes are constantly tempted to enforce or re-establish exclusivity in seeing to their own interests. And in this book, I shall seek to demonstrate that through Western history, artisans, who often straddle the blurry line between working class and middle class, have played a particularly important role in radicalising the self-emancipatory ethos. Ultimately, I aim to demonstrate through a post-structuralist Marxian perspective that the capitalist system has always carried within itself not just the contradictory material conditions but also – and perhaps more critically – *the contradictory culture* of its own destruction, for it is dependent on a liberalist ethos that branches off into a supportive possessive culture *and* a subversive egalitarian culture.

The argument in this book will proceed through 7 chapters and a conclusion. Loosely speaking, Chapters 1 and 2, Chapters 3 and 4, and Chapters 5 and 6 are held together by common aims, while Chapter 7 is somewhat standalone. Chapters 1 and 2 aim to provide an expanded overview of the book's theoretical argument. Chapter 1 focuses on the key philosophical debates that the book enters into. It will explore in more detail the contrasting interpretations of contemporary anti-capitalism, beginning with a re-focusing on the cycle of struggles of 2011. The chapter shall trace the emergence of contemporary intellectual conflict back to the 1960s, contrasting Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of corporeal immanence with idealist philosophies of transcendence. The chapter shall also reintroduce Hardt and Negri's revitalisation of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of desire, outlining their history of Europe's anti-bourgeois social movements. Finally, it shall elaborate on how the book alters Hardt and Negri's ontology of desire, with an assessment of the contradictory, possessive/egalitarian Lockean spirit of early Anglo-Saxon radicalism. Chapter 2 outlines the book's application of the self-emancipatory ethos to the development of the modern West. It attempts a thorough reinterpretation of Hardt and Negri's history of the emergence of anti-bourgeois European radicalism, focusing on the eminently bourgeois character of such radicalism. The chapter explores how the Italian city-states of the Medieval period pioneered bourgeois notions of self-emancipation and popular participation, but fell back on an aristocratic culture of command, and how bourgeois self-emancipatory culture was brought out in the Netherlands and England in the seventeenth century. In critiquing Hardt and Negri's concept of an anti-bourgeois alter-modernity opposing bourgeois modernity, the chapter analyses the links between the philosophy of Spinoza – held up by Hardt and Negri as the ultimate alter-modernity thinker of the seventeenth century – and the philosophy of Locke – the seventeenth century's pioneer of liberal-bourgeois individualism.

Chapters 3 and 4 aim to analyse key social and political movements in Western history, with a focus on the postmodernist or libertarian break of the 1960s in the context of the evolution of Western liberal democracy. Chapter 3 focuses on May

1968 in France, the most revolutionary moment in the social upheavals of the West during the 1960s. In analysing the 1968 period, the chapter shall focus on Julian Bourg's (2007) reinterpretation of the legacy of 1968. Bourg's argument that the revolutionary fervour of the 1968 period instigated democratic reform in the West which challenged the established order informs this book's concept of social change emerging through contradictory forces. However, in Chapter 4, Bourg's argument will be deconstructed, because Bourg, similarly to Hardt and Negri, falls back on a simplistic notion of opposition by drawing a clear distinction between the liberal and democratic aspects of liberal democracy. In Chapter 4, this overstated distinction is rejected in favour of an analysis of the contradictory self-emancipatory character of Western democracy. The chapter shall challenge Bourg's distancing of Anglo-Saxon liberalism and French republicanism. It shall do this by first focusing on the links between student radicalism in the United States and France in the 1960s, and then by delving deeper into history, focusing on the way in which France's revolutionary republican tradition follows in the footsteps of the Anglo-Saxon liberalist radicalism that made the American Revolution possible. Through the exploration of the intertwined histories of Anglo-Saxon and French radicalism, it shall be suggested that ultimately, both traditions have played important roles in the development of the West's liberalist ethos.

In Chapters 5 and 6, the aim is to focus on two of the key philosophies that have accompanied postmodernist or left-libertarian movements since the 1960s. In particular, the chapters shall explore in more detail the philosophy of the key theorists on emancipatory desire – Deleuze and Guattari and Hardt and Negri. In Chapter 5 I shall focus on Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* (first published 1972), the first of two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. The first volume shall be focused on because it is this volume that is the product of the May 1968 milieu, and it is the intention of the chapter to explore the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari's ontology of desire is rooted in the revolutionary upsurge of this period. The chapter shall analyse Deleuze and Guattari's philosophical flight from Lacanian psychoanalysis and their problematic turn to Nietzsche's will to power. In Chapter 6 I shall focus on Hardt and Negri's revitalisation of Deleuze and Guattari's ontology of desire in the context of the emergence of a new anti-capitalist movement in the late 1990s. The chapter shall consider Negri's grounding in the anti-authoritarian radicalism of the post-'68 period and how this grounding has shaped Hardt and Negri's concept of the asymmetry between the productive multitude and the vampire system of control. Hardt and Negri have written a trilogy of books on the revolutionary potential of desire; *Empire* (2001), *Multitude* (2004), and *Commonwealth* (2009), but Chapter 6 focuses on *Empire* (first published 2000), because, like *Anti-Oedipus*, it is rooted in a revolutionary social movement against the bourgeois establishment, and it is in *Empire* that we find Hardt and Negri at their most anti-authoritarian, strongly rejecting institutional solutions to capitalist problems to reveal their anti-capitalist ethos in its rawest form.

By the time of *Multitude* (2004), Hardt and Negri were coming to terms with the rise of the more moderate alter-globalisation movement against neoliberal

globalisation, and had noticeably softened their tone. In *Multitude*, while remaining committed to the ontology of revolutionary desire, they displayed more openness to the notion of a global justice movement against the capitalist Empire. The emergence of the less revolutionary alter-globalisation movement, which Hardt and Negri felt compelled to respond to in *Multitude*, has become an important feature of contemporary anti-systemic struggle and has absorbed much anti-capitalist energy. It is necessary, therefore, to consider how this emergent alter-globalist spirit fits into the discussion of the development of Western radicalism. Chapter 7 addresses this issue. It considers the relationship between the anti-authoritarian philosophy of Hardt and Negri and the ‘transnationalist’ political ideas within the alter-globalisation movement. In particular, the chapter focuses on the ideas of Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Jan Aart Scholte. I identify these authors as two of the most radical alter-globalist thinkers, and the chapter considers how they help draw radical anti-capitalist undercurrents into a mainstream institutional process. Here I reflect on the extent to which desires for being-with humanity and nature can be drawn out from the contradictory self-emancipatory ethos through their institutionalisation in a transnationalist project that remains within the spirit of being-with being. The chapter also draws attention to the implicit transnationalist attempt to radicalise Hardt and Negri’s rejection of liberalist bourgeois culture, with transnationalists championing non-Western, non-bourgeois ways of being and seeking to empower indigenous peoples in their struggles against Western domination. However, the chapter explores the Western-bourgeois character of this championing of the non-Western, placing it in the context of liberalist associational radicalism and the globalisation of the West’s being-with deterritorialising tendency.

Finally, the Conclusion chapter shall summarise the arguments presented in each chapter, and in doing so will elaborate on some key points and arguments that have been covered in the book. Here I shall re-explore my use of Hoofd’s post-structuralist idea of inhabiting or immersing oneself in the culture or social system that one is analysing. In doing this, I shall tentatively consider the theoretical and philosophical contradictions that I have inhabited or worked through, considering the problematic relationship between, on the one hand, notions of an essential biological and desiring nature, and, on the other, notions of social constructionism and/or cultural determinism.

Notes

- 1 I must stress here that I am using ‘left-libertarian’ as a broad umbrella term to describe a variety of movements that are inclined towards combining radical notions of individual liberty with radical notions of egalitarianism. When I use the term, then, I do not have any particular schools of thought in mind which have been labelled or which adopt the term ‘left-libertarian’. While originally used as a label for anarchist movements, most recently the term has become associated with the redistributive political focus of writers such as Hillel Steiner and Philippe Van Parijs. I would include both types of

left-libertarianism under my broad label, which serves the purpose of describing a broad Western tendency.

- 2 One particular attempt to do this was provided by L. Susan Brown in her *The Politics of Individualism*; 1993.
- 3 As we shall see in Chapter 5, for Deleuze and Guattari, not all bodies without organs are positive, but the positive one seems to be presented as the extension of the human's inherent being of variety or multiplicity. Negative bodies without organs react against and corrupt such inherent being.
- 4 Hardt and Negri, incidentally, do accept that they embrace a humanism (see 2001, 91–92), but insist, paradoxically from this book's point of view, that theirs is a post-human humanism that unpacks the human being through its creative, reconstructive potential.
- 5 I must stress here that “dualistic” is my interpretation. As we shall return to throughout the book, Deleuze and Guattari, and Hardt and Negri after them, were trying to reject dualisms with their concept of immanence. I argue that what they actually did was invert the idealist dualism they were trying to reject; in opposition to the embrace of transcendence as the positive to the negative of immanence, they embraced immanence as the positive to the negative of transcendence. That is to say, rather than embrace a worldview based on thorough immanence, they externalised certain negative forces which became “transcendent” within the realm of immanence.
- 6 Žižek lays out his reinterpretation in *The Parallax View*, 2006. For an accessible introduction to his idea, see Žižek, 2009.

Perspectives on contemporary radicalism

Transcendence and the immanentist break

In commenting on the social unrest and resistance movements of 2011, Žižek (2011) suggested that the manifesto of the Spanish *indignados* revealed much about of the “post-ideological” era we find ourselves in, for it was indicative of the fact that protesters have become very good at disavowing the system but have proved incapable of developing a radical alternative to it. Laying out their human rights, the *indignados* called for an “ethical revolution”, rejecting the entire political class because of its complicity in the corporate drive for power and profit. For Žižek, this moralistic rage against the system is simply not enough – what is needed is “a positive programme of sociopolitical change”. Even in Greece, where protestors were more radical and confrontational, Žižek suggested that in attempting to reach consensus on positive action for change, the protestors could agree only on an impotent response – “to exert pressure on political parties” (ibid.). Žižek has made (2012) similar criticisms of the Occupy movement, which followed in the footsteps of the 2011 European protests against economic mismanagement and austerity programmes. For Žižek (2011), the Occupiers demanded radical change whilst refusing to adequately organise themselves to actually effect democratisation – it was almost as if they deliberately enfeebled themselves as part of their anti-establishment charade. Žižek argues that, ultimately, the protesters of the current era “express a spirit of revolt without revolution”. For revolution, the protesters need “a strong body able to reach quick decisions and to implement them with all necessary harshness”.

Despite Žižek’s pessimistic assessment of contemporary political struggle, intellectuals whose ideas are closer to the protesters’ own interpret the spirit of the age very differently. Hardt and Negri, for example, would argue that Žižek misses the point, failing to grasp the new dynamics of emancipatory social movements. Many social movements no longer feel the need to rely on ‘strong bodies’ to add solid structure to their projects for change. They do not seek to be filtered, moulded and branded by centres of power. They are not compelled by the need to order diversity around an efficient decision-making body, or to follow a grand plan laid out by a party manifesto. In *Declaration* (2012), Hardt and Negri argue that rather than submitting to central leadership, today’s social movements simply assert themselves by taking to the streets and occupying city squares. In doing so,

they “have declared a new set of principles and truths” (4). Through their declarations, the multitude of revolting peoples is beginning to develop “the basis for constituting a new and sustainable society” (ibid.). As Hardt and Negri note, in the occupied areas of 2011, organisation was marked by a lack of clear leadership structures; it proved impossible to find real leaders or figureheads, with the press relying on informal spokespeople and celebrity intellectuals for insight. Instead, there was an invigorating democratic ethic to the movements, with horizontal organising and participatory decision-making. Through their democratising or people-power ethic, the protesters opposed the corrupting effects of privilege and hierarchy. In opposing the power of elite individuals with the power of the people, the protesters developed “a struggle for the common” (ibid., 7).

In an argument antithetical to Žižek’s, Hardt and Negri state that 2011 was the year of radical social change. Early in the year, the exploited peoples of the world were crippled by the fear that the worldwide economic crisis had imbued within them. The multitude was tolerating the ‘tough decisions’ on economic restructuring their leaders were making, “lest even greater disasters befall us” (ibid., 4). However, as the year progressed, this tolerance began to wane and a new “cycle of struggles” emerged to undermine the existing political arrangement. The precursor to this cycle began in Tunisia in December 2010, when mass street demonstrations began against Ben Ali’s government. With Ben Ali ousted by mid-January, “Egyptians took up the baton” (ibid., 5), beginning their demonstrations in late January, occupying Tahrir Square and forcing President Mubarak out of office. These Arab struggles for democracy tapped into grievances in other Arabic countries, with the emancipatory upsurge spreading to Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. Unlike Žižek (see 2011), Hardt and Negri focus on the positive aspects of the Arab Spring, suggesting that the emancipatory struggles pushed forward a progressive agenda, even if they didn’t bring about complete democratic revolutions. Inspired by the spontaneity of the Arab Spring push for democratisation, the *indignado* movement in Spain began occupations of central squares in Madrid and Barcelona on May 15th. Demanding ‘Democracia real ya’ – real democracy now – the protesters rejected political representation because they were demoralised by its ineffectiveness, and dismayed by their socialist-led government’s collusion in protecting the banking and corporate elite and in failing to support ordinary people during economic plight. As Hardt and Negri note, as part of their democratising push, the *indignados* developed participatory assemblies in the occupied squares. The Spanish occupations inspired Greeks to take up the baton, with protesters occupying Syntagma Square as austerity became the indefinite future for Greece. Finally, Hardt and Negri suggest that the Occupy movement, beginning in Zuccotti Park in New York in September, pushed the rebellion further, with the movement quickly spreading across the United States and the world.

Importantly, Hardt and Negri link the 2011 wave of uprisings to the “alter-globalization movements” that began to make an impact at the end of the 1990s (2012, 7). The demonstrators within these movements would try to disrupt the

summit meetings of “the key institutions of the global power system”. They would travel from summit to summit, challenging the legitimacy of the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the G8, and other global institutions, calling into question the right of these institutions’ bureaucrats to set the political and economic agenda for the world. However, Hardt and Negri note that while the early alter-globalisation movement was nomadic, the cycle that began in 2011 was marked by occupation – by the refusal to be moved. They suggest that while the alter-globalisation movement nurtured the rebellion against the global system of power, the rebellious pitch has now been invested so thoroughly in local and national social issues that a rejection of the global system is beginning to *take root*.

Žižek is happy to embrace participatory democracy in the squares only to the extent that the social organisation leads directly to the forging of a new socialist ideology that can obliterate capitalist non-ideology. However, for Hardt and Negri, the social movements of 2011 did not “build headquarters or form central committees” not because they were lost in a post-ideological age, but because their concept of constitution has been democratically radicalised (2012, 10). In developing a constituent process, the new social movements will not seek “to codify new social relations in a fixed order” (*ibid.*), for they do not want there to be a fixed order to restrict their common power. One might say, then, that in implicit opposition to Žižek, Hardt and Negri suggest that *the spirit of revolt is the becoming of the revolution*, for within the spirit lies a radical notion of democratisation. For Hardt and Negri, there is no need to drive the new social movements towards the claiming of power, for in their very being the movements are sowing the seeds of a future revolution. Living through the spirit of radical democracy, the new social movements are alienated by traditional socialist forcing mechanisms that demand the immediate overthrow of the system and victory at all costs – as Žižek puts it, the pressing need for “quick decisions” and “necessary harshness”. Protesters in the twenty-first century want to *live* people-power in its radical form, and in doing so, they nurture the culture of the commons that makes possible a revolutionary reorganisation of social life.

I have now outlined two of the key competing perspectives within the radical intellectual left on contemporary resistance to the capitalist order. Let us consider this intellectual difference as part of a conflict between two closely related but divergent strands of radical bourgeois thought. On the one side, Žižek emerges from a strand of the Western intelligentsia still tightly rooted in the modernist philosophical movement against bourgeois conservatism that began in the second half of the nineteenth century. Those with modernist leanings reject the Enlightenment’s drive towards absolute rational mastery, which subsumes “the particular under the universal” (see Bernstein, 2001, 5). They associate such a drive with the dehumanising effects of capitalist and totalitarian bureaucracy. However, while such intellectuals embrace “sensuous particularity” in the forging of social and political radicalism, they remain committed to the pursuit of “rational ends” (Bernstein, 2001, 6). The bounded, bureaucratic, instrumentalist reason

of the Enlightenment is seen by modernists as an irrational form of reason that reproduces itself as a stifling, deadening force. To fight this irrational force, social subjects must draw on the power of their consciousness to reflect, with a “true” or open-minded reason, on alternative possibilities of existence, always bearing in mind the treasured but elusive end of “freedom and happiness” (ibid., 5). Thinkers with modernist leanings, then, reject absolute mastery over the sensual world, or the world of physical experience, but remain dependent on a mind that can abstract itself away from sensual reality to see past its limitations. There still seems, therefore, to be some emphasis here on the mind rising above sensual particularity. This emphasis encourages modernist thinkers to lean towards notions of *transcending* the material state of existence.

On the other side of the radical intellectual left, we find thinkers like Hardt and Negri who emanate from a strand of the Western intelligentsia that is determined to rip open the modernist legacy. Such thinkers embrace the modernist rejection of Enlightenment totality, but work to push it further, fundamentally rejecting a transcendent mental force or any commitment to a rational end of true reason. They insist that we do not only experiment with sensual particularity, but lose ‘our selves’ in it, thereby *fully embracing the immanent*. Human beings, then, should *feel* their way towards limitless reinvention by flowing through the intensities of life. We may loosely call immanentist thinkers ‘postmodernist’ because of the way in which they break from the modern inclination towards transcendence. In embracing immanent sensuality, the ‘postmodernists’ tend to look favourably on the spontaneous, anarchistic upsurges that mark the current period of social and political struggle. Those with modernist leanings, on the other hand, often remain sceptical of the radical emancipatory flows of the current period. Holding firm to faith in an overriding human consciousness, believing in the stability and order it promises, the modernists pull back on the brink of what we might call ‘the post-modern precipice’, refusing to leap towards the ‘abyss’ of absolute immanence.

I would now like to consider ideas presented at two key conferences on contemporary political struggle in order to explore the ‘modernist/postmodernist’ intellectual opposition further.² Key philosophical ideas explored at these conferences highlighted the key ground over which the intellectuals dispute. I shall explore the ways in which ‘modernist’ and ‘postmodernist’ intellectuals are animated by differing notions of freeing oneself within the collective struggle. I shall try to highlight how, by embracing differing notions of sensual being, the intellectuals are led to conflicting notions of the organisation and power that is necessary to drive forward emancipatory social or political movements.

In their ‘Introduction’ to *The Idea of Communism* (2010), a book based on a conference of the same name held at Birkbeck, University of London in 2009, Douzinas and Žižek argued that the spectre of communism had returned to haunt the world capitalist system. After the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s and the proclamation of the “end of history” in the wake of “unipolar world American hegemony” (vii), the economic crisis that began in 2008 had “marked the beginning of a return to full-blown history” (viii). For Douzinas and

Žižek, the challenge to the political establishment is marked by the emergence of a new notion of communism, one that has left behind adherence to Soviet-style ‘communism’. In the wake of the economic crisis and the ensuing political crisis, Douzinas and Žižek helped organise the ‘Idea of Communism’ conference to bring together views from the West’s leading leftist philosophers on the emergence of a new communism.

It is significant that in their ‘Introduction’ to the collection of lectures on communism, Douzinas and Žižek suggest Alain Badiou as the man behind the phrase ‘The Idea of Communism’. They note that in the attempt to reclaim communism from its authoritarian connotations, Badiou has asserted that “from Plato onwards, Communism is the only political Idea worthy of a philosopher” (ibid., ix). Badiou is a key figure on the radical philosophical left, and it is his lecture exploring the Idea (capital ‘I’) of communism that appears first in Douzinas and Žižek’s edited collection. It is worth exploring some of the concepts Badiou presented because they highlight key issues regarding immanence and transcendence. More so than Žižek, Badiou teeters on the brink of the ‘postmodern precipice’, struggling to find a way to retain an element of transcendence within a worldview he presents as immanentist.

For Badiou (2010), communism is the emergence of political truth, and it can be understood Platonically as the ultimate political Idea. In opposition to the Idealessness of “contemporary democratic materialism”, which he associates with Anglo-Saxon empiricism, Badiou exalts the challenge posed to liberal capitalism by the emergence of the communist Idea. For Badiou, contemporary democratic materialism is a crude form of materialism that simply embraces sensual experience without working to re-orientate it towards emancipatory ends. His argument is based on the premise that the individual body is bound by “selfishness, competition [and] finitude” (ibid.). It is this individual body that is unleashed by the individualism of liberal capitalism – individualism understood, then, as synonymous with animality (“they’re one and the same thing”; ibid., 3). For Badiou, then, a simple embrace of sensual experience can only lead one to a limited life as a self-contained individual who is vulnerable to domination and destruction in a world of competing individuals. In order to free oneself from this limited state of existence, an individual chooses to incorporate his or her body into a “body-of-truth” (ibid.); a body that “cannot be reduced to an individual” (ibid., 2). The individual, then, goes through a process of “subjectification”, subjecting him or herself to a social body and an accompanying body of thought in order to rise away from limited primal existence and towards an extended existence within a ‘true’ body of overcoming. For Badiou, through this process of subjectification, the individual becomes part of “a political truth procedure” (ibid., 3), for he or she is heading towards a ‘true’ idea of emancipation from material suffering.

Badiou states that his “friend” Žižek also argues strongly for the return of the Idea of communism, and in recognising the force of Žižek’s Lacanian approach to revitalising the Idea, Badiou goes on to frame his notion of the Idea within Lacan’s “three orders of the Subject: the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic”

(*ibid.*, 4). In the development of the communist Idea, an emancipatory political sequence “is the Real on which the Idea is based”. The Real is understood as the realm where primal human resistance emerges against various forms of oppression, domination and exploitation. It is defined by spontaneous upsurges of anger and fight; the basic energies that begin a rejection of an established order. Such upsurges can provide individuals with a sense of emancipation, but they don’t become truth procedures unless a body-of-truth emerges out of them. For this to happen, an idea of emancipatory truth, of post-individualist truth, must begin to take hold. For Badiou, the Idea, being based on the Real, does not descend down from some divine realm to lead a political movement, but emerges out of the desires, interests, and reasoning of the movement itself. Nevertheless, Badiou still envisions ‘true’ ideas rising out of primal material conditions to re-orientate fragments of emancipation towards a ‘true’ process of total emancipation. For Badiou, the realm of the Imaginary is where post-primal, post-individualist possibilities are imagined. The ideas produced in the Imaginary are always a work in progress, always limited by, or developed through, the practical possibilities that exist within the Symbolic order of the hegemonic system of power, but the Imaginary alone has the power to move the individual from “fragments of truth” (*ibid.*, 14) towards the true or ultimate emancipation of communism.

Badiou suggests that while the events of the 1960s opened up new emancipatory possibilities through a new imaginary that rejected the ‘necessity’ of party centralisation, these possibilities have been repressed beneath the reaffirmation of the bourgeois symbolic order. In the current era, the “popular masses” do not assert a coherent alternative to the established order because the capitalist system has shut off the possibility of communism – the masses are “lacking the Idea” to sustain and reinforce a truth procedure (*ibid.*, 13). In championing individual subjectification to a body-of-truth, Badiou argues that the names of revolutionary heroes – from Spartacus, to Robespierre, to Marx, to Mao and Che Guevara – continue to matter. The names of revolutionary heroes relate to the Idea of communism in that they symbolise historical moments “of politics as truth” (*ibid.*, 10). The revolutionary heroes, in their disavowal of individualism for the collective Subject, bring out the emancipatory struggle of the Real. In doing so, they inspire the Real struggles of the millions of ordinary individuals who are made anonymous by the capitalist system. For Badiou, then, we cannot reject the cult of personality – for him it was in fact the rejection of the cult of personality in the name of ‘democracy’ that “heralded the decline of the Idea of communism” (*ibid.*).

Despite his best attempts to distance communism from authoritarianism, with his fascination with revolutionary heroes who turn themselves into cult leaders, Badiou seems to reveal his underlying vanguardist inclinations. Badiou, for example, remains fascinated with the disciplining power of Chairman Mao, the Great Helmsman of Chinese Communism, particularly the power Mao had to unleash popular insurrection against the Communist Party of China during the Cultural Revolution (see Badiou, 2013). What Badiou seems to champion

is any individual who rises up from raw, Real struggle to reject his or her self-centredness within the symbolic order, only to become all-powerful by leading the masses from ‘fragments of truth’ towards the universalising, totalising force of an Idea encapsulated by the leading individuals themselves. Ultimately, Badiou seems to admire Mao as the epitome of the self-empowering individual who can incite the people to sacrifice themselves on the altar of the individual’s greatness, with the individual’s greatness becoming confused with the common good: during the Cultural Revolution in China, Mao was able to abuse his demigod-demagogue status to incite a pro-Maoist hysteria, thereby reinforcing his power over the Chinese people as the Communist messiah (see Wardega, 2012, and Burma, 2001). What Badiou seems most interested in, then, is not how the people can lead themselves through their grassroots movements, but how the people can be swept up by individuals who emerge from grassroots movements to impress themselves on the people as unquestionable leaders, ones who can elevate popular disorder to the order of an idealistic truth. The cult of personality, in both its fascist and communist forms, takes an elitist notion of bourgeois sovereignty to an extreme, galvanising a totalised mass behind the absolute power of a single ‘emancipatory’ individual.

Hardt and Negri also presented at the 2009 Idea of Communism conference that Badiou headlined with Žižek, with each of the former authors presenting separately. Although neither Hardt (2010) nor Negri (2010) really explore their opposition to transcendentalist communism in their Birkbeck lectures – perhaps in recognition of the central role of Badiou and Žižek at the conference – when the two thinkers combined to write *Empire* (first released in 2000), they rejected the emphasis on the formation of overriding ideas or ideology in the development of communism. Although they share in some of Badiou’s notions of uncontainable violence and spontaneous revolutionary upsurge, for Hardt and Negri, communism is produced by the Real in and of itself. They reject Badiou’s notion of the individual-animal as essentially selfish without the enlightening power of the Idea: rejecting the need for subjectification to an Idea in order to transform raw struggle into communism, they champion corporeal desire in itself as a communistic force, with raw desire producing infinite connections in a social world. As I suggested in the Introduction, in order to understand the ethos that marks Hardt and Negri’s notion of desire, one has to trace their philosophy back to the social upheavals in the West in the 1960s. In particular, one has to return to the uprising of May 1968 in France, for it was the ’68 period that led to the publication of the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* by Deleuze and Guattari, the philosophical works that provide the foundations for Hardt and Negri’s ontology of desire. Furthermore, it was during the ’68 period that the divide between Badiou’s style of idea-led politics and Deleuze and Guattari’s style of pure-materialist politics began to open up.

As noted earlier, Badiou links his philosophy to Lacan’s three orders of the Subject, and in doing so he invokes the Freudian–Lacanian tradition that emerged during the 1960s. Deleuze and Guattari wrote their formative work *Anti-Oedipus*

(first published 1972) in rejection of Freudian psychoanalysis. Central to their rejection was a rejection of a Freudian unconscious defined by primal selfishness. They suggested that this cynical view of the unconscious reinforced the need for bourgeois authority because, as Badiou suggests, to combat the selfish tendencies of the animal body what is needed is an Idea to strive towards, an Idea that is ultimately defined by the ‘enlightened’ bourgeois intellectuals who know how to guide the ‘masses’ – as Badiou still calls the people in his lecture – to their ‘true’ freedom, or the freedom that is defined for them in any case. Badiou recognises that May ’68 marked the emergence of a radicalised emancipatory Idea, but in doing so, he ultimately rejects what Deleuze and Guattari embrace – the joyous, libidinal, anti-authoritarian desire of the protests of the ’68 period. For Badiou, the spontaneous self-organisation of the ’68ers was the emergence of a Real truth procedure, but in their refusal to finally organise themselves with a collective ideology, the ’68ers sank back towards the symbolic order of the State (see Badiou, 2008). However, from the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari and Hardt and Negri, in refusing to give up on the Idea, Badiou cannot promote the radically emancipatory, anti-statist philosophy he attempts to, because the Idea implicitly shares with State philosophy the belief that the wild and disorientated masses require purification and direction, for they need to ascend from raw, real struggle to the universal, absolute right of the Idea.

For Badiou the Real and the Idea are interdependent, and the Idea is supposedly not transcendental because it emerges through the Real. Nevertheless, the Idea is the ultimate power, because it is the mediatory force that filters and ultimately seems to reconstitute human being, transforming primal animal bodies into bodies of truth. I would argue, then, that Badiou makes an implicitly hierarchical distinction between the Real and the Idea, and subsequently he struggles to detach his politics from notions of militant vanguards, who, with their special imaginary powers, are compelled to ‘guide’ the vulnerable herds. It is perhaps unsurprising, given his fear of desiring masses that have not been aligned to the enlightening Idea, that Badiou, like Žižek, continues to emphasise the overriding importance of organisational discipline, which forges all into the general will. Organisational discipline ultimately requires a disciplinary power that almost inevitably falls into the hands of a concentrated minority, who may not have formal state power in their hands but will have enough informal or pervasive power to root out wayward movements and steer mass anger towards ‘true’ insurrection. As Douzinas (2013, 183) succinctly notes:

The political organisation Badiou fantasizes is highly disciplined and, although not attached to a class, acts towards the people in a directive and authoritarian manner.

At a follow-up conference to ‘The Idea of Communism’, held in New York in October 2011, Étienne Balibar recognised in his lecture, as I suggest earlier, that one of the most prominent conflicts in contemporary debates on communism

emerges between the philosophical perspective represented by Žižek and the perspective represented by Hardt and Negri (see Balibar, 2013). Žižek is resolutely committed to the Marxist–Leninist project to seize the state, and for him individual freedom is very much subordinate to party discipline. As Žižek (2001) notes in his critique of Hardt and Negri’s *Empire*, “politics without the organizational form of the party is politics without politics”. For Žižek, Hardt and Negri’s “pseudo-Deleuzian” ethos of radical emancipatory politics is wrapped up in and implicitly inspired by capitalism’s embrace of unlimited freedom and absolute deviancy, and it cannot, therefore, offer a viable alternative to the capitalist system. However, Badiou, by embracing organisational discipline in the lifting up of the masses, whilst also insisting on organic, non-party forms of organisation that are more amenable to voluntary commitment, may seem like an intermediary figure between two poles, Žižek on one side and Hardt and Negri on the other. However, Žižek and Badiou are ultimately philosophically united in opposition to Hardt and Negri’s philosophy by refusing to leap into the ‘abyss’ of immanence, with the former authors tied together by a turn to overriding ideas that lift movements higher. For Ruda (2013) and Balibar (2013), through their turn to ideas, Žižek and Badiou commit themselves to an *idealist* philosophy of communism.³

For Balibar, Badiou’s assertion of the “intrinsically ‘idealistic’ character of the communist discourse” is “indisputable” (2013, 14). Under this idealistic perspective, the possibility of communist reality is made actual only through mental capacities; through the imagination and ideals of the mind. As we have seen, for Badiou humans are creatures of raw, bodily compulsions, but it is the idealising mind that really makes us human – consciousness allows us to imagine possibilities beyond our animality. The communist Idea is the ultimate idea that can lead humanity towards egalitarian unity, doing so in absolute opposition to humanity’s competitive, (self)-destructive instincts. Because an idea, by its very nature, can create an essential distinction between the existing state of affairs and the possible state of affairs, communists must be led by an idea, or “adapt their lives to the model provided by an idea” (ibid., 15). Through their idea-led notion of communism, both Badiou and Žižek champion the preeminent role of communist ideology during revolutionary change, even if they accept that the re-orientating ideology emerges out of political struggle in the Real (see ibid., 24–28). Ideology helps to crystallise a *desire* for communism, which can be understood in terms of a conscious commitment to an ideal. Under an idealist perspective, then, communist desires manifest themselves as ideal fantasies; communism being the ideal object longed for but yet to be reached. However, by basing their ontology of desire on Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis, Hardt and Negri reject the concept of a desire of fantasy and longing; a desire which works against the nihilistic body that *lacks* a collective focus. Hardt and Negri reject a presumption of an ontological lack at the core of human nature. They embrace the global multitude as the productive force whose bodily desires do not need to be mediated by the elite mind’s ideals or fantasies in order to produce communism. For Hardt and Negri, unconscious, bodily desires produce communism in their very being.

It must be noted at this point that in his *Organs without Bodies*, a critique of Deleuze's philosophy, Žižek insists that he is opposed to idealism and is in fact a true materialist. However, he makes this assertion only by embracing the mind as the true revolutionary force. For Žižek a "pure a-subjective current of consciousness" enables humanity to overcome its bodily limitations, with this consciousness being "thoroughly extracted from its corporeal base" (2004, 'Deleuze', section 1). He argues that while Deleuze displays his true materialism in *Logic of Sense* by embracing the human mind as an organ of pure potentiality, the "Guattarized" Deleuze in *Anti-Oedipus* slides towards idealism by embracing limitative bodily productions. Despite Žižek's categorisation of himself as a materialist, I will continue to understand Žižek as an idealist in line with Balibar's overview of idealism provided above. As Balibar (2013) suggests through his insistence that communism is idealistic, Žižek explicitly embraces the system's superstructure as the location of the ideal-producing consciousness: this is the place where "EVERYTHING is ultimately decided", the site that is "ontologically cut off from the site of material production" (Žižek, 2004, 'Deleuze', section 5). Žižek, then, is understood as an idealist because for him the material conditions of capitalism are overcome only through the mind's potential to transcend materiality itself – for Žižek revolution is ultimately and ontologically always ideal or ideal-led.⁴ With a nod to the idealistic character of his materialism, he refers to it as a "post-metaphysical idealism" or a "spectral materialism", a materialism willing to face up to the fact that ultimately there is no 'real' physical matter but only the "scientific Real of mathematized 'immaterial' processes" (ibid., section 4); the virtual of infinite possibility.

Žižek's turn to an a-subjective realm of pure potentiality sparks what I think is an interesting question; how do we square Žižek's embrace of 'strong bodies' and 'necessary harshness' with his hunger for an open-ended process of possibility creation? I would argue that Žižek's dual leaning towards both the establishment of bodies and the dissolution of bodies is rooted in the type of problematic 'double affirmation' that was discussed in this book's Introduction. Jameson (1991), in linking idealisation back to the modernist tradition, notes that even in their reaction against bourgeois atomisation, modernists remain dependent on a life experienced as an "autonomous bourgeois monad or ego or individual" (15). The modernist experiences life, then, much as a traditional bourgeois man does, thinking and feeling as a "centred subject" (ibid.), seeking to find emancipation through the emergent self. Jameson seems to think that through the experience of being centred through an ego or self, modernist radicals discover the lifeless horror of self-centred existence, and are compelled towards a rejection of the very self they are founded on. I argue, though, that the modernist radical heads towards new supposedly post-self potentialities not in spite of his or her 'self' but precisely because of his or her self. I argue that Žižek, as a radical whose ideas are closely related to the modernist tradition, is caught in a modernist contradiction, in that his search for the infinite is premised on the bourgeois ego's obsession with a super-human power for overcoming all limitations. The

radical modernist-bourgeois self that emerges through the traditional bourgeois ego empowers itself through its fantasies of connecting with a realm of pure possibility, revelling in its special abilities to surpass ‘ordinary’ material existence. Such a bourgeois self, then, does not actually overcome itself through imagining tapping into a realm of pure possibility, but strengthens itself through reinforcing its sense of its own power of overcoming. I would say, then, that the modernist reaction against the tedium of traditional bourgeois existence is actually driven forward by a self-emancipatory ego that reacts in order to revitalise its self, that is to say, is driven forward by *a self that yearns to be so free that it cannot be held back even by itself*.

The modernist-bourgeois self, as a self driven towards a transcendent type of overcoming, should be differentiated from the post-modernist-bourgeois self that Deleuze and Guattari gave expression to. In its embrace of immanence, indeed, in its constitution as immanent itself, the post-modernist-bourgeois self opens up to the ‘real’ or ‘ordinary’ material world. On the other hand, the modernist-bourgeois self, being more concerned with maintaining its special egoist state, opens up to the ordinary world only in a limited sense. The modernist-bourgeois self, as an extension of the traditional bourgeois ego, is a relatively conservative self. It is reluctant to fully embrace the ordinary world, lest its special transcendent condition be undermined, and it gains its sense of power largely through protecting and preserving its special condition. As it expresses itself through the world, it continually seeks to establish and re-establish the culture that supports its self-preservation, yearning to fix in place a type of social order that it remains secure and powerful within. ‘Strong’ bodies, or bodies-of-truth (or really ‘special’ bodies), allow this self to manifest itself in groups in which it can maintain a type of overarching control or status. The point here is not to say that when the modernist self finds expression through the “collective ideals of an artistic or political vanguard or avant-garde” (Jameson, 1991, 15) that the commitment to the radical cause is fake or is just a cover for the interests of the traditional bourgeois classes. Rather, it is to say that even in his or her most heartfelt anti-individualist expressions, the modernist radical remains animated by a conservative self-establishing tendency. It is therefore little wonder that modernist-leaning intellectuals like Žižek and Badiou are so ambivalent towards anarchistic mobility, usurpations, and subterranean lines of flight – such forms of immanentist deviancy threaten the special position of the self-establishing ego. The radicals, then, who are culturally rooted in the late-modern era have a tendency to reproduce the organisational dynamics that supported the conservative bourgeois establishment even as they attempt to organise revolutionary resistance. Žižek is right to point out that there is an intimate connection between the anarchistic forms of today’s radicalism and the adaptability and deviancy of today’s postmodern capitalism. However, the old socialist forms of resistance to which Žižek turns are just as marked by the hegemonic ethos of their time as are today’s forms of resistance.

For Hardt and Negri, the old socialist left tended towards totalising forms and overarching authority because it was rooted in the modern, as opposed to

postmodern, bourgeois notion of sovereignty – a sovereignty of structured progress and ordered unity. For Hardt and Negri, postmodern sovereignty establishes a critical break from its modern predecessor, being a form of power that has adapted to the new emancipatory dynamics within the multitude – dynamics which themselves forced the breaking apart of modern sovereignty. In order to understand this transformation of power, let us consider Hart and Negri’s history of bourgeois sovereignty and its relationship with revolutionary desire in more detail. Hardt and Negri (2001) argue that modernity has two distinct sides to it that contradict each other. Modernity unleashed “the immanent forces of desire and association”, but produced a reaction in the form of “an overarching authority” that desperately tried to impose itself on desire (69). State sovereignty emerges with the aim of reconciling these two conflicting forces, but the forces remain irreconcilable, continually breaking out in absolute opposition.

For Hardt and Negri, modernity began with the emergence of Renaissance humanism, or a European revolution between 1200 and 1600, during which time “humans declared themselves masters of their own lives” and began to reject “the transcendent realm” (*ibid.*, 70 and 71). Embracing their own inherent constituent power, people began to develop a revolutionary notion of politics. From within Catholicism came a movement rejecting church superiority over the community of Christians, and in Republics of Northern Italy such as Padua, sovereignty was brought down to earth, with legislative power proclaimed by the citizen multitude. Hardt and Negri argue that the revolutionary break was marked by an unshakeable faith in the unlimited potential of the human being as a social being:

Renaissance humanism initiated a revolutionary notion of human equality, of singularity and community, cooperation and multitude, that resonated with forces and desires extending horizontally across the globe.

(*ibid.*, 76)

Some Protestant sects continued in this tradition by developing participatory forms of worship, and the Protestant Dutch Republic of the 1600s produced the philosophy of Spinoza, which, according to Hardt and Negri, championed the unbounded, immanent democracy of the multitude. For Hardt and Negri, “by the time we arrive at Spinoza, in fact, the horizon of immanence and the horizon of the democratic political order coincide completely” (*ibid.*, 73).

However, to backtrack, almost as soon as the revolutionary break of self-constitution and connection emerged, it provoked a counterrevolutionary tendency. The emergent forces of desire could not be destroyed and there was no returning to the past, but the counterrevolutionary forces emerging within the Renaissance revolution strove to “dominate and expropriate” the forces of desire (*ibid.*, 74). It was in the civil war that characterised early modernity that embryonic capitalism emerged, along with its associated class struggle. The new creative labouring forces that grew with the proliferation of desire were managed by the emergent bourgeoisie that tapped into the dynamism of labour. For Hardt and Negri, by the

sixteenth century, the “forces of order” were beginning to succeed in subduing the revolutionary upsurge, developing a new transcendent power and instilling “a miserable and humiliating peace” (ibid., 75). The counterreformist movement in the Catholic Church and reactionary intolerance in Protestant churches – which sometimes became churches of state religion – had, by the seventeenth century, helped to ensure that Europe was “feudal again” (ibid., 76). However, it was not possible to crush the forces of revolution, with the new peace masking the perpetual crisis of modernity: “Wherever spaces were closed, movements turned to nomadism and exodus, carrying with them the desire and hope of an irrepressible experience” (ibid.). Again, for Hardt and Negri, it was Spinoza – living on the fringes of Europe as part of a Jewish community that had escaped persecution on the increasingly absolutist continent – who gave expression to the intensifying undercurrent of emancipatory desire.

Hardt and Negri suggest that the Enlightenment emerged out of the recognition that revolutionary desire could not be crushed. The Enlightenment sought to overcome the “absolute dualism” (2001, 78) of the medieval period through mediation, through the development of a “weak” transcendent power that would allow the structured, gradual release of pent-up desires. It was far too dangerous to allow the multitude to self-constitute society, but they would be allowed to desire through a “preconstituted order” (ibid., 79). For Hardt and Negri, it is with Descartes, who reintroduced a transcendent God into the Real of nature, that the Enlightenment begins, the Enlightenment as synonymous with “bourgeois ideology” (ibid., 80). Furthermore, the authors argue that, in political philosophy, the notion of modern transcendent power is founded upon Hobbes’s assertion of the need for a ‘God on Earth’, or an absolute sovereign power, to rule over and above the people in order to prevent the war of each against all (ibid., 83–84). Theoretically, this transcendent power represents the people, for the people ‘consent’ to its sovereignty with the expectation that it will inhibit the terror of absolute war and ensure peace amongst the individuals of society. Again, this modern transcendent power is not designed to completely crush emancipatory struggle like medieval transcendent power, but to channel struggle towards ordered, ‘just’ struggle between competitive individuals – ultimately it is designed to ensure the smooth development of capitalism. This ‘justice’ requires a new logic of power because the humanist revolution shattered the fixed hierarchies of medieval society. Rather than hopelessly attempt to re-establish absolute command over the partially liberated multitude, the powerful sought to govern the multitude with a penetrating logic of discipline and systematisation (see ibid., 88–89 on Foucault). They envisioned – much like, I would argue, Žižek and Badiou do – not extinguishing the people’s raw, emancipatory movements, but overcoming them through riding them to guide and re-orientate them, and ultimately rein them in. They envisioned, then, a kind of contextualised transcendence, or a world of micro-transcendence.

However, for Hardt and Negri, it was still not possible to fully control the desiring multitude in this way, for the disciplinary logic could only respond to

the multitude's dynamism. They suggest that in opposition to the counterrevolutionary tendencies represented by Hobbes, the republican-leaning movement that sparked the English Civil War – or what Hardt and Negri prefer to call the English Revolution – fled to North America to continue the emancipatory project (*ibid.*, see 162 and note 3, 441). For Hardt and Negri, the American Revolution of the eighteenth century is based upon the exodus of the English nonconformists and radicals who carried with them the revolutionary desire of Renaissance humanism. By the time of the American Revolution, this desire had started to bloom. It was this desire that allowed the United States to develop a notion of sovereignty that built upon modern sovereignty but pushed sovereignty towards a radical break.

The American Revolution would force a break from modern sovereignty by rejecting the notion of overriding authority. For Hardt and Negri, the American Declaration of Independence is foundational to the American notion of immanent power. It is with this Declaration that the Americans rejected a transfer of power to a superior or transcendent sovereign and proclaimed that humanity's emancipation is grounded on its own inherent power; it is "grounded on the multitude's power to construct its own political institutions and constitute society" (2001, 165). Through the American immanentist tradition, there is still a transfer of power to centres of government, but there is a radical emphasis on ensuring that sovereign power is underpinned by or is contingent upon democratic will. Ultimately, then, the sovereign does not rein in the people, but the people rein in the sovereign, enforcing limitations to power, checks and balances, and the separation of powers, thereby ensuring that ultimate power is the multitude's power. For Hardt and Negri, then, despite the "profound religiousness" of America's revolutionary republicanism, underlying it there is "an extraordinarily secular and immanentist idea" (*ibid.*, 161), which gives expression to a desiring multitude that is beginning to disperse power within its own networks of life. Furthermore, they suggest that this idea of immanence "is based on an idea of productivity" (*ibid.*, 164). Only with its own productivity can the multitude create its own society on the plane of immanence without relying on an estranged, transcendent power. Hardt and Negri link this notion of productivity to Weber's notion of the Protestant work ethic. Spurred on by this ethic, each member of the community feels compelled to contribute to the "productive synergies" that constitute society. God becomes not so much an external power to be pleased as he does an immanent spirit to be embraced in this world in the forging of a community based on productive desire: "one might say that only the productive power of the multitude demonstrates the existence of God and the presence of divinity on earth" (*ibid.*, 164–165).

Hardt and Negri, however, do not simply celebrate American republicanism as the becoming of the revolutionary desire of Renaissance humanism. American republicanism perpetuated the unleashing of revolutionary desire, but at the same time it perpetuated the unleashing of counterrevolutionary forces. The authors suggest that the United States carries forward an emancipatory energy from the English Revolution, but the English exiles who laid the foundations of the United

States also carried with them the reactionary forces of modernity that continually seek to codify and structure the productions of desire. The United States laid the foundations for, and now drives forward, the postmodern break from modernity, but in building on modern sovereignty, the United States deepens the logic of disciplinary power to unleash the forces of biopower. As shall be commented on in more detail in Chapter 6, for Hardt and Negri, biopower is the reactionary force that sustains the expansion and intensification of the accumulative logic of capitalism. The United States then, in forging postmodern sovereignty, exacerbates the contradiction of modernity. Although the reactionary forces of power are increasingly unable to tame the networking multitude with overriding transcendent force, such forces of power perpetuate an antagonistic relationship with the immanent forces of connective desire by pervading desiring networks with micro centres of control that limit the multitude's possibilities.

This rather elongated overview of Hardt and Negri's history of modernity is necessary because to a large extent this book builds on the basic tenets of Hardt and Negri's concept of the development of modern and subsequent postmodern contradiction. Nevertheless, I contend that despite all their insistence on immanence, Hardt and Negri fall back on the type of modern dualism they are keen to reject. In their concept of humanist revolution, desire is the absolutely positive force, whereas the forces of control are merely negative and reactive. As shall be analysed in Chapter 6, for Hardt and Negri, the reactive forces are *dead forces* of exploitation and accumulation that live only by feeding off the vitality of revolutionary desire. These forces, then, are monstrous and really only external, because they are absolutely oppositional to the dynamism and driving force of desire – desire as the Real immanent force.

It is with Hardt and Negri's analysis of the American break that the limits of their notion of the desire/control dichotomy become apparent. Significantly, in keeping with Marxian tradition, Hardt and Negri associate liberalism with the logic of capitalist command. For them, liberalism, as the philosophy of individualism, plays an important role in the development of modernity's 'weak' or mediatory transcendent power. It does not crush desire, but rides over it, encouraging the repression of desire's social potential and dividing the multitude by re-orientating its members towards self-importance and competition (see 2001, 188–189 and 198; see also Hardt, 1993). Their argument is closely related to Deleuze and Guattari's view on the role of philosophies of privatisation in the development of liberal capitalism. For Deleuze and Guattari, key individualist thinkers are "heroes of codification", developing ideologies to straitjacket desire (see Dosse, 2010, 203). The authors argue, for example, that Martin Luther, the pioneer of Protestantism, helped to privatise belief, that the liberal economist Ricardo supported the privatisation of the means of production, and that Freud completed the picture by privatising desire.

Liberal individualism, in being associated with the external forces that over-determine desire, becomes a reactive, negative force. This conceptualisation, however, is problematic because much of the spirit Hardt and Negri link to the

American multitude's revolutionary break is fundamentally Lockean, and Locke is one of the founding fathers of liberal philosophy. Unsurprisingly, given that Locke gave expression to the anti-absolutist movement that secured the passing of the English Bill of Rights, an Act fundamental to Anglo-Saxon politics, Thomas Jefferson, the chief author of the American Declaration of Independence – a document which, as noted earlier, is much admired by Hardt and Negri – described Locke as one of “the three greatest men that have ever lived” (letter to John Trumbull, 15/02/1789). Key principles of the Declaration were advanced by Locke in his famous *Two Treatises of Government* (1823 [1689]). I argue here – and I shall develop this argument in more detail in the next chapter – that, critically, Locke's type of liberalism did not simply co-opt Renaissance humanism's immanentist ethos for its own ends, but actively contributed towards the development of humanist radicalism. Key features of Locke's philosophy – the natural equality of all men, the self-evident rights or powers of all men, the self-constitution of government by the people, and the right of the people to overthrow government that no longer fits with their constituent impulses – are features that Hardt and Negri associate with the development of the revolutionary humanist tradition. Particularly revealing is the aforementioned link Hardt and Negri make between the Protestant ethic and this radical tradition, for the protestant ethic is inextricably tied up with Locke's liberal notions of self-assertion and contribution. For Locke, (to put it in the language of Hardt and Negri that I have already quoted), each man is a ‘singular’ being, but he shares in a common spirit, and is therefore compelled to ‘cooperate’ as part of a ‘community’, contributing to the ‘productive synergies’ that raise mankind up and ‘demonstrate . . . the presence of divinity on earth’. Again, as Hardt and Negri suggest, wrapped up in the overbearing religiousness of the Anglo-Protestant tradition is a radical immanentist notion of a shared nature and consequent common rights:

it is very clear that God, as King David says (Psalm 115. 16), ‘has given the earth to the children of men,’ given it to mankind in common.

(Locke, *Two Treatises*, 2.24)

Here Locke rejects the idea that monarchs, as the supposed heirs of Adam, have an exclusive right to property. Furthermore, because the earth is ‘mankind's in common’, he really rejects the idea that any privileged group can claim exclusive rights to property.

Nevertheless, Locke, of course, introduces a contradiction as soon as he declares the earth to be mankind's in common, setting out to explain “how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express compact of all the commoners” (ibid.). While Hardt and Negri associate the Protestant ethic with the united efforts of the multitude, Locke, himself from a Puritan Protestant family, whose liberalist philosophy was to a large extent an expression of England's seventeenth-century Protestant radicalism, highlights the need for individuals to combine their labour

with something in order to claim it as their own. Here Locke sneaks possessive tendencies into the Protestant ethic, and it is for this possessive element to his thought that Locke is often derided (see Macpherson, 1962). In pushing forward a theory of immanent contradiction, I suggest that the Protestant ethic paradoxically carried forward the radical democratic tendency suggested by Hardt and Negri *as well as* the radical possessive tendency that Weber began the notion of with his famous theory linking the Protestant ethic to the spirit of capitalism. The Protestant ethic, I argue, is an early expression of the contradiction of the liberalist ethos, with the individual under its sway compelled to prove his or her divine worthiness through his or her contribution to the common good but also through his or her accumulation of capital. As such the 'progressive' Protestant 'man' is a man of conflicting emotions, being keen to open up a democratising social process while falling back on the status and privileged access to power that comes with capital.

