Building the Atlantic Empires

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Building the Atlantic Empires

Unfree Labor and Imperial States in the Political Economy of Capitalism, ca. 1500–1914

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Foreword

Atlantic history has flourished over the past two decades to become one of the most dynamic fields of historical inquiry. But even its most ardent practitioners have noted its kraken-like nature, tentacles waving frantically for a purchase on something solid. Its gravest weakness, I maintain, lies in the absence of an integrating theoretical framework. Multiple historiographies dot the ocean as islands upon which to founder: national histories colonize the Atlantic; world systems theory reduces the globe to core and periphery; and postmodernist cultural studies devalue the human component for free trade in discourse. Informed by but not shackled to these powerful schools of historical thought (with their own colonizing tendencies), the historians whose essays appear in this collection look to another pole star.

For the current generation of leftist historians, Atlantic history fulfils the role that the history of the working class did for the progeny of E.P. Thompson. Just as Marx's writings on industrial capitalism inspired this earlier cohort, I believe that his model of the "so-called primitive accumulation" of capital infuses much of the better writing on the new maritime history. Against a broader tableaux than nation centerd histories of *the* working class, this literature documents the wildly chaotic, at times seemingly conflicted, but typically cruel enterprise of private capital formation and the establishment of colonial regimes, imperial business underwritten by force, whether actual or implicit in the human relations cobbled together in the search for profit. "Capital comes" into the world "dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt," affirmed Marx (*Capital* 1: Chapter 31). That statement could not be truer than of Europe's imperial project.

This collection reminds us that imperialism must be understood in terms of the destructive creation of capitalism. Spread across the globe by states, imperialism produced outcomes of a peculiarly stateless nature. I say stateless not because nations did not play an obvious role in imperialism or that individual states did not produce distinct colonial societies and economies. But the inter-state rivalries that colonized the Atlantic also reordered production and redrafted labor forms that worked ultimately to the ends of capital, making for an *Atlantic empire of capital*. Covering the era of capitalism's globalization, this collection assesses the nature and permutations of its singular creation— unfree labor—as planted by imperial European nations and their colonies around the Atlantic (and beyond). A direct expression of social force, as conceived by Marx, unfree labor forms sank deep and tangled roots, their tendrils binding past to present day.

Control of labor lay at the heart of European imperialism and one cannot underestimate the importance of bonded labor to the history of the Atlantic. But the diversity of colonial settings with distinct economies, infrastructural needs, existing labor forces, access to external labor sources, and defence requirements led to the proliferation of unfree labor forms. At once foreign to one another and at root the same, each labor type expressed both the needs of the imperial state and the requirements of capital. These essays pick apart the various strands of experience so as to enable their twisting together again into a stronger understanding of labor's place in the Atlantic. They provide a more nuanced reading of unfree labor, a historically significant but hard to define category often lost between the compass points of slave and free labor. The overwhelming majority of those who worked well into the nineteenth century in the Atlantic World did so in one form or another of "unfreedom" with slavery but one iteration of bondage.

These essays highlight the complexity that the simple terms free and unfree labor often obscure, being more so rubrics sheltering a plethora of human relationships centerd in and around the workplace. They remind us that capitalism acted across time and space, providing multiple "intersections," places where expropriation occurred, labor relocated and multiplied, commodities were produced, and ultimately capitalist social structure took root. The promiscuous conjoining of imperial labor needs and scarce labor supply produced a motley crew of labor forms. Coercion in one form or another scraped as many workers as possible from around the Atlantic. Multiple circuits of labor flows intertwined in the developing global labor market. Each destination proved an entity unto itself with decisions about sources of labor and degrees of subjection made to meet these needs, making for discrete labor systems.

This process of capital accumulation made for temporal and spatial variance that can be studied contextually. But to lose sight of the driving historical forces in becoming fascinated by difference and contingency seduces one into primarily descriptive rather than explanatory renderings of history. From the inception of European imperialism in the New World, labor migration, typically coerced but not uniformly so, has been the currency of colonialism, and that flow from the outset has transcended regions, nation states, and empires. The newly acquired lands' greed for human bodies proved insatiable; or, more accurately, the insatiable need for profit of imperial and colonial statesmen, merchants, planters, soldiers of fortune, indigenous overlords, *et alia* drove them to do harm to other people. In short, capitalism provided the crucible that forged commodities from human actions.

This collection, bridging the primitive accumulation and globalization of capital, contributes greatly to the telling of this story of freedom and

unfreedom, coercion and resistance. Spanning 400 plus years and unwinding on the distant shores of Europe, Africa and the Americas, these subplots nonetheless strike a similar refrain. National and subsequently imperial development comprised not some abstract process but a litany of acts of force. Laborers' coerced toil built empires; from their sweat political elites, landed gentry, and merchant cadres wrung riches. Neither boundaries of nations, nor bounds of human decency stood in their way. These essays testify not only to the Janus-face of capital but also to its mercurial nature, quick to extract silver from any opportunity that arose. At the same time, working people made for a very diverse crew, negotiating where they could for whatever advantage, however small, in the process playing a pivotal role in the construction of this new Atlantic World.

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Introduction

As the title of this collection suggests, our aim is to rethink the relationship between the rise of capitalist economic development, Western European expansion in the Atlantic basin, and state mobilization of unfree labor from the sixteenth through the twentieth centuries. In contrast to much of the scholarship on the Atlantic world, the essays in this collection examine the state as an agent in both imperial and capitalist expansion. Although our framework is largely Atlantic, its implications are global. The main actors in these essays are coerced workers and the officials and institutions of Western European imperial states and their colonies in the Americas. The works presented here help transcend national, imperial, colonial, geographic, and historiographic boundaries by offering comparative insights, both within and across empires, into multiple forms and ideologies of unfree labor as they evolved over more than four centuries of imperial and economic development. We hope these insights will clarify new avenues of research for scholars interested in the histories of coerced workers faced with the growing power of imperial states and capitalism in an evolving Atlantic world.

One innovation in this collection is the emphasis on the state itself as a key actor in the mobilization and employment of unfree labor. Most of the essays highlight people working under varying regimes of coercion who were deployed in both the public and the private sectors in ways that mutually benefited both public and private interests. In fact the boundaries between state and private actors and interests in the recruitment, deployment, and policing of unfree labor over time were always blurred. States routinely collaborated with quasi-state entities, such as chartered trading companies or privateers, and with private entrepreneurs to execute state tasks with unfree labor. State officials often pursued their own private enrichment through state institutions with forced laborers. Thus, the essays in this collection pay particular attention to the many layers of personnel, authority, jurisdiction, and funding that comprised metropolitan, imperial, and colonial branches of administration. We also see the many interconnections between colonial administration, quasi-state institutions, and the various human officials who made and modified state policy.

To date, studies of Atlantic economic and labor history have focused more on the work of colonial subsistence and market production than the work necessary to establish and defend colonies, and build imperial infrastructure.[1] This

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1 For two, earlier collections of essays on unfree labor in the Atlantic world see Colin A. Palmer, ed., *The Worlds of Unfree Labour: From Indentured Servitude to Slavery* (Aldershot: Ashgate

may be because it is easier to measure aspects of "productive" labor such as efficiency and productivity, or measure its impact over time, if the work results in a product that has value in a market. It is much more difficult to measure the value and productivity of what we might call "constructive" labor, work that built and sustained empires. The extension of empire into the Americas and elsewhere included a range of tasks even broader than those required in the private sector—extracting state-owned resources, building and sustaining settlements, constructing imperial infrastructure (ships, roads, forts, prisons, warehouses, governors' mansions), transporting trade goods, and defending those settlements on land and at sea. This kind of labor might better be called the reproductive labor of empire, a labor that is often unpaid and unpleasant and therefore requires the state's forcible expropriation of people's bodies to extract the political and economic benefits of their labor. States' efforts to coerce people into doing their work through enslavement, indenture, impressment, and penal servitude sustained European imperialism for centuries, but they also had profound effects on evolving ideas about labor, freedom, and empire itself.

While considering the debates that marked the Loyola conference, it became clear that our volume would need to address the conflicting views historians have brought to bear on the nexus between unfree labor, imperial expansion in the Atlantic, and the political economies of empire that guided such expansion. Most fundamental were debates about defining freedom and unfreedom. Early on it became clear that it was more useful analytically to think of various types of labor on a continuum, rather than as sharply delineated opposites. Yet the analytically comfortable continuum often foundered when we confronted workers' own responses to the work regimes they were forced to endure. This was especially contentious in our efforts to understand the similarities and differences between indentured labor and slavery.

Chattel slavery became both the metaphor and the reality of the ultimate in unfreedom in Europe and its colonies by the end of the seventeenth century. This equation in part explains why the Atlantic experience of African slavery and its abolition shaped all forms of unfree labor in the Atlantic basin and beyond from the late 1600s onward. The racialization of slavery in the Atlantic world and its consequences for African-descended people marked a key difference between enslavement and other forms of labor coercion. At the same time, however, the labor of indentured workers proved critical in the formation of the Atlantic economy. For instance, indentured servants and

Variorum, 1998) and Paul E. Lovejoy and Nicholas Rogers, eds., *Unfree Labour in the Development of the Atlantic World* (Ilford, UK and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1994).

others forced into servitude made up the mainstay of the unfree workforce at the inception of the English plantation complex in the mid-seventeenth century. In all, close to 2.6 million indentured workers came to toil in the Americas between 1492 and 1922. Tens of thousands of convicts came as well.[2] Working and living conditions for both groups were often indistinguishable from those endured by slaves, yet neither indenture nor convict labor has imprinted itself on both the public and scholarly consciousness to the same degree. Legal differences between slavery and indenture made more difference over the long term than they did for those who suffered through both regimes. White servants who survived their indentures usually became wage laborers, and often rented land to farm for their own gain; few returned to Europe, although many moved on to other colonies in search of opportunity. Surviving Asian indentured servants who came after 1834 could also improve their material circumstances in some American settings. For black slaves such paths to freedom and material improvement were rare indeed.[3] Imperial officials and employers never tired of emphasizing the contractual basis of indenture in their own defense, although in practice, many indentures were

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2 For servitude's importance in the early plantation complex, see John Donoghue, "Indentured Servitude in the Seventeenth Century English Atlantic: A Brief Survey of the Literature," *The History Compass* vol. 10 (2013): 1–10. For estimates of 1,153,000 indentured workers and 149,000 convicts who migrated to the Americas from 1492 through 1880 see David Eltis, *Coerced and Free Migration: Global Perspectives* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), Table 2, 67. For an estimate of 1,438,485 indentured workers who migrated to the Americas from 1881 through 1922 see David Northrup, *Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism, 1834–1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Table A.2, 159–160.

3 For the enslaved manumission and self-purchase were legal in most of the Atlantic empires, at least into the eighteenth century. Thereafter, particularly in Anglo-America the possibilities for achieving freedom diminished. See Elsa Goveia, "The West Indian Slave Laws of the Eighteenth Century," *Revista de Ciencias Sociales* vol. 4, no. 1 (1960): 75–106 on the variations in manumission policies, civil and religious rights of enslaved and free people of color in the Caribbean by the 1700s. For a discussion of the labor, race, and citizenship after emancipation in comparative perspective see Frederick Cooper, Thomas C. Holt, and Rebecca J. Scott, *Beyond Slavery: Explorations of Race, Labor, and Citizenship in Post-emancipation Societies* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). On indentured laborers and their prospects during and after bondage see: E. Van den Boogaart and P. Emmer, *Colonialism and Migration: Indentured Labour Before and After Slavery* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986); Alison Games, *Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Christopher Tomlins, *Freedom Bound: Law, Labor, and Civic Identity in Colonizing America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). On indenture and its aftermath from 1834 to 1922, see Northrup, *Indentured Labor,* 104–154.

indeed forced upon workers, who often died during their terms of service. For historians it is more difficult to understand what degree of agency, desperation, or coercion laborers experienced in "choosing" indenture or, less often, even enslavement.[4] Many early modern Europeans and colonists decried indenture as slavery, yet indenture persisted as a form of servitude even for whites into the nineteenth century.

The work presented in this volume shows that multiple forms of unfree labor bracketed the establishment and disintegration of Atlantic empires from the sixteenth into the twentieth centuries. The enslavement of Africans and their descendants in the Atlantic world has been particularly well studied and has generated an extensive debate about the institution's role in the history of the Atlantic empires and of global capitalism. We do not intend to duplicate that massive effort here. Instead, we seek to understand the range of and interactions among different forms of unfree labor in the evolution of imperialism and capitalism in the Atlantic world. This volume shows how the work necessary to establish and reproduce empires shaped workers' relationships with imperial states and the ideologies of freedom, legitimacy, and citizenship in important ways not captured in studies of productive labor alone. Commodity production for a market was not the only factor driving the transformation of labor itself into a commodity. For instance, in particular historical moments and settings imperial competition and colonial defense could generate sufficient demand for labor to transform labor markets and modes of labor control. We recognize that states' patterns of recruitment and employment of unfree labor, including but not limited to slavery, were shaped in part by an increasingly integrated world market and the interests of merchants and owners of capital. However, state institutions and policies were not merely tools that directly translated those interests into practice. As a number of the essays in this volume show, state actions could be shaped by other political or ideological imperatives as well. Additionally, in some settings, the politics of imperial competition and defense could deprive thousands of life and liberty in cases of impressment and transportation, while in other settings they could compel officials to modify the terms of labor with their workers to forestall rebellion.

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4 For a more detailed discussion of the many paradoxes and problems in defining slavery and freedom see, Stanley L. Engerman's "Introduction" to Engerman, ed. *Terms of Labor: Slavery, Serfdom, and Free Labor* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 1–23. Also, Cooper, Holt, and Scott, "Introduction," *Beyond Slavery*, 1–32.

Theoretical Frameworks

One of the main purposes of our book is to situate labor history within the history of European political economies of empire. In doing so, we illuminate how the expansion of global capitalism and state-driven, Atlantic empire-building unfolded as interconnected processes over the early modern (ca. 1500–1800) and modern eras. The reciprocal history of state formation and capital accumulation was predicated upon imperial warfare and the concomitant rise of the early modern Atlantic plantation complex,[5] both of which encompassed economic innovations in production, commerce, finance, and labor, the latter marked most profoundly by the racialization of slavery. Brought into being through interstate competition and capitalist expansion, the Atlantic world became a developmental crucible for more integrated global networks of economic and cultural exchange towards the end of the early modern period. We have thus focused on the Atlantic as a primary theater of operations for colonization, capitalist expansion, and state-sponsored empire-building, recognizing that these processes depended critically upon state efforts to mobilize labor for commodity production and labor to expand and reproduce the empire. Despite the symbiotic relationship between empire-building and capital formation and accumulation, the existing literature on the Atlantic empires has not done enough to fuse imperial histories of the state with those of labor and capital. To address this gap in the literature, the discussion now turns to an interdisciplinary examination of four fields of study: world systems theory, Atlantic history, global labor history, and the history of capitalism.

World systems theory is a multi-disciplinary study of modernity pioneered by the work of the sociologist Emmanuel Wallerstein, who was deeply influenced by Marxian thought and the historical scholarship of the Annales School, most notably by the work of Fernand Braudel.[6] The central thesis of

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5   Philip Curtin, *The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

6   Fernand Braudel published prolifically. For two of his most influential works, see *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Centuries*, 3 vols., Miriam Kochan, trans. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992); *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip* II, 2 vols., trans. Siân Reynolds (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973, 1995). *The Mediterranean* and *Capitalism and Civilization* were first published in French, respectively, in 1949 and 1967. For an historiographical appreciation of Braudel's work within the tradition of the Annales school, see Peter Burke, *The French Historical Revolution: The Annales School 1929–89* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).

world systems theory is that the Western-dominated, modern world emerged through a history of totalizing, capitalist integration that functioned in part through interstate competition. While capitalism created one, international division of labor, world systems theory holds that the competition between sovereign states that emerged in the sixteenth century, partly as a result of the on-going transition from feudalism to capitalism, created a regional hierarchy that divided the world into "core" and dependent or "peripheral" zones. The capitalist West and its powerful states dominated the core; their colonies and weaker states constituted the peripheries.[7]

Wallerstein's four-volume collection, *The Modern World-System*, has attracted legions of critically-engaged practitioners as well as overtly hostile critics. Both the first and second volumes have been questioned for over-emphasizing the profitability and globally-integrating tendencies of foreign commerce during the early modern era. While this critique has some validity, we find it less convincing than others that accuse Wallerstein of collapsing politics into economics, resulting in an analysis of interstate competition that obscures vital, often culturally-derived differences between state political ideologies and internal state structures. These differences shaped the contingent and varied history of capitalism's expansion, which, apart from its partial dependence on state intervention, owed much to the interstate competition for dominance within Europe and across the wider world.[8] Wallerstein also does little to situate the

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7   Wallerstein worked out his world systems theory through dozens of publications, but the four principal works are: *The Modern World-System : Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1976); *The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy,1600–1750* (New York: Academic Press, 1980); *The Modern World-System III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730–1840s* (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1989); *The Modern World-System, IV: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789–1914* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011). Wallerstein paid tribute to Braudel's influence by naming the Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations at SUNY-Binghamton after the Annales school historian.

8   For important critiques of Wallerstein's interstate analysis, see Theda Skocpol, "Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique," *American Journal of Sociology* vol. 82, no. 5 (1977): 1075–1090; Robert Brenner, "The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism," *New Left Review* vol. 104 (1977): 25–92; Robert A. Denmark and Kenneth P. Thomas, "The Brenner-Wallerstein Debate," *International Studies Quarterly* vol. 32, no. 1 (1988): 47–65. For more recent work that offers nuanced, interdisciplinary analysis of how the capitalist world system evolved through hegemonic institutions that depended on complex combinations of private and public power within and without the state proper, see Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly Silver, *Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1999); Roy Kwon, "Hegemonies in

modern sovereign state's emergence explicitly in the history of the imperial state. Indeed, he consigns empire to antiquity as a political and economic system that forestalled capitalist development, whereas we see the emergence of the Atlantic empires as central to capitalism's early modern history.[9] Our book argues that competitive empire-building in the Atlantic became a forcing house of modernity by catalyzing capitalist enterprise and revolutionizing the Western state as a sovereign entity, through its evolution as a bureaucratically complex, fiscal institution devoted to war-making, colonial conquest, and colonial governance in regions of the world hardly known to its medieval predecessors. Wallerstein wrote that interstate competition limited rather than expanded the sovereignty of early modern states. In contrast, most historians argue that western European states, competing for imperial dominance in the Atlantic world expanded their sovereign dominion by administering new colonies directly or by delegating shares of governing power to colonial assemblies or chartered, public/private ventures. Importantly, as we argue here, the interstate competition over Atlantic colonization that expanded the sovereign powers of western European states, especially over people and their labor, also fostered capitalist economic development.[10]

Together the essays in this collection show how the Atlantic empires expanded their sovereignty by organizing economic activity abroad that increased the demand for unfree labor and the need to legitimate coercive labor regimes. These organizational priorities required imperial states to make historically new, sovereign claims over the labor power and the physical bodies of their own and foreign people. For example, states forced enemy soldiers, smugglers, those it deemed seditious, vagrants, and the poor and homeless into several forms of unfree work, including plantation labor, fort building, and military service. Unfortunately, neither world systems theory nor imperial

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the World-System: An Empirical Assessment of Hegemonic Sequences from the 16th to 20th Century," *Sociological Perspectives* vol. 54, no. 4 (2011): 593–617.

9   In *The Modern World-System* II: *Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy,1600–1750*, Wallerstein essentially reduces "mercantilism" to a commercial response to the crisis in European feudalism, downplaying its part in the titanic struggle between imperial states for hegemony in both the colonial Atlantic and Europe itself. In our view, the history of early modern empire-building subsumed the history of mercantilism; the latter's crucial origins in colonization and colonial commerce were associated with but not determined by Europe's feudal crisis; mercantilism, in fact, can be considered both a cause and symptom of the feudal crisis.

10   See, for example, Immanuel Wallerstein, "The West, Capitalism, and the Modern World-System," *Review* vol. XV (1992): 561–595 and the discussion of state sovereignty as limited by interstate competition on pp. 579–580.

Atlantic histories have analyzed these processes in much detail. Conversely, the contributors to this book demonstrate how the Atlantic empires and their colonial governments actually created a spectrum of unfree, productive and reproductive labor, calculated for political and economic exploitation to give imperial states a competitive advantage against their rivals. Political structures, we argue, played an indispensable part in the commodification of labor power and people, a process made possible by revolutionary notions of state sovereignty born of Atlantic involvements.

While Wallerstein has been rightly criticized for his problematic treatment of political structures, he should be credited with making clear and direct links between interstate competition and the "ceaseless accumulation of capital" that marked the advent of the global economy.[11] Imperial histories of the Atlantic world, with their focus on ideology, administration, law, language, and culture, have seldom made this link in any systematic and explicit fashion, even when they go a long way in exposing the weaknesses of Wallerstein's core-periphery determinism. When imperial literature does turn its attention to economic expansion, the capitalist modes such expansion assumed rarely receive any sort of rigorous analytical engagement.[12] As a result, histories of the imperial Atlantic economies often lose their capacity to account for the state's part in one of the most deeply transformative events in human history, the centuries-long transition that made capitalism a global phenomenon, a transition that depended not upon mystical "market forces" guided by a mythical "invisible hand," but upon the drive to maximize profits that actually helped create market demands instead of responding to them, as many economic historians argue. The import of such demystification can hardly be understated, for it historicizes both the state and capital, which have been falsely rendered in the past and present as natural foundations of advanced civilizations.[13]

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11   Ibid., 568–569.

12   See for instance, David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Armitage does excellent work excavating protean concepts of British imperialism through a linguistic method. But unfortunately, while historicizing the ideological justifications British writers employed on behalf of a commercial, maritime empire, Armitage's reliance on language naturalizes a historical process, that being the progressively capitalist modes of commerce and finance that shaped the discourses and policies of English expansion in the Atlantic. As a result, he forfeits an opportunity to more fully contextualize how early modern British imperial ideology departed fundamentally from its intellectual inheritances.

13   See for instance Dale Tomich's critique of neo-classical economic history in his introduction to *Through the Prism of Slavery: Labor, Capital, and the World Economy* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 8–9.

Although Wallerstein foregrounds the power interests of the state in world systems theory, he has been correctly criticized for a deterministic reading of the core states' relationship to the periphery, seeing the latter locked in a condition of developmental dependency. Similar criticisms have been launched against imperial histories of the Atlantic for reducing the history of the colonial periphery to a function of policies initiated within the imperial metropolis. But Wallerstein's analysis of capitalist labor forms in the colonial periphery contains the very grounds for reformulating his core/periphery dynamic. In such a reformulation, colonies can be seen as indispensable engines of capitalist modernity, as they played host to the most profitable innovations in capitalist labor relations, as the history of slavery and servitude in the Atlantic attests.[14] Unlike Marx and most labor historians who published before the 1990s, Wallerstein sees slavery and servitude as integral to capital accumulation. Indeed, Wallerstein has "questioned whether [wage labor] has been even the majority mode within historical capitalism.... It is surely not clear that in the history of the world there has been less slavery within the capitalist/'modern' historical system than in previous ones. One might perhaps make the opposite case."[15] In this book, we make the case that states and colonial governments helped create capitalist systems of slavery and servitude. These governments used unfree labor to construct and defend their empires, both physically and ideologically. Political institutions around the Atlantic empires helped create the conditions in which goods were efficiently and securely produced by servants and slaves for an expanding world market. As several contributions in this book demonstrate in regard to the politics of unfree labor, imperial and colonial governments

14   David Brion Davis, *Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of New World Slavery* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). Moving beyond core/periphery determinism, Davis compares the slave regimes of the British, French, and Iberian Atlantic, exploring how culturally specific imperial/colonial tensions and intra-colonial conflicts informed the national, imperial, and global histories of "New World" slavery, which he identifies as a politically-structured, explicitly capitalist institution. Lauren Benton's attempt to move beyond core/periphery determinism is less successful. In "From the World-Systems Perspective to Institutional World History: Culture and Economy in Global Theory," *Journal of World History* vol. 7, no. 2 (1996): 261–295, she draws important attention to the stadial and structural rigidities of Wallerstein's model. But in her subsequent monograph, *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), she fails to improve upon the promise of her insights. While she deftly recovers the social contexts and cultural negotiations that guided imperial/colonial and intra-colonial legal histories, she adopts a cultural determinist approach that abandons capitalism as a meaningful analytical category, hardly a satisfying alternative to world systems theory in explaining modern global historical development.

15   Wallerstein, "The West, Capitalism, and the Modern World System," 575–576.

often worked cooperatively, but their relations were also fraught with tensions that revealed the sometimes conflicting agendas of the imperial state and the private interests ensconced in colonial governments. Colonial governments wielded considerable if not decisive influence over unfree labor regimes in the "periphery" and capitalism's expansion transformed the character of free and unfree labor in the core and periphery diachronically, suggesting that historians should explore the relations between free and unfree labor as part of a reciprocal rather than stadial history.[16]

Some of the best work on the imperial history of the "core" states of the "world system" has flourished in the literature of Atlantic history, which certainly can no longer be called an emerging field. Although its origins stretch back to the late nineteenth century, Atlantic history really became prominent in the 1990s, with its maturation marked by internal critiques from Atlanticists and criticisms by both national and global historians. At this point, few studying the history of western Africa and the Americas can now write without reference to the work of Atlantic historians, who have provided an invaluable service to historical scholarship by revealing the limitations of work that strictly adheres to a national paradigm.[17]

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16   Over the course of five decades, the Latin American historical anthropologist and world systems theorist Sidney Mintz has done much to fruitfully complicate Wallerstein's core/periphery model, with special attention to labor history. See, for example, "The So-Called World System: Local Initiative and Local Response," *Dialectical Anthropology* vol. 2 (1977): 253–267; *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York: Penguin, 1986); "Creolization and Hispanic Exceptionalism," *Review* vol. 31, no. 3 (2008): 251–265.

17   For competing and conflicting reflections on methodological approaches to Atlantic history and its historiographical impact, see Marcus Rediker, "The Red Atlantic, or, 'A Terrible Blast Swept over the Heaving Sea,'" in Bernhard Klein and Gesa Mackenthun, eds., *Sea Changes: Historicizing the Ocean* (New York: Routledge, 2003) and David Armitage, "Three Concepts of Atlantic History" in David Armitage and Michael Braddick, *The British Atlantic World, 1500–1800* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002). Rediker, in contrast to Armitage, convincingly places the history of capitalism, and in particular capitalism's labor history, at the core of Atlantic history. The national paradigm rarely afflicted Africanists studying the pre-imperial era. But it should be emphasized here that Atlantic history has had an uneven impact, with historians of the Americas far outpacing their Europeanist counterparts (including those studying Britain) in terms of broadening their historical contexts through an Atlantic perspective. Europeanists who have embraced world systems theory present a vital exception, as do historians of early modern Ireland, who, led by D.B. Quinn, played instrumental parts in conceptualizing the Atlantic approach. For a critique of insular historiography and the promise of widening British and Irish history with more global perspectives, see Nicholas Canny, "Writing Early Modern History: Ireland, Britain, and the Wider World," *The Historical Journal* vol. 46, no. 3 (2003): 723–747. For an appreciation of Quinn's contributions to Atlantic history, see Nicholas Canny and Karen Ordahl Kupperman, "The Scholarship and Legacy of David Beers Quinn, 1909–2002," *William and Mary Quarterly* vol. 60, no. 4 (2003): 843–860.

Atlantic history views the Atlantic Ocean, and the littoral and landed interiors encompassing it, as an historically-integrated region created initially in the early modern period by the commerce and colonization that brought Africans, Native Americans, and Europeans into social, cultural, economic and political relationships.[18] Atlanticists do not approach colonial histories in the Americas as mere preludes to the "inevitable" birth of American nation-states. They instead seek more authentic historical contexts by uniting colonial and post-colonial histories to show how the circulation of people, goods, ideas, and experience integrated distant points around the Atlantic world or shaped the history of a specific region located within it.[19] The essays in this collection are all conceived

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18   From the fifteenth through eighteenth centuries, "Atlantic," while in use, was outpaced by "the Western Ocean," the "North Sea," "the Ocean Sea," and the "Ethiopian Sea." "Atlantic" became a regular reference to the ocean discussed here by the mid-18th Century. Whatever early modern people called it, at both the elite and popular levels, they had already begun to think of the Atlantic and its littoral as an interconnected and interactive space. See Joyce Chaplin, "The Atlantic Ocean and its Contemporary Meanings, 1492–1808," in Jack Greene and Phillip Morgan, eds., *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 35–54. For work on the Atlantic world as an "Atlantic System" with definitive criteria overlapping with Wallerstein's world systems theory but with greater emphasis on cultural history, see Horst Pietschmann, ed., *Atlantic History: History of the Atlantic System, 1580–1830* (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2002), especially Pietschmann's introduction and Pieter Emmer's essay, which respectively support and reject political and economic modes of "Atlantic System" analysis. For slavery and the slave trade's central place in the systematic integration of an Atlantic world, see Barbara Solow, ed., *Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

19   For an explanation of the idea of Atlantic history by a figure crucial to its founding and development, see Bernard Bailyn, *Atlantic History: Concept and Contours* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). For a conceptualization of Atlantic history from one of its most influential practitioners, and one that stands in sharp relief to Bailyn's, see Marcus Rediker, "The Red Atlantic, or, 'A Terrible Blast Swept over the Heaving Sea,'" in Bernhard Klein and Gesa Mackenthun, eds., *Sea Changes: Historicizing the Ocean* (New York: Routledge, 2003). For critiques and historiographic reviews of Atlantic history, see Greene and Morgan, eds., *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal;* James Sidbury, Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, James Sweet, Claudio Saunt, Pekka Hämäläinen, Laurent Dubois, Christopher Hodson, Karen Graubart, Patrick Griffin, "Forum: Ethnogenesis," *William and Mary Quarterly*, vol. 68, no. 2 (2011), 181–239; Jose Canizares-Esguerra and Erik Seeman, eds., *The Atlantic in Global History, 1500–2000* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2007); Alison Games, Phil Stern, Paul Mapp, Peter Colcanis, and Julie Sievers, "Forum: Beyond the Atlantic," *William and Mary Quarterly*, vol. 63, no. 4 (2006), 675–776; Ian K. Steele, "Bernard Bailyn's American Atlantic," *History and Theory*, vol. 46, no. 1 (2007); Jorge Cañizares-Esquerra, "Some Caveats about the 'Atlantic Paradigm,'" *History Compass* (2003), http://www.history-compass.com; Joyce E. Chaplin, "Expansion and Exceptionalism in Early American History," *Journal of American History*, vol. 89, no. 4 (2003), 1431–1455.

in this broad Atlantic framework, though most focus on the interactions between European metropoles and colonies in the Americas.

Studies of the African slave trade and African slavery in the Americas have had perhaps the greatest success in establishing the Atlantic as a coherent framework for historical analysis, an especially impressive feat considering the methodological diversity that marks this literature. Pain-staking statistical research has invaluably improved our understanding of the scope, scale, morbidity, geography, commercial integration, and economic complexity of the slave trade, which brought approximately 12 million Africans on the "Middle Passage" across the Atlantic.[20] Many Atlantic histories focus on slavery's economic and political impact on the Americas, Europe, and Africa, and have been especially adept in explaining the relationship between slavery, slave trading, and capitalism's geographic expansion and structural development. Other studies of slavery concentrate on the cultural adjustments and practices of resistance that Africans and their descendants made as a result of their Atlantic diaspora. As Atlanticists have demonstrated, slavery and the slave trade made the Atlantic world a historically crucial space for the spread of global capitalism. Powerfully human histories of the slave trade have recovered the subject as a lived experience, revealing yet another dimension of capitalism's impact in the Atlantic world and the histories of class and racial formation that it helped bring into being. We now have a clearer understanding of both the scale of the slave trade and the suffering, exploitation, resistance, despair, compassion, and cultural creativity of the enslaved. Much work remains to be done, however, as better integrating African societies into the historical consolidation of the Atlantic world remains a challenge for Atlanticists.[21]

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20 The culmination of the work in quantitative history of the slave trade is available through the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database at http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/index.faces.

21 For an overview of African Atlantic history, see Philip Morgan, "Africa and the Atlantic," in Greene and Morgan, eds., *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal*, 223–248. For statistical research on the slave trade, see David Eltis, David Richardson, Stephen D. Behrendt and Herbert Klein, eds., *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Database on* CD-ROM *Set and Guide* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); David Eltis and David Richardson, eds., *Extending the Frontiers: Essays on the New Transatlantic Slave Trade Database* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008). For an approach that puts the human experience at the center, see Marcus Rediker, *The Slave Ship: A Human History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2007). Other important work on the slave trade and its circum-Atlantic impact include John Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1600* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Joseph E. Inikori and Stanley L. Engerman, eds., *The Atlantic Slave Trade: Effects on Economics,*

Exploring experience within a particular empire has been a staple of Atlantic scholarship, although in historicizing states (whether imperial or national) as ideologically-driven institutions riven by conflicting interests, Atlanticists have departed from past generations of historians who naturalized empires as anthropological givens. Again, in regard to empires, Atlanticists have encouraged "transatlantic" or "hemispheric" histories that compare and contrast Atlantic empires to establish how their histories both connect and depart from one another. Hemispheric approaches to colonial and imperial Atlantic histories have done much to wear away the rigid determinism of the core/periphery relationship that plagued both imperial history and continues to plague world systems theory; as a result, our appreciation of so-called peripheral influence on the core has grown appreciably, perhaps to the point where the core/periphery dichotomy has lost its former utility.[22] Comparative histories of

Society, and Peoples in Africa, the Americas, and Europe (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992); Joseph C. Miller, *Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730–1830* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); Boubacar Barry, *Senegambia and the African Slave Trade* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Joseph E. Inikori, *Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England: A Study in International Trade and Economic Development* (New York: Cambridge, 2002); Patrick Manning, *Slavery, Colonialism, and Economic Growth in Dahomey, 1640–1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Paul E. Lovejoy, *Slavery, Commerce and Production in the Sokoto Caliphate of West Africa* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005); Jose Curto and Paul Lovejoy, eds., *Enslaving Connections: Changing Cultures of Africa and Brazil during the Era of Slavery* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2004); David Eltis, *The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). As the scholarship of the world historian Patrick Manning reminds us, the transatlantic slave trade was inextricably connected to the internal African slave trade and others that sent captives to what we now call the Middle East. See Manning's *The African Diaspora: A History through Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); ed., *Slave Trades, 1500–1800: The Globalization of Forced Labour* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996); *Slavery and African Life: Occidental, Oriental, and African Slave Trades* (Cambridge University Press, 1990). For cultural approaches to the African experience in Atlantic history, see James Sidbury, *Becoming African in America: Race and Nation in the Early Black Atlantic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double-Consciousness* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); Michael Gomez, *Exchanging our Country Marks: The Transformation of African Culture in the Antebellum South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).

22   Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, *The Americas: A Hemispheric History* (New York: Modern Library, 2003); Jack Greene, "Hemispheric History and Atlantic History," in Greene and Morgan, eds., *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal*, 299–317; "Beyond Power: Paradigm Subversion and Reformulation and the Re-creation of the Early Modern Atlantic World," in Jack Greene, *Interpreting Early America: Historiographical Essays* (Charlottesville: University

the Atlantic empires have also highlighted the weaknesses of the sociological model building of world systems theory, which minimizes the ideological and structural differences between states that made interstate competition so dynamic and the consequent history of capitalist expansion in the Atlantic and beyond so contingent. Comparative Atlantic approaches have demonstrated how different structural, ideological, commercial, and cultural influences conditioned imperial states and the colonial revolutions that sought to dismantle them.[23] Comparative studies have revealed similarities among empires as well as the differences between them. For example, the historian Eliga Gould has skillfully exposed how empires created legal double standards to justify institutions such as slavery in the colonies, even when they could not be countenanced by the state at home.[24]

Intellectual historians of the Atlantic world have rarely grappled with the explicitly capitalist economic contexts of colonization and empire-building; labor historians, particularly historians of slavery and servitude, have treated the problem in illuminating ways. For example, an impressive set of studies have proven how sugar planters were far from paternalistic signeurs, despite their cultural and legal-self fashioning, and exploited slave labor within an expressly capitalist economic system.[25] Regarding British colonization, scholars

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Press of Virginia, 1996), 17–42; J.H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). Also see Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy, eds., *Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the New World, 1500–1800* (New York: Routledge, 2001) for comparative approaches to the Iberian, Dutch, British, and French Atlantic empires.

23 Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World*; Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, c. 1500–c.1800* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995); Christian Koot, *Empire at the Periphery: British Colonists, Anglo-Dutch Trade, and the Development of the British Atlantic, 1621–1713* (New York: New York University Press, 2011); David Ormrod, The *Rise of Commercial Empires: England and the Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism, 1650–1770* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Wim Klooster, *Revolutions in the Atlantic World: A Comparative History* (New York: New York University Press, 2009); Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900*; Elizabeth Mancke, "Empire and State," in Armitage and Braddick, eds., *The British Atlantic World, 1500–1800*, 175–195.

24 Eliga Gould, "Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery," *American Historical Review* vol. 112 (2007): 764–786.

25 See for instance, Stuart Schwartz, *Sugar Plantation in the Formation of Brazilian Society* (New York: Cambridge, 1985); Herbert S. Klein, "The Atlantic Slave Trade to 1650," in Stuart Schwartz, ed., *Tropical Babylons: Sugar and the Making of the Atlantic World, 1450–1680* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Russell Menard, *Sweet Negotiations: Sugar, Slavery, and Plantation Servitude in Early Barbados* (Charlottesville, VA: University of

have exposed how the chattel principle of servitude laid the legal and economic foundation for racialized slavery in an "empire of liberty" that made the Atlantic plantation complex a laboratory for capitalist modes of production, trade, and finance.[26] Intellectual historians have also been remiss in studying the history of ideas that accompanied class formation in the Atlantic. Although dismissive of the alleged crudities and idealism of labor history, self-proclaimed intellectual historians of Atlantic colonization should re-examine the myopic and idealized contexts of their own methodologies before throwing stones; employing material contexts would help as a first step.[27] In *The Many-Headed Hydra*, Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker demonstrated how the early modern Atlantic world witnessed the birth of a multi-ethnic, multi-racial proletariat

Virginia Press, 2005); Dale Tomich, "World Slavery and Caribbean Capitalism: Cuban Sugar and Slavery," *Theory and Society* vol. 23, no. 1 (1991): 297–319; Verene Shepherd, *Livestock, Sugar, and Slavery: Contested Terrain in Colonial Jamaica* (Kingston, JA: Ian Randle, 2009); Hilary McD. Beckles, "Capitalism, Slavery and Caribbean Modernity," *Callaloo* vol. 20, no. 4 (1997): 777–789; Clarence Munford, *The Black Ordeal of Slavery and Slave Trading in the French West Indies, 1625–1715*, 2 vols. (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992).

26   Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944); Hilary McD. Beckles, "The Colours of Property: Brown, White and Black Chattels and their Responses on the Caribbean Frontier," *Slavery & Abolition* vol. 15, no. 2 (1994): 36–51; *White Servitude and Black Slavery in Barbados, 1627–1715* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1989); Theodore Allen, *The Invention of the White Race: The Origin of Racial Oppression in Anglo-America*, 2 vols. (New York: Verso, 1997); John Donoghue, "'Out of the Land of Bondage': The English Revolution and the Atlantic Origins of Abolition," *American Historical Review* vol. 115, no. 4 (2010): 943–974; *'Fire under the Ashes': An Atlantic History of the English Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Simon Newman, *A New World of Labor: The Development of Plantation Slavery in the British Atlantic* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

27   The linguistic analysis of imperial and colonial discourse often leaves its subject at face value, validating as history what really amounted to a mythology when set within contemporary material and social contexts. Andrew Fitzmaurice's intellectual history of the Virginia Company provides a clear example of this problem. Fitzmaurice explores the civic humanist language that justified the Virginia Company's colonial projects, partly, as he explains, to exonerate the Company from what he sees as the harsh and mistaken view of historians who portray it as a profit-driven venture. Although the greed-denying principles of the Company's public spirited language certainly animated its discourse, Fitzmaurice writes as if language were reality. The reality was that while civic humanism flourished in the Company's promotional material, children were being swept of off London's streets at the Company's behest, commodified, and sold as temporary chattel property to planters who were in haste to maximize profits at the outset of the colony's tobacco boom. See Fitzmaurice, "The Civic Solution to the Crisis of English Colonization, 1609–1625," *The Historical Journal* vol. 42, no. 1 (1999): 25–51.

that challenged the propertied notions of imperial and national liberty during the seventeenth-century English Revolutions and the late eighteenth-century "Age of Revolutions." Their innovative labor history illustrated the insufficiency of national analysis and exemplified the utility of deploying the Atlantic as a category of historical analysis to recover a history of ideas "from below."[28]

The Many-Headed Hydra revealed how the early modern history of the Atlantic beckoned toward the global future of a Western hegemonic, capitalist modernity which exulted in the rhetoric of political and economic liberty while structuring its power and pinioning its expansion on oppressive class relationships that stemmed from the exploitation of both free and unfree labor on transnational scales. As a result, Linebaugh and Rediker have helped lead the way toward an authentic "Global Labor History," performing two essential tasks of global labor history identified by Marcel van der Linden and Jan Luccasen, two of its leading practitioners: to liberate labor history from its national confines and to integrate the history of pre-industrial workers into the history of capitalism. Van der Linden has also made a compelling call for labor historians to critically engage with world systems theory.[29] We believe the essays in this book have gone some way in honoring van der Linden's appeal, particularly by adopting Wallerstein's conclusion that capitalism's global proliferation hinged on the exploitation of unfree labor in the early modern and modern eras, thereby overcoming the errors made by classical and neoliberal political economists as well as labor historians (often writing within the Marxian tradition) that posited free labor as a *sine qua non* of capitalist economic and social relations.[30] Moreover, many of the contributors argue

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28   For the authors' reflection on their book's methods and impact, see Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, "The Many-Headed Hydra: Reflections on History from Below" in Marcel van der Linden and Karl Roth, eds., *Beyond Marx: Theorizing Global Labor Relations in the Twenty-First Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 21–40.

29   Marcel van der Linden, *Workers of the World: Essays toward a Global Labor History* (Leiden: Brill, 2008); *Transnational Labour History: Explorations* (Aldershot, 2003); with Jan Lucassen, *Prolegomena for a Global Labor History* (Amsterdam: International Institute for Social History, 1999). Also see Leon Fink, ed., *Workers Across the Americas: The Transnational Turn in Labor History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) for an appreciation of labor history's global turn from a hemispheric perspective.

30   For insightful reflections on the problem, see Walter Johnson, "The Pedestal and the Veil: Rethinking the Capitalism/Slavery Question," *Journal of the Early Republic* vol. 24, no. 2 (2004): 299–308; Rakesh Bhandari, "Slavery and Wage Labor in History," *Rethinking Marxism* vol. 19 (2007): 396–408.

in line with Linebaugh and Rediker that servitude, slavery, and forced military service converged to form a critical nexus of exploited labor that made empire-building and capitalist growth concomitant processes.[31]

Unfree labor also became crucial to post-abolition, capitalist advancement in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A growing literature has demonstrated that after abolition, imperial states worked together and sometimes at odds with colonial planters and post-colonial governments to invent categories of unfree labor necessary for the maximization of profits in cash crop plantation production and in state-supported infrastructure projects such as railroad building. A major feature of this scholarship focuses on the mobilization of Asian and African indentured workers and their (sometimes forced) migration to and within the Caribbean and beyond, revealing how capitalist political economies created labor recruitment systems that spanned the newly globalized plantation complex. Scholars, including contributors in the pages that follow, have also been attentive to how the workers themselves claimed the rights of citizens while agitating for the amelioration and often the abolition of their unfree condition.[32] Recognizing that the history of abolition moved at different speeds around the Atlantic empires and global economy, examples in this volume reinforce recent work on how slavery's end in British and French colonies sparked a period of "second slavery" in Brazil and Cuba. Studies are now linking that process to the larger one by which the Atlantic

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31 For an amplification on this theme in the seventeenth century English Atlantic, see Donoghue, *'Fire under the Ashes': An Atlantic History of the English Revolution*, Chapter 6.

32 Lomarsh Roopnarine, *Indo-Caribbean Indenture: Resistance and Accommodation, 1838–1920* (Mona, JA: University of the West Indies Press, 2007); Emma Christopher, Cassandra Pybus, and Marcus Rediker, *Many Middle Passages: Forced Migration and the Making of the Modern World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Hilary Beckles, *Great House Rules: Landless Emancipation and Workers' Protest in Barbados, 1838–1938* (Kingston, JA: Ian Randle, 2004); Frederick Cooper, Thomas C. Holt, and Rebecca J. Scott, *Beyond Slavery: Explorations of Race, Labor and Citizenship in Post Emancipation Societies* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); David Northrup, *Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism 1834–1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Lovejoy and Rogers, eds., *Unfree Labour in the Development of the Atlantic World,* Part III; Walton Look Lai, *Indentured Labor, Caribbean Sugar: Chinese and Indian Migrants to the British West Indies, 1838–1918* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); P.C. Emmer, *Colonialism and Migration: Indentured Labor Before and After Slavery* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), Parts III and IV.

and world economies became increasingly interconnected during the age of industrial capitalism and European colonization in Africa and Asia.[33]

While concentrating on the United States within a widening global economy, practitioners of the so-called "new history of capitalism" have shown how capitalism's progress within the U.S. depended upon various forms of free and unfree labor, with the latter encompassing colonial and early republic-era servitude, antebellum slavery, post-abolition convict labor, debt peonage, and indentured labor, as well as slave trading before and after its American prohibition; as these historians argue, unfree labor regimes in the U.S. linked the nation's capitalist development to a global capitalist market.[34]

While state political institutions figure largely in all of these works as purveyors of capitalist growth on national and global scales, only scant attention has been paid to the part the state played in the commodification of people for forced service in a spectrum of unfree labor forms. We seek to rectify that error here, noting that the work of Peter Way, Denver Brunsman, and Niklas Frykman has already shown in valuable ways how forced military labor and the brutal disciplinary regime encompassing military labor, both voluntary and coerced, became an essential instrument

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33   Sidney Mintz, Dale Tomich, Michael Zeuske, et al., "The Second Slavery: Mass Slavery, World-Economy, and Comparative Microhistories," *Review* vol. 31, nos. 2–3 (2008): Part I, 91–247; Part II, 254–437. Thirteen scholars contributed to this path-breaking forum.

34   Stephanie Smallwood, *Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); Seth Rockman, "The Unfree Origins of American Capitalism" in Cathy Matson, ed., *The Economy of Early America: Historical Perspectives & New Directions* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006); Walter Johnson, *Soul by Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Alex Lichtenstein, *Twice the Work of Free Labor: The Political Economy of Convict Labor in the New South* (London: Verso, 1996). Although it takes a non-U.S. subject as its focus, that being the murder of Africans on the British slave ship *Zong* to recoup insurance monies, Ian Baucom's *Specters of the Atlantic: Finance Capital, Slavery, and the Philosophy of History* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005) attention to the financial history of capitalism and slavery is of a piece with the work done on the same subject by historians of the U.S.; the same may be said in commendation of Margot Finn's work on the financial commodification and social regulation of the English poor through colonial servitude. See Finn's *The Character of Credit: Personal Debt in English Culture, 1740–1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). John Donoghue wishes to thank Jeff Sklansky of the University of Illinois-Chicago for fascinating discussions on the recent historiography of American capitalism. For a review of the literature, see Sklansky's "The Elusive Sovereign: New Intellectual and Social Histories of Capitalism," *Modern Intellectual History* vol. 9, no. 1 (2012): 233–248.

of Atlantic empire building.[35] *Building the Atlantic Empires*, in contrast to most work on unfree labor's part in the reciprocal histories of capitalism and imperial expansion, turns its full attention to how and why states, both in their own right and in conjunction with private enterprise or state-chartered companies, reduced millions of people over four centuries to labor commodities and varying degrees of unfreedom for political and economic exploitation.

The explanatory power of the Atlantic as a useful category of historical analysis has become increasingly apparent in recent years, not least for its capacity to link the Atlantic world to global history. The Atlanticist Nicholas Canny correctly observed that commerce in the early modern Atlantic helped create one of the signal features of modernity—international markets based on the mass (vs. singularly elite) consumption of imported goods. Canny's observation stands as a reminder to Atlantic history's globalist detractors that far from being enveloped by global history, Atlantic history remains vital on its own terms, while at the same time it supplies critical insights for the work of global historians. The global economic historian Peter Colcanis remarked not long ago that Atlantic history has moved "from obscurity to meaninglessness without any intervening period of coherence."[36] The literature produced by Atlantic historians on labor, migration, capital, and empire, however, demonstrates just the opposite, as fruitful unions between Atlantic and global history have flourished in the wake of Colcanis' dismissive observation. The value of an Atlantic framework to explore the historical relationship between state-mobilized unfree labor, empire-building, and capitalist development is borne out below through a brief discussion of the organizational logic of the book and then a more detailed description of the book's chapters.

We opted to cover all the major Atlantic powers, ordering the chapters by empire to give readers a comparative perspective on how each state grappled with the problem of mobilizing colonial unfree labor for its own

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35   Denver Brunsman, *The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth Century Atlantic World* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013); Peter Way, "'Black Service...White Money': The Peculiar Institution of Military Labor in the British Army during the Seven Years' War," in Fink, ed., *Workers Across the Americas: The Transnational Turn in Labor History*, 57–80. Niklas Frykman, "Seamen on Late Eighteenth-Century European Warships," *International Review of Social History* vol. 54 (2009): 67–93. For more work on the political and economic import of military labor, see Eric Jan-Zurcher, ed., *Fighting for a Living: A Comparative History of Military Labor, 1500–2000* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013).

36   Greene and Morgan, eds., *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal*, 325 for the Canny quotation; p. 5 for Colcanis.

political purposes, which, as many of the chapters demonstrate, often furthered the pursuit of capitalist profit-making in the colonial plantation complex. Applying a strict chronological scheme to the chapters, on the other hand, simply proved impossible. Therefore the book begins with Evelyn Jennings' chapter, which spans most of the chronology covered in the collection and offers a broad overview of types of unfree labor in the Spanish empire. She explores how the Spanish imperial state organized and adapted forms of unfree labor as its empire spread from Europe to the Americas, from 1500 through its end in 1898. The chapters that follow proceed sequentially through the Iberian, Dutch, English, and French Empires in a rough chronological order. Rafael Chambouleyron's work examines the mid-seventeenth through late-eighteenth century Portuguese Amazon region while James Coltrain looks at Spanish Florida from the late seventeenth through mid-eighteenth centuries. Beginning in eastern Brazil in the mid-seventeenth century, Karwan Fatah-Black and Pepijn Brandon branch out from the Iberian to the Dutch Atlantic and into Africa, following their story up through the late eighteenth century. The next two chapters by John Donoghue and Anna Suranyi explore the seventeenth century English Atlantic, focusing on unfree labor in Britain, Ireland, Africa, and the West Indies. The book ends in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with Elizabeth Heath's work on French Guadeloupe, an island that remains a French colony to this very day. Heath's chapter closes the volume at its chronological endpoint, but also offers a close study of how at the beginning of the modern period, imperial states were faced with a new task: mobilizing unfree labor for the post-abolition plantation complex. This process revived forms of plantation servitude common in the early modern English Atlantic and also renewed debates about race, citizenship, and colonial/imperial political relations that had surfaced earlier in the English and Spanish Atlantic. A more detailed summary of each chapter now follows.

Evelyn Jennings examines forced labor as a foundational component of the political economy of Spain's American empire in comparative perspective. She argues that the empire's resilience and longevity derived in part from its access in the metropole and the colonies to large groups of people vulnerable to many modes of coercion: soldiers and sailors, tribute laborers, slaves, convicts, and only belatedly, indentured servants. She uses the case of Cuba to focus more attention on reproductive, imperial labor and its connections to the productive labor of wealth extraction and export production. Over the colonial period Cuba served as a site for imperial administration, maritime commerce, mining, ship building, subsistence

and export agriculture, and fortification and infrastructural construction. Jennings argues that Cuba's forced labor regimes grew out of historical contexts in which subjugation or coercion of labor was mediated by an ideal of mutual obligation between the state and the workers it employed. She shows that the political and economic transformations wrought by imperial warfare, capitalism, and growing resistance by laborers ultimately eroded both crown paternalism and any loyalty it had engendered by the nineteenth century.

Rafael Chambouleyron's essay on the Maranhão region of Brazil (ca. 1640–1755) offers a case study of the complex interplay between an imperial state and private interests in a frontier area. In territory that was still largely in indigenous control, the Portuguese crown engaged in warfare with a "double dimension": to bring native groups under crown control and to acquire slaves. Crown officials also used policy allowing or prohibiting indigenous slavery as a tool to contend with Portuguese settlers and Jesuit missionaries over access to native laborers. Showing some parallels to the Spanish empire, for the Portuguese crown Amerindian workers became an essential element of colonial domination because the state was able to shape access to the natives' labor, tax that access to raise revenue, and employ some indigenous laborers for its own purposes. Chambouleyron argues against a definition of the state that focuses narrowly on its laws and decrees as the driving force of transformation in the region. Rather he sees state officials implementing or modifying policy in shifting colonial circumstances to project imperial power by shaping relationships between groups, establishing the sites of their interaction, encouraging or discouraging economic initiatives, and defending Portuguese colonialism in the region.

