Masoud Mohammadi Alamuti

Critical Rationalism and Globalization

Towards the sociology of the open global society

Masoud Alamuti's highly original study of globalization is remarkable for its breadth of vision and for its skilful integration of sociological theory and normative argument. His controversial thesis that critical rationalism can lead us to an open global society that is both peaceful and just is a much-needed antidote to the pessimism that globalization so often attracts.

Peter Jones, *Emeritus Professor of Political Philosophy,*
Newcastle University, UK.

This important book boldly blends critical rationalism with social theory to arrive at a powerful defense of openness to individual and collective learning as a key to conceiving and devising a just order for the emergent global society. One can only hope that readers will resist any temptations to dismiss Masoud Alamuti's ideas as overly idealistic or unrealistic. If they do, they can benefit enormously from an author who challenges us to reconsider long-standing, but increasingly anachronistic and/or normatively dubious under-standings of society, national sovereignty, and tolerance. Another virtue of his book is that it goes beyond critiquing the existing order of interstate-relations, outlining the contours of an admittedly radical, yet arguably more humane alternative. I highly recommend this timely, thought-provoking contribution to an evolving debate.

Volker H. Schmidt, *Professor of Sociology,*
National University of Singapore.

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Critical Rationalism and Globalization

Critical Rationalism and Globalization addresses how the access to critical reason enables people to shape a new social order on a global scale.

This book demonstrates how the philosophy of critical rationalism contributes to the sociology of Globalization, through uncovering the role of critical reason in arriving at an agreement on *common values and institutions* on a global scale. It discusses how value consensus on the institutions of sovereignty and inter–state law has prepared the ground for the rise of a *global system of national societies* after the end of World War II. *Masoud Alamuti* argues that uneven openness of national economies to global trade and investment should be comprehended in the framework of the post–war legal and political context. Using the concept of rationality as *openness to criticism*, the book proposes a *normative theory of open global society* in order to show that the existing value consensus on the cult of sovereignty suffers from the recognition of the possibility of rational dialogue among competing ways of the good life. *Masoud Alamuti* argues that once the people of the world, across national communities, open their fundamental ways of the good life to mutual criticism, they can create common global values necessary for the rise of a *just social order* on a global scale.

This book will be of interest to students and scholars of Globalization Studies, Global Sociology and International Relations.

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Rethinking Globalizations

Edited by Barry K. Gills, University of Helsinki, Finland and Kevin Gray University of Sussex, UK.

This series is designed to break new ground in the literature on globalization and its academic and popular understanding. Rather than perpetuating or simply reacting to the economic understanding of globalization, this series seeks to capture the term and broaden its meaning to encompass a wide range of issues and disciplines and convey a sense of alternative possibilities for the future.

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Critical Rationalism and Globalization

Towards the sociology of the open global society

Masoud Mohammadi Alamuti

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To my father Hojatollah Mohammadi Alamuti

Acknowledgement

Preface

> [C]ritical rationalism is not merely an account of science, but a complete philosophy. ... [S]cience is Enlightenment, genuine knowledge about reality. The methods of science—expressed by critical rationalism—are universally applicable precisely because these methods are not mere rules regarding the effective use of an instrument, but principles of rational problem solving in general.
>
> (C. Fred Alford 1987: 454)

> [The] idea of an open society is an attempt to transform the European idea of freedom into a *sociological construction* that can be seen as an ideal type in the sense of Max Weber. ... [T]he idea of such a society is an ideal, so that a concrete society can approximate it more or less. ... [T]his ideal can be used as a *standard for criticizing the existing social order* and also as a *guide for attempts to reform them*.
>
> (Hans Albert 2006: 8, emphasis added)

This book realizes my long-term goal of addressing the role of human reason in the creation of a just and free global society. As reflected in the title of this book, *Critical Rationalism and Globalization*, the philosophy of critical rationalism is used to introduce the function of human reason. The subtitle *The Sociology of Open Global Society* shows that this book aims to turn the ideal of an open global society into a normative theory of global society for arguing how people of the world can create a just and free society on a global scale.

Globalization is usually defined as the *compression of time and space* through the emergence of new information technologies connecting distinct communities around the globe. This book, however, attempts to introduce globalization as social change on a global scale. Moreover, it aims to redefine the social change necessary for transforming the existing global order into an open global society.

I have taken the central issue of the sociology of globalization as the question of how human actors' access to critical reason enables them to shape a new social order on a global scale. This question covers the role of reason in the rise of global order, as well as in the transformation of this order into an ideal global society.

This book argues that if globalization amounts to *social change on a global scale* and if such social change should be addressed by a theory of society, the

contribution of human reason to the emergence of global order must be shown through a theory of society. If this is correct, the question of how people's access to critical reason enables them to create social order and to change it should be answered before discussing the way in which rationality and globalization are linked.

During the development of my sociological thinking, the central role of *common values* in the emergence of social order led me to question whether the contribution of critical rationalism to the sociology of globalization can be understood through uncovering the role of reason in order to arrive at an agreement on a set of common values and institutions on a global scale. In other words, it must be asked whether the existing global order is under-pinned by a *value consensus* among national societies, and, if so, whether people are capable of revising such a value consensus in order to create an ideal social order on a global scale.

The critical stage in the development of my arguments in this book was reached when I understood that, although at least one of dominant themes in modern sociology, Talcott Parsons's theory of society, has paid close attention to the function of common values in the emergence of a peaceful social order, it does not address the role of reason in the initial creation of shared values. This observation led me to recognize that an *oversocialized conception of the human actor* who merely internalized a given value system to make social order possible has prevented modern sociology from detecting the role of human reason in social change through its capacity for revising the existing value consensus.

With this sociological diagnosis, it became clear to me that a theory of social change showing the reason why human actors are capable of reshaping social order through criticism of its moral foundations is required for the formulation of a sociology of globalization. Therefore, I devote Chapters 4 and 5 to the introduction of the new models of human action and social change that are necessary for showing the reason for which a new sociology of globalization requires the philosophy of critical rationalism.

It might be interesting for the reader to know that it was the failure of modern sociology to address the question of social change that led me to consider the contribution of critical rationalism to the sociology of globalization and to a normative theory of global society.

My sociological inquiries have empowered me to realize that the relation-ship between rationality and globalization cannot be addressed when human actors are depicted merely as *value-takers*, rather than *value-makers*. Not only should human actors be regarded as independent actors who have already organized their social relationships on a domestic scale through a value con-sensus, but they should also be viewed as independent actors capable of thinking independently of their social conditions and of acting to achieve the creation of an open global society.

With this background in mind, I have realized that, despite its origin in the philosophy of critical rationalism, Karl Popper's theory of open society is not

capable of addressing the question of social change from a *closed society* to an *open society* because it proposes a concept of critical reason according to which the existing value consensus, as the source of social integration, cannot be subjected to rational criticism. I have learnt that this sociological failure originates in Popper's reading of critical rationalism in terms of *irrational faith in reason*.

From this perspective, this book can be viewed as a new critique of Popper's theory of the open society and as the first systematic attempt to use the concept of rationality as an *openness to criticism*, as William Bartley has defined it, in order to formulate a social theory of open global society in which one of the major upshots is a new sociology of globalization.

It is remarkable that it was Bartley who recognized, better than anyone, that Popper's concept of rationality does not provide a reasonable defense of rationality. Nevertheless, Bartley himself was not concerned with the sociological consequences of Popper's irrational faith in reason. However, it has become clear to me that Bartley's theory of critical rationalism has an undetected potential for reformulating modern sociology so that it works for the sociology of globalization. I have addressed the difference between Popper's and Bartley's concepts of critical rationalism in Chapter 2.

Perhaps it is the use of Bartley's concept of rationality as *openness to criticism* for the formulation of the theory of social change from a closed to an open society that has enabled this book to present a new sociology of globalization. Inspired by this concept of rationality, I have defined the transition from a closed to an open society as *social learning from error* during which people open their moral beliefs and social institutions to rational criticism.

This book views globalization as the process through which a *global system of national societies* has been created and argues that this new social order can be transformed into an open global society. The idea of an open global society is used not only for criticizing a global system of national societies, but also for introducing attempts to reform it.

In this book, I have tried to show that people should not passively accept a global order which cannot help them to attain their goals. They are capable of activating their critical reason to create a just and free global society.

Masoud Mohammadi Alamuti
Münster, Germany
July 2014

Preface from series editor

How are we to transform the world, and overcome the legacies of past centuries of division, war, extreme inequality, and oppression? How are we to achieve a new unity of humanity in a future global social community, a true 'global society'? On what basis can we establish a set of globally shared common values, beyond the present "cult of (national) sovereignty", that can profoundly change the social, economic, and political organisation of the world? How can we move all humanity towards a permanent peace, global social justice, good planetary environmental stewardship, and the full equality of all persons and peoples in the world?

In this ambitious work, Masoud Mohammadi Alamuti addresses these questions with a serious and meticulous scholarship. Rather than dismiss such questions as merely "unrealistic", Alamuti rather invites us to take them very seriously, and to investigate, with him, new approaches to knowledge and human action which, he argues, could be the keys to unlock a new era in global history. He undertakes this exploration with a strong and consistent methodological and historical optimism. Yet, realistically, he acknowledges that even the ultimate goals that he professes would not constitute a state of perfection without contradictions. The historical goals Alamuti professes are of the highest order, and witness to his progressive and cosmopolitan values.

In the course of his argument, Alamuti leads the reader through an intense and often provocative critical encounter with an impressive array of leading past and present social and political philosophers and theorists. The theme and role of "rationality" looms perhaps largest throughout this work, and Alamuti offers us a fresh interpretation of the universal potential of "critical rationalism" to radically transform the present world order. It is by his insistent linking of the critical rational faculty, which he argues is inherent in all people, to the process of dialogue and learning, that may constitute the pivotal argument in this book. This position reflects Alamuti's bold reconceptualization of human action, based upon the potential to rationally criticise both "tradition" and competing truth claims (through "conjecture and refutation") and thus learn through mutual dialogue and reflection on experience. He is quite clear, however, about what he regards as the inherent dangers of moral relativism, and reveals its close relation with the liberal ethics of modernity now prevailing in the organisation of the world.

His central positioning of "the meaning of the good life" in his overall schema of history and social change is admirable, while being provocative to stimulate much further thought and debate. His ultimate vision is one of a unity of humanity, in which inter-civilisational dialogue and critical self-reflection have produced a new awareness (or even a consensus) of common values, upon which new global common institutions (beyond the present "cult of sovereignty" and conventional international law) can be built on global scale. He has a strong faith in "the law of humanity" and in human capacity for self-critical thought and action to transform the dark legacies of global history. His new global society would institutionalise these common human values, and bring about a new form of democratic global order, based upon the equality of all persons (rather than states), a just and open world economy, and a constitutional form of democratic global government to protect the common rights and welfare of all humanity.

Alamuti's contribution to the study of globalization rests in his claims to provide a new basis for understanding globalisation processes resting on a theory of society (rather than upon economy and inter-state relations only). Thus he seeks a new sociological framework to understand both the past and the future of globalising social change, and apply this theory to "the problem of social order on a global scale". Alamuti's journey takes us from the world of "incommensurate communities", (irrational) dogmatic epistemologies and truth claims, and the Hobbesian war of all against all, into a new social order beyond a mere conglomeration of contending "national societies" dominated by a few great powers in pursuit of their own interests.

It is Alamuti's greatest hope and his analytical intention in this work, to show us, in his estimation, how we might find a path, a method, a mechanism, to overcome the "permanent crisis of a divided humanity". Alamuti invites us to elevate a new "cult of humanity" to the highest position, in which all people are "equal moral beings" and thus realise historically at last "the unfulfilled capacity for global democracy". It is this optimistic and emancipator spirit and perspective that, in my own view, most characterises and distinguishes the arguments put forward in this book. Let us join with Alamuti on this journey, and with an open mind investigate his call for a global "value revolution" which will lead humanity to an "institutional revolution" on global scale.

Barry K. Gills
December 2014

1 Introduction

By the late 1970s the concept of globalization had begun to be used by the academic community, but without any particular focus. It was not until after the end of the Cold War, however, that the development of globalization studies in terms of how they relate to the world as a whole became central to the social sciences. Nevertheless, there have been few systematic attempts to analyze globalization on the basis of the theory of society.

The concept of globalization is used with a great variety of meanings, so it is not easy to trace the theoretical foundations of discussions relating to it. Nevertheless, the aim of this book is to show that competing concepts and theories of globalization have originated in the social theories which have been used to address the issues of global order and global change.

As observed by Richard Falk (1999), although the mainstream globalization debate claims that the most fundamental aspect of current globalization is the inescapable compression of time and space, which is linked closely to the emergence of information technologies, and has contributed to economic restructuring at the global level, it does not deny that this compression has also created a new set of social relations among all people (Scholte 2005). The global quality of such social relations is, nevertheless, considered to be the result of cumulative changes in people's relations with each other. If, however, globalization has a distinctive social meaning beyond its *time-space sense,* as argued by Martin Shaw (2000), the theory of globalization cannot ignore the theory of society, of which the main task is to question what society is and how it changes.

This book plans to reexamine the need to use the theory of society in order to establish the globalization debate within a sociological framework and to show how competing concepts of globalization have originated in the theories of social order and social change. This book attempts to rethink globalization through the development of a new theory of society based on the philosophy of critical rationalism. Thus, the terms *critical rationalism* and *globalization* in the title of this book stress the contribution of this philosophy to the theory of globalization.

Frank Lechner (1991) has defined globalization as *the process by which a new social order comes about on a global scale*, bringing radically different

communities into interaction with one another. With this concept of globalization as its reference point, this book identifies the problem of social order on a global scale on the basis of a sociological approach and shows how different theories of society have dealt with this problem. From this standpoint, the contribution of modern sociology to globalization studies is situated within the context of the answer provided by it for the Hobbesian problem of a peaceful social order on a global scale. Furthermore, this book aims to show that modern sociology requires a substantive transformation in order to provide a theory of society capable of addressing social change on a global scale.

From a sociological perspective, defining globalization as *the emergence of social order on a global scale* not only allows global order to be viewed as a societal arrangement which has increased the possibility of peaceful coexistence for distinct communities, but also suggests that the existing global order can be reorganized to make the world a more just and free place for all people. In this sense, the sociology of globalization finds a normative task in introducing mechanisms for social change from the existing global order to an ideal one.

This book aims to apply the philosophy of critical rationalism and the idea of an open society for the development of a critical sociology of global order which not only provides a sociological explanation for the rise of social order on a global scale, but also uses sociological logic to explore the possibility of transforming the existing global order into a just and free global society. The book introduces the idea of an open society as a sociological construct in order to demonstrate that people across national societies who open their fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism are capable of shaping the common values necessary for the rise of an open society on a global scale.

Against this background, the central argument in this book is that a new theory of society for the sociology of globalization can be developed on the basis of critical rationalism and the concept of an open society. Thus, a systematic attempt is made to transform the idea of open society into a *sociological theory of open society* upon which an open global society is viewed as an alternative global order. Furthermore, the rise of the existing world order is analyzed as a result of opening values and institutions to rational criticism.

William Warren Bartley's theory of rationality (1964, 1984) is used to introduce a new theory of human action upon which the sociology of open global society in this book rests. The concept of *openness to criticism*, which is inspired by Bartley's theory of rationality, lies at the heart of this book and is used to internalize critical rationalism in the sociology of globalization and to develop the sociology of open global society.

Although Bartley did not apply the concept of openness to criticism for formulating a sociological theory of open society, this book argues that such a concept of rationality provides the theory of society with a new microfoundation enabling it to serve the sociology of globalization. Viewed from this perspective, this book should be regarded as a sociological critique of

Karl Popper's theory of open society, parallel to a philosophical critique of Popper's concept of rationality, which is presented by Bartley's theory of rationality. Initially, it might seem strange that a concept of rationality as openness to criticism is capable of changing our understanding of globalization. However, the reader who follows the sequence of the arguments in this book will realize that the theory of rationality contributes to the sociology of globalization to the same extent that it affects the theory of society.

Bartley defines rationality as openness to criticism in the following way: a belief is a *rational belief* only if it has been opened to rational criticism and is not known to be a *false belief*. Logically speaking, Bartley shows that a rationalist does not need irrational faith in reason and is capable of defending his or her rational identity by argument since there is no limit on opening all of our beliefs to criticism. The book uses this concept of rationality to show that an open society is a rational one because its moral foundation and institutional structure are open to criticism.

In contrast to Bartley, Popper (1945) claims that *faith in reason* is an *irrational faith*. Popper defines critical rationalism as a moral attitude of treating critical argument seriously, claiming that one cannot defend all of his or her beliefs through argument. Hence, Popper justifies critical rationalism through an irrational faith in reason which cannot be defended by argument. This book argues that Popper's irrational faith in reason has prevented him from developing a theory of rational action upon which access to critical reason enables human actors to revise their shared values and common institutions, and to effect the transformation from a closed to an open society. It is in this sense that this book turns Bartley's critique of Popper's concept of rationality into a new basis for the sociological theory of open global society.

The concept of openness to criticism is used to show that rational dialogue among competing ways of the good life is conceivable and results in a set of global shared values that are necessary for a peaceful global order. This book argues that people living in different societies throughout the world who keep their fundamental beliefs regarding the universe, the good life, justice, legitimacy, and efficiency closed to mutual criticism actually live in *incommensurable communities* without any set of common values and institutions, and who are involved in the Hobbesian state of war of all against all. The idea of open global society, however, aims to provide a normative solution to the Hobbesian state of war among national societies which are not prepared to open their fundamental beliefs to rational criticism. The concept of open global society implies that people who activate their access to critical reason are capable of entering into a moral dialogue to learn from each other's rational criticism and agree on a set of global values to control egoistic behavior and enable a peaceful social order on a global scale.

Taking the model of science as its paradigm, this book purports that, just as scientific knowledge grows through *conjecture* and *refutation*, human society also develops through social learning by trial and error and by opening common values and social institutions to rational criticism. From a

sociological perspective, this means that the process of rationalization in human society takes place according to the model of science, i.e., through learning from errors.

Once people perceive their common values merely as *tentative conjectures* (Albert 2006) for a peaceful social order that controls their egoistic behavior, they can test the objectivity of normative conjectures by entering into inter-subjective refutation. The ideal type of open global society applies the model of science to show that, once people recognize their national values as conjectural solutions for the problem of social order, they will be prepared for an inter-societal debate aimed at defining a set of global values necessary for social life in the world as one single place. It is true that globalization has connected people across distinct communities; however, the social meaning of globalization must be sought in the establishment of a set of shared values and social institutions on a global scale. The sociology of open global society proposed in this book not only defines the social meaning of the current form of globalization according to the rise of global values and institutions, but also argues that a just and free global society will only emerge if all people living in national societies open their fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism in order to discover the moral basis for solving the Hobbesian war of all against all on a global level.

This book suggests that there is no *substantive difference* between a domestic and a global society in terms of how people should be organized within a just and free social order to meet their goals. In other words, if globalization refers to the rise of a social order on a global scale, the theory of globalization is faced with a problem similar to the one dealt with by a theory of domestic society in addressing the rise of social order on a national level. Hence, the legacies of modern sociology can be used to explore how social order has been globalized. At least one of the mainstreams of modern sociology implies that people can control egoistic behavior through an agreement on a system of common values. Global application of this thesis leads to recognition that a global society, like a domestic one, can overcome the problem of social order through a value consensus with institutional ramifications. This book shows that globalization has created a global system of national societies via a set of shared values and institutions through the openness of human actors to criticism.

The sociology of open global society which is developed in this book has been inspired by the model of science with the aim of showing that rationalization on a global scale is possible if all people open their fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism in order to discover moral truths whereby they can consider one another as *equal moral beings* whose social organization on a global scale does not lead to the war of all against all.

The above explanations enable the reader to understand how philosophy of critical rationalism is introduced into the sociology of globalization in this book. A sociological framework for this introduction is presented in the following four major steps:

- The contribution of epistemology to the theory of society is shown. Whereas the theory of society analyzes the rise of social order, epistemology shows that social order rests on a value consensus attainable on the basis of people's cognitive capacity to recognize a false belief by subjecting it to criticism.
- The contribution of the theory of society to the sociology of globalization is shown. Since the rise of social order on a global scale originates in a set of shared norms among distinct societies, a theory of society is needed to show how such a normative consensus was achieved for the first time due to people's cognitive capacity.
- A new theory of human action which criticizes the oversocialized image of individuals and regards people as being capable of revising their fundamental beliefs and social institutions is introduced.
- A new theory of society is introduced to show that the transition from a closed to an open society originates in people's access to critical reason, which allows them to revise the dominate values and institutions from the perspective of people as independent actors.

The first step introduces critical rationalism to the sociology of globalization in Chapter 2. In order to develop a new theory of society, this chapter examines the connection between epistemology and sociology through the notion of common values. It is argued that the theory of society addresses the question of how social order is possible despite the fact that people pursue their own self-interests and that sociology offers the answer that it is due to the existence of a system of common values internalized in people's moral identity which controls egoistic behavior. Furthermore, the argument continues that this conventional answer is supported by an epistemological theory which shows that people not only internalize the existing values in order to control egoistic behavior, but also revise existing values when their critical minds inform them that these values might be shaped on false premises and mistakenly serve to guide their lives.

The contribution of epistemology to the theory of society, which also affects the theory of global society, implies that it is people's access to reason or their cognitive capacity for recognizing a false belief by opening it to criticism which allows them to agree on regulative norms in social life for managing egoistic behavior. If this argument is correct, openness to criticism can play the same role on a global scale as on a domestic level.

In Chapter 2 it is argued that justificational epistemology prevents the recognition of how people use the faculty of reason to agree on common values by assuming that individuals must justify their beliefs in order to identify their truth. From such a perspective, people regard their beliefs as justified, true, and non-revisable through rational debate, assuming that their first principles are absolutely true. In contrast to this perspective, Chapter 2 presents a nonjustificational epistemology, which defines rational people as those who open their first principles to criticism and act on the basis of beliefs

which are not yet known to be false, thus contributing to the theory of society by showing that it is access to critical reason which allows people to enter into rational dialogue about common values.

In Chapter 2 the contribution of epistemology to the theory of society is addressed because epistemology is so fundamental for the development of the sociology of open global society. If people across distinct communities do not open their ultimate values to mutual criticism, the creation of a peaceful and just global order will prove to be impossible. The contribution of critical rationalism to the theory of global society should be examined in the context of the implications of nonjustificational epistemology for open dialogue among competing ways of the good life.

The second step in the sociological framework of this book is objectified in Chapter 3. As argued, a sociological analysis of globalization should be formulated on the basis of a theory of society. Acceptance that globalization is the process by which a new social order comes about on a global scale must also entail agreement that the meaning of globalization rests on the concept of social order. By the same token, recognition that it is a system of shared values that gives a social meaning to human life should entail acceptance that the social meaning of globalization rests upon a system of global values.

Chapter 3 provides three examples of how the sociology of globalization has been influenced by the theory of society. The first example concerns Karl Marx's theory of society and its impact on Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system theory. Using Marx's sociology, Wallerstein argues that the sub-units of the modern world-system have been integrated into it through one single division of labor between a capitalist core and an exploited periphery (1979). Marx envisages a *domestic* capitalist society in which capitalist *relations of production* determine the way in which individuals are organized in society, whereas Wallerstein defines a capitalist world order based on a single division of labor between the core and the periphery reflecting similar relations of production on a global level. Since Marx's theory of society is at the base of Wallerstein's analysis of the modern world order and there is no notable room in Marx's sociology for defining common values as the main source of social order, Wallerstein views the rise of a global culture in the context of a capitalist world economy.

The second example presented in Chapter 3 refers to the influence of Talcott Parsons's theory of society on Roland Robertson's globalization theory. Unlike Parsons, Robertson does not give common values a central role in the rise of a world order and does not define the world as a social whole on the assumption that people living in different societies have agreed on a set of global values. For these reasons, his theory of globalization cannot be viewed as an application of Parsons's theory of society. Yet Robertson's theory does use the insights provided by Parsons's theory of society to adopt a voluntaristic analysis of globalization that implies that people's capacity for self-reflection on their global condition enables them to shape a global discourse through which competing images of a global order affect the global

human condition. Robertson does not argue, however, that this global discourse has the goal of overcoming moral disputes and creating the shared values necessary for a peaceful global order.

The third example explores the influence of Emile Durkheim's sociology on John Meyer's theory of world society. Unlike Robertson, Meyer bases his theory of globalization on the works of classical sociologists such as Durkheim and Max Weber. For Meyer, the emergence of a world society originates in a global culture which has internalized modern instrumental rationality in the identities and behavior of nation-state leaders, nongovernmental organizations and individuals. According to Meyer, the ideal type of the nation-state as a modern form of social order has enabled people to organize social life on a global scale rationally upon shared understanding of how a national society should organize its individual members.

Through Durkheim's sociology, Meyer's theory of globalization learns that a world society requires a shared moral understanding. Through Weber's sociology, Meyer shows how people have used *instrumental reason* to adapt their behavior to a rational model of action and a reasonable form of social order: *the modern nation-state*. Nevertheless, Meyer's theory of world society does not show how access to reason allowed people initially to agree upon the *cult of sovereignty* as a value system. Like Durkheim, Meyer assumes global values have existed historically and he describes how a world society emerges once national societies and their citizens have adopted a set of given global values.

These three examples lead to a critical insight: if the sociology of globalization should be formulated on the basis of the theory of society, then the theory itself must be able to address the question of how common values were created for the first time. Put differently, globalization as the process by which a new social order appears on a global scale requires a theory of society which considers access to critical reason as the cognitive source of people's consensus on common values. This book points out, however, that surprisingly mainstream modern sociology does not offer any such theory of society. Hence, a theory of society based on the philosophy of critical rationalism is formulated in order to narrow this central gap in modern sociology and to address the issue of social change as a set of normative and institutional changes.

The third step in the development of the new sociological framework is therefore allocated to offering a new micro-foundation for the sociology of globalization and is demonstrated in Chapter 4. As argued in this chapter, although modern sociology has addressed the central importance of shared values for the formation of social order, the question of how common values were created for the first time has received insufficient attention.

Chapter 4 traces this weakness in modern sociology to the *oversocialized image of the human actor* (Wrong 1961) according to which people internalize a system of given values in their behavior, which consequently controls their egoistic behavior and results in a peaceful social order. This interpretation of

human action does not allow room for access to reason to enable people to revise dominant values whose premises are recognized to be false. In order to suggest a new micro-foundation for the sociology of globalization, Chapter 4 introduces an independent image of a human actor who recognizes the power of human reason for reexamining the existing values and institutions, i.e., the established social order, regardless of the dictates of social conditions or personal interests. This introduction of critical rationalism to modern sociology means that people's access to critical reason allows them to act in favor of social change from an unsatisfactory social order to an alternative social arrangement.

Chapter 4 traces the oversocialized image of the individual in works concerning the theory of society by three leading classical and modern sociologists, Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons. The conclusion is reached that the rise of social order on a global scale cannot be addressed sociologically if the oversocialized image of human actors remains the micro-foundation of the theory of society. In other words, the question of how a set of global values was created for the first time in order to make global order possible cannot be addressed without a new image of human actors. Human actors whose minds are under the influence of social forces merely reproduce the dominant values and institutions and are not capable of thinking and acting independently to effect the social transition from the existing social order to an ideal one. This book argues that the new micro-foundation leads to a theory of society upon which the sociology of globalization and the sociology of open global society can be formulated.

The fourth step for the development of the new sociological framework is the formulation of a theory of society which uses the concept of openness to criticism to integrate the new image of the human actor into a new model of social change. Chapter 5 is central to the argument in this book because it shows how a *critical version of rationality* can serve the sociology of global order.

Using the new image of the human actor as its micro-foundation, Chapter 5 explains how people actually open their closed values to rational criticism in order to make the transition from a closed to an open society. Inspired by the model of science, Chapter 5 describes this transition as *social learning from errors*. This model of social change is used in Chapter 7 to address the possibility of the emergence of an open society on a global scale.

Chapter 5 introduces the five elements of social change from a closed to an open society: metaphysical, moral, legal, political, and economic. Similarly to the method of conjecture and refutation in the model of science, human society changes and grows through learning from errors in the revision of common values and social institutions. This process of social learning from rational criticism is shown to be the mechanism for social change on all five major levels: on a metaphysical level, people correct their world-view through openness to rational criticism. Similarly, on a moral level, they improve their understanding of the good life by uncovering false premises. This same kind

of openness to criticism takes place in the legal, political, and economic elements of social change from a closed to an open society. As a whole, the transition includes all five phases of social learning from errors, beginning with people opening their world-view to criticism and extending to economic change.

Although the model of social change assumes that normative consensus is central to social integration and that revision of this consensus leads to social change, there is no claim that such social integration is perfect and without internal contradictions. Unlike the conflict theory of society, however, critical-rationalist sociology traces the main source of social conflict in the content of the value consensus and the malfunctions of social institutions, discovering that the main source of social conflict originates in the *closedness* of common values and social institutions to criticism. The model of social change examines internal contradictions in liberal society on the basis of such a rationale.

Chapter 5 presents the mechanism of *thinkers-social movements-the masses* in order to show the involvement of human actors in the processes of social learning from errors. It is argued that thinkers introduce a new ideal type of social order by opening their own fundamental beliefs to rational criticism. Once social movements are persuaded by thinkers' alternative concepts of social order, they try to convince oppressed people of the need to effect social change for realization of the new model of social order. This mechanism of thinkers—social movements—the masses rests on the image of independent human actors who are capable of revising their values and institutions and is used in this book to show how actors in civil society are able to turn an unjust global order into an open global society.

Since globalization originates in the modern form of social organization, Chapter 5 employs the model of transition from a closed to an open society to introduce a new sociology of modernity and to show that the emergence of a global system of national societies has been inspired by liberal ethics of modernity. This book uses its critical-rationalist sociology not only to demonstrate that liberal ethics of modernity have played a significant role in the existing form of globalization, but also to reveal that liberal ethics of modernity are the major source of the problematic nature of a new social order on a global scale.

In Chapter 5 modernity is introduced as the result of a transition from a traditional society to a liberal one in which traditional world-views and moral beliefs have been opened to criticism and have facilitated the rise of social institutions in liberal democracies. The examples of the English and American Revolutions reveal how liberal thinkers developed the concept of a liberal society as an alternative to the traditional form of society and how social movements employed this concept to mobilize the masses for social change.

Using the philosophy of critical rationalism, Chapter 5 redefines the unfinished project of modernity as an unfulfilled social transition from a liberal to an open society and introduces the five elements of social change which occur when liberal people open their world-views and their accounts of the good

life, justice, legitimacy, and efficiency to rational criticism. The importance of this interpretation of the unfulfilled project of modernity for the sociology of globalization is that it leads to the realization that the liberal ethics of the modern world order can be replaced by the ethics of openness to criticism.

In short, the new model of social change is used in this book to reanalyze globalization as social change on a global scale, rather than just compressed in time and space. Critical rationalism contributes to the study of globalization by offering a new macrosociology whose micro-foundations are based on the concept of an independent human actor, rather than an oversocialized individual.

Chapter 6 uses the proposed model of social change to address the question of how a new social order has come about on a global scale. The sociological analysis of globalization suggested in this book describes globalization as the emergence of a global system in which distinct communities are integrated into a social whole through a value consensus on the cult of sovereignty. This normative agreement has led to the institutions of international law and the management of the great powers through which political power is exercised on a global scale coexisting in an uneven world economy in which developed economies have opened their national borders to global trade and investment more than the less developed economies and thus have benefited much more from the global mobility of capital and labor.

In Chapter 6 it is argued that the rise of the global system of national societies in the twentieth century originated in the European cultural modernity of the seventeenth century. Using critical-rationalist sociology, the historical processes are reconstructed through which human actors, especially state leaders, opened their world-views and moral beliefs to rational criticism. It is argued that this openness enabled European leaders to overcome their moral disputes regarding the role of religion in international politics, leading to the Peace of Westphalia and later enabling them to transform their subjects into citizens in modern European nation-states under the influence of modern social revolutions. However, until the middle of the twentieth century, the normative idea of national sovereignty was not accepted by state leaders across the globe as a regulative principle for the social integration of national societies under inter-state law and management by the great powers.

The modern state system, as a political order, was established through a shared understanding of national societies as *equal sovereigns*. Chapter 6 argues that following World War II the expansion of the modern nation-state found a global dimension and served as a mechanism for the social organization of distinct communities within a global system. Such social integration, however, does not mean that national societies have arrived at a shared understanding of the meaning of the good life, but rather that they have validated the cult of the nation-state as a global shared norm through which different concepts of the good life can be pursued. In other words, the national societies have partially approached a normative solution for the Hobbesian problem of social order on a global scale.

Liberal ethics of modernity, i.e., tolerance of difference, may be said to have achieved relative *global recognition*. Chapter 6 explains that under the influence of the Western allies during World War II political world leaders opened their world-views and recognized that 'the cult of sovereignty' helped them to pursue their own cultural identities, political goals, and economic interests. This prepared them for the establishment of a set of global institutions to enforce their shared cult of sovereignty and transform their value consensus into the legal institution of international law. Therefore, the path was laid for the emergence of a global political system connecting national societies on the basis of the cult of sovereignty and management by the great powers.

In Chapter 6 it is argued that, in contrast to the domestic domain, the liberal ethics of tolerance have not paved the way for the rise of a constitutional state on a global level that protects people's equal right to self-determination. Instead of offering such protection, the Allied victors of World War II took over the responsibility of managing global politics in the emerging global order, creating the rise of an uneven world economy within the context of international law and the balance of power. Under the leadership of the USA, the Bretton Woods institutions were intended to shape the architecture of the post-war economy within the normative context of the cult of sovereignty. However, the architecture of this world economy does not provide economic agents across the globe with similar opportunities to pursue their own economic interests and participate in global competition. This has resulted in an oligopolistic, rather than a competitive global market.

As discussed in Chapter 6, following the conclusion of World War II economic openness to global trade and investment has been focused on the triad of Europe, Japan, and North America (Hirst *et al*. 2009). Although other major economic players, such as the People's Republic of China, India, and Brazil, have played an important role in the world economy during recent decades, a significant proportion of the world, i.e., the less developed and some developing economies, has not been able to enjoy the economic benefits resulting from the expansion of global trade and investment.

In Chapter 6 the new social order on a global scale is criticized from a moral perspective. The cult of sovereignty is the first target of the critical sociology of globalization. The main reason why the global system of national societies suffers from internal political tensions and economic crises is that it has not truly overcome the Hobbesian problem of social order on a global scale because it assumes that people across societies are not capable of entering into rational dialogue concerning the creation of common values. As long as social life is organized globally on the basis of mankind being divided into separated societies, no sustainable solution will be able to be found for the Hobbesian problem of the war of all against all.

This book argues that the emerging global order rests on the premise that radically different societies have justified their own fundamental beliefs, and have thus closed the principles upon which their communities are organized to rational dialogue. Hence, they are merely capable of agreeing on the norm

of sovereignty. On this false epistemological premise, normative consensus with the function of integrating national societies into a global system suffers from the absence of a common understanding of the good life and preserves the conflict of opinions about it. This moral weakness is echoed in the context of international law, whose focus of protection, regardless of the democratic or undemocratic nature of the nation-state, is on the nation-state, rather than on equal rights for citizens, regardless their national affiliation.

The reason why the political system in the emerging global order suffers from the absence of a democratic global state and devotes the monopoly of force to the great powers is that inter-state law has been designed principally for the protection of the cult of sovereignty, rather than for the protection of the law of humanity. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that economic agents do not benefit from equal opportunities to use the mobility of capital and labor on a global scale to boost their economic welfare. The rise of an uneven world economy is the natural result of the very different economic rights which national economies have defined for their economic agents and the extent to which their legal framework allows their borders to be opened to global trade and investment.

As argued in Chapter 6, the benefits and risks of globalization are unequally shared among all people because they have not yet activated their access to critical reason in order to overcome their moral disputes regarding the meaning of the good life and have concentrated their shared global norms on the cult of sovereignty. It is not unfair to say that the *permanent crisis of a divided mankind*, as Istvan Hont (1994) terms it, originates in the premise that all people should be organized into national societies with sovereignty, meaning that their notions of the good life, justice, legitimacy, and efficiency are incommensurable and cannot be subjected to rational debate.

This premise implies that people cannot overcome the Hobbesian state of war of all against all because they are incapable of controlling egoistic behavior through the establishment of shared values and social institutions on a global scale. This book argues that the permanent crisis of a divided mankind originates in the cult of sovereignty, which is based on the false epistemological premise that the different ideal types of the good life, justice, legitimacy, and efficiency are incommensurable and unable to enter into rational dialogue.

Viewed from the philosophy of critical rationalism, however, people are indeed capable of using critical reason to question the premises of the cult of sovereignty and to enter into moral dialogue to discover the common values necessary for a just and free global society. This book employs the model of science to provide a sustainable solution for the permanent crisis of a divided mankind.

Chapter 7 presents the sociology of open global society, arguing that civilizations, as the highest cultural groupings of people on a global scale, provide a societal context through which individuals across national societies are capable of entering into rational dialogue about the meaning of the good life.

Once people have revised the cult of sovereignty, inter-state law will no longer be the central legal device for the integration of national societies into a global system. Accordingly, an alternative legal system will be required to organize people according to a *cult of humanity* which views all people as equal moral beings.

Logically speaking, the sociology of open global society aims to introduce the new legal system based on a new value system which can emerge through rational debate among distinct communities. What can lie at the core of the new value system? As argued in Chapter 7, people, not national states, should be regarded as equal sovereigns in the global social system. In short, the cult of sovereignty has to be replaced by the cult of humanity. This is only possible, however, if all people accept that the national identities dividing them into distinct communities are not given facts and can indeed be subjected to rational debate.

Inspired by the philosophy of critical rationalism, it is argued in Chapter 7 that the cult of humanity emerges when citizens adopt ethics of openness to criticism and modify their local way of the good life in order to discover a common feature shared by all mankind, which this book suggests is people's common access to critical reason. This is called the *rational unity of mankind* by Popper. Once the cult of humanity has emerged at the heart of a system of global values, the ground is prepared for the establishment of the law of humanity as an alternative for inter-state law.

The sociology of open global society then goes on to show that once people have replaced international law with the law of humanity, the political transformation of the modern nation-state system into a global constitutional state becomes possible. It is not surprising that mankind divided into nation-states is unable to overcome the Hobbesian war of all against all by means of political devices such as the balance of power and management by the great powers. Analogous to domestic society, an open global society is capable of overcoming the Hobbesian problem through the replacement of management by the great powers with a global democracy that protects all people from the illicit use of force by those great powers pursuing their own interests.

The sociology of open global society argues that the existing world economy, whose benefits and costs are divided unfairly between the developed and less developed societies, could be transformed into a competitive and just global economy endowed with the law of humanity and global democracy. It could then secure for economic agents equal rights as well as the opportunity to use the global mobility of capital and labor, regardless of national citizenship.

The sociology of open global society that I have begun to develop in this book is quite radical in many respects. It introduces the five elements of far-reaching social change from a global system whose national units are integrated through social norms of sovereignty into an open global society whose citizens are integrated through a set of social bonds reflected in the ethics of openness to criticism, the law of humanity, a constitutional state, and a just

economy. Instead of the cult of sovereignty and inter-state law, the social content of the open global society should be pursued in the cult of humanity which originates in people's equal access to critical reason.

It is important to note that the sociology of open global society refers to a *normative theory of global society*, which implies that the existing world order should not be regarded as a non-revisable social order. Access to critical reason empowers people to revise dominant values and institutions in favor of a more just and free world.

The sociology of open global society rests on the critical-rationalist theory of action. Once the oversocialized image of human actors is refuted, the ground is prepared to demonstrate that human actors can create the global values required for global justice and peace. Only the assumption that national communities have already influenced individuals' minds and rendered them incapable of using reason to question the existing consensus can lead to the realization that national cultures have prevented people entering into a moral dialogue that can result in the creation of an open global society.

This book uses the legacies of modern sociology to show that, on a global scale, a moral solution for the Hobbesian problem of social order is the creation of common values which control the egoistic behavior of global actors, especially that of the great powers. Modern sociology shows that the Hobbesian problem of social order is insoluble without such common values. According to the philosophy of critical rationalism it is clear that distinct communities are capable of entering into a moral dialogue in order to create an open global society.

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2   Epistemology and the Theory of Society

The question of how epistemology contributes to the theory of society is the subject of inquiry in this chapter, which aims to show how people employ their cognitive abilities to enter into a rational dialogue about their ultimate common values that are required for social order. It is argued that people's access to critical reason enables them not only to create common values, but also to revise their value consensus, which is necessary for changing an existing social order. The central argument in this chapter is that a shift from justificational to nonjustificational epistemology is needed in order to understand the contributions of epistemology to the theory of society. This chapter paves the way for showing how rational dialogue among civilizations can create the common global values that facilitate for transition from the existing global order to an open global society.

   This chapter (a) argues that, due to the base of social order on a normative consensus on ultimate values and the *cognitive nature* of this consensus, epistemology contributes to the theory of society by questioning how people's way of thinking can be modeled to bring about the development of such a value consensus; (b) criticizes two justificational concepts (*dogmatic* and *skeptical*) of knowledge and rationality, in order to show that justificational epistemology cannot address the question of rational dialogue about competing ways of the good life; (c) argues that Karl Popper and William Bartley have introduced a nonjustificational approach to knowledge and rationality, which permits an examination of the contribution of epistemology to the theory of society; and (d) concludes that social change from a closed to an open society should be understood within the context of nonjustificational epistemology. In other words, this chapter offers philosophical foundations for questioning the way in which people's access to critical reason can operate as an agent for normative change from a closed to an open society. The arguments in Chapters 4 and 5 ultimately are based upon the contributions of epistemology to the theory of society.

Epistemology and Rational Dialogue on Ultimate Values

Although epistemology is too vast a topic to be addressed in this chapter, some important aspects which directly relate to the purpose of the chapter

will be tackled, namely the contribution that epistemology makes to the theory of society.

In *Epistemology Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses*, Laurence Bonjour (2002) defines the central problem of epistemology as *how one can establish that his or her beliefs are true or false.*[1] This epistemological question is closely connected with the central issues of sociology: *how social order is shaped and how society changes.*

Epistemology contributes to the theory of society through addressing the issue of how people's cognitive ability to recognize true or false values enables them to overcome their moral disputes and create common values, which are necessary not only for the rise of a peaceful social order to control egoistic behavior, but also for changing the existing social order when people discover that its moral foundation is no longer valid.

In the following sections, justificational and nonjustificational theories of human knowledge and their consequences for rational dialogue among competing ways of the good life are debated. Justificational theories of knowledge are divided into the two schools of dogmatic and skeptical approaches to knowledge. In each school of epistemology, the notion of knowledge as *justified true belief* leads to a model of human thought according to which people begin with unjustified premises to establish the truth of their beliefs. However, since unjustified premises involve *infinite regress*, the proposed model of human thought cannot address the central question in epistemology; hence, it does not show how people's access to critical reason enables them to create the common values necessary for a peaceful social order.

Infinite regress means that for a person S to prove that a belief X at some time t is true, he or she must produce a different belief Y from which logically follows that Y then establishes X in the sense that as Y is true, X must also be true. However, the truth of Y evidently also needs to be established, which results in infinite regress. Justificational epistemology involves infinite regress due to its assumption that people begin with justified premises to prove the truth of their beliefs. However, since justification of the premises is not possible, conclusions of such a justificational model of human thought cannot be proved.

In contrast, nonjustificational epistemology leads to a model of human thought according to which the premises used for identifying the truth of a belief are open to criticism per se. Thus, such a nonjustificational model of human thought does not involve infinite regress when it argues that people defend the non-falsity of their beliefs on the premises that they are not yet known to be untrue.

The nonjustificational model of knowledge leads to a theory of rationality according to which people who hold the premises of their competing beliefs regarding the good life open to criticism can enter into moral dialogue, which enables them to learn from mutual mistakes and turns such moral learning into a rational agreement on a system of common values. However, since the premises of such a value consensus remain open to criticism, people can revise

the existing value agreement to improve social order for the sake of human well-being.

Knowledge as Justified True Belief

As argued earlier, the conception of knowledge as *justified true belief* provides the main framework for addressing the question of why neither of the two major schools of dogmatism and skepticism which reflect the justificational theory of knowledge can explain the cognitive functions of the human mind or the faculty of reason. Popper introduces these two schools thus:

> Broadly speaking, there have been since antiquity two main schools in the theory of knowledge: one is the school of the *pessimists*, the sceptics (or the agnostics) who deny the possibility of justification, and with it, of any established knowledge; the other is the school of those who believe in the possibility of justification; of giving a justification of our claim to know, to be able to attain knowledge. I shall call this later school simply the school of the *optimists*. … Both pessimists and optimists at least agreed that the *central problem* of the theory of knowledge was the problem of *justification*; or more precisely, of the *rational justification* of the claim that certain of our beliefs or theories are true.
>
> <div align="right">(Shearmur and Turner 2012: 3, 7, emphasis in the original)</div>

It is important to note that the school of the optimists becomes dogmatic in that it claims that our beliefs must be justified in order to be identified as true beliefs. As argued in the preceding section, the dogmatic and skeptical schools can be categorized within the context of a traditional justificationist epistemology. As observed by Alan Musgrave, "At the basis of the traditional theory of knowledge is the assumption that knowledge is a special kind of *belief*: knowledge consists of those beliefs which can be justified. According to this conception of knowledge, to say 'I know *X*' means something like 'I believe *X*, I can justify my belief in *X*, and *X* is true'" (Musgrave 1974: 561, emphasis in the original). In order to explore the outcome of the assumption of knowledge as justified true belief for questioning how people can establish whether their beliefs are true or false, which is necessary for reaching an agreement on a system of common values, the argument is divided into two sub-sections below.

The Dogmatic Approach to Knowledge and Rationality

In this section, the dogmatic approach to knowledge is discussed in order to show why the assumption of self-evident or justified premises prevents traditional epistemology from demonstrating how people use their cognitive abilities to enter into a rational dialogue about ultimate values. Viewed from a historical perspective, Descartes was one of the chief proponents of the

dogmatic approach of knowledge in the modern age. Bonjour defines the principles of Cartesian epistemology thus:

> The view that has been standardly ascribed to Descartes is that only beliefs that are *infallible*, beliefs that are *guaranteed* to be true, can really count as knowledge. … [T]he person who has knowledge must actually have the infallible belief in question; and Descartes seems to suggest that this belief must be very strong: he or she must be *incapable of reasonably doubting* that the preposition in question is true. And finally, it seems clear that for Descartes the person must realize that the belief is infallible, must see or grasp the *reason* why its truth is guaranteed … Thus we have the following three-part Cartesian account of knowledge: knowledge is a strong or certain *belief* for which the person has a *reason* that guarantees *truth*.
>
> (2002: 23, emphasis in the original)

According to Descartes, establishment of such infallible beliefs requires that one's knowledge should be based upon self-evident or a priori justified premises, such as *I think, hence I exist*, or else on *immediate experiences* regarding the person's beliefs, desires, etc. Everything that a person knows is known via inference from these two key sources: self-evident principles and immediate experiences (Bonjour 2002: 23–24). According to the principles of Cartesian epistemology, the self-evident premises echo the concept of knowledge as justified true belief in the dogmatic approach. However, how can it be shown that *closedness* of self-evident premises to rational criticism leads to the dogmatic nature of traditional epistemology?

Using Cartesian epistemology as the basis for addressing the question of how a person establishes whether his or her beliefs are true or false, the person must consider three specific conditions. According to Bonjour:

> for a person S to know some preposition P at some time t, the following three conditions must be satisfied …
>
> 1c. S must *believe* or *accept* P at t without any possible doubt.
>
> 2c. P must be *true*.
>
> 3c. S must have at t a *reason* or *justification* that *guarantees* that P is true.
>
> (ibid.: 27, emphasis in the original)

Given these three conditions, how does the Cartesian theory of knowledge configure the functions of human thought? Through responding to this question an understanding is gained of why such a Cartesian model of human reason cannot be used to question how people enter into a rational dialogue about the competing ultimate values necessary for a peaceful social order. Before developing this argument, however, it is important to note that the strong assumption in the context of traditional epistemology that people can offer reasons or justification to guarantee the truth of their beliefs has been

disputed and that a weaker condition for justification has been offered to make the notion of knowledge as justified true belief more realistic.[2]

As Bonjour argues, the *weak concept of knowledge* is offered to overcome the problem of the many cases which do not satisfy the strong condition for justification. Bonjour states that "the correct version of the reason or justification condition does not require *conclusive* reasons or justification for there to be knowledge. What is required is instead only *reasonably strong* reasons or justification condition, strong enough to make it quite *likely* that the proposition in question is true, but not necessarily strong enough to *guarantee* its truth" (2002: 42, emphasis in the original). However, "One very obvious question to ask about the weak conception is *how* likely the truth of the proposition must be to satisfy this weaker version of the reason or justification condition. If, as seems at least initially reasonable, the level of likelihood can correctly be thought of as a level of probability, then just *how* probable must it be in light of the reasons or justification available that the proposition is true in order for it to be adequately justified to count as knowledge?" (ibid.: 43, emphasis in the original). For Bonjour, the obvious outcome of this discussion is that the traditional notion of knowledge is seriously problematic with regard to the strength of justification that should be required for knowledge (ibid.: 48). As discussed below, this serious challenge is also reflected in what Hume calls the *problem of induction*, according to which a non-limited amount of justifier evidence must be used to prove that a belief is true.

To show how the dogmatic version of traditional epistemology prevents the theory of knowledge from building a model of human thought for addressing the possibility of rational dialogue regarding concepts of the good life, the three satisfactory conditions discussed above must be reformulated to make it clear that they actually refer to *knowing human actors*, i.e., not only to statements, but also to the human train of thought. It thus becomes possible to show cognitive functions of the human mind that have been modeled on dogmatic epistemology do not allow people to enter into rational discussion about opposing ultimate values.

Suppose that a person S, as a *knowing actor*, wants to establish whether his or her beliefs are true or false. Using the notion of knowledge as justified true belief dogmatic epistemology models the *train of thought* of the person S as he or she justifies the belief in question. Thus, dogmatic epistemology assumes that the mind of the person S works according to the following premises to reach a justified true belief P at time t:

Premise (I): S is completely certain that belief P at t is true.
Premise (II): S has justifier reasons which guarantee that belief P at t is true.

Conclusion: S identifies (knows) that belief P at t is a true belief.

Notably, without the assumption of knowledge as justified true belief, it is impossible to model the train of thought of the person S as he or she

establishes whether his or her belief P at time t is true. In other words, the person S must be sure of his or her cognitive ability in order to be completely certain that belief P at t is true, and the person S must admit that he or she can provide justifier reasons to guarantee that belief P at t is true. Only if the person S assumes that he or she possesses such cognitive abilities, can he or she identify his or her belief P at t as true. As argued earlier, the weaker account of the justification condition merely implies that the knowing actor does not require *conclusive* justifier reason to guarantee the truth of his or her belief P at time t.

The dogmatic approach to knowledge models the train of thought of the person S in such a way because its main premise is that the person S *must justify* his or her belief P at time t in order to establish the truth of such a belief.

Recalling the principles of Cartesian epistemology, the train of thought of the person S can be remodeled to show how the notion of knowledge as justified true belief is connected with Descartes's notion of self-evident premises. It thus becomes understandable that dogmatism in Descartes's epistemology originates in the closedness of the self-evident premises to rational criticism. The reformulated model appears thus:

> Premise (I): Belief P is ultimately justified based on (subjectively) self-evident premises at time t.
> Premise (II): S uses (subjectively) justified premises to infer belief P at time t
>
> _____
>
> Conclusion: S (subjectively) justifies belief P at time t.