I argue that in reacting against possessive and power-seeking tendencies, which undoubtedly are *part of* the heart of the liberal tradition, Hardt and Negri shy away from the way in which liberalist philosophy follows in the path of the emancipatory project of Renaissance humanism, that is, the way in which it follows in its path not by simply controlling or limiting the project but by reflecting and developing its inherent self-emancipatory contradictions. Locke's thought reveals the paradox of the humanist project: in proclaiming the freedom of the individual from state tyranny, Locke proclaimed the paradox whereby empowerment manifests itself as both free accumulation and egalitarian association. Ultimately, however much possession is fundamental to Locke's notion of liberty, when Locke proclaims the right to property he defines 'property' in a broad sense (see Levy, 1983, for a critique of Macpherson's reduction of the seventeenth-century notion of 'property' to the 'working capital' that the self possesses. See also Ryan, 1965). For Locke, with "[everyone] being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions" (*Two Treatises*, 2.6). Possession is a key element, but not the sole element, in Locke's assertion of property rights. Overall, Locke's defence of individual liberty is a defence of the right of the individual to develop his singular being (his 'property') free from overbearing interference. Perhaps more pragmatically than Hardt and Negri, Locke recognised that individuals breaking free from aristocratic absolutism would zealously defend their rights to self-preservation and self-advancement. Even so, it would be unfair to stereotype Locke as a simple defender of a self-centred world or as an anti-social philosopher, because he argued that as individuals seek to develop their being on their own terms, God's reason, immanent in all men – for all men are "furnished with like faculties, sharing . . . in one community of Nature" (*ibid.*, 2.6) – will guide men towards mutual respect. An immanent reason guides mankind towards the recognition that it is in each man's interests to respect the rights of all others, and consequently towards the recognition that each man must commit himself to the forging of government in order to protect mutual interests and the common good that emerges from those mutual

interests (see *ibid.*, 2.131). Locke, then, like any good Marxist, recognises that individuals preserve and nourish their being most successfully when they work together in mutual respect and with a sense of common purpose.

It should be noted at this point that some right-libertarian thinkers have suggested that, for Locke, the instituting of the common good was to be understood only in a minimalist way, with the common good understood in terms of protecting private interests. Through such a notion of the common good, the government would be justified in taxing citizens only to raise the money that is necessary to protect the private property of individuals (see Nozick, 1974). However, again, because of Locke's broad definition of property, the protection of private property should not be understood merely as the protection of personal possessions or capital. When Locke asserts that "as much as possible" mankind is to be preserved (*Two Treatises*, 2.171) – for the natural rights of each are best preserved through the preservation of the common stock of men – he is not simply asserting that the possessions of men are to be preserved. For Locke, mankind is not synonymous with possession; more it is synonymous with a shared nature and a common desire for equality. Ultimately, Locke seems to leave open the question of exactly how the people's representatives will legislate for equality amongst individuals (Waldron, 1988), and so it seems quite in keeping with Locke's basic principles to suggest that the legislature could, if the public that legitimised it approved, uphold, say, the people's rights to life and health with any number of proactive community- and welfare-promoting measures. Even wealth redistribution cannot be off the agenda when all people have, in principle, an equal stake in a government that is bound to see to all individuals' equal rights to possession.

The point, then, of this brief reappraisal of the Lockean liberal tradition is not to celebrate the democratising tendencies of Anglo-Saxon individualism in the way that a right-wing commentator might (see Chodorov, 1962, or more recently, Ferguson, 2011), but to emphasise that, from the outset, the revolutionary, democratising tendency that Hardt and Negri extract from the Anglo-American tradition is fundamentally implicated in the rise of liberal individualism. It is, therefore, simply not possible to divide the 'positive' forces of emancipatory desire from the 'negative' forces of possessive reaction; *both forces are essential, immanent features of the revolutionary humanist tradition in and of themselves*. In the next chapter, I shall elaborate on this argument to suggest that the author Hardt and Negri associate most closely with the birth of the radical democratic tradition – Spinoza – was himself absorbed within an emergent liberalist culture, and as such his philosophy reflects many of the essential features of the liberalism that would become associated with Locke. Ultimately, it seems hopeless to attempt to find, as Hardt and Negri do, a modern, radical European tradition external to the hegemonic dynamics of liberalist culture, with European radicalism indebted to the seventeenth-century liberalist assertion that self-interest and self-emancipation necessitate action in common. The next chapter shall highlight the liberalist tendency that seems to underpin both Europe's moderate and radical democratising movements by linking it to the history of the emergence of the bourgeois classes.

I shall argue that from the Medieval period through to the birth of liberalism, and then on through the modern age, ‘progressive’ bourgeois classes have consistently attempted to radicalise the bourgeoisie’s notion of self-interest. In doing so, they have greatly contributed to the emergence of a radical democratic culture, but at the same time they have been unable to shake off the power-seeking desires that remain latent in their radicalised bourgeois ethos of self-emancipation. Through their contribution to the development of the self-emancipatory ethos, the bourgeois progressives and radicals have greatly contributed to the exacerbation of the liberalist contradiction.

Note on citations of *Two Treatises* by John Locke

Numbers refer to Essay and point – for example, 2.26 refers to Essay 2, point 26.

Notes

- 1 See Castoriadis (2007) on capitalist imaginary versus creative imaginary.
- 2 I accept that this is a rather crude way of dividing intellectuals, but I think it serves a useful, illustrative purpose when it is understood in relation to the earlier discussion on the immanentist break from transcendence.
- 3 Ruda (2013) provides a bold defence of communist idealism by drawing heavily, indeed almost exclusively, on the philosophies of Žižek and Badiou.
- 4 Although for Žižek this ideal is never a fixed Being but always in the process of Becoming, always open to new possibilities.

A short history of bourgeois self-emancipation

From Spinoza to Locke and onwards

In this chapter I will suggest that in the Medieval period, as the proto-bourgeois classes began to assert the self against stifling feudal structures, they began to open up the paradox of self-emancipation, unleashing the two oppositional facets of desire which struggle against each other but which nevertheless remain two immanent, interdependent forces. As stated in the Introduction, I argue that the emergence of the West's bourgeois classes is underpinned by a liberalist or self-emancipatory ethos that is constituted by a contradictory desiring being, in which desires for *being-over* humanity and nature, or desires for possession and power, come into conflict with desires for *being-with* humanity and nature, or desires for horizontal connection. The centuries-long development of Western-bourgeois society is animated by the bringing out or deterritorialising of this contradictory ethos, so that being-over and being-with desires are increasingly uninhibited or uncontained by the territorialising codes of the establishment, despite the persistent and often zealous conservative attempts to reterritorialise society. As the contradictory ethos has been brought out, contradictory movements have emerged to produce an increasingly fraught contradiction between the West's two key individualist ideologies; an individualism based on notions of essential equality and democracy, and an individualism based on essentialist notions of competition and accumulation.

In this chapter, then, I shall attempt to show that the radical protestors of the contemporary age are heirs to a long history of self-emancipatory radicalism that has emerged in tandem with the bourgeois history of self-advancement. Liberalist culture has sustained bourgeois power, but the self-emancipatory tendencies of that culture incite anti-authoritarian sentiments and often a radicalist search for the formation of the self in common with others. In this move towards a being-with notion of self formation, we can find what we might call the West's key 'social ethos'. I am borrowing this term from Costas Douzinas, who has written on the role of this ethos in shaping contemporary forms of leftist radicalism. I borrow it, however, in a provocative way. In principle, I understand the social ethos just as Douzinas does. Douzinas suggests that the social ethos locates human emancipation in an individual who is autonomous but who recognises that he or she shares his or her existence with a community, so that "being in common is an integral

part of being self' (2013, 195). Douzinas, however, locates this notion away from the 'extreme' of liberal individualism, which, in classic Marxian fashion, he alienates from the history of democratic struggle and essentially reduces to the possessiveness of neoliberalism (see *ibid.*, 90–96). I argue that despite his best efforts to distance the social ethos from liberalism, with his notion of being one's self by being in common, Douzinas expertly outlines a notion of egalitarianism that has deep roots in the West's liberalist culture. As I began to suggest in the last chapter, liberalist traditions, from their earliest stirrings, developed a premise of a common human spirit that connected all individuals in equality. In the last chapter I looked at the formation of this idea in Locke's philosophy, and in this chapter I shall compare Locke's formation to the formation put forward by Spinoza. It is important to do this because as alluded to in the last chapter, while Hardt and Negri associate Spinoza with a tradition of alter-modernity, I root Spinoza firmly in the history of the development of modern bourgeois society, and see him as an important figure in marking the emergence of the liberalist ethos.

Before I get onto further analysis of Spinoza and Locke, though, let me return to the beginnings of proto-bourgeois radicalism in the Medieval period. To pick up on the criticisms I made of Hardt and Negri's history of European radicalism in the last chapter, I would emphasise that the authors greatly underplay the extent to which revolutionary humanism was the product of the emerging bourgeois classes. After all, who was it that led what Hardt and Negri conceptualise as the humanist break in Medieval Italy? While it would be wrong to underestimate the importance of popular revolt in late medieval Europe, one group in particular played the predominant role in the humanist transformations of the Medieval period; indeed Hardt and Negri seem to recognise this group as a key protagonist in the transformations (see 2001, 74): The oligarchic merchant classes – the proto-bourgeoisie that was strongest in the city-states of Northern Italy – spearheaded a self-emancipatory process by usurping the power of the landed aristocracy, throwing off vestiges of the aristocracy's anti-commercial ideology as they did so (see Jones, 1997). The merchant classes played a dominant role in spreading a revolution through their expansive trading networks. They derived their strength from their proactive, exploratory proto-individualism, which emphasised productive improvement and knowledge accumulation in the competitive pursuit of profit. While the aristocratic classes derived their power from military strength and absolute command, the merchant classes were reliant upon the interactions and exchanges that made the development of profitable trade possible. Through their trading culture, or really their way of life, the merchants began to desire in a more grounded, open-ended way. They made a move towards growing through the world rather than rising above the world, and as they did so they began to develop a more immanentist or empirical outlook.¹

Alongside the merchants, Hardt and Negri recognise the leading role theologians played in inspiring the Renaissance awakening, with thinkers such as Duns Scotus and William of Ockham giving expression to an emerging immanentist spirit (see 2001, 71 and 73). Hardt and Negri also include "astronomers"

and “politicians” alongside “merchants” in listing the key protagonists of the Renaissance revolution (see *ibid.*, 74). What we can see here is that the authors implicitly recognise that members of a medieval intelligentsia – which included lawyers, artists, musicians, philosophers, as well as the theologians, astronomers, and politicians – emerged with the merchants and would become part of a status-conscious Bürgertum estate (the burgher citizens or bourgeoisie of the Medieval period) that began to dominate the culture of medieval autonomous cities (see Poggi, 1983 in Holton, 2013²). This intelligentsia grew out of privileged social circles, and as its members became associated with merchant-led city-state life, it began to play a key role in giving expression to merchant culture. A Renaissance-intelligentsia worldview emerged along with merchant power, which took for granted immanentist assumptions about exploration and transformation of the physical world and which could consequently help reinforce the merchant push towards material mastery.

The predominance of privileged groups on the list of key protagonists of Renaissance humanism undermines Hardt and Negri’s notion of a multitude forging a revolutionary break from power. Nevertheless, when listing the key protagonists, they do single out “artisans” alongside the astronomers, merchants, and politicians (2001, 74). Perhaps with the inclusion of artisans we see at least some significant involvement of ordinary, downtrodden people at the cutting edge of the humanist surge. Or perhaps not. Even the artisans were a relatively privileged group in a medieval world of grinding peasant and labouring poverty. The artisans really formed part of an emergent middle class; a skilled burgher class becoming powerful through monopolising guilds. Stasavage (2013) notes that while the autonomous cities that emerged in Medieval Europe were, from the outset, dominated by merchant oligarchies, artisan classes did challenge this merchant power by struggling for craft guild representation on city councils. Nevertheless, the artisans did not really oppose the commercial spirit of the merchants, more the merchants’ attempt to monopolise commerce. Indeed, Mielants explains that craftsmen often led urban revolts against merchant elites not as paupers but as relatively privileged workers fighting to preserve their income and status (2007, 34, quoting Blockmans and Prevenier, 1978). The craft guilds increasingly adopted a trading mentality, and they sought political representation mainly to protect their commercial rights. Indeed, Stasavage notes that during the fourteenth century, in the autonomous cities of Tuscany, craft guilds succeeded in wresting some political power from the merchants, only to mimic medieval merchant tendencies by reinforcing their own property rights “while . . . creating barriers to entry for newcomers” (2013, 3. As Stasavage suggests, a similar process took place in Flanders). Abu-Lughod (1989) suggests that while the larger-scale merchant-bankers were the vanguard of the capitalist system to come, the urban artisans still tended to think like merchants, with the trading mentality permeating right through medieval city life. As Jones states: “in varying degrees all social classes were attracted or affected by trade” (1997, 206). Abu-Lughod elaborates on this idea by explaining how, in medieval Genoa, one of the leading commercial cities

of the period, even housewives and humble artisans would send small quantities of their goods to be sold in foreign ports, and poor labourers would invest meagre sums in shares called *loca* to claim a tiny stake in large trading vessels. In a lottery-like gamble, the workers hoped for their ship to return with huge profits (1989, 119–120).

While the merchants' trading mentality may have trickled right down the social strata, most city residents did not share in merchant privilege. Leading artisan groups, however, by embracing a commercial mentality, *did* come to share in merchant privilege. For Stasavage, ultimately the merchants and artisan groups in particular industries shared in the privilege of their burgher or citizen status (2013, 7–8), as 'citizens' became "equated with 'merchants'" (Jones, 1997, 206). These commercial citizens were not quite modern capitalists because they used their privileged citizen status not so much to individualise trade and industry but more to form a variety of guild oligarchies that struggled to monopolise access to their industries. While the guilds struggled with one another to monopolise political power, ultimately, they shared in the culture of oligarchy whereby select groups of trade masters would control specific industries. Through their culture of oligarchy, the merchants and artisans were united by a "corporate spirit" (Pirenne, 1915, in Stasavage, 2013, 7).

In the struggle to monopolise commerce, the leading merchants of the Northern Italian city-states would amass vast fortunes through their oversight of long-distance trade (Scott, 2012). They would emerge as powerful merchant-bankers with the resources to reinforce themselves as the predominant guild oligarchy, stifling small-scale investments and minor entrepreneurship and undermining the craft guilds (see Abu-Lughod, 1989). It was this entrenchment of merchant power that would cause the artisan revolts of the fourteenth century. Stasavage (2013) notes that once the merchant oligarchs had accumulated fortunes through risky long distance trade, they preferred to reinvest their wealth in lower-risk opportunities, investing in land rents and public debt. In the process, they shifted from an "active entrepreneurial" to a "passive rentier" outlook (Holton, 2013, 73), and in doing so they tended towards the idle exploitation of the landed aristocracy (even though it was precisely this exploitation that they had initially reacted against). Nevertheless, because, as Stasavage suggests, the artisan oligarchs followed the merchants' lead by attempting to install their own monopolies in their industries, it is not accurate to imagine a non-productive, exploitative merchant class holding down a productive, exploited artisan class. What Poggi describes as the late medieval *Bürgertum* estate – the citizenship of the autonomous cities that shared in status and cultural privilege, which seldom included more than 10 per cent of urban populations (Holton, 2013, 73), was not beyond the reach of successful artisans. The artisans of the leading guilds became very much part of the *Bürgertum*, evolving from artisans to merchants through their guild power. Mielants tracks this process in commenting on the beginnings of capitalistic industry, noting, for example (by quoting Munro, 1990), that weaver guilds in the Low Countries became associations dominated by master weavers who acted as chief industrial

entrepreneurs, organising production through a domestic putting-out system that exploited female piece work (2007, 35).³

Through their ethos of interchange and expansion, the merchant-led *Bürgertum* of the Italian city-states would embrace notions of republican government, although, as suggested, such government was democratic only in a very limited sense. The city-states of Northern Italy had some concept of popular sovereignty, but the oligarchic tendency of the craft and merchant guilds severely limited the development of a democratising process. Indeed, Stasavage (2013) argues that the stifling oligarchic character of political and social organisation in the autonomous medieval cities undermined Renaissance innovation and led to economic stagnation. The proto-bourgeoisie of the Medieval period had pioneered a notion of popular participation in the forging of a self-productive society, but ultimately fell back on an aristocratic command mentality that demanded absolute stability and social preservation; hence the elite merchant families of the city-states became patrician merchants, or a “commercial aristocracy” (see Abu-Lughod, 1989, 120).

Holton (2013) emphasises the contradictory character of the medieval Italian city-states, exploring how their nascent capitalist tendencies were couched within a feudal culture that acted as a strong counteracting tendency. The city-states emerged in the early Middle Ages out of “informal, oath-based associations” (Stasavage, 2013, 6), pioneering practices of free association based on mutual interest that would re-emerge in the development of modern capitalism and the liberalist ethos. But as informal associations became tightly controlled, hierarchical guilds that were vehemently opposed to individual enterprise and industry competition, feudal tendencies re-emerged with a vengeance. Holton notes that Italian city-states tended to have ancient origins, and rural nobles became prominent in the commercial activities of the cities as noble prejudices against economic activity dwindled. What emerged were patrician elites that were a fusion of noble landowners, merchants, and successful artisans. Because a hegemonic aristocratic culture permeated these elites, their outlook “involved a strong measure of feudal status preoccupations” (2013, 72). For Holton, the merchants’ aforementioned shift from entrepreneurial long-distance trade to passive rentier activities was a clear sign of “re-feudalisation”, a process that peaked in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (*ibid.* 73, quoting Hale, 1979). In the end what came to concern the patrician elites most was not economic advancement but the reinforcement of oligarchic exclusivity through claiming noble status, with leading families claiming to descend from rural noble blood to reinforce their legitimacy (*ibid.*, see also Ackroyd, 2010). Such was the force of re-feudalisation that leading Italian city-states became not just oligarchic but dynastic, with Florence, the leading Renaissance city, becoming, in the fifteenth century, the realm of an unofficial merchant royal family, the Medici banking family (see Scott, 2012).

To a large extent, the Germanic autonomous cities of the Medieval period tended to be pulled along by the same tendencies of the Italian city-states. However, the Germanic cities tended to avoid the slide towards outright dynastic rule, with patrician–merchant oligarchies dominating city governments into the

early modern period (Holton, 2013, see also Scott, 2012). By the 1600s in the Dutch Republic, the wealthy merchants were overcoming the political threat of the artisan guilds to establish oligarchic rule in Dutch cities, with the merchant-run city governments appeasing the burgher artisans by installing tight economic regulations to guarantee monopolies for the city guilds. Indeed, Poell suggests that the interdependency of local elites and the privileged burghers or citizens created one of the key coalitions that helped maintain order in the Dutch Republic, which made up about one third of the population (2009, 293). Partly through their oversight of orderly local economies, the leading merchants amassed great wealth and influence from their city bases, and through this wealth and influence they were becoming the *regenten*, the rulers of the Dutch Republic. Critically, though, the merchants' wealth and power was also to a large extent derived from their embrace of free trade. de Vries (2009, 100) notes a contradiction here, for while at the national and provincial levels the regenten were happy with limited interference in market forces, at the municipal level the regenten actively encouraged local monopolies through the formations of guilds that remained dependent on city governments. This contradiction of relatively free trade coexisting alongside tightly controlled trade perhaps reveals much about the competing cultural tendencies of the seventeenth century Netherlands. The Dutch Republic of the 1600s was pushing medieval merchant-bourgeois humanism to its limit. The regenten merchant class of the Dutch Republic had taken Italian city-state merchant power further by building itself into a confederate power that could seriously challenge the power of the landed aristocracy outside of the cities. But through the growth of their power, the Dutch merchants had exacerbated the contradiction of Renaissance humanism. They were developing a notion of unbounded free trade, of including the world in a productive process of interchange, but this expansive, deterritorialising notion continued to be founded on a feudal cultural base, so that the elite merchants could not give up their absolute hold on Dutch cities. The regenten became, *de facto*, a hereditary, merchant–patrician class, adopting an aristocratic command mentality based on absolute exclusivity. Indeed, Poell notes that the aristocrats and regents of the Dutch Republic merged into one ruling elite, another key coalition securing control in local, provincial, and central state institutions (2009, 293).

It was the emergence of this patrician–merchant oligarchy that shaped the political and cultural environment in which the Dutch Jew Spinoza was raised. As noted in the last chapter, Hardt and Negri closely associate Spinoza with the rise of Renaissance humanism, and before them Deleuze and Guattari derived much inspiration from Spinoza's metaphysics of infinite immanent connections. Deleuze and Guattari and Hardt and Negri, however, greatly underplay the extent to which Spinoza's metaphysics gives expression to the unbounded optimism of the merchants of the Dutch Republic, whose spirit defined the Republic's culture and drove forward a nation in the throes of global trade domination. Spinoza was himself from a merchant family – although not a particularly wealthy one – and helped to run the family importing business after his father's death. Spinoza's

venture into business was not successful and he ended up becoming an artisan of sorts, working as a modest lens-grinder and instrument maker. Feuer (1958) argues that Spinoza gave up his business interests because of his reaction against the competitive capitalism that marked the outlook of the Jewish elite and the influential, conservative Calvinists (6). Nevertheless, Spinoza remained very much part of the dominant merchant–artisan *Bürgertum* estate, and he would emerge in the 1660s as a ‘liberal’ republican supporting the republican Dutch government led by the Grand Pensionary of the Netherlands, Johan de Witt, a man who represented the trade-orientated interests of the oligarchic merchant class (see Žižek, 2004, ‘Deleuze’, section 6). For Feuer, while it is true that Spinoza became a moderate republican, this was only after he had started to move away from the religious and political radicalism he had initially embraced in reaction against Holland’s conservative elite (from the mid-1650s, around the time of his excommunication from the Jewish community in Amsterdam, Spinoza became closely associated with Utopian radicals in the city, some of whom, like Franciscus Van den Enden, held revolutionary egalitarian ideas [Nyden-Bullock, 2007]). Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the religious radicalism, which, Feuer suggests (in a similar vein to Hardt and Negri), undermined the order of the medieval world, still emerged through the *Bürgertum* estate, and, I would argue, really only radicalised and developed the proto-self-emancipatory ethos of the elite merchants. Because of the diffuse proto-self-emancipatory ethos uniting radical and moderate members of the *Bürgertum*, one can understand how a radical such as Spinoza could so easily slide towards becoming a moderate, and why deeply radical notions of existence would remain central to his philosophy even as his political outlook mellowed.

More so than his actual political philosophy, Spinoza’s naturalistic metaphysics inspired the democratic radicalism of the French Enlightenment, significantly influencing the political thought of the encyclopèdistes who laid the ideational groundwork for the French Revolution of 1789 (Israel, 1995). Deleuze and Guattari inherited this French radical legacy, drawing on it (as well as on Spinoza explicitly) to develop their materialist metaphysics of interconnected desiring multitudes. Spinoza’s metaphysical radicalism, elaborated on most fully in his *magnum opus*, *Ethics*, lay in his willingness to ground human behaviour in a non-teleological nature. For Spinoza, God is immanent in this nature, and cannot be thought of as a transcendent being who bestows special status on certain human beings. Spinoza, then, humbles mankind by suggesting that no man, not even a king, can raise himself up by drawing on a transcendent “power of god” (see TTP 6, 81 – see Spinoza, 2007). Here Spinoza, like Locke, undermines the divine right of kings, but because of his metaphysical naturalism Spinoza’s conclusions on right are starker than Locke’s – for Spinoza, without a transcendent legislator, an individual has no natural entitlements, or natural rights in the Lockean sense, at all.

With no conscious Will, God has no normative order to offer, and there is therefore no natural law that mankind is compelled to follow. Spinoza, then, would not be able to abide by Locke’s assertion that even in the state of nature

men are obliged to follow the natural law of God's reason – Spinoza explicitly rejects the idea of “men in nature as a state within a state” (TP 2/6 – see Spinoza, 2000). For Spinoza, ultimately, man has “sovereign natural right” only to the extent that any other creature has it. That is to say, a man has the ‘right’ to do anything that his natural faculties enable him to do, just as, for example, natural faculties give fish the right to “have possession of the water” (TTP 16, 195). Significantly, Spinoza is asserting here that natural right is synonymous with natural power. A man's powers, or natural faculties, drive him to persevere in his being (E IVP18S – for the *Ethics*, see Spinoza, 1985). This is a radical conception of an individual's power because it leads Spinoza to the conclusion that men are never bound to adhere to the covenants set in place by a sovereign authority. If a group of individuals decide that a covenant is detrimental to their striving to persevere in being, and if they have the collective power to oppose the sovereign, then they have the natural ‘right’ to ignore the covenant or to declare it “null and void” (see TTP 16, 182). Ultimately no man can transfer his natural right to the sovereign and be forced to follow the sovereign's whims, for his natural right is his natural power, or his inherent ability to act on his strongest interest. A man, therefore, will inevitably defy the sovereign if it is in his interest to do so. And here emerges the potentially revolutionary implications of Spinoza's philosophy. For Spinoza, unlike for Locke, the people do not have an inalienable juridical right to overthrow an unjust government. Nevertheless, for Spinoza the government retains the ‘right’ to its power only to the extent that it appeases the people. If a sovereign does not rule in the people's interests, the people will inevitably challenge its power with their collective counterpower. Regardless of any formal social contract, then, Spinoza believed that any government that wanted to survive in the long-term would be compelled to accept constitutional limitations to ensure that its power was not at odds with the interests and natural power of the people (Sharp, 2013).

For Hardt and Negri, despite Spinoza's acceptance that a constituted sovereign power can survive if it compromises with the people – an acceptance which marks Spinoza as politically moderate or ‘liberal’ – Spinoza's underlying ontology remains radical because Spinoza continues to assert that a sovereign can never really take away the people's collective power; a sovereign's assertions of right remain superficial, dependent on the unlimited constituent power of the people, or the people's *potentia*. A state grasps only a temporary constituted power or *potestas*; an institutionalising force that limits the multitude's possibilities and overdetermines its potential (see Field, 2012, 23). In his *Political Treatise*, Spinoza explains that the state emerges spontaneously out of the natural passions of men. Recognising that they are individually weak and vulnerable to the sway of the passions, men feel compelled to forge civil society and constitute a sovereign state, being drawn together by “some common emotion . . . a common hope, or common fear, or desire to avenge some common injury” (TP 6/1). Although the state is designed to control the anti-social potential of the passions, it remains forged through the common natural powers and passions of the people, and this

for Hardt and Negri offers the hope of the emergence of organic, pre-institutional, and non-hierarchical forms of social organisation that remain constituent without collapsing into a solid, overarching constituted order.

Nevertheless, in extracting a radical democratic tendency from Spinoza's philosophy, Hardt and Negri overlook a key piece of Bürgertum or proto-bourgeois conservatism that is essential to Spinoza's view of humanity. As Sandra Field points out in her excellent critique of Negri's interpretation of Spinoza (2012), it seems pretty clear that Spinoza does not share Hardt and Negri's optimism about a free desiring multitude. Civil society may emerge out of the people's powers and passions, but for Spinoza, without the state to control the passions, collective desire cannot be maintained, and civil society collapses into the war of each against all. Spinoza is indebted to Hobbes's view of human nature, suggesting that human beings are generally not rational and tend to be overwhelmed by sad and vicious passions (E IVP54S), being "more inclined to vengeance than compassion" (TP 1/5). Spinoza, unlike Hobbes, does not suggest that individuals must give absolute power to the sovereign in order to protect humanity from the war of each against all. Nevertheless, Spinoza does not suggest, as Negri claims he does, that free individuals in unmediated social relations will tend towards a collective of horizontal unity and harmony. Because destructive passions tend to overwhelm human reason, individuals rely on the state to protect themselves from themselves. Spinoza, then, seems to directly challenge Hardt and Negri's ontology of desire by suggesting that the multitude cannot preserve and nourish its being by following its passions through to collective emancipation. Indeed, it is precisely passions that hold back the collective potential of the people, which is why Spinoza focuses on the need for strong institutions to channel passions towards the common good. As Field succinctly notes, for Spinoza, "the power of the multitude is inseparable from the institutional mediation that shapes it" (*ibid.*, 22).

In the *Ethics*, Spinoza famously rejected Descartes's mind/body dualism and insisted that, while mind and body may be two finite modes of different attributes, they are of one ontological substance, a substance that is the infinity of nature and God. Hardt and Negri celebrate this as a thoroughly materialist conception of the Real that opens up the possibility of human beings who come to live in harmony with their own bodies and all the other bodies of nature; the conception leads to the realisation of the essential interconnective unity of all things. However, Spinoza's monism stills seems to be premised on the notion of the rational mind overcoming the body's irrational passions. For Spinoza the passions are external and passive forces affecting the mind. The human mind strives alongside the human body to persevere in being, but desires rooted in the body impress upon the mind a striving after inadequate ideas (E VP20S). However, through its striving to persevere in its being, the mind creates its own adequate ideas that are felt as active affects (see Dutton, 2014, section 5). These are active joys and desires that guide man towards a rational understanding of the world. It is this rational understanding that frees mankind from the sway of the passions,

leading us to harmony with the world, a world whose affective powers would otherwise overwhelm us.

What we can see here is that, again, Spinoza's ontology cannot support Hardt and Negri's embrace of corporeal desires. Spinoza develops the rather conservative rationalist denigration of passions of the body, which are always inadequate – bumped around in the vastness of nature – while elevating the rationalising mind, which alone can lead the human to adequate ideas and the highest good – knowledge of God. For Spinoza, the mind emerges out of the one ontological essence to lead the human towards the true preservation of its being. The mind cannot detach itself from the body, indeed, it shares its being with the body, but it alone reorients the human being towards spiritual perfection with its divine self-constituting and self-perpetuating power. Ultimately, then, Spinoza's notion of human freedom is egoistic and idea-led, amounting to an early version of Žižek's psychoanalytic philosophy of the transcendent mind that frees human being by emerging from the limited body to reconnect the human entity with the limitless potential of the primordial soup of quantum waves (see Žižek, 2004, on Spinoza's place within modern philosophy⁴). Overall, then, Spinoza's philosophy, rather than, as Hardt and Negri suggest, a breakthrough immanentist philosophy that celebrates the organic natural capacities of the people, seems more like a 'progressive' version of what Hardt and Negri describe as the bourgeois philosophy of 'weak' transcendence (see discussion in the last chapter). It is 'progressive' in the sense that it moves towards an immanentist outlook with its notion of a world of oneness that human beings can connect with. However, Spinoza still imagines minds rising out of a debased world of corporeal passions – minds seem to reconnect individuals with another world; a world which, although supposedly immanent, in being somehow beyond sensual experience, feels transcendent from the world of 'ordinary' existence. And as noted above, in imagining an overcoming of the anti-social passions of 'ordinary' bodies, Spinoza struggles to detach his political visions from notions of mediating institutions that rise out of common desires to enforce overriding order. As I shall elaborate on later, we might think of such institutions as representing transcendent minds that have the capacity to control 'ordinary' bodies.

As noted, although Jewish, Spinoza was shaped by the United Provinces' Christian radicalism, being caught up in Northern Europe's Protestant Reformation. While the elite Dutch merchants, overseeing the institutional conservatism of the Dutch Reformed Church, could not let go of their oligarchic power, the marginalised religious radicals of the *Bürgertum* – Spinoza among them – challenged the elite to bring out its own ethos by opening up the spiritual, social, and productive process. The radicals, then, embraced an emergent self-emancipatory ethos by refusing to relent in their search for individual freedom. The radicals may have struggled for a new collective unity, but their struggle emerged out of the merchant struggle for the self and remained premised on the search for self-betterment. Let us remember here that Spinoza, as one of these radicals, championed civil society only to the extent that it was "consonant with individual liberty"

(TTP 16, 207), founding his argument on the essential, self-centred drive to persevere in being:

Since reason demands nothing contrary to Nature, it demands that everyone love himself, seek his own advantage, what is really useful to him, want what will really lead a man to greater perfection, and absolutely, that everyone should strive to preserve his own being as far as he can.

(E IVP18S)

As Spinoza searched for what was really in the self-interest of men, he came to the conclusion that an individual's salvation could only be achieved in harmony with others. As a result, Spinoza helped to open up the contradiction of the self-emancipatory ethos, bringing out associational desires with his pantheistic metaphysics, complicating the merchant push for self-mastery and power. Many radical Protestant groups of the era contributed to the emerging contradiction. Feuer notes, for example, that groups such as the Quakers and the Diggers in England, who shared in the same zeitgeist as Spinoza, also began to embrace pantheistic notions of human existence, believing that God's pervasive spirit united all of nature (1958, 53). First and foremost, such radicals were defending the individual's freedom *to be*, though they had brought out the idea that individuals *be truly free* through egalitarian association.

Ultimately, then, it seems reasonable to argue that while Spinoza's notion of people power was radical for its time, it was not clearly separate from the era's emergent self-emancipatory ethos. Indeed, there seem to be some strikingly Lockean tones to Spinoza's concept of the multitude's *potentia*. Locke and Spinoza were both shaped by the seventeenth-century struggles against state absolutism and by the Protestant radicalism that marked those struggles,⁵ and Spinoza and Locke's shared zeitgeist is expressed by both authors with similar notions of individual liberty. Despite their very different metaphysical outlooks, both philosophers oppose state absolutism by emphasising the power inherent in each individual. For both philosophers, all human beings are fallible because of their tendency to be swayed by the passions, but all are naturally imbued with God's reason, and for both philosophers this reason is the source of the human being's power. Through their reason humans can recognise the self-destructive tendencies of their desires and can form governments that will oversee social relations to ensure that all can flourish in their liberty. For both the *potestas*, or juridical power that the people consent to, is always dependent on the people's *potentia*, the people's capacity for self-determination, a capacity which gives them the 'right' to change or overthrow government that does not fit with their determination of individual liberty as expressed through the common good.

When Negri traces the radical democratic tradition back to the genesis of capitalism, he hopes to find a tradition clearly demarcated from capitalism's liberal individualism, and indeed, picking up on seventeenth-century metaphysical radicalism, he imagines he has found the beginnings of this demarcated radical

tradition in the work of Spinoza. But on closer inspection it seems that what he has actually stumbled across is a philosopher, who, along with Locke, gave expression to the era's emerging liberalist spirit, which, in reacting against the semi-aristocratic absolutism epitomised by Hobbes's philosophy, championed the power of the liberated individual whilst simultaneously asserting that individual power is most effectively expressed through associational action. As Field notes (2012, 23), Negri suggests that Spinoza's revolutionary democratic break is found within his insistence that "political power always remains concretely in the bodies of the human individuals who make up the multitude". This sentiment animates the great anti-totalitarian assertion that individuals always have the will and capacity, and therefore the 'right', to break free from power structures that attempt to crush the individual beneath a transcendent force. Inconveniently for Negri, this assertion is as much Lockean and liberal as it is Spinozist and radical.

As we shall see in chapter 5, Deleuze and Guattari insist that one should attempt to find the radical ethos or essence in a philosopher, without getting too caught up in the historically rooted conservatism or prejudices that a philosopher might betray. This logic is used to justify overlooking Spinoza's sexism and his exclusion of servants, foreigners and those who do not lead 'respectable lives' when he forms his vision of democracy (see TP 11/3). What it does not seem fair to do, however, is to extract radicalism from Spinoza while overlooking the potential radicalism in other authors, like Locke, who are overlooked because of their more obvious complicities in the development of the 'enemy' system – the capitalist system (see Macpherson, 1962, on Locke's philosophy of accumulation. See also Armitage, 2004, on Locke's complicity in Afro-American slavery). Hardt and Negri may counter by arguing that Spinoza's core ethos was more radical than Locke's because of the way in which it embraces the notion of immanent spirituality. Whereas Spinoza was an early Bible critic, Locke's justifications for his political views in the *Two Treatises* are replete with quotes from the Bible; indeed, Locke embraced the divine revelation of Scripture in *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1958 [1695]). Locke's God is more clearly transcendent than Spinoza's, the former God revealing the natural law that mankind must follow even in the state of nature. In Locke's work the state's law can become synonymous with God's law, and as God's law is defined by God's reason, the state may claim to represent God's reason and may use this claim to override the people's inherent power with juridical right (see Tuckness, 2002). Nevertheless, as noted, Locke's juridical power remains rooted in an immanent spirituality; it may descend from up high but it is a natural endowment within mankind that is their property – it is part of their natural capacity. One can extract an essentially radical ethos from Locke, then, because his essentially immanentist notion of right undermines the transcendent power that he invokes to justify it.⁶ Indeed, as I shall come back to below, Locke's empirical epistemological vision arguably pushes immanentist conceptions of existence further than Spinoza's semi-mystical rationalism, with the latter seeming to rely on the notion of a divine reason within the order of nature that is beyond the reach of sensual experience. As suggested

earlier, ultimately Spinoza seems to rely on the kind of 'weak' or contextualised transcendence that Hardt and Negri associate with modern bourgeois sovereignty.

While in his lifetime Spinoza remained a marginalised figure lurking on the fringes of the merchant-bourgeois establishment, Locke's close relationship with an emergent bourgeois Whig oligarchy in England marks him out as a more mainstream philosopher. But we should not be deterred from seeking out radicalism that lurks within the conservatism of the mainstream, and Locke's philosophy is interesting precisely because it marks the rise of self-emancipatory radicalism to that mainstream. True, compared to Spinoza, Locke presents a more explicit embrace of personal possession, which is more clearly aligned with the interests of the emerging Whig establishment. Nevertheless, Locke really only teases out or exposes the bourgeois contradiction that Spinoza grappled with. While keen to embrace a divine oneness, Spinoza insists on the pre-eminence of the striving individual, remaining dependent on an emergent bourgeois notion of self-centred interest. Indeed, for Žižek, Spinoza's assertion of a purely positive being of self-preservation, along with his conflation of natural right and natural power, mean he remains dependent on the self-assertive, 'might-makes-right' tendencies that underlie the juridical equality propounded by liberal bourgeois ideology (see 2004, 'Deleuze', section 6). Locke, for better or worse, gives expression to emerging liberalist ideas in a more pragmatic way. Like Spinoza, Locke locates human being in the individual's striving for self-preservation, although he does not as clearly (or as idealistically) demarcate a divine mind from corporeal experience. As a result, he more explicitly embraces an individual's desire to claim ownership and better his or her self materially. Nevertheless, Locke's worldview remains premised on a radical notion of a common spirituality that makes possible collective action through reason; for even though a man is born as an independent self, the reason or spirituality he shares with all others makes him always connected to mankind.

Locke, though, does not simply maintain a certain radical ethos while simultaneously corrupting it with the emerging bourgeois establishment's conservative notions of order and possession. On the contrary, England's emergent bourgeois establishment had emerged through the development of the radicalism that Locke gives expression to. Spinoza gave expression to bourgeois radicalism through a seventeenth-century Dutch culture in which an aristocratic command mentality inhibited the bringing out or deterritorialisation of the self-emancipatory ethos. Locke, on the other hand, gave expression to bourgeois radicalism through a seventeenth-century English culture in which some type of bourgeois breakthrough had been made; enough of the aristocratic command mentality had been shed to allow the deterritorialising process of the self-emancipatory ethos to develop in a more uninhibited way. As a result, as I shall argue later, in Locke's philosophy we seem to find a more immanent notion of equality that is rooted in self-emancipatory being-with desires that more freely pervade through the ordinary social world.

As noted, Spinoza largely embraces Hobbe's cynical concept of human nature, believing humans to be under the sway of their largely anti-social passions most

of the time (see TTP 16, 200). Although he radically asserts that all men are born with the basic natural faculties needed to cultivate the reason that is necessary to control the passions (see TP 7/4 and 7/27), ultimately Spinoza believes that most men, most of the time, do not think or behave in the way that they should for their own good – that is, they tend not to behave rationally (see Den Uyl, 1983). Feuer (1958) identifies here a fundamental conflict in Spinoza’s philosophy; Spinoza attempted to embrace a basic democratising ethic but ultimately did not trust in the ability of people to organise their freedom. For Spinoza, because of the overwhelming power of people’s basic destructive nature, democracy seems to be postulated more as an ideal than a sustainable form of government (see Niemi, 2013, Section 5).

What we find in Locke, however, is a more optimistic concept of human nature. Locke introduces a basic civility into the state of nature, more fundamentally rejecting the Hobbesian war of each against all. As noted, Spinoza assumes that the notion of natural law, which Locke relies on to support his notion of the state of nature, is an artificial concept that idealistically posits a state within a state. However, as suggested, natural law is really used by Locke to aggrandise a vision of a basic human condition or state marked by civility. It is true that Locke, like Spinoza, follows the potentially elitist Enlightenment idea that civility or morality is ultimately derived from reason – potentially elitist because it can encourage elect ‘reasonable’ minds to rise above the barbarous passions of the masses. Nevertheless, civility for Locke seems much more firmly rooted in the basic physical nature of the human being – civility emerging from a basic intuitive agreeableness. For the empiricist Locke, the mind does not so much strive to overcome the bodily passions as it does record the patterns of sensual experience. Man’s “obligation to mutual love” (*Two Treatises*, Essay 2, point 4), then, is the self-evident realisation that man comes to simply by experiencing what life is – man, it seems, is essentially impelled to share in the sensual spirit that each man has by nature an equal stake in. While Locke shares in Spinoza’s early liberal conservatism by promoting anti-popular mixed constitutions and by reducing humankind to *mankind*, Locke’s fledgling democratic ethos seems to display more faith in people than Spinoza’s.

Perhaps because Spinoza is more fearful of the liberated masses than Locke, he seems drawn to strong institutions of government that may tend towards absolutism. It has been argued that in reacting against the selfish tendencies of individuals, Spinoza champions the idea of individuals binding themselves so closely together that they become a super-individual that acts with a single mind (see Den Uyl, 1983, and Barbone, 2001, for discussion of this idea). Indeed, especially in his *Political Treatise* when discussing aristocracies, Spinoza puts great emphasis on a body of legal oversight that may represent a super-individual. For the liberal philosopher Isaiah Berlin, by reifying a super-individual state that subsumes individuals within itself, Spinoza dissolves individual freedom within the right of the overarching juridical body (1969). Furthermore, Spinoza develops a notion of universal or civil state religion that has a distinctly Rousseauian ring to it (see TTP 14, 182–183).

This is significant because Hardt and Negri are highly critical of Rousseau's philosophy because of its emphasis on a general will that subsumes the singularities of the multitude in the name of the common good (2001, 85). For Hardt and Negri, Rousseau's notion of the general will is tied up in bourgeois notions of transcendent power; a power that overrides democratising flows. If we can interpret Spinoza's state as a juridical super-individual, then he may well express sentiments in line with Rousseau's general will. In any case, Spinoza and Rousseau's similar views on civil religion are perhaps most telling. Both philosophers seem to conceive of a sovereign that tolerates spiritual diversity but ultimately monopolises spiritual virtue and forces all to bend to its rationalisations of right.⁷

Locke and Spinoza are both products of their respective cultural and historical contexts, and the philosophies of both authors are important markers on the road of the progression of the self-emancipatory ethos. Both authors are very much *after* Hobbes, who was really a conservative reactionary writing just before the final blow to absolute monarchy in England; he recognised the significance of the emergence of bourgeois individualism but was desperate to contain it within aristocratic totality (see Robin, 2011). Spinoza gives expression to the limits of early modern merchant-bourgeois (or Bürgertum) society, limits which were reached in the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century. The Republic's undercurrent of Bürgertum radicalism, represented by Spinoza, which fed into an emergent liberal individualism with its accompanying free trade agenda (see De la Court brothers, close associates of Johan De Witt, for anti-guild, anti-oligarchy sentiments in the Netherlands in the seventeenth century; see Petry, 1984) was not strong enough to counteract resilient aristocratic-oligarchic tendencies that continued to permeate through Dutch Bürgertum life. Spinoza's philosophy is revealing here, for as we have seen, even within Spinozist materialist radicalism there lurks a deep fear of the unfettered masses and a strong transcendent-rationalist presence that seems strongly influenced by an aristocratic command mentality. In England after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, however, the patrician-merchant world of feudal totality began to break apart. Locke's thought is a product of this context, being representative of the early stirrings of a post-medieval, modern liberal ideology. This ideology was to a large extent rooted in medieval-bourgeois culture but gave expression to a bringing out of the bourgeoisie's self-emancipatory ethos so that vestiges of the command mentality of the medieval world started to be effectively counteracted. This counteracting would be slow, as reflected in the painfully slow process of democratisation in England (later the United Kingdom).

England's emergent bourgeoisie would only gradually give up on feudal or aristocratic command, and would long maintain aristocratic fear of the nation's vast property-less class. Nevertheless, England did not collapse into absolute patrician-merchant oligarchy as the Dutch Republic did, and slowly *but surely* the bringing out of the self-emancipatory ethos through English society undermined bourgeois conservatism and anti-democratic self-interest. With the rise of a Lockean-style liberalism, an ethos of individual empowerment began to trickle down the social strata. The bourgeois-aristocratic clique that ruled early modern

England, then, was undone by its own self-emancipatory ethos, because even as this clique desperately tried to preserve its status, the hegemonic culture it pro-pounded encouraged individuals to stand up for themselves and demonstrate the responsibility they had for their own lives. Setting a property or wealth bar for inclusion in the ‘democratic’ process did little to halt the agitation for the opening up of the process; couched within a culture defined by individual empowerment, such a bar only encouraged classes to prove their worthiness through their aspiration and action. More and more classes of society combined their own self-interest with this culture of empowerment to refuse their place in a static hierarchy and insist on their inherent rights to be full members of civil society. And when this populist energy combined with the force of the protestant radicals on the bourgeois fringe, the elite found time and again that they would have to compromise with the people in order to maintain any legitimacy.⁸

As Macpherson (1962) alludes to, even one of England’s first modern popular movements for democratisation – the Leveller movement of the English Civil War – was strongly marked by a bourgeois culture of self-emancipation. Macpherson uses his analysis to suggest that the Levellers were not really working class activists, but petit-bourgeois artisans who demanded rights only for themselves, not the masses, and who defined their power in terms of their capital or property. Even if this were strictly true (and as Levy [1983] suggests, it is not at all clear that it is), it would not change the fact that these aspirant middling sorts were challenging bourgeois elitism by turning the elite’s own self-emancipatory ethos against them, and this was important because it helped to open up the productive process and prevent the collapse into outright patrician oligarchy. Furthermore, by nurturing the culture that would prevent this collapse the Levellers became important precursors to later movements for popular empowerment, with northern England’s working class Chartist movement of the nineteenth century following in the Leveller tradition.

Macpherson is right to point out that there is a popular English tradition marked by self-interested groups clamouring for the right of inclusion by demonstrating their power. He is also right to point out that individuals within such groups have often tried to demonstrate their power through their ability to acquire property or capital. He is wrong, however, to *reduce* the Anglo-Saxon notion of property to material possession. As suggested in the last chapter through a discussion of Locke’s notion of property, when early modern Anglo-Saxon radicals thought about the individual’s property, they were thinking about *the being* individuals possess more fundamentally than the things they possess. True, for them being was marked by natural capacities that an individual might utilise to claim possession of things – including, possibly, the labour of others. Self-possession, then, can be projected onto the world through *being-over* desires. However, as I have argued, the being that the self possesses cannot be reduced to being-over desires, because the self also empowers itself through *being-with* desires.

For Macpherson the “possessive quality” of liberalism is found in the “conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities,

owing nothing to society for them” (1962, 3, emphasis added). The problem with Macpherson’s argument is that many of the early English radicals who contributed to the formation of the liberalist ethos were fundamentally opposed to the idea that the free individual owed nothing to society. As suggested, English radicalism of the seventeenth century was more or less synonymous with protestant radicalism, and the protestant radicals championed an egalitarian notion of human being. They believed that each individual had an equal stake in God’s nature or spirit – each may have owned his own person or being, but his person or being was rooted in God, who pervaded and tied together all individuals. The protestant radicals, then, would not abide the idea of owing nothing to society, for they did not believe that individual being was the individual’s alone. The individual’s being was really the common being of man, and the radicals believed in demonstrating one’s shared nature through contribution to civil society. As noted in the last chapter, Hardt and Negri suggest that protestant radicalism encouraged ‘productive synergies’ that connected individuals who believed in growing and finding God through egalitarian association. Such individuals would demonstrate their custodianship of God’s spirit through their being-with desires.

As Levy (1983) points out in his criticism of Macpherson’s interpretation of the Leveller notion of property, many at the heart of the Leveller movement were radical egalitarians. One of the most influential Levellers, John Lilburne, offered precursors to Locke’s ideas with his belief that the “Law of God” was “engraven in Nature”, and that all individuals, regardless of status, had an essential moral worth or dignity derived from their sharing in God’s Nature. Lilburne, like many Levellers, did defend the right to personal estate, but he did not make estate a prerequisite of equal rights – these rights were derived from the inherent worth in man’s common spirituality. Like Locke after them, the Levellers defended a broad range of individual rights under the label ‘property’. They reflected the contradiction of the emerging liberalist ethos in that they turned to both individual trade and estate *and* egalitarian association to produce an effective counterpower to monarchical absolutism and elite bourgeois exclusivity. However much their complicity with bourgeois possessiveness has complicated their democratic credentials, the communal, spiritual radicalism they nurtured as an essential feature of their worldview has been a vital cultural legacy for later left-wing radicals championing participation and cooperation over atomisation and competition.

In this chapter, we have reached the point where we find a self-emancipatory ethos brewing in seventeenth-century England but struggling to break free from aristocratic-bourgeois conservatism. A defining feature of this ethos is its refusal to be contained in a constituted order – as Hardt and Negri might say, it is deterritorialising by nature, seeking flight from its containment. Inevitably, then, radical bourgeois and petit-bourgeois Puritans who embraced the ethos fled England driven to self-constitute a new society. They fled to America to found New England – for them, a better England, one free from the corrupting influences holding England back. As shall be discussed in Chapter 4, their influence on the development of the United States was immense, and when the Anglo-Americans

published the Declaration of Independence in 1776 – as noted in the last chapter, for Hardt and Negri, a document which expressed a radical democratic ethos – it was heavily marked by the spirit of the Puritans who settled in America as both independent proprietors and egalitarian associators. Speaking more generally, the Declaration was made in the name of the proud property-owning classes of the 13 colonies. Many of the early United States’ property-owning classes were humble and not at all wealthy, but they were the cultural (and in many cases actual) descendants of the bourgeois, petit-bourgeois, and aspirant emigrants to America who dreamed of a land of unbounded opportunity for spiritual and/or material betterment. From their beginnings, the property-owning classes of the United States would move towards driving the process of the deterritorialisation of the Western world’s culture of individual empowerment, and in doing so they would find themselves persistently caught between being-over and being-with notions of self-emancipation.

In Chapter 4 I shall explore in more detail how self-emancipatory movements have been played out in the United States. For now, I think it will be useful to finish the chapter by momentarily bringing the historical analysis up to the present-day United States, which will help us to re-focus on the current state of self-emancipatory movements. This re-focusing is important because in the next chapter, I will leap forward somewhat to exploring the 1960s origins of contemporary forms of self-emancipatory radicalism.

The United States’ present day Occupy movement is heavily influenced by the radicalism of the 1960s, which itself, I will argue in Chapter 4, was heavily influenced by the self-emancipatory culture of the United States. Ultimately, the Occupy movement is rooted in a tradition of Anglo-American self-emancipatory radicalism. Consequently, when the Occupy movement emerged in the United States in 2011, it was marked not so much by a reaction against American culture as it was by an embrace of a radical undercurrent of America’s liberalist spirit. Many Occupy protesters flew American flags – some flew upside down ones (see *A Typical Faux*, 2012), hinting at their desire to turn America on its head by embracing its revolutionary underside. And when the New York City General Assembly occupying Wall Street in Liberty Square issued its declaration on its purpose, its writers echoed the sentiments of the Declaration of Independence and the Founding Fathers, stating that the people must cooperate to form government to protect their rights, and that upon corruption of the government, “it is up to . . . individuals to protect their own rights, and those of their neighbors” (New York City General Assembly, 2011). In their calls for the 99% to embrace “direct democracy” and a new collective spirit, the occupy demonstrators founded their argument on an anarchistic (and certainly not Tea Party-esque) version of American libertarianism, championing the notion that individuals and local communities must *themselves act* to uphold their rights in equality and embrace participation and contribution to the common good. One American Occupy protester, complete with Guy Fawkes mask and a ‘we are the 99%’ jacket, held a sign that played on the famous Uncle Sam World War

One recruitment poster. Complete with Uncle Sam finger pointing, the contemporary version of the poster declared “I want YOU to stop being AFRAID”, with the poster listing various ‘others’ Americans should stop being afraid of, including “other classes”. It finishes by declaring “YOU’RE AMERICANS, ACT LIKE IT!” The underlying message is clear: if you want to be a true American, don’t fight for your rights in fear of the Other; fight for your rights always in communion with your fellow human beings.

Note on citations of works by Spinoza

TTP refers to the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, or *Theological-Political Treatise*. Citations refer to chapter, then page number from the Silverthorne and Israel translation (e.g., 6, 18 refers to chapter 6, page 18).

TP refers to the *Tractatus Politicus*, or *Political Treatise*. Citations refer to the chapters/sections (e.g., 2/6 refers to chapter 2, section 6).