James Coltrain's essay offers a good example of Jennings' point about the elasticity of imperial bonds in the complex interplay of state demand for unfree labor and workers' responses to reward and repression. Coltrain examines the twenty-year project of building a stone fort to defend St. Augustine, Florida in the face of English encroachment from the mid-seventeenth through the early eighteenth century. In spite of the colony's remoteness and poverty, its strategic importance as a bulwark against English expansion gave even unfree workers, such as indigenous peons, black slaves, and Spanish convicts, some leverage to negotiate their terms of work and living arrangements. In return most of the unfree workers in St. Augustine made "measured contributions...to Spanish rule" through their hard work and defense of the colony. Hierarchies of class, ethnicity, and race were flexible, but never overturned, and various forms of forced labor remained in place. All in St. Augustine depended on imperial support

to protect them from starvation or capture by English invaders. Most of the unfree eschewed resistance serious enough to undermine imperial control, thereby "reinforce[ing] the security of Spanish rule."

Pepijn Brandon and Karwan Fatah-Black's article presents a convincing challenge to the historian Pieter Emmer's view that the United Provinces eschewed empire-building in favor of commercial expansion. They argue that while politically de-centralized and often out-sourced to chartered enterprises such as the Dutch West Indies Company, a quasi-private venture with a monopoly on the Dutch slave trade, the state actually became a key agent in the global amplification of Dutch power. Turning to labor history for perspective, Brandon and Fatah-Black conclude that despite the failure of their *Groot Desseyn* (or "Grand Design") for an Atlantic empire, the Dutch state and its private backers relied upon military force to sustain both the ill-fated colonization of Brazil and their share of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. The authors' data and analysis match the complexity of the Atlantic history of Dutch empire-building, rejecting the simple dichotomy between violent imperial and peaceful commercial expansion upon which Emmer's Dutch exceptionalism rests.

John Donoghue uses the lens of labor history to trace how the English state entered into its initial phase of empire-building in the Atlantic world in the immediate aftermath of the English Revolution. The state forced unpropertied men into military service on stunningly larger scales and in a more systematic fashion than it had previously in the early modern era. Naval impressment and army conscription enabled the state to conquer and colonize Ireland, win a naval war with the Dutch that increased colonial trade, and invade and annex Spanish Jamaica via a transatlantic armada. At the same time, resembling its systematic expansion of military conscription for imperial purposes, the revolutionary government remade pre-existing policies for colonial transportation into a new technology for empire-building, forcing thousands of poor people from Britain and Ireland into chattel servitude in the Caribbean, where they labored beside African slaves. As Donoghue contends, the creation of an English Atlantic imperium was made possible by another revolution in the concept of English state sovereignty: as the state imposed new forms of jurisdiction over colonies and colonial commerce, it claimed new forms of dominion over the bodies and labor power of its own people while it promoted the enslavement of others from around the Atlantic world.

Anna Suranyi explores the seventeenth-century colonial transportation policies of the English state in Britain and Ireland, asserting in contrast to most work on the subject that the transportation of Irish Catholics in the wake of the Cromwellian conquest should not be seen as an exceptional case. Her

contention is that throughout the seventeenth century, the state pursued the transportation of "superfluous" elements of both the English and Irish populations—convicts, the poor, and the seditious -for the same reasons: to seek their moral redemption through servitude, to rid itself of restive populations that were expensive, to detain, surveil, and control, and to provide cheap labor for profit-maximizing colonial planters. She argues that the state strove to exercise impartiality in correcting abuses in the Irish Catholic transportation system, but due to capitalist interests ensconced within the state itself, ultimately lacked the political will to do so. In the end for Suranyi, the state's good intentions lost out to its population management imperatives and its desire to speed capitalist development in the plantation complex by organizing a supply of exploitable, unfree labor.

Elizabeth Heath brings the history of unfree labor and empire into the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in the French colony of Guadeloupe under the Third Republic. Her essay shows well the interactions and contestations over terms of labor and definitions of "Frenchness" and citizenship among metropolitan politicians, colonial officials and sugar producers, and workers, both island-born and immigrants. The two aims of colonial policy over the republican period were incorporating Guadeloupean workers of color as full citizens in the French republic and ensuring the productivity of the island's sugar industry. In the 1870s and 1880s metropolitan officials had some success in achieving both goals by defining African-descended Guadeloupeans as too French for the degrading work of sugar production and importing tens of thousands of indentured laborers, mostly from India. However, by the 1890s and early 1900s the global economic crisis reduced prices on the world market for sugar, ending government subsidized immigration. Similar to the Cuban case discussed in Jennings' essay, British pressure also ended Guadeloupean employers' access to laborers from India. As the immigrant labor pool disappeared, colonial officials eventually privileged profit and productivity in the sugar industry over republican ideals and imposed a more restrictive and racialized form of colonial citizenship on Guadeloupeans of color.

The vantage point of many of these essays is colonial in the sense that it is colonial relations of labor that frame their evidence and argument. Importantly, the colonial perspective clarifies the insufficiency of totalizing and Eurocentric models of economic transition and transformation. There was no single historical path or pattern to a capitalism based on free, wage labor. Instead as historian Steve Stern has argued "what is distinctive about the economic logic of colonial and neo-colonial situations is precisely the entrepreneurial tendency to combine variegated labor strategies,...into a

unified package" in any given enterprise. A similar "law of diversity" as he called it applied to the reproductive labor of empire building and the essays collected here show how workers shaped and were shaped by that law in particular imperial and local circumstances.[37]

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37   Steve J. Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World System in the Perspective of Latin
       America and the Caribbean," *American Historical Review* vol. 93, no. 4 (1988): 870–871.

The Sinews of Spain's American Empire: Forced Labor in Cuba from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries[1]

Evelyn P. Jennings

The importance of forced labor as a key component of empire building in the early modern Atlantic world is well known and there is a rich scholarly bibliography on the main forms of labor coercion that European colonizers employed in the Americas—labor tribute, indenture, penal servitude, and slavery. Much of this scholarship on forced labor has focused on what might be called "productive" labor, usually in the private sector, and its connections to the growth of capitalism: work to extract resources for sustenance, tribute, or export. This focus on productive labor and private entrepreneurship is particularly strong in the scholarship on the Anglo-Atlantic world, especially the shifting patterns of indenture and slavery in plantation agriculture, and their links to English industrial capitalism.[2]

The historical development of labor regimes in the Spanish empire, on the other hand, grew from different roots and traversed a different path. Scholars have recognized the importance of government regulations (or lack thereof) as a factor in the political economy of imperial labor regimes, but rarely are

2 For an introduction to this bibliography see Eric Williams, *Capital and Slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994[1944]); Barbara L. Solow, ed., *Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); David W. Galenson, "The Rise and Fall of Indentured Servitude in the Americas," *Journal of Economic History* vol. 44, no. 1 (1984): 1–26; David Eltis, *The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Russell R. Menard, *Sweet Negotiation: Sugar, Slavery and Plantation Agriculture in Early Barbados* (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2006).

the labor needs and employment patterns of the state itself foregrounded.[3] Therefore to analyze the political economy of labor in Spanish America from a different perspective, this essay focuses on what might be called "constructive" or "defensive" labor and the imperial state as an agent of labor recruitment and employment, exploring three points of argument. The first contends that Spain's resilience and longevity as an imperial power were due in part to the crown's access, both at home and in the Americas, to large groups of people vulnerable to coercion and to its success in employing a wide range of methods of coercion to extract their labor for defense and development. Over time a symbiosis developed between the political and economic needs of the empire and its labor requirements. Different forms of forced labor could be employed to establish and sustain colonies and generate revenue, but labor coercion was also an effective method of controlling dissent and rebellion in the metropolis and the colonies. The second point of argument contends that Spain was distinctive in the importance of constructive and defensive labor to the physical and social construction of its American empire. As the earliest and initially the wealthiest of the American colonizers, Spain expended greater human and fiscal resources to defend that wealth from the 1500s into the eighteenth century. As such, marshalling the people necessary to build and staff the infrastructure of an early modern maritime empire (ships, ports, and forts) was a crucial component of the political economy of Spain's American empire. Labor recruitment for state service shaped relationships between the crown and its many subjects and it created markets for labor that affected opportunities and costs for private employers. The third point of argument addresses a more speculative question. Were the traditions from which Spain drew its imperial policies of labor recruitment and deployment also a factor in the longevity of the Spanish empire? Crown labor policies grew out of historical contexts in which a measure of subjugation or coercion of labor was the norm, but a norm that was mediated to some degree by an ideal of mutual obligation between the state as an employer and its workers. Discourses about rights were most often couched in terms of an individual or group's right to the king's benevolence, protection, or succor at least until the eighteenth century. Hence, most of the unfree workers who built the Spanish American empire were considered subjects or dependents of the crown and as such had access to both the king's

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3   For instance, on the importance of government regulations see E. Van Den Boogaart and P. Emmer, "Colonialism and Migration: An Overview," In *Colonialism and Migration: Indentured Labour Before and After Slavery* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 1986), 7 and Stanley L. Engerman, "'Servants to Slaves to Servants': Contract Labour and European Expansion," 267–270 in the same volume and the included bibliography for both essays.

grace and royal justice. Though we have ample evidence of workers' resistance to imperial labor exactions, the crown negotiated a sufficient balance between upholding its working subjects' rights to sustenance, humane treatment, and royal justice and enforcing its will through punishment and violence often enough to build and sustain its empire physically and ideologically. Thus Spain was able to settle colonies, mine precious metals, build forts and ships, and staff an army and navy without generating resistance serious enough to bring down the monarchy or the empire until the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The Spanish colony of Cuba is an especially useful example for exploring the political economy of forced labor in imperial service. The island remained a Spanish colony until 1898, much later than most of the rest of the empire. Also, in contrast to other Euro-American colonies in the Americas, particularly those in the Caribbean, Cuba experienced a wide range of development phases based on different regimes of forced labor: an early mining economy based largely on indigenous tribute labor up to the mid-1500s, a long phase of more than two centuries as a main hub of Spain's network of maritime trade and defense based increasingly on African slavery, a reliance on both penal servitude and slavery during the imperial wars of the 1700s, and a shift away from slavery in the public sector toward convicts and indentured laborers as the private sector, plantation economy expanded in the 1800s.

An examination of imperial labor regimes in colonial Cuba offers both an overview of forced labor as a foundational component of the political economy of Spain's American empire and an examination of those policies and practices in comparative perspective. Though the state rarely employed only one type of labor for any task, for clarity's sake this analysis is organized mostly by type of laborer (free, military, labor tributary, enslaved, convict, indentured) and the kinds of imperial occupations at which they worked to explore general patterns of who did what kinds of work for the state and why.

Free Spanish Emigration to America

Given the importance of indenture as a form of labor coercion in the establishment of England and France's American empires, it is worth asking why this was not the case for Spanish America. Much of the answer lies in the significant opportunities presented by the human and mineral resources of the Caribbean and mainland Spanish colonies compared with those resources in North America or the Lesser Antilles before 1650. Another important factor was the Spanish crown's policies toward emigration and toward labor by its diverse colonial subjects.

Spain's period of most extensive imperial expansion, the 1490s to about 1570, was also one of population growth on the peninsula.[4] The Spanish crown tried mightily to restrict emigration to America to mostly Castilian Catholics with only limited success: requiring licenses from the House of Trade and proof of *limpieza de sangre* and requiring all passengers to the Indies to depart through Seville. Observing crown regulations often required emigrants to spend months traveling first to their birthplaces, then to Seville, to document their ancestry, await the issuance of their licenses, and then the sailing of the Indies fleet. The total number of emigrants from Spain to the Americas remained relatively small—an average of 2,000–2,500 per year or 200,000–250,000 over the sixteenth century, according to one commonly cited estimate.[5] Another scholar estimates that 437,000 emigrants left Spain for America from 1500 to 1650.[6]

The costs of passage were usually negotiated with the ships' captains and included charges for baggage, rations of food, water, and firewood. Most emigrants had to sell their property and belongings to pay the customary half of the cost up front. Some took out loans or relied on remittances from family and friends already in the Indies to pay the rest, due within thirty days of arrival in the Americas.[7] Others agreed to work for relatively short periods to pay off the debt. The time and expense involved in legal emigration usually meant that few poor Spaniards could afford the trip unless they were part of a wealthier person's entourage. Legal emigrants generally included royal officials and clergy or family groups, often of merchants, all of whom traveled with their servants and retainers. Individuals migrating "unattached" were uncommon as

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4   J.H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2006), 52, estimates growth from about 4 to perhaps 6.5 million in the Castilian population over the sixteenth century. Jorge Nadal y Oller, *La población española* (*Siglos* XVI *a* XX) (Barcelona: Ediciones Ariel, 1966), 28, contends that the high tide of population growth in Castile did not extend beyond 1570.

5   Elliott, *Empires*, 52. B.H. Slicher Van Bath, "The Absence of White Contract Labour in Spanish America during the Colonial Period," in *Colonialism and Migration: Indentured Labour Before and After Slavery*, edited by P.C. Emmer (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), 25.

6   Ida Altman and James Horn, "Introduction." in *"To Make America." European Emigration in the Early Modern Period* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 4–5 for the Spanish estimates compared with those of emigrants from the other Atlantic imperial metropoles—Portugal, France, and England. Altman and Horn note that there are virtually no estimates of total emigration from Spain for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

7   Auke Pieter Jacobs, "Legal and Illegal Emigration from Seville, 1550–1650," in *"To Make America." European Emigration in the Early Modern Period*, eds. Ida Altman and James Horn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 59–67.

emigrants more often traveled within the bonds of family or clientage relation-
ships. As one historian has noted "even the conquerors were not solitary lions."[8]

Artisans and other working people whose skills were in demand in the colo-
nies also emigrated in increasing numbers from the mid-sixteenth century
onward.[9] Emigrants who were skilled craftsmen sometimes traveled with an
apprentice or servants. The norm for apprentices in Peru, for example, was a
two- to three-year term of service after which the apprentice received a set of
tools, clothing, or money, or sometimes all three. Even in skilled work white
apprentices were soon joined by Amerindians and mestizos. Because of the
high demand for skilled workers in the Indies, artisans also found it lucrative to
train enslaved blacks in their trades and then sell them at a profit.[10]

The transatlantic journey and the new colonial environment certainly had
their risks, particularly high mortality in the new disease environments. Yet,
historian Ida Altman has concluded that the "rapid and precocious" develop-
ment of Spanish America made "a variety of opportunities available to poten-
tial emigrants from all levels of society." Unlike many of the colonies of other
European empires, these opportunities were sufficient to sustain Spanish emi-
gration to the Americas with "little or no systematic governmental or commer-
cial organization and intervention."[11] Wealthier Spanish emigrants had little
trouble finding people who were willing to set sail in their retinues and agree
to a period of work on arrival in the Indies.[12] White Spaniards in the Americas
enjoyed freedom from the worst of the menial tasks because those jobs
employed so many Amerindians, Africans, and mixed race peoples.[13]

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8   Slicher Van Bath, "The Absences of White Contract Labour," 28.

9   Peter Boyd-Bowman, *Patterns of Spanish Emigration to the New World* (Buffalo: SUNY at
     Buffalo, 1973), 72. Boyd-Bowman's data shows that by the mid-1500s the numbers of "lone
     adventurers" progressively diminished and more emigrants were professional men, gov-
     ernment and ecclesiastical officials and their entourages, skilled craftsmen or servants of
     large households. One in every sixteen male migrants was a merchant or factor.

10   Peter Boyd-Bowman, *Indice geobiográfico de cuarenta mil pobladores españoles de América
     en el Siglo* vol. I, 1493–1519 (Bogotá: Instituto de Caro y Cuervo, 1964), 225, 228 and Boyd-
     Bowman, *Indice de cuarenta mil pobladores españoles de América en el Siglo* SVI, vol. II,
     1520–1539 (Mexico: Ed. Jus. Academia Mexicana de Genealogía y Heráldica, 1968), 346,
     526 for examples of apprentices listed on emigration licenses. Lockhart, *Spanish Peru*,
     111–112 for a discussion of the different groups of people working as apprentices.

11   For the mortality estimate, J.H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World*, 49. The quotation is
     in Ida Altman and James Horn, eds. "Introduction," in "*To Make America*," 14.

12   Jacobs, "Legal and Illegal Emigration," 79.

13   Lockhart, *Spanish Peru*, 125 contends that an important characteristic of sixteenth-century
     Peru was that white Spaniards largely disappeared from the lower levels of the agricultural

Volunteering for military service in the Indies was another way for poorer white Spaniards to emigrate without contracting significant debt or labor obligations. This stream of emigration was more likely to attract the solitary migrant. Soldiers were needed for fixed garrisons such as the one established in Havana in the second half of the sixteenth century and to protect the silver fleets at sea.[14] Recruitment of soldiers for the armed Indies merchant ships was usually carried out in the areas around Seville.[15] Desertion rates among both soldiers and sailors tended to be high, providing several avenues for unlicensed emigration to the Spanish colonies. Military commanders whose soldiers deserted before the sailing of the fleet from Seville could "sell" the open slot in their squads to illegal emigrants. On arrival in the Indies desertion among soldiers and sailors reached close to twenty percent in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, meaning that there were years when illegal emigrants outnumbered legal ones.[16]

Overall, the opportunities for whites in the Spanish American colonies kept the Spanish immigrant population comparatively free of the legal obligations to labor that constrained their mobility or choice of employment, and the crown refused to allow a formal system of indenture for white Spaniards to cover the costs of passage.[17] By the early decades of the seventeenth century Spain had suffered a demographic decline due to epidemics, expulsions of Jews and *moriscos*, and losses in warfare. Thus, in a period in which some Northern European states were worried about "surplus" populations, the Spanish crown had no incentive to encourage emigration to its American colonies, but opportunities were sufficient to provide largely voluntary workers for skilled

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sector. Such work, like mining and much domestic service, was done instead by blacks, Amerindians, and later generations of mixed race peoples.

14   Alejandro de la Fuente, *Havana and the Atlantic in the Sixteenth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 5.

15   De la Fuente, *Havana*, 51. Armed convoys of ships to guard the Indies trade from Spanish America to Seville were established in the 1530s and a formal annual fleet system was in place by the 1560s.

16   Jacobs, "Legal and Illegal Emigration," 75–79. Jacobs notes that in 1614 there were 460 deserters from the galleons' crews to the Americas and only 353 legal emigrants (79).

17   Altman and Horn, "Introduction," in "*To Make America*," 15. Elliott, *Empires*, 51–53 argues that the large non-white population in Spanish America meant that "there was no extensive labour market in the Spanish Indies to provide immigrants work" (53). Boyd-Bowman, *Patterns of Spanish Emigration to the New World*, 80 notes that by the second half of the sixteenth century there was a steady increase in the number of people emigrating "as servants in the retinue of some high-ranking official of Church or State."

labor and in army and naval service in Spain's American empire from the late 1400s into the 1700s.[18]

Military Service

Forced levies and impressments for army and naval service in the Atlantic were two forms of labor coercion that Spain was able largely to avoid until the Caribbean became a major battleground of imperial rivalry in the eighteenth century. In contrast to labor recruitment for its Mediterranean galleys, the crown sought mostly free workers for the Atlantic navy emphasizing less compulsion and more positive incentives than it used in the recruitment of galley oarsmen and arsenal workers for its Mediterranean navy.

Though some slaves served in the Atlantic fleets, most sailors to the Indies were free men, ninety per cent of whom came from the regions of Andalusia in the south and Cantabria in the north.[19] With a rapidly growing peninsular population in the first half of the sixteenth century the merchant and military fleets were able to recruit some 40,000 men, mostly volunteers, among the native born. This was in part due to higher wages for sailors than rural day-laborers, though these benefits were eroded by inflation from the late sixteenth into the seventeenth century.[20] The recruits most likely to be forced into service were homeless or orphaned boys or young men captured on the streets of Seville by the agents of ship owners to be pages or apprentices on an upcoming voyage.[21]

Pay for sailors on the royal armadas was lower than wages offered on privately-owned merchant vessels and over the sixteenth century all sailors were increasingly proletarianized. Yet, as historian Pablo Pérez-Mallaína has

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18   Slicher Van Bath, "The Absence of White Contract Labour," 26.

19   Pablo E. Pérez-Mallaína, *Spain's Men of the Sea: Daily Life in the Indies Fleets in the Sixteenth Century*, trans. Carla Rahn Phillips (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 38–39.

20   For comparative data on the size of the populations of the main Atlantic imperial powers during the era of colonization see Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, "Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth Among the New World Economies: a View from Economic Historians of the United States," in *How Latin America Fell Behind* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 265, Table 10.2. On wages in the early seventeenth century Spanish fleets and infantry Spain, see Carla Rahn Phillips, *Six Galleons for the King of Spain* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), Appendix C, Tables 10–13, 237–240.

21   Pérez-Mallaína, *Spain's Men*, 28, 76–78.

argued, sailors in the Indies fleets were "not obliged to render personal services" and "could not, with impunity, be treated unjustly or cruelly." His deep research in the Spanish court of appeals records in the Seville's House of Trade reveals substantial evidence that sailors' accusations of mistreatment were taken seriously and abusive ships' masters could be punished with fines and jail time.[22]

By the seventeenth century both Spanish population growth and trade with the Indies had ebbed, though military demand for sailors increased as Spain got involved in the Thirty Years' War after 1618.[23] Soon the Spanish state found it necessary to impose more incentives, both positive and punitive, to advance naval recruitment. In 1625 it instituted a mandatory registration plan known as the *matrícula* to generate a listing of all men in Spain with any seafaring experience. The "carrot" was tax exemptions for voluntary registrants with the "stick" of penalties for those who tried to escape it. When thousands of men for a fleet needed to be recruited royal officials or their contractors would use these lists for naval levies in various regions of Spain. Thus, in times of crisis the crown resorted to forced service. Coercive recruitment was not unique to the Spanish navy; all early modern powers resorted to such tactics to maintain a navy.[24] The crown also hired foreign ships and sailors in Spain's European

22   Pérez-Mallaína, *Spain's Men*, 191–196. In the argument of the proletarianization of sailors in the early modern era Pérez-Mallaína follows Marcus Rediker's *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American World, 1700–1750* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). But Pérez-Mallaína contrasts the Spanish courts' response to sailors' grievances to Rediker's examination of the British Admiralty courts' bias in favor of ship captains' authority and the rights of capital. Instead, Pérez-Mallaína contends that Spanish monarchs and their advisers "believed their duty lay in protecting the rights of the weak" (196).

23   Phillips, *Six Galleons*, 8–9.

24   David C. Goodman, *Spanish Naval Power 1589–1665: Reconstruction and Defeat* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 258–259. Goodman emphasizes currency manipulations that caused drastic fluctuations of inflation and deflation as the main reason for Spains' difficulties in maintaining a navy, along with the extent of Spain's defense commitments relative to its European rivals, and the royal treasury's repeated bankruptcies as factors in restricting resources available for naval expansion. Carla Rahn Phillips, "The Labour Market for Sailors in Spain," in *"Those Emblems of Hell"? European Sailors and the Maritime Labour Market, 1570–1870*, Research in Maritime History, no. 13, eds. Paul van Royen, Jaap Bruijn and Jan Lucassen (St. John's, Newfoundland: International Maritime Economic History Association, 1997), 342 argues that physical coercion for recruitment to Spanish naval service was rare, though economic coercion in the lack of viable alternatives likely played an important role in individuals' decisions to go to sea. Phillips, *Six Galleons*, 116, 141–142 gives two examples of forced service, but says this coercion must have been rare.

colonies and among its allies, especially in the Mediterranean ports of Ragusa, Naples, and Genoa.[25]

Thus, the two branches of Spain's navy evolved distinct patterns of labor recruitment and levels of coercion; the galleys became a notorious site of forced labor, floating prisons to exploit slaves and punish criminals from which few returned. The Atlantic fleets, on the other hand, were more able to recruit free workers as sailors in part due to depressed agricultural wages in Spain and the relative success of state paternalism in offering incentives. Also, though the fortunate were few, men volunteered based on the perceived opportunities that awaited in the Americas, even for those who deserted from military service. In the vast Spanish American empire capturing and punishing deserters was not well organized much before the eighteenth century.[26]

Besides their duties as soldiers and sailors, men in military service also provided constructive labor to the crown. After the mid-sixteenth century Havana had a permanent army garrison and its soldiers could be employed digging trenches for the city's first *zanja* (fresh water canal) and as laborers in early fort construction projects.[27] Additionally, the Indies fleets employed both sailors and soldiers to ply Spain's Atlantic sea lanes and defend silver shipments. For the months they were in Havana awaiting their return to Seville sailors could hire out their labor in the shipyards, especially if they were skilled carpenters or caulkers.[28] Similar to the staffing of Spain's Atlantic fleets the building of its ships relied mostly on free laborers.[29]

While Spain's empire afloat relied mostly on free workers, except for the human-powered galleys, its land-based defenses and infrastructure used a higher proportion of coerced labor. This may have been true in part because land fortifications required tremendous outputs of labor over many years, much of it unskilled, in contrast to building and sailing ships on the Atlantic.

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25   Phillips, "The Labour Market," 333 and Phillips, *Six Galleons*, 119–151 and Appendix C, 237–240.

26   Pérez-Mallaína, *Spain's Men*, 215.

27   On the building of the zanja see De la Fuente, *Havana*, 108–110; Marrero, *Cuba, economía y sociedad*, vol. 2, 164, 269–270; Miguel A. Puig-Samper and Consuelo Naranjo Orovio, "El abastemiento de aguas a la ciudad de la Habana: de la Zanja Real al Canal de Vento," in *Obras hidrálulicas en América colonia* (Madrid: Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Transportes y Medio Ambiente, 1993), 81–83.

28   De la Fuente, *Havana*, 77–80 on the numbers of soldiers stationed in Havana from the 1570s to around 1610.

29   For more detail on the labor regime in eighteenth-century Havana's royal shipyard see Evelyn Jennings, "War as the Forcing House of Change," *William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd Series, vol. 63, no. 3 (July 2005): 411–440.

Also on land, the empire had access to larger numbers of tribute laborers or could more easily import and police populations of slaves and convicts, which will be discussed at length below.

Labor Tribute

When the Spanish extended conquest and territorial expansion to the New World after 1492, they transported slavery, labor tribute, and penal servitude as developed on the peninsula to their American colonies, but only rarely did they bring to the Americas the people subjected to those regimes in Spain. Rather, the Spanish forced their new American subjects, the Amerindians, to work, though the specific coercive regimes shifted over time. Spain, unique among its European competitors, was able to claim territories inhabited by many millions of indigenous peoples, most of who were subjected to varying regimes of coerced labor within a decade of contact.

Estimates of the size of the Americas' indigenous population before European contact remain inexact and contested, but some rough figures will make the point. By 1550 the Spanish had claimed and begun to settle the territories that would constitute their American empire into the eighteenth century. The most densely populated and most highly developed regions of the New World were all under Spanish control. Spain's first colony on Hispaniola had an estimated population of several hundred thousand native inhabitants in the 1490s. Cuba's total indigenous population may have been about 112,000 living mostly in the eastern portion of the island.[30] The large native empire of central Mexico may have had between sixteen to eighteen million people in 1520, the Andean region perhaps another thirteen to fifteen million. All of North America (excluding Mexico), on the other hand, had only an estimated three to four million native people.[31]

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30   For Hispaniola see Maximo Livi-Bacci, "The Depopulation of Hispanic America after the Conquest," *Population and Development Review*, vol. 32, no. 2 (June 2006), 200. For Cuba, Louis A. Pérez, Jr. *Cuba. Between Reform and Revolution*, 3rd ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 14.

31   Suzanne Austin Alchon, "Appendix: The Demographic Debate," *A Pest in the Land* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2003), 147–172 contains a review of twentieth-century estimates of and debates about the size of the pre-contact indigenous population of the Americas. For her conclusions on the most plausible estimates of populations by region see 160–172: Hispaniola (166), the entire Caribbean (167), Mexico (163), the Andes region (169), North America (160), and the entire hemisphere (172).

The regimes of tribute labor imposed in the Americas had deep roots in Spain's long history as a frontier of warfare between Christian and Muslim states. Armed conflict between the increasingly powerful Castilian monarchy and Muslim polities generated models of subjugation of conquered peoples and the extraction of their labor that were transferred and practiced in the New World. For instance, victorious Christian military commanders on the peninsula were often rewarded with grants of land and labor tribute known as *encomiendas* from the newly-conquered, sedentary Muslim populations in southern Spain, a practice that was later adapted to the conquered territories of the New World.

On both sides of the Atlantic variations of the encomienda as labor tribute were key instruments used by the Spanish crown to establish its rule in newly conquered territories with large settled populations. In Spain's American colonies the encomienda was a grant only of the labor of a group of natives and did not include land. Though the encomienda served to organize the labor of conquered subjects, it served other political and cultural goals as well. The grant of an encomienda rewarded loyal Spanish expeditioners at little cost to the crown, but they were held at the king's pleasure and usually were not inheritable. The encomiendas also used the political leadership of indigenous communities to muster laborers for service to Spaniards, further reducing the crown's costs. The crown could and did rescind, confiscate, and reassign encomiendas and ultimately abolished them in 1542 to curb the power of the early conquistadors. Initially, the cultural goals of the encomienda were to use the grants as a vehicle for Christianization by charging the encomenderos with the conversion and protection of their consigned Amerindians. The Spanish crown realized its economic, political, and cultural goals through the encomienda with varying success throughout the Americas, but native encomendados (the consigned natives) performed much of the labor that established mining centers in the Caribbean and the mainland colonies.[32]

Though Columbus found no gold in Cuba on his first trip to the island in 1492, when the conquest of the island was undertaken in 1511 the expedition found gold in both the eastern and western halves of the island. Cuba's first Spanish settlers were keen to exploit these mineral deposits and by 1513 King Ferdinand granted Cuba's governor, Diego Velázquez, the power to establish

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32   For a summary of the meaning of encomienda in Spain and the Americas and its legal precedents see Francisco J. Andrés Santos, "Encomienda y usufructo en Indias," *Legal History* vol. 69, nos. 3/4 (September 2001): 245–248. One of the best descriptions in English remains James Lockhart and Stuart B. Schwartz, *Early Latin America* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 21–22; 68–70.

encomiendas. Velázquez rewarded the royal treasurer and other crown officials with 200 native workers. Other important Spaniards received grants of 100 natives; the smallest grants were for forty native workers.[33] Thus, Spaniards first exploited Cuba's gold largely with indigenous tribute labor.

The mineral resources of the Americas officially belonged to the crown and therefore, mining became a combined state-private enterprise. The king often supplied experts, loans, and grants of labor while private contractors raised the necessary capital for equipment, construction, and the sustenance of the labor force and paid the crown a portion of the gold produced, usually one-fifth. Over the sixteenth century the crown used reductions in the royal portion as an incentive to contractors to undertake new mining ventures or to stimulate greater production in older ones.[34] In Cuba however, the gold cycle was relatively short, in part due to modest deposits, but also to the failure of the encomienda system to maintain and protect the island's native population. Cuba's encomenderos pushed their charges so hard that thousands perished and agriculture languished, necessitating the importation of food.[35] In Cuba the economic and cultural goals of the encomienda system foundered on the greed of the early conquerors.

Within the first decade of conquest Spaniards in Cuba began to complain of the decline of the island's native population. Overwork and disruption killed thousands; despair compelled thousands more to choose suicide over subjugation to the Spanish.[36] Spanish settlers began to request access to both Amerindian and African slaves to supplement the labor of native encomendados. Queen Isabella had resisted Columbus's wholesale enslavement of Caribbean natives in 1498, but by 1503 she had allowed exceptions for those natives deemed cannibals or captured in a "just war."[37] The most well known of these may be the cacique Hatuey whose followers the king condemned to slavery after burning

33   Irene Wright, *The Early History of Cuba* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1916), 45–47.

34   Levi Marrero, *Cuba: economía y sociedad*, vol. 2 (Madrid: Ed. Playor, 1974), 24–26 for several examples of mining contracts for one-tenth and even one-twentieth as the royal portion for ten years in the copper mines of eastern Cuba.

35   Marrero, *Cuba*, vol. 2, 18–19.

36   The earliest recorded epidemic in Cuba was in 1519. Several Spanish authors in the sixteenth century, including Bartolomé de las Casas, left detailed accounts of native suicides, "sometimes as whole households together." Quoted in Louis A. Pérez, Jr. *To Die in Cuba: Suicide and Society* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 3–5.

37   Elliott, *Empires*, 97–98. For Columbus' proposal to Queen Isabella see Christopher Columbus, *Letter* on the New World in Jon Cowans, ed., *Early Modern Spain: A Documentary History* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 33. For examples of continued Indian enslavement in the peripheries of the empire in the eighteenth century see

their leader at the stake, a story made infamous by former Cuban encomend-
ero, Bartolomé de Las Casas.[38] Thereafter, to recruit more indigenous forced
labor for the Caribbean colonies Spaniards embarked on slaving expeditions
around the circum-Caribbean. Such expeditions in Central America resulted
in the virtual extinction of some native groups by the 1540s.[39]

The many royal orders over the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries affirm-
ing yet qualifying the Amerindians' free status as Spanish vassals demonstrated
the tension between the crown's paternalism and the voracious demand for
labor necessitated by the entire colonial enterprise. By 1526 Ferdinand's grand-
son, Charles I (V) was sufficiently alarmed at the diminution of the natives of the
Caribbean to write that "the excessive…and continuous work" exacted by
the "persons who had them commended (encomendados) to them, many of
them [the Indians] have died and others have hung themselves…for not being
able to suffer so much work." The king recognized that digging for gold was the
most onerous work endured by tribute laborers and ordered that no encomen-
deros in Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, Cuba, or Jamaica could send their native
laborers to mining or other draining work. Transgressors would face the loss of
their grant of native workers and the confiscation of their goods.[40] After a sec-
ond smallpox epidemic in 1530 further decimated the native population, the
crown started issuing additional restrictions on indigenous enslavement.[41]

The encomienda, and to a lesser degree the enslavement of Amerindians, were
the forms of labor coercion that allowed Spaniards in Cuba to establish their ini-
tial settlements and profit from the mining of gold. But even as early as 1530 when
copper deposits were discovered in eastern Cuba local officials petitioned the
crown for loans to buy black slaves to extract copper, not native slaves or tribute
laborers. With the proclamation of the New Laws of the Indies for the Good
Treatment and Preservation of the Indians in 1542 and 1543 the crown banned
both the granting of new encomiendas and enslavement of the Amerindians.
Though the full enforcement of those laws took several years, by 1550 the remain-
ing several thousand indigenous people left in Cuba were officially free subjects

David J. Weber, *Bárbaros. Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment* (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005), 83–85 and 234–241.

38 Bartolomé de Las Casas, *An Account, Much Abbreviated, of the Destruction of the Indies*,
edited with and introduction by Franklin W. Knight, trans. Andrew Hurley (Indianapolis
and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 2003), 18–20 and Wright, *Early History of Cuba*, 47.

39 O. Nigel Bolland, "Colonization and Slavery in Central America," in *Unfree Labour in the
Development of the Atlantic World*, edited by Paul E. Lovejoy and Nicholas Rogers (Ilford
UK and Portland OR: Frank Cass, 1994), 11–18.

40 Quoted in Marrero, *Cuba*, vol. 2, 9.

41 Wright, *Early History of Cuba*, 47.

and both the state and private employers turned to other methods of coercion to carry out the work of empire.[42] For example, while the initial construction and settlement of Havana had been accomplished largely with indigenous labor, the town's reconstruction after the attack by French pirate Jacques de Sorés in 1555 was carried out predominantly by African slaves.[43]

Because of the catastrophic decline of the indigenous population, the predominant modes of labor coercion in Cuba throughout the colonial period were enslavement (briefly of Amerindians as discussed above, mostly of Africans and their descendants thereafter) and penal servitude. Though they will be discussed separately below, slaves and convict laborers were employed in tandem, often simultaneously, in state service until the final abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century. Both had deep roots in policy and practice in Spain and, like the encomienda, were transferred and adapted to the state's labor needs in Spain's American colonies from 1492 onward.

Slavery

In contrast to Northern European states that established American empires later, Spain and Portugal both had continuous experience with enslavement in law and practice in the metropolis as a mode of labor coercion from ancient times into the modern era. In the centuries of warfare between Muslim and Christian kingdoms on the Iberian peninsula both sides claimed the right to enslave any fighters captured in battle; for the Christians those many thousands of captives became slaves of the crown.[44] For example, the Christian siege of Malaga in 1487 generated between 11,000 and 15,000 royal slaves. Expeditions against the *moriscos* of Alpujarras, north of Granada under Philip II consigned some 25,000 to 30,000 defeated rebels to enslavement from 1568 to 1571.[45] Even as late as the eighteenth century raiding along the North African coast by Spanish corsairs between 1710 and 1789 produced close to 6,000 captives for

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42   Marrero, *Cuba*, vol. 2, 11.

43   De la Fuente, *Havana*, 5.

44   Maximiliano Barrio Gozalo, *Esclavos y cautivos. Conflicto entre la Cristianidad y el Islam en el Siglo* XVIII (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 2006), 84 and ft. 194, though practice clearly predated the pronouncement, Pope Paul III in 1549 authorized the employment of male and female Muslim slaves in publicly useful tasks and for domestic service. Franco Silva, *La esclavitud en Andalucia*, 36.

45   Alessandro Stella, *Histoires d'esclaves dans la péninsule ibérique* (Paris: Édicions de L'École des Hautes études en Sciences Sociales, 2000), 67–70.

state projects.[46] Spain also had a smaller population of slaves of sub-Saharan African descent by the sixteenth century mostly purchased through the Portuguese or Mediterranean slave trades.[47] The supply of slaves through capture in war or purchase was uneven over time but the Spanish state controlled the labor of tens of thousands of slaves on the peninsula, while private owners employed many thousands more.

Slavery was also enshrined in Spanish law from the Middle Ages onward, recognized as a necessary, but unnatural state of subjugation. Spain's medieval law code, the *Siete Partidas*, was based on imperial Roman legal norms, later tempered by those of the Christian Bible and the Catholic Church.[48] Slavery was characterized as an institution with deep historical roots, but also one that was evil and against natural reason.[49] The code tried to bridge the contradiction between the ancients' view of enslavement as an appropriate state for inferior beings and aspects of Christian thought that viewed the slave as a human being with a soul, capable of attaining salvation and deserving of mercy.[50] The

46 Stella, *Histoires d'esclaves*, 68. Maximiliano Barrio Gozalo, "La esclavitud en el mediterráneo occidental en el siglo XVIII. Los esclavos del Rey en España," *Critica storica* vol. 17, no. 2 (1980): 207–208.

47 There is a considerable bibliography on the history of slavery in Spain though studies of specific towns or regions tend to predominate, see William D. Phillips, "Slavery in Spain, Ancient to Early Modern: A Survey of the Historiography Since 1990," *Bulletin of the Society for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies* vol. 27, no. 2–3 (Winter-Spring, 2001–2002): 10–18; William D. Phillips, *Historia de la esclavitud en España* (Madrid: Editorial Playor, 1990) and "The Old World Background of Slavery in the Americas," in Barbara Solow, ed., *Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 43–61. Also Stella, *Histoires d'esclaves;* Charles Verlinden, *L'esclavage dans l'Europe médiévale, tome 1, Péninsule ibérique-France* (Brugge: De Tempel, 1955); Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, "La esclavitud en Castilla durante la Edad Moderna," *Estudios de historia social de España* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1952), 369–373.

48 Francisco López Estrada and María Teresa López García-Berdoy, eds. *Las Siete Partidas Antología* (Madrid: Editorial Castalia, 1992), 13–38.

49 Partida IV, Título V and Título XXI, Ley I in *Las Siete Partidas*, vol. 4, ed. Robert I. Burns, trans. Samuel Scott Parsons (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 901, 977.

50 See the discussion on this question throughout David Brion Davis', *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988[1966]) especially 58–61 and 98–106, 251. On ancient precedents, mostly in Greek, Jewish, and early Christian thought, 62–90. On the dualism within Christianity that both rationalized slavery and contained ideals of freedom and equality that were "potentially abolitionist," 89–90. Also Alfonso Franco Silva, *La esclavitud en Andalucía, 1450–1550* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1990), 36.

authority of masters was upheld throughout the code, but the *Siete Partidas* also allowed the enslaved certain rights along with their obligations to obey and serve their owners; for instance, slaves had some right to choose their own marriage partners and to pursue their freedom through self-purchase.[51] The Spanish crown resisted attempts by the conquerors and settlers in the Americas to enslave most of the Amerindians precisely because they were vassals of the crown, but had no such qualms, at least initially, about unconverted Muslims or sub-Saharan Africans.

The greatest demand for labor in peninsular sites of state-directed work was in the Mediterranean galleys. One historian estimates that as many as 150,000 slaves toiled in Spain's galleys from the sixteenth century to their abolition in 1748.[52] For a period of about sixty years (1578 through the early 1630s) the crown also used galleys stationed in Cartagena, Santo Domingo, and Havana to defend its Caribbean colonies from pirates, employing a mix of convicts and several hundred slaves at the oars. Slaves comprised about twenty percent of the total workforce on the Caribbean galleys and their varied provenance shows the relative porosity of Spanish restrictions on emigration of foreigners and non-Catholics to the Americas. New World galleys employed Muslim slaves from North Africa usually listed as Moors and others called Turks from Anatolia and other sites in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea region. Even a few Christian renegades and rebellious *moriscos* enslaved for resisting expulsion from Spain in the 1610s found their way to the Caribbean as galley slaves.[53]

Historiography on Caribbean slavery often foregrounds the transfer of enslavement of sub-Saharan Africans for plantation labor as the foundation of modern slavery in the region but, as David Wheat has argued in his examination of the Caribbean galleys, prior to 1650 "multiple forms of slavery and servitude" supported the empire "in ways that remain to be explored."[54] This insight can be extended to forced labor more generally and to state work beyond the galleys, in mining, ship and fort building, and naval service. For

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51   Partida IV, Título V, Leyes I and II, in *Siete Partidas*, vol. 4, 901–902. For a study of these provisions in practice in a Spanish colony see Herman L. Bennett, *Africans in Colonial Mexico. Absolutism, Christianity, and Afro-Creole Consciousness, 1570–1640* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003).

52   Stella, *Histoires d'esclaves*, 70.

53   David Wheat, "Mediterranean Slavery, New World Transformations: Galley Slaves in the Spanish Caribbean, 1578–1635," *Slavery & Abolition* vol. 31, no. 3 (September 2010): 328–333.

54   Wheat, "Mediterranean Slavery," 338.

instance, over the seventeenth century the galleys became outmoded in naval warfare and the ships spent increased time in port. Rather than disband or simply incarcerate the forced laborers from the galleys, the crown chose to continue to confine both the galleys' slaves and convicts and benefit from their labor by sending them ashore to do heavy work to support the navy, in construction and maintenance on the docks, in arsenals, and in the transport of water, wood, and supplies.[55] The crown's choice to shift the extensive use of forced labor in galleys to land-based defensive and constructive labor replicated patterns of labor in building Caribbean forts from the late seventeenth century onward. In this sense the flow of precedent and practice may have been from the Americas back to the metropolis by the eighteenth century.

By the second half of the sixteenth century Spain's relative monopoly on land and at sea in the Americas had been sufficiently challenged by rival European powers to prompt the Spanish crown to experiment with new defense initiatives, supported by growing investments of state money, manpower, and supervision. State slavery, employing contingents of *esclavos del rey* or king's slaves, was an important component of these new defense plans. Royal slaves were always combined with other coerced and free workers for state projects and the shifting mix of workers provides insights into the overall political economy of the Spanish empire.

For land-based defense, the Spanish crown authorized the first forts in Cuba in 1537 and 1555 in response to French pirate attacks. The fortifications constructed in the late 1530s were very modest, however, and much of the actual construction and the later manning of the fort fell to the colony's Spanish and Amerindian residents. As silver production on the mainland increased so too did the labor required to defend the fleets that passed through Havana. By 1575 almost 200 slaves worked to complete Havana's first stone fort, La Fuerza. The crown employed its own slaves as a supplement to wage laborers and slaves furnished by city residents. Fort construction was also a site of forced labor for various troublesome elements of the local population, vagrants of mixed backgrounds, a few indigenous people, and even fourteen French pirates captured off the coast of Matanzas.[56] A similar mix of laborers completed the El Morro fort, which still guards the eastern point of Havana's port, in 1640.[57]

Ships were built in Cuba for royal fleets from the sixteenth century onward and by the eighteenth century royal slaves had become a small but important

55   Barrio Gozalo, *Esclavos y cautivos*, 162–171. Wheat, "Mediterranean Slavery," 334–335.

56   Renée Mendez Capote, *Fortalezas de la Habana colonial* (Havana: Editorial Gente Nueva, 1974), 15–16.

57   Marrero, *Cuba*, vol. 2, 42.

component of the mix of coerced and free laborers there as well, especially in Havana's shipyards.[58] In a common example of state-private enterprise, the king contracted out royal shipbuilding in Havana to a chartered company in 1740, and granted the Royal Company of Havana [RCH] the right to import African slaves for sale in the private sector in exchange for undertaking the expense of constructing royal ships.[59] Though more than two thirds of the 800 workers in Havana's shipyard were free wage earners, the RCH owned and maintained several contingents of skilled slaves especially as wood cutters in the forests around the city and as sawyers preparing lumber for ship construction. By 1748 there were thirteen woodcutting sites around Havana with a mix of 350 to 400 enslaved and free workers.[60] The crown's policy of employing a mix of forced and free workers that included a modest number of royal slaves in strategic tasks succeeded in regenerating the stock of ships in the imperial navy by the mid-eighteenth century.

The relatively ad hoc and reactive labor policy for imperial defense protected Cuba until the humiliating defeat of Britain's siege and occupation of Havana from 1762 to 1763. When Havana was returned to Spain in the Treaty of Paris, Spanish policymakers felt compelled to carry out a new, comprehensive plan of defense for Cuba, some of which required changes in state policies of labor recruitment by assuming direct oversight of the repairs and fort construction around the city.[61]

A brief increase in the resort to state slavery was the remedy for labor recruitment in fort building. For much of the preceding period the crown had tried to restrict the trade in African slaves to Cuba through monopoly contracts, but in

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58   For the early period of shipbuilding in Havana see De la Fuente, *Havana*, 127–134.

59   Archivo General de Indias [AGI], Ultramar, legajo 995, "Representación de la Junta de la Compañía," December 19, 1748 for the details of the Royal Company of Havana's charter; Monserrat Gárate Ojanguren, *Comercio ultramarino e Ilustración. La Real Compañía de la Habana* (San Sebastian: Departamento de Cultura del País Vasco, 1993) for a thorough analysis of the Company and all of its business dealings.

60   Marrero, *Cuba*, 8:19 on lumber gangs in Havana's hinterland. AGI, Ultramar, 995, "Representation of the Royal Company of Havana," Dec. 19, 1748 on the RCH's employment of enslaved and free workers in the shipyard.

61   In exchange for the return of Havana, other provisions of the Peace included ceding Florida and all Spanish territory in North America east of the Mississippi to Britain, tolerating British logwood cutters in Honduras and the renunciation of any rights to Newfoundland fishing. Spain also had to return Colônia do Sacramento (in the Río de la Plata) to Portugal. France sought to soften the blow of these losses by ceding Louisiana to its Spanish ally. See John Lynch, *Bourbon Spain, 1700–1808* (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1989), 318.

the face of the defense needs after 1762 Charles III authorized the importation through multiple carriers of almost 8,000 slaves in the next year and a half.[62] Of this total, more than half (4,359) were purchased by the crown for work in the fortifications. To encourage a speedy increase in the legitimate slave trade to the island for defense construction, the crown allowed the rest to be sold to private owners.[63]

This extensive resort to state enslavement in the early 1760s was unique in Cuba's experience with the state as a slave owner. By 1765 there were over 2,000 workers at the fort construction projects, 62.1% of whom were royal slaves.[64] Thereafter however, from 1765 to 1768 the state began to sell off some the unskilled royal slaves to offset the costs of purchasing and maintaining such a large cohort of state slaves, increasing its use of convict labor instead. In keeping with historical patterns of state slavery in Cuba, once the initial crisis had passed—the fort works begun and other networks for forced and free laborers tapped—the state could begin to sell some of its own slaves to recoup its initial investment.

Spain also pressed slaves into military service in its American empire but, in contrast to the English empire of the eighteenth century, the numbers were small. Spain employed hundreds of slaves in various capacities in a desperate, though failed attempt to save Havana during the British attack in 1762. Even in defeat the crown rewarded dozens of those slaves for their service and sacrifice.[65] During Spain's intervention in the American War of Independence from 1779 to 1783, the crown continued to follow more traditional patterns based on the strategic use of small groups of slaves as auxiliaries in battle.[66] Only when Spain was back on the defensive in the chaotic warfare following the outbreak

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62   Gloria García, "El mercado de fuerza de trabajo en Cuba: El mercado esclavista (1760–1789)," in *La esclavitud en Cuba* (Havana: Editorial Academia, 1986), 135.

63   Archivo General de Simancas [AGS], Secretaría y Superintendencia de Hacienda [SSH] 2344, Balance sheet of state slaves purchased under Ricla from June 30, 1763 to May 18, 1765.

64   AGI, Santo Domingo [SD], 1647, Review extracts of the king's slaves and others in the defense works of Havana from March 31 to October 27, 1765; AGS, SSH, 2344, Review extract for February 23, 1766.

65   For more detail on the slaves rewarded for service after the occupation of Havana see Evelyn P. Jennings, "Paths to Freedom: Imperial Defense and Manumission in Havana, 1762–1800," in *Paths to Freedom: Manumission in the Atlantic World*, edited by Rosemary Brana-Shute and Randy J. Sparks, 121–141 (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2009).

66   AGI, Papeles de Cuba, 1247, reports of the artillery force dated the first days of June–December 1780 and January, February, April, and May, 1781. Also notice no. 239, Garcini to Navarro, March 13, 1781 on the embarkation of 30 royal artillery slaves with the army of operation.

of slave rebellion in nearby Saint Domingue in the 1790s did the crown resort to recruiting thousands of slaves to fight in the king's name and later rewarding them for their service, even in defeat.

In 1793 Spain was desperate enough to recruit rebellious slaves under the command of George Biassou, Jean François, and for a time Toussaint L'Ouverture, to try to save its colony in Santo Domingo. Though L'Ouverture later defected to the revolutionary French army, Biassou and François continued to serve the Spanish king in battle, in Spanish Florida and Spain respectively, until their deaths and were rewarded for their loyalty.[67] However, in the context of the revolutionary Caribbean of the 1790s and expanding plantation agriculture in Cuba, when those allies arrived in Havana's port after Spain withdrew from the war, the Captain-General of Cuba refused even to allow them off the ship. He insisted that they were a pernicious example of savagery and might incite rebellion in Cuba as well.[68] By the early nineteenth century, once the insurgent slaves of Haiti had freed themselves from slavery and French colonial rule, Cuba had become a plantation colony with a majority of its population enslaved or free people of color. Spanish officials assigned to the island now resisted the employment of slaves in the military and even questioned the loyalty of free militiamen of color who had fought so effectively to defend Spanish interests in the Caribbean in the previous generation.[69]

For centuries, the Spanish crown had made strategic use of slaves to defend Cuba, rewarding loyalty and military service by slaves, employing others as squads of skilled slaves in vital tasks—lumbering in the shipyard or manning the cannons in Havana's forts. The crown resorted to extensive use of royal slaves in the most extreme moments of threat to the empire, after the British occupation of Havana in 1763 in unskilled fort building and during the Haitian Revolution in the 1790s as military allies.

As Cuba's plantation economy expanded thereafter the crown's approach to slavery shifted away from the paternalism of earlier policy and practice, though it never completely disappeared from official policies toward slaves. Shortly

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67   Jane G. Landers, *Atlantic Creoles in the Age of Revolutions* (Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2010), 68–94.

68   David Geggus, "The Arming of Slaves in the Haitian Revolution," in Christopher Leslie Brown and Philip D. Morgan, eds., *Arming Slaves from Classical Times to the Modern Ages* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), 220–221. See also Jane Landers "Transforming Bondsmen into Vassals," 129–131 in the same volume on the recruitment of the black auxiliaries of Charles IV. The correspondence in AGI, Estado, 5A details the wrangles among Spanish officials in Cuba and Santo Domingo about the resettlement and rewards for the empire's black allies after Spain withdrew from the conflict.

69   See for instance, Kuethe, *Cuba*, 170–173.

after the crown conceded free trade in slaves to Cuban planters in 1789, slaves and people of color became a majority of the island's population. All forms of resistance to slavery increased in a crescendo of flight, destruction of property, rebellion and violence that culminated in the Escalera Rebellion of 1843.[70] The threat of a large and growing enslaved population in the private sector and British abolitionism in the same period tempered both the state's access to slaves and its paternal regard for their welfare. Instead the state came to rely more heavily on various streams of people forced to labor because of transgressions against Spanish law, people who were in many ways more expendable than the crown's native vassals or its own slaves.

Penal Servitude-Convict Labor

Spain's history of penal servitude had many similarities to its long and continuous history with slavery in policy and practice at home and in its colonies. In the late fifteenth century Ferdinand and Isabella supplemented their contingents of galley slaves in the Mediterranean fleets with convicts sentenced to hard labor at the oars. Due to rising wages for free oarsmen over the sixteenth century subsequent monarchs came to rely almost exclusively on forced laborers by the late 1500s.[71] As noted above, almost eighty percent of the Caribbean galleys' labor force was convict labors.