According to the conception of infinite regress, the person S can prove that belief P at time t is true only if he or she can produce one or more beliefs F from which it logically follows that F then establishes P in the sense that if F is true, then P must also be true. In turn, however, the truth of F must be established, which leads to infinite regress. Cartesian epistemology aims to prevent such infinite regress by assuming that at least some fundamental beliefs must be known *self-evidently* by the person S. This, however, leads to a certain subjective property of such fundamental beliefs guaranteeing the objective truth of what one believes since subjective' self-evident premises cannot be justified objectively.[3]

Musgrave discusses the outcome of the dogmatic approach to knowledge for a rational discussion thus:

> If rational discussion involves justification, and if the ultimate justification is subjective, then it is impossible to have a rational discussion with someone who disagrees over first principles. All one can do in this case is to reassert and try to establish your authority. It follows that rational discussion never reflects genuine disagreement at all: for the discussion to

be rational both parties must agree on fundamental premises (first prin-
ciples), and any disagreement must be due to somebody's failure correctly
to reach the right conclusions. Dogmatists seek to defend rationality, but
end up by narrowly circumscribing the role of rational argument: it con-
sists merely in drawing conclusions from commonly known premises,
agreement upon which can be reached only by nonrational, authoritarian
means. … [D]ogmatic authoritarianism soon collapses into relativism.
For the dogmatist cannot guarantee that his subjective criterion of truth
will produce universal agreement on first principles, nor can he guarantee
that he will be able to exert his authority over dissenters.

(1974: 563)

Since dogmatic epistemology models the cognitive functions of the human
mind on the assumption of knowledge as justified true belief, it needs to
assume self-evident premises to make the very act of thinking possible. How-
ever, self-evident premises are justified subjectively and thus cannot provide
people with an epistemic foundation upon which their moral dispute about
ultimate values can be solved. The dogmatic approach to knowledge leads to
the claim that people's minds work on the basis of self-evident premises to
deduce justified moral belief, thus leaving no scope for disputing such moral
beliefs. In addition, the dogmatic approach to knowledge results in a justifi-
cational concept of normative consensus among people. Any rational con-
sensus on ultimate values among people whose train of thought ultimately
rests on self-evident premises would have to be an absolute consensus because
the assumption that all people begin with same self-evident premises and use
same deduction would lead to the inevitable conclusion that these people
draw the same justified conclusions from same justified premises. Thus, a
normative consensus emerging from this kind of cognitive train of thought
would have to be absolute and non-revisable.

The dogmatic theory of knowledge models people's cognitive processes in
terms of how they themselves judge their beliefs since entering into rational
dialogue with other people to justify their beliefs is not required. People who
begin with self-evident premises and arrive at justified true belief guarantee
that their own understanding of the good life is definitely true. Thus, the
dogmatic approach denies the need for rational dialogue about competing
ways of the good life to discover ultimate values for the good life.

The dogmatic approach to knowledge leads to *uncritical rationalism,* which
implies that people can justify all of their beliefs and need not be prepared to
accept any position which is not based on justified reasons. Uncritical
rationalists never dispute their first principles; therefore, they see no need for
comments from other people which might inform them that their first princi-
ples are wrong. In short, uncritical rationalists are closed-minded people who
believe that they can *guarantee* the epistemic truth of their ultimate values.
Moreover, such closed-minded persons allow themselves authoritatively to

impose their own interpretation of the good life on others owing to their claim to possess justified true values.

In sum, dogmatic epistemology leads to a dogmatic identity according to which people consider their value consensus as absolute. The social organization of such closed-minded people would naturally be a closed society with no scope for rational discussion about fundamental principles. Hence, the moral attitudes of such people do not allow them to question the existing normative agreement in order to discover what might be wrong with the premises of their value consensus. An examination of the cognitive functions of the human mind based on dogmatic epistemology would make it impossible to show how a closed society can be transformed into an open society because people who are not willing to open their fundamental principles to rational discussion cannot discover whether some premises of their value consensus might be wrong.

The Skeptical Approach to Knowledge and Rationality

This section argues that another version of justificational epistemology (i.e., the skeptical approach to knowledge) suffers from basing its argument on the concept of knowledge as justified true belief. Similarly to the dogmatic approach, the skeptical approach accepts that a belief must be justified in order to be true. However, in contrast to the dogmatic school, the skeptical approach does not claim any ultimate, justifiable foundations in self-evident premises which need no reason for justification. This observation leads to the denial of the very existence of a justified true belief or objective knowledge in the skeptical approach.

Taking into account the disagreement between the two major versions of justificational epistemology regarding the possibility of justifying the premises of our beliefs, the question for the skeptical approach is how to model the train of thought to conclude that people *cannot* justify their beliefs, which denies skeptics the opportunity to attempt to enter into rational dialogue about their ultimate values.

The central thesis of skeptical epistemology is that individuals who cannot prove their ultimate premise as self-evidently true must give up the claim of objective knowledge. As Musgrave observes, "while denying all dogmatist claims to know the objective truth, sceptics agreed with dogmatists that, if absolute or objective truth cannot be known, it is a useless fiction. Since we cannot know objective truth, they said, let us give up all pretence to objective knowledge. If we must have *some* beliefs … let us admit that the criteria by which we select them are purely subjective" (1974: 564). Skeptical epistemology leads to critical irrationalism on the one hand through its criticism of the dogmatic claim that premises are justifiable, and on the other hand through its claim that objective knowledge is not at all possible when premises are actually unjustifiable and that ultimately premises are selected through pure subjectivity.

If Cartesian epistemology represents the dogmatic school, then Humean epistemology is a good representative of the skeptical school. Hume recognizes that the traditional theory of knowledge cannot *stop* infinite regress because it assumes that the premises of a deductive argument can be justified somehow. Although Hume is right in that premises are not self-evidently justifiable, he wrongly concludes that non-justifiable premises cannot be used to establish whether a belief is true or false. In other words, Hume's skepticism originates in his justificationism because his acceptance that (a) knowledge is justified true belief, and that (b) premises cannot be justified leads him to conclude that objective knowledge is not possible. If, however, he changes the first premise, he cannot use the second premise to obtain his skeptic view of knowledge. Similarly to Cartesian epistemology, the Humean theory of knowledge leads to the conclusion that the ultimate premise must be selected subjectively, and that there is no objective way of dealing with the question of ultimate premises.

In *Hume's Philosophy of Common Life*, Donald Livingston (1984) argues that Hume's epistemology rests on the idea of a world of common life that is central to our popular and philosophical thinking. For Hume, genuine philosophical thinking must proceed within that framework. In contrast to Descartes, Hume introduces common life as a societal context that shapes human thought in order to replace Descartes's self-evident first principles with his own justifier conception of a world of common life.[4] As Livingston states,

> In Hume's conception, philosophy must begin *within* the frame-work of common life, for in the end "we can give no reason for our most general and most refined principles, beside our experience of their reality …" [I]t is the ultimacy principle that makes Hume's skepticism possible. If ultimate questions about existences are possible, then answers to them are possible. But the only nonarbitrary answers we can give to these, or to any other question of fact and existence, are based on experience and so are contingent. But contingent answers, by the very principle of ultimacy, are inadequate.
>
> (1984: 24–25, emphasis in the original)

In accordance with this skeptical approach to knowledge, the train of human thought can be modeled thus: the person S who begins with unjustified premises cannot identify whether his or her belief P at time t is true or false, even if he or she uses a valid deductive method:

Premise (I): Belief P is ultimately justified based on self-evident (unjustified) premises at time t.
Premise (II): S uses unjustified premises to infer belief P at time t.

Conclusion: S does not justify belief P based on unjustified premises at time t.

Not surprisingly, the skeptical approach to knowledge denies the possibility of a rational dialogue about competing ways of the good life. Since it models the train of human thought on the false notion of knowledge as justified true belief, it concludes that people cannot use their faculty of reason to establish whether their beliefs are true or false. People who base their beliefs upon subjective premises have no objective foundation upon which they can use their faculties of reason to solve moral disputes about ultimate values. Ultimate values then become *incommensurable*.

Skeptical epistemology models human knowledge on people who start with different subjective premises and who arrive at various conclusions; thus, there is no normative consensus about ultimate values which could be regarded as objective and the consensus cannot be thought of as revisable. This theory of knowledge describes the cognitive function of skeptics in a pluralistic society suffering from an unavoidable moral dispute regarding ultimate values. Such a society includes radically different conceptions of the good life, however, without any objective criterion against which the truth or falsity of competing ways of the good life can be judged, skeptics cannot use their reason to agree on a system of common values. Similarly to dogmatism, the skeptical approach leads to a closed society whose individual members are incapable of talking about the first principles rationally or of creating common values through rational dialogue.

A Nonjustificational Epistemology and Rational Dialogue

As argued earlier, this chapter addresses the question of how epistemology contributes to the theory of society. A response can now be offered. However, traditional epistemology fails to deliver an answer due to its justificationism.

The central question in epistemology is the way in which people establish whether their beliefs are true or false, and the main issues in theoretical sociology are what is society and how does it change? The responses to these questions are intrinsically connected with one another because human actors' cognitive ability to establish true or false beliefs lead them to *socially recognized true beliefs about the meaning of the good life*, which operate as common values that control people's egoist behavior. This is a necessary condition for a peaceful social order. In this sense, the capacity of human reason to identify one's true or false beliefs is linked with the capacity to enter into rational dialogue in order to create a common interpretation of the good life. Epistemologically, common values can be viewed as a *common understanding* of the ultimate goals of human life.

Epistemology contributes to the theory of society for addressing the question of social change from the existing social order to an ideal one by showing that the cognitive ability for establishing one's true or false beliefs allows people to revise the previous common understanding of the good life. Through critical reason, people discover what is wrong with their previous common beliefs.

This section argues that epistemology contributes to the theory of society via a shift from a justificational to a nonjustificational concept of human understanding. This epistemological shift enables the theory of society to analyze the processes of social transition from a closed to an open society due to people's cognitive ability for revising their common understanding of the good life upon their discovery that their moral consensus can be refuted by falsifier evidence.

In order to introduce nonjustificational epistemology to the theory of society, Popper's epistemology is reviewed here to show that it originated as a result of a significant shift from justification to criticism. Nevertheless, since Popper does not extend this shift to his moral philosophy, his conception of rationality does not work for introducing nonjustificational epistemology to the theory of society. Given this critique, this section then argues that Bartley's theories of knowledge and rationality prepare the ground for situating nonjustificational epistemology in the theory of society. Bartley's epistemology is used to show that a common understanding of the good life is possible due to the cognitive ability of the human mind.

Popper's Epistemology and Irrational Faith in Reason

Popper's critical epistemology has played a peculiar role in the development of the philosophy of the open society. On the one hand, Popper's idea of open society reflects his critical approach to epistemology. According to Popper, members of an open society are able freely to decide how to manage their lives and to participate in decisions regarding their common concerns. An open society institutionalizes competition and criticism in all social realms in order to find new solutions for all kinds of problems (Albert 2006: 7). On the other hand, Popper argues that the transition from a closed to an open society requires a change in moral attitude: from the uncritical attitude of closed-minded individuals to the critical attitude of people who are ready to listen to each other and learn through mutual criticism. Nevertheless, his epistemology does not show how normative change from closed ethics to open ethics can come about through people's access to critical reason (Jarvie and Pralong 2003: 128–130).

In this case, the argument is not that Popper's epistemology has failed to contribute to his theory of the open society, but rather that his philosophy of the open society does not clarify how a person who is a critical rationalist, not a dogmatist or a skeptic, uses his or her cognitive ability to create the common values required by an open society to organize its individual members.

The development of Popper's epistemology can be situated within the context of the preceding arguments regarding the Humean critique of the dogmatic theory of knowledge. Popper introduces a philosophy of science, rather than a philosophy of knowledge, through his reflections on Hume's epistemology.

Popper offers new solutions to two major epistemological problems: Hume's problem of induction and Kant's problem of demarcation. The problem of induction refers to the question of how experiences can be used logically to predict events in the future, and the problem of demarcation reflects how science can be distinguished from metaphysical propositions and other such systems. Popper's solutions to these problems present a *significant shift from justification* to *falsification*, and his solution for the induction problem enables him to define his demarcation criterion.

Popper argues that, "Hume was interested in the status of human *knowledge* or, as he might have said, in the question of whether any of our beliefs— and which of them—can be *justified* by sufficient reasons." Popper adds that Hume asks: "Are we justified in reasoning from [repeated] instances of which we have experience to other instances [conclusions] of which we have no experience?" (1972: 3–4, emphasis in the original).

Popper reformulates Hume's logical problem of induction thus: "Can the claim that an explanatory universal theory is true or that it is false be justified by 'empirical reasons'; that is, can the assumption of the truth of test statements justify either the claim that a universal theory is true or the claim that it is false? To this problem, my answer is positive: Yes, *the assumption of the truth of the test statements sometime allows us to justify the claim that an explanatory universal theory is false*" (1972: 7, emphasis in the original). Popper's reformulation indicates a clear shift from justification to falsification.

This shift can be interpreted thus: while no amount of justifier evidence can justify a scientific theory, just one piece of falsifier evidence is enough to refute it. Popper's epistemology addresses the question of how scientific theories can be established as true or false on the basis of empirical evidence, so the subject matter of Popper's epistemology *is not* the question of how human beliefs can be identified as true or false, but how scientific theories can be established as true or false.

Popper's solution to the induction problem has two main components: (a) the replacement of *inductive* logic with *deductive* logic, and (b) the definition of a new role for empirical evidence when examining a scientific theory. Popper knows that inductive logic does not create a logical connection between the premises and the conclusion; however, deductive logic does. In addition, empirical facts cannot be used as the premises in a deductive test of scientific theory. So, how can deductive reasoning be used for an empirical test of a universal theory?

Popper argues that a deductive method not only transmits the truth of the premises to the conclusion, but also retransmits a falsity of the conclusion to at least one of the premises. "[D]eductive logic is not only the theory of the *transmission of truth* from the premises to the conclusion, but it is also, at the same time, the theory of the *retransmission of falsity* from the conclusion to at least one of the premises. … In this way deductive logic becomes the theory of rational criticism. For all rational criticism takes the form of an attempt to show that unacceptable conclusions can be derived from the assertion we are

trying to criticize" (1992: 75). Popper (1959) argues that the purpose of the rigorous testing of theories is their refutation. Failed attempts at refutation would result in corroboration. Yet corroboration is not another term for justification since it does not involve any notion of inductive support for a theory. Theories remain valid as long as they have not been falsified.

In *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* Popper argues that "what characterizes the empirical method is its manner of exposing to falsification, in every conceivable way, the system to be tested. Its aim is not to save the lives of untenable systems but, on the contrary, to select the one which is by comparison the fittest, by exposing them all to the fiercest struggle for survival" (1959: 42). Thus, from a scientific perspective, the objectivity of opposing empirical theories can be discovered through an inter-subjective dialogue. Jeremy Shearmur recognizes this interpretation of science in Popper's works: "Objectivity, Popper has argued, is best achieved as a product of inter-subjective dialogue" (Catton and MacDonald 2004: 100).

Popper describes the shift from justification to falsification as a *tetradic schema: $P_1 \rightarrow TT \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P_2$*, where P_1 is the original scientific problem; *TT* is a tentative theory or a hypothetical solution to the problem; *EE* is error elimination or empirical falsification; and P_2 is a new problem which emerges as a result of empirical criticism. In this sense, knowledge grows through learning from error or via conjectures and refutations. Popper argues that "The so-called objectivity of science lies in the objectivity of the critical method; that is, above all, in the fact that no theory is exempt from criticism, and further, in the fact that the logical instrument of criticism—the logical contradiction—is objective" (1992: 66–67). Popper does not consider the objectivity of science as a matter for the individual scientist, "but rather the social result of mutual criticism, of the friendly–hostile division of labour among scientists, of their co-operation and also of their competition" (ibid.: 72).

Popper's solution for the induction problem enables him to separate science from metaphysics. In *Conjectures and Refutations*, he points out, "The criterion of falsifiability is a solution to this problem of demarcation, for it says that statements or systems of statements, in order to be ranked as scientific, must be capable of conflicting with possible, or conceivable, observations" (1963: 39). It should be emphasized here that Popper regards scientific theories as being refutable, and metaphysical beliefs as criticizable. However, according to Popper, "the solution of a philosophical problem is never final. It cannot be based upon a final proof or upon a final refutation: this is a consequence of the irrefutability of philosophical theories. … Yet it may be based upon the conscientious and critical examination of a problem-situation and its underlying assumptions, and of the various possible ways of resolving it" (ibid.: 200).

In light of Popper's rejection of both dogmatism and skepticism, the question of whether his epistemology enables him to explain the possibility of rational dialogue among competing ways of the good life must be addressed.

In *The Objectivism of Popper's Epistemology*, Alan Musgrave observes that "Popper agrees with the sceptic, against the dogmatic, that we cannot infallibly know objective or absolute truth—but he agrees with the dogmatic, against the sceptic, that the notion of objective or absolute truth plays an important role as a regulative standard. In this way, he tries to eschew dogmatism without succumbing to subjectivism, relativism, and irrationalism" (1974: 564–565). However, the preceding arguments have shown that Popper's epistemology mainly uses the shift from justification to falsification to show how a scientific theory can be examined by empirical evidence.

Despite his philosophy of science, according to which all scientific hypotheses must be open to criticism, Popper introduces a conception of rationality in which human beliefs are not regarded as open to criticism. In other words, when Popper discusses human beliefs in general, he claims that our belief in reason cannot be based on rational argument, but on irrational faith in reason. Popper thus *disconnects* epistemology and the concept of rationality, which can enable him to take a rationalist position between dogmatism and skepticism. Unfortunately, Popper does not follow his philosophy of science in confronting the issue of rational beliefs, and his concept of rationality actually involves justificationism.

How does Popper define critical rationalism? In order to address this question, Popper's definition of uncritical rationalism must be examined. Popper states:

> I shall distinguish in what follows between two rationalist positions, which I label "critical rationalism" and "uncritical rationalism" … Uncritical or comprehensive rationalism can be described as the attitude of the person who says "I am not prepared to accept anything that cannot be defended by means of argument or experience." We can express this also in the form of the principle that any assumption which cannot be supported either by argument or by experience is to be discarded. Now it is easy to see that this principle of an uncritical rationalism is inconsistent; for since it cannot, in its turn, be supported by argument or by experience, it implies that it should itself be discarded. … Uncritical rationalism is therefore logically untenable; and since a purely logical argument can show this, uncritical rationalism can be defeated by its own chosen weapon, argument.

> (1945: 435–436)

Before addressing the problem faced by Popper's critical rationalism, one should discuss why he perceives *comprehensive rationalism* as uncritical. Popper's critique of uncritical rationalism rightly targets the infinite regress involved in the claim for justification of the premises of any rational argument through argument or experience. Popper rightly argues that the premises of an argument cannot be justified. His critique of uncritical rationalism might,

however, involve a problem similar to the one in Hume's critique of inductive reasoning.

Hume argues that the invalidity of inductive argument implies that empirical evidence cannot be used legitimately for testing the objectivity of a scientific hypothesis. Popper, however, offers a logical solution for the induction problem, as argued earlier. However, when he discusses regarding the objectivity of a human belief in general, he concludes that if the premises of our rational beliefs cannot be justified, there is no logical solution allowing us to defend our beliefs rationally. In other words, Popper's argument against uncritical rationalism implies that, if the premises of our beliefs cannot be justified rationally, nor can they be criticized rationally. Using Popper's own philosophy of science to judge his critique of uncritical rationalism, it must be admitted that, since the premises are not justifiable, the beliefs originating in these premises cannot be rationally justified. This is the case if a defensible argument or a rational belief is merely defined as a justified argument or a justified belief.

Popper can argue that uncritical rationalism is untenable due to its inability to justify its own premises. However, he cannot argue that, since people cannot justify their beliefs, they cannot defend their beliefs through critical reason. In this sense, Popper's critique of uncritical rationalism appears in itself to be a justificational critique.

Put differently, if the shift from justification to criticism in epistemology is transferred to the conception of rationality, the premise of any argument can be defended rationally via its openness to criticism. In order to avoid infinite regress, the argument must be that first principles can be criticized rather than that they can be justified. Thus, a rational critique of uncritical rationalism must target the claim of uncritical rationalism that *the first principles are justifiable rather than criticizable*. Popper does not follow this nonjustificational line of critique which is consistent with his own critical philosophy of science.

Popper attempts to justify his critical rationalism as an alternative to uncritical rationalism by claiming that it is a moral attitude. Popper states:

> neither logical argument nor experience can establish the rationalist attitude; for only those who are ready to consider argument or experience, and who have therefore adopted this attitude already, will be impressed by them. … [T]his means that whoever adopts the rationalist attitude does so because he has adopted, consciously or unconsciously, some proposal, or decision, or belief, or behaviour which may be called "irrational." Whether this adoption is tentative or leads to a settled habit, we may describe it as an irrational *faith in reason*.
>
> (1945: 436, emphasis in the original)

This conception of rationality as an irrational faith does not allow Popper to discover how people's cognitive ability to open their first principles to rational

criticism enables them to enter into rational dialogue regarding competing ways of the good life.

Popper defines critical rationalism as a moral attitude of readiness to listen to critical argument and learn from experiences or as an attitude of admitting that, *I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth*.[5] If, however, this moral attitude itself cannot be discussed rationally, how can people's cognitive ability to learn from error enable them to transform closed ethics into open ethics? In other words, if the train of human thought is modeled on the basis of Popper's conception of rationality, people's cognitive ability to rationalize their beliefs cannot play a role in the transition from closed to open ethics.

In his critique of the *myth of the framework*, Popper states that "a critical discussion and a comparison of the various frameworks is always possible. It is a dogma—a dangerous dogma—that the different frameworks are likely mutually untranslatable languages. … My counter-thesis is that it simply exaggerates a difficulty into an impossibility. The difficulty of discussion between people brought up in different frameworks is to be admitted. But nothing is more fruitful than such a discussion" (1970: 56–57). Nevertheless, Popper's interpretation of critical rationalism does not prepare the ground for his counter-thesis that a rational dialogue about competing ways of the good life is possible when such frameworks accept that their first principles are open to mutual criticism. Hans Albert addresses the issue thus:

> the myth of the framework amounts to the thesis that a rational discussion of principles is impossible … If that were the case then so-called ultimate presuppositions would be immune from any criticism. But this thesis has turned out to be untenable. By the way, it has fatal consequences for any cognitive practice. That is to say it has the consequence that one dogmatically asserts one's own principles as true or one accepts a relativism with respect to truth by which the truth of propositions is relativized to the preferred frame of presuppositions. This is the dilemma between foundationalism and relativism …
>
> (2006: 9)

Popper's critical rationalism does not direct our attention to the significant insight by Albert that the first principles must be open to criticism in order to find a solution for the dilemma between dogmatism and skepticism.

There is no reason to assume that the first premises must be justified in order for a belief to be rational. As argued in Bartley's nonjustificational epistemology, once the shift from justification to criticism is extended from the philosophy of science to the philosophy of knowledge, people's minds can be modeled to show that they are capable of defending their conclusions as being true as long as their premises are not known to be untrue.

Bartley's Epistemology and Rationality as Openness to Criticism

Bartley's nonjustificational epistemology facilitates the adoption a model of human knowledge according to which the question of how people's faculty of reason allows them to shape a common understanding of the good life can be addressed without infinite regress.

How does Bartley answer the epistemological question posed at the beginning of this chapter? From the preceding arguments, it is clear that neither a dogmatist nor a skeptic can enter into a rational dialogue; hence, neither of them can show how moral disputes about ultimate values might be solved rationally. Epistemologically, the main reason for this is that dogmatists and skeptics assume that first principles are subjective and are closed to rational discussion. If human beliefs must be justified in order to be true and justification of first principles involves infinite regress, identification of whether our beliefs are true or false becomes impossible.[6]

Whereas Popper's epistemology uses the shift from justification to criticism to demarcate science and metaphysics, Bartley's epistemology uses the aforementioned shift to find a demarcation criterion for separating *rational* from *irrational* beliefs. In his article, *Demarcation Between Science and Metaphysics*, Bartley makes it clear that openness to criticism is the important boundary for making the distinction between a *rational* belief and an *irrational* belief (1968: 44–49). Bartley discusses two problems in demarcation: what he calls "Popper's first problem of demarcation" between scientific statements and non-scientific ones, which is of little importance in comparison to the second problem of evaluating theories or beliefs rationally.

Bartley is interested in "Popper's second demarcation problem" and argues that the intention is to exclude theories or beliefs which have built-in devices for advocating or deflecting critical arguments (ibid.: 45). Bartley argues that a theory or a belief is rational only if it contains no criticism-deflecting derives and is vulnerable (or open) to criticism.

Thus, the objective method of learning from trial and error uses not only the logic of scientific discovery, but also the logic of discovering human knowledge, thus leading to a general theory of knowledge that is useful for examining competing moral understandings of the good life via the method of conjecture and refutation, therefore achieving moral objectivity through inter-subjective criticism.

In *The Retreat to Commitment*, Bartley introduces the central problem of modern philosophy thus:

> Generally speaking, the various revolutions in philosophy can be characterized by reference to the solution they offer to what I believe is the fundamental problem of modern philosophy. This is the problem of defeating the *tu quoque* by showing that it is possible to choose in a nonarbitrary way among competing, mutually exclusive theories, and more broadly speaking—among competing "ways of life." This is, I

believe, more fundamental than what has been called the "central problem of the theory of knowledge": namely, the demarcation of science from non-science.

(1984: 83–84)

Both the dogmatic and the skeptical approaches to human knowledge lead to a subjective and arbitrary standard of morality on the basis of which people's critical reason cannot be used to judging opposing ways of the good life; consequently, people must make an irrational commitment to a system of ultimate values. In contrast, the nonjustificational theory of knowledge, as Bartley defines it, invites people to open their first premises to mutual criticism in order to activate their cognitive abilities in order to make an objective moral judgment regarding the competing concepts of the good life. In this way, a common, objectively evaluated understanding of the good life becomes possible.

Noretta Koertge adopts Bartley's epistemology in terms of the conjunction of (R) and (Q) as follows:

> (R) A principle P is held rationally relative to the knowledge available at time t if and only if
>   (a) P is hold open to criticism.
>   (b) There are no known cogent criticisms of P at time t.
> (Q) It is logically possible to be a rationalist, i.e. to hold open all one's principles (including this one) rationally.

(1974: 79–80)

According to Bartley, as in scientific theory, the rationality of a belief will be relative to its success in weathering serious criticism. Similarly, Settle *et al.* suggest that the Principle of Openness to Criticism is: "No view known or deemed to be uncriticizable is rationally tenable" (Settle et al. 1974: 87). Keeping Bartley's demarcation in mind, it is possible to use nonjustificational epistemology to model the train of thought of a person who employs her or his critical reason to establish whether her or his beliefs are false or true.

Through a nonjustificational lens, the train of thought of person S when he or she uses the premises to deduce belief P at time t can be modeled as follows:

> Premise (I): A belief is rational, only if its premises are held open to criticism and are not known to be untrue at time t.
> Premise (II): S uses unfalse premises to deduce belief P at time t
>
> ───────────────────────────────
>
> Conclusion: S defends belief P as a rational (unfalse) belief at time t.

According to this model of human knowledge, people do not involve infinite regress when they admit that their premises might be mistaken and build their beliefs—including their moral beliefs about the meaning of the good life—upon

premises which are not closed to rational discussion. People enter into a rational dialogue because the faculty of reason has the ability to open the first principles to rational criticism. Once this inherent cognitive ability of the human mind has been activated, individuals are prepared to open their closed moral attitudes.

Thus, societal transition from a closed to an open society should be addressed by the theory of society which internalizes nonjustificational epistemology in its model of human action. Inspired by the contributions of epistemology to the theory of society, this particular model of human action is developed in Chapter 4.

Bartley's nonjustificational epistemology directly affects his theory of rationality. Unlike Popper, Bartley does not argue that people's faith in reason is irrational, rather he seeks to define the identity of a rationalist as a person who is capable of defending his or her identity. For Bartley, a rationalist, i.e., a reasonable person who possesses beliefs that are open to criticism and that have not yet been refuted, can defend his or her identity without involving infinite regress (Agassi *et al.* 1971: 43).

Bartley defines critical rationalism, which he calls *pancritical rationalism*, against both the dogmatist identity of an uncritical rationalist and the skeptical identity of a critical irrationalist. His critical rationalism is developed by expanding Popper's logic of scientific discovery, first, to the philosophy of knowledge and, second, to the theory of rationality. Accordingly, Bartley argues that not only scientific beliefs, but also non-scientific beliefs can be held rationally by subjecting them to inter-subjective criticism.

Bartley argues that dogmatic rationalism and skeptical irrationalism arise within the polluted context of the justificationist philosophy of true belief. He states that, "Instead of positing infallible intellectual authorities to guarantee positions, one may build a philosophical programme for counteracting intellectual error" (1982: 150). Once people admit that they should discover potential errors in their beliefs, their understanding of the meaning of rational belief and action shifts from justification to criticism.

Popper says that, "The central question for Hume was: do we act according to reason or not? And my answer is: Yes." Popper then goes on to explain why his answer is yes:

> not only do *we reason rationally*, and therefore contrary to the principle of induction, established as invalid by Hume, but that *we also act rationally*: in accordance with reason rather than with induction. We do not act upon repetition or "habit," but upon the best tested of our theories which, we have seen, are the ones for which we have good rational reasons; not of course good reasons for believing them to be true, but for believing them to be best available from the point of view of a search for truth or verisimilitude – the best among the competing theories, the best approximations to the truth..
>
> (Popper 1972: 95, emphasis added)

Here Popper actually situates his critical epistemology in the theory of rational action. Yet when he comes to defining critical rationalism, he describes it as an irrational faith in reason. Nonjustificational epistemology implies that people's trains of thought are modeled as they act upon their own *best available moral beliefs*, which can emerge through an inter-subjective dialogue among competing ways of the good life.

Bartley offers a theory of rationality which defines the rationalist identity as follows: "the rationalist identity might be characterised as one who holds *all* of his beliefs, including his stands and his basic philosophical position itself, open to criticism; one who protects nothing from criticism by justifying it irrationally" (1964: 30, emphasis in the original). In *The Retreat to Commitment*, Bartley notes that "It is … one of the merits of pancritical rationalism … that it presents a theory about people, not statements. … an *account of the essence of being a rationalist*. It is an account of how a rationalist or critical person might behave" (1984: 233, emphasis in the original). Thus, Bartley uses nonjustificational epistemology to define the identity of a rationalist.

As Mariano Artiges observes:

> According to Popper, the *attitude* of rational argument cannot be founded on rational argument. This is why he asserted that his critical rationalism untimely relied on an *irrational decision*. Bartley regarded such a position as suicidal. For under these circumstances, critical rationalism must always come up against the standard objection of philosophical or religious fideists. Indeed, a fideist could always answer the rationalist along the following lines: "you attack me because I rely on an irrational faith, but you also ultimately rely on an irrational faith."
>
> (1999: 19, emphasis in the original)

Bartley notes that "The nub of the skeptical and fideistic objection was not, after all, simply the argument that comprehensive justification is impossible. It was, rather, that *since* comprehensive justification is impossible, the choice between competing ultimate positions is arbitrary" (1964: 15, emphasis in the original).

The upshot of Bartley's theory of rationality for sociology can be described thus: people use their critical reason to open their first principles of competing ways of the good life to rational criticism. Unlike dogmatism and skepticism, the philosophy of critical rationalism enables the theory of society to address the possibility of overcoming moral dispute among competing ultimate values, which makes a peaceful social order possible. In Chapter 5 Bartley's theory of rationality is used to formulate a theory of social change from a closed to an open society on the basis of which it is argued in Chapter 7 that transition from the existing global order to an open global society can be analyzed in light of the cognitive ability of people of the world to open their premises to mutual discussion. This chapter thus prepares the ground for the central argument in this book which implies that civilizations should not

be considered as incommensurable frameworks whose different principles make their peaceful coexistence impossible.

Critical Rationalism and the Theory of Society

As argued earlier in this chapter, the proponents of Popper's social philosophy of the open society, such as Albert and Shearmur, among others, believe that Popper's epistemology has paved the way for his theory of the open society by viewing science as the enterprise of trial and error and defining open society as a society of open-minded people who have chosen the moral attitude of openness to criticism. "The open society as it has been characterized by Popper is a society whose members have the possibility to decide freely about how to lead their lives and to participate in decisions about their common affairs" (Albert 2006: 7). Mark Notturno argues that: "These ideas—that objective knowledge is inherently fallible; and that we can never justify, but can criticize it—are essential both to Popper's philosophy of science and to his concept of open society" (2000: xxvi). However, from a sociological perspective, the question is how people's objective knowledge enables them to create common values on which basis social ordering of open-minded people becomes possible.

Since Popper assumes that to be an open-minded person is an irrational moral choice, he can hardly provide an epistemological explanation of the way in which the value consensus of closed-minded members in a closed society was transformed into a value consensus among open-minded members of an open society.

In *Minima Moralia*, Sandra Pralong makes the following observation:

> Choosing between the two competing ethical projects—the "totalitarian" and the "humanitarian"—is, in my opinion, one of the keys to the transition from closed to open society … Yet Popper seems to underrate a key problem related to the existence of two different ethical paradigms. Not only does he fail to specify the different criteria for moral choice that are associated with each approach, but he also under-emphasizes the difficulty of *transition* from one ethical paradigm to another.
>
> <div align="right">(Jarvie and Pralong 2003: 129, emphasis in the original)</div>

It is not surprising that Popper cannot address a normative change from a closed to an open society since he does not offer an *epistemological explanation* for people's faith in reason.

In order for the theory of society to address a social transition from a closed to an open society based on a parallel change in value consensus among individual members of those societies, it requires an epistemological explanation of why people are capable of opening their first principles to rational criticism.

Thus, the advocates of Popper's epistemologically inspired theory of the open society have ignored a vital problem in the micro-foundation of Popper's theory: Popper's epistemology does not serve his theory of the open society because it disconnects epistemology and the concept of rationality.

This chapter aims to show that Bartley's nonjustificational epistemology, which has already been situated in his theory of rationality, paves the way for showing how the faculty of reason allows people to create an epistemic shift in their common understanding of the good life and that people's critical rationality is the motor that can open "closed values" to criticism.

Critical Rationalism and a Revisable Value Consensus

On the basis of the preceding arguments, it can now be shown how non-justificational epistemology can be situated in the theory of open society. Not only does the theory of open society describe an open society, but it also shows how an open society is created when individual members of a closed society open their normative consensus to rational criticism.

The model of human knowledge comes into the picture to enable us to address the question of why an epistemic consensus on common values was possible for the first time and also the question of why the openness of the first principles to rational criticism allows people to revise the common values which they themselves have created.

At the *individual* level, the nonjustificational model of knowledge implies that (a) a belief P regarding the meaning of the good life (ultimate values) is rational at time t, only if its premises are held open to criticism and are not known to be untrue, and (b) a person S uses such unfalse premises to deduce her or his belief P regarding the meaning of the good life (ultimate values) at time t. If these two premises are not false, then it can be concluded that the person S can rationally defend his or her ultimate values (belief P) at time t as long as the premises are not known to be false at time t.

What does it mean at the individual level to be a rationalist, rather than a dogmatist or relativist? This book purports that it means that rational people can defend their ultimate values by holding the premises of such values open to rational criticism.

At the *societal level*, the model of knowledge leads to significant outcomes for the rise and the fall of an epistemic consensus on ultimate values, common to individual members of a society, whether closed or open.

Moving from the individual to the societal level, it can be argued that, due to the similar cognitive functions of human minds, people who hold the premises of their competing ways of the good life open to rational criticism jointly learn to exclude the ways of life that they recognize as errors and to retain the ways of the good life which have not yet been refuted. The argument can be formulated thus: (a) beliefs P_1 to P_n regarding competing meanings of the good life (ultimate values) are rational at time t, only if their premises held open to mutual criticism and are not known to be untrue, and

(b) persons S_1 to S_n use such unfalse premises to defend their beliefs P_1 to P_n regarding the meanings of the good life (ultimate values) at time t. If these two premises are not false, then the conclusion is that persons S_1 to S_n jointly agree on one account of the good life which are not known to be untrue by them at time t.

In other words, the openness of participants in a rational dialogue about competing ways of the good life enables them to learn from mutual errors and to arrive at a rational consensus on common values which are still open to criticism. Such an unjustified consensus does not suffer from infinite regress and can be *corroborated* by the unsuccessful attempts to refute it.

In contrast to dogmatic and skeptical epistemologies, which are unable to show how people use their reason to enter into a rational dialogue regarding competing notions of the good life, nonjustificational epistemology models human knowledge to show that people employ their reason to open their premises to mutual criticism and create the common values necessary for social order. In order for these common values to have an epistemic and rational nature, rather than an *arbitrary* one, this normative agreement must be addressed by a theory of objective knowledge.

Through a nonjustificational lens, a normative consensus on ultimate values cannot logically be a justified consensus because of the infinite regress involved in such a value consensus. In other words, this consensus cannot be an epistemic outcome of the human mind working on the model of conjecture and refutation. Hence, every value consensus should be regarded as imperfect and capable of revision by means of trial and error.

This leads us to a *process of moral learning* which uses the model of science to show that people uses their reason to revise dominant values when they have discovered that the premises of their moral agreement are known to be untrue. As mentioned previously, objectivity is best achieved as a product of inter-subjective dialogue (Catton and MacDonald 2004: 100).

As long as Popper's irrational faith in reason remains the moral foundation of his theory of open society, the method of conjecture and refutation cannot be introduced to such a theory of society. When people's trains of thought are shaped in a nonjustificational way, their rational consensus on ultimate values cannot be absolute and non-revisable, which means that not only did people previously change their value consensus by opening its premises to rational criticism, but also that they are capable of changing the existing normative consensus through such openness to criticism.

From a Closed to an Open Society: A Normative Change

It is argued in this chapter that epistemology contributes to the theory of society by providing an epistemic rationale for understanding why people's access to critical reason enables them to agree on a system of ultimate values necessary for the rise of a peaceful social order. The question of how

epistemology contributes to the theory of society can be reformatted since the issue of social change from a closed to an open society is also addressed.

The theory of social change explores how the existing social order cedes its place to a new one. Sociologists, such as Talcott Parsons, have argued that social order is not possible without a set of common values. Accordingly, epistemology contributes to the theory of social change as well as to the theory of social order.

The epistemology proposed in this chapter allows the theory of social change to consider people's access to critical reason as the source of a normative change from one value consensus to another. As argued above, objectivity in ethics is best achieved as a product of inter-subjective dialogue in which the premises of moral arguments are held open to rational criticism.

The significant upshot of this approach to social change for the social philosophy of open society is that people use critical reason to question the ethics of a closed society. Hence, the normative problem for individual members of a closed society is how they can discover their moral deficits. Nonjustificational models of knowledge and rationality contribute to an answer for this question by replaying people's use of critical reason in their search for the mistaken premises which have made the moral consensus in the closed society untrue. Once individual members of a closed society have discovered their common normative errors, they can replace falsified values with a new system of common values, which remains valid as long as its premises have not been refuted inter-subjectively. In this book, the replacement of closed ethics with open ethics is defined as *moral learning through rational criticism*.

From this perspective, the ideal of an open society is not only a sociological device on the basis of which a sociological pathology of the closed society can be offered, but also a sociological solution for building an open society through questioning the closed values.

Overall, Chapter 2 provides the foundations for the development of arguments in this book about several central issues. In Chapter 4 the contribution of epistemology to sociology is highlighted in order to show how people's cognitive ability to identify rational beliefs enables them to become independent actors who use their objective knowledge to enter into a moral dialogue for opening closed values. The present argument regarding epistemology and the theory of society leads to an examination in Chapter 4 of the over-socialized image of the human actor as a means of showing how people are agents of social change.

In Chapter 5 the epistemological insights of nonjustificationism are used to introduce five elements of social transition from a closed to an open society. These include worldview, moral beliefs, legal codes of behavior, political use of power, and economic resource allocation. Inspired by nonjustificational epistemology, Chapter 5 offers a critical sociology of modernity in which the transition from a traditional to a modern society is analyzed as epistemic openness of old worldviews and images of the good life to rational criticism, as well as institutional openness of traditional legal, political, and economic

systems to criticism. This new sociological analysis of modernity leads to an unfinished project of modernity in terms of a capacity for opening modern society to rational critique. This analysis also enables us to make a significant distinction between a liberal and an open society.

Chapters 6 and 7 benefit from epistemology of the open society in the sense of offering a new micro-foundation for a sociological analysis of global social change. Chapter 6 analyzes the rise of global order as an integration of national societies in a global social system originating in an openness of national societies to a modern form of political organization based on the nation-state ideal type, and to a global model of economic organization based on market economy.

Chapter 7 uses the epistemology of the open society to show not only that a rational dialogue among world civilizations is possible, but also that such open dialogue operates as the mechanism for creating a system of common global values. Chapter 7 argues that the access of the people of the world to critical reason enables civilizations to enter into a moral dialogue for creating the common values that are required for the emergence of global peace, democracy, and justice.

In sum, Chapter 2 builds the epistemological base for the theory of an open global society, which is the central aim of this book, and also introduces a normative approach to globalization based on the philosophy of critical rationalism advocated therein.

Notes

1 Laurence Bonjour argues that epistemology is the philosophical study of knowledge which aims to address the question of how human knowledge is shaped and how it grows (Bonjour 2002: 1–6). It is remarkable that what distinguishes *modern* and *traditional* epistemologies is that, in modern epistemology, the question of what is the ontological nature of human knowledge has been replaced with the logical question of how a *knowledge claim* can be evaluated objectively.

2 In 1963 Edmund Gettier published a short article entitled "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" and offered examples (so-called Gettier cases) in which the conditions required by the traditional notion of knowledge are supposedly satisfied, but which, nevertheless, are not cases of knowledge (1963: 121–123).

3 According to Descartes, a person's belief in their own existence cannot be doubted. In other words, Descartes constructs his modern epistemology on the basis of the fundamental premise that since I think, I exist, and my existence cannot be disputed. Descartes attempts to justify the first principle of his epistemology in order to show that if one begins with this premise and uses valid deductions, one can achieve a substantial body of knowledge which should be error-free.

4 As observed by Donald Livingston, Hume criticized the claim that philosophy has the authority to command belief and moral judgment independently of the received beliefs, customs, and prejudices of common life. However, Hume discovered that such a concept of philosophy leads to total skepticism because it cannot justify its own premises. According to Hume, "If philosophical activity is to continue at all, it must reform itself … and recognize common life not as an object of critical reflection but as a category internal to its own critical activity. True philosophy, then, presupposes the authority of common life as a whole" (Livingston 1984: 3). Hume

claims that philosophy should lead us to critical reflection because he believes that a philosopher cannot justify his first principles. Hence, his philosophy of common life rests on a justificational critique of philosophical activity.

5 In his article entitled 'On Critical and Pancritical Rationalism', Antoni Diller admits that Popper has stated that the attitude of reasonableness is accepted by means of an irrational faith. Unlike Bartley, he argues that this is not, however, fideism. According to Diller, "The decision to treat arguments seriously is irrational because it is a moral decision. Rational discourse, for Popper, is guided by the regulative idea of truth. Moral principles, unlike theories, are capable neither of being true nor of being false" (2013: 128). On the basis of this premise, Popper argues that our faith in reason should be irrational. However, if one argues that moral principles can be subjected to rational debate, one need not regard the attitude of reasonableness as an irrational faith in reason.

6 Various theories of knowledge, according to Bartley, are functions of the answers which philosophers give to the question of the nature of the rational authority to which a rationalist appeals to justify all his opinions (1984: 87).This shows that Bartley recognizes that a rationalist appeals to an epistemological point of view in order to justify all of his beliefs.

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3 The Theory of Society and the Sociology of Globalization

The debate about globalization has become increasingly central to sociology; nevertheless, relatively few attempts have been made to address the question of why globalization should be understood within the context of the theory of society. If, however, globalization is the process through which a *new social order* comes about on a global scale, a theory of globalization must be formulated on the basis of the theory of society that addresses the rise of social order per se. The sociology of globalization can be said to be underpinned by a theory of global society that aims to explain the rise of a new social order on a global scale.

This chapter shows how the question of social order on a global scale is addressed by three major sociologies of globalization, each inspired by the theory of society which it uses. It is argued that the legacies of modern sociology have not been employed properly by these three sociologies of globalization for exploring the social meaning of global order and formulating the theory of globalization. The conclusion is reached that the philosophy of critical rationalism can be used for developing a new sociology of globalization; accordingly, the perspective of a critical-rationalist theory of society is used to analyze globalization in Chapter 6.

In summary, this chapter (a) argues that modern sociology has recognized the central importance of the Hobbesian problem of social order for the theory of society, namely that the pursuit of self-interest leads to the war of all against all, (b) reasons that Talcott Parsons has offered a plausible solution to the Hobbesian problem of social order, according to which a system of common values prevents the war of all against all by controlling the egoistic behavior of individuals, (c) examines the three major sociologies of globalization in order to show how each of them addresses the rise of social order on a global scale according to the sociological theories employed, and (d) argues in favor of a new sociology of globalization by using the contribution of nonjustificational epistemology to the theory of society.

The Hobbesian Problem of Social Order and Modern Sociology

In Chapter 4 the Hobbesian problem of social order is discussed in detail as a central problem whose importance for modern sociology is recognized by

Parsons. For the purpose of the present argument, however, a brief résumé of the problem is sufficient. In *The Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes posits that as a result of their egoistic behavior people cannot find peace in the absence of some central absolute power with absolute authority to prevent the war of all against all.

Hobbes's definition of human nature,[1] in particular the role of reason, leads him to the social problem of human action which is driven by a plurality of passions, rather than by reason (1928: 24). Hobbes concludes that, if reason is a servant of the passions and if the passions are plural and random, there is "no common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves" (ibid.). Hence, since the passions, the ultimate ends of action, are diverse, there is nothing to prevent their pursuit from resulting in a war of all against all. Hobbes calls this the *state of nature* and writes: "if any two men desire the same thing which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in this way to their end endeavor to destroy or subdue one another" (ibid.: 63). This implication of Hobbes's account of human nature makes it understandable why Parsons views the Hobbesian problem of individuals pursuing their own personal goals as central to the development of a theory of society[2] that seeks to address social order. As argued later in this book, the Hobbesian problem has similar importance for a sociological theory of global order that aims to explain the rise of social order on a global scale.

In *The Structure of Social Action*, Parsons states that "the basis of Hobbes' social thinking lies in his famous concept of the state of nature as the war of all against all. … Man, he says, is guided by a plurality of passions. The good is simply that which any man desires. But unfortunately there are very severe limitations on the extent to which these desires can be realized, limitations which according to Hobbes lie primarily in the nature of the relations of man to man" (1937: 89). On a global scale, the same problem can be perceived in the relationships of national societies with each other. As will be discussed, the problem of social order on a domestic level has a normative solution, which in turn is also required on a global scale.

Hobbes concludes that the pursuit of self-interest leads to the state of war of all against all and that people should enter into a social contract in order to control their egoistic behavior through the establishment of an absolute political power. Hobbes does not recognize a normative solution for controlling individuals' egoistic behavior; thus, his *Leviathan* emerges as a political solution for the problem of social order.

As Parsons observes, "[Hobbes] went on to deduce the character of the concrete system which would result if its units were in fact as defined. And in so doing he became involved in an empirical problem which has not yet been encountered … [i.e.,] the problem of [social] order. This problem, in the sense in which Hobbes posed it, constitutes the most fundamental empirical difficulty of utilitarian thought" (1937: 91). The Hobbesian problem of social order can be summarized thus: the inevitable result of the self-interested

behavior of people who pursue their goals, with reason as a servant of the passions and the passions as plural and random, is a war of all against all. Hobbes's proposal that self-interested people can enter into a social contract to transfer their rights to an 'absolute power' in order to protect themselves from the state of war begs the paradoxical question why, if all people pursue their own self-interest, a ruler with absolute power should be an exception to this and not use this unlimited power in order to pursue his or her own interests.

Classical sociologists, such as Weber and Durkheim, have examined the problem of social order in terms of the nature of human action. Parsons, however, introduced the Hobbesian problem of social order as a central sociological problem whose solution plays a defining role in the development of modern sociology. As Frank Lechner observes:

> They [the classical sociologists] founded the sociological tradition by for-mulating two core problems: the (analytical) problem of social order and the (historical) problem of modernity. These were related. Determining how social order is possible in general may (and did) tell us something about how it is possible under particular conditions—for example, after a period of radical change. Determining the distinctive character and ori-gins of this new form of social order, modernity, may (and did) raise questions about conventional accounts of social order.
>
> (Swatos 1989: 11)

The classical sociologists addressed the question of social order through their sociologies of modernity and their ideal types of human action. In his sociology of modernity, Max Weber argues that "One of the constitutive components of the modern capitalist spirit and, moreover, generally of modern civilization, was the rational organization of [society] on the basis of *the idea of the calling*. … [T]he origin of economic rationalism depends not only on an advanced development of technology and law but also on the capacity and disposition of persons to *organize their lives* in a practical-rational manner" (2001: 122, 160, emphasis in the original). Since Weber's concept of human nature implies that people's access to reason enables them to orient their action goals towards a system of ultimate values, he describes the rise of modern society as a consequence of the people's ability to organize their social lives in a practical-rational manner. In contrast to Hobbes, Weber does not argue that the pursuit of self-interest leads to the state of war. However, he acknowledges that the modern social order is underpinned by the rational capacity of individuals to organize their social lives, thus reducing the phenomenon of social structure to the complexity of human action.

Emile Durkheim employs a different concept of human nature in his social epistemology to show that people's minds are shaped by social categories that are rooted in a system of values; hence, social order exists because action goals are shaped by a system of common values. Durkheim's account of

human nature can be linked to his sociology of the modern social order. The importance of Durkheim's moral approach to social order will become clear in a later discussion of how his sociology inspired John Meyer's theory of world society.

Durkheim's sociology (1964) contrasts the *mechanical solidarity* of segmentary societies with the *organic solidarity* of societies in which there is a more complex division of labor. In the mechanical model of social order or solidarity, people's minds are categorized according to traditional codes of moral behaviors; thus, the social organization of such people reflects the state of their minds, implying that every consciousness *strokes as one*. In an organic model of social order, however, individuals' minds are categorized as developing independently and interdependently, and free from the oppression of the common consciousness. The rise of the modern social order reflects a social transition from the mechanical to the organic model of social order with a parallel change in the categories of human thought.[3] By defining human nature in the context of a given value system in society, Durkheim, in contrast to Hobbes, does not argue that the pursuit of self-interest results in the war of all against all.

From a Marxian perspective, the rise of the capitalist social order is regarded as an unconscious process in which all acts of sociation are performed by isolated individuals who are not conscious of their sociation when in pursuit of their own natural needs. In *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Marx asks:

> What is society, whatever its form may be? The product of men's reciprocal action. Are men free to choose this or that form of society for themselves? By no means. Assume a particular state of development in the productive forces of man and you will get a particular form of commerce and consumption. Assume particular stages of development in production, commerce, and consumption and you will have a corresponding social constitution, a corresponding organization of the family, of orders or of classes.
>
> (1963: 180)

Hence, it is no wonder that Marx views the transition from a pre-modern to a capitalist social order as the transformation of the pre-modern economic base into new relations of production.

As argued by Marx, modern capitalist society originated in the transition from a feudal society in which people unconsciously pursued their needs under the influence of a feudal mode of ownership to a new social order in which people unconsciously pursue their needs under a dominant capitalist mode of ownership. The question of *what holds a capitalist society together* is addressed by Marx's theory of society based on his idea that the capitalist division of labor organizes society. In other words, the societal content of a capitalist society refers to a capitalist mode of production, rather than to a normative consensus among the individual members of a capitalist society.

Marx emphasizes that "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. The economic structure of society is the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness" (Marx and Engels 1962: 363). According to Marx's theory of society, economic forces determine what it is that holds a capitalist society together: an economic division of labor between workers and capitalists. As argued later in this chapter, Marx's theory of society is used by Wallerstein's world-system theory to introduce the unification role played by a single global division of labor in making the world a social whole.

Using Hobbes's concept, Marx might argue that an unintended consequence of the unconscious pursuit of self-interest by alienated individuals in a capitalist society[4] is an unjust division of economic labor that reflects the conflict of interests between the labor class and the capitalists.

The major classical sociologists examining the question of how human action can lead to the rise of a social order define human nature in different ways, so their analyses are naturally dissimilar. Parsons uses the insight of classical sociologists, such as Durkheim and Weber, to show that the Hobbesian problem of social order has a normative resolution. As argued in the following section, this normative solution confronts globalization theorists addressing the question of social order on a global scale with a situation similar to the one already faced by sociologists developing theories of social order on a national scale.

Common Values and the Meaning of Social Order

In this section, the central argument is that Parsons's normative solution for a peaceful social order has a significant consequence for the development of a sociological theory of globalization that addresses social order on a global scale. This section argues that globalization has a *social content* which can only be captured if the globalization theory is able to explain the rise of global values which have made a global system of national societies possible.