E refers to the *Ethics*. Citations use the following symbols/abbreviations: Roman numerals refer to parts; ‘P’ followed by number refers to proposition; ‘C’ refers to corollary; ‘D’ refers to definition, ‘S’ refers to scholium (e.g., E IVP18S refers to *Ethics*, part 4 (IV), proposition 18, scholium).

Notes

- 1 As an interesting aside, see Sagan et al. (2009 [1980]) on the ancient origins of the development of the opposition between the aristocratic retreat from the material world and the merchant embrace of the material world.
- 2 Holton is uncomfortable with the notion of a medieval *Bürgerium*, for he sees in the concept a modern attempt to project an emergent bourgeoisie back into the past. Whether or not the *Bürgerium* is the direct forerunner of the modern bourgeoisie, Poggi’s suggestion that the *Bürgerium* constituted a dominant estate that laid cultural foundations for a future bourgeois breakthrough seems perfectly reasonable.
- 3 See Mielants (2007, 35) also for an overview of the Drapers in Leiden, who, despite descending from a circle of small independent artisans, became powerful early capitalists employing proletarianised unskilled labourers.
- 4 For Žižek, Spinoza lays the foundations of modern thought by proposing a radical ontology of one Substance, out of which emerges a multitude of contradictory affects that cannot be reduced to either positive or negative outcomes. Žižek argues, however, that Spinoza remains limited by his belief that out of the one Substance emerges entities that have only a positive striving to persevere in their being. For Žižek, Spinoza shies away from the negativity of being – the death drive of beings, and Deleuze follows in Spinoza’s path with his vitalism; “his elevation of the notion of Life to a new name for Becoming as the only true encompassing Whole, the One-ness, of Being itself” (2004, ‘Deleuze’, section 5).
- 5 Indeed, Feuer suggests a direct connection between the philosophy of Spinoza and Locke (1958, ‘Epilogue’), noting that Locke travelled to Holland in 1684 and came under the influence of a group of Spinozists. During this period in Holland, Locke wrote the *Letter Concerning Toleration*.

- 6 George Berkeley seemed to recognise what was at stake when he suggested in his *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (2007 [1710]) that Locke's rejection of innate ideas would inevitably lead to atheism. Berkeley recognised, then, that Locke's own deep religiousness was being undermined by his empiricism.
- 7 See Feuer (1958), on Spinoza's lack of defence for freedom of religious expression. See also Tuckness (2002b), for a discussion of Locke's notion of state toleration.
- 8 Following a similar historical trajectory to this book, Arrighi et al. (2003) track the spread of capitalism (as a fundamental feature of government) from the Italian city-states to the Dutch proto-nation-state and on into a centralised state – England. They discuss the argument that capitalistic practices became more deeply entrenched in national cultures as capitalism was embraced by increasingly complex states. What I focus on is the spread of the liberalist ethos that developed in tandem with the development of capitalist government. I argue that this ethos underpins modern capitalism and shapes the direction of its evolution.

May 1968

Towards the limits of self-emancipatory radicalism

The anti-consumerist group Adbusters played a significant role in helping to spark the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations which, as noted in Chapter 1, perpetuated the broad pro-democracy movement that swept the globe in 2011 (see Lazar, 2011). During the Occupy movement's height from late 2011 through to 2012, a plethora of material dedicated to the Occupy movement cluttered the Adbusters website. One of the striking features of this material was how common it was for references to the revolutionary upsurges of the 1960s to emerge. If, for example, you had sat down to watch the Livestream aired on the Adbusters website in the spring of 2012, it wouldn't be too long before you would be watching an Occupy promotional video calling for today's demonstrators to rejuvenate the spirit of the 1960s. Such harking back to the 1960s is common on the contemporary radical left, and this chapter seeks to understand the 1960s (and really the early 1970s as well) as a critical period in the emergence of today's left-libertarian radicalism. Building on the argument made in Chapter 1, I suggest that activists in the 1960s brought out the West's undercurrent of being-with self-emancipatory radicalism to challenge the limits of 'modern' bourgeois society.

The argument here draws inspiration from DeKoven's (2004) study of the emergence of the postmodern in the 1960s. DeKoven's analysis focuses on the 1960s as the pivot from modernity to postmodernity. She grasps at the way in which postmodernity radicalises the contradiction of modernity, implicitly recognising that "modernity's own democratizing individualism" (xvi) – conceptualised in this book as a paradoxical bourgeois-liberalist ethos of self-emancipation – underpins the postmodern move towards both increasingly deterritorialised capitalist possession and increasingly deterritorialised forms of egalitarian association. In the 1960s, radicals who yearned for an egalitarian process of self-emancipation found the conservatism of modern society increasingly intolerable. While the Enlightenment project of modernity was supposed to open up the process of individual emancipation, the modern bourgeois classes continually fell back on conservative notions of order, thereby holding in check the emancipatory process. Being-with radicalism was inhibited by traditional ideas about the upstanding or respectable individual, which suggested that not all individuals were equally worthy of being-with connection. The rational, mature, middle-class white man

of established Western culture was idealised as the transcendent figure who was overcoming the barbarism and/or destructive irrationality of the young, other classes, other races, other cultures, and of more or less the entire female sex. Such idealisations still played a prominent role in the culture of the 1960s West, and they helped to give ‘respectable’ Western men a special role in maintaining the forms of order, discipline, and hierarchy that kept such men in positions of power.

The modern men of power, then, while rooted in a culture that had been moving for several centuries towards an insistence on equality, oversaw the preservation of self-serving systems of economic, social, and cultural inequality. The radicals of the 1960s felt stifled by the overbearing modern institutions of discipline and order that enforced such inequality, and they drew on a Western tradition of self-emancipatory radicalism to open up an egalitarian process. They insisted that the institutions of the elite, especially the universities, had to open up to new peoples, new cultures, new ways of thinking, and new ways of organising. Through their desires to be-with all humans, not just idealised white men, they dreamed of a new lifeworld of horizontal connections. They set out to create a proliferating series of egalitarian relationships between the sexes, between classes, between people of different ages, between races, between nations, between cultures, between lifestyles. They drew on the legacy of the protestant radicalism of the seventeenth century and insisted that an essential spiritual equality between all humans meant just that – *a human was human, no exceptions, no qualifications*. Being-with desires had to be opened up to the entire human population.

DeKoven’s analysis (2004) of the postmodern break focuses on 1960s radicalism in the United States, noting that “postmodernity . . . is in many ways the culmination of the modernity so closely identified with American-dominated globalism” (xv). DeKoven’s point here ties in with the discussion in the last chapter on the United States emerging as an epicentre of self-emancipatory radicalism in the wake of Renaissance humanism, and we shall return to the immense influence of the United States’ self-emancipatory culture in Chapter 4. This chapter, however, is focused on how the diffuse self-emancipatory culture of the West was brought out into postmodernist being-with radicalism in France in the 1960s. As I shall note later, 1960s French radicalism has a special place in the mythos of contemporary left-libertarian movements. This is especially true of France’s uprising of May 1968. It is here, in the sudden, explosive reaction against a fervently institutionalising French state, that we find activists on the limits of bourgeois self-emancipation.

David Graeber, an anarchist intellectual-activist who, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, was heavily involved in the activism of some of the anti-capitalist groups of North America, has remained a prominent figure within contemporary anti-capitalism, helping to kick start the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations by supporting the organisation of the first General Assembly in Zuccotti Park (Bennett, 2011; see also Graeber, 2011). Graeber has published (2009) an ethnographic study on anarchist-inclined anti-capitalist groups from the early 2000s, focusing on the Direct Action Network (DAN) of North America. In his book,

Graeber notes how at the end of one particular DAN meeting, an activist spoke about the development of the Peoples' Global Action (PGA) network, a network that had inspired DAN and had been the driving force behind the demonstrations against the WTO meetings in Seattle in 1999 – these demonstrations marking the coming-of-age of the contemporary anti-capitalist movement. Olivier, the activist who spoke, was himself involved in the PGA network, and although he makes only a very brief reference to the 1960s, his comment is revealing of the mythos within one of the formative networks of contemporary, libertarian anti-capitalism. In commenting on the worldwide spread of PGA and associated horizontal networks during the late 1990s and early 2000s, Olivier states: “What’s happening now is surely the biggest thing since May 1968. At least in Europe. The first time that I’ve felt such a huge, global upsurge” (ibid. 33). When looking for a reference point for the contemporary movement he is involved in – the last stand-out signpost back down the historical path – Olivier intuitively turns to May 1968 in France. He seems to see May 1968 as marking a breakthrough moment in radical activism, being a key part of a series of events that witnessed the final flowering on the radical left of the master narratives of Marxism before the breakdown of leftist utopianism into particularist, participatory forms of activism. While the 1960s period across the West marked the emergence of new forms of emancipatory politics, it does seem that May '68 in France has a special place in the history of New Left radicalism. In the run-up to May 2012, the Occupy movement refocused attention on May '68. The movement was planning a series of demonstrations for May 1st to show solidarity with workers on International Workers Day. In line with Occupy's revolutionary project, activists called for a general strike. In the context of this revolutionary struggle, the insurrectionary moment in France in May 1968 – when workers were striking en masse and students were occupying their universities – was a key event that was repeatedly invoked (see Culture Jammers blog, 12/04/2012 and 26/04/2012).

May '68 was a particularly explosive reaction within a wider Western movement driven forward by a burgeoning self-emancipatory dynamic, marking the emergence of a profoundly anti-authoritarian culture that would increasingly permeate through Western society. As Bourg (2007) notes, in France May 2nd to June 30th 1968 was a time when a modern liberal democracy “seemed to court the possibility of a leftist revolution” (3–4). While the revolution failed to materialise, the period is significant, Bourg argues, because it opened up “an era of radical agitation and cultural and political upheaval that reached fever pitch in the early 1970s” (ibid., 5). Bourg suggests that the events of 1968 were marked by an “antinomian revolt against norms” (ibid.); by an anti-authoritarian ethos that rejected the established norms of law and order and the limitations of contemporary liberal democracy. As was suggested at the beginning of this chapter, what can be seen in the 1968 period is a self-emancipatory struggle against the limits of established social life. In August 1968, Jean-Marie Domenach described the struggle as “in the name of the desire to live to express oneself, to be free”. The demonstrators were struggling for the freedom to be who they wanted to

be, playing an important role in the development of the striving towards “self-realization” (in *ibid.*, 7). Interestingly, in the decade or so after May ’68, it would be precisely the antinomian ethos of the May ’68 events that would compel a questioning of the Marxist ideas that had played an important role in inspiring the activists of the ’68 period in the first place. Obedience to Marxist ‘laws of history’ and ‘necessary’ organisational discipline became increasingly intolerable as the emerging ethos encouraged a questioning of ideological restrictions on the free development of activist movements. Indeed, the movement of May ’68 was not part of an ideological grand plan – its spontaneous eruption and informal organisation emerged through its notion of unguided grassroots resistance.

Much like the *indignados* and Occupy demonstrators of today, the activists in France in May 1968 were reluctant to be clear on how exactly they wanted a new society to function – they hesitated to propound new laws or new norms because they were against the restrictive nature of laws and norms (*ibid.*, 8). Their ethos was perhaps best summed up by a famous piece of graffiti from May ’68: “it is forbidden to forbid”. In their yearnings for absolute freedom, the activists believed they could organise social life without the need for overriding rules and regulations. They were drawn to the idea that if given the freedom to realise themselves, they would be able to form egalitarian social relations without the need for repression or enforced discipline. Moving towards anti-statist notions of communism, they began to embrace an anarchistic notion of liberty that championed individual freedom within the collective.

Because of the anarchistic tendency within the May ’68 movement, a number of radical leftist thinkers with Marxist–socialist leanings have seen in the ‘insurrection’ of May ’68 stirrings of an individualistic culture that is itself to blame for the entrenchment of the capitalist liberal ‘democracy’ that the events of May ’68 were supposed to challenge. One famous criticism by a leftist radical came in an article published by Régis Debray in 1978, with the 10th anniversary of ‘the events’ in mind. For Debray, the activists’ burgeoning culture of individual fulfilment and independence would help make possible the development of late modern capitalism, wherein capitalist individualism could no longer be held back by French republican values of social responsibility and community engagement. Similarly, writing from 1979–1982, Gilles Lipovetsky suggested that in obsessing over their own wants and desires the students of 1968 had helped to bring about a “second individualist revolution” of “personalization” (in Bourg, 2007, 32). Lipovetsky was concerned with what he saw as a turn towards self-gratification at the expense of social and political engagement. Furthermore, in 1998, Jean-Pierre Le Goff (who was associated with Maoist movements) emphasised the confused and contradictory tendencies of far-left movements in the post-1968 era, with radicals torn between “neo-Leninism” and an emerging philosophy of desire. For Le Goff, the emphasis on the immediate assertion of desire undermined neo-Leninist inclinations towards collective action, which required “sacrifice” and “discipline” (in *ibid.*, 34). He argued that instead of a revolution in democratic politics, the post-’68 era has been marked by “hedonistic individualism” and an “anti-democratic” malaise.

For Bourg, “it is precisely this interpretation of May 1968 as nihilistic and individualistic” that must be challenged (ibid., 34). Bourg takes inspiration from Laurent Joffrin’s (1988) more positive assessment of the post-1968 era, noting Joffrin’s suggestion that one way to interpret May ’68 is as a “democratic revolt” with a lasting legacy (in Bourg, 2007, 31). Joffrin suggests that despite the individualist tendencies of May 1968, its libertarian culture could encourage an individualism based on “civic participation”. Rather than bringing about an individualist revolution that undermined key aspects of French republicanism, for Joffrin, the protagonists of May ’68 actually built on and helped further the republican project; a project which seeks to uphold the rights of ordinary citizens and instigate equality in the organisation of society, opposing the fixed rule of established elites:

The revolt moved forward in step with a democratization of society that had been underway for over two centuries . . . [it was] not a failed revolution, but a great reformist revolt, a democratic insurrection.

(in ibid.)

Bourg suggests that the democratic revolt became expressed through a “renewal of civil society”; a renewal in the social space “between atomized individuals, and the state and its laws” (ibid., 17). The renewed civil society of the new social movements would help propagate a renewed ethics of equal rights that would help break down traditional social hierarchies based on age, sex, sexual orientation, race, culture, and fixed status identities.

Bourg concedes that such a renewed civil society, with its emphasis on the human rights of individuals could (and did) become compatible with capitalistic notions of individual right and power, but his important point is that the ethic of the democratic revolt could not simply be reduced to a capitalist logic. This idea of differing notions of individual right ties in with my earlier comments on DeKoven’s interpretation of the 1960s; during this period, modernity’s ‘own democratising individualism’ lead into postmodernist movements that brought out contradictory notions of individual liberty. The ’68-era activists brought out a being-with culture based on self-realisation through egalitarian association, but because the culture remained rooted in a contradictory self-emancipatory ethos, it bled into (but was not consumed by) the being-over culture of self-realisation of an emergent ‘neoliberal’ capitalism. Indeed, the 1960s was a time of emergence for both right- and left-libertarian movements, with Milton Friedman’s 1962 publication *Capitalism and Freedom* marking the emergence of the former. Both types of libertarianism championed the individual at the heart of economic and social life, and the most radical right-libertarians shared in left-libertarian opposition to the development of corporatist forms of organisation and power; indeed, radical right-libertarians such as Murray Rothbard became associated with leftist free market anarchism in the late 1960s and early 1970s (see Carson, 2014. I shall return to the post-1960s bleeding from left to right in the next chapter).

Bourg notes that “the momentum for May ’68 undeniably came from the student milieu” (2007, 26), and the epicentre of the protests that would spiral towards an insurrectionary moment in France was the Nanterre campus of the University of Paris. In a period of post-war economic boom, the number of students in France had quadrupled from 1955 to 1968. The students were part of a burgeoning middle class that grew in line with the discourse of purchasing power and consumption. However, as the economy rapidly modernised, universities became increasingly technocratic, becoming well positioned to supply the burgeoning economy with the necessary managers and administrators. The new university campus of Nanterre, founded in 1964, was an archetypal example of the modern (‘modern’ here simply meaning up-to-date) university designed for the emerging middle classes. Henri Lefebvre, a radical sociology lecturer who had started working at Nanterre not long after its opening, described the campus as “an enterprise, devoted to the production of averagely qualified intellectuals and ‘junior cadres’ for this society” (in Miller, 2008). In his *L’irruption de Nanterre au Sommet*, Lefebvre explains the insurrection at Nanterre as an inevitable reaction against the bland, disciplined, technocratic way of life that the campus was designed to instil in the students. Lefebvre developed a notion of capitalist control similar to the notion of biopower developed by Foucault. For Lefebvre, a dehumanising capitalist logic of management, exchange, and profit was permeating through all the spaces of social life, and the instrumentalist turn in the universities was a symptom of this logic. What was needed was to reclaim public space so that all the capitalist symbolism and assumptions of that space could be inverted and turned towards the collective creation of emancipatory forms of social interaction and organisation.

Daniel Cohn-Bendit was one of the key student leaders behind the protests at Nanterre. He was a student of Lefebvre and was deeply inspired by his lecturer’s ideas on the reinvention of everyday life. To a large extent Cohn-Bendit was driven to activism by his own discipline’s implication in the rise of the technocratic society (see Wolin, 2010, 53–56). Sociology had come to prioritise quantitative methods and empirical research, gathering data on society that could be utilised by technocrats to further their manipulative oversight. Social scientists were being hired as corporate consultants to help generate information on how to most efficiently organise workers. But for students like Cohn-Bendit, who had been brought up on promises of a better life for all, there was more to the university system than producing knowledge and expertise for systems of control. For them, university gave people the opportunity to ask how society could be improved, how people could live together, how life could be made more fulfilling. The bland, pacifying consumerism produced by the culture industry was not enough to satisfy demands for a good life; society had to ponder how life could be enriched in different ways. On the eve of the May revolt, a Situationist International tract captured the mood of the moment, proclaiming: “we don’t want to live in a world that guarantees not dying of hunger at the cost of dying of boredom” (in *ibid.*, 56).

May '68, then, was a reaction against the encroaching cultural order of the technocratic capitalist system, and the aim was to spark a fundamental transformation in biopolitical society. However, while the students attempted to reject the very essence of the capitalist system, we must ask to what extent they did so precisely because of their socialisation within a bourgeois academic world. As shall be analysed further later, the students did not reject the basic tenets of personal freedom and social experience that were key to the development of consumerist society. Rather, they radicalised these tenets to reject their institutionalisation into a simplistic cultural order, and it was, perhaps, precisely the post-war culture of aspiration – which shaped their emergent middle-class identity – that compelled them to ask for more; as Bourq notes, “in a culture of plenty, their expectations of life, society and history were heightened” (2007, 25). The students owed their relatively privileged middle-class position to the ‘development’ engineered by the technocratic-capitalist system, and it would be from their privileged position that they would passionately embrace a radicalised version of the bourgeois ethos of self-emancipation to turn on the system through which they were socialised as bourgeois individuals. In searching for the true meaning of individual freedom from a position of cultural privilege, the students had immense ambition. And by modifying Moretti’s concept of dualistic bourgeois identity (see 2013), we can see how this ambition was torn between two planes of bourgeois experience, exposing an “intra-bourgeois contradiction” (ibid.). On the one hand, the students entered the academies ready to channel their self-emancipatory intensities into the struggle for distinction and status, preparing themselves for a professional life of disciplined analysis and industrious endeavour. On the other hand, beneath the surface of respectability lurked the raw self-emancipatory intensity that sustains the bourgeois classes in their struggle for affirmation, and it would be this raw intensity, stoked up by the post-war culture of aspiration, that would drive the students towards an attack on stifling rules and regulations and towards the exploration of alternative possibilities for individual and collective experience.

As early as November 1967, students had briefly gone on strike in protest against the “general working conditions” at the Nanterre campus (Bourq, 2007, 20). In the build-up to this event, one of the first things to rile students was the university’s policy on ‘interactions’ between male and female students – men and women had to live in separate buildings and were not allowed to visit each other. Only after the male students’ camp-in protest in April 1967 did the University loosen its grip on the students’ interactions by allowing male students over the age of 21 to have female visitors (male students under the age of 21 needed their parent’s permission to have female visitors, and no female students were allowed male visitors). Two things about these early stirrings of the '68-era protests seem particularly significant. First, it is striking that from the very beginning, what really *moved* students towards revolt was the issue of personal freedom, an issue that could not be clearly separated from the wider cultural movement towards individual and/or consumer choice, however much the students insisted that their struggle for sexual liberation was a struggle for anti-bourgeois collective

experience. Second, from the beginning of the movement, students utilised a tactic that would be a feature of many of the student protests of the era and which continues to be an important tactic in student protests and related political activism up to the present day: the students began to *occupy*. They did so to assert their power or autonomy, realising that occupation was an effective way of undermining oppressive authorities who would rather it be the case that they alone have the right to assert control over space and the culture and values nurtured within that space. Inspired by Lefebvre's ideas on social rejuvenation, the students would increasingly seek to carve out a space for the invention of their own spatial and social order.

The personal freedom that the Nanterre students sought to carve out in their spatial and social order was not only about gender relations and sexual politics. The students felt that their lives were subject to a general system of authoritarian repression, and felt that university and state authorities worked together to constitute this system. Their suspicion of the system was heightened at the time of the November 1967 student strike, when students were taking pictures of the numerous plainclothes policemen strolling around campus, attaching pictures to bulletin boards to spread their sense of indignity (Bourg, 2007, 20). A lack of political freedom for students at Nanterre was a particular cause of indignation; students were forbidden from taking part in political meetings. Frustration at the tight restrictions on student political engagement, combined with the sense that the university curriculum was conservative and did not encourage free thought, would lead to more student action in March 1968. In mid-March, sociology students at Nanterre went on strike demanding the "removal of outdated curricula and greater freedom of association". Further action was taken after students were arrested for taking part in anti-Vietnam War protests. On March 22nd, students occupied the administration building at the university, plastering its walls with graffiti that declared such things as "Professors you are past and so is your culture!" (ibid.). This formative event would lead to the students christening themselves as the March 22nd Movement. The situation had become so serious that on March 28th, the dean closed Nanterre for four days. This only helped to galvanise activists, who organised a series of mass meetings with burgeoning attendances. By April 22nd, activists had produced a collectively written manifesto, much like their *indignado* and Occupy movement heirs would several decades later. The April 22nd manifesto would underline the revolutionary ethos of the activists by calling for an end to the development of the "capitalist-technocratic" university and for solidarity with the working class (ibid.). With the protest movement making radical demands and continuing to grow, and with open clashes developing between left-wing and right-wing students, the university was closed indefinitely on Thursday, May 2nd.

The closing of the university did not, however, prevent the movement from spreading. On May 3rd, a small group of demonstrators made their presence felt in the courtyard of the Sorbonne, confirming their support for their fellow students at Nanterre. This show of solidarity worried the university authorities and

it was quickly decided to close the Sorbonne “for only the second time in its 700 year history” (ibid.). By five o’clock on May 3rd, the police had arrived to clear the demonstrators from the Sorbonne and began arresting them. A crowd of students and onlookers began to gather at the scene, and as police vans full of demonstrators began to pull away, one of the first clear insurrectionary moments of May ’68 emerged. In a “spontaneous and unorganised” intervention, the crowd began to block and attack a police vehicle, spurred on by the chant “free our comrades!” (in ibid., 21). From here, the violence escalated, with clashes between police and activists spreading through the Latin Quarter around the Sorbonne. 600 students were arrested on the day, but the rebellion could not be contained. On the night of May 3rd, the unified student/young academic front against the authorities strengthened: “the largest national student union and the junior faculty union voted to go out on strike” (ibid.).

Demonstrations continued during the week from Monday to Friday May 6th to 10th as student representatives negotiated with the university. Importantly, the students seemed to have some indirect support from the general population of Paris. It seemed that change was in the air, with large sections of the population being unwilling to back the authorities’ harsh repression of student activism. On May 10th, the government affirmed its refusal to release students imprisoned following the violence at the Sorbonne on May 3rd. In light of this, anger erupted and 15,000 protestors began an aggressive occupation of the Latin Quarter, setting up barricades to fend off police. Violent clashes continued through the night. That weekend, belated attempts by Prime Minister Georges Pompidou to appease demonstrators failed. With the students already having been in talks with the trade unions, the revolutionary wheel was already turning, and together the students and trade unions called a one-day general strike for May 13th.

On the day of the general strike, the students led a march of 800,000 demonstrators across Paris, and that night the students occupied the Sorbonne. Building on experiments with their action committees, the students at the Sorbonne began to engage in round after round of debate and discussion. With no formal organisation the students would nurture their participatory project at the Sorbonne until June 16th, when the police put an end to their occupation. Bourg (2007) describes the assemblies at the Sorbonne as having a carnival atmosphere, with students relishing the opportunity to express themselves freely; they could mingle, share ideas, and talk openly about their hopes and dreams in a way they had never done before. The pent-up being-with desires of the students were bursting forth in a celebratory moment of freedom, and once these energies were released, they would continue to permeate and charge the cultural world for years to come:

alongside the revolutionary rhetoric and its economic-class vocabulary, it was the libertarian spirit of the Sorbonne and then at the nearby Théâtre de L’Odéon that did most to create the mythos of May 1968 . . . the spontaneity, ease, and openness were formative for thousands.

(ibid., 22)

It is this libertarian spirit that was enlivened in the general assemblies of the *indignados* and the Occupiers.

Nevertheless, while there was certainly a strong strand of left-libertarianism and anarchism within the student milieu – with the March 22nd Movement and Situationist ideas becoming prominent – it is important to remember, as touched on earlier, that the student movement of the May '68 era was permeated with more traditional Marxist–Leninist activists – Trotskyists, Maoists, Castroists etc. Bourg notes that “the Trotskyists and the March 22nd Movement saw their memberships swell in May and June, ahead of all others” (2007, 26), a fact which hints at the combination of anarchist and Marxist ideas within the student movement. While Marxist activists may have favoured clearer political programs and strong decision-making bodies, they were tied to the libertarian ethos emerging within the student milieu and they were deeply opposed to the strict authoritarianism of established Stalinist-communism. Indeed, the Stalinist tendencies of the French Communist Party (PCF) meant that it was quickly “discredited” by the students (*ibid.*). Furthermore, one of Bourg’s key points is that in the aftermath of May '68, leftist activists would begin to shed traditional Marxist notions of revolutionary necessity, which had taken their activism so far but were becoming surplus to requirements as the burgeoning anti-authoritarian ethos rose to the fore (see *ibid.*, 27).

In the immediate aftermath of May '68, three radical leftist authors who epitomised the changing theoretical and political emphasis – Claude Lefort, Edgar Morin, and Cornelius Castoriadis – wrote *Mai 68: La brèche*, celebrating the vitality of the fresh-faced revolt. The authors believed that the events could transpire to form part of a radical break from the soul-destroying bureaucratic society, with organic spontaneity and grassroots participation seemingly in the ascendency. The authors were particularly well placed to relate to the students: all had been members of Socialisme ou Barbarie (Socialism or Barbarism), a libertarian socialist group that ran a journal and existed from 1948 until 1965. Like many of the students during the revolt of 1968, Castoriadis and Lefort had originally been Trotskyists, but, in a precursor to the leftist identity crises in the wake of May '68, they became disenchanted with Trotskyism and broke away to found Socialism or Barbarism (Telos Staff, 1975). While Trotskyism offered a more democratic vision than Stalinism, for the members of Socialism or Barbarism, it still placed too much emphasis on a strong centralising party – for the libertarian socialists, workers’ councils and direct democracy had to be the heart and soul of any ‘socialist’ society. Their journal would anticipate the student grievances of May 1968 by focussing on the problem of the governing bureaucracies of modern capitalism, which were seen as fundamental obstacles to the establishment of a truly free society. Wolin (2010) notes that while the mainstream left awaited the historically predetermined revolt of the working class, it was the “gauchistes” – those to the “left of the left” – who recognised that the dynamics of struggle were changing: “Those associated with innovative avant-garde organs such as the Situationist International, Arguments, and Socialism or Barbarism” recognised that rather than being clearly class-based and structured, revolt was becoming a

diffuse cultural revolt against the structures imposed on everyday life; a revolt that sought new associative forms and a new stateless form of society (19–20).

Herbert Marcuse's Western Marxist ideas became highly influential on student radicals in the 1960s (on Marcuse's position in Western Marxism, see Gottlieb, 1989). Like Sartre, another key influence on the era's radicals, Marcuse was interested in the revolutionary activism emerging in marginalised groups outside of the industrial proletariat. For Marcuse, the traditional proletariat was being pacified by a mass culture of consumer gratification, but those groups on the fringes who had not been fully absorbed by mass society were rising to resist the encroachment of a homogenising capitalist force:

The students, African Americans, third world revolutionaries, and, later, feminists, who were beginning to rise up around him as he wrote. [Marcuse] retained until his death a commitment to the 'new social movements' he did so much to foster and inspire.

(DeKoven, 2004, 28)

In his most influential text, *One-Dimensional Man* (first published in 1964), Marcuse echoes themes from Lefebvre's writings by stating that the instrumentalist logic of capitalism has penetrated so deeply into social life that only a total revolution in social and cultural reality could save humanity from capitalist alienation. Nevertheless, while Marcuse rallies against a vacuous bourgeois existence, he does so by invoking a particularly bourgeois preoccupation with the "free individual" (DeKoven, 2004, 28). Marcuse opposes the "totalised domination" of one-dimensional society with a "fully liberated existence" that is premised on a "new reality principle" (ibid.). From his position of cultural privilege, Marcuse reacted against a 'vulgar' culture of consumption, believing in an entirely new way of being, with a multi-dimensional society rising as the antithesis to one-dimensional society. Yet Marcuse's utopian belief in total revolution is premised on precisely the emancipatory optimism that defined post-war consumerism. In his *Eros and Civilization* (first published in 1955, and an important precursor to Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*) Marcuse sets out what sounds remarkably like a consumerist utopia, suggesting that technological advancement was becoming so great that human beings could be liberated from toil. As DeKoven notes, "this utopian view of technology's capability to end the struggle of existence underlies much sixties utopian revolutionary ideology" (ibid.). Not unlike 'the masses', then, the bourgeois avant-garde, swept up in a world of material plenty, dreamed of a life without labour: a life of leisure, pleasure, and free association.

Of course, for the radicals like Marcuse, even if the masses were to be free from work, they would not be free from alienation, because their existence is defined by the 'false needs' of one-dimensional culture. The people were increasingly allowed, even encouraged, to satisfy their desires, but only within the logic of an instrumental reason that inhibited truly human connections. Human desire was being desublimated, then, but only in a repressive way that reinforced the logic of struggle and

domination. Despite his emphasis on the penetration of the instrumentalist way of being that defined the capitalist system, DeKoven notes that Marcuse was implicitly beginning to move away from the Frankfurt School emphasis on the system's 'totalised domination'. For DeKoven, Marcuse, with his notion of one-dimensional society versus the liberation of Eros, begins with the same type of modernist dualism that marks the work of the earlier Frankfurt School writers Adorno and Horkheimer. However, by moving towards a focus on the system's facilitation of (limited) desiring liberation, Marcuse begins to move away from his modernist dualism, and verges, DeKoven suggests, on a postmodernist ambivalence towards the potential for liberation inherent in the system. While Marcuse remains committed to the modernist ideal of "revolutionary transcendence", he reluctantly acknowledges the flexibility of the hegemonic order in its integration of radical opposition. In doing so, he comes close to the postmodernist position that hegemonic power is in itself a contradiction, seeking absolute order yet "riddled with . . . potentialities of resistance" that emerge out of its own dynamics (ibid., 31). From here I would add that in the 1960s the bourgeois avant-garde and their aspirant student companions gave expression to a potentiality of resistance built into the bourgeois order. The problem the radical activists really had with hegemonic consumer culture was not that it represented the vacuous bourgeois existence they were totally opposed to, but that it was *not bourgeois enough*, in the sense that it expressed a simplified version of their ethos of self-emancipation that blunted this ethos's inherent subversive potential. Bourgeois radicals scorned and alienated themselves from consumer culture precisely because it was close enough to their own culture to be dangerously tempting.

During May 1968, radicals and rank-and-file workers shared their existences within the hegemonic self-emancipatory culture and fed off each other's related dynamics. The workers were "directly inspired" to strike by the students (Bourg, 2007, 23), and they contributed to the libertarian spirit that the students were nurturing with their wildcat activism. Rather than waiting for the labour union bureaucracy to sanction their strikes, workers on the ground took the initiative, seizing control of factory after factory for themselves. It was the workers' empowering direct action that drove the insurrectionary movement forward, while the establishment of the national labour unions offered only a "lumbering and staggered response" (ibid., 23), unprepared for such worker spontaneity. As for the political establishment of the left, it too offered a lumbering and staggered response to the sweeping tide of social unrest (ibid., 24), with the two leading leftist parties, the French Communist Party (PCF) and the Unified Socialist Party (PSU), seeming to lose touch with their own rank-and-file supporters. The French Communist Party (PCF) in particular completely misread the worker mood; its instinct to condemn the 'anarchic' uprising of the students was at odds with widespread worker sympathy with the student cause. Many workers were actually aligning themselves with the students' "generalised antiauthoritarianism" (ibid., 26), galvanising the ethos that sparked the criticisms of bureaucratic organisation – the type of organisation that tied parties like the PCF and the PSU to the logic of the state.

Despite the general support for an insurrectionary moment in France in May 1968, the revolutionary upsurge gave way very suddenly to a counterrevolutionary wave that led to the instituting of a reinforced right-wing government. This was probably due to the fact that during the May days, as Bourq notes, the student and workers could plan together when they had shared interests, but they would rarely come together *as one* (ibid., 23). The potential for real revolution in France in 1968 was always held back by the wedge between bourgeois-leaning radicals and the mass of workers with more practical ambitions. Ultimately, there remained significant cultural differences between student and avant-garde activists, who were ‘cultivated’ and radicalised by their intellectual socialisation within the bourgeois academies, and the down-to-earth workers – proud, often patriotic, and struggling to improve their working conditions and standards of living. When it came to the crunch, many workers fell back on the traditions of law and order that at least preserved their basic position within their society. The bourgeois-leaning radicals’ promises of a brave new world were not appealing enough to override workers’ pragmatic desires to protect what they had.

The right-wing reaction, however, did not simply crush all the libertarian energies that May 1968 had released. Many who ultimately backed down from outright revolution were not calling for a return to the way things were before the May insurrection – what they wanted was a new type of stability within which reform could take place. As noted, for Bourq, what emerged was a renewed civil society through a renewed democratic ethic, which emphasised new forms of equality against institutional conservatism. Bourq notes that while the radicals of 1968 were at first utterly opposed to compromise and reform that would undermine the revolution, in the post-1968 years many would become important contributors to the development of a mainstream democratic ethic. Here Bourq singles out the Maoist-leaning Groupe d’information sur les prisons (GIP). While many activists associated with the GIP were committed revolutionaries, when they fought against the “intolerable” conditions faced by prisoners and encouraged prisoners to develop “participatory self-representation” (ibid., 14–15; see also 326–327), they were looking to reform society and establishment institutions with an implicit human rights agenda (see ibid., 228–229). While the radicals of 1968 initially rejected ‘official politics’ and the institutions of the French state in favour of an ‘outside’ alternative, by the mid-1970s activists were building on implications of groups like the GIP, beginning to re-think the philosophy of total rejection and recognising how groups could campaign for reform within the Fifth Republic in order to achieve their ends. French feminists played a key role here, working to reform the legal system so that stronger restrictions were placed on sexual violence.

Wolin (2010) suggests that the French Maoists who played such a prominent role in post-1968 activism in France were slowly transformed from “political dogmatists” to become key players in a democratic cultural revolution (4). Many of the Maoists were students from the *École normale supérieure* (ENS) in Paris, the highly exclusive higher education establishment reserved for only the

most gifted students. The intellectual culture at the ENS in the 1960s was heavily shaped by the psychoanalytic structuralism of Jacques Lacan, who gave a series of famous seminars there from 1964 to 1969. Lacan's thought strongly influenced the Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, a prominent figure who lived at the ENS, with Althusser developing a structural Marxist notion of subjectification into the symbolic order of capitalism. Althusser's version of Marxism fitted well with the intellectual traditions of the super-elite ENS, which was set up in the wake of the French Revolution to produce the professors of Enlightenment transcendence. The ENS was a cornerstone in a French tradition of elite thinkers raising themselves up to claim a status akin to a "lay aristocracy", who functioned in Republican France as "arbiters of the true, the right, and the good" (see *ibid.*, 19). The elite academics, through their enlightened state, would reveal their special insights to the masses in order to guide them into a righteous future. Althusser's structural Marxism emerged through this culture. Althusser scorned the idea of subjective agents transforming society with their free will, reacting against humanism to propose an anti-humanist version of Marxism. He focused on the processes that defined the symbolic order of the structuring system, suggesting that it was the processes, not individuals, which would bring about revolution. The problem with this zealously anti-individualist idea was that it implicitly placed a kind of ultimate power in the hands of those who could, with their special access to knowledge, explain how processes would develop to create revolution. Elite Marxists themselves, then, could draw on their position within elite institutions to claim special access to knowledge and lead the people towards foreseen or 'inevitable' ends. They were the "prophetic intellectuals" who could set out the people's structural future (see *ibid.*, 20).

The Maoists of the ENS were heavily shaped by Althusser's ideas, forging a 'Maoist-Althusserian clique' (Dosse, 2010, 3). Althusser's notion of a scientific knowledge of structural change added conviction to the Maoist activists, who could draw on this knowledge, this truth, to become vanguards pushing forward revolutionary inevitability. In Chapter 1, we came across a normalien (former ENS student) who was one of the Maoists of the 1968 period – Alain Badiou. Badiou was always one of the staunchest Maoists. In 1969, Badiou co-founded the splinter Maoist group the Union des communistes français marxistes-léninistes (UCF-ML). For Badiou, there was a need to break away because the prominent Maoist group the Gauche prolétarienne (GP) was pandering to the "politics of everyday life" and/or "libidinal politics" (Wolin, 2010, 156) – that is to say, the politics of Nanterre. For Badiou, libidinal politics is a very middle-class, self-indulgent type of politics, inferior to the 'real' politics of unbending political will that can be traced back through the Bolsheviks to the Jacobins. (This is a line of violent, uncompromising insurrectionary political struggle that Žižek also champions; Balibar, 2013, 28). As alluded to in Chapter 1, Badiou is drawn to 'heroic' figures like Mao and Robespierre who have a terrifyingly clinical commitment to revolutionary truth, being unshakable in their belief that they are pursuing the course of history with their 'purification' of revolutionary movements.

In 1968, then, the Maoists, who were preparing for the working-class revolution that they had foreseen, were caught out by the spontaneous upsurge rooted in Nanterre. In a sense, a student elite had been usurped by the more down-to-earth Nanterre students, whose ethos emerged from the aspirations of the bourgeois rank and file. The student radicals at Nanterre, still privileged but less shaped by the traditions of transcendence of super-elite institutions, were the face of the brash bourgeois classes in the making; an emergent middle class with a burning desire to open up self-emancipation and self-empowerment. The young radicals of Nanterre and later the Sorbonne, complemented by the leading lights of the French avant-garde, felt the urge to push the limits of order by living through forms of horizontal social organisation and experimenting with boundless connections between states of being. And in the post-'68 period, it was two former Sorbonne rather than ENS students, Deleuze and Guattari, who recognised the emergence of a libertarian ethos and gave expression to it with their philosophy of desire. Both Deleuze and Guattari were from self-made entrepreneurial families (see Dosse, 2010, Part 1, sections 1 and 5), and this is probably more than an incidental fact, because it is often those from aspirant families on the fringes of the bourgeois elite who, caught between senses of alienation and self-assertion, radicalise the bourgeois ethos to turn it against the bourgeoisie.

While the Maoist radicals were caught out by the upsurge of May 1968, they soon adapted to the spirit of the times and became leading activists in the post-1968 period – as noted, it was precisely for this adaption or ‘deviation’ that Badiou criticised the Gauche prolétarienne (GP). The Maoists would pick up on their own doctrine of “immersing oneself among the masses” (Wolin, 2010, 18) to become notorious for supporting marginal groups such as “immigrants, the unemployed, prisoners, gays” (ibid., 16), thereby contributing to the emerging democratic ethic based on notions of human rights. As Wolin points out, “in a textbook case of unintended consequences,” their idealised vision of a purifying Cultural Revolution “fused unexpectedly with the ‘critique of everyday life’ as elaborated by the 1960s French cultural avant-garde” (ibid., 20). The Maoists became important civil society activists that pushed liberal democracy to uphold core values by recognising that every human, whatever their ethnicity, faith, gender, sexual orientation, or social standing, has the right to be protected from exploitation, domination, and/or discrimination.

As alluded to earlier, for Bourg (2007), because of the relationship between the democratic ethic and the drive to expand the scope of human or individual rights, the ethic could be made compatible with “a liberalism centred on the individual” (34), but it was not reducible to it. He argues that while there are connections between the ‘liberational’ culture emerging from 1968 and Anglo-American liberalism, they are not one and the same thing: “I take exception to the view that post-1968 intellectual-political histories of France ought to be subtitled *How the French stopped worrying and learned to love Anglo-American Liberalism*” (ibid., 13, italics in original). In pursuing this argument Bourg attempts to draw a distinction between the “liberal and democratic sides of liberal-democracy” (ibid., 39). He

sees liberalism as focusing on “the individual and rights at the heart of political life”, whereas democracy is about “legal and social equality”. For Bourq, whereas liberalism prioritises individual empowerment, democracy seeks to tame individual power with mediatory institutions that prevent the ‘freedoms’ of certain individuals from trumping or trampling upon the freedoms of others. Bourq suggests that democracy is about reasonableness, restraint, moderation; about an ethics that places certain limits on the potentially undemocratic excesses of human desire, whether they be liberal-individualist desires or anti-liberal revolutionary desires: “Democratic society in its fullest and most realized sense is neither entirely liberal nor illiberal (*ibid.*, 40) . . . desire has its limits, and the antinomian must face the law” (229).

In championing the culture of democracy that was developed in the aftermath of May 1968, Bourq is keen to stress the particularity of the French experience. For him, the French stand out with their own particular brand of contemporary ‘liberal’ society; a society that is not entirely comfortable with the traditions of Anglo-Saxon liberalism. It is this unique take on what a liberal-democratic society is that makes the French particularly productive when it comes to democratisation:

On the whole . . . at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s (or even today), one would have been hard-pressed to find in France large numbers of people advocating an anti-statist, free-market liberal order composed of hungry and covetous self-starters . . . French Republicanism was not Anglo-American liberalism; John Locke was not French.

(*ibid.* 303)

In discussing the distinctive French traditions of liberation, Bourq draws attention to French institutions and associations. He suggests that while in North America an institution is likely to be seen as something established and static, in France, an institution is something that also has “connotations that are more activist and approving” (*ibid.*, 343). For Bourq, while in Anglo-Saxon countries people are likely to think of an institution as something that keeps society in check, something that helps to control, order, and bind, in France “the word institution does not have a pejorative connotation . . . it has on the contrary creative, transformative, if not revolutionary implications” (Ayme, in *ibid.*, 344). Ayme notes that new institutions played a positive role during the French revolution: the citizens of the nation came together to create progressive institutions of democratic society and undermine the established power of monarchical rule. Here the French began a tradition of popular, pro-active instituting; of citizens uniting to create new associational forms that challenge the power of the status quo with new ways of organising, new ideas, and new values.

Of course, in France as anywhere else, as an institution becomes established and influential, it can “constrain, repress, and make people conform” (Bourq, 2007, 344), but for Bourq, in France new institutions, like Institutional Psychotherapy (with which Félix Guattari was associated), are often founded by citizens for

citizens; founded to liberate citizens from the established norms and systems that stifle social life. For the French, established institutions are there to be challenged by civil society; to be contested, revised, and transformed. Particular kinds of institution – French *associations* – are part of the fabric of French civil society. In French law, an association is a group of two or more people who agree to work together “for a purpose other than making a profit” (ibid.). These associations are legally considered to be moral persons and therefore have a different status to businesses and unions. Bourq suggests that while one may consider businesses and unions to be part of a “market civil society” because they consist of private individuals that share vested interests, one may think of associations as part of “non-market associative civil society” because they consist of private individuals whose shared interests are not, fundamentally, material benefit for the group. Associations, whether they are sports clubs, national groups, or community or social organisations, have some wider social purpose; they seek to contribute to the vitality of society in some way. Bourq notes that the flourishing of democratic impulses in 1960s and 1970s France would help foster a flourishing of the country’s associative life. In the 1960s, approximately 10,000 associations were created each year. In the 1970s, it jumped to 25,000 a year; “in the 1980s, 40,000; and in the 1990s, 60,000. In the early twenty-first century, about 40 percent of the French adult population belonged to at least one of the approximately 700,000 associations in the country” (ibid., 345). Associations contribute to democratisation in the way that they enable ordinary citizens to unite to rejuvenate their communities or support some social cause.

Bourq suggests that whereas French institutions are animated by strong social commitments, there is a sense in the United States that institutions are distant forces mediating between free-market individuals on the make. Bourq seems to suggest, then, that in essence French society is more civil – it is deeply marked by sociability, connections, break-ups, breakaways, reconstitutions; by human beings mixing, associating and relating for some social purpose. This is why Bourq asserts that “there is in France a view that civil society is not empty” (ibid., 346). He posits this French idea of social space as a “counter-model to the model of Anglo-American space as composed of free-market individuals” (ibid.); individuals who develop rather shallow self-interested market associations. Looking for great intellectual figures who are part of the development of divergent traditions in Anglo-Saxon and continental culture, Bourq links Descartes and Spinoza to French culture, as they “came out against the vacuum” of social space, while linking “English thinkers such as Locke” to Anglo-Saxon culture because they embraced the vacuum. Referring to the cultural environment in North America, Bourq suggests that Anglo-Saxon liberalism leads to a society of “atomized individuals” who “collide in the vastness of . . . space” (ibid.). He is implying that in North America, there isn’t much of a society at all – instead one finds individuals largely cut off from one another, who wander through ‘society’ for their own ends, clashing with other individuals in a struggle for supremacy, joining forces with other ‘atoms’ when necessary to achieve shared benefits but

remaining, fundamentally, self-contained units. The Anglo-Saxon 'liberal-legal' framework and the accompanying politics of liberal democracy (emphasis on the liberal) are essentially pragmatic developments; they help to ensure that the individualistic struggles can continue, that the competition is sporting or reasonably fair, that individualism does not become suppressed by the 'victory' or total domination of certain individuals. The strong institutions of the 'liberal' nation-state help to protect the atomised but orderly individuals from the excesses of unchecked desire, from wild or untamed individuals who terrorise the society of systematised individuals. For Bourg, in France, while there is an acceptance of "the institutionalization of our desires" (ibid.), there is a sense that rather than being external mediatory forces, institutions are formed by ordinary citizens working together for democratic integration in a passionate search for the common good. The French, then, are concerned with atom-splitting, and all the energy that that creates.

In this chapter, Bourg's re-evaluation of the legacy of May 1968 has been explored in some detail. It has been important to do this for two reasons. First, Bourg cuts through partisan interpretations of May 1968 on both the left and right, effectively drawing attention to its progressive democratic legacy. By exploring this legacy, he points towards the ways in which '68-era radicalism was permeated by liberalist notions of individual freedom and egalitarian association, insightfully tracking the channelling of radicalism into a mainstream liberal-democratic ethics. Second, by exploring the conflicts that arise at the meeting between liberalism and democracy, Bourg helps open up the debate on the contradictions at the heart of contemporary Western society. However, Bourg's particular interpretation, that the legacy of May 1968 is a democratically inclined France and a liberally inclined Anglo-Saxon world, ultimately obfuscates the ethos that underpins emancipatory struggle across the West. In the next chapter, Bourg's interpretation will be thoroughly critiqued, held up as an exemplary attempt to distance liberal and democratic traditions that are in fact inextricably intertwined. In more or less reducing liberalism to notions of a free market full of "covetous" individuals, Bourg presents a version of Macpherson's notion of a possessive individualism at the heart of Anglo-Saxon liberalism. In doing so, he creates a foil for the French 'democratic' tradition he champions. Building on the argument developed in the last two chapters, in the next chapter I shall explore political and cultural history in the United States and France to emphasise the intimate connections between the liberal and democratic struggles both within and across the two countries. In the process, I attempt to highlight just how liberalist Bourg's notion of French democracy is. I shall suggest that while Bourg is right to point out that John Locke was not French, a Lockean spectre has always animated (and simultaneously haunted) the French experience of democratic struggle.

Varieties of self-emancipatory experience

French and Anglo-Saxon cultures of self-emancipation

In the last chapter I explored Bourg's perspective on the legacy of the upheavals in France in the era surrounding 1968 in some detail. In this chapter, I shall consider his argument more critically and use it to launch a discussion on the history and development of liberalist culture in Western society. I shall postulate that instead of envisaging a French-centred, carved-out space for associational democracy within an Anglo-Saxon-centred, atomised liberal order – as Bourg seems to do – it is more insightful to focus on the way in which egalitarian-associational tendencies have emerged as essential features of a liberalist Western culture. As suggested at the end of the last chapter, Bourg follows in Macpherson's vein to more or less reduce liberalism to possessive individualism, and in doing so he fails to face up to the basically liberalist or self-emancipatory character of the associational democracy he champions. Building on analysis in Chapters 1 and 2, this chapter shall explore the intertwined histories of liberalist culture in the Anglo-Saxon world and in France, drawing into question the clear distinction Bourg creates between the Anglo-Saxon liberal-individualist tradition and the French republican-democratic tradition.

We saw in the last chapter that in attempting to enrich the Anglo-Saxon/French divide, Bourg suggests that key Anglo-Saxon-leaning philosophers like John Locke tend to embrace a social vacuum, whereas key French or republican-leaning philosophers like Descartes tend to challenge a social vacuum. However, as was argued at length in Chapters 1 and 2, it is a crude simplification to say that Locke's liberalism embraces a social vacuum – indeed, a sociable human condition is essential to Lockean thinking. In fact what Bourg identifies as a social focus in French philosophy is inextricably tied up in liberalist notions of free association. To emphasise this point, let us consider that when making his statement about John Locke not being French, Bourg attempts to push the Anglo-Saxon/French contrast further by adding that the democratically minded Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville “was not a utilitarian” (2007, 303) – that is to say, he did not embrace the cold, calculative notion of social justice that was associated with the rise of Anglo-Saxon liberal capitalism. As true as this is,¹ the claiming of Tocqueville as a distinctly French thinker does little to support Bourg's argument, for Tocqueville was a classical liberal who, as we shall see

later, was deeply inspired by Anglo-American notions of democracy. His concepts of democracy and social justice, then, were developed as much in the name of liberal individualism as they were against liberal individualism's excesses. I shall argue that, ultimately, the French republican tradition is France's answer to Anglo-Saxon liberalism – it was and is the means by which a historically rigid, semi-liberal nation-state could/can adapt to the development of a hegemonic Anglo-Saxon liberalist culture to produce its own version of liberal democracy, which has been forged through a history of lurches towards extremes of egalitarianism and authoritarianism.

As we saw in the last chapter, it was a young, expanding middle class in the affluent 1960s that produced anti-bourgeois sentiments, as this class's emergent members (students) embraced their self-emancipatory desires in order to desire new forms of associational life. However, while the last chapter focused on the student-led struggles in France surrounding May 1968, this chapter shall relate the French movement more clearly to wider trends in Western culture, focusing in particular on the pervasive influence of American libertarian tendencies. As alluded to in the last chapter, in the wake of the 1960s embrace of personal freedom and a pervasive entrepreneurial spirit at the expense of traditional values and rigid hierarchy, left-libertarian culture became intertwined with the 'freedoms' offered by the re-modernising (or post-modernising) free market. The free-market economy became enlivened by new forms of association and new cultural niches. While some activists within the emerging libertarian culture sought to break away, others growing up within it were tempted by the opportunities for self-affirmation offered by the free market. Cool capitalist entrepreneurs emerged from the milieu of libertarian hippie culture. Richard Branson, for example, emerged from such culture to tap into its youth music scene, offering a service that enabled young people to buy into their cultural expression (see Sandbrook, 2012). Young people emerging from the libertarian culture of the 1960s and 1970s were becoming tied to the network of capitalist structures that enabled them to bring out their personal desires – the evolution of the identity of Jerry Rubin, the Yippie left-wing radical from the 1960s who went on to become a successful businessmen, is an interesting example of the swing from self-affirmation to the profit motive (see Krassner, 1995).

As Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) suggest, the libertarian culture from the 1960s that has been carried into the corporate world has penetrated deep into its lifeblood. Corporations have learned to be flexible and respond to consumer 'needs', becoming malleable bureaucracies that can frame and manipulate associational life. In order to develop their malleability, the most 'progressive' corporations do not simply study and respond to consumer trends; they fully embrace social flows and emerging interconnections. Through this embrace a sense of openness and adaptability may penetrate deep into the corporate management system. From the mid-1970s onwards, forward-looking businesses began to abandon the insistence on strict hierarchy, formality, deference, and respectability, instead favouring a networking organisational structure wherein employees

are encouraged to interact, share ideas, use their initiative, and think outside the box. Open-to-change organisational culture became increasingly central to developing the flexible products and services for the multitude; a multitude that demands accessibility, options, range and immediacy. Boltanski and Chiapello argue that by the 1990s, a new management discourse had been fully developed that embraced the ideology of networking and self-development.

A key point to emphasise here is that, for Boltanski and Chiapello, this networking ideology, or what amounts to a new spirit of capitalism, has become part of the very essence of capitalism, and cannot simply be understood as a mask for pure capitalist interests. Here Boltanski and Chiapello reject a crude Marxist interpretation of ideology “as a set of false ideas” designed to conceal the reality of pure exploitative force (*ibid.*, xx). For them, capitalist ideology can only legitimate the accumulation process if it really does shape and constrain capitalist structures. The authors, then, are inspired by the Weberian concept of interests and ideas interacting in the transformation of society (*ibid.*, xix–xx. On Weber’s concept, see Runciman, 1978). In this book I have sought to push this concept further by suggesting that driving the interplay of interests and ideas is the ontological contradiction of being-over desires (the desires rationalised into interests) interacting with being-with desires (the desires rationalised into ideas or social purpose). In the analysis that follows I shall elaborate on how, in the struggle for interests, a liberalist spirituality or sense of social purpose developed in the West, which was not simply reducible to the interests from which it emerged and which carried forward a democratising ethos that was difficult to contain.

Bourg’s interpretation of the liberal tradition, I would argue, follows in the footsteps of the crude Marxist base/superstructure model just alluded to. Bourg presents Anglo-Saxon liberalism as an ideology that really only gives expression to the base forces of competitive struggle; liberalism’s ideas on individual rights lack any real social purpose, for they ultimately only justify individual empowerment through possession and accumulation. But while Bourg reduces Anglo-Saxon liberalism to base relations of force, he does more or less the opposite when interpreting French republicanism. He seems to suggest that republican ideology has made some type of critical break from base relations of force, being animated by rich social interactions and anti-competitive notions of associational democracy. What emerges, then, is a vision of a largely anti-social and barely democratic Anglo-Saxon liberal culture, and a highly social and lightly individualist French republican culture.

In this chapter, I shall suggest that this polarisation of liberal and democratic traditions is unconvincing, requiring great oversights and simplifications in order to be credible. While Anglo-Saxon liberalism may have pioneered and driven forward the notion of possessive individualism, moralistic reactions against the selfish consequences of this notion should not lead us to make rash judgments that overlook the subtleties and complexities of liberalist traditions. I argue that a fair analysis of liberalist ideas and movements demonstrates that supposedly French-republican inclinations towards associational richness have always been

essential to liberalist radicalism; indeed, associational radicalism has often been pioneered through liberalist culture in the Anglo-Saxon world. At the same time, the desperate search for a less selfish democratic society should not lead us to idealise the French republican tradition and overlook or underplay its roots in base forces of competitive struggle. I shall also argue, then, that a fair analysis of French republican ideas and movements demonstrates that liberalist notions of individual rights and possession have always been essential to the democratic-republican cause; indeed, French democratic radicalism has largely been premised on liberalist notions of self-emancipation. I argue that France is adept at producing radical democratic ideologies but that these ideologies are to a large extent a by-product of France's traumatic, polarising struggles within a wider Western liberalist context. I argue that Anglo-Saxon liberalism and French republicanism are two varieties that emerge out of a diffuse liberalist culture, with each producing contradictory movements towards possession and egalitarianism in the forging of liberal democratic society.

As we saw in the last chapter, in attempting to open up the divide between Anglo-Saxon liberalism and French republicanism, Bourq emphasises the distinction between market civil society and associative civil society, suggesting that liberal America can be linked more to the former and republican France more to the latter. For Bourq, the United States' market civil society is premised on self-contained individuals who form shallow social connections with others through an instrumentalist mentality, while France's associative civil society is defined by active citizens developing deeply felt social bonds through a sense of social purpose. The point to make here is that Bourq grossly overstates the extent to which the two forms of civil society are distinct. As was alluded to in the last chapter and earlier, deep associational tendencies continuously permeate through market-based connections, acting as a social glue to maintain a sense of mutuality and preventing the slide towards an outright Hobbesian war of each against all. At the same time, hardnosed self-interest continuously permeates through non-market connections, acting to align social goals with mutual gain. Market civil society, then, emerges through the being-over desires of possessive individualism, but to a certain extent depends upon the latent potential of the desiring Other – being-with desire, which can drive market-based associational activities towards democratising social purpose.

The development of Anglo-Saxon civil society is defined by a contradictory process in which self-emancipatory desires drive individuals towards both competition and a relatively open-ended sociability. The World Values Survey group, a global network of social scientists that carries out representative surveys of various national populations, has sought to measure attitudes, beliefs, and social practices within nations from 1981 to the present. Surveys carried out over this period show that countries with Anglo-Saxon cultures consistently display, by Western standards, relatively high levels of general interpersonal trust (even though it is true, as Putnam [1995] suggests, that levels of trust have declined as societies have become more diverse), and the peoples in these countries tend to place a

relatively high level of importance on friendship (rather than simply on family, although such countries place a relatively high level of importance on family as well). Such results strongly challenge the idea of Anglo-Saxon civil society being defined by a social vacuum, with suspicious, self-contained individuals developing a civil society defined by competition and basic self-interest. In fact, the results can lead to the suggestion that a successful free-market-based society, in spite of itself, actually depends upon relatively high levels of open-ended or outward-looking sociability (See Welzel, 2013, Chapter 6, ‘Benign Individualism’, for allusions to this idea).

My suggestion, then, is that Anglo-Saxon culture is underpinned by a self-emancipatory ethos that drives individuals to seek out others to develop new social forms. Seeking others to compete with and be-over is a critical part of the process, but it is not what the process can be reduced to. Even as individuals fervently struggle against one another they are forming partnerships, alliances, and close friendships as they search for both shared benefit and social meaning. Ultimately market civil society, to a significant degree, depends upon an underlying cultural drive to associate, with such a drive feeding into both the market civil society and an associational civil society – the latter being defined by a type of social purpose that is not reducible to the self-interest of the free market.² While neither free-market association nor non-market association is reducible to the other, neither is entirely opposite to the other, for market-based shared interests continuously blur into non-market shared desires, and vice versa. Alexis de Tocqueville, writing in the 1830s when the French state was still trying to get to grips with the notion of liberal democracy, recognised the intimate connection between individualism and associational life within the Anglo-American liberal tradition. Commenting on his experiences in the United States, Tocqueville notes:

Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition are forever forming associations . . . of a thousand different types. . . . As soon as several Americans have conceived a sentiment or an idea that they want to produce before the world, they seek each other out, and when found, they unite. Thenceforth, they are no longer isolated individuals, but a power conspicuous from the distance whose actions serve as an example; when it speaks, men listen.

(In Wolin, 2010, 361–362)

As shall be discussed further, Wolin recognises that because of a French tradition of centralising and statist rule, which leaves little room for individual choice, French associational life has historically been stifled. Nevertheless, like Bourq, he suggests that since the struggles of May 1968 in France, French associational life has been invigorated, while the rise of neoliberalism in the Anglo-Saxon world has undermined America’s associational vitality. Consequently, he suggests that the historical trend for America to have a strong associational culture and France a weak one “seems to have undergone a reversal” (ibid., 362). Much

like Bourq, he emphasises the atomistic tendencies of contemporary America, stating that “in recent years Americans have increasingly been observed ‘bowling alone’”. The ‘bowling alone’ reference refers to a study by Robert Putnam from the early 1990s that bemoans the decline in civil society engagement in the United States from the 1960s onwards (see Putnam, 1995 and 2000). However, as Lemann (1996) pointed out, Putnam’s study focused largely on declining membership in traditional, even old-fashioned voluntary organisations like the Boy Scouts, the Masons, and the League of Women’s Voters, which may have become increasingly out of touch with a post-1960s America defined by more post-modern, particularist types of association. When Putnam does address newer, expanding forms of association, such as online groups and self-help groups, he is too quick to dismiss the depth of social meaning in them, failing to explore how such groups can prompt a whole host of informal interactions that are difficult to measure.

In any case, Wolin’s and Bourq’s politicised assertions that French society has become more associational than an atomised US society didn’t really stand up to the evidence. World Values surveys carried out in the United States suggest a strong increase in US civil society engagement from the 1980s to the 1990s, a period in which a supposedly atomising neoliberal culture became hegemonic (see World Values Survey, ‘Online Analysis’). Furthermore, equivalent World Values surveys that were carried out in 2006 in both France and the United States, just one year before the publication of Bourq’s study and four years before Wolin’s, suggested that by almost every measure, US citizens were more likely to be actively engaged in civil society than their French counterparts. According to the survey results, Americans were more likely to be active members of what Bourq might call market civil society groups – “trade unions”, “professional organisations”, and “consumer organisations” (ibid.) While Bourq may have expected these results (although the level of active involvement in trade unions was perhaps surprising given America’s anti-socialist leanings), the surveys also suggested that Americans were more likely, sometimes much more likely, to be active members of what Bourq would consider more truly associational groups – “church and religious organisations”, “art, music or educational organisations”, “political parties”, “charitable or humanitarian organisations”, and “other” organisations (ibid.).³ Although the rise of neoliberal possessiveness and the challenges of creating harmony out of more diverse societies have had negative impacts on the United States’ associational life, US activists have played a key role in the development of more inclusive forms of civic engagement and the United States has continued to have a relatively strong and vibrant civic life.

As Bourq notes, the struggles in France in May 1968 were tied to the student struggles that were occurring across the Western world during the 1960s. The student struggles in the United States were particularly vibrant, and this awkward fact is something that Bourq does not really address in setting up the Anglo-individualist antithesis to French associational life. In the 1960s in the United States, hippie culture merged with New Left culture to produce America’s potent

brand of youth counterculture. Anti-war demonstrations, self-exploration, anti-materialism, drug use and exploration of alternative states of consciousness, experiments in communal living, feminist activism, exploration of alternative spirituality, anti-establishment sentiments, and sexual and sexuality exploration thrived within the American counterculture. America's youth culture of peace, love, sex, drugs, and rock 'n' roll was, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, almost certainly the most fashionable alternative youth cultural movement in the Western world.

In the last chapter I suggested that the May '68 revolt in France was closely tied up with a post-war ethos of consumerist freedom, but it is important to note here that it was the United States more than any other nation that in the post-war period sold to the world the consumerist vision. American consumerism sold youth the fantasy of choice, progress, self-expression, and romantic adventure. The American cowboy, slugging it out the frontier – tough, cool, casual, independent, and free – became the ideal image of consumerist individualism. American companies began to sell the cowboy image (and the clothes that went with that image) to Americans and to the world. Denim jeans, once simply the work trousers of cowboys, became, increasingly in the 1960s, the must-have fashion accessory in the West. Practical, rugged, and durable, they became synonymous with the adventurous consumer on the go. For the youth of the 1960s, whether mainstream or alternative, they became a fashion item that was symbolic of an assertion of youth independence from stiff, stuffy, uptight parents that didn't quite get the new age of laidback coolness and exuberant self-exploration. With today's world in which almost everyone regularly wears jeans, could we not say that in some part of our subconscious, nearly all of us imagine ourselves as cowboys now, slugging it out on the frontier of existence? (see Ferguson, 2011, on the rise of jean culture⁴).

The French youth milieu of the 1960s and 1970s was not immune to the advance of cowboy-cool. As Wolin notes, the student revolutionaries in France merged fantasies of Cultural Revolutionary China with “the American idyll of the Woodstock Nation”. French youth would be inspired by countercultural notions of cultural creativity, self-expression, and new forms of social belonging: by an American notion of the liberalisation of everyday life. Wolin notes, for example, that Guy Hocquenghem – 1968 activist and later queer theorist academic who was deeply inspired by Deleuze and Guattari's notion of desiring-machines – stated that the American counterculture had taught the idea that “class struggle is also a struggle for the expression of desire, for communication, and not simply an economic and political struggle” (2010, 357). The American student movement of the 1960s, just like its French counterpart, would be implicated in the rise of consumer society for its hedonistic and narcissistic tendencies, but would continually spill over into radical politics. A revealing expression of the emancipatory culture that blurred leisure and politics was witnessed during the incident in 1970 when, with Maoist leaders in France imprisoned by Pompidou's government, “Rolling Stone's frontman, Mick Jagger, interrupted a concert at the Palais des Sports Stadium to plead for the

imprisoned Maoists' release" (ibid., 5). This was typical of the association between 1960s rock 'n' roll culture and the New Left (confused, strained, and ambivalent though this relationship was: see Burley, 2008).

The US 1960s student movement began to emerge in 1964–1965, when students on the Berkeley campus of the University of California demonstrated for similar reasons to those of the students on the Nanterre campus in Paris in 1967–1968; the Berkeley students developed the Free Speech Movement, demanding that the university lift its restrictions on student political organisation on campus and that it recognise the students' rights to freedom of speech and academic freedom (see Kitchell et al., 1990). This student struggle in California, then, was in many ways a precursor to May '68 in France. Ultimately, while France's May '68 stands out because of the escalation of the struggle to the level of national crisis, in truth, French youth were a long way from leading the anti-authoritarian revolution of the 1960s. This is a point made by Van Herpen (2008), a Dutch former activist who was resident at the Sorbonne occupation in 1968.

Van Herpen refers to the youth revolt across the West in the late 1960s as "the postmodern value revolution" (7). Beyond America, he points out that in Europe the Provo movement in the Netherlands, taking off in 1965, pioneered the playful, humorous, and experimental spirit that would be a key feature of the anti-authoritarian atmosphere in the build-up to and during May '68. Indeed, he describes the Provo movement as "the direct forerunner of May '68" (ibid.). The Provos sought to politicise and enrich everyday life in ways that connected with the American counterculture. Their cultural traits, including their tendency to create satirical public spectacles, would echo down the generations right through to the Occupy movement. Van Herpen notes that the French student revolt of May '68 was a "rather late phenomenon" in comparison to other student revolts across the Western world (ibid., 11). He suggests that the late but unusually explosive nature of France's student revolt was in keeping with its politico-cultural history. French institutional conservatism creates a "*champagne effect*: a sudden outburst of all the repressed energy, strengthening the readiness for action" (ibid., 12, emphasis in original). Van Herpen highlights the fact that there is

a French *tradition* of popular upheavals, caused by a lack of flexibility in the French political system to modernize itself and to adapt itself in a gradual way to changing circumstances.

(ibid., emphasis in original)

Elaborating on this point, Alain Touraine notes, when relating the history of French "bourgeois conservatism" to the intense force of the May movement, that in France "you have to shout very loud in order to be heard, kick in the doors to be received" (1968, in ibid., 12). Bearing this analysis of the French system in mind, I suggest that Bourg misrepresents the French tendency towards intermittent radical outburst by putting it forward as the West's pioneering democratic tradition. Although he recognises the violent and anti-democratic potential of

France's revolutionary tradition, he romanticises the democratising tendencies of French institutions, seriously underplaying French institutional conservatism, which plays a critical role in inciting the sudden explosion of late-comer radicalism. I shall discuss France's political history in more detail later in the chapter.

It is important at this point, however, to note that while French political culture has long been marked by illiberal and anti-democratic tendencies, American political culture carries within itself an often-brutal notion of authority that consistently undermines the self-emancipatory energies that the United States produces. To exemplify this, let us head back to American student protests in the 1960s. In the spring of 1969, students from UC Berkeley would build on the legacy of the Free Speech Movement of 1964–1965 to become embroiled in activism that led to a tragic confrontation with state authority. In April, without university approval, students worked with local residents to create a community park on derelict land owned by the university. A certain Ronald Reagan was Governor of California at the time of the occupation of the land, having been swept to power on the back of popular support for a crackdown on supposed subversive and immoral student activism and lifestyles within California's public university system (Kahn, 2004). In occupying the land that became known as "People's Park", the students had violated the university's property rights, and the future architect of Reaganomics had his opportunity to crush the communist-leaning students. Overriding the promise of UC Berkeley Chancellor Roger W. Heyns to consult with students about plans before further action was taken, Reagan sent 300 California Highway Patrol and Berkeley police officers into People's Park to reclaim the land and fence it off.

When student activists attempted to reclaim the park by force, the tragedy unfolded. Reagan's Chief of Staff, Edwin Meese III, oversaw the government response to the protest. He sent 791 officers into battle against the students, authorising them to use whatever means necessary to restore order over a crowd that had risen to around 6,000 people (see Kitchell, 1990). Apart from the usual charge of baton-swinging riot police into the crowd, things took a more sinister turn when Alameda County Sheriff's deputies fired with shotguns at bystanders sitting on the roof of a nearby cinema. Student James Rector died of his wounds from the shooting and carpenter Alan Blanchard was permanently blinded. More shots were fired as the protestors were forced to disperse, with dozens being hospitalised. Governor Reagan called a state of emergency in Berkeley and 2,700 National Guard troops were sent to occupy the city, which they did for two weeks, breaking up all assemblies and enforcing a curfew. Just over a year after the shootings near People's Park, in similar circumstances to those in Berkeley, the Ohio National Guard fired on unarmed protestors at Kent State University, killing four students and seriously wounding nine (this event triggered a nationwide student strike, although without mass worker support).

It is interesting to note that despite the scale of the violent radicalism of students and workers during the uprising in France in 1968, and despite the reputation of France's authoritarian President, Charles de Gaulle (and despite his *threats*

to call in the military), the French authorities did not launch a military crackdown and start shooting unarmed protestors. Yet when authorities in the United States in the same era were faced with unrest that was similar but comparatively minor, they could quickly react with lethal force and even military occupation. So why did authorities in 'the land of the free' behave so brutally towards their own citizens, even when, as I shall argue further later in the chapter, their political and social system, in certain key respects, historically has tended to be relatively open in comparison to the French system? Why were US states often less tolerant of disobedience than the French state, despite the latter's tendencies towards authoritarianism? What we see in these formative years in US history in the late 1960s and early 1970s is a country in which a culture of liberalist autonomy had unleashed profound libertarian forces. But populist leaders like Ronald Reagan were able to tap into many American citizens' deep fear of the consequences of increased freedom. It seems that the American consciousness of relative individual freedom makes many Americans extremely sensitive to any threat to their freedom, and ironically, it is often freedom itself that they fear the most. There is a tradition of extreme social contradiction in American society that can be traced right back to the Puritan and evangelical roots of the American national identity; a contradiction in which ground-breaking rights in terms of political contribution, free enquiry, and free association are developed within a highly reactive and stifling social culture. An ideology of strict personal discipline has perpetually existed in the United States at the meeting point between the contradictory self-emancipatory desires that are brought out by American culture, as society desperately seeks to maintain a 'moderate' middle ground between the radical desiring forces that continually threaten the existing social order. Many Americans in the late 1960s and early 1970s, then, were terrified that immodest emancipatory forces might destroy their precarious society, and they were willing to tolerate harsh crackdowns to prevent the breakdown of law and order, or, as Bourq might say, to preserve the nation's overarching institutions of stability (even after the shocking shootings of unarmed students by the Ohio National Guard at Kent State University, a Gallup opinion poll, conducted immediately after the event, had only 11 per cent of the American public blaming the student deaths on the National Guard, while the majority, 58 per cent, blamed the demonstrating students for the deaths; see Lawrence, 1970).

The American people, then, have historically entered into a social contract with their governments based on disciplined individualism. Let us roam, the people say, let us pursue our interests and better ourselves, and we will accept the clear, solid limits to our range. We will accept that disobeying the law is *particularly* intolerable and inexcusable, for we have many freedoms, and we shouldn't abuse them. The people accept that their individual freedom can develop within a reasonably wide range, and that if they cross the boundaries of this range, the state has the right to stamp on them; to crush transgressions that seem to be unnecessary and ultimately dangerous to the entire social edifice. The message from the state authorities that often emerges is something like 'we're quite happy to let

you go so far, *but don't you dare go any further*'. Tocqueville recognised this freedom/discipline contradiction in the United States, particularly with regards to freedom of expression, noting that, ultimately, Americans expect conformity as much as they expect individualist differentiation: "The majority has enclosed thought within a formidable fence. A writer is free inside that area, but woe to the man who goes beyond it" (*Democracy in America*, Volume I, Chapter 5).

Nevertheless, the American establishment has proved continually incapable of holding back the destabilising self-emancipatory movements fed by its own liberalist culture. The clampdowns by American authorities in the 1960s and 1970s could not halt the social and cultural transformations of the era any more than de Gaulle could halt similar transformations in France. Reagan's shootings and military clampdown failed even to prevent the UC Berkley students from reclaiming People's Park – it was reclaimed in 1972, after more direct action and support from Berkeley City Council, and became democratically overseen by People's Park Council, a group which contained community members as well as activists.

I would now like to turn my attention to the origins of American radicalism to explore the development of the United States' self-emancipatory contradictions further. I shall focus on how Puritanism's ascetic individualism paradoxically acted as a cocoon for deterritorialising radicalism, harbouring a self-affirming dynamic that would continually break out into a pioneer, frontier culture, which itself would underlie the future explosion of cowboy cool.

In the 1600s, radical English colonists in America were forming their own communities, developing communal politics and democratising societies. Driven on by their protestant work ethic and sense of individual autonomy, the colonists did not rely on the external English authorities to make their communities for them; they made them for themselves. At this point we should remember the contrasts between the founding of the Northern and Southern English-American colonies. Tocqueville suggests that in the Southern colonies like Virginia, protestant radicalism was tempered by the buccaneering spirit of the unscrupulous and/or desperate/low-status individuals who settled there to find their fortune or escape poverty in England – their adventures to the New World tended not to be based on spiritual purpose. For him, the widespread exploitation of black slaves in the South was indicative of the non-liberal characteristics of the Southern colonies; while slavery might reveal the dark side of individualist greed, it was also in keeping with the South's tendencies towards the development of an aristocratic culture of absolute command. However, "on this same English foundation there developed in the North very different characteristics" (*Democracy in America*, Volume I, Chapter 2). Tocqueville's argument may now seem like an outdated judgment on the less pious Southerners, but there is an important truth to his emphasis on social differences between the founders of the Northern and Southern colonies (see Lee, 2005, on the development of Virginia, 76 and 115–118).

The Northern English-American colonies of New England were initially settled by middle-class Puritans with radical notions of egalitarianism. Unlike many of the settlers in the South, the Pilgrims who settled in New England in

1622 to found New Plymouth (and many who came later) were not, first and foremost, interested in making money. As I shall come to, they very much did carry with them a bourgeois notion of individual enterprise, but the key point to stress here is that from the beginning their religious ideology was essential, and not simply auxiliary to their interests, in shaping their actions and worldview. The colonists' aim was to find somewhere where they could practice their non-conformist religion without persecution while retaining their English identity (Lee, 2005, 122), and their religious ideology was tied to notions of commitment to the community: "each [Pilgrim Father] was required to sign an oath that they would combine themselves 'into a civil body politic'" (ibid., 123). For the Pilgrims, utilising slave labour, or even indentured labour, was out of the question: "Each person was the equal of the other. The colony was a partnership. Even the idea of ownership was, at first, rejected" (ibid.). The Pilgrims were required to share in the burdens of the community, labouring as well as administering for the good of the plantation as a whole. The community relied on no one else and had no surplus to export or trade. These Puritan pioneers were not good businessmen. Nevertheless, the Pilgrims had been required to set up their own commercial company to fund their journey to the New World, and with their inward-looking and idealistic colony struggling to maintain itself, the settlers were forced to seek support from the merchant venturers in England. But for the merchants, there seemed to be little hope of making money out of the plantation, and so "the London shareholders gave up their hopes and then their rights to making a profit and the settlers were left to their own devices and desires" (ibid.).

Despite the lack of support, the pioneering New Plymouth colony did not capitulate. With their activist and communitarian spirit, the settlers began to prosper:

The deeply non-conformist Protestant work ethic came into its own. They believed in working for each other and thus for the common good. As they worked, so too did the colony.

(ibid.)

Although New England would develop into a collection of colonies that were far removed from early utopian notions of communal living, the basic principles of communitarianism and contribution laid down by the original settlers would leave a lasting legacy. Indeed, Tocqueville argues that the Puritan communities of New England developed the essential principles of modern democratic society, having a profound influence on the other Anglo-American colonies and spreading their message across the world:

The civilization of New England has been like a beacon lit upon a hill, which, after it has diffused its warmth immediately around it, also tinges the distant horizon with its glow.

(Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Volume I, Chapter 2)

Tocqueville concedes, however, that Americans would become as obsessed with individual wealth as they were with community democracy. The radical puritanism of New England was not simply being corrupted through the development of this obsession, because as suggested in chapters 1 and 2, Protestant radicalism gave expression to a self-emancipatory contradiction. Radical Protestantism always carried within itself a strong notion of individual striving – this is why, even in its communitarian radicalism, puritanism placed a strong emphasis on individuals standing up and proving themselves with their contributions to the community. And because of their rooting in individual striving, Protestant radicals would continually be drawn towards proving their divine worthiness through their accumulation of property, thereby undermining their own egalitarianism and contributing towards the development of modern materialism. As Puritan community members began to bring out being-over desires from within their being-with spiritualism, dominant, self-aggrandising figures started to emerge. Through this process, the Massachusetts Bay Colony of New England developed a Puritan oligarchy, with representatives appointed through a limited system of democracy based on religious qualifications (see Lee, 2005, 124–125).

Furthermore, Puritan asceticism, although having roots in a worthy notion of sacrifice for the community, became increasingly associated with a clinical notion of saving up capital that could be used to represent increasing self-importance. In any case, even in its more spiritual forms, Puritan asceticism was based on fear as much as it was on moral purpose. Puritans were terrified of their own self-emancipatory desires, and would seek to repress themselves and their fellow community members in a vain attempt to preserve ‘modest’ amounts of liberty. Ultimately they sought to hold back the desire through which they were constituted as self-emancipatory beings, rather than bring out or open up the being-with desiring process that they had nurtured with their spiritual egalitarianism. The Puritans of Massachusetts, then, became driven to extreme forms of bigotry and persecution as they tried to control communities full of dissenters. As Lee points out, it was a great irony that the religious leaders who set up the administration of New England had come to escape religious persecution and yet they would become highly intolerant of divergent forms of spirituality, even radical Protestant ones (*ibid.*, 121 and 125).

Despite its glaring hypocrisies, puritanical Protestantism focused energies on political emancipation and social rights. The Massachusetts administration provided a certain amount of centralised oversight and pioneered notions of a citizenship with obligations and rights. Religious authorities had “some moral obligation to provide services from welfare to the military protection of the people” (*ibid.*, 125). New settlements were legislated for, and property owners were accountable to the body politic. Furthermore, radical Protestant non-conformists would be drawn to the Massachusetts region, and when some of them became disillusioned with Massachusetts’s hypocritical intolerance, they would push the democratising agenda further by setting up new colonies in the New England area, embracing Protestant diversity and a separation between church and state.

The radical non-conformist Protestant notion was developing that “man [is] free to think and act as his conscience dictate[s] and not according to some congregation of ministers and administrators” (in Lee, 2005, 128–129^s). The tendency towards egalitarianism embedded in protestant radicalism, then, could not be contained by Massachusetts’s retreat towards bigotry and hierarchy. Speaking of the New England colony of Connecticut, Lee notes that, by 1639, it had “written the first constitution of what became America”. Catholics were permitted to run for political office in the Connecticut assembly, and “there was virtual universal suffrage” (ibid., 127). By the end of the American War of Independence, another New England colony, New Hampshire, had universal male suffrage, and even, briefly, female suffrage. Through these developments the New Englanders were laying the foundations not only for the United States of America but for the modern liberal-democratic state in general:

The general principles which are the groundwork of modern constitutions, principles which, in the seventeenth century, were imperfectly known in Europe, and not completely triumphant even in Great Britain, were all recognized and established by the laws of New England: the intervention of the people in public affairs, the free voting of taxes, the responsibility of the agents of power, personal liberty, and trial by jury were all positively established without discussion. These fruitful principles were there applied and developed to an extent such as no nation in Europe has yet ventured to attempt.

(Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Volume I, Chapter 2)

The New Englanders’ democratising tendency was constituted through their spiritual desires to connect with fellow human beings in equality. Their spiritualism contained within itself, then, a progressive human rights sentiment, and with this, the New England US states were among the first in the world to abolish black slavery; mostly, it is true, in a gradualist way (with only ‘conservative’ Massachusetts being outright in its abolition), but as part of a long-term cultural process, and not, as in France in 1794, for a few years in a moment of revolutionary fervour. By 1800, enslavement of the children of slaves had been abolished in most of the Northern US states, which included those states neighbouring New England, such as Pennsylvania and New York, which shared in the New England cultures of protestant radicalism and self-emancipatory striving. We should not, of course, in any way underplay the highly significant role the Northern states played in facilitating the slave trade – the number of slaves in the colonies/states had always receded as one headed north towards New England, but Northern states, including those within New England, eagerly engaged in the slave trade through the 1700s (see Latour, 2010). We should state quite clearly that the radical logic of accumulation fostered by the New England states directly contributed to an instrumentalist embrace of slavery. Nevertheless, we should not, in moralistic outrage at the hypocrisies of the past, subsequently reduce the positive dimension of Puritanism to its negative dimension. The initial Puritan stance

against slavery led into a very real abolitionist culture in New England and neighbouring states that counteracted the slide towards a raw possessive Puritanism. Religious congregations and closely related abolitionist societies in the North played a key role in pressuring state governments to change the law on slavery. They emerged through America's aforementioned strong tradition of associative non-market civil society, representing just the type of association that Bourq recognises as being key to the development of democracy – they represent civilian movements to rein in the powers of dominant/exploitative groups and individuals.

The United States, then, has deep traditions of both democratising movement and social conservatism. It has developed through a strong culture of free association, which persistently creates movements that drive institutional change or re-institutionalisation, yet such change is persistently hampered by a tendency to fall back on the 'stability' promised by established forms of order. As we saw in the last chapter, Bourq really only considers this latter tendency in the United States, focusing on the foreground of the conservative-American invocation of institutional tradition, while championing France for its pioneering tradition of popular re-institutionalisation. In doing so, Bourq more or less ignores the United States' background tradition of popular re-institutionalisation, which is in many ways the forerunner of France's tradition. While the French tradition was inhibited until 1789 because of France's development of absolutist monarchy, the US tradition had been slowly burgeoning from the days of the first colonial communities in the early to mid-1600s. When the Anglo-American colonists released their Declaration of Independence 13 years before the French Revolution, and insisted on the people's right to overthrow government and re-institute it in their own image, they were giving expression to an associational culture supporting institutional change that was over 150 years in the making. As Roberts (2004) states in his authoritative history of the world; "The American adoption of a democratic theory that all governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . was epoch-marking" (728).

Ultimately, Bourq's ideas on French democracy are rooted in a common misperception that, as Wolin misleadingly puts it, "it was the French, after all, who back in 1789 had invented the rights of man and citizen" (2010, 5). Wolin is referring here to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of August 1789, adopted by the National Constituent Assembly of France at the beginning of the French Revolution. Such statements really misrepresent history, because the core human rights sentiments of the French Declaration were premised on sentiments that had been nurtured through 150 years of political and religious struggle in the Anglo-Saxon world. The French were really relatively late on the scene in terms of political and legal application of human rights sentiments during the French Revolution, although as in 1968, when the French finally rallied to the era's democratising movement, their revolutionary urgency compelled them towards sudden and profound political and ideological breakthroughs, so that they quickly caught up with and even briefly lead the democratising push. Nevertheless, the

French Declaration largely echoed, even paraphrased, the human rights statements of the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 (see Mason, 1776), the latter being a key inspiration for the American Declaration of Independence that was created only weeks after the Virginia Declaration was ratified. Indeed, there seems to have been a very direct link between the American Declaration and the French Declaration, for Thomas Jefferson, the chief author of the American Declaration, was in France at the time of the French Declaration as Minister to France, and in the months prior to its adoption had cooperated with Lafayette in drafting it⁶. Critically, the French Declaration followed in the American tradition by continuing to tie property rights to human rights, declaring that “the right to Property is inviolable and sacred”.

The tendency to misrepresent the history of the West’s democratising movement through a disassociation of Anglo-Saxon and French political traditions is particularly strong in Marxist circles. For example, in assessing the impact of the French Revolution, the famous Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm argues that “if the economy of the nineteenth century world was formed mainly under the influence of the British Industrial Revolution, its politics and ideology were formed mainly by the French” (1996 [1962], 53). Here Hobsbawm proposes the ‘duel revolution’ model, which separates British economic radicalism from French political radicalism. Such a model was a strangely un-Marxist idea within Marxism, for it separated radical politics from capitalist revolution even though Marxism had always insisted on how political revolution would be brought about through the material conditions of capitalism. I suspect that Hobsbawm separates economic and political traditions in such a clear way because, although he recognises that the French Revolution began as a bourgeois revolution, he contributes to a Marxist tradition of seeing a kernel of proletarian revolution emerging through it – of seeing a revolution within the revolution. He is drawn, then, towards distinguishing a democratising tradition that has a ‘genuine’ democratising tendency within it. In being drawn in this way, Hobsbawm loses focus on the French Revolution’s key role, namely, the spreading and accelerating of a democratising revolution that was to a large extent an extension of the Anglo-Saxon struggle for individual rights. As I shall argue later, even the French Revolution’s revolution within the revolution was part of this extension, and did not represent a fundamental break from the bourgeois revolution.

The idea of revolution within the revolution was proposed by Hobsbawm’s fellow Marxist historian Christopher Hill in his analysis of the English Civil War (1955), or what he prefers to call the English Revolution. Focusing on the Leveller movement, Hill sees the emergence of a democratic agenda that pushed beyond the limited, self-serving notion of ‘democracy’ supported by the initial bourgeois agitators. However, as argued in Chapter 2, the Levellers contributed towards the development of the being-with self-emancipatory culture of bourgeois radicals. Ultimately, the Leveller movement was strongly rooted in the culture of autonomously minded artisans with petit-bourgeois tendencies, who, through defending their rights to possession or estate, remained tied to bourgeois ideas about

individual empowerment through claiming a physical stake in society. As the Anglo-Saxon democratising tradition was revitalised through the development of the Anglo-American colonies, it would re-emerge through an alignment of interests and culture between bourgeois radicals and humble but autonomous freemen, with the latter valuing property rights while challenging elite bourgeois exclusivity (see Lee, 2005, 125–126, on the importance of free workers in the development of New England society). And when the French Revolution moved towards democratic radicalism, it was far from incomparable, because the radicalism was, much like in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, constituted through the alignment of artisanal freemen and bourgeois radicals, although this time the bourgeois radicals were more secularised radicals, rather than Protestant ones. Such secularisation did not constitute a fundamental break from the self-emancipatory ethic of Protestantism, for, as Roberts (2004) suggests, Enlightenment-era ‘Romantic’ radicals such as Rousseau could be said to be promoting a “secularized Protestantism”, building upon the Protestant emphasis on self-realisation and a search for truth over respect for tradition and custom (see 674–695). The immanent Protestant God, the God to be pursued and discovered, became the Supreme Being of the French Revolution.

Hobsbawm notes that it was the *sans-culotte* masses of Paris – “small craftsmen, shopkeepers, artisans, tiny entrepreneurs and the like” (1996, 63) – who initiated an armed overthrow of the early French Revolution’s exclusive bourgeois regime, and moved the revolution towards radical notions of universal male suffrage. As Hobsbawm suggests, the *sans-culottes*’ political demands were infused with *petit-bourgeois* leanings, for they demanded the protection of small-scale holdings and independent craftsmanship and enterprise. However, Hobsbawm argues that the Jacobin regime’s constitution of 1793, which to a large extent represented *sans-culotte* interests, was, with its guarantee of rights to public relief and public schooling, “the first genuinely democratic constitution proclaimed by a modern state”; it was declaring that “the happiness of all was the aim of government” (*ibid.*, 69). Nevertheless, there was no fundamental break from bourgeois radicalism in this declaration, for it was rooted in a liberalist notion of the protection of equal individual rights through the institutionalisation of the common good (indeed, there is a strikingly Lockean tone to the declaration, for, as we saw in Chapter 1, Locke insists that ‘as much as possible’ mankind is to be preserved). Ultimately, while Hobsbawm suggests that the mixed proletarian/bourgeois ideology of the *sans-culottes* faded as socio-economic conditions changed and small freeholders and entrepreneurs were marginalised, he seems to underplay the extent to which the *sans-culotte*-style, bourgeoisified populist worldview has been carried into not just *petit-bourgeois* movements for small businesses and meritocracy, but also into working-class movements for public ownership and social democracy that are premised on a civil society logic of association for mutual benefit.

Furthermore, as Hobsbawm accepts, with France sliding towards revolutionary dictatorship, the 1793 constitution was an ‘academic’ document, which in reality

amounted to an assertion that the state knew what the people wanted and what would be best for them. The constitution's suspension in October 1793 would mark a long tradition in France for the state to veer towards totalising, nationalistic populism. And as Hobsbawm notes, it would only be in the twentieth century that humanity would come to realise the true horror of total mobilisation for the greatness of the state, which was pioneered in revolutionary France (see *ibid.*, 67). During the French Revolution, the French state began to embrace a culture of individual rights, but ultimately fell back on a deeply engrained tradition of aristocratic command. As Wolin puts it, France has a "long-standing and traditional *étatiste* political model, which one can trace back to the absolutist reign of Louis XIV", noting the model's "centralizing and hierarchical organizational mentality" (2010, 359). Through this model, a paternalistic notion of the need to oversee communal harmony often trumps the movement towards individuation and free association. Tocqueville was acutely aware of the French state's enduring tendency towards paternalism, bemoaning in 1856 a French administrative system that is "always better aware of the citizen's interests than the citizen himself" (in *ibid.*, 52).

Commenting on the power of authorities in 1960s France, Wolin notes that "the situation had changed very little since Tocqueville's day", suggesting that the French establishment organised society in a hugely bureaucratic and strictly hierarchical way, with a "marked aversion to participatory decision making" (*ibid.*, 52). France's tendencies towards autocracy had nearly led in the late 1950s to a military coup, with only the return of the "Republican autocrat" General Charles de Gaulle staving off a military dictatorship (*ibid.*, 40–42). For Wolin, de Gaulle's return was part of a "time-honoured cycle of French political culture: the oscillation between revolutionary upsurge and autocracy" (*ibid.*). While de Gaulle had strong popular support, for the student youth in France in the 1960s, the culture of establishment authoritarianism that de Gaulle oversaw was becoming increasingly at odds with the "cultural modernization" of which the French youth were a part (*ibid.*, 50). While the new affluent society promised change, Wolin notes that France was still dominated by "a smug coterie of elites [that] monopolized the corridors of power as well as the venues of cultural prestige" (*ibid.*, 51). France's higher education system reflected the traditionalist emphasis on order and duty. It was strictly controlled, carefully designed to churn out respectable citizens who could contribute towards the greater good of the nation-state: Wolin refers to its "Napoleonic centralization" and its "didactic and austere" teaching that "discouraged creativity and individual initiative" precisely at a time when these notions were becoming more pertinent. With "broader cultural trends [encouraging] immoderation and the joys of immediate gratification" (*ibid.*), France faced another moment of self-emancipatory zeal building up beneath the cork of establishment conservatism. It is this periodic rise in bubbling tension that creates what Van Herpen, as we saw earlier, calls France's *champagne effect*. French activists in the 1960s and 1970s would produce some of the era's most influential movements and ideas pointing towards radical notions of self and social emancipation precisely because they

were fighting so hard to force the unyielding institutions of their nation-state to flex under the weight of their oppositional force.

While it was the workers in France who in 1968 escalated the struggle to the level of national crisis and potential revolution, as we have seen, they initially followed the students' lead. And while the workers' ideological agenda differed from that of the students', they indirectly followed a middle-class notion of social change by fervently seeking out material and social enrichment. While workers were willing to put extreme pressure on their inflexible government with strikes that might force through new deals on pay and working conditions, as Wolin (2010) points out, rather than instigate a revolution, "French workers were quite content to enjoy the fruits of post-war affluence: *les trente glorieuses*, or the thirty glorious years" (19).⁷ Wolin also notes that because of a move towards a post-industrial society, the labouring working class was losing its pre-eminence as a political and economic force in post-war France, and there was a corresponding rise in "salaried employees (*salariés*)", consisting of "white collar workers and middle managers" (ibid., 27). The working classes, then, were drifting towards a middle-class work environment. So, while the gap between students and workers that was prevalent during 1968 would not be bridged in the post-1968 era, both groups shared in a liberalist notion of aspiration, only different positions in the social and/or class hierarchy drove each group towards different interpretations of aspiration. While the students along with the wider bourgeois avant-garde, who took for granted a certain level of social privilege, strove towards radical forms of cultural and 'spiritual' enrichment, the working classes strove towards the basic material and social enrichment associated with middle-class status. Commenting on radical leftism in France in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Wolin notes that "one of the main ironies of the gauchiste is that while economically privileged student radicals increasingly identified with the working class, the French workers' main objective was to accede to the ranks of the middle class" (ibid., 353).

In this chapter, I have explored France's strained relationship to liberalist individuation within a wider Western context of Anglo-Saxon hegemony. In 1981, the French people finally elected a left-wing President, François Mitterrand, in the post-1968 period. With links to radical activists from the 1968 era, Mitterrand's Socialist administration attempted to implement a radical nationalisation programme, but after two years it reversed its course and followed the economic liberalisation agenda being pushed forward by Reagan and Thatcher. This move exemplifies the history of French political culture since 1789: it is a culture caught in the West's Anglo-Saxon-led liberalist flow while never being quite sure what to make of it – it part rejects it, part radicalises it, and part embraces it, to greater or lesser degrees, depending on the historical moment. The contradictory attitude towards liberalism was exemplified again in 2001, when Jospin's Socialist government backed the Tobin Tax on foreign exchange and championed the principle of wealth redistribution (as promoted by anti-capitalist demonstrators), while at the same time implementing its own programme of neoliberal privatisation (Callinicos, 2003, 89–90). French governments persistently try to resist

liberalist individualisation through a republican culture of solidarity that remains rooted in aristocratic paternalism. However, they continually struggle to do so, because, in truth, France is caught in the same contradiction as the Anglo-Saxon countries are – the burgeoning of the liberalist ethos in France produces civil society association and democratisation, but the possessive and power-seeking tendencies of individualised citizens continuously threaten democracy. In reaction against this individualism the French state falls back on its paternalistic regulation, and as it overcompensates in order to enforce ‘democratic order’, it stifles the associational, self-emancipatory movements on which democratic life is dependent. Inevitably, state mediation remains tentative and uncertain, and liberalist impulses burst forth to drive society to increasing contradiction.

Notes

- 1 In any case, while Anglo-Saxon utilitarian logic has been used to justify laissez-faire economics, its calculative coldness could just as easily be applied to continental traditions of strong, non-liberal nation-states that pursue all sorts of terrible means in the name of some greater good. As Bourq himself concedes, France has been guilty of utilising this type of logic through its revolutionary traditions.
- 2 See World Values Survey, ‘Findings and Insights’: “emancipative values establish a *civic form of modern individualism* that favours out-group trust and cosmopolitan orientations towards others” (emphasis in original).
- 3 Americans were just as likely as French respondents to say they were active members of “environmental organisations”. The only type of voluntary organisation that French respondents were more likely to be active members of was “sport or recreation organisations”.
- 4 While Ferguson ultimately pushes a rightist interpretation of 1960s youth struggle, oversimplifying it into a purely social or personalising revolution, his analysis of the influence of American consumerism and American fashion is very insightful.
- 5 See *ibid.*, 127–129, on the anti-authoritarianism of Samuel Gorton and Roger Williams and their role in the founding of Rhode Island, and the role played by other non-conformists in laying foundations for New Hampshire.
- 6 See Billias (2009). Billias notes that the extent of American influence on the French Revolution is a controversial topic, and many scholars have sought to downplay the influence. The point here is not to deny an independent human rights tradition in France, but to emphasise that the American example clearly set the tone of the era and was the preeminent reference point for the National Constituent Assembly.
- 7 For a relevant aside on post-war working-class culture before the rise of neoliberalism, see Sandbrook (2012). Specifically, Sandbrook makes some insightful links between the leftist militancy of British workers in the 1970s and their pragmatic ambitions within the context of the rise of consumer society.

Deleuze and Guattari

Self-emancipatory philosophy in the '68 era

If it can be said that two individuals managed to encapsulate the insurrectionary energy of May 1968 in France, then those individuals are surely Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. May '68 was a seminal moment in their lives; indeed, it was the events of May that brought the two together. As Dosse (2010) notes, the two men had very different lives, and it was perhaps only through the shock of May, through this “founding rupture” (170), that the two could reach each other and begin such a productive partnership. In 1968, Deleuze was an established philosopher, Guattari a “militant psychoanalyst” working at La Borde Psychiatric clinic (ibid., 1). Jean-Pierre Muyard became a doctor at La Borde in 1966. Although he was a medical student, he had also taken sociology courses at the Lyon University Humanities Division, and he kept in touch with friends at the Division who had been taught by Deleuze. Through this connection, Muyard and Deleuze became friends (ibid., 2). In 1969, Muyard arranged for Deleuze and Guattari to meet, hoping that Guattari could channel his relentless activist energy into something new (although Deleuze and Guattari had exchanged letters and ideas in the spring of 1969, before they had met; ibid., 4). The year 1969 was a formative one for both Deleuze and Guattari. Guattari had been a committed Lacanian thinker, but with his 1969 lecture ‘Machine and Structure’, Guattari challenged the structuralist paradigm represented by Lacan. Deleuze too was at a turning point. By 1969, philosophy was under serious attack from structuralism, and particularly Lacanian thinking, being as it was “at the vanguard of structuralism” (ibid., 3). Deleuze’s 1968 and 1969 publications *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense* (see 1994 and 1993) sought to respond to this challenge by addressing psychoanalytic questions, and in ‘Machine and Structure’, Guattari drew from the perspective developed in these two texts. Both Deleuze and Guattari, then, had a vested interest in meeting each other, with Deleuze keen to discuss psychoanalysis and learn more about psychiatric practice, and Guattari looking to develop his philosophical challenge to psychoanalysis.

By 1971, Deleuze and Guattari had worked through their ideas together and were on the verge of publishing *Anti-Oedipus*, which would represent a definitive break from Lacanian psychoanalysis. The great Lacan himself got wind of the news that Deleuze and Guattari were on the verge of publishing a book that might

pose challenging questions for his psychoanalytic paradigm. Worried, he began to make concerted efforts to court Guattari, his former loyal follower (who Lacan had always kept at arm's length), and he also tried to meet with Deleuze (but Deleuze did not trust him). Finally, Guattari met with Lacan at a classy restaurant on the quays of the Seine, with Lacan hoping that Guattari would clarify to what extent his upcoming book would take Guattari in a radically different direction. When they met, Guattari was upfront about the ideas that would be found in *Anti-Oedipus*, expecting a backlash from his former master. Instead, Lacan was affable, but he gently encouraged Guattari to reconsider the tone of the book. Unfortunately for Lacan, his one-time disciple was having none of it:

But it was too late. Something had been destroyed. Maybe it had always been broken between us. And then, had he ever had access to anyone or ever truly spoken to anyone? He'd established himself as a despotic signifier and maybe he'd long ago condemned himself to irremediable solitude?

(Guattari, journal entry, October 6th, 1971; in Dosse, 2010, 184)

When Lacan left Guattari that evening, Lacan suggested he was reassured, and seemed to think that he could still bring Guattari back on side. But Lacan would soon learn the true extent of Deleuze and Guattari's attack on Lacanian thinking, and Guattari and Lacan would never meet again (*ibid.*, 185). No series of events could more potently represent the critical rupture between the philosophy of symbolic structure and the philosophy of deterritorialising desire. It is the deterritorialising ethos of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy that this chapter shall explore.

Commenting on his collaboration with Deleuze, Guattari (1972) emphasised that the political context profoundly shaped their interactions, stating; "at the outset, it was less a matter of sharing a common understanding than sharing the sum of our uncertainties and even a certain discomfort and confusion with respect to the way that May 1968 had turned out" (*in ibid.*, 8). What emerged out of their shared uncertainties was a philosophy that tapped into the spontaneous energy and anti-authoritarian tendencies of the May movement; a philosophy that essentialised free-flowing desire and alienated overriding structures and powers. At the same time, as suggested, the philosophy was a reaction against the reification of structure within the academies. I discussed in the last chapter the idea that the distinct intensity and revolutionary nature of French student and worker protests in 1968 were a result of a sudden release of pent-up frustrations; a mighty reaction against the tendency of the French system to become increasingly hardened and inflexible. Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of desire runs along the same lines of flight as the social-activist reaction of 1968, for while students and workers reacted against the bureaucratic and conservative French system on the ground, Deleuze and Guattari reacted against totalising systems of thought from within the intellectual establishment, developing their philosophy of schizo breaks from structure at the zenith of structuralism within the academies. But Deleuze and Guattari were not alone here. As Hardt points out (2006), in his desperation to pry himself away from the French

philosophical establishment of the era, Deleuze turned to Nietzsche, as did “many French philosophers of Deleuze’s generation – including Michel Foucault, Pierre Klossowski, and Jacques Derrida” (xi). Nietzsche’s philosophy of will offered a radical escape from the dominant “legitimate” philosophy of “pure reason” and “sovereign judgement” (see Massumi, 1992, 1).

The Nietzschean authors of Deleuze’s generation looked to Nietzsche “in part as a kind of provocation” (Hardt, 2006, xi). They were especially keen on provoking a reaction against Hegelian dialectics: “Deleuze once remarked that his generation was characterised by a generalized anti-Hegelianism” (ibid.). For Deleuze, in opposition to Hegel, “Nietzsche’s philosophy . . . forms an absolute anti-dialectics” (in ibid.). He suggests that Hegelian dialectics epitomise State philosophy, setting up extreme contradictions that can only be overcome by the reestablishment of order and the unfolding of reason. Deleuze rejected the idea that difference could be reduced to dialectical opposition; as we shall explore further, difference for Deleuze was inextricably linked to the openness of the Nietzschean will, which cannot be reduced to a binary structure. By embracing a will of pure difference, Deleuze and Guattari found a way to make the human being’s limitless potential immanent and common rather than transcendent and exclusive.

In his Foreword to the English translation (2006 [1983]) of Deleuze’s *Nietzsche et la philosophie* (1962), Michael Hardt (co-author of *Empire*) suggests that the three most important concepts Deleuze draws from Nietzsche are the intimately related “multiplicity, becoming, and affirmation” (ix). Nietzsche’s famous proclamation that ‘God is dead’ is key here, for it is an announcement of Nietzsche’s rejection of the notion that all difference can be reduced to a primary identity or ordering principle. For Nietzsche, our will does not drive us to find our true selves, but drives us to continually reinvent ourselves:

Nietzsche proposes the will to power as a perpetual motor that produces differences. What the will wills is difference. The will to power is a machine of multiplicities.

(ibid.)

Becoming emerges through the willing of *multiplicity*; being is the process of becoming – the multiplying becomings, the differentiating becomings. Acts of becoming are *affirmations*, and here Deleuze finds an ethics in Nietzsche’s work, for he argues we should live through embracing our will so as to affirm our being (ibid., x). An affirmation is an active force because it is a creative force that produces new states of being. On the other hand, there are reactive forces that produce nothing, which Nietzsche relates to *ressentiment* and bad conscience. Deleuze considers how in Nietzsche’s work, the “master mentality” is a “purely active” force; it is a positive force because it is premised on autonomy and self-creation, on the creation of the “good” (a non-value-laden term here), whereas its negation of the other (the “evil” other) is “merely secondary” (ibid.). In contrast, the “slave mentality” is “purely reactive”; it is a negative force because it is

premised on negativity – it begins with “you are evil”, and only then proceeds to “therefore I am good”. An authoritarian figure rules through *ressentiment* and bad conscience and is therefore not a master at all, but a reactionary “man-slave” (ibid. xvi). That is to say, he is utterly dependent on the productive forces of creative, living beings, and can only live by controlling and feeding off their life forces.

Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche is idiosyncratic, to say the least. As Hardt asks, “How do we square, then, Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche with the numerous other readings that emphasize Nietzsche’s aristocratic nature, his anti-Semitism, his misogyny, and his reactionary politics?” (ibid., xii). For Hardt, Deleuze has a deliberately selective interpretation of Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘will to power’ and joyful domination. Hardt notes that, in much of his work, Deleuze focuses on one particular philosophical figure of importance to him, whether it be Spinoza, Hume, or Kant etc. But Deleuze is not interested in finding the ‘true’ Hume etc.; he is interested in bringing out what he considers to be the positive ethos lurking in the works of the philosophers, so as to construct a different version of the modern European philosophical tradition. So, as Hardt notes, if, for example, Spinoza was a misogynist, for Deleuze this does not taint or corrupt his philosophy; in the act of selection, this detail can simply be ignored, while the positive, productive energy of the philosophy is embraced: “He concentrates on what interests him most, what is active and living in each philosopher” (ibid.). We should note that, for Deleuze, his interpretation of a philosopher is not simply based on arbitrary subjective selection, nor is it about being deliberately unfaithful to a philosopher’s work. Deleuze might claim that his interpretations of philosophers are “faithful and precise”, for he seeks out the positive essence of a philosopher’s work, bringing out what for the philosophers themselves may have been mixed with culturally shaped negativity or reactionaryness: “[Deleuze] will declare confidently and without qualification what is the essence of Spinoza’s thought or what is Bergson’s fundamental idea” (ibid.). And for Hardt, Deleuze “isolates the heart of Nietzsche’s work and carries it forward” (ibid., xiii), the suggestion being that Nietzsche’s supposedly affirmative contempt for, say, democracy or women, was in fact in contradiction with his own philosophy; a philosophy which emphasised that hatred for certain classes or groups was often based on *ressentiment*, on a reactionary desire to stifle productive life forces: “in this sense Deleuze is indeed true to Nietzsche’s thought, perhaps even more so than Nietzsche himself was” (ibid.).

Deleuze himself argues that “Nietzsche’s posthumous fate” has been tarnished by his association with fascist thinking and over-violent yearnings in general, adding that “it is perhaps in England that Nietzsche has been most misunderstood” (2006 [1983], xv). Nietzsche was very much a continental philosopher, and (like Deleuze himself) reacted against the heavyweights of the established continental canon – French rationalism and German dialectics, heavyweights that “have never been of central importance to English thought” (ibid.). Rather politely (being conscious of the fact that he is addressing English readers in his

Preface to the English translation of *Nietzsche et la philosophie*), Deleuze notes that because of the Anglo-Saxon philosophical traditions of empiricism and pragmatism, the English had little need to seriously address Nietzsche's theoretical attack on continental philosophy's negative command mentality, so that his influence in England was restricted to literature; his influence was "emotional" rather than "philosophical" (ibid.). In a backhanded compliment, Deleuze states that Nietzsche, "one of the greatest philosophers of the nineteenth century", developed, like the English, an "empiricism and pragmatism", but that Nietzsche's is "very special" and runs "counter" to the English's "'good sense'" (ibid.). The implication here is that the English have developed rather superficial theoretical traditions exploring experience and grounded being, which have blinded the English to Nietzsche's ability to tap into the productive essence of being or will. Indeed, Nietzsche, commenting on the very Anglo-Saxon utilitarian tradition, suggested that only the English are obsessed with generating "happiness", which he considered a very weak measure of fulfilment, while Nietzsche himself was interested in fulfilment through force and greatness (see Anomaly, 2005).

Nevertheless, in recognising the emotional effect Nietzsche's thought could have on Anglo-Saxon thinkers, Deleuze is drawn to Anglo-Saxon radicalism. He was interested in the way that Anglo-Saxon literature often expresses an immanentist, barrier-breaking, schizophrenic energy: "a limitless process, a constantly reiterated ability to transgress limits, to carry out a release" (Dosse, 2010, 199). There is Thomas Hardy, whose Naturalist works were informed by his deist-spiritual metaphysical worldview, which replaced a personal god with the notion of the 'unconscious will of the Universe' – a conceptualisation not unrelated to the Spinozian one that so inspired Deleuze; there is D.H. Lawrence's embrace of the body over the mind; there is the searing personality imbued within the elusive symbolism and intertextuality of Malcolm Lowry's work; there are the surrealist works of Henry Miller, in which the imagined becomes as Real as actual experience; there are Allen Ginsberg's vivid depictions of America's desire-driven yearnings as against its stifling institutions; and there are Jack Kerouac's spontaneous outpourings that feed off the dynamism and chaos of life:

The only people for me are the mad ones, the ones who are mad to live, mad to talk, mad to be saved, desirous of everything at the same time, the ones who never yawn or say a commonplace thing, but burn, burn, burn.

(2000 [1957], Sal, Chapter 1)

As Dosse notes, the aforementioned authors embraced the flows of life that they experienced emanating from within and without: "[they] all carried the world within themselves and could be delusional; they could break their moorings and scramble codes to facilitate the flux" (2010, 199). Ultimately, as suggested in the last chapter, 'moderate' Anglo-Saxon traditions, including some strands of empiricism and pragmatism, represent only a 'respectable' foreground to deep traditions of immanentist, self-emancipatory radicalism.

Deleuze argues that “Nietzsche is most misunderstood in relation to the question of power” (2006, xvii). Deleuze suggests that Nietzsche’s primary concern is with the dynamics of forces that shape “phenomena, things, organisms, societies, consciousness and spirits” (ibid., xvi), and that it is only with an understanding of a notion of an interplay of forces that one can understand what Nietzsche means by the ‘will to power’. For Deleuze, “every time we interpret will to power as ‘wanting or seeking power’ we encounter platitudes which have nothing to do with Nietzsche’s thought” (ibid., xvii). Deleuze suggests that an affirmative force, as a productive force, is a power in itself – it does not need power over other forces to be a power. Nevertheless, power relations emerge out of the confrontation between forces; a dominant power comes into being when an affirmative force is overwhelmed by another affirmative force, each force striving simply to be. As a force becomes established, it becomes a total or a whole, and as it does so it loses its power of propagation in multiplicity, and begins to persist through repetitive loops that exclude and inhibit other affirmative forces. From this perspective, then, the interactions of force of wills inadvertently lead into power relations, and as these relations become established, the active will increasingly become lost, with the power of multiplicity constrained by overarching domination:

Power is therefore not what the will wants, but on the contrary, the one that wants in the will. And ‘to want or seek power’ is only the lowest degree of the will to power, its negative form, the guise it assumes when reactive forces prevail in the state of things.

(ibid.)

Deleuze suggests that Nietzsche knew that superficial interpretations of his philosophy would lead people to view him as a very dangerous, power-mad thinker. Deleuze argues that Nietzsche reveals his understanding of these potential reactions when he sets up the “ape” against Zarathustra in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (see 1978). Zarathustra’s ape has learned to copy what Zarathustra says. This ‘buffoon’ warns Zarathustra not to enter a city, as he will find there only feeble, small-minded people. But Zarathustra has no time for his double, for the double despises the small people for all the wrong reasons: the ape despises them because they do not admire his supposed greatness – they do not submit to his ‘power’. For Deleuze, the ape is therefore symbolic of the “prophet” or the “fascist”, being reactionary; he reacts against those who do not conform or submit to his notion of right or truth. Zarathustra himself cares only for his self-affirmations, with what he himself can be, and does not worry himself with what other people think of him. Zarathustra despises only in the sense of refusing to allow other forces to stand in his way – he loves his will and follows it, and when he encounters others who might try to inhibit his love for his will, he simply moves on and carries on: “where one can no longer love, one should – *pass by!*” (Chapter 51, ‘On Passing-By’).

Furthermore, for Deleuze, rather than embracing nihilism, Nietzsche defines it “in terms of the triumph of reactive forces or the negative in the will to power”

(2006, xviii–xix). The reactive forces have nothing to affirm; they can only destroy the multiplicity of life through their drive to control life forces and fix them into place. The ‘*Übermensch*’ (which Deleuze translates as ‘Overman’, not liking the connotations of ‘superman’), like Zarathustra, overcomes nihilism with his transformative power, with his will to affirm, to become, and become, and become. The Overman, then, is the “transhistoric element of man” (ibid., xix), which is constantly making the future with becomings.

Despite Deleuze’s attempts to extract from Nietzsche an embrace of the immanent world in the becoming of multiplicity, through his attempt to live through his will to power, “Nietzsche grew progressively more isolated to the point of madness” (Seem, 1984, xxiii). For Deleuze and Guattari, this would be largely because, like the schizophrenic who has made a radical break from power, Nietzsche was forced to detach himself from the social body of control that is constantly trying to stifle the types of free-flowing, deterritorialised affirmations he was trying to make. However, I would argue that there is more to it than that. I suggest that in his ferocious reaction against the overbearing continental command mentality, Nietzsche was bringing out his self-centred will-power. He was driven to isolation, then, to a large extent because he placed his self at the centre of his world; he explored the world as an autonomous unit, as a lone wolf, empowering himself through his freedom to roam.

Furthermore, the belief in a will or nature of pure potential or pure multiplicity is not at all at odds with a centred self. Indeed, I suggest that such a belief results from a rampant self that turns its own desire on itself. In Chapter 1, I suggested that idealist thinkers yearn for a self that is so free that it cannot be held back even by itself, and I suggest here that immanentist thinkers like Nietzsche push even further in their self-emancipatory radicalism. The idealist radicals accept that they start out as a self, limited by their selves and centred on their selves, and break out from there. But the immanentist radicals, in living through a rampant will-power, cannot stomach the idea of starting out in any way limited by the organisation of a self. As a result, their self turns on the very idea of itself, willing itself away in its yearnings for absolute freedom to be.

Deleuze attempts to qualify Nietzsche’s conceptualisation of the Overman as a Borgia, a Jesuit and a member of the Prussian Officer Corps, arguing that such conceptualisations are not an indication of Nietzsche’s proto-fascism. Yet at the same time, Deleuze suggests that such conceptualisations allow Nietzsche to directly express thought as experience and movement (2006, xix). This means, surely, that the way in which Nietzsche is inspired by ruthless, power-grasping individuals, groups, and movements reveals much about Nietzsche’s ethos or tendency and the intimacy between the will to dominate and the Overman. I argue that ultimately, Nietzsche unleashes the contradiction of will-power. In the first instance, Nietzsche attempts to embrace a raw self-centred will-power that underlies both being-over and being-with desire. The Overman who embraces such a will is more or less indifferent to others, for first and foremost, in loving his will, he loves himself. Nevertheless, as he affirms his forces, capacities, and/or powers

through the world, the Overman begins to overwhelm or trample on other forces, capacities, and/or powers that get in his way. As he does so, the Overman begins to bring out being-over and being-with desires from his will-power, enriching his sense of self in various ways in the process. The Overman is becoming a contradictory self-emancipatory being: both zealously domineering and competitive and highly curious and sensitive in his interactions with other will-powers in the world (on contradiction in Nietzsche, see Cybulska, 2011).

Ultimately, as Seem suggests, *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari's seminal text, "is not a purely Nietzschean undertaking" (1984, xix). While Nietzsche was drawn to the idea of a lone superman taking on the world with his life-force, Deleuze and Guattari sought to take Nietzsche's raw will-power and bring it out through being-with desires. In doing so, they insisted on the essentially connective nature of human being, with human desire producing ever-new connections between beings. The human being is "the being who is in intimate contact with the profound life of all forms or all types of beings" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, 4), and the revolutionary schizophrenic Man, rather than cut off, becomes inextricably intertwined with the "machines of the universe", with the beings of "animals, vegetables and minerals" (Laing, 1971, in Seem, 1984, xxii). For Deleuze and Guattari, "everything is a machine . . . celestial machines, the stars or rainbows in the sky, alpine machines – all of them connected to [the schizophrenic's] body" (1984, 2). The body of the human being is ultimately itself made up of machines, for its organic agglomerations constitute desiring-machines, which produce links and flows amongst the machinic arrangements, or the component parts, of the material universe. The human being, then, is only a collection of natural matter within a network of natural matter through which energies or intensities flow, and so humans can take nature into themselves; they can be nature, so that the human and nature are one and the same, each a movement within the other, all a part of the process of desiring-production. The human being need not be preoccupied with finding its 'true' identity or its code of life, for it can free itself by embracing itself as "*Homo natura*", thereby dispersing itself amongst the uncoded flows of the man-nature universe (ibid., 33). Ultimately, for Deleuze and Guattari, a human being has no central identity to fall back on because as its desiring-machines open up to the flows of the natural world, they are constantly altered by new integrations and are broken up and reformed in new ways, producing a series of states of being or becomings.

Deleuze and Guattari's vision of desiring nature artistically gave expression to the left-libertarian utopianism of the 1968 era. They imagined a social world emerging out of a primordial realm of spontaneously developing connections. In this world, there was no basic will to have power, nor even a basic selfishness, because the constantly developing connections of natural machinic production opened out the agglomerations of matter of beings to the other beings of the world, rather than closed them down on themselves. In this world, then, social life could be organised freely without collapsing into competition and hierarchy, and there was no need for an overriding power that would institute 'justice' and

protect individuals from the ‘savagery’ of natural existence. All people needed was the freedom simply *to be*, and with this freedom they could produce a social world of horizontal connections.

In *Anti-Oedipus*, however, Deleuze and Guattari didn’t just represent a left-libertarian utopia; they also represented the libertarian struggle against the establishment forces of power. In the book, human desire is presented as a force which is constantly being repressed and structured by the social order, which develops rules and codes to rein in desiring-production. While desire is constantly breaking out towards its free-flowing, productive potential, thereby deterritorialising or breaking open the social order, the social order persistently attempts to counteract the deterritorialising tendency with its reterritorialisations. In doing so, it re-establishes order with evolving codes that contain desiring-production within the order’s segregating identities, such as ethnic, national, and individualised identities. For Deleuze and Guattari, however, under the social order of capitalism, reterritorialisations continually fail to hold back the deterritorialising tendency (see 1984, 33–35). This idea of the social order’s failing struggle to counteract the deterritorialising tendency ties in closely with Hardt and Negri’s vision of the emergence of the multitude’s democracy – as we saw in Chapter 1, Hardt and Negri imagine a system of control that can only react to the constituent process of the multitude, with the system always compromising and always in retreat against a common emancipatory force. Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the development in the direction of ever-greater deterritorialisation is “an irreversible process” (*ibid.*, 321).

Deleuze and Guattari gave their breakthrough book the name *Anti-Oedipus* because they were opposed to psychoanalysis’s ‘Oedipalization’ of desire, reacting against the attempt to structure desire through the familial complex. As alluded to earlier, in particular they were opposed to the structuralist psychoanalysis of Lacan, which occupied a strong position in the world of ‘legitimate’ philosophy at the time. Even so, Guattari had begun his journey towards *Anti-Oedipus* as a Lacanian psychiatrist. Guattari began working at La Borde Psychiatric Clinic in the mid-1950s, where he helped to develop the Institutional Psychotherapy that would place La Borde at the cutting edge of the French avant-garde world. The clinic’s founder, Jean Oury, was a Lacanian analyst, and Guattari was one of Lacan’s early disciples, but the ethos nurtured at La Borde began to break away from Freudian-Lacanian thinking (Massumi, 1992, 2).

The notion of group fantasy that would be elaborated on in *Anti-Oedipus* has its origins in Guattari’s practices at La Borde (Dosse, 2010, 4–5), which involved trying to break down the traditional hierarchy of doctor and patient. Doctors and patients were encouraged to contribute to a group process in which all would share their experiences and together build a shared notion of their repression and liberation. At La Borde, interactions were designed to “open onto fundamental relations of a metaphysical kind that *bring out* the most radical and basic alienations of madness or neurosis” and channel madness towards revolutionary action (Guattari, 1955, in Massumi, 1992, 2–3, emphasis in original). Guattari was the

driving force behind the institution's split from Lacanian psychoanalysis, pushing it "from Institutional Psychotherapy to the limits of antipsychiatry" (Dosse, 2010, 176). Deleuze and Guattari wanted to dethrone the psychoanalyst, who had established for himself a position of great power as the authority on healing and 'healthy' development, the expert on hidden or repressed truths, and the gate-keeper on access into the symbolic order of society. As noted at the beginning of the chapter, Guattari would come to see Lacan himself as an established 'despotic signifier'.

Deleuze and Guattari were opposed to the way in which Lacan buried the affects of the unconscious beneath a symbolic structure. Rather than think of the unconscious as buried, Deleuze thought of the unconscious as always present, as always driving our life forward. Psychoanalysis was repressive in the way it attempted to set up a "preconscious" system of signification, which, in the establishment of central meaning and systemic order, would inhibit the multiplicities created by the unconscious's desiring-production: "What do we do with the unconscious itself, if not reduce it explicitly to an empty form where desire itself is absent and evacuated?" (Deleuze, in Dosse, 2010, 196). Deleuze and Guattari were deeply opposed to the way in which Lacanian psychoanalysis created an unconscious that was structured like a language; to the way in which it created a system of signification that contained an infinite Real within an overlaid framework. Lacanian thinking, then, was suffocating the immanent Real of desiring-production beneath a transcendent symbolic order. Here Lacanian psychoanalysis was building on Freud's reaction against the affirmations of the unconscious – Freud exposed the unconscious then recoiled from it in conservative bourgeois fear of its subversive potential.

Deleuze and Guattari explain that psychoanalysis made the "great discovery . . . of the productions of desire, of the productions of the unconscious" (1984, 24). However, they suggest that once psychoanalysis put forward Oedipus as a developmental concept – once it reduced the productions of the unconscious to the familial complex and a pervasive father figure – it buried the unconscious "beneath a new brand of idealism" (ibid.). The unconscious, a factory of limitless production, became merely represented as classical theatre; it became a tragic, fanciful version of what it really was. To the contrary, Deleuze and Guattari promoted a "materialist psychiatry", which contends that the process of production of the unconscious is "the only real" (ibid.). They suggest that rather than facing up to the fact that the psychoanalytical repression and "distortion" of the unconscious may itself be causing neurotic and psychotic problems (ibid., 49), psychoanalysis demands that the mentally ill conform to its notion of healthy development. It regards the insane as those who have not come to terms with "the parental complex", normalising self-punishment in the process by linking it to the 'inevitable' guilt we feel for having courted the Oedipus complex. Psychoanalysis, then, creates a hidden 'dirty' truth out of our instincts, or a monster out of our unconscious. In doing so, it creates an intolerable desiring Real that must be buried, thereby "taking part in the work of bourgeois repression"

(*ibid.*, 50). In encouraging a rising above our unconscious yearnings, psychoanalysis normalises castration, reinforcing a bourgeois asceticism of self-denial. And in the maintenance of the order of castration, psychoanalysis makes paternal oversight key to the symbolic order. It insists that those who wish to function healthily in society must accept castration in the form of subjection to “a father-substitute” (see Freud, 1964, 250–252) – an authority figure who will watch over you and enforce the culture of self-denial.

In rejecting the idea that desire must be reined in or even cut off, Deleuze and Guattari attempt to flip the “traditional logic of desire”, which they argue develops from Plato and compels us to see desire as essentially a lack: “a lack of the real object” (1984, 25). Following in this tradition, psychoanalysis views desire as the production of mere fantasies, as the production of “imaginary objects”. In this tradition, corporeal desire is defined by a basic inadequacy, and becomes sublimated into a ‘spiritual’ longing for a higher-level object that is always somewhat out of reach from the position of our base existence. However, Deleuze and Guattari contend that corporeal desire has no inadequacy or is not lacking anything, for it produces a proliferating series of becomings and connections within the immanence of the man-nature universe of desiring-machines. Desire does not need to be funnelled towards the realisation of an ideal object in order to make something meaningful or real. For Deleuze and Guattari, what desire produces is absolutely adequate and fully Real, with even desire’s delusions and hallucinations being intensities that are affecting and effective and therefore Real. Desiring-production, then, constitutes “the Real in and of itself” (*ibid.*, 27).

Despite Deleuze and Guattari’s criticisms of Lacanian psychoanalysis, it is nevertheless true that Lacan helped push structuralism to its limit. As Dosse suggests, Deleuze and Guattari embraced “a Lacanian breakthrough allowing for a schizophrenic flux able to subvert the field of psychoanalysis” (2010, 195). Lacan hinted at the schizophrenic route that Deleuze and Guattari would take because rather than reify the notion of an overarching system of interrelation and order, Lacan was interested in the “lack in the signifying chain”, the deviations within the system of signification that relate to the elusive unconscious. Deleuze was not schooled in Freud and Lacan in the way Guattari was, but in *Difference and Repetition* (first published in French 1968) and *The Logic of Sense* (first published in French 1969), Deleuze attempted to fuse the history of ‘illegitimate’ philosophy with the contemporary theory of psychoanalysis that was so prominent at the time (see Massumi, 1992, 2). In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze drew from Lacan’s notion of the object *o*, the partial object. Deleuze links partial objects to Freud’s notion of partial drives, drives which need not correlate with real life events but which burst out as if from nowhere. Deleuze could take inspiration from the Lacanian model of an unconscious Real that could never truly be contained by the symbolic order, and in the notion of the partial object he found a basic component of desiring-production; rudimentary agglomerations of matter with only limited structural order, which could be tiny parts in a constantly shifting wider agglomeration through which intensities flow. Partial objects were brought out by Deleuze and Guattari to become

the immanent “molecular functions of the unconscious” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, 324). They became the basic elements within the “productive synthesis” of desire (ibid., 5), wherein continuous flows are coupled with partial objects which draw off or interrupt part of this flow (or “energy machines” become coupled with “organ-machines”, ibid., 1), producing a “partial object-flow connective synthesis” (ibid., 6). There is no goal or end to which this synthesis is striving; there is only the creative process, the process of production, of “producing production” (ibid. 7), of producing multiplicity.

For Deleuze and Guattari, then, the human being does not set out as an organism, tightly structured as a coherent whole for itself. It does not even set out as a loose collection of organs, with each organ a self-contained whole. It sets out through “organs-partial objects” (ibid., 326). Such objects do not have the specific roles of organs, but are just simple organic bits – not bits of a whole, not pieces in a jigsaw, but just bits. Just bits that can accumulate and connect and link flows in limitless ways: “partial objects are not the expression of a fragmented, shattered organism, which would presuppose a destroyed totality or the freed parts of a whole” (ibid.). The organs-partial objects begin to develop the human being as they open out to the organic matter of the human body and the matter of the wider world. As they do so, they connect the human being to *the body without organs*. Deleuze developed the concept of the body without organs from the ideas of the schizophrenically inclined Antonin Artaud (Dosse, 2010, 190). As the organs-partial objects of the schizophrenic radical connect in undirected ways with the matter of the world, they become part of a wider body of desiring-machines. The radical’s organs-partial objects connect with each other and with other objects and stimuli in the development of shifting bodily agglomerations, churning out new desiring-productions in a proliferating mess of seemingly irrational creations; strange trains of thought, expressions, delusions, etc. The radical becomes capable of limitless modifications to their human body and being as they produce themselves as a supple supermolecular individual – a body without organs – drawing in and off the energies and partial objects of the cosmos as they pass from one state of being to another: “No mouth No tongue No teeth No Larynx No oesophagus No stomach No belly No anus I will reconstruct the man that I am” (Artaud, in ibid.).

In its radical form, then, the body without organs is an extension of the simple bits that constitute the organs-partial objects. It is an addition to the agglomerations of partial objects that are always connecting outwards with new matter. It is a “whole” of matter, but not a unifying or totalising whole; it is added to the organs-partial objects “like a new, really distinct part” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, 326), and the body without organs and the organs-partial objects “are opposed conjointly to the organism” (ibid.). Ultimately,

The organs-partial objects and the body without organs are at bottom one and the same thing . . . partial objects are the direct powers of the body without organs and the body without organs, the raw material of the partial objects.

(ibid.)

Together, they are the “two material elements of the schizophrenic desiring-machines” (*ibid.*, 327), the body without organs constituting the material agglomeration within which the organs-partial objects, as the constituent parts, connect and produce multiplicity.

Deleuze and Guattari seem to suggest that the human being is forged through a biological essence of plasticity, setting out as a super-supple individual, or as Massumi suggests, an oozing mess of “muck” (see 1992, 48). The hardening into a self-centred organism is secondary to the primary process of desiring-production, and the essential biological elements, the conjoined organs-partial objects and the body without organs, are always producing flight from the development of the fixed organisation of an organism. Deleuze and Guattari are keen to stress that their description of desiring-production should not be seen as a metaphor for an ideal human, but as a description of a Real process based on real desiring-machines (see 1984, 36–41) – the authors imagine themselves as mechanics working to understand the machinic arrangements of biology. The problem, however, is that Deleuze and Guattari are ultimately only able to describe the process with symbolic language and analogy. They seem unable, critically, to point to what an organ-partial object concretely is, or to explain how such an object can precede the actual, concrete organisation of organs and organisms.

This lack of a concrete basis to their concepts becomes clear when Deleuze and Guattari invoke the molecular structure of the genetic code to try to argue for the basic uncoded nature of human being. Deleuze and Guattari accept that DNA molecules ‘fold’ into “exclusive molar configurations”, thereby producing genetic codes (1984, 328). However, they note that the code is undone as the DNA molecule unfolds “along a molecular fibre that includes all the possible figures”. The DNA molecule, then, opens up to reconfigurations that can bring about almost limitless variation. Genes emerge from a basic “chain state” that is “distinct . . . from any code” (*ibid.*). Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the unconscious corresponds to the basic process of genetic decoding, with the unconscious formed as a “molecular chain”, reproducing a “signifying chain” that

is not used to discover or decipher codes of desire, but to cause absolutely decoded flows of desire, Libido, to circulate, and to discover in desire that which scrambles all the codes and undoes all the territorialities.

(*ibid.*)

Such an idea of a genetic-molecular basis to the decoding brought about by the unconscious gives Deleuze and Guattari’s unconscious a semblance of biological legitimacy. However, their description can only be understood as a metaphor for an idealised vision of human being, for it ultimately misrepresents the reality of genetic coding.

While it is true that evolution is brought about by mutations that take place as DNA molecules unzip and reproduce themselves, and true that new sequences of bases within the molecule can bring about an immeasurable amount of biological

variation, significant genetic change usually requires thousands, even millions of years to come about. Human lifetimes are marked much more by remarkably accurate reproduction of genetic codes within cells than by genetic decoding. The human being is produced through a highly refined set of genetic instructions, which have evolved over millions of years of natural selection to produce a being with an array of specific characteristics that are useful for self-perpetuation and self-propagation. We may be desiring-machines, but our desire is coded for by our genes, which have the function of producing us as machines of survival. As Richard Dawkins put it in his ground-breaking book *The Selfish Gene*, we humans “are survival machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes” (2006, xxi). It is important to note here that, contrary to popular belief, in his book, Dawkins did not seek to reduce human being to a primal selfishness. Dawkins suggests that genes, as the units of natural selection, have an “as-if” selfishness (xii), but biology and behaviour cannot be simply reduced to the ‘selfishness’ of genes, for genes code for a variety of traits that support the long-term persistence of the types of organisms in which they reside (see *ibid.*, ix, on the distinction between genes as the immortal replicators and biological beings as the vehicles of the replicators). Human genes have been naturally selected to suit the human environment, and as a result, they code for human beings that can thrive in a human world of social groups; a world that has a basic social element to it. Ultimately, they code for a human being that strives to thrive in contradictory ways, with different types of striving corresponding to different types of thriving. Consequently, the human being is caught in a state of constant tension, particularly between desires to take or snatch for a feeling of priority, and desires to share – share in emotions, hopes and dreams as well as things – for some feeling of ‘greater’ goodness.

However, rather than face up to the contradictory nature of our complex human being, including the self-centred potential embedded within it, Deleuze and Guattari attempt to embrace only one facet of our being, our being-with facet, and, high on the desires of our being-with being, they are repulsed by the selfish elements of our being, and alienate them as dead forces that react against and stifle our being-with openness. For Deleuze and Guattari, the reactive forces of death begin to emerge from the primordial world of desiring-production as the organs-partial objects connect with the body without organs. As noted earlier, the body without organs has the radical potential to be an extension of the desiring-production of the organs-partial objects; in its radical form it is an overall body, a “giant molecule” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, 327), of limitless reconstruction. In this form, it is a “nonlimitative” body without organs (see Massumi, 1992, 75). However, because it is added to the organs-partial objects as a whole, as something dense or full in itself, the body without organs has the potential to collapse in on itself and begin limiting the reconfigurations of the partial objects and the flows between them, becoming a “limitative” body without organs (*ibid.*). The limitative body without organs is a form of death that desires (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, 329). Existing as an “immobile motor” (*ibid.*), it is sparked

into life like a Frankenstein's monster by the life desires of the "working organs" (ibid.). The working organs produce the multiplying intensities of life, while a limiting immobile motor stifles intensities by fixing them into circuits.

The social body of society, or the "socius", emerges through the connections between the two forms of the body without organs: "a society is a dissipative structure with its own determining tension between a limitative body without organs and a nonlimitative one" (Massumi, 1992, 75). The limitative body without organs has a divisive, codifying tendency. It attracts to itself the desiring-machines of individuals and limits their potential by subjecting them to structuration, compelling them to feel a connection with the systematising social body's categories of differentiation: "Husband/wife, parent/child . . . faithful/infidel . . . rich/poor" (ibid., 76). In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari explain the development of the limitative body without organs by stating that the productive synthesis of desiring-machines produces a "nonproductive" element: "the body without organs" (1984, 8). In this case, the (limitative) body without organs is an element of "antiproduction" (ibid.), and, as the desiring-machines reach out in producing connections, they couple antiproduction with the productive process.

In relation to this analysis, Massumi (1992) explains that as we progress through life our desiring-machines become tied to certain agglomerations of matter that are relatively solid in structure. Intensities of desire from our desiring-machines can connect into a certain relatively solid structure or object, and as they do so they can become part of relatively fixed circuits of desire and can facilitate the hardening of the structure into its constitution. Fixed desires developed through the hardening structure can flow back into the desiring-machines to create a positive feedback loop and a dependency on the structure or object, which becomes an "addictive whole attractor" (74). The recognition of satisfaction through such structures or objects leads us to prioritise them to the detriment of the body's other desires for connection. The "closed constellation" – the limitative body without organs that is developing – crushes the potential of an individual's varied desires beneath the dominant circuits of satisfaction. This limitative body without organs is reactive, working against the body's "open constellation"; its active connective potential that is our desiring being. The whole attractors that come to dominate our being are reinforced by "even more powerful reactive forces" from the outside (ibid. 75); the social forces that resonate with the body's emerging constellation. These social forces "are identified as belonging to the body", and they tap into the existing habit-forming feedback loops so as to bump up "the sensations of the first feedback loop" (ibid.). The "that's it!" of satisfaction-recognition becomes the "that's me!" of socially conditioned self-reflection.

In explaining the development of whole attractors, Massumi starts with the example of what is for many the earliest experience of a whole attractor: a mother's breast, and I think this example can be used to highlight the way in which Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the development of the reactive forces relies on a twisting or inversion of the actual development of desire. If we consider the way in which genes code for desire so that we will desire in certain ways, we can see

that we do not start out with desiring-machines producing free-flowing desire, but with desiring-machines of whole or cohesive structure that compel us to seek out and/or recognise certain types of satisfaction. It is not, then, bodies from the outside that corrupt our primordial plasticity, but bodies that we are constituted as that limit or shape our potential. We can become dependent on specific objects not because those objects appropriate our free-flowing desire, but because such objects become recognised as an outlet for specific types of desire that are rooted in specific types of desiring-machines. We become addicted to whole attractors because they correspond with the desires of our in-built whole attractors, which are primed to prompt specific types of satisfaction or positive feedback responses as their desires are fulfilled. Our desire is coded so that we will desire things that are useful for our perpetuation and thriving. A mother's breast is one such thing. A baby has an in-built desire to suck on any teat-like object and to feel satisfied and encouraged when milk is passed into its body through sucking on such an object. Such an in-built desire and positive feedback mechanism is essential to the baby's survival. The breast, then, does not help to corrupt the baby's 'open constellation', but helps to bring out part of a baby's in-built potential.

For Deleuze and Guattari, the (limitative) body without organs is initially repulsed by the desiring-machines of production, and a social machine that is paranoid in nature develops when this body without organs can no longer tolerate the desiring-machines. In a capitalist society, capitalists are initially conscious of the conflict of interests the capitalist mode of production creates, and as a result forms of oppression and control necessarily develop. However, "a perverted, bewitched world quickly comes into being" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, 11) when the paranoid machine begins to subsume, rather than simply hold back, the oppositional forces. At this point capital, as a full body, "falls back on all of production", so that it increasingly becomes a surface on which all social production is inscribed. Throughout history, an element of antiproduction has created various "full bodies" (ibid., 10); social bodies or social frameworks. Such bodies may constitute "the body of the earth" ('savage' society), that of the "tyrant" ('barbarian' society), or of "capital" ('civilised' society). These bodies appropriate the power of desiring-production, so that desire in the social field is constrained, shaped, and channelled by the social framework of the full body. As desiring-production appears to emanate from the full body, society comes to view this body as a "natural or divine presupposition" (ibid.), but in truth this is only because of the power the body has to appropriate desire for its own ends. The "repulsion" or "paranoid-machine" becomes an "attraction" or "miraculating-machine".

The production that has just been described – the production of inscription onto the full body, or what Deleuze and Guattari call the "production of recording", has limited sway over the subject that can be discerned emerging on the recording surface of the (limitative) body without organs. Although an attraction machine has been produced, the tension between the attraction and repulsion of desiring-machines and the (limitative) body without organs persists. However, a "genuine reconciliation" of the two takes place on the level of a new machine: the "celibate

machine" (ibid., 17). Here, overwhelmed by the control of the attracting machine, the subject is compelled to embrace the repression and the dominant currents of the full body, experiencing even suffering as a form of sensual pleasure that can be called "autoerotic" (ibid., 18). What is taking place, then, is an immaculate conception, wherein a miraculous, fixed, pure consummation is achieved between the desiring-machines and the body without organs, "so as to give birth to a new humanity or a glorious organism" (ibid.). Now the production of recording has morphed into the "production of consumption", for the desiring-machines are being continuously consumed by a self-perpetuating system of cohesion. We can relate this process of the consumption of desire and the reproduction of a desiring order to Marcuse's conception of capitalism producing 'false needs' through desublimation (touched on in Chapter 3 of this book).

Ultimately, however, as alluded to above, Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis analyses how the flows of "revolutionary" desire can never be entirely consumed by the reactive forces of the body without organs, for the unconscious continues to churn out desires that break out from and break up the body of "segregations" that sustains the overriding social order (ibid., 105). Nevertheless, the reactive body continually fights back against the revolutionary flows by spreading through the lines of flight and feeding off their desiring intensities. We have, then, "something like two poles" of desire, which can be felt as two poles of schizophrenic delirium, one "paranoiac-segregative" and the other "schizonomadic". In the process of social production there are countless subtle or chaotic shifts between the poles, with desire oscillating "between its reactionary charge and its revolutionary potential" (ibid.). With this notion of oscillation, Deleuze and Guattari almost face up to the contradictory nature of our desiring being, hinting at the way in which oppositional feelings are paradoxically rooted in a certain interdependency; being rooted in a human organism that is driven to incite both types of desire to varying degrees in various moments in order to sustain itself. Even so, ultimately Deleuze and Guattari remain stuck on a basic dualism of 'good' versus 'bad' desire, because for them the revolutionary pole is the primary pole. Schizoanalysis views "desire [as] revolutionary in its essence": revolutionary desire is "real desire" (ibid., 118) – really desire in its purest form, for as we have seen, desire is the infinite potential of desiring-production, whereas reactionary desire turns desire on its own open-ended being.

In this chapter, we have seen that in the 1960s, in reaction against bourgeois conservatism and overbearing forms of institutionalisation, Deleuze and Guattari emerged from the milieu of the bourgeois avant-garde to tap into, and give expression to, the 1960s radical self-emancipatory movements that pioneered libertarian or anarchistic notions of communism. Despite rejecting Cartesian dualism and the primary role of the imaginary or ideology in revolutionary struggle, in their highly emotive reaction against France's stifling social system, Deleuze and Guattari produced a dualistic notion of affirmative desire versus reactive desire, or productive desire versus anti-productive desire, or life-affirming desire versus death-affirming desire. True, the authors de-essentialise psychoanalysis's death

drive, thereby looking to overcome an essential dualism of life drives versus death drives. However, in doing so they create a new hierarchical dualism, with the positive forces of the organs-partial objects becoming perverted or corrupted by the negative forces of full bodies, which can only feed off the life forces and limit the limitless productions of the working organs. I suggest that here Deleuze and Guattari invert rather than overcome the West's Christian-rooted dualism, proposing, by building on Nietzsche's model, base forces of desire that are powerful and thereby 'good', and overriding forces of order that are dependent on the powerful forces, and are thereby weak and 'bad'. The 'bad' forces of self-centredness and power-seeking become in Deleuze and Guattari's model alienated or externalised forces, but this modelling said more about the authors' desperation to reject an immanent potential in their philosophical ethos than it did about the true nature of desire.

Indeed, I would argue that in recoiling from self-centred and power-seeking desires, Deleuze and Guattari, in the last instance, run from the immanentist perspective that they are keen to embrace. They refuse to thoroughly *inhabit* the 'bad' desires, and therefore refuse a thoroughly immanentist perspective. From such a perspective, there can be no external within, no alien within: only the familiar, only inherent potentials. Ultimately, Deleuze and Guattari's sensitivity to the way in which desires rapidly swing towards their supposed opposite is most revealing, for it hints at a recognition of the fact that 'negative' or 'reactionary' desire is just as essential to the Real of desire as is 'positive' or 'revolutionary' desire, with the two facets of desire equally capable of affirming the human life-force or human will-power.

Hardt and Negri on postmodernisation

Self-emancipatory radicalism in the politics of the multitude

In the last chapter, I discussed Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of self-emancipation, linking it to the wider cultural reaction against French institutional conservatism while focusing on the way in which Deleuze and Guattari reacted against such conservatism within the academies. In this chapter, I shall consider the way in which Hardt and Negri carry Deleuze and Guattari's self-emancipatory radicalism into the neoliberal age. We shall see that Hardt and Negri build on Deleuze and Guattari's conception of binary opposition between the productive forces of desire and the reactive forces of control to suggest that the reactive capitalist order of Empire is totally dependent on the emancipatory flows of the proletarian multitude. In doing so, rather than exploring the way in which the neoliberal capitalist order emerges out of human desiring being within a bourgeois cultural context, Hardt and Negri accentuate Deleuze and Guattari's alienation of the power-seeking Other to set up a pervasive capitalist 'thing' as the great anti-life, vampire monster that sucks the life out of the productive, creative, labouring multitude. Ultimately, like Deleuze and Guattari, they recoil from the bourgeois character of the radical self-emancipatory ethos they embrace, thereby refusing to face up to the development of the being-over desires that emerge as an inherent feature of that ethos.

In commenting on the relationship between Deleuze and Guattari's and Hardt and Negri's philosophies, Featherstone (2002) suggests that Hardt and Negri's emancipatory ethos carries within itself the primal drive of capitalism. However, while I argue that Hardt and Negri continue in Deleuze and Guattari's vein, Featherstone develops a psychoanalytic argument to suggest that Hardt and Negri corrupt Deleuze and Guattari's concept of desire by unleashing the primal drive that Deleuze and Guattari wrap up in a collective object of socialisation. Featherstone suggests that Hardt and Negri, while relying upon Deleuze and Guattari's work, repress their "debt to psychoanalysis" by hiding the "the Freudian roots" of Deleuze and Guattari's two-volume *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (374). He argues that Deleuze and Guattari created a constructive tension, between, on the one hand, Freud and Lacan's micro analysis of patient refusal of Oedipal prohibition, and, on the other, their own macro analysis of capitalist psychology as an anti-Oedipal dysfunction. Hardt and Negri, however,

deny the existence of Oedipal psychology in their anti-authoritarian rejection of the father figure. In doing so, they embrace a “post-communism” (ibid., 373) or a “postmodern communism” (ibid., 374) of absolute freedom, which, like capitalism, refuses all social order in its production of individualist excess. Rather than seeking to ground the “autonomy of the individual” in a symbolic order, Hardt and Negri fall “back onto the totalitarianism of complete control” even as they try to reject the totalitarianism of capitalism (ibid.). Featherstone suggests that Freud’s “anti-utopian” critique of the repression of Oedipal psychology is relevant here. This critique is tied to the assertion of castration as a socialising force; to the notion that one must learn to “accept limitation for the sake of others” (ibid., 375). In opposition to limitation, Hardt and Negri seek to “smash through the law of sociability”, a law which for Featherstone is rooted “in Lacan’s master signifier: the phallic ‘No!’ of Oedipal prohibition”, which facilitates an individual’s “entry into the social order” (ibid.). It is the denial of the social order that produces “the Nazi death drive that desires the destruction of authority and the return to pre-Oedipal self-identity” (ibid.). By embracing this Nazi death drive, Hardt and Negri desire reunion with “the Hobbesian state of nature” (ibid.).

While Featherstone boldly attempts to retain Deleuze and Guattari within the psychoanalytic paradigm, as we saw in Chapter 5, in truth, Deleuze and Guattari’s seminal work, *Anti-Oedipus*, is a fundamental rejection of Freudian psychoanalysis. The book is entitled *Anti-Oedipus* not because Deleuze and Guattari associate capitalist power with a rejection of Oedipal psychology; on the contrary, Deleuze and Guattari analyse the negativity capitalism produces through the role it plays in Oedipalisation. Their book is called *Anti-Oedipus* precisely because they reject the psychoanalytic concept of Oedipal psychology, associating it with bourgeois repression and the master signifier of totality. Nevertheless, Featherstone does, importantly, recognise the leftist-reactionary nature of *Anti-Oedipus*, the first volume of Deleuze and Guattari’s *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, and suggests a move towards a seemingly more cautious notion of desiring struggle in the second volume, *A Thousand Plateaus*. It was noted in Chapter 5 that *Anti-Oedipus* is seething with the anti-authoritarian energy of the 1968 uprising in France, and as such it sought to create an absolute opposition between the desiring forces of liberation and the capitalist forces of control. However, for Featherstone, while it is true that *Anti-Oedipus* was a reaction against the “paranoiac social formation” in the name of the “utopian” forces of desire (ibid., 377), it hints at the conspiracy between supposedly emancipatory desire and the capitalist social formation. Featherstone suggests that *Anti-Oedipus* is an ironic work, which, by embracing the schizophrenic process, exposes the pathological, irrational rationality of capitalism. He argues that by the time of *A Thousand Plateaus*, with the reaction against authority having subsided, Deleuze and Guattari more openly acknowledged the inevitable limitations to the flows of desire by emphasising the merging between deterritorialising desire and territorialising structure, developing the concept of rhizomes, or uncoded schizophrenic breaks, which consistently collapse into root-tree structures, or forms of paranoiac “capital-overdetermination”

(ibid.). For Featherstone, then, *A Thousand Plateaus* recognises the totalitarian potential lurking in desire, and begins to explore how desire can be channelled into more flexible institutions of control:

The second volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* drops the nascent utopianism of the first book in favour of an attempt to negotiate, or reform, the relationship between freedom and control that emerged out of the ruins of the first book.

(ibid.)

From Featherstone's psychoanalytic perspective, then, while Hardt and Negri continue to insist on the absolute opposition between the productive, emancipatory forces of desire and the dead forces of control, idealistically believing that pure desiring freedom will overwhelm the reactive negativity of accumulation, Deleuze and Guattari begin to abandon this utopianism by the end of *Anti-Oedipus*, and by the time of *A Thousand Plateaus*, they are "explaining that raw productivity must always pass through channels of institutional control" (2002, 377). For Featherstone, while Hardt and Negri reject structuralism and insist that Deleuze and Guattari did the same, in reality, after the early petulance of *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari returned to the structuralist paradigm of Lacan by recognising the necessity of the self's subjectification to the symbolic order (ibid., 377–378). Featherstone suggests that *A Thousand Plateaus* falls back so heavily onto psychoanalysis that it is possible to say that, along with Freud and Lacan, Deleuze teaches us "that the fundamental nature of desire is dissatisfaction and alienation" (ibid., 383), with individuals perpetually lacking a collective object as they isolate, and thereby make vulnerable, their centred selves.

In truth, however, *A Thousand Plateaus* never goes so far as to retreat from *Anti-Oedipus*'s assertion that desire does not lack anything; there is no disavowal of the revolutionary, productive forces of desiring-machines. Desiring-machines, the organic-cosmic arrangements outlined in *Anti-Oedipus*, were rebranded in *A Thousand Plateaus* as "assemblages" to emphasise that while desire emanated from "machinic arrangements" (see Dosse, 2010, 263), these arrangements were not fixed in place and did not simply produce stable identities (see Massumi, 1992, 82). Rather, desire flows through constantly shifting organic-cosmic assemblages in the production of infinite states of being. Furthermore, the development in *A Thousand Plateaus* of the concept of the links between rhizomes and root-tree structures is based on *Anti-Oedipus*'s recognition of the pervasive power of the reactive forces of structuration. As outlined in the last chapter, the notion of the reactive forces emerging out of the productive syntheses of desire before turning desire back on itself is fundamental to *Anti-Oedipus*. The reactive forces attract loose assemblages to their totalising centres, causing revolutionary flights of desire to swing towards the reactionary pole. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, the absolute opposition between the positive forces of desire and negative forces of reaction remains, with Deleuze and Guattari re-emphasising the ability of the reactive

forces to pervert or invert the productive flows of desire. Deleuze reaffirmed his and Guattari's denouncements of the psychoanalytic perspective on desire in an interview with Claire Parnet in the late 1980s. In the interview Deleuze links the psychoanalytic project to the conservative bourgeois insistence on self-denial, stating that "really psychoanalysts talk about desire exactly like priests talk about it". He suggests that the psychoanalytic resolve to destroy the primal animality of desire through castration is akin to the Christian attempt to cut off the sinful body: the psychoanalytic wailing about the necessity of castration is "worse than [the idea of] original sin . . . it's a kind of enormous curse on desire that is quite precisely frightening" (see Deleuze, 2011).

Furthermore, contrary to Featherstone's claim, Hardt and Negri do not seek to hide Deleuze and Guattari's roots in psychoanalysis. They openly acknowledge their debt to Deleuze and Guattari precisely because they recognise that these authors played a key role in the rejection of the conservatism they see in psychoanalysis's mortal fear of unfettered desire and in its insistence on desire's subjection to a symbolic order. Deleuze and Guattari, rooted in the libertarian upsurge of the 1960s, unleashed a barrage of anti-authoritarianism against psychoanalysis's links with what Hardt and Negri would go on to recognise as the 'modern' notion of bourgeois sovereignty (as discussed in Chapter 1). For Deleuze and Guattari, psychoanalysis contributed to the power of the capitalist order by refusing desire's exodus from totality. Instead of embracing the emancipatory flights of desire, psychoanalysis stigmatises free-flowing desire, insisting that it be stifled and made subject to an overarching order. For Deleuze and Guattari and Hardt and Negri, the embrace of desire is not a return to the Hobbesian war of each against all because they simply do not accept the psychoanalytic reduction of raw desire to primal drive; for them, individual desiring freedom and solidarity go hand in hand because raw desire is connective and therefore social by nature.

In *Empire*, their seminal work, which was first published in 2000 at the height of neoliberal hegemony, Hardt and Negri suggest that the development of the neoliberal system of globalisation from the late 1970s – a system that the authors conceptualise as Empire – was a deterritorialising development forced on the capitalist system by the post-war proletarian struggles against centralising and/or totalising structures of exploitation and control – that is to say, against the structures of modern bourgeois sovereignty. The development is, therefore, in spite of itself, "really a condition of the liberation of" the proletariat (2001, 52). For Hardt and Negri, the pressure of proletarian internationalism forced the capitalist system to neutralise the industrial proletariat by deactivating and dispersing its members, but in doing so, it was forced to open up the world to increased flows of trade so that the loss of a stable labour force was offset by increased access to material and labour resources. In opening up the world to capital, Empire undermined the authority of nation-states, which, for Hardt and Negri, was inadvertently progressive because proletarian internationalism had always been held back by the divisions and totalisations instituted by nation-states. With boundaries to access brought down, the world's proletarian classes had increased

opportunities to interact and form subconscious unities out of their diversities, undermining notions of a proletarian mass with their actions as a proletarian *multitude*. In *Empire*, then, Hardt and Negri set themselves the task of explaining the potential for liberation inherent in the new global capitalist system. To do this, they build on Deleuze and Guattari's project to analyse the new dynamics of resistance and emancipation that emerged from 1968 – that is, post-centralising, post-statist, and ultimately post-modern dynamics.

Although in *Empire* Hardt and Negri cite *A Thousand Plateaus* and not *Anti-Oedipus* as the book by Deleuze and Guattari that had the major influence on their work (2001, 415), it is clear that the foundations of Hardt and Negri's philosophy can be traced to *Anti-Oedipus*, which was itself the foundation for *A Thousand Plateaus*. Hardt and Negri take from *A Thousand Plateaus* the concept of non-centred rhizome networks to build their vision of a networking proletarian multitude, but as alluded to, the rhizome concept was based on the productive desiring-machines that were formulated in *Anti-Oedipus*. Ultimately Hardt and Negri attempt to provide a more practical and updated vision of the dispersed capitalist social body, or 'socius', which Deleuze and Guattari outlined in 1972 in *Anti-Oedipus*. They mark the progress of the capitalist body by analysing the role of the productive labour of the contemporary proletarian multitude in shaping the deterritorialisation of it, whilst also expanding on the notion of reterritorialisation by suggesting that within the fabric of the multitude's deterritorialising, horizontal networks, pervasive corporate structures create micro centres of territorialising control over the production of social life.

Antonio Negri's long road towards the writing of *Empire* was marked early on by his interest and involvement in the anti-authoritarian activism of the 1960s and 1970s. An intellectual schooled in philosophy, Negri would become immersed in the working-class movement located in the industrial North of Italy, where a new wave of radical activism radiated out from the epicentre of Turin. It was here in 1962 that "thousands of workers protested against the trade unions' compromises with the car manufacturer FIAT" (Bove, 2010, 177). This protest set the tone for a new anti-institutional focus to working-class struggles in Italy, as workers took on the bureaucratic tendencies of their own trade union bodies and of the communist party while continuing their struggle against capitalist industry. The working-class struggles in the 1960s in Italy tied in closely with the struggles in France in the same period, which we visited Chapter 3. We saw in chapter 3, for instance, that May 1968 was marked by the workers' wildcat strikes and their refusal to be led by the trade union and socialist and communist party leadership. They embraced the libertarian spirit of the moment and spontaneously organised themselves.

Throughout his involvement in the working-class struggles of the 1960s and 1970s, Negri wrote and published his reinterpretations of Marxism and state power, which would play a key role in the development of the Italian Autonomous Marxist movement. Autonomous Marxism had an anti-authoritarian emphasis on worker self-organisation and the rejection of bureaucratic oversight. Such

anti-authoritarianism emerged through the nature of power relations in post-war Italy. I discussed in Chapter 4 the history of France in terms of its sharp divides between establishment conservatism and popular resistance, and how this stark contradiction produces particular types of leftist-reactionary political movements. Although Italy has a quite distinct political history, it shares in France's continental tradition of highly confrontational struggles between the powerful and the subjugated. In the 1960s and 1970s Italian Autonomous Marxism emerged as a product of such confrontations, being part of a widespread rejection of authority in the face of uncompromising elites: "In the absence of postwar de-fascistisation, society remained sharply divided along political lines; the permanent class conflict that marked these two decades saw Italy in a state of simmering civil war" (Bove, 2010, 178). The philosophy Negri developed during this period was a reflection of this intense antagonism, postulating an absolute opposition, or an "irreconcilable asymmetry" between living labour and dead capital (in *ibid.*, 178–179).