A major shift occurred in the use of forced labor in Spain, however, with the abolition of the Mediterranean galleys in 1748. Some former galley prisoners were sent to the mercury mines of Almadén, Spain, others to North African *presidios.* Slaves and convicts formerly working at the galleys' oars were assigned to Spanish navy yards and port areas pumping out dry docks and hauling materials. As new peninsular fortifications and naval arsenals were built in the middle decades of the 1700s, the state resorted to forced levies of "undesirables"—vagrants, beggars, and gypsies—to supplement labor by slaves and free wage workers. In a shift from military recruitment strategies of previous

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70   On the growing tide of slave resistance and rebellion in the first half of the nineteenth century see Robert L. Paquette, *Sugar Is Made with Blood* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1988); Matt D. Childs, *The Aponte Rebellion in Cuba and the Struggle against Atlantic Slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Manuel Barcia, *Seeds of Insurrection: Domination and Resistance on Western Cuban Plantations, 1808–1848* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008).

71   Ruth Pike, *Penal Servitude in Early Modern Spain* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 4–6.

centuries, by the mid-eighteenth century the most able-bodied of those rounded up were conscripted into the army; the rest sent to labor in forts and naval yards.[72]

The almost endless cycles of war in which Spain was embroiled for most of the eighteenth century made defensive and constructive labor in Caribbean colonies such as Cuba an imperial imperative. As historian Ruth Pike has noted the 1700s were the high tide of the use of penal servitude in Spain's American empire and of state slavery as the previous section showed.[73] In the face of the high costs of purchasing and maintaining thousands of slaves, royal officials recruited laborers from the empire-wide pools of convicts; by the 1770s, prisoners outnumbered the enslaved by almost two to one in state projects in Cuba.

Free workers, both whites and free people of color, represented a growing percentage of the total workforce, though Cuban officials complained bitterly about the difficulties of retaining and disciplining free workers over time. To control at least some of its workers' mobility even after the main projects were completed in 1790, the state employed 300 prisoners and sixty king's slaves to maintain Havana's forts.[74]

Some of the convict laborers in eighteenth-century Havana were sent from Spain, but the major crown networks of forced labor that expanded to fill the positions formerly held by slaves was the flow of convict laborers from Mexico.[75] The post-1763 militarization and defense plan that created such demand for forced labor in Cuba also brought greater state coercion for military recruitment to the much more populous colony of Mexico. Army levies in the 1770s and 1780s coincided with a period of hunger and deprivation in the region that increased crime. Men caught trying to desert the army and those accused of other crimes found themselves chained together and marched to Veracruz to complete their sentences at hard labor in the forts of the circum-Caribbean. Their sentences ranged from one to ten years, but those transported into the Caribbean averaged a little over five years each. One historian of these eighteenth-century Mexican convicts has concluded that there was a symbiosis of aims in the Spanish state's practice of sentencing transgressors to exile

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72   Pike, *Penal Servitude*, 51–53 and 66–71.

73   Ruth Pike, "Penal Servitude in the Spanish Empire: Presidio Labor in the Eighteenth Century," *Hispanic American Historical Review* vol. 58, no. 1 (1978): 21–40.

74   AGS, Guerra, 7242, exp. 20, no. 193.

75   Pike, "Penal Servitude in the Spanish Empire," 33; Jorge L. Lizardi Pollock, "Presidios, presidiarios y desertores: Los desterrados de Nueva España, 1777–1797," in *El Caribe en los intereses imperiales, 1750–1815* (San Juan Mixcoal, MX: Instituto de Investigadores Dr. José María Luis Mora, 2000), 21.

and hard labor in Caribbean defense works similar to the regimes of punishment in the Spanish Mediterranean. New Spain officials could relieve themselves of troublesome people from the margins of society and presidio officials in Havana and elsewhere could supply state projects with a cheap and largely expendable cohort of workers.[76]

As the preceding examination suggests royal slaves were rarely cheap or expendable, but because they constituted a semi-permanent force at the king's disposal, they could be expedient in moments of crisis or urgency. If they acquired skills in the king's service they could be retained for particularly strategic tasks (wood-cutting and preparation in the Havana's shipyards, for instance) or sold to the private sector. Penal servitude, on the other hand, was becoming an increasingly attractive form of labor coercion for an imperial power facing the challenges of fighting wars on a global scale, defending a far-flung empire, and disciplining a diverse and restive population of subjects.

Plantation Expansion in Nineteenth-Century Cuba and Experiments with Indenture

The Spanish state in Cuba continued to own slaves in its own name into the nineteenth century, but it never again needed thousands of forced laborers at one time as it had in 1763. Cuba's expanded fortifications defended the island from attack until the US invasion in 1898 ended Spanish colonialism in the Americas. Imperial shipbuilding and naval recruitment declined after the Spanish defeat at the battle of Trafalgar in 1805. Napoleon I's invasion of the Spanish peninsula in 1808 brought civil war to the peninsula and ultimately independence to Spain's mainland American empire by the 1820s. For Cuban colonial officials this meant the end of access to large numbers of convict laborers from Mexico. British abolitionism from 1820 onward constrained the state's legal access to slaves, though the private sector continued to import slaves by the tens of thousands until 1867.[77]

The most enduring form of state coercion for public labor over the entire colonial period was penal servitude. After 1790 the sources of these convicts shifted away from mainland Spanish America to Cuba itself and to the increasingly chaotic metropole. In both Spain and Cuba the state more aggressively pursued those classified as vagrants and military deserters. In the nineteenth

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76   Lizardi, "Presidios," 20–27.

77   On treaties in 1817 and 1835 see David Murray, *Odious Commerce. Britain, Spain and the Abolition of the Cuban Slave Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

century the number of political prisoners rose as revolutionary movements erupted in Spain and Cuba. The burgeoning enslaved population was also more restive and the state developed a program to centralize the incarceration of fugitive slaves in Havana that allowed colonial officials to benefit from their labor.[78]

The Cuban railroad building projects of the mid-nineteenth century illustrate the shifting political economy of imperial labor recruitment and employment particularly well. The railroad projects' promoters, similar to planters in the private sector, had to recruit labor in a vastly different labor market after the 1820s. Antislave trade treaties with Great Britain in 1817 and 1835 had succeeded in disrupting the flow of African slaves to Cuba and raising prices. Spain abolished slavery in the metropole in 1836 and the British officially ended slavery in their empire in 1834 and freedpeople's apprenticeship in 1838, causing Cuban slave owners to fear the eventual end of slavery on their island as well.[79] Colonial officials began to experiment with contract labor in the 1830s to complete the first railroad line in Cuba.[80] As the transatlantic slave trade continued to shrink, by the late 1840s, private entrepreneurs were also compelled to recruit contract laborers from Yucatan and China.

The mid-nineteenth century was also a period of rising fears among Cuban whites of the social consequences of the first surge of sugar expansion that between 1791 and 1830 had brought almost three hundred fifty thousand African slaves to Cuba.[81] The white elite wrote grimly of the "Africanization" of Cuban society as the island shifted from having a majority of whites to a majority of people of color after 1792, and the state and private organizations proposed initiatives to increase white immigration to the island to avoid the twin horrors of slave rebellion on the Haitian model or slave emancipation on the British Caribbean one.[82]

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78   Gabino La Rosa Corzo, *Los cimarrones de Cuba* (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1988) on fugitive slaves and the policy of centralizing their incarceration in Havana.

79   Murray, *Odious Commerce*, 68–88, Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, *Empire and Antislavery. Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, 1833–1874* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1999), 14–36.

80   For monographs on railroad building in Cuba see Oscar Zanetti and Alejandro García, *Sugar and Railroads. A Cuban History, 1837–1959,* trans. Franklin W. Knight and Mary Todd (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998) and Edward Moyano Bazzini, *La nueva frontera del azúcar. El ferrocarril y la economía cubana del Siglo XIX* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigación, 1991).

81   Trans-Atlantic slave trade database. http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates .faces.

82   Archivo Histórico Nacional [AHN], Estado, leg 6374, exp. 36, no. 1, August 27, 1833, Ricafort to King.

The labor force for building the railroad came to include virtually every kind of forced and free laborer ever employed in the colony. The work, similar to plantation labor, was arduous and largely unskilled labor, rarely attracting free laborers at the low wages generally offered. An 1837 report from the commission that oversaw the railroad building, lamented that in Cuba where "daily wages are so high and hands always scarce for the urgent work of agriculture, workers are not to be found."[83] From 1835 to 1840 the rail line's workforce contained some slaves owned by or housed in the Havana Repository for runaway slaves and nominally free Africans known as *emancipados.*[84] Other workers were convicts—Cubans or criminals sentenced to the island from other parts of the empire. The composite group of forced laborers numbered about 500 per year over the five-year span.[85]

Though royal and fugitive slaves and hundreds of emancipados were assigned to the railroad project, the demands of other public works, like road repair, and the 209 deaths among rail workers necessitated that government officials search for new alternatives to recruit workers while retaining mechanisms of control.[86] Although there had been discussion since at least the late eighteenth century of encouraging white immigration to Cuba, the railroad commission's contracts were the first large-scale initiatives in that direction.[87] The largest group of contract laborers, a total of 927, came from the Canary Islands. By the time the rail line opened two years later in 1837, 632 had completed their contracts, 240 had died or fled, 35 were incapacitated, 13 worked

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83   AHN, Ultramar, leg. 37, exp. 1, no. 30.

84   The emancipados were enslaved Africans freed by the terms of the antislave trade treaty signed by Spain and Great Britain in 1817. After 1820 any slaves illegally shipped to Spanish colonies could be seized by the British navy, then freed. In an example of creative coercion by the Spanish state, beginning in 1824 the emancipados were consigned to the Captains General of Cuba to be allocated to private individuals for training and Christianization rather than returned to Africa and possible reenslavement. Murray, *Odious Commerce*, 271–297, Inés Roldán de Montaud, "Origen, evolución, y supresión del grupo de negros 'emancipados' en Cuba 1817–1870," *Revista de Indias* vol. 42, nos. 169–170 (1982): 574–576, Luis Martínez-Fernández, "The Havana Anglo-Spanish Mixed Commission for the Suppression of the Slave Trade and Cuba's *Emancipados*," *Slavery & Abolition*, vol. 16, no. 2 (1995), 209–213.

85   La Rosa Corzo, *Los cimarrones*, 68.

86   AHN, Ultramar, leg. 37, exp. 1, no. 30, July 26, 1837.

87   Consuelo Naranjo Orovio, "La amenaza haitiana, un miedo interesado. Poder y fomento de la población blanca en Cuba." In *El rumor de Haití en Cuba. Temor, raza, y rebeldía, 1789–1844*. eds. María Dolores González-Ripoll, Consuelo Naranjo Orovio, Ada Ferrer, Gloria García and Josef Opatrný, 83–178 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2004).

on other public projects, and only 7 remained working on the railroad.[88] A smaller group of workers (281) from the US, said to be Irish, were contracted through an agent in the US. In both cases, the railroad commissioners lost both the labor and at least a portion of the money advanced for the passages of the migrants through death or desertion.[89] However, those who protested or were captured in flight were returned to the railroad work as *forzados* or convict laborers. Since the state was the main employer, it could use both soldiers and the criminal justice system to enforce labor discipline among contract workers.[90] The main goal of the commissioners was to keep the contract workers sufficiently isolated from the larger free population to guarantee obedience and discourage flight. But ultimately, in spite of all these official complaints, the first line of railroad was finished on time and under budget. White contract labor was, for the railroad officials, a successful supplement to other forms of labor coercion.[91]

In the plantation sector, on the other hand, recruitment of white contract labor would not be the answer to the vagaries of the illegal slave trade. Like other Caribbean plantation colonies in the mid-nineteenth century the colonial state in Cuba turned its attention to Asia and to the now independent country of Mexico for relatively low-cost, bound labor. Funds were invested in the immigration of *yucatecos* (largely Mayans or mestizos from the Yucatan peninsula) and Chinese as indentured laborers, whose contracts obligated them to accept wages well below the Cuban norm for both free wage earners and hired slaves.[92] The prices that planters paid to purchase their contracts were also considerably lower than the prices for African slaves; from 1845 to 1860 prices for Chinese indentures were less than half those of slaves.[93]

The numbers of yucatecos imported into Cuba was small; Chinese indentured laborers arrived in much larger numbers, over 120,000 from 1847 to 1874.[94] The Cuban Captain General was forced to confront the increasing complexities

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88   AHN, Ultramar, leg. 37, exp. 1, no. 29.

89   AHN, Ultramar, leg. 15, exp. 1, no.4, 2 show losses of about 25% on the passages for Canary Islanders who died or deserted the railroad works.

90   Manuel Moreno Fraginals, *El ingenio. Complejo económico social cubano del azúcar* (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 2001), 253.

91   AHN, Ultramar, leg. 37, exp. 1, no. 30, July 26, 1837.

92   Naranjo, "Amenaza," 162.

93   Lisa Yun, *The Coolie Speaks: Chinese Indentured Laborers and African Slaves in Cuba* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008), Table 1.2, 17.

94   Yun, *The Coolie Speaks*, 19, Table 1.3 cites 138,156 Chinese as having embarked from China to Cuba from 1847–1873, and 121,810 who actually landed.

of introducing new peoples into Cuba.[95] Cuban officials proposed using the tools of slavery to control both groups in spite of their nominally free status.[96] These new indentured workers were no longer subjects or vassals of the crown. The queen and the Cuban Captain-General saw their primary obligation as defending the internal tranquility of Cuba from slave rebellion, not protecting foreign workers. But these bound laborers were the free subjects of other sovereign polities and this fact was the ultimate undoing of indenture in nineteenth-century Cuba. After several years' wrangle with representatives of both the Mexican and British governments, the Spanish crown curtailed the importation of involuntary workers from Yucatan.[97] Reports of mistreatment and disregard for the terms of the Chinese workers' contracts by planters led to so much resistance that both the Spanish crown and the Chinese government tried to intervene. Decrees from Spain over the 1850s and 1860s oscillated between efforts to hold Cuban employers to at least the terms of the Chinese workers' contracts and attempts to quell resistance and flight.[98]

The political landscape in which colonial officials and the crown tried to negotiate the terms of forced labor in Cuba was dramatically altered by the outbreak of independence insurrection in eastern Cuba in 1868. The rebels sought recruits by offering freedom to both African slaves and Chinese indentured workers who joined the movement. The crown initiated gradual emancipation of slaves with the Moret Law of 1870 and increased its pressure on Cuban traffickers in Chinese workers to end the trade. Shortly after the Portuguese prohibited any further emigration through their port of Macao in December 1873 an official Chinese commission of inquiry arrived in Cuba to investigate the dreadful reports of conditions for workers. Traveling around the

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95   Estimates vary widely, from 730 to as many as 10,000, but even the highest number was small compared to African and even Chinese bound immigrants. See Paul Estrade, "Los colonos como sustitutos de los esclavos negros," in *Cuba la perla de las Antillas: Actas de las I Jornadas sobre 'Cuba y su historia'.* eds. Consuelo Naranjo Orovio and Tomás Mallo Gutiérrez (Madrid: Dos Calles, 1994), 97. Many were captured and sold to Cuban traders by Mexican officials during the Caste Wars in the Yucatan in the 1840s. See Nelson A. Reed, *The Caste War of Yucatán.* rev. ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 142.

96   Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Manuscripts, *Colonos yucatecos en Cuba*, MSS/13857, 1848–1849, f. 16.

97   For more detail on this whole episode see Evelyn P. Jennings, "'Some Unhappy Indians Trafficked by Force': Race, Status and Work Discipline in mid-Nineteenth Century Cuba," in *Bonded Labor in the Cultural Contact Zone*, eds. Gesa Mackenthun and Raphael Hörmann, 209–225 (Münster and New York: Waxmann, 2010).

98   *The Cuba Commission Report. A Hidden History of the Chinese in Cuba*, Introduction by Denise Helly (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 23–26.

island the commissioners collected testimony from 2,841 Chinese "[a]lmost every [one of whom]...was, or had been undergoing suffering, and suffering was the purport of almost every word heard...."[99]

Thus, by 1870 the political economy of forced labor in the much-diminished Spanish American empire had shifted irrevocably. The Spanish state no longer had large pools of workers vulnerable to coercion at its disposal to defend the empire. Instead it enacted the Moret Law to begin to free the enslaved to try to recruit them to defend colonialism against the independence movement. By the late 1880s the Atlantic context had also been radically changed by abolitionism and the emancipation of Africans and their descendants in all of the Americas with the exception of Brazil. Because Cuban sugar and the island's market were the last remnants of American colonial wealth that Spain could exploit by the late nineteenth century, the crown worried less about protecting the weak among its colonial residents in favor of ensuring the rights of profit and property of their employers. Only when the colonial bond itself was threatened by independence insurrection did the Spanish state invoke its earlier paternalism and offer freedom in exchange for continued fealty to the crown.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis highlights the singular features of the political economy of forced labor in Spain and its American empire. Patterns of conquest developed on the frontier between Christianity and Islam on the peninsula led to the Spanish state's extensive imposition of labor tribute and slavery on large populations of culturally different peoples. Such reserves of forced labor allowed Spain to man its Mediterranean galleys, staff its arsenals, and recruit labor for other state enterprises. Spain also embarked on its American conquests from a position of strength in the sixteenth century. With a growing peninsular population for much of the century, the crown was able to staff an army and navy and settle its new colonies with Spaniards relatively free of coercive labor strictures for the next two centuries. Spain also had the good fortune to claim its colonies in the American regions that contained the greatest stores of precious metals and the largest indigenous populations. By importing and adapting a wide range of forced labor regimes in the Americas, Spain was able to build colonies, mine their wealth, and successfully defend its empire until the early nineteenth century.

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99   *The Cuba Commission Report*, 34.

As an early European colonizer, Spain's empire began from a medieval state whose authority was based in part on the paternalism of the monarch and the theoretically equal access of all her or his subjects to royal grace and justice. Much is often made of the slowness and inefficiency of both but many Spanish subjects, both free and unfree, seem to have had sufficient faith in the eventual outcome of their suits to try their luck by petitioning the crown rather than through outright rebellion. On the other hand, we cannot underestimate the Spanish state's powers of coercion and punishment. Spanish monarchs could reward faithful subjects with a small pension or gratuity, but they could also punish severely those who resisted royal authority. We have many examples of exemplary executions, the victims drawn and quartered and their heads left on pikes. Yet, one wonders if the possibility of years of miserable labor at the galleys' oars or digging trenches for the forts of Havana were not an even greater deterrent to resistance. Coffles of convicts suffering the long journey to labor far from their homes were a common sight in many parts of the empire. An uneasy balance between force and favor—penal servitude and paternalism, enslavement and manumission, labor tribute and loyalty to a distant lord—all built and maintained the Spanish American empire.

Until quite recently, in the historiography of comparative empire imperial Spain was often characterized as the lumbering giant—increasingly sclerotic and unable to adapt to changing times. This examination of the Spanish state's patterns of employment of forced labor suggests a different picture at least for the period before 1800. A skillful yet expedient combination of state and private enterprise carried out most imperial work and a skillful yet expedient combination of paternalism and repression maintained sufficient order and loyalty in Spain's mainland colonies until the early nineteenth century. In Cuba the colonial bond held much longer, but repression outweighed paternalism for much of the period after 1830. As policy and practice in the wider Atlantic world moved away from slavery, the colonial officials in Cuba relied more heavily on the expansion and manipulation of the criminal justice system to supply forced labor for public works—runaway slaves, emancipados, convicts, military deserters, and enemies of the crown. For the first time in the Spanish empire state bodies also looked for bonded labor through indenture in former colonies such as the Yucatan and in China. Ultimately however, no amount of adaptation, belated paternalism, or increased repression could save Spanish colonialism in Cuba by 1898.

Indian Freedom and Indian Slavery in the Portuguese Amazon (1640–1755)[1]

Rafael Chambouleyron

Introduction

Compared to other regions of America, the Amazon basin—situated on the northwest of the Portuguese possessions—was conquered and occupied in a later period of the Portuguese colonization of the continent. It was only during the 1610s, that the crown undertook the occupation of that region in a systematic and definitive way. During the early 1620s, when the Spanish and the Portuguese monarchies were united,[2] the crown founded an independent province in the north, the *Estado do Maranhão*—the State of Maranhão, formed by two main captaincies, Pará (or Grão-Pará) and Maranhão. This decision was based upon the distance between Maranhão and the capital of Brazil, in Bahia, and the difficulties of traveling along the north coast, owing to contrary winds and currents. Not only was the state of Maranhão a separate province of the Portuguese dominions in South America, but its colonization also followed different paths compared to the other "conquests" of Portugal on the continent. In fact, the Amazon region was characterized by several distinct features: its frontier status (bordering Spanish, French, and Dutch possessions), by the dispersion of its population over a vast territory, by the importance of forest products in its economy and thereby the significance of its *sertão* (the hinterland), and by the crucial role played by Indian laborers.

During the seventeenth century, the settlers and the royal and local authorities soon discovered the importance of the region's native population and

2 From 1580 until 1640, owing to dynastic reasons, the Portuguese crown belonged to the kings of Castile. For a recent analysis on the consequences of this period for the region, see: Guida Marques, "Entre deux empires: le Maranhão dans l'Union ibérique (1614–1641)," *Nuevo Mundo, Mundos Nuevos*, 2010, http://nuevomundo.revues.org/59333, accessed on Jan. 16, 2012; Alírio Cardoso, "A conquista do Maranhão e as disputas atlânticas na geopolítica da União Ibérica (1596–1626)," *Revista Brasileira de História* vol. 31, no. 61 (2011): 317–338.

widely used Indian workers. Natives were the main laborers in transportation by rowing canoes, in the collection of products in the sertão (like cacao, bark-clove[3] and sarsaparilla), in colonial defense as troops, and in the cultivation of such crops as manioc, cacao, sugar, and tobacco. Thus, as the Overseas Council explained to the king, in 1645, "it is impossible to cultivate and fructify the lands of these captaincies without Indians."[4] Two years later, Governor Francisco Coelho de Carvalho stated the necessity of having all the allied Indians prepared for war, since, according to him, on "those Indians depends the defense of this State."[5]

Except for some short periods (1609–1611; 1647–1653; 1680–1688), in seventeenth-century Portuguese America, Indian enslavement remained legal; it was finally abolished, at least officially, in the mid-eighteenth century. Contrary to that of African slaves, Indian slavery had raised much discussion about its legitimacy among the settlers, missionaries, authorities, the crown, and the Indians themselves, concerning the nature of Indians' freedom and the limits and modes of enslavement. These debates and struggles expressed the views of different groups within the empire and in the colonies, as well as in the Court at Lisbon.[6] Since the sixteenth century, many royal orders, in accord with papal decrees, sought to define the relationship between Portuguese settlers and the native population.[7] After the creation of the State of Maranhão, the kings of Portugal

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3   Bark-clove, *cravo de casca* or *pau cravo* (*Dicypellium caryophyllatum*), was a bark of a tree which resembled Indian clove in taste, and was widely collected by settlers, becoming one of the main products of Grão-Pará's exports.

4   *Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino*, Lisbon, Portugal [hereafter AHU], Maranhão, caixa 2, doc. 181, "*Consulta* from the Overseas Council to Dom João IV," Oct. 24, 1645.

5   Coelho de Carvalho's letter is included in: AHU, Pará, caixa 1, doc. 67, "Requisition from Sebastião Lucena de Azevedo to Dom João IV," [1647].

6   See: Ronaldo Vainfas, *Ideologia e escravidão: os letrados e a sociedade escravista no Brasil colonial* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1986); José Eisenberg, *As missões jesuíticas e o pensamento político moderno: encontros culturais, aventuras teóricas* (Belo Horizonte: Editora da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, 2000); Carlos Alberto Ribeiro de Moura Zeron, *Linha de fé: a Companhia de Jesus e a escravidão no processo de formação da sociedade colonial* (*Brasil, séculos* XVI e XVII) (São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 2011).

7   See: José Vicente César, "Situação legal do índio durante o período colonial (1500–1822)," *América Indígena* vol. 45, no. 2 (1985): 391–425. Heloísa Liberalli Belotto, "Política Indigenista no Brasil Colonial, 1570–1750," *Revista do Instituto de Estudos Brasileiros*, 29 (1988), 49–60; Beatriz Perrone-Moisés, "Inventário da legislação indigenista. 1500–1800," in *História dos índios no Brasil*, ed. Manuela Carneiro da Cunha (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1992), 529–566. Francisco Ribeiro da Silva, "A legislação seiscentista portuguesa e os índios do Brasil," in *Brasil: colonização e escravidão*, ed. Maria Beatriz Nizza da Silva (Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 2000), 15–27; Zeron, *Linha de fé*, 316–369.

decreed several orders which regulated the use of Indian workers, both free and enslaved, for the operation of Maranhão's economy. As regards Indian labor, changing circumstances in the colony determined the decisions of the crown and the actions of the many groups involved. Therefore, there was a close relationship between colonial reality and the Portuguese Indian policy for the Amazon region.

Certainly Portugal's broader (and previous) colonial experience in South America influenced the decisions taken by the kings, and their enforcement by royal and local authorities in the State of Maranhão. However, one can argue that the specificities of the Portuguese colonization of the Amazon region, and especially the straits faced by the crown to maintain its dominion over this vast territory are essential to understanding the policies related to Indian labor throughout the seventeenth century and the conflicts which derived from them. Undoubtedly, the acquisition and organization of both free and enslaved laborers became one of the main issues among settlers, the crown, royal and local authorities, clerics, and the Indian themselves throughout the colonial period.

Since the mid-nineteenth century, historiography on colonial Brazil defined colonial Indian legislation as contradictory. In the 1850s, João Francisco Lisboa wrote that Portuguese relations with the Indians consisted of an "uninterrupted succession of hesitations and contradictions," until the ministry of the Marquis of Pombal (1751–1777).[8] The fact that throughout the seventeenth century the crown oscillated between the permission and prohibition of Indian slavery strengthened this perspective, which saw Indian legislation as a battlefield between different groups of colonial society, especially the Jesuits and the settlers, with the crown ceding to each of them alternately. More recently, however, Beatriz Perrone-Moisés reassessed João Francisco Lisboa's analysis, showing that although Indian legislation appeared to be oscillatory, there were some trends that underlay legal determinations. For Perrone-Moisés, who is inspired by a new perspective in Brazilian historiography which stresses the importance and complexity of the role played by the Indians themselves,[9] Indian policy was also determined by the reaction of the Indian peoples: "acceptance of the system" and "resistance" became basic

8   João Francisco Lisboa, *Crônica do Brasil colonial: apontamentos para a história do Maranhão* (Petrópolis/Brasília: Vozes/INL, 1976), 406.

9   See: Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, "Introdução a uma história indígena" in *História dos índios no Brasil*, 9–24; John M. Monteiro, "Armas e armadilhas: história e resistência dos índios," in *A Outra Margem do Ocidente*, ed. Adauto Novaes (São Paulo: FUNARTE/Companhia das Letras, 1999), 237–256.

pillars for the regulation of Portuguese–Indian relations, defining different general policies for "allied" and "hostile" Indians.[10]

This essay argues that one has to understand the so-called "oscillation" of Indian legislation and policy in the Amazon region within a general context of the Portuguese empire from the 1640s onwards, when Portugal regained its independence from Spain. In fact, the consolidation of the new Bragança dynasty brought increasing intervention of the crown in the region to assure Portuguese control over the territory and to guarantee the incomes of a fragile Treasury. Both imperatives may explain the importance of Indian slavery for the crown in the region.

Thus, from the viewpoint of the crown, the legality of slavery in the northern provinces of Portuguese America lay at an intersection of political struggle (between the different groups in the colony, including the Indians), spatial control over a vast territory, labor problems, and the financing of the Royal Treasury. The second half of the seventeenth century was characterized by an increasing interest from the crown towards the State of Maranhão. In fact, the late 1660s represented the beginning of a "prolonged depression" which lasted at least until the 1690s, "dominated by a crisis in the sugar, tobacco, silver and slave trades."[11] Besides many initiatives to face the crisis, the crown implemented the revitalization of some of its colonies' economies, such as that of the State of Maranhão.[12] It is within this context that one has to understand the significant role played by the crown and the manifold ways by which, beyond Indian labor issues, the Court at Lisbon tried to intervene in the State of Maranhão's economy and society.[13]

Indian Legislation and Indian Slavery

In seventeenth-century Amazonia, the Indian labor system was defined not only by the legal (and illegal) modes of enslavement, but also by a complex

10   Perrone-Moisés, "Índios livres e índios escravos. Os princípios da legislação indigenista colonial (séculos XVI a XVIII)," in *História dos índios no Brasil*, 115–132.

11   Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, "Portugal and Her Empire, 1680–1720," in *The New Cambridge Modern History*, ed. John S. Bromley (Cambridge: CUP, 1970), 4: 511.

12   Ibid., 530–531; Carl Hanson, *Economia e sociedade no Portugal barroco, 1668–1703* (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 1986), 247–251; Godinho, "Problèmes d'économie atlantique. Le Portugal, les flottes du sucre et les flottes de l'or (1670–1770)," *Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations* vol. 5, no. 2 (1950): 184–197.

13   See: Rafael Chambouleyron, *Povoamento, agricultura e ocupação na Amazônia colonial (1640–1706)* (Belém, Açaí/UFPA, 2010).

legal apparatus. Portuguese legal definitions of Indians' freedom determined the functioning of the Christian missionary communities (the *aldeias*, where Indians were indoctrinated), the limits and types of missionaries' temporal jurisdiction over the Indians, the bringing of Indians from the sertão to the *aldeias* (*descimentos*), and the distribution of free Indian workers among the settlers, clerics, and the authorities (*repartição*). None of these issues was exclusive to the state of Maranhão. It was during the second half of the sixteenth and early seventeenth century that many of these problems were faced by the priests and authorities responsible for the conversion of the Indians in Brazil.[14]

Although Indian slavery became an issue of constant discussion, it was never seriously challenged; what became the center of argument was the basis for its legitimization. According to Portuguese laws, there were basically two main sources of legal enslavement: the ransoming of slaves (*resgates*), and just war (*guerra justa*).[15]

The ransoming of slaves consisted of a mechanism to "save" those Indians who had been captured and enslaved by rival tribes, and was practiced by the Portuguese in Africa as well.[16] It was a Christian task of the Portuguese to "rescue" those Indian slaves from the hands of their enemies—many of whom practiced ritual cannibalism—and bring them to work and ideally to be converted within the Portuguese communities. The troops that ransomed slaves in the sertão (*tropas de resgate*) were regulated by an ordinance (*regimento*). However, these troops always had an unclear status, since the Portuguese could enter the hinterland officially for the ransoming of slaves, but eventually declare war on Indian groups, or collect Amazonian spices.[17] According to an ordinance of 1660, since two Jesuits were entering the Amazon River in a mission, they were to be escorted by nine soldiers, the leader of whom should only intervene in military issues. Besides these Portuguese soldiers, the bulk of the troop was composed of allied Indians. Although one of the purposes of this

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14   Georg Thomas, *Política indigenista dos portugueses no Brasil 1500–1640* (São Paulo: Loyola, 1982); Ronald Raminelli, *Imagens da colonização: a representação do índio de Caminha a Vieira* (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 1996); Zeron, *Linha de fé*.

15   See: Ângela Domingues, "Os conceitos de guerra justa e resgate e os ameríndios do norte do Brasil," in *Brasil: colonização e escravidão*, 45–56.

16   In 1685, Governor Gomes Freire de Andrade reminded the crown that if resgates were allowed in Africa, there was no reason to ban this practice in Maranhão. "Letter from Gomes Freire de Andrade to Dom Pedro II," AHU, Maranhão, caixa 6, doc. 726, São Luís, Oct, 15, 1685.

17   See: Dauril Alden, "Indian versus Black Slavery in the State of Maranhão during the Seventeenth and the Eighteenth Centuries," *Bibliotheca Americana* vol. 1, no. 3 (1984): 97; Domingues, "Os conceitos de guerra justa e resgate e os ameríndios do norte do Brasil," 51–52.

expedition was to preach the Gospel, the regimento specified in detail the distribution of slaves in case of a fortuitous war against Indians, and in case there were Indians who wanted to trade slaves.[18]

War was another important source of legal enslavement on many occasions. The discussion about just war belonged to an old tradition, resumed in Portugal after European settlement in the Americas.[19] The legitimacy, nature, and regulation of war against the Indians were discussed many times in relation to the State of Maranhão.[20] Questions about the best times to send military expeditions, the nature of Indian aggression, legal irregularities in the declaration of war, and abuses perpetrated by the Portuguese all had been debated at court, since the sixteenth century.

Over time Indian slavery was allowed and forbidden alternately on many occasions. The list below in Table 2.1 shows the main laws concerning the enslavement of Indians in the State of Maranhão.

Indian Slavery and Labor Policy

Owing to the importance of Indian labor for the functioning of the Amazonian economy, the Portuguese crown had to constantly intervene in order to regulate the acquisition and use of an Indian labor force. One can argue that there was not a concrete policy concerning the Indians workers throughout the Portuguese conquests in America. Therefore, although the manifold experiences from the several regions of Portuguese territories were certainly linked, there were regional solutions for specific conjunctures. Thus, the captaincies of Bahia and Pernambuco, where an economy based on sugar cultivation prospered, was heavily dependent on African slaves, and had a different place for the Indian worker, both free and slave, than the Amazon region. Even in those regions that relied on Indian workers during the seventeenth century, such as the captaincy of São Paulo (in the southern part of Brazil), there were specific compromises; that was the case of the "private administration" of free Indians by the settlers, actually a veiled slavery,

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18   Charles Boxer, "Um regimento inédito sobre o resgate dos ameríndios no Maranhão em 1660," *Actas do* v *Colóquio Internacional de Estudos Luso-brasileiros* (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1965), 3: 65–71; see also: David Sweet, "A Rich Realm of Nature Destroyed: The Middle Amazon Valley, 1640–1750" (PhD Diss., Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, 1974), 579–594.

19   See José Sebastião da Silva Dias, *Os descobrimentos e a problemática cultural do século* xvi (Lisbon: Estampa, 1982), 182–191.

20   See Márcia Mello, *Fé e império: as Juntas das Missões nas conquistas portuguesas* (Manaus: EdUA, 2009), 304–317.

TABLE 2.1   *Main Laws on Indian Enslavement in Maranhão*

November 10, 1647[21]	-	abolishes private administration of free Indians
1652[22]	-	determines the freedom of all Indians (decree inserted in the ordinances of the captain-majors of Pará and Maranhão)
October 17, 1653[23]	-	revises the 1652 ordinances
	-	determines the causes of legal Indian enslavement
	-	authorizes the ransoming of slaves held by Indian groups
April 9, 1655[24]	-	defines the cases of legal enslavement
	-	determines the examination of the slaves made in preceding years
April 14, 1655[25]	-	determines that the Jesuits will have the exclusivity of free Indians' administration
	-	determines that Indians' distribution will be made by a Jesuit and a person elected by the Council
	-	defines the working period of the Indians and their payment
	-	defines the rules for the missionary expeditions to the sertão

21   *Anais da Biblioteca Nacional* [hereafter ABN] vol. 66 (1948): 17–18, "Ley por que S. Mag.^de mandou que os Índios do Maranhão sejão livres," Nov. 10, 1647. This law was reinforced in 1649 and 1650. See "P.ª o g.ᵒʳ do Maranhaõ," May 29, 1649. AHU, cod. 275, fol. 151; "Para o gov.ᵒʳ do Maranhaõ," May 14, 1650. AHU, cod. 275, fols. 167–167v.

22   AHU, Maranhão (Avulsos), caixa 3, doc. 321, "*Consulta* from the Overseas Council to Dom João IV," Sep. 20, 1652. Bernardo Pereira de Berredo, *Annaes historicos do Estado do Maranhaõ* (Lisbon, na Officina de Francisco Luiz Ameno, 1749), 418, 420.

23   ABN vol. 66 (1948): 19–21, "Provisão sobre a liberdade e captiveiro do gentio do Maranhão," Oct. 17, 1653.

24   ABN vol. 66 (1948): 25–28, "Ley que se passou pelo Secretario de Estado em 9 de abril de 655 sobre os Indios do Maranhão," Apr. 9, 1655. This law was reinforced in 1658 and 1659. See ABN 66 (1948): 29; "Provisão sobre a liberdade do gentio do Maranhão," Apr. 10, 1658. AHU, cod. 92, fols. 321v–322, "Sobre a g.ᵈᵃ e observança da ley doz Indios do Maranhaõ e penna q. se impõem aos q. a naõ obedeçerem," May 16, 1659.

25   *Annaes da Bibliotheca e Archivo Publico do Pará* I (1902): 25–46, "Regimento de André Vital de Negreiros, Governador Geral do Estado do Maranhão e Grão-Pará," Apr. 14, 1655.

	- restricts the war against the Indians
	- commends the governor to bring Indians from the sertão
September 12, 1663[26]	- abolishes the temporal jurisdiction of the religious orders
	- defines that the Councils will elect a responsible official for the distribution of free Indians and a cleric for the ransoming expeditions
April 1, 1680[27]	- abolishes Indian slavery
	- determines that Indians caught in war will be considered only as prisoners
December 12, 1686[28] *Regimento das Missões*	- determines that Jesuits and Franciscans (Province of Santo Antônio) would have the spiritual and "political and temporal" government of the *aldeias* under their administration
April 28, 1688[29]	- revokes the April 1, 1680 law
	- authorizes the ransoming of slaves, which will be undertaken by the Jesuits
	- determines that the slaves will be distributed by the Councils
	- defines the cases of legitimate slavery by war

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26   ABN vol. 66 (1948): 29–31, "Provisão em forma de ley sobre a liberdade dos Indios do Maranhão e forma quem que devem ser admenistrados no espiritual pellos Religiosos da Companhia e os das mais religiões de aquelle Estado," Sep. 12, 1663. This law was detailed in a series of royal orders issued in 1675, 1676, 1677 and 1679: AHU, cod. 268, fols. 9v–10, "P.ᵃ o g.ᵒʳ do Estado do Maranhaõ," Apr. 3, 1675. AHU, cod. 268, fols. 13v–14, "Para o governador do Maranhão," Sep. 19, 1676. ABN vol. 66 (1948): 44–45, "Provisão em forma de Ley sobre o cabo de escolta das missões do Maranhão e repartição dos índios," Dec. 4, 1677. ABN vol. 66 (1948): 48–49, "Para os officiaes da Camara do Maranhão," Mar. 16, 1679. AHU, cod. 93, fols. 212–212v, "O Bispo do Maranhão," Mar. 23, 1679.

27   ABN vol. 66 (1948): 57–59, "Ley sobre a liberdade do gentio do Maranhão," Apr. 1, 1680.

28   "Regimento das missoens do Estado do Maranham & Parà," Dec. 12, 1686 in *Regimento & leys sobre as missoens do Estado do Maranhaõ, & Parà, & sobre a liberdade dos Índios* (Lisboa Occidental: na Officina de Antonio Manescal, 1724), 1–16. See: Mello, "O Regimento das Missões: poder e negociação na Amazônia portuguesa," *Clio—Série Revista de Pesquisa Histórica* vol. 27, no. 1 (2009): 46.

29   ABN vol. 66 (1948): 97–101, "Alvará em forma de ley expedido pelo secretario de Estado que deroga as demais leys que se hão passado sobre os indios do Maranhão," Apr. 28, 1688.

which consisted of an agreement between the crown and Portuguese settlers, after a series of confrontations between the latter and the Jesuits.[30]

In the Amazon region, labor, especially access to it, was certainly one of the main issues that moved the crown to intervene—not always with success—in the many conflicts derived from the clash of different interests concerning the acquisition and use of Indian laborers, both free and slave. The prohibition of slavery in 1652 and 1680, and its allowance in 1653 and 1688 were followed by a series of complaints (and sometime violent reactions) by settlers, clerics, authorities, and Indians.

Thus, as Nádia Farage has pointed out, "the dispute and control over Indian labor constitutes the thread that weaves the political history of Maranhão and Grão-Pará."[31] Historiography has analyzed this key issue for the seventeenth century, examining the complex political relations involved in the dispute over the Indian workers, both free and slave.[32] These conflicts derived not only from the prohibition of enslavement (in 1652 and 1680), which originated a series of grave complaints, especially from the settlers, which moved the crown to revise these ordinances. They were also linked to the modes of the free Indian administration by the Jesuits (such as stated in 1653, 1655, 1680 and 1686)

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30   See Monteiro, *Negros da terra: índios e bandeirantes nas origens de São Paulo* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1994); Muriel Nazzari, "Da escravidão à liberdade: a transição de índio administrado pra vassalo independente em São Paulo colonial," in *Brasil: coloniza-ção e escravidão*, Maria B. N. Silva (Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 2000), 28–44; Juarez Donizete Ambires, "Os jesuítas e a administração dos índios por particulares em São Paulo, no último quartel do século XVII" (MPhil Thesis, Univ. de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2000); Ambires, "Jacob Roland: um jesuíta flamengo na América Portuguesa," *Revista Brasileira de História* vol. 25, no. 50 (2005): 201–216; Regina K. Rico Santos de Mendonça, "Escravidão indígena no vale do Paraíba: exploração e conquista dos sertões da capitania de Nossa Senhora de Itanhaém, século XVII" (MPhil Thesis, Univ. de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2009).

31   Nádia Farage, *As muralhas dos sertões* (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1991), 26.

32   For a more recent debate on seventeenth-century Amazonia, see: Almir Diniz de Carvalho Júnior, "Índios cristãos: a conversão dos índios na Amazônia portuguesa (1653–1769)" (PhD Diss., Univ. Estadual de Campinas, Campinas, 2005); Décio de Alencar Guzmán, "A coloniza-ção nas Amazônias: guerras, comércio e escravidão nos séculos XVII e XVIII," *Revista Estudos Amazônicos* vol. 111, no. 2 (2008): 103–139; Camila Loureiro Dias, "Civilidade, cultura e comércio: os princípios fundamentais da política indigenista na Amazônia (1614–1757)" (MPhil Thesis, Univ. de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2009), 49–86; Chambouleyron, Fernanda Aires Bombardi, Vanice Siqueira de Melo, "O 'estrondo das armas': violência, guerra e trabalho indígena na Amazônia colonial," *Projeto História*, no. 39 (2009): 115–137; Mello, *Fé e império*, 243–317; Karl-Heinz Arenz, *De l'Alzette à l'Amazonie: Jean-Philippe Bettendorff et les jésuites en Amazonie portugaise (1661–1693)* (Saarbrücken: Éditions universitaires européennes, 2010); Chambouleyron & Bombardi, "Descimentos privados de índios na Amazônia colonial (sécu-los XVII e XVIII)," *Varia Historia* vol. 27, no. 46 (2011): 601–623.

and to the control of the Society of Jesus over the legitimization of enslavements made in the sertão (1653, 1655). Thus, in 1661 and 1684, the Jesuits were expelled from the State of Maranhão (the last time, only from the city of São Luís), owing to the conflicts that derived from their control over Indian labor force.[33]

Therefore, there is no doubt that the politics of the State of Maranhão influenced labor policy, and the fragile equilibrium the crown had to maintain between different groups within colonial society, including the Indians themselves. However, one can also argue that Indian slavery was also linked to the ways the crown envisaged the reproduction of its own power over the vast territory of the State of Maranhão.

During the seventeenth century, in many captaincies of the State of Brazil, such as Pernambuco, war became an important mechanism for the imposition of Portuguese dominion over the Indians and territory; thus the Portuguese undertook military expeditions against the Indians for the "cleansing of the *sertões*";[34] in the State of Maranhão however, it was also an important means of acquiring Indian slave labor.[35]

An example of this double dimension of war was the one fought against the Amanaju in 1689. According to Governor Artur de Sá e Meneses, following the royal decision taken on April 28, 1688, a Junta voted for the legality of the war against that native nation. The expedition was commanded by Captain-Major Antônio de Albuquerque Coelho de Carvalho (later governor of the State), and

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[33] For a recent discussion on these two revolts, see: Geraldo Mártires Coelho, "A pátria do Anticristo: A expulsão dos jesuítas do Maranhão e Grão-Pará e o messianismo milenarista do Padre Vieira," *Luso-Brazilian Review*, vol. 37, no. 1 (2000): 17–32; Milson Coutinho, *A revolta de Bequimão*, 2nd ed. (São Luís: Instituto Geia, 2004); Chambouleyron, "'Duplicados clamores'. Queixas e rebeliões na Amazônia colonial (século XVII)," *Projeto História* no. 33 (2006): 159–178; Joely Pinheiro Ungaretti, "Conflitos entre jesuítas e colonos na América portuguesa (1640–1700)" (MPhil Thesis, Univ. Estadual de Campinas, Campinas, 2007), 109–178; Antônio Filipe Pereira Caetano, *Entre drogas e cachaça: A política colonial e as tensões na América portuguesa (1640–1710)* (Macieó: EdUFAL, 2009); Arenz, *De l'Alzette à l'Amazonie*, 103–106 and 371–388.

[34] See for example, Ricardo Pinto de Medeiros, "O descobrimento dos outros: povos indígenas do sertão nordestino no período colonial" (PhD Diss. Univ. Federal de Pernambuco, Recife, 2000), 114–149; Pedro Puntoni, *A guerra dos bárbaros. Povos indígenas e a colonização do sertão nordeste do Brasil, 1650–1720* (São Paulo: Hucitec/EdUSP, 2002); Friedrich Câmera Siering, "Conquista e dominação dos povos indígenas: resistência no sertão dos Maracás (1650–1701)" (MPhil Thesis, Univ. Federal da Bahia, Salvador, 2008), 51–83.

[35] Moreover, Vanice Siqueira de Melo showed, for the early eighteenth-century State of Maranhão, that war was an important source of power, especially for the governors, since part of the booty had to be given to the governor as an official tax (called *jóia*). Melo, "Cruentas guerras: índios e portugueses nos sertões do Maranhão e Piauí (primeira metade do século XVIII)," (MPhil Thesis, Univ. Federal do Pará, Belém, 2011), 112–125.

comprised Portuguese troops as well as Indians of allied peoples, such as the Tupinambá, the Aruaqui and the natives of the aldeia Maracanã (in the captaincy of Pará). The governor explained that the allied Indians attacked with such a fury that "the corporals and soldiers were not enough" to prevent the killings. As a result, and unfortunately for the Portuguese, almost no prisoners were taken.[36] However, it seems there was more at issue than slaves in the Amanaju war. Investigating the reasons of this conflict, Vanice Siqueira de Melo found evidence that the initial "aggression" of the Amanaju (which legitimized the military expedition) was motivated by the presence of Portuguese and allied Indians exploiting bark-clove in the Indians' territory (in the Cabo do Norte).[37] War thus could mean both a means to acquire Indian slaves, and also to gain control over a territory of economic interest.

Some years earlier, this was the same reason used by the Portuguese to declare war against the Taconhapé, in the Xingu River. This war, though, was fought before the 1688 law, and prisoners could not be officially enslaved. Similarly to legitimations of the Amanaju war, the Portuguese justified this conflict owing to the killing of some white people by the Indians; Portuguese settlers were frightened to enter this sertão, where they used to gather spices. That was the reason alleged by the Belém Council to the governor. The royal resolution authorizing the war stressed that the punishment should be "exemplary" but should not lead to the "total destruction" of the Taconhapé.[38] As stated by the Jesuit father João Felipe Bettendorff, the Taconhapé territory had "amounts of bark-clove," and even the difficulties encountered by the settlers navigating on the Xingu's dangerous currents were not enough to deter the exploiters of clove, the "cravistas," who "risk all to gather clove wherever it is."[39] Thus victory over the Taconhapé permitted the "opening" of the Xingu sertão to the exploitation of Amazonian spices.[40]

The conflict with the Caicai and Guanaré on the eastern frontier of the State of Maranhão, in the early 1690s is paradigmatic of how war represented an

36   AHU, Pará, caixa 3, doc. 278, "Letter from Artur de Sá e Meneses to Dom Pedro II," Belém, Nov. 29, 1689. .

37   Melo, "'Aleivosias, mortes e roubos'. Guerras entre índios e portugueses na Amazônia colonial (1680–1706)" (BA Thes., Univ. Federal do Pará, Belém, 2008), 50.

38   AHU, Maranhão, caixa 6, doc. 662, "*Consulta* from the Overseas Council to Dom Pedro II," Mar. 10, 1682.

39   João Felipe Bettendorff, SJ, *Crônica da missão dos Padres da Companhia de Jesus no Maranhão* (Belém: SECULT, 1990[1698]), 279.

40   See: Chambouleyron, "O sertão dos Taconhapé. Cravo, índios e guerras no Xingu seiscentista," in *Histórias do Xingu: fronteiras, espaços e territorialidades* (XVII–XXI), ed. César Martins Sousa & Cardoso (Belém: EdUFPA, 2008), 51–74.

intersection between territorial struggles and labor supply.[41] These people used to ravage the settlers' estates, killing slaves and setting fires on their properties. It was a necessity, thus, to "disinfest" the sertões of the rivers Itapecuru, Mearim and Munim. The declaration of this war followed all the legal procedures established by the law issued on April 28, 1688. A Junta approved the "justice" of the war and two judicial inquiries were established by a judge, with the testimony of sixteen and ten witnesses (respectively). Prisoners were enslaved and some of them distributed among the troops. The Overseas Council considered it legal. As usual, the sovereign requested the opinion of former Governor Freire de Andrade. In his paper, Freire de Andrade considered the reasons for war as justified. However, he also wrote a revealing remark:

> It should be recommended to the governor, that in this issue he follow strictly His Majesty's law, restricting as much as possible the execution of such punishment, because settlers' designs on the Indians render their witness untrustworthy to determine the guilt of the natives.[42]

Gomes Freire's warning could not have been more opportune. Four years later, a second war was organized by Governor Antônio de Albuquerque Coelho de Carvalho against the Caicai. However, 800 of these Indians went beforehand to the Itapecuru fortress asking for peace. According to the governor, the captain-major and the settlers of Itapecuru decided nevertheless to capture the Indians, many of whom resisted only to be seized by the Portuguese. Coelho de Carvalho decided then to annul the enslavements.[43] His decision was approved by the Overseas Council and the king.[44]

Although the crown did not consider this last war legitimate, there is no doubt that there was a delicate equilibrium between war and slavery for its

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41   Mauro da Costa Oliveira argues that what historiography has considered as a territorial expansion in the Portuguese Amazon region motivated by geopolitical objectives was in fact the result of enslavement which spread Portuguese dominion all over this vast territory. Although this is an interesting viewpoint, one cannot dismiss the role frontier issues played for the Portuguese crown in the region. Mauro da Costa de Oliveira, "Escravidão indígena na Amazônia colonial" (MPhil Thesis, Univ. Federal de Goiás, Goiânia, 2001).

42   AHU, Maranhão, caixa 8, doc. 862, "*Consulta* from the Overseas Council to Dom Pedro II," Feb. 10, 1693.

43   AHU, "Maranhão, caixa 9, doc. 912, *Consulta* from the Overseas Council to Dom Pedro II," Jan. 26, 1696.

44   ABN vol. 66 (1948): 159, "Sobre se dar livramento aos culpados que concorrerão no captiveiro do gentio," Feb. 1, 1696.

own interests. The fact that the conflicts took place in the margins of the State of Maranhão shows that the kings took advantage of the struggles to impose royal authority in the frontiers of the Amazon region; not surprisingly, in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, a third war was fought against the "corsair Indians" of the rivers Itapecuru and Mearim, where the Portuguese were gradually establishing an economy based mainly in sugar cane cultivation and cattle breeding.[45]

Slavery, Royal Power and the Treasury

Defined in 1653, 1655 and 1688, the resgates were an important means of acquiring Indian slaves for the settlers, and even for the crown, thus becoming a central part of the Portuguese Indian policy in the Amazon region. In fact, the regulation of the resgates, and that of Indian slavery in general, was closely linked to the financing of the royal Treasury throughout the colonial period; as Camila Dias points out, towards the end of the seventeenth century, the resgates "served a political-economic project of the Portuguese State itself."[46] Being a frontier region, and certainly not a wealthy conquest, the State of Maranhão's royal Treasury faced serious straits, especially for the financing of the fortresses and troops. Thus, the taxation of Indian slaves became a coveted source of income for the crown.

From the late 1650s onward, both in Maranhão and at Court, the royal authorities presented plans for the collection of taxes from slaves. In 1659, King Afonso VI determined the governor of Maranhão to inform his opinion regarding a tax over the slaves, for the financing of the journeys to the sertão.[47] Governor Dom Pedro de Melo replied stating that instead of a tax, which would not be accepted by the people, the sovereign should order a percentage of slaves (one out of ten) to be given to the Treasury (as it was usually done with the corporals, soldiers, and Indians who went on the ransoming expeditions).[48]

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45   See Maria do Socorro Coelho Cabral, *Caminhos do gado: conquista e ocupação do sul do Maranhão* (São Luís, SIOGE, 1992); Ana Paula Macedo Cunha, "Engenhos e engenhocas: a atividade açucareira no Estado do Maranhão e Grão-Pará (1706–1750)" (MPhil Thesis, Univ. Federal do Pará, Belém, 2009); Chambouleyron, *Povoamento, ocupação e agricultura na Amazônia colonial*, 121–151.