Disagreeing with Hobbes' claim that reason is a servant of the passions and that the pursuit of self-interest necessarily results in the war of all against all, Parsons argues that the very existence of social order implies that the state of nature is not actually the state of war. However, Parsons accepts Hobbes' conclusion that a social force must exist to control the egoistic behavior of people pursuing their own self-interests and to make a peaceful social order possible.

Parsons's normative solution to the Hobbesian problem implies that a system of common values towards which people orient their action goals operates as a social force in its moral sense which internally controls the pursuit of self-interest and prevents the rise of the state of war. Respect for a system of common values implies recognition of others as equal moral beings, rather than as a means for achieving one's own interests. In terms of a system

of ultimate values, moral order within society gives people a type of *social solidarity* which prevents them from becoming involved in an unrestricted struggle for power and wealth.

Parsons's sociology of modernity implies that people's recognition of each other as possessors of equal rights to self-determination has enabled them to replace the traditional model of social order based on the authority of one person with a modern social order based on equal rights for all citizens. Parsons emphasizes the voluntary orientation of people on ultimate values, without arguing, however, that people create common values through rational dialogue. According to Parsons's sociology, ultimate values in society are a given fact which people merely choose voluntarily. Roland Robertson states that:

> a great deal of sociological theory in the past thirty years or so has been concerned to challenge Parsons's declaration that the central problem of sociological theory is the problem of [social] order, the fact remains that much of the attempt to resist Parsons has consisted of providing alternative accounts of order … The convergence is seen in one major form … in the apparent acceptance by many sociologists, of various schools of modern sociology, of the common culture, or dominant ideology, thesis … which essentially maintains that the central ingredient of social order is the institutionalization and/or the internationalization of cultural values.
>
> (1992: 43–44)

Given this recognition of common values as the solution to the Hobbesian problem of social order by various schools of modern sociology, it is not surprising that common values are of central importance for modern sociology when addressing social order on a global scale, in the same way as on a domestic level.

One of central contributions of sociology to the understanding of human society is that human life in society has been shaped by social forces. As Peter Wagner observes, "The sociological tradition tended to regard the social and socially determined nature of human life as one of its most important insights" (2001: 114). Although this is the interpretation of sociology is offered by Durkheim's and Marx's theories of society, neither Parsons nor Weber argue that the socially determined nature of human life implies that the human being is merely a product of social order. Parsons defines the *societal function* of common values as people's *voluntary respect* for values already apparently included in the social nature of human life. Yet, like Durkheim and Weber, Parsons views the system of common values as a given social fact and the role of people's access to reason in managing the conflict of interest through moral respect for others is limited to voluntary respect for existing common values.

In order to understand how social order on a global scale has evolved, we must explore not only the kind of value consensus among people which has been shaped on a global level to make such global order possible, but also the

kind of value change which must come about in order to transform the existing form of globalization into a desirable one. Hence, it is important to go beyond Parsons's interpretation of the social meaning of human life and discover how people's access to critical reason enables them to create a peaceful social order by achieving a rational consensus on common values. In Chapter 2 of this book it become clear that it is people's cognitive ability for critical reasoning that facilitates such a rational consensus, and some modern sociologists recognize people's ability to create common values which give their lives social meaning.

Alain Touraine and Jürgen Habermas, for instance, argue that the system of common values in society should not be considered as a given fact, as claimed by Durkheim and Parsons, but that people create their common values. As William Outhwaite observes, "The absence of extra-social guarantees for social arrangements is the starting-point for Alain Touraine's model of historicity and the self-production of society" (2006: 66). In his critique of Parsons's sociology[5], Touraine argues that human action does not merely realize 'pre-existing' values, but actually creates values. Therefore, action should not be defined as a reaction to a situation involving values already in existence. For Touraine, it is action that creates these values, and action is always creative (Knöbl 1999: 406). From this perspective, modern society should not be regarded as being grounded in the nature of things, but instead as the more or less intended result of human action and more or less open to change by human action (Outhwaite 2006: 61).

Habermas develops the Weberian sociology of modernity by using the same train of thought as the function of human action in the self-creation of society becomes clearer. As Outhwaite points out, "In Habermas' analysis, the rationality embodied in the critique of tradition and the development of rational legal structures opens up possibilities of communication action, in which people come to an agreement on what should be done on the basis of rational arguments and reasons" (ibid.: 64). As argued in Chapter 2, non-justificational epistemology and the concept of rationality as *openness to criticism* lead to an examination of the way in which people's access to reason enables them to agree on a set of revisable common values which make a peaceful social order possible.

Against this background, it is not surprising that the social meaning of human life in society is found in people's ability to use their cognitive abilities to create a common understanding of the good life on the basis of which they control their egoistic behavior through respect for the ultimate values which they themselves have agreed upon. Accordingly, globalization as the process of the rise of a social order on a global scale cannot be understood without addressing the question of how national societies across the globe have arrived at a set of shared values on a global scale necessary for global order. Identification of the role of globally shared values in the rise of world order is the main lesson for the sociology of globalization to learn from modern sociology.

Globalization and the Societal Meaning of Global Order

The preceding arguments offer a novel angle on the debate about the meaning of globalization. The notion that globalization refers to the rise of social order on a global scale implies that its meaning depends on the meaning of such a global order. The definition of globalization is therefore based on the concept of global order per se, so the driving forces of globalization cannot be separated from the forces which have created a social order on a global scale, including the shared values that are necessary for the rise of such a global order.

A sociological theory of globalization which defines its subject as the emerging world order must use the theory of society to show how social order evolves on a global scale.

Globalization refers to the fact that, to an increasing degree, the lives of individuals and societies everywhere are affected by events and processes everywhere. Globalization has interconnected the people of the world by creating a new system of social relations on a global level. Martin Shaw defines this global fact as a *global society* and points out:

> Global society clearly exhibits growing system integration, above all at the level of socio-economic relations, but also in the development of cultural and political institutions. *What is a great deal more problematic is the development of social integration in the value sense.* How far has the growing integration of global systems been accompanied by a genuine emergence of consensus and normative integration? … Does this mean that the concept of global society should be employed only in a factual and never in a normative sense? In reality such a division cannot be made, because *the two dimensions actually concern aspects of the same relationships.* Even global market relations … involve the growth of common expectations and ideas of social life. … The growth of global politics is not just the bringing of very diffuse interests into relations with one another; it also involves the development of a common language and values (of democracy, right, nation, etc.) in which conflicts are articulated.
>
> (1994: 11, emphasis added)

Shaw rightly criticizes globalization theories which define the concept of global as a *transnational space* shaped by information technologies and which ignore the societal content of *globality*. He argues that "By global, we mean not just transformed conceptions of time and space but the new social meaning that these have involved. I propose that we understand this as the development of *a common consciousness of human society on a world scale.* … If we accept that the global has a distinctive social meaning, however, beyond its environmental and time-space senses, we will look for its origins … in different places" (ibid.: 11–12). If the social meaning of the term *global* refers to what modern sociology defines as the social content of human life, its

origins should be sought in the values and institutions created to make a *global system of national societies* possible.

Although globalization cannot be viewed as the processes through which a global society has been created by a normative agreement between the people of the world, it should, however, be regarded as the processes through which all people have been interconnected via a global system of national societies based on a globally common understanding regarding the modern ideal type of social order.

In Chapter 6 it will be demonstrated how the liberal ethics of modernity as well as the principle of national sovereignty have contributed to the rise of a common moral unpretending, which together have shaped the global system of national societies. For the purpose of the present argument, however, it suffices to say that globalization contains a societal meaning which must be explored by the theory of globalization.

In sociological terms, the societal meaning of globalization refers not only to the formation of a global society, but also to its origin in a shared understanding among national communities and their individual members regarding the shared values necessary for organizing social life on a global scale.

As Peter Beyer observes, "globalization theory distinguishes itself from longer established worldwide perspectives in that it takes as its primary unit of social analysis the entire globe, which it treats as a single social system" (Robertson and White 2003a: 155–190). The main task of a social theory of globalization is to offer a social explanation for the rise of such a global social whole in terms of shared values and institutions, without which the primary unit of social analysis in globalization theory loses its own meaning.

Lechner notes that "if we are to study global order as sociologists and answer the question how it is possible, we must search for globally institutionalized modes of communication and association, of competition and conflict which involve interaction on an unprecedented scale and are guided by normative principles of unprecedented scope" (Robertson and Garrett 1991: 263). Lechner's recognition that this social order has created unparalleled global institutions that are guided by normative principles leads to an exploration of the societal meaning of globalization.

Modern sociology contributes to the theory of globalization by defining the societal meaning of social order on the basis of common values in the process of creating global order, for the rise of such a global order is not possible without a set of shared values between national communities. Modern sociology thus allows the sociology of globalization to explore the way in which global values have, to some degree, prevented a global war of all against all by controlling the pursuit of self-interests by national societies.

The Theory of Society and Globalization: Three Telling Examples

The three major sociological analyses of globalization briefly discussed below show how globalization theories inspired by theories of society have analyzed

the rise of social order on a global scale, and also how sociology can contribute to these theories by addressing the question of social order at a global level. These analyses include Wallerstein's world-system theory which originated in Marx's sociology, Robertson's theory of globalization and its connection with Parsons's sociology, and then Meyer's theory of world society which has its roots in Durkheim's sociology. These examples provide the foundation for the next section in which the case is made for the formulation of a new sociology of globalization based on a theory of society, called as *critical-rationalist sociology*, that addresses the role of people's access to critical reason in the creation of the common values necessary for the emergence of social order.

Marx's Theory of Society and Wallerstein's World-System Theory

Immanuel Wallerstein's theory of the modern world-system was not originally presented as a theory of globalization. However, its explanation of the rise of the modern world-system as a global social whole is actually a sociological analysis of globalization.

Wallerstein's world-system theory is rooted principally in the Marxian theory of society. Unlike the sociologies of Weber and Parsons, Marx's theory analyzes the formation of social order on the basis of economic dynamics, rather than cultural mechanisms. As argued earlier, Marx defines the nature of social order and individuals' actions as reflections of the dominant relations of production, a context in which a struggle for wealth and power between social classes shapes the nature of social order.

In the first volume of *The Modern World-System* (1974), Wallerstein argues that modern social change can only be studied within the context of a historically conceived single world system. As observed by Ragin and Chirot, "The single social system Wallerstein identified was the capitalist world economy. It was not a loose collection of capitalist nation states … but an economic entity spanning continents and politics, a unique and encompassing social system" (Skocpol 1984: 285). Wallerstein thus introduces the modern world-system as a global social system in which the world economy, global politics, and global culture interact and a global division of economic labor unifies different parts of the modern world-system as a social whole.

Wallerstein views this global social system as a capitalist social order on a global scale and bases his analysis of the world-system more or less on the Marxian logic of a capitalist social system in which the struggle for wealth and power between the capitalist and worker classes determines the nature of social order.

In introducing the modern world-system as a capitalist social system, Wallerstein distinguishes between three kinds of social systems: mini-systems; world empires, and world economies. According to Wallerstein, every society was once a mini-system, i.e., a social system composed of very simple agricultural or hunting societies featuring a complete division of labor and a

single cultural framework. Subsequently, a world-system of units based on a single division of labor and multiple cultural systems evolved globally. Wallerstein argues that two types of such world-systems are possible, one that is unified through a common political system (world empire), and another that has no common political system (world economy) (Wallerstein 1979: 23). A world empire has multiple cultural systems, but only one single political system and a single division of labor. A world economy, on the other hand, combines multiple politics and multiple cultures in a single division of economic labor, and it is this idea of a single capitalist mode of production with multiple political and cultural systems that leads Wallerstein to his sociology of globalization.

Wallerstein argues that the political unity of a world empire allows it to control *capital mobility* throughout its territory in order to use the surplus in the economy for maintaining its bureaucracy, which reduces its ability to maintain political unity. According to Wallerstein (1974), a new type of world economy evolved around 1500 AD, namely a capitalist world order with the state not so much a central economic establishment, but rather a means for assuring certain terms of trade in economic dealings with others. Hence, the market operated to create incentives for increased productivity and economic development.

From the perspective of the world-system theory, this new type of world economy developed a core with well-established towns, successful manufacturing, advanced agriculture, skilled and relatively well-paid labor, and high economic investment. However, this core needed peripheries from which an economic surplus could be extracted to enable expansion of the economy to a global scale.

Wallerstein argues that *disunity* of the political system in this new type of world economy facilitated capital mobility across its increasingly global operations, which meant that capitalist 'relations of production' achieved a 'global' dimension.

As Beyer argues, according to the modern world-system theory, the expansion of social order on a global scale can be analyzed as follows:

> With various antecedents, the story, for Wallerstein, begins in Western European society in the middle of the fifteenth century. Here and for the succeeding centuries, there developed an economy which escaped the tutelage of a single political power and thus the redistributive effects of a world-empire. Capital, or surplus economic value, accumulated in the hands of merchants instead of being siphoned off to support an imperial bureaucracy and its consumption. The capitalist merchants amassed their wealth in towns and cities that largely escaped the domination of the political lords who nominally ruled over the territory in which they existed. From here, they established trade with regions well beyond their territories, especially the Baltic lands and the New World. … From this

beginning, the European world-economy has spread to encompass the whole globe.

(1994: 16–17)

The modern world-system changed because the European expansion of trade resulted in a world economy, and not a world empire like its antecedents. The capitalist division of labor between the core and the periphery established an unjust relationship between the core areas as producers of manufactured goods and the peripheral areas as producers of primary goods.

According to Wallerstein, at first, the differences between the core and the periphery were small; however, northwestern Europe expanded the economic gap through exploitation and the purchase of cheap primary products in return for expensive manufacturing goods. From the outset, the creation of a capitalist world economy was based on the uneven division of labor between the core and the periphery (1979: 95–118).

As Daniel Chirot and Thomas Hall argue, "Wallerstein turns the Marxist notion of class conflict into a question of international conflict. … [T]he bourgeoisie and the proletariat are world-wide classes that do not operate merely within state boundaries. …This implies that the class and even ethnic structures within particular countries must be interpreted as mere adjuncts of the international capitalist division of labor … [N]o single country, or even group of countries, can escape the logic of this transnational system" (1982: 85–86). The intention here is not a detailed discussion regarding how the world-system theory describes the internal functioning of the capitalist world economy, but rather to show how this theory of globalization inspired by Marx's theory of society defines the social meaning of world order.

The world-system theory defines globalization as an economic process through which the capitalist mode of social order has expanded from its origin in Europe to a global scale via the emergence of a single division of economic labor. The modern nation-state system has been a significant element in this global division of labor, without which capital mobility and thus capital accumulation on a global scale would have been impossible.

As observed by Beyer, modern states operate within the framework of a world economy dominated by market trade. It is the functioning of the market that creates core and periphery. States do not control this global market, but merely strengthen its operation. Beyer states that

> strong states form in core areas to protect the interests of these regions against the semiperiphery and periphery. They serve the interests of the ruling classes of the core but at the cost of redistributing some of the wealth to the lower classes in those areas. States in peripheral regions are correspondingly weaker because their local bourgeoisies have a vested interest in a weak state that cannot threaten their position in the overall capitalist system … According to Wallerstein, therefore, nation-states are

part of a single logic of the world-economy: they are a dependent function of it and not a countercurrent within it.

(Robertson and White 2003a: 159)

Whereas the economic strengths in the core areas allow their ruling classes to develop strong states which protect their interests, the ruling classes on the periphery create weak states which cannot prevent them from functioning under the imposed global division of economic labor.

Like Marx, Wallerstein argues that the logic of capitalist social order enables us to understand why the division of labor between capitalist and worker classes is dictated by the capitalist market. Whereas Marx's logic addresses social order on a national scale, Wallerstein's modern world-system theory addresses the rise of a capitalist world order and defines the unity of the global system as a single capitalist division of labor (1988: 584). Wallerstein thus attributes a Marxian meaning to the social content of globalization, and the notion of a system of common values does not play a role in his description of the social nature of human life on a global scale.

In such a theory of capitalist world economy whose cultural systems, as well as political systems, are multiple, it is difficult to include the independent function of common values. Wallerstein attributes a justifier function to the multiple cultural systems in single division of labor and calls it the idea system of the capitalist world economy (1990: 30). On the one hand, this idea system eliminates all social barriers to market operations; on the other, it assures unequal distribution of the surplus proceeds essential for the growth of capital. Cultural diversity facilitates *economy unity* with a single division of labor and need not imply that a social system suffers from disunity. Accordingly, multiple cultural systems, similarly to multiple political systems, enable the ruling capitalist classes to pursue their interests better.

Aristide Zolberg criticizes the concept of the social system inspired by Marx and based on economic activity in Wallerstein's theory of world order. Wallerstein claims that a single division of labor as a shared model of economic activity unifies the modern world-system, and Zolberg asks: "why should that aspect of the totality of human existence be singled out as the necessary and sufficient defining element of a 'real' social system? … In his view, social systems vary in the first instance as a function of the geographical scale of their economic organization, and in the second as a function of the scale of political organization in relation to the economic" (1981: 257). A modern world-system that mainly refers to a global system of economic activities is no more than a global market and cannot be a world society without a minimum level of shared values.

Given this Marxian concept of the political and cultural elements of the social system shaped on the relations of production, it is not surprising that Wallerstein equates the rise of a social order on a global scale with a world economy that unifies multiple political and cultural systems through a global division of economic labor. The importance of the modern world-system

approach to globalization for the present argument is found in its use of Marx's theory of society to show how a social system has emerged on a global scale during the past four centuries. In addition, it shows that the modern nation-state system has been an essential element of a capitalist global order. The world-system theory does not emphasize the normative element in its analysis of the formation of world order because its notion of the social system gives priority to the economic essence of social order.

In their critique of Wallerstein's economic interpretation of the world-system, Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills argue that the study of the world system need not be deterministic:

> Nor need such a study be "economic-determinist." On the contrary, this study would recognize the interaction and support of at least three legs of the social stool, without which it could not stand, let alone develop. These three legs are: organization of political power; identity and legitimation through culture and ideology; and management of economic surplus and capital accumulation through a complex division of labor. Each of these is related to the other and all of them to the system as a whole and its transformation.
>
> (1996: 109)

Viewed from this comprehensive outlook, the social content of a global system cannot merely be reduced to a capitalist division of economic labor.[6] A new concept of social system is required to uncover the social meaning of world order to include non-economic aspects of the social life.

Parsons's Sociology and Robertson's Theory of Globalization

Roland Robertson's globalization theory is another significant example of how the theory of society contributes to the sociology of globalization. This section aims to show that Robertson's theory of globalization was inspired by Parsons's theory of society, but is not based on the Parsonian model of social integration that implies the necessity for a system of common values in order to make a peaceful social order possible. Although Robertson does not view globalization as a formation of world society in which all people have agreed on global values, in keeping with Parsons's concept, he ascribes an active role to human agents who shape global order through rethinking their global condition.

From Robertson's perspective, the clear interest which classical sociologists, such as Simmel, Durkheim, and Weber, have shown in globalization and the world as a single global society has "involved concentration on the basically internal affairs of 'modern societies'" (1992: 16). Simmel views humankind as more than merely the sum of all societies and argues that "society requires the individual to differentiate himself from the humanity general, but forbids him to stand out from the socially general" (Wolff 1950: 63–64). Simmel

recognizes a tension between humankind and national societies. In accordance with this analysis of modernity as the emergence of the cult of the individual, Durkheim argues that, once modern society becomes a global reality, the diversification of individuals in specific groups reaches the point where they do not have much in common as members of national societies, which means that humankind becomes a world society.

Robertson argues that Weber does not deny the existence of a world-historical trend in the direction of *universal brotherhood*, but perceives a tension between the demands of being both a member of a specific nation and of humankind. Weber regards the world as a whole as a domain of struggle between nations (Robertson 1992: 21–24). Robertson summarizes his position thus: "my claim is that sociology became preoccupied with the national society without much recognition of the global basis of sociability. … The classical sociologists … largely neglected the globalization process in favour of a concern with the nationally constituted society" (1993: 174). Although the classical sociologists are interested in globalization, the rise of a global order is not their subject matter.

Robertson's sociology of globalization can be considered as an alternative for the world-system theory. Robertson attributes a defining role in the rise of global order to global culture, instead of global economy or global politics. However, as noted earlier, in contrast to classical and modern sociologists, such as Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons, Robertson's concept of culture does not refer to a system of common values as the basis for a social order.

As mentioned, Robertson admits that many sociologists in various schools of modern sociology regard common culture as the central ingredient of social order and states that "the leading classical sociologists promoted the idea, if only implicitly, that what later came to be called a central value system was an essential feature of viable national societies and that in external terms each society should develop a sense of its own collective identity" (1992: 109). Yet Robertson also accepts Margaret Archer's criticism (1988) of sociological debate that a 'central value system' is an essential feature of national societies as *the myth of cultural integration*.

Robertson arrives at the following conclusion: "Commitment to the idea of the culturally cohesive national society has blinded us to the various ways in which the world as a whole has been increasingly 'organized' around sets of shifting definitions of the global circumstance" (ibid.: 114). Thus, Robertson's theory of globalization requires a new account of culture for addressing the role of global culture in making the world a social whole.

From Robertson's perspective, the question remains is how can Parsons's theory of society contribute to the sociology of globalization? This reflects the reason for which Robertson's theory of globalization is considered to be an alternative for the world-system theory.

Robertson uses the notion of globality (the world as a whole) to describe global order in a sociological sense. For him, globality is a question of competing interpretations of the *global-human condition* by individuals in national

societies across the globe. Just as the world-system theory is underpinned by the concept of a single division of economic labor on a global level, the notion of the global-human condition originates in the ability of individuals to reflect on their own global condition. In *Interpreting Globality*, Robertson points out that:

> the world-system perspective may be most fruitfully compared with the view of Talcott Parsons, who became increasingly concerned with the view of evolutionary formation of the modern global-human condition. One of the most persistent themes in Parsons' work from his earliest writings in the 1920s concerned the ways in which cultural symbols, values and beliefs channel and give meaning to the basic productive forces of human life.
>
> (1983: 8)

Inspired by this interpretation of cultural symbols and values, Robertson replaces the deterministic approach in the world-system theory with the voluntaristic account of human action which Parsonian sociology devotes to human actors in terms of their voluntary orientation towards cultural values and beliefs. Robertson shows that the subunits in the world system are not merely reflections of the global division of economic labor, but rather redefine 'global order' via rethinking the global-human condition.

Robertson develops the theme of societal reflexiveness and does not regard the world to be exhausted by its systemic features (1992: 13). Such societal reflexiveness on a global level addresses the role of global culture in making the whole world a single place.

In order to analyze how global culture—through competing interpretations of the global condition by human actors—operates as the driving force of globalization, Robertson defines globalization as the process through which the world has moved towards *unicity*. Therefore, he states that discussion of globalization entails the realization that we are referring to a specific path which the world has taken in the direction of becoming a single system (1993: 183–184). Robertson uses the Parsonian approach to people's active reflections on their social conditions to show that the world has not moved towards unicity merely as a result of the emergence of a global division of economic labor. The path in this direction is also the outcome of the reactions of individuals and national societies to their emerging global condition.

In Wallerstein's world-system theory, it is a single division of economic labor that integrates multiple political and cultural systems. Can a parallel cultural force be found in Robertson's concept of globality to show that the world is heading towards becoming homogenous?

Robertson (1993) views the rise of the world as a social system in terms of the four major focal points of the globalization process whose competing interpretations point the world towards becoming a single system: *nationally constituted societies, individuals, the global system of societies*, and *humankind*.

The idea of common values as the moral base for social order is clearly foreign to Roberson's sociology of globalization.

According to Robertson, these four focal points interact with each other to enable the world move towards unicity. This interaction is described as a "twofold process involving the interpenetration of the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism" (1992: 100). During this twofold process, national societies operate in the broader context of a global system of societies and constitute themselves in the light of the confrontation between the norms and values institutionalized within a national society and with the different images of the good society offered by other world societies. Thus, individual members of each particular society employ their interpretations of the good society to construct their personal and national identities in the context of the global system. The notion of humankind is developed when individuals and national societies exchange their interpretations of the good society with regard to the notion of humanity. As Beyer summarizes:

> Both individuals and national societies act in the context of a relativizing world system of societies whose unity or identity expresses itself in the encompassing notion of humanity. For Robertson *globalization is a process that is bringing about a single social world*. This leads to the relativization of all self/society dualisms with reference to an encompassing world-system-of-societies/humankind dualism. … Central to the very idea of globalization is that subunits of the global system can constitute themselves only with reference to this encompassing whole. This is what Robertson means by relativization. But conversely, the *global whole becomes a social reality* only as it crystallizes out of the attempts of subunits to deal with their relativizing context. Global culture is the product of these efforts.
>
> (Robertson and White 2003a: 168–169, emphasis added)

The cultural driving forces of globalization are revealed in individuals' capacity for revising their personal and national identities in terms of other societies' different notions of the good society and mankind. In a sense, the relativization of general identities leads to the search for particularistic identities and for the meaning of the universal whole.

Robertson argues that Parsons's work contains a similar analysis of the expansion of the modern state-system on a global scale: "That, I believe, is how Parsons should be read, one major clue in that respect being his argument that the Western system of societies has been progressively expanded, so as to yield a global 'system of societies'" (Robertson and Turner 1991: 146). Roberson's theory of globalization attempts to define the emergence of a global system of societies through its own cultural approach to globalization.

Like the world-system theory, Robertson's theory views the rise of the modern nation-state system as a necessary component of globalization. In

contrast to the world-system theory, however, Robertson's theory does not clarify how the nation-state system interacts with global economy and global culture in order to show a specific path towards the world becoming a single social system. Whereas Wallerstein's world-system theory demonstrates how a single division of economic labor has integrated the multiple political and cultural systems into a capitalist world order, Robertson's globalization theory does not devote a similar integrating role to global culture and offers no system of shared values among national societies for connecting the functions of the modern nation-state and the capitalist world economy with the function of global culture.

In short, the social meaning of global order in Robertson's theory of globalization does not have any *tangible content* since there is no search for shared values which facilitate the global expansion of the nation-state model of social order and the market model of economic organization.

Durkheim's Sociology and Meyer's Theory of World Society

Similarly to Robertson, John Meyer also presents a cultural sociology of globalization, but he uses Durkheim's theory of society and Weber's ideal type of *instrumental rationality* to show that the formation of world society originates in the global culture that shapes the identities of states, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals. For Meyer, the emergence of world society took on a notable meaning when a new institutional solution was sought to fill the void left at the end of World War II.

The solution was found in a global expansion of the nation-state model of social order. From this perspective, globalization refers to the rise of an *instrumental culture* on a global scale embodied, according to Meyer, in the nation-state model. A world society thus arises when the individuals and organizations that constitute modern nation-states all enter into a global system of societies, and their identities are shaped by global culture. Thus, in contrast to the world-system theory, Meyer's theory of world society argues that global culture defines the way in which nation-states, individuals, and organizations shape a world society.

Georg Krüchen and Gili Drori argue that Meyer's work in the 1970s challenged the dominant sociological theories of the day. In contrast to Parsonian sociology, Meyer does not believe that social norms are internalized by individuals and are therefore regulators of individual behavior. For Meyer, the role of *common norms* in the social integration of individuals is the creation of shared expectations codified into models of how the world operates (Krüchen and Drori 2009: 6). In order to develop his theory of world society, Meyer applies Durkheim's and Weber's sociologies.

Meyer's sociology of globalization is an analysis of world order in which global culture plays the main role, in accordance with Durkheim's and Weber's theories of society. As Krüchen and Drori observe:

Meyer's reaction develops into an emphasis on culture as the defining dimension of society, and thus world society is defined as 'broad cultural order with explicit origins in western society' … This understanding of society … draws directly on two of the founding fathers of sociology, namely, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. From Durkheim, Meyer draws the emphasis on the shared moral understanding that underlines all social processes and structures and that cannot be reduced to individual or collective preferences; from Weber, Meyer draws the *notion of occidental rationalization as specifying the basis cultural tenets of world society*. On both, Meyer elaborates, for example, by spotlighting the universalistic norms of fairness and equality, voluntary and self-organized action, and cosmopolitanism as equally essential in specifying the cultural core of world society.

(2009: 17, emphasis added)

The concept of world society is central to Meyer's sociology of global order. In *World Society and the Nation-state*, Meyer *et al*. state, "We are trying to account for a world whose societies, organized as nation-states, are structurally similar in many unexpected dimensions and change in unexpectedly similar ways" (1997: 174). The authors argue that the concept of world order as a global system—consisting of subunits such as nation-states who compete with each other in the pursuit of wealth and power without any normative bonds to control such a competition—should be replaced with a concept of world society in which a shared moral understanding directs the social behavior of the subunits, namely states, individuals, and organizations. This shared moral understanding that connects national societies and their individual members in a world society reflects Meyer's societal definition of global order (ibid.: 175–187). As Krüchen and Drori argue:

> The macrostructures of [world] society, which are conceptualized as a worldwide cultural frame with its historical roots in Western society, constitute individual and collective actors. For Meyer, macrostructures influence norms and behavior: It is not actors and their interests who constitute society ("bottom up"), but rather society, whose main cultural characteristics have become global over time, that constitutes actors in ongoing processes of rationalization ("top down").
>
> (2009: 21–22)

In contrast to the world-system theory or the realist school of International Relations, Meyer uses Durkheim's sociology to develop his theory of world society to show that it is not the self-interested behavior of the subunits in the global system, such as nation-states, social classes, and individuals, that construct world order, but rather a shared moral understanding among the subunits that makes such a world order possible. Meyer assumes that the subunits are norm-takers, rather than norm-makers. The social content of world order

defined on the basis of Durkheim's theory of society implies the existence of a given system of common values which defines the identity of individuals in society.

Keeping in mind the Durkheimian origin of Meyer's theory of world society, it is understandable why Meyer uses Weber's notion of instrumental rationality to show that a shared understanding of the nation-state form of social order has operated as the cultural motor force for globalization.

Meyer argues that what distinguishes 'modern actors' is "their unique senses of agency and identity, which together shape a sense of a rational and bounded agent" (Frank and Meyer 2002: 87–89). The development of this modern sense of actorhood is explained as a historical process, but Meyer does not argue that modern actors have actually been involved in the historical process of creating a shared moral understanding. Instead, he assumes the historical process to be an exogenous factor in the formation of a world society and that modern actors orient their behavior and voluntarily shape their identities in a rational manner. Accordingly, the agency of modern actors is defined on the basis of their voluntary use of occidental rationality to follow the Western model of social order for organizing their national societies, their organizations, and their personal identities.

As Krüchen and Drori observe, "Meyer sees Weber as the most explicit theorist of occidental rationalization, and he extends Weber's rationalization thesis into a globalization thesis by arguing that the main tenets of occidental rationalization—in particular, the belief in progress, justice, the spread of means-end rationality, and most importantly, the universality of such belief—become global" (Krüchen and Drori 2009: 24). Meyer applies Weber's ideal type of instrumental rationality, rather than value rationality, in order to justify his claim that all the national societies in world society have accepted the occidental model of rationality, either in terms of a rational person or a rational social order.

However, according to Weber's notion of value rationality, it is clear that all national societies would be modern liberal-democratic societies if they had accepted occidental rationality when choosing ultimate values of human life. As Krüchen and Drori observe, Meyer's interpretation of rationalization as a homogenizing force omits the tacit images of conflict theory that underpin Weber's work. In fact, Weber argues that rationalization also leads to different spheres of value and results in societal struggles (Krüchen and Drori 2009: 24). Viewed from the perspective of Weber's notion of value rationality, it can be said that national societies and their individual members do not share a set of global common values in terms of the ultimate aims of the good life. They may, however, share an instrumental rationality, which implies that, in the context of the existing global system, each society should use instrumental reason in order to realize its own ultimate values. However, national societies have not yet arrived at a global normative consensus on ultimate values. Therefore, it is hard to imagine that the cultural core of world society, from

Meyer's perspective, leads to a set of truly common global values as the basis for identifying the social meaning of global order.

Nevertheless, Meyer's homogenizing concept of rationality which shows that modern actors have internalized occidental rationality in terms of a global expansion of an instrumental culture leads to a definition of globalization as the process of world society formation. According to Meyer, "The bases of the rules that are to govern the new world society lie in the underlying laws of nature and rationality. … Global social integration and legal order are, thus, possible because humans act in a universe of common natural laws and social rationalities" (Krüchen and Drori 2009: 45). Meyer mistakenly assumes that all liberal and nonliberal societies across the globe are modern societies in the Western sense, who use occidental rationality to organize their citizens' social life.

Influenced by his narrow perspective of instrumental reason, Meyer then goes on to introduce the cultural mechanism of globalization:

> The core mechanism by which the wider global instrumental culture is transmitted to subunits … is through the structuring of actor identities. Once national societies enter the world as nation-state actors, they acquire proper identity and purpose and seek out approved forms rather eagerly. Once social groups have been recognized as formed organizations, they come to be open to wider models of rationalization. Once persons become modern individuals, they eagerly acquire the forms of modern individualism.
>
> (2000: 243)

Similarly to Durkheim, Meyer reasons that a world society exists because its subunits benefit from a shared moral understanding of the laws of nature and rationality which integrates them into a world society through a joint modern identity.

Lechner recognizes this Durkheimian approach to world society and argues that, by analogy with Durkheim's account of social order in a differentiated society on the basis of the *cult of the individual*, it can be shown that a world system of national societies has been made possible by the *cult of the nation-state*: a particular form of society has become an ultimate, sacred symbol, and the main source of a set of global norms on the basis of which the social content of world order is to be understood (1989: 18–22).

Thus, globalization is defined by Meyer as the expanded flow of instrumental culture around the world. According to him, "common models of social order become authoritative in many different social settings. … In many areas of social life, common models organized in world discourse arise and penetrate social life worldwide" (2000: 235–236). In summary, the driving cultural force of globalization originates in a Weberian interpretation of occidental rationality; the role of occidental rationality in the integration of the

subunits into a world society should be understood in the context of Durkheim's theory of society.

Meyer's sociology of globalization rests on the false premise that the Western model of social order has dominated world discourse. The main reason for this mistake is perhaps that Meyer ignores Weber's ideal type of value rationality, which implies that national societies take opposite positions to each other in the global system due to their radically different substantive rationalities. According to John Rawls (2001), liberal and nonliberal societies cannot be regarded as similar modern societies in terms of their *substantive rationality*, despite their common instrumental rationality. Meyer, however, claims that:

> The nation-state form, with individuals as citizens, and organizations as components, is found worldwide. … [W]hile there are attempts in Asia and the Islamic world to limit the spread of models originating in the West, a surprising feature of the modern system is how completely the Western models dominate world discourse about the rights of individuals, the responsibilities and sovereignty of the state, and the nature of preferred organizational forms.
>
> (Meyer and Jepperson 2000:106)

Agreement that liberal and nonliberal societies confer similar rights on citizens and organizations would mean that the rise of world society had turned all the national societies and their populations into modern actors in the Western sense.

According to Meyer, "Globalization of instrumental culture is a product of a stateless world that is filled with 'social actors' who are legitimated in rationalistic and universalistic terms" (2000: 246). For Meyer, since World War II there has been a dramatic increase in a long-term tendency towards global social integration, despite the problem of conflicting yet sovereign nation-states. A solution has been found in the emergence of a *global rationalistic culture* giving nation-states and individuals a modern identity which prevents the Hobbesian war of all against all (Krüchen and Drori: 2009: 43–45). For Meyer, the social content of global order lies in a shared understanding of the nation-state model of social order as a normative solution to wars on a global scale.

Beyond economic integration on a global scale, this notion of globalization does not imply a greater influence of the global market on the modern national societies. Instead, it envisages a new social order reflecting a global order of national societies whose citizens and organizations have been normatively connected through a shared moral understanding based on the ideal type of the nation-state. This assumption implies that the rise of the modern nation-state system is an inseparable part of globalization. A similar conclusion can be drawn from the world-system theory and Robertson's theory of globalization. The problem with Meyer's sociology of globalization, however,

is that it does not regard modern human actors as the creators of a set of shared global norms through which the new social order has evolved on a global scale, but rather as shapers of their rational identities through the instrumental culture of modernity.

Critical Rationalism and the Sociology of Globalization

The preceding sections have revealed how the sociologies of globalization have defined the social meaning of the emerging global order on the basis of the theory of society which they have chosen to use in order to address the fundamental question of social order. It must now be asked how the philosophy of critical rationalism contributes to the sociology of globalization. If epistemology leads to the possibility of rational dialogue among competing ways of the good life and helps to achieve a set of common values, it is not surprising that this philosophy contributes to the sociology of globalization by communicating which theory of society should be the basis for addressing the rise of social order on a global scale. The philosophy of critical rationalism enables the sociology of globalization not only to analyze the existing global order, but also to uncover the problematic nature of this order resulting from its value consensus concerning the cult of sovereignty.

Rational Dialogue and Common Values for Global Order

The three examples of the sociology of globalization discussed here encourage us to ask whether the social meaning of the emerging global order has been addressed sufficiently. If the answer is "no," do we require a new theory of society as the basis for formulating the sociology of globalization? If the answer is "yes," how does nonjustificational epistemology enable us to formulate this new of theory of society?

   These three examples of sociologies of globalization have not supplied any real answer to the question of how to connect the societal content of global order with people's ability to create a set of global values. For the world-system theory, the single division of economic labor between the core and the periphery defines the social meaning of world order. However, this interpretation of how people and societies are connected on a global scale ignores the role of human actors in the creation of shared norms on which a social order on a global scale might be based. Robertson's theory of globalization takes into account the role of human agency in shaping global culture and the rise of the world as a social whole; nevertheless, it does not show how people's access to critical reason enables them to create the shared moral understanding necessary for global order. Meyer's theory of world society reveals the social content of global order in a set of global norms (similar to Lechner's cult of the nation-state), yet it considers the rise of global norms to be a historical fact and does not argue how national societies, particularly state leaders, might initially have been involved in the creation of such global norms.

In summary, the question of how people's cognitive ability to engage in a rational dialogue in order to create a system of global values has not been the main subject of inquiry in the sociology of globalization. In this sense, the sociology of globalization has not yet truly faced with the Hobbesian problem of social order on a global scale.

As argued in Chapter 2, through the use of nonjustificational theories of knowledge and rationality the theory of society can address the question of how people use their critical reason to agree on a system common values for overcoming the Hobbesian problem of the war of all against all. The application of nonjustificational epistemology for formulating the sociology of globalization leads to the need for a new theory of society whose central aim is to show how common values, as the main source of a stable social order, were created initially.

In order to show how the philosophy of critical rationalism contributes to the sociology of globalization, Chapter 5 introduces a critical-rationalist theory of society that seeks to situate people's access to critical reason in the theory of society and to show that people who are capable of opening their moral beliefs to rational criticism create revisable common values on the basis of which a peaceful social order can emerge. Chapter 4 provides the critical-rationalist sociology with a new theory of human action which paves the way for applying the critical-rationalist sociology on a global scale and shows that people's potential access to objective knowledge allows them to think independently of their social conditions and personal interests. Accordingly, people can be viewed as the creators of common values designed to control the egoistic behavior.

Competing Ways of Life and an Open Global Society

The development of the theory of society based on the new theory of human action in this book paves the way for the introduction of a new sociology of global order. This has the central aim of viewing the rise of social order on a global scale as the consequence of a normative consensus among national societies, and particularly their leaders. It is reflected in inter-state law based on the principle of sovereignty. National sovereignty reflects a cultural consensus among national communities and a cult of the nation-state, according to which each society can pursue its own conception of the good life, and its own models of political order and economic organization. This normative consensus facilitates the emergence of a political system of nation-states on a global level within which an openness of national economies to global trade and investment has become possible.

Using the contributions of critical rationalism to the theory of society, Chapter 7 argues that the problematic nature of the existing normative consensus based on the cult of the nation-state, which is reflected in the illegitimate management of global politics by the great powers and the uneven development of the world economy, needs to be reconsidered if the

sovereignty of world populations is to be brought about. The philosophy of critical rationalism implies that people are capable of revising the cult of the nation-state and of creating a new set of global values through an open moral dialogue about competing ways of the good life.

Inspired by nonjustificational epistemology, the idea of an open global society leads this book to a sociological scheme for criticizing the existing global order and for introducing attempts to reform it. As Hans Albert argues:

> [The] idea of an open society is an attempt to transform the European idea of freedom into a *sociological construction* that can be seen as an ideal type in the sense of Max Weber. … the idea of such a society is an ideal, so that a concrete society can approximate it more or less. … this ideal can be used as a *standard for criticizing the existing social order* and also as a *guide for attempts to reform them*.
>
> (2006: 8, emphasis added)

The idea of an open global society can show that the existing global order is underpinned by a value consensus based on the cult of the nation-state and closed to criticism. By contrast, this sociological construction implies that the people of the world can create a new system of common values on a global scale by opening their fundamental moral beliefs to mutual criticism in order to make the world a global society of equal and free citizens.

Notes

1 Alex Viskovatoff argues that Thomas Hobbes "is the first philosopher to express the ambition to explain human behavior scientifically" (2001: 316). In other words, Hobbes suggests a scientific model of human action that is based on the forces which drive such an action.

2 According to Hobbes, the theory of society is still one element of moral philosophy. As argued by David Frisby and Derek Sayer, Hobbes, like John Locke, belongs to the *natural law contract theorists* who argue that the state of war can be changed into a peaceful social order through the establishment of a social contract (1986: 19).

3 In *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Emile Durkheim (1912) attributes a social origin to logical thought and the philosophers' categories of understanding, such as the concepts of space, time, relation, cause, and number, through which all subjective experience is ordered. This is an indication of Durkheim's social epistemology which is underpinned by his theory of society. Since people's categories of thought are ordered by society, their behavior is also orientated towards moral values that have been defined by society.

4 Bertell Ollman, in *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society*, argues that Marx views man as a social being whose behavior is shaped by social forces (1976: 104). Thus, Marx defines an alienated worker or capitalist on the basis of the unjust relations of production governing capitalist society. Whereas Durkheim views man as a social being because he follows moral order in society, Marx regards workers and capitalists as social beings because their behavior in capitalist society is determined by the dominant relations of production. As Ollman observes, "Marx claims that one of the manifestations of alienation is that 'all is under the sway of inhuman power,' and adds, 'this applies also to the capitalist.'

The forms of alienation differ for each class because their position and style of life differ" (ibid.: 32).

5 Alain Touraine's critique of Parsons's sociology has received notable attention in Wolfgang Knöbl's essay "Social Theory from a Sartrean Point of View" (1999). As Knöbl states, "In contrast to Parsons and the more static model of society found in his circles, for Touraine conflictual relationships and the process of social change that arises from them form the centre of sociological analysis. … Touraine's concept of action is melded with the idea of the self–production of society, through which collective actors, classes and social movements almost necessarily move to the centre of Tourainian analyses … In short, the impulse towards freedom that came from Sartre's philosophy was transformed into a dynamic theory of collective action and social movements, which preserved important insights of Parsons's structural functionalism" (1999: 408–409).

6 In *The World System* Frank and Gills reject any unidirectional schema of causality according to which the economic structure in society must necessarily determine the ideology and political apparatus of a mode of accumulation because they are not separated spheres in society (1996: 110).

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4 Human Action for Social Change

In Chapter 2 it was demonstrated that epistemology contributes to the theory of society by addressing the question of why individuals' rational consensus on common values is based on the capacity of the human mind to recognize true or false beliefs. In this chapter, a new theory of human action is introduced to provide the theory of society with a new micro-foundation in order to address the question of how individuals use their cognitive ability to transform the existing social order into a new one. Inspired by the philosophy of critical rationalism, this action theory introduces a significant shift from oversocialized actors whose thoughts are shaped by a given system of values to independent ones who can criticize the dominant values, thus preparing the ground for showing how individuals are the agents of an institutional change from a closed to an open society.

This chapter (a) redefines the central problem in action theory, (b) examines solutions to it offered by three leading sociologists, i.e., Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons, (c) uses examples to show how these solutions are affected by the oversocialized image of human actors, (d) introduces a critical-rationalist theory of human action to explain how people use critical reason to change social order by questioning its moral foundations, and (e) introduces the mechanism of thinkers-social movements-the masses to show how independent actors work together in the sphere of civil society to create social change.

In short, this chapter uses the philosophy of critical rationalism to introduce a new micro-foundation for macro-social change. The critical-rationalist theory of action, as the new micro-foundation, does not address the way in which people behave within their everyday social conditions to satisfy their personal interests, but instead targets the actions performed by independent actors once they have decided to create a social order based on a rational consensus on common values to allow them to pursue their goals peacefully. In this sense, people can be viewed as agents of social change from an existing social order to an ideal one, rather than as social beings which merely reproduce the existing social order.

The Central Problem in Action Theory

Before discussing the inherent problem of the theory of human action, major terms used frequently in this chapter are defined. First, the term *human action* is used to describe individual behavior, and the terms *the individual, the person*, and *people* are used interchangeably, so human action refers to the action of an individual, a person, or people action. Second, the term social order is applied to describe a relatively stable pattern of social relations among individuals or people, and social change refers to a structural change from the existing social order to the new social order.

   In the *Micro-Macro Link* (1987) Jeffery Alexander argues that the problem of action theory should be defined according to the analysis of how the individual and society are linked together, i.e., in the context of the theory of society. Hence, action theory must tackle issues such as whether human action is shaped by social order, whether society is created by human action, or whether individuals and society recreate each other. Accordingly, action theory does not address the behavior of isolated people, but instead views human action and social order in a mutual relationship.[1] The question of how the individual and society may recreate each other is usually discussed in the context of the micro-foundations of macrosociology. As Alexander ascertains, "Every theory of society assumes an image of man as an actor, assumes an answer to the question, 'What is action?'" (1988: 13) Against this background, the Hobbesian problem of social order is discussed in this chapter in order to recall the central problem of action theory,[2] and a reformulated action problem is offered to pave the way for showing how critical rationalism, as a theory of rationality, offers a new image of human actors on the basis of which the theory of society can explain the social change from a closed to an open society.

Thomas Hobbes and the Problem of Action Theory

As argued in Chapter 3, in *The Structure of Social Action* Talcott Parsons elucidates the central problem of action theory based on Thomas Hobbes's perspective of the individual and society, which is perhaps the best means of entering into a discourse on action theory (Joas 1996: 8). Parsons defines this problem through critique of the utilitarian theory of society, according to which an unintended consequence of people's pursuit of self-interest may be harmonized social order. Parsons's critique is addressed in some detail below, but it suffices for the purpose of the present discussion to note that his critique leads to a recognition of the importance of the Hobbesian problem of social order for the development of modern sociological theory.

   Using a utilitarian conception of the person, Hobbes (1928) argues that the unavoidable outcome of each individual pursuing his or her self-interest without a central power to control egoistic behavior would be the war of all against all, which Hobbes calls the *state of nature*. The importance of

Hobbes's argument for identifying the central problem of action theory lies in his beginning with a utilitarian perspective on human action. His conclusion, however, is the opposite of that suggested by utilitarian social theory.

Parsons states that according to Hobbes, reason is a servant of the passions in terms of the faculty of devising means to secure what one desires. However, since desires are random, the passions are diverse and there is nothing to prevent their pursuit resulting in conflict (Parsons 1937: 89).

Parsons argues that, despite Hobbes' social theory being entirely based on utilitarianism, the important conclusion resulting from his utilitarian premise contradicts the utilitarian theory of society and introduces the question of how it is possible for egoistic behavior to lead to a peaceful social order, despite the various desires and passions.

Hobbes concludes that the pursuit of self-interest leads to the state of war of all against all. Hence, people should enter into a social contract to control their egoistic behavior by means of an absolute power. Parsons rightly argues that the problem of social order, as conceived by Hobbes, creates the most fundamental empirical difficulty of utilitarian thought.

Parsons defines the central problem of action theory in close connection with Hobbes's problem of social order. Viewed through a Hobbesian lens, the central problem of action theory can be defined in following way: If individuals pursue their personal interests, how is it possible that their egoistic behavior leads to a peaceful social order despite the fact that human desires are diverse and reason is the servant of the passions? Parsons rightly argues that a genuine solution for the Hobbesian problem has never been achieved on a strictly utilitarian basis (1937: 93).

Keeping in mind the Hobbesian problem, Parsons defines the central problem of action theory in the light of the observation that empirical facts demonstrate the existence of social order. Therefore, a theory of society that aims to address social order must replace the utilitarian perspective of human action with a new action model to address the question of why a peaceful social order exists. In this sense, Parsons uses the Hobbesian diagnosis of the problem of social order to define the problem of action theory without, however, accepting the Hobbesian premises that people merely follow their own interests and that reason is a servant of the passions. In short, Parsons transforms the Hobbesian problem of a peaceful social order into an action problem that models human behavior in such a way that individuals' actions can lead to a peaceful social order despite their pursuit of self-interest.

Redefining the Problem of Action Theory

It is important to recall that Parsons does not revise the action problem in order to replace the Hobbesian premise of passion driving action with the assumption that it is reason that drives action. Parsons revises the action problem on the premise that the actual existence of a peaceful social order implies that human action is not shaped solely by the pursuit of self-interest.

Parsons argues that the behavior of self-interested actors contains a *normative element* which controls egoistic behavior, thus making a peaceful social order possible. This explains why his formulation of the problem in action theory does not reject that it is passion, rather than reason, that drives human action.

The premise of passion driving action rests on the assumption that there is no objective criterion for using reason to judge various desires. However, once people recognize that the faculty of reason enables them to make judgments, there are no grounds for assuming that reason merely helps to find an effective means towards an end that is determined by passion. Thus, the problem of action theory should be redefined on the premise that it is reason that drives human action.

When refutation of the premise of passion driving human action is recognized, the social consequence of individuals' behavior would not be the Hobbesian state of war of all against all. Accordingly, the central problem of action theory can be redefined as the question of how it transpires that people pursuing their own goals use reason to organize their behavior in a way that creates a social order for the realization of their goals. In addition, this question can be expanded to how it transpires that people pursuing their own goals use reason to transform the existing social order into an ideal one.

In the next section it is argued that Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons have addressed the problem of human action in order to develop a sociological theory for addressing the question of what social order is and how it changes. Examples are offered to show why theories of society are structured on an oversocialized conception of the person which can be called the *perspective of the individual-in-society*. It is also shown why such an image of the human actor originates in justificational epistemology.

The Theory of Society and an Oversocialized Image of the Individual

Before examining three pertinent examples, the relationship between rationality, human action, and social order should be recalled as a context for understanding the importance of theories of knowledge and rationality for the theory of action. In *Action and its Environment*, Alexander recognizes these relationships thus:

> The presuppositions of any social theory are the positions a theory takes about the nature of human action and the manner in which plural actions are interrelated. The problem of action refers basically to epistemological questions: to problems of idealism and materialism, which are usually formulated sociologically in terms of the relative "rationality" of the prototypical actor in any theoretical system. The problem of [social] order, on the other hand, refers to the problem of how consistent patterns of such rational and nonrational actions are created: are patterns of action the result of continuous negotiation between relatively separated

individuals or is this patterning—at least in part—the result of the imposition (either consensually or coercively) on individuals of a sui generis, prior structure or pattern?

(1988: 223)

Against this background, it will be shown that Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons have formulated theories of human action in order to find a solution for the question of social order based on their epistemological doctrines regarding the function of the human mind. These examples point to an oversocialized image of the individual whose mind is shaped by social forces, in particular by a given system of values which disputes people's ability to think independently of social forces. This opens the way for the introduction of a shift from an oversocialized human actor to an independent one capable of using objective knowledge to create social order.

In *Epistemology and Sociology*, Harry Kienzle views the place of the individual in society as significant for the rise of sociological theory. He argues that this analytical relation between the individual and society has determined the subject matter of sociology. Kienzle states:

one of the most important questions that confronted early sociologists was whether to view society as an object in man's environment or to view man in society. *This analytical placing of society inside or outside the individual to a considerable degree has determined the subject matter of sociology* and its methodology, and this question seems to parallel closely the philosophers' questions concerning the knowledge situation, that is, the cognitive relation between the object of knowledge and the perceiving subject.