Negri's decades of formation of his anti-authoritarian communism culminated in *Empire*, co-written with his young American protégé Michael Hardt. In this book, Hardt and Negri explain that Empire is the world system that effectively regulates the globalisation of economic and cultural exchanges, being "the sovereign power that governs the world" (2001, xi). As noted, Hardt and Negri argued – before the rise of post-global-recession populism – that the sovereignty of nation-states is in decline, with money, technology, ideas, people, and goods moving with increasing ease across national boundaries. They see these movements as flows which states struggle to control, resulting in states consistently losing authority over their economies and social organisation. Penetrating and steering these flows, Empire is everywhere and nowhere; a pervasive force with no territorial centre of power that continuously seeks to incorporate "the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers" (*ibid.*, xii). Indeed, Empire "rules over the entire civilised world" (*ibid.*, xiv). The United States, according to Hardt and Negri, while unlike a traditional imperial master, occupies a privileged position in Empire because of its political and ideological foundations (discussed in Chapters 2 and 4 of this book), which promote the concept of Empire with notions of expanding frontiers and power distributed in networks. This postmodern imperial idea has now emerged onto the world stage after developing in the United States (and to a lesser extent Europe) in tandem with the capitalist mode of production (*ibid.*, xvi), producing a new type of dispersed, flexible sovereignty.

Much of the first section of *Empire* is dedicated to describing nodes of territorial power in Empire's world network, analysing the constitution of the supranational order of universal right. However, this analysis really provides only a superficial outline of Empire; it focuses on the central elements in a decentralising world. It is not until biopolitical production and the underpinning ontology have been discussed that Hardt and Negri are in a position to explain what really drives forward the development of Empire. They argue that the established supranational regulatory institutions that help constitute the supranational juridical order – for

example, the United Nations and the multi- or trans-national financial and trade agencies such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO – cannot really be understood until one realises their place in supporting biopower within Empire.

Hardt and Negri's concept of biopower is traced in *Empire* back to some of Foucault's ideas, which were themselves closely related to ideas that Deleuze and Guattari would formulate in *Anti-Oedipus*. Foucault argued that control in capitalist society increasingly concerns not the control of consciousness or ideology, but the control of the body, that is, biopolitical control; the control of life itself, ultimately the control of the feelings running through the biological being. While Foucault's notion of control is very similar to Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the appropriation of desire by the reactive forces in the making of a new humanity, Hardt and Negri are ultimately critical of Foucault because they suggest that his attachment to a "structuralist epistemology" meant that his theory lacked an engine to drive it:

If at this point we were to ask Foucault what drives the system, or rather, who is 'bios', his response would be ineffable, or nothing at all. What Foucault fails to grasp finally are the real dynamics of production in biopolitical society. (2001, 28)

One could perhaps express this criticism slightly differently by arguing that Foucault was suggesting that power drives the system, but he would struggle to explain what drives power: is it power all the way down in some type of infinite regress? Hardt and Negri note that Deleuze himself argued in a private letter (1977, in *ibid.*, 422) that his main methodological difference with Foucault rested on the question of production. The key point that Deleuze would make is that the social system is indeed driven by something, and that something is the *desire* of social beings, who produce the social world with the desire of their bodies. Capitalism persists through the appropriation of the desiring-production of the people.

Hardt and Negri take desire, then, as the active driving force that produces social reality in both its liberatory and repressive dimensions. They argue that with their "poststructuralist" conception of biopolitical society, Deleuze and Guattari "demystify" structuralism, presenting an interpretation that grounds the question of production in the Real of social being. This interpretation, then, provides "ontological substance" to the question of social production (2001, 28). Furthermore, Hardt and Negri draw directly from the theoretical language of *Anti-Oedipus* by stating that "machines produce", arguing that "social machines" produce "the world along with the subjects and objects that constitute it" (*ibid.*). It is important to emphasise here that, in this passage, Hardt and Negri refer to the productive power of *social* machines; in a similar vein to Deleuze and Guattari they argue that the human being's desiring-machines produce ever-new connections and are therefore social by nature. In addition, they build on Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the (nonlimitative) body without organs by suggesting that

the shifting states of being produced through the connections of the human's social machines lead to the development of a "new body" that produces "the human anew", so as to produce the "posthuman". Referring explicitly to Deleuze and Guattari's concepts in *Anti-Oedipus*, they describe the development of the posthuman as coming through a process of production in which there are "no fixed and necessary boundaries between human and animal, human and machine, male and female . . . nature itself is an artificial terrain open to ever-new mutations, mixtures, and hybridizations" (ibid., 215). Under *Empire*, while the social, productive forces are the Real immanent forces, the ability of capitalism's biopolitical machine to turn desire against itself ensures that "exploitation exists in an indefinite non-place", with biology itself reconstructed with ordering norms. The multitude, however, retains the potential to produce a 'new body' that is uncontained by the system's limiting production of 'human nature'. The emancipatory social body, in producing ever-new connections and unions between beings and objects, opens out to "that highest consciousness that is infused with love" (ibid., 216).

Nevertheless, Hardt and Negri argue that while Deleuze and Guattari provided a "radical ontology" of the production of the social, in their work it remained "insubstantial and impotent" because they "seem to be able to conceive positively only the tendencies toward continuous movement and absolute flows". They add that the authors managed to explain production "only superficially and ephemerally, as a chaotic, indeterminate horizon marked by the ungraspable event" (2001, 28). While Hardt and Negri embrace the "discovery" of Deleuze and Guattari's ontology of production, in *Empire* they seek to explain production in a more practical way as the basis of political movements and systems of power. In short, they wish to make the Real of social production more 'real' for the reader.

In focusing on the practicalities of biopolitical production, Hardt and Negri explain that it is "the huge transnational corporations that construct the fundamental connective fabric of the biopolitical world in certain important respects" (ibid., 31). The authors suggest that in the second half of the twentieth century, multinational corporations began to move beyond commanding and exploiting territories; they increasingly assimilated territories into the world market by making them part of their global flows of commodities, monies and populations. Territories, then, were becoming fully incorporated within the network of world corporate production. As territories became increasingly incorporated, so too did the peoples and cultures within them. As a result, life-worlds became increasingly structured by a monetary framework, that is, life became increasingly seen from the perspective of money – "nothing escapes money" (ibid., 32). Under capitalism's system of biopower, money becomes the primary need. This need becomes central to the re-production of capitalist power, for it sustains the capitalist way of life. Money-capital comes to encapsulate the ultimate meaning of society; it becomes the master signifier, the ultimate longed-for object, the symbol of pure power – pure capture and accumulation. Ultimately, then, rather than just commodities, the great corporate powers produce "subjectivities . . . they produce

needs, social relations, bodies and minds . . . they produce producers” (ibid.). That is to say, corporations produce subjects who will take capitalist ways for granted, eagerly consuming and contributing towards the reproduction of capitalist production. Those who labour under capitalism along with those who consume under it become part of a network of production that produces a form of social life that reproduces capitalism.

Hardt and Negri proceed by explaining that a group of Italian Marxist authors, including Paolo Virno, Maurizio Lazzarato and Christian Marazzi, were among the first to outline how the system of production has been transformed to focus on producing producers. Virno is a particularly important figure; influential on the development of Autonomous Marxism, he participated in the *Potere Operaio* workerist group along with Negri in the late 1960s and 1970s, and, like Negri, spent time in jail, arrested in 1979 for his supposed association with the Red Brigades – he would be acquitted in 1987. Virno would greatly develop his political thought during his three years in prison, and after release he went on to organise the *Luogo Comune* publication, which explored the dynamics of labour under the Post-Fordist industrial model (see Virno and Hardt, 1996, on radical Italian thought). For Hardt and Negri, the Italian Marxists recognised that in the post-war period, industrial workers were increasingly marginalised in the productive process while “intellectual, immaterial, and communicative labour power” played an increasingly central role in the production of surplus value (2001, 29). Here, the Italian Marxists were beginning to explain the process of postmodernisation (see ibid., 280–300).

However, Hardt and Negri argue that while the Italian Marxists provided important insights by describing the new forms of production, in the end they failed to truly grasp the biopolitical nature of this production. The Italian authors describe production within the framework of language and communication, treating productive labour merely as an “intellectual” and “incorporeal” pursuit. However, as we have seen, for Hardt and Negri, the production of capital is premised not on ideas but on emotion and lifeblood, so that “one of the primary aspects of immaterial labor . . . [is] the labor of the production and manipulation of affects” (2001, 30). The biopolitical networks in the era of Empire, then, work to direct the sentiments of social subjects in order to shape the fundamental tendencies of the social world. The marketing industries are key here, for they play a central role in producing the ‘immaterial’ services, experiences, and forms of communication that affect people in such a way as to encourage increasing consumption of, and identification with, the commodities and brands of business.

Marketers meticulously study potential target markets through carefully planned market research that attempts to tune into the cultural waves produced by consumers. They will use the information they garner through their studies to produce ‘integrated marketing communication’ (Percy, 2008), which, through a variety of mediums, targets specific consumers with a potent mix of intensities and sentiments that tap into the identified consumers’ hopes, desires, and fears. Through a consistent, emotionally driven message, the marketers are seeking to

sell more than just a product, and more even than a service: they seek to sell a potent brand that encapsulates an identity, an ethos, or a lifestyle, creating a subliminal association between human need and certain branded products (for a good overview of these ideas, see Lull, 2000, 102–111). And through their emphasis on ‘relationship marketing’ (see Palmer et al., 2005), marketers attempt to become part of our social networks in order to be active contributors towards the development of lifestyles and subcultures, exploiting their intimacy with us in order to tailor services and packages of commodities to the specific ‘needs’ that exist within our life-worlds. Ultimately, they want to produce proletarian producers who will themselves actively contribute towards the development of consumer and capitalist society by forging new forms of identity and culture through commodities, brands, and entrepreneurial creativity.

Although the notion of Empire’s pervasive biopower might give the impression that Empire has an ultimate power, as alluded to earlier, for Hardt and Negri, the people – the multitude – always have the ultimate power, because it is they who ultimately produce human biology (over and over) and the connective basis of the social world with the social machines of desiring-production. The horizontal production of the multitude is the true driving force of the system, and Empire can only react against this production and twist it in the creation of overriding control and order. Empire’s postmodern sovereignty of networks and dispersed power is pervasive, but is ultimately secondary to the multitude’s “revolutionary desire of post-modernity” (2001, 65), which enables the multitude to ‘self-produce’ itself on “the plane of immanence” (ibid.). As suggested earlier, for Hardt and Negri, Empire did not create the conditions of the multitude’s freedom, but emerged as a new way to control the lines of flight produced by proletarian connections and internationalism.

With their notion of a two-headed biopower – a biopower of desiring freedom and overriding control – Hardt and Negri found a very clever way to have their cake and eat it as left-libertarian radicals. Their vision of the reactive, pervasive biopower of Empire enabled them to create an absolute enemy – a monstrous, corrupting, infectious Other – that could be set up as an immanent mortal danger that *just had to be* resisted. At the same time, their vision of a primary emancipatory desire could be invoked to essentialise their being-with yearnings; they could fall back on a reassuring notion of a pure revolutionary desire that, like some divine force (that is somehow even more ‘divine’ than the divine in being “ontologically grounded” (see ibid., 66) in the material world), is the ‘good’ force that can never truly be corrupted by the ‘bad’ forces of Empire. Masterfully, here Hardt and Negri reject utopianism in order to create an ultimate utopian vision – a vision of an inherent world that need not be longed for as a far-off dream but can simply be made through immanent desire. The ideal end of egalitarian freedom is cleverly converted into an irresistible inevitability and can be confidently embraced, as Hardt and Negri suggest, as part of a “materialist teleology” (ibid.). As Deleuze and Guattari postulate, with such a perspective the ‘promised land’ becomes something greater than a longed-for ideal; it becomes a real, actual world that is being “created in the process of its tendency” (1984, 135).

While the modulating networks of Empire attempt to regulate the networks of social production, they can only respond to the basic deterritorialising tendency of the multitude. Production is ultimately controlled by living labour, and Empire can only desperately (and hopelessly) react against it, attempting to reterritorialise the deterritorialising processes that have been unleashed. The multitude continuously builds its own deterritorialising network structures that push against Empire. With its grasping hands, Empire seeks to bring all such destabilisations back within its control, but Empire has to continuously loosen its grip, bending its structures in the process, to retain the diversity of struggles shooting out from it. The more Empire bends to re-absorb movements within the system, the more it frees the creative forces of the productive multitude, thereby contributing to its own downfall. Drawing inspiration from Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*, Hardt and Negri describe this passage as

disrupting the linear and totalitarian figure of capitalist development. Resistances are no longer marginal but active in the centre of a society that opens up in networks; the individual points are singularized in a thousand plateaus. (2001, 25)

As Empire attempts to subsume social life itself, it becomes increasingly dependent on the life forces of the multitude, whose members seek out ever-new connections and propagate “uncontainable singularization” (ibid.) – that is, they propagate a multiplying array of states of being that are created through the flows, mixes and shifting syntheses of desiring-production. The multitude, then, is driven by its emancipatory desire to re-appropriate knowledge, information, and communication so that it is in control of the production of affects; is in control of the production of its own feelings and states of being, and can produce in a way that is not alienated from desiring-production.

For Hardt and Negri, Empire is the full body of capital, a body of capture that can exist only by appropriating and drawing off the productive forces of desiring bodies. The authors see our world as one in which “the absolutely positive force” of the multitude attempts to constitute being, but it is hampered and pulled at by the “empty . . . parasitical machine” of Empire, a machine that has no life of its own, surviving only by desperately clinging to and exploiting the increasingly liberatory flows of the multitude, which relentlessly tries to shake it off (2001, 62). With these flows, the multitude pushes the systemic power of the world order “toward an empty and abstract unification” – toward Empire, whose power is virtual in the sense that it is based only on adaptation to the Real, deterritorialising productive power of the multitude. In *Anti-Oedipus* Deleuze and Guattari suggest that capitalism is a deterritorialising system, being forced to increasingly let loose the desiring-production of labour power in order to find more life processes to extract surplus value from. Money-capital increasingly flows and becomes decoded because it stalks the decoding flows produced by labour power (see 1984, 33–35). Hardt and Negri build on Deleuze and Guattari's conception

of capitalism, explicitly suggesting that the distinction between productive and non-productive forces is key to understanding why capitalism under the deterritorialising system of Empire is doomed (ibid., 25). Framing their argument in Marxist language like Deleuze and Guattari but focusing more on the practicalities of class struggle, they relate ownership to a vampire regime of dead labour. The multitude, then,

is the real productive force of our social world, whereas Empire is a mere apparatus of capture that lives off the vitality of the multitude – as Marx would say, a vampire regime of accumulated dead labor that survives only by sucking the blood of the living.

(2001, 62)

As Deleuze and Guattari state, social bodies of control are “perverse” in the sense that they turn on the being, the life-force, of desiring-production (1984, 321).

Under Empire, the multitude is forcing capitalism to the brink of a totally free-flowing social world, wherein “nomadic” people are constantly sharing and integrating resources, ideas and identities to create new hybridisations. The new world would be a world of real liberty where distinct subjectivities would be free to flourish through free association and a process of constant reformation; it would be a world defined by “the self-production of the subject” (Hardt and Negri, 2001, 63). As Hardt and Negri make clear (ibid., 51), it is towards Marx’s stateless communism that desire is immanently driven, wherein each individual can freely produce and associate for his or her own benefit. The transitional, intermediate phase of state socialism is never ‘desired’ by the multitude; when the people of the multitude desire freely, they inherently produce horizontal connections, not vertical organisation. The libertarian Marxists Hardt and Negri – much like the early Marx, one could argue – radicalise bourgeois notions of self-determination and free association to rally against all forms of authority that hold back the potential of the active, productive individual. Perhaps for the early Marx, as for Hardt and Negri, the rise of communism is inevitable not so much because of the proletariat’s antagonistic relationship with the bourgeoisie under capitalist relations of production, but more because communist potential is built into the nature of humanity’s species-being; into the essential will of autonomous, self-producing, anti-authoritarian individuals who are averse to capitalism’s alienating forms of labour! (for an interesting discussion on human nature and species-being in Marx, see Geras, 1983).

In *Empire*, Hardt and Negri suggest that in a world of uncontainable singularisation, the struggles of the multitude have become increasingly incommunicable, meaning it has become increasingly difficult for proletarian groups to pass an ideological agenda from population to population to develop a cycle of revolt. Nevertheless, as we saw in Chapter 1 when analysing Hardt and Negri’s assessment of the events of 2011, in their more up-to-date *Declaration* (2012), they recognise that the new social movements can spread waves of protest by sharing revolutionary desires across a globalised world. With Empire pervading all of

social life, the virtual centre can be attacked from any point (2001, 58), and in fighting a biopolitical machine, struggles become at once economic, political and cultural struggles; struggles for a fundamentally new way of life. Enveloped by a pervasive global system, and with seemingly no one to turn to, insurrectionists leap vertically to a total rejection of the system, and at their most political, they critique the global system in its universality, gazing towards a hazy global solution. The new cycles of struggle, then, are based not so much on the linear development of an ideological movement, but on the sudden eruption of desiring radicalism, which spreads sentiments of subversion through the intricate cultural networks of the world. The radical networking groups under postmodern capitalism are turning (to use Hardt and Negri's language) incommunicability into communicability through a common sense of shared desires.

In *Empire*, Hardt and Negri suggested that the political challenge was to create a common language for the struggles so that we could "translate" the "particular language of each into a cosmopolitan language" (ibid., 56–57), a language that would clarify the common enemy and construct a new proletarian internationalism. This language, though, would be distinct from the language of previous struggles against capitalism in that it would seek to uphold and expand the diversity of the multitude that has developed under Empire: it would be a language "that functions not on the basis of resemblances but on the basis of differences: a communication of singularities" (ibid., 57). Hardt and Negri have tracked the development of this language through their books since *Empire*, responding to the rise of the alter-globalisation movement in *Multitude* (2004), articulating an anti-statist vision of common ownership in *Commonwealth* (2009), and championing the birth of a new global movement in *Declaration* (2012). Back in 2000, when *Empire* was first published, Hardt and Negri looked to the insurrectionary politics and networking radicalism of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) for early stirrings of a revolutionary movement premised on singularisation.

In 1994, the Zapatistas sparked a revolutionary movement in Chiapas, Mexico, emerging from the indigenous Maya population in the district (see Wild, 1998). They were motivated by local problems of poverty, exclusion, and lack of representation of indigenous people, challenging racial hierarchies in Mexico. However, while the rebellion sought to protect the singular lifeworld of the indigenous Maya, it was not parochial, for it immediately reached out to the world in seeking a solution to the encroachment of the neoliberal order. For the EZLN, this order was behind the instituting of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which, they believed, would help further the process of the subordination of poorer South America to richer North America. On 1st January 1994, the day NAFTA came into effect, the EZLN essentially declared war on the Mexican government, beginning an armed uprising. Seeking to protect the right of the Maya in Chiapas to live their traditional way of life, whilst also championing a revolutionary project across the country with a broader anarchist or libertarian Marxist agenda, the EZLN seized a number of towns and villages in their area. The Mexican army countered their offensive and the EZLN were soon

overrun, but through a defensive strategy the group managed to form a number of independent municipalities. In the long run the EZLN sought not to maintain a military campaign against the Mexican state, but to use their uprising to draw international attention to their cause, seeking to garner support by networking with Mexican and international socialist and anarchist groups. They embraced the use of the internet to disseminate their statements, in so doing gaining fairly widespread notoriety, with the popular anti-establishment band Rage Against the Machine championing their cause. In 1996 the EZLN called for a gathering of grassroots movements from across the globe resisting capitalism: they called for an ‘encuentro’ (encounter) in purpose-built arenas in the Lacandon jungle, where groups could meet to discuss common tactics, problems and solutions; 6,000 people attended from over 40 countries, declaring that they formed “a collective network of all our particular struggles and resistances . . . an intercontinental network of resistance against neo-liberalism” (Marcos, 2002, 117).

This first encounter spawned a second one in Spain in August 1997. In addition, groups from the encounters came from across the globe to meet in Geneva in February 1998, forming the coalition group Peoples’ Global Action (PGA), which was set up to help coordinate demonstrations and resistance against neo-liberalism and capitalism. Mobilisations, referred to as Global Action Days, were organised to integrate a diversity of demonstrations across the globe, with key demonstrations targeting the summits and conferences of the international institutions of neoliberal capitalism (see Graeber, 2009, xii–xv). Out of this radical activist movement came the infamous demonstrations outside the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference in Seattle (30/11/99), which influenced a series of other key demonstrations outside summits or conferences of international institutions, including the Quebec (20–21/04/01), Genoa (20–1/07/2001), and Barcelona (16/03/02) demonstrations. As Juris’s ethnographic study (2008) of this emergent anti-capitalist movement highlights, a notion of singularity in commonality was critical to the organisation of demonstrations. Demonstrators would try to build consensus on how an overall loose coordination and cohesiveness for a demonstration could emerge through a variety of demonstrating blocs, each bloc having its own array of loosely-aligned agendas, tactics, and cultures. The idea was to create a multifaceted swarm – a true multitude – that could overwhelm a conference or summit.

Hardt and Negri’s *Empire*, then, published in 2000, emerged from a revitalised anti-capitalist movement that burst onto the scene in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Like Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus*, it sought to draw out the radical ethos of its moment and champion this ethos as the basis for a future revolution. Hardt and Negri attempted to show that, within the diverse multitude, insurrectionists could emerge from any point in the global system. When exploitation increasingly permeates all of social life, ultimately no one proletarianised group can be the vanguard of the revolution. Nevertheless, as this overview alludes to, while groups peripheral to the West played an important role in the rise of anti-capitalism, Western-rooted activist groups like PGA, with a core of activists from

white middle-class families (see Thompson, 2010), quickly came to play a critical role in the development and popularisation of the movement. Furthermore, it is not quite accurate to imagine the Maya Zapatistas as the autonomous pioneers who spread their culture of resistance to the West. The Zapatistas emerged already linked into the cultural flows emanating from the West, and their revolutionary agenda was heavily shaped by the radical philosophy of Western academics. Indeed, the EZLN's former main spokesperson, Subcomandante Marcos (Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vicente), who played a key role in steering, perhaps even to some extent leading, the EZLN agenda, is a non-Maya Mexican, and admits to being a highly educated urban man from a middle-class family (Marcos, 2001). In this context, it is interesting to note that, while never stating so explicitly, Hardt and Negri seemed to predict the rise of a Western middle-class hegemony over the current era's anti-capitalist movement. They did so by linking biopolitical radicalism to the work practices and work places of what amounts to a Western-rooted, technical intelligentsia.

As noted, Hardt and Negri describe postmodernisation in terms of the rise of immaterial production; that is, the rise of the production of services and affects, and ultimately biology and social life itself. Computer technology plays an increasingly important role in this production as it adds to the efficiency and effectiveness of the problem solving and strategic thinking that is central to successful biopolitical production – management could not intervene successfully in the web of life without the vast processing capabilities of computers. The production of affects, then, relies upon the computers' vast data banks on consumers' opinions and their patterns of behaviours and interactions. Huge amounts of information need to be processed as part of the development of the data banks, and there is a corresponding rise in low skill, low value jobs based on "routine symbolic manipulation", such as data inputting and word processing, which serve as small links in an overarching computerised chain (this seems like an updated version of Marx's vision of workers becoming cogs of flesh in a machine of iron – now a machine of silicon).

Furthermore, Hardt and Negri suggest that an increasing number of people labour to produce affects. Affective labourers can be found in a wide array of industries, for as all production is increasingly treated as a service, more and more employees are directed to deal with human contact and the production of positive relationships. Hardt and Negri give the examples of employment in the health-care and entertainment industries, but as we have seen, the marketing industry is the critical component in the penetration of social life, and marketing principles underlie the notion of 'providing a service'. The authors suggest that because affective labour focuses on human interaction, "cooperation is completely inherent in the labor itself" (*ibid.*, 294). This labour force cannot, consequently, be completely orchestrated by capital; it focuses on building autonomous relationships with consumers as well as with co-workers, so that an understanding can be built up of how its members, as social producers, can relate to humanity in social space. Within this immaterial labour market, an increasingly central role is placed

on the manipulation of knowledge and information as opposed to the manipulation of physical things, with it being encouraged for knowledge resources to be communicated amongst workers to create an increasingly rich understanding of the complexity of social life. This proactive, creative, cooperative communication network, which Boltanski and Chiapello, as we saw in Chapter 4, would say is based on the new spirit of capitalism, offers hope of a “spontaneous and elementary communism” (Hardt and Negri, 2001, 294).

In the Postscript (1990) to Guattari and Negri’s *Communists Like Us* – written in 1989 in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union – Negri, in providing a commentary on who it was that drove the insurrection against state socialism, is more specific on which groups are likely to drive forward the post-industrial communist revolution. In precursor statements to those found in *Empire*, Negri states that in relying on the productive labour of the multitude, the capitalist system is compelled to open up spaces for relatively free, transgressive knowledge production, so that “meanders of social mobility” develop (153). Again, he argues that increased knowledge production gives workers the initiative needed to enrich the biopolitical system with their independently developed forms of connection. The Soviet system, as a state capitalist system, embraced producers of affects within the meanders of social mobility to strengthen the capture of social life, but the producers increasingly used their knowledge production to develop lines of flight from the system and turn against its parasitical oversight:

Who has revolted? The working class? In part yes, but often not. The middle classes, then? To a fair degree, but only when they were not linked to the bureaucracy. What about the students, scientists, workers linked to advanced technologies, intellectuals, and in short, all those who deal with abstract and intellectual work? Certainly this represents the nucleus of the rebellion. Those who rebelled, in brief, were the new kind of producers.

(*ibid.*, 172)

Negri makes a distinction here between two types of middle class producers. The middle class tied to bureaucracy – more generally, we might say the middle class whose labour is closely controlled by the bureaucratic management networks of businesses and establishment institutions – is portrayed as the less radical class. Many members of this class might well be the new kind of producers, i.e., the producers of affects – we might think here of a whole host of managers in marketing and public relations and of providers of professional services – but they are to a large extent pacified by being tied to systems geared towards profit making. The other type of middle class, though, is more radical. This class, less pervaded by bureaucratic networks, has more freedom to undertake abstract and intellectual work that is not geared towards generating networks of affective control but is geared towards the propagation of an emancipatory ethos of social life.

Interestingly, then, while championing the productive power of an exploited multitude, Negri brings to *Empire* a focus on a relatively privileged working elite

involved in the production of the social-labour force. By focusing on the critical importance of intellectual labour in the production of revolutionary forms of social life, Hardt and Negri are drawn towards the relatively free technicians of social production, a kind of *intellectual-technical middle class* (the students Negri mentions in the earlier quote are members of this class in the making). A member of this class is “a social producer, manager of his own means of production and capable of supplying both work and intellectual planning, both innovative activity and a cooperative socialization” (Negri, 1990, 172). This class, then, relies on bourgeois notions of independent labour and creative self-production, and through such notions builds a revolutionary future. The intellectual-technical middle class, through its expert knowledge of social production, can propagate the deterritorialising communication and information networks that favour “cooperative productivity” (Hardt and Negri, 2001, 411). As they embed their form of productivity within social life, the intellectual-technical middle class – along with Hardt and Negri who labour themselves as members of this class – can await “the maturation of the political development” inherent in their productivity (*ibid.*).

Hardt and Negri, of course, would not want us to see the intellectual-technical middle class as a vanguard class that leads the political struggle of the multitude, but in playing such a central role in shaping the socially productive behaviour of the multitude, this class seems to lead at least as a *cultural* vanguard. In Hardt and Negri’s implicit model, the mass factory workers are replaced by the mass office and service workers as the central exploited producers within capitalist society, with the contemporary two groups being alienated by carefully controlled, routinised labour processes. Like the mass factory workers, the office and service workers are antagonistic towards the system because of the way in which it exploits them, but they lack the individual autonomy and associated self-emancipatory radicalism to turn rebellion into revolution. The intellectual-technical middle class, then, the managers of their own means of production, must save such workers from alienation by reshaping their social networks and thereby steering them from routine social production to a radical social production. The intellectual-technicians come across as heroic figures of the ‘good’, using their power to shape social production only to propagate the horizontal networks of desiring-production. For Hardt and Negri their goodness would be linked to their autonomy, for autonomy brings about the freedom of horizontal desiring-production. However, more practically speaking, the members of the intellectual-technical middle class occupy positions of power in the Western-bourgeois system, especially in the private research institutes and academies. They are highly prized within the bourgeois system as the producers of valuable ideas and the propagators and developers of cultural capital – as Hardt and Negri suggest, the system facilitates the ‘meanders of social mobility’ within which they work because it is dependent on their production. Ultimately, members of the intellectual-technical middle class are tightly rooted in the power structures and culture of the bourgeois system, being key contributors towards the development of the contradictory bourgeois ethos of self-emancipation. I argue, then, that the intellectual-technical

middle class pumps radicalised bourgeois biopower through the expanding social-information-network infrastructure in the reproduction of its own human being – the being its members are constituted by as bourgeois subjects.

In this chapter we have seen that Hardt and Negri contrast the “being” of communist desire with the corruption of the “will to power” – the will to power understood here in its lowest form, the form of wanting or seeking power (2001, 413). In Hardt and Negri’s great polarisation, which they pick up from Deleuze and Guattari, the human population, the multitude, in its “love” and “innocence” (ibid.), struggles *to be* – that is, to be communist – by producing desiring-connections. On the other hand, the pervasive capitalist system, essentially answerable to no human being, is a system of death that perpetuates itself by appropriating desire and generating limited cycles of desiring-production that reproduce accumulation and power. However, rather than retreating to nightmarish (but somehow reassuringly simple) visions of dead forces stalking the living, in this book I have proposed that we face up to the conatus, the essential vitality, of power, focusing on the way in which the human being produces its own power-seeking desires. I have argued that capitalism does not emerge out of human production as a Frankenstein’s monster that turns back on its unwitting creator, but emerges out of the essence of our being – at least the essence of our being as it exists under conditions of bourgeois cultural hegemony and biopower. Radical leftists like Hardt and Negri feel compelled to dehumanise the power-seeking dimensions of the system in their genuine, whole-hearted embrace of the being-with facet of desire, which zealously reacts against its oppositional facet of being-over desire. Nevertheless, because both facets of desire are essential to the self-emancipatory process that Hardt and Negri implicitly embrace, a being-over potential remains latent within their revolutionary activism; indeed, this latent potential helps galvanise their activism, reinforcing their sense of individual autonomy and purpose and leading them to implicitly champion the intellectual-technical middle class – that is, their class – as a cultural vanguard. Furthermore, as I shall return to in the Conclusion, anarchistic anti-capitalist activists, who often embrace something of the spirit of Deleuze and Guattari’s and Hardt and Negri’s Nietzschean individualism, can slide towards self-aggrandising notions of revolutionary purity as they develop their intolerance of the system’s effects and engage in highly confrontational forms of activism.

Note

- 1 For Althusser (1969), of course, such a suggestion about the early Marx is beside the point, because the later Marx made an epistemological break from the early, immature humanist Marx. It is not within the scope of this book to get into the debate on the early Marx versus the mature Marx (although Thompson’s critique, 1995 [1978], of Althusser’s interpretation is worth noting). All that is really important to note here is that Althusser promoted the notion of the epistemological break in support of modern statist models of socialism and against the new social movements of the 1960s that were transforming Western culture.

Flexible re-institutionalisation

From revolutionary anti-capitalism to transnationalist alter-globalism

In Chapters 3 and 4 it was suggested that anti-capitalists from the 1960s desperately tried to reject the fundamentals of liberal-democratic culture but could never really do so because their worldview emerged through this culture and radicalised, rather than overturned, its underlying tendencies. Therefore the absorption of progressive egalitarian tendencies into the mainstream from the 1960s onwards marked not so much a co-opting of radicalism as it did a convergence of closely related cultures. I touched on the fact that the convergence was marked by a revitalised human rights culture, which built on liberalist traditions stretching back to the early modern period. The convergence, however, did not entirely suck the life out of the underlying radicalism, and the radicalism re-emerged in fresh forms in the 1990s in reaction against an entrenched corporate power that threatened to stifle self-emancipatory vitality. In the last chapter, it was suggested that Hardt and Negri's philosophy of the revolutionary, desiring multitude, as expressed in *Empire*, was a product of this renewed radical reaction. The point of this chapter is to demonstrate that the eruption of anti-capitalist radicalism in the late 1990s had an effect similar to that of the eruptions of the late 1960s: the 1990s radicalism sent shockwaves through the system, which resonated with the tendencies of progressives or reformists within or close to the mainstream to help open up a new convergence.

I postulate that the new convergence started to emerge when anarchistic/left-libertarian anti-capitalists aligned with the spirit of Hardt and Negri became conflated with the rise of the alter-globalisation movement. While the alter-globalisation movement contained within it many anti-capitalist elements and sentiments, it opened out towards a diverse mix of internationalist activists who sought to reform the global system by injecting egalitarian radicalism into social and political institutions, reinventing notions of human rights and social justice in the process. This chapter shall focus on internationalist ideas that are closest to the point of convergence with anarchistic anti-capitalism; it shall focus on the ideas of some of the most radical internationalists, who are so radical that they are best understood as *transnationalists*. Transnationalists are close to Hardt and Negri with their intent focus on moving beyond the sovereignty and power of nation-states, with their emphasis on crossing national boundaries in the creation

of a new type of global (and not simply inter-national) democracy. Although, as we shall see, these transnationalists display some differences to Hardt and Negri on the style of activism embraced and on responses to localist resistances, they open up the possibilities for deterritorialising energies to be channelled into new forms of institutional organisation without losing their vitality.

Specifically, the chapter will focus on the ideas of Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Jan Aart Scholte, who I have identified as exemplary transnationalists. While I say this, I must note that Scholte rejects the transnationalist label. For Scholte, while transnationalism focuses on “crossing spaces”, it still prioritises the national scale of democracy as the unit of sovereignty in the making of global democracy (2014, 14). For Scholte, global democracy must be based on “transscularity”; on giving equal weight to various scales of democracy. Nevertheless, I contend that the transnationalist label is useful to describe Scholte’s and Santos’s type of alter-globalism because it captures something of these authors’ commitment to work through and within existing nation-state legal structures to bring about progressive reform.

In the last chapter I touched on the fact that Peoples’ Global Action (PGA), an activist coalition that played a key role in initiating the anti-capitalist demonstrations against international financial and trade institutions in the late 1990s, was inspired by the libertarian Marxism and/or anarchism of the Maya Zapatistas. As Graeber explores, in the early 2000s, a number of grassroots activist groups sprung up in North America that followed in the footsteps of PGA to champion anarchistic forms of self-organisation – Graeber himself participated in one of the key coalitions, the Direct Action Network (DAN). Callinicos (2003, see 80–81) associates such radicalism with Autonomous Marxist coalitions such as *Ya Basta!* – a group inspired by the philosophy of Hardt and Negri – suggesting that they set the tone for the period’s demonstrations. Driving forward the organisation of the pluralistic protests against global neoliberal institutions, the mix of anarchists, radical greens, and libertarian Marxists were willing to work with reformist groups and socialist groups with hierarchical internal structures, but they remained suspicious of such groups and were determined to allow a radical spirit of democracy to permeate their organisational culture (see SchNEWS, 2001). As Graeber explains, the anarchistic groups sought to develop horizontal social relations between activists through direct democracy. DAN groups would utilise open spokescouncils to come to decisions, allowing all participants to share ideas and express their views, and groups required that decisions be reached by consensus rather than by majority vote. The groups practised direct action to challenge the legitimacy of established political and legal institutions, insisting that such a challenge was necessary to establish genuine self-determination. In creating lines of flight from established institutions and in experimenting with new forms of social relations, the anarchists sought to carve out a space in which to nurture a new, emancipated way of life. As Graeber notes (2011), anarchist activists – himself included – and anarchist principles would also be central to the Occupy movement when it emerged in New York in August 2011.

The alter-globalisation movement emerged in the early 2000s out of the era's anti-capitalist zeitgeist, coalescing around the World Social Forum (WSF), first held in Brazil in 2001. The WSF was charged with an anarchistic spirit, refusing, to the dismay of socialists, to become a decision-making body for the global left (see Stephen, 2009; see also Santos, 2008, for an embrace of the WSF's openness). Instead it functioned like a collection of spokescouncils, encouraging interchange and consensus building amongst a diverse array of activist groups. As alluded to in the last chapter, the early anti-capitalist movement that emerged from the PGA coalition quickly became rooted in the West, with a niche group of anti-institutionalist, hardcore, or 'professional' Western activists driving forward key protests against the summits and conferences of neoliberal institutions in Western cities. Such activists revelled in cutting themselves off from the social and political mainstream, tending to stick to marginal networks based on a kind of pure, revolutionary ethos.¹ The WSF, on the other hand, emerged as an inclusive, popular institution of the global left. In making itself popular, the WSF based itself in the global South to challenge Northern or Western exclusivity, and sought to draw in support from a wide array of disillusioned individuals and groups: as well as the hardcore revolutionaries, it attracted community, labour, and peasant groups from the South fighting for particular local causes, mainstream politicians and commentators seeking to associate themselves with global justice, and a variety of international charities and NGOs, some more radical than others. The diverse mix of WSF participants united behind an anti-neoliberal globalisation sentiment, as expressed in the WSF's Charter of Principles. The WSF set out to bring about relatively radical reform to the global economic and political system, so that it would begin to promote justice over profit.

While we might think of the WSF as an institution of the global left because of its attempt to establish a new body of leftist thought, with its spirit of plurality and aversion to centralised decision-making it has established itself as a flexible institution, which, as if in the best traditions of liberalist radicalism, is open to a continual process of re-institutionalisation. As Pleyers (2012) suggests, WSF activists have nurtured a political culture "that favours horizontality, internal democracy and the active participation of grassroots actors" (167). To put it into the language of Deleuze and Guattari, while the WSF seeks new territorial arrangements in its drive to reform the global system, it is relatively open to deterritorialising social movements, and it nurtures flexible notions of territorialisation that open up institutional arrangements to a process of democratising change.

In Chapter 1 of this book, I explored Žižek's insistence on the need for the current era's insurrectionary movements to form themselves into a 'strong body', and this idea fits well with what Pleyers describes as "one of the best established models in social movement studies", as propounded by key thinkers such as Michels and Weber. This model suggests that social movements begin with spontaneity and widespread participation of grassroots members, whose shared passion is enough to drive the movement without the need for tight, controlling structures. However, as a movement becomes established, it hardens into a fixed

institution that enforces “regularised routine”, “hierarchy”, and “instrumental reason” (Walker, 1994, in Pleyers, 2012, 166). Formal rules and regulations slowly become implemented by an emerging bureaucratic leadership, which suppresses grassroots vitality beneath the iron will of the central organisational strategy. And as the leadership entrenches itself, it comes to value its self-preservation as much as or more than the social purpose of the movement out of which its institutional arrangement emerged.

Pleyers suggests that while elites within the WSF have tried to move it through this ‘inevitable’ process of hardening institutionalisation, the WSF’s grassroots activists, with their aforementioned culture of participatory democracy, have counteracted this tendency. Pleyers notes that the first three meetings of the WSF were all held in Porto Alegre, Brazil, and that the attendance boomed from one to the next, with 15,000 attendees in 2001, 50,000 in 2002, and 100,000 in 2003 (2012, 167). For Pleyers this growth was made possible by prestigious intellectuals who, often working for NGOs, had the necessary “economic, cultural and social capital” to oversee the development of convergence meetings within the burgeoning alter-globalisation movement in the late 1990s (*ibid.*). The intellectuals developed “international networks of affinity”, establishing themselves as leading figures within the movement. As a result, when alter-globalism began to coalesce around the WSF in 2001, the intellectuals were in position to lead the WSF by dominating the International Council (IC), the organisation that controlled the WSF agenda. Holding its meetings “behind closed doors, with security guards at the entrance”, the IC failed to represent the plethora of grassroots organisations that made up the alter-globalisation movement. Pleyers suggests that consequently, the first WSF “resembled an academic congress”, with scholar-activists organising large panel discussions and shaping many of the smaller workshops (*ibid.*). For the 2003 WSF, attended by over 100,000 people, the WSF’s professionalised Brazilian organising committee sought to “manage the crowds” by prioritising mass lectures by famous intellectuals and political leaders, having the effect of further pacifying “ordinary” participants (*ibid.*, 173).

Pleyers suggests that from the beginning, activists at the WSF have challenged its centralising and hierarchising tendencies. The 2005 WSF in Porto Alegre reached new heights, with a record audience of over 170,000 people. As Pleyers notes, while one might assume that the increasing scale would lead to even more crowd management, “the 2005 forum actually looked very different”. This time, “smaller and more participatory workshops” proliferated to undermine the 2003 dependency on mass lectures (*ibid.*). The workshops were designed to be inclusive, consisting largely of open discussion groups. This shift in approach was made possible by a shift in power relations. For the 2005 WSF, professional organisers working in conjunction with the IC would no longer control the organisation of panels and the choice of speakers. This control now rested with the participating organisations themselves, a shift which helped to decentralise the WSF process. Pleyers notes that the shift gave the event a “bottom-up dynamic”, with participants able to autonomously develop their activist networks (*ibid.*).

Furthermore, in adapting to the demands to make the WSF more plural and inclusive, the WSF has moved towards becoming less dependent on a central event in one location. This trend emerged for the 2006 WSF, which was “poly-centric” (P-WSF); it was held simultaneously in Bamako, Caracas, and Karachi. Furthermore, Pleyers argues that, since 2006, leading intellectual-activists who played a prominent role in the founding of the WSF have begun to lose their influence. He notes that a number of leading intellectuals have, since 2006, expressed grave concerns about the viability of the WSF as an effective body able to initiate positive change (see Bello, 2007). Rather than as a sign of the decline of the WSF, Pleyers interprets this criticism as evidence that such intellectuals are losing touch with an increasingly participatory forum – they are dismayed because WSF participants are beginning to reject their expert supervision (see 2012, 180). For Pleyers, the dominant intellectuals are being replaced by “a new generation of experts and advocacy networks”, who/which are more attuned to a culture of egalitarian organisation.

For Pleyers, the fact that grassroots social movements have successfully resisted tendencies towards scholar-activist and NGO domination says much about a shift in the culture of global civil society. Grassroots movements – such as Via Campesina, the international movement for poor farmers – have become increasingly unwilling to allow the Western intelligentsia and NGOs to speak in their name or to represent their interests in dealing with international institutions. Instead, they have become increasingly determined to build their own international networks and speak for themselves (2012, 177). Pleyers does concede, however, that grassroots resistance to the institutionalisation of the WSF may have caused a drop in participant numbers and less media coverage of the event. The 2011 WSF in Dakar, for example, had around 40,000 attendees, well down from the highs of over 100,000 at previous forums. However, Pleyers suggests that rather than being a sign of the decline of social movements, this drop in popularity may reflect the penetration of the culture of democratisation. The WSF has developed an agenda to reach out geographically and socially beyond the white middle-class activist base. In this way, the WSF prioritises the development of dispersed grassroots networks of resistance over the necessity of an increasingly strong impact event overseen by an organisational elite.

In his analysis of the anti-institutionalist/institutionalist dynamic at the WSF, Pleyers comes close to postulating a dualism between the grassroots movements of the South and the activist elite of the West. However, I would emphasise the interconnectivity between the Southern activists and the Western activist elite. Pleyers proposes a rather idealistic theory of resistance similar to Hardt and Negri’s, in which exploited activists of the multitude struggle to break free from the elites that attempt to stifle and control their open movements. And like Hardt and Negri, Pleyers underplays the significance of the intellectual elite’s role in organising and steering popular social movements: through the power they have to organise and steer, they *shape the ethos* of social movements. As we have seen, Pleyers suggests that alter-globalism emerged as a conscious movement when members of the

Western intelligentsia emanating from academies and NGOs used their ‘economic, cultural and social capital’ to build ‘international networks of affinity’. In leading the development of these networks, the intelligentsia did not just oversee a process; they forged a process marked by their hegemonic culture. The point here is not to deny the vitality or the radicalism of grassroots movements of the South, but to insist that as local movements based on particular local causes reach out to the world to find allies in their struggle, they become tied to a global social network through which the West spreads its dominant cultural currents. Such currents do not simply override ‘non-Western’ movements, but they do percolate through them and influence them with Western notions of social change, so that non-Western sentiments of sociality are channelled towards Western notions of self-determination and universal egalitarianism. And as Pleyers notes, even as the grassroots movements try to break away from Western elites, they become tied to ‘a new generation of experts and advocacy networks’, who/which have strong roots in the culture of the radicalised section of the Western intelligentsia – an intelligentsia that is always pushing to open up the world to flows of egalitarian association.

The radical segment of the Western intelligentsia within the alter-globalisation movement is deeply anti-Western-centric, being strongly opposed to the hegemony of Western culture and the leadership role the West assumes it has the right to take. Nevertheless, in pursuing the argument in the previous paragraph, I insist here that even the most anti-Western-centric Western intellectuals are anti-Western-centric not in spite of their status as members of a privileged Western intelligentsia, *but precisely because of their status as members of a privileged Western intelligentsia*. As I have suggested in this book, there is a long tradition of bourgeois Western activists embracing associational radicalism to pursue unbounded human equality and to denounce the exploitation carried out by Western peoples and systems. The current crop of radical Western alter-globalist activists, then, are heirs to a tradition that stretches right back to the protestant radicalism of the seventeenth century. Such radicalism produced individuals like Roger Williams, one of the founders of the New England state of Rhode Island, who struggled tirelessly for spiritual diversity and embraced the life-worlds of indigenous peoples. Williams believed in an essential spiritual equality that tied together all men, denouncing self-aggrandising ideas about Christian superiority. Commenting on the Native American peoples, Williams wrote;

Boast Not, Proud English, of thy birth and blood,
Thy brother Indian is by birth as Good.
Of one blood god made him and thee and all,
As wise, as fair, as strong, as personal.

(in Hill, 1997, 112)

Williams, then, yearned to open up the being-with culture of protestant radicalism to the peoples of the world. He sensed that it was just as possible to be-with an ‘Indian’ brother as it was to be-with an English brother.

The radical Western activists of the alter-globalisation movement, in spreading their intellectual and social culture, produce their international networks of affinity and thereby produce Westernised intellectual-activist counterparts throughout the world (see Pleyers, 2012, 174, on the dominant role of professional Malians, Westernised and well-connected with their European fellows, at the Bamako P-WSF in 2006). Such intellectual-activists increasingly take for granted and help re-produce the radical Western tradition that embraces non-Western ways of being in the drive towards increasingly deterritorialised being-with desire. Driven on by this being-with culture, Westernised activists are selective in their embrace of the non-Western, embracing those ways of being in which they see an egalitarian tendency that is compatible with their own radicalised Western way of being. They do not, indeed cannot, reject the Western culture that has shaped their way of being, but instead seek to alienate from themselves the being-over facet of Western culture in their embrace of its being-with facet. Even in their genuine, heartfelt recoil from desires for power, they yearn for the empowerment of their being-with desires, and are impelled to draw on their economic, social, and cultural capital to orientate the world to their being-with way of being, guiding, with encouragement or discouragement as the occasion suits, and subconsciously filtering social movements as they seek to will their culture, if not themselves, to power. In a very specific sense, then, anti-Western-centric activists socialised into the tradition of the West's being-with radicalism struggle for hegemonic power, spreading a radicalised self-emancipatory ethos across the world.

In *Empire*, Hardt and Negri display a certain amount of ambivalence towards anti-Western-centric ideas. In their fervent embrace of the immanent potential for global revolution, the authors are keen to criticise 'localist' leftists (who we can associate with humanitarian NGOs or charities like Oxfam; see Callinicos, 2003) who embrace boundaries of identity, territory, or nationality in order to protect local groups from the invasion of neoliberal globalisation. Hardt and Negri refer to this response as "entirely reactive" (2001, 44); a swing towards paternalistic protectionism in reaction against Western discourses of expansion. In embracing the flows that constitute Empire, Hardt and Negri argue that it is more realistic, more practical, to avoid idealising about a 'pure' outside and focus on the potentials for liberation *within* a universal Empire.² As suggested in the last chapter, through this argument, Hardt and Negri implicitly embrace the hegemonic productions of the West's intellectual-technical middle class. Nevertheless, as they wrote *Multitude* in the early 2000s, Hardt and Negri responded to the development of the alter-globalisation movement to more explicitly express an anti-Western-centric philosophy, following in the vein of activists prominent at the World Social Forum (WSF) by embracing the spiritual singularities or life-worlds of indigenous peoples (see Hardt and Negri, 2004, 125–129). Like some of the most radical WSF activists, who, as suggested at the beginning of this chapter, we can call *trans*-nationalists rather than *inter*-nationalists because of their emphasis on horizontal networks across national boundaries, Hardt and Negri insisted in *Multitude* that to embrace local

or indigenous singularity is not to entrench difference, for singularities are always open to common experiences and desires.

Despite its embrace of worldwide networks as against localist protectionism, *Empire* was highly critical of the notion of a global juridical right. In developing its criticisms, Hardt and Negri associated the West's 'progressive' leftist internationalism with such a notion of right. They argued that internationalists do not throw away the old nation-state model in which state authority is based upon a contractual agreement between the people and the authorities. They suggest that in trying to build theoretical models to support the constitution of a progressive supranational power, many theorists have turned to "Lockean ideologies" of the sovereign state (2001, 7). Through a "liberal" model, the supranational order is understood in "decentralised, pluralistic terms" (ibid.). The supranational order faces resistance from a plethora of activists and is compelled towards seeking the consent of a network of small and large groups. Rather than state centralisation, this model favours an agglomeration of associational groups in the constitution of "*global civil society*" (ibid., emphasis in original³). Hardt and Negri cite Richard Falk as the preeminent proponent of this "reformist" model⁴ (see ibid., note 11, 416–417). For Hardt and Negri, the global civil society project is based on the transposing of an outdated nation-state model onto the supranational, that is, post-state order. While in the liberal model global civil society struggles for concessions from an overriding sovereign power, under *Empire*, sovereign power is dispersed, and the multitude best challenges its pervasiveness through the development of its productive networks, within which the multitude constitutes its own radical, immanent power.

Since the publication of *Empire*, transnationalist alter-globalists have themselves criticised the 'liberal' legalism of alter-globalist notions of global democratic governance. In their Introduction to their edited collection *Law and Globalisation from Below* (2005), 'transnationalists' Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito recognised the deficiencies in contemporary socio-legal theory on the constitution of a more egalitarian global order. They argued that in the late 1990s and early 2000s, while there was a proliferation of theories and empirical studies on law and globalisation, the "paradox" was that such theories and studies largely failed to grasp the significance of the bottom-up nature of the contestation of globalisation (2). For the editors, the trend of the period was for scholars to conceive of global legal transformations as a top-down process "of diffusion of economic and legal models from the global North to the global South" (ibid.). Among various top-down models, Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito recognise that one trend was for scholars to conceive of "the expansion of the interstate human rights regime and international law at large". Like Hardt and Negri, they note that Richard Falk is one of the key proponents of this approach. The editors seem to accept, then, some of Hardt and Negri's criticisms of internationalist legalism in the era of Hardt and Negri's *Empire* (late 1990s to early 2000s). They accept that the legal models of liberal Northern nation-states were being projected onto a diversity of grassroots struggles across the globe and were failing to take into account the independent creativity of the grassroots activists themselves.

While, like Hardt and Negri, Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito recognise the limitations of legal models if the law is conceived of as a top-down enforcement, they do not go so far as to reject legalism as a stifling imposition on the richness of biopolitical life. For them, the aim is to help grassroots movements and associated Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) articulate their own “alternative legal frameworks” that can effectively challenge neoliberal institutions (2005, 3). The project Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito give expression to has radically democratic implications because rather than a global civil society seeking concessions from an overarching supranational order, they conceive of a global civil society that rejects the hegemonic order by building a “cosmopolitan legality” – a counterhegemonic legality that is built upon the varied bottom-up or “subaltern” democratic practices of the world’s marginalised peoples. This notion of the constitution of a new plural power by transnational social movements comes very close to Hardt and Negri’s conception of a constituting multitude that “creates new institutional and social models based on its own productive capacities” (2004, 308).