46   Dias, "Civilidade, cultura e comércio," 128.

47   AHU, cod. 275, fol. 306, "Para o g.ᵒʳ do Maranhaõ," May 6, 1659.

48   AHU, Maranhão, caixa 4, doc. 421, "Letter from Dom Pedro de Melo to Dom Afonso VI," São Luís, Feb. 7, 1660.

A few years later, an anonymous author wrote some considerations for the "common welfare" of Maranhão, and suggested that the settlers should pay two to four rods of cotton cloth (which circulated as currency in the State of Maranhão), for each ransomed slave.[49]

It was only in the 1670s, though, that the crown took this taxation seriously and determined the payments of tithes regarding the slaves brought from the hinterland. Not surprisingly, the regency (1667–1683) and especially the reign (1683–1706) of Dom Pedro II was defined by Nuno Monteiro as characterized by the consolidation of the Bragança dynasty and by the "restoration of a well defined model of political decision-making."[50] Thus, in April 3, 1675, the prince decided to impose the payment of this tax.[51]

After the 1688 law, which reinstated the resgates, the role played by slavery for the financing of the royal Treasury became not only evident, but systematically organized, increasing and making more efficient "the control over the payment of taxes on ransomed slaves," as Márcia Mello stresses.[52] First of all, the crown determined that the ransoming troops would be financed by the Treasury, which would allocate three thousands *cruzados* (1,440,000 réis) for the **purchase** of slaves in the sertão. Moreover, for each slave taken the settlers would pay 3,000 *réis* to finance more journeys to the hinterland. A special registry would be kept for all these payments.

In July 1689, for example, the Council of São Luís, captaincy of Maranhão, registered 124,416 réis received by the royal Treasury related to twenty-six people brought from the sertão by Francisco Ferreira Bernardes, "for the work in the cane fields" (not all the slaves paid 3,000 réis). In October of the same year, the settlers of São Luís paid 137,791 réis, related to thirty-two slaves ransomed by an expedition undertaken by Sergeant-Major Lemos de Mascarenhas.[53] In

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49   AHU Maranhão, caixa 4, doc. 465, "Paper Concerning the State of Maranhão," Feb. 24, 1663.

50   Nuno Gonçalo Monteiro, "A consolidação da dinastia de Bragança e o apogeu do Portugal barroco: centros de poder e trajetórias sociais (1668–1750)," in *História de Portugal*, ed. José Tengarrinha (Bauru/São Paulo/Lisboa: EdUSC/EdUNESP/Instituto Camões, 2000), 130.

51   AHU, cod. 268, fols. 9v–10, "P.ª o g.ᵒʳ do Estado do Maranhaõ," Apr. 3, 1675.

52   Mello, *Fé e império*, 276.

53   Unfortunately, data related to the incomes of the royal Treasury are extremely fragmented and inaccurate for the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth centuries. There is a number for 1688, when the captaincy of Maranhão tithes represented almost 1.7 million réis. Taking this number as correct and as a reference for 1689, the taxes paid by slave buyers in the two expeditions represented 15% of this amount. AHU, Maranhão, caixa 7, doc. 821, "*Consulta* from the Overseas Council to Dom Pedro II," Sep. 18, 1690. One has to remember that 1689 was the first year when this tax was systematically exacted by the Treasury.

April 1691, thirty-two more slaves were distributed among the dwellers of this city, paying 157,650 réis.[54]

Tamyris Monteiro Neves points out that these measures have to be understood as an important means for the crown to generate resources for the Treasury, which she shows were used in a series of different activities: the financing of the ransoming troops, including pecuniary support for the *descimentos* of free Indians, the payment of services rendered by settlers to the crown, the construction and renovation of buildings, the financing of the fortresses and military troops, and the payment of judiciary costs for the Indians themselves.[55]

Towards the end of the century, however, more changes were introduced, and a new institution became central for the organization of a labor policy and as a mechanism for the crown to try to control enslavement in the Amazon region.

Royal Control and the *Junta das Missões*

Throughout the seventeenth century, the many regulations concerning the modes and limits of enslavement did not mean that the Portuguese refrained from illegally enslaving Indians, or that, when it was allowed, they followed all the legal procedures for the dispatch of an expedition and for ensuring the legitimacy of each slave taken by war or ransoming. As Sue Gross asserts for the first half of the eighteenth century, but perfectly applicable to the seventeenth century, illegal enslaving was "widespread and almost impossible to control."[56]

In 1650, for example, Governor Luís de Magalhães accused the captain-major of Pará of ransoming 150 slaves.[57] In turn, Luís de Magalhães himself was later charged with having sent troops to the sertão to ransom slaves, under the pretense that they had been sent to discover gold.[58] Years later, in 1667, the

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54   *Arquivo Público do Estado do Maranhão*, São Luís, Brazil, fols. 2–5; 5v–9v and 11–15v, respectively, "Livro de Registro Geral (1689–1746)."

55   Tamyris Monteiro Neves, "Entre salvar almas para Deus e gerar lucro para a Fazenda real: a empresa dos resgates" (BA Thes., Univ. Federal do Pará, Belém, 2011), 42–46.

56   Sue Anderson Gross, "Labor in Amazonia in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century," *The Americas* vol. 32, no. 2 (1975): 216. See also: Sweet, "A Rich Realm of Nature Destroyed," 479–480; Farage, *As muralhas dos sertões*, 28–31; Dias, "Civilidade, cultura e comércio," 90; Mello, *Fé e império*, 283–287.

57   AHU, Maranhão, caixa 3, doc. 284, "Letter from Luís de Magalhães to Dom João IV," São Luís, Jan. 28, 1650.

58   AHU, Maranhão, caixa 3, doc. 300, "List of accusations against Luís de Magalhães" [1650s].

representative of Pará at court, Vicente de Oliveira, accused Governor Rui Vaz de Siqueira of sending troops to the sertão for resgates, against the regulations of the September 12, 1663 law.[59]

Some years later, before the abolition of slavery in 1680, the royal treasurer reported the confiscation of thirty-seven slaves, ransomed contrary to the regulations.[60] In fact, the practice was so widespread that when Governor Artur de Sá e Meneses ordered a judge to investigate who had sent troops for the resgates during a period when they were banned from 1680 until 1688, he discovered that almost all of Pará's settlers were involved. Both decided not to continue the inquiry, since it would "destroy this land," and, instead asked the king for a general pardon.[61] Analyzing this case, the Overseas Council agreed with the opinion of the royal counselor, for whom there existed many examples in human history, where "the abundance of criminals rendered impossible punishment and facilitated remission."[62] On February 6, 1691, the king pardoned all the settlers, "to avoid the total ruin which that people would experience."[63]

The recurrence of illegal enslavement, although pardoned by the king in 1691, led to an intensified (although not always efficient) control from the crown and the royal authorities in the State of Maranhão. On the one hand, the king tried to increase the control over the canoes sent to the sertão, which were the unique means of bringing Indians from the hinterland.[64] On the other hand, he recommended the enforcement of the ransoming law of 1688, and tightened the punishments for those who committed infractions.

Moreover, the installation of the *Junta das Missões*—Missions Junta—in the early 1680s meant the establishment of an organism responsible for the control and regulation of missionary and Indian matters, although it began to work effectively only after the approval of the *Regimento das Missões* (1686).[65]

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59   AHU, "Pará, caixa 2, doc. 132, "*Consulta* from the Overseas Council to Dom Afonso VI," Jan. 26, 1667.

60   AHU, cod. 274, fols. 13v–14, "Sobre o que escreve o Provedor da Faz.ª do Estado do Maranhaõ," Jun. 26, 1679.

61   AHU, Pará, caixa 3, doc. 276, "Letter from Artur de Sá e Meneses to Dom Pedro II," Belém, Nov. 27, 1689.

62   AHU, cod. 274, fols. 69v–70, "O governador do Estado do Maranhaõ Artur de Saa e Meneses dà conta em como os mais dos moradores daquelle Estado haviaõ feito resgates de escravos contra as ordens de S.Mg.ᵈᵉ," Oct. 7, 1690.

63   AHU, cod. 94, fols. 131v–132, "Sobre serem perdoados os moradores do Maranhaõ que tiverem encorrido no crime de fazer escravos contra a ley de S. Mag.ᵈᵉ," Feb. 9, 1691.

64   AHU, cod. 94, fols. 157–157v, "Sobre o registro das canoas," Feb. 6, 1691.

65   Mello, *Fé e império*, 159–163.

Composed by the governor, the bishop, and the prelates of the different religious orders acting in the region, besides missionary issues, the Junta became more and more concerned with the definition of what Márcia Mello calls "the development of an Indigenous policy by the Portuguese state." Thus, the Juntas in the captaincies of Maranhão and Pará analyzed questions such as the bringing of free Indians from the hinterland, the legitimacy of ransoming enslavements, declaration of wars, and so forth.[66] A royal letter issued on November 20, 1699 defined this more influential role played by the Mission Junta, since it determined that any expedition to the hinterland had to be authorized by the Junta das Missões.[67] Márcia Mello correctly indicates that the Juntas cannot be understood simply from their regulatory function as regards the missions and missionaries. They acted both as a mechanism of political control and as an official forum where different groups in this society sought solutions for the recurring problem of labor supply.[68]

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Labor supply and labor regulations constituted a serious problem for the state of Maranhão. The contradictory nature of labor legislation, political pressure from different groups of colonial society, specific conjunctures such as epidemics and Indian resistance, all transformed labor into a key issue in the colonial Amazon region. Uncertainty about labor supply seriously hindered economic production, as the many complaints sent from the "conquest" expressed so clearly.

Nevertheless, throughout the seventeenth century, the economic development of the state of Maranhão, related to the exploitation of the forest products and the increase of agricultural activity, which concerned the settlers and the crown (particularly troubled by the reproduction of the military and royal institutions in the region) could not be promoted without addressing labor questions. Legislation and royal orders should not be seen as the main basis for

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66   Mello, *Fé e império*, 176–178. See also: Wojtalewicz, "The *Junta de Missões/Junta de Misiones*: A Comparative Study of Peripheries and Imperial Administration in Eighteenth-Century Iberian Empires," *Colonial Latin American Review* vol. 8, no. 2 (1999): 225–240; Souza Jr., "Tramas do cotidiano," 209–216.

67   ABN vol. 66 (1948): 192, "Sobre se permitirem os resgates a requerimento dos officiaes da Camara do Maranhão," Nov. 20, 1699.

68   Mello, *Fé e império*, 178.

social change in the state of Maranhão.[69] Nonetheless, the role the crown itself tried to play in this frontier region—spurring its economic development and territorial occupation as well as addressing the interests of the many groups that constituted colonial society—shaped the way the Amazonian society was organized and had a profound influence on the lives of the many Indian nations who inhabited this northern province of Portuguese America.

Contrary to other parts of its vast empire, the Portuguese crown intervened in many aspects of Amazonian economy and society, where Indian labor had become an essential element of colonial dominion, since control over the Indians also meant control over the frontiers and over the reproduction of its own power in the region. That was the reason why, throughout the seventeenth century, the kings of Portugal and their councils at Court had to negotiate, sometimes reviewing former decisions, with the many demands from the settlers, colonial authorities, local elites, clerics and the Indians.

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69   As David Sweet indicates, historiography overemphasized "changes in law" as "milestones in the course of social change." Sweet, "A Rich Realm of Nature Destroyed," 145.

Constructing the Atlantic's Boundaries: Forced and Coerced Labor on Imperial Fortifications in Colonial Florida

James Coltrain

One might not expect that the most pressing duty for a Spanish colonial governor would be to stack bricks. But in 1683 Florida Governor Juan Márquez Cabrera was consumed with just that task, trying to fill a remaining gap in St. Augustine's new stone fort. Working alongside him were not only soldiers, clergy, and townspeople, but also Native American peons, African slaves, Spanish convicts, and even former English prisoners. We could read the official account of the governor's contribution as political theater, but another observer on site remembered how Márquez worked so urgently and cursed so fiercely, that only calm words of a town priest prevented a mutiny. The governor and his diverse crew were working to shore up the Castillo San Marcos, a massive stone fort, the construction of which the Spanish authorities had authorized following a devastating pirate attack in 1668. The governor was so on edge because a new band of pirates was waiting downriver, and would again sack the town in days if the fort were indefensible. In seventeenth-century St. Augustine, finding a quality workforce could be the difference between life and death.[1]

1　The chief archival sources for this paper come from the records of the *Archivo General de Indias* in Seville, Spain. A large number of the documents from those holdings are reproduced in the Stetson Collection, an exhaustive microfilm series with copies of correspondence relating to the colonial history of Spanish Florida. The copy of the Stetson Collection I consulted is kept at the University of Florida. In many cases I have used transcriptions and translations of Stetson records prepared by Luis Arana while researching the Historical Structure Report on the Castillo for the National Parks Service. His papers are held in the Parks Service Archives in Jacksonville Florida. Stetson Collection "58-1-21/44 1693" Smathers Library, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL (Hereafter SC), "Luis Arana Papers, Stetson Transcripts 1668" Parks Service Archives, Jacksonville, FL (Hereafter JPS); Luis Arana *Defenses and Defenders at St. Augustine* (St. Augustine: St. Augustine Historical Society, 1999), 68, Albert Manucy, *The History of Castillo de San Marcos and Fort Matanzas from Contemporary Narratives and Letters* (Washington: National Park Service, 1943), 17; Albert Manucy and Luis Arana *The Building of the Castillo de San Marcos* (St. Augustine: Eastern National Park & Monument Association, 1977).

In many ways that night's scene resembles the picture some historians have given of life in the Atlantic World. A wild place, where different races, cultures, and languages collided, adapting to new problems, exploring new opportunities, and creating identities far away from the view of European powers.[2] Though remotely located, desperately vulnerable, and chronically underfunded, St. Augustine was in need of a fort that would take hundreds of workers decades to build. Such a scenario seems like just the recipe for a transcendent Atlantic experience, where unfree workers might capitalize on the dire need for labor, assert their autonomy from a weak imperial authority, and improve their social standing.

Over nearly a century of work constructing and maintaining the Castillo many of St. Augustine's forced workers seemed to do just that. Slaves, peons, and prisoners seized upon opportunities from pragmatic Floridian authorities, distinguishing themselves professionally, increasing their social and material standing, and sometimes even gaining their freedom. But such advancements were not the result of wily Atlantic creoles flaunting imperial legitimacy. Because of the constant threat of violence from competing powers in Carolina, Georgia, and elsewhere in the Caribbean, the same vulnerabilities that could have chipped away at Spanish control made the entire surrounding population dependent on the empire for protection inside the rising Castillo. The construction process did push the local government, and even the empire itself, to offer greater recognition in the community to all levels of St. Augustine's diverse workforce. But these workers' challenges to the Spanish social conventions only succeeded to the degree that they accommodated, rather than subverted, the wider goal of sustaining the empire. In a hotly contested Atlantic World, imperial presence remained a key factor in the experience of unfree laborers.

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2   A number of historians have stressed the transnational qualities of the Atlantic World, often emphasizing fluid identities, and negotiated or even subverted imperial authority. Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden, eds., *Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500–1800* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001); Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy, eds., *Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the New World, 1500–1820*, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2002); David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, eds., *The British Atlantic World 1500–1800* (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Elizabeth Mancke and Carole Shammas, *The Creation of the British Atlantic World* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); Marcus Rediker, *Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2005); Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); James H. Sweet, *Domingos Alvares, African Healing, and the Intellectual History of the Atlantic World*, 1st ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).

A small outpost like St. Augustine could hardly have faced a greater labor challenge than the construction of a permanent stone fort. The small coastal town had served for decades as the last stop for Spanish ships heading from the Caribbean back to Europe, and had neither enough quality land nor mineral wealth to ensure economic independence or even self-sufficiency. Augustinians instead depended heavily on the *situado*, a yearly bulk subsidy payment dispensed by the Viceroy of New Spain that often arrived years overdue. Even basic correspondence could take weeks or months, and many major decisions required approval from the crown, so erecting new defenses in such an isolated location presented a formidable task. Fortifications were the largest and most expensive public works in all of North America well into the eighteenth century, and Florida's Castillo would prove no exception. To complete a stone fortification within a decade was very quick work, and most constructions stretched on for years more. The enterprise required a well balanced staff of trained craftsmen and unskilled workers, all of whom would need to adapt quickly to a location's specific engineering challenges. Spain's inconsistent support of St. Augustine made makeshift local solutions even more likely. As a remote military outpost incapable even of growing enough food to subsist, St. Augustine already depended on royal funding for the entire construction. But authorized funds were often slow to make it through New Spain's sprawling bureaucracy, leaving Florida's governors to come up with creative solutions to the fort's labor needs. Florida's geographical distance also made Spanish oversight infrequent, allowing local leadership even more space to work outside of imperial norms.[3]

The final design of St. Augustine's new fort ensured its construction would dominate local affairs for many years. A fortunate deposit of local stone meant that the new Castillo San Marcos could be a formidable, modern structure. The fort's design was simple by European standards, but hulking and massive on the North American coast. It was a basic square shape, with four diamond shaped bastions extending from each corner. After finally securing the initial funds and the first work crews, construction began in 1672. Workers built each of the imposing bastions separately, but the fort was not completed until more than twenty years later in 1695. Even after finishing the fort, work crews continued with repairs, renovations, and additions for six decades more, leaving a dramatic mark on the St. Augustine community well into the eighteenth century.

Florida's early attempts at meeting its labor needs involved the use of local natives, just as Spain's imperial authorities preferred. Filling even the initial

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3   Amy Turner Bushnell, *Situado and Sabana: Spain's Support System for the Presidio and Mission Provinces of Florida* (New York: American Museum of Natural History, 1994); SC 2-4-1/19; Queen Regent, SC 2-4-1/19/1; Arana, *Defenders*, 3–4; Cendoya to King, SC 58-1-26.

150 positions in a town of only hundreds required the governor Manuel de Cendoya to reach out to the frontier and employ native peons. These Indian workers were paid a small cash wage along with maize, but Spanish soldiers had to force their service to varying degrees. Overseers kept many of the natives past the end of their designated terms, preventing them from tending to their own families and crops in the local provinces of the Guale, Timucua, and Apalache language groups. This compulsory, hard service placed a strain on relations with surrounding tribes, leading local clergy to protest the practice. Frontier priests complained that because the peons were already responsible for their own agricultural sustenance, as well as work that the crown required in the fields of wealthier townspeople, the extra fort service, paid or not, constituted an unnecessary additional strain.[4]

A fearsome epidemic strained St. Augustine's precarious labor solution within the first year of construction. The official correspondence called the disease, possibly smallpox, "contagion" and as it ravaged the inland of Florida it also took its toll on the St. Augustine community. The extreme working conditions worsened the situation for the primarily native workforce. Toiling long hours in harsh conditions made the group particularly vulnerable, attempting new tasks and straining new muscles, breathing in the dust from sawed timbers and cut stone. Governor Cendoya was less sympathetic, thinking the natives naturally unfit for the hard labor. His frustrations may have stemmed from the hard tasks that now fell to him, as he and his soldiers began working at the site themselves, unable to find replacements for their Indian staff. Cendoya had to pay the enlisted men's extra wages out of his own salary, and the soldiers' service amplified the possibility of friction among those Castillo workers who had survived the plague.[5]

The susceptibility of indigenous workers to disease led to St. Augustine's first staffing adaptation, as Governor Cendoya quickly petitioned for thirty African slaves from Havana to bolster the crew. Imperial officials had previously frowned on the use of black labor, but as the situation grew more serious, they gave in to the governor's request. Subsequent governors made similar moves, but as early as 1687 African slaves escaping from English Carolina also began finding their way into Florida. Florida's governor Diego de Quiroga y Losada refused to return or pay the English for the first escapees, and eventually freed the group under the condition that they adopt Catholicism and work on the Castillo.[6] As the

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4 Cendoya, SC 58-2-3/5; Arana, *Defenders*, 30–31.

5 Cendoya, SC 54-5-11/10.

6 Governor Quiroga's decision to free Catholic converts received confirmation from the crown in 1693. Some later refugees' bids for freedom were complicated by periods of truce

decades passed such incidents became more common. Yamasee Indians led another group into Florida a few years later, after rumors had made their way far enough to the north that black slaves began to cite the previous imperial amnesties as they arrived, offering loyalty and conversion to Catholicism in exchange for freedom. Florida's governors in the early eighteenth century continued to put the ex-bondsmen to work on the fort while the Spanish Council of the Indies deadlocked in debate over the diplomatic consequences of endorsing the retention of English escapees. Gradually it became clear that if English slaves would embrace the empire and its church, they would find a freer life upon escaping to the Castillo, regardless of the crown's official policy. St. Augustine's officials kept some of the escaped slaves in an ambiguous serf-like state, guaranteeing them amnesty and a role in the community, but requiring they remain to labor on the fort. Nevertheless even their hard working conditions at the Castillo would have been more tolerable than grueling work on sugar islands or rice plantations, and black slaves from English colonies continually braved great dangers to take up carpentry, masonry, and earth moving at the Castillo.[7]

By the heyday of the Castillo's construction in 1670s and 1680s, St Augustine's labor demand had produced a wildly eclectic and multicultural group of workers. There were still Indian peons working on coerced schedules to bring small wages to their inland families. Joining them were black workers of various origins and predicaments including slaves imported from Spanish Cuba, escapees from British Carolina or Georgia working in a serf-like state, and other fully free black laborers. Ethnically Spanish workers had a similarly wide assortment, from Iberian convicts, to locally-born mestizos, to regular soldiers from throughout the empire who might be assigned construction duties. Perhaps the most unlikely laborers were English colonists from Charleston, who had been taken prisoner in 1670 after their ship ran aground in northern Florida, and kept following a botched diplomatic mission to reclaim them. Two of the group, William Carr and John Rivers, before had been practicing masons and worked at the fort as a stonecutter and lime burner. Thus, a varied group from a spectrum of ethnicities and nearly a half dozen languages began a decades-long project that would help preserve the imperial power that forcibly compelled many of their labors.[8]

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with Britain. In 1733 the crown again declared freedom for converted escapees, but did not grandfather in all who had arrived during the interim. Manucy, *Building,* 34; SC "58-1-24/25," "54-4-13/126."

7   John Jay Tepaske, *The Governorship of Spanish Florida* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1964), 4.

8   JPS, Historic Structure Report, 8.

The diverse group provided plenty of potential grounds for internal strife that could undermine both the project and Spanish authority. The indigenous laborers might speak any of three major local languages as their native tongue, and had longstanding grievances with each other and the empire. Amongst the Spanish there were significant class divisions revolving around birthplace and ethnic origin, as well as town disputes that frequently split residents between the opinions of religious and civil authorities. Religion also provided a potential point of contention for workers from Protestant English colonies, whom St. Augustine's officials expected to become loyal Catholics. But the most important source of potential stress was the monotonous and often grueling labor required for building, made more difficult by frequent setbacks and local disasters.

The project of building the new fort was already the most extensive enterprise ever conducted in St. Augustine before the first stone was laid. Augustinians had not even the basic tools to begin construction, so the first workers traipsed into to the woods to gather timber for axes, mallets, hammers, and picks. Workers also built larger timber machinery, scaffolding, barrels, storage huts, small cranes, carts, rafts, and docking points. Because of St. Augustine's isolation and the stringent budget, officials could not even count on receiving manufactured metal goods for the undertaking. Instead Spain sent large bars of iron and lead, which teams of smiths had to beat and cast into axe heads, crowbars, pulley wheels, and nails.[9] As soon as 1672, there were 150 laborers working daily in teams of 50, some gathering oyster shells to burn in the lime kilns, others mixing lime into mortar, and still others quarrying and carrying stone from downriver. Extracting the local *coquina* stone that would form the fort walls became a specialized skill over the many years of construction. Coquina is an extremely coarse limestone found in coastal areas. Named from the Spanish word for cockle shell because many bivalve pieces are still recognizable in its stone sections, the material is a soft, often brittle compaction of marine detritus.[10]

The fickle nature of coquina stone meant local authorities were likely to respect anyone with a talent for extracting it, regardless of social rank. The stone varied greatly in its quality, and a keen grading skill was needed to separate masonry worthy blocks from brittle castoffs. Small teams hacked long grooves into the stone surface to outline large blocks, before using long pry bars to break the future bricks loose. It was grueling work, with the hot sun reflecting off the bright white quarry walls. Laborers walked across a bed of

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9   JPS, Miscellaneous, 82–84.

10   Tepaske, 4, 78; JPS Historic Structure Report, 12.

crumbled seashell shards, which other workers sometimes collected to use for paving in tabby, a coarse, low grade plaster. Even before digging could begin, the quarries had to be cleared of tangled trees and brush, and once workers had lifted out the heaviest wet blocks and hit water, the entire process would begin anew. Laborers would load the cut stones onto ox carts and then gingerly on to rafts to float up the river to the old fort. The workers piled the blocks near the shore to bake like adobe, shedding water content and hardening into usable bricks. The process could take months or even years, and so the quarry-men's work quickly accumulated in neatly stacked piles waiting to be laid.[11]

Once enough stones had been quarried, the proper construction of the fort began. Masons carefully laid strong foundation courses that would support the thick and heavy bastion walls, and then delicately lifted the heavy stone blocks onto the rising walls using cranes carpenters had constructed on site. To bolster the diamond bastions against cannon shot, workers conducted significant earthmoving operations using only buckets, filling each bastion to the brim with dirt. Unlike the precision needed for stone grading, carpentry and lime burning, this was menial work, often frustrated by rains that would make a muddy slurry of the manmade earthen banks. Once the earth filled walls were completed, laborers would seal them with coarse white plaster to prevent much moisture from seeping through the porous coquina stone. The plaster coating would require frequent maintenance, and keep similar laborers busy for decades to come.

Challenges from Florida's elements forced Florida's governors and engineers to stay pragmatic and efficient in their approach towards labor. In 1674 the Atlantic produced a powerful hurricane that made a sloppy mess of the Castillo's neat beginnings. The quickly built shacks sheltering the smithys and lime barrels would have been hard hit, leaving unattended tools mired in mud. Spilt lime and charcoal could have made for a chemical mess, while piles of cut stone would likely have sunk into the soft soil, leaving laborers to carefully clean the bricks so they would bond tightly to mixed mortar. Unfinished earthen embankments slid down, swallowing up tools, buckets, and even a cannon that workers later had to fish out. Beyond regular tropical storms that caused such problems including another major hurricane in 1707, Florida's normal climate could provide plenty of its own misery, from sweltering, sticky summers to winters cold enough to freeze the water in local swamps.[12]

Even more dangerous to the continued work on the Castillo was the unre-lenting threat of violence from imperial rivals. French and English pirates

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11   Arana, *Defenders*, 31.
12   Ponce, sc 58-1-26/24.

continued to raid various Florida settlements well into the eighteenth century, with specific attacks in 1683, when Governor Márquez was noisily imploring his men to finish the fort, and again in 1686 when the infamous pirate Nicholas Grammont threatened the town before being driven away in a skirmish.[13] As the British colonies of Carolina and Georgia expanded, violent raids by the English and their allied tribes punished Spanish Indians' settlements surrounding St. Augustine nearly every year. In 1702, a Carolinian expedition besieged the whole of St. Augustine, and though the local labor force survived largely unharmed inside the fort they had constructed, the workers watched English soldiers burn the entire town, leaving only smoldering ruins to the hungry survivors. Sporadic skirmishes and rumors of such attacks only intensified as the eighteenth century progressed, culminating in another harrowing siege in 1740 by Georgian militia and British regulars that again nearly pushed the town to starvation.

Long periods of neglect from the wider empire could also sap the motivation of the workers responsible for the Castillo. Many negative aspects of the castle environment itself contributed to an ambivalence that could undercut any sense of accomplishment or recognition workers might have gained. When St. Augustine's military companies began conducting their regular business inside the new fort in the 1680s, it became the center of all town activity, and laborers became of secondary importance, expected to stay clear of the structure's primary occupants. As St. Augustine continued to suffer periods of neglect from the Spanish authorities, current and former builders could feel the frustration of seeing their hard work decay and crumble without the financial support to maintain proper repairs. During the early years of the eighteenth century, some of the fort's interior rooms were so dilapidated they were unsafe to enter, and the workers and soldiers on site reported a host of sicknesses and infirmities. Coupled with the ever present threat of violence from English invaders, the condition of the fort could produce palpable feelings of anxiety, frustration, and resentment amongst all levels of laborers. For some near the bottom, these resentments were much more tangible. When St. Augustine's officials began locking away some convicts and slave workers within the fort's finished rooms to prevent wandering at night, those laborers found themselves prisoners of the structure they had helped to build.[14]

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13   Manucy, *Building*, 30, 54–56; Manucy, *Letters*, 17, 20; Arana, *Defenders*, 68; JPS, Miscellaneous, 82–84.

14   Tepaske, 4,78; JPS Historic Structure Report, 12; JPS "Chronology" 12; SC 58-1-23/358; 58-1-27/a-46; JPS "Chronology" 13; SC 58-1-28/87; 58-1-28/93.

To prevent St. Augustine's workforce from splintering into revolt amidst so many stresses, local Spanish officials continually compromised imperial expectations to expand the community opportunities available to workers. The pay scale of early construction laborers is emblematic of this process. Cendoya and early governors initially used the labor pay scale to inscribe empire-wide Spanish prejudices regarding race and ethnicity. In general Spanish laborers earned more than their Indian counterparts, who in turn collected more than those few of mixed or African ancestry. But pay scales from later years included opportunities for workers to rise somewhat above their racial status. Because of the high degree of skill needed to cut coquina blocks without them breaking, or to keep kiln fires hot enough for burning lime, some workers could supplant their social betters in professional positions. An Indian stonecutter could make double what an unskilled Spanish laborer could, even if his take was still well below that of a Spaniard in the same profession. This potential for advancement likely helped mute some of the potential friction that could result from unjust divisions amongst compelled manual laborers. But there was no racial class that governors regarded lower than those who had been subversive. Other than slaves, Spanish convicts were the only workers receiving no pay, only rations.[15]

Spanish officials in Florida also attempted to preserve order by offering black workers a far greater recognition as imperial subjects than was available in many rival English territories. While many British colonies were solidifying racial distinctions in law that would term all blacks chattel, black residents of St. Augustine, both slave and free, lived as persons and members of the community. First and foremost, officials expected black workers in Florida to become full members of the Catholic Church, signifying their worth under divine mandate. Ex-slaves from English colonies learned to speak Spanish and discarded their simple slave sobriquets for full Spanish names. Many married native women raised mixed children who would be of marginally higher status. Black slaves could participate in the justice system and testify in proceedings, though their lower racial status often earned them questionable results. Despite very real limitations, black slaves experienced far greater acknowledgement and possibilities in Florida than their counterparts in South Carolina or Georgia. Those who remained enslaved were very much unfree, but even as they toiled under the threat of the lash, the continual flight of refugees from the north proved that Spanish policy had created a significant difference for black slaves across imperial boundaries.[16]

15   Royal Officials, SC "54-5-20/30"; "54-5-14/142"; "2-4-1/19/5"; JPS, Historic Structure Report, 7.

16   Jane Landers, *Black Society in Spanish Florida* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 23–28, *Fort Mose Gracia Real De Santa Teresa De Mose: A Free Black Town in Spanish Colonial*

When international violence did come again to Florida many of St. Augustine's unfree laborers preferred the prospect of participating in the Spanish community to the even greater dangers of siding with foreign invaders. In both the 1702 and 1740 sieges, governors recognized the brave service of many slaves in battle, some in defending the very fort they had helped construct. Members of native tribes who had worked under coercion on the Castillo exposed and foiled a plot during the 1702 siege when a local native allied with the English tried to persuade other refugees to revolt and sabotage the Spanish defense. Such acts were not necessarily reflective of an enthusiastic loyalty among all St. Augustine's enslaved and coerced workers, but they do suggest that even unfree laborers often operated within the Floridian community in roles similar to those of other lower class subjects.

These measured contributions of unfree laborers to Spanish rule are also evident in St. Augustine's longstanding record of relatively little labor strife. The colony did not suffer any significant worker-led stoppage, mutiny, or slave insurrection during the years of the Castillo's construction. Despite a host of stressful challenges, divisions among the workforce, and the value of information on the construction to rival English agents, few laborers rebelled against Spanish authority. Even as St. Augustine's leaders actively tried to instigate slave revolts in Carolina through rumors of freedom in Florida, a variety of forced and coerced laborers persisted at the Castillo without major incident.[17]

The success that St. Augustine's authorities achieved by giving unfree laborers a greater stake in the community eventually earned support from the Spanish crown. Having earlier prohibited governors from reimbursing the British masters of slaves escaping to St. Augustine, royal officials decided by 1733 to make good on the rumors and the fuzzy precedent that had led hopeful black slaves to flee into Florida. With the continued growth of British settlements and the founding of Georgia, creating slave unrest in the colonies to the north had become even more appealing. The crown ruled that from that point forward no slaves escaping from English colonies would be turned away, and that all incoming slaves who accepted Catholicism would be granted new freedom as Spanish subjects. The need for adequate labor had not only changed the prospects for St. Augustine's black workers, but had altered the institution

Florida (St. Augustine: St. Augustine Historical Society, 1992); Sue Peabody and Keila Grinberg, *Slavery, Freedom, and the Law in the Atlantic World: A Brief History with Documents* (New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2007).

17   JPS, Chronology, 12; Zuniga, SC 12789-12786; 12859-12854; Charles W. Arnade, *The Siege of St. Augustine In 1702* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1959), 45, 54, 15–16; Bushnell, 98.

of slavery in Florida.[18] By the middle of the eighteenth century such decisions had led to former slaves inhabiting positions uncommon elsewhere in the Spanish empire and nearly unheard of in the colonies of imperial rivals. St. Augustine had so many productive black subjects that in 1738 Governor Manuel de Montiano helped establish Fort Mose, a settlement of mostly escaped slaves, many of whom had worked on the Castillo. Mose had a full company of deployed black militiamen, and these soldiers held the same rank and status as their ethnically Spanish counterparts in St. Augustine.[19]

Yet no matter how fully many workers took advantage of opportunities afforded by Spanish rule, no serious threat to unfree labor or the Spanish authority that endorsed it ever materialized. When Augustinians evacuated Florida following a treaty with Britain after the Seven Years' War, hundreds of slaves appeared on the registers. The Castillo still featured an overseer's quarters, and the fort still likely held some workers locked inside when the drawbridge was raised each night. Despite the distinction and respect that skilled workers in lower racial categories had earned over simple laborers of Spanish descent, labor on the Castillo remained a common punishment for St. Augustine's undesirables. Although they took advantage of the opportunities offered in the Castillo's construction, St. Augustine's lower class laborers never gained the greater autonomy that might have come from challenging imperial authority.[20]

Such challenges remained unlikely because the persistent threats of foreign violence towards St. Augustine never abated. English raiding threatened the property, freedom, religious practice, and lives of all Spanish Floridians, and unfree laborers were in special danger of being captured and sold into the brutal sugar slavery of the English Caribbean. All of St. Augustine's residents, including those from the lowest classes, remained dependent on the cash, troops, and armaments of the Spanish empire to keep the Castillo defensible, and ensure protection from the rival English. Thus, even as the local Spanish leaders eased imperial expectations for the social order, and unfree laborers used their value and skills to help carve out new opportunities, the gains made by workers all ultimately reinforced the security of Spanish rule.

Even the social adaptations that local officials made to meet their labor needs still reinforced the broader culture of imperial Spain. Opportunities for professional distinction and social mobility held such value because Florida still maintained a complex racial hierarchy. The incorporation of all unfree

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18   SC 58-1-24/258.

19   Bushnell, 204; Arana, *Defenders*, 70; Tepakse, 8; Landers, *Black Society*, 29–37.

20   SC 86-7-22/7; Manucy, *Building*, 46.

workers into the community as subjects depended heavily on the use of the Spanish language and the adoption of a state-supervised corporate Catholicism, both of which bound laborers even closer to the empire. All of these measures were so noteworthy because they contrasted with the policies of Britain's nearby rival colonies. In other contested areas of North America the distinct imperial cultures of Britain and France would produce much different solutions to the problem of finding the labor for fort construction.[21] Even in an Atlantic world full of creative adaptations, unexpected encounters, and relatively light supervision, the influence and culture of empires were key factors in defining the experience of forced and coerced labor. Just as in other aspects of early American life, the careers of fort laborers sometimes presented diverse possibilities, but were ultimately constrained by imperial rule. Workers from four continents had transcended the Atlantic to build in St. Augustine, but the product of their labor had only made North America's imperial boundaries all the more evident.

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21 For instance, the construction of the French Fortress Louisbourg relied mostly on the paid labor of stationed soldiers working during their leave, and a few private contractors, Bruce W. Fry, *"An Appearance of Strength" the Fortifications of Louisbourg*, 2 vols. (Ontario: Parks Canada, 1984); A.J.B. Johnston, *Control and Order in French Colonial Louisbourg, 1713–1758* (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001). Many British frontier forts like Fort Stanwix were built using primarily on duty soldiers, with little private or coerced labor; John F. Luzader, *The Construction and Military History of Fort Stanwix* (Washington, D. C.: Office of Park Historic Preservation, National Park Service, 1969); Lee H. Hanson and Dick Ping Hsu, *Casemates and Cannonballs: Archeological Investigations at Fort Stanwix Rome, New York* (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1975).

"For the Reputation and Respectability of the State": Trade, the Imperial State, Unfree Labor, and Empire in the Dutch Atlantic

Pepijn Brandon and Karwan Fatah-Black

Introduction

In a controversial but influential article published in 1999, the Dutch historians Piet Emmer and Wim Klooster characterized the early modern Dutch Atlantic as an example of expansion without empire.[1] While Wim Klooster in the meantime seems to have tacitly moved away from this notion, Piet Emmer has repeatedly reaffirmed it.[2] The central idea behind his thesis is that the Dutch provided a unique model of "purely mercantile expansion" that in fundamental ways "differed from a policy designed by a central state in shaping the foundations of a maritime empire."[3]

Piet Emmer's insistence on the non-imperial form of expansion rests at least in part on an anachronism. When held against the nineteenth century British ideal type, it could indeed be argued that the Dutch did not have a similar system in which they combined direct and indirect rule to control the sum of their Atlantic domains. The initial plans for the Dutch Atlantic, known as the *Groot Desseyn* (Grand Design), did envision a centrally ruled empire.[4]

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1 P.C. Emmer and W.W. Klooster, "The Dutch Atlantic, 1600–1800: Expansion Without Empire," *Itinerario* vol. 23, no. 2 (1999): 48–69. For the influence of this thesis on Dutch Atlantic studies, see Gert Oostindie and Jessica Vance Roitman, "Repositioning the Dutch in the Atlantic, 1680–1800," *Itinerario* vol. 36, no. 2 (2012): 129–160.

2 While still stressing the differences with "princely" states and their expansion, Wim Klooster's more recent contributions explicitly address the question of power-projection in the Netherlandic world. E.g. Wim Klooster, "The Place of New Netherland in the West India Company's Grand Scheme," in Joyce D. Goodfriend ed., *Revisiting New Netherland. Perspectives on Early Dutch America* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 57–70, and Wayne te Brake and Wim Klooster, "Introduction," in Wayne te Brake and Wim Klooster eds., *Power and the City in the Netherlandic World* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2006), 1–11.

3 Pieter C. Emmer, "The Dutch and the Atlantic Challenge, 1600–1800," in P.C. Emmer, O. Pétré-Grenouilleau and J.V. Roitman eds., *A deus ex Machine Revisited: Atlantic Colonial Trade and European Economic Development* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2006), 151–177, 164.

4 Henk den Heijer, *De geschiedenis van de* WIC (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2002), 69–73.

The Design rested on the idea that Brazil could become the seat of colonial rule, similar to Batavia on Java, or the Portuguese example of Goa in Asia. In practice, however, the Dutch Atlantic saw a more fragmented governing system in which Dutch cities and provinces had special interests in particular colonies, and the West India Company, formally chartered in 1621 with the monopoly of all trade in the Atlantic basin, farmed out its responsibilities in so-called patroonships or through subsidiary chartered companies. Already in 1630 and especially from 1640 onward the WIC lost many of its privileges to private traders. This continued throughout the seventeenth century until it also lost its exclusive rights to the Dutch slave trade in the 1730s. Private enterprise outside the WIC made up about 70 per cent of the Atlantic trade and shipping of the Dutch.[5] In contrast to its East-Indian counterpart, the VOC, the Dutch West India Company only took a small share of the total Dutch Atlantic activities.

However, the lack of formal unity, the prevalence of private enterprise and the absence of a clear command center in the Dutch Atlantic for much of the early modern period does not mean that state power and territorial control were insignificant factors in Dutch Atlantic expansion. Likewise, the question of labor requirement that was central to the economic structure of the Dutch Atlantic was at key points solved through state and state-like institutions. Regarding labor, the Dutch were at a particular disadvantage compared to the French, English and Iberians since their sources of manpower were limited within the Republic.[6] This increased the need for the Dutch to rely on a multiplicity of supply lines, and on a wide range of negotiated labor relations. On occasion this meant that they were luring workers to their Atlantic domains offering good terms and conditions, but in others, brutal force was the only way they could alleviate their permanent labor shortages. Territoriality crucially determined the ways this force was meted out, whether it was by creating the operating bases for the slave-trade on the West-African coast and in the Caribbean, by setting the geographic perimeters of the Dutch slave production system, or by creating the physical boundaries between bondage and escape.

This article aims to show in what ways, directly or through subsidiary institutions, state intervention remained central to the functioning of the Dutch in the Atlantic. In doing so, it provides an alternative to trade-centered accounts of Dutch Atlantic expansion, in which the state and warfare have virtually been written out of the story. Both during the initial forceful entry of the Dutch

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5   Henk den Heijer and Victor Enthoven, "Nederland en de Atlantische wereld, 1600–1800. Een historiografisch overzicht," *Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis* vol. 24, no. 2 (2005): 147–166.

6   Gijs Kruijtzer, "European Migration in the Dutch Sphere," in Gert Oostindie ed., *Dutch Colonialism, Migration and Cultural Heritage* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2008), 97–154.

in the Atlantic, as well as in later stages when the protection of its trading connections became the mainstay of its activity, the defense of small albeit crucial territories remained a priority to the state, the directors of Dutch colonial companies, as well as private merchants.

The Brokerage Form of Dutch Commercial Expansion

One of the causes for the notion of a Dutch Atlantic void of power-play—at least after the first steps towards large scale territorial expansion in Brazil came to nothing—is the seemingly subordinate role of the state beyond European waters. Both warfare and administration in the West and the East were "outsourced" to the main merchant enterprises. However, both the typical form of organization of these companies and the commercio-political networks of their directors in practice tied them firmly to the state.

For the Dutch, their empire was not only pristinely commercial in its aims, but also in its forms of organization.[7] As Niels Steensgaard emphasized long ago, the Dutch merchant companies turned around the relationship between profit and power that underlay their Portuguese predecessor. Rather than acting as tributary enterprises to provide revenue to the state, the VOC and WIC incorporated a substantial part of their "protection costs" into their trade balance, making warfare a direct subsidiary to the accumulation of capital by their merchant-investors.[8] This model was well suited for a state that excelled in what Charles Tilly dubbed "brokerage"; the outsourcing, wholesale or in part, of warring tasks to independent or semi-independent entrepreneurs who executed these tasks with the aim of making a profit.[9]

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7   Hugo Grotius already theorized this marked difference between the Dutch empire and earlier forms of imperial expansion. Martine Julia van Ittersum, "The Long Goodbye: Hugo Grotius' Justification of Dutch Expansion Overseas, 1615–1645," *History of European Ideas* vol. 36 (2010): 386–411. For a wider intellectual context, see Arthur Weststeijn, "Republican Empire. Colonialism, Commerce and Corruption in the Dutch Golden Age," *Renaissance Studies*, vol. 26, no. 4 (2012): 491–509.

8   Niels Steensgaard, *Carracks, Caravans and Companies. The Structural Crisis in the European-Asian Trade in the Early 17th Century* (Copenhagen: Lund, 1973), 114, and Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times* (London/New York: Verso 2002[1994]), 127 ff.

9   Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992* (Cambridge, MA/Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 29. For the brokerage character of the early modern Dutch state, see Pepijn Brandon, *Masters of War: State, Capital, and Military Enterprise in the Dutch Cycle of Accumulation, 1600–1795* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2014), especially Chapters 1 and 2.

The 35th condition of the VOC charter, drawn up by the States General in 1602, famously granted the company the right beyond Cape Hope and the Straits of Magellan "to make alliances as well as contracts with princes and potentates in the name of the States General of the United Netherlands, (…) to build fortresses and strongholds there, summon and employ governors, soldiers, and public prosecutors (…)."[10] The 1621 WIC charter mirrored this clause for the Atlantic to the letter, with the significant difference that the conditions on war and diplomacy came much earlier in the text, reflecting the even more warlike ambitions that drove the decision to erect a chartered company for the West Indies.[11] Coming right after the end of the twelve years' truce between the Dutch Republic and the Habsburg Empire, the WIC was seen primarily as a tool to make deep incursions into the core overseas possessions of the Spanish crown, and this was also reflected in the charter by the adding of extra clauses that were absent from the VOC charter promising the WIC state support in the form of soldiers and fortresses.[12]

The inclusion of promises of state support into the very constitution of the WIC already signifies that this early form of "privatized" warfare did in no way lead to a passive role of the state towards global commercial ventures. Neither were these promises simply empty phrases. Especially in the early decades when both the independent existence of the state and the position of the VOC and WIC overseas were continuously threatened by war with the Habsburg Empire, the commercial companies and the state always assisted each other with military and financial aid in times of need.[13] The organizational structure

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10   "Octroy, by de Hoogh Mog. Heeren Staten Generael der Vereenighde Nederlanden ver-
      leendt aen de Oost-Indische Compagnie," *Recueil van alle de placaten, ordonnantien, reso-*
      lutien, instructien, lysten en waarschouwingen, betreffende de Admiraliteyten, convoyen,
      licenten en verdere zee-saeken. Volume II (The Hague: Paulus Scheltus, 1701), 12–13.

11   Den Heijer, *Geschiedenis van de* WIC, 33–34.

12   Conditions II–VII of the charter. *Octroy, by de Hooghe Mogende heeren Staten Generael*
      verleent aende West Indische Compagnie, in date den derden Junij 1621. Mette Ampliatien
      van dien, etc. (The Hague: Wede en erfgenamen Van Wouw, 1637).

13   For the VOC, see Victor Enthoven, "Van steunpilaar tot blok aan het been. De Verenigde
      Oost-Indische Compagnie en de Unie," in Gerrit Knaap and Ger Teitler eds., *De Verenigde*
      Oost-Indische Compagnie tussen oorlog en diplomatie (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij: 2002),
      35–58, Idem, "Mars en Mercurius bijeen. De smalle marges van het Nederlandse mari-
      tieme veiligheidsbeleid rond 1650," in Leo Akveld et al. eds., *In het kielzog. Maritiem-*
      historische studies aangeboden aan Jaap R. Bruijn bij zijn vertrek als hoogleraar
      zeegeschiedenis aan de Universiteit Leiden (Amsterdam: De Bataafse Leeuw, 2003), 40–60,
      and Alfred Staarman, "De VOC en de Staten-Generaal in de Engelse Oorlogen: een onge-
      makkelijk bondgenootschap," *Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis* vol. 15, no. 1 (1996): 3–24. For
      the WIC, see Den Heijer, *Geschiedenis van de* WIC, 39–41.

of the VOC and WIC guaranteed that lines of communication with the relevant bureaucratic bodies always remained short. This was true in particular for the relations between the colonial companies and the Admiralty Boards. Dutch naval administration, like the state in general, was organized federally, with five independent Admiralty Boards residing in different cities. The delegates on the boards were appointed for limited terms only by the different sovereign provinces, and within the provinces by the city councils of the leading towns and the nobility for the main rural areas. This created a complex form of cross-representation, that allowed especially the dominant merchant families of the Dutch Republic a tight grip on the commercially important naval affairs.[14] While this federal structure of the navy is sometimes presented as a barrier to successful power projection at sea, Jan Glete has convincingly argued that especially in the seventeenth century, federalism allowed for forms of "interest aggregation" behind naval policy that made the Dutch state more rather than less efficient than most of its competitors.[15]

The organizational structure of the colonial companies resembled that of the federal Navy Boards so closely, that some have described the VOC as "an admiralty for Asia."[16] Both the VOC and the WIC were divided in chambers (six and five respectively) residing in leading commercial towns, often admiralty towns. The directors of these chambers were selected from the company investors, but often also fulfilled leading positions in the Dutch state at the local, provincial or "national" level.[17] Later "patroonships" in Berbice and New Netherland, as well as chartered companies for Suriname and Essequibo

14   Pepijn Brandon, "Global Power, Local Connections: The Dutch Admiralties and Their Supply Networks," in Richard Harding and Sergio Solbes Ferri eds., *The Contractor State and Its Implications, 1659–1815* (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria: Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Servicio de Publicaciones, 2012), 57–80.

15   Jan Glete, *Navies and Nations. Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–1860.* Volume I (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993), 154.

16   Oscar Gelderblom, Abe de Jong, and Joost Jonker, "An Admiralty for Asia. Isaac le Maire and Conflicting Conceptions about the Corporate Governance of the VOC," Working Paper Erasmus Research Institute of Management, 2010.

17   As in almost every area, the political connections of VOC directors have been investigated more thoroughly than those of their West Indian counterparts. E.g. Femme Gaastra, *Bewind en beleid bij de* VOC*: de financiële en commerciële politiek van de bewindhebbers, 1672–1702* (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1989), Victor Enthoven, "'Veel vertier.' De Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie in Zeeland, een economische reus op Walcheren," *Archief. Mededelingen van het Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen* (1989), 49–127, and Hans Bonke and Katja Bossaers, *Heren investeren. De bewindhebbers van de West-Friese Kamers van de* VOC (Haarlem: Regionale Geschiedbeoefening Noord-Holland, 2002).

followed a similar model. Thus, while the companies formally remained private institutions, informally they were strongly integrated with the state on an organizational and personal level. Appendix 1 shows this more concretely by tracing the West Indian connections of members of the Amsterdam Admiralty Board. Among naval administrators, many had either been major investors (*hoofdparticipanten*) or directors of the WIC, or were moving into West Indian careers. Sometimes these state and semi-private functions overlapped directly. But even where they did not, it is hard to maintain the image of a West-India interest that was pristinely commercial, disconnected from state policies. A letter written during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War to the Governor General in Suriname by the highest official of the Amsterdam Admiralty Board, Fiscal Advocate Johan Cornelis van der Hoop, who had himself recently given up his position as director of the Suriname Company, underlines that those trading places between state and company, even as late as the 1780s when according to Emmer all hopes for maintaining a Dutch empire in the West were long lost, took with them their former attachments:

> This I can testify, that I would not have left [the Suriname Company] if the circumstances of war had not hindered my own prospects concerning the colony, forcing me to abandon the hope of seeing it again soon in the state of affluence in which it can be. Nonetheless, Your Honor will possibly have already been informed, that I can indeed retain my attachment to the Colony, be active in it, and will especially work to bring any help and improvement to your conditions that are within my powers.[18]

Close connections between state and companies meant that the formal distinction between state strategies and commercial strategies overseas could be easily bridged in times of need. Of course, there were also important disadvantages for long-term power projection that were inherent to the brokerage forms of state and merchant cooperation that underlay the Dutch Atlantic empire. The most important of these is that different towns and provinces could use their influence over the federal state and the companies to favor the interests of "their own" merchants. This problem had a particular impact in the Atlantic, where Zeeland and Amsterdam often clashed vehemently, to the detriment of the long-term capacity of the WIC to hold its ground. Private merchants could and did use these divisions to undercut the monopoly of both the first and the second WIC, leading to the situation after 1734 when the WIC had lost all of its

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18   Dutch National Archive, The Hague, Admiraliteitscolleges XXXIX, Van de Hoop, 1524–1825, no. 54, p. 167. Letter by Van der Hoop to Governor General Texier in Suriname, 7 April 1782.

former monopoly trading rights. Rather than leading to the abolition of the WIC, this meant that the Company was reduced to only one of the two core functions that had been assigned to it and its predecessor right from the start. Having lost most of its commercial functions, the WIC continued as a brokerage institution renting out protection on the African coast, and administrating Dutch foreign possessions in exchange for the right to levy a tax on West Indian commerce.[19] As will be shown in the following sections, the legal division between state territoriality at home and company territoriality overseas did not prevent the States General from intervening in West Indian affairs when the core interests of Dutch trade in the Atlantic were at stake.

The Grand Design and the Loss of Dutch Brazil

The first phase of Dutch territorial expansion was directly subordinate to the struggle between the emergent Dutch Republic and the Habsburg Empire.[20] This context also heavily influenced the Dutch position on enslaved labor as a core institution of the Atlantic economy. During the Dutch Revolt, the abhorrence of slavery as a particularly Spanish crime against the natives of the Americas had formed one of the master-themes of the *leyenda negra* employed in anti-Habsburg propaganda. When venturing into the Americas, the Dutch for a time cultivated the illusion of a natural alliance between themselves and the natives, founded on the common experience of Spanish bondage.[21] Of course, these fantasies were never innocent, and Dutch attitudes to slavery changed dramatically as soon as the prospects of expansion became more concrete. Being drawn into the slave trade by a series of more or less coincidental actions of private merchants, very soon the Dutch came to appreciate the enslavement of non-Europeans on a more systematic basis as a way to build their empire.[22] However, problems connected to the capture and control of forced labor, including resistance and mutiny by the enslaved themselves, limited the options for Dutch empire-builders.

19   Henk den Heijer, *Goud, ivoor en slaven. Scheepvaart en handel van de Tweede Westindische Compagnie op Afrika, 1674–1740* (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1997), 299 ff.

20   Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic world 1606–1661* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).

21   Benjamin Schmidt, "Exotic Allies. The Dutch-Chilean Encounter and the Failed Conquest of America," *Renaissance Quarterly* vol. 52 (1999): 440–473.