(1970: 413, emphasis added)

Recognition of an Oversocialized Person

In *The Oversocialized Conception of Men in Modern Sociology*, Dennis Wrong observes that the image of human actors used by sociologists to address the Hobbesian problem of social order causes the answer to lose its meaning. Put simply, sociologists assume that it is people's internalization of common values that makes a peaceful social order possible. However, from the outset the formulation of a notion of people with internalized common values denies the Hobbesian problem of social order. As Wrong says:

Sociological theory originates in the asking of general questions about man and society. The answers lose their meaning if they are elaborated without reference to the questions, as has been the case in much contemporary theory. An example is the Hobbesian question of how men become tractable to social controls. The two-fold answer of contemporary theory is that man "internalizes" social norms and seeks a favorable

self-image by conforming to the "expectations" of others. Such a model of men denies the very possibility of his being anything but a thoroughly socialized being and thus denies the reality of the Hobbesian question. … Sociologists need to develop a more complex, dialectical conception of human nature instead of relying on an implicit conception that is tailor-made for special sociological problems.

(1961: 183)

According to Wrong, sociological theory does not truly address the question of why social order is possible, instead it merely contends that people with common values do not fight each other owing to their diverse interests. In this case, an oversocialized person is someone whose passively accepted common values control their egoistic behavior. In this oversocialized image, individuals are value-takers rather than value-makers. Hence, sociologists have ruled out the image of creative actors who use their reason to agree on common values to control their egoistic behavior.

The main reason why sociologists such as Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons do not pay close attention to the contract theory of society as a solution for the Hobbesian problem of social order is their use of this oversocialized image of the individual. Such sociologists build their analyses of social order on a critique of utilitarianism, which assumes reason to be the servant of the passions. Given this oversocialized human actor in sociology, an explanation follows of why these leading sociologists claim that human thought is shaped by social forces, rather than by people's capacity for free thought. The over-socialized image of the actor has been renamed by Steven Seidman as the perspective of the individual-in-society.

According to Seidman, "By adopting the perspective of the individual-in-society, the Enlightenment science of man disavowed the aim of contract theory as that of elaborating a universally valid, ideal social order" (1983: 23). This point of view has paved the way for the rise of an oversocialized conception of the human actor as the micro-foundation of modern sociology.[3]

Durkheim's Theory of Society: The Image of the Individual-in-Society

Having identified the problem in action theory, the question is asked how Durkheim's theory of society uses an oversocialized image of the person to show that a stable social order is possible. In response, it is argued that Durkheim's sociology should be understood in the context of his social epistemology, according to which people's minds are categorized by the moral codes of behaviors.

Durkheim developed his sociology through a critique of the contract theory of society. However, his interpretation of this theory is utilitarian. It should be recalled that the contract theory of society, which was introduced by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, was underpinned by the central premise that people's access to reason enables them to agree on a social contract which allows them

to organize their social relations peacefully. Durkheim's critique of the contract theory, however, refers to Spenser's utilitarian interpretation of it, which implies that, although people pursue their own interests, the social consequence of such egoistic behavior is a peaceful social order. Leon Mayhew recognized that the early utilitarian social theorists, such as Milton and Locke, assign a central role to human reason in the analysis of the way in which a stable social order rests upon a social contract that is required among rational people. As explained by Mayhew, "Supposing that utilitarian thought cannot account for order and stability, sociologists are inclined to dismiss much of 17th- and 18th-century thought as pre-sociological and look to the developments in the 19th- and 20th-century thought for building blocks of the sociological perspective, accepting Comte's allegation that the thought of the enlightenment was organically imbecilic" (1984: 1278). This observation leads Mayhew to the following insightful argument:

> The underlying premise of the contract doctrine is that the ultimate terms and foundations of society and civil government can be derived from understanding how rational individuals make decisions. The doctrine is well and forcefully summarized in Milton's famous words to the effect that among men "who are born to command, and not to obey" utility alone can explain the origin of public authority…
>
> The term "public" is the key to understanding utilitarian thought. The public is a solidary group, bound by their common reason and united by a process of dialogue through which the principle of socially limited state power is stated forcefully. …The [early] utilitarian argument asserts that in any free exchange of ideas among rational thinkers, truth will emerge victorious … Public dialogue provides a means for founding order in society or reason in the individual…If all have reason, and if reason is capable of discovering truth, all will ultimately come to truth..
>
> (ibid.: 1280–1281, 1283)

Viewed from this perspective, it can be argued that Durkheim's critique of the contract theory of society targets Spencer's sociology, whose premise was that an unintended outcome of the pursuit of self-interest is a stable social order (1964: 200–206). However, for Milton and Locke, as argued in Chapter 5, it is human reason that allows people to create a peaceful social order.

Durkheim argues that neither the pursuit of self-interest nor an inherent capacity for human reason can provide a model of the individual's behavior according to which a theory of social order can be formulated. Instead of contemplating society as the product of a social contract among rational beings, Durkheim (1964) proposed an image of the individual-in-society to show why people are moral beings with socially categorized minds. Hence, instead of being egoistic actors, as stated by the utilitarians, people are moral beings who respect the moral maxims necessary for a stable social order.

Durkheim's perspective of the individual-in-society is based on his critique of Spenser's sociology. As Parsons observes:

> The line which Durkheim's criticism takes is that the Spenserian, or more generally utilitarian, formulation fails to exhaust, even for the case of what are purely "interested" transactions of the market place, the elements which actually are both to be found in the existing system of such transactions, and which, it can be shown, must exist, if the system is to function at all. What is omitted is the fact that these transactions are actually entered into in accordance with a body of binding rules which are not part of the *ad hoc* agreement of the parties. The elements included in the utilitarian conception are, on the contrary, all taken account of in the terms of agreement. What may, however, be called the "institution" of contract—the rules regulating relations of contract—has not been agreed to by the parties but exists prior to and independently by any such agreement.
>
> (1937: 311, emphasis in the original)

Unsurprisingly, Durkheim's sociology must be understood in the context of its critique of the utilitarian theory of society. In *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society*, Robert Bellah explains Durkheim's critique of the utilitarian sociology thus:

> if interest relates men, it is never for more than some few moments. … In the fact of exchange, the various agents remain outside of each other, and when the business has been completed, each one retries and is left entirely on his own. … If we look further into the matter, we shall see that this total harmony of interests conceals a latent or deferred conflict. For where interest is the only ruling force each individual finds himself in a state of war with every other since nothing comes to mollify the egos, and any truce in this eternal antagonism would not be of long duration.
>
> (1973: 89)

According to Durkheim, Spenser ignores non-contractual relations upon which the exchange of interests rest.[4] It is clear that Durkheim's critique does not refer to the social contract between people and the state as proposed by Milton or Locke because Durkheim cannot claim that such a social contract has not been agreed by the parties, but existed prior to such an agreement. His critique thus refers to the *ad hoc* agreement of the parties in the market place. If society is viewed as a market place, it is understandable why Durkheim cannot admit that the emergence of a market society has not been an unintended social consequence of egoistic behavior because a commercial society requires a body of binding rules which are not part of the *ad hoc* agreement of the parties. Instead of contemplating the social contract between people and the state, Durkheim views the contract theory of society in terms of an *ad hoc*

agreement between self-interested individuals who follow their passions, rather than reason.

Therefore, Durkheim's theory of society leads to a perspective of the individual-in-society which emphasizes the existence of a body of rules which are not the object of an agreement between the contracting parties. It can be said that Durkheim develops a theory of society on the basis of which the Hobbesian problem of social order is solved by referring to a given system of values.

However, Durkheim does not address the question of how common values have been created for the first time. His claim that these values cannot be the object of an agreement between people means that he cannot argue that people have created these values. In a sense, Durkheim argues that the cult of the individual, as ethics of the pursuit of self-interest, is the product of a social state. As Parsons observes, "Individuality is a product of a certain social state, of the *conscience collective*. It is true that Durkheim leaves us there. He does not attempt to explain in turn what is the source of the cult of the individual; he is content with establishing its existence" (1937: 334). It is argued in Chapter 5 that the cult of the individual is the outcome of a *normative agreement* among modern people who have used their critical reason to respect a moral maxim implying that every individual can pursue his or her personal interests.

Durkheim's sociology uses the perspective of the individual-in-society in order to show that social order is possible because there are common values upon which people define their action goals. Hence, not only does the pursuit of personal goals not create the war of all against all, instead it actually creates a harmonized social order. As perceived by Durkheim, society is a moral community whose stability is dependent upon people's respect for common values.

Durkheim builds his theory of society on the perspective of the individual-in-society because he thinks that neither people's access to reason (which according to Kant's idealism is an inherent capacity of the mind), nor people's emotional tendency to pursue their own interests (according to Hume's empiricism this is a natural human tendency), can offer an epistemological base for the action theory. Durkheim's perception of the individual-in-society refers to an image of a human actor for whom the existence of a system of common values enables social order.

In *The Dualism of Human Nature* (1914), Durkheim develops his conception of human nature so that it includes two components: an organism and a personality. Due to our organic nature, as argued by Durkheim, we have elementary needs and perceptions which shape our personal interests. As a part of organic nature, people are subject to a natural determinism shared by other animal species. However, due to our personalities, the individual has a socially deliberated identity. The personality is the component of individuals' psychic life which binds them to each other to form a moral community, and Durkheim's oversocialized image of the person refers to this moral component of human beings.

Following this account of human nature, Durkheim introduces his notion of social categories of human thought: individuals internalize moral values because their minds are categorized in this way. In other words: "Socialization for Durkheim is a learning process, chiefly one of learning the normative structures of the social environment" (Tiryakian 1979: 216). In this image of the individual-in-society, it is people's social categories of mind which enable them to respect the ultimate values defined for them by society. Durkheim's social epistemology thus allows him to define the individual's moral capacity for voluntary orientation on common values as the main source of social order. People employ their moral capacity to adopt themselves to common values which regulate their behavior.

As observed by Anne Warfield Rawls, "Durkheim's epistemological argument … locates the origin of the fundamental categories of human thought, or reason, not in individual perception, as Hume had argued, nor as a transcendent and innate aspect of the mind, as Kant had argued, but rather, in the shared emotional experiences of those ritually produced moral forces created by the enactment of concrete practices in the midst of an assembled group"(2004: 10).

In *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912), Durkheim uses the model of *religiously enacted practice* to explain the social categories of human thought. Warfield Rawls summarizes the notion of the social categories of human thought thus:

> Durkheim argued that the categories of the understanding enter the minds of individual persons during enacted practice in such a way as to be empirically valid … It is the socioempirical origin of the six categories in enacted practice that, according to Durkheim, allows his epistemology to overcome the duality of thought and reality. … Durkheim's argument is epistemological in the classical sense in that it explains the relationship between perceptions, ideas, and external reality in such a way that key thoughts and concepts can be shown to bear a valid or true relationship to the external reality, which in this case consists entirely of social forces.
>
> (1996: 437)

Durkheim's social epistemology refers to the social categories which govern human thought, claiming that universal categories of human thought—such as time, space, class, number, cause, substance, and personality—are specific categories, whose medium is language (1912: 8–11). Durkheim then argues that, when the social origin of the categories is admitted, a new attitude becomes possible, which will enable us to escape the difficulties posed by empiricism and idealism (ibid.: 13–18). Durkheim argues that if utilitarians and contract theory recognized that moral codes—rather than personal interest or human reason—direct people's thought and action, they would admit that social order results from common values. In short, according to Durkheim, societies can only develop when enacted practices produce

categories of human understanding in common, thus enabling individual members of society to communicate.

Mark Cladis recalls that according to Durkheim: "reason itself is shaped by unkempt socio–historical institutions, and religion had been an especially formative one. What might seem to be basic, universal categories of human thought such as time, space, class, number, cause, substance, and personality are in fact culturally specific categories" (1992: 73). If Durkheim is correct, it would be very difficult to imagine how people could think regardless of their cultural identities, whereas their minds are shaped by such identities. Accordingly, Durkheim's social epistemology is relativist and defines the function of the human mind on the basis of its sociocultural conditions.

Moreover, Durkheim's social epistemology is justificationist due to its claim that the categories of human thought enter into the minds of individuals during enacted practice in such a way as to be empirically valid. Durkheim's image of the individual-in-society rests on the epistemic premise that people can justify their subjective understanding as a valid hypothesis for the external world. However, the mind itself does not play an independent role in creating such a valid hypothesis, as Kant argues, because social categories of thought, in terms of sacred and profane moral codes, direct human intellect.

According to Durkheim's theory of society, social change would only be possible if the existing value system were transformed into a new one. However, people as value-takers cannot be the agents of social change. Hence, in his analysis of social transition from a *mechanical* to an *organic* social order, Durkheim argues that population growth leads to greater density and that greater density makes a new social order necessary (1964: 256–263). Nevertheless, he does not argue that people have changed traditional values to the cult of the individual in order to create such a social change: "The division of labor varies in direct ratio with the volume and density of societies, and, if it progresses in a continuous manner in the course of social development, it is because societies become regularly denser and generally more voluminous" (ibid.: 262). The agents of social change are evidently not people using their reason to revise their common moral values.

Weber's Theory of Society: The Place of the Individual-in-Society

In following two sub-sections, it is argued that, similarly to Durkheim, Weber and Parsons develop their theories of society on the basis of the image of the individual-in-society as reflected in their models of human action. The question of how the oversocialized conception of the individual can be linked to Kantian moral philosophy will be addressed at the end of this discussion.

First, the relation of the individual and society in Weber's sociology is discussed. The perspective of the individual-in-society is used in Weber's sociology to address the question of why a peaceful social order is possible. In contrast to Durkheim, Weber does not establish his theory of society on the basis of a critique of utilitarianism. However, as Simon Clarke points out,

"Weber accepted Menger's account of the rational origins of money and of market exchange …What Weber rejected about marginalist economics was its 'naturalism,' and its implicit subordination of ethical and political ends to the single ideal of economic rationality. For Weber, by contrast, economic rationality could only be a subordinate ethical ideal" (1983: 204). Having said that, it can be argued that Weber's sociology replies to the question of how individuals' substantive rationality leads them to a stable social order. In this sense, Weber models the pursuit of personal goals by means of his ideal types of rational action in order to show how human action and social order are linked.

On the basis of the preceding argument, if it can be shown that Weber's ideal types of rational action involve an image of the individual-in-society, then there is an explanation for why Weber's sociology is underpinned by the oversocialized actor, who is merely a value-taker, rather than a value-maker. If the argument is correct so far, we must examine Weber's ideal types of rational action and discuss the function of his concept of rationality in his analysis of social order.

In *Economy and Society*, Weber defines action as a behavior to which "the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning." However, such behavior is social action "insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course" (1968: 4). Given this concept of meaningful action, the ideal types of human action are categorized into four groups. However, it should be noted that according to Weber:

> Human behaviour is rational to the extent that it conforms to meanings and values, and non-rational to the extent that it does not. It is partly for this reason that Weber insists on the construction of *rational* ideal types. If we start from the presumption of rationality in our attempts to make sense of human actions, then the place of other, non-rational elements in behavior may then be seen "as accounting for the observed deviations from this hypothetical course."
>   (Whimster and Lash 1987: 139–140, emphasis in the original)

From Weber's perspective, human action may be oriented on *instrumental-rational, value-rational, affectual*, or *traditional* grounds. Weber argues that the actor's orientation may be determined principally by his "expectations as to the behavior of objects … and of other human beings," by his "conscious belief in [a] value for its own sake," by his "specific affect and feeling states," or by "ingrained habituation" (1968: 24–25, 29). Due to the importance of the ideal types of rational action for Weber's analysis of social order, we focus on the two ideal types of instrumental-rational action and value-rational action.

For Weber, the ideal type of instrumental-rational action describes the behavior of typical actors who take into account the consequences of their actions in order to be able to pursue their goals more rationally and to better

calculate the best way to realize those goals. However, the ideal type of value-rational action describes the behavior of typical actors who pursue an absolute value for its own sake, independently of the prospect for success. However, based on the model of value-rational action, the actors use their reason to check the internal consistency of the interpretive schemas which deal with the intrinsic worthiness of a goal itself (1949: 15–18).

In *Economy and Society*, Weber argues that "Choice between alternative and conflicting ends and results may well be determined in a value–rational manner. … the actor may, instead of deciding between alternative and conflicting ends in terms of a rational orientation to a system of values, simply take them as given subjective assessed relative urgency"(1968: 26). Nevertheless, such ultimate values are viewed as a given fact towards which action goals are oriented.

The image of the individual-in-society in Weber's ideal type of value-rational action explains how individuals choose their value orientation: it is society which defines the ultimate values. in other words, people are actors who use their value-rationality to voluntarily respect a system of ultimate values given to them by their society, rather than the actors who use their critical reason to create ultimate values through their rational consensus. As is argued below, Weber's ideal type of value-rational action originates in Kant's moral philosophy, on the basis of which human agency, in terms of practical reason, is deemed to show voluntary respect for moral law (Warren 1988: 37–41).

If moral law is defined as a system of ultimate values, then moral action based on the model of value-rational action is the behavior of a typical actor who defines the goals of his or her action on the basis of a choice between the available systems of ultimate values. The question of how such a value system is created would be entirely foreign to Weber's ideal types of human action. Weber states, "[We] must recognize that general views of life and the universe can never be the products of increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest ideals, which move us most forcefully, are always formed only in the struggle with other ideals which are just as sacred to others as ours are to us" (1949: 57). Put simply, Weber's ideal type of value-rational action implies that reason cannot be used to enable people to make rational judgments about opposing value systems or ways of life. Hence, a system of ultimate values is chosen by the actor on the basis of *irrational faith,* rather than rational argument and, as shown in Chapter 2, refers to relativist ethics.

In contrast to Durkheim's social categories of human thought, Weber's notion of value rationality confers an active role on human reason when choosing ultimate values. Nevertheless, in both cases, the oversocialized image of the person can be traced to people's inability to use their critical reason to revise the existing value systems: people remain value-takers. However, as argued earlier, the contract theory of society applies a model of human action according to which people use reason to agree on ultimate values as the basis for organizing a peaceful social order.

Weber used his models of rational action to address collective conceptions of social order. For Weber (1968), a model of value-rational action implies that once meaningful actions which are mutually oriented on a system of values are viewed as a whole, they shape a social pattern of normative behaviors. The perspective of the individual-in-society enables Weber to argue that a peaceful social order is possible because society provides people with the ultimate values which they use to orient their action goals. If society did not provide people with such shared moral beliefs, their egoistic behavior would result in the Hobbesian war of all against all. However, when people use their value rationality to respect a given system of values, their instrumental behavior, which searches for effective means to realize action goals, does not involve them in a conflict of opposing interests. As Parsons observes:

> Weber has arrived at the same point Durkheim reached when he interpreted constraint as moral authority. Moreover, Weber has approached the question from the same point of view, that of an individual thought of as acting in relation of rules that constitute conditions of his action. … In both cases a legitimate [social] order is contrasted with a situation of the uncontrolled play of interests.
>
> (1937: 661)

Durkheim and Weber use the perspective of the individual-in-society to show why a peaceful social order becomes possible. Whereas Durkheim defines this oversocialized image of the person through the notion of social categories of human thought which internalize ultimate values in people's behavior, Weber defines the oversocialized person in terms of his model of value-rational action. This ideal type of human action originates in Kant's moral philosophy, which implies that practical reason empowers people to make moral choices through their voluntary respect for moral law. Put simply, according to Weber, ultimate values cannot be judged on the basis of rational argument: people select their ultimate values through irrational faith.

Weber's interpretation of personality and its impact on his theory of society should be understood on the basis of his ideal types of rational action. E. B. Portis rightly argues that value rationality, in terms of the ultimate meaning which people give to their lives, implies that most individuals define their ultimate values in relation to the social context. As Portis points out:

> The most obvious implication of Weber's conception of personality for his social thought is the assumption that human beings have a psychological need for ultimate values to give meaning to their lives. … In the process of providing justification or hope, religions and ideologies also provide the values by which individuals can gain a sense of personal identity. Because most individuals are dependent upon their social and cultural context for their ultimate values, uniformities in personality are encountered at any given time for any given society. … Weber did,

however, generalize on the channels through which social influence determines meanings and thereby imposes personality patterns upon different social strata.

(1978: 116)

The impact of Weber's oversocialized image of the human actor can be explored in his theory of social change. Weber describes modernity as a social change from a traditional to a modern society, and his analysis is supported by his action models. Weber (1958) defines the cultural aspect of modernity as the emergence of new value rationality. According to Weber, rationalization in the modern world is the effect of an earlier process of rationalization. It is religious beliefs that are rationalized in the first instance. Priests attempt to provide an internally consistent account according to a cosmocentric view-point. Puritanism therefore represents a radicalization of salvation beliefs which offers a clearer and more consistent account than the preceding notions of salvation (Whimster and Lash 1987: 8). Thus, Puritanism was the perfect expression of substantive rationality which provided modern people with a more consistent interpretation of the Christian doctrine of salvation, but endowed the new interpretations with a close relationship with the existing ultimate and unquestioned values.

In his analysis of cultural modernity, Weber includes the emergence of *value-pluralism*, implying that the transition from a Protestant society to a secular one gives people a plurality of gods and demons. As Whimster and Lash explain, Weber considers that:

The modern individual has access to a scientific cognitive understanding of the physical world and the life sciences, but this entirely lacks the integrative structure of the old religious legitimation. Arguably the differentiation of the life orders makes the need for such an understanding more necessary, for science can provide no ultimate meanings; moreover human existence is cruelly split between the public realm of the economic and political and the private realm of the erotic and the aesthetic. In Weber's account each life order has its own set of values, the "value-spheres." This means that the modern individual always has to confront an irrevocable value-pluralism. For Weber this is the price of science dislodging religion.

(1987: 7)

On the basis of this analysis of modernity, Weber develops a social theory of modern society, which covers the legal, political, and economic dimensions of modernization structured on his ideal type of instrumental-rational action.

If science cannot provide modern people with ultimate values for the good life and if the members of a secular society live with a plurality of gods and demons, it is not surprising that the spheres of politics and economy are assumed to be zones of struggle for power and wealth. Similarly to

Durkheim, Weber recognizes the importance of a system of common values for the rise of a stable social order with his ideal types of substantive and instrumental rationality. Weber concludes that the condition of a plurality of gods and demons causes modern people to suffer from a lack of common values to control their egoistic behavior. According to Weber, the struggle for power and wealth can lead to an *iron cage*. In Weber's sociology of modernity, the modern bureaucratic state and the market economy are two bold examples of instrumental rationality and must be understood in the context of a lack of common values in secular society.

The image of the individual-in-society shapes Weber's sociological analysis of modernity. Modern people who assume ultimate values to be a given fact are unable to question the premises of their Christian worldview and ethics. Individuals are merely able to use practical reason to arrive at an irrational faith in a system of ultimate values or to argue for a more internally consistent interpretation of ultimate values. However, this substantive rationality has led to a value pluralism which can result in a struggle for power and wealth. Modernity has not made people the masters of their own social fates because their value rationality has not enabled them to create a single system of common values as a basis for controlling their egoistic behavior in modern politics and economy. If modern people do not use their reason to question the premises of dominant values in traditional society and to create a new system of common values, how can Weber's action model which defines people as value-takers and as not value-makers solve the Hobbesian problem of social order? A new action theory is required to show that a new explanation for social change from a traditional to a modern society can be offered, replacing the oversocialized human actor with an independent actor capable of thinking despite the dominant values and institutions, and thereby becoming the master of his or her social fate.

Parsons's Theory of Society: The Oversocialized Image of the Person

Having discussed Weber's action models, the question can be addressed of how Parsons's theory of society uses the perspective of the individual-in-society to suggest a solution for the problem of action which has been identified. Parsons provides modern sociology with an action theory that attempts to include the insights of Durkheim's and Weber's models of human action, while retaining the individual-in-society perspective.

Parsons accepts Hobbes's premise of human action that people pursue their own self-interest and therefore agrees with Hobbes that egoistic behavior is capable of creating the state of war of all against all. However, his empirical observation of the existence of peaceful social order causes him to disagree with Hobbes that egoistic behavior has actually propelled society towards a state of war. Hence, Parsons searches for a normative element in human action which can make peaceful social order possible despite the pursuit of self-interest. Hence, Parsons's action theory seeks to link the normative power

of common values with the materialistic power of human desires in one model of human action in order to allow his modern sociology to argue that common values control egoistic behavior in each typical human action and thus enable a peaceful social order.

Parsons's disagreement with Hobbes prompted him to reevaluate the problem of action theory. Due to the existence of social order, Parsons suggests that the problem inherent within action theory is the question of how might it be possible that an unintended consequence of people's pursuit of self-interest is not in the war of all against all, but rather in peaceful social order. Parsons's action theory provides a normative solution for this newly defined action problem.

Instead of redefining the Hobbesian problem highlighted at the beginning of this section in order to discover how access to reason enables people to agree on common values for creating a peaceful social order, Parsons takes social order as a given fact whose existence means that individuals do not fight each other. Hence, the utilitarian model of self-interested actors cannot explain how individuals' behavior results in social order.

It now becomes understandable why Parsons, like Durkheim, bases his action theory on a critique of the utilitarian theory of society offered by Spenser's sociology, and why Parsons's action theory originates in the social thoughts of Hume, Smith, and Ferguson, and *not* in the contract theories of society based on the notion of natural reason proposed by philosophers such as Milton, Locke, and Rousseau.

According to Parsons, the problem of action theory is not the question of how people's access to reason enables them to create a moral order on the basis of which peace and justice are possible. The problem is that the premise of the pursuit of *subjective utilities* must be replaced with a model of human action which includes an objective moral force for controlling egoistic behavior. The question of how such a moral order was initially created is not Parsons's problem. As for Durkheim and Weber, ultimate values are given facts for Parsons's action theory.

In his critique of the utilitarian theory of society, Parsons (1937) argues that the conception of human action shaped by subjective utilities means that there is no objective basis on which people can coordinate their actions on a societal level because other people's subjective values or action goals cannot be known. If human action is meaningful behavior which takes into account the behavior of others, a dilemma arises regarding the question of how people's subjective goals are actually coordinated without common values.

Parsons targets the coordination problem of subjective utilities in order to show that the utilitarian model of action *cannot* address the origin of action goals. If the pursuit of self-interest does not reveal the origin of action goals, the action theory has to be based on a normative element leading to the origin of action goals. As observed by Hans Joas in *The Creativity of Action*, "Parsons saw a link between utilitarianism's inability to explain the existence and genesis of social order, on the one hand, and its inability to explain the

origin of action goals, on the other" (1996: 14). Accordingly, Parsons must show why the subjective nature of action goals prevents utilitarianism from addressing the question of social order and how his own action theory can address such a problem.

In *The Structure of Social Action*, Parsons argues that the utilitarian scheme of human action takes goals as a given fact. In other words, action goals are viewed as an *exogenous variable* of the model. Parsons then argues that there are major possibilities for the utilitarian model to address action goals as follows.

Action goals can be assumed to vary randomly relative to the means-end relationship and its central element: the actor's understanding of his situation (Parsons 1937: 63). The assumption of action goals as the purely subjective product of each individual can only mean that these goals are statistically subject to random variation. Parsons argues that the dilemma faced by the utilitarian action model is that it must either assume that free will exists and therefore declare that goals vary at random or assume that goals do not vary at random, at the price of no longer being able to define a place for free will in its model of action. However, as Parsons observes, the first assumption is untenable because there is no sense in human choice among random ends (ibid.: 64). Once the first assumption is ruled out, Parsons must show that the second assumption is also untenable in order to refute the utilitarian action theory as a whole.

The second assumption implies that actors do not regard their goals as random, but rather choose ends based on their scientific knowledge of some empirical reality. The very existence of such knowledge of goals, however, implies that human action becomes determined by its conditions. Parsons argues that without the independence of ends the distinction between conditions and means becomes meaningless. Accordingly, action becomes a process of rational adaptation to these conditions. As Parsons rightly concludes, the active role of the actor is reduced to understanding his situation and predicting its future course of development (1937: 64). Parsons argues that, if the only possible basis for empirical knowledge of a future state of affairs is prediction on the basis of knowledge of present and past states, the utilitarian action model must assume that actors use empirical knowledge of their ends to enable them to avoid any error in choosing their goals, which is an untenable assumption.

Parsons then concludes: "Thus with respect to the status of ends, positivistic thought is caught in the 'utilitarian dilemma.' That is, either the active agency of the actor in the choice of ends is an independent factor in action, and the end element must be random; or the objectionable implication of the randomness of ends is denied, but then *their independence disappears* and they are assimilated to the condition of the situation" (1937: 64, emphasis in the original). Parsons can now infer that in order to address the origin of action goals, the notion must be given up that action goals are both subjective and external to the action model.

Unsurprisingly, Parsons calls his theory a voluntaristic theory of action because he aims to make action goals an *endogenous variable* of the model which means that the model recognizes an active role for human actors in determining their own action goals. If free will has won a place in our action model, the choice of ends must be linked with such a free will. As noted earlier, Parsons's action theory rests on Kant's moral philosophy, so this is an opportune moment to argue that Parsons's theory of action suffers from an oversocialized image of the human actor because it uses a Kantian type of moral freedom to define the agency of human actor.

Similarly to Weber, Parsons required a Kantian notion of moral freedom to rescue the utilitarian theory of action from subjective goals. If goals are viewed as an endogenous variable, Kantian ethics provides the theory with an active image of the person, which is necessary for hinging the choice of goals on *objective moral law*. It is noteworthy that Kant's moral theory, like Hume's, had already criticized utilitarian moral philosophy and had shown that moral choice cannot rest on passion. As Seidman states, "by stressing the active role of mind in the origins of knowledge and moral law, Kant opened the door for a uniquely German form of rationalism" (1983: 183). This notion of the active role of individuals in their moral choices due to their access to practical reason is used by both Weber and Parsons in the development of models of human action according to which people's moral autonomy is viewed in terms of respecting a system of ultimate values.

Kant's (1788) moral theory implies acceptance that (a) rational will should be regarded as free will, and admission that (b) free will be considered will under moral law, so rational will can be deduced to be will under moral law. However, for the purpose of the present argument, the key point is that Kant's moral philosophy serves Parsons's action theory by working as a system of values for this theory.

Having said that, Parsons interprets Kantian moral law (through which rational will must be defined) as a system of ultimate values towards which actors voluntarily orient their action goals. Put simply, action goals are not determined randomly or subjectively. It is an objective moral law in terms of a given system of ultimate values on the basis of which action goals are shaped. An examination of Parsons's action model in the context of Kant's moral philosophy makes it possible to understand why Parsons's action theory reflects the image of the individual-in-society. The individual's agency, according to Kant, is defined in terms of practical reason. A perception of moral law as a given system of values enables Parsons to argue that people choose their action goals by using practical reason. Hence, reason drives human action, and moral freedom is linked to human actors' agency.

Parsons overcomes the utilitarian dilemma by limiting the individual's active role to moral respect for a given system of values. People choose their action goals, but society defines the ultimate values towards which these goals must be oriented. Parsons implies that individuals are active only to the extent that their common values permit. Given the notion of practical reason,

people cannot create the common values which make a peaceful social order possible. Mutual respect for the moral law of society would, however, enable such a peaceful social order.

Kant's philosophy leads him to a *community of moral beings* which he calls the Kingdom of Ends. Christine Korsgaard observes Kant's social philosophy thus:

> On the whole, Kant's view is that we must always hold ourselves responsible… It is because of the respect which the moral law commands us to accord to the humanity in every person. We hold one another responsible because this is essential to our interactions with each other as *persons*; because in this way we together populate a moral world. … [I]n so far as we are noumenal, or active beings, we join with others in those inter-subjective standpoints which we can occupy together, either as thinkers or as agents. When we enter into relations of reciprocity, and hold one another responsible, we enter together into the standpoint of practical reason, and create a Kingdom of Ends on earth.
>
> (1996: 212, emphasis in the original)

Against this background, it is no surprise that Kant's moral philosophy serves Parsons's action theory, which characterizes the voluntaristic nature of human action in terms of rational respect for moral law. Parsons argues that it is only the existence of a system of common values that prevents egoistic behavior leading to the Hobbesian war of all against all.

Parsons (1937) uses action models conceived by Weber and Durkheim to internalize Kant's ethics in his model of human action. Through Weber, Parsons learns about the two ideal types of instrumental- and value-rational actions which imply that ultimate values define action goals and that people use their instrumental reason to find an effective means of achieving such ultimate values. Through Durkheim, Parsons learns that it is a single moral order that integrates people within a social division of labor because the ethical codes of such a single order internalized in people's categories of thought prevent them from unrestricted egoistic behavior which can result in the Hobbesian war of all against all.

Nevertheless, Parsons must still show that people who act do not separate their value rationality from their instrumental reason. Parsons "complains that Weber's division of social action into the ideal types of *Zweck* (or instrumental) and *Wert* (or value) rationality creates the appearance that a given empirical action can be completely instrumental" (Alexander 1983: 18). A particular empirical action which includes both a normative element defining action goals and an instrumental element providing effective means with given ends signifies that Parsons can no longer preserve Weber's separation of instrumental and substantive rationality as two ideal types of human action, but must combine those ideal types in one unit or model of human action.

Parsons's action theory defines a *unit act* as a *frame of reference* according to which people using substantive rationality in order to voluntarily choose action goals apply instrumental reason to find an effective means to meet action goals. Parsons calls this action model a voluntaristic action theory because it confers an active role to reason when defining action goals. However, the active role must be understood in terms of the image of the individual-in-society, which limits human agency to rational respect for a given system of values. People remain value-takers, rather than value-makers.

In order to develop his action model, Parsons requires a theory of internalization of a single value system in people's personalities to show that the pursuit of self-interest is controlled internally by the moral capacity provided by people's access to practical reason. Hence, Parsons's action theory leads to understanding a social learning process which cultivates this moral capacity in the individual's personality. As Alexander notes, Parsons "wanted to know the precise mechanism that links micro, individual action to macro, collective context. He discovered this mechanism in the phenomenon of internalization, a process he believed lay at the heart of the most important accomplishments of Durkheim and Weber" (1988: 278). The mechanism of internalization of common values in the human actor's personal identity enables Parsons to argue that society teaches people how to manage their conflict of interests through their regard for each other as equal moral beings. In this sense, Parsons uses Kantian ethics to introduce a theory of human action capable of addressing the question of how a peaceful social order is possible in which people regard each other as equal moral beings.

In *The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory*, Parsons summarizes his key arguments regarding his action theory and social order, clearly showing the influence of Kant's moral philosophy on his theory of society.

> [The] random variation of systems of ends would be incompatible with the most elementary form of social order. For there would be no guaranty that any large proportion of such systems would include a recognition of other people's ends as valuable in themselves, and there would be thus be no necessary limitation on the means that some, at least, would employ to gain their own ends at the expenses of others. The relations of individuals then would tend to be resolved into a struggle for power—for the means for each to realize his own ends. This would be, in the absence of constraining factors, a war of all against all—Hobbes's state of nature. In so far, however, as individuals share a common system of ultimate ends, this system would, among other things, define what they all held their relations ought to be, would lay down norms determining these relations and limits on the use of others as means … In so far, then, as action is determined by ultimate ends, the existence of a system of such ends common to the members of the community seems to be the only alternative to a state of chaos—a necessary factor in social stability.
>
> (1935: 295)

An oversocialized image of the individual is reflected in Parsons's action theory, which criticizes the utilitarian model of action for its inability to give human actors an active role when choosing their ends, but, nevertheless, it limits their active role to a voluntary orientation towards a given system of ultimate values. Frank Lechner summarizes this state of affairs: "Though Parsons challenged the former's [the utilitarian] reliance on 'given' individual rationality as a basis of social order, he in fact substituted a 'given' social order for their unexamined, bedrock individual" (Robertson and Turner 1991: 183). Similarly, Joas and Knöbl write, "Ironically, one may criticize Parsons in much the same way as he himself did the utilitarians. Parsons asserted that the utilitarians had failed to inquire into the origins of notions of utility, desires, 'ends', etc. In a similar way, we must criticize Parsons for failing to make any effort to inquire into the genesis of values, where they come from … And how do values come to be *shared* in the first place?" (Joas and Knöbl 2009: 53, emphasis in the original). If values are considered to be given facts, the individual must also be viewed as an actor whose moral identify is determined by society.

As argued by Wrong (1961), the assumption that social order exists because individuals have internalized a set of common values implies the denial of the very possibility of man being anything but a thoroughly socialized being. Parsons's *oversocialized persons* have no active role in shaping their common values. Similarly to communitarians, Parsons claims that people are only capable of thinking within the context of their cultural identities.

Parsons's perspective of the individual-in-society shows why he cannot allocate an active role to individuals in a social change from traditional to modern society. Keeping Parsons's arguments in mind, discussion can begin as to whether the existing social order can only be transformed into a new social order if the present values system is replaced with a new one. Parsons's action model does not let him to define individuals as agents of social change, because people who are merely value-takers cannot question their socially given moral identities. In order for people to assume moral freedom and responsibility, they must be viewed as actors who are capable of thinking for themselves, regardless of their cultural identity or personal interest.

In *Evolutionary Universals in Society* (1964), Parsons argues that societies evolve by adapting themselves to their environment. Parsons reasons that it is the ethics of tolerance of difference which validates individuals as equal citizens, and which has allowed modern society to adapt to its environment much better than traditional societies. According to Parsons, as Lechner observes:

> Modernity can be seen as the institutionalization of a pattern of "modern" values— individualism and rational activism above all—specified to guide action in different spheres. The specification of such controlling values, when properly linked with recourses of action, makes a modern [social] order coherent. At the same time, modernity is the outcome of an

evolutionary process that leads to a higher level of organized social complexity.

<div align="right">(Robertson and Turner 1991: 177)</div>

Unlike Weber, Parsons does not argue that modernity has destroyed pre-modern common values in favor of a plurality of gods and demons, hence preparing the way for the Hobbesian struggle for power and wealth. Acccording to Parsons, modernity has replaced traditional values with liberal ethics of tolerance of difference. He states that "Tolerance of difference is itself a value, not the absence of common values, and at the very least this must be institutionalized in a highly pluralistic society" (Robertson and Turner 1991: 41). Placing tolerance of difference at the core of modern values, Parsons argues that modernity has created a *general legal system* which has made modern politics and economy possible. Parsons states:

> one can identify the development of a general legal system as a crucial aspect of societal development. … In England, however, the development went, in a highly distinction way … the crucial period was the early 17th century, when Justice Coke asserted the independence of the Common Law from control by royal prerogative … This development of English Common Law, with its adaptation and further development in the overseas English-speaking world, not only constituted the most advanced case of universalistic normative order, but was probably decisive for the modern world. This general type of legal order is, in my opinion, the most important single hallmark of modern society.
>
> <div align="right">(1964: 351, 353)</div>

Parsons argues that modern bureaucracy and market economy should be understood within the context of such universal legal norms: "For, bureaucracy, these involves definitions of the power of office, the terms of access to it, and the line dividing proper from improper pressure or influence. For money and market, the relevant norms include the whole complex of property right" (1964: 351). Parsons argues that the rise of democracies with elected leadership is also an important aspect in the new social order of modernity, which rest on the universalistic legal norms (ibid.: 353–356).

Although Parsons's analysis of modernity leads to an understanding of the way in which the institutionalization of the values of tolerance and individualism in modern society can be connected with the rise of the modern legal system and indeed modern politics and economics, he does not argue that modern-thinking actors played a role in this social change, because his action theory implies that they are value-takers, rather than value-makers. Accordingly, Parsons's image of the individual-in-society does not allow him to explore the way in which modern people used their critical reason to question pre-modern values in favor of the ethics of tolerance in order to make modern social order possible. As Alexander points out, "because of American ideology,

with its emphasis on freedom, and because of autonomous theoretical considerations, it becomes difficult for American theorists to accept Parsons's emphasis on the socialized individual. They demanded new conceptualization of action" (1988: 282).

In this context, Richard Münch (1981, 1982) has examined in depth the influence of Kant's philosophy on Parsons's sociology, introducing the Kantian notion of *interpenetration* as the main framework through which such an influence is to be understood. Münch states that "Parsons's solution [for the problem of social order] lies instead in the notion of 'interpenetration' of distinct subsystems of action. This notion … is a derivative of Kantian transcendental philosophy" (1981: 709). Using Kant's philosophy, Parsons can argue that normative and materialistic elements of action interpenetrate to shape a unified action. In this book, however, the influence of Kant's moral philosophy on Parsons's sociology has been interpreted in terms of its function for addressing the question of how substantive rationality or practical reason shapes the normative element of human action, which allows us to uncover the reason for which Parsons's action theory rests on the oversocialized image of the human actor.

A Justificational Epistemology and the Oversocialized Individual

The preceding arguments have shown how the three major theories of society claim that the rationality of human actors is shaped by society's value system. This section addresses the question of why the notion of a social base for an individual's rationality rests on a justificational epistemology in order to show that liberation from a theory of society with an oversocialized image of the human actor requires a fundamental shift from justificational to nonjustificational epistemology.

The discussion of Durkheim's image of the individual-in-society has argued that Durkheim's social epistemology understands social order to be based on a system of values because people's minds categorize and think within the context of moral codes of behavior in society. Their reason justifies respect for these moral codes. This viewpoint of the place of individual-in-society rests on Durkheim's theory of knowledge, which originates in his claim that neither Hume's nor Kant's epistemologies justify their solutions for the problem of how the human mind makes a connection between subjective hypotheses and external reality.

Hume claims that *inductive logic* cannot provide the human mind with a solution for finding a connection between hypotheses and reality, with the result that people follow customs and habits in order to justify their mental attitudes. Durkheim criticizes Hume's epistemology and states, "to reduce reason to experience is to make reason disappear—because it is to reduce the universality and necessity that characterize reason to mere appearances, illusions that might be practically convenient but that correspond nothing in things. … Classical empiricism leads to irrationalism; perhaps it should be

called by that name" (1912: 13). Durkheim also argues that Kant's idealist epistemology cannot solve the problem of how the human mind makes a connection between subjective hypotheses and external reality because merely stating that the power of reasoning is inherent in the a priori nature of human intellect does not explain such a connection. Durkheim states: "The apriorists are rationalists; they believe that the world has a logical aspect that reason eminently expresses. To do this, however, they have to ascribe to the intellect a certain power to transcend experiences … Merely to say it is inherent in the nature of human intellect is not to explain that power" (Durkheim 1912: 13–14).

Durkheim accepts justification as an epistemological criterion for finding a connection between subjective hypotheses and external reality and tries to replace Hume's and Kant's justificationism with his own justificational social epistemology. Inspired by *enacted religious practice*, Durkheim proposes that social categories of understanding enter the minds of individuals during enacted practice in a way that justifies them empirically. Hence, he does not reject the standard of justification, but claims that social categories of thought provide a new way to justify subjective hypotheses. Justification, however, involves infinite regress, so Durkheim would have to admit that his solution is no better than Hume's and Kant's.

The discussion of Weber's and Parsons's oversocialized images of the person suggests that their theories of society imply understanding a person's active role as a voluntary choice of a given system of values. In the case of Parsons, it is argued that the existence of social order depends on voluntary respect for common values. In Kantian moral philosophy, value-rational action implies that practical reason is employed to show people's moral respect for ultimate values. The oversocialized perspective of the person appears in the model of human action through the assumption that ultimate values are given facts which cannot be subjected to rational assessment. This image of the individual-in-society rests upon Weber's model of value-rational action, which originates in Kant's moral philosophy.

Kant criticizes Hume's skepticism epistemology, yet he does not refute Hume's justificationism. In *Philosophical Essays* (1748), Hume argues that inductive logic does not lead us to justified true knowledge, hence people cannot have objective knowledge. Kant accepts objective knowledge as justified true belief. However, he introduces *deductive logic* as a method for justifying hypotheses. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787), Kant formulates his idealist epistemology in which the human mind uses deductive logic to justify the conclusion of its hypotheses based on premises which are true, a priori. These premises are *categorical imperatives* upon which the human mind is shaped. Since Kant assumes that the imperatives cannot be wrong, he infers that reason can justify its hypotheses. People understand external reality because their minds are categorized to find a connection between mental schemes and empirical facts. In this sense, Kant's epistemology is justificationist because it claims that hypotheses can be justified by deductive inference from justified premises.

As Korsgaard observes, "Kant's deduction only licenses our use of the principles of pure understanding for objects as *we experience them*, that is, as 'phenomena.' It does not provide us with a justification for applying them to things as they are in themselves—to 'noumena'" (1996: 9, emphasis in the original). Yet in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), Kant suggests that our hypotheses about the world of human beings (noumena) can be justified on the basis of categorical imperatives. According to Korsgaard, Kant's moral argument "is that (1) a rational will must be regarded as a free will, and (2) a free will is a will under moral law. Therefore, a rational will is a will under moral law" (1996: 24). Against this background, it becomes understandable why Kant's moral theory originates in justificational epistemology.

Since Kant assumes that the premises of his moral philosophy are justified, he concludes that a rational will is a will under moral law. In this sense, Kant's notion of practical reason, which implies that people's moral choices are rational only if they respect moral law, originates in the justificational theory of knowledge. It is therefore unsurprising that the oversocialized image of the person is closely connected with the Kantian notion of practical reason.

Human Action Theory: A Critical-Rationalist Approach

In this section, the philosophy of critical rationalism is used to introduce a new action model for addressing the redefined problem of human action. Thus, this chapter provides Chapter 5 with the micro-foundations necessary for an analysis of macro-social change from a closed to an open society. In Chapters 6 and 7 this theory of action is applied to show how people can open their moral beliefs in order to transform the existing global order into an open global society.

In Chapter 2 it is argued that nonjustificational epistemology leads to a theory of rationality, which William Bartley called pancritical rationalism, according to which one's fundamental beliefs must be opened to criticism if their objectivity is to be tested. Against this background, objective knowledge, including objective moral knowledge, is possible not because our knowledge claims can be justified, but because they can be criticized. Thus, nonjustificational theories of knowledge and rationality can be used to introduce a shift from an image of the individual-in-society according to which the actors merely respect dominant common values and institutions to an image of the individual in which independent actors apply their critical reason to question unacceptable values and institutions.[5] This image of the human actor enables us to define human agency in terms of the actor's rational capacity to use objective knowledge for a critique of dominant values and institutions.

The oversocialized image of the person claims that the actor's mind is socially categorized to respect a system of values voluntarily owing to the epistemological doctrines that underlie it which address the question of human knowledge according to the standard of justification. In Chapter 2 justification is shown to involve infinite regress, which implies that it is not

capable of showing how the human mind works to find a connection between hypotheses and the external world. The consequence of justificational episte-mology for the micro-foundation of macro-sociological theory has been images of human thought and action which are shaped by society, which implies that people cannot have objective knowledge because their thoughts are based upon different social conditions. The claim that the human mind cannot work independently of its social conditions reflects acceptance of relativism, which views human knowledge as a by-product of society.

The Problem of Action Theory and an Independent Actor

The central problem of action theory as defined in this book is how people in pursuit of goals use reason to agree upon common values that are necessary for the rise of a free and just society. Taking the existing social order as a reference point and regarding the actor as a self-interested person, the argu-ment is made that a solution for addressing this question of social order is that the egoistic behavior of people who respect common values is controlled by the common values. However, as Wrong (1961) observes, the claim that social order becomes possible due to people's internalization of common values denies the very existence of the Hobbesian problem.

The reformulated problem of action avoids this paradox through its new image of the individual. Unlike the Hobbesian theory, it is not assumed that passion drives action. Hence, the pursuit of personal goals is not necessarily assumed to result in the war of all against all. In contrast to Parsons's theory, a peaceful social order is not viewed as a given fact, but as an unfulfilled capacity which can only be realized if the pursuit of personal goals is managed rationally. Therefore, the problem of action theory becomes the question of how people use their reason to create common values as the basis upon which social institutions organize individuals' actions as they can pursue their goals. In this reformulation, neither social order nor common values are given facts. Common values and social institutions are revisable because people who have created values and institutions are also capable of revising them.

In other words, the problem of action theory should be formulated in a consistent way, not on the basis of the oversocialized image of the actor, which denies people's objective knowledge from the very beginning and assumes that social forces shape human thought. If social forces determine people's thoughts and actions, then individuals are not capable of playing an active role in shaping a free and just society, and the central problem of human action loses its meaning. This condition would force us to assume that a just and free society already exists and that people merely have respect for it. However, as Alain Touraine observes, "Human action does not merely realize 'pre-existing' values; rather, it creates values. Therefore, action is not defined as mere reaction to a situation involving values that already exist somewhere. It is the action that creates these values. Hence, action is always

creative" (Knöbl 1999: 406). If Touraine is right, the question of how non-justificational epistemology affects our moral philosophy must be addressed in order to internalize the image of a creative person in our model of human action and find a new moral base for the ideal type of value-rational action. This new image of an independent person with objective knowledge changes the nature of people's moral choices from a passive respect for a set of given values to an active role in the creation of common values.

Nonjustificational Epistemology and Ethics of Openness to Criticism

Moral philosophy addresses the question of how people should test the rightness and wrongness of their behavior. Whereas utilitarian ethics claim that passion drives action, Kantian ethics argues that it is reason that drives human action. As argued earlier, Kant defines practical reason as the basis for judging the rightness of moral behavior according to its respect for moral law. Given utilitarian and Kantian ethics, nonjustificational models of knowledge and rationality are used here to introduce ethics of openness to criticism as a basis for reformation of ideal types of human action.

Bartley did not employ his notion of rationality for the formulation of a moral theory to address the question of right and wrong moral behaviors. He did, however, advocate ethics of argument which lead to ethics of openness to criticism. Bartley points out:

> The ethics of argument that I endorse invokes a different sort of senti-ment, which can be spread far more widely: *respect* for people. Whether one owes love to few people or many, one owes respect for all—at least until they very definitely show themselves unworthy of it. One of the most important ways of indicating prima facie respect for a person is to attempt to take his views seriously. This would be impossible if rationality were so limited that critical argument was impossible.
>
> (1984: 165, emphasis in the original)

The ethics of respect for people via taking their views seriously paves the way for opening our moral beliefs to mutual criticism. Jeremy Shearmur and Hans Albert have argued that our moral beliefs can be subjected to criticism in order to show how our reason can be applied to judge our moral behavior. Shearmur, for instance, points out:

> [Since] on Popper's account, moral judgment is freed from determination by the factual or by authority, it is in danger of being left arbitrary. For it is not made clear how an individual's moral judgments are constrained by anything at all. In *The Open Society*, Popper tells us that he does "not mean that [moral conventions] must be arbitrary" and he writes of its being "our business to improve them as much as we can." But he does

not then tell us how this is to be done or in what such improvement may consist.

(1990: 118)

Shearmur argues that "There is … no reason in principle why the foundations of morality … may not equally be seen *not* as dependent upon ourselves, but as the product of a fallibilistic intuitionism that is subject to *intersubjective testability*" (Shearmur 1990: 119, emphasis in the original). It is important to recall that Popper admires Kant's moral philosophy: "Kant was right when he based the 'Golden Rule' on the idea of reason. To be sure, it is impossible to prove the rightness of any ethical principle, or even to argue in its favour in just the manner in which we argue in favour of a scientific statement. Ethics is not a science" (1945: 443).

However, in *Treatise on Critical Reason*, Hans Albert applies the methodology of critical examination to show that moral claims can be subjected to rational evaluation:

> one can regard the methodology of critical examination, sketched in our general treatment of the epistemological problematic, as a *general* alternative to the classical doctrine, and apply it to *all* kinds of conventions, including normative conceptions and standards of value. …
>
> The belief that, because of their autonomy, ethics and actual morality cannot be subjected to criticism based in knowledge arises presumably from a vacuum fiction such as the one which played a role in our analysis of epistemological problems: from the assumption, that is, that at a certain point in time we have to make a decision about our fundamental system of values as a whole, and we must do this in complete isolation from all considerations unrelated to value, and thus from all considerations of knowledge.
>
> (1985: 95, 99)

Against this background, Albert argues that "Values are neither sacred, nor merely arbitrary matters of taste. They are as subject to rational discussion as are the hypotheses of science, provided we recognize that values are themselves solutions to problems, and in this sense hypothetical, which is merely to say that we recognize that better solutions might be found" (Alford 1987: 457). From this perspective, this chapter is inspired by the model of science to introduce ethics of openness to criticism.

Ethics of openness to criticism can be defined on the basis of nonjustificational theories of knowledge and rationality to suggest a new moral philosophy on the basis of which common values are viewed as hypothetical solutions rather than given facts. Hence, ethics of openness to criticism imply that people's access to critical reason enables them to revise their common values in order to find better solutions for social order.