Scholte (2014) builds on Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito’s project to understand the potential for global democracy in an age of globalising social connections. He argues that models for global democratic governance tend to fall within two broad categories. The first category he refers to as *statism*, models of which suggest that what is most needed is “multilateral collaboration among nation-states” (4). The second category he refers to as *modern cosmopolitanism*, models of which, in being more or less synonymous with the ‘liberal’ model outlined earlier, suggest that global democracy should be conceived as a supranational version of Western liberal democracy, championing notions “such as citizenship, human rights, civil society and representative government” (ibid.). However, for Scholte, “each of these two models has severe flaws” (ibid., 5). Building on the insights he has developed as a convenor of and activist within the Building Global Democracy (BGD) programme, Scholte suggests a third category of models, which he labels *postmodern global democracies*. This category is similar to Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito’s radicalised cosmopolitanism in its insistence on bottom-up self-constitution and an egalitarian diversity of practices.

In explaining their notion of cosmopolitan legality, Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito (2005) are critical of what they call “hegemony scholars” (6). Such scholars, they argue, who “draw on a rich tradition of critical social theory, from Marx to Bourdieu and Foucault” (ibid.), emphasise the futility of *turning to the law* in resisting the status quo. Analysts of the construction of hegemony are keen to draw attention to the role the internationalisation of Western law plays in the perpetuation of the hegemonic order. Appeals to the law, which ultimately accept the authority of the powers that be, help to reinforce the status of capitalist structures of legitimation. Resistance movements that focus on legal reform, then, can help reproduce the hegemony of the capitalist system, which strengthens its grip the more it resigns resistance movements to its role as arbitrator. Hardt and Negri tie in closely with the ‘hegemony scholars’, for in *Empire*, heavily influenced by

both Marx and Foucault, they emphasise the importance of universal juridical right in the constitution of Empire's supranational order.

Despite recognising the insights of hegemony scholars, Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito state that in their obsession with the collaboration between hegemonic forces and supposedly counterhegemonic movements, hegemony scholars exaggerate the ideological function of certain types of counterhegemony movements. For Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito, hegemony scholars over-emphasise the role of transnational elites in the construction of global counterhegemony. They insist that "myriad, local, non-English-speaking actors" play a crucial role in constructing counterhegemonic movements as they struggle against the intrusive power of neoliberal globalisation (2005, 11). So, for the editors, when we see, say, Bolivian peasants resisting the privatisation of water services, we should recognise that while the grassroots resisters may work in alliance with transnational NGOs, their struggle over legal institutions is specific to local marginalisation and is absolutely counterhegemonic. Furthermore, Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito argue that in emphasising the pervasiveness of hegemonic structures, hegemony scholars implicitly dismiss practically all Westernised transnational elites for disseminating more or less the same underlying capitalist agenda. In doing so, they overlook the real differences that one finds within the elite: "conflating international human rights lawyers risking their lives on the job with transnational corporate lawyers making a fortune attains analytical bite at the cost of descriptive oversimplification" (ibid.). While it is true that when transnational coalitions enable positive reforms to legal structures they may, implicitly at least, recognise the power of legitimation of the establishment, the ethos of the struggle they are contributing to can be genuinely counterhegemonic and can nurture a tendency towards radical reformulations of legal structures. So, for example, we saw real progress when "corporate dominance of the global regulation of international property rights" was successfully challenged by an alliance of activists and local community groups that forced legal reform in South Africa to allow for "the production of affordable antiretroviral drugs for AIDS patients" (ibid., 12). If counterhegemonic coalitions do seek a "new legal hegemony orthodoxy", it is one that champions "solidaristic, cosmopolitan legal frameworks" over a corporate-friendly consensus (ibid.).

For Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito, in the best traditions of critical theory, they see it as their job to draw out and give expression to the progressive tendencies within emergent movements. The editors argue that it is absolutely necessary to start "from where we are" (ibid., 18), and that in this respect, "subaltern cosmopolitan legality follows the path of counterhegemonic struggles first theorized by Gramsci" (ibid.). Similarly, in response to Harvey's orthodox Marxist criticisms of their *Commonwealth* – in which Harvey bemoans the lack of development of consciously revolutionary action in Hardt and Negri's vision of social change – Hardt and Negri make clear that it is the tendency of social movements that really matters and not the extent of their explicit radicalism (see Harvey et al., 2009). They too argue that a social revolution begins with the budding of

an anti-systemic approach – the approach does not suddenly appear fully formed. Such embryonic movements nurture emancipatory desire and can be inclined towards, and/or develop into, more radical movements.

Hardt and Negri's embrace of counterhegemonic reform, as seen in *Commonwealth*, first clearly emerged in their *Multitude* (2004). As noted, *Empire*, the predecessor to *Multitude*, was a highly leftist-reactionary book, written during the eruption of anti-capitalist radicalism in the late 1990s. As such, it is dripping with a highly confrontational, revolutionary spirit, championing violent uprisings such as the Zapatista uprising and the race riots in LA in 1992 (see 2001, 54). At a moment when they were deeply sensitive to the development of capitalism's biopower and its overriding juridical right, with its militaristic permanent state of emergency, in *Empire* Hardt and Negri imagine a violent, "barbaric" (but positive) struggle against the capitalist system (see *ibid.*, 213–218), as social movements suddenly unleash revolutionary flows against an increasingly pervasive regime of capture.⁵ However, by the time they sat down to write *Multitude*, with revolutionary zeal being channelled towards a new cycle of struggle, Hardt and Negri, while still insisting on the limits of reform projects, were ready to champion the rise of a new global movement with an anti-capitalist tendency. In doing so, they were very careful to recognise the potentially counterproductive outcomes of revolutionary zeal, keen to stress that in order to avoid sliding towards autocratic enforcements, radical social movements should be willing to work with progressive reformist groups to open up a process of institutional transformation that is infused with a revolutionary spirit: "[the multitude] must organize its project in step with the times, determined by constituent mechanisms and institutional procedures that guard against dramatic reversals and suicidal errors" (2004, 355).

Regardless of their comfort with reformist movements, it is clear that transnationalist alter-globalists, much like Hardt and Negri, are animated by a radical anti-capitalist agenda. In the Introduction to the second volume of *Reinventing Social Emancipation – Another Production is Possible: Beyond the Capitalist Canon* (2006) – Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito insist that a post-capitalist economic system will be integral to the development of a system of bottom-up global democracy, for capitalism concentrates power in the hands of the few, not the people. They envisage alternative production projects linking up to form a network of labour internationalism, with a diverse group of cooperatives, NGOs, state agencies, and social movement organisations coming together to share ideas and activities on egalitarian forms of production. Moving along similar lines, Scholte notes that democratisation, as an egalitarian project, requires "equivalent opportunities for all affected persons to participate in and exercise control over societal regulatory processes" (2014, 11). For Scholte, such equalisation cannot be achieved through the basic notion of "equality of civil and political rights" (*ibid.*) as espoused by liberal democracies. Glaring economic inequalities both within and between nations lead to privileged classes – with their educational advantages, social and political contacts, and influential resources at their disposal – having better access to the levers of power. Scholte, consequently,

calls for “a relatively even distribution of material resources across ‘the people’” (ibid.). Such a distribution would give all individuals an equal, basic capacity to contribute towards the development of the institutional framework within which their social organisation and production evolves.

While insisting that their cosmopolitanism is premised on the self-affirmations of the peoples of the world, Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito recognise that the cosmopolitan project has roots in Western modernity. Cosmopolitan Westerners have historically opposed elitist Western projects to subjugate “inferior” peoples. Their cosmopolitanism can be traced through opposition to neoliberalism to nineteenth century anti-imperialism and right back to opposition to the “Colonial Christianity” of the sixteenth century (2005, 13). Such cosmopolitanism insists on a humanist notion of justice; on the idea that the essential worth of each human being overrides any nation’s or state’s notion of its right to dominate certain sections of humanity. As I have suggested, we can connect cosmopolitanism to the development of liberalist spirituality. Earlier, it was noted that Roger Williams, the progressive Protestant of early colonial North America, refused to recognise the inferiority of the ‘Indian’ peoples; he also refused to recognise the right of Europeans to expropriate Indian lands. For Williams, the Indians were fellow men, equal by birth and ultimately equal in the eyes of God. Unlike many of his fellow colonists, he strove to maintain reciprocal and convivial relationships with the Native American communities. Williams learnt Native American languages, came to respect their cultures, and refused to baptise natives because of his belief in Liberty of Conscience (see Davis, 1970, and Barry, 2012). He developed friendships and trust with the Native Americans, forming alliances with them, especially the Narragansett people. His project was cosmopolitan in the sense that, to borrow the language of Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito, he sought for people from disparate cultures to “understand and welcome their differences while striving to pursue joint endeavours” (2005, 13).

However, Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito suggest that because modern cosmopolitan projects tend to be rooted in Western traditions, they very often carry forward notions of justice that ultimately fall back on Western dominance. Williams’s early cosmopolitan spirit is indicative here, for despite all his conviviality with the Native Americans, he was still part of the colonial imposition on North America, and even supported the Massachusetts Bay colony in the Pequot War (despite all his moral and political disagreements with the colony), helping to maintain the division between the Pequot and the Narragansett that ensured victory for the colonists. More contemporarily, Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito note that humanitarian organisations and human rights activists often promote a notion of human rights that has a distinctly “Western” and “liberal” bent, and therefore they often promote property rights over notions of human dignity and collective rights (2005, 13–14). Here, again, a top-down process can develop, whereby the West exports models of cosmopolitan justice that are conducive to the West’s capitalist expansion. On the other hand, Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito support a cosmopolitan model in which Western activists *respond* to the struggles of the excluded rather than assert their

cosmopolitanism onto the world. The editors, then, embrace a bottom-up version of cosmopolitanism; a *subaltern* cosmopolitanism. This cosmopolitanism rejects hegemonic impositions of right from the dominant, and embraces an egalitarian diversity emerging from the grassroots: “Subaltern cosmopolitanism, with its emphasis on social inclusion . . . is of an oppositional variety” (2005, 14).

As alluded to earlier, Scholte (2014), similarly to Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito, critiques *modern* cosmopolitanism. For Scholte, modern cosmopolitans, following in the traditions of Vitoria, Kant, and Marx, recognise the limitations of divisive statist models and insist on transnational solidarity and the building of world government (8). Nevertheless, Scholte argues, modern cosmopolitans ultimately tend to hold a limited conception of global democracy in that they attempt to transpose the state model of ‘western liberal democracy’ onto the global level. Global cosmopolitanism supports a supranational government underpinned by global human rights or universal justice, with accountability and public participation facilitated by global civil society and a global public sphere. For Scholte, modern cosmopolitanism’s liberal-legal framework does not push democratisation far enough. It still projects a top-down nation-state model onto the global level, with a supreme sovereign authority that works over and above other levels of government. For Scholte, modern cosmopolitan writers neglect the subject of how a global government would interact with democratic government at regional, national, and local levels. Indeed, he argues that in some sense modern cosmopolitanism, with its notion of supranational order, is even more homogenising than statism, for it insists on the universal dimension of ‘the people’. It is this notion that Hardt and Negri associate with the rise of Empire and universal imperial right. Hardt and Negri insist that such a universalising notion is out of step with the development of biopolitical production, in which singularities and heterogeneity are more significant than the universal. Similarly, Scholte notes that communities across the world, each with different local issues and concerns, often do not think of their collective identity in terms of the entire human species. To insist, then, on the primacy of universal solidarity would be to impose artificial unity on a diversity of peoples.

For Scholte, modern cosmopolitanism’s notions of universal right are based on Western predispositions and fail to reflect the concerns of all the world’s peoples. He can envisage how global human rights could underpin global citizenship, but would expect such rights to be “reformulated beyond a particularistic western-liberal conception so as to incorporate more cross-cultural notions of life with dignity” (2014, 12; Scholte cites Santos as a reference point here). In addition, Scholte accepts that there is much merit to the notion of global civil society holding governments to account. But Scholte has a postmodern conception of civil society that is at odds with the “modern” notion of “bureaucratic citizen organisations (‘NGOs’)” dominating civil space (*ibid.*). For Scholte, what is needed is for grassroots movements to realise their potential to take a more active role in developing their own civil society networks with participatory democracy. As we have seen, for Pleyers, this is precisely what they are starting to do.

In championing subaltern cosmopolitanism, Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito (2005) emphasise the need to reconnect law and politics (15). They suggest that the law is too often institutionalised as a transcendent power: a supreme, ‘objective’ force that issues its dictates from up high (as we have seen, this is precisely the type of legal power that Hardt and Negri reject). For Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito, legal institutionalisation should instead be seen as part of the process of participatory democracy and part of the political struggle against hegemonic forces. For this reason, turning to already-established legal structures can take counterhegemonic movements only so far. They note that the collection of case studies in their book point to the fact that transnational and local movements advance their causes through a “combination of legal and illegal (as well as non-legal) strategies” (ibid.). Such movements do not pander to the law, but organise “rallies, strikes, consumer boycotts, civil disobedience, and other forms of (often-times illegal) direct action” as they seek legal redress and legal reform (ibid.). From squatters in Texas to the landless peasants’ movement (MST) and participatory budgeting in Brazil, marginalised groups are recognising the progress that can be made by “straddl[ing] the border between legality and illegality”, finding practical ways to force the legal establishment to face up to counterhegemonic notions of community (ibid.). Social movements and TANs can exploit tensions between local, national and supranational legal frameworks to advance their counterhegemonic cause, seeking out the most progressive legalism at every legal level. Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito refer, for example, to Arriscado, Matias and Costa’s case study on the way in which Portuguese communities turned to European directives and regulations to challenge the Portuguese government on the building of co-incineration facilities that threatened community rights to a clean environment.

Subaltern cosmopolitan legality, as alluded to, seeks to move the law beyond the liberal-legal framework, which is heavily biased towards property rights, especially in the liberal heartlands of the Anglo-Saxon world (see Ricketts, 2012, 9–10). However, while seeking a redefinition of rights, subaltern cosmopolitanism does not reject rights altogether, for it is necessary for local and transnational activists to seek the protection of vulnerable individuals and groups in the face of US militarism and worker exploitation within neoliberal structures. In their *Law and Globalisation From Below*, Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito brought together a series of studies which they felt demonstrated that subaltern groups seek to push the notion of right beyond the confines of possessive individualism towards communal notions of right that are not derived from Western traditions. They draw attention, in particular, to Visvanathan and Parmar’s study of grassroots struggles in India “for the collective rights to the commons, culture, land, and traditional knowledge” (2005, 16, and see Chapter 14). We see embedded in this notion of right a very organic conception of the law; law which, far from just outlining a basic framework of rules, helps to institute protections for entire life-worlds.

Nevertheless, as I have argued through this book, the attempt to oppose liberal individualism to solidaristic notions of right is problematic, for the right to

'property' is understood in a complex way in liberalist traditions, and its development brings out both a possessiveness and an egalitarianism that sit uncomfortably beside one another in Western society. I am tempted here to provocatively suggest that Visvanathan and Parmar, as Professors emanating from Westernised academic institutes – the Dhirubhai Ambani Institute of Information and Communication Technology in Visvanathan's case, and the Mudra Institute for Communication in Parmar's case; institutes, as Hardt and Negri might suggest, that are critical to the production of communication and information knowledges for Empire's biopolitical networks, networks which expand outwards from the West – are promoting a radicalised Western cosmopolitan agenda as much as local traditions when they champion the rights of indigenous peoples in India. They build on the liberalist notions of autonomy, essential equality, and freedom of association to insist on the rights of individuals and their communities to be different.

In any case, regardless of its Western cultural leanings, the emphasis on marginalised Southern ways of being is undoubtedly central to Santos's progressive message, which is elaborated on in the three volumes of *Reinventing Social Emancipation* (2005, 2006, and 2007). Acting as editor, he contributes to a theoretical overview for each volume's concepts in introductions, while the main bulk of each book is made up of detailed case studies by a number of different authors who have sought to comprehend the struggles of exploited peoples in the global South. In the Introduction to Volume III of *Reinventing Social Emancipation – Another Knowledge is Possible* (2007), Santos argues, with Nunes and Meneses, that there can be no global social justice without global cognitive justice. The authors explain that there is a tendency for Northern intellectuals to dictate to the world what particular type of knowledge can lead to worldwide emancipation. However, because this knowledge is based on Western values and Western concepts of truth and development, it acts as a hegemonic paradigm that suppresses the creative development of a diversity of knowledges by local peoples. Santos challenges social science to engage with and incorporate ideas and knowledge produced not only by the dominant powers but also knowledge produced by marginalised peoples.

In championing local ways of knowing and being and challenging the Western tendency to impose Western ways on the world, Scholte (2014) suggests that Western concepts of global democracy tend to be based on "anthropocentrism" (13). For Scholte, as Western-led over-exploitation of the world's resources drives our planet towards ecological instability, much more thought needs to be given to how a world society can "embrace the overall web of life", rather than see the world as something to be dominated (*ibid.*). Scholte suggests, then, that we must move "from anthropocentrism to biocentrism" (21), implying that any ethos of domination is incompatible with a true notion of democracy. In order for democracy to flourish, we should avoid striving to subsume the natural world and the 'primitive' peoples close to it in the name of humanity's material progress, and should instead focus on respecting and sharing in the riches of nature, thereby enabling all peoples in their different life-worlds to enhance their wellbeing. In

order to develop the connection between a profound respect for people and a profound respect for nature, Scholte suggests that human beings need to rethink notions of “citizenship” – a term, after all, “derived from the city, a human settlement that is deliberately situated outside and above ‘the state of nature’” (ibid). Here ‘civilised’ people could learn from indigenous peoples already close to nature, like Amazonian peoples who, in opposition to citizenship, have championed the principle of “forestizenship”, which emphasises humankind’s duties to the full web of life (ibid). In the same vein, the Bolivian government, Scholte notes, with its mandate deriving largely from indigenous communities, has campaigned at the United Nations for its “Law of Rights of Mother Earth” (ibid.). Much like Scholte, Santos et al. (2007), in reacting against the Western way of knowing the world, suggest that the West has much to learn from indigenous groups that live through their intimacy with the web of life, arguing that instead of “a monoculture of scientific knowledge” what is needed is “an ecology of knowledges” (ibid., see xlvi–xlix). In attempting to protect the diversity-promoting life-worlds of indigenous peoples, Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito champion indigenous struggles for the right to territory (2005, 21; see also Rodríguez-Garavito and Arenas, 2005, 248–251).

Similarly to Scholte and Santos, Hardt and Negri reject a ‘bourgeois’ science based on transcendent rationality and hierarchical codification. Instead they embrace the science of immanent materialism emerging from Spinoza. Science in this form does not strive towards the highest realm of objective purity, but immerses itself in the mechanics of the material world and learns from sensual experience. Embracing “a science of multiplicities” (2004, 309), the people of the multitude explore the intricacies of the world and bring into being a diversity of knowledges that are shared to produce a new “social knowledge”; an understanding of the common desires that connect a world of proliferating singularities. As we saw in the last chapter, Hardt and Negri promote ‘translation’ between distinct knowledges – very similarly to how Santos does, incidentally (see Santos et al., 2007) – to produce interconnections and hybridisations that facilitate unity in diversity.

While supporting the protection of local ways of being, in guarding against a primordialist tendency to fix ways of being in place (on this tendency, see Hardt and Negri, 2001, 45), Scholte (2014) is keen to stress that bottom-up democracy does not necessitate giving local territories primary sovereignty. Instead of prioritising any one geographical space in the building of global democracy, Scholte promotes, as noted at the beginning of the chapter, “transscularity”, insisting that no one scale is key to democracy (14). With this principle, Scholte insists that not even the “immediate sphere” of family and community interactions can be given primacy in democratisation (ibid., 10), noting that “some national states and global social movements can manifest considerably more people’s rule than certain local orders” (ibid.). For Scholte, there can be no hierarchy of democratic levels, not even an inverted hierarchy, or presuppositions about which level of democracy is most important. We can see here that what matters most to Scholte

is not local freedom per se, *but the right type of egalitarian freedom*, which should be sought out at various scales. As a Western intellectual, he propagates a discourse that does not embrace local ways of being indiscriminately, but carefully discriminates in order to capture and bring out ways of being that are compatible with his own radicalised version of Western egalitarianism.

While Scholte may come close to Hardt and Negri's concept of the multitude in his embrace of the people's potential to develop their own multiple identities through horizontal and proliferating interconnections, in pushing anti-Western-centrism to its limits, he rejects Hardt and Negri's ontological conception of desire (personal communication, 30/04/2012). For Scholte, because each person's sense of desire is a product of a particular cultural life-world, it is not possible to propose a universal concept of desire that applies to all people. He suggests that this universalist approach ties in with the Western modernist project to institute Western cultural hegemony – who are Hardt and Negri to inform the world what or how the people desire? Scholte questions the extent to which Hardt and Negri have really engaged with the diversity of the world's peoples in order to reach their conclusions on desire, noting, for example, that while Hardt has appeared as a celebratory or 'VIP' speaker at the World Social Forum (WSF) – offering his insights to largely passive audiences – Scholte, and many other activists like him, are part of the WSF grind; consistently engaged in the collective reflections with grassroots organisations year after year. Through such thoroughly active engagement, Scholte believes that it is possible to build bridges between distinct groups while continuing to respect a diversity of ontological opinions.

Nevertheless, as a former grassroots activist who paid the price for his subversive endeavours with a jail term, Negri can certainly make the claim that his ideas have a firm basis in the real life struggles of the oppressed. This is why, as we saw in the last chapter, Negri, with Hardt, proposes a 'materialist teleology'; an analysis of the human purpose that emerges out of the multitude's concrete struggles for liberation. Scholte, however, has been shaped by a different type of activism to Negri. While Negri's philosophy was shaped by his activism in the 1960s and 1970s, which centred on the confrontational struggles of working-class Westerners, Scholte is closer to the human rights activists who, as touched on earlier in the chapter, Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito connect to the Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) that seek to support the most marginalised communities in the world in their struggles for new institutions to uphold social justice. In emanating from different activist backgrounds, Negri and Scholte express decidedly different philosophical attitudes. Negri's attitude has been forged through his immersion in the subversive undercurrents of Western anti-capitalism, which, in rubbing up against the West's capitalist heartlands, are highly reactive. Consequently, activists within these subversive flows develop a raw, confrontational energy, and live through a taken-as-given desiring spontaneity – a spontaneity on which Negri bases his philosophy of desire. Scholte's attitude, on the other hand, has been forged through his immersion in a scholar-activist and NGO project premised on inclusive debates and discussions that aim to bring together

different groups and sections of communities. Scholte's style of activism, then, seeks to move raw struggle to joint reflection and mediation, drawing radical energies into a mainstream project to develop new institutional forms. Rather than charging in and attempting to incite the people into an all or nothing struggle, Scholte attempts "to be as deferential as possible" in helping activist groups find workable solutions to their problems (personal communication, 30/04/2012). As opposed to the philosophy of affirmative desire, then, Scholte proposes a philosophy of deference to the marginalised.

However, the differing styles of activism and attitudes of Negri and Scholte disguise cultural backgrounds that are in fact closely related. As touched on, both activists emerge from a broad political-philosophical Western intelligentsia whose members share in a radicalised Western spirit of cultural transformation. The different philosophical attitudes of Negri and Scholte remain premised on shared philosophical principles, with both attitudes playing key roles in the development of a process of emergence through which radicalised notions of self-emancipation come to reshape and revitalise the West's mainstream institutions. While Scholte attempts to reject a Hardt-and-Negri-style philosophy of desire, his worldview is premised, much like Hardt and Negri's, on a belief in the unlimited positive potential of self-producing subjects who are free from the corrupting forces of Western/capitalist systems of domination. Like Hardt and Negri, he is active in opening up the world to the human being's connective capacities, seeming to take for granted a Hardt-and-Negri-style desire of multiplying connections and identities. This desire is implicitly conceptualised as universal, but only in the sense that it pervades and emerges out of the world's peoples in producing indeterminate becomings – it universalises the endless production of the local nuance. Again, though, the local nuance always emerges out of, and remains bonded to, humanity's interconnections, which, as touched on in the last chapter, Hardt and Negri link to a desire of sentient love. In implicitly embracing a desire of multiplicity, connection, and love, Scholte unites humanity with the chaotic but living flows of the world, relating to the indigenous immersion in nature and admiring nature's self-constituted biodiversity. Similarly, Hardt and Negri embrace organic flow through their Romantic sensibility (see Bove, 2010, 186), picking up on Deleuze and Guattari's conceptualisation of man as *Homo natura*. As we saw in Chapter 5, Deleuze and Guattari ground humanity in the desiring-machines of the cosmos, proclaiming the creative potential of human subjects who work through nature, who *be with* nature, rather than be over it. Both Negri and Scholte, then, as products of a broad Western intelligentsia with a spiritual mission to bring out the potential of its own particular cultural life-world, embrace the West's culture of associational or interconnective radicalism to push forward a project that presupposes a certain type of being-with desiring purity.

In this chapter, I have suggested that the alter-globalisation movement emerged out of the anti-capitalist milieu of the late 1990s to channel self-emancipatory radicalism towards mainstream projects of institutional transformation. Furthermore,

I have argued that transnationalist alter-globalists like Santos and Scholte played a critical role in bridging the gap between the undercurrents of resistance and the institutionalising mainstream, doing so by embracing a radical ethos of self-constitution and investing that ethos in the development of highly flexible concepts of legal right and social justice. We have seen that in embracing a spirit of inclusion in the development of new institutional forms, transnationalists fervently react against the domineering and divisive traits embedded in Western globalisation. Nevertheless, I have suggested that their sensitivity to those traits emerges out of the Western intelligentsia's immanent struggle with the contradictory nature of the Western ethos of self-emancipation. Like Hardt and Negri, in reacting against the desiring Other that is alienated but always there in potential, transnationalists swing to, and attempt to live through, the being-with facet of self-emancipatory desire. And even in their genuine, heartfelt commitment to being-with desire, transnationalists are impelled by a self-affirming passion, driven to spread their notion of the self-constituting self through the networks of the world system, proclaiming a counterhegemonic hegemony. The transnationalists, then, drawing on their economic, social, and cultural capital as part of an influential, Westernised, worldwide intelligentsia, actually contribute to Western-led globalisation, even though it is no doubt true that they do so by contradicting and undermining key features of the West's capitalist and bureaucratic social forms. In doing so, ultimately, the transnationalists help to bring out the essential being-over/being-with contradiction of Western culture onto the world stage.

In steering transnationalist activist networks and inadvertently (and often indirectly) dominating the intellectual expression of the transnationalist struggle, a section of the progressive Westernised intelligentsia has a filtering power that allows it to guide the progressive struggles of marginalised peoples. Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito set themselves up as prospectors looking for nuggets of radicalism that can fit with their own radical culture; they explore the world with a "prospective spirit that can be called the sociology of emergence" (2005, 17). They work, then, to "blow-up" or tease out suitable cultural tendencies that support the emergence of their radical cosmopolitanism. While they set up the West's modern, top-down cosmopolitanism as oppositional to their subaltern cosmopolitanism, theirs actually builds on the modern model: it emanates from the top (the Westernised intellectual elite) and insists on the penetration of the radical cosmopolitan spirit to the bottom of world society, so that those at the bottom are empowered to develop their own cosmopolitan projects *in the spirit of the radical West*. Through this model, the radical tendencies of Western cosmopolitanism are brought out – that is, they are deterritorialised and *post-modernised*. With evangelical enthusiasm, the transnationalists are determined to reinvigorate all of life; they are determined to radicalise the world, saving the West from itself and enabling the peoples of the world to find themselves – or find the open selves that the members of the Western intelligentsia, from their own cultural perspective, take as given.

Notes

- 1 See Reitan (2007, 256–257) on Peoples’ Global Action’s (PGA’s) fundamentalist commitment to the network of networks.
- 2 Alter-globalist activist Hoofd (2012, 70–74) sharply criticises Hardt and Negri for this embrace of *Empire*, associating it with the spread of Western networks of dominance.
- 3 Hardt and Negri expand on their criticisms of the global civil society model in *Multitude* (2004, 294–296), explicitly critiquing the WSF model.
- 4 Falk is a former fellow of the Transnational Institute, an international left-wing think tank closely associated with internationalist alter-globalists prominent at the WSF (prominent WSF activists Walden Bello and Susan George are Fellows of the Institute).
- 5 Although even in *Empire* there are hints of a reformist, institution-based notion of social transformation – see 2001, 403–410, on the ‘rights’ that the multitude struggle for.

Conclusion

This book began as a response to the cycle of struggles of 2011, drawing out and focussing on the distinctly Western anti-authoritarian tendency of the struggles. It went on to explore how the West's anti-authoritarian tendency has evolved through the development of the socio-economic conditions of Western society. I have suggested that an anti-authoritarian or libertarian reaction against conservative bourgeois authority and culture has always been inherent in the development of the West's bourgeois hegemony, and accordingly I have argued that Western anti-authoritarianism is tied to the bourgeois classes' ethos of self-emancipation, which brings out, and continually exacerbates the contradiction between, possessive, power-seeking, *being-over* desires and connective, egalitarian, *being-with* desires. The conception of desiring contradiction I suggest builds on the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari and Hardt and Negri, but it seeks to radicalise the post-structuralist perspective of these authors by deconstructing their attempts to create an absolute opposition between the positive, ontological *being-with* desires of the people, and the negative, anti-being *being-over* desires of the bourgeois system. As I argued in the Introduction, while Deleuze and Guattari were part of the radical struggles of the 1960s to overcome the self, their project remained premised on a notion of biological will-power that cannot be separated from self-affirmation and the potential of the human organism to empower itself at the expense of others. Proposing being-over and being-with desires as two inherent human forces, as two facets that are both Real in and of themselves, I have suggested that the radical leftist attempt to alienate being-over desires from humanity actually reveals much about the dynamic that the bourgeois classes struggle with as they develop their activism – middle-class radicals like Deleuze and Guattari and Hardt and Negri are so sensitive to being-over desires precisely because they are so close to them as they live through and build their purpose out of the bourgeois ethos. I have proposed that, ultimately, Western bourgeois radicals and/or progressives cannot extricate themselves from the bourgeois culture through which they are socialised, and as a result, in their struggle for popular sovereignty, the radicals and/or progressives carry forward the bourgeois or liberalist contradiction of self-emancipation, even though it true that in their embrace of

the being-with facet of desire the radicals and/or progressives continually push forward the democratising dimension of Western liberal democracy.

In Chapter 1, the current era's anti-authoritarian or left-libertarian tendency was linked to the emergence of theories of postmodern immanence, and we saw that idealist theorists or theorists of transcendence are keen to focus on the primal selfishness that postmodernisation supposedly unleashes. It was suggested that idealist theorists such as Žižek and Badiou embrace transcendent ideology in opposition to primal bourgeois individualism, but that they actually remain dependent on bourgeois notions of intellectual self-sufficiency and unlimited self-potential, thereby revealing their connections to the bourgeoisie's self-emancipatory ethos. The idealist intellectuals, it was suggested, do not transcend the bourgeois-individualist spirit, but are marked by a relatively conservative bourgeois culture that elevates the freedom of the elite individual thinker and denigrates the freedom of the supposedly more impulsive masses. It was suggested that such intellectuals give expression to a modern, as opposed to postmodern, bourgeois radicalism, and that such intellectuals remain dependent on bourgeois self-emancipatory desires but strongly limit their expression through self-centred or egoistic ordering, structuring, and disciplining. Postmodernist radicalism brings out or deterritorialises modernism's underlying self-emancipatory desires to undermine ordering, structuring, and disciplining functions, but in doing so it exacerbates the contradiction of being-over and being-with desires, inadvertently harbouring the being-over potential within being-with movements and potentially contributing towards new forms of power-seeking under neoliberalism. The chapter ended by charting Hardt and Negri's history of the emergence of postmodernist notions of self-constitution, focusing on the way in which Hardt and Negri conceptualise an absolute opposition between the multitude's desire for proliferating, horizontal social connections, and the bourgeois state's hierarchising, ordering functions. The chapter suggested that this oppositional model was difficult to justify, drawing attention to the way in which Lockean, liberal-bourgeois notions of self-emancipation marked what Hardt and Negri identify as Europe's revolutionary humanism. This argument would be expanded in Chapter 2 through a reassessment of Hardt and Negri's historical trajectory of revolutionary desire.

In Chapter 2, then, it was argued that radical Western-bourgeois projects can be traced right back to the early stirrings of bourgeois society in the Italian city-states of the Medieval period. It was suggested that as modern-Western bourgeois culture emerged it became premised on notions of self-reliance and self-production that opened out towards notions of unbounded interchange and expanding mutual interest, notions that took on a spiritual dimension. We saw, then, that the Medieval period's emerging spirit of Renaissance humanism, which Hardt and Negri attempt to extricate from the bourgeois project of power-seeking and elite self-protection, actually emerged out of and remained rooted in the bourgeois struggle for the self, simultaneously challenging and enriching the bourgeois concept of self-interest. We saw that as the bourgeois culture of self-emancipation evolved and spread, it was radicalised in the seventeenth century

in the Netherlands and England. While Hardt and Negri attempt to propose the Dutchman Spinoza as the figure of this period whose philosophy exemplified an anti-bourgeois alter-modernity of nature-human commonality, it was suggested that Spinoza actually brought out tendencies in the bourgeois project of self-constitution, and that in doing so he could not extricate himself from the power-seeking or possessive inclinations of the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, it was suggested that by propagating a rationalist metaphysics that placed the ego above the passions, Spinoza reflected conservative bourgeois-aristocratic fears of the desiring masses. Locke was then positioned as a philosopher of the period who marked the emergence of the bourgeois or liberalist ethos by bringing the self-emancipatory radicalism in Spinoza's philosophy into the mainstream of English society. Locke helped channel the seventeenth century's radical self-constituting protestant energies into an institutional settlement that laid bare the contradiction of the self-emancipatory ethos, championing notions of human commonality that rubbed up uneasily against notions of natural possession. Nevertheless, it was insisted that the seventeenth-century liberalist struggles for 'property' in England, which Locke's philosophy was a product of, could not be reduced to possession, and that these struggles nurtured grounded notions of individual autonomy, natural civility and popular participation that spread through the social classes and slowly but surely undermined the command mentality of the egoistic bourgeois aristocracy.

Chapter 3 analysed anti-capitalist radicalism in the 1960s, focusing on the radicalism that emerged through the revolt of May 1968 in France; it was this revolt that opened the path towards Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of connective or being-with desire. It was postulated that the culture of today's anti-authoritarian or left-libertarian activism began to break through in the 1960s when modern conservatism was undermined by a postmodernist radicalisation of notions of human rights. Building on discussion in Chapter 1, the chapter explored the relationship between a post-war culture of aspiration and the era's radicalised undercurrents of self-emancipatory striving, analysing how an emergent bourgeois populism undermined conservative bourgeois notions of fixed social order to open up a revitalised democratic process. We saw that while radical leftism in the 1960s was influenced by elitist notions of transcendent oversight, a bourgeois avant-garde joined forces with a middle-class student movement to propagate a culture of horizontal immanence. In a release of pent-up frustration against a crusty establishment, student activists attempted to externalise notions of bourgeois power from their ethos of personal and social freedom, but what they actually did was bring out the self-emancipatory radicalism of the liberalist ethos to force change on the existing social order; an order that incited self-assertion whilst attempting to keep it in check to protect its position and interests. An emergent postmodernist left, then, embraced the libertarian undercurrent of capitalist society to champion anarchistic notions of individuation and eminently bottom-up forms of organisation. By drawing on Julian Bourg's study of the post-1968 era in France, the chapter suggested that in the wake of 1968, radical self-emancipatory energies became

channelled towards new institutional projects to deepen and extend human rights, and that in the process a revitalised culture of civil society association emerged in the Western world. However, it was noted that in his championing of French liberal democracy, Bourq attempted to draw a clear distinction between an associational French democratic tradition and a possessive Anglo-Saxon liberal tradition, thereby challenging this book's argument on the essentially liberalist character of the West's democratising project. It was necessary, then, to build on arguments made in Chapters 1 and 2 to explore how the dynamics of the liberalist ethos have been played out differently in France and the United States.

This exploration was undertaken in Chapter 4. In this chapter, we revisited Hardt and Negri's history of the rise of revolutionary desire to explore the central role the United States has played in unleashing radical being-with desires as part of its liberalist project. It was suggested here that it was not possible to draw a clear cultural distinction between the United States' current embrace of possessive neoliberalism and the current era's associational, democratising activism. Building on discussion in Chapter 2, it was suggested that the current neoliberal culture of individual striving continues in the vein of the West's self-emancipatory contradiction, creating an uneasy merger between libertarian dynamics of barrier-breaking power-seeking and barrier-breaking egalitarian association. It was argued, then, that it was too simplistic for Bourq to associate Anglo-American liberal ideology with the rise of possession and the atomisation of society, while associating French republicanism with the rise of democratic association and a rich civil society. The chapter utilised the analysis of the French liberal Tocqueville to explore how the colonists who would go on to form the United States brought out the self-emancipatory tendencies within English liberalist culture to simultaneously pioneer individual enterprise and a humanist spirit of equality. It was suggested that the United States has continually been marked by the paradox of individual struggle coupled with common purpose, and that this coupling explains the vitality of the United States' own anti-authoritarian struggles in the 1960s. It was pointed out that the United States' 1960s countercultural anti-authoritarianism closely tied in with the French struggles of the same period, with activism in both countries driven by the search for new forms of self-constitution in commonality with others. Furthermore, it was noted that the United States' post-war socio-economic environment, marked by the rise of consumer culture, hugely influenced the French post-war experience and outlook, and that in many ways the emergence of the United States' countercultural struggle was a precursor to the related French struggles. Indeed, it was argued that there is a history of French democratic radicalism emerging as a relatively late phenomenon within the Western zeitgeist of a given time, and that such French radicalism tends to absorb the dynamics of a liberalist ethos over which the Anglo-Saxon world has had hegemonic influence since the late seventeenth century. It was argued that a history of French institutional conservatism has intensified the radicalisation of French democratic movements, but that such radicalism should not be confused with a concept of French exceptionalism, in which France produces

a democratising dynamic that is fundamentally different to the Anglo-Saxon dynamic. It was argued that an analysis of French democratic struggles demonstrates that France is ultimately caught in more or less the same liberalist dynamic as the Anglo-Saxon world is, with its bourgeois struggles for self-betterment continually spilling over into populist struggles for self-development through mutual interest and spiritual notions of the common good.

In Chapter 5, we returned to radicalism in France in the 1960s. While Chapters 3 and 4 focused on the political and social dynamics emerging out of the 1960s, Chapter 5 homed in on the radical philosophy that gave expression to the era's radical culture, focusing specifically on Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*, a book that emerged out of the 1968 revolt to unleash a philosophy of desiring radicalism. Building on discussion in Chapter 2, the chapter highlighted Deleuze and Guattari's reaction against the structuralist-psychoanalytic paradigm perpetuated by an academic super-elite at the *École normale supérieure*, focusing on the structuralist attempt to enmesh desire within a rigid symbolic order. It was suggested that in reacting against conservative bourgeois notions of structure, Deleuze and Guattari embraced unfettered desire as a revolutionary, deterritorialising force, but that in doing so they brought out self-emancipatory bourgeois radicalism. In the process, Deleuze and Guattari embraced radicalised being-with desires to propose a vision of a cosmos of interconnected desiring-machines, which built on the West's tradition of radical Judeo-Christian pantheism to push bourgeois notions of freely associating entities to their limits. As noted at the beginning of this conclusion, Deleuze and Guattari attempt to alienate power-seeking desires from their desiring project, but power-seeking remains latent in what amounts to their raw struggle for self-emancipation. The chapter suggested that Deleuze and Guattari's confused relationship with power is rooted in their embrace of the Nietzschean will to power in reaction against the Hegelian dialectic. Deleuze and Guattari stand Nietzsche's proactive will against the reactionary forces of self-preservation and control, but it was suggested that it is not at all clear that Nietzsche was able to wrestle raw will away from the self-aggrandising compulsions of the human animal. I argued that, contrary to the suggestions of Deleuze and Guattari, Nietzsche's will to power cannot be extricated from the will to dominate (though it cannot be reduced to it either). Wanting or seeking power is not simply the will to power in its perverted, reactionary form, but a potential lurking in the individual's desires for empowerment and emancipation. Indeed, Nietzsche's philosophy of will seems to bring out self-emancipatory radicalism by invoking fantasies of the unstoppable warrior-aristocrat hero, who swings from unfettered domination to unfettered connection as he asserts his self both over and through the world.

The individual's will to power that makes anything possible can also bring out the potentially sinister personal conviction that nothing can stand in the individual's way. Indeed, even though Deleuze and Guattari's concept of a connective desire of multiplicity attempts to decentre the self, there remains in the concept an implicit connection to a self-perpetuating self that drives the production of desiring affirmation. In reacting against the psychoanalytic concept of desiring lack,

Deleuze and Guattari propose a desire that never lacks anything, that continually produces immediate connections. Although the authors rejected suggestions that this notion of desire is connected to capitalist ideas of possession, it does seem reasonable to sense in the ethos of immediacy a connection with having or possessing – *don't want something, just have it*. Indeed, Bourg (2007) notes that in the post-1968 period, leftist activists such as Guy Hocquenghem, who embraced the spirit of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of desire, slid towards a disconcerting 'dark homosexuality', which, in its embrace of unfettered sexual desire, could slide towards notions of uninhibited conquest (see Part Three). It could be argued that activists simply corrupted the philosophy of desire, but, as Bourg suggests, it doesn't seem unreasonable to argue that they may have brought out a potential lurking in the philosophy's ethos of immediate assertion and immediate gratification.

In any case, we saw in chapter 5 that while Deleuze and Guattari attempt to alienate power-seeking by suggesting that the reactive forces of control corrupt desire by it turning back on its revolutionary potential, they nevertheless accept that control emerges from within the process of desiring-production, and are sensitive to how easily free connections or relations can slide towards structures of control. It was suggested, then, that the authors implicitly recognised the essential interrelations between human openness and human self-centeredness.

Deleuze and Guattari track the development of the human self from its initial larval stage in infancy – when the self is not really a self but a 'supple individual' playfully reinventing itself through the objects and flows of the world – to a mature adult stage, when the self has hardened into an intricately coordinated organism and has formed a highly limited sense of 'identity'. Through the development of the self the human being's natural, open-ended desiring-production is stifled and turned towards contained desiring circuits. However, I argued that while the human being has great natural potential for exploration and reciprocal connection, it is born already structured as a self-serving organism, primed to satisfy itself in ways that are useful for its self-perpetuation and self-propagation. From the moment of birth, the individual begins to develop positive feedback loops, being impelled to seek satisfaction for the self-serving organs of the human body. I have argued that a radical (or perverse) interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the human being leads to the conclusion that there is never an initial moment when the human being is a plastic corporeal structure becoming whatever its open-ended desires make it – it is born with specific types of self-potential that tend to lead it to desire in certain human ways. The limitative body that produces power, division, prejudice, and fixed identities is not a dead, alien body without organs emerging to corrupt our human being, but one facet of our nature, limitative in its constitution through self-serving organs. At the same time, the non-limitative body that produces connection, commonality, love, and openness is not our true being beneath our organic organisation, but the other facet of our nature, still rooted in self-serving organs but constituting the human organism's potential to thrive through association and commonality. In childhood, in its

‘larval’ form, the contradiction of human being is exposed, with the child capable of the most wonderful experimentations with identity and the most unadulterated displays of love, whilst simultaneously capable of the most reactionary and spiteful displays of possessiveness and selfishness.¹

Some of the unequivocal statements on human being in the previous paragraph may seem to jar with the insistence made in the Introduction that this book embraces a radical post-structuralist perspective. After all, is the book not very close to arguing for an essential human nature guiding all human activity, while post-structuralism is supposed to work to deconstruct or delegitimise all assertions of essential truth? As suggested in the Introduction, in taking inspiration from Ingrid Hoofd’s interpretation of post-structuralism, what I have tried to do in this book is inhabit, or immerse myself in, the liberal-humanist cultural context that produces Western radicalism in order to gain a greater sense of the assumptions and ideals that drive this radicalism forward. I have concluded that within the liberal-humanist context a particular human will-power and a corresponding self-emancipatory desiring ethos are critical to human existence or being and drive forward the key cultural processes of Western-bourgeois society. To what extent these dynamics constitute a human being that is essential and universal, valid in all times and places, is a challenging philosophical question that is not really within the scope of this book. All that I can say here is that from the perspective of the Western-bourgeois, liberal-humanist radicalism being inhabited in this book, I *sense* an essential human will-power, and an essential (but contradictory) desiring nature which plays itself out in a deterritorialising way in bourgeois society. Contemporary left-libertarian Western radicals – and I as the author of this book while immersing myself in the culture of the radicals – *cannot help* but see all of human life through the essential driving forces of their own lives and culture, irrespective of whether an Other essence is possible beyond their own form of existence. As a result, the radicals’ existential experience of human being inevitably and essentially shapes their interpretations of the dynamics that drive forward other societies or other peoples. This is why, as touched on in Chapter 5 and as I shall return to later, even the post-structuralists Deleuze and Guattari interpret Other societies – like indigenous societies – through the assumptions of their own cultural life-world, envisaging what is essentially the same desiring process that marks Western societies playing itself out in all other societies (even if it is playing itself out in different ways in the different socio-economic conditions of the different societies).

I suggest that even the post-structuralist rejection of essential being proposes a certain ultimate essentialism – an essentialism of non-essentialism. Furthermore, by building on Hoofd’s deconstruction of post-structuralism and her arguments on the contradictions that mark Western radicals, I would argue that the post-structuralist zeal for non-essentialism relies upon Western presuppositions on the inalienable freedom to continuously question and subject every assertion of truth to rigorous and limitless questioning (see Hoofd, 2012, 19–20). Post-structuralism then, is premised on a contradiction whereby it attempts to maintain

total openness to new possibilities but does so through a culture defined by the endless pursuit of truth in the name of self-discovery and self-realisation. In deconstructing post-structuralism itself, I argue that in order to repress its own internal contradictions, post-structuralism hides its roots in the self's search for essential meaning and purpose through its faith in the ideal of absolute heterogeneity and limitless being. In the process, it fails to face up to the way in which its ideal remains marked by the interests of the self that desires an ultimate 'emancipatory' truth; a truth that will ensure that the self is not held back by any limiting truth, *not even the truth of itself*. What I have tried to do, then, is bring out and work through (but not vainly overcome) the contradictory assumptions that mark post-structuralism, trying to find a useful path through its interlinked notions of, on the one hand, open, limitless, and self-reflexive questioning, and, on the other, the search for new and increasingly revealing or insightful meaning.

I would like to finish the book with a final political critique of Deleuze and Guattari's portrayal of radical will, insisting that the Nietzschean will to power that the authors depend upon carries within it a potential that is brought out by philosophers of extreme individualism – philosophers such as Ayn Rand, who, in the post-war period, provided the right-libertarian counterweight to the era's left-libertarianism, giving expression to an entrepreneurial culture that heavily influenced an emergent neoliberalism. Much like Nietzsche, Rand admired strong individuals and rejected ideas of a compulsion to love the weak or poor.

Adam Curtis (2011, Episode 1) suggests that Rand's thought influenced the Silicon Valley entrepreneurs of the United States in the 1990s. These entrepreneurs bought into the logic of the computer network, believing that they could create order in society without central control. Individuals were becoming nodes in a world-wide network of information flow. It was believed that heroic individuals could follow their desires while maintaining their rational self-interest to oversee the growth in a global system of prosperity. Lauren Carpenter suggests this growing belief emerged as the "Californian ideology" (in *ibid.*). Expressing similar themes to Hardt and Negri, Carpenter suggests that the leading capitalist entrepreneurs were embracing the declining power of the nation-state and the increasing inability of politicians to interfere with the freedoms offered by the expanding world market. Out of this milieu of neoliberal euphoria emerged Alan Greenspan – a close friend of Rand who supported her philosophical system of Objectivism – who rose to become Chairman of the Federal Reserve under Ronald Reagan, remaining in office under successive US Presidents until his term came to an end under George W. Bush on 31st January 2006. With his faith in free markets, Greenspan lowered interest rates to 1 per cent in 2004, giving banks increased access to cheap money. Greenspan believed that rational self-interest, aided by the complex calculations made possible by computer technologies, would ensure that the financial markets would be self-regulating, with banks only lending to those who could afford to pay money back. But of course, in reality, banks borrowed as much as they could and lent out as much as they could, bundling risky subprime mortgages into securities in the desire for immediate

returns. Nietzsche's rawer, less rationalistic notion of individual will could have taught Greenspan a lesson here: unleashed desires for self-gain are intoxicating and overwhelming, demanding immediate gratification – they are rarely reined in by any overriding rational self-interest for long-term gain. Greenspan was forced to admit he had placed too much faith in free markets when the housing bubble burst in 2008.

In Chapter 6, it was suggested that Deleuze and Guattari's 1960s spirit of self-emancipatory desire had churned on as a radical undercurrent through the development of a contradictory neoliberal culture in the post-1968 era, and that this spirit was invoked and enlivened in the 1990s when a new wave of youthful aspiration collided with the increasingly entrenched neoliberal elite. It was suggested that Hardt and Negri gave expression to this new wave by reworking Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of desire to champion a free-flowing desiring multitude taking on the worldwide capitalist Empire. It was argued that it was not reasonable to propose, as some psychoanalytic philosophers did, that Hardt and Negri had corrupted Deleuze and Guattari's theory by unleashing a crude neoliberalist type of individual freedom, for just like Deleuze and Guattari, Hardt and Negri rejected psychoanalysis's cynical concept of anti-social drives to champion an immanent, horizontal desire of connections and love. Nevertheless, it was accepted that Hardt and Negri, like Deleuze and Guattari, shied away from the intimate connections between the development of their ethos of desiring freedom and the development of a wider liberalist culture of self-emancipation. In the 1990s, as in the 1960s, this burgeoning culture incited being-with desires within a context of entrepreneurial striving marked by being-over desires. We should not, then, see the Western anti-capitalist activism that Hardt and Negri gave expression to as absolutely oppositional to the neoliberal order, but as part of an immanent cultural process in which an enlivened liberalist culture unleashed cycles of revolt against its own mainstream.

Curtis suggests (2011, Episode Two) that activists emerging from the 1960s and after who have tried to embrace an ethos of organic or pure, unfettered freedom, have consistently found that individual power-seeking quickly emerges as a natural feature within such 'purity'. Curtis notes that idealistic theories on humanity's oneness with self-stabilising ecological systems developed through the twentieth century in the West to culminate in the anarchistic explosion of the 1960s. Curtis refers to a number of thinkers who propounded similar ideas to those put forward by Deleuze and Guattari on the human being as a machinic-organic arrangement within a network of energy flow through nature. At the end of World War One, Arthur Tansley took Freud's notion of the human brain as an electrical machine to suggest that there existed vast interconnected circuits that linked all organisms. Cybernetics theorist Norbert Wiener also picked up on the machinic theme, viewing humans and machines as one, with individuals as nodes in networked systems. Buckminster Fuller drew on this emergent ontology of organic networks to propose that human societies should form themselves into interconnected webs. Similarly to Deleuze and Guattari, Fuller argued that identity markers such as

nationality and class created divisions that disrupted the development of naturally harmonious societies. He believed that if individuals were to immerse themselves in the flows of life, they would not sabotage society with their power struggles but would instead seek connections with their fellow beings (in *ibid.*).

Fuller's 1964 manifesto presented a utopian vision of free societies, which were devoid of governing elites that seek to control the natural flows of life. Fuller's vision inspired the student-led counterculture emerging in the United States. As noted in Chapter 4, the young radicals of the 1960s American counterculture would soon learn that the American authorities were far from willing to usher in an economic, political, and social revolution, and when the radicals' utopian dreams were shattered, many of them began to retreat from the mainstream of American life. As Curtis notes, between 1967 and 1971, half a million Americans fled the cities to found communes in the country, hoping to realise the idyllic societies they believed were possible by reconnecting with the natural world's systems of organisation (*ibid.*). Communes used Fuller's geodesic domes – symbols of a strong and stable interconnected web – to build their homes, and individuals attempted to forge themselves into a societal organism of many parts that acted in the interests of all. However, as Curtis points out, while the communes were supposed to be egalitarian and liberating, they all failed – most within three years – because they were torn apart by “the very thing that was supposed to have been banished: power”. Informal hierarchies quickly developed in the communes, with strong personalities dominating the communes' supposedly free and open discussions. For Curtis, the failure of the self-organising model results from utopian notions of natural organisation that fail to address “the central dynamic forces of human society: politics and power”. Curtis postulates that the tendency to view the man-nature biological system as a basis for social organisation “has risen up to become the ideology of our age”; an ideology that shies away from the being of power that lurks within nature's biological systems.