22   Johannes Menne Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade 1600–1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 10 ff.

The *Groot Desseyn* was the name of a failed attempt—in several waves—by the Dutch to create an Atlantic Empire based on acquiring slave fortresses in Africa and sugar plantations in Brazil. The acquisition of labor played out at three levels closely connecting the capture of land in the Americas, slave trading fortresses in Africa, and the mobilization of soldiers from Europe. The tactical choices behind the large scale incursion into the Iberian Atlantic were the outcome of a debate between the States of Zeeland and Holland about how to engage militarily and economically in the Atlantic. The difference of opinion largely rested on the choice between a frontal attack, preferred by Amsterdam, and a more cautious incursion via the Guianas advocated by Willem Usselinx representing Zeeland. The States of Holland won this debate, which in turn led to a large scale mobilization of forces to support the plan. While initially relying on European workers, the Dutch soon learned that they needed the people they encountered overseas if they were to settle in the Americas successfully. While initially opting for friendly relations, the Dutch increasingly began to rely on force and enslavement. The resulting conflict contributed to the failure of the Dutch to hold on to Brazil.[23]

On a European level the *Groot Desseyn* had immediate repercussions for the mobilization of military men from all over North Western Europe. The first wave of the *Groot Desseyn* commenced in 1624 and included the ravenous capture of Bahia where soldiers under Dutch command raped and pillaged in a drunken frenzy. Brazil became a flashpoint in Hispano-Dutch warfare and the widespread reporting on the events on both sides mimicked the central themes of the conflict.[24] The importance of the Dutch challenge to the Iberian powers is illustrated by the grand revenge undertaken by the Spanish forces. The Spanish troops began their counter attack in the Southern Netherlands by successfully laying siege to Breda to delay a Dutch release party for the soon to be besieged forces in Bahia. Then, the Portuguese and Spanish combined their forces to mobilize the largest army that ever had crossed the Atlantic.[25] These

23   Den Heyer, *Geschiedenis van de* WIC, 69–73.

24   Yolanda Rodríguez Pérez, "Wijze Indianen, Barbaarse Hollanders. De beeldvorming van Nederlanders en Indianen in de Spaanse literatuur van de Gouden Eeuw," *De Zeventiende Eeuw* vol. 21, no. 1 (2005): 99–111, and Michiel van Groesen, "Lessons Learned. The Second Dutch Conquest of Brazil and the Memory of the First," *Colonial Latin American Review* vol. 20, no. 2 (2011): 167–193.

25   Jan Dirksz Lam, *Expeditie naar de Goudkust: het journaal van Jan Dircksz Lam over de Nederlandse aanval op Elmina, 1624–1626*, edited by Hendrik Jacob den Heijer (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2013), 33; Mark Meuwese, *Brothers in Arms, Partners in Trade . Dutch-Indigenous Alliances in the Atlantic World, 1595–1674* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012), 35; Den Heijer, *De geschiedenis van de* WIC, 38–39.

were only the opening moves of what would become a global battle between the Iberians and the Dutch. It is estimated that a total of 67,000 men were hired by the WIC between 1623 and 1636, most of these sailors and soldiers.[26]

In 1625, the WIC initiated a plan to strike all around the Atlantic, with the main force serving as a release party in Brazil. This army was then to be split up to go to Africa and the Caribbean. In the event, however, the Dutch were confronted with the severe limitations of relying solely on European soldiers and sailors. On the Atlantic crossing 2,000 sailors and soldiers died, and the release of Bahia failed. Nevertheless, the expeditionary force split to make two attacks, one on Puerto Rico and one on Elmina.[27] The Puerto Rico expedition failed, and the commander could not execute the remainder of his orders because the now restless and mutinous crew forced the squadron to sail back to the Republic. The attack on the Gold Coast failed as well. Here the usefulness of indigenous forces was made painfully clear to the Dutch. While resting, the Dutch sailors and soldiers suffered a surprise attack by African soldiers under Portuguese command, "cutting their heads like chickens" leaving 441 men dead.[28]

Undeterred by the defeat the Dutch managed to mobilize a second wave of attacks. In 1629 7,000 soldiers and sailors were sent to Brazil. The encounters with African and Indigenous soldiers taught the Dutch that they needed to recruit indigenous forces to fight their battles for them. The Dutch tried to break the alliance between the Indigenous fighters and the Portuguese. The promise of freedom was an obvious choice for the Dutch when it came to acquiring the goodwill of Portuguese unfree and colonized subjects. To bring the Indigenous Brazilians to their camp, the WIC in their Order of Government of 1629 proclaimed the Indigenous Brazilians to be free subjects. The WIC affirmed that all Africans and Indigenous Brazilians would be freed if they had

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26   Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, *Dutch and Portuguese in Western Africa. Empires, Merchants and the Atlantic System, 1580–1674* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2011), 106–107; Bruno Romero Ferreira Miranda, *Gente de Guerra. Origem cotidiano e resistência dos soldados do exército da companhia das índias ocidentais no Brasil (1630–1654)*, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Leiden University, 2011, https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/18047. While it is usually assumed by Dutch historians that the possibility to attract immigrant labor for the army and the fleet precluded impressment as a central form of labor recruitment, there is sporadic evidence for impressment. More importantly, the widespread practice of trapping sailors in debt forcing them to serve the VOC, WIC and navy, can also be viewed as a forced labor practice. Matthias van Rossum, *Werkers van de wereld. Globalisering, maritieme arbeidsmarkten en de verhouding tussen Aziaten en Europeanen in dienst van de* VOC, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Free University Amsterdam, 2013.

27   Mark Meuwese, *Brothers in Arms*, 36.

28   Lam, *Expeditie naar de Goudkust.*

"ran away from their masters to our side during the recent war."[29] Africans, who escaped enslavement under the Portuguese did join the Dutch, but only on the condition that they would be free.[30] The promise of freedom was however difficult to keep for the Dutch.

In Brazil the fear that Indigenous Brazilians would defect from the Dutch was constant, and this fear informed how the state attempted to regulate the exploitation and use of the Indigenous. The WIC had to repeat time and again to its European subjects that Brazilians should not be enslaved. These ordinances were published to prevent conflicts with the Indigenous, who in Portuguese times had been paid (about half the customary European wages) rather than enslaved. Good relations with the indigenous were predicated on the Dutch paying ample respect to them, as well as the tribute that the Dutch delivered to the Indigenous leaders. This made the Indigenous unsuited for exploitation on the plantations. The ensuing strategy of reliance on Indigenous troops was successful for the colonists for a limited number of years. In the late 1630s the Indigenous forces supplied considerable number of people to the WIC expeditions, border patrols, counter insurgency and the successful attempt to fend off the landing of the Spanish forces in Brazil. They later were instrumental in the WIC's capture of Luanda and São Tomé in 1641.[31]

However, there were severe limits to the strategy, connected to the tensions between relying on the promise of freedom on the one hand, and the building of slave-based plantation economies on the other. In the first waves of the Dutch Atlantic expansion the Caribbean and Brazilian incursions were intricately linked. The same could be said for the supply of forced indigenous labor. The lack of slave imports prompted the Dutch colonists on St. Eustatius to import enslaved Amerindians. Lack of laborers made the colonists look for places to enslave them, both on the Caribbean Islands and on the Guiana coast. There they notoriously kidnapped as many as 80 people on one occasion.[32] A debate was held amongst the WIC directors about the possibility of engaging in the trading of enslaved Amerindians in the Amazon delta. The trading of Amerindian slaves was a common practice of the Portuguese from Maranhão to Pernambuco. When the Dutch took over this area they began to export the enslaved from Amazonia to Maranhão to Spanish America and the

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29   Dutch National Archive, The Hague, Oude Westindische Compagnie, inv.nr. 8, letter by the Heeren XIX, 1 August 1635. cited in: Mark Meuwese, *Brothers in Arms*, 149.

30   Ibid., 128.

31   Ibid., 154–162.

32   Cornelis Goslinga, *The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast 1580–1680* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1971), 263.

Caribbean. After the WIC securely took Marnahão from the Portuguese, Dutch traders of indigenous slaves arrived in Barbados to sell their human cargoes. While contrary to the formal WIC policy that granted freedom to the indigenous, in practice these regulations were not upheld.[33] In the 1640s the Dutch actively participated in the Caribbean market for enslaved Amerindians.[34] In Brazil itself, once the use of the Indigenous for military expeditions declined, they were mobilized to work as "wood-cutters, cattle ranchers, and cart-drivers," crucial functions for the running of sugar mills. However, the field work was done by enslaved Africans. In the salt pans the Dutch did employ Indigenous Brazilians, but they were deemed most important to produce food to sustain the enslaved Africans on the plantations.[35]

After the initial success in recruiting Indigenous forces, the continuing enslavement of them partly explains why the Dutch were to lose control of important areas in Brazil in the following years. The conflicts over indigenous enslavement and the high death toll among the Indigenous fighters when the Dutch undertook their assault on Luanda, turned the relation with the Indigenous Brazilians sour. Around 1642 a smallpox epidemic strained the relations further. The Dutch not only became associated with the spread of the disease, company officials also decided to use enslaved Indigenous Brazilians to replace the workers who had died.[36] The traditional Portuguese Brazilian view has been that the insults from Jews and Protestants against the religious practices of the Indigenous united them with the Catholic plantation owners against the Dutch.[37] According to a recent study by Mark Meuwese the WIC was "forcibly expelled" from Maranhão and Ceará in 1643–1644 because of an uprising that was triggered by the exploitation of indigenous workers by WIC personnel.[38] From 1645 onwards the simultaneous and combined uprisings by Portuguese colonists and Indigenous Brazilians spelled the end of the Dutch adventure in Brazil.[39]

The loss of the two provinces served as an example and the Dutch began to lose their will to invest in the retaking of lost possessions, although it took nine

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33   L.A.H.C. Hulsman, 'Nederlands Amazonia: Handel Met Indianen Tussen 1580 en 1680', Ph.D. dissertation, University of Amsterdam Amsterdam, 2009, 138–139, http://dare.uva .nl/record/316229.

34   Ibid., 138.

35   Mark Meuwese, *Brothers in Arms*, 157–158.

36   Ibid., 166–169.

37   João Capistrano de Abreu, *Chapters of Brazil's Colonial History, 1500–1800*, trans. Arthur Brakel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 87.

38   Mark Meuwese, *Brothers in Arms*, 189.

39   C.R. Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil, 1624–1654* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 159–171.

more years to really end the Dutch hold over its last colonial possession in Brazil. In the face of impending defeat the WIC, the states of Zeeland, and Holland as well as the States General started to turn in on each other, all trying to protect the part of this project that was most valuable to them. Amsterdam's priority was to keep the sugar trade going, regardless of the nationality of the producers. Zeeland however profited from privateering operations along the coast, for which Zeeland investors needed military backup and a continuation of hostilities.[40] In 1648 the States General mustered one last expedition to save what remained of Dutch Brazil, but this ended in defeat in 1649. When supplies began to run low and the commander of the fleet was confronted by a mutiny the decision was made not to complete orders and sail back to the Republic. In the following years the power of the Dutch shrank, until their last stronghold in Recife fell in 1654.[41] Even in these years, the States General continued to provide substantial financial and material support to the WIC efforts to maintain its Brazilian strongholds. The eventual loss of Brazil was compensated for the Dutch by gains in Asia, as well as the offer of reparations to be made by the Portuguese for the loss of the colony and its property.[42]

Continued Expansion

While the grand design and the subsequent development of Brazil as a Dutch colony failed, the Dutch did not retreat from the Atlantic world. The Dutch came to focus primarily on (slave) trading in what has been called the second Atlantic economy. In this second system the territory was smaller, although the Dutch presence on the African coast was substantial. Based on its territorial

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40   H.J. den Heijer, "Het recht van de sterkste in de polder. Politieke en economische strijd tussen Amsterdam en Zeeland over de kwestie Brazilië, 1630–1654," in D. Bos, M.A. Ebben and Henk te Velde eds., *Harmonie in Holland. Het poldermodel van 1500 tot nu* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2007), 72–92.; W.J. van Hoboken, *Witte de With in Brazilië, 1648–1649* (Amsterdam 1955), 6–9, 18–24.

41   Bea Brommer, Henk den Heijer, and Jaap Jacobs, *Grote atlas van de West-Indische Compagnie/Comprehensive atlas of the Dutch West India Company. I, De oude* WIC *1621–1674/The old* WIC *1621–1674* (Voorburg: Asia Maior, 2011), 158.

42   Cátia Antunes, "Oost voor West en West voor Oost. De Nederlands-Portugese koloniale interactie in de zeventiende eeuw," in Alicia Schrikker and Thomas Lindblad eds., *Het verre gezicht: Politieke en culturele relaties tussen Nederland en Azië, Afrika en Amerika* (Franeker: Van Wijnen, 2011), 35–48; Evaldo Cabral de Mello, *De Braziliaanse affaire. Portugal, de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden en Noord-Oost Brazilië, 1641–1669*, trans. Catherine Barel (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2005), 61–82.

position both on the African coast and in the Caribbean the Dutch were able to acquire a central role in the trans-Atlantic slave trade only second to Portugal until 1675.[43] It has to be kept in mind how important the territorial requirements were that underpinned the Dutch Atlantic after the fall of Brazil. The slave forts became central to Anglo-Dutch confrontations beyond European waters in the Western hemisphere. When adding to this the time between the loss of Brazil and the acquiring of Suriname was no more that thirteen years, it can easily be argued that the Dutch continued to engage almost uninterruptedly in territorial conflicts in the Atlantic throughout the seventeenth century. This should come as no surprise in a period that was characterized by almost continuous engagement in great-power struggle for the Dutch.[44]

The first steps into the slave trade by the Dutch were taken by private traders, before the development of the monopoly companies. These private traders had slave trading as part of their wider trade portfolio, servicing Spanish and Portuguese demand in the Caribbean and Brazil. These private voyages were limited in number, employing slave trading knowledge acquired from the Iberian precedent in the Southern Atlantic.[45] After 1635 the WIC got a firmer grip on the slave trade, but private traders did continue their activities. In the period between 1580 and 1674 private traders organized at least 45 per cent of the Dutch slave trade. As Antunes and Ribeiro da Silva argue for the period, only twelve per cent of the Dutch slaving voyages at the time can be confirmed to have been organized by the WIC, of the remaining 43 per cent it is unclear if they were either private or WIC voyages.[46] Private entrepreneurs, especially from Amsterdam, thus laid an important foundation under the Dutch engagement with the Atlantic world. The WIC was one of the actors, and would increase in importance over the following decades, relying upon the military foundation on which private trade rested.

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43   Jan de Vries, "The Dutch Atlantic Economies," in Peter A. Coclanis ed., *The Atlantic Economy during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Organization, Operation, Practice, and Personnel* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 2005), 1–29.

44   Maarten Prak, *The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 27 ff.

45   Catia Antunes and Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, "Amsterdam Merchants in the Slave Trade and African Commerce, 1580s–1670s," *Tijdschrift Voor Sociale En Economische Geschiedenis* vol. 9, no. 2 (2012): 3–30; Wim Klooster, "Het begin van de Nederlandse slavenhandel in het Atlantisch gebied," in Maurits Ebben, Henk den Heijer and Joost Schokkenbroek eds., *Alle streken van het kompas. Maritieme geschiedenis is Nederland* (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2010), 249–262.

46   Antunes and Ribeiro da Silva, "Amsterdam Merchants in the Slave Trade and African Commerce, 1580s–1670s."

With regards to the regular trade in enslaved Africans, two tracks of engagement developed. The Dutch primarily shipped slaves to work on Dutch plantations. They did this both for Brazil as well as Suriname and the smaller Guiana colonies. After the second Anglo-Dutch War there was also a period when the Dutch Caribbean island of Curaçao became the main destination for Dutch slave ships. These shipments of African captives were not primarily destined to work on Dutch plantations, but were to be sold to the Spanish, as well as French and British colonists. This lasted until the War of the Spanish Succession when the Dutch plantation colony Suriname became the primary destination of the ships.[47] The servicing of non-Dutch colonial enterprises not only took place on Dutch ships. Especially in the eighteenth century the Dutch stronghold of Elmina was where the slaves were sold to Portuguese and other merchants.[48]

After the loss of Brazil and during the transition into the second Atlantic system, state intervention in the Atlantic region became inextricably linked to the competition between the Dutch state and England as the rising Atlantic power. The first Anglo-Dutch War in the mid-1650s, combined with a weakening of Spanish power in the region, had allowed the WIC to move into the African slave trade on a large scale, and to become a subcontractor for the *asiento* in 1662.[49] However, the simultaneous growth of the English role in the slave trade led to increasing clashes along the African coast. In 1661, an English Royal Adventurers expedition captured the WIC fortress St Andries in the Gambia estuary. In 1663, Charles II sent a navy squadron to protect English interests in the slave trade, leading to further clashes with the WIC.[50] Characteristically, the WIC turned to the States General for help. In 1664, the "Highly Esteemed Gentlemen" decided to send twelve war-ships headed by the Republic's most able fleet commander Michiel de Ruyter to recapture WIC fortresses on the Guinean coast.[51] De Ruyter's seventeenth-century biographer Gerard Brandt described the reasoning behind this decision:

> They [the States General] judged that such violence was insufferable, and had to be stopped with valiance and force, both because of the

47   *The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database* (Atlanta, Georgia, 2008), http://www.slavevoyages .org/.

48   Den Heijer, *Goud, ivoor en slaven*, 366.

49   Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, 33, and J.R. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century* (London/New York: Longman, 1996), 35.

50   Gijs Rommelse, *The Second Anglo-Dutch War, (1665–1667): International Raison d'état, Mercantilism and maritime strife* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2006), 89–91.

51   Ibid, 106–108.

consequences thereof for the prestige of other far-away dominions and possessions, and for other reasons. They understood, that they had to restore the West India Company (which had provided the State with great services at various occasions) in their possessions along the coasts of Africa and Guinea, and to help them keep everything else they possessed there; both for the reputation and respectability of the state, and for the large trade that in those regions was conducted with considerable advantages.[52]

De Ruyter's success in saving the Dutch slave fortresses formed the direct prelude to the Second Anglo-Dutch War, which defined the shape of the Dutch Atlantic empire for the remainder of the seventeenth century and the entirety of the next. During this war, the English captured the Dutch colonies of New Netherland and Suriname, consolidating the small territorial empire that from now on was focused completely on the African coast and the Caribbean colonies that provided the Dutch with their own overseas plantation system and a permanent bridgehead into the wider Atlantic trade.

The Dutch learned much about the enslavement of Africans and the trade in these captive workers during their engagement in Brazil.[53] With this knowledge they were able to reinvent their empire. As has been noted, the new system was based on the capture of West African strongholds in the late 1630s and early 1640s and expansion in the Caribbean and the Guiana Coast. But the continuation of Dutch control against the threats by competitors defined much of the Atlantic conflicts in which the Dutch engaged. Part of this was the consolidation of its African domains, which resulted in a large boom in the Dutch slave trade. In the period between 1674 and 1680 many enslaved Africans were exported from Elmina.[54] The territorial expansion into the Guianas in 1667 shows that the Dutch continued to hold on to their expansionist vision for the building of a productive empire based on enslaved African labor acquired through its forts of the African coast as well as plantation colonies on the Guiana Coast. These state funded conflicts catered to the interests of private actors from Dutch cities who invested in trade, production, and war, thus further entangling imperial rivalry with the imperatives of the Atlantic slave trade.

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52 Gerard Brandt, *Het leven en bedryf van den heere Michiel de Ruiter, Hertog, Ridder, &c. L. Admiraal Generaal van Hollandt en Westvrieslandt* (Amsterdam: Wolfgang, Waasberge, Boom, Van Someren en Goethals, 1687), 292.

53 Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, 14.

54 Den Heijer, *Goud, ivoor en slaven*, 150.

Imperial Consolidation

Rather than a steady decline, as suggested by Emmer, or, as Jan de Vries has argued, that the Dutch shifted their attention to the role of Atlantic middlemen after the loss of Brazil, the Dutch presence in the Atlantic should be characterized as imperial consolidation on a modest yet solid footing. The Second Anglo-Dutch War was a success for the Dutch in that they simultaneously took a definitive hold of their position on the slave trading African coast and acquired and consolidated their holdings on the Guiana Coast. The Anglo-Dutch naval alliance that was concluded after the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672–1674) did not end state involvement in favor of Atlantic trade. While at the height of Dutch power at sea in the mid-1650s, naval convoying for the protection of trade had been primarily provided for European destinations with an emphasis on the protection of the Baltic "mother trade," eighteenth-century naval assistance became more and more directed towards the protection of long-distance trade. Decades long low-intensity warfare against the North-African privateering states of Sale (Morocco) and Algiers became key priorities of the Amsterdam Navy Board, as shown in Table 4.1 which sums up the total convoying activities conducted from Amsterdam in a representative year in the mid-eighteenth century.[55]

TABLE 4.1   *Convoying ships and cruisers sent out by the Amsterdam Admiralty Board, 1738*

Name ship	Destination	Crew size	Total costs (f)
Dolphijn	Morocco and the Mediterranean	151	56,594
Spiegelbos	Morocco and the Mediterranean	150	50,781
Brederode	Mediterranean	271	102,554
De Brack	Mediterranean	100	38,563
Hartekamp	Morocco	150	49,324
Westerdijkshorn	West Indies	201	78,517
Beschermer	West Indies	201	75,652
		1,224	451,985

SOURCE: DUTCH NATIONAL ARCHIVE, THE HAGUE, ARCHIEF GENERALITEITSREKENKAMER, NO. 548.

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55   On the general development of the Dutch naval intervention in this period, see J.R. Bruijn, *The Duch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Columbia, SC: University of South Caroline, 1993).

The employment of state force also characterized the consolidation of the Dutch Empire on the other side of the Atlantic. Without the combined assistance from the WIC and the state in providing slaves, soldiers and money, the Dutch exploits on the Guiana coast would have been doomed. On some occasions the colonization efforts did not get state backing. Those expeditions failed, invariably ending in the decimation of the colonists involved.[56] Only when fortresses were built and slave ships provided laborers, could colonization attempts survive.

In the second Dutch Atlantic system, based on plantation production and transit-trade in the Caribbean, the relative numbers of sailors, soldiers and plantation laborers changed fundamentally. The armies sent across the Atlantic became smaller, while the size of the agricultural workforce increased drastically. The Dutch-French assault on St. Eustatius in 1666 was undertaken by at most a few hundred men. The grand assault on English power in the Caribbean by Abraham Crijnssen was undertaken by only 3 frigates, 750 sailors and 224 soldiers, a fraction of what was deployed to fight the Iberians in Brazil and West Africa. Still it managed to wrest Suriname from English power and continue to assault a number of other colonies as well.[57] From the end of the Second Anglo Dutch War onwards the Dutch Atlantic territory was largely consolidated around four Guiana plantation colonies, Berbice, Demerara, Essequibo and Suriname, and the two islands Curacao and St. Eustatius. While not large compared to the other European territories in the Americas, these colonies were strategically located in the fast expanding world of Atlantic production. The Guianas produced primarily sugar, and in the eighteenth century also the boom product of coffee. The islands, on the other hand, functioned as nodal points for trade. [58]

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56 Henk den Heijer, "'Over warme en koude landen'. Mislukte Nederlandse volksplantingen op de Wilde Kust in de zeventiende eeuw," *De Zeventiende Eeuw* vol. 21, no. 1 (2005): 79–90; G. van Alphen, *Jan Reeps en zijn onbekende kolonisatiepoging in Zuid-Amerika, 1692* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1960); Kim Isolde Muller (ed.), *Elisabeth van der Woude, Memorije van 't geen bij mijn tijt is voorgevallen: met het opzienbarende verslag van haar reis naar de Wilde Kust, 1676–1677* (Amsterdam: Terra Incognita, 2001).

57 Goslinga, *The Dutch in the Caribbean*, 395–399.

58 Gert Oostindie and Jessica Vance Roitman, "Repositioning the Dutch in the Atlantic, 1680–1800," *Itinerario* vol. 36, no. 2 (2012): 129–160; Wim Klooster, *Illicit Riches: The Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648–1795*, 1995; Linda Marguerite Rupert, *Creolization and Contraband: Curaçao in the Early Modern Atlantic World* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2012); Johannes Postma, "Suriname and Its Atlantic Connections, 1667–1795," in *Riches from Atlantic Commerce: Dutch Transatlantic Trade and Shipping, 1585–1817*,

In terms of their political organization, these colonies reflected the large role of federal and private bodies in the structure of the Dutch state at home. Suriname is a case in point. Conflicts over strategy between the province of Holland and Zeeland played a large role in the run up to the conquest of the colony, and in the first decade and a half of its existence, the new Dutch territory overseas was run by the States of Zeeland, with the States General taking upon itself responsibility for the defense of the colony. In 1683, control of Suriname was turned over to the new-founded Suriname Society, with the WIC, the city of Amsterdam and the ruling class family Van Aerssen-Van Sommelsdijck each taking an equal share. Thus, the execution of colonial rule rested on the same private-state cooperation that underlay the entire Dutch overseas empire.[59]

Suriname soon developed into the largest production center for tropical goods under Dutch control. The colony was envisioned as a new Brazil and a second chance to set up large scale plantation production.[60] For the Dutch the major difference between Suriname and Brazil was that the Portuguese had not previously settled there, and there was no similar relationship between the colonizing Europeans and the indigenous Caribs and Arawaks as there had been with the native Brazilians. The English colonizers from whom the Dutch took the colony in 1667–8 did not have institutions by which the indigenous worked for them on a large scale, had forms of representation in government, or were engaged in the military apparatus of the colony. Under Dutch rule of Suriname some Indigenous were initially held as slaves while other groups made alliances and served as auxiliaries. The relation between the colonizers and the colonized turned sour more quickly than in Brazil. During the conflicts the Dutch took measures to effect a stricter separation between colonists and the Indigenous. In 1679,

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Johannes Posma and Victor Enthoven (eds.), *The Atlantic World*, vol. 1 (Leiden / Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003), 287–322; Victor Enthoven, "'That Abominable Nest of Pirates': St. Eustatius and the North Americans, 1680–1780," *Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* vol. 10, no. 2 (2012): 239–301.

59   Cornelis Ch. Goslinga, *The Dutch in the Caribbean and in the Guianas, 1680–1791*, Anjerpublikaties 19 (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1985); G.W. van der Meiden, *Betwist Bestuur: een eeuw strijd om de macht in Suriname, 1651–1753* (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 2008), 10–16.

60   Otto Keye, *Beschryvinge van het heerlijcke ende gezegende landt Guajana, waer inne gelegen is de seer voorname lantstreke genaemt Serrenamme* (The Hague: Henricus Hondius boekverkooper in de Hofstraet, 1667).

as a result of the sustained attacks, many plantations were abandoned and further colonization was seriously endangered.[61]

To prevent a repetition of the Brazilian debacle, Governor Heinsius, a veteran from Brazil was sent to the colony.[62] The colonists themselves responded to the Indigenous threat with mass executions. One of them reported "we have now hanged about 30 of the rascals, and caught and shot an equal number."[63] The irregular militias of the colonists were not sufficient to subdue the indigenous attacks, and the States General intervened by supplying armed forces and building fortresses. By 1680 the Dutch went on the counter offensive, with the capture of the indigenous stronghold *Karassobo* being of great military importance.[64] They continued burning indigenous villages. In one attack they captured "82 Indians, both men, women and children, and five Negroes." The majority of the captives were hanged in the forest.[65] In the closing years of the war two fortresses, Fort Para and Fort Sommelsdijck, were constructed as strongholds against these indigenous attacks. The colonists began to take steps to appease the Amerindians, while shifting the brunt of plantation labor even further towards enslaved Africans. The Dutch finally managed to gain lasting peace by banning the colonists from trading with the Indigenous (a permanent source of conflict), letting the Dutch governor marry the daughter of one of the Indigenous leaders, organizing the regular payment of tribute in the form of an *Indiaas Cargasoen* and maybe most importantly by banning the enslavement of Amerindians. Over the years indigenous enslavement in the colony dropped from five hundred "red" slaves to less than 60.[66]

From the moment the Surinamese colony was secured, the Dutch plantation system began to experience steady expansion. To sustain the constant stream of enslaved Africans, the colonists could not rely on private merchants alone. While initially the governor had allowed interlopers to act as suppliers, plantation owners wanted a more regulated supply of captive workers. A petitioning colonist argued: "The supply of negroes by private traders, as has been the practice so far, is to the detriment of the planters, because this does not give them sufficient time to pay their debts, and the planter cannot sustain

61   R. Buve, "Gouverneur Johannes Heinsius, de rol van Van Aerssens voorganger tijdens de Surinaams-Indische Oorlog, 1678–1680," *Nieuwe West-Indische Gids* vol. 45 (1966): 14–26.

62   Ibid.

63   Zeeuws Archief, Staten van Zeeland, 2035 no. 326.

64   Hulsman, "Nederlands Amazonia," 171.

65   Zeeuws Archief, Staten van Zeeland, 2035 nos. 445/446.

66   Karwan Fatah-Black, "Suriname and the Atlantic World, 1650–1800," Ph.D. thesis, Leiden University, 2013, 172.

himself."[67] To remedy this the Dutch WIC, which was at the same time a trading company and partner in the administration of the colony, was to step in and secure slave shipments. Taking an interest in the long-term development of a stable colony, the WIC simultaneously provided credit to the planters who could not pay for their captive workers on delivery. In this very concrete way the company was called into action to support the colonial project. However, private traders continuously infringed on the monopoly, and interloping became a major phenomenon.[68] At the end of the seventeenth century the WIC again began to threaten to stop the slave trade because the company was supplying endless lines of credit, without the planters repaying their debts. It took private initiative from Surinamese colonists to entice the WIC to return to the slave trading business.[69]

This combination of functions of the WIC, which acted at one and the same time as partner in colonial administration, supplier of (enslaved) labor power and creditor, might have been a reason why liberalization of the Dutch slave trade came rather late compared to the other north European competitors. In the case of the Dutch, the state chartered company continued its exclusive position until 1730, while the French and British had already opened the trade to private entrepreneurs in the seventeenth century. The WIC at the time had been running at a loss, but because of the company's centrality to Dutch power and slave trading in the Atlantic the States General continued to subsidize it on a regular basis. In the late 1720s a debate ensued between the WIC directors and free traders about the liberalization of the trade. The company directors argued they were in the best position to supply the plantation colonies with enslaved Africans. The private traders, however, were accommodated by the States General by a partial opening of the slave trade. From 1730 onward free traders were able to buy licenses from the WIC, and the company retained its exclusive right to the slave trade to Suriname and the other Guiana colonies. In 1734 the free traders won another victory over the monopoly company, which was forced to open up the Gold Coast to the private traders. Finally, in 1738, the WIC was forced to let go of its exclusive right to the slave trade in Suriname and the Guianas.[70]

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67   Zeeuws Archief, Staten van Zeeland, 2035 no. 129. Petition by inhabitants of Suriname of March 1669.

68   Rudolf Paesie, *Lorrendrayen op Africa. De illegale goederen-en slavenhandel op West-Afrika tijdens het achttiende-eeuwse handelsmonopolie van de West-Indische Compagnie, 1700–1734* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 2008).

69   Fatah-Black, "Suriname and the Atlantic World," 180–184.

70   Postma, *The Dutch*, 201–206.

Although the company directors were pessimistic about the future of the company after the loss of its right over the slave trade, the company continued for another 61 years.[71] From Elmina the WIC was selling on average between one thousand and two and a half thousand slaves directly to the Dutch free traders until the collapse of Dutch power in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War.[72] The WIC also sold numerous slaves to non-Dutch ships from their strongholds on the Gold Coast. Henk den Heijer estimates this amounted to as many as fifteen hundred to two thousand slaves per year.[73] The Dutch private traders used Elmina to amend their shipments in case they failed to acquire enough slaves along the coast, and foreign traders could use Elmina as a European stronghold and slave market. In exchange for Brazilian tobacco, gold and other products the Dutch provided slaves to arriving ships or sold the right to sail to Elmina's subsidiary fortresses and outposts in exchange for gold or tropical products.[74]

Dutch military activities in the Atlantic world of the eighteenth century concentrated on protecting the plantation complex. This included the building and manning of fortresses, the convoying of merchant vessels and the long drawn out battles against slave uprisings and conflicts with maroon communities. In all these activities the States General consistently intervened to support the colonial enterprises, even investing in military defense when the formal holders of the jurisdiction (such as chartered companies) proved unwilling or unable. For example, in Suriname, the colonists, the local governing council and the Suriname Company could not come to an agreement over who was to pay for the building of a strategically placed fortress *Nieuw Amsterdam* and a line of smaller strongholds along the river mouth. The States General, however, intervened and assured that both the colonists and the company contributed to the building project.[75]

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71   Heijer, *Goud, Ivoor en Slaven*, 368–369.

72   Postma, *The Dutch*, 206.

73   Den Heijer, *Goud, Ivoor en Slaven*, 370.

74   Stéphanie Kraakman, "De vrije vaart op Elmina. De slavenhandel en de WIC na da verandering van het monopolie in 1730," 2013, https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/21570.

75   *Conventie tusschen de directeuren van de geoctroyeerde societeyt van Suriname ter eenre en gemagtigde van raaden van policie der voorschreeve colonie, mitsgaders van veel voornaame en meest gedistingueerde ingeseetenen en geinteresseerdens in deselve colonie, ter andere zyde: By haar Hoog Mog. geapproberrt den 19 December 1733* (The Hague: J. Scheltus, 1734); Julien Wolbers, *Geschiedenis van Suriname* (Amsterdam: Emmering, 1970), 97–98; Jan Jacob Hartsinck, *Beschryving van Guiana, of de Wildekust in Zuid-America*, vol. 2 (Amsterdam: Gerrit Tielenburg, 1770), 728–738.

Hardly were the troubles surrounding the building of the fortress dealt with before the landed conflicts between the colonists and inland maroon communities flared up. This resulted in a period of sustained conflict from the 1750s until the early 1790s.[76] After crushing the 1763 slave revolt in Berbice, the victorious commander Louis Henri Fourgeoud in the service of the States General was relocated to Suriname in 1773 to fight the maroons and to lay out a 100 kilometer long line of defense through the Surinamese jungle.[77] The costs of the war against the maroons and the manning of the defense barrier and the peopling of a buffer zone were enormous. In the 1750s the payment of military personnel alone already amounted to about 3.5 million guilders a year. In the seventies this rose to as much as 8 million, not much less than the expenditure on "defense on land" within the Dutch Republic itself.[78]

Thus, far from expanding their trade in a non-territorial fashion, the military conquest and protection of small but important footholds on the African and Caribbean coast were of prime importance to the continued prominent role of the Dutch in the Atlantic, including the trans-Atlantic slave-trade as well as the sale of typical eighteenth century slave-produced boom-products such as sugar and coffee. Cooperation between the States General, the Admiralty Boards and commercial companies remained crucial to the fulfilling of Dutch imperial ambitions. The parceling out of administrative tasks to "brokerage" institutions such as the WIC and the Suriname Society did not reflect a lack of interest in Atlantic territories by the state, but mirrored the federal and brokerage structure of the Dutch state at home. Finally, the fact that formal ownership over these overseas territories was private, does not mean the States General did not care for their "Dutchness." If by nothing else, this is shown by the seamless transition of the Dutch West Indian possessions from brokerage rule to nationalized state-control that followed the collapse of the WIC in 1791 and the abolition of the Society of Suriname by the new Batavian regime in 1795.[79]

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76   Wim S.M. Hoogbergen, *The Boni Maroon wars in Suriname* (Leiden / New York: Brill, 1990).

77   Wolbers, *Geschiedenis van Suriname*, 325–325.

78   John Gabriel Stedman, *Narrative of a Five Years' Expedition against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam, in Guiana, on the Wild Coast of South America, from the Year 1772 to 1777* (London: J. Johnson & J. Edwards, 1796). During the 1770s, the Province of Holland (responsible for about 58% of the total state budget) expended around 5.5 million guilders per year on "defense on land." Figures in R. Liesker and W. Fritschy, *Gewestelijke financiën ten tijde van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden.* Volume IV: Holland, 1572–1795 (The Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2004), 394–395.

79   On the transition, see Gerrit Jan Schutte, *De Nederlandse patriotten en de koloniën. Een onderzoek naar hun denkbeelden en optreden, 1770–1800* (Utrecht: Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht, 1974).

Conclusion

Far from exhibiting an example of "expansion without empire," Dutch success in the Atlantic crucially rested on the combination of commercial activity and military power-projection. Without a territorial base, neither the prominent role of the Dutch in trans-Atlantic slave trade (carrying about 5 percent of all the enslaved from Africa to the Americas), nor the dynamic role of trade in Atlantic goods in the eighteenth century Dutch economy would have been feasible.

While territoriality did not take the shape of a clearly focused, politically centralized empire, the long-lasting Dutch presence in the Atlantic world was no less underpinned by military might than that of its competitors. Neither did the substantial outsourcing of state-like responsibilities to commercial companies formally independent of the state signify a real absence of imperial ambitions or state intervention. The power of the VOC and WIC never exceeded the limits of what was granted by the States General's charter, and at crucial points in their existence it was only the direct armed intervention by state troops and ships that secured Dutch trans-oceanic commerce. Short lines of communication between the directors of commercial companies and state institutions, most crucially in the case of commercial protection the Admiralty Boards, made sure East- and West-India interests were well reflected in the long-term strategies pursued by the States General. Important changes in the territorial shape of the Dutch Atlantic were always concomitant to European great power struggles, and had to be sanctioned by inter-state treaties. Finally, the suggestion that after the collapse of Dutch Brazil in 1654 and the definitive loss of the New Netherland colonies in 1674 Dutch territories were too small to be considered a "real empire," lacks substance. Of course, the eighteenth-century Dutch possessions never met the standards Dutch expansionists had originally set for themselves in their *Grand Design*. Nevertheless, without a significant territorial base overseas guaranteed by military might the Dutch would have lost out not only as empire-builders, but as commercial middlemen as well. Knowing this, Dutch investors and politicians were willing to muster military force to prop up their territorial rule in the Atlantic even beyond the eighteenth century.

Appendix 1

TABLE 4.2   *West Indian careers of Amsterdam Admiralty Board administrators*

Name	Position on Amsterdam Admiralty Board (years)	West Indian connection (years start and end of term when available)
Gijsbert van Hemert	Delegate (1645–1648)	Director WIC (?)
Albert Bas	Delegate (1648–1650)	Director WIC (1645), *Hoofdparticipant* WIC (?)
Cornelis Witsen	Delegate (1654–1658)	Director WIC (1645), *Hoofdparticipant* WIC (1658)
Johan van der Merct	Delegate (1657–1661)	Director WIC (?), *Hoofdparticipant* WIC (?)
Cornelis de Lange	Delegate (1668–1671)	Director WIC (1677–1682)
Wigbolt Slicher	Receiver-General (1669–1713)	*Hoofdparticipant* (1658)
Hendrik Brouwer	Delegate (1674–1676)	*Hoofdparticipant* (1658)
Adriaen Backer	Delegate (1679–1684)	Director Society of Suriname (1690)
Mattheus Schatter	Delegate (1685–1689)	Director WIC (?)
Nicolaes Opmeer	Delegate (1688–1691)	Director WIC (1682)
Tinco van Andringa	Delegate (1689)	Director WIC (1689)
Joan de Vries	Delegate (1691–1708)	Director Society of Suriname (1689)
Boudewijn Jongkint	Delegate (1702–1706, 1709–1712)	Director WIC (1695–1713)
Nicolaas Sautijn	Fiscal Advocate (1707–1718), Delegate (1733–1743)	Presiding Director WIC (1721), Director Society of Suriname (1721)
Cornelis Munter	Delegate (1708)	Director WIC (1698), Director Society of Suriname (1698)
Jeronimus de Haze de Gregorio	Delegate (1710–1711)	Director WIC (1696)
Reinier Crabeth	Delegate (1732–1749)	Director WIC (1746–1748)
Pieter van den Broek	Delegate (1748–1758)	Director WIC (1751)
Egbert de Vrij Temminck	Delegate (1748–1749)	Director WIC (1738)

TABLE 4.2   *West Indian careers of Amsterdam Admiralty Board administrators* (cont.)

Name	Position on Amsterdam Admiralty Board (years)	West Indian connection (years start and end of term when available)
Gerrit Hooft	Delegate (1756–1763)	Director WIC (1709–1716), Director Society of Suriname (1710–1716)
Cornelis Hop	Delegate (1758–1759, 1761–1762)	Director WIC (1716–1753), Director Society of Suriname (1734–1750)
Francois de Mey	Delegate (1761–1764, 1773–1776)	Director WIC (1784)
Nicolaes van Alphen	Delegate (1763–1764)	Director WIC (1771–1784)
Hendrik Baron van Isselmuden tot Paaslo	Delegate (1763–1765)	Director WIC (1759)
Gerrit Gerritsz Hooft	Delegate (1767–1770)	Director Society of Suriname (1751)
Borchard Herman Gansneb	Delegate (1770–1771)	Director WIC (1772)
Daniel Deutz	Delegate (1770–1775)	Director Colony of Berbice (1757)
Johan Cornelis van der Hoop	Fiscal Advocate (1781–1795)	Secretary of Society of Suriname (1769), Director of Society of Suriname (1782)
Pieter Clifford	Delegate (1783–1784)	Director WIC (1761)
Joachim Rendorp	Delegate (1787–1789)	Director Society of Suriname (1758)
Jan Elias Huydecoper van Maarseveen	Delegate (1789–1791, 1793–1794)	Director Colony of Suriname (1793)

SOURCES: SEE BRANDON, MASTERS OF WAR, ANNEX 1.

The Unfree Origins of English Empire-Building in the Seventeenth Century Atlantic

John Donoghue

Weighing his country's prospects for empire in 1654, Thomas Scot declared that the people of England were poised to become "masters of the whole world."[1] Although certainly grandiose, Scot's boast was nonetheless grounded in a less-encompassing reality. As a leading Parliamentarian, Scot had borne witness to how the English Revolution had transformed England from a monarchy to a republic that had dedicated itself to imperial expansion. Although historians will always disagree about the empire's chronological origins, many would concur that the 1649–1654 era marked a critical point in the empire's emergence. During this period, the revolutionary state had conquered and colonized Catholic Ireland, vanquished the Dutch in a naval war, and launched two transatlantic expeditions to bring oscillating colonies more firmly into the imperial orbit. At the same time, Parliamentary legislation laid the legal foundations for what would become a prosperous empire. Indeed, at the end of 1654, the year Scot made his enthusiastic declaration about England's imperial potential, the state mobilized a transatlantic armada consisting of 42 ships and 13,490 men to conquer and colonize Spanish Hispaniola. Although the expedition failed in that attempt, it did conquer Jamaica, creating an English colony out of a former Spanish possession where profits from sugar, extracted from the labor of slaves, would make it one of the richest dominions in the imperial realm.[2] Scot's braggadocio, in sum, was a commentary on the English state's first, concerted foray into empire-building in the Atlantic world.

This chapter discusses the labor history surrounding the birth of England's Atlantic empire during the age of the English Revolution. The religious, discursive, commercial, and intellectual history of the early empire has been well-documented; its labor history, however, has a comparatively thinner

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1   Scot quoted in Blair Worden, *The Rump Parliament, 1648–1653* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 330–331.

2   British Library Sloane Mss 3926 fol. 2; Frances Henderson, ed., *The Clarke Papers: Further Selections from the Papers of William Clarke*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 5, 203, 205; Bernard Capp, *Cromwell's Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution 1648–1660* (London: Clarendon Press, 1989), 87.

literature.[3] Equally problematic, the labor histories of England's seventeenth century colonies rarely adopt an imperial or even an Atlantic perspective and too often contain themselves to questions bound by some of economic history's most myopic methodologies.[4] Employing labor as a useful category of historical analysis, however, reveals that the state found it impossible to begin building its Atlantic empire without laying revolutionary claims to its dominion over the bodies and labor power of the people it governed in Britain and Ireland. Labor history also illustrates how the new imperial state's policies facilitated England's rise as a slave trading power, hastened the evolution of multiple forms of chattel bondage in the colonies, and contributed to one of the most tragically profound innovations of early modern capitalism, the racialization of slavery in the English Atlantic.

As this chapter discusses, to lay the political and economic foundations of England's Atlantic empire, the state found it necessary to mobilize what the historian Evelyn Jennings has called "productive" and "constructive" labor. As Jennings explains in the Spanish imperial context, productive labor occurred in mines and on plantations which had been capitalized through private investment. These ventures profitably exploited workers by subjecting them to various forms of unfree labor ranging from the native American tribute system to the perpetual enslavement of both creole and African-born "negros." In contrast to the mostly private organization of productive labor, the Spanish

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3   David Armitage, "The Cromwellian Protectorate and the Languages of Empire," *Historical Journal* vol. 35, no. 3 (1992): 531–555; *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Robert M. Bliss, *Revolution and Empire: English Politics and the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990); Alison Games, *The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Karen Ordahl Kupperman, "Errand into the Indies: Puritan Colonization from Providence Island through the Western Design," *William and Mary Quarterly* vol. 45, no. 2 (1988): 70–99; Carla Gardina Pestana, *The English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 1640–1661* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). Although Chapter 6 in Pestana's book deals with the labor history of the early empire, for a more comprehensive and insightful treatment, see Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000). Unfortunately, Abigail Swingen's new work on the labor history of the empire was published too late to make use of in this chapter. See Swingen's *Competing Visions of Empire: Labor, Slavery, and the Origins of the British Atlantic Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015).

4   For influential economic histories of colonial servitude, see David Galenson, *White Servitude in Colonial America: An Economic Analysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981) and David Souden, "'Rogues, Whores and Vagabonds?' Indentured Servant Emigrants to North America, and the Case of Mid-Seventeenth-Century Bristol," *Social History* vol. 3, no. 1 (1978): 23–41. For my critique of these works and other economic studies of servitude, see "Indentured Servitude in the Seventeenth Century Atlantic: A Brief Survey of the Literature," *History Compass* (2013): 1–10.

imperial state directed the "constructive" labor of infrastructural development, employing a mix of Crown slaves, convicts, political prisoners, and contract laborers to build docks, wharves, roads, forts, canals, and railroads. The infrastructural work of these unfree laborers helped make private colonial investment profitable and the colonies themselves defensible from pirates, privateers, and imperial armadas.[5]

When compared to its Spanish counterpart, however, the English state took the lead in helping to procure and deploy both productive and constructive labor in the mid-seventeenth century, the very point at which it chose to assert itself as the sovereign agent of English imperial expansion around the Atlantic. The productive labor of seventeenth century servants and slaves in English colonies is almost always explored within a colonial context, while constructive military labor in the seventeenth century English empire has only begun to attract scholarly attention.[6] As this chapter demonstrates, broadening our perspective from mere colonial to Atlantic-wide horizons illuminates how the early imperial state began forging a political economy of capitalism through the coercion of military and plantation labor on a scale unprecedented in English history.

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6 Simon Newman, *A New World of Labor: The Development of Plantation Slavery in the British Atlantic* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). For dynamic and influential work on seventeenth century servitude and slavery in the English colonial context, see Theodore W. Allen, *The Invention of the White Race: The Origin of Racial Oppression in Anglo-America*, 2 vols. (New York: Verso, 1997); Hilary McD. Beckles, *White Servitude and Black Slavery in Barbados, 1627–1715* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1989); Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: Norton, 1975). I have attempted an Atlantic analysis of servitude and slavery in "'Out of the Land of Bondage': The English Revolution and the Atlantic Origins of Abolition," *American Historical Review* vol. 115, no. 4 (2010): 943–974 and *'Fire under the Ashes': An Atlantic History of the English Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), Chapter 7. For pioneering scholarship on military labor, see Denver Brunsman's *The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013), 1–38 for an insightful overview of the history of English naval impressment, ca. 1500–1700; the rest of Brunsman's book deals with the key part naval impressment played in eighteenth century British empire-building. For other leading work on the relationship between military labor and eighteenth century British imperialism, see Niklas Frykman, "Seamen on Late Eighteenth Century Warships," *International Review of Social History* vol. 54 (2009): 67–93; Peter Way, "Class Warfare: Primitive Accumulation, Military Revolution and the British War Worker," in Marcel van der Linden and Karl Heinz Roth eds., *Beyond Marx: Confronting Labor History and the Concept of Labor with the Global Labor Relations of the 21st Century* (Berlin and Hamburg: Assoziation A, 2009); "Memoirs of an Invalid: James Miller and the Making of the British-American Empire in the Seven Years' War," in Donna Haverty-Stacke and Daniel J. Walkowitz ed., *Rethinking U.S. Labor History: Essays in the Working-Class Experience, 1756–2009* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010), 25–53.

To proceed, this chapter begins with a discussion of how the Commonwealth encouraged the transatlantic slave trade from Africa through imperial legislation and the impact these commercial policies had on the development of the colonial plantation complex. It then moves on to chart the reasons why the new imperial state revolutionized the system of colonial "transportation," the process by which the poor and others deemed undesirable were shipped into forced labor in the colonies. The last part of the chapter focuses on how the state, in the face of popular opposition, mobilized constructive labor for empire-building by means of military conscription.

Slave Trade

In the three years following its birth in 1649, the revolutionary Republic legislated England's Atlantic empire into existence through three sets of laws: the Plantation Act of 1650; the Navigation Act (1651); and the Act for the Settlement of Ireland (1652). The Irish settlement bill will be discussed below, but for now it's important to recognize that Parliament established its sovereignty over the colonies through the Plantation Act, which in turn gave it the authority to regulate imperial commerce through the Navigation Act the next year. Parliament intended to use the Navigation Act as leverage against Holland by forbidding Dutch merchants to trade with English colonies. At the time, the United Provinces loomed large in English eyes as Europe's greatest naval power. The Dutch Republic also figured as England's most potent commercial competitor around the globe, even in commerce with its own Atlantic colonies. The English hoped that the Navigation Act and the daunting prospect of lost profits would compel the Dutch to accept their invitation to partner in a militant Protestant, republican empire. Besides paving the way for a Protestant internationale, the imperial union the English proposed to the Dutch would open each country's global and colonial markets to the other, a lucrative trade that would fall under the protection of the world's most formidable blue water fighting forces. The United Provinces, however, rejected the Commonwealth's overture and the two republics went to war on the high seas in 1652.[7] England's victory in 1654 forced the Dutch to accept the Navigation Act's trade restrictions, an obvious boon to English merchants engaged in colonial commerce. Written largely by Maurice Thomson and Martin Noell, England's leading colonial merchants and two of the nation's most important slave traders, the Navigation Act created an

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7 There were three seventeenth century Anglo-Dutch Wars: 1652–1654; 1665–1667; 1672–1674.

imperial trade zone with excise and customs duties that forced colonists to conduct all extra-colonial commerce through English ports. It also promoted a version of what contemporaries called "free trade," in the sense that although the Act closed colonial commerce to foreigners, it opened it up to English merchants whose commerce abroad had been previously restricted by merchant monopolies.[8] Free trade under the Navigation Act meant greater access to the African slave trade for English merchants; indeed, the Navigation Act helped inaugurate England's rise as a slave trading Atlantic empire. Parliament had reincorporated the Guinea Company in 1651 to encourage its commercial ventures in Africa. But the state used the Navigation Act the same year to prevent the Guinea Company from monopolizing the commerce in enslaved Africans. As a result, new competition among English merchants expanded the volume of the slave trade to the English West Indies. By the mid-1650s, at least seventy five English slave ships were plying their lethal but very profitable trade off the African Gold Coast. By 1659, a Dutch bureaucrat living in the Bight of Benin recorded his wonder at the "endless number of (English) slavers" sailing there to purchase African people. By the end of the decade, vessels flying the English ensign were unloading 2,000 slaves annually to Barbados. As the Barbados historian Larry Gragg has noted, in the 1650s, English merchants eclipsed their Dutch rivals in the slave trade to the island. In a revealing instance of how the slave trade facilitated by the Navigation Act promoted the imperial state's other interests in the Caribbean, General Robert Venables, a commander of the Western Design expedition, drew on the authority of the Act to impound the "cargo" of a Dutch slave ship captured in Barbados. Venables then sold the slaves to sugar planters to raise money to buy arms for the impending English invasion of Spanish Hispaniola.[9]

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8   J.E. Farnell, "The Navigation Act of 1651, the First Dutch War, and the London Merchant Community," *Economic History Review* vol. 16, no. 3 (1964): 439–454; Russell Menard, *Sweet Negotiations: Sugar, Slavery, and Plantation Agriculture in Early Barbados* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006), 59; "Plantation Empire: How Sugar and Tobacco Planters Built Their Industries and Raised an Empire," *Agricultural History* vol. 81, no. 3 (2007): 312–314; Richard B. Sheridan, *Sugar and Slavery: Economic History of the West Indies, 1623–1775* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 92–95.