On the individual level, the following premises and conclusion for ethics of openness to criticism are presented:

> Premise (I): Individuals use critical reason to evaluate their ultimate values.
> Premise (II): Individuals' ultimate values shape their action goals.
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>
> Conclusion: Individuals use critical reason to determine their action goals through rational evaluation of their ultimate values.

Given the above argument, the moral philosophy of openness to criticism implies that individuals' readiness to learn from their mistakes enables them to judge their ultimate values and revise common values when they have discovered that their premises are wrong. In this sense, there is no substantive difference between rational evaluation of a scientific hypothesis and a moral claim, as Albert states. Inspired by nonjustificational epistemology, our knowledge claims, whether scientific or moral, can be evaluated according to the standard of *intersubjective criticism*.

It is on a societal level that ethics of openness to criticism find their true meaning. As shown below, people can use critical reason to define and to revise their ultimate values, through which they can determine their action goals.

> Premise (I): People use *critical public reason* (or intersubjective criticism) to jointly evaluate their ultimate values.
> Premise (II): Revisable ultimate values shape people's action goals.
>
> ---
>
> Conclusion: People use *critical public reason* to shape their own action goals based jointly on their revisable ultimate values.

In contrast to Parsons's action theory, ethics of openness to criticism prepare the ground for a model of human action which can truly address the origin of action goals by recognizing that common values resulted from critical reason. The ethics of openness to criticism enable us to understand why common values are not given facts, but instead are revisable through the method of conjecture and refutation. An independent assessment of ultimate values is possible because the ethics of openness to criticism is underpinned by an image of the human actor in which people are viewed as independent thinkers who use reason to judge on competing ways of the good life. As Bartley (1984) rightly argues, such a choice cannot be arbitrary.

The ethics of openness to criticism paves the way for finding a new solution for the central problem of human action by pointing out that people who open their fundamental moral beliefs to rational debate create the common values necessary for the rise of a free and just society. Internalization of this

new moral philosophy in our ideal types of human action can lead to the realization of this solution.

The Moral Philosophy of Openness to Criticism and The Ideal Types of Human Action

As argued previously, the ideal types of human action, especially value-rational actions from the perspective of Weber and Parsons, are inspired by Kantian ethics, which define the rational agency of the human actor in terms of his or her voluntary respect for a given system of ultimate values. Parsons used this moral theory to show that the existence of social order originates in common values which people have internalized. However, once the problem of action theory is redefined as the question of how people apply critical reason to create common values for the first time, social order and common values can no longer be assumed to be given facts. On the contrary, they must be regarded as revisable facts. Under these conditions, the task of the ideal types of human action informed by the ethics of openness to criticism is to show how people's critical reason enables them to *revise the existing common values* in order to achieve the unfulfilled capacity of a peaceful social order. As will be argued in Chapter 5, social change from a state of war to a state of civil life during modernity was the outcome of such a transformation of the common values in traditional society into the liberal ethics of tolerance of difference in modern society.

Whereas the ideal type of value-rational action according to Weber and Parsons implies that ultimate values are an exogenous variable in action theory owing to the assumption that they are given facts, the model of value-rational action based on the ethics of openness to criticism does not consider ultimate values as given facts. On the contrary, the ethics of openness to criticism transform ultimate values into endogenous variables in the model of human action. Action theory can thus address the question of the way in which a peaceful social order is created because it is people who have created ultimate values. In order to formulate an action model in which neither social order nor ultimate values are given facts, we require an ideal type of value-rational action which uses the ethics of openness to criticism to show that people who mutually open their moral beliefs to criticism shape the public reason necessary for a rational consensus on ultimate values.

Inspired by the ethics of openness to criticism the ideal type of value-rational action can be revised thus: people orient their action goals towards common values, and have already been the authors of these common values. In addition, once people have realized that the premises of their values consensus have been wrong, they can revise these values through critical public reason. Thus, the ideal type of value-rational action is redefined to allow us to see that human action is the agent of social change.

This reformulation of the ideal type of value-rational action paves the ground for understanding why common values can not only control egoistic

behaviors in favor of peaceful social order, but also provide people with an objective standard for judging their conjectures regarding action goals. Admitting that people themselves have agreed on common values via social learning open to mutual criticism would make it possible to understand why such a rational consensus on ultimate values prevents people from turning the pursuit of their personal goals into a conflict of interests.

The new ideal type of value-rational action implies that people use their reason to create common values as moral devices for controlling egoistic and unjust behavior. The ethics of openness to criticism imply that people's moral behavior is rational in so far as they respect their own created common values and are willing to keep such an imperfect value consensus open to new revision.

The ideal type of instrumental-rational action also finds a new formulation under nonjustificational epistemology. Whereas Weber and Parsons define an instrumental action in terms of how successfully it employs the means to meet given ends, the notion of effective tools finds a new meaning through a nonjustificational lens. The method of discovering the effective means for given ends is similar to that of discovering moral truth. In both cases, the human mind works through the method of conjecture and refutation. Objective knowledge of the effective means for achieving ends can be produced once people subject their conjectures to mutual refutation. On this premise, there is no substantive difference between value-rational action and instrumental-rational action because action goals and action means are rationalized through intersubjective criticism.

Given these ideal types of human action, the relationship between *interests* and *values* can be perceived in a new way: people's interests are shaped within the context of common values created by the people themselves. Such common values are, however, the product of people's critical reason. Once we admit that people pursue their interests within the context of socially recognized common values, we can accept that reason, rather than passion, derives action. The claim that passion drives action confronts us with the utilitarian dilemma, as recognized by Parsons. The utilitarian dilemma implies that the absence of common values promotes the pursuit of self-interest, leading to the state of war of all against all. Put simply, if typical people in society do not define their interests on the basis of their common values, the existence of social order becomes impossible. The preceding arguments lead to the conclusion that reason must drive action if a peaceful social order is to exist.

Despite our acceptance that our interests are defined within the context of our value system, we cannot argue that interest and reason are two parallel or equal motor forces in human action. Instead, interest or desire should be viewed as an agent of human action in the context of common values created through people's access to critical reason. In contrast to Weber's model of action, interests and values should not be given equal roles because a peaceful social order is only possible if egoistic desires are controlled by a rational consensus on common values. Put simply, the Hobbesian problem of social

order can only be solved if we admit that passion *does not* drive human action.

Keeping in mind the new ideal types of human action, a critical-rationalist theory of human action based on the notion of *rationality as openness to criticism* can be introduced. The nonjustificational theories of knowledge and rationality already used for developing the ethics of openness to criticism can be internalized in the micro-foundations of macro-sociological theory for addressing the question of how a closed society can be transformed into an open society.

This epistemological doctrine is used to suggest a new theory of human action targeted at the problem of how people's access to critical reason enables them to change the existing social order into an alternative one with the moral freedom of the human actors defined on the basis of their critical rationality. In other words, the philosophy of critical rationalism is introduced to the theory of social change from a closed to an open society.

The Critical-Rationalist Action Theory: Premises and Conclusion

In contrast to Parsons's action theory, the new theory of action does not answer the question of how people use their critical reason to internalize the common values necessary for a peaceful social order, but, instead, aims to show how people use their critical reason to create common values which regulate individuals' behavior. The premises and conclusion of this critical-rationalist theory of action are as follows:

> Premise (I): Individuals use their critical public reason to agree on a set of common ultimate values.
> Premise (II): By providing common goals for individuals' behavior, common values integrate people's behavior into the context of consensually based social institutions.
>
> ―――――――――――
>
> Conclusion: Individuals use their critical public reason to turn their normative consensus into a set of consensually based social institutions.

The first premise rests on the ethics of openness to criticism and the new ideal type of value-rational action. Individuals use their critical reason to arrive at a value consensus because reason provides them with objective knowledge on the basis of which such common values are built. The second premise implies that whereas individuals' behavior is shaped according to their action goals, common values operate as a unifying mechanism to integrate separate individual actions into a consensually based social order. The conclusion reflects the solution for the action problem provided by this theory. In short, an unfulfilled peaceful social order is created through people using their critical public reason to agree on common values which control egoistic behavior.

As Figure 4.1 shows, this theory of human action allows us to understand how human actors create the transition from a closed to an open social order. It should not be forgotten that the reason for being able to argue that people create social change is that this theory has already recognized individuals as independent actors capable to going beyond their own social conditions and personal interests to protest against values and institutions with the wrong premises.

The action theory can be reformulated to show that it provides a micro-foundation for this theory of social change aimed at addressing the question of how a closed society can be transformed into an open one.

Human Actions ⟶ Social Change

↑

Thinkers–Movements–the Masses
(Civil Society Actors)

↑

The Ideal–Types of Human Action

Rationality as:
Openness to Criticism

↑

Human Actor: Independent of
Social Conditions and Personal Interests

↑

A Critique of Oversocialized Individual → New Perspective of the Individual in Society ← The Ethics of Openness to Criticism

↑

Objective Knowledge

↑

Nonjustificational Epistemology

Figure 4.1 Critical Rationalism and Human Action for Social Change

Premise (I): Individuals use critical public reason to revise closed ultimate values in favor of more open ultimate values.
Premise (II): Once normative consensus in a closed social order has been altered into a more open consensus, the closed society becomes more open.

Conclusion: Individuals use critical public reason for opening a closed social order through revising their ultimate values.

According to Figure 4.1, nonjustificational epistemology enables us to understand the function of people's objective knowledge. A new perspective of the individual in society originates in a critique of the oversocialized image of the person and in the new moral philosophy. In this context, the theory of rationality as openness to criticism leads to a new concept of rationality for redefining the model of value-rational action and instrumental-rational action. As shown below, the critical-rationalist theory of human action offers a new micro-framework for translating the image of independent actors into more concerted concepts of civil society actors as thinkers, social movements, and the masses.

The Action Theory and Civil Society Actors

The image of the individual as an independent actor enables us to connect the action theory with the role of civil society in social change. The notion of civil society, as is argued in some detail in Chapter 7, refers to a *free social zone* in which people find opportunity to express their critique of an established social order. In other words, civil society is a societal sphere in which people can be better understood as independent actors. In a similar line of thought, William Outhwaite defines civil society the sphere "where organized but informal grouping of people without formal power or institutional authority challenge established but somehow discredited institutions" (2006: 106). It is noteworthy that, whereas people are usually involved in their own daily lives, certain moments of social change cause them to act as independent thinkers who use the free zone of civil society to transform the existing social order into an alternative one.

It may be difficult to see how ordinary people can become independent actors who transcend their social conditions and personal interests. Yet understanding that such independent actions take place via the mechanism of thinkers-social movements-the masses makes the image of the person as independent actor more comprehensible. The majority of ordinary people do not behave in the course of their daily lives as though they are critical of established values or institutions. However, in the moment of social change, ordinary people can become actors involved in social protest against the established social order. Hence, the active role of ordinary people in bringing

about social change can be seen in the context of the mechanism of thinkers-social movements-the masses.

In this theory of action, the term *the individual* refers to all people in various social groups who somehow use their critical reason to revise the existing values and institutions. The general term the individual can be divided into three groups of people: (a) thinkers, (b) social movements, and (c) the masses. Although the behavior of all three groups is modeled on the basis of this action theory, it is important to identify the specific functions which each of them may have in shaping a *civil society collective action* for transforming the existing social order into a new order.

Thinkers, social movements, and the masses are three major civil society actors whose joint efforts can shape a collective action for the transition from a closed to an open social order. It is difficult to imagine how ordinary people can initiate a critique of social order. Yet if thinkers and social movements help them by initiating such a critique, their reason can be activated to accept such a critique. Usually, the individuals involved in questioning a social order are thinkers whose access to critical reason is activated prior to that of other actors. Thinkers initiate rational critique of unjust values and institutions, but their theoretical critique requires the help of social movements composed of those who were first to accept the thinkers' critique. Movements use new ideal types of social order to mobilize the masses for social change. Once ordinary people have been persuaded of the need for social change by social movements and thinkers, society arrives at a new value consensus on ultimate values. Put simply, the action theory argues that the role of individuals who use critical public reason to revise the value consensus and social order should be understood in the context of civil society collective action in which thinkers, social movements, and the masses work together to shape critical public reason.

In sum, this new image of human actors should be perceived in terms of independent actions by thinkers, social movements, and the masses within the context of a civil sphere. The three major actors of civil society must, however, open their beliefs to rational criticism in order to realize social change. In Chapter 5 the critical-rationalist action theory is applied in order to introduce a sociological model of social change. This model shows how the transition from a traditional to modern society took shape as a result of liberal thinkers, social movements, and the masses opening their ultimate values to rational criticism. In Chapters 4 and 5 a theoretical framework is provided for addressing the question of how the existing global order can be transformed into an open global society.

Notes

1   Jeffrey Alexander and Bernhard Giesen argue that the micro-macro dichotomy should be considered an analytic distinction, rather than a concrete dichotomy, such as individual versus society, which is fundamentally misplaced (Alexander *et al.* 1987: 1).

2 In *Social Systems* Niklas Luhmann views the problem of human action from the perspective of the social situation. He believes that one can say that human beings act. "But since that always occurs in situations, the question remains whether and to what extent the action is attributed to the individual human being or to the situation. If one wants to bring about a decision about this question, one must observe, not the human being in the situation, but the process of attribution. Therefore, actions are not ultimate ontological givens that emerge as unavoidable empirical elements that force themselves upon one in every sociological analysis. ... Actions are artifacts of processes of attribution, the results of observing observers ... which emerge when a system operates recursively on the level of second-order observation" (Luhmann 1995: xliii–xliv). In this chapter an oversocialized conception of the human actor is criticized, however, because when human action is simply a product of a social situation, human agency loses its meaning.

3 Steven Seidman believes that the Enlightenment science of man is shaped through a critique of modern contract theory of society suggested by Condorcet and Hobbes, for example. Seidman states: "In its critique of contract theory, the Enlightenment reoriented the focus of human studies from questions regarding the origins of society and the ideal social order to an empirically oriented inquiry combining a sociological interest in sociocultural development and an anthropological interest in the structure of human nature. To the extent that contract theory was integral to the movement of modern rationalism associated with Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza, the critique of contract theory implied a more general critique of rationalism" (Seidman 1983: 35). Keeping this explanation in mind, it is not surprising that the Enlightenment science of man did not concentrate on the question of how people's access to reason enables them to transform the existing social order into an ideal one.

4 As argued by Robert Bellah, a contract between two human agents for the purpose of exchanging their mutual interests is insufficient in itself, but is only made possible thanks to the regulation of the contract which was originally societal. From the perspective of Durkheim's theory of society, the function of society is not simply to watch passively to ensure that contracts are carried out. It is to determine under which conditions the contracts are executable, which Durkheim terms the non-contractual relations of the contracts (1973: 100).

5 Karl Popper's logic of situation can be considered a model of human action according to which people always act adequately in accordance with their social situation. He points out: "Objective 'understanding' consists in realizing that action was objectively *appropriate to the situation*. In other words, the situation is analyzed far enough for the elements which initially appeared to be psychological (such as wishes, motives, memories, and associations) to be transformed into elements of the situation" (Popper 1992: 79, emphasis in the original). It seems that Popper's logic of situation echoes an oversocialized image of the human actor because, if actors always act in accordance with their social condition and rational action refers to such an adequate reaction to the situation, how can people use reason for criticizing dominant social situations?

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5 From a Closed to an Open Society: Unfinished Modernity

As previously argued, a theory of society which establishes its micro-foundation upon the assumption of people's access to critical reason is required for a sociological analysis of globalization. In this chapter a theory of society, *critical-rationalist sociology*, is formulated to show that in the West people's access to critical reason has enabled them to transform a traditional society into a liberal society. This chapter defines the unfinished project of modernity as an unfulfilled social transition from a liberal society to an open society. The theory of society that is presented here leads to a *critical theory of liberal society*, which demonstrates that the social crises in a liberal society should be understood in the context of problematic normative agreement within this society.

In sum, this chapter (a) proposes a sociological theory of transition from a closed to an open society, (b) uses critical-rationalist sociology to develop a new social theory of modernity as a social change from a traditional to a liberal society, and (c) introduces a social theory of open society which defines the unfinished project of modernity as a social change from a liberal to an open society. In brief, a sociological theory is introduced in order to pave the way for questions to be asked in Chapter 6 regarding the way in which a new social order emerges on a global scale, and for it to be argued in Chapter 7 that the existing global order can be transformed into an open global society.

As argued in Chapter 4, in order to internalize the philosophy of critical rationalism in modern sociology, an oversocialized image of the individual must be replaced with a concept of the individual that implies that people can think and act regardless of their social conditions and personal interests. It is only on the basis of this independent image of human beings that people can be viewed as the agents of social change from a closed to an open society. As argued, the theory of rationality as *openness to criticism*, introduced by William Bartley, leads to such an image of individuals. It is also important to note that access to critical reason is that which places people's agency within the context of the mechanism of thinkers–social movements–the masses, which was introduced in the previous chapter as civil society collective action, i.e., actors in civil society working together to facilitate social change from a closed to an open society.

The Theory of Society: A Critical-Rationalist Approach

As a science of society, sociology seeks to address two major questions: what is society, and how does it change? A theory of society using the critical-rationalist model of human action not only addresses the rise of the existing social order based on people's access to critical reason, but also points out how the existing social order can be transformed into an ideal order based on individuals' access to critical reason and how critical reason enables people to open their values and institutions to criticism, thus becoming creators of social order, as well as agents of social change.

Hans Joas argues why a theory of society must demonstrate how *rational action* is linked with social order through a *normative agreement*:

> Sociology therefore required a fundamental theory of action which was able to define various types of action according to how they differed specifically from rational action. It required a theory of society as an interconnection of actions that was more than merely the unintended linking of actions motivated by self-interest. And that was why sociology attached such great importance to the normative agreement of the members of the society.
>
> (1996: 35)

Sociological theory shows how common values control egoistic behavior and makes social order possible.[1] Given this link between consensus about ultimate values and the formation of a social order, a theory of society can use a model of rational action to show how value integration in society can be linked to people's access to critical reason. Put simply, the question is how people, as reasonable actors, are oriented to common values and how they create a peaceful social order through such value-based interaction. As discussed in Chapter 4, critical rationalism provides a theory of human action so an explanation must follow of how such a theory can be employed to address the two questions of what is society, and how does it change? Accordingly, the critical-rationalist model of human action becomes the micro-foundation for a critical-rationalist theory of society to address social change from a closed to an open society.

Critical Rationalism and Sociological Theory

Before arguing how the model of human action can be used to develop a theory of society aimed at addressing the question of the rise of social order, the Hobbesian problem of social order must be brought to mind. At the heart of modern sociology, as recognized by Talcott Parsons, is the question of how interaction among people pursuing their own individual interests has led to a peaceful social order, rather than to social chaos.

As argued in Chapter 4, on the basis of this action model the Hobbesian question regarding peaceful social order can be reformulated in the following

way: How do people who pursue their own goals use their access to critical reason to shape a moral dialogue whose result is a set of common values upon which they can control their egoistic behavior and establish peaceful social order? Keeping in mind this question of social order, we can now begin to look for a solution offered by critical-rationalist sociology for this central problem in theoretical sociology.

It is noteworthy that the theory of society being developed to solve the problem of social order posits that the existing social order is itself an outcome of previous social change. In other words, the question of social order can not be separated from the question of social change.

The premises and the conclusion in this theory of society are presented below:

> Premise (I): Due to their access to critical reason, people achieve a normative agreement about the ultimate values.
> Premise (II): The ultimate values control egoistic behavior, hence enabling people to create a peaceful social order.
>
> ---
>
> Conclusion: People use their critical reason to agree on the ultimate values to control their egoistic behavior in order to create a peaceful social order.

The proposed theory of society addresses the central question of how a peaceful social order is created through people's access to critical reason. The first premise rests on the critical-rationalist model of action and implies that individuals can think independently of their social conditions and personal desires in order to use their reason to discuss the meaning of the good life. Through the method of trial and error, people can learn from each other's critique to get closer to a revisable moral consensus on the ultimate values of a good life.[2] If this premise is assumed to be wrong, one must accept that the ultimate values in human life are determined either by passions or by social conditions.

As argued in Chapter 4, both of these options reject people's capability for self-determination, which is the main claim for the transition from a traditional society to a modern society. People who cannot create or revise the ultimate values are also unable to determine their social fate. The proposed theory of society recognizes that people who possess critical reason are able to be self-creators of their social order on the grounds that they can agree on a set of common values for control of their passion-based egoistic behavior.

When discussing the second premise, Parsons has showed that individuals pursuing their own personal interests lack a set of common values which leads to a conflict of interests (see Chapter 4). Whenever there is an absence of common values towards which people's actions can be orientated, their egoistic behavior reflects divergent subjective desires and cannot result in social order. Hence, the Hobbesian war of all against all is an unavoidable consequence of the lack of common values to control egoistic behavior.

Given this formulation of the theory of society, the theory of social order can be developed into a theory of social transition from a closed to an open society with the following premises and conclusion:

Premise (I): Upon understanding that the premises of the existing value consensus are wrong, people change the consensus and revise their normative agreement.

Premise (II): Since the existing social order depends on the exercise of normative agreement, individuals who open their shared values to criticism transform the existing social order into a more open one.

Conclusion: People change social order through opening the existing value consensus to rational criticism, or people open their closed social order by opening their normative agreement to rational criticism.

Since the existing social order originates in established normative agreement and people have created common values, it is not surprising that they are capable of revising their consensus once they have understood that their value consensus suffers from false premises. The first premise implies not only that the existing social order depends on people's critical reason via the mechanism of normative agreement, but also that social change originates from individuals' access to critical reason through the mechanism of value change once they become self-protesters against their own previously accepted values.

The premises of the theory of social change can be used to model social change from a closed to an open social order. The more people open the premises of their value consensus to rational criticism, the more they are able to open the closedness of the existing social order towards a more open society.

Critical-rationalist sociology, as a theory of social order as well as one of social change, facilitates an examination of the way in which a closed society can become more open due to people's access to critical reason operating via the mechanism of the openness of thinkers-social movements-the masses to criticism. Individuals build and change their society because they are capable of using their faculties of reason not only for creating the normative agreement that manages egoistic behavior, but also for revising their value consensus. In this sense, people's access to critical reason becomes the driving force of social change from a closed to an open society.

Critical-Rationalist Sociology: The Five Elements of Social Change

Keeping the premises of the critical-rationalist theory of society in mind, the five elements of social transition from a closed to an open society can now be introduced through a reformulation of the premises of the theories of social order and social change to include the metaphysical, moral, legal, political, and economic elements of people's shared values as follows:

Premise (I): Individuals use critical reason to open their fundamental beliefs regarding the universe, the good life, legal justice, political legitimacy, and economic efficiency to criticism.

Premise (II): People revise their value consensus upon discovering that their accounts of the universe, the good life, justice, legitimacy, and efficiency might be wrong.

Conclusion: Individuals use critical reason to revise their value consensus on the truth of the universe, the good life, justice, legitimacy, and efficiency.

It should be remembered that people's worldviews are composed of the deepest elements of their values consensus and that their conceptions of the good life are defined within the context of their worldviews. Once the meaning of the good life is shaped according to people's worldviews, the ground is prepared for including a concept of legal justice in people's normative agreement which implies that the legal system should create an equal right to the fulfillment of what is defined as the good life. However, the addition of a state with a legitimate monopoly of power to enforce the law of society according to this value consensus is also required. Furthermore, people's normative agreement includes the way in which they define the rights of economic agents to effect an efficient allocation of resources in order to meet people's needs.

Once the five elements of a closed normative agreement regarding the truth of the universe, the good life, legal justice, political legitimacy, and economic efficiency are opened to criticism, people's critical reason enables them to transform the dominate values of the closed society into a set of more open values.

In this sense, the five elements of normative change from a closed to an open society consist of an openness of worldviews, the meaning of the good life, the concept of legal justice, the meaning of political legitimacy, and a definition of economic efficiency.

Given the emergence of a new value consensus on the universe, the good life, legal justice, political legitimacy, and economic efficiency, the question remains of how a new normative agreement affects existing social institutions. The following premises can be introduced to address this question:

Premise (I): Individuals use the new value consensus to delegitimize closed social institutions in favor of a set of open worldviews, open ethics, open laws, open states, and open economies.

Premise (II): Using their new normative consensus, people agree on a *social contract* to open the closed institutions to the extent allowed by the new values.

Conclusion: People open their social institutions to the extent that they have already opened their normative agreement to rational criticism.

It must be emphasized here that this theory of social change is, in fact, a critical theory of society because it shows how people's access to critical reason enables them not only to question unjust values and institutions, but also to find a solution to replenish the existing society's unfulfilled capacity by opening the closed society to rational criticism.

Similarly to the five elements of normative critique of a closed society in favor of the values of an open society, the five elements of institutional change from a closed to an open society can be identified. They include the formation of an *open worldview* which allows people to use their critical reason to discover the truth of the universe; the rise of *open ethics* which enable individuals to discover the meaning of the good life; the rise of *open law* which enforces people's equal right to pursue the good life; the formation of an *open state* which uses the monopoly of power to enforce open law, and the rise of an *open economy* which allows economic agents to use their equal moral, legal, and political rights to make rational decisions about their preferences and abilities to effect an efficient allocation of resources for people's needs.

Against this background, the actors in civil society are able to transform the new value consensus on the moral ideal of an open society into a social contract through which individuals agree to create an open state in order to secure people's equal right to pursue the good life. Put differently, a social change from a closed to an open society requires a social contract to realize people's moral equality on the grounds of their critical reason. An open society is a Kantian kingdom of ends in which all people are ends due to their access to critical reason. Human actors, such as thinkers, social movements, and the masses, are viewed not as oversocialized actors, but as actors capable of using their reason to evaluate the existing value consensus and social institutions independently. Once civil society actors have shaped a moral critique of the dominant values, they are prepared to agree upon a social contract for transforming an illegitimate social order into a just and peaceful one.

It is now understandable why such moral critique is able to operate as a normative solution for the Hobbesian problem of social order: the more people open their fundamental beliefs regarding the universe, the good life, legal justice, political legitimacy, and economic efficiency to rational criticism, the better they are able to learn how to organize their society to control egoistic behavior. The peaceful nature of an open social order should be sought in its capacity to control egoistic behavior not only on the basis of the ethics of openness to criticism, but also on the basis of open law which gives every person the equal right to pursue the good life, an open state which enforces such open law, and an open economy whose agents' rights are protected by the open state.

Figure 5.1 shows the five elements of social change from a closed to an open society. People's access to critical reason in the context of collective action by civil society enables them to open the closed society's normative consensus by opening their worldview and their accounts of the good life, justice, legitimacy, and efficiency. Consequently, the institutional structure of the closed

society is opened by the rise of a set of open worldviews, open ethics, open laws, open states, and open economies. The transition from a closed to an open society is a set of normative and institutional changes that originate in people's access to critical reason.

   The next section applies the critical-rationalist theory of social change in order to develop a historical sociology of modernity which could be viewed as the processes through which traditional society in medieval Europe was transformed into the liberal society of the modern Western world.[3] This model of social change is used in this book in order to address the transition from the existing global order to an open global society.

From Traditional to Liberal Society: A New Sociology of Modernity

In this section critical-rationalist sociology is employed to analyze the West's transition from a traditional society to a modern society based on the openness of modern people's values to rational criticism reflected in a parallel openness of their social institutions. In order to achieve this objective, four steps are followed, beginning with an introduction about the central position

Figure 5.1 From a Closed to an Open Society: A Sociological Model

of *liberalism* in identifying the nature of social change from a traditional to a modern society. Next, historical evidence is used to describe a normative change in the transition from a traditional to a modern liberal society. The third step offers historical evidence demonstrating that such normative change has fostered the institutional reform necessary to transform the traditional society into the liberal society it is now. Finally, the question is raised of whether this liberal society is *modern* enough in the sense of *openness to rational criticism*.

On the basis of the critical-rationalist model of social change, this historical transition is addressed through a rational reconstruction of the major elements of social change from a traditional to a liberal society. Prior to this reconstruction, however, it is important to recall the central place of *liberalism* in such a social transition.

Whereas Marxian sociology regards European modernity as a largely economic transition from a feudal to a capitalist society with liberal ideology serving as ideological justification for economic change, mainstream sociologists, such as Weber, Durkheim, and Parsons, situate liberalism or the ideal of respect for the individual at the center of this societal transition and perceive modernity as social change originating in the rise of new value consensus on *ethical freedom* in terms of giving individuals the cognitive ability and legal right to define their own concepts of the good life and to determine their own political fates. These freedoms of thought and moral choice are reflected in the modern people's value consensus on tolerance of difference and the pursuit of happiness.

Parsons emphasizes that "Tolerance of difference is itself a value, not the absence of common values, and at the very least *this* must be institutionalized in a highly pluralistic society… [I]t seems clear that the bias of most sociological tradition has been against recognizing the importance of the existence of a single value system" (Robertson and Turner 1991: 41, emphasis in the original). This section argues that tolerance of difference holds a central place at the core of a single value system in a historical sociology of modernity.

Richard Ashcraft, in *Marx and Weber on Liberalism as Bourgeois Ideology*, directs us towards such a central position for liberalism:

> Almost everyone who has investigated the subject agrees that between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries a great social transformation occurred, primarily in England and France, but to a lesser extent in other European countries and America as well. In sociological terms this change is generally characterized as the rise of liberalism and is linked with the English, French, and American Revolutions. The socioeconomic factors are summarized under the general heading of the industrial revolution and the rise of capitalism. Finally, there are several cultural dimensions to these changes, most notably the Protestant Reformation.
>
> (Ashcraft 1972: 130)

Ashcraft's analysis presents liberal modernity in the context of modern-age social revolutions.[4] Within this context, the critical-rationalist model of social change facilitates the definition of this liberal content of Western modernity based on the proposed elements of social change. This section introduces a new understanding of the rise of modern society on the basis of the emergence of a liberal value consensus during the transition from a traditional to a modern society and provides Chapter 6 with a sociological theory for an examination of the way in which the modern nation-states have become integrated into a global system of national societies. In addition, a moral critique of such a normative agreement prepares the ground for Chapter 7 wherein is debated the question of how the existing global order can be transformed into an open global society.

An Epistemic Solution for Traditional Society

This theory of social change seeks the origins of institutional change in Europe and America in a normative change from traditional to liberal values. Recalling the analytical scheme provided in Chapter 4 which showed how civil society actors effect social change by opening their moral beliefs to criticism, an exploration is made of how European thinkers, social movements, and the masses opened their traditional worldviews and their value consensus to criticism in favor of the liberal ethics of modernity, and also of the consequences of this moral openness for institutional change from a traditional to a liberal society. With this in mind, a historical sociology of modern society inspired by the philosophy of critical rationalism follows and facilitates a redefinition of the unfinished project of modernity with respect to this societal change.

The Problem of a Conflict of Opinions

Inspired by Popper's method of scientific inquiry, the central social problem confronted by Europeans in their traditional society must first be identified and then the solution provided by liberal thinkers must be found. Subsequently, it can be argued that social movements and the masses which recognized this solution employed the idea of liberal society in order to effect institutional change from a traditional to a modern society by means of social revolutions.

In order to identify the social problems confronting traditional seventeenth-century European society, the term *traditional society* must be understood and the spiritual domination of the Catholic Church and institutional domination by the absolute monarchy must be recognized. This definition of traditional society reveals the social problem originated in the spiritual domination of the Catholic Church and the political representation of them through the institution of absolute monarchy.

As argued by Pierre Manent in *An Intellectual History of Liberalism*, the European social problem originated in the normative claim of the Church in terms of the moral ideal of salvation being linked with absolute monarchy as an effective political institution for realization of this claim. As argued by Manent, the worldview of the Church implied that "the good that it provided—salvation—was not of this world … it had been assigned by God himself and by his Son the mission of leading men to salvation for which the Church, by God's grace, was the unique vehicle" (1994: 4). Keeping this normative claim in mind, it is important to understand why national monarchy was an effective social institution for the realization of the moral ideal of salvation, and that the outcome was the emergence of a social problem in the traditional European society.

The Church needed national monarchy to give its moral ideal of salvation a social component because, unlike Judaism and Islam, the Church does not provide a law that is supposed to govern all of men's actions in the earthly city, whereas the king, like the emperor, and unlike the city-state, was able to lay claim to *divine right* (Manent 1994: 4, 7). It was for these reasons that national or absolute monarchy became the political possessor of this divine right or even the political head of the Church, as in the case of England.

However, it must not be forgotten that the Church's normative claim was based on a worldview which gave the Church the unique authority to interpret God's message. This interpretation was then translated into the divine right of absolute political power so that the King could enforce this interpretation. Against this background, the social problems of Europeans during the formative age of modernity originated in the worldviews and moral attitudes of the Church and the social institution of absolute monarchy which in turn was underpinned by epistemic absolutism.

Thus, under the spiritual influence of the Catholic Church, traditional society suffered from the absence of freedom of thought and of moral choice to define its own worldview and moral attitudes. Furthermore, under the absolute power of national monarchy it was difficult for society to locate the institutional space necessary to question the dominant worldviews and moral attitudes.

Having identified the social problem, it is easy to understand that the established Protestant character of the English monarchy had promoted the rise of a conflict of opinions among various interpretations of God's message between Catholics defending the monarchy and Protestants supporting a republic. According to liberal thinkers such as Milton and Locke, the civil war that took place in England during the mid-seventeenth century originated in an epistemic problem.

As Manent observes, the English civil war "was the most dramatic expression of the theologico-political problem in its postmedieval form. It raged for several years and raised related questions: What is the king's function, what is the meaning of the monarchical institution, and what is religion's place in the body politics?" (1994: 20). Thus, the social problem was reflected in the civil

war owing to its ideological sources which, in turn, had an an epistemological origin: the claim of the Church to provide the sole interpretation of God's message about the good life.

Thomas Hobbes, an early liberal thinker, diagnosed the ultimate origin of the civil war in a conflict of opinions about the meaning of the good life. As Manent observes, Hobbes believed that:

> The conflict of opinions over the good had produced the war of all against all, which prevented all social, intellectual, and economic life. Everyone was racked by the fear of death. The incompatibility of opinions regarding the good had produced absolute evil. It was from this point that one had to rise up, to reconstruct a new political organization invulnerable to the conflict of opinions.
>
> (1994: 23)

Using the critical-rationalist model of social change, one can explore how liberal thinkers, such as Milton and Locke, provided a rational solution for the Hobbesian social problem based on the ideal of liberal society and deploying an epistemological critique of traditional worldviews and ethics.

The Moral Ideal of Liberal Society: Epistemic Logic

John Milton and John Locke were among the most influential thinkers of their age whose ideas were used by social movements to transform European monarchies and American colonies into liberal societies. Only a brief outline of the essence of these philosophers' liberating thoughts can be presented here to help to uncover the epistemic logic of the rise of the new value consensus essential for the transition from a traditional to a modern society. This epistemic logic permits the inclusion of some of the twentieth-century liberal thinkers, such as John Rawls, who has elaborated upon the ideal type of liberal society.

During the formative period of the English civil war, Milton and Locke understood that epistemological views were the ultimate cause of the conflict of religious opinion regarding the authority of the church and proposed the idea of a free society based on an alternative epistemology. Critical rationality caused liberal thinkers to refute the premise of the Church's normative claim to provide the sole interpretation of the God's message: *the salvation of humankind*.

Epistemological openness led liberal thinkers to subsequent ontological and moral openness as a result of which they conceived social institutions for a liberal society. As will be argued in the next section, it was this moral openness that provided Europeans with a normative solution for overcoming the social problem of civil war. As argued in Chapters 2 and 4, an important connection exists between this epistemological theory and sociological analysis and shows how social movements employed liberating thoughts to

mobilize the masses in order to transform traditional institutions into modern ones.

John Milton's liberal thoughts supplied intellectual input for the mid-seventeenth-century revolution in England. Furthermore, John Locke's ideas influenced the eighteenth-century revolution in America. It is noteworthy that French liberals such as Diderot, Voltaire, Condorcet, and Rousseau, and their intellectual inputs for the French Revolution are not included in this historical analysis[5] due to limited space, thus this argument concentrates on the two main lines of liberal thought and their effect on the rise of modern society in order to show how liberalism created the intellectual energy for social change from a traditional to a modern society.

John Milton, a leading intellectual spokesman during the English civil war recognized the cultural origin of the war in the religious conflict over the authority of the church, and its institutional representation in absolute monarchy. Assuming Milton's premise, what could an epistemic solution for this conflict of opinions?

Milton introduced his liberal thoughts in the context of Puritanism, a reformist movement whose main characteristic was a criticism of the Church's moral authority. In short, Puritan reformists claimed that Christians should enjoy the moral freedom to use their reason in order to understand God's message and moral commands directly. In this Puritan context, Milton understood that there was something wrong with the epistemic premises of the Catholic Church's doctrine of salvation and proposed the reformation of the Church governance, later expanding this to reformation of the government of society as a whole.

Milton recognized that the Church actually advocated a determinist worldview which refused to grant Christians the cognitive freedom to use 'reason' to defend their rational faith in God's message. In other words, if the universe is defined as a place in which all phenomena are determined by God's will, is it possible to say that people have voluntarily come to have faith in God's message? Milton sought a new worldview according to which God grants His creatures cognitive freedom through their access to reason.

A rational faith in God's message requires a concept of people as rational beings. Viewed from the perspective of a person's cognitive ability, an important element in the Puritan social movement is a worldview of people as *free individuals* who are capable of using their reason to attain voluntary faith in God's message. This concept, however, is in contradiction with the authority of the Catholic Church. In *The Modernity of Milton*, Martin Larson points out:

> In this conception of God, we see Milton's modernity again. It is, first of all, obvious that he had freed himself completely from the tyranny of the orthodox and irrational creed. … Milton's theory of God is not only rational but also reasonable; it is an exposition of the universe which we can all accept. … With Milton's Renaissance metaphysics the doctrine of human depravity, impotence, and need for absolute dependence upon

external forces become untenable. …And it was this revolt, of which Milton was but one powerful champion, that paved the way for modern life.

(1970: 129, 132)

Given this metaphysical openness, Milton then argues that since people possess reason and free will, they are independent moral agents; their ultimate fate in the society depends on themselves. Hence, it is not surprising that Milton believed that individuals should have an equal moral right to pursue the good life.

In his epistemic critique of the Church's closed worldview and ethics, Milton recalled the philosophic logic of Stoicism. As Larson observes, Milton believed that:

> This was the message of Christianity to the world: negate yourself, hate this world and the life thereof, surrender to the unseen, believe in Christ, put yourself in the right relationship with the supernatural, and you will go to Heaven after death; refuse this invitation and you will spend eternity in hell-fire. …The message of Stoicism was quite different … Depend upon your reason and knowledge to gain virtue; develop your own resources … don't worry about the future; … derive all good from within; … free yourself from all passion and achieve happiness by desiring those things only which you can at all times bestow upon yourself in any condition of life.

(1970: 103–104)

Against this background, it is understandable why Milton recognized that value consensus in traditional society originated in the dogmatic teachings of the Catholic Church and was thus vulnerable to a conflict of opinions.

For Milton, people who accepted the moral authority of the Church through irrational faith did not use reason to defend their faith. An unavoidable consequence of such dogmatic faith that did not permit the questioning of moral beliefs was a conflict of opinions. Christians who followed the Church's interpretation of God's message were unable to enjoy rational discussion and thought. The social problem in English society during the mid-seventeenth century was rooted in the conflict of opinions regarding the meaning of the good life, but people who opened their closed worldview and admitted the role which reason can play in understanding God's message would be capable of finding an epistemological solution to the political dispute over the divine right of a national monarchy.

Using his modern worldview and ethics, Milton recognized that any proposal for institutional change in a national monarchy required reform in the governance of the Church itself. As pointed out by Andrew Milner, "The philosophical basis of Milton's theory of Church government is, of course, his individualism, which leads him necessarily to the notion that 'no man or body of men … can be the infallible judgers or determiners in matters of religion to

any other men's consciences but their own'" (1981: 104). In this sense, Milton is a critical-rationalist thinker who openly admits *human fallibility* and uses this notion to argue that not only governance of the Church, but also government of society, must be designed in recognition of cognitive fallibility.

In his reformist proposals Milton argued that tolerance of difference must be applied for reconstruction of the Church government, with allowance for open discussion of rival interpretations of God's message via moral dialogue in order to discover the truth of Christianity. Milner argues that "Just as Milton rejects the feudal organicist conception of the church in favour of an essentially voluntaristic notion of the church as a constructed institution, so too he rejects the feudal conception of the state as organism in favour of the notion of the state as construct" (1981: 104–105). Such a voluntaristic proposal criticized the unique interpretation of the Catholic Church regarding God's message, an interpretation which was internalized in feudal governance of the Church.

According to Milton, " all men naturally were born free … and were, by privilege above all the creatures, born to command, and not to obey" (1848a: 8–9). This particular concept of humanity is central to all of Milton's intellectual works and underpins his idea of liberal society.

Milton linked the proposal of institutional reform within the Church with his wider ideal of a liberal society. In *The Second Defense of the People of England*, Milton refuted the King's divine right and proposed a republic capable of realizing the self-governance of morally free people (1848b: 298–299). Milner argues that Milton's understanding of social institutions rests on the moral equality of all people: "Since the rational free man will act justly, it follows that any constraints imposed upon him must necessarily deflect him from the path of righteousness. Thus Milton is led to a profoundly libertarian conception of the nature of social institutions" (1981: 102). Drawing on his open ethics, Milton criticized absolute monarchy in favor of a democratic society.

Milton used his famous poems such as *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained* to show that the reason people have lost paradise as an ideal society is that they have not used their reason. Those who recognize this unfulfilled capacity can regain paradise (Marilla 1968: 76). In short, Milton employed epistemic critique of the Church's spiritual authority to define his ideal of liberal society and to provide intellectual input for the rise of a value consensus on tolerance of difference in English society in the process of transformation from absolute monarchy into a constitutional state. Put simply, Milton's rationalist epistemology, which led to his more open worldview and ethic, paved the way for the rise of tolerance of difference instead of the conflict of opinions as a core value of modernity. As argued by Larson, the influence of Milton's liberal thoughts was not limited to England: "The influence of Milton's political theories, being more explicit than his religious, must have been no less. Those theories are the direct forerunners of Rousseau, the French Revolution, and the Constitution of the United States" (1970: 240).

Steven Seidman uses an analysis similar to the one proposed here within the context of Milton's liberalism:

> the philosophes' critique of the particular doctrines of Christianity—original sin, immortality of the soul, miracles—represented a fundamental criticism of Christianity as a closed and dogmatic system. The world as represented by Christianity was a cosmos: human beings, nature, and the divine were integrated into a finite, hierarchical, and harmonious world order, wherein each being had a fixed place and purpose. The church hierarchy transmitted the revealed word of God—the cosmic order—to the general society in the form of a complete deductive system or casuistry of ethics, politics, and social practice. The philosophes did not oppose the ethical or spiritual core of Christianity. … *The philosophes opposed the closed and dogmatic character of Christianity*, which, in their view, sanctioned hierarchy and authoritarian social order.
>
> <div align="right">(1983: 37–38, emphasis added)</div>

John Locke's liberalism followed a similar critique of traditional society, yet his epistemology made an even stronger argument in defense of the ethics of tolerance of difference in the transition from a traditional to liberal society. Nicholas Wolterstorff, in *John Locke and the Ethics of Belief*, argues that Locke employed rationalist epistemology to deal with the problem of a conflict of opinions: "Locke intended his epistemology as a solution to the crisis of the fracturing of the moral and religious tradition of Europe at the beginning of modernity" (Wolterstorff 1996: 227). Recognizing human fallibility, Locke argued that religious tolerance is required for the transformation from the state of civil war into peaceful social order.

Locke's epistemology was targeted at addressing the following question: "How should we form our beliefs on fundamental matters of religion and morality so as to live together in social harmony, when we can no longer appeal to a shared and unified tradition?" (Wolterstorff 1996: x) In *The Conduct of the Understanding*, Locke (1880) argued that a new theory of knowledge was needed to show how rational dialogue among people with opposing opinions of the good life was actually possible. Similarly to Milton, Locke employed rationalist epistemology to question the closed worldview and moral attitudes.

Viewed through a critical-rationalist lens, the originality of Locke's epistemology lies in his notion that the premises of our moral beliefs should be open to criticism. As Locke states:

> It was of no small advantage to those who affected to be masters and teachers, to make this the principle of principles, that principles must not be questioned: For having once established this tenet, that there are innate principles, it put their followers upon a necessity of receiving some doctrines as such; which was to take them off from the use of their own

> reason and judgment, and put them upon believing and taking them upon trust, be more easily governed by, and made useful to some sort of men, who had the skill and office to principle and guide them. Nor is it a small power it gives one man over another, to have the authority to be the dictator of principles, and teacher of unquestionable truths; and to make a man swallow that for an innate principle, which may serve to his purpose, who teacheth them.
>
> (Wolterstorff 1996: 5)

Locke also argues that competing opinions which deduce their conclusions from unquestioned premises inevitably result in a conflict of opinion because the unchallenged grounds for each judgment claim that their conclusion is justified. If, however, one's epistemic attitude is altered to question the principles, it can be argued that the conclusions are also questionable. Locke proposed just such an epistemic solution for the problem of conflicting religious opinions by implying that people who accept that their opinions are questionable on the basis that the principles cannot be perfect, would tolerate each other's opinions. Locke's emphasis on the ethics of tolerance of difference, in particular, religious tolerance during the civil war, originates in the context of his epistemological openness, i.e., the notion of opening unquestionable principles to rational criticism.

People who accepted that reason should guide their moral beliefs were in a position to question the Church's moral authority for they knew the Church had provided traditional society with only one unquestioned interpretation of God's message. Locke also argued for an open worldview, not one having all things predetermined. Hence, he was able to define moral freedom for individuals on the basis of their access to reason for evaluation of their moral beliefs regarding the good life. According to Locke, God Himself had given people *the faculty of reason* in order to enable them to understand the universe and the meaning of the good life. In this open worldview, people wanting to solve their conflict of opinions regarding the good life ought to use their reason to explore possible meanings of the good life while morally tolerating each other due to their knowledge that nobody can claim her moral opinion to be unquestionable and that the premises for opinions can always be challenged.

In *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Locke states that "the Mind if it will proceed rationally, ought to examine all the grounds of Probability, and see how they make more or less, for or against any probable Proposition, before it assents to or dissents from it, and upon a due balancing of the whole, reject, or receive it, with a more or less firm assent, proportionally to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of Probability on one side or the other" (1979: 656). Although Locke's epistemology is justificationist with its assumption that *justifier evidence* increases the probability of proposed claims of knowledge being true, this weakness does not reduce the

significance of his epistemic solution to overcoming the problem of conflict of opinions.

As observed by Wolterstorff, Locke's view with regard to the question of how reason is used for the formulation of a valid argument "was that we are to apply the principle of proportionality to what we hear Reason saying. But there are other possible answers than this to the question. Karl Popper, for example, proposed something quite different from Locke's principle, a falsificationist rather than a justificationist principle" (Wolterstorff 1996: 91). If justification involves infinite regress, as argued in Chapter 2, and hence cannot truly solve the problem of a conflict of opinions, nor can tolerance of difference be an ultimate moral solution for solving a conflict of opinions on the good life, as will be discussed in this chapter.

As argued earlier, Locke used his anti-dogmatic epistemology and world-view to argue that people should adopt liberal ethics in order to tolerate each other's religious opinions by recognizing that any premises are subject to questions. Such a normative change should not be understood as a transformation of the Church's moral absolutism into nihilistic ethics, but as a normative change giving people the moral freedom to define the meaning of the good life on the grounds of their access to reason. Reason itself, however, was defined in a justificationist sense: reason, not passion, justifies moral choice.

Hence, the emergence of ethics of tolerance of difference was the outcome of a rational critique of the Church's moral dogmatism, as well as of opening the premises of traditional ethics to rational questioning. Tolerance of difference thus originated in greater freedom of thought through openness to criticism, while, ironically, suffering under justificationism.

Locke's ethics of tolerance involved a utilitarian account of the good life. If tolerance of difference cannot provide a durable solution to the problem of conflicts of opinions, utilitarian ethics remedies the moral gap arising from the infinite regress involved in this tolerance. People require a common standard for defining the good life, and the liberal ethics offer one in the maxim of utility. In *The Letter Concerning Tolerance*, Locke introduced *utility* in terms of *civil interest*, writing: "Civil interest I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and possession of outward things, such as money, land, houses, furniture, and the like" (1823: 10).

Locke provided modern Europeans with a theological analysis of why pleasure should be considered a moral standard for defining the content of the good life. Individuals with the moral freedom to choose their own interpretations of the good life can examine their own subjective sense of happiness, which points to a utilitarian turn in the liberal ethic of modernity.

Locke's moral philosophy introduced this utilitarian turn on the basis of a theological understanding reflected in his analysis of the law of nature. As John Lenz points out:

> Arguing that there exists a "rule of morals" obligating man, Locke focuses his attention on two main problems: the source of the rule and how it

is known. His answers account for calling this rule a "law of nature." It is natural because God's will, the ultimate basis of the law, is revealed in the capabilities inherent in man's nature. And it is natural because God has given man, in the faculties of sense and reason, the means by which it can be known.

(1956: 105)

If God-given faculties of sense inform people about what is pleasant and painful, following one's sense of happiness would show rational respect for God's moral commands. Locke's moral theory implies that pursuit of a happy life demonstrates the use of reason to follow God's command, for it is God Himself who has given mankind the faculties of sense and reason.

Viewed from a Lockean perspective, the normative shift from traditional to liberal ethics not only applied to the rise of tolerance of difference, but also to utilitarian ethics. Tolerance gives people the moral freedom to pursue what their senses tell them is a happy life. While tolerance does not cognitively inform people of what might actually be the content of the good life, the senses of pleasure and pain do provide this information emotionally. The liberal ethics of modernity refers to a rational consensus about what passion tells individuals about the good life. Therefore, tolerance of difference joins with the utilitarian standard of subjective happiness to shape the liberal ethics of modernity. Although utilitarians, such as Bentham and Hume, rejected the theological basis of Locke's moral philosophy, the utilitarian element in liberal ethics was no longer justified on the grounds of a religious worldview, but rather on the basis of a secular one.

Locke employed his moral theory to introduce *natural right* as the basis for social institutions within a liberal society. Moreover, the institutional transition from absolute monarchy to a constitutional state which he outlined was later appropratiated by the Americans in order to justify their revolution in the eighteenth century.

Through his moral philosophy Locke was aware that individuals have the moral right to learn about and to pursue the good life. This moral right must, however, be defined in terms of people's natural right to organize a society in which their good life can be realized. During the transition from a traditional to a liberal society, a legal definition must be given to the moral dimension often spoken of as a natural right and thought to be an aspect of government by consent.

Locke's notions of the *state of war* and the *state of political society* provide an institutional framework for the reconstruction of the logic of the social transition from a traditional to a liberal society. In *Two Treaties of Government*, Locke defines the state of political society thus: "the beginning of political society depends upon the consent of the individuals to join and make one society, who, when they are thus incorporated, might set up what form of government they thought fit" (1823: 150). In contrast, the state of war leads to a social situation in which the natural rights of liberty, life, and the pursuit

of happiness are violated by those who impose their will on others without their consent. Locke writes: "[Anyone] who attempts to get another man into his absolute power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with him. … he who would get me into his power without my consent, would use me as he pleased …To be free from such force is the only security of my preservation. … And, therefore, it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put himself into a state of war with me" (ibid.: 112–113). This distinction between the state of peace and the state of war prepares the ground for understanding the transition from a traditional society to a liberal society.

Those who recognize their natural rights to liberty, life, and happiness are entitled to *the right of revolution* to alter absolute monarchy, which has put itself into a state of war with them and to establish a constitutional state to protect their natural rights. This logic was used by the English and the Americans during the formative age of modernity when they decided to turn their traditional normative agreement into tolerance and the pursuit of happiness, thus creating the basis for institutional change from absolute monarchies to liberal democracies through the social revolutions that took place during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Viewed from critical-rationalist sociology, the rise of a liberal society followed a Lockean pattern, in the sense of an openness of the Church's moral authority to criticism which resulted in social change from absolute monarchies to constitutional republics in the modern West. The transition from the state of war to the state of political society implied that absolute monarchy should be replaced by a constitutional state with a monopoly of force limited by the principles of natural law. The moral ideal of a liberal society was introduced by thinkers such as Milton and Locke as an unfulfilled goal to be achieved, provided that people made use of their right of revolution in order to transform the absolute monarchy into a constitutional state. This equated to an institutional change in the form of a social contract that approved people's right to a constitutional state corresponding to their value consensus on tolerance and happiness.