In this book I emphasised that while it is unreasonable to cynically reduce anti-authoritarian radicalism to the dynamics of individual power-seeking, this radicalism does emerge out of a bourgeois-individualist self-emancipatory context, and consequently, particularly in its raw, leftist-reactionary form, the radicalism carries a being-over potential within its being-with spirit. Many anarchistic activists who emerged as part of the anti-capitalist movement in the late 1990s and early 2000s embraced a self-affirming Nietzschean individualism that resonated with the desiring radicalism infused within Hardt and Negri's *Empire*.² Through its will to power this anti-capitalist activism was developing highly confrontational forms of resistance, embracing a Hardt-and-Negri-style concept of “antagonism [as] self-affirmation and valorisation: the real motor of innovation and progress” (see Bove, 2010, 184). Some anarchists of the period, whether Black Bloc or other ‘hardcore’ anarchists, essentially declared war on the state (see *The Invisible Committee*, 2009), seeming to invoke Maoist notions of spontaneous, revolutionary violence from the post-1968 period, which Deleuze and Guattari had always attempted to distance from desiring radicalism (see Dosse,

2010, 207). Indeed, many alter-globalisation activists, including Jan Aart Scholte³ (whose ideas we explored in Chapter 7), associate certain forms of uncompromising Western activism with a highly masculine ethos of domination (see also Kolářová, 2009). David Graeber notes that within the North American anarchist circles of the early 2000s, a North American version of the Italian Autonomous Marxist group *Ya Basta!* – a group directly inspired by Hardt and Negri – started to emerge, and activists were shocked by tales of the Italian *Ya Basta!*'s tactics of directly confronting police with two-by-fours (2009, 46). Perhaps more significantly, though, Graeber notes that *Ya Basta!* groups were like the hardcore anarchists who rejected the clear procedures of spokescouncils in the embrace of more spontaneous, 'liberating' meetings and discussions. The result, though, seemed to be small cliques holding private meetings, and strong male personalities dominating *Ya Basta!* discussions (see *ibid.*, 20–21). Ultimately, as one activist pointed out, *Ya Basta!* seemed to lack "an internal democratic process" (*ibid.* 60).

Nevertheless, as noted in Chapter 7, while in *Empire* – written during a leftist-reactionary period in the late 1990s – Hardt and Negri are quite open to the spontaneity of violent, 'barbaric' upsurges, and seem to write in the spirit of Nietzschean, masculine shows of strength, they began to move away from their reactionary days in the early 2000s, seeming to become more sensitive to the risk of forms of domination emerging from their radical ethos. In their more constructive reflections in *Multitude* (2004), the authors placed more emphasis on the need for the people to develop their own institutional or constitutional procedures to guard against counterproductive invocations of power. In Chapter 7, I suggested that the rise of the alter-globalisation movement in the early 2000s influenced Hardt and Negri's move to a more reflective approach. It was suggested that the most radical alter-globalist activists, who were labelled 'transnationalists', fully embraced the radical being-with spirit associated with Hardt and Negri's philosophy (even if only implicitly and/or indirectly), and complemented the project in *Multitude* by championing the power of peoples to develop their own institutional procedures to ensure that being-with radicalism remains within its own spirit, without sliding towards its being-over potential. For the being-with spirit within the institutional processes to maintain its vitality, transnationalists insist that the desires and wills of all individual group participants must continually animate and reanimate a consensus-based decision-making procedure, which promotes flexibility, accommodation, and reconciliation, keeping the group always open to new possibilities – ultimately the procedure seems to promote loose territorialisations through a process of deterritorialisation. The chapter argued that through this focus on institutional development, the transnationalists drew the radical energies of the self-emancipatory undercurrents of anti-capitalism into a mainstream project to radically reform liberal-democratic society, focusing on the development of new legal orthodoxies. Critically, the embrace of new legal rules was premised on an immanent process of participatory democracy, with groups not submitting to an overarching or transcendent adjudicating power but

forging their own forms of self-constitution. While, as noted in the last chapter, anti-capitalist radicals can tend to cut themselves off from broad political coalitions in their nurturing of desiring purity, transnationalists premise their activism on including as many groups and peoples from around the world as possible in a new political process, encouraging cultural translation and a respect for difference as they do so. Furthermore, in Chapter 7, we saw that in developing an eminently inclusive notion of activism, transnationalists are highly sensitive to Western-centric activist notions of self-affirmation that seem to encourage the crushing or subsuming of non-Western forms of activism.

Hoofd (2012) comes close to transnationalist notions with her criticisms of Western-centric activism. She argues that many activist coalitions with their origins in the West – including the ‘no-border’ activists inspired by the ideas of Hardt and Negri – promote a puritanical notion of global integration that helps speed up the subordination of non-Western economies and cultures to the universalising force of Western liberal humanism. Hoofd sets up her argument by suggesting that activists are far too uncritical of the notion of ‘activism’ itself, which she posits as a value-laden term that can be traced back to the early 1900s and the development in the West of a highly economistic spirit that embraced “energetic action” in the name of the advancement of the nation (6–7). This spirit would spread and emerge in an ideal of liberation through *doing something*; through agitation and endeavour as opposed to passivity. Hoofd suggests that we live under an activist neoliberal regime that compels its citizen-subjects to be active, creative, and free. Indeed, the system actively encourages these attitudes, for it advances through ‘meritocratic’ competition between subjects striving to develop their skills and achieve their potential within the ‘creative economy’. Ultimately, activists are driven to propagate their active energy through the world in the production of Western ‘development’.

Although transnationalism attempts to protect peoples from the spread of Western hegemony, it was suggested in Chapter 7 that transnationalist activism is rooted in the West, with Westernised intellectuals and Western-rooted Transnational Advocacy Networks displaying cultural hegemony over the transnationalist projects. It was suggested that while it is true that this is a genuinely counterhegemonic hegemony, it still draws much of its energy from the West’s liberalist ethos of self-emancipation, and its protagonists are keen to assert their radicalised Western project through the world, even if not over the world. It was noted that transnationalist notions of bottom-up cosmopolitanism are heavily influenced by Western traditions promoting human rights and spiritual and associational diversity, and that like anti-authoritarian visions from the 1960s and 1970s, including Deleuze and Guattari’s, transnationalist visions implicitly build on the West’s Judeo-Christian, pantheistic idealisations of a nature bonded by oneness. Although transnationalists attempt to shift political power to marginalised communities by focusing on their egalitarian social forms and their victimhood in relation to the West, there is a tendency for transnationalists to romanticise naturalistic indigenous life-worlds, opposing them to the corrupting

force of the West's robotic system of control – the great oppositional force that crushes the life out of the people's natural communalism. In doing so, they build on Hardt and Negri's stark contrast between the life of communism and the death of capitalism. This false polarisation, which brings out Western anti-capitalism's reactionary alienation of the capitalist Other, obscures the contradictory globalising dynamics that the West unleashes, and which the transnationalists, as hegemonic players within the alter-globalisation movement, contribute towards.

As Hardt and Negri implicitly suggest, the desiring flows emanating from Empire – really, globalised Western culture driven forward by capitalist expansion – have already permeated through the peoples of the world to such an extent that even radical, indigenous, non-Western communities like the Maya in Chiapas have been heavily influenced by Western models of resistance. Ultimately, Western-dominated global activist networks unconsciously attempt to redirect indigenous forms of proto-communist organisation by aligning struggles with the radicalised Western agenda of universal emancipation and self-determination. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, indigenous notions of common ownership are often couched within strong social bodies that subordinate the people to the earth (see Dosse, 2010, 202), and through the earth to localist notions of belonging that can slide towards restrictive communitarianism or parochialism. Such bodies, then, are territorialising bodies. As we have seen, Deleuze and Guattari and Hardt and Negri suggest that the social body of capitalism is different in that it is a body that is dependent on deterritorialisation. There is an implication, then, that it is the multitudes of Western capitalism that have the greatest power to open up the being-with desires of localist groups to a deterritorialising process that greatly expands the interconnections between being-with spiritual cultures.

Finally, to lay my own feelings and passions on my research on the table, I would like to argue that both left-libertarian anti-capitalists and transnationalist alter-globalists need to show an increased willingness to reflect upon their position within a Western-bourgeois world system if they are to continue to succeed in asserting a progressive being-with agenda. Activists and intellectuals deriving their activist spirit from a hegemonic, contradictory bourgeois-liberalist ethos must come to terms with the way in which they use their privileged positions within Western culture to bring out its tendencies. The people often resist the advances of progressives and radicals, and I think we need a more introspective discussion on why. It is far too easy and convenient to simply blame the biopower of the capitalist Other for the resistance, and we are far too quick to wave away the emerging populist resentment of the 'liberal' or 'cosmopolitan elite' – broad labels used to question the role of a whole host of progressives and radicals who are culturally privileged. Are the people not on to something? Do they not sense the contradictory yearnings of the self-emancipatory leftists? In this book I have drawn attention to the fact that throughout the history of the West, bourgeois or middle-class progressives and radicals have been able to draw on their economic, cultural, and social capital to politically and/or culturally lead popular democratising movements. Especially because of their privileged access

to higher education – the engine rooms of self-emancipatory cultural production – middle-class radicals and progressives, always somewhat removed from the more down-to-earth concerns of working-class people, have the upper hand in setting the agenda within activist movements. I suspect that many working people are intuitively aware of a history of bourgeois emergence and self-empowerment within popular movements, and are therefore, with some good reason, suspicious of a middle-class or cosmopolitan leftist agenda. In a period where Brexit and Trump are galvanising a new angry populism, it is necessary to try to reach out to working class people with a new level of humility and honesty.

As Runciman (2012) suggests in his review of *The Occupy Handbook* (see Byrne, 2012), it is not at all clear that it was the ‘99%’ who took to the streets to demand a fundamental transformation to the politico-economic system in 2011. In truth, a 1% from within the 99% attempted to galvanise the 99% behind their cause (with some success), spouting radical-bourgeois notions of the common good that are rooted in the philosophy of Western academies. The core activists of the Occupy movement invoke the liberalist notions of autonomy, equality, and popular sovereignty to challenge the super-elite, thereby steering the protests with a radicalised bourgeois agenda. And again, this process, whereby the steering role in political struggle becomes dominated by bourgeois radicals, is nothing new. At the sharp end of the multitude’s historic struggle for liberty, one finds, time and again, the relatively privileged bourgeois or middle-class spiritualists, or secularists, or hardcore activists, driving forward the bourgeois contradiction. No wonder, then, that, as we saw in Chapter 6, even in Hardt and Negri’s anti-authoritarian embrace of the horizontal multitude, the intellectual-technical middle classes play the key role in producing communistic cultural forms and ways of associating. In this conceptualisation of professional productive pioneers driving forward a revolutionary process, Hardt and Negri come close to reflecting what Gouldner (1979) describes as the intelligentsia’s self-justification for its privileged position in the class hierarchy. This aspirational and continually emergent class – what Gouldner describes as the New Class in the post-war context – is premised on its power to disseminate culture: “Just as the New Class is not the proletariat of the past, neither is it the old bourgeoisie. It is, rather, a new *cultural* bourgeoisie, whose capital is not its money, but its control over valuable cultures” (21) – a control that derives from access to privilege-producing forms of education (19).

What, then, of the future of anti-capitalism and alter-globalism in the West? Even in the face of a rising populism, perhaps by nurturing the being-with or egalitarian spirit of the radicalised liberalist ethos, transnationalism will help to draw this spirit out from its roots in the individual’s struggle for the self, helping to develop the egalitarian spirit *within its own spirit*. However, given the way in which the contradiction of the liberalist ethos has been exacerbated by the neoliberal revolution, and the ease with which the leftist assertion of the singular drifts towards the rightist assertion of the self, it is hard to envisage how transnationalism can or will continually radicalise the institutions of liberal democracy while

subduing the being-over tendencies that are likely to emerge as this radicalisation takes place. And considering the already global nature of Western culture and the role transnationalism unwittingly plays in the process of globalisation, it seems highly unlikely that transnationalism can facilitate a ‘non-Western’ emancipatory revolution that is not rooted in the burgeoning of the self-emancipatory ethos. Ultimately, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, humanity has run up against the limits of a dialectic of desire, with two oppositional but interdependent forces driving society to the threshold of both absolute freedom and absolute power.

As Hoofd (2012) suggests, perhaps the only way through this dialectical impasse will be Western civilisation’s collapse (see 109–111), which would mark the total exhaustion of the dialectic contained within the self-emancipatory ethos. Perhaps rising from the ashes we would see a phoenix society which, in being marked by new socio-economic conditions, would be animated by a proliferation of being-with desire and would produce a communistic or anarchistic spirit that no longer emerges so closely with the competitive, being-over desires of self-emancipatory individuals desperately struggling to break free. But to what extent would (or could) this new society transform our desiring being? And what new dialectical process might this society open up? Furthermore, might there be another way through the self-emancipatory dialectic other than Western collapse? Unfortunately, I am not in a position to explore such questions here. In any case, answering them is complicated by the ambivalent approach towards essentialism and truth that I have adopted in this post-structuralist book. Nevertheless, I am happy to (reflectively) embrace this ambivalence and the liberal-humanist contradiction on which it is based, and am interested to see where such an embrace can take us. To borrow words from Hoofd, because this book

cannot – in fact, does not wish to – escape the humanist aporia, some of its argument may seem to produce inconsistent conclusions to some readers. But performing its humanist imperative *to the point of contradiction* is exactly its aim.

(2012, 22, emphasis in original)

This book, then, has been focused on exploring, *working through*, and bringing out the contradictory tendencies of the culture it inhabits in order to shed light – and open up a new dialogue – on its potentials and possibilities.

Notes

- 1 See Segev (2000, 255) on the possessive tendencies of young children even in utopian communalist societies.
- 2 See Bey (1991) for an interesting precursor to this emergence.
- 3 Scholte talks of the “male posturing” in Western activist groups (personal communication, 30/04/2012).



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Bibliography

- Abu-Lughod, J. L. (1989), *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ackroyd, P. (2010), *Venice, Pure City*. London: Vintage.
- Adbusters, ‘Occupy Wallstreet’, webpage: www.adbusters.org/campaigns/occupywallstreet, first accessed 20/11/2011.
- Althusser, L. (1969), *For Marx*. Trans. B. Brewster. London: Penguin Press.
- Anomaly, J. (2005, Spring), ‘Nietzsche’s Critique of Utilitarianism’. *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, 29, pp. 1–15.
- Armitage, D. (2004, October), ‘John Locke, Carolina and the “Two Treatises of Government”’. *Political Theory*, 32(5), pp. 602–627.
- Arrighi, G., Hui, P., Hung, H. and Selden, M. (2003), ‘Historical Capitalism, East and West’. In *The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 and 50 Year Perspectives*. Eds. G. Arrighi, T. Hamashita, and M. Selden. London: RoutledgeCurzon, pp. 259–316.
- A Typical Faux (2012), ‘Occupy – Still Free (Take a Chance on Me) [Full]’. *You Tube*, posted 17/03/2012: www.youtube.com/watch?v=HIYMLR_DGWU, accessed 08/06/2012.
- Badiou, A. (2008, September–October), ‘Roads to Renegacy: Interview With Eric Hazan’. *New Left Review*, 53, pp. 125–133.
- Badiou, A. (2010), ‘The Idea of Communism’. In *The Idea of Communism*. Eds. C. Douzinas and S. Žižek. London: Verso, pp. 1–14.
- Badiou, A. (2013), ‘The Communist Idea and the Question of Terror’. In *The Idea of Communism 2: The New York Conference*. Ed. S. Žižek. London: Verso, pp. 1–12.
- Balibar, E. (2013), ‘Communism as Commitment, Imagination and Politics’. In *The Idea of Communism 2: The New York Conference*. Ed. S. Žižek. London: Verso, pp. 13–35.
- Barbone, S. (2001), ‘What Counts as an Individual for Spinoza?’. In *Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes*. Eds. O. I. Koistinen and J. I. Biro. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 89–112.
- Barry, J. M. (2012), *Roger Williams and the Creation of the American Soul*. New York: Viking Press.
- Bello, W. (2007), ‘The Forum at the Crossroads’. *Foreign Policy in Focus*, 19(2), webpage: www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/noticias_textos.php?cd_news=395, accessed 07/12/2014.
- Bennett, D. (2011), ‘David Graeber, the Anti-Leader of Occupy Wall Street’. *Bloomberg Businessweek*, 26 October 2011, webpage: www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/david-graeber-the-antileader-of-occupy-wall-street-10262011.html, accessed 21/05/2012.

- Berkeley, G. (2007 [1710]), *The Principles of Human Knowledge*. Ed. J. Bennett, webpage: www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/berkeley1710.pdf, accessed 04/05/2014.
- Berlin, I. (1969), 'Two Concepts of Liberty'. In *Four Essays on Liberty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 118–173.
- Bernstein, J. M. (2001), 'Introduction'. In *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*. Ed. J. M. Bernstein. London: Routledge, pp. 1–28.
- Bey, H. (1991), 'The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism'. *The Hermetic Library*, webpage: http://hermetic.com/bey/taz_cont.html, accessed 15/10/2010.
- Billias, G. A. (2009), *American Constitutionalism Heard Round the World, 1776–1989: A Global Perspective*. New York: New York University Press.
- Boltanski, L. and Chiapello, E. (2005), *The New Spirit of Capitalism*. Trans. G. Elliott. London: Verso.
- Bourg, J. (2007), *From Revolution to Ethics: May 1968 and Contemporary French Thought*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Bove, A. (2010), 'Antonio Negri (1933-)'. In *From Agamben to Žižek: Contemporary Critical Theorists*. Ed. J. Simons. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 177–193.
- Brown, L. S. (1993), *The Politics of Individualism: Liberalism, Liberal Feminism, and Anarchism*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Burley, L. (2008), 'Jagger vs Lennon: London's Riots of 1968 Provided the Backdrop to a Rock'n'roll Battle Royale'. *The Independent*, 9 March 2008, webpage: www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/music/features/jagger-vs-lennon-londons-riots-of-1968-provided-the-backdrop-to-a-rocknroll-battle-royale-792450.html, accessed 12/05/2012.
- Burma, I. (2001), 'Cult of the Chairman'. *The Guardian*, 7 March 2001, webpage: www.theguardian.com/world/2001/mar/07/china.features11, accessed 06/06/2013.
- Byrne, J. (Ed.) (2012), *The Occupy Handbook*. New York: Back Bay Books.
- Callinicos, A. (2003), *An Anti-Capitalist Manifesto*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Campbell, C. (1987), *The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Carson, K. (2014), 'What Is Left-Libertarianism?'. *Center for a Stateless Society*, 15 June 2014, webpage: <https://c4ss.org/content/28216>, accessed 10/09/2016.
- Castoriadis, C. (2007), *Figures of the Thinkable*. Trans. H. Arnold. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Chodorov, F. (1962), *Out of Step: The Autobiography of an Individualist*. New York: The Devin-Adair Company.
- Culture Jammers. (12/04/2012), 'Battle for the Soul of Occupy'. *Adbusters*, webpage: www.adbusters.org/blogs/adbusters-blog/jump.html, accessed 12/08/12.
- Culture Jammers. (26/04/2012), 'The May 2012 Insurrection: Tactical Briefing #30'. *Adbusters*, webpage: www.adbusters.org/blogs/adbusters-blog/playjazz.html, accessed 12/08/12.
- Curtis, A. (Writer and Director), (2011), 'Love and Power' [TV series episode], Episode 1, *All Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace*. BBC2 (West Midlands, England), 23/05/2011.
- Curtis, A. (Writer and Director), (2011), 'The Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts' [TV series episode], Episode 2, *All Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace*. BBC2 (West Midlands, England), 30/05/2011.

- Cybulska, E. (2011), 'Nietzsche: Love, Guilt & Redemption'. *Philosophy Now*, webpage: https://philosophynow.org/issues/86/Nietzsche_Love_Guilt_and_Redemption, accessed 22/08/2012.
- Davis, J. L. (1970, December), 'Roger Williams Among the Narragansett Indians'. *The New England Quarterly*, 43(4), pp. 593–604.
- Dawkins, R. (2006), *The Selfish Gene*. 30th Anniversary Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dean, J. (2013), 'Communist Desire'. In *The Idea of Communism 2: The New York Conference*. Ed. S. Žižek. London: Verso, pp. 77–102.
- DeKoven, M. (2004), *The Sixties and the Emergence of the Postmodern*. London: Duke University Press.
- Deleuze, G. (1993), *The Logic of Sense*. Ed. C. V. Boundas, trans. M. Lester, with C. Stivale. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Deleuze, G. (1994), *Difference and Repetition*. Trans. P. Patton. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Deleuze, G. (2006 [1983]), *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. Trans. H. Tomlinson. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Deleuze, G. (2011), Interview by C. Parnet, 'Gilles Deleuze: 'D' for Desire'. *You Tube*, webpage, uploaded 20/02/2013, www.youtube.com/watch?v=IrZdOZzr4as, accessed 15/06/2014. Extract from P. Boutang (Director), (2011), *Gilles Deleuze: From A to Z* [DVD], Trans. C. J. Stivale. Semiotext(e).
- Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1984), *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem, and H. R. Lane. London: The Athlone Press.
- Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1988), *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Trans. B. Massumi. London: The Athlone Press.
- Den Uyl, D. J. (1983), *Power, State, and Freedom: An Interpretation of Spinoza's Political Philosophy*. Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum & Company.
- Dosse, F. (2010), *Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*. Trans. D. Glassman. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Douzinas, C. (2013), *Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Douzinas, C. and Žižek, S. (2010), 'Introduction'. In *The Idea of Communism*. Eds. C. Douzinas and S. Žižek. London: Verso, pp. vii–x.
- Dutton, B. D., 'Benedict de Spinoza'. *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, webpage: www.iep.utm.edu/spinoza/, accessed 01/04/2014.
- Featherstone, M. (2002), 'Empire and Utopia: A Psychoanalytic Critique of Totality'. *Cultural Values*, 6(4), pp. 369–384.
- Ferguson, N. (2011), *Civilization: The West and the Rest*. London: Penguin Books.
- Feuer, L. S. (1958), *Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Field, S. (2012, June), 'Democracy and the Multitude: Spinoza Against Negri'. *Theoria*, Vol. 59, No. 131, pp. 21–40.
- Foucault, M. (1984), 'Introduction'. In *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Eds. G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem, and H. R. Lane. London: The Athlone Press.
- Freud, S. (1964), 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable'. In *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: Vol. 23 (1937–1939)*. Ed. J. Strachey. London: The Hogarth Press.
- Friedman, M. (1962), *Capitalism and Freedom*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Friend, C., 'Social Contract Theory'. *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, webpage: www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/, accessed 12/07/2013.
- Geras, N. (1983), *Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend*. London: Verso.
- Gottlieb, R. S. (Ed.) (1989), *An Anthology of Western Marxism: From Lukacs and Gramsci to Socialist-Feminism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gouldner, A. W. (1979), *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*. New York: The Seabury Press.
- Graeber, D. (2009), *Direct Action: An Ethnography*. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- Graeber, D. (2011), 'Occupy Wall Street's Anarchist Roots'. *Al Jazeera*, 30 November 2011, webpage: www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/11/2011112872835904508.html, accessed 17/12/11.
- Guattari, F. and Negri, A. (1990), *Communists Like Us: New Spaces of Liberty, New Lines of Alliance*. Trans. M. Ryan. New York: Semiotexte(e).
- Hardt, M. (1993, Fall/Winter), "'Political Liberalism", by John Rawls'. *Qui Parle*, 1, pp. 140–149, University of Nebraska Press.
- Hardt, M. (2006 [1983]), 'Foreword'. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. Ed. G. Deleuze, trans. H. Tomlinson. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hardt, M. (2010), 'The Common in Communism'. In *The Idea of Communism*. Eds. C. Douzinas and S. Žižek. London: Verso, pp. 131–44.
- Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2001), *Empire*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2004), *Multitude*. New York: The Penguin Press.
- Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2009), *Commonwealth*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2012), *Declaration*. Retrieved from *Negri in English*, webpage: <http://antonionegriinenglish.wordpress.com/2012/05/16/declaration-by-hardt-and-negri/>, accessed 12/01/13.
- Harvey, D., Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2009, November), 'Commonwealth: An Exchange'. *Artforum*, 48(3), pp. 210–221.
- Hill, C. (1955), *The English Revolution*, webpage: www.marxists.org/archive/hill-christopher/english-revolution/, accessed 04/06/2012.
- Hill, C. (1997), *Puritanism and Revolution: Studies in Interpretation of the English Revolution of the 17th Century*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. E. (1996 [1962]), *The Age of Revolution: 1789–1848*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Holton, R. J. (2013), *Cities, Capitalism and Civilization*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Hoofd, I. M. (2012), *Ambiguities of Activism: Alter-Globalism and the Imperatives of Speed*. London: Routledge.
- The Invisible Committee (2009), 'The Coming Insurrection'. Retrieved from *Support the Tarnac 10*, webpage: <http://tarnac9.wordpress.com/texts/the-coming-insurrection/>, accessed 20/08/2011.
- Israel, J. I. (1995), *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477–1806*. Oxford: Clarendon-Press.
- Jameson, F. (1991), *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. London: Verso.
- Jefferson, T. (15/02/1789), 'Thomas Jefferson to John Trumbull'. Retrieved from *Library of Congress*, webpage: www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/18.html, accessed 17/09/2014.
- Jones, P. (1997), *The Italian City-State: From Commune to Signoria*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Juris, J. S. (2008), *Networking Futures: The Movements Against Corporate Globalization*. Duke University Press.

- Kahn, J. (2004), 'Ronald Reagan Launched Political Career Using the Berkeley Campus as a Target'. *UC Berkeley News*, 8 June 2004, webpage: www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/06/08_reagan.shtml, accessed 12/06/2014.
- Kerouac, J. (2000 [1957]), *On the Road*. London: Penguin.
- Kilkenny, A. (2012), 'Tens of Thousands March in Oakland, New York for May Day'. *The Nation*, 2 May 2012, webpage: www.thenation.com/blog/167666/tens-thousands-march-oakland-new-york-may-day#, accessed 12/08/2012.
- Kitchell, M. (Director and Producer), Griffin, S., Kitchell, M. and Most, S. (writers), (1990), *Berkeley in the Sixties*. [DVD, released 2002], First Run Features.
- Kolářová, M. (2009), 'Fairies and Fighters: Gendered Tactics of the Alter-globalization Movement in Prague (2000) and Genoa (2001)'. *Feminist Review*, 92, pp. 91–107.
- Krassner, P. (1995), 'Who Killed Jerry Rubin?'. *The Realist*, webpage: www.ep.tc/realist/130/02.html, accessed 04/06/2012.
- Latour, F. (2010), 'New England's Hidden History'. *boston.com, Today's Globe*, 26/09/2010, webpage: www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/09/26/new_englands_hidden_history/?page=1, accessed 12/05/2013.
- Lawrence, D. (1970), 'Campus Unrest Linked to Drugs'. *The Palm Beach Post*, 28 May 1970, webpage: <http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=kn0yAAAIBAJ&sjid=-bUFAAAIBAJ&pg=862,4936664&dq=kent-state&hl=en>, accessed 12/06/2014.
- Lazar, S. (2011), 'Occupy Wall Street: Interview With Micah White From *Adbusters*'. *Huffington Post*, 12 July 2011, webpage: www.huffingtonpost.com/shira-lazar/micah-white-adbusters-_b_996931.html, accessed 04/05/2014.
- Lee, C. (2005), *This Sceptred Isle: Empire*. London: BBC Books.
- Lemann, N. (1996), 'Kicking in Groups', *The Atlantic*, 1 April 1996, webpage: www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1996/04/kicking-in-groups/376562/, accessed 07/03/2013.
- Levy, M. B. (1983, March), 'Freedom, Property and the Levellers: The Case of John Lilburne'. *The Western Political Quarterly*, 36(1), pp. 116–133.
- Locke, J. (1823 [1689]), 'Two Treatises of Government'. In *The Works of John Locke* (A New Edition, Corrected), Vol. V. Prepared by R. Hay, webpage: <http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf>, accessed 02/02/2013.
- Locke, J. (1958 [1695]), *The Reasonableness of Christianity, as Delivered in the Scriptures. With A Discourse of Miracles and part of A Third Letter Concerning Toleration*. Ed. I. T. Ramsey. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Lull, J. (2000), *Media, Communication, Culture: A Global Approach*. 2nd Edition. Cambridge: Polity.
- Macpherson, C. B. (1962), *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Magee, G. A. (2010), *The Hegel Dictionary*. London: Continuum.
- Marcos, S. I. (2001, May–June), 'Interview by G. Márquez and R. Pombo, "The Punch Card and the Hourglass"'. *New Left Review*, 9, pp. 69–79.
- Marcos, S. I. (2002), *Our Word Is Our Weapon: Selected Writings*. Ed. J. P. de León. New York: Seven Stories Press.
- Mason, G. (1776), 'The Virginia Declaration of Rights'. *National Archives*, webpage: www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/virginia_declaration_of_rights.html, accessed 12/08/2012.
- Massumi, B. (1992), *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations From Deleuze and Guattari*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

- Mielants, E. (2007), *The Origins of Capitalism and the Rise of the West*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Miller, D. (2008), 'Writing on the Wall'. *New Humanist*, 7 August 2008, webpage: <https://newhumanist.org.uk/articles/1780/writing-on-the-wall>, accessed 12/03/2013.
- Moretti, F. (2013), *The Bourgeois: Between History and Literature*. London: Verso.
- National Assembly of France (1789), 'Declaration of the Rights of Man – 1789'. Retrieved from *Yale Law School, The Avalon Project*, webpage: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp, accessed 12/08/2012.
- Negri, A. (1990), 'Postscript, 1990'. Trans. J. Becker. In *Communists Like Us: New Spaces of Liberty, New Lines of Alliance*. Eds. F. Guattari and A. Negri. New York: Semiotexte(e), pp. 149–173.
- Negri, A. (2010), 'Communism: Some Thoughts on the Concept and Practice'. Trans. A. Bové. In *The Idea of Communism*. Eds. S. Žižek and C. Douzinas. London: Verso, pp. 155–166.
- Newsnight* [TV Programme]. BBC2 (West Midlands, England), 17/11/2011.
- New York City General Assembly (2011), 'Declaration of the Occupation of New York City'. Retrieved from *The Sparrow Project*, webpage: www.sparrowmedia.net/declaration/, accessed 06/06/2012.
- Niemi, J. (2013), 'Benedict de Spinoza: Political Philosophy.' *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, webpage: www.iep.utm.edu/spin-pol/, accessed 23/07/2013.
- Nietzsche, F. (1978), *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None*. Trans. W. Kaufmann. London: Penguin Books.
- Nozick, R. (1974), *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. New York: Basic Books.
- Nyden-Bullock, T. (2007), *Spinoza's Radical Cartesian Mind*. London: Continuum.
- Palmer, R., Lindgreen, A. and Vanhamme, J. (2005), 'Relationship Marketing: Schools of Thought and Future Research Directions'. *Marketing Intelligence & Planning*, 23(3), pp. 313–330.
- Percy, L. (2008), *Strategic Integrated Marketing Communication: Theory and Practice*. London: Butterworth–Heinemann.
- Petry, M. (1984), 'Hobbes and the Early Dutch Spinozists'. In *Spinoza's Political and Theological Thought*. Ed. C. de Deugd. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, pp. 63–72.
- Pleyers, G. (2012), 'A Decade of World Social Forums: Internationalisation Without Institutionalisation?'. In *Global Civil Society 2012: Ten Years of Critical Reflection*. Eds. M. Kaldor, H. L. Moore, and S. Selchow. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, Chap. 10.
- Poell, T. (2009), 'Local Particularism Challenged: 1795–1813.' In *The Political Economy of the Dutch Republic*. Ed. O. Gelderblom. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, pp. 291–320.
- Putnam, R. D. (1995), 'Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital'. *Journal of Democracy*, 6(1), pp. 65–78.
- Putnam, R. D. (2000), *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Reitan, R. (2007), *Global Activism (Rethinking Globalizations)*. London: Routledge.
- Ricketts, A. (2012), *The Activists' Handbook: A Step-By-Step Guide to Participatory Democracy*. London: Zed Books.
- Roberts, J. M. (2004), *The New Penguin History of the World*. London: Penguin.
- Robin, C. (2011), *The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism From Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rodríguez-Garavito, C. A. and Arenas, L. C. (2005), 'Indigenous Rights, Transnational Activism, and Legal Mobilization: The Struggle of the U'wa People in

- Colombia'. In *Law and Globalization From Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality*. Eds. B. de S. Santos and C. A. Rodríguez-Garavito. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 241–266.
- Roper, B. S. (2013), *The History of Democracy: A Marxist Interpretation*. London: Pluto.
- Ruda, F. (2013), 'Remembering the Impossible: For a Meta-Critical Anamnesis of Communism'. In *The Idea of Communism 2*. Ed. S. Žižek. London: Verso, pp. 137–168.
- Runciman, D. (2012, October 25), 'Stiffed' (review of *The Occupy Handbook*). *London Review of Books*, 34(20), pp. 7–9.
- Runciman, W. G. (Ed.) (1978), *Max Weber: Selections in Translation*. Trans. E. Matthews. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ryan, A. (1965), 'John Locke and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat'. *Political Studies*, 13, pp. 219–230.
- Sagan, C., Druryan, A. and Soter, S. (Writers), Malone, A. (Director), (2009 [1980]), 'The Backbone of Night'. Episode 7 of *Cosmos: A Personal Voyage* [DVD]. Fremantle Media Enterprises.
- Sandbrook, D. (Presenter), (2012), *The 70s*, [TV series]. BBC2 (West Midlands, England), 4 Episodes, aired 16/04/2012, 23/04/2012, 30/04/2012, and 07/05/2012.
- Santos, B. de S. (Ed.) (2005), *Democratizing Democracy: Beyond the Liberal Democratic Canon*. Reinventing Social Emancipation: Toward New Manifestos, Volume I. London: Verso.
- Santos, B. de S. (Ed.) (2006), *Another Production Is Possible: Beyond the Capitalist Canon*. Reinventing Social Emancipation: Toward New Manifestos, Volume II. London: Verso.
- Santos, B. de S. (Ed.) (2007), *Another Knowledge Is Possible: Beyond Northern Epistemologies*. Reinventing Social Emancipation: Toward New Manifestos, Volume III. London: Verso.
- Santos, B. de S. (2008), Interview by IPS Correspondents, 'Q&A: "WSF Is As Much a Cultural Struggle As a Political One"'. *Inter Press Service News Agency*, webpage: www.ipsnews.net/2008/01/qa-lsqouwsf-is-as-much-a-cultural-struggle-as-a-political-oners-quo/, accessed 11/10/2010.
- Santos, B. de S., Nunes, J. A. and Meneses, M. P. (2007), 'Introduction: Opening Up the Canon of Knowledge and Recognition of Difference'. In *Another Knowledge Is Possible: Beyond Northern Epistemologies*. Ed. B. de S. Santos. London: Verso, pp. xix–lxii.
- Santos, B. de S. and Rodríguez-Garavito, C. A. (2005), 'Law, Politics, and the Subaltern in Counter-Hegemonic Globalization'. In *Law and Globalization From Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality*. Eds. B. de S. Santos and C. A. Rodríguez-Garavito. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–26.
- Santos, B. de S. and Rodríguez-Garavito, C. A. (2006), 'Introduction: Expanding the Economic Canon and Searching for Alternatives to Neoliberal Globalization'. In *Another Production Is Possible: Beyond the Capitalist Canon*. Ed. B. de S. Santos. London: Verso, pp. xvii–lxii.
- SchNEWS (2001), 'Monopolise Resistance? How Globalise Resistance Would Hijack Revolt. . .'. *SchNEWS*, webpage: www.schnews.org.uk/monopresist/monopoliseresistance/index.htm, accessed 15/11/2010.
- Scholte, J. A. (2014), 'Reinventing Global Democracy'. *European Journal of International Relations*, 20(1), pp. 3–28.
- Scott, T. (2012), *The City-State in Europe: 1000–1600*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Seem, M. (1984), 'Introduction'. In *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Eds. G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem, and H. R. Lane. London: The Athlone Press.
- Segev, T. (2000), *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Sharp, H. (2013), 'Violenta imperia nemo continuit diu: Spinoza and the Revolutionary Laws of Human Nature'. Eds. E. R. Jimenez, M. Lampert, C. Roberts, and R. Zambrana. *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, 34(1), pp. 133–148.
- Spinoza, B. de (1985), *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, vol. I. Ed. and trans. E. M. Curley. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Spinoza, B. de (2000), *Political Treatise*. Trans. S. Shirley. Intro. and notes S. Barbone and L. Rice. Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Spinoza, B. de. (2007) *Theological-Political Treatise*. Ed. J. Israel, trans. M Silverthorne and J. Israel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stasavage, D. (2013), *Was Weber Right? City Autonomy, Political Oligarchy, and the Rise of Europe*. January 2013, webpage: www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/piep/2013/stasavage.pdf, accessed 03/04/14.
- Steinberg, J. (2013), 'Spinoza's Political Philosophy'. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2013 Edition). Ed. E. N. Zalta, webpage: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/spinoza-political/>, accessed 07/02/2013.
- Stephen, M. (2009, December), 'Alter-Globalism as Counter-Hegemony: Evaluating the "Postmodern Prince"'. *Globalizations*, 6(4), pp. 483–498.
- Telos Staff (1975, March 20), 'An Interview With C. Castoriadis'. *Telos*, 23, pp. 131–155.
- Thompson, A. K. (2010), *Black Bloc, White Riot: Anti-Globalization and the Genealogy of Dissent*. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- Thompson, E. P. (1995 [1978]), *The Poverty of Theory: Or an Orrery of Errors*. London: Merlin Press.
- Tocqueville, A. de [1835], *Democracy in America*, Volume I and Volume II. Trans. H. Reeve, revised and corrected, 1899, webpage: http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/toc_indx.html, accessed 04/07/2013.
- Tuckness, A. (2002, April), 'Rethinking the Intolerant Locke'. *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(2), pp. 288–298.
- Tuckness, A. (2012), 'Locke's Political Philosophy'. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2012 Edition). Ed. E. N. Zalta, webpage: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/locke-political/>, accessed 23/03/2013.
- Uzgalis, W. (2012), 'John Locke'. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2012 Edition). Ed. E. N. Zalta, webpage: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/locke/>, accessed 14/06/2013.
- Van Herpen, M. H. (2008), 'Paris May '68 and Provo Amsterdam '65: Trying to Understand Two Postmodern Youth Revolts', webpage: www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Marcel_Van_Herpen_May_68_and_Provo_Amsterdam_65.pdf, accessed 12/08/2012.
- Virno, P. and Hardt, M. (Eds.) (1996), *Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Visvanathan, S. and Parmar, C. (2005). 'Life, Life World, and Life Chances: Vulnerability and Survival in Indian Constitutional Law'. In *Law and Globalization From Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality*. Eds. B. de S. Santos and C. A. Rodríguez-Garavito. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 339–362.

- Vries, de J. (2009), 'The Political Economy of Bread in the Dutch Republic'. In *The Political Economy of the Dutch Republic*. Ed. O. Gelderblom. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, pp. 85–114.
- Waldron, J. (1988), *The Right to Private Property*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Wardęga, J. (2012), 'Mao Zedong in Present-Day China: Forms of Deification'. *Politics and Religion in Contemporary China*, VI(2), pp. 181–197, webpage: www.politicsandreligionjournal.com/images/pdf_files/engleski/volume6_no2/joanna.pdf, accessed 14/03/2013.
- Welzel, C. (2013), *Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wild, N. (Director), Becker, M. and Wild, N. (writers), Carson, B., Tougas, K. and Wild, N. (Producers), (1998), *A Place Called Chiapas* [DVD, released 2005]. Zeitgeist Films, webpage: www.youtube.com/watch?v=4TffwElt_UU, accessed 20/10/2012.
- Wolin, R. (2010), *The Wind from the East: French Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution, and the Legacy of the 1960s*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- World Social Forum, 'World Social Forum Charter of Principles'. Retrieved from *Fórum Social Mundial*, 08/06/2002, webpage: www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main.php?id_menu=4&cd_language=2, accessed 10/09/2011.
- World Values Survey, 'Findings and Insights', webpage: www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp, accessed 20/09/16.
- World Values Survey, 'Online Analysis', under 'Data and Documentation', webpage: www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp.
- Žižek, S. (2001), 'Have Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri Re-Written the Communist Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century?' *Rethinking Marxism*, 13(3/4), webpage: www.egs.edu/faculty/slavoj-zizek/articles/have-michael-hardt-and-antonio-negri-rewritten-the-communist-manifesto-for-the-twenty-first-century/, accessed 12/05/2013.
- Žižek, S. (2004). *Organs Without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences*. London: Routledge.
- Žižek, S. (2006), *The Parallax View*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Žižek, S. (2009), 'Slavoj Žižek. The Return to Hegel. 2009 1/16'. Lecture at European Graduate School. Retrieved from *You Tube*, uploaded by European Graduate School Video Lectures, beginning at www.youtube.com/watch?v=aR3vfHuOW38&list=PL11B4EB334188B3A3&index=1, accessed 12/08/2013.
- Žižek, S. (2011), 'Shoplifters of the World Unite'. *London Review of Books*, 19 August 2011, webpage: www.lrb.co.uk/2011/08/19/slavoj-zizek/shoplifters-of-the-world-unite, accessed 25/08/2011.
- Žižek, S. (2012), 'Occupy Wall Street: What Is to Be Done Next?'. *The Guardian*, 24 April 2012, webpage: www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/apr/24/occupy-wall-street-what-is-to-be-done-next, accessed 30/04/2014.



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Index

- activism 9–11, 66–7, 72–7, 91, 155–6, 168–70
Adbusters 65
Adorno and Horkheimer 76
affects 55, 129, 131, 135–6
alter-globalisation 2, 23–4, 28, 141–2, 144–5, 169
Althusser, L. 78, 138n1
American Revolution 39
anarchist 66, 74, 133–4, 140, 168–9
anti-humanist 78
antinomian 67–8, 80
antiproduction 117–18
anti-Western-centric 144–5
aristocracy 46, 48–50
Artaud, A. 114
artisans 22, 47–50, 98–9
aspiration 71, 101
assemblages 7, 11, 123
associational 55–6, 80, 83–8, 97
atomised 82–3, 88
avant-garde 3, 36, 74–7, 79, 101, 111
- Badiou, A. 30–4, 36, 78–9, 160
Berkeley campus (University of California) 90
Berlin, I. 58
biopower 18–19, 40, 127–8, 130, 138
body without organs 7, 114–19, 127, 164
bourgeoisie 3–4, 17–19, 46–7, 59, 79, 172
bourgeois sovereignty 32, 37, 57, 124
- capitalist system 6, 18–19, 22, 31, 71, 124–5, 136
castration 113, 122, 124
citizenship 48, 95, 151, 154
- civil society 2, 52–3, 60–1, 69, 77, 79, 143; associative 81, 86, 97; global 146–7, 151; market 81, 86–8
Cohn-Bendit, D. 70
command mentality 49–50, 57, 59
common good 42–3, 55, 99
communism 6, 8, 30–2, 34–5, 68, 132
Connecticut 96
consensus 134, 140–1, 169
conservatism 4, 53–4, 56–9, 90–1, 100, 124
consumerism 70, 75, 89
corporations 84, 128–9
cosmopolitanism 147, 150–2, 157
counterculture 89–90, 168
Curtis, A. 166–8
- Dawkins, R. 116
Declaration of Independence (American) 39, 41, 62, 97–8
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789) 97
deconstruction 9–10, 165
Deleuze, G. 35, 103, 105–9
Deleuze and Guattari: *Anti-Oedipus* 6, 23, 33–5, 103–4, 110–11, 117, 122–8, 131; *A Thousand Plateaus* 122–3, 125, 131
democratisation 16, 20–2, 27–8, 59–60, 80–1, 149–51
Derrida, J. 9–10, 105
Descartes, R. 38, 53, 81, 83
desire: reactionary 12, 106, 119–20; revolutionary 13, 38–40, 119–20, 130
desiring-machines 110, 114–19, 123, 127
desiring-production 110–16, 118–19, 130–2, 137–8, 164
deterritorialisation 20, 57, 62, 111, 125, 171

- deterritorialise 13–15
 dialectical 20, 105, 173
 Diggers 55
 Direct Action Network (DAN) 66, 140
 Dutch Republic 37, 50, 59
- early modern (period) 50, 59–60, 139
 École normale supérieure (ENS) 77–9
 egalitarianism 3, 14–16, 46, 84–6, 93–6, 144, 153–5
 empiricism 30, 64n6, 107
 English Civil War 39, 60, 98
 Enlightenment 29, 38, 51, 58, 65, 78, 99
 entrepreneurial 4, 48–9, 79, 84, 130, 166–7
- Foucault, M. 18, 70, 105, 127, 147–8
 free market 69, 80–2, 84, 87
 Free Speech Movement 90–1
 French Revolution 51, 78, 80, 97–100
 Freud, S. 40, 112–13, 121, 123
 Friedman, M. 69
 full body 118–19, 131
- Gaille, C. de 91, 93, 100
 genetic code 115
 geodesic domes 168
 global South 141, 146, 153
 Graeber, D. 66–7, 140, 169
 Greenspan, A. 166–7
 Guattari, F. 103–4, 111–12; *see also* Deleuze and Guattari
- Hardt and Negri: *Commonwealth* 133, 148–9; *Declaration* 26–8; *Empire* 5–6, 23, 32–4, 124–8, 132–9, 145–9, 168–9; *Multitude* 23–4, 133, 145, 149, 169
 Harvey, D. 148
 Hegel, F. 1, 105
 hegemony 19, 101, 135, 138, 144–8, 157–9, 170
 Hill, C. 98
 Hobbes, T. 39, 53, 59
 Hobsbawm, E. 98–100
 Hocquenghem, G. 89, 164
Homo natura 110, 156
 Hoofd, I. 9–11, 170, 173
 horizontal connections 11, 66, 111, 132
 human being 7–8, 11, 33, 54–61, 110–16, 138, 164–7
 humanism 25n4, 78; Renaissance 37, 39, 41–2, 47, 50
- human nature 34, 53, 57–8, 128, 132, 165
 human rights 15–16, 69, 77–9, 96–8, 139, 147–51
- idealist 9, 34–5, 160
 ideology 6, 10, 15, 28, 32–4, 59, 85, 94, 127
 immanence 19, 25n5, 29–30, 34–40, 113, 130
 indigenous 24, 133, 144–6, 153–6, 165, 170–1
Indignados 26–7, 68, 74
 individualism: liberal 16, 40, 43, 46, 59, 84, 152; possessive 82–3, 85–6, 152
 institutionalisation 24, 71, 99, 119, 142–3, 152
 intellectual-technical middle class 137–8, 145
 Italian city-states 22, 48–9
 Italy 37, 46, 125–6
- (La) Borde Psychiatric Clinic 103, 111
 Lacan, J. 78, 103–4, 111–13, 123
 Lefebvre, H. 70
 leftist-reactionary 14, 122, 126, 149, 168
 Levellers 60–1, 98
 liberal democracy 14, 79, 82–4, 147, 151, 172
 liberal humanist 8–9, 17, 165, 173
 liberalism 15, 40–1, 43, 46, 59–60, 79–86
 libertarian: left- 3–5, 8–9, 14, 24n1, 69, 84, 110, 165; right- 4, 14, 43, 69, 166
 Lilburne, J. 61
 Locke, J. 41–3, 52, 55–9, 80–3, 99
- Macpherson, C. B. 60
 Mao, Z. 31–2, 78
 Maoist 77–9, 89, 168
 March 22nd Movement 72, 74
 Marcos, Subcomandante 135
 Marcuse, H. 75–6
 marketing 129–30, 135–6
 Marxism 17–18, 67, 78, 98; Autonomous 125–6, 129; Lacanian 6–7, 9
 Massachusetts 95–6, 150
 materialism 30, 35, 154
 Maya 133, 135, 140, 171
 Medieval period 13, 16, 38, 45–7, 49
 merchant 46–51, 54–5, 59
 Mitterrand, F. 101
 modern 4–6, 29, 36–40, 46, 57, 65–6, 124; capitalism 64n8, 68

- modernist 28–9, 35–6, 76
 modernity 4, 8, 37–8, 40, 65–6, 150; alter-
 22, 46, 161
 Moretti, F. 71
 multiplicity 105, 108–9, 114–15
 multitude 11, 37–40, 53, 125, 128, 130–4,
 154–5

 Nanterre (University of Paris campus)
 70–2, 78–9, 90
 Negri, A. 125–6, 155–6; *see also* Hardt
 and Negri
 neoliberalism 29, 46, 87, 134, 166
 New Class 172
 New England 61, 93–7, 99
 New Hampshire 96
 New Left 67, 88, 90
 Nietzsche, F. 105–10, 163, 166
 Northern (American colonies/states) 93,
 96

 Occupy movement 2, 26–7, 62, 65–7, 90,
 140, 172
 oligarchy 48, 50, 59–60, 95
 organism 7–8, 114–15, 119, 164

 partial object 113–15
 participatory democracy 28, 142, 151–2
 patrician 49–50, 59–60
 Peoples' Global Action (PGA) 67, 134,
 140–1
 petit-bourgeois 60–2, 98–9
 Pilgrims 93–4
 postmodern 4–5, 18, 29–30, 36–40, 65–6,
 90, 126, 130, 147–51
 postmodernisation 129, 135
 postmodernity 5, 65–6, 130
 post-structuralist 6, 9, 12, 17–18, 127, 165
 proletariat 75, 124
 property 41–3, 56, 60–2, 95, 98–9, 150,
 152–3
 Protestant radicalism 41, 55, 61, 95–6, 144
 Protestant work ethic 39, 93–4
 psychoanalysis 7, 33, 103, 112–13, 121–4
 Puritan 41, 94–6
 Putnam, R. 86, 88

 Rand, A. 166
 rationalist 54, 59, 161
 Reagan, R. 91–2, 101
 Real 11–12, 14, 31–5, 112–13, 127–8
 re-institutionalisation 97, 141

 republicanism 39, 80, 85–6
 reterritorialisation 111, 125
 reterritorialise 13, 45, 131
 Romantic 99, 156
 Rousseau, J.-J. 59, 99

 Sans-culotte 99
 Santos B. de S. 140, 146–54, 157
 schizoanalysis 4–5, 34, 119
 Scholte J. A. 140, 147, 149, 151, 153–6,
 173n3
 Seattle (WTO protests) 2, 5, 67, 134
 self-centred 7, 9, 35, 42, 55, 109,
 115–16
 selves 5, 9, 29, 105, 109, 123, 157
 singularisation 131–3
 singularity 7, 37, 134, 146
 socialism 132, 138n1
 Socialism or Barbarism 74
 socius 117, 125
 Sorbonne 72–3, 79, 90
 Southern (American colonies/states) 93
 Spinoza, B. de 37–8, 46, 50–9, 81, 106,
 154
 structuralism 78, 103–4, 113, 123, 127
 students 17, 67–8, 70–9, 90–3, 101,
 136–7
 supranational 126, 146–8, 151
 symbolic order 31–3, 78, 112–13,
 122–4

 territorialisation 141
 Tocqueville, A. de 83, 87, 93–6, 100
 transcendence 8–9, 18, 29–30, 38, 54, 57,
 76–9
 translation 154
 Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs)
 147, 152, 155
 transnationalism 139–40, 157, 170–1

 utilitarian 83, 102n1, 107

 vanguard 19, 36, 134, 137
 Virginia Declaration of Rights 98

 Weberian 85
 Western-centric 170
 Western intelligentsia 28–9, 143–4,
 156–7
 Westernised 145, 148, 153, 157
 Williams, R. 144, 150
 will-power 4, 7, 9, 13, 109–10, 165

- will to power 105–6, 108–9, 138, 163, 166, 168
- workers 47–8, 67, 76–7, 99, 101, 102n7, 125, 135–7
- working classes 16–17, 19, 101
- World Social Forum (WSF) 141–3, 145, 155
- World Values Survey 86, 88
- Ya Basta! 140, 169
- Yippie 84
- Zapatista (Army of National Liberation) 5, 133–5, 140, 149
- Žižek, S. 6, 8–9, 20, 26–30, 32–6, 54, 57, 78, 141