9   Larry Gragg, "'To Procure Negros': The English Slave Trade to Barbados, 1627–1660," *Slavery and Abolition* vol. 16, no. 1 (1995): 65–84; Margaret Makepeace, "English Traders on the Guinea Coast, 1657–1688: An Analysis of the East India Company Archive," *History in Africa*, vol. 16 (1989): 237–284; John C. Appleby, "A Guinea Venture, c. 1657: A Note on the Early English Slave Trade," *Mariner's Mirror* vol. 79, no. 1 (1993): 84–87; Leo F. Stock, *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting North America*, 5 vols. (Washington, DC, 1924), 1: 121–123; W. Noel Sainsbury, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and the*

The Navigation Act and the boom in England's African slave trade that it helped make possible figured crucially in the demographic transition of the unfree work-force on Barbados, where "negro" slaves began outnumbering European inden-tured servants certainly by the early 1660s, if not the mid-1650s. Barbados thus became the first place in the English empire to experience what colonial slavery scholars have called "the terrible transformation," whereby the system of perma-nent slavery, justified on racial grounds, replaced the indentured labor system as the main form of unfree labor in the colonial plantation complex. A decade after the passage of the Navigation Act, contemporaries, noting the profitability of racialized slavery, were calling African slaves "the sinews" of England's empire of liberty. The commercial policies of the newly-conceived imperial state thus played a catalytic part in the rise of slavery in the English West Indies and the racial stratification of freedom and slavery around the empire. As early as 1659, a member of Parliament, fearing that transporting Royalist rebels into colonial ser-vitude had violated the civil liberties of free born Englishmen, wondered aloud if the political "slavery" of arbitrary government had led to the physical enslave-ment of English people, thus making their lives "as cheap as…negros."[10]

The Navigation Acts fostered a conflicted imperial discourse of freedom and slavery. Royalist sugar planters despised the Navigation Act, arguing that a revolutionary regime of usurping puritan fanatics had forced them into politi-cal "slavery" by disrupting their own "free trade" with Dutch slavers, who had supplied them with African slaves at the outset of the sugar boom. Free trade, as highlighted by this conflict between the imperial state and colonial capitalists, had yet to take on a coherent meaning in the seventeenth century. Perhaps more

West Indies, 1574–1660 (London, 1860), 331, 339; Elizabeth Donnan, ed., *Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America, 1441–1700* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1930), 1: 126–134; C.H. Firth, ed., *The Narrative of General Venables* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1900), 34; Appendix D, 140–141; Bodleian Library Carte Ms 74 fol.37.

10   50,251 people from Britain and Ireland and elsewhere in Europe arrived in the English Chesapeake and Caribbean between 1650 and 1660. Historians estimate that anywhere between 50% and 75% of these migrants were servants. 40,726 people of African descent were imported, mostly to the Caribbean, during the same period, nearly all of them as enslaved persons. As the European (mostly from Britain and Ireland) rate of migration had greatly outpaced that from Africa (almost all from west/central Africa) during the preceding decades of colonization, unfree workers from Europe continued to outnumber their African counter-parts in the English Atlantic during the early 1650s, although Africans on Barbados came to outnumber Europeans by the late 1650s or early 1660s; this did not occur in the Chesapeake until the 1690s. For colonial migration statistics, see David Galenson, *White Servitude in Colonial America: An Economic Analysis* (New York, 1984), 216–218, tables H3 and H4. See E.A. Wrigley and R.S. Schofield, *The Population History of England, 1541–1871: A Reconstruction* (London, 1981), 227; Pestana, *The English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution,* 210–212.

importantly, the debate over free trade reveals how the commercial tensions generated by the conflicting interests of colonists and the imperial state were present at the empire's creation. Sharpened by the political language of freedom and slavery, these tensions rose and fell over the next century, although they spiked again little more than a century later following the passage of another set of navigation acts. The ensuing political dispute between colonists and the home government helped generate the imperial crisis that culminated in the American Revolution.[11]

But in another, much less discursive struggle between freedom and slavery, English merchants, seamen, and planters were forced to confront determined resistance by the Africans they had enslaved through "free trade," both on plantations and on the slave ships themselves. Across the Atlantic during the 1650s, slave ships bound for the West Indies supplied the stage for several slave uprisings. During the same period, a series of slave rebellions shook Barbados and Bermuda, encouraged by both the growing number of slaves in those colonies and the political fallout from the English Revolution, which divided the plantocracy and disrupted the disciplinary regime of the plantation, a vulnerability

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11 Farnell, "The Navigation Act of 1651, the First Dutch War and the London Merchant Community," 439–454. For the argument that the Navigation Act had more to do with English Continental diplomacy than colonial commercial competition, see Stephen Pincus, *Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650–1658* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 40–50. For a view critical of Pincus' that stresses the commercial dimensions of the Navigation Acts and first Anglo-Dutch War, see Jonathan Israel, "England, the Dutch Republic, and Europe in the Seventeenth Century," *Historical Journal* vol. 4, no. 2 (1997): 117–121. Outside the small circle of elite merchant revolutionaries, members of the radical republican Leveller movement also advocated for "free trade" because it helped small producers and wore away at the royal prerogative. See, for instance, see John Lilburne, *The Charters of London, or the Second Part of London's Liberty in Chains Discovered* (London, 1646). For more scholarship on seventeenth century notions of free trade, see Christian J. Koot, "A 'Dangerous Principle': Free Trade Discourses in Barbados and the English Leeward Islands, 1650–1689," *Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* vol. 5, no.1 (2007): 132–163; Thomas Leng, "Commercial Conflict and Regulation in the Discourse of Trade in Seventeenth-Century England," *The Historical Journal* vol. 48, no. 4 (2005): 933–954; Pestana, *English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution*, 159–174; David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (New York: Cambridge, 2000), 100–124. For the classic statement of unrestricted free trade, see Hugo Grotius, *Mare Liberum* (Amsterdam, 1609). For the inter-imperial view, see John Selden, *Mare Clausum* (London, 1635). The imperial state periodically attempted to enforce its commercial policies on the colonies (ca. 1650–1775) with limited success. As Nuala Zahedieh argues, by the turn of the eighteenth century, colonists and their commercial and financial partners in London had created a de facto free trading Atlantic economy that largely eluded the state's commercial restrictions. See Zahedieh's *The Capital and the Colonies: London and the Atlantic Economy, 1660–1700* (New York: Cambridge, 2010).

that the enslaved seized upon to exploit. The enslaved would continue to resist in a cycle of Atlantic-wide rebellions that stretched into the late eighteenth century. In contrast to the navigation acts, these rebellions created an imperial crisis from below in the wake of the American Revolution, when hundreds of thousands of Britons, inspired by the freedom struggles of slaves and uneasy about the state's attempt to subject their American cousins to the imperial yoke, turned to abolitionism in an attempt to redefine the nature of British liberty.[12]

Colonial Transportation

While commercial legislation made a formative contribution to England's rapid ascent as a competitive player in the African slave trade, the state itself did not directly engage in the trade; the imperial state did, however, participate extensively in the trade of indentured servants, who made up the bulk of the unfree workforce on English plantations for much of the seventeenth century. It should be noted at the outset of this discussion that the history of English colonial transportation preceded the birth of the imperial state. Early in the seventeenth century, in conjunction with local government and private interests, the state began transporting people into colonial servitude to alleviate the social problems that civil society associated with England's rapid population growth. These initiatives, however, required the state to assume a power over its own people that it had never exercised before. In 1618, the City of London and the Virginia Company had devised a plan to capture and ship poor children to Virginia, where their moral characters would be reformed through the discipline that "severe masters" would mete out on them as domestics and tobacco field hands. The concern the Virginia Company and the City showed for the children's moral well-being must be measured against the protests of the children's parents, the children themselves, and members of the London citizenry. In the winter of 1619, all of these constituencies petitioned the English state to stop a shipment to Virginia of over a hundred poor children, whom constables had seized on the City streets. Responding to these petitions, the Privy Council, acting on behalf of King James I, recognized that no legal

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12   Jerome Handler, "Slave Revolts and Conspiracies in Seventeenth-Century Barbados," *New West Indian Guide* vol. 56 (1982): 5–43. Hilary McD Beckles, "'A Riotous and Unruly Lot': Irish Indentured Servants and Freemen in the English West Indies, 1644–1713," *William and Mary Quarterly* vol. 47, no. 4 (1990): 503–522; Linebaugh and Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra*, Chapters 4–6. Christopher L. Brown, *Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

foundation existed to force children away from their families to work against their will "beyond the seas." As a result, the Privy Council turned to the royal prerogative and sanctioned the City/Virginia Company plan, declaring it as beneficial to the state for relieving it of future idlers, criminals and vagabonds. Reinforcing the position of the City and Virginia Company, the Privy Council also asserted that the allegedly dissolute children would be morally redeemed through hard labor and stern task masters.[13]

The English Revolution and the imperial turn it quickly took produced another revolution in the state's colonial transportation policies, when England's self-described "godly" revolutionaries united their vision of social reformation at home with imperial ambitions abroad. Whereas before the Revolution, transportation evolved as a measure to combat the unruly expansion of the early modern English population, the Wars of the Three Kingdoms (1638–1651) and the English Civil Wars (1642–1651), which provided the military context for the English Revolution, had led to a dramatic population decline, around 3% of the total population. The figure, in comparison, exceeded the percentage of English killed during World War I. Although an expanding population no longer presented problems, puritan revolutionaries made England's moral reformation a much higher policy priority than had their royal predecessors, passing a 1652 act that empowered all English JPs to ship undesirables off to colonial plantations. Scouring the land of what the self-styled saints described as the "noxious humours" of "lewd…dangerous…rogues, vagrants, and other idle persons," would "secure the peace of the Commonwealth" and promote England's Christian regeneration. Moral reformation at home, in turn, would provide the foundation for godly expansion abroad to advance England's interests, the first of which, according to the state, lay in advancing the apocalyptic project of the Protestant Reformation. Deliberating with the Council of State over the proposed invasion of the Spanish West Indies in the spring of 1654, Cromwell told the Council of State that he planned to use "force to secure…eight or ten thousand bodies of men every year" to "vent" them out of England and Scotland and onto Caribbean plantations. Caribbean empire-building thus promoted England's domestic reformation through a program of ethical cleansing based on colonial transportation. "Providence,"

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13   Abbot Emerson Smith, "The Transportation of Convicts to the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century," *American Historical Review* vol. 39, no. 2 (1934): 233–234; J.V. Lyle, ed., *Acts of the Privy Council of England, vol. 37, 1619–1621* (London, 1931), 118; Robert C. Johnson, "The Transportation of Vagrant Children from London to Virginia, 1618–1622," in Howard S. Reinmuth, Jr., ed., *Early Stuart Studies: Essays in Honor of David Harris Willson* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), 137–151.

Cromwell roundly declared, "seemed to lead us hither to the West Indies," where ruled "the Spaniard, being the greatest enemy to the Protestants in the world." With the Spanish antichrist growing richer, stronger, and prouder through its American dominions, the Lord Protector concluded "we must now consider the work we may do in the world as well as at home."[14]

Beyond promoting England's own godly reformation, the imperial state used transportation to combat political resistance in Scotland, Ireland, and England itself. Hundreds of Scottish soldiers captured during the Republic's conquest of Scotland (1651–1654) and dozens of English Royalists taken during a 1655 rising were shipped to the colonies, where they were forced into labor in places as disparate as Massachusetts iron works, Virginia tobacco plantations, and Barbados sugar mills.[15] Over ten thousand Irish Catholics, possibly tens of thousands, fared far worse than the English and Scots, however, as they were targeted for transportation for multiple and sometimes overlapping reasons that included poverty, underemployment, religion, and suspicion of political sedition. But the underlying purpose behind all of the reasons the state cited for transporting Irish Catholics lay in completing the conquest and colonization of Ireland.[16]

The state's transportation policies in mid-seventeenth century Ireland differed fundamentally from those in England and Scotland, since the state designed the transportation of Irish Catholics to Atlantic colonies to facilitate the colonization of Catholic Ireland by English and Scottish Protestants. English merchants were deeply involved in this process, particularly men like

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14   Padraig Lenihan, "War and Population, 1649–52," *Irish Economic and Social History* vol. 24 (1997): 18–21; C.H. Firth, ed., *The Clarke Papers*, 4 vols. (London: Camden Society, 1891), 3: 203–206; S.R. Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649–1660*, 4 vols. (London, 1894–1903), 3: 159; Egerton Mss 2395 fols. 228–229, BL; Allen B. Hinds, *Calendar of State Papers of English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, 1655–1656* (London, 1930), 146–161; Sainsbury, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial*, 447.

15   Marsha Hamilton, *Social and Economic Networks in Early Massachusetts: Atlantic Connections* (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009), 42–43; Pestana, *English Atlantic in Age of Revolution*, 183, 208–212.

16   While nobody knows the exact number transported from Ireland into the colonies during the 1650s, the number certainly exceeded ten thousand. See my discussion of Irish transportation in *Fire Under the Ashes: An Atlantic History of the English Revolution*, 260–261, and FN 36, p. 347 for archival and secondary sources. William Petty, an early political economist who gained invaluable experience in Cromwellian Ireland evaluating the profitability of Irish land and labor for the Commonwealth, estimated 34,000 Irish men were shipped out of Ireland by the English following the 1649 conquest, although this number would have included soldiers sent to Europe. See Linebaugh and Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra*, 123.

Martin Noell with close ties to the revolutionary governments of the 1650s. Noell had helped finance the Irish conquest and was deeply invested in the slave trade; he also owned land and estates in Barbados, Montserrat, and Jamaica. For their services to the state in the conquest of Ireland, Noell and his fellow investors were remunerated in confiscated Catholic land, which they either developed or sold off to Protestant settlers. But Catholic lands could not be colonized without removing Catholic people, which led the English state, through the Act for the Settlement of Ireland, to enact the policy of transplantation, whereby Catholics would be forced to give up their property and move west across the River Shannon to take up state-allotted holdings in the province of Connaught. When Catholics, either in arms or through other means, resisted being forced into what amounted to an early modern reservation system for Irish "savages," they could be transported beyond the seas and into forced labor in English colonies. Irish soldiers who had surrendered with the Duke of Ormonde's army were first targeted for transportation. Partisan fighters called "tories" who continued to fight after Ormonde's formal surrender also faced transportation when captured. To terrorize the Catholic population into submission, the state also subjected the families and neighbors of tories, or any civilian whom the English accused of supporting the tory insurgency, to colonial transportation. Indeed, entire villages suspected of such sympathies were emptied of their inhabitants, whom the English shipped to Barbados and Jamaica. Nothing like this ever happened in England or Scotland, because these countries were largely Protestant and they were not being colonized. In Ireland, transplantation sped the way for colonization while transportation made the colonization of the Caribbean more lucrative by supplying workers to labor hungry sugar planters.[17]

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17   Robert Dunlop, ed., *Ireland Under the Commonwealth: Being a Selection of Documents Relating to the Government of Ireland from 1651 to 1659*, 2 vols. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1913), 1: 338–339, 341, 354–355, 430, 437, 467, 477, 485, 489–490, 528, 544, 553; Robert P. Mahaffy, *Calendar of the State Papers Relating to Ireland Preserved in the Public Record Office: Adventurers for Land, 1642–1659* (London, 1903), 63, 382; *Calendar of State Papers Relating to Ireland Preserved in the Public Record Office, 1647–1660, Addenda 1625–1660* (London, 1903), 437, 447, 459, 461, 462, 494, 503, 509, 518, 519, 559; Micheál Ó Siochrú, *Oliver Cromwell and the Conquest of Ireland* (London: Faber and Faber, 2008), 226–230. It has been argued elsewhere in this book that the state's transportation policies for the Irish poor in the 1650s followed those developed for the English poor in the early seventeenth century. In truth, the Irish Catholic experience with colonial transportation during the 1650s was exceptional, not derivative, since Ireland itself was being colonized in the wake of its conquest at the hands of the Republic. Through Irish colonization, the English imperial state reduced millions of Irish to poverty through the destructive effects of warfare, the

While the purpose of colonial transportation changed with the advent of English empire-building in the Atlantic, so too did the scale. Before the imperial turn of the Revolution, the City of London and/or the English state sanctioned the transportation of usually small groups of prisoners. By the mid-1650s, with the move to empire in full motion, the state ordered the transportation of thousands of people at a time. In England, the state created a legal framework that bound provincial courts into a national system that would systematically expand the scale of colonial transportation, ordering county JPs to send assize lists to London, where the government could compute the number of felons it might choose to ship to the colonies. Officers from the New Model Army assumed the duties of JPs in 1655, when the Protectorate regime under Oliver Cromwell reorganized England's counties into ten districts governed by major generals. In Ireland, successive amendments to the Act for Settlement made all Catholics subject to transportation who had in any way supported resistance to Parliamentary armies in the 1640s or to the conquering New Model Army in the 1650s; this essentially made the entire Catholic population eligible.[18]

In sum, the imperial state's main interest in colonial transportation lay in moral reformation at home, suppressing political dissent in Britain and Ireland, and advancing the conquest and colonization of Ireland; supplying unfree labor to the colonies was important, but not primary, except perhaps for the merchants who profited from the state contracts they received to bring transportees to the colonies. Still, the tens of thousands of people the state did force

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large-scale expropriation of Irish Catholic land, and the eviction of Catholic tenants. The state also resorted to manufactured famines to crush tory resistance to colonization. Thus, the problem of Irish poverty in the 1650s that the English state tried to solve partially through transportation was produced directly by the English state through the militant Protestant campaign it waged in Ireland to disenfranchise and/or destroy the Catholic population. In contrast, the pre-imperial English state used transportation in piecemeal fashion and without religious bias to combat the ill-effects of poverty produced by rapid population expansion and the transition to capitalism. In Ireland, the imperial state systematically applied transportation in an almost totally sectarian fashion to the Catholic population it had intentionally impoverished, a population, moreover, that had DECLINED BY 20%, largely due to the violence visited on the country by English empire-builders.

18   Peter Wilson Coldham, *Emigrants in Chains: A Social History of Forced Emigration to the Americas of Felons, Destitute Children, Political and Religious Non-Conformists, Vagabonds, Beggars and Other Undesirables 1607–1776* (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1992), 49–50; M.A.E. Green, *Calendar of State Papers, Interregnum, 1656–1657* (London, 1883), 324, 343; S.R. Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649–1656*, 4 vols. (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1903, 1965), 4: 33; *An Act for the Attainder of the Rebels in Ireland: At the Parliament Begun at Westminster the 17th Day of September, 1656* (London, 1657).

into colonial bondage, mostly in the West Indies, did help meet the critical need for unfree labor during the West Indian sugar boom which had begun on Barbados in the mid-1640s. Ultimately, transportation reveals the state's critical part in English empire-building; by forcing British and Irish people into servitude across the Atlantic, the state helped subsidize the explosive growth of plantation capitalism and the consolidation of England's imperial interests in the colonization of Ireland and the West Indies.

Early English imperial expansion in the Atlantic also helped drive capitalist innovations in the trade and exploitation of unfree labor. In the colonial transportation system devised by the imperial state, people were not just sent to the colonies to work—they were sold into servitude, a form of bondage that most would experience on cash crop plantations. As recent research has revealed, most unskilled indentured servants who worked on mid-seventeenth century Chesapeake and West Indian plantations were largely deceived into service by "spirits" or "kidnappers," who by hook or crook or flat out coercion lured or forced young people aboard ships from which they could not alight until they reached their colonial destination. Although economic historians have portrayed indentured servitude as a contractual relationship between master and servant, those who had been spirited away to the colonies had their contracts of service imposed upon them, either by colonial authorities or through a bargain struck between the ship's master and a planter, making the worker's consent irrelevant. The worker could be sold and sold again for any reason, again without their consent, for the time stipulated in the contract, which, depending upon the age of the person in question, ranged usually from four to ten years. As these contracts and colonial estate law held, the worker would serve as the property of their master or masters for the amount of time contractually stipulated; servants were therefore legally recognized among the "goods and chattels" possessed by their masters. As the historian John Wareing has found, spirits and kidnappers supplied mainstream merchants and ship captains with the bulk of the servants they sold into colonial servitude in the mid-seventeenth century. State transportation added another link in the servant supply chain, which was forged mostly through coercion and deception. Recognizing the vital role that spirits and the state played in the servant trade has important repercussions, as it casts a dubious light on the way economic historians have described indentured servitude as an institution based on voluntary migration and a market-driven contractual relationship between equally informed, consenting parties.[19]

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19   John Wareing, "The Regulation and Organisation of the Trade in Indentured Servants for the American Colonies in London, 1645–1718, and the Career of William Haverland,

Indentured servitude was a temporary form of chattel bondage, and the minority of historians who have perceptively described it in this way have done well to note how the accretion of colonial labor law over the course of the seventeenth century defined it as such. Even more importantly, these historians have recognized how the chattel dimensions of servitude laid the legal foundation for the buying and selling of colonial workers, a foundation upon which the most inhuman form of bondage in world history would rise, racialized chattel slavery in the English Atlantic. But the emphasis on colonial law's part in the construction of involuntary chattel bondage has obscured the part played by the imperial state. First, most people transported by the state did not have a choice in the matter, and even the felons who selected plantation labor over the gallows can hardly be described as doing so without duress; moreover, given the high mortality rates of servants and slaves in the Chesapeake and West Indies, choosing a rake over a noose often meant a prolonged death sentence. Secondly, in the colonial transportation system, the state figured as the first agent in the chattelization of the transported; the state sold each transported person to a merchant contractor; the contractor in turn, via the ship master they employed to trade in the colonies, sold the person at a profit to a colonial planter, who could then re-sell the servant at their discretion. Despite what most economic historians have written, indentured servants themselves and not just their contractual time, were being bought and sold, as planters gained bodily control of the servants they purchased as "goods and chattels." As I have written elsewhere, those forced to labor in such conditions often referred to themselves revealingly as "bond slaves." Through its innovative transportation policies, the young imperial state played a formative part in fashioning the involuntary, chattel dimensions of colonial servitude, where indentured laborers often conceived of themselves, non-metaphorically, as slaves.[20]

Emigration Agent," (PhD Diss., University of London, 2000); "'Violently Taken Away or Cheatingly Duckoyed': The Illicit Recruitment in London of Indentured Servants for the American colonies, 1645–1718," *London Journal* vol. 26, no. 2 (2001): 1–22. For more on servant plantation labor, see my "Indentured Servitude in the Seventeenth Century Altantic: A Brief Survey of the Literature," *History Compass* (2013), 1–10.

20   Simon Newman, *A New World of Labor: The Development of Plantation Slavery in the British Atlantic* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014). For more work on the chattel nature of indentured servitude and its import in the development of racialized chattel slavery in the Atlantic plantation complex, see Allen, *The Invention of the White Race* 2: 1–147; Hilary McD. Beckles, "The Colours of Property: Brown, White and Black Chattels and their Responses on the Caribbean Frontier," *Slavery & Abolition* vol. 15, no. 2 (1994): 36–51; "The Concept of 'White Slavery' in the English Caribbean During the Early

Conscription

In a tradition that stretched back to the middle ages, the state claimed the right to conscript or impress its subjects for landed military service in the case of domestic insurrection or foreign invasion. Impressment for foreign wars had no constitutional mandate. By the 1620s, however, English parliaments were giving their tacit consent to the unpopular practice, which had already begun to stir violent resistance. During the Wars of the Three Kingdoms and the English Civil Wars (1638–1651), both Royalist and Parliamentary armies resorted to conscription to field the ranks of "the foot" or the infantry. Each side in the conflict could argue that such coercion fell within the just tradition of raising armies to put down domestic insurrections, although the scale of conscription that marked military recruitment during these conflicts dwarfed all previous initiatives. [21]

The exploding demand for unfree military labor had dramatic political consequences. By the end of the First Civil War (1642–1646), the Levellers, a popular republican movement that attracted both civilians and soldiers from Parliament's New Model Army, had organized mass opposition to impressment in principle, and not just for present military purposes. Leveller campaigns in the late 1640s drew hundreds of thousands of subscribers who signed petitions that placed the demand to end conscription alongside calls for the abolition of established religion, the House of Lords, and the monarchy, among other reforms. The Levellers likened the condition of pressed soldiers to "Turkish galley slaves." Although scholars of the Revolution have written volumes about the

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Seventeenth Century," in John Brewer and Susan Staves, ed*., Early Modern Conceptions of Property* (London: Routledge, 1996); Warren M. Billings, "The Law of Servants and Slaves in Seventeenth-Century Virginia," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* vol. 99 (1991): 45–62; John Donoghue, *'Fire under the Ashes': An Atlantic History of the English Revolution*, Chapters 6 and 7. Newman, *A New World of Labor*, Chapters 4 and 5.

21   During the famous Petition of Right debates in the House of Commons, participants recognized both the illegality and alleged necessity of the press for soldiers for service abroad. See J.G.A. Pocock, "Propriety, Liberty and Valor: Ideology, Rhetoric and Speech in the 1628 Debates in the House of Commons," in D.N. DeLuna, Perry Anderson, and Glenn Burgess, eds., *The Political Imagination in History: Essays Concerning J.G.A. Pocock* (Dexter, MI: Owlworks Press, 2006), 252–256. For more work on infantry conscription before and during the English Revolution, see Ian Gentles, *New Model Army in England, Scotland, and Ireland, 1645–1653* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992, 1994), 31–32; "Why Men Fought in the British Civil Wars," *History Teacher* vol. 26, no. 4 (1993): H.N. Brailsford, *The Levellers and the English Revolution* [edited and prepared by Christopher Hill] (London: Cresset Press, 1961), 14, 143, 147, 101, 299, 352, 462, 530.

political language of slavery and freedom during the conflict, the Levellers were doing more than applying vivid linguistic devices to articulate their opposition to impressment. The members of the radical movement actually understood conscription as a material consequence of political tyranny, as an embodied form of political slavery. The references to bondage were therefore literal, not metaphorical: "We entreat you," pled the Levellers, "to consider what difference there is between binding a man to an oar as a galley-slave in Turkey or Argiere, and pressing of men to serve in your war." The state's forcing men to work and kill against their will through conscription thus figured for the Levellers as one of the worst violations of the republican axiom of government by consent. Conscription also destroyed the classic republican virtue of citizen armies, perverting them into the mercenary instruments of tyrants who fought for gold and glory rather than the noble end of commonwealth liberty. Although the Levellers failed to convince the New Model generals to abolish impressment, they did guarantee that army conscription would not be employed in the service of foreign wars. The promise, as we will see, was not kept.[22]

Although unpopular, most regarded naval impressment as a necessary evil, although the sailors themselves found it both unnecessary and evil. Like conscription for the army, forcing men into the navy had medieval roots. But there were important differences between the two forms of impressment. The state, as the Levellers decried in their petitions, had long targeted the poor when pressing men to serve in the infantry. Forced service in the army thus served the state in two ways (while also revealing the class bias that defined state interests): first, it got men into the ranks to provide the needed military labor; secondly, it turned allegedly idle, criminally-prone and potentially seditious poor young men from social and political problems into state assets. Naval impressment, in contrast, did not target the poor as such, although many if not most men pressed into sea-borne service did not possess much in the way of material wealth. Sailors, unlike foot soldiers, represented skilled labor, and to effectively man a potent navy, press gangs went in search of seasoned, able-bodied

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22   'Argiere' referred to in the quotation is now spelled Algiers. There is a vast body of work on the language of freedom and slavery in the political discourse of the English Revolution. For illuminating entry points, see Jonathan Scott, "What were Commonwealth Principles?" *Historical Journal* vol. 47, no. 3 (2004): 591–613; Quentin Skinner, "John Milton and the Politics of Slavery," in Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics: Renaissance Virtues*, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2: 286–308. For the Leveller quotes, see Richard Overton (?) and William Walwyn (?), *A Remonstrance of Many Thousand Citizens* (London, 1646), 16. For more on the Leveller opposition to impressment, see Donoghue, *'Fire under the Ashes': An Atlantic History of the English Revolution*, 184–185, 187, 190–194, 196.

seamen. Pressing "land men," however, that is men without sailing experience, was regarded as an outright affront to English liberty. With that said, sailors, as well as their families, friends, and neighbors, in other words, the people who made up the maritime working-classes of England, did not make such distinctions, and resisted the press gang with consistent vigor. During the English Civil Wars, both sides pressed thousands of men into their navies at unprecedented rates, which ultimately disrupted the tenuous stasis that gave naval impressment at least the thin veneer of legitimacy that its army counterpart had never enjoyed. In fact, it was a sea captain from a prominent maritime family, Thomas Rainsborough, who led the Leveller charge against impressment at the famous Putney Debates. Rainsborough and his Leveller colleagues joined their opposition to infantry impressment with a campaign against naval impressment as well, demonstrating the growing conflict between popular perceptions of political liberty and the military demands of the early modern state.[23]

As with colonial transportation, the imperial turn of the English Revolution had a revolutionary impact on the practice of military conscription, which the state, for the first time, would use in the service of empire building in the Atlantic world. But unlike the productive labor that state transportation mobilized for colonial plantations, conscription raised the constructive, military labor necessary for colonial conquest. In early 1649, as we have seen, the revolutionary government set out to conquer Catholic Ireland, an imperial initiative that required the mass mobilization of military labor. The soldiers of the New Model Army resisted forced service in Ireland for an array of reasons, not the least of which was the republican conviction that the state had no right to compel its own people to fight abroad without their consent. In the spring of 1649, several mutinies broke out in the army to protest the impending invasion. They were easily crushed and the New Model Army, under the command of General Oliver Cromwell, began its Irish campaign that August. Due to battle, disease, exposure, and malnutrition, the ranks of the infantry quickly thinned. As a result, throughout the period of the conquest (1649–1660), the Irish garrison was continually replenished with pressed troops, many of whom arrived without arms or uniforms and were barely fit to serve. The garrison, however,

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23   For naval impressment in the English Revolution and the seventeenth century more generally, see Bernard Capp, *Cromwell's Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution 1648–1660* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 58, 122, 258–259, 263; Brunsman, *Evil Necessity*, 20–25. For the Levellers on naval impressment, see *An Agreement of the Free People of England* (London, 1649), Clause 11. For Rainsborough in particular, see Whitney R.D. Jones, *Thomas Rainborowe: Civil War Seamen, Siegemaster, and Radical* (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2005).

managed to hang on in the face of continued tory opposition, achieving a key objective of the imperial state, which also realized another of its objectives through the Irish press, ridding England of thousands of allegedly idle and morally degenerate men and boys in the pursuit of puritan-styled social reformation.[24]

In 1653, with the surrender of Ormonde's army, the state could shift more of its resources from Ireland to the naval war that had erupted with the United Provinces the previous year. We have already discussed how the Dutch war originated in the wider empire-building context of the Navigation Act, but we have not addressed how it resulted in the biggest naval build-up to that point in English history. The build-up required dozens of new ships and tens of thousands more men. During the duration of the Dutch War (1652–1654), the English navy grew by an average of ten thousand men a year, most of them pressed into service through Parliamentary ordinances. Able bodied seamen were in increasingly short supply, due to a declining population and the expansion of England's merchant marine, which grew in proportion to the nation's rapidly globalizing commercial interests. Ironically, the English navy also had to compete with its Dutch counterpart for the service of English seamen, since conditions and pay on the ships of the United Provinces were comparatively much better. As the maritime historian Denver Brunsman has written, the English sailor Edward Coxere, whom the press gangs forced out of hiding in maritime London and onto an English vessel in the Dutch war, had actually served more time on Dutch as compared to English ships; he found it necessary to relearn the language of sailing in English because he had absorbed it so deeply in Dutch. The Dutch, who eschewed the practice of impressment, had grown their powerful navy through positive incentives rather than through the coercive means employed by the English, which occasioned continual resistance on the part of English seamen and their friends, families, and neighbors. The Dutch, however, fell to the English in 1654, a victory made possible in part through the press gang, the subjects of which usually fought well once they resigned to their fate aboard ship. But back on land, resistance resumed in more organized form, as sailors rioted twice during the war on Tower Hill, the site of the Navy Office, to claim back pay and to protest illegal impressments in

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24   Chris Durston, "'Let Ireland be Quiet': Opposition in England to the Cromwellian Conquest of Ireland," *History Workshop Journal* vol. 21 (1986): 105–112; Henry Denne, *The Levellers Design Discovered: or, the Anatomie of the Late Unhappy Mutiny Presented unto the Soldiery of the Army* (London, 1649); G.E. Aylmer, *The Levellers in the English Revolution* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975), 44–45; Dunlop, ed., *Ireland under the Commonwealth*, 2: 50, 133–134.

some of the worst urban unrest London had seen since the outbreak of the English Revolution.[25]

With the victorious conclusion of the Dutch War, the English Commonwealth quickly turned from its fiercest Protestant rival to its most powerful Catholic adversary, plotting an ambitious course of imperial expansion in the Spanish Caribbean that came to be known as the Western Design. Regime-change, however, occurred within the imperial state late in the Dutch war, when army officers led by Major General Oliver Cromwell conspired to dissolve two successive republican governments over the course of 1653. By December of that year, Cromwell had been declared Lord Protector, assuming full command over the nation's armed forces until a new Parliament could be called. Cromwell, a devoted admirer of Sir Walter Raleigh, was easily convinced by the slave trader and colonial investor Martin Noell and several in his circle to move quickly to undertake the conquest of the Spanish West Indies. As the sugar boom continued to explode across the English Caribbean, Noell and his cohort argued that such a "western design" would have apocalyptic consequences, progressing the Protestant Reformation at the expense of the antichristian power of Catholic Spain by violently depriving it of the source of its imperial strength, the wealth it derived from its American colonies. Pillaging gold and silver through privateering would not be enough; the English needed to "gain ground" in the Caribbean, as Cromwell declared, by conquering Spanish colonies. After deliberating where to strike, Cromwell and the Protectorate Council of State, advised by Noell and company and heavily under the influence of army officers close to Cromwell, chose Hispaniola as the chief target.[26]

The Western Design required the mobilization of a transatlantic invasion force, which in turn called for another, extensive campaign to conscript the constructive military labor necessary for imperial expansion. Impressment for the West Indian expedition, moreover, would take place hard on the heels of the campaigns ordered for the Dutch War and as others continued to man the imperial garrison in Ireland. As we have seen, the state's claim to dominion over the bodies of its subjects for military service had expanded in proportion to its imperial ambitions, although the claim itself had been contested by soldiers, sailors, and hundreds of thousands of Leveller supporters at the very

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25   Brunsman, *Evil Necessity*, 24; Capp, *Cromwell's Navy*, 9, 289. For Levellers holding up the Dutch non-impressment policy as an example for English reformers to follow, see *A Remonstrance of Many Thousand Citizens* (London, 1646), 16.

26   Bodleian Library Rawl Ms A 30.171; Firth, ed., *Clarke Papers*, 3: 203–206; S.R. Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649–1660*, 4 vols. (London, 1894–1903), 3: 159.

moment of the imperial state's creation. The tension reached a breaking point as the West Indian armada prepared to embark, with navy and army mutinies bringing the conflict between the the imperial state, via the political economy of capitalism and the civic virtue of republican citizenship, into bold relief. The Protectorate had continued to withhold sailors' pay from the Dutch War while it had renewed the naval press for the Western Design without Parliament's consent, an illegal act. It had also impressed "land men" for naval service, another illegal act that also revealed how desperate the navy's labor needs had become. Finding friends in high places, the sailors, led by the republican radical Admiral John Lawson, mutinied at Portsmouth in October 1654. The mutineers demanded back pay, better conditions, and "that they not be imprested to serve…apprehending it to be inconsistent with the principles of freedom and liberty, to force men to serve in military employment, either by sea or by land." The government broke the mutiny by delivering back pay, although later that December in Portsmouth, they faced another mutiny, this time by the army.[27]

As the fleet readied to drop anchor and sail for the Caribbean, the soldiers, mostly pressed out of English jails, assembled on the Portsmouth docks. When the signal to board was fired the soldiers ran away and hid anywhere in the town that they could. Their officers eventually reassembled the troops on the docks, although it took armed force, including the intervention of General Henry Desborough, who used the backside of his horse, to force the men up the gangplanks and onto their ships. As one officer reported, having been given no arms or uniforms, they justifiably feared they were being transported beyond the seas into bondage. Once the ships set sail, another mutiny occurred when soldiers conspired to take command of a ship to divert it to the Isle of Wight. Dropping anchor in the Caribbean in February, the press for the infantry continued, although most servants in Barbados and other English controlled islands, saw military service in a superior light to slave labor on sugar plantations. Planters complained bitterly that they were being deprived of invaluable labor and of Protestant servants whose service they hoped to rely upon should Irish and African laborers choose to rise up, which they did indeed do the next year following this disruption to the plantation regime. General Robert Venables remained unmoved, dismissing the planters as a "company of whining geese."

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27   Henderson, ed., *The Clarke Papers*, 5: 115, 190, 200; John Jeafferson, ed., *Middlesex County Records*, 4 vols. (London: Middlesex Co. Records Society, 1888), 3: 224; Green, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Interregnum* (1653–1654), 319; Capp, *Cromwell's Navy*, 136–138; *The Humble Petition of the Seamen* (London, 1654).

The invasion of Hispaniola ended in disaster, largely due to Venables' incompetence. Regrouping, Venables in conjunction with Admiral William Penn, the naval commander, chose Spanish Jamaica as the next target. The English carried Jamaica easily, as the Spanish had only provided the island with meager defenses. English officers, awarded land for their services, pressed their soldiers into plantation work to grow food and cash crops. The soldiers mutinied again, believing that their original fear of being enslaved had come to fruition. With scant provisions in an unfamiliar climate that made the soldiers prone to disease, Jamaica quickly turned into a death trap for the English soldiers forced to labor there. As one soldier described the scene, "there were many dead, their carcasses lying unburied in the highways and among bushes...many of them that were alive walked like ghosts or dead men, who as I went through the town, lay groaning and crying out, 'Bread, for the Lord's sake!'"[28]

In all, six of the seven thousand troops, the great majority pressed into service, died during the year-long campaign the English waged in the West Indies. In a manner of decades, however, the island would become the richest spot in the English empire, with profits derived from sugar and slaves. In the long run, the immediate failures of Cromwell's transatlantic armada would be eclipsed by the great success of English empire building in Jamaica, a project that, as one Western Design veteran wrote, had aimed at the "utter extirpation of all idle, profane, irreligious ones...sent over as soldiers and servants into this new conquered commonwealth."[29]

Conclusion

The early modern English imperial state first took shape in 1649 with the conquest and colonization of Ireland and quickly assumed transtlantic dimensions through subsequent legislation and force of arms. While the state had invested very little in the way of colonial development in the Atlantic for most of the seventeenth century, the Plantation Act of 1650 declared Parliament's

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28 British Library Egerton Mss 2648 fos. 247; Firth, ed., *Venables' Narrative*, Appendix D, 142–143; Thomas Birch, ed., *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, 7 vols. (London, 1742), 4: 151; quote from Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate*, 4: 216.

29 Firth, ed., *Venables' Narrative*, 20, 28, 34, 45, Appendix B, 116–122, Appendix E, 156; I.S., *A Brief and Perfect Journal of the Late Proceedings and Success of the English Army in the West Indies,* 6, 16, 24; Carla Gardina Pestana, "English Character and the Fiasco of the Western Design," *Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* vol. 3, no. (2005): 5; Bodleian Library Rawlinson Mss A 36 fos. 368, 374–376; 37 fols. 31–32; 53 fol. 284.

sovereign authority over all the colonies. The following year, the Navigation Act created an imperial trade zone excluding foreign competition. Revealing what became a perennial disconnect between the imperial state and colonial governments, colonists objected to the political "slavery" that the state's initiatives allegedly subjected them to, including the prohibition of the trade with Dutch slavers that had helped make sugar production profitable in the West Indies. The imperial state responded by sending fleets across the Atlantic to force colonial governments into submission, although with only limited success, as colonists continued to trade with foreign merchants. The Dutch too, objected to the Navigation Acts, which led in 1652 to a naval war which the English won in the spring of 1654, a victory that in turn ensured the rise of a profitable English slave trade to the West Indies. That December, the state embarked upon its most ambitious imperial initiative to date, the conquest of the Spanish Caribbean, which despite heavy losses, led to the capture of Jamaica, which eventually became the crown jewel in England's Atlantic empire.

The English state's new commitment to Atlantic empire-building in the mid-seventeenth century depended upon its ability to command various forms of unfree labor. In its infancy, the imperial state pursued English moral reformation and the colonization of Catholic Ireland, two policies that revolutionized the practice of colonial transportation and sent tens of thousands of people against their will into colonial bondage. As the state recognized, colonial transportation supplied West Indian sugar planters with cheap labor to supplement the expanding African slave labor force that had made plantation capitalism so profitable. But while the imperial state succeeded in mobilizing productive plantation labor, empire building also required the mobilization of constructive labor through military conscription. Without impressing tens of thousands of men to serve in the Irish conquest, the Dutch War, and the Western Design to the Spanish Caribbean, English empire building in the Atlantic would have ground to a halt. In this way, the state's coercive mobilization of constructive military labor proved indispensable to the success of its imperial projects around the Atlantic. Importantly, to ensure the success of transportation and conscription as instruments of empire building, the state had to overcome the objections of its own people and the armed resistance of those it had conquered in Ireland. In England, the state circumvented popular republican resistance by expanding its sovereign claims, for the first time, to the bodies and labor power of its own subjects for the purpose of imperial expansion in the Atlantic. In Ireland, the state overcame Catholic resistance through manufactured famine, violent force, and the political terrorism of subjecting non-combatants to colonial transportation. As few scholars have

noted, transportation also helped lay the chattel foundations for colonial bondage in the English Atlantic. The state's commercial policies abetted this process as well, promoting the proliferation of racialized slavery by fostering "free trade" legislation that expanded English participation in the transatlantic slave trade. As this chapter has demonstrated, by sanctioning the sale of Africans into perpetual slavery and coercing the constructive and productive labor of its own subjects, the state assisted in the creation of an unfree colonial labor system during a critical period of capital formation in the English plantation complex. Within this context, the state also helped to fashion the central paradox of English imperial ideology, that a freedom loving empire could be built on the foundation of forced labor and slavery.

Indenture, Transportation, and Spiriting: Seventeenth Century English Penal Policy and 'Superfluous' Populations[1]

Anna Suranyi

The Atlantic colonies held by England in the seventeenth century meant many things for the state, including a source for resources, a market for manufactured goods, a zone for territorial expansion, a manifestation of success against rivals in the imperial struggle, and also territory for shunting populations that the state deemed undesirable. These unwanted persons consisted of poor vagrants, criminals, and rebels against the state, including the Irish, who were sometimes identified as part of the latter group. By sending these groups abroad as indentured servants, the English government sought, at various times, a cleansing of unwanted populations, a perceived moral redemption for the individuals involved, and a savings in detention expenses. In addition to these motivations for expelling certain populations, a further stimulus for shipping indentured servants was to supply labor to the new colonies in the Atlantic. Yet at the same time, the state also strove, not always successfully, to present itself as exerting impartial justice in the three kingdoms of England, Ireland, and Scotland, and attempted to maintain synchronization of penal solutions to sedition, crime, and poverty in both England and Ireland.

Fairness was intrinsically difficult to achieve because of significant conflicts of interests within the state. The greatest obstacle was the fact that many of the individual contractors involved in shipping servants held influential government offices, and were able to shape public policy to support their private interests. The period of the Interregnum is particularly revealing in this regard, because it demonstrates a shift in public policy from a focus on the removal of populations deemed excess, surplus, or disorderly to a focus on a simultaneous though competing set of imperatives—moral redemption, populating the colonies, and economic profit. Nonetheless, the English government, even during the Interregnum, continued to express uneasiness about its participation in human trafficking, while lacking sufficient political will to halt it.

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1 I am indebted to the editors of this volume for their fruitful comments and suggestions.

During the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, overpopulation was a significant concern for the government. A number of authors have discussed the issue of population growth in early modern Britain and the perception of social danger that resulted.[2] Seventeenth century authors frequently addressed their fear that England was inundated with vagrants and the poor. For example, a 1610 pamphlet by Thomas Blenerhasset, a leading planter in Ulster, proposed that England, "overcharged with much people" should colonize Ulster to find room for its "overplus" population.[3] In 1621 colonial entrepreneur Edwin Sandys encouraged plantation in Virginia, claiming that it would allow the "nation to disburden itself" of "the abundance of people."[4] Writer Gervase Markham urged that jobs in husbandry be found for "waste persons."[5] Rapid population growth combined with lack of adaptation to the increasingly capitalist economy drove the English government to react to problems such as vagrancy, crime, and the presence of large numbers of "masterless" men and women through a variety of measures during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, including the establishment of the Elizabethan poor laws and their periodic modifications.[6] A key provision of the poor laws was forced labor or apprenticeships for indigent youths and the "undeserving poor," and in the

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2 The classic work is A.L. Beier, *Masterless Men: The Vagrancy Problem in England 1560–1640* (London: Methuen, 1985). See also Patricia Fumerton, *Unsettled: The Culture of Mobility and the Working Poor in Early Modern England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); John Pound, *Poverty and Vagrancy in Tudor England*, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1986); J.A. Sharpe, *Crime in Early Modern England 1550–1750* (London: Longman, 1984); Linda Woodbridge, *Vagrancy, Homelessness, and English Renaissance Literature* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001); *Poverty and Policy in Tudor and Stuart England* (London: Longman, 1988); *From Reformation to Improvement: Public Welfare in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Jeremy Boulton, "The Poor Among the Rich: Paupers and the Parish in the West End, 1600–1724," in Paul Griffiths and Mark S.R. Jenner, eds., *Londinopolis: Essays in the Cultural and Social History of Early Modern London* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 197–225; Paul Griffiths, "Masterless Young People in Norwich, 1560–1645," in Paul Griffiths, Adam Fox and Steve Hindle, eds., *The Experience of Authority in Early Modern England* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 146–86.

3 Thomas Blenerhasset, *A Direction for the Plantation in Ulster* (London, 1610).

4 Edwin Sandys, quoted in Theodore K. Rabb, *Jacobean Gentleman: Sir Edwin Sandys, 1561–1629* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 240.

5 Steve Hindle, "'Waste' Children? Pauper Apprenticeship under the Elizabethan Poor Laws," in Penelope Lane and Neil Raven, eds., *Women, Work, and Wages in England, 1600–1850* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2004), 17.

6 See Paul Slack, *The English Poor Law, 1531–1782* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) about attempts to reform the poor.

seventeenth century, as England acquired colonies, this was extended to indenture contracts in overseas settlements.[7] Both apprenticeships and indenture were most likely cheaper than state-sponsored poor relief in the long run. While indenture was usually contracted voluntarily for four year terms, people sent unwillingly by the government, including indigents, rebels, and criminals, usually served for seven years or more—the same duration as a typical apprenticeship. In addition to constituting a criminal sentence, productive labor was seen as morally redemptive for the poor and unemployed.

In the seventeenth century, the colonies presented a zone where a population that was seen as a "burden" could be productively allocated—indeed where such a population was needed. The importance of this outlet is demonstrated by the gradual extension and expansion of the policy of transportation of purported undesirables, a policy that showed continuity between Royalist and Parliamentary governments. The chief motivation for transporting undesirable populations was not purely demographic, because rates of transportation actually rose during the Interregnum period, at a time when population had fallen as a result of the Civil Wars.[8] Moral imperatives were thus a significant motivation. Furthermore, the government's support of transportation also stemmed from the intertwining of public policy and private interests, as many influential members of the English and colonial administrations were also prominent entrepreneurs who were personally profiting from the transportation of servants.

As a consequence of both government policy and the existence of a real market for labor in the colonies, thousands of indentured servants crossed the Atlantic during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The majority of servants from both Britain and Ireland sailed voluntarily, recruited by independent contractors, often fleeing destitution and unaware of the horrors of the Atlantic passage or the realities of hard labor that awaited them.[9] For many,

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7   Aubrey Gwynn, "Cromwell's Policy of Transportation, Part I," *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review of Letters, Philosophy & Science* vol. 19 (1930): 617; Steve Hindle, *On the Parish? The Micro-Politics of Poor Relief in Rural England c. 1550–1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 191–219.

8   For example, see the figures in Charles Carlton, *Going to the Wars: The Experience of the British Civil Wars, 1638–1651* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 211–214.

9   Don Jordan and Michael Walsh contend in *White Cargo: The Forgotten History of Britain's White Slaves in America* (New York: New York University Press, 2008) that indenture was often tantamount to slavery, and thus no real choice existed for the unfortunates that signed indenture contracts. Hilary Beckles analyzes the market forces behind indentured servitude in *White Servitude and Black Slavery in Barbados, 1627–1715* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1989) and David Galenson analyzes the economic rationale behind servants' willingness to

servitude was to be an exploitative experience during which they encountered severe hardships, extreme cruelty, or even death. It is worth considering whether signing an indenture under such circumstances was a real choice or simply an act of economic desperation. Yet many did not have even this slight opportunity to make a decision about their own fates. In addition to those servants who agreed to contract for indenture, there were numerous servants who were unwillingly transported under the auspices of state-sponsored policies. This chapter will focus on government-backed transportation of unwilling persons from 1618 to 1670, and explores the demographic, political, moral, and economic rationales for continuing state-sponsored indentured servitude. I also investigate complications arising from the divergence between government aims and the labor requirements of colonial masters, as well as the government's deviation from its ostensible commitment to protect its subjects.

The practice of indenturing servants remained relatively consistent during the seventeenth and into the eighteenth centuries. There were a number of categories of servants, including servants shipped by government contractors and those shipped by independent businessmen. Servants could also be divided into those sailing voluntarily and involuntarily, with the former consisting mainly of indigent youths who hoped to better their situations through the completion of a temporary contract.[10] Involuntary servants included convicts, individuals deemed part of undesirable populations, such as indigents, orphans, or vagrants, and those seen as dangerous undesirables such as criminals or religious, political, or military rebels.[11] In addition to licensed contractors, "spirits," often illegally employed by ostensibly legitimate recruiting firms, were responsible for "spiriting away" (kidnapping) or "trepanning" (conning) people into servitude, many of whom were then "barbadosed" or sent to the West Indies.[12] It was illegal to force servants into indenture, but the laws were

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sign indenture contracts. *White Servitude in Colonial America: An Economic Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

10   Farley Grubb argues that loss of parents and their support was a significant cause for voluntarily contracting into servitude. "Fatherless and Friendless: Factors Influencing the Flow of English Emigrant Servants," *Journal of Economic History* vol. 52, no. 1 (1992): 85–108.

11   In addition to English or Irish Royalist soldiers, the latter category also included Irish Catholic priests and Quakers.

12   On the practice of spiriting, as well as resistance to it, see John Wareing, "Preventive and Punitive Regulation in Seventeenth-century Social Policy: Conflicts of Interest and the Failure to Make 'Stealing and Transporting Children, and other Persons' a Felony, 1645–73," *Social History* vol. 27, no. 3 (2002): 288–308, and "'Violently taken away or cheatingly duckoyed.' The Illicit Recruitment in London of Indentured Servants for the American Colonies,

widely evaded. In general whether obtained through legal or illegitimate means, the typical destination for indentured servants was the American mainland colonies or the Caribbean. Servants came from across Britain and Ireland, both sexes, and all ages, including small children, though youths predominated.

Substantial numbers of servants were sent overseas in the early days of the British colonies. Beginning shortly after the initial establishment of English colonists at Jamestown in 1607, a flow of approximately 300,000 English persons, of whom about 75% were servants, as well as between 20,000 and 40,000 Irish, 7,000 Scots, and some continental Europeans migrated to the West Indies and North America.[13] Thus while most migrating Irish and Scots were servants, perhaps a larger percentage than among the English, by far most servants were English. By 1660, approximately 20% of the servants were Irish, though percentages ebbed and flowed at various times.[14]

Government-sponsored transportation proposals began in the early decades of the seventeenth century, and continued into the eighteenth. Once begun, the policy of transportation was continued through several government administrations. There was both continuity and disjunction between the policies of the royal governments of the early seventeenth century, and the policies of the Interregnum. As it took office in 1649, the Interregnum administration reiterated the previous government's right to apprehend, punish, and put to work English vagrants, beggars, rogues and poor children, thus reaffirming the Elizabethan and subsequent poor laws.[15] In 1652 and 1654, Parliamentary Acts recommended shipments of the poor away from Britain, a policy reiterated by the Interregnum Council of State in 1656, and by the Restoration government in 1662–4, 1667, and 1670, with a term of labor usually set at seven years for involuntary servants.[16] In 1670 an Act of the Scottish Parliament established

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1645–1718," *The London Journal: A Review of Metropolitan Society Past and Present* vol. 26 (2001): 1–22.

13   Alison Games, "Migration," in David Armitage and Michael Braddick, eds., *The British Atlantic World*, 1500–1800 (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 38, 41. The first to provide a good estimate of numbers of servants was Abbot Emerson Smith, *Colonists in Bondage: White Servitude and Convict Labor in America, 1607–1776* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947), 336.

14   Beckles, *White Servitude and Black Slavery in Barbados, 1627–1715,* 38.

15   C.H. Firth and R.S. Rait, eds., *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642–1660* [hereafter *AOI*], (London, 1911), 104–110.

16   For example, "Rogues, vagabonds, idle and disorderly persons, and beggars" to be transported as magistrates see fit, "for a term not exceeding seven years" in Leo Stock, ed., *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments* Respecting North America, 1542–1688, 5 vols. [*Parl. Deb. 1*],

transportation for those who refused to disclose evidence about rebels against the state or Presbyterian conventicles, an ever-present issue in culturally fractious and religiously divided Scotland.[17]

Most of this legislation focused on the English poor, criminals, or during the Civil War period, rebels. Government initiatives to transport vagrants, rebels, and other populations deemed undesirable had multiple aims. Vagrants and the indigent were perceived to cause disorder. They were believed to be idle and lazy rather than destitute as a result of economic circumstances, and were variously referred to as "rogues," "vagabonds," "idle," "disorderly," "lewd," and "dangerous."[18] Labor itself was perceived to be morally uplifting—thus government officials believed that by forcing former vagrants to work, they were making the latter economically productive, as well as improving them morally. Transportation was a convenient way for the government to rid itself of individuals it would otherwise have been feeding in the jails or through parish relief. Transportation was costly—the government typically subsidized transport costs at approximately £5 per head—but it was relieved of the costs for feeding prisoners or convicts. The financial obligation incurred in providing poor relief or in maintaining poorhouses was considerably higher than the one-time shipping cost for servants.[19] Consciousness of the relative benefits and costs must have encouraged the government's readiness to lay out money for servants' passages across the ocean. Furthermore, this policy meshed with early modern social values which mandated that the appropriate context for dependent individuals was under the dominion and discipline of a master.[20]

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v. 1, 1542–1688 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution, 1924) hereafter *Parl. Deb.* 1, in 1662 (293), and see also 1662 (306), 1663 (309–10), 1664 (320–321, 327), 1664 (351), 1667 (351), 1670 (353, 357). On August 14, 1656, the Council of State ordered that "lewd and dangerous persons, rogues, vagrants, and other idle persons, who have no means of livelihood, and refuse to work" be transported to the plantations. W. Noel Sainsbury, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1574–1660,* (London: Royal Stationary Office, 1860) [hereafter *CSPC, 1574–1660*], 447.