Hence, the social institutions of liberal society, including the rule of law, a constitutional state, and a market economy, should be examined closely in the context of normative change from the moral authority of the Church to the liberal ethics of tolerance and happiness, which, in turn, should be understood in the context of the openness of epistemological attitudes and worldviews. As observed by John Dunn:

> in 1681 at the very latest Locke set himself to provide a systematic refutation of absolutist theory in its most socially plausible, though not intellectually most rigorous form … It was a refutation which not merely set out logical limits to the legitimacy of royal authority but which rendered these socially operational by empowering the community to judge

when they had been transgressed and to reassert them in action. In short it was a theoretical proclamation of the ultimate right of revolution.

(1969: 48)

Both Milton and Locke used their epistemology to introduce an ideal of liberal society based on the key premise of the individual's access to reason. As Matthew Jordan points out in *Milton and Modernity*:

> Milton and Locke's belief in the individual exercise of reason in the light of the law of nature expresses an ethos of debate in principle without regard to all preexisting social and political rank and in accord with universal rules …Their emphasis on the individual's use of reason rather than reliance on authority becomes the watchword of a new political dynamic.
>
> (2001: 34)

This reflects the image of an independent person who is capable of thinking, despite social conditions and personal interests, as argued in Chapter 4. Milton and Locke are viewed as the founding fathers of revolutionary liberal thought during the seventeenth century who notably influenced social revolutions in England and America through their epistemic emphasis on the moral agency of individuals originating in their access to critical reason. As Jordan rightly observes:

> Both Milton and Locke construct their arguments around the idea that men are naturally free. Government is a contrivance designed to further the ends of such men and is limited to those actions which they recognize as performing this function. A government which fails to meet this criterion may legitimately be replaced or overthrown (both Milton and Locke were active revolutionaries).
>
> (2001: 9)

A particularly distinctive feature of Milton and Locke's liberal thinking is that they linked human reason with human agency in order to show that the transformation of the traditional social order into a liberal social order might be possible. In this sense, it can be argued that Milton and Locke were critical-rationalist thinkers who admitted not only the limits to human reason, but also reason's ability to make people agents of social change.

The next section focuses on the way in which the concept of liberal society was used by the social revolutions in England and the USA to replace traditional society with modern society. It reveals a connection between the historical sociology of modernity and modern social revolutions.

From Value to Institutional Change: The English and American Revolutions

The preceding section demonstrated how two leading liberal thinkers defined a free society and the processes that can transform a traditional society into a modern one. In order to develop this critical-rationalist sociology of modernity, an explanation follows of how the idea of liberal society was actually employed by social movements and the masses to give real life to the idea. Just as the openness of liberal thinkers, such as Milton and Locke, to rational criticism enabled them to conceive their concepts of a liberal society, the openness of social movements and the masses to such criticism empowered them to create a set of new values and social institutions. Essentially, what liberal thinkers had theoretically described as a possibility for transition from a traditional to a liberal society became a social reality once social movements and the masses perceived that they were rational agents capable of criticizing dominant values and institutions based on false premises. The rise of a liberal social order was the outcome of such social revolutions, two historical examples of which are given here: the English Revolution in the mid-seventeenth century and the American Revolution in the eighteenth century. These revolutions show how the model of social change proposed here can address the rise of Western modern society.

The role of liberal thought in social revolution is recognized by sociologists of modernity. Peter Wagner, for instance, states: "These revolutions gave institutional expression to the political aspect of a broader culture of individual autonomy that is a key element of modernity" (2008: 238). Similarly, Steven Seidman argues that "Liberalism arose as a reaction against hierarchical and absolutist order, which suppressed individual freedom. Liberals sought a program of social reconstruction founded upon their pluralistic and voluntaristic theory of institutions" (1983: 15). On the basis of critical-rationalist sociology, the English Revolution can be described as a set made up of normative and institutional openness to criticism. These revolutions can thus be regarded as modern social movements which have created a liberal society. Critical-rationalist sociology presents the revolutions as a social transition from the *state of war* to the *state of civil life* in which liberal thinkers, social movements, and the masses have opened their moral beliefs to rational criticism and created the social institutions necessary for the protection of such freedom of thought.

The Puritan Movement and the English Revolution

Given the collective action of civil society agents introduced in Chapter 4, a brief reconstruction of the English Revolution based on the model of social change used here addresses how liberal ideas during the mid-seventeeth century English Revolution were used by social movements to mobilize people to replace absolute monarchy with a liberal state.

At the center of the social efforts to change the traditional society in mid-seventeeth-century England was a Puritan movement that was deeply involved in a political protest against the English monarch Charles I. The central ideas of this movement and Milton's contributions to its liberal thoughts demonstrate how Milton's liberalism was used by the movement in its struggle for liberty. Milton's contributions to the rise of modern society, however, is not limited to the collapse of the monarchy in 1640, for his liberal thoughts continued to influence the rise of a liberal society after the revolution of 1640.

Milton and the Puritan Movement

In *Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution*, William Haller argues that Puritan movement developed as a result of the outbreak of the revolution in 1640, not only as a campaign for restructuring the church governance but also as a sustained enterprise of preachers for setting forth in the pulpit and the press a conception of spiritual life and moral behaviors. According to Haller, English Protestantism had transfused in large measure the whole of English life (1955: xi). Given this high place of Puritan movement in the transformation of English society, Haller enables us to see a *perfect rule of life* that serves as a *shared value* among Puritans:

> To reformers both Scots and English the ideas of greatest importance were, to begin with, those they held in common with one another and with Protestants in general. They believed that the scriptures contained a perfect rule of life for all to follow in family, church, and state, a rule to be comprehended by the exercise of reason in the spirit of faith and to be made known through the arts of discourse. They believed in the spiritual equality of all men before God and in the possibility of a spiritual election transcending all other distinctions between man and man. They tended to conceive of the visible church less as a hierarchy descending from the apostles than as a communion of the elect coming together in mutual understanding and agreement.
>
> (1955: 3–4)

Arthur Barker argues similarly in *Milton and the Puritan Dilemma* that the central dilemma of Puritanism was "how to reconcile the liberty which man claims as his right by the dignity of his nature and as the source of his earthly happiness with that divinely revealed truth of the spirit upon which ecclesiastical reformation must be founded and through which man must seek his eternal happiness" (1942: 18). Milton's epistemic solution to the problem of the civil war not only helps to explain his intellectual contributions to the Puritan movement, but also raises the question of how the movement dealt with the problem of civil war in terms of reforming governance of the Church and the state to reconcile people's natural right to earthly happiness with their spiritual happiness.

Comprehension of the Puritan belief that the scriptures contained a *perfect rule of life* to be followed in all facets of life as an exercise of reason and expressed in discourse makes it easy to understand how Milton's epistemology and social philosophy contributed to the intellectual sources of the Puritan movement. As argued, Milton criticized the dogmatic epistemology of the Catholic Church for its rejection of the role of reason and the discourse in understanding the rule offered by the scriptures. In addition, Milton's theory of society implied that, for creation of a free commonwealth based on rational understanding of the perfect rule of life, the Puritan movement should not only reform the Church, but also transform the absolute monarchy into a republic.

As Haller argues, Milton's participation in the argument for liberty and reformation was very significant in the history of that argument. He brought the highest culture of the Renaissance and the Reformation to the intellectual support of the Puritan movement (1955: xv).

The central question, however, is how liberal thought like Milton's was employed by the Puritan movement in its spiritual and political struggle to reform the English Church and state and to create a new social order for the realization of the natural right of people to earthly and spiritual happiness. To address this question, one must explore the role of the Puritan account of human reason in shaping shared values regarding the perfect rule of life. Using critical-rationalist sociology, the English Revolution can be analyzed as a social change from a monarchy to a constitutional state based on the rise of shared values among Puritans, which then expanded to society as a whole, and opened its worldview and moral beliefs to rational criticism. Shared values provided the Puritans with the political will to transform the monarchy into a liberal state. A new understanding of reason brought the ethics of tolerance of difference to the heart of these shared values.

The Puritan Movement, New Values, and the End of the Monarchy

The mid-seventeenth-century English Revolution began with the convening of Parliament in 1640 and reached its peak with the collapse of the monarchy and disruption of church services in 1649. The revolution was not, however, merely a political struggle between the King and Parliament or a religious controversy over church governance. Its origin was in people, particularly English Protestants, opening their worldview and moral beliefs. As Haller recounts:

> Discussion spread to the press and the public. Men of varying interests and tempers, such as John Goodwin, Roger Williams, Henry Robinson, William Walwyn, Richard Overton, and John Milton were soon raising questions as to the scope and function of liberty within the framework of society which went far beyond the expectations of the original champions of reform-liberty of conscience, of thought and expression, of preaching

and the press, of religious and political association, of legal status, of economic enterprise and social opportunity.

(1955: xiii)

Whereas the great dispute between the King and Parliament centered on the question of how the Church should be governed, by whom, and to what end, Puritans needed to shape their shared values on the basis of which they could turn the dispute between King Charles I and Parliament into broader social demands in order to realize the ideal of a free commonwealth and overcome their dilemma of how to rejoin earthly happiness with spiritual life according to God's message.

   Milton's rationalist epistemology and theory of society contributed to the rise of this particular value consensus among Puritans not only due to its proposal that the dispute between the King and Parliament over Church governance be solved on the basis of a rational approach to the Church's mission and function in a free society, but also due to its argument that access to reason enables individuals to change dominant values and institutions. For Milton, the issue of the Church could not be isolated from the issue of rational government of society. Inspired by his epistemology, his theory of society implied that a rational church and a reasonable state can only exist in a free society which respects people's natural right to know and to pursue the good life due to their access to reason. Once Puritans followed this rational logic, they understood that a value consensus about the perfect rule of life should involve the tolerance of difference and the pursuit of happiness and also that such a value consensus could not become a social reality unless they fought against the King and for Parliament, and this appeared to reflect the will of the people. Milton introduced the role of reason in such an institutional transition as follows:

> If men within themselves would be governed by reason, and not generally give up their understanding to a double tyranny, of custom from without, and blind affections within, they would discern better what it is to favour and uphold the tyrant of a nation. But, being slaves within doors, no wonder that they strive so much to have the public state conformably governed to the inward vicious rules by which they govern themselves.
>
> (1848a: 2)

According to Miltonian logic, the human agency which Milton regarded as being bestowed on rational beings meant that Puritans should use reason to define their common values about the perfect rule of life, and seek how to realize the normative agreement in terms of an institutional change from a monarchy to a republic. Thus, the role of the Independent Party in the English Revolution can be understood as a political facet of the Puritan social movement.

The political forces before the revolution were divided into supporters of the King on the one hand, and supporters of Parliament on the other. Among the supporters of Parliament the Independents represented the Puritan movement, while other groups, such as the Presbyterians and the Levellers, backed it for different reasons. It was, however, the Independent Party, under the leadership of Oliver Cromwell, that played the dominant role in the final struggle against the King.

Puritans considered that the Independent Party looked at human agency from a rationalist perspective. As argued by Milner, "In asserting the individual's right to interpret the Bible, Independency in fact denied the validity of all other authorities, and firmly located the source of all truth, all knowledge, in the individual reason. Thus the Protestant appeal to Scripture becomes, in effect, an appeal to the individual reason" (1981: 54). As argued earlier, this appeal to an individual's reason lay at the core of Puritans' shared values regarding the interpretation of the perfect rule of life through the art of discourse, which in turn paved the way for the ethics of tolerance and happiness.

With its political appearance in the Independent Party, the Puritan movement converted its value consensus into political will, especially under the leadership of Cromwell. As Milner points out:

> That Revolutionary Independency, as a political force, was committed to a far-reaching attack on privilege and tradition is almost self-evident. From the initial Parliamentarian opposition to the power of the bishops, and to the abuses of monarchical power, the Independents went on to launch a full-scale attack on the traditional institutions of England. They swept aside the traditionalist structure of the Parliamentarian Army and created the New Model Army, an army which, it its career structure, came as near to establishing "equality of opportunity" as has any subsequent English army; they abolished both the House of Lords and the monarchy … they broke the power of the industrial monopolies and smashed aside the constrains on improving landlordism which the old feudal state machinery had imposed.
>
> (1981: 55)

Once Puritan members of the Independent Party understood that their access to reason enabled them to protest against dominant values, a strong political will was shaped to change dominant institutions as well. It seems that Milton's epistemology played an important role in shaping the Puritan value consensus and the public admiration for the theory of social contract associated with the consensus.

As Haller rightly observes, "The theory of the social contract might be of dubious validity as law or history, but its acceptance by the public which came forward in the Puritan Revolution pointed to the inescapable condition of all government in the age to come" (1955: 353). This conception of the

state also rested upon a doctrine of law, called *common law*, as set forth by Edward Coke.

Haller argues that Coke had been the champion and expounder of the common law as opposed to the courts which depended directly upon the crown. He argued that the essence of law is not the power of state but reason revealing itself continuously in the life of a nation (1955: 70–71). In *From Kingdom to Commonwealth*, Donald Hanson maintains that:

> The traditional political arrangements of the England monarchy reached a stage of crisis in the first decades of the seventeenth century. In seeking a solution, the English people, or rather those who acted in their name, found it necessary to destroy the independent authority of the monarchy, and in doing so they fashioned the modern English state in practice and in theory. … In the seventeenth century the medieval subject became a citizen.
>
> (1970: 26–27)

Hanson recognizes that the decision made by the English to destroy the monarchy was based on civic consciousness and argues that such civic consciousness "did not appear until … a substantial minority of the English people became explicitly aware of the shared and general nature of their status as citizens and the issues that were at stake" (1970: 5), adding that "the development of civic consciousness in seventeenth-century England was the indispensable precondition of the achievement of constitutional government" (ibid.: 354).

Although the mid-seventeenth-century revolution was not successful in terms of establishing a liberal society, it was an important beginning for the gradual rise of such a society in England. As C. B. Macpherson rightly observes:

> It was then, in the course of a protracted struggle in parliament, a civil war, a series of republican experiments, a restoration of the monarchy, and a final constitutional revolution, that the principles which were to become basic to liberal democracy were all developed, though not with equal success at the time. And it is clear that an essential ingredient, both of practical struggle and of the theoretical justifications, was a new belief in the value and the rights of the individual.
>
> (1964: 1)

For critical-rationalist sociology, the English Revolution changed traditional institutions because not only liberal thinkers, but also ordinary people had opened their worldviews and moral beliefs to rational criticism. In other words, people used their critical reason for changing their social fates.

Hence, it would not be wrong to conclude that at the core of the rise of modern society in England is a moral learning from error reflecting in the

ethics of tolerance and a liberal state to protect this tolerance. Thus, this modern society was shaped through a set of normative and institutional changes originating in people's revision of their values and institutions.

The Movement for Independence and the American Revolution

Using critical-rationalist sociology, this section seeks to show how the American Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century originated in liberal ideas, in particular Locke's liberalism. The American Revolution is analyzed as a social change from a colonial society towards a constitutional democracy based on a social agreement concerning mankind's natural right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. While the English Revolution in the mid-seventeenth century was not sufficiently successful to establish a truly liberal society, the American Revolution effectively created a liberal democracy.

Social Problems of Colonial Society

Between the 1760s and 1780s America experienced profound social change in the transition from a colonial society to a liberal society. In order to address the question of how liberal thought provided the American revolutionary movement with an intellectual base and why the rise of such a liberal society rested on a value consensus on 'natural rights' to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, the social problem faced by the American colonies must be identified.

Bernard Bailyn describes the situation in the American colonies prior to the revolution in the 1780s thus:

> previous to the Revolution the political experience of the colonial Americans had been roughly analogous to that of the English. Control of public authority had been firmly held by a native aristocracy—merchants and landlords in the North, planters in the South—allied, commonly, with British officialdom. By restricting representation in the provincial assemblies, limiting the franchise, and invoking the restrictive power of the English state, this aristocracy had dominated the governmental machinery of the mainland colonies. … But the control of this colonial counterpart of a traditional aristocracy, with its Old World ideas of privilege and hierarchy, orthodoxy in religious establishment, and economic inequality, was progressively threatened by the growing strength of a native, frontier-bred democracy that expressed itself most forcefully in the lower houses of the "rising" provincial assemblies. A conflict between the two groups and ways of life was building up, and it broke out in fury after 1765.

(1962: 340)

Given the situation of American colonies, an important difference between the social problems in the traditional English society of the mid–seventeenth century and the American colonies of the eighteenth century is recognizable. Whereas the conflict of opinions and interests in England was an internal one between the King and Parliament, the conflict in America was one between the Parliament of British Empire and the colonies' lower houses in the emerging provincial assemblies. Nevertheless, the similar nature of both cases can be perceived in the conflict that originated in a systematic violation of people's natural right to determine their own social fates. In England, the King had such illegitimate dealings with the people; in America, the British Parliament treated the inhabitants of the American colonies in a similar manner.

Therefore, it is not surprising that liberal thought, in particular Locke's notion of the right of revolution, was applicable in both cases in order to inform social movements and the masses how to liberate themselves from illegitimate governance and to build a democratic society. In brief, Locke's idea of the right of revolution was employed by the American Revolution to mobilize the colonies against the British Empire. In this revolution, normative consensus on natural right played a significant role. In a sense, the normative force of natural right helped the movement for independence to justify the American Revolution.

Liberal Thought and the Movement for Independent

Merle Curti introduces Locke's intellectual role in shaping the logic of American revolutionists thus:

> Political thought both before and during the American Revolution was profoundly affected by the *Two Treatises on Civil Government*. Otis, John and Samuel Adams, and other leading revolutionists quoted "the great Mr. Locke" reverently; Franklin, Hamilton, and Jefferson read and praised him. His natural-rights philosophy, including the doctrine that all government rests on the consent of the governed and may be overthrown by revolution if it persistently violates individual life, liberty, and property, was incorporated in the Declaration of Independence itself.
>
> (1937: 107)

However, the systematic influence of Locke's thought on the American Revolution can be explored by addressing the question of why the movement for independence required Locke's theory of the right of revolution, not only for showing that the Parliament in England had imposed a state of war on the colonists, but also for advocating a political revolution to overthrow the British tyranny.

In this sense, Locke's influence on the American Revolution was not just limited to the Declaration of Independence or to quotations by leading revolutionists. Locke's social philosophy facilitates an understanding of how a

social movement with the goal of freedom from British tyranny could be justified by the rise of a value consensus on the natural rights to liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Hence, the American Revolution was no more than a transition from the state of war to the state of political society.

As discussed above, Locke used the three key terms, namely the *state of nature*, the *state of war*, and the *state of civil society*, to address the following questions: (a) why people live together in the state of nature out of respect for their equal natural rights based on an implicit moral consensus, (b) how tyranny violates people's natural rights in the state of an imposed war, and (c) why people are entitled to the natural right to defend themselves against tyranny which threatens their liberty and happy life.

On these premises, the movement for independence required Locke's philosophy of natural rights, which implied that the state of war imposed on the colonies by the English Parliament could be altered into a state of civil life by means of revolution if people recognized that they had such natural rights which were violated by external tyranny. Basically, the people in the colonies had to arrive at a normative consensus on their natural rights. As Bailyn argues:

> the final conclusion of the colonists' logic could be drawn not with regret but with joy. For while everyone knew that when tyranny is abroad "submission is a crime"; while they readily acknowledged that "no obedience is due to arbitrary, unconstitutional edicts calculated to enslave a free people"; and while they knew that the invasion of the liberties of the people "constitutes a state of war with the people" who may properly use "all the power which God has given them" to protect themselves— nevertheless they hesitated to come to a final separation even after Lexington and Bunker Hill.
>
> (1992: 141–142)

Once the colonists had accepted that their natural rights had been violated by the British Empire, they were prepared to become involved in the social change necessary for regaining their natural rights to pursue liberty and happiness. To this objective, the colonists should open their traditional worldviews and moral beliefs to criticism in order to accept that such a violation of natural rights had actually occurred and had to be protested through social revolution.

A Normative Agreement on Natural Rights

Independence from Britain required a value consensus upon which people could be mobilized to alter the state of war into one of civil life. The movement for independence used the normative power of natural rights to prepare the ground for the rise of a rational consensus on liberal values of tolerance and the pursuit of happiness, as already provided by Locke.

The leaders of the movement understood that political change was impossible without a change in the *moral base* of colonial society. As Baliyn quotes from a letter written by John Adams to Hezekiah Niles: "But what do we mean by the American Revolution? Do we mean the American war? The Revolution was effected before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people, a change in their religious sentiments, of their duties and obligations ... This radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the people was the real American Revolution" (1992: 160). The preceding argument shows that it was hardly surprising that the movement for independence concentrated on the natural right to create this moral base for the Revolution.

If all people are entitled to the equal moral right to determine the good life due to access to reason, natural rights have to be situated at the core of the value consensus necessary for the Revolution. Hence, the leaders of the movement referred to natural rights in their efforts to promote change in the colonists' minds. As argued by Charles Mullett in *Coke and the American Revolution*, in order to make the colonists aware of their natural rights, colonial pamphleteers quoted the "political saint of England," especially Edward Coke, who held a place of honor in the revolutionary writings of Jefferson and Adams (1932: 457–458).

Thus, the colonists gradually recognized the concept of natural right and understood that the British Parliament, in which they had no voice, violated their natural rights. As Mullett observes, "by the law of nature non-English subjects of the king were beyond the power of Parliament. ... John Adams was more single-minded in his reading of Coke ... From him Adams gained the belief that common law was common right, and the subject's best birthright, and without it there was no right" (1932: 463, 469). The colonists were thus persuaded to protest against the British Parliament in order to regain their natural rights once they had arrived at a value consensus that their ideal birthright was the right to determine their own good life. Accordingly, a change from dependence to independence required them to open their old worldview and moral beliefs to rational criticism. Upon becoming aware of their natural rights, the colonists agreed on the central values of equal rights to liberty, life, and the pursuit of happiness. As Leon Dion observes:

> the doctrine of natural law intrinsically constitutes an integrated structure which is apt to exert far-reaching influences on the minds, conceptions, and attitudes of those people who commit themselves to its tenets ... By substituting the rule of reason for the ties of kinship and ancestor worship and an objective set of values for the tribal tabus, natural law furnishes the basis for a wider and less constrained consensus on the new existential order ... When natural law is conceived as a guiding model, its revolutionary possibilities will at once be obvious to the politically oppressed people and it will be logically transformed into a theory of natural rights. The search for the best régime will then yield to the demand for a

legitimate and more moral government …The doctrine of natural law, well designed to meet the needs of the moment, permitted the transformation of many unrelated arguments of opposition into a system … It even permitted the colonies to overcome their reluctance to make a direct attack on the King with whom they recognized themselves bound by contract. Neither Parliament, nor constitution, nor King, but consent, was now held to be basis of society and government.

(1957: 231–233)

Unsurprisingly, "John Adams later remarked that the main problem was to get thirteen revolutionary movements into unified action. To attain that objective, the first condition was a compelling general issue and the second a common definition of that issue. The British imperial policy after 1763 supplied the first condition; the doctrine of natural law or, better termed, doctrine of natural rights, the second" (Dion 1957: 235). Dion states: "When delegates from nine provinces assembled in New York for the Stamp Act Congress … it was evident to all that a common basis of understanding was needed if arguments were to be presented and views and petitions decided on. Gadsden from South Carolina successfully suggested that all sections and people could concur in opposing the Stamp Act by discussing and presenting their views 'in the broad, common ground' of natural rights" (ibid.: 235). In this sense, natural rights became the foundation of a normative consensus on how movements and people should be united to protest against the British Empire.

According to Lockean logic, the transition from dependence to independence during the American Revolution required a value consensus on natural rights among the various revolutionary movements and people engaged in the Revolution in the different American colonies. Following the same line of thought, Curti observes, "True, the *Treatises of Civil Government* was seldom cited in the Constitutional Convention of 1787; but the cardinal doctrine that the people in themselves constitute a power superior to the government, that government may be dissolved without affecting civil society, had great weight in the minds of the men assembled in 1787 at Philadelphia to frame a new constitution, and was also a powerful factor in the fundamental assumptions of those who made and revised state constitutions" (1937: 135). Similarly, Sacvan Bercovitch argues that "Uprising in America meant the progress through revolution of 'the people' at large. It stood for a national consensus that rose above racial, economic, or sectional divisions, and that revealed itself, with rising clarity, in struggle against an oppressive Old World" (1976: 603). This value consensus on the natural right to pursue what people believe to be the good life makes the institutional change from a colonial society to liberal society in America understandable.

The American Republic: An Institutional Change

The value consensus on natural rights was transformed into a political force for turning a colonial society into an independent republic. The American colonists used not only Locke's theory of the right of revolution to free themselves from the British Empire, but also Locke's theory of the social contract to create an American Republic based on their shared values, i.e., the pursuit of happiness and tolerance of difference. As Bailyn observes, "In America, where the character of the people was ideal for the attainment of liberty, institutions should be devised that conformed not to inherited prejudices and the accidents of history but to the true principles of human liberty. Let the American colonies cast off the chains that tie them to England and its corrupt monarchy, and as independent states create unicameral assemblies chosen annually by a 'more equal' system of representation than heretofore and presided over by 'a president only'" (1992: 286). This demonstrates that the people of colonies had agreed on the creation of a new social order based on liberal values and natural law.

As Gertrude Himmelfarb notes, "In his insistence on natural rights and a contract between the people and the government, Jefferson may be thought of as a discipline of Locke" (2008: 200). As a founding father of the American Republic, Jefferson employed Locke's ideas to defend the right of revolution on the basis of liberal values.

In *The Creation of the American Republic*, Gordon Wood points out that "Americans needed some new contractual analogy to explain their evolving relationships among themselves and with the state. Only a social agreement among the people, only such a Lockean contract, seemed to make sense of their rapidly developing idea of a constitution as a fundamental law designed by the people to be separated from and controlling of all the institutions of government" (1969: 283). This interpretation of the influence of Locke's theory of social contract on the institutional design of the American Republic reveals how the value consensus on natural rights operated as a moral base for the rise of a new social order with fundamental law to protect the ultimate values: *tolerance of difference and the pursuit of happiness.*

Another outcome of revolution was that the legal and political institutions of the new republic facilitated economic change towards a market economy. As J. Franklin Jameson argues:

> The stream of revolution, once started, could not be confined within narrow banks, but spread abroad upon the land. Many economic desires, many social aspirations were set free by the political struggle, many aspects of colonial society profoundly altered by the forces thus let loose. The relations of social classes to each other, the institution of slavery, the system of land-holding, the course of business … all felt the transforming hand of revolution.

> (1967: 9)

In short, the recognition of people's natural rights paved the way for granting them greater equal opportunities to pursue their own well-being. Viewed from the perspective of critical-rationalist sociology, the social change from a colonial to a liberal society occurred because intellectuals, social movements, and ordinary people had opened their worldviews and values to criticism and recognized that their natural rights had be institutionalized through a social contract between the people and state. By defining natural rights as the fundamental law of society, this legal change laid the groundwork for the rise of a political democracy, i.e., a federation of republican states under the leadership of one elected president. Natural rights included the right to possess private property, and the republic states as the guardians of this right provided a legal foundation for the transformation of the colonial economy into a market economy.

It is not unreasonable to posit that the emerging economic welfare originated in the social institutions created by the revolution under the influence of Locke's theories of natural rights and social contract.

Unfinished Modernity: From a Liberal to an Open Society

These two examples of important modern-age social revolutions show that the transition from a traditional to liberal society was both a normative and an institutional change. However, the question remains as to whether liberal society is actually modernity's final destination or rather an unfinished project defined as unfulfilled social change from a liberal society to an open society.

Using the critical-rationalist model of social change, this section discusses modernity's unfinished project in a sociological theory of the open society. An examination of Popper's theory of the open society reveals its failure to address the question of how a closed society can be transformed into an open society and the problematics of liberal society. Moreover, John Rawls's political liberalism is discussed to show what is wrong with one of the most sophisticated redefinitions of the conception of liberal society in the twentieth century. On the basis of the preceding arguments, the critical sociology of open society is introduced to argue how individuals' access to reason enables them to criticize the ethics of tolerance in favor of ethics of openness to criticism as the moral foundation for institutional change from a liberal to an open society.

It is noteworthy that Hans Albert uses the philosophy of critical rationalism to offer a similar interpretation of the unfinished project of Enlightenment. As observed by C. Fred Alford in *Hans Albert and the Unfinished Enlightenment*, "The completion of the Enlightenment would involve, according to Albert, the widespread recognition that the principles of fallibility and provisionally are applicable to almost all practices, not just science … The completion of the Enlightenment would involve the recognition that institutions that foster criticism are conductive to effective action in almost all areas of life" (1987: 458).

Is a Liberal Society an Open Society?

The unfinished project of modernity can be better understood by questioning whether a liberal society is an open society. An explanation of the failure of liberal society to fulfill the objective of an open social order leads to definition of the social change from a liberal to an open society. Subsequently, a critique of liberal society helps us to better understand the sociological meaning of an open society.

Critical-rationalist sociology plays two roles simultaneously in providing a critical sociology of modernity. On the one hand, it argues that liberal society has been created via the normative and institutional openness of traditional society to rational criticism, while on the other hand it argues that liberal society can be improved by opening its value consensus and social institutions to rational criticism. Critical-rationalist sociology fulfills these two functions due to the fact that it is based on a theory of rationality having the main premise that people who open their beliefs to criticism can learn from their own mistaken premises. Similarly to traditional society, liberal society is a human-made social order and as such must be regarded as imperfect and capable of being improved. The mechanism for progress in social development is the discovery of the faulty premises in the liberal society's values and institutions.

Learning from mistaken premises not only makes it possible to detect the reason why liberal society suffers from social problems, but also to show how an open society can prevent such problems from arising. In essence, social problems are a sign that an open society remains an unfulfilled project for modernity.

According to the epistemology of liberal society, a key premise for consensus on liberal values, i.e., tolerance of difference and the pursuit of happiness, is people's inability to use reason to judge ultimate values or the content of the good life. Hence, moral freedom is defined by liberals as the ethical liberty to choose what might be the good life, without any objective standard for such a moral choice. From the nonjustificational perspective, liberals think that the content of the good life cannot be judged on the basis of objective or rational criteria which seek *justifier evidence* to evaluate competing doctrines of the good life. Liberals find no epistemic possibility, of there being an objective meaning for the good life, and thus are led to tolerance of difference and the pursuit of subjective happiness.

This makes it understandable why the main premise of a rational consensus on liberal values may be wrong. According to the philosophy of critical rationalism proposed by Bartley, people are able to rationalize their ultimate values or moral claims regarding the good life by subjecting them to rational criticism. There is no need to look for justifier evidence, so no infinite regress is involved and critical reason can be used to assess opposing doctrines of the good life and a rational solution for a conflict of opinions regarding the ultimate values can be found.

This epistemic critique of the subjectivity of ultimate values in a liberal society leads to the objective ethics of an open society, which, in turn paves the way for the introduction of a sociological conception of open society. Liberal people who change their moral attitude about the impossibility of an objective meaning for the good life can arrive at a new normative agreement termed here as the *ethics of openness to criticism*. The central role of normative agreement in a theory of society provides grounds for not only understanding why, sociologically speaking, a liberal society is not an open society, but also for defining open society itself.

In short, a liberal society is not an open society because its value consensus is different from normative agreement in an open society. Arguments concerning a transition from tolerance of difference to openness to criticism follow later; for the purpose of the present argument, however, it suffices to say that a liberal society does not fulfill the objectives of an open social order because its citizens do not agree to use their critical reason in the determination of their ultimate values and thus accept the pursuit of subjective happiness, for which there is no rational standard, which points out the irrationality or the *rationality deficit* of liberal social order.

Given this background, the next sub-section addresses the reason why Popper is unable to provide us with a sociological conception of open society because he does not use the notion of rationality as openness to criticism in order to conceptualize open society.

Formation of an Open Society: Popper's Problematic Analysis

Critical-rationalist sociology is used here to address an empirical question of how traditional society was changed to liberal society because it had opened its values and institutions to rational criticism. Now, critical-rationalist sociology addresses a normative question of how to transform a liberal society into an open society as the unfinished project of modernity. However, before the attempt to offer a sociological theory of transition from liberal to open society, Popper's analysis of such a social transition will be referred to briefly in order to demonstrate that he did not employ his critical philosophy sufficiently in his presentation of the social meaning of open society and its substantive difference from liberal society.

In Chapter 2 Popper's critical rationalism was examined in some detail. In this section, his analysis of how a closed society can be transformed into an open society is discussed briefly to show that his theory of open society does not make a clear distinction between liberal and open society and that the main reason it is unable to provide a normative critique of liberal society based on the ideal of open society is his definition of critical rationalism as *irrational faith in reason*.

Popper addresses the question of the transition of a closed society to an open one in two ways. He argues that "the transition from the closed to the open society can be described as one of the deepest revolutions through which

mankind has passed … Greeks started for us that great revolution which, it seems, is still in its beginning" (1945: 167). He argues that, of course, this revolution was not made consciously. "The breakdown of tribalism, of the closed societies of Greece, may be traced back to the time when population growth began to make itself felt among the ruling class of landed proprieties" (ibid.: 167). As Ian Jarvie observes:

> Popper suggests that population pressure created tension within the ruling class, presumably in a struggle for spoils, and was meliorated by the creation of daughter cities or colonies. But cultural contact and commerce created even more stress, as non-traditional classes, including foreigners, appeared on the scene to disrupt the order of things. By the sixth century there were revolutions and reactions, the birth of free thought and clear evidence of the strain of civilisation. The strain comes from the demands made on the citizen by the breakdown of the closed society: to be rational, to think for themselves, to be autonomous, and above all to take responsibility for the way things are.
>
> (2001: 147)

Although the rise of an open society is not perceived as a man-made social change in this version of Popper's analysis of the transition to an open society, paradoxically, it demands individuals to be rational and take responsibility for their ways of social life. Since Popper defines critical rationality as irrational faith in reason, he is unable to argue that open society is shaped when critical reason is used to take responsibility for social change. However, Popper states:

> it seems to be possible to give some useful criterion of the transition from the closed society to the open. The transition takes place when social institutions are first consciously recognized as man-made, and when their conscious alteration is discussed in terms of their suitability for the achievement of human aims or purposes. Or, putting the matter in a less abstract way, the closed society breaks down when the supernatural awe with which the social order is considered gives way to active interference, and to the conscious pursuit of personal or group interests.
>
> (1945: 613)

This interpretation of Popper's analysis of the formation of an open society considers people to be the forces behind the transformation of a closed to an open society once they have recognized that the closed society cannot meet their aims. However, it is not clear how people use reason to change social institutions. If it is not individuals' access to reason that drives their moral choice for an open society, it cannot be argued that people have used reason in their discovery of why a closed society cannot meet their goals. People cannot consciously change a closed society into an open one without having

recognized, first, that they have consciously criticized their own normative agreement in the closed society, and, second, that they have consciously agreed on the need for replacing that normative agreement with a new value consensus. However, Popper's irrational faith in reason permits neither of these options because consciousness of criticism and change require rational, rather than irrational, faith in reason.

Jarvie argues that "Popper holds that the difference between science and magic is not their *ideas* but the *attitude* adopted to the ideas. … Science and its rationality are an attitude to, a way we treat, ideas. … Under Popper's hand this model of science is transformed into a model for society in general. … A society which adopts such an attitude to itself and its components is an open society, and a paradigm for the open society is the open institution of science" (2001: 145–147). Given this clarification, Popper's social theory of open society implies that the transition from a closed to an open society occurs once people have changed their closed moral attitudes to open ones. However, Popper's answer to why people change their moral attitude is that no explanation can be given except that this has occurred through a moral choice. This kind of explanation does not clarify how people can use critical reason to question the existing moral attitudes. As argued in Chapter 4, the ultimate origin of moral choices remains unclear, as was the case in Kant's moral philosophy.

If Popper's theory of the open society is correct, no scientific explanation of this transition from a closed to an open society can be found because the social change is merely a matter of moral choice unaided by human reason. Critical-rationalist theory of society, however, introduces people's access to reason as the driving force for transition from a closed to an open society due to individual members of the closed society being able to criticize the dominate values of the existing social order in favor of the values of open society.

Popper does not offer a sociological analysis of the formation of an open society because he does not use the model of science, according to which moral attitudes, similarly to scientific hypotheses, can be regarded as conjectures for solving social problems. From a sociological perspective, the social transition from a closed to an open society requires that first of all that closed moral attitudes are opened to rational criticism. On the basis of such a value change, it is then possible to argue that social institutions are consciously discussed and that conscious alteration justified via moral dialogue paves the way for institutional change from a closed to an open society.

In Chapter 4 the micro-forces of such a *macro social change* were introduced in a critical-rationalist theory of human action based on Bartley's theory of rationality, which is premised on an analogy between the model of science and that of rationality. As stated by Agassi *et al.*, "Popper has equated the empirical character of scientific theories with their refutability … Analogously, Bartley has equated rationality with openness to criticism" (1971: 45). Unlike Popper's irrational faith in reason, however, Bartley's theory of rationality demonstrates that people use their critical reason to

question the dominant values of a closed society, thus facilitating a scientific explanation of the transition from a closed to an open society. Rational reconstruction of the trains of thought and action opened to criticism through critical reason is used in this model of social change to examine historical processes which brought about social learning for the transition from a traditional to a liberal society. The model of social change is now used to define the unfinished project of modernity as an unfulfilled social change from a liberal to an open society.

The lack of a sociological ideal type of open society in which normative agreement about the ethics of openness to criticism clearly plays a central role, Popper cannot argue how an open society might differ from a liberal society, for it is this moral foundation of an open society based on rational criticism which leads to the discovery of the way in which liberal ethics of tolerance and happiness are the factors which distinguish an open society from a liberal society.

Mario Bunge's argument is not surprising: "Popper's social philosophy lacks a theory about social order because he has neither a theory of society nor a positive moral philosophy. All Popper's social philosophy does is admonish us to replace the substantive traditional question 'Who shall be the rulers?' with the procedural question 'How can we tame them?' In other words, Popper's conception and defense of liberty and democracy is limited to law and politics" (1996: 551). The comment can be added that Popper's social philosophy does not address the way in which liberal values of tolerance and happiness have shaped social institutions in liberal society, such as natural rights, liberal state, and market economy.

Against this background, Popper should not be expected to be capable of providing a critique of liberal society from the perspective of open society. In fact, Popper's discussion does not involve any notable differences between a liberal and an open society. In *Popper's Open Society after 50 Years*, Jarvie and Pralong state:

> Since our knowledge of what is virtuous is conjectural, like all our knowledge, it would be dogmatic and risky to shape society according to one recipe. However, a liberal and secular society can accommodate within it almost all experiments in ways of living, in cultivation of the virtues that different groups wish to advocate. A plural, secular order is a means to guard against catastrophic mistakes.
>
> (2003: xviii)

If this is correct, what is the difference between a liberal society and an open society? If the terms *liberal society* and *open society* are just two names for one social reality, i.e., *modern society*, what does the idea of open society add to the concept of modern liberal society?

Towards a Sociological Theory of Open Society

In this closing section of Chapter 5, the argument is presented that the unfinished project of modernity can be redefined in the context of social transition from a liberal to an open society. It has also been argued that the sociological conception of open society can be used to develop a critical sociology of liberal society.

The social theory of open society not only criticizes the existing liberal social order, but also shows how it can be altered into an open society based on the model of social change introduced here. Prior to the formulation of such a social theory of open society, however, Rawls's political liberalism is discussed briefly in order to elucidate why liberal society originates in a false epistemological premise reflected in Rawls's notion of incommensurable doctrines of the good life.

An Epistemic Critique of Rawls's Liberal Society

John Rawls uses his influential notion of *political liberalism* to provide a new analysis of liberal society in order to deal with the problem in the twentieth century which is more or less similar to the one faced by Milton and Locke in the seventeenth century. Rawls points out that "the historical origin of political liberalism … is the Reformation and its aftermath, with the long controversies over religious tolerance in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries" (1993: xxiv). Although Rawls's political liberalism is a significant contribution to understanding liberal society, it does not change the essence of the ethic of tolerance of difference which allows peaceful coexistence of opposing doctrines of the good life and pursuit of individual subjective values. Rawls's theory of liberal society is based on a *political conception of justice* with the same central premise that individuals are not capable of using their reason to make judgments about the good life and create objective common values.

Nevertheless, Rawls persuasively argues that *reasonable*, rather than *rational* people can create fair terms for social cooperation to allow opposing doctrines of the good life to pursue their own subjective values. In *Political Liberalism*, Rawls argues that his theory of liberal society addresses the following question: "How is it possible that there can be a stable and just society whose free and equal citizens are deeply divided by conflicting and even incommensurable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?" (1993: 133). Rawls's solution is that such a liberal society can be established when reasonable individuals arrive at an overlapping consensus on the political conception of justice to manage their opposing doctrines with all people having the freedom to pursue their own doctrines (ibid.: 134). From a sociological view, Rawls's central thesis can be described as follows: reasonable people who cannot rationally make judgments on the meaning of the good life are, however, capable of using their practical reason to create an *overlapping consensus* on a political concept of justice in order to recognize their equal right

to liberty and equality. In sum, reasonable people can achieve a normative consensus on the toleration of each other's comprehensive doctrines of the good life by agreeing that society should pay particular attention to meeting the needs of those who are most disadvantaged.

Whereas Rawls calls his introduction of an overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice, rather than a moral consensus, it actually requires that opposing doctrines reach an overlapping normative agreement on a plural meaning of the good life. Without such a moral agreement, it is not clear why opposing doctrines should arrive at such a political consensus instead of fighting against each other to impose their comprehensive doctrines of the good life. Before an attempt can be made to show that Rawls's political liberalism rests on the assumption of the moral ability of individuals to shape overlapping consensus, the central epistemological premises of his notion of a liberal society of free and equal individuals must be examined.

It can be argued that Rawls establishes his theory of liberal society with its political conception of justice on the basis of the following epidemiological premise, which has not yet received much attention:

> I noted what it means to say that a conception of justice is supported by an overlapping consensus. It means that it is supported by a consensus including the opposing religious, philosophical and moral doctrines likely to thrive over generations in the society effectively regulated by that conception of justice. These opposing doctrines we assume to involve conflicting and indeed *incommensurable comprehensive conceptions of the meaning, values and purpose of human life (or conceptions of the good)*, and there are no resources within the political view to judge those conflicting conceptions. … Yet despite the fact that there are opposing comprehensive conceptions affirmed in society, there is no difficulty as to how an overlapping consensus may exist.
>
> <div align="right">(1987: 9, emphasis added)</div>

In view of Locke's argument implying that the premises of opposing opinions are questionable, one is driven to ask why opposing comprehensive doctrines should be considered incommensurable. Although Rawls does not explicitly answer this, it can be assumed that it is the claim of having already justified their opinions that renders the doctrines incommensurable and unable to be debated in an open dialogue which might require them to consider the premises of their doctrines questionable and their conclusions unjustified.

Rawls bases his political liberalism on the fundamental epistemological premise that opposing comprehensive doctrines cannot rationally solve their moral dispute on the meaning of the good life due to the lack of resources within the existing political viewpoint to judge the conflicting doctrines rationally. As will be seen, this epistemological premise is reflected in Rawls's distinction between a *reasonable* person and a *rational* person, which is central to his

argument about the possibility of reaching an overlapping consensus on the political conception of justice.

Since Rawls does not admit the questionability of the premises of opposing doctrines or that their conclusions may be found to be unjustified, opening these premises to criticism means that he can no longer claim that comprehensive doctrines do not enter into a rational dialogue to overcome moral dispute about the meaning of the good life. Put simply, Rawls's idea of political liberalism ignores an epistemological solution to the problem of opposing opinions on the grounds of his assumption that comprehensive doctrines are incommensurable. Consequently, it is not difficult to see that, from the very beginning, Rawls's conception of liberal society wrongly assumes that there is no *rational* solution to a conflict of opinions.

Nevertheless, Rawls does look for a *reasonable* solution. To this end, he defines a hypothetical *original situation* which enables him to abstract individuals from the social conditions in which they exist by what he calls "the veil of ignorance" (1993: 23). In this original situation, people are regarded as possessors of moral capacities that allow them to agree on a political conception of justice defined by the two following principles: "a. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basis rights and liberties … b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunities; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society" (ibid,: 5–6).

Keeping the two principles of his political notion of justice in mind, Rawls argues that two moral capacities exist which enable individuals to turn these principles into a social contract which reflects an overlapping consensus among opposing comprehensive doctrines of the good life. These two moral powers are the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a concept of the good life (1993: 19). As observed by Clark Wolf, "The two moral powers are crucial elements of Rawls's conception of citizens as 'free and equal'… The capacity for a sense of justice is necessary since it is one of the capacities that make social cooperation possible. … And the capacity to adopt, rationally revise, and pursue a conception of the good is among the most important constitutions of the conception of citizens as free" (Davion and Wolf 2000: 105). Parallel to these moral capacities, Rawls defines two notions of a reasonable and rational person on the basis of which people belonging to opposing comprehensive doctrines can arrive at an overlapping consensus on the two principles of justice without having to accept a common account of the good life or ultimate values. In this sense, Rawls's liberal society is, morally speaking, a pluralistic modern society in which liberalism is just one comprehensive doctrine of the good life. What is the substantive difference between the political conception of justice and the ethic of tolerance of difference? Rawls seems to make it clear that an overlapping political consensus among opposing doctrines of the good life is possible, whereas liberals had not provided such a sophisticated explanation for this possibility. Yet in terms

of the substance of liberal values, Rawls follows the central epistemological assumption of liberalism that human reason cannot judge the ultimate values of human life objectively.

According to Rawls, rational people adopt means to achieve given goals and adjust them in the light of their life plans. However, Rawls does not argue that such people are capable of rationalizing their ultimate values. If it is reason that makes this possible, Rawls must assume that people can use reason to define the meaning of the good life. Political liberalism, however, focuses on how practical reason is employed to define fair terms for social cooperation, rather than a rational conception of the good life. Hence, Rawls uses the notion of *reasonable people* to defend his notion of overlapping consensus among incommensurable doctrines of the good life. According to Rawls, reasonable people seek fair terms of social cooperation with others and expect people living in free institutions to disagree on fundamental matters of religion, morality or philosophy. *Unreasonable people*, however, lack one or both of these attitudes (Rawls 1993:48–54). Using these definitions of rational and reasonable people, Rawls bases his idea of liberal society on the conception of reasonable rather than rational people. According to Rawls, reasonable comprehensive doctrines can arrive at such an overlapping consensus. Hence, doctrines which are unreasonable from his perspective are excluded from his idea of a liberal society.

In short, Rawls's assumption that doctrines of the good life are incommensurable allows no scope for the argument that rational people can open the premises of their competing doctrines to mutual criticism in order to attain an overlapping consensus on the good life and to establish a peaceful social order. His definition of rational people is restricted to those who possess the moral ability either to find effective means for given goals or to revise such goals in terms of their overall life plan. Meanwhile, his political liberalism has not changed the existing ethics of tolerance of difference in liberal society. However, through clarifying the way in which a liberal value consensus might have evolved and what streams of thought might underpin it, Rawls has actually prepared the ground for an epistemological critique of the ultimate values of liberalism.

From a Liberal to an Open Society: Opening Epistemology and Worldview

On the basis of the model for social change proposed here, social transition from a closed to an open society begins with an openness of worldview that originates in epistemological change. A liberal society is more open than a traditional society, but it can become even more open provided that its value consensus recognizes that ultimate values can be judged objectively. In this section, it is argued that such a value change requires parallel changes in the epistemology and worldview of liberal society.

As argued above, liberals such as Milton and Locke changed their epistemologies in order to uncover defects in the old worldview. They rightly understood that the traditional worldview was deterministic in terms of lacking scope for human free will because it did not recognize mankind's access to reason as the agent of social change. Milton and Locke argued that, for people who realize that their God-given faculties of reason should be used to discover the meaning of the universe, a new worldview emerges once the power of self-determination power is recognized.

Having said that, what epistemological critique of liberal worldview could lead to an epistemology of open society? In order to address this question, the main problem with a liberal worldview must be exposed. As argued earlier, liberal people have acknowledged their human agency in a non-deterministic universe in which they can know and pursue their good life and build a liberal social order based on their liberal values. However, they have not yet utilized their critical reason to define a common meaning for the good life. The liberal worldview is still closed in terms of the agency defined for the determination of social destiny through the rationalization of ultimate aims. If, however, the epistemological standard of justification is shifted to criticism, the ground will be prepared for a parallel shift from a liberal worldview to an open one in which people determine their ultimate goals by making objective judgments about them.

Although liberal epistemology accepts that access to reason enables people to be independent agents capable of exercising their free will to determine their social fates, this access to reason is not expanded to include the ability to define the ultimate values of a decent life. Hence, for liberalism, reason cannot be used to judge the content of the good life. As shown in the case of Rawls's liberalism, for instance, the need for an overlapping consensus on opposing accounts of the good life originates in the premise that incommensurable doctrines cannot enter into an open dialogue to solve their moral dispute regarding the content of the good life.

Accordingly, an epistemological change from the standard of justification to one of criticism is required, as argued in detail in Chapter 2, in order to grant a truly human agency to people who want to use their reason in order to exercise their free will so that they can know and pursue their good life. This epistemological shift then prepares the ground for a parallel shift from a liberal to an open worldview. In a sense, the unfinished project of modernity requires an epistemic shift from justification to criticism for the rise of an open worldview according to which human reason can be employed for the definition and pursuit of the good life.

Epistemology of open society implies that, despite being unable to justify their accounts of the good life, people can get nearer to the truth of the good life by means of conjecture and refutation inspired by the model of science. Despite justificational epistemology, Bartley's theory of rationality leads us to see why opposing doctrines of the good life can act as a social framework for refutation of moral conjectures about the good life. As in the method of

scientific discovery, open-minded people can enter into a moral dialogue to test what might be wrong with the premises and conclusions of opposing doctrines of the good life and can say to each other, "I may be wrong, you may be right; let us discuss our opposing conjectures of the good life, allowing their premises to be questioned, in order to get nearer to the moral truth of a good life".

Given this epistemological shift, the unfinished project of modernity regarding social transition from a liberal to an open society calls for an ontological shift. If people's faculties of reason do not devote sufficient agency to discovering that they themselves are the authors of their content of the good life, their worldviews are not yet open enough to situate their free wills in its non-deterministic universe. Whereas a liberal worldview prepares the ground for a liberal moral philosophy according to which people's reason cannot be used to judge the content of the good life, an open society, on the other hand, rests on an open worldview leading to ethics of openness to criticism according to which people can apply the model of science to get neater to the moral truth of a good life via intersubjective criticism. The sociological theory of the open society thus rests upon nonjustificational epistemology implying that the liberal worldview must be opened to criticism in order for people to exercise free will through their access to critical reason.

A Value Shift from Tolerance to Rational Dialogue

Having accepted that their liberal worldviews regarding mankind's inability to use reason in order to know the good life has limited their human agency, people are prepared to transform their worldviews anew. Accordingly, they are capable of using reason to discover the meaning of the good life through the method of conjecture and refutation, as implied in the scientific model.

In contrast to liberal ethics of tolerance underpinned by liberal epistemology and worldview, the moral philosophy of open society is defined by nonjustificational epistemology and metaphysics. As will be argued, this points towards a substantive difference between the ultimate values of liberal and open societies.

A critical theory of liberal society must reflect its problematic value consensus, i.e., the implication that people are free to identify what they mean by a good life, but cannot use their reason to defend their moral choices through argument. As Rawls's interpretation of liberalism shows, individual members of liberal society are always faced with a reasonable choice between opposing doctrines of the good life without any objective criterion and thus cannot use their reason to discover the meaning of the good life, so their accounts of the good life remain subjective and personal. At best they can arrive at a reasonable consensus on tolerance of opposing doctrines of the good life.

The tolerance of difference refers to *unsocial sociability* because it offers no objective social norms according to which people can evaluate their personal conjectures from an intersubjective perspective. The term unsocial sociability,

as used by Kant, means that liberal people have joined together to build a society with no moral maxim except for tolerance of others because their opposing doctrines of the good life cannot be judged on an objective standard. In order to pursue their personal interests, people are not prevented from regarding others as the means to their own ends.