17   *Act Against such who shall Refuse to Depone Against Delinquent*s (Edinburgh, 1670). See also *Parl. Deb*. 1, 448.

18   See footnote 16.

19   Robert C. Johnson, "The Transportation of Vagrant Children from London to Virginia, 1618–22," in Howard S. Reinmuth Jr., ed., *Early Stuart Studies: Essays in Honor of David Harris Willson* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), 150.

20   On early modern ideas about the appropriate structure for the household, see Susan Amussen, *An Ordered Society: Gender and Class in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1988). Steve Hindle addresses attempts by government and parishes to "reconstitute" suitable households for poor children through apprenticeships. See Hindle, *On the Parish,* 193–195.

It was in the economic aspects of the servant trade that the complex inter-action of public and private interests comes to the fore. Many of these interests actually competed with each other. For example, there is evidence that impoverished but self-supporting individuals were swept up with some regularity when servant cargos were assembled.[21] This would seem disadvantageous for the government if it meant paying for the transportation of individuals who had not previously been the recipients of government funds for food or housing. However, although there were instances of administrative strictures against this practice, they were rarely enforced. This can be explained in two ways. In part, the perceived need to rid society of certain populations—the poor, disreputable, and disorderly—led local and national governments to turn a blind eye to their disappearance, or even to encourage it. But a further reason that this practice occurred was because the interests of national and local governments, local officials, shippers, and contractors did not always intersect. Thus while from a purely economic perspective, governments might favor sending only people enrolled in poor relief out of the country, those who profited through commissions or direct profits obtained by amassing or shipping individuals might be less fastidious about which individuals they chose to ship. Indeed, the shippers themselves preferred strong and healthy servants who would bring a greater price upon the sale of their contracts, and fit persons were perhaps less likely to come from the destitute poor. The very system of government-sanctioned indenture thus bred corruption. Farley Grubb has shown that in the eighteenth century, the necessity of convincing contractors to ship criminal servants resulted in adjustments to the length of the criminal sentences assigned to convicts, regardless of the magnitude of the crime committed, as the government sought to make convicts desirable to shippers who were primarily interested in profits. Thus equality of justice under the law was undermined in favor of capitalist concerns.[22] This practice likely also shaped

21   See Johnson, "Transportation of Vagrant Children," 142, for some discussion of young street children being detained by the authorities without surety of vagrancy.

22   Criminals tended to have a reduced value relative to voluntary migrants because of the assumption that they would be less well behaved as servants. Thus sentences were longer than the contracts of voluntary servants, in order to equalize their value at auction, because otherwise shippers would be hesitant to take them. However, overlong sentences implied incorrigibility, and further reduced value. Thus most criminals, whether having committed serious crimes or more minor ones, were sentenced to the same length of indenture—seven years. Farley Grubb, "The Transatlantic Market for British Convict Labor," *The Journal of Economic History* vol. 60, no. 1 (2000): 94–122. See also "The Market Evaluation of Criminality: Evidence from the Auction of British Convict Labor in America, 1767–1775," *The American Economic Review,* vol. 91, no. 1 (2001): 295–304.

convict indentures in the seventeenth century, when the average sentence of seven years fits Grubb's model for the later period.

Perhaps the greatest stain on government policy came from the fact that a number of influential members of the administration realized significant personal gain from transporting indentured servants. Transportation was a profitable enterprise: top government contractors, such as the merchant Martin Noell, could realize a substantial profit, because the government subsidy for shipping as well as the profits from selling the servants' contracts at auction on disembarking made the shipping of servants under government contracts more lucrative than private shipping ventures.[23] Noell reaped profits during the Interregnum through his influence in Parliamentary politics, the Boards of Trade, and the Council of State. He was likely one of the authors of the Navigation Act of 1651.[24] He continued in favor during the Restoration, receiving a knighthood. At various times he also controlled excise farms in a number of colonial and domestic products, held contracts in military supplies, and helped fund Cromwell's expedition to take Jamaica from the Spanish. In addition, Noell was a sugar merchant and a colonial planter, owning estates in Jamaica, Barbados, Montserrat, and Ireland, and controlled a firm involved in a number of shipping ventures to the West Indies, including human cargoes of slaves and indentured servants as well as sugar, shoes, horses, and other goods.[25] Noell thus exemplified the tangled incentives and conflicts of interest inherent in the policy of transporting unwilling indentured servants. His public and private roles intertwined, allowing him enormous influence over government economic policies to his personal benefit, including laws regarding the transportation of criminals, vagrants, or rebels as indentured servants.

Although Noell might have been unusual in the number of commercial ventures that he was involved in or the amount of influence he exercised, he was by no means unique. There were many other merchant entrepreneurs, such as Noell's colleague Thomas Povey, who also exercised great governmental power,

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23   For example, see Orders of the Council of State, May 22 1656, "Concerning the transportation of 1,200 men from Knockfergus, in Ireland, and Port Patrick, in Scotland, to Jamaica; Martin Noell contracting to send them over at 5*l*. 10*s*. per head." *CSPC 1574–1660,* 440–1.

24   An attempt to limit the freight trade by foreign shippers, especially the Dutch.

25   On Noell, see Russell Menard, *Sweet Negotiations: Sugar, Slavery, and Plantation Agriculture in Early Barbados* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006), 44, 54, 59, 93, 146; C.M. Andrews, "British Committees, Commissions, and Councils of Trade and Plantations, 1622–1675," *Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science,* vol. 26 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1908), 49–51; Richard B. Sheridan, *Sugar and Slavery: An Economic History of the British West Indies, 1623–1775* (Kingston: Canoe Press, 2000), 90–92.

probably helped Noell write the Navigation Act of 1651, likely suggested the Council for Trade in the Americas, and who served as one of its more active members. He too held key government offices and controlled excise farms and Atlantic shipping ventures. Like Noell, Povey had a career spanning several administrations. He retained influence through the governments of Charles I, the Interregnum and into the Restoration.[26] There were many other entrepreneurs simultaneously active in colonization, human trafficking, military contracting, and government office; a few of the more prominent included Maurice Thomson, Andrew Riccard, and Robert Rich, second earl of Warwick.[27] Such men often retained influence through three government administrations which held supposedly disparate political principles, but which were united by an interest in the capitalistic exploitation of resources, whether colonial or human, as well as by an inability or disinclination to separate the private interests of their members from the will of the state.

And yet, even these merchant entrepreneurs were not able to fully control English transportation policy. Whether in England or Ireland, implementation of the state's commitment to the policy of shifting particular populations abroad often proceeded in a haphazard manner, like many policy initiatives of the early modern state. One difficulty involved disjunctions between the English government's desire to remove certain populations that were seen as unwanted and actual colonial desires for labor. Colonial planters themselves had distinct preferences regarding servants and tried to influence the demography of shipments of servants, though sometimes their aims contrasted with government desires to remove certain populations from Britain. Unsurprisingly, colonials favored servants who were healthy young adults without criminal records. One repeatedly expressed preference was for either English or Scottish servants rather than the Irish. Protestant colonists stereotyped the Irish as lazy and rebellious, while Scots, in contrast, were seen as hardworking and diligent. Irish Catholic servants were also seen as presenting a potential risk: there was danger of conspiracy with French Catholic forces in the Caribbean. These suspicions were not entirely unmerited, as shown by the collusion of Irish servants with the French in the Leeward Islands in the 1660s and 1680s. Irish servants had also previously been involved in revolts in Barbados in the 1630s, 40s, and 50s, and were suspected of participating in slave revolts in the 1670s, 1680s and 90s.[28]

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26 On Povey, see Andrews, "British Committees, Commissions, and Councils of Trade and Plantations, 1622–1675," 51–56.

27 Thomson is mentioned in Menard, *Sweet Negotiations*, 55, 59.

28 Discussed in Jerome Handler, "Slave Revolts and Conspiracies in Seventeenth-Century Barbadoes," *New West Indian Guide* vol. 56, (1982); Hilary Beckles, "A 'riotous and unruly lot': Irish Indentured Servants and Freemen in the English West Indies, 1644–1713)," *William*

Political prisoners, many of whom were Irish in the mid-seventeenth century, were seen as particularly troublesome, and hence less desirable as servants. Island planters repeatedly tried to control the composition of their newly recruited labor force, requesting more Scottish or English and fewer Irish servants, including petitions to the central government from the 1650s to the 70s.[29] For example, Barbadian planters sent a petition to Oliver Cromwell in 1655 to ask for relief from military service because of the dangers of leaving behind potentially rebellious African slaves, and Irish and Scots servants, the latter of whom were "formerly prisoners of war and ready to rebel." They concluded by asking for more English servants.[30] Planters soon reconciled themselves to Scottish servants, as well as to slaves, but continued to try to eschew the Irish. In a 1675 petition by Barbados planters asking for increased shipments of slaves, the planters also insisted on receiving English and Scottish servants, since "Irish servants they find of small value."[31] In 1676 the government responded to similar concerns by discussing a plan to hire Scots to go to Jamaica "as being very good servants."[32] In August of the same year, Governor Jonathan Atkins of Barbados also complained that Irish servants were "idle."[33] The disinclination to hire Irish servants likely resulted in a reduction in value of contracts to shippers, just as it occurred for convicts.

Nonetheless, there was an upsurge of Irish servants sent to the colonies, particularly during the Interregnum Commonwealth. Some authors have claimed that the English targeted the Irish in the practice of forced indenture, but the reality is complicated.[34] The seventeenth century was an era of tremendous

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and Mary Quarterly, 3rd. Ser., vol. 47, no. 4 (1990): 515–521; Beckles, White Servitude, 100, 107–113.

29   Beckles, "Riotous and Unruly Lot," 509–512, and Beckles, "The Colours of Property: Brown, White and Black Chattels and their responses on the Caribbean Frontier" in Paul Lovejoy and Nicholas Rogers, eds., Unfree Labour in the Development of the Atlantic World (London: Frank Cass, 1994), 44.

30   The Humble Overtures of Divers Persons Nearly Concerned in the Present Posture and Condition of the Island of Barbados (London, 1655), The National Archives CO 1/69, No. 2.

31   W. Noel Sainsbury, ed., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1675–1676, also Addenda 1574–1674 [hereafter CSPC, 1675–76], (London: Royal Stationary Office, 1893), 304.

32   CSPC, 1675–76, 516. See also 105, as well as Beckles, White Servitude, 69; Nini Rogers, Ireland, Slavery and Anti-Slavery (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 40.

33   CSPC, 1675–76, 445. See also Beckles, White Servitude, 38–39, 123.

34   This contention has often been presented by amateur researchers, including Sean Callaghan, To Hell or Barbados (Dingle: Brandon Books, 2001); Michael Hoffman, They were White and They were Slaves (Dresden, New York: Wiswell Ruffin House, 1993), Lawrence Kelleher, To Shed a Tear: A Story of Irish Slavery in the British West Indies (Writers Club Press, 2001). The books cited here are historically problematic, participating in a public

English prejudice against the Irish and against Catholics, magnified by the Irish Rebellion of 1641 and Ireland's royalism during the English Civil War. There was a tendency during this period for the English government to view all Irish Catholics, including civilians, as dangerous and actively hostile to English rule. Sending the Irish to indenture overseas was a policy in concert with forced migration to Connaught on the western side of Ireland, especially as those who refused to relocate were further threatened with "banish[ment]" overseas within six months if they remained.[35] Violence targeting the Irish was condoned if not explicitly prescribed by the state. The Irish frequently became the object of vagrant removal orders promulgated by the Council of State, and applicable in both England and Ireland. In 1653, a Bristol merchant applied to ship 250 Irish women to New England. This was turned down, but a cargo of male and female "beggars and vagabonds" from Cork was granted.[36] In 1654, local town governors were ordered by the Irish Commissioners to hand rogues and vagabonds to three Waterford merchants.[37] This scheme was obviously subject to corruption as officials looking to rapidly fulfill quotas swept up non-vagrant individuals, or as shipping contractors pressured officials to ignore unhealthy indigents in favor of vigorous servants who would bring higher prices when their contracts were sold. These measures resulted in the transportation of many thousands of Irish civilians to the colonies, especially the Caribbean.

The precedents for the forcible indenture of rebels, vagrants, criminals, and the poor were initially developed in England, and continued to be utilized there during the same period. The orders for detaining Irish vagrants and indigents were consistent with Parliamentary orders for the rounding up of vagrants in England at the same time.[38] With the exception of the immediate

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discourse claiming that slavery was less severe than previously thought. Some of the authors are affiliated with white supremacist groups. For a critique of such authors, see 45–46. A more accurately researched discussion of the forcible indenture of Irish servants, including children, can be found in Jordan and Walsh, *White Cargo,* 137–154. Also see the situation of Richard Mecane, discussed below.

35   *Parl. Deb.* 1, 241 n. 23. Evidence suggests that there were few instances of this being carried out.

36   Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate: 1649–1656,* 4 vols. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1989) 110.

37   Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate,* 4: 110–111; John Prendergast, *The Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland* (New York: P.M. Haverty, 1868), 245.

38   For example, in May of 1653, the Commissioners of Ireland issued the following order: "all laws and statutes now in force in the Commonwealth of England for the correction and punishment of rogues, vagrants, sturdy beggars, idle and disorderly persons...and for

aftermath of the Irish rebellion, during which the Interregnum Council of State authorized several transports of Irish civilians, totalling many thousands of people, neither the English administration nor the Irish Commissioners authorized the forcible removal of the "deserving poor," instead targeting groups that they saw as disruptive: unemployed vagrants, criminals, poorhouse occupants, and rebels against the government. In both England and Ireland, frequent exploitation of vulnerable people occurred as spirits, unscrupulous magistrates, and contractors conned and kidnapped individuals onto their ships, and the government often overlooked or even condoned these abuses. Yet at the same time, they did prompt the administration to investigate offenses and to enforce civilian protections, though perhaps more scrupulously in England than in Ireland. Thus forcible indenture policies were not a special punitive system applied exclusively to Ireland, but were part of an economic system that accepted ethnic prejudice, but in which both xenophobia and the contradictory impulse of the impartial application of justice were superseded by both capitalistic profit motives and the perceived needs of the state.

Forcible indenture and transportation policies also applied to criminals, who were in fact one of the first groups to be sent by the English government as involuntary servants. As early as January of 1615, the administration of James I issued a commission in which it authorized persons sentenced for lesser capital crimes to be reprieved by transportation to "parts abroad."[39] The stated

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relieving and setting of the poor to work, be and are hereby declared to be in force in Ireland." Cited in Gwynn, "Cromwell's Policy of Transportation," 616–617. Also see Council of State Orders "touching the transporting of vagrants, felons, &c. to the foreign plantations" from November 8, 1653 in *CSPC, 1574–1660,* Council of State, Orders "touching the transporting of vagrants, felons, &c. to the foreign plantations," November 8, 1653, 410, "a Committee to report upon…the transportation of vagrants to the foreign plantations," Nov. 15, 1653, 410–411; "Draft of a bill…for transporting vagrants to the Western plantations, to be recommended to Committee of Parliament appointed to consider of the poor people of the Commonwealth," December 9, 1653, 412; Orders of the Council of State "Concerning the apprehending of lewd and dangerous persons, rogues, vagrants, and other idle persons, who have no way of livelihood and refuse to work, and treating with merchants and others for transporting them to the English plantations in America," August 5, 1656, 447; various resolutions from the council about vagrants, August 18, 1656, 448; Instruction for the Council, "To consider how the colonies might be best supplied with servants; that no persons may be forced or enticed away by unlawful or indirect ways; that those willing to be transported thither may be encouraged; and a course legally settled to send over vagrants and others who remain here noxious and unprofitable," December 1, 1660, 493.

39 Capital crimes included offenses that would incur considerably lighter sentences today, and which were viewed as lesser crimes in the seventeenth century, such as theft, robbery, negligent manslaughter, assault, or poaching. In comparison, the commission specified

intentions were both that "justice be tempered with mercie," and that the convicts might "yield a profitable service."[40] This began the penal policy of transporting criminals, and it was readily adopted by successive governments who saw it as a way of reducing prison populations, saving costs, and reforming or rehabilitating prisoners.

The government typically transported criminals against their will, but in many cases individuals agreed to go in exchange for a remission of penalties. Transportation could be justified as merciful in these circumstances, usually as a reprieve from execution. Often this occurred as the result of the pleas of relatives, such as John Throgmorten's grandmother, who begged that her grandson be transported to Virginia rather than executed, in the second decade of the seventeenth century.[41] In 1619, Lord Russell requested that one Harry Reade, a highwayman, receive clemency by being sent to Virginia.[42] In 1633 the king granted mercy to Thomas Brice, a condemned prisoner in Newgate, at the request of his father, commanding that Thomas be transported to Virginia.[43] Similarly, on June 18, 1635, John Haydon, a prisoner in Bridewell, petitioned the Court of High Commission to be freed if he voluntarily went to Virginia. He appears to have been a member of a dissenting sect, as his crimes included "preaching abroad."[44] Haydon may have gone as a freeman, but many in the same situation agreed to have their passage paid for by their servitude. Two weeks after Haydon's petition, a warrant was issued to send nine women and five men from Newgate to Virginia.[45]

Sometimes transportation was employed as an alternative to keeping petty criminals in prison. In 1638, Elizabeth Cotterell, still imprisoned in the Marshalsea prison eight months after she had been reprieved, presumably for non-payment of prison expenses, successfully petitioned to be transported to Virginia.[46] For individuals like Cotterell, service overseas might have presented an opportunity, particularly when the fees for the passage across the ocean

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that those convicted of more serious crimes such as intentional murder, rape, witchcraft, or burglary were not to receive transportation reprieves.

40   The text of the commission is excerpted in Abbot Emerson Smith, "The Transportation of Convicts to the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century," *American Historical Review* vol. 39, no. 2 (1934): 233–234.

41   *Parl. Deb.* 1, 176, 204; Smith, "Transportation of Convicts," 235.

42   *CSPC, 1675–76,* 57.

43   *CSPC, 1675–76,* 75.

44   *CSPC*, 1675–76, 78.

45   *CSPC, 1675–76,* 79.

46   *CSPC, 1574–1660,* 281–2. See also similar incidents in *CSPC 1574–1660,* 410, 412, 447; *CSPC, 1675–76,* 81, 82.

were paid through her service agreement. Likewise, three hundred "malefactors" who had been made "free of fees from the gaols" were sent to St. Christopher in 1676.[47] It is evident that a sentence of transportation was not intended to be a death sentence, nor, for these felons at least, to be permanent. When a bill for transporting thieves (specifically those who had not committed burglary or murder, the latter group more likely to have been slated for execution) to the plantations was debated in 1667, some Members actually criticized it on the grounds that "it would be an incouragement to theeves and robbers to do it to get a stock to carry to the plantations."[48] While the accuracy of this theory was dubious, it did reflect the opinions of some politicians that transportation was a desirable prospect for the poor. Expectations often did not match reality. Some servants probably saw their trip across the Atlantic as a second chance, but when they actually reached their destinations and encountered horrific conditions, they often regretted it, as attested to by a number of published written works, as well as the attempts of some to return to their homeland.[49]

Even while influential and self interested members of the English government saw the shipment of servants as both a fulfillment of the state's needs and a commercial proposition, the administration also had to pay heed to the specificity of demands for bound labor from the other side of the Atlantic. Like the Irish, criminal and child servants presented particular difficulties, because they were inherently less desirable to overseas masters. Nonetheless, the government attempted to balance the utility of removing certain populations at home against the actual labor needs overseas. Children in particular were more sought-after in the beginning of the seventeenth century than later, and more desirable in the mainland colonies than in the Caribbean, primarily in areas where plantation labor did not prevail.

Poor children were often targeted for transportation by the government, under the belief that they were destined to become beggars and vagrants. It is not clear whether such children were always orphans or merely destitute. The government displayed considerably more ambiguity about its motives for

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47   *CSPC, 1675–76,* 346–347, 350.

48   *Parl. Deb. 1,* 351.

49   There were a number of written works that discussed the experience of indentured servitude, one of the most famous being Richard Ligon, *A True and Exact History of the Island of Barbadoes* (London, Printed for H. Mosely, 1657). Some of these were written by former servants themselves, and most of these were critical of the practice of servitude, including James Revel's poem, *The Poor Unhappy Transported Felon's Sorrowful Account* [York: C. Croshaw, ca. 1800], and William Morelay, *The Infortunate* (Newcastle, 1743). However some were less condemnatory, such as George Alsop, *A character of the province of Maryland* (London, 1666).

transporting children than it showed in the case of adults, and the implementation of such policies was virtually always justified on the grounds that transportation was morally and economically beneficial to the youths. Shipments of children were generally planned on a larger scale than those of adult voluntary servants, often one hundred or more, although there were exceptions.

The earliest attempt to transport large numbers of children occurred in 1618, when the Virginia Company, which had been agitating for vagrant adults to fill its labor needs, changed the request to vagrant children. The initial plan provided for "a hundred young boys and girls who lay starving in the streets" to be shipped from London to Virginia.[50] Before the City of London agreed, there were a series of tense negotiations between the City and the Virginia Company over the value of the freedom dues which the children would receive upon completing their indentures.[51] Yet further obstacles appeared. Even children could protest against forcible transportation overseas. Of the one hundred "ill-disposed children, who under severe masters in Virginia may be brought to goodness, and of whom the City is especially desirous to be disburdened" a considerable number declared their reluctance to go, making it necessary for the City and the Virginia Company to request additional authority—from the Privy Council—in order to transport the children "against their will."[52] In 1620, the City of London was able to hand over these children "from their superfluous multitude" to be sent to Virginia as servants.[53] This incident is particularly instructive because it illustrates a number of contested moral, legal, and economic positions that would continue to reverberate in later initiatives to transport indentured servants: from the City of London's attempt to provide for the children in its care by negotiating a more fair settlement of freedom dues for them, to its inability to transport them against their will, and its desire to "disburden" itself of a population deemed "ill-disposed," and "superfluous."

In 1623, it was proposed in the Council of New England that an Elizabethan statute intended to bind poor children as apprentices be used to send them as servants to the New England plantation, thus explicitly employing the Elizabethan poor laws to justify this newer punitive system.[54] This practice was

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50   *CSPC, 1574–1660,* 19.

51   A detailed description of these events can be found in Johnson, "Transportation of Vagrant Children," 138–144. Freedom dues were a payment upon release from indenture, and variously included land, money, tools, livestock, or clothing. The Privy Council was an advisory body to the monarch, but it also exercised some executive and juridical powers.

52   *CSPC, 1574–1660,* 23.

53   *CSPC, 1574–1660,* 23.

54   *CSPC, 1574–1660,* 37.

not devoid of potential hazard for the proposed servants, a fact of which Parliament was fully aware. Such dangers had been vividly illustrated a month earlier, when it was stated in the Privy Council that there were "not above ten men and boys living, of the whole number of servants taken to Virginia in the Seaflower."[55] Presumably this included the hundred "superfluous" children referred to above, as well as others, most of whom did not survive their periods of indenture.[56]

The transportation of children continued throughout the seventeenth century. On Jan 31, 1643, New Englanders petitioned Parliament for a collection on the next two fast days to pay for the transportation of "poor fatherless children" either "driven out of Ireland" or "of this kingdom [England]" that "are out of employment" to be "transplanted to New England." The first shipment of these children arrived at New England the same year.[57]

However, 1643 seems to have been the last time the government deliberately attempted to transplant English children during the colonial period.[58] Likely this cessation was a combination of increased public concern over forced indenture practices, especially in the case of children, along with an increase in appeals from colonial planters to transport only adult servants. Vagrant or available children continued to be transported by spirits and unscrupulous government contractors, however, and Irish children, perhaps seen as more expendable, continued to be sent overseas as well. In 1653, the Council of State agreed to grant a license to a New England merchant to take 400 Irish children to plantations in New England and Virginia.[59] Soon after, an act was drafted

55   *CSPC, 1574–1660,* 36. See also the discussion of servant death rates in Johnson "Transportation of Vagrant Children," 147–8.

56   The Seaflower regularly plied the route between New England, the West Indies and Britain, and was mentioned frequently in Parliamentary documents. It often carried indentured servants, and was particularly noted for the bad conditions in which they were housed while onboard. See Arthur Percival Newton, *The Colonizing Activities of the English Puritans* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1914), 90–1, 94, 98–99, 108, 111–113, 115, 118, 129, 135. Causes of death for the hundred children, mostly boys, included shipboard mortality, disease, and Indian attacks. Johnson, "Transportation of Vagrant Children," 146–149.

57   *Parl. Deb.* 1, 140 and n.151.

58   See Wareing, "Preventive and Punitive Regulation," 305 on the end of government-sanctioned mass transplantations of children.

59   *CSPC 1574–1660*, 407. The shipper, David Selleck of Boston, was a frequent contractor for government shipments of the Irish. A week after his commission to ship the children, he was paid by the Irish Commissioners to ship 250 Irish vagrant women and 300 vagrant Irish men into New England as indentured servants. Also see Prendergast, *The Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland* 245.

supporting the transportation of poor Irish children to England and the Western Plantations.[60]

Fundamentally, however, shipments of children failed to meet the Caribbean demand for labor. While children were apparently somewhat desirable in the mainland colonies, presumably because they were bound for much longer terms than adults and were employable as household laborers, they were less sought-after on farms and plantations where hard labor was the main work for servants. In 1661, for example, Barbados' Master and Servant Act stipulated that children under the age of 14 not be brought in as servants.[61] After midcentury, Caribbean planters repeatedly requested that only adults be sent, such as a request in 1697 that any convict servants sent would include only those "as are fit for laborious service, but no women, children nor other infirm persons."[62]

However, the state did have a compelling reason to send children to the colonies, perhaps more significant than a desire to cleanse England and Ireland of undesired vagrant populations. Children could be seen as nascent colonists after they had completed their terms in bondage, and some transportation schemes, involving both children and adults, were intended to rapidly populate new English territories with white settlers, especially during the heyday of Cromwell's Western Design. In 1655 after the English seized Jamaica from the Spanish, they attempted to encourage settlement there as rapidly as possible, offering considerable incentives for New Englanders to transplant themselves to the new Caribbean colony.[63] These included white indentured servants who were intended to swell the island population of freemen once they had completed their indentures.[64] This aim was clearly indicated in a proposal to secure Antigua in April of 1656, which states that "no supplies of servants have of late arrived from England; number of fighting men very inconsiderable," or the

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60   See Alderman Tichborne on October 11, 1653 in *CSPC 1574–1660*, 409.

61   *Acts, passed in the island of Barbados. From 1643, to 1762*, (London, 1764), 35.

62   On January 15 of 1697, Jamaica merchants "were quite at a loss" because the only people they could "prevail with" to go to Jamaica were "a few poor families of more women and children than men, who would not serve their end." On February 1, the Council of Trade and Plantations found that of the colonies only Barbados was willing to take "malefactors" and then only those "as are fit for laborious service, but no women, children nor other infirm persons." J.W. Fortescue, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, Volume 15: 1696–1697* (1904), 303, 341.

63   Smith, "Transportation of Convicts," 240–241.

64   *CSPC 1574–1660*, 429–30. For further attempts to transport people to Jamaica in 1656, see *CSPC 1574–1660*, 448, and Smith, *Colonists in Bondage*, 170, describes the shipment of 1,200 soldiers—from government forces, not royalists—from Carrickfergus.

Antiguan governor's request for "a garrison of 500 soldiers be kept upon the island, or a supply sent of English and Scotch servants" with arms and ammunition.[65] Similar schemes also occurred for St. Christopher, where the three hundred convicts sent in 1676 were "for the better supply of white men in the Island."[66]

There was an especially strong desire to rapidly populate Jamaica with British whites. On October 3, 1655 the Council of State notoriously ordered that 1000 Irish girls and 1000 Irish boys under 14 be sent to Jamaica, presumably as servants, but with a small stipulated settlement of cash, probably to be given after completing servitude at the age of 21.[67] This initiative blended many of the government's goals in encouraging transportation. Contemporaries could actually, if unrealistically, define this proposal as beneficial to the youths involved: Henry Cromwell wrote of the girls that "Concerninge the younge women, although we must use force in takeinge them up, yet it beinge so much for their owne goode, and likely to be of soe great advantage to the publique" that it would be a worthwhile endeavor.[68] In reference to the boys, Cromwell continued that "it will be necessarye, that care be taken for the clotheinge of them…(as)…it may be a meanes to make them English–men, I meane rather, Christianes." The undisguised underlying policy incentive was the desire to reduce the ranks of the Irish poor while supplying labor for the colonies; Cromwell acknowledged this, adding "we could well spare them, and they would be of use."[69] Women, including servant women, were often transported as potential wives for the colonists, which may have been an additional motivation for transporting the girls. Although government officials were less concerned with the rights of Irish than English youths, it appears that initiative was eventually abandoned, probably at least partially because of the infeasibility of transporting so many unwilling servant children, though hundreds of

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65   April 1656. *CSPC 1574–1660*, 440, 443. The request demonstrated the desperate desire to populate the island with whites, asking for servants who were "prisoners and and the like, if not, Scots and Irish." (440).

66   *CSPC, 1675–76,* 346–347.

67   *CSPC 1574–1660*, 431. On populating Jamaica with whites, see *CSPC 1574–1660*, 429–30. For further attempts to transport people to Jamaica in 1656, see *CSPC 1574–1660*, 448.

68   Thomas Birch, ed., *Collection of State Papers of John Thurloe, 1638–1660*, 7 vols. (London, 1742), 4: 23, 40. At various places Cromwell refers to the youths as both "boys" and "girls" and "men" and "women." In addition, he suggests numbers that range between 1000, 1500, and 2000 for the males.

69   Birch, ed., *Thurloe Papers,* 4: 40. It was seen as less politically feasible to transport unwilling Scottish servants during the same period. Rogers, *Ireland,* 47.

youths were transported during smaller ventures.[70] One of the striking aspects
of this plan was the fact that these Irish youths were to be sent, in part, to swell
the population of whites loyal to the English government, presumably after
having been converted to Protestantism.

Another group of servants with a reduced value on the labor market abroad
were enemy military combatants and rebels. Beginning in 1649, transporta-
tion was used to punish and remove military forces that had opposed the
Interregnum government, following the precedents established for convicts.[71]
Such men were considered a threat to order, and might be transported if they
seemed of no use in prisoner exchanges, were not charged with capital crimes,
and presumably seemed too expensive to keep incarcerated. After the fall of
the royalist garrison at Drogheda in 1649, Oliver Cromwell infamously wrote to
Parliament that "When they submitted, their officers were knock'd on the
head, and every tenth man of the soldiers kill'd, and the rest shipped for the
Barbadoes. The soldiers in the other towns were all spared as to their lives only,
and shipped likewise for the Barbadoes."[72] There were a number of instances
in which such troops were sent to continental armies, a policy that acted as a
double edged sword because it removed rebel soldiers from Britain, but meant
that they might be deployed in French or Spanish armies supporting non-
British interests. In 1654 then, the Irish Commissioners preferred to send a
group of Catholic military prisoners to the West Indies, and attempted to
enhance compliance by stipulating that these men would be treated the same
as English servants "they will have as good condition as any English or other
servants there," with terms of four years rather than the usual criminal term of
seven to ten years, "and after four years are to be free men to act for their
advantage," while officers, soldiers, and male civilians who traveled voluntarily
would be offered a fourteen shilling stipend.[73] Women volunteers were to

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70   Although it is not currently possible to know whether this grand transportation scheme
      occurred, there is no evidence that it was implemented, and most researchers agree that it did
      not occur. For instance, see Gardiner, *Commonwealth and Protectorate*, 4: 219; Smith, *Colonists
      in Bondage,* 169. Nini Rogers points out that it was seen as even less politically feasible to trans-
      port large numbers of unwilling Scottish servants during the same period. Rogers, *Ireland,* 47.

71   Beckles states that 1649 is the earliest date for the transportation of rebels, and 1614 for the
      transportation of convicts. Beckles, *White Servitude,* 53, 56. See also Smith, "Transportation
      of Convicts," 233.

72   Sept. 17, 1649, *Parl. Deb.* 1, 211. Rogers suggests that most of the soldiers in this rebel army
      were likely English. Rogers, *Ireland,* 46. Such soldiers would have been seen as traitorous,
      however, for aiding the royalist and Catholic cause.

73   The Irish Commissioners were an administrative body established by the crown in the
      1530s to implement royal policy in Ireland. The Interregnum government continued the
      Commission.

be given clothing.[74] A substantial number of the Royalist Salisbury rebels of 1654, many of whom were gentlemen, were also sent to work in the fields in Barbados.[75] In September of 1655, the Council of State ordered that the English, Scotch, Irish, and Dutch sailors held in the Castle of Plymouth, and "not fit to be tried for their lives" were likewise to be sent to Barbados.[76]

Although the Interregnum Commonwealth had initiated the practice of transporting rebels, Restoration governments continued to employ transportation to punish and remove military forces that had opposed the government. The Scottish rebels of 1667, the 1685 Argyll rebels, and the 1685 Monmouth rebels were also sent to Barbados.[77] It should be noted that even captured rebels were not sent to permanent servitude. Rebels were normally sentenced to seven to ten years, with indenture contracts drawn up once they were aboard ship, and while conditions of servitude were often extremely harsh, there is also evidence that some survived to the end of their terms. Some of the political prisoners in Barbados were freed at the accessions of both Charles II and William of Orange.[78] It appears that some rebels, convicts, and those considered rogues or beggars were given life terms, but these were rare if they existed.[79]

In addition to persons transported unwillingly by the government, a considerable illegal trade in servants persisted. There were sporadic attempts to regulate this trade that reveal much of what we know about it. Fear of the spirits was very real, even in the beginning of the century: in 1618 a warrant was issued against Owen Evans, Messenger of the Chamber, because he had "pretended a commission to press maidens to be sent to the Bermudas and Virginia, and raised money thereby." Evans' "undue proceedings breed such terror to the poor maidens, that forty have fled from one parish [in Somersetshire] to obscure places, and their parents do not know what has become of them."[80] While this case suggests prosecution of an influential member of society, such cases were infrequent, and enforcement of the laws against spiriting in Britain was rare.

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74   June 15, 1654, Irish Record Office, A/90, 50, 708, in Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate,* 4: 111–112. The overwhelming desire to be rid of these soldiers is illustrated by the fact that their original intended destination had been the Catholic Spanish army on the continent. On this practice, see Smith, *Colonists in Bondage,* 163.

75   *Parl. Deb.* 1, 247–249.

76   *CSPC 1574–1660,* 428. See also Beckles, *White Servitude,* 53.

77   Beckles, *White Servitude, 52–3;* Jill Sheppard, *The "Redlegs" of Barbados, their Origins and History,* (Millwood, NY: KTO Press, 1977), 29.

78   Beckles, *White Servitude,* 5, 52–56, 165–166.

79   Beckles briefly discusses "lifers," but it is unclear how widespread the practice was. Beckles, *White Servitude,* 7.

80   *CSPC,1574–1660,* 19.

When spirits were prosecuted, it was often piecemeal, as a result of tips and the resolve of determined individuals: for example, in November of 1653, a ship's master and a spirit were served a warrant for stealing Bart Broome an 11 year old boy and forced to return the boy to his father.[81] It appears that the senior Broome had traced his son to London, and his insistence was the driving force behind the boy's release, which the captain of the ship at first resisted. Likewise in August of 1657, a tip led to the investigation of a ship named the *Conquer* ready to embark for the West Indies. Of the 27 servants on board, fifteen were willing to go into service overseas, two women willing to go "if they had their clothes," presumably negotiating conditions of indenture even though they had been originally coerced. Eleven more had been spirited and wanted to leave. The ship was only allowed to continue after the eleven people "unduly enticed" were freed.[82] In April 1668 the "lost child John Brookes" was rescued "after much trouble and charge"; apparently several other children "enticed from their parents" were still held in three ships and required government warrants to be released, as the ships' masters would not let the parents take their children without a payment.[83] Notably, in none of these incidents were the merchants or ships masters prosecuted.

There do not seem to have been systematic safeguards in the colonies, such as officials charged with inspecting all cargoes of servants to ensure that they were voluntary. This would have been difficult to enforce given the laxity of the early modern state, and indeed, it would have been detrimental to colonial interests. Once a ship with servants had set sail, there was little recourse. It was also clear that there was substantial government collusion in the activities of the spirits, diminishing any real attempts to punish them. Although some individuals were rescued, this was exceptional. On occasion even when kidnappers were apprehended, they were allowed to continue with their cargoes of captive servants because the latter were perceived as vagrants who would be better kept in custody.[84]

At the same time, spiriting was one of the most emotionally resonant issues and there were repeated attempts within Parliament to prevent illicit kidnapping and to ensure that servants being transported were "willing to serve," including

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81   *CSPC 1574–1660*, 411. The captain was told that he would resist the warrant "at his peril."

82   *CSPC 1574–1660*, 457. This investigation was taken seriously, sending the Lieutenant of the Tower to investigate, seize the captives, and report to the Council of State.

83   W. Noel Sainsbury ed., *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, 1661–1668* (London, 1880), 555.

84   See Beckles, *White Servitude,* 50–52.

mandates to inspect all ships and register all servants leaving British ports. However, most attempts to authorize legislation faltered.[85] In 1643, government alarm resulted in one of the first of many ordinances to have every ship leaving London searched.[86] It is unlikely that this ever occurred. In 1645, Parliament ordered that anyone apprehended stealing children would "be brought to severe and exemplary Punishment" and that all ships at dock in London be immediately searched.[87] In 1647, while encouraging "adventurers" to colonize, Parliament stipulated that all servants being transported be registered as willing, uncoerced, and adult.[88] In 1660 there was an attempt to establish a registry to allow "for all servants and children to be transported to Virginia and Barbadoes, to declare their willingness to go."[89] In the 1661 Master and Servant Act, Barbadian planters attempted to reassure the British government, perhaps deceitfully, that they were not encouraging kidnapping, by allowing servants who complained to the magistrates of kidnapping to regain their freedom. Nevertheless, they sought to limit access by stipulating that such an opportunity only existed during the first month of arrival, a rule which must have almost eliminated the likelihood of servants unable to prove their arrival dates or afraid of reprisals from brutal masters, from regaining their freedom through this method.[90] In 1670, William Haverland, John Steward, William Thiene, Robert Bayley, and Mark Collins were each individually charged with spiriting hundreds of people yearly (up to the astonishing number of 800) to Barbados, Jamaica, and Virginia.[91]

Yet while individual spirits were occasionally prosecuted, the merchants whose capital underwrote these voyages were not. Despite the various efforts to restrict spiriting, a considerable illegal trade in servants continued to persist. Evidence suggests that the regulations were only enforced when complaints were made. It is true that it was probably impossible to oversee the trade sufficiently, and there would have been logistical difficulties involved in employing the number of necessary officials and in regulating ships' arrivals and departures, but there was also a lack of will to regulate a trade that was enriching people of influence, many of whom were in Parliament.

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85   For 1647: See *Parl. Deb.* 1, 185–6; *AOI,* 912–913. Also debated in *Parl. Deb.* 1 in 1662 (303), 1670 (357–359, 361, 366), 1671 (375, 382), 1673 (397–398, 400–401). An act against this was passed in 1671. *CSPC, 1675–76,* 521. See also Beckles, *White Servitude,* 50. Also see the impassioned Parliamentary debates discussed below.

86   Beckles, *White Servitude,* 50.

87   *AOI,* 681.

88   *AOI,* 912.

89   *CSPC, 1675–76,* 138.

90   Beckles, *White Servitude,* 82; *Acts, passed in the island of Barbados*, 36.

91   *CSPC, 1675–76,* 521.

There was some recourse for individual servants who felt they had been treated unjustly once they had arrived in the colonies. Often it was extremely inadequate, exposing servants to reprisals, but sometimes they were able to publicize their grievances, even if their crimes had been against the state.[92] For instance, in 1659, Rowland Thomas, a royalist who had been transported to Barbados as an indentured servant, petitioned Parliament that he had been sold for £100 by Martin Noell. Noell responded that "he never sold anyone for money," avowing "I abhor the thoughts of setting £100 upon any man's person. It is false and scandalous. I indent with all persons that I send over. Indeed, the work is hard, but none are sent without their consent. They were civilly used."[93] Noell's statement was disingenuous, as he typically shipped prisoners and convicts, but his defensiveness as well as the necessity to make a deposition before the government in this case was evidence of a need to emphasize legality and fair practices.[94] This case in particular was to have a big impact on Parliamentary consciousness, even if it ultimately led to little substantial change.

In another case, an Irishman, Richard Mecane, argued to a Maryland court in 1661 that he and seven other boys had been kidnapped from Ireland in 1654, and although he possessed no indenture contract, he was now 21 and according to the customs of the colony, he was due to be released. His master, Thomas Gerrard, contended that Mecane still had eight and a half more years to serve. The court took the complaint seriously, and determined that Mecane was nineteen, and had to serve two more years—thus dividing the difference, but favoring the servant's claim more than the master's. A further interesting aspect of the case is that the testimony of witnesses about the initial arrival and sale of the eight boys revealed the disapproval of community members six years before regarding Gerrard's indenturing of children. The case also provides evidence for the kidnapping of children from Ireland in the 1650s.[95]

Almost from the beginning, some in the government had misgivings about the policy of involuntarily indenturing servants, even convicted criminals. On one hand, the government appeared to have discovered a solution for reducing its costs related to the imprisonment of rebels, criminals, and the poor, while

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92 Beckles, *Riotous and Unruly,* 514.

93 *Parl. Deb*. 1, 250.

94 Note the astronomical cost reported—more like a ransom than the cost of a normal indenture contract. The normal price for servants in North America during the 18th century was closer to £15. Abbot Emerson Smith discussed security payments of £100 required in St. Christopher for convicts, and something similar may have occurred in this case. Smith, "Transportation of Convicts," 240–241.

95 *Proceedings of the Provincial Court, 1658–1662,* vol. 41, 476–8, Maryland State Archives Online, http://www.aomol.net/html/index.html.

supplying the colonies with labor, but on the other, during the mid seventeenth century the legality of the transportation policy was vigorously debated in Parliament (as slavery was not). There were at least three rounds of discussions about the legality of shipping "felons and prisoners" overseas in 1649, 1651, 1657.[96] This topic was debated in the early 1660s as well, yet the government failed to make the stealing of children a felony.[97] In 1660 the Privy Council referred to the kidnapping of children as "A thing so barbarous and inhumane that Nature itself, much more Christians, cannot but abhorre," but the latest bill failed to pass.[98] A hint as to why may be found in the petition of a number of merchants involved in the servant trade in July of 1664. Although claiming that they "abominate[d] the very thoughts of" spiriting youths, they alleged that the legislation gave "the opportunity to many evil-minded persons to enlist themselves voluntarily to go the voyage, and having received money, clothes, diet, &c., to pretend they were betrayed or carried away without their consents."[99] Thus this petition, although it presented itself as a disavowal of spiriting, in fact undermined the idea that it was occurring, or that spirited individuals could be reliably identified, by implying that poverty-stricken individuals were taking advantage of the supposed benefits of an indenture contract and then claiming to be kidnapped in order to take advantage of innocent merchants. This led to the evisceration of the bill then being debated, which in itself was relatively weak, as it only recommended but did not mandate that shippers register their cargoes of servants.[100] Similar opposition to outlawing the practice of transporting English prisoners meant that further bills were unsuccessfully introduced in 1670, 1674, 1675, 1676, and 1679.[101] In 1670, a bill was introduced to allow prisoners to elect to be transported for a term of seven years. Yet again, the interests of merchant capitalists had been favored over the interests of the general population.[102]

In addition to the fact that these failed attempts at regulation did not shield the vulnerable populations that they were intended to protect, in theory they did not apply to Irish or Scottish prisoners.[103] This was not because the Irish or Scots were specifically excluded, but because the nature of the discussions on

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96   *Parl. Deb.* 1, 209–211, 222, 241.

97   See Wareing, "Preventative and Punitive Regulation."

98   Quoted in Wareing, "Preventative and Punitive Regulation," 296.

99   *CPSC, America and the West Indies*, 5: 220, 222. Also see Wareing, "Preventative and Punitive Regulation," 294–295.

100   Wareing, "Preventative and Punitive Regulation," 295.

101   *Parl. Deb.* 1, 1670 (354–355, 359–410), 1674 (404–405), 1675 (405–409), 1676 (410), 1679 (417).

102   *Parl. Deb.* 1, 1670, 355.

103   *Parl. Deb.* 1, (417). See also Wareing, "Preventive," 298–299.

transportation centered on whether the government was overreaching by limiting the rights of free English subjects, a particularly striking reservation in some ways because the individuals being transported were vagrants, criminals, and rebels.

The Rowland Thomas case, as well as one filed at the same time by Marcellus Rivers and Oxenbridge Foyle, for instance, led to a particularly vigorous debate in Parliament from 1658–9 on the ethics of selling royalist rebels as indentured servants. Thomas had supported the Stuarts while Rivers and Foyle had taken part in the Salisbury rebellion—all of them had been transported as servants to Barbados.[104] The petitioners described the merchants who sold them as "their pretended owners, merchants that deal in slaves and souls of men," who "enslave[d] those of their own country and religion," in denial of their obligation to the "free-born people of England by whose suffrages they sit in Parliament."[105] Some members responded by defending the forced indenture of royalists on the grounds that they were serving a punishment for their crimes, or claiming that if the petitioners were reprieved, then all royalist prisoners— Scots were particularly mentioned—would clamor for release.[106] However, several members responded like Sir Henry Vane: "I do not look on this business as a Cavelierish business, but as a matter that concerns the liberty of the free-born people of England," or Sir John Lenthall "I hope it is not the effect of our war to make merchandize of men. I consider them as Englishmen…. We are the freest people in the world."[107]

Yet the very terms of this debate excluded those who were not English. Although the Irish were never mentioned in the debate, many of the speakers criticizing the servitude of Royalists explicitly indicated that they did not extend the same rights to African slaves, with Mr. Boscawen stating that "I would have you consider the trade of buying and selling men," but specifying that if the plaintiffs were ignored, "our lives will be as close as those negroes."[108] For Sir Arthur Hasleridge, one of the hardships of servitude was that "These men are now sold into slavery among beasts"—African slaves.[109]

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104   *Journals of the House of Commons, 1651–1659,* Vol. vii (reprinted London: House of Commons, 1813), 620; Marcellus Rivers, *Englands Slavery or Barbados Merchandize* (London: 1659).

105   Thomas Burton, *Diary of Thomas Burton, Esq., Member in the Parliaments of Oliver and Richard Cromwell from 1656–1659,* 4 vols. (London: Henry Colburn, 1828), 257.

106   For example, Burton, *Diary,* 263, 270.

107   Burton, *Diary*, 263, 270. See also Sir Arthur Hasleridge, 270.

108   Burton, *Diary*, 269.

109   Burton, *Diary,* 273. The entire debate is excerpted in Burton, *Diary,* 256–273. It is also discussed in Hilary Beckles, "The Concept of 'White Slavery' in the English Caribbean During

In the end, this attempt at regulation failed, as did most others, but the government continued to attempt, albeit inadequately, to ensure that the servant trade proceeded according to the law and included legal protections for individuals, both in England and Ireland. This was consistent with the government's self representation as a protector of freeborn Englishmen, and also with paternalistic interest in the welfare of servants, including servant children who were supposedly being shipped overseas for moral redemption. The debates about this practice centered on moral concerns—reforming the undesirable populations, removing negative influences from the commonwealth, or conversely, the rights of the transported. Yet evidence suggests that another unspoken imperative was stronger in the end: the economic interests and political influence of capitalist entrepreneurs like Martin Noell far outweighed the scant political will in elite circles to effectively curtail abuses in the servant trade.

At the same time, despite the focus on the abrogation of English rights only, there were sustained—though anemic—attempts to enforce transportation laws in Ireland as well as in England. Debates about the right of the government to involuntarily indenture and sell English subjects automatically seemed to exclude the Irish and Scots. Nonetheless, the English government did attempt to stem abuses in Ireland, even during the Interregnum period which saw the highest level of administrative contempt for the Irish. When town governors in the south of Ireland were ordered to turn in vagrants for transportation in 1654, they were asked for assurances that they would send no persons of good repute or members of families. This likely addressed real concerns of the populations from which servants were drawn.[110] By December of that year, the Irish Commissioners ordered that all ships in Irish harbors bound for the colonies be searched to ensure that no persons on board had been detained without warrants.[111] In 1655, in the aftermath of fighting in Ireland, while rebel troops were still being shipped to the West Indies to involuntary servitude, a ship in Dublin harbor was ordered to be searched on the suspicion that the servants within its holds had been taken forcibly.[112] As in the English cases, the shippers

the Early Seventeenth Century," in John Brewer and Susan Staves, eds., *Early Modern Conceptions of Property* (London: Routledge, 1996), 580 and following.

110   Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate*, 110–111.

111   Prendergast, *Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland*, 246. The warrants were for the detention of vagrants—thus the search was for servants who had been seized but were previously employed or supported by families.

112   Order by the Deputy and Council, July 6, 1655, Irish Record Office, A/5, 5, 188, in Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and the Protectorate,* 111.

were not prosecuted in these instances, although kidnapped servants found were usually released. Abuses continued, and in 1655 the Irish vagrancy laws were temporarily put in abeyance because they had been misused "to delude poor people by false pretences into by places, and thence they force people on board their ships."[113] The Irish Commissioners also stopped issuing licenses to contractors in 1655.[114] In fact, during the 1650s, there were repeated attempts by the Commissioners General for Ireland to prevent non-vagrants from being transported unwillingly from Ireland, and to enforce the search of all ships bound for Barbados. Vagrants were to be identified by warrants signed by two Justices of the Peace. Widespread abuses of the vagrancy laws led to the transportation orders for Irish vagrants being repealed by 1657.[115] It is notable that these measures did not occur in England, likely because rule breaking was less frequent, but it is also evidence that abuse of the Irish vagrant transportation laws was taken seriously. It should be noted that the 1655 measure to halt the collection of Irish vagrants expressed concern that English non-vagrant persons were being seized in addition to the Irish.[116] It is difficult to assess the government's level of assiduousness when many factors still remain unknown, including the extent of the government's knowledge about outcomes and abuses of servant transportation, accurate tallies of numbers of individuals spirited, and the degree of success of government initiatives against spiriting.

For the English state, the policy of transportation of vagrants, criminals, beggars, and others that were seen as surplus or undesirable populations that strained the resources or disturbed the morality of the state was motivated primarily by public policy that sought to maximize both the practical gains to be achieved from transportation as well as capital investments for interested members of the government. It was also conducted according to a practice that was believed to provide moral benefit to the individuals involved, especially if government officials did not pay overly close heed to the actual conditions of indenture that awaited transported servants. Perhaps more importantly, it was part of a moral imperative to cleanse the commonwealth of disorderly and contaminating individuals, allowing the state to

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113   Cited in Prendergast, *Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland*, 246.

114   Smith, 168.

115   Gwynn, "Cromwell's Policy," 622–623. Also see Smith, *Colonists in Bondage,* 163–169 on corruption among shippers and magistrates in shipping supposed vagrants from Ireland to servitude overseas, and governmental attempts to curtail it.

116   Prendergast, *Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland*, 246.

present itself as a moral guide, protector of its subjects, and guardian of the public good. The combination of practical utility, capitalist gain, and a commitment to the construction of consistent law and policy allowed the exercise of discrimination toward rebels or those of Irish ethnicity, but also mitigated against biased behavior in some instances.

Thus for the English authorities, transportation of both willing and unwilling servants, English, Scottish, and Irish, frequently carried out by licensed private contractors, served multiple needs. First, indentured servants made up the first unfree labor force of England's plantation empire, one that would be eventually dominated by permanently enslaved Africans. Furthermore, deportation of undesirables into indentured servitude was an expedient way of avoiding more costly options; mass executions or expensive incarcerations, even though the profit from the sale of servants' contracts went to the contractors who shipped them, and not into the state's coffers. Since many of the larger contractors were also government officials or agents, members of government also obtained significant profits from transportation even if the state as a whole did not. Transportation of the indigent built on established precedents from the English poor laws for dealing with vagrants and the poor, and government authorities believed that indigents, and especially destitute children, whether Irish or English, benefited from being placed in positions of indenture.

The government tried to provide assurances that it was protecting servants against kidnapping and inequitable indenture practices, even those shipped unwillingly. Yet these measures were diluted by the weakness and endemic favoritism of the early modern state and the lack of will to implement impartiality, particularly in the Irish context. Within this framework, the rights of the poor or of adversaries of the government were recognized, as evidenced by debates in the government and the attempts to regulate, but ultimately treated as almost negligible. Thus, the state's claim to protect its subjects was compromised by its willingness to countenance the intertwining of public and private aspirations. The violence of indenture demonstrates the complex and sometimes contradictory nature of state participation and intervention in unfree labor systems in the English Atlantic.