According to critical-rationalist sociology, however, a system of ultimate values can be the source of social integration, but also the origin of social crisis. The ethics of tolerance of difference have enabled liberal people to deal with their moral disputes regarding the good life via an overlapping consensus, which means that nobody can impose her or his understanding of the good life on others. This is significant progress; yet tolerance of difference does not prevent people from experiencing systematic errors in their understanding of the good life since it has not provided them with an objective standard for the avoidance of false moral choices.

Rational reconstruction of a liberal person's moral choice under the condition of tolerance of difference demonstrates that such a person has enough moral freedom to choose one of the available doctrines of the good life, but also that there is no objective criterion in terms of a set of social norms to inform him or her how to avoid a false choice. Hence, he or she must choose one doctrine among many, but cannot argue that his or her choice has not been a wrong one. Hence, the moral choice remains purely subjective. In *Morality and Modernity*, Ross Poole recognizes this problem with liberal ethics:

> Liberalism has given up trying to discover what constitutes the good life; it leaves this in the domain of individual choice. It has limited itself to providing a theory of justice. … Underlying the liberal emphasis on the freedom of people to choose their own conception of the good is *the failure of liberalism to confront the arbitrariness of this freedom where people are devoid of standards to inform their choosing*. The reality to which this freedom is subject is the process of rationalisation and the socially imposed goals of consumption and power. … Nihilism arises in part through the collapse of objective values and the incapacity of individuals to provide their own. It is the emptiness of absolute freedom: freedom as arbitrariness.
>
> (1991: 85, 89, emphasis added)

Against this background, the sociological theory of open society explains that the transition from a liberal to an open society refers to moral critique targeting the dominant liberal values of the tolerance of difference while not ignoring its merits. This new level of moral openness to rational criticism reveals the distinction between the moral base of a liberal and of an open society. Whereas Popper did not address the question of how an open society may differ from a liberal one owing to his assumption that transition from a closed to an open society originates in irrational moral choice, the

sociological theory of open society allows the argument to be made that individuals who open their moral attitude of tolerance to rational criticism can arrive at a *new normative agreement* on the ethics of openness to criticism.

This argument points out the sociological distinction between a liberal and an open society: despite their liberal views, individual members of an open society agree to enter into a rational dialogue to discover the meaning of the good life. The following sub-sections address the institutional consequences of a normative shift from tolerance of difference to openness to criticism. In a moral sense, the unfinished project of modernity requires a value change from the liberal ethics of tolerance to the ethics of openness to criticism in order to discover the content of the good life through trial and error. Moral dialogue is not practiced in liberal society because liberal people should tolerate each other's values rather than discuss them, but lack of moral dialogue means that people cannot learn from each other's ways of the good life.

From the Natural Law of Liberty to the Open Law of Reason

On the basis of the preceding analyses, it can be argued that individuals in a liberal society who open their moral beliefs to agree on ethics of openness to criticism which allow them to use their reason to judge their moral choices promote legal transition from the natural law of liberal society to an open law of critical reason.

In *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, F. A. Hayek writes that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries "'Reason,' which had included the capacity of the mind to distinguish between good and evil, that is between what was and what was not in accordance with established rules, came to mean a capacity to construct such rules by deduction from explicit premises. The conception of natural law was thereby turned into that of a 'law of reason'" (1973: 21). Although Hayek criticizes constructivist rationalism, historical facts, such as the English and American Revolutions, show that people who have realized that reason enables them to question unjust laws in traditional society actually define and establish their natural rights.

Against this background, it can be argued that institutions of law should be defined as the legal means for the realization of people's moral agreement on ultimate values. A value consensus promotes the exploration of how institutions of law should be regarded as a legal framework for the protection of people's right to fair terms for social cooperation when striving to attain their goals. Accordingly, it is not surprising that *natural law* came to be understood as the design of *natural reason* in the seventeenth century.

As argued earlier, natural law is defined as a set of natural rights entitling people as rational beings to equal rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, to use Locke's terms. Rawls expands the law of liberty to his two principles of the political conception of justice, using the ideal type of *reasonable person* to define the law of liberty. He views two principles of justice

as guidelines for the way in which basic institutions should realize the values of liberty and equality (1993: 5).

Similarly, Clark Wolf observes that, "The fundamental liberal rights are just those rights that are necessary for the protection of people's ability to adopt and to rationally revise and pursues their conception of the good" (Davion and Wolf 2000: 111). These observations show that the legal theory of liberal society is situated in its theory of the good life. Since the value consensus in a liberal society implies that people are free to define and pursue their notion of the good life, the institutions of law are defined to protect people's ability to strive their personal designation of the good life. Viewed from a sociological theory of open society, the theory of justice is found in the context of the theory of the good life, which, in turn, originates in the theory of reason. Given this connection between moral theory and theory of justice, Poole observes that:

> The arbitrariness which liberalism concedes to the good cannot but return to infect the domain of justice. If we are to do better than liberalism we must provide *reasons* why people ought to be just. We must go beyond liberalism and locate a concept of justice within an account of the good … Justice must be conceived, not a constraint upon individual's pursuing their good, but a component of it. … Justice involves a recognition of the rights and perhaps the well-being of others. For justice to become a part of our good, the claims and concerns of others must enter into the structure of our desires, not merely as contingently available means to their satisfaction, but as their objects.
>
> (1991: 85–86)

Yet questions remain regarding the effect of a moral shift from tolerance to rational dialogue about the institutions of law in open society and the formulation of a theory of justice based on the ethics of openness to criticism in the context of a sociological theory of open society.

Although natural rights seek to protect people's fundamental rights to pursue the good life as they perceive it, it is not clear how to redefine fundamental rights once people have discovered that their consensus on liberal values is wrong. Put differently, as long as liberal society preserves its ultimate values, natural rights do not require any substantial change because they perform their defined legal task.

However, is it possible for fallible people to create a perfect error-free normative agreements? A negative answer to this question means that the transition from natural law to open law should be regarded as *legal learning* through which liberal people discover that the ethics of openness to criticism as an alternative for tolerance of difference require a change in the institutions of natural law in order to protect the new value consensus on discovery of the good life. As long as liberal-minded people do not open their value consensus

to rational criticism, legal transition from natural law to open law is impossible.

Legal philosophy of an open society enables examination of the content of what is called *open law*. Acceptance that the theory of justice is situated within the theory of the good life implies that the institutions of law in an open society originate in the ethics of openness to criticism. People must have equal right to know and pursue the good life. Individuals in open society deal justly with each other owing to their common, but revisable values beyond self-interest. Justice in such an open society is not a constraint on the individual's pursuit of the good life, but a constituent of it. In open society, the claims and concerns of others enter into the structure of people's desires owing to the objective, but revisable value consensus on the basis that the well-being of others is part of the good life.

There are two fundamental differences between open law and natural law. First, the main function of institutions of law in an open society is the protection of the ethics of openness to criticism and their effect on the objective, but revisable meaning of the good life, rather than protection of tolerance of difference. Second, in contrast to natural law, which is not defined in connection with discovery of own potential errors within it, open law means that the institution of law is not perfect and must be subjected to rational examination in order to discover potential errors within it. The legal order of an open society enables citizens to change their fundamental rights on realizing that existing institutions of law are not sufficiently effective to protect their ultimate values of the good life. Consequently, open law is capable of radical revision and provides civil society actors with the legal freedom to inspect the existing legal order and make it more effective.

In *Between Facts and Norms*, Jürgen Habermas proposes similar approach: "From the standpoint of *legal theory*, the modern legal order can draw its legitimacy only from the idea of self–determination: citizens should always be able to understand themselves also as authors of the law to which they are subject as addressees" (1997: 449, emphasis in the original). Habermas argues that this concept of modernity involves subjects who mutually accord one another the basic rights and duties required for rational discourse. Occurrence of this process under modern positive law, results in a *basic system of rights*, which is the threshold to constitutional rights necessary for the realization of the idea of self-determination. Unlike Rawls, Habermas argues that opposing doctrines of the good life are commensurable and thus capable of entering into rational discourse. As such, Habermas's ethics of discourse justify his interpretation of modern law. In contrast to the Habermas's justificational account of dialogue, the legal philosophy of open law originates in the ethics of openness to criticism.

In short, open law reflects a *legal rationality* in open society which enables open society to resolve its legal problems, regardless of how fundamental they may be. Thereby, the model of science is extended to the legal institutions of

open society. Just as science grows through trial and error, institutions of law improve through learning from errors in the law.

From Liberal Democracy to Open Democracy

Once civil society actors have accepted that people's moral right to pursue an objective meaning of the good life should be legalized by the institutions of open law, they will establish an open constitutional state whose use of the monopoly of power is limited by open law. In order to address the transition from the existing liberal state to such an open democracy, these two forms of democracy must be distinguished from one another.

The relationship between liberalism as a theory of justice and democracy as a theory of politics should be understood within the context of a liberal theory of the good life. In liberal society, fundamental rights to liberty and equality in Rawls's terms, explain why a constitutional democracy is justified to legitimately employ the monopoly of power to enforce the fundamental rights. F. A. Hayek, in *The Constitution of Liberty*, argues that liberal society limits the monopoly of coercion to the state and controls this power of the state to instances where it is required to prevent coercion by private individuals. "This is possible only by the state's protecting known private spheres of the individuals against interference by others and delimiting these private spheres, not by specific assignation, but by creating conditions under which the individual can determine his own sphere by relying on rules which tell him what the government will do in different types of situations" (1978: 21). The ultimate source of the political legitimacy of a liberal state is an overlapping consensus that exists in liberal society on the tolerance of difference which requires each individual to find his or her own private sphere in which to pursue their own subjective account of the good life. In this sense, if value consensus of liberal society is problematic because it suffers from the lack of an objective conception of the good life, the pursuit of self-interest via natural law, affects the legitimacy of the liberal state.

As Hayek argues, the limitation of government by the rule of law means that the state should not be able to change natural law in favor of its own interests. However, if we accept this, and if we remember that the natural law in liberal society is not open to criticism because it originates in an unchangeable ethics of the pursuit of subjective happiness, we will involve infinite regress. Liberal state cannot change natural law, and natural law cannot be reformed because any radical change in such a law means that liberal society must change its ultimate values which are closed to criticism. If liberal ethics revises its central claim that opposing doctrines of the good life cannot be objectively evaluated, liberal society must change its moral base, and it means that it would be no longer a liberal society at all.

Hayek rightly argues that the ideal of democratic control of government and of the limitation of government by law cannot be both achieved by placing power into the hands of a single representative body that is both rule-making

and governmental. Hence, in order to prevent the liberal state from changing the law in favor of its interests, Hayek proposes two separate representative bodies, one charged with the task of stating the general rules of just conduct, and another with the task of government. In addition, he outlines specific conditions concerning the choice of appropriate candidates for the representative body charged with the task of stating the general rules of just conduct (1973: 447–456).

Taking into account all this considerations, however, the question remains whether such a representative body can change natural law, or whether it should merely protect the natural law from selfish interventions by interest groups. It appears that in liberal society the legal system protects natural law and the liberal state must be limited to natural law. Hence, the question of how natural law itself should be open to criticism is beyond the mandate of the institutions of law in liberal society. Given the perspective of natural law, any radical change in liberal democracy requires a redefinition of the political legitimacy of the limited state under any given natural law. If natural law is not truly open to criticism, liberal democracy also suffers as a result of potential errors in the law according to which its legitimacy is defined.

Similarly to liberal democracy, an open democracy uses the monopoly of power to enforce the general rules of just conduct. However, this just conduct is not defined according to the natural law of liberty. The political legitimacy of an open state originates in the open law of critical reason. Hence, the government reflects an open body politics which indicates government by the people and for the people. The open state is a representative body because it is elected by majority rule. However, in an open society the fundamental law allows people to revise their models of democracy when they comprehend that it is no longer an efficient device through which to achieve their ultimate values. In this sense, democracy itself is open to criticism.

For instance, if people discover that majority rule may not be the best political arrangement through which to achieve the sovereignty of the people, then they are legally allowed to change the existing model of democracy in order to find a better alternative. The model of science is used by open democracy in order to improve the political institution of society in order to more effectively realize the ultimate values of an open society. People use their previous errors to design new models of democratic government because the open law of critical reason allows them to change their models of sovereignty.

The transition from a liberal to an open democracy takes place when people question the origins of the liberal model of government in natural law and liberal ethics. Once people have realized that open law can protect their freedom of thought and that they can find an objective meaning for the good life, they will ask why they should not agree about new political institutions the legitimacy of whose monopoly of force can be better monitored by civil society actors. Open democracy does not involve infinite regress because it does not seek to justify one model of sovereignty. On the contrary, it means that the meaning of sovereignty must be improved through trial and error.

Open democracy implies that people use their 'open law of critical reason' to revise the content of the state's political legitimacy.

From a Free Market to an Open Economy

A free market is defined as a mechanism of resource allocation by means of *price system*. In a liberal society utilitarian ethics, natural law, and the constitutional state define economic agents' rights to shape personal preferences and capacities through the mechanism of *relative price*. According to liberal ethics, natural law, and the liberal state, the market economy is considered to be the most effective mechanism for allocating scarce resources to meet diverse needs.

The mainstream interpretation of the market economy argues that the mechanism of relative price enables consumers and producers to take advantage of timely signals in order to make rational choices about their utility preferences and productive capacities. Yet these rational choices take place under conditions in which consumers' rights to define their preferences and producers' rights to mobilize their capacities have already been defined by the liberal society. Consequently, consumers' and producers' rational choices which shape the mechanism of relative price directly depend on how the society in question defines the rights of economic agents to make rational decisions. In *The Driving Force of the Market*, Israel Kirzner points out:

> Without these institutional prerequisites—primarily, private property rights and freedom and enforceability of contract—the market cannot operate. It follows that those institutions cannot be created by the market itself. … Surely the principal historical basis for the institution of private property rights or for the institution of enforceability of contract has been man's moral convictions concerning the simple justice of owning what one has produced with one's own effort.
>
> (2000: 83)

Hence, in a market economy, private property rights play a key role in identifying the way in which producers and consumers make economic decisions. Through the rights conferred upon economic agents, utilitarian ethics and natural law provide the moral and legal bases for producers' and consumers' rational choices. The liberal state uses the monopoly of force to secure these preconditions for the market economy, so the economic functions of the market and the welfare state should be examined closely within the context of liberal society as a societal arrangement.

The transition from a liberal to an open economy rests on the redefinition of equal rights for consumers and producers to make rational choices as the driving forces of a market economy in terms of how they define their utility preferences and productive capacities. On the basis of the preceding analysis, it is not difficult to perceive that open ethics, open law, and open politics

provide economic agents with a new definition of equal rights to participate in and to make use of the opportunities of the market economy. Consequently, the meaning of economic competition is defined on the basis of a set of moral, legal, and political rights for economic agents. In an open economy, the meaning of efficient resource allocation to diverse needs of people is directly dependent on the equal rights introduced by objective ethics of open society, rather than by the subjective ethics of liberal society; by the open law of open society, rather than the natural law of liberal society; by an open democracy, rather than a liberal state.

According to the model of science, economic agents given equal moral, legal, and political rights to make their own choices will do so rationally through trial and error with the help of signals of relative prices. In short, economic agents test their conjectures regarding consumption and production choices within an open market, whereby their equal rights have been already defined by open ethics and law and secured by the open state.

The openness of ethics in the open society allows consumers to define their own utility map on the basis of objective values. Hence, their economic preferences become rational in as much as they do not use subjective guidelines. Moreover, the openness of law allows producers to define their production map on the basis of models of property rights which are revisable according to their inefficiency.

Thus, the right to private property should not be regarded as the main justification for ownership of production rights or as having no errors. If economic agents discovered that an alternative ownership pattern might be more efficient or more just, they could revise the established model of property rights. In an open economy, the model of resource allocation is also open to criticism. In contrast to a liberal economy, an open economy does not assume that private property rights and the liberal model of division of labor between private and public sectors cannot be revised. In an open economy, the function of the welfare state is also defined on the basis of the needs of the open society as a societal arrangement, which can imply substantively different functions from those of a welfare state in a liberal democracy.

The Unfinished Project of Modernity: A New Sociological Perspective

On the basis of the preceding analyses, the sociological theory of open society explains why justificationist epistemology and liberal worldview have negatively affected liberal society's social institutions. The transition from a liberal to an open society, in the model proposed for social change, requires a set of social changes aimed at creating values and social institutions which remain open to rational revision and improvement.

From a metaphysical perspective, liberal people should change their worldview and acknowledge their ability to use their access to critical reason to define their ultimate values objectively. From an ethical perspective, liberal people should transform their subjective pursuit of happiness into an

objective account of the good life. From a legal perspective, they should convert natural law into open law which could legalize social cooperation in achieving an objective account of the good life. From a political perspective, they should turn the liberal state into an open democracy in order to hand the monopoly of power to a state capable of enforcing open law. From an economic perspective, liberal people should revise their model of resource allocation to one based on a new set of equal rights for consumers and producers on the basis of open ethics and open law.

Sociological critique of liberal society refers to a set of interrelated societal deficits which reinforce one another in the formation of social crises in liberal society. Just as people used their critical reason to transform traditional society into liberal society through the mechanism of thinkers-social movements-the masses, so can liberal people open their worldview, ethics of tolerance, natural law, liberal democracy, and market economy to rational criticism in order to discover what might be wrong with the existing societal arrangements and bring about the unfulfilled capacity of the project of modernity. It is this *openness to criticism* which works as the *mechanism for social change* from a liberal society to an open society. In Chapters 6 and 7 the model of social change introduced in this chapter is used to develop a sociological theory of social change from the existing global order to an open global society.

Notes

1 Durkheim argues that, in modern society, it is the cult of the individual that defines the *shared values* upon which social order rests. As Robert Bellah observes, according to Durkheim, "In reality, the religion of the individual was socially instituted, as were all known religions. It is society which fixes for us this ideal as the sole common goal which can rally our wills. To take it away from us when we have nothing else to put in its place is, then, to precipitate us into that moral anarchy which is precisely what we wish to combat" (1973: 54–55). In other words, it is the cult of the individual that prevents the anarchy or the war of all against all.

2 In *The Republic of Science*, Ian Jarvie proposes a similar approach for using the model of science to explain how society develops. He does not argue, however, that the model of science is capable of leading us to a new micro-foundation for the theory of society. He states that Popper "is taking the circumscribed rationality of the institutions (s) of science as a model for an attitude that should be extended to social life as a whole … A society which adopts such an attitude to itself and its components is an open society, and a paradigm for the open society is the open institutions of science" (2001: 146–147). This chapter aims to show, however, that people are capable of adopting such an attitude if they open their worldviews and moral beliefs to rational criticism.

3 Guenther Roth, in *Rationalization in Max Weber's Development History*, observes that "Weber offered us a fragmentary theory of modernity from the viewpoint of his evolutionary theory of rationalization and his specific developmental histories. The socio-historical models were meant to facilitate the comparative study of world history in search of the distinctiveness of Western rationalism" (Whimster and Lash 1989: 90). The aim of this chapter, however, is to use the philosophy of critical rationalism to offer a new sociology of modernity whose central goal is not to show

that Western modernity is distinctive, but rather to highlight the positive and negative sides of liberal modernity.

4 Richard Ashcraft observes that both Marx and Weber, in different ways of course, have attempted "to draw the historical connection between the Reformation, the English Revolution, the rise of capitalism, and the emergence of political liberalism" (1972: 137). The model of social change proposed in this chapter interprets this historical connection on the basis of the five elements of social change which it uses in order to analyze the transition from a closed to an open society.

5 In *The Roads to Modernity*, Gertrude Himmelfarb finds a link between liberty and reason in the French Enlightenment: "If reason heads the list of qualities defining the French Enlightenment, liberty is not far behind. Reason may have been the impulse behind the appeal for religious toleration … but the ostensible principle supporting that appeal was liberty, the liberty to follow one's conscience, interest, and will" (2008: 158). As argued in this chapter, Milton and Locke advocate a more or less similar relationship between reason, religious tolerance, and liberty.

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6   A Critical Sociology of Global Order

Viewed primarily as an economic phenomenon, globalization is often perceived as the emergence of transnational space, undermining nation-state capacities as the key actor in global order in favor of the private sector. Employing the philosophy of critical rationalism, however, in this chapter a critical sociology of globalization is introduced which defines globalization as the unification of national societies via a global system. In this chapter and based upon social theory of transition from a closed to an open society (see Chapter 5), an analysis is made of the role of the liberal ethics of modernity in the political unification of national societies into a global system through the cult of sovereignty. Thus, the openness of the world economy to trade and investment will be understood in the context of such a global political order. In this chapter it is argued that societal deficiency in the existing global order is to be sought in its relativist ethics, which are, in turn, reflected in the shortcomings of international law, the balance of power, and an uneven development of the world economy.

This chapter (a) explains the way in which the philosophy of critical rationalism contributes to a critical sociology of global order; (b) argues that the cultural driving force of the transition from the pre-global to global order originated in the liberal ethics of modernity; (c) questions how the legal principal of national sovereignty has been globalized to construct a political system of national societies; (d) explains the functions of the ending of World War II and the Cold War during the transition from a pre-global to a global order of national societies; (e) argues how the post-war political order has prepared the ground for economic openness towards trade and investment in the world economy; and (f) provides us with a moral critique of the existing global order. In short, this chapter uses critical rationalism to develop a new sociology of global order. It introduces globalization as the rise of a new social order on a global scale to be understood not only as a cross-societal moral consensus, but also as a set of connected legal, political, and economic changes on a global level.

Critical Rationalism and the Sociology of Global Order

In developing a sociological theory of the open society, the preceding chapters have argued that the individual's access to critical reason allows him or her to

question the dominant values of traditional society in order to create a moral base for a just social order. However, for the purpose of this chapter, we need to know how access to critical reason might have affected the historical processes which transformed a pre-global order into a global order. Put simply, the question is how critical reason might actually have been activated to shape a moral critique of the pre-global order in favor of a global order of national societies.

It is reasonable to claim that the aim of developing a sociological theory of globalization (i.e., the rise of global order) requires that such a social theory is based on our theory of society. In *Globalization: Critical Concepts in Sociology*, Frank Lechner states: "globalization … is the process by which a new social order comes about on a global scale, bringing culturally distinct communities into interaction with each other. Since this process involves a shift in the level of social organization and an integration of distinct elements into one system, it is likely to be subject to various tensions and conflicts" (Robertson and White 2003c: 102). If the subject matter of a social theory of globalization is the process by which a new social order comes about on a global scale, we must elucidate the theory of society upon which our analysis of this change is based. Thus, Mathias Albert argues rightly that theories of society must be used to formulate globalization theory:

> a comprehensive theoretical account of globalization needs to identify its point of reference, be it a "system" or a "society."…This basically translates into a request for globalization theories to explicate whether their main point of reference is, for example, a global system, a capitalist world system, or an international society of states. … a globalization theory needs to turn to theories of society.
>
> (2007: 173–174)

In Chapter 5 it was shown how the philosophy of critical rationalism contributes to modern sociological theory. Now the question must be asked how critical-rationalist sociology, as a theory of society, provides us with an analytical model to explain the historical transition from the pre-global order to a global social system in which national societies are linked systematically through a set of cultural, political, and economic institutions.

The social theory of transition from a closed to an open society has introduced five elements that are integral to the rise of a new social order: metaphysical, moral, legal, political, and economic. Inspired by this theory of social change, the historical processes through which national societies have somehow become integrated into a global system will now be introduced. Following this line of inquiry, the philosophy of critical rationalism points us towards the question of how human actors have opened their cultural values to rational criticism and thereby paved the way for an institutional transition from the pre-global order of traditional communities to a global system of modern nation-states. Applying the social theory of open society, this chapter

will show how cultural modernity has provided moral input towards the creation of the legal principle of national sovereignty whose expansion to a global scale has created an institutional framework for globalization.

In order for a sociological theory of global order to become a solution, the problem itself has to be identified. Sociologically speaking, the central problem of globalization theory could be identified in the following way: How does a new social order come about on a global scale that can link national societies into a global social order? The question remains, however, of what is meant by a *global social order*. Is it a *global system* or a *global society*?

Globalization theories often discuss the notion that a global order is not a global society in terms of a set of shared values and social institutions. In other words, globalization as a process leading to a new social order on a global scale does not come about because all people have agreed upon a set of global values with which to build common institutions for organizing their global social life. Yet it does not mean that the rise of such a global order does not enjoy any shared values among the actors, as is the case in nation-states that are managed by political leaders.

According to Martin Shaw, "Global society clearly exhibits growing system integration, above all at the level of socio-economic relations, but also in the development of cultural and political institutions. What is a great deal more problematic is the development of social integration in the value sense. How far has the growing integration of global systems been accompanied by a genuine emergence of consensus and normative integration?" (1994: 11). In one sense, the rise of a new social order on a global scale cannot be regarded as value integration among all people, but it is not impossible to view such a global social order as the outcome of a moral consensus among nation-states.

Similarly, as Dietrich Jung reminds us, "The English School certainly offers an interesting starting point for the analysis of norms and ideas in international politics, but in limiting society to aspects of normative integration, its concept essentially lacks the all-encompassing character that a theory of world society should provide" (2001: 405). It is therefore important to address the question of how global social order might be the outcome of a normative agreement among the leaders of national societies, if not among the world's people.

In Chapter 3 John Meyer's theory of world society was introduced which gives *global culture* a defining role in the understanding of globalization. He emphasizes culture as the defining dimension of society, and hence, for him, *world society* is to be perceived as a broad cultural order with distinct origins in Western society. Meyer argues that modern national societies use a model similar to the social organization of their individual members, called the nation-state model. Hence, national societies, as building blocks of world society, reflect a shared cultural model of social order which is globalized (2000: 236). In this sense, national societies are culturally integrated into a world society because they share a model similar to that for the social ordering of individuals. In *World Society and the Nation-State*, Meyer explains:

"We are trying to account for a world whose societies, organized as nation-states, are structurally similar in many unexpected dimensions …We see the nation-state as culturally constructed …We find that the culture involved is substantially organized on a worldwide basis" (Meyer *et al.* 1997: 145, 147).

Keeping in mind Meyer's analysis of global order, it will be shown how the nation-state model of social organization has spread from Europe to the four quarters of the globe. The philosophy of critical rationalism may help us to address this question by showing how an openness of the leaders of European states to a rational critique of their international order has allowed them to create a *regional social order*, later expanded on a global scale. The critical-rationalist theory of society will be applied in an exploration of the mechanisms of transition from the pre-global to a global order.

Against this background, the philosophy of critical rationalism contributes to a critical sociology of global order in two ways: first, by pointing the sociology towards an openness of political leaders with regard to a moral critique of dominant social institutions as a cultural force for political unification of the nation-states into a global system. Second, it allows the sociology to uncover societal deficiencies in the existing global order through a critique of its value consensus, i.e., the liberal ethics of modernity. The critical sociology of global order is introduced below in order to reconstruct rationally the societal process of the rise of a new social order on a global scale.

The next section addresses the cultural origins of the existing global order in order to show how an openness of the European political leaders to criticism has enabled them to define the moral foundation of a new social order on a global level.

Modernity and the Cultural Origins of Global Order

As noted earlier, globalization is often viewed as a recent phenomenon which, with the help of electronic technologies, has turned the world into a global village. As David Northrup reminds us, "Social scientists and journalists who address the globalization model generally treat it as a recent phenomenon, produced by the end of the Cold War, the explosion of global trade, and the spread of high-speed electronic communications" (2005: 253). Moreover, the emergence of a global market is often regarded as another aspect of the decline of the nation-state. As Frans Schuurman states, "Globalization discourses announce the end of the nation-state; in fact it is this decline of the nation-state that is at the core of many globalization theories" (2001: 61). This economic understanding of globalization does not permit us to explore the cultural driving forces of the existing global order. Therefore, this section argues that globalization is not to be defined principally as process of undermining national sovereignty, but as one through which the nation-state model of social organization gains global recognition due to its efficiency at accommodating radically different communities under the blanket of one global

system. Hence, a critical sociology of global order enables us to explore reasons why the rise of a global order might have originated in a value consensus regarding the nation-state model among state leaders, which was introduced in seventeenth-century Europe and spread around the globe during the twentieth century.

In Chapter 5 it was argued that the transition from traditional to liberal society during post-seventeenth century Europe was the societal consequence of a moral openness of European people to rational criticism that justified the replacement of the monarchy with liberal democracy. It was the rational critique of traditional Christian ethics by modern Europeans that led to agreement on the ethics of liberalism. Hence, liberal democracy, as a set of legal and political institutions, originated in a moral shift from traditional to liberal ethics. An examination now follows of how a similar openness to criticism enabled European political leaders during the formative age of the international European system to agree upon liberal ethics as a foundation for the legal and political infrastructures of a regional social order whose global expansion made the emergence of a global system possible.

Inspired by critical-rationalist sociology and the investigation of the part played by an openness of moral beliefs to rational criticism in the formation of a global order, it will be argued that state leaders who opened their moral beliefs to criticism created liberal ethics upon which the legal principle of national sovereignty was defined and paved the way for the political integration of national societies in the context of the post-war global order.

A Moral Solution for European Religious Warfare

As argued earlier, global expansion of the nation-state originated in the European nation-state system. In *The Nation State and Global Order*, Walter Opello, Jr. and Stephen Rosow remind us that:

> Religious conflict between Catholics and Protestants developed in every European monarchy, especially in northern Europe. States began to advance the religions of their rulers by attacking states whose rulers professed opposing faiths. These wars, known as the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), began in German-speaking kingdoms … Eventually, the desire to end the bloodshed and the resulting economic devastation led to a new concern with peace in Europe.
>
> (1999: 70)

In this context, it is understandable why the Peace of Westphalia[1] is perhaps the most important historical benchmark in the formation of the modern territorial state: it had a major effect on the transition from a *pre-global* world order of politically separated units to a *global order* of politically linked nation-states whose value consensus on the legal equality of national sovereigns enabled them to find an institutional solution for their moral disputes.

   A sociological explanation for the formation of global order begins with an examination of the moral function of the Peace of Westphalia, actually a series of treaties that brought the Thirty Years' War to an end. As Daniel Philpott reminds us:

> In the negotiating halls of Münster and Osnabrück, Dutch and German rulers won a monopoly of constitutional powers, just as their counterparts elsewhere in Europe already enjoyed. But in order for these states to triumph, the rival authority of the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church, who had once legislated, judged, and enforced laws and religious uniformity within these states' territories, had to be replaced. A sovereign state system required both state institutions within borders and the disappearance of authorities who would interfere from without. The international constitution defined both aspects.
>
> (1999: 567–568)

Signed by several monarchical states, the Treaty of Westphalia offered a normative solution for social order in Europe when the European rulers opened their minds to the possibility that their religious conflicts had originated in imposed ethical uniformity and that the imposition of a religious unity on Catholics and Protestants was actually the cultural source of political conflicts between the European monarchies. The rulers realized that a moral solution for their political conflict was the replacement of the religious authority of the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church with liberal ethics according to which each sovereign ruler had the right to determine the religious affiliation of his state.

   It is important to recognize that the emergence of a sovereign state system as a regional political order in seventeenth-century Europe was underpinned by a moral consensus among rulers to replace their religious base of political order with a secular one which was echoed in the legal equality of the 'sovereign rulers'. Each of the sovereigns had the right to make use of the monopoly of force within his national territory, but not outside of it. Hence, the religious wars resulted in a moral solution by leading to a new legal base which prevented absolute monarchies from employing political force beyond their borders.

   As stated by Martin Shaw, "The Westphalian idea was, however, essentially pre-modern in that it saw sovereignty as belonging to the ruler rather than the people. That is why the American and especially the French revolutions were such challenges to the *ancient régime* throughout Europe—to established patterns of relations between, as well as within, states" (2000: 31). As argued in Chapter 5, modern social revolutions in the West opposed absolute monarchies in favor of the people's sovereignty. Hence, there was no longer a moral consensus on the equal rights of absolute monarchies to shape a political order of national sovereigns. As Christian Reus-Smit states, "During the eighteenth century, a profound ideological revolution eroded the normative

foundations of the absolutist society of states" (1997: 576). In this sense, the ground was prepared for employing the normative solution of the Peace of Westphalia to shape the modern nation-state system. In this context, George Soros observes:

> Sovereignty is an anachronistic concept. It has its origin in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) concluded after 30 years of religious warfare. It was decided that the sovereign could determine the religion of his subjects: *cuius regio eius religio*. When the people rose up against their rulers in the French Revolution the power they captured was the power of the sovereign. That is how the modern nation-state was born, in which sovereignty belongs to the people. There has been a tension between the nation-state and the universal principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity ever since.
>
> (2002: 170)

The transition from pre-global to global order began with the Peace of Westphalia not only by solving the internal political crisis in Europe, but also by paving the way for national societies to be respected as equal moral units. This legal equality was the means through which national societies could be integrated into a global political order despite their radically different value systems and political regimes as long as they had equal rights of self-sovereignty. As will be argued below, viewed through a sociological lens, the liberal ethics of modernity taught twentieth-century state leaders to realize that moral respect for the nation-state's legal equality under inter-state law to use the monopoly of force within (but not outside) its own borders, could be a political solution for preventing global wars.

Before examining the way in which moral consensus among state leaders, in particular among the victors of World War II, was shaped to turn inter-state law into the legal foundation for a political organization of national societies on a global scale, a sociological exploration of the modern nation-state might help us better to understand why globalization, as the rise of a global social order, is rooted in the liberal ethics of modern society. In *A Social Theory of the Nation-State* Daniel Chernilo argues that the classical and modern sociologists have recognized that "the concept of modern society emphasises the desirability of a universalistic type of social integration, and implies a relatively high degree of moral consensus with regard to the importance of these universalistic values" (2007: 91). If the modern nation-state is introduced as a global ideal of national organization, could *global social learning* be explored similarly to its domestic equivalent in the transition from a traditional to a liberal society, a change wherein liberal-minded individuals with an openness to criticism question their dominant traditional values in favor of a modern nation-state?

Put differently, can we rationally reconstruct the historical processes which have transformed the pre-global order of a world of separated political units into a global order of the modern nation-state as *global social learning*

through which the people of the world open their values and institutions to rational criticism in order to solve the Hobbesian problem of the war of all against all in favor of a peaceful global order? My response, as elaborated below, is that while people have not yet subjected their values and institutions to such rational criticism, twentieth-century state leaders, regardless of whether they are liberal or nonliberal, have opened their minds to such criticism in order to shape a more or less worldwide consensus regarding the legal equality of nation-states.

In this context, it is important to understand why Meyer's (1997) theory of world society errs in claiming that a global cultural consensus regarding the ideal-type of the modern nation-state has been shaped by states leaders, social groups, and individuals, with the institutions of world society at its base. In short, Meyer's theory of world society, inspired by classical sociologists such as Weber and Durkheim, defines the modern nation-state as being based on an instrumental rationality through which either collective or individual social actors rationalize their actions in order to meet their goals. Meyer assumes that models for modern actorhood are provided for national states, social groups, and individuals (2000: 158–159). Ignoring the specific moral content of the modern nation-state (i.e., the liberal ethics of modernity) revealed in my sociological analysis of the transition from a traditional to an liberal society, Meyer considers all contemporary nation-states to be liberal-democratic societies whose leaders and individual members rationally organize their relationships and that, in this sense, all people living in world societies enjoy an instrumental global culture.

For Meyer, "globalization [in a sense] means the expanded flow of instrumental culture around the world. Put simply, common models of social order become authoritative in many different social settings" (2000: 235). However, it is clear not only that not all nation-states are modern in the liberal-democratic sense, but also that the rationality for modern actorhood cannot be limited to instrumental rationality and that the substantive rationality reflected in the liberal ethics of modernity cannot be ignored.

According to Meyer, "Instead of a central actor, the culture of world society allocates responsible and authoritative actorhood to nation-states. They derive their rights and agency from the relatively united culture of natural and moral law institutionalized by the science and professions" (1997: 169). However, viewed from a Rawlsian perspective, it would not be difficult to see that, due to their different conceptions of a just society, there is no cultural unity between liberal and nonliberal societies in terms of the way in which they organize their citizens. However, under the coverage of inter-state law that provides the modern nation-states with enough moral freedom to define their own substantive rationality, in Weber's terms, there could be integration into a global system, not a world society. Ironically, while the existing global order is not a world society of liberal and nonliberal nation-states as advocated in Rawls's *The Law of Peoples*, it still originates in the liberal ethics of modern society used by state leaders, in particularly in the

post-World War II period, for the realization of peaceful co-existence between liberal and nonliberal societies under inter-state law which recognizes the legal equality of sovereign states, regardless of their moral philosophies or substantive rationalities. Thus, our analysis of global order formation cannot be limited to instrumental rationality and must include the substantive rationality of modern national society.

Inspired by Habermas's discursive ethics, Andrew Linklater (2006) views the emergence of the political community of modern nation-states as a *moral-practical learning process.*[2] He argues that "sovereign states learn to control violent tendencies by agreeing on some universal moral and legal principles which bind them loosely together in an international society" (Linklater and Suganami 2006: 121). Significantly, such moral consensus has been taking place on a global scale among state leaders in a complex process. Hence, the paradoxical role of the so-called European *nation-state-empires* in arriving at such a global consensus cannot be ignored.

According to Opello, Jr. and Rosow, "By the hegemony of European society, we mean not only the domination of specific actors or institutions, but also a routinization of specific sets of social relations through which peoples inside and outside Europe were integrated into the European imperial system" (1999: 168). While the European nation-state-empires, such as Britain, France, and Germany, imposed their models of social organization on their colonies, the nationalist social movements in the colonies, in turn, played an important role in making use of the modern ideal-type of a free society against illegitimate invasion by such empires, which enabled them to transform the colonies into independent nation-states during the second half of the twenteith century. As a result, moral consensus on national sovereignty as a regulative ideal of political order between newly independent nation-states and liberal nation-states became possible. In fact, the liberal ethics of modern society paved the way for the rise of global moral consensus between leaders of liberal and nonliberal nation-states.

In *Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?* Jack Donnelly (1998: 1–24) explains how such *liberal potential* helped to make the pre-modern world more civilized. Quoting Peter Lyon, Donnelly points out:

> The classical standard of civilization … outlined a path for non-Western states to become recognized as sovereign equals and thus obtain the protections of (Western) international law. Entry into (Eurocentric) international society required neither religious conversion, as the Ottomans and medieval and early modern Europeans demanded, nor subordination to an imperial superior, as the Chinese and the Ottomans required. Full and equal membership in international society was … opened to non-European, non-Christian, and even non-white states willing to comply with relatively clear behavioural standards codified in positive international law.
>
> Arguments of "superior civilization" lost ground to a state-centric logic of sovereign equality. … [T]he special privilege of recognition as a (Great)

Power continued to erode during the era of the League of Nations. …The first Hague Conference, in 1899, had been notable for the attendance of China, Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Persia and Siam. The second Hague Conference, in 1907, was the first international gathering of the modern states system at which Europeans were outnumbered by non-Europeans.

(1998: 8–9)

However, prior to the conclusion of World War II, as is argued in some detail in the next section, the modern nation-state system had not yet achieved global recognition because it comprised nation-state-empires struggling for political power. Even after the end of World War II, the rise of a global system of nation-states with more or less formal equality in terms of nation sovereignty did not solve the complex Hobbesian problem of the war of all against all because the liberal ethics of modernity allowed nation-states, particularly powerful ones, to follow their national interests at the expense of other nations. As Buzan and Little observe:

Westphalian states constructed a diplomacy based on mutual acceptance of each other as legal equals, a practice in sharp contrast to the norm of unequal relations that prevailed in both ancient and classical and medieval international systems. They … *generated a self-conscious principle of balance of power* aimed at *preventing any one state from taking over the system*. … Given the obsession with exclusive sovereignty, the political structure of the system was necessarily anarchic … States needed to pursue power if they were to survive, and their pursuit of power ensured that the system was marked by military competition and the security dilemma.

(1999: 90, emphasis added)

The contribution that the philosophy of critical rationalism makes to a critical sociology of global order is to reveal the problematic nature of the value consensus of state leaders concerning the legal principle of national sovereignty. The moral critique of liberal society on a domestic level due to its utilitarian ethics presented in Chapter 5, can now be used by analogy to show why social crises in the existing global order originate in its moral foundation, which rests on the ethics of modern society. This will be elaborated in the final section of this chapter. A critical sociology of global order suggests the existence of a moral pathology in the current global crises. This rests on a critique of the liberal ethics.

National Sovereignty, the Balance of Power, and Global Order

In this section it is argued that the rise of near-global consensus about the principle of national sovereignty under the cultural influence of the dominant Western powers at the end of World War II prepared the ground for the

political unification of national societies within a global system. The key role of inter-state law in the formation of the institution of the balance of power which organized national societies politically following the conclusion of World War II is addressed. In this sense, modern nation-states have used the legal institution of *sovereignty* and the political institution of the *balance of power* to shape a Lockean social contract for the prevention of the Hobbesian war of all against all on a global scale. However, these institutions cannot play the role of a *global constitutional state* with a monopoly of force to control egoistic behavior by nation-states. Thus, the emergent political order suffers from the absence of legal legitimacy and the existence of political anarchy.

Western Culture and Post-World War II Political Order

In *The Anarchical Society*, Hedley Bull argues: "The first global political system has taken the form of a global system of states. What is chiefly responsible for the emergence of a degree of interaction among political systems in all the continents of the world, sufficient to make it possible for us to speak of a world political system, has been the expansion of the European state system all over the globe, and its transformation into a state system of global dimension" (1977: 20). Bull reminds us that a genuinely global single political system only emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and states that "Throughout human history, before the nineteenth century there was no single political system that spanned the world as a whole" (ibid.: 19). Viewed through a sociological lens, however, the question of how such a single political order was shaped must be addressed within the context of an inter-state moral consensus concerning equal legal rights of sovereignty which, in turn, are rooted in the cultural modernity of the nation-state system, as argued above.

Historical evidence shows that the world prior to the end of World War II cannot be defined as a global political system of nation-states that regulated their relationships according to inter-state law. As observed by Shaw, "Before 1939 there had been a large number of more or less autonomous nation-states, of which the major states constituted rival world-empires, and between which competition could ultimately lead to a range of possible wars"(2000: 118). Thus, it is reasonable to say that before 1939 there had been no moral consensus reflecting inter-state law among national societies to prevent the unlimited use of force in solving conflicts of interest. The two world wars that took place during the first half of the twentieth century amply demonstrate the consequences deriving from the absence of a global political system having an institutional mechanism to protect nation-states.

Although the European nation-state system was shaped in the seventeenth century by absolute monarchies which had their foundation in the Peace of Westphalia, the expansion of the nation-state model on a global level took place during the mid-twentieth century following the conclusion of World War II. In the era of nation-states-empires before 1939, as Philpott notes,

"Over the ensuing three hundred years, the history of sovereignty is largely the history of Westphalia's geographic extension. Until this extension was completed through the revolution of colonial independence in the 1960s, … [N]o constitution of international society was mutually, explicitly, agreed upon" (1999: 582). Since the nation-state-empires did not operate as equal sovereigns, the lack of a political order of such multi-empires is not surprising. Put simply, during the first half of the twentieth century global political order actually suffered from the absence of the Peace of Westphalia.

The conclusion of World War II was the most important event in the gradual globalization of the nation-state model of social order. The ending of the Cold War in 1989 reinforced the global expansion of the modern nation-state system; however, it did not alter the major institutions of the post-war global order, as will be seen below. World War II was enacted among global nation-state-empires, i.e., German and Japanese empires on one side, and American, British, French and Russian empires on the other, all of which were situated in a pre-global order that did not recognize the equal legal rights of sovereign states according to inter-state law.

Nevertheless, when the nation-state-empires—the eventual victors of World War II—decided to create a peaceful global order through which to pursue their own cultural values, political goals, and economic interests, the allied powers applied the Westphalian principle of sovereignty at a global level in order to find a normative solution for a peaceful social ordering of nation-states. The leaders of the great powers agreed to expand the ideal-type of a modern nation-state on a global scale. Following the conclusion of World War II, the nation-state model of social order was accorded worldwide respect because social groups and individuals regarded it as a useful method through which to achieve their own cultural, political and economic goals.

Although it was the leaders of the great powers who played the main role in shaping an inter-state moral consensus on the cult of sovereignty, this moral agreement also benefited Western cultural modernity through its unintended expansion to colonial societies in the form of a struggle between empires and national social movements. As Bull observes, "if contemporary international society does have any cultural basis, this is not only genuinely global culture, but is rather the culture of so-called 'modernity.' And if we ask what is modernity in culture, it is not clear how we answer this except by saying that it is the culture of the dominant Western powers" (1977: 37). Perhaps it was the dualistic nature of the liberal ethics of modernity that enabled the victors of World War II to agree upon the global expansion of the cult of sovereignty as an effective solution, not only for their own interests, but also as a means of making the world a safer place for all people.

National Sovereignty and Inter-State Law

Given the consensus of the leaders of powerful states on the need for a peaceful global order following World War II, the concept of national

sovereignty facilitated the initiation of an inter-state law which was later enforced by the political mechanism of the balance of power. Hence, for the first time in human history, inter-state law based on the liberal culture of modernity, paved the way for the political unification of the modern nation-state. In this chapter the critical sociology of global order seeks to show how the cultural force of liberal ethics led the state leaders to define an inter-state law based on the concept of sovereignty, thus pioneering the rise of a global political order which, in turn, shaped an institutional base for an openness of the world economy to more widespread trade and investment.

As defined by David Armstrong:

> Sovereignty has a legal meaning, and only a legal meaning. It denotes constitutional or jurisdictional independence and has nothing to do with a state's actual power to perform specific functions or the ways in which its freedom to act may be constrained by non-legal forces outside its control … A sovereign state cannot formally be subject to any external jurisdiction except by its own consent. … However profound the changes in international relations in the past 50 years have been, they have not altered this central fact.
>
> (1999: 559)

Similarly, David Held states: "The emergence of a 'society' of states, first in Europe and later across the globe, went hand in hand with a new conception of international law that can be referred to the 'Westphalian regime' … but that I simply refer to as the classic regime of sovereignty" (2002: 3).

A closer look at the question of how the concept of sovereignty provides inter-state law with legal logic shows that recognition of the central notion of natural law, in terms of the consent of individuals who are subject to the law enables an understanding of why the principle of national sovereignty instills a similar legal logic to inter-state law.

At the domestic level, natural law implies that individuals, due to their access to reason, are entitled to equal moral rights to define their own good life by means of protection through a legal system which shields them from having the will of others imposed on them without their consent. As Habermas argues, "Only the symbolic construction of 'a people' makes the modern state into a nation-state. Constructed through the medium of modern law, the modern territorial state thus depends on the development of a national consciousness to provide it with the cultural substrate for a civil solidarity" (2001: 64). Given the function of natural law in the rise of the modern nation-state, an analogy can now help us to understand how the principle of sovereignty provided inter-state law with such legal logic.

Sovereignty as a legal concept endows a jurisdictional independence to the nation-state according to which a sovereign state cannot formally be subject to any external jurisdiction without its own consent. Thus, inter-state law can be said to derive from the consent of states based upon the following moral

consensus among the leaders of the states: a reasonable solution for preventing the Hobbesian war of all against all is the establishment of an inter-state law to protect the natural law of modern nation-states. Yet, as Armstrong reminds us, "International law, therefore, remains the law of states associated in a society of states, not of people who are members of some larger community. As such it inevitably reflects the interests of the more powerful members of international society" (1999: 559). The dominate culture of the Western victors of World War II was reflected in the effort of their leaders to initiate inter-state law as an expression of the ability of natural law to solve political disputes among radically different national societies, and, at the same time, of the interests of the most powerful members of the global system and their need for a more stable world in which to pursue economic growth and welfare.

Inter-state law provided the modern nation-states with the legal protection to pursue their own moral conceptions of the good life, political goals, and economic interests. Thus, following its initiation by the victors of World War II, it was respected by the other members of the emerging global order as an effective legal framework to protect diverse value identities, political regimes, and economic systems, regardless their commitments to the liberal ethics of modernity, to political liberalism, and to a market economy. The nonliberal nation-states acknowledged that the principles of sovereignty and inter-state law could be an effective legal device that would offer protection against unilateral intervention by liberal societies, which gradually led to a worldwide moral consensus on this new legal foundation for a global system of modern nation-states. Nevertheless, as will be argued below, national sovereignty and inter-state law served as a legal cover for *relativist ethics* concealed by Western cultural modernity. Thus, the emergence of an ideological crisis became a distinct possibility, as proved to be the case during the Cold War between the capitalist West and communist East.

Robert Keohane argues that the principle of national sovereignty has provided a Lockean solution for the problem of a peaceful global order. Given the Hobbesian logic of the so-called realist school of international relations which views the world as a collectivity of states, each of which operates independently, Keohane points out:

> Adopting an institutionalist perspective, I suggest that one way out of the realist trap is to explore further the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is often associated with realist thinking; and globalist writers sometimes argue that its usefulness and clarity have been diminished in the modern world. In contrast, I will argue that sovereign statehood is an institution—a set of persistent and connected rules prescribing behavioral roles, constraining activity, and shaping expectation—whose rules significantly modify the Hobbesian notion of anarchy … Its evolution can be understood in terms of the rational interests of the elites that run powerful states, in view of the institutional constrains that they face. Our prospects

for understanding the present conjuncture—globalization, the end of the Cold War, the dubious prospects for a new world order—will be enhanced if we understand the nature of sovereignty.

(Holm and Sørensen 1995: 167)

Keohane's argument implies that the institutions of national sovereignty and inter-state law can prevent the egoistic behavior of powerful states in looking after their radically different ultimate values, political power and economic interests. He reminds us that "Liberal thinkers have sought to resolve Hobbes's dilemma by building reliable representative institutions, with checks on the power of rulers, hence avoiding the dilemma of accepting either anarchy or a 'predatory' state" (Holm and Sørensen 1995: 171). However, the question remains whether these institutions have created a global liberal state. Should domestic liberal states play such a role, Keohane claims that the institutions of national sovereignty and inter-state law have provided a solution for avoiding global anarchy. According to him, "States will 'internalize' sovereignty norms, and this process of socialization will teach them that 'they can afford to rely more on the institutional fabric of international society and less on individual national means' to achieve their objectives" (ibid.: 174). In a sense, states have begun to understand that they cannot live in a global state of war and that their political relations must be regulated on the basis of law, rather than force.

At the end of World War II, however, it was a political balance among powerful states, not a global constitutional state, which was designed actually to prevent the Hobbesian war of all against all. As debated below, if all member nations in the post-war global system were liberal societies, then Keohane could argue that the institutions of national sovereignty and inter-state law have created the legal foundation for a global political order that is more or less capable of acting as a global constitutional state.

David Long recognizes this issue:

> Rejecting the Hobbesian analogy to a state of nature, neoliberal institutionalism embraces a more Lockean view of states entering contracts while pursuing their self-interests. At one level, the Lockean domestic analogy renders Keohane's neoliberalism very close to Hedley Bull's … conception of international society. However, the similarity demonstrates all the more clearly that 'liberalism by analogy' lacks the liberal focus and/or commitment to liberty and to individuals and social groups, as it renders the individuals and groups invisible in the analogical world of state-persons.

(Hovden and Keene 2002: 41)

Put simply, as long as nonliberal societies do not accept the liberal ideal of social order, institutions of national sovereignty and inter-state law are incapable of providing a truly Lockean solution for the Hobbesian problem of

war of all against all on a global scale which evolved as a result of the absence of a moral consensus between liberal and nonliberal societies about the ultimate values of the good life. This conclusion leads our critical sociology of the existing global order to the question of how inter-state law contributes to the political unification of the modern nation-states under the mechanism of the balance of power, instead of to a global constitutional state. As will be argued here, the anarchical nature of the global social order can be discovered and tracked in the liberal ethics of modernity through the legal institution of national sovereignty.

The Balance of Power and Political Ordering of Nation-states

The post-war global order created a social learning process through which the nation-states opened their national cultures, polities, and economies in order to adapt to new global conditions. However, this does not mean that people living in nonliberal societies became *liberal individuals* who would question traditional values in order to establish a global society. As will be argued in Chapter 7, even from the perspective of Rawls's *The Law of Peoples* (2001) the post-war global order cannot be identified as a liberal order in which nonliberal and liberal societies have arrived at an overlapping moral consensus to overcome their political disputes through a social contract that respects the moral equality of all people living in different societies. Such a *World Society of Peoples*, as Rawls (2001) calls it, would require a social contract by all people, not by state leaders. Since the post-war global order was not a *liberal social order*, how can the political dynamics of globalization be connected with the liberal ethics of modernity through legal institutions of sovereignty and inter-state law?

In the context of a critical sociology of global order, the essence of global political order can be understood through an exploration of the way in which the victors of World War II utilized the institutions of sovereignty and inter-state law to create a mechanism for the political organization of national societies who respect these legal principles.

In *The Permanent Crisis of a Divided Mankind*, Istvan Hont observes that:

> The efforts to develop international law were attempts to *regularize the rules of conflict in a world of might, not right*. It was for this reason that Kant denounced the early modern classical exponents of natural law and international rights as "sorry comforters"; thinkers who could not finally lift their eyes above accepting the power games of "nation-states" as an inescapable condition of politics. What Kant showed was that *modern international law was ultimately an expression of the principles of "reason of state."*
>
> (1994: 176, emphasis added)

If Kant is right, then it must be asked how the institutions of national sovereignty and inter-state law enabled the victors of World War II to design a new global political order to integrate nation-states that had been founded more or less on "power games," rather than on a truly Lockean social contract.

In *The Anarchical Society*, Bull defines the balance of power as "what Vattel meant: 'a state of affairs such that no one power is in a position where it is preponderant and can lay down the law to others'. ... A balance of power in Vattel's sense requires that there should be general belief in it; it is not sufficient for the balance of power to exist objectively but not subjectively" (1977: 97, 99). Accordingly, the institution of the balance of power implies a conscious attempt at keeping the preponderance of any one state in check through the notion that competing political powers who are convinced that the law cannot be dictated to any of them accept the regulation of their conflicts through inter-state law that protects their national sovereignty. World War II persuaded the leaders of the victorious states that a *balanced power game* could be an effective mechanism to prevent them from becoming involved in another global war. Once nation-state members of the post-war global order, particularly the new great powers, accepted the regulation of their political relations in the context of institutions of sovereignty and inter-state law, they were able to use the mechanisms of the balance of power and the management of the great powers to avoid another world war. In other words, instead of creating a global constitutional state, the balance of power was used to enforce inter-state law.

The World War II Allies established the United Nations, whereby not only were sovereign states accepted as key political actors in the post-war global system, but also the principles of the balance of power and the management of the great powers were employed as political devices for enforcing inter-state law. Put differently, if a political institution wields the monopoly of power to enforce inter-state law and national sovereignty, and if no global constitutional state exists to enact this on behalf of individual nation-states, no alternative remains except to award the role of enforcer to the institutions holding the balance of power and the management of the great powers.

In addition to these political thoughts, there are economic concerns. The USA played a special role in the design of a post-war political order that was conducive to US global leadership. According to Wallerstein, "The USA was thus able to establish a new world order, a *pax americana*, after the long disorder of 1914–45. ... The world-economy needed the re-entry of these countries [Germany and Japan] both as major producers and as major consumers for US production. The USA needed a network of associates to maintain the world order. ... [The USA also supported] the slow political decolonization of the Third World and modest efforts for its so-called economic development" (1993: 1–2). Consequently, the cultural identity of the post-war political order not only originated in the USA, but also served its economic interests. The balance of power and the management of the great powers were reflected in

the membership and veto rights of the five permanent nation-states of the UN Security Council: "The US, the UK, France, Russia and China, the victorious powers of the Second World War, are permanent members. …The permanent members have a veto, which means that no resolution can be passed if any of the big five is opposed" (Patomäki and Teivainen 2004: 20).

Through the institutions of the balance of power and the management of the great powers it is becomes clear why the modern nation-states were politically connected on a global level so that they were no longer able to organize their political power, internally or externally, irrespective of the balance of power and the demands of the great powers. Viewed through a critical sociology of global order, the political aspect of the transition from the pre-global era of individual nation-state-empires during the period prior to 1939 to a post-World War II global order refers to the emergence of the institutions holding the balance of power and the management of the great powers. This has to be understood within the context of legal institutions of sovereignty and inter-state law, and the dominant culture of the Western powers, as argued by Bull (1977).

In *The Globalization of Liberalism*, Keohane argues, "What liberalism prescribes was to a remarkable extent implemented by the United States and its Western allies after the Second World War. The United States, in conjunction with Western European governments, set about constructing a framework of rules that would promote commerce and economic growth" (Hovden and Keene 2002: 23–24). The preceding arguments show that the rise of the modern nation-states should be considered a driving force for a new global order. Nevertheless, the recent phase of globalization has indeed undermined the capacity of the nation-states to manage their internal affairs, despite the fact that from a historical perspective the modern nation-system has been an agent of globalization.

Although the post-war global order placed competing political systems under its regulating political institutions, it still suffered from the absence of a global constitutional state requiring that liberal and nonliberal societies open their ultimate values to mutual criticism in order to create common values upon which they could achieve a durable solution for the Hobbesian problem of the war of all against all. The application of the liberal ethics of modernity to construct the legal institution of sovereignty and the political institution of the balance of power during the post-war era could not prevent a deep ideological conflict concealed by post-war liberal tolerance. Thus, an ideological conflict between liberalism and Marxism regarding the ideal-type of a just and free society became the main cultural source of the Cold War between the superpowers and their blocs of nation-states, undermining the post-war global political order from within. The next section addresses the question of how this unsolved moral dispute between liberal and nonliberal societies during the Cold War era (or post-World War II period) was echoed in a new round of political struggle for power among national societies.

The End of the Cold War and Multipolar Global Order

The Cold War era should be regarded as an internal feature of the post-war global order, rather than as an entirely new era, with its end reinforcing the post-war global order. Martin Shaw introduces the Cold War period thus:

> from the mid-1940s, state power in the northern industrial world was increasingly configured in a radically different way from the whole of the previous historical period. Before 1939 there had been a large number of more or less autonomous nation-states, of which the major states constituted rival world-empires, and between which competition could ultimately lead to a range of possible wars. Now there were two competing state-blocs, whose rivalry dominated world politics, together with a larger number of essentially secondary and minor centers of state power outside these blocs. A world dominated by two blocs, major Western and minor Soviet, was very different indeed from the previous national-international world based on rival European empires.
>
> (2000: 118)

Shaw's analysis of the Cold War shows insufficient concern for the cultural context of the post-war global order with regard to competition between Western and Eastern blocs. The political and military competition between the two major blocs originated in a moral dispute concerning the ideal-type of a just society, an issue which had not been solved by simply allowing post-war national societies to follow their own philosophies of the good life. Viewed through a sociological lens, the modern nation-states actually needed to overcome their moral disputes through a rational (open to criticism) dialogue with the aim of arriving at common ultimate values. There follows the argument that the Cold War era should be interpreted in the context of the liberal ethics of modernity, national sovereignty, and the post-war balance of power.

   If cultural relativism is accepted and such relativism is translated into the language of political cold war by the balance of power, it is not surprising that the two major social philosophies (i.e., liberalism and Marxism)—which distinguished the cultural identities of the post-war great powers (the USA, Britain, and France, on the one hand, and Russia and China, on the other)—reshaped the political struggle of the period prior to 1939 in a new form of the post-war order of modern nation-states. As Philip Cerny judges:

> The Modern world has been only two truly internationalist political projects, liberalism and Marxism. But both were also assimilated into the confines and practices of the nation-state early in their historical trajectories, the first through the British, French and American revolutions, the second through the Russian and Chinese revolutions. Only then did they attain institutionalized power, for it was at the nation-state level that the most fundamental structures and institutions of society and politics had

become embedded. The apparent history of the modern world was thus absorbed into a historiography of nation-states.

<div align="right">(1997: 253–254)</div>

The Soviet Union was transformed into an Eastern bloc of nation-states and the main political rival of the Western bloc not just through its military power. Viewed through a cultural sociology of the Cold War, the Soviet Union could unify the Eastern bloc on the basis of Marxist ideology, which conceives an ideal just society to be organized upon the foundation of public ownership, a concept which required an authoritative and central model of societal management. It should not be forgotten that the political unification of the Eastern bloc via an ideological force was already taking place in the context of post-war global culture. Ironically, it was the liberal ethics of modernity that made such political unification possible by the means of the cult of sovereignty and the principle of the balance of power and led to the rise of bipolar opposition within the post-war global social order.

The Soviet Union used the cultural dispute of the post-war order regarding an ideal social order to claim that the Eastern bloc of national societies should organize their own peoples according an ideal-type of politics and economy that was radically different from the liberal model of social organization. In this sense, the political economy of the Eastern bloc during the Cold War should to be interpreted within the framework of communist social philosophy. Thus, the Cold War was not only a political, but also an ideological conflict based on an *unsolved moral dispute* regarding the definition of a just and free society.

While the post-war global order opened the political space of the world to greater participation by independent nation-states and non-governmental actors, the evolution of the Cold War had a negative effect on political pluralism. The ideological conflict in this moral dispute transformed the balance of power into a bipolar Cold War.

In *Open Society, Reforming Global Capitalism*, Soros observes that:

> The tragedy of World War II led to the establishment of the United Nations (UN), designed to preserve peace and security in the world. Unfortunately, the design was not equal to the noble goal. No sooner was the UN born than the world broke into two opposing camps, one led by the United States, the other by the Soviet Union. Two sides were locked in mortal combat, both military and ideological; yet each side realized that it had to respect the vital interests of the other, since both possessed the ability to destroy the other with nuclear weapons.

<div align="right">(2000: xiv–xv)</div>

As Soros argues, "The Cold War can be interpreted as a conflict between two superpowers or as a conflict between two ideas about how society ought to be organized: open society and closed society" (2002: 153–154). This means that

from the outset the Cold War was a struggle over the moral basis of a just social order.

From a sociological perspective, the political collapse of the Cold War can be attributed to the problems created by the ideology of central socio-economic planning for the capacities of the Soviet Union regarding management of internal affairs and external commitments as a superpower. In contrast, the liberal model of social order utilized its domestic decentralized model and outward-looking global policies in order to succeed in the competition with its Eastern rival.

Historical evidence has shown that the political economy of the Soviet Union suffered from a lack of democracy and from economic inefficiency. Keohane describes the social order in the Soviet Union as being based on the Hobbesian model and perceives an ideational advantage of liberal society due to its use of the Lockean model. Keohane points out:

> the Hobbesian solution in the contemporary world is self-defeating. It creates internal oppression, external strife, technological backwardness, and economic decay. Indeed, its failure is illustrated by the fate of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union chose an essentially Hobbesian path: internally, by constructing a centralized authoritarian state and externally, by seeking autarchy and being suspicious of international cooperation and its institutionalized forms. Internally, the Soviet approach failed for similar reasons to those that neoclassical economic historians have cited for the poor growth records of absolute monarchies, although the Soviet Union compounded its commitment problem by arrogating all key property rights to the state—that is, to the Communist Party elite acting collectively—and by creating a cumbersome bureaucratic structure that did not have incentives to act effectively or to innovate. Nevertheless, many of the Soviet Union's weaknesses were inherent in its inability to make credible internal or external commitments. … For liberals, constitutional government must be combined with a framework of stable property rights that permit markets to operate in which individual incentives and social welfare are aligned with one another.
>
> (Holm and Sørensen 1995: 170–171)

Thus, we can understand why an ideological failure of the central model of social organization led to political collapse of the Cold War through its damaging outcomes for the liberty and welfare of people living in the Eastern bloc.

The problematic nature of the Soviet Union ideal type of society was recognized by its leadership, and Mikhail Gorbachev played a significant role in the bringing about the collapse of the Eastern bloc. In *The Soviet Union under Gorbachev*, Valerie Bunce answers the following question, which is important for the present argument:

Why did Gorbachev and his allies decide to embark on radical reform? The answer is that, by the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union was facing a number of crises. Turning first to the many domestic difficulties facing the Soviet Union, there were signs of serious trouble in the economy. … [T]here was a long-term decline in capital and labour productivity. … By engaging in massive protectionism of major Soviet domestic economic and political interests, introducing symbolic economic reforms and engineering a 'partial' participation in the global economy, Brezhnev's economic policies had generated a great deal of corruption … If these domestic difficulties were not enough, there were also serious international problems confronting the Soviet Union in the 1980s … Eastern Europe had become a significant burden on the Soviet Union. …The extensive trade subsidies offered to the Eastern Europe, the considerable burden of regional defence.

(1991: 222–225)

Having explained the socio-economic crises faced by the Soviet Union, Bunce concludes that "Gorbachev delegitimated state socialism as a viable model of economic development, political stability, national security, and international influence and ended the Soviet role as leader of the world socialist movement. He thereby declared the West the victor in the postwar competition between capitalist liberal democracy and state socialism" (1991: 231). Gorbachev acknowledged the irrationality of central planning as a defining feature in a communist society in contrast to the more successful experience of a decentralized liberal model of social organization. As Bunce observed, "Indeed, Gorbachev is the first 'reforming tsar' to fully embrace the West in the sense of allying with the West, in the sense of speaking to a common European home, and in the sense of emulating the economic, political, and social fruits of the Western experience" (ibid.: 241). In a sense, Gorbachev used critical reason to open his mind to *societal mistakes* in the Soviet Union's model of social order and was thus in a position to learn from such mistakes in order to reform the Eastern bloc, a critical reform which prepared the ground for the ending of the Cold War.

While the end of the Cold War did not alter the primary institutions of the post-war global order, it did reinforce the institutions of cultural pluralism, sovereignty, inter-state law, and the balance of power. As argued by Buzan:

In the perspective of primary institutions, the ending of the Cold War was not nearly such a substantial event as the ending of the Second World War. During the later 1940s, the market, multilateral diplomacy and equality of people made huge advances, war became ever more hedged around with restrictions and colonialism began to collapse as a core institution of international society. During the 1990s no major primary institutions either collapsed or arose. The market and multilateralism became more universally applied, great power war moved even

further into the background … Through the lens of primary institutions, one sees very considerable continuity in the social world order, and less of a transformation at the end of the Cold War.

(2006: 366, 368)

The ending of the Cold War reinforced the post-war global order by demonstrating that the communist ideal of a just society had not passed the historical test of a successful and sustainable social order and by showing that liberal society might be a more reliable model of social organization due to its capacity to secure the cultural freedom of thought, political democracy, and economic welfare. As Buzan and Little argue, "for liberals, the forty years of Cold War are now depicted not as a struggle for power, but as an ideological battle between capitalism and communism from which capitalism has emerged triumphant" (1999: 89). The question, however, remains of whether the ending of the Cold War has changed the anarchical nature of the post-war global order by reviving the liberal ethics of modernity. In other words, the question remains whether people living in Eastern European societies have become Western in terms of their moral philosophies and political beliefs. Post-Cold War evidence refutes such a hypothesis because Russia, at the center of the bloc, for example, cannot be regarded as a liberal-democratic society.

Sovereignty, Balance of Power, and Global Economic Order

Globalization is frequently defined as an economic phenomenon which has undermined the ability of a nation-state to manage its internal affairs. However, a sociology of globalization originated in the philosophy of critical rationalism which analyzes it as a set of systematic moral, legal, political, and economic changes creating a new global social order. Based on this sociological viewpoint for addressing the economic dimension of global social order, this section will demonstrate the way in which the legal and political institutions of the post-war global order, i.e., national sovereignty, inter-state law, and the balance of power have shaped institutional structures in an uneven world economy and have had the positive effect of creating global markets that are more open to trade and investment. On the other hand there is a negative effect of bringing about a highly uneven distribution of the benefits and costs of economic globalization for both developed and developing countries.

The Social Foundations of World Economy

In Chapter 5 it was shown that the emergence of a market economy depended on a set of moral, legal, and political changes within the context of societal change from a traditional to a liberal society. If modern economy profits from a competitive market and a welfare state by effectively allocating available

resources to the needs of the people, the main reason is that modern society has already provided the competitive market economy with social foundations based on utilitarian ethics, such as enabling consumers to pursue their personal preferences and to own private property and allowing producers to make the most of their personal capacities under a constitutional state. Put simply, a liberal market economy only works if the economic agents, consumers and producers are perceived in principle to have equal moral, legal, and political status. As Israel Kirzner states, "Without these institutional prerequisites—primarily, private property rights and freedom and enforceability of contract—the market cannot operate. … The institutions upon which the market must depend must have been created or have evolved through processes different from those spontaneous coordinative processes which we have seen to constitute the essence of the market's operation" (2000: 83). However, it is important to understand what kind of legal and political institutions have shaped the current global markets.

A truly open global economy requires the principle of regarding all economic agents as having equal status in terms of economic rights. Consequently, the question arises whether the post-war order has provided the social foundations for a competitive global market or a global welfare state in terms of institutions of national sovereignty, inter-state law, and the balance of power. To find an answer, an analysis of economic globalization and its origins in the legal and political openness of the post-war global order will be made, taking into account the context of institutions of sovereignty and the balance of power. This institutional background allows us to explore the extent to which economic agents on a global scale are protected by inter-state law and the legitimate use of political force used in principle for enforcing equal status.

As Lutz Leisering observes, "Interpretations of globalization broaden if the term is understood to include, not simply raw economic variables, but the world economy as an institutional system involving extensive legal and cultural legitimation. The justifications of expanded trade and investment must ultimately resort to globalized conceptions of the rights of individuals … around the world. Global markets of a capitalist sort are substantially legitimated only if the participants can be seen as having equal status in principle" (Krücken and Drori 2009: 282). Having said that, it is important to understand how the justification for expanded trade and investment came about within the context of the post-war social foundations of the world economy and how this was developed further at the end of the Cold War.

The End of World War II and The World Economy

The legal and political contexts of post-war global order makes it quite understandable why the Western allied powers of World War II tried to use inter-state law and their dominant political position to define the new legal environment in a way that would facilitate the global trade and investment

necessary for their economic growth and welfare. Prior to showing how, within the context of inter-state law, the Western victors of World War II used their political position to design the architecture of the world economy, the function of national sovereignty in opening global markets to greater trade and investments will be addressed.

The importance of national sovereignty for the openness of national economies to global trade and investment during the post-war era has been recognized by Robert Latham, who states that:

> there are two bases for counting state sovereignty as a liberal domain. The state can be understood, first of all, as the provider of a liberal political and social space. Walzer points out that "the recognition of sovereignty is the only way we have of establishing an arena within which freedom can be fought for and (sometimes) won." Without the state being sovereign, the authority of liberal relations worked out in and through the state would be brought into question in that they would be subject to arbitrary external control. Second, and more broadly, the effectiveness of a state in liberal relations is predicated in part on its status as a sovereign state. International economic exchange, for example, would be hardly conceivable without state action. In order for a state to enter into effective agreements not only with its own domestic actors, but also other states and foreign nationals, it is necessary for it to have a sufficient degree of sovereignty.
>
> (1993: 142)

Lathan's argument enables us to understand why the rise of the post-war world economy actually would have been impossible without an expansion of the modern nation-state system on a global scale. However, it is important to note that Lathan's reasoning should only be accepted conditionally because, although the modern nation-state should, in principle, protect the equal rights of its economic agents, not all nation-states are actually liberal states. Thus, not all national economies are market economies. Given the diversity of legal systems in the post-war political order, inter-state law could not be expected to provide the post-war world economy with the social foundations necessary for a truly open global economy. This point will be elaborated in Chapter 7, and a definition of the economic order of an open global society provided.

As will be shown below, an oligopolistic world economy emerged after the war due to the fact that only liberal nation-states were ideationally ready for and practically capable of the development of the legal protection needed for multilateral trade and investment among their national economies, whereas nonliberal nation-states did not open their economic borders to a great extent. This uneven status of openness of national economies to multilateral trade and investment led to a parallel unequal economic globalization. In addition, it should not be forgotten that the USA and its Western Allies took advantage

of their political supremacy to shape the architecture of the post-war world economy according to their own economic interests.

Under the leadership of the USA and the UK in 1944, the Bretton Woods institutions were designed to provide the post-war global order with institutions to facilitate international trade and investment among the allied powers of World War II. The balance of power and the legal equality of sovereign states had to provide such social foundations in order to ensure post-war economic growth and to transform the world into a safer place in which to conduct trade and investment. As Patomäki and Teivainen remind us:

> The economic experts of two countries, the US and Great Britain, planned the new principles of governance of the capitalist world economy in 1942–43. Because of the great depression and the world war, the world economy was largely in a state of disintegration and disarray. … [T]he US organized a conference in Bretton Woods, a small village in New Hampshire. The conference, attended by representatives of forty-four countries, including the Soviet Union and many Latin American countries, created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The latter now forms the core of the World Bank Group.
>
> (2004: 41)

The Bretton Woods institutions became important parts of the post-war world economy or oligopolistic global market. As will be discussed, another equally important institution established under Western leadership was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

The Bretton Woods institutions actually "established rules for a relatively open multilateral system of trade and payments, but they did so in a way that would reconcile openness and trade expansion with fixed yet changeable exchange rates, strict capital control, and the commitment of national governments to full employment and economic and political stabilization" (Patomäki and Teivainen 2004: 41). Helen Thompson states:

> For the American and British architects of the post-war monetary and financial order the crucial dilemma was how to reconcile the reconstruction of a liberal world trading order with the high levels of domestic employment and growth that political elites would have to deliver to citizens to restore the legitimacy of their authority. … It was not international trade which would threaten the economic foundations of the nation-state, but the absence of it. … Only if capital controls were a permanent part of the post-war world could multilateral trade and monetary structures be reconciled with the political and economic expectations of citizens to which political elites would have to respond.
>
> (1997: 97–98)

This makes it easier to understand why the Bretton Woods institutions were closely linked to a global expansion of the modern nation-state system and thereby secured internal political stability and external economic growth for the Western liberal democracies, rather than for all people in general.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was also promoted in the same context and, often regarded as a mere by-product of the aforementioned negotiations, was established in order to finance post-war reconstruction for the Allies powers of World War II and was later developed into the World Bank. As Thompson argues, "When the Truman administration offered Marshall Aid, it was effectively giving to Western Europe the kind of credit to rebuild and sustain international trade, for the sake of national prosperity and social and political stability, which Keynes [the influential British economist] had demanded in 1944" (1997 : 99). In fact, the USA needed to reconstruct Europe and Japan in order to create a global market for its products. In this sense, from the outset, the post-war world economy was not designed to serve the world as a whole.

GATT, which was later succeeded by the World Trade Organization (WTO), resulted from negotiations begun in the immediate aftermath of World War II and signed in 1947. "In 1947–94, seven rounds of multilateral trade negotiations took place. Each round succeeded, at least in principle, in the incremental lowering of tariffs and, later, of abolishing some technical barriers to trade. … The World Trade Organization (WTO) was created by the final agreements … As of April 2003, the WTO has 146 member-states" (Patomäki and Teivainen 2004: 70). The aim of GATT was to remove the very high tariffs imposed during the worldwide crises of 1914–45 relating to trade in tangible commodities. However, "The WTO definition of 'related to trade' is very wide indeed. National regulations, subsidies as well as any 'distortive' tax or industrial policies can be defined as barriers to free trade. The logic of 'free trade' in this sense is simple. Ultimately, trade is absolutely and perfectly free only in an idealized and globalized model of neoclassical free market capitalism" (ibid.: 73). Nonetheless, as argued above, the post-war global order did not provide the social foundations for an idealized open global economy because economic agents across the globe were not yet regarded as having equal status in principle.

Nevertheless, the nation-state system was not a *global liberal state* that could protect the property rights of individuals across the globe, because there was not the legal infrastructure of a competitive global market within which trade among national economies could be absolutely free. Thus, the WTO shaped the rules of global trade according to the post-war political order, paving the way for openness of the national economies prepared to pay the price for a greater economic growth at the expense of weaker political sovereignty.

In *Globalization in Question,* Paul Hirst *et al*. compare a *global economy* with an *international economy* to show that the world economy is not a truly globalized economy, as is often believed:

An international economy is one in which the principal entities are national economies. Trade and investment produce growing interconnection between these still national economies. Such a process involves the increasing integration of more and more nations and economic actors into world market relationships. … [Yet] the importance of trade is, however, progressively replaced by the centrality of investment relations between nations … [T]he international and the domestic policy fields either remain relatively separate as distinct levels of governance or they work "automatically."

In a globalized economy, national economies and their international interactions are subsumed and rearticulated by genuinely global processes and transactions into a new structure. Economic actors and activities become disembedded from national societies and domestic policies, whether of private corporations or public regulators, and must routinely take account of the potentially global determinants of their sphere of operations.

(2009: 19–20)

In distinguishing between international and global economies, it can be argued that a globalized economy materializes only within the context of an open global society within which all the economic agents are regarded as having equal rights that are protected by a global constitutional state (see Chapter 7). We know, however, that the institutions of sovereignty and the balance of power did not provide the post-war economy with such a global constitutional state.

However, it is easy to see why the Bretton Woods institutions did not create a truly globalized economy, despite paving the way for the rise of a world economy that was more open to national economies in terms of trade tariffs and capital accounts. In the institutional context of the post-war world economy, the nation-states were given greater access to political power, but some of them also exerted considerably more influence on the functions of the Bretton Woods institutions. This unequal influence was very evident in the asymmetric governance of the institutions in favor of the US and the European Community.

As Hirst *et al.* observe, "In the period 1945–73 the dominant factor driving the world economy was growth in international trade" (2009: 68). The post-war growth of trade was the outcome of a world economy that was more open to private sector activities that were unequally distributed across the globe. In *The Global Economy: Myths and Realities*, Hirst observes:

the world economy remains dominated by the three major blocs of wealth and power: the Triad of Europe, Japan, and North America. Outside the Triad, industrial growth and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows are concentrated in a limited number of successful but relatively small developing countries, or in specific regions of larger countries, such as the

coastal provinces of China. Together with the OECD countries, the elite of newly industrializing countries represent a small proportion of the world's population. … [F]ew companies are truly transnational; rather, most are multinational and operate from a distance base in one of the three blocs of the Triad.

(1997: 410)

This highly uneven development of the world economy following World War II originated in the highly unequal distribution of political power among nation-states and in the dissimilar legal rights awarded to economic agents.

The reason for which the triad regions of Europe, Japan, and North America were able to open their national economics to mutual trade and investment was that they shared similar legal and political institutions which allowed them to reduce their trade tariffs and to open their capital accounts within the framework of the Bretton Woods institutions. For the rest of the world economy, however, the lack of a similar institutional context outside the triad regions led to less openness to international trade and investment and, accordingly, a highly uneven usage of economic globalization, with its benefits and risks, by national societies across the globe.

Global Economic Order after the End of the Cold War

As argued earlier, the end of the Cold War did not change the primary institutions of the post-war global order. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union implied that a market economy might be a more reliable model for the economic ordering of consumers and producers, whether nationally or globally. However, the agreement that later became known as the Washington Consensus transformed the notion of *market-based global order* into a neo-liberal ideology for globalization without recognizing the need for social foundations in an open global economy, in contrast to the critical sociology of globalization which, in keeping with the philosophy of critical rationalism, does recognize these needs.

In early 1989, prior to the end of the Cold War, the world economy witnessed an acceleration in trade and investment resulting from the increased application of GATT. In order to explore the link between post-war trade growth and the development of the world economy during the early 1980s, it is important to keep in mind that, as argued by Soros, "The Bretton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank were designed to facilitate international trade and investment in an environment of restricted private capital flows. … International capital movements accelerated in the early 1980s under Roland Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, and financial markets became truly global in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet empire" (2002: 2). This institutional openness pioneered efforts for improvement in the world economy during the early 1980s.

In this context, the authors of *Globalization, Growth and Poverty* (2002), a World Bank policy research report, argue that globalization improved the economic situation of developed and developing countries after 1980: "The most encouraging development in the third wave of globalization is that some developing countries, accounting for about 3 billion people, have succeeded for the first time in harnessing their labor abundance to give them a competitive advantage in labor-intensive manufactures and service. In 1980 only 25 percent of the exports of developing countries were manufactures; by 1998 this had risen to 80 percent" (World Bank 2002: 31). Yet the fact ought not be ignored that the unfulfilled capacities in the open global economy were much greater than could be covered by the progress after the 1980s; realization of this potential, however, was not possible due to the dependency of post-war legal and political institutions on the balance of power.

Keeping this in mind, the ending of the Cold War removed some of the political obstacles preventing the nation-states in the Eastern bloc from opening their national economies to global markets and led to a multi-dimensional outcome for the world economy. First, the unification of Germany, as well as the prospect of including Eastern Europe in the European Union, turned the European Union (EU) into a new economic player in the post-Cold War economy and enabled the EU to operate more or less independently of the USA in a multipolar global social system. During the post-Cold War era, the EU has gradually become a new bloc of nation-states advocating a multicentric global order and thus, alongside the USA and Japan, one of the three major actors in the world economy.

Second, the end of the Cold War led China to open its national economy to global trade and investment and generally to take account of market orientation in its global politics, while the former communist bloc was continuing to disintegrate. Third, influenced by the unsuccessful experience of the communist model, the developing world attempted to privatize its national economies, as advocated by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the WTO. All of these effects resulting from the end of the Cold War paved the way for the neoliberal doctrine of world order. However, as argued above, the primary institutions of the post-war global order had not changed. Still, how can a free global market be shaped without the appropriate social foundations?

While national society remains the main institutional feature of the post-Cold War global order, there now exists a trade-off between the political sovereignty and the economic power of such a national society. In *Beyond Westphalia? Capitalism after the 'Fall'*, Buzan and Little argue that:

> The globalization argument is not just that economic interaction is becoming more and more important in the day to day life of units [nation-states], but also that it is transforming the units themselves. The pursuit of the liberal goals that are seen to be essential to the promotion of late twentieth century capitalism requires a big reduction in the state's

control of the national economy, and a general opening of borders to economic transactions... If the military-political sector is losing dominance as the defining process of the system, and if globalization is pushing the state out of many aspects of the economy, can the traditional dominance of the Westphalian state as the defining unit of the international system be maintained?

(1999: 93)

If we take national society as the unit of global order in the post-Cold War era, we can understand why the political sovereignty of national societies is weakening. To a greater or lesser extent, their states are becoming agents of global markets. In other words, a sharp reduction in the state's control over the national economy results in the state surrendering its economic role to the private sector. The subsequent emergence of private economic sectors around the globe could create a more open world economy, without the trade-off between political control and the participation of the private sector in the world economy actually weakens national sovereignty as a whole, due to the power of economic globalization. National societies thus remain the main institutional units of the post-Cold War global order by modifying their governmental economic functions to enable the private sector to gain more opportunities in the emerging global markets. However, stronger national economic growth means, in turn, that national societies gain more power to secure the welfare of their populations if, of course, the assumption is valid that gains from economic globalization in the private sector do return to domestic society.

Yet the absence of fair global competition leads to a situation in which weak national societies lose more political power at the expense of less economic growth, whereas strong national societies gain more economic growth at the expense of losing less political power. The institution of the balance of power determines the equity and inequity of the distribution of benefits and risks of economic globalization between national societies in any global order with national societies connected through the principles of sovereignty and management of great powers. Hence, fair economic globalization calls for the transformation of the balance of power into a democratic global state (see Chapter 7).

Put simply, national societies that have not been given equal power in the post-Cold War multipolar order cannot operate as equal national sovereigns in such a global order. As a global constitutional state to protect the property rights and employment rights of owners and workers around the world did not emerge in the period following the end of the Cold War, the old balance of power has still led to an oligopolistic world economy. Thus, it is not surprising that global welfare is very unevenly distributed among the world's population. Therefore, the neoliberal understanding of globalization which tends to preach that globalization, i.e., the formation of a free global market, has contributed to the economic welfare of all societies and peoples,

regardless of their political positions in the post-Cold War balance of power, is a dangerous myth.

   Against this background, we can gain a better understanding of the reasons for which the post-Cold War global order has served mainly the developed nations, not the developing world. Taking the three major blocs in the world economy into account, Hirst *et al.* state:

> for the foreseeable future the real character of the international system will be that of one dominated by the Triad countries and their regional clusters and allies. We have entered a period when three large economic formations look to have emerged … In the mid-1990s, in terms of GDP the EU and the USA were about equal, with Japan about half as big … As far as shares of world exports of goods only are concerned, while there had been some convergence, the three blocs seemed to have stabilized, with the EU at 25 per cent, the USA at 20 per cent and Japan at 19 per cent…
>
> (2009: 63)

In view of the distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI), which has a marked effect on domestic economic growth due to its international competitiveness, Hirst *et al*. argue that the multinational companies are the agents responsible for FDI. The strategies of these organizations as they shape the role and distribution of FDI are central to the analysis that follows below. As we shall see, that distribution is socially and geographically uneven on a world scale. FDI is heavily concentrated in the industrial states and in a small number of rapidly developing industrial economies (ibid. 2009: 68–69). As Hirst *et al.* observe:

> Sixty per cent of the flows of US$ bn FDI over the period 1991–6 were between just the members of the Triad bloc, which also accounted for 75 per cent of total accumulated stock of FDI in 1995. North America, Europe and East Asia have dominated as both the originators and the destinations for international investment … These three areas have consistently accounted for between 65 and 70 per cent of all FDI flows between 1990 and 2000. In the case of investment, the flows have been particularly intense between North America and Western Europe, while Japan remained a net exporter of FDI in mid-1990s to both the other areas.
>
> (ibid.: 73)

Similarly, Zhang Yunling states: "in 1990, the triad countries share around a total of 65 percent of world export and import, out of which 70 percent is conducted among themselves, mainly by TNCs. The developing countries and the former Eastern bloc countries are largely excluded" (1995: 93). All of this leads to a better understanding of the uneven development of the world economy following the Cold War.

Despite this unequal distribution of international investment with its particularly positive outcomes for the economic growth of the three major blocs in the world economy, globalization has also promoted the economic growth of developing nations which have opened their national economies to the global market. In other words, developing countries which have created more social foundations for the participation of their private sectors in global economic competition have profited more from economic globalization.

As noted earlier, the authors of *Globalization, Growth and Poverty* argue that globalization has positively changed the economic situation in developed and developing countries by providing jobs in labor-intensive production and by substantially increasing manufacturing activities. "Another important change in the pattern of developing country exports has been their substantial increase in exports of services. In the early 1980s, commercial services made up 17 percent of the exports of rich countries, but only 9 percent of the exports of developing countries. During the third wave of globalization, the share of services in rich country exports increased slightly—to 20 percent—but for developing countries the share almost doubled to 17 percent" (World Bank 2002: 31–32). What was it that accounted for this shift?

According to the World Bank, "Partly it was changing economic policy. Tariffs on manufactured goods in developed countries continued to decline, and many developing countries undertook major trade liberalizations. At the same time many countries liberalized barriers to foreign investment and improved other aspects of their investment climate. Partly it was due to continuing technical progress in transport and communications" (2002: 32–33). The World Bank report states that "our research shows that open trade and investment policies are not going to do much for poor countries if other policies are bad" (ibid.: 19).

The report states, however, that "About 2 billion people live in countries that are not participating strongly in globalization, many of them in Africa and the former Soviet Union … Their exports are usually confined to a narrow range of primary commodities. … Participation in the world's industrial economy raises incomes, but for about a century only a minority of people participated and so global industrialization led to greater inequality. This third wave of globalization may mark the turning point at which participation has widened sufficiently for it to reduce both poverty and inequality" (World Bank 2002: 6–7). Thus, an analysis should be made of the positive as well as the negative effects of the post-Cold War economic globalization on the people of the world.

Taking all of this into account, one can conclude that, despite global growth and welfare being distributed unequally between the strong and the weak, the emerging global economy has reduced global poverty. However, the global economy suffers from a significant misallocation of global resources in regard to the needs of the world's population due to the lack of fair competition that is the result of the absence of equal rights for all economic agents.

The institutions of sovereignty and the balance of power must be changed if all people are to benefit fairly from economic globalization. This conclusion leads us to ask what is *critical* in a critical sociology of globalization. The final section of this chapter is devoted to seeking an answer to this question.

A Moral Critique of the Existing Global Order

As argued in this book, the task of a critical theory of society is to provide a sociological pathology of the existing social order by uncovering possible deficits in the existing value consensus which causes societies to suffer from injustice, tyranny, and poverty. In Chapter 5 it was shown that, viewed through the lens of the social theory of open society, the transition from a traditional to a liberal society was an institutional outcome of a moral critique. Modern liberal individuals opened their minds to accepting that traditional ethics could no longer provide a moral base for a free society and replaced traditional ethics with a liberal moral philosophy upon which each person should pursue what he or she defines as the meaning of the good life. Taking these liberal ethics as their value consensus, such liberal individuals established, mostly through social revolutions, a legal system based on the natural right to institutionalize their equal moral right to the self-determination of ultimate values. To enforce such a legal system, liberal-minded individuals established a constitutional state in order to protect their natural rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, as formulated by Locke, and elaborated by Rawls's political liberalism.

On the basis of social institutions constructed to protect their rights, modern economic agents used their equal rights to shape a market economy which organizes their social division of labor to meet their self-defined goals for the good life. In Chapter 5 it was posited that what might be wrong with a liberal society is that liberal individuals who are given an equal moral right to self-definition of the good life, are, nevertheless, assumed to be incapable of learning from each other's rational criticism of the definition of an objective meaning of the good life. Thus, the content of the good life remains subjective and utilitarian, with a set of damaging effects on the institutional fabric of liberal democracy. Against this background, this section defines what is critical for a critical sociology of global order by searching for what might be wrong with the moral foundation of the post-war global order, which is deeply reflected in the institutions of national sovereignty, inter-state law, the balance of power, and an oligopolistic global market, with detrimental effects upon the lives of the large majority of the world's population. While the existing global order is not a liberal order, it has been influenced by the liberal ethics of modernity, which also help to uncover societal deficits in the existing global order.

An exploration of normative deficiency is necessary for the detection of societal deficits in the existing global order. Viewed from a historical perspective, the rise of the post-war global order has created a more peaceful and

wealthier world in comparison to the pre-global order of nation-state-empires during the nineteenth century. These were replaced by a global system of relatively equal national sovereigns who are relatively free to pursue their ultimate values under the protection of a global security system that is based on the balance of power and provides increased economic welfare in an more open world economy. Nevertheless, unfulfilled capacities in the existing global order have to be questioned with regard to the highly uneven welfare the global system of national societies has provided for the global population and also its inability to solve the global problems of poverty, justice, and democracy, among others.

Liberal Ethics, National Sovereignty, and Global Social Order

Given the preceding arguments, the societal crises in the contemporary global order are shown to be rooted in the cult of national sovereignty, which originated in the Peace of Westphalia. This cult has served as an effective moral base for saving nation-states from involvement in a hot global war, but a cold war of radically different ultimate values has prevailed behind the moral relativism of the modern state system and is often on the verge of becoming a hot political or economic war, if the conditions so require.

The Peace of Westphalia overcame the religious war of Europe, yet it did not solve moral crisis in Europe: How can competing conceptions of the good life rationally overcome moral disputes, rather than hiding them under the banner of a moral pluralism or relativism? Unsolved moral disputes regarding different ways of the good life led to the unsustainable legal solution of national sovereignty, implying that our inability to overcome moral disputes rationally leads to our assumption that such disputes belong in their own national contexts. A global order resting on the principle of national sovereignty suffers from the absence of an objective ethics or, put differently, critical rationality has not been used to build a global society based on a set of objective ultimate values.

Viewed from a sociological perspective, the Hobbesian problem of the war of all against all can be overcome through a moral dialogue to create objective values for the rational management of the egoistic behavior of individual members of society, the main source of such a war. Ironically, the liberal ethics of modernity perceive the ultimate values of liberal society to be personal, not objective. Viewed from a domestic level, liberal society uses a constitutional state to protect the natural right of individuals to pursue their personal interpretation of the good life. Hence, this Lockean constitutional solution can partially solve the Hobbesian war of all against all. However, when liberal ethics are used to overcome an inter-state or global war, as in the case of the Peace of Westphalia and later the post-World War II global social order, the legal principle of national sovereignty and the political institution of the balance of power cannot assume the function of a constitutional state legitimated by direct votes from individual members of a liberal society. This

leads to the realization that the liberal ethics of the modern nation-state system are fundamentally responsible for societal deficits in the existing global order.

In *The Permanent Crisis of a Divided Mankind*, Hont diagnoses that "There are two obvious dangers threatening 'nation-states': either they cannot preserve their territorial integrity, or they cannot provide the people within their territory with adequate welfare and comfort" (1994: 170). Viewed through the philosophy of critical rationalism, as long as nation-states do not share objective values, they cannot avoid the two threats because the territorial integrity of a nation-state can always be threatened under the condition of the Hobbesian war of all against all.[3] As argued in Chapter 5, a durable solution for the Hobbesian problem is a set of common values that controls egoistic behavior. As such, if nation-states cannot solve their moral disputes through rational dialogue, their division of labor on a global economic level will always suffer as a result of an uneven distribution of welfare, with negative consequences for people living in national societies. What has divided humanity into national societies is their unresolved moral dispute regarding the ultimate values. By the same reasoning, the solution is the unification of national societies in a global society on the basis of common values resulted from rational dialogue among national societies.

A peaceful and just global order requires a global democratic state to enforce the natural rights of all people to adequate material welfare and a decent spiritual life. However, the ethics of the existing global order do not enjoy objective common values because national societies have concealed their moral disputes behind moral pluralism in order to justify the principle of national sovereignty. Through national sovereignty great powers can illegally govern the existing global order. Our global social crises, concerning poverty, inequality, and violence, originate in a form of globalization standing upon subjective and utilitarian ethics. This moral critique of the existing global order indicates the need for a moral dialogue among national societies.

The Need for Moral Dialogue among Societies

In light of the preceding arguments, a sociological solution for global crises can be sought in a moral dialogue which directly targets *subjective ethics* in the existing global order. As Amitai Etzioni argues, the moral relativism which dominates cross-cultural relationships has no rational foundation. He observes that "One kind of relativism of special importance to international relations is the notion that members of one culture should not 'judge' those of others … Relativists oppose cross-cultural judgments on the grounds that there are not overarching moral truths … Relativists further argue that other cultures have virtues of their own; and those communities ought to be arbitrators of the values to which their members are held accountable" (1997: 177). Evidently, cross-cultural relativism is the moral foundation of national sovereignty. Individuals who accept that their moral disputes can be solved by

opening their moral claims to mutual criticism, no longer need to limit their social life to a national context in order to protect their right to the self-realization of the good life. Such open-minded people can establish a peaceful global order based on the legal principle of *equal global citizens* who can replace the established institutions of the balance of power and the management of great powers with a *global democratic state*.

Etzioni rightly argues that "notions of global human rights do not provide a reliable exist from relativism, although they add a source of moral judgment across cultures, above and beyond that provided by the empirical global minimalists" (1997: 182). His argument refers to "the ways in which these documents [such as the Declaration of Human Rights] have been developed. They typically are not reflections of truly democratic process in international bodies—or in the countries represented in them—nor do they reflect the result of worldwide consensus building" (ibid.). He argues that:

> The weakness of global claims for human rights cannot be overcome in a definitive way merely by redrafting the UN Charter, or by changing the voting patterns in the General Assembly, or by other such changes in international institutions. Before one can expect to see global mores that command the compelling power of those that govern the inner life of various societies, the citizens of the world will have to engage in a worldwide moral dialogue and advance these to a point that a significant and compelling core of shared values will emerge. … Moral dialogues assume that societies need shared formulations of the good, and cannot function only on the basis of negotiated settlements of differences between individual and subgroup formations of the good.
>
> (ibid.: 183)

If comprehensive doctrines regarding decent ways of life, in Rawls's sense, do not open their moral claims to mutual criticism, the problem of cross-cultural relativism will not be overcome. As argued in Chapter 4, individuals ought to be regarded as human agents whose ability to think independently of social conditions and personal interests allows them to criticize the relativist ethics of the existing global order in favor of objective global values.

One key contribution of modern sociology to globalization studies is the concept that a peaceful global order cannot be created without cross-cultural moral consensus to control the egoistic behavior of individuals on a national or a global level. Viewed from this sociological perspective, the reasons for which the existing global order suffers from social crises are understandable. Modern sociology teaches us to view *global modernity* as a normative social learning through which individual members of national societies open their moral doctrines to rational critique in order to create an overlapping consensus on the content of the good life. In *One World: The Ethics of Globalization*, Peter Singer[4] argues:

We have lived with the idea of sovereign states for so long that they have come to be part of the background not only of diplomacy and public policy but also of ethics. Implicit in the term "globalization" rather than the older "internationalization" is the idea that we are moving beyond the era of growing ties between nations and are beginning to contemplate something beyond the existing conception of the nation-state. But this change needs to be reflected in all levels of our thought, and especially in our thinking about ethics.

(2004: 8)

If the dominant belief in our age is that people are not able to give up their existing cultural identities in favor of a global one, perhaps the reason for this is that not only ordinary people, but also many of the elite consider human reason to be the servant of the passions. Yet the philosophy of critical rationalism enables us to view individuals as critical thinkers capable of governing their passions. People who do not employ their critical reason to think independently about their identities and interests are unable to solve the permanent crisis of a divided humankind. In Chapter 7 it is argued that cross-cultural dialogue is the mechanism needed to transform the existing global order into an open global society.

Notes

1 As Opello, Jr. and Rosow argue, it is remarkable that "The Peace of Westphalia recognized the principle of state sovereignty and enshrined the concept of secure and universally recognized state borders in law" (1999: 70). This chapter shows that the Peace of Westphalia should be regarded as providing a means of understanding the outcome of liberal ethics for inter-state law and the modern political nation-state system.

2 In *The English School of International Relations*, Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami observe that the English School, however, "rejected the Kantian tradition with its progressivist faith in the human capacity to agree on universal norms which would secure the passage from a system of states dominated by power and force to a world community governed by dialogue and consent" (2006: 153). Nevertheless, the concept of international society advances the sociology of global order in that it demonstrates that the cult of sovereignty has been turned into a *global shared value* for the creation of a global system of national societies.

3 Istvan Hont points out: "The efforts to develop international law were attempts to regularize the rules of conflict in a world of might, not right" (1994: 176). This means that international law is not designed principally for protection of equal rights to self-determination for all people. On the contrary, its main focus is on the prevention of the state of war of all against all among national sovereigns.

4 The ethics of globalization, as argued by Peter Singer, refers to a set of global norms which are necessary to enable mankind to live together in one world, rather than divided into separate communities. Singer states: "A global ethic should not stop at, or give great significant to, national boundaries. National sovereignty has no *intrinsic* moral weight. What weight national sovereignty does have comes from the role that an international principle requiring respect for national sovereignty plays, in normal circumstance, in promoting peaceful relationships between states"

(2004: 148). Hence, global ethics should give priority to the cult of humanity, rather than to the cult of sovereignty.

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7   Moral Dialogue for
     an Open Global Society

In this chapter, the philosophy of critical rationalism is employed to introduce a sociological theory to explain the transition from the existing global order to an open global society. The contribution of epistemology to the theory of society and its outcomes for the theories of human action and social change, discussed in Chapters 2, 4, and 5, are applied to show that people who open their moral beliefs to rational criticism can shape a moral dialogue among civilizations to agree upon a system of common values in order to establish the law of humanity, a constitutional global state, and a just global economy. The moral dialogue for an open global order refers to a logical possibility or an unfulfilled capacity which originates in people's access to reason. The chapters posit that if we accept that reason drives action, then it would not be unrealistic to argue that the people of the world can use their critical reason to create the common values that are necessary for a peaceful social order on a global scale. Nonetheless, it does not mean that non-logical obstacles cannot prevent people from entering into such a rational dialogue in order to realize the unfulfilled capacity of human reason to create an open global society.

The chapter (a) explains how an open moral dialogue among civilizations enables all people to overcome their dispute about the meaning of the good life; (b) argues that the law of humanity should be established to institutionalize an equal right for the pursuit of the good life; (c) reasons that such a global law should be enforced by limiting the use of monopoly of force to a democratic global government; (d) explores potential roles for global democracy to provide equal opportunities for economic agents to determine their needs and capacities for achieving the good life; and (e) addresses the question of how the actors in the global civil sphere could realize the ideal of an open global society. In short, Chapter 7 employs the philosophy of critical rationalism to present a social theory of open global society which shows how a cultural dialogue among civilizations works towards overcoming the social problems on a global scale.

Inter-Civilizational Dialogue and Common Global Values

The sociological theory of open society (introduced in Chapter 5) implies that open-minded individuals can criticize the dominant values of the existing global order in order to discover possible alternative values. The value system of the existing global order suggests that *national values* are deemed to be non-negotiable. If individuals are regarded as oversocialized people whose ultimate values are defined nationally, how might they be able to open their moral beliefs to rational dialogue in order to overcome their moral dispute with other nations about the meaning of the good life?

Viewed from the ideal-type of human action based on the philosophy of critical rationalism, however, individuals are considered to be independent agents who can reevaluate their moral attitudes and revise their value system if they realize that their values might be wrong. An inter-civilizational dialogue[1] inspired by such a critical-rationalist model of human action would offer us a large-scale cultural framework through which individuals within national communities could be involved in a moral dialogue concerning competing ways of the good life, thus classifying national societies as world civilizations based on common values and social institutions. Thus, moral dialogue for an open global society has to take place within a dialogue among civilizations.

Nonjustificational Epistemology and a Dialogue of Civilizations

An open moral dialogue among civilizations requires a *concept of dialogue* which implies that "without claiming any monopoly, all the participants are oriented toward meaning and truth" (Dallmayr 2009: 30–31). Given this attitude, participants in the dialogue of civilizations must recognize that their moral beliefs are imperfect and could be improved by learning from the critiques of other people. A nonjustificational model of dialogue implies that, since none of the participants in dialogue can claim justification for their meaning of the good life, their interpretation of the good life should be opened to rational criticism. Thus, they might be able to discover what could be wrong with their ultimate values. As Fred Dallmayr observes, "dialogue is intrinsically at odds with any cognitive absolutism … [it] does not in any way signal a lapse into relativism or arbitrary randomness" (ibid.: 30). An open moral dialogue should be *critical* and *rational* in order not to suffer from absolutism and relativism.

It is well known that Popper (1945) has argued for a moral attitude of "I may be wrong and you may be right, let us discuss it to get nearer to the truth." I have developed this attitude towards a *moral theory of openness to criticism* based on nonjustificational epistemology, according to which the objectivity of our moral beliefs can be secured through inter-subjective criticism. This may be compared to the quest for the objectivity upon which scientific hypotheses are constructed. If individuals were to recognize that their

interpretation of the good life might be imperfect and could be improved by learning from the wrong premises, their concept of the good life would not be limited to merely one source. They would understand that, while they cannot justify their moral beliefs, they may criticize those beliefs. In doing so, they would help to shape an open moral dialogue among world civilizations.

Civilizations and National Societies

In the literature of civilizational studies, considerable attention has been paid to the concept of civilization and its relationship to national societies. In order to address the question of how the dialogue among civilizations could serve as a *moral framework* to overcome the sociological problem of a just and free global order, I refer to the term *civilization* as a large-scale and long-term framework for the cultural integration of national societies. In this sense, civilizations can operate as major sub-units of the world within which moral dialogue among national societies might take place.

   In *Civilizations in Dispute*, Johann Arnason states: "the concept of civilization refers to large-scale and long-term constellations within which more organized societies can coexist or succeed each other…" (2003: 59). If we accept this feature of a civilization, the question arises as to the nature of the force that integrates national societies into a civilization. One answer is that common worldviews and moral beliefs operate as cultural links among national societies within a civilization. Samuel Huntington offers us a culture-based concept of civilization:

> A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people … People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change. … A civilization may include several nation states … The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy.
>
> (1993: 24–25)

Given Huntington's definition, shared values among national societies in terms of their more or less similar visions of the universe and the good life situate them in a world civilization. Despite his over-integrated notion of civilizational unity, as Arnason (2003) observes, Huntington's culture-centric interpretation of civilization is a suitable context for addressing the question of how individuals' moral beliefs could be opened to rational criticism.

Similarly, Benjamin Nelson defines civilization as "the fundamental canons governing the decision-matrices in the spheres of opinion and act" (1973: 82). According to Robert Cox, "civilization is something we carry in our heads which guides our understanding of the world; and for different peoples this understanding is different … We need to know more about the modes of thought characteristic of different civilizations, how these modes of thought came about, and how they may be changing" (2000: 220).

Furthermore, an institutional aspect could be added to the concept of civilization. To accomplish this, S. N. Eisenstadt recognizes the central core of the concept of civilization as the combination of cosmological visions with definition, construction, and regulation of the major arenas of social life. He states that, "The impact of such ontological visions and premises on institutional formation is effected through the various processes of social interaction and control that develop in a society" (2