Citizens of the Empire? Indentured Labor, Global Capitalism and the Limits of French Republicanism in Colonial Guadeloupe

Elizabeth Heath

In the early days of France's Third Republic colonial administrators on the tiny island-colony of Guadeloupe extolled the Frenchness and patriotism of the local working population, most of whom were descendants of slaves freed in 1848. Official visits, Bastille Day celebrations, and work festivals all provided officials an opportunity to praise the population's "profound attachment…to Republican institutions…their wisely liberal aspirations and respect for authority."[1] No matter how they described it, nearly all agreed that local workers of color deserved inclusion in the French nation as citizens because, in short, they were French. Officials further backed these claims with concrete legislation that solidified the political status and rights of Guadeloupean citizens. Between 1870 and 1900 the Third Republic re-established universal male suffrage on the island, reaffirmed the right of Guadeloupeans to elect representatives to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in Paris, and also included them in key pieces of legislation, namely the 1884 law legalizing unions and other forms of association.

By 1910, however, a strikingly different set of discourses and policies had emerged. In the face of mounting economic and social problems, colonial officials revised their conception of Guadeloupe's worker-citizens of color. In subsequent years Guadeloupean men of color retained their official status as French citizens, but the content of this citizenship diverged significantly from that held by metropolitan Frenchmen. Above all, Republican officials excluded Guadeloupeans from new forms of state assistance and benefits being offered to metropolitan working citizens. In addition, officials undercut the political rights of Guadeloupeans and limited their right to unionize and strike. By the beginning of World War I Guadeloupeans of color had become second-class citizens.

This article examines the declining status of Guadeloupean workers of color in the early Third Republic; it does so by considering the way that changes in

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1 Governor's Report to the Minister of the Colonies, March 22, 1882, Fonds ministériels, Série géographique, Guadeloupe 12/136, (hereafter FM SG Guadeloupe), Archives nationales d'outre-mer (hereafter ANOM).

colonial citizenship were conditioned by shifts in the global economy and the international labor market. French colonial policy in Guadeloupe was driven by two conflicting goals: a republican ideal of political and social assimilation for Guadeloupean citizens of color; and the economic advancement of a labor-hungry colonial sugar industry. The Republic's ability to balance these two competing demands ultimately depended on conditions in the capitalist global economy and particularly international patterns of labor recruitment and employment. The dramatic shift from an inclusive to a more restrictive and racialized notion of French citizenship in Guadeloupe are thus to be understood within the context of the global capitalist economy of the late nineteenth century.

The international movement of people and goods in the late nineteenth century initially created an opportunity for the French Republic to reconcile republican and economic ambitions, and to offer black Guadeloupeans a new, more inclusive form of citizenship. In Guadeloupe, the owners of sugar plantations and factories recruited indentured workers from India and other parts of Asia to work as manual laborers in sugar fields. These contract-bound workers provided the sugar industry with a cheap and docile labor force. Guadeloupean workers benefited socially and politically from the presence of Indian indentured laborers. Indentured workers supplied the sugar industry with essential manual labor thereby freeing (at least in the imagination of local colonial officials) Guadeloupe's black workers to pursue new economic opportunities and social advancement. As long as indentured laborers toiled in the colony's sugar fields and factories, the Third Republic embraced Guadeloupean workers as French and upheld its promise of political and social equality for all citizens. Indeed, the greatest potential for Guadeloupeans of color to be included in the French nation politically, socially, and culturally occurred when the colony's sugar industry had an abundance of immigrant labor to work the fields and factories. These opportunities began to disappear at the end of the nineteenth century as the international sugar market spiraled into crisis and contract labor recruitment trickled to a halt. The closing of the contract labor trade to Guadeloupe signaled the beginning of new political and social restrictions for local-born workers of color.

Global capitalism and the international flow of labor were two key factors that shaped opportunities for political and social inclusion in the French imperial-nation state. Situating the story of Guadeloupe within the context of global capitalism offers new ways to understand the racialization of French citizenship in the early days of the Third Republic. The limits of French republicanism in Guadeloupe cannot be understood by looking exclusively at events within the Third Republic and French empire, or by appeals to the inherent

contradictions within French republicanism.[2] Rather, one must explore the ways that these limits—and contradictions—emerged from a French imperial project that relied upon coercive labor regimes to accommodate republican ideals to the logic of a global capitalist economy.

The Problem of Labor in Post-Emancipation Guadeloupe

The shifting terrain of citizenship in Guadeloupe is an important, though often forgotten part of the Third Republic's colonial policy and *mission civilisatrice*. In general, Guadeloupe has been viewed as an archaic remnant of an older age of imperialism shaped by sugar, slavery, and merchant capitalism.[3] Indeed, a quick view of Guadeloupe in 1880 reveals a colony marked by this earlier moment of imperialism. People of color comprised more than 80% of the population; most of these individuals descended from Africans who had been transported to the island as slaves. The vast majority worked for the sugar industry. A small population of educated elites, mostly of mixed race, worked in professional occupations. The island also contained a small group of whites who formed the colony's economic and political elite; the most influential of this group owned the colony's sugar factories and plantations. Finally, the colony included a limited group of colonial administrators. A Governor appointed by the Colonial Ministry in Paris headed this administration; he was assisted by two appointed officials, the Director of the Interior and the Attorney General. The governor worked in consultation with the local legislative body, the *conseil général*.

Old and new structures of empire rested uneasily in Guadeloupe in the Third Republic. It is exactly for this reason that Guadeloupe offers a key

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2   For example, Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism Between the Two World Wars* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005) and Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).

3   In comparison to North Africa, West Africa, and Indochina, Guadeloupe and the other anci-ennes colonies have received scant attention in recent scholarship. Notable exceptions are Benoît Fricoteaux, *Propagandes et assimilation aux Antilles françaises entre 1890 et 1946* (Lille: Atelier nation de reproduction des thèses, 2004); Myriam Cottias, "La silence de la nation: les 'vieilles' colonies comme lieu de définition des dogmes republicains, 1848–1905," *Outre-Mers* vol. 90, no. 338–339 (2003): 21–45; Céline Flory, "New Africans in Postslavery French West Indies and Guiana, 1854–1889," in *Paths of the Atlantic Slave Trade: Interactions, Identities, and Images* ed. Ana Lucia Araujo (Amherst, MA: Cambria, 2011); and Rebecca Hartkopf Schloss, *Sweet Liberty: The Final Days of Slavery in Martinique* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2009).

opportunity to study the colonial project of the Third Republic. As one of France's oldest possessions, Guadeloupe was also one of the colonies in which France pursued its policy of assimilation most actively. Assimilation would have meant the full extension of French political and social rights to Guadeloupeans, the automatic extension of all metropolitan laws to the island, and the administrative integration of the island to the metropole. At the same time, the island's recent transition from a regime of slave to wage labor made the labor question and economic productivity an explicit topic of debate in colonial policy. In the early days of the Third Republic, then, colonial officials in Guadeloupe openly sought to balance the republican ideal of assimilation with an economic goal of productivity.

Their attempts to do so, however, were shaped by the economic and social structures they inherited from the Second Empire and its response to emancipation in Guadeloupe. On March 4, 1848 the Second Republic ended slavery on French soil. The abolition decree not only emancipated slaves in the *anciennes colonies* but also granted them full French citizenship including universal male suffrage. Former slave owners and sugar producers decried the proclamation, arguing that it would bring economic crisis and social upheaval. Guadeloupean sugar producers had good reasons to predict the worst.[4] In 1848 sugar production on the island revolved around inefficient agro-industrial complexes (*habitations-sucreries*) reliant on slave labor.[5] Most Guadeloupean sugar planters teetered on the brink of bankruptcy and used slave labor to compensate for aging machinery and outdated techniques.[6] Emancipation and the shift to free labor thus instigated a sea change on the island. In Guadelope, 87,087 (roughly 67% of the population) people, most of them working in the sugar industry, were freed from bondage.[7] The economic effects of emancipation were

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4   Sugar production dropped initially but began to recover by 1858. Lucien Casta-Lumio, *Étude historique sur les origines de l'immigration réglementée dans nos anciennes colonies de la Réunion, la Guadeloupe, la Martinique, et la Guyane* (Paris: G. Vilette, 1906), 34. Also Christian Schnakenbourg, *Histoire de l'industrie sucrière en Guadeloupe aux XIXe et XXe siècles. La transition post-esclavagiste 1848–1883* (Paris: Harmattan, 2007).

5   J.H. Galloway, *The Cane Sugar Industry: An Historical Geography from its Origins to 1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 140.

6   On the debt and precarious position of sugar producers prior to emancipation see Josette Fallope, *Esclaves et citoyens. Les noirs à la Guadeloupe au XIXe siècle dans les processus de résistance et d'integration, 1802–1910* (Basse-Terre: Société d'Histoire de la Guadeloupe, 1992), 252–262. For parallels with nearby Martinique see Dale Tomich, *Slavery in the Circuit of Sugar: Martinique in the World Economy, 1830–1848* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1990).

7   Statistics are from Nelly Schmidt, "1848 dans les colonies françaises des Caraïbes. Ambitions républicaines et ordre colonial." *RFHOM* 1er sem vol. 87, no. 326–327 (2000): 205–244. Also see

enormous. Men and women once forced to toil in the cane fields and sugar mills were now free, and most wanted nothing more to do with the hated industry.

Intense struggles between former slaves and former masters, particularly over labor and labor practices, marked the transition from slave to wage labor. At first sugar producers sought new forms of labor discipline.[8] The Second Empire, which effectively dismantled the political rights of ex-slaves, facilitated these initiatives. White sugar planters lobbied for, and won, formal legislation curtailing the rights of workers of color to support themselves as subsistence farmers, work irregularly, and to change jobs freely. A racialized discourse about the unformed work habits and improvident character of black workers justified these juridical tactics. Race therefore continued to play a fundamental role in structuring economic opportunities and social relations on the island.

Sugar producers, though, were not content. Hoping to reduce their dependency on "unreliable" former slaves, Guadeloupean sugar producers searched for new labor sources. They found what they sought in Africa and India. In 1852 Guadeloupean sugar producers successfully petitioned the government to bring indentured laborers to the island.[9] Guadeloupean sugar planters initially turned to West Africa, from which they transported nearly 6,000 Africans between 1857 and 1861. They ended the trade at the request of the British government, which argued that labor recruitment in West Africa too closely resembled the slave trade. In return, the British government allowed the French to recruit laborers from British India. Between 1854 and 1889, 41,828 Indians traveled to Guadeloupe to serve five- or ten-year contracts on local plantations.[10]

　　　Henri Bangou, *La Guadeloupe. Les aspects de la colonisation, 1848–1939* (Paris: Harmattan, 1987), 35.

8　　For a full description of the transition see Paul Butel, *Histoire des Antilles françaises XVII-XXe siècles* (Paris: Perrin, 2002), Chapter 9; Rosamund Renard, "Labour Relations in Martinique and Guadeloupe, 1848-1870" in *Caribbean Freedom*, ed. Hilary Beckles and Verene Shepard (Kingston: Ian Randle, 1993); and Ernest Wright, *French Politics in the West Indies* (Ann Arbor: U. Microfilms International, 1981).

9　　Casta-Lumio, *Origines de l'immigration réglementée*, 81–108.

10　　Emile Légier, *La Martinique et la Guadeloupe* (Paris: Bureaux de la Sucrerie Indigène et Coloniale, 1905), 20. Also see David Northup, "Indentured Indians in the French Antilles," *RFHOM* vol. 87, no. 326–327 (2000): 245–271 and Schnakenbourg, *Histoire de l'industrie sucrière*, Chapter two. The British government did place limits on this trade; it regulated French recruitment in India and also monitored conditions in Guadeloupe. The British government would eventually end transport to Guadeloupe because of the abusive work

Thus under the Second Empire Guadeloupean sugar planters created a nominally-free labor force: a population of workers who "freely" entered into a labor contract that specified long hours, low wages, and deprived them of basic civil liberties and rights that would allow them to challenge the contract legally. This workforce remained essential even after modern factories replaced the old sugar mills.[11] Factories did not run by themselves and sugar cane did not grow of its own accord; labor remained the essential component of production. Sugar producers did everything within their power to remind colonial officials that the colony's prosperity depended on a marginally-free labor force.

Labor and Assimilation in the Early Years of the Third Republic

The labor policies enacted in post-emancipation Guadeloupe were not unusual. Across the Atlantic world, former slave owners undermined the liberties of former slaves and recruited indentured labor.[12] Guadeloupe might have remained faithful to this model had it not been for the momentous changes of 1870–1, which ushered in the Third Republic.[13] In 1871 the new Republic restored the political rights of Guadeloupeans and called the island's male citizens to elect national representatives.[14] The regime also assigned new colonial officials

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conditions to which the workers were exposed, the inadequate medical services offered to workers, and low repatriation rates.

11   Between 1861 and 1884 twenty factories replaced the more than 1,000 mills that existed previously in Guadeloupe. Fueled by steam power and equipped with steel rollers, the new factories decreased processing time and increased the amount of sugar extracted. Galloway, *The Sugar Industry*, 136; Noel Deerr, *The History of Sugar,* 2 vols. (London: Chapman and Hall, 1949–1950), 2: 537, 549; and Christian Schnakenbourg, "From Sugar Estate to Central Factory," in *Crisis and Change in the International Sugar Economy, 1850–1914*, ed. Bill Albert and Adrian Graves (Norwich: ISC Press, 1984), 91.

12   On this transition elsewhere see Thomas Holt, *The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor, and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832–1938* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1992); Walter Rodney, *A History of the Guyanese Working People, 1881–1905* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1981); Walton Look Lai, *Indenture Labor, Caribbean Sugar: Chinese and Indian Migrants to The British West Indies, 1838–1918* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Moon-Ho Jung, *Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor and Sugar in the Age of Emancipation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2006); and Alex Lichtenstein, *Twice the Work of Free Labor: The Political Economy of Convict Labor in the New South* (New York: Verso, 1996).

13   Liberalizing reforms began during the last years of the Second Empire and in 1869 politicians even considered easing suffrage restrictions in Guadeloupe. See Hazareesingh, *From Subject to Citizen.*

14   *Gazette Officiel de la Guadeloupe*, October 1, 1870.

and established administrative rules that aspired to color-blindness in social and political policies. Guadeloupeans of color hoped that emancipation's promises of equality, liberty, and full citizenship might finally be realized.[15]

The Third Republic, however, was beset by problems. Political rivalries and power struggles threatened the new regime from its inception. Ideological conflicts among the Republic's supporters also contributed to the regime's woes. Republicans may have been united in their desire for a Republic, but they did not always share the same vision of the future or agree on the government's role in shaping French society. Above all, the new Republic confronted an old challenge: how to balance claims for social and political equality, particularly among the working class, while promoting economic development and the concerns of industrial capitalists who had, historically, sided against the Republic?

The issue did not simply affect Republican metropolitan rule. Stability and prosperity in the *anciennes colonies* also depended on the Republic's ability to reconcile the two claims. In Guadeloupe the clearest expression of this conflict emerged during debates over labor and labor legislation. The Third Republic had reinvested Guadeloupeans with the rights of citizenship but did not overturn the restrictive labor laws immediately, a decision that pointed to the Republic's vested interest in the economic well-being of the sugar industry and white sugar elites.[16] The Minister of the Navy and Colonies deflected the issue by organizing a commission to resolve the issue. The group, which was led by the abolitionist Victor Schoelcher, met regularly in 1873 to debate colonial policies towards black working citizens in Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Réunion.[17] At the heart of the debate were two competing conceptions of colonialism: one viewed colonialism as an economic endeavor in which profit drove policy; the other subscribed to more humanistic goals such as assimilation. At the head of this second group was Schoelcher, who argued against any laws that would deny black citizens basic political rights and civil liberties in the name

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15   It should be noted that this conception of citizenship was gendered; the Second Republic offered the promise of universal *male* suffrage. Women in France would not receive the vote until 1944.

16   The extent to which these political rights were, and could be embraced, is, of course, another story. See the first volume of Jean-Pierre Sainton's *Les nègres en politique: couleur, identités, et strategies de pouvoir en Guadeloupe au tournant du siècle,* 2 vols. (Paris: Septentrion Presses Universitaires, 2000).

17   Victor Schoelcher was the author of the abolition decree of 1848. He elaborated his position on immigration in the *anciennes colonies* in *Polémique coloniale* (Paris: Dentu 1882) and in Guadeloupe in *Nouvelle réglementation de l'immigration à la Guadeloupe* (Paris: Dentu, 1885).

of economic productivity. He urged instead more benevolent and uplifting policies to liberate workers and shape them into ideal citizens. The solution to the labor question in the *anciennes colonies*, he argued, was to offer the population economic, political, and educational opportunities—particularly the opportunity to become landowners.[18]

Nevertheless, economic concerns could not be ignored. While many commission members agreed that restrictive labor laws should be overturned, they also insisted that sugar producers be guaranteed a reliable workforce. Indentured laborers—who were not French citizens and could therefore be governed by special laws—were already working in the colonies and could aid the sugar industry. Many commission members urged the state to continue indentured labor recruitment to the colonies, arguing that immigration would allow the state to dismantle restrictive labor laws thereby guaranteeing the rights of local worker-citizens.[19] Despite the concerns of Schoelcher, who argued that immigrant workers would compete with local workers and depress wages, the proposal won widespread support among the commission members and its continuation was confirmed.

In the end colonial administrators and politicians reconciled demands for social and political equality by Guadeloupean workers of color and the self-interested appeals of sugar producers for "economic liberty" in Guadeloupe and the other *anciennes colonies* through immigration. French local-born workers in the colony would no longer be subject to special work legislation. Instead they would be free to pursue new professions and opportunities deemed more appropriate to their interests and status. Meanwhile sugar production would continue with the labor of a marginalized immigrant population possessing few legal and political rights.[20] The colonial administrators who embraced this system rarely questioned the colonies' dependence on sugar production or considered diversifying the colonial economy. Rather they

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18 Proceedings of the Commission du régime du travail aux colonies, especially the December 15, 1873, December 22, 1873, March 2, 1874, and June 1, 1874 sessions, FM SG Généralités, 127/1105, ANOM.

19 Proceedings of the Commission du régime du travail aux colonies, December 8, 1873. Also July 15, 1874. FM SG Généralités, 127/1105, ANOM. It should be noted that Victor Schoelcher and the representative of French Guyane, Marck, lobbied against immigration, arguing that immigrants unfairly competed with local workers and lowered local wages.

20 An older variation of this idea was promoted by the Abbé Sieyes. See William H. Sewell, Jr., *A Rhetoric of Bourgeois Revolution: The Abbé Sieyes and What is the Third Estate* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 153–158 and Laurent Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787–1804* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2004), Chapter six.

were content to soothe the fundamental tensions plaguing the colony by shifting the onus of production onto a non-French working class.

Guadeloupeans into Frenchmen

The Colonial Commission debates in the early 1870s resolved—at least temporarily—competing social, political, and economic demands by lifting restrictions on local workers of color. Yet, the Commission stopped short of creating new economic opportunities for native-born (*créole*) workers.[21] It also did not address broader demands for the complete assimilation of the *anciennes colonies*. Assimilation would have instigated two major changes: first, the integration of the "old colonies" into France as full departments; and second, the extension of all metropolitan legislation and policies to the territories and their populations. In 1875 Guadeloupean citizens enjoyed many of the same rights and duties as their metropolitan peers, but not all.[22] Full assimilation would have made colonial citizens indistinguishable from metropolitan citizens and would have fully integrated them into the French nation.

Guadeloupeans petitioned for assimilation in the 1880s and 1890s. Local politicians, elites, and colonial administrators from all backgrounds called for inclusion. Indeed, few meetings of the local legislative body, the *conseil général,* concluded without passing motion for full assimilation.[23] Their claims for total integration rested on the idea that Guadeloupeans were French. According to one discourse that became commonplace in the early years of the Third Republic, the black inhabitants of the French Antilles had thoroughly assimilated to French civilization during centuries of exposure to the French. It was said that the slave population had "mixed with the metropolitan-born population whose language, religion, and manners and customs they adopted."[24]

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21   In the early Third Republic the term *créole* referred to individuals who had been born in Guadeloupe (rather than individuals who had been born in France and settled in Guadeloupe). The term referred to all island-born individuals regardless of race or class; however, when used in reference to workers, the term *créole* almost always implied that the individual was of African-descent whose ancestors had been brought to Guadeloupe as slaves.

22   At this time, Guadeloupeans possessed nearly all the political rights of metropolitan French, including universal adult male suffrage. They were not, however, required to perform military service, a duty—or right—that many hoped to secure through assimilation.

23   In the 1880s the seat of the *conseil général* was largely occupied by white or mixed-race elites.

24   Alcindor, *Les Antilles françaises*, 91.

Abolition, which transformed slaves into free wage laborers, solidified their French status.[25]

In this discourse Guadeloupeans qualified for assimilation because of cultural affinities that they acquired over centuries of servitude. Nevertheless it was the change in their status—from unfree to free people—rather than cultural factors that entitled them to the label of "French." The importance of labor and productivity for national inclusion in the early days of the Third Republic—and the shifting idea of what kind of labor suited citizens—is perhaps best illustrated by the discussions surrounding two immigrant populations on the island. In part, these discourses are striking because they reversed racial hierarchies common in the late nineteenth century that placed Africans near the bottom of the order and Indians slightly higher; in Guadeloupe officials praised African immigrants while denigrating contract workers from India.[26]

On the one hand, the local administrators and elected officials extolled the virtues of African residents in Guadeloupe. In 1884 leading members of the African-born community asked to be naturalized by the French government.[27] The administration and *conseil général* warmly received the request of these individuals, who had first arrived in Guadeloupe in the 1850s and 60s as indentured laborers and, upon completing their contracts, had settled in the colony and become local residents. A leading *conseiller*, Justin Marie, introduced the discussion by applauding the petitioners who, in his estimation, "follow our lives, free of contract, and who constitute an integral part of the population." Moreover, he explained, "they contribute to the prosperity of the region...most of them being property owners." He concluded by stating that "these men [who are] of the same race and same origin as the vast majority of the colonial population should be included in the common law as citizens and enjoy those same civil and political rights."[28] Marie's opinion was firmly supported by Alexandre Isaac, the Director of the Interior, who argued that "these foreigners...have blended into the local population whose habits they adopted, and today they

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25   Ibid.

26   Prevailing racial theories at the time placed Africans at the bottom of the racial hierarchy while linking Indians with Aryan traditions. See Thomas Trautmann, *Aryans and British India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) and William Cohen, *The French Encounter with Africans: White Responses to Blacks, 1530–1880* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980).

27   African residents in Guadeloupe were considered country-less and nationality-less and consequently had to petition the French government for basic civil rights, including the right to marry. Appeals are found in FM SG Guadeloupe 72/548, ANOM.

28   *Conseil général, session ordinaire. Extrait du procès-verbal* (December 13, 1884), FM SG Guadeloupe 107/754, ANOM.

continue with their hardworking tendencies, they are a population quite worthy of [our] concern."[29] The motion passed overwhelmingly.

In contrast, leading officials in Guadeloupe remained skeptical about Indian laborers. Although considered a necessity, officials criticized Indians for indolence, poor work habits, and immorality as well as for evading work, breaking their contracts, or feigning illness.[30] Accounts of their alcoholism, unschooled children, and allegedly tumultuous domestic lives were taken as a further indication of their inferiority. While Indian laborers also had the right to appeal for naturalization after they had fulfilled their contract, this was an exceptional status awarded to only the most honorable and disciplined of Indian workers.

Sugar factory owners openly castigated Indian immigrants, to whom they transferred a number of negative stereotypes once applied to Guadeloupean workers of African descent. Ignoring the obvious ways that the exploitative labor regime itself produced worker resistance, sugar elites depicted Indian workers as inherently "unruly," "undisciplined," and "violent" individuals needing constant surveillance and punishment. Despite these descriptions, sugar producers regarded indentured laborers as "a necessary evil." Sugar factory owners were open about the fact that they preferred *créole* workers, whom they depicted as strong, fast, and conscientious. But they also acknowledged that local workers had little interest in sugar industry work. In contrast, immigrants—no matter how "uncouth," "lazy," or "uncivilized"—were contractually bound to work in the sugar industry. Their presence ensured that crops were harvested and sugar cane processed in a timely manner. The sugar industry therefore depended on the continued availability of immigrant laborers. Immigration, they argued, was "a question of life or death for the colony…to deprive the colony and its agricultural sector of the workers it needs is to condemn it to ruin—a ruin that is immediate and certain."[31]

Between 1880 and 1895 Guadeloupe's white sugar elites repeatedly asked the colonial government to secure new supplies of indentured workers from India, China, and even Annam (Vietnam). These requests were spurred by the global sugar crisis, during which the price of sugar dropped dramatically and the profits earned by sugar producers plummeted.[32] Faced with mount-

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29   Ibid.

30   Monthly Governor's reports to the Minister of the Colonies, FM SG Guadeloupe 12/135, ANOM.

31   *Le Courrier de la Guadeloupe,* January 4, 1881.

32   The sugar crisis began in 1884, when the price of sugar dropped from almost 50 francs/100 kg to 32 francs/100 kg. The price of sugar fluctuated between 15 and 28 francs/100 kg between 1886 and 1908.

ing debts, sugar elites saw few options for reducing production costs other than cutting labor costs. Sugar elites consequently sought to expand the contract labor pool and displace local, Guadeloupean workers of color. Sugar producers framed their economic demands in terms of the local worker's presumed social and economic desires. In their appeals colonial elites reiterated and reinforced the connections between labor and social status established in earlier discourses. Sugar producers depicted Guadeloupeans as productive, skilled laborers who rightly loathed the sugar industry's dirty and onerous work. Guadeloupeans who worked in the industry rightly preferred skilled jobs in the factories. Sugar producers acknowledged this reality and, as a result, sought a population that was more suited to the industry's other jobs.

Thus the early decades of the Third Republic witnessed the emergence of discourses and policies that linked labor and citizenship in ways that appeared to advance claims for assimilation. In this discourse native-born Guadeloupean workers of color were embraced as French. Their history, culture, and labor preferences revealed their "Frenchness," an elusive quality determined more by habits and mores rather than skin color. Nevertheless, this was not a race-blind vision of assimilation that accepted all individuals. Rather it was a policy of acceptance that reconciled republican ideals with the exploitative logic of a capitalist system of production through the recruitment of foreign labor. As such, economic productivity remained dependent on the exploitation of labor, but this labor force was to be recruited not from the local citizenry, but from abroad. Thus, while white sugar elites and colonial officials confirmed the "Frenchness" and social rights of Guadeloupean workers of color, they also demanded new convoys of indentured laborers. Immigrant workers were to provide the sugar industry with a malleable labor force whose discipline could be enforced through deportation and whose exploitation could be justified by racial hierarchies and civilizational narratives. The capitalist organization of the international sugar economy and the economic ambitions of Guadeloupe's sugar plantations thereby forced the Republic to delimit the republican ideal of universal rights for all of Guadeloupe's sugar workers. Forced to choose between the economic health of the colony and the rights of citizens, the Republic endorsed a third option: the creation of a secondary pool of unfree labor. Through the creation of a dual labor system, the Third Republic ultimately found a way to balance the competing demands of a colonial policy of assimilation based on republican ideals and a colonial economy based on a capitalist mode of production.

Frenchmen into Peasants

In the years that followed assimilation won widespread support from colonial officials, local politicians and Guadeloupean elites—including leading sugar producers. In 1882 Guadeloupean Deputy Gaston Gerville-Réache authored a law to assimilate Guadeloupe, which was supported by a number of influential colonial and metropolitan officials including Victor Schoelcher. In spite of this support, the measure did not win the requisite votes in the Chamber of Deputies. Although bids for assimilation failed, officials did not abandon the position that Guadeloupeans were essentially French and that Guadeloupe should be treated as a department of France.[33] Nevertheless, subsequent appeals for assimilation were muffled by larger concerns. Guadeloupean demands paled in comparison to the broader economic problems afflicting France in the 1880s. Likewise new colonial projects overshadowed the plight of the old colony. Finally, political instability and social unrest in the metropole drew attention away from colonial affairs.[34]

The colony itself experienced many of the same problems plaguing metropolitan departments. Like France, Guadeloupe suffered considerable economic problems during the 1880s and 1890s. For the island this economic upheaval resulted from fluctuations on the international sugar market. The island was likewise riven by political tensions between conservatives and socialists. Finally, colonial officials expressed numerous concerns about local workers. Although immigration helped to free Guadeloupean workers from the sugar industry in theory, there were few other jobs available on the island. Officials worried that lack of economic opportunities might lead working class citizens towards unions, strikes, and socialist politics that would undermine the Republic.[35]

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33 Officials, politicians, and elites voiced their continued support for, and desire of, full assimilation during the annual meetings of the *conseil général*. The issue was also discussed at the Congrès colonial national held in conjunction with the 1889 Universal Exposition in Paris. At the meeting colonial officials and lobbyists issued a motion strongly supporting the immediate assimilation of Guadeloupe and other *anciennes colonies*. The discussion can be found in *Recueil des délibérations du Congrès Colonial National Paris 1889–1890, t. 1* (Paris: Librairie des annales économiques, 1890), 169–193.

34 A contemporary perspective on this shift, and particularly the role that global economic pressures played in the reassessment of colonial policy, is found in Marcel Dubois and Auguste Terrier, *Les colonies françaises. Un siècle d'expansion coloniale* (Paris: Challamel, 1902), 374–397.

35 The socialist party developed under the leadership of Hégésippe Légitimus and received broad support from black working-class voters. Socialist politicians won key political offices in the 1890s and 1900s.

Colonial officials responded to the island's problems with policies that resembled metropolitan reforms.[36] In the 1890s colonial administrators tried to create economic opportunities for Guadeloupean workers of color and buffer them from "questionable" political influences by turning wage laborers into peasant farmers.[37] Over the next decade colonial administrators promoted smallholding as an ideal occupation, and peasant farmers as ideal citizens. Happy in their situation and free from economic or political concerns, the smallholder and his family would ultimately help to reform society and promote social harmony on the colony. This, in turn, would help stabilize the republic. As in the metropole, French labor in Guadeloupe was to be defined as small-scale farming as done by the independent peasant.

At first, colonial officials considered ways to support Guadeloupe's tiny peasantry, most of whom lived in the mountainous regions of Basse-Terre. Governors encouraged the *conseil général* to extend credit to worthy smallholders. In addition, they applauded metropolitan legislation granting tax reductions to secondary crops—namely coffee and cacao—grown by smallholders in the mountains.[38] There were also attempts to improve agricultural instruction on the island and to hire an agronomist who would help local growers.

Beginning in the mid-1890s colonial administrators undertook the active constitution of a smallholder class. In a series of letters written to the Minister of the Colonies in early 1894, Governor Pardon sketched the issues driving the policy. On the one hand, he wrote, *créole* workers despised the idea of laboring for someone else and were, as a result, unreliable and poor workers.[39] On the other hand, he argued, immigrant laborers, particularly indentured workers from India, were "more docile and less free, because they are under contract." Indian contract laborers possessed fewer political and legal rights than local workers, which diffused the possibility of collective action and thus made them remarkably useful for plantation and factory work. As a result, island

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36 This was part of a larger effort to stem the rural exodus. The idea was fully elaborated in Jules Méline, *Le retour à la terre et la surproduction industrielle* (Paris: Hachette, 1906).

37 Interestingly Victor Schoelcher first advanced the idea of peasant farming in the colonial commission in 1872. He argued that peasant farmers would buffer the colony from social and economic divisions. Commission du régime du travail aux colonies, December 15, 1873, FM SG Généralités 127/1105, ANOM.

38 See the opening speeches of the Governor of Guadeloupe before the *conseil général* in 1889, 1891, and 1892 and Report from the Governor, June 1892, FM SG Guadeloupe 13/140, ANOM.

39 Governor's Report to the Minister of the Colonies, June 29, 1894, FM SG Guadeloupe 203/1229, ANOM.

employers "greatly desire the re-opening of Indian immigration." Nevertheless, he admitted, *créole* workers, who had few alternatives to working in the sugar industry, viewed foreign workers as a threat.

Governor Pardon suggested that colonial officials resolve the problem by reconfiguring the island's workforce. Immigrant labor, he argued, was "indispensable," but only possible if the administration were to free *créole* workers from wage labor. "For this," he continued, "one could develop a concession system in the island's state lands. The lands would be completely suitable for coffee and cocoa production, which would be very remunerative." One could, he continued, give each interested family a plot of two hectares and, in doing so, expose them to the freeing effects of property. In short, Pardon suggested that the administration could create a new class of smallholders. By providing the *créole* workforce with a small plot of land, the workers could be freed of the negative effects of wage labor.

A year later Pardon offered a more concrete policy. He suggested reopening "official" immigration, but under one condition. "Immigration," he wrote, "is only morally possible if *créole* workers are given access to property"[40] "I would like it to be possible," he continued, "for the Administration to give 100 *créole* workers a concession of land of at least one hectare each for every 100 immigrant workers introduced to the colony. Immigration is indispensable for large property, but its only chance of lasting success depends on creating small property owners." The smallholder, he argued, was the future of the colony. In the margins of the report the Minister of the Colonies scribbled, "Encourage the Governor in the creation of *la petite propriété*."[41]

The proposal would have redeveloped vast areas of the colony according to an idealized vision of rural France. In addition it would have transformed Guadeloupean workers of color into peasant farmers who would confirm their aptitude for the truest form of "French" labor: farming. Peasant farmers would stabilize the colony socially and politically. Far from the questionable influences of the sugar factories and the whims of the international market, peasant farmers would be immune to economic, political, and social troubles. Thus, assimilation and integration meant dividing Guadeloupe into two spheres. The sugar industry was to dominate the first, located in Grande-Terre. In this region administrators were willing to concede to the economic demands of local planters, essentially granting their claims that the economic interests of

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40   Governor's Report to the Minister of the Colonies, April 21, 1895, FM SG Guadeloupe
      203/1229, ANOM.

41   Ibid.

capitalists should take priority over the social and political rights of workers. Small farms were to occupy the second sphere located in Basse-Terre. Here Guadeloupean citizens would find their true calling as French peasants, and ultimately realize the vision of freedom and liberty that many of them had expressed in the immediate post-emancipation period. This conception of freedom privileged social and political equality over economic imperatives, and expressly challenged the idea that to be "free" was to be able to sell one's labor to an employer in the sugar industry.

Disappearing Labor, Disappearing Citizens

Ultimately plans to reconstitute Guadeloupe as a rural department failed. Pardon's proposals remained just that; Guadeloupeans were not transformed into peasants, and Guadeloupe was not remade into an ideal French countryside. Instead, Guadeloupe and Guadeloupeans experienced a different kind of transformation. Rather than becoming prototypical French peasants, the population became surprisingly "un-French." A tangle of reasons contributed to the shift, but economic factors best account for the particular timing of the turn.

In the late 1890s and early 1900s new developments in the global market—including increased market integration, heightened competition and protectionism—coincided with, and exacerbated, economic problems within France and the French empire. Conditions deteriorated rapidly in Guadeloupe. As the price of sugar dropped to twenty-five francs per one hundred kilograms, the island transformed its trade surplus of 1.5 million francs to a deficit of 4.2 million francs.[42] Staggering amounts were drawn into the trade deficit, and currency became scarce. By mid-1895 the colony and the sugar industry stood on the brink of financial collapse. Sugar producers struggled to pay their creditors. In fact, 1895 would mark the beginning of a series of defaults and foreclosures in which local economic elites began to lose their hold on the Guadeloupean sugar industry.

The disappearance of a government-supported labor recruitment program preceded the shift. By the turn of the century sources of immigrant labor began to evaporate. Citing abuse, neglect, and low rates of repatriation, British

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42   Fallope, *Esclaves et citoyens:*, 531. Also Alain Buffon, *Monnaie et crédit en économie coloniale: contribution à l'histoire économique de la Guadeloupe, 1635–1919* (Basse-Terre: Société d'histoire de la Guadeloupe, 1979).

authorities outlawed the transport of Indian laborers to the French Antilles in 1888.[43] Colonial officials and sugar elites attempted to fill the void by bringing Chinese, Japanese, and Vietnamese workers, but with little success.[44] In the early 1900s officials even considered recruiting Europeans, but found few people willing to move to the colony to work in the cane fields. By 1905 organized efforts to recruit mass populations of immigrant labor, which had been the linchpin of Pardon's plans, had disappeared.

Meanwhile the sugar industry's labor demands did not abate; high labor inputs at low costs remained central to its economic model. Indentured workers had helped planters to achieve this goal and to weather the sugar crisis of the 1880s and 1890s. Crisis struck the sugar industry once again in the 1900s, but this time sugar producers did not have recourse to cheap foreign labor provided by the state. Sugar producers nevertheless redoubled their efforts to lower production costs by decreasing labor costs. They cut wages, pushing most local workers into abject poverty. In addition, some sugar producers illegally recruited workers from nearby islands. Local workers quite rightly viewed these recruits as competitors who undercut wages.

In addition, factory owners cut production costs by reducing the amount paid for sugarcane. In the 1880s sugar factories purchased most of their sugar cane from independent producers or farmers who rented land from the factories. Far from the independent peasantry promoted by the colonial administration, this farming class was contractually tied to the sugar industry. In the 1900s sugar factory owners squeezed this group by reducing the amount paid for sugarcane, often below production costs.

Guadeloupean workers and smallholders did not accept these changes without a fight. Indeed, they did exactly what officials feared. In the 1900s Guadeloupean workers and smallholders claimed their rights as French citizens and mobilized. Guadeloupe experienced small waves of strikes in 1900 and 1902 as well as a major strike in 1910. The last of these ground sugar production on the island to a halt and temporarily crippled the industry. Through their actions local workers tried to achieve what administrators had only talked about: integration into the nation as equals. Through unionization and collective action, workers in Guadeloupe—much like workers in the

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43   Schnakenbourg, *Histoire de l'industrie sucrière*, 85.

44   French officials had little success with Chinese officials, but successfully recruited Japanese and Annamite workers. These experiments, however, were an unqualified disaster. Japanese and Annamite workers both rebelled soon after their arrival in the colony. Officials returned Japanese workers home but sent Annamite workers to French Guyane, a penal colony.

metropole—tried to carve out a better life by transforming work conditions and compensation. In short, they asked the Republic to recognize them as citizens and as workers and to guarantee their rights no matter what kind of labor they performed.

The strikes, however, occurred in the midst of broader changes within France's imperial policy. Assimilation—the ideal of the 1880s and 1890s—had since given way to a new emphasis on economic development and productivity (*mise en valeur*) and the idea of association.[45] France's revised colonial policy privileged economic development over social and political concerns. Guadeloupe had been drawn slowly into this new policy in the course of the 1900s, but the implications of this shift for the local population were not entirely clear until the strike of 1910 when sugar producers and metropolitan investors insisted that the colonial government break up the strike and force employees to return to work at their old wages. In their correspondence Guadeloupean sugar producers reminded the government that a favorable resolution to "the labor issue" was essential to the colony's future. Sugar producers and their supporters no longer asked that the colonial administration resolve the issue by finding new and ample sources of cheap docile labor, which they knew to be hard to find and elusive. Acknowledging the changes that had occurred in the global labor market and driven by their own need to maximize profits derived from the sugar cane crop, they demanded that the colonial government use its power to make the existing labor pool of native-born workers compliant. Members of the Chamber of Commerce in Paris, citing their "interests in the region," even wrote to the Minister of the Colonies to demand that he "reestablish order and peace in our unfortunate colonies for which the labor question is essential."[46]

The colonial administration eventually met the demands of sugar elites by undertaking a number of political, social, and economic reforms. Economic and labor conditions in Guadeloupe deteriorated in subsequent years as the colonial administration refused to support worker claims or strikes. Threats to bring in

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45   The French colonial policy of association aimed to "uplift" and "modernize" native populations while simultaneously preserving their unique cultural systems and social structures. As Raymond Betts has explained, "Rather than attempt to absorb the native societies administratively and culturally into the French nation, France was to pursue a more flexible policy which would emphasize retention of local institutions and which would make the native an associate in the colonial enterprise." Raymond Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890–1914* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005 [1960]), xv.

46   Letter from the Chamber of Commerce Paris to the Minister of the Colonies dated March 31, 1910, FM SG Guadeloupe 221/1370, ANOM.

the military to break up local strikes effectively deprived Guadeloupean workers of the right to unionize and engage in collective action—rights that might have allowed them to push for change and reform from within the sugar industry. Other factors contributed to the shaping of a politically-weakened working class. Like other colonies, Guadeloupe possessed few institutionalized forms of aid.[47] Factories distributed assistance to workers, thereby discouraging worker protest. The governor also had a small fund, which he distributed to "deserving" individuals. In dire economic times, workers found it necessary to comply with the demands of administrators and employers, or face hunger. Through these measures Guadeloupean officials and sugar elites created a new system of labor discipline and control. Guadeloupean workers of color found themselves integrated into a new colonial system of unfree labor organized to meet metropolitan economic interests and the dictates of a capitalist economy.

In addition, the colonial administration backed the exclusion of Guadeloupean workers from new rights and benefits extended to workers and farmers in the metropole by the Third Republic. Between 1900 and 1912, Guadeloupeans were left out of key pieces of legislation regarding accident insurance, work hours reductions, and medical assistance, all of which offered metropolitan rural populations new resources and benefits. Moreover, Guadeloupeans did not receive legislation that strengthened the collective power of workers. Guadeloupeans were not included in the 1909 law that allowed unions to take on some of the functions of cooperatives and to purchase machines, equipment, tool, and other supplies. Guadeloupean workers were likewise left out of a law that created rural mediating boards (*conseils de prud'hommes*) and offered new forms of credit to rural workers and smallholders.

By the end of the decade the Guadeloupean population had been pushed back into the sugar industry—both in a practical sense and in the imagination of colonial officials. A familiar discourse resurfaced as Guadeloupean workers returned to this most "un-French" form of labor. Terms such as "lazy," "ignorant," and "superstitious," which were once reserved for indentured laborers, were once again applied to Guadeloupean workers. Where officials and elites once extolled the French qualities of the local populace, they now questioned the population's fitness for citizenship. As this discursive transformation occurred, the real political and social rights of Guadeloupeans also diminished. By 1910 the French citizens of Guadeloupe had been reduced to mere colonial citizens who had to prove their worth to the Third Republic through economic productivity.

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47   Hospice and hospitals served the neediest, but officials even reduced or cut these services.

Conclusion

On the eve of World War I, Guadeloupean workers possessed a form of citizenship unequal in rights and status. Long-formed associations between labor and citizenship helped to justify and reinforce their second-class status. In the first years of the Third Republic, when immigrant labor had been abundant, sugar industry work had been portrayed as undesirable and inappropriate for French citizens. *Créole* workers who worked in the industry were disassociated from the work they performed by their disdain for the sugar industry and their desire to find better opportunities as independent farmers. Their economic aspirations confirmed the "Frenchness" of Guadeloupean workers, and justified calls for assimilation and departmentalization. Ultimately, however, economic upheaval and the disappearance of immigrant labor, coupled with new colonial policies, undermined this idyllic vision of Guadeloupe. In the face of economic crisis, Guadeloupeans would be locked into jobs once characterized as "un-French." The shift would be accompanied by a new racialized discourse that marked Guadeloupean workers, and their labor habits, as uncivilized and unworthy of inclusion in the nation as full French citizens.

This dramatic transformation in the status of Guadeloupean workers ultimately emerged from an antinomy at the heart of the Third Republic's colonial policy. On the one hand the Third Republic sought to extend republican ideals to the colony, even holding out the possibility of full political and legal assimilation for Guadeloupean workers of color. At the same time, the Third Republic refused to give up the dream of a productive and prosperous sugar industry in Guadeloupe despite the fact that the its producers claimed that the only way for it to keep apace with global sugar production was through a cheap, controllable labor force. Colonial officials initially balanced the social and economic demands of workers and the capitalist imperatives of sugar producers through the recruitment of indentured labor. As this labor pool disappeared, however, colonial officials eventually privileged the economic aspects of French colonialism over republican ideals, and enacted policies that created a new set of marginally-free laborers from its own citizenry.

Conclusion

The essays in this volume bring to light four over-arching themes in the study of empire-building in the Atlantic, the part imperial states played in mobilizing a spectrum of unfree labor, and how the unfree labor histories of the Atlantic empires figured in the rise of capitalism. Taken collectively, they illustrate the value of comparative imperial and hemispheric analysis in an Atlantic context. First, the essays have demonstrated that European states took on various institutional forms and frequently partnered with private enterprise to engage in the work of Atlantic empire-building. Second, they have shown how competing capitalist interests involved in the process of imperial expansion often brought states and their colonial governments into conflict over the usage and exploitation of unfree labor. Third, they have discussed how states themselves became primary agents in the recruitment and deployment of various form of unfree labor for both productive and reproductive work. Both forms of unfree labor, as these essays have illustrated, served the political and economic interests of states as well as capitalist interests invested in colonial commerce and production. Finally, although imperial discourses often professed to serve the best interests of the unfree workers that states deployed in Atlantic colonies, capitalist imperatives for profit maximization overwhelmed whatever political will existed to protect workers from various forms of abuse and dehumanizing exploitation. The following paragraphs offer more expansive commentary on each of these four themes.

The multiple institutional types of the Atlantic imperial states included the Catholic monarchies of the Iberian empires, the imperial republics of mid-seventeenth century England and late nineteenth-century France, and the corporate republic of the seventeenth-century United Provinces. However, despite their varied constitutional composition, important commonalities linked the Atlantic histories of these imperial states. For instance, very different states could adopt similar mechanisms to expand their empires, such as joint state/private ventures to explore and exploit new territories and peoples or to pilfer from rivals, as the essays by Brandon and Fatah-Black, Chambouleyron, Suryani, Coltrain, and Jennings show. Foremost among these commonalities, state imperatives of empire-building regarding the deployment of unfree labor consistently conflicted with the interests of colonial governments and colonial subjects. These confrontations are instructive, as they clarify that so-called colonial "peripheries" exerted a powerful counterbalance to the metropolitan "core," in contrast to much of the literature in imperial scholarship and world systems theory. All the essays show the complexities of local realities in the

colonies—Portuguese warfare with indigenous groups in Maranão, the threat of buccaneering incursions in St. Augustine, competing commercial priorities between colonial and imperial officials in Barbados, and endemic conflicts among workers, colonial officials, and metropolitan administrators over who could be forced to do what kinds of work in all the Atlantic empires. These conflicts were sharpened by the resistance of the coerced, their political allies in the colonies and the metropole, and the depredations of imperial rivals. The conflicted relationships between imperial and colonial governments also reveal how the economic interests of both parties often diverged, particularly in regard to the use of unfree labor. By highlighting the importance of these conflicts, these essays have helped to bring contradictory patterns of capitalist development from the sixteenth to the twentieth century into clearer historical perspective, unsettling the origins narratives of both stadial Marxist and neo-liberal thought.

While comparative analysis has shed light on important problems in the book, critical connections have also been made across the histories of the Atlantic empires regarding the relationship between capitalist proliferation, empire-building, and state mobilization of unfree labor. One of this volume's most important, connective themes addresses a critical yet neglected feature of labor, imperial, and Atlantic historiographies: how states became vital agents in organizing the supply of unfree labor for private and public exploitation, before and after the abolition of slavery. The methods usually employed by labor historians situate free and unfree labor in private, employer-employee or master-servant/slave relationships. But the contributors in the book have recognized that the history of capitalist unfree labor is intricately connected to programs that Atlantic imperial states devised to promote the profitability, expansion, and security of their territories. They are not the first to recognize these connections, as the state has long been studied in imperial and Atlantic histories for the part it played in constructing the legal regimes sanctioning the transportation and exploitation of African slave labor and the various forms of plantation servitude before and after its abolition. Labor historians have thoroughly surveyed the experiences of these workers and how they figured within the history of the Atlantic colonial development. However, all of the contributors to this book have emphasized that the state itself became an indispensable agent in mobilizing and deploying convicts, indentured servants, slaves, soldiers, and sailors for plantation, infrastructural, and military labor from the sixteenth through twentieth centuries. In response, the contributors have made a methodological departure, exploring the history of capitalism through the state's efforts to innovate, codify, trade in, deploy, command, and benefit from unfree labor. Although the Atlantic empires

structured state power differently in relation to colonization, they understood that maintaining an adequate supply of unfree labor was necessary for military strength and the profitability of commerce and plantation production. Without securing and increasing such military strength and economic profitability through its own exploitation of unfree labor, an imperial state's power diminished, leaving an empire at a competitive disadvantage with its European rivals. In this regard, Jennings provides methodological guidance for future work through her valuable distinction between state recruitment of productive and reproductive labor. Her case study of nineteenth-century Cuba recovers how the Spanish crown and officials in Cuba recruited "productive" labor for private profit in the plantation complex and "reproductive" labor that facilitated both private profit and state power through private and public infrastructural development. Donoghue's attention to military conscription builds on Jennings' method to explain that without making innovative claims on the labor power of its people, the English state would not have mustered the reproductive labor for the military campaigns it waged on land and sea to defeat imperial rivals and conquer colonial territory. That volunteers were in short supply for the military work of empire building made reproductive labor in the army and navy an experience in life-threatening unfreedom, as the majority of English conscripts perished while under arms. Coltrain's work on St. Augustine shows Spanish colonial officials negotiating terms of labor and hierarchies of class and race to preserve a remote but strategic colony. Heath shows officials of the French Third Republic contending with Guadeloupean planters and African-descended workers over plantation labor and definitions of citizenship. Beyond these examples, all of the chapters demonstrate that the imperial states and colonial governments of the Atlantic world turned unfree workers into political assets, continually mobilizing different groups of workers and containing threats to their supply to reinvest in projects that linked imperial prowess to capitalist enterprise.

A number of these essays illustrate how so-called enlightened ideals concerning colonial unfree workers, generated in metropolitan contexts, animated imperial policies and discourses of subject-hood and citizenship. Examples here include Spanish royal justice and protection for slaves and other unfree workers in Cuba and St. Augustine, the English state's belief that those it transported into colonial servitude would experience moral uplift through severe plantation labor discipline, and the full political and cultural citizenship that the French state promised for post-abolition plantation workers in Guadeloupe. The same could hold true in the colonial context, especially in times of external threat, as the chapters on Cuba, St. Augustine, and the Portuguese Amazon attest or imply. Higher ideals also entered the discourse when metropolitan

officials hoped to cement the loyalty of subjects or citizens, as Jennings and
Heath's work demonstrates respectively in the case of nineteenth-century
Cuba and Guadeloupe. In many of these cases, workers, soldiers, sailors, and
convicts struggled to claim justice, sometimes from within imperial institu-
tions, sometimes from without. However, in all of these cases, when states' and
colonial entrepreneurs' interests in maximizing productivity and profit coin-
cided, these higher ideals foundered as both groups sought greater integration
into first Atlantic, then global markets for labor and colonial goods and defend-
ing their territories and trade. To paraphrase Marx, imperial states may have
articulated their missions and goals in humanitarian or moral terms, but ulti-
mately the evolution of capitalism within the contentious imperial framework
of the Atlantic stripped away from the state the sentimental veil of paternalism
and reduced the relationship between sovereign and soldier, ruler and ruled,
master and slave or servant, and employer and worker to naked self-interest.

Taken in sum, the contributions in this volume demonstrate that the state
did not simply establish the legal framework to force workers to labor in the
Atlantic colonies; it also coerced people to do the work of defending and
reproducing the empire and it joined colonial officials, merchants, and plant-
ers in the process of commodifying people to exploit for economic profit as
species of economic capital. Chamboleyron shows the Portuguese crown
making war on indigenous groups in the Amazon to garner slaves and secure
territory. Brandon and Fatah-Black, Coltrain, Donoghue, and Jennings all
detail the tremendous labor demands of the military foundations of the
English, Dutch, and Spanish empires. While the Iberian empires began their
Atlantic expansion with well-established policies of coercion through enslave-
ment and transportation of convicts, the English and Dutch elaborated com-
parable policies on the march. Brandon and Fatah-Black show the Dutch
adapting practices of the Portuguese during in their occupation of Northeast
Brazil. Donoghue and Suryani show the English empire developing the legal
foundations for racialized chattel slavery through the transportation and com-
modification of British and Irish convicts, poor people, and political prisoners.
In this case, the state itself initiated the chattel degradation of its own sub-
jects, forcing them into colonial servitude as alienable, capitalist labor com-
modities. Further research by scholars may reveal that other states engaged in
Atlantic empire-building were involved in the same business of commodifying
their own subjects in a similar fashion. The contributions to this collection
demonstrate the value of examining labor coercion in state and private enter-
prises in the same frame. For instance, further study of the systematic use of
conscription for imperial warfare or the deployment of slave, convict, and
political prisoner labor on military infrastructure and public works could

generate questions about how such labor defined the political identities of those forced to do it. More research could also reveal how states' patterns of labor recruitment and employment affected or was influenced by existing practice in the private sector. Such questions will illuminate further how the interrelated processes that gave rise to empires and modern states also shaped the development of capitalism. The essays here offer a glimpse into how historians can conceptualize the imperial state as an agent of labor exploitation and commodification. Although we have focused on the Atlantic empires and the catalytic part they played in the creation of capitalism, the work here provides several frameworks to advance the investigation of the relationships between imperial states, capitalism, and the exploitation of unfree labor that will be of use to historians studying the Atlantic world and beyond.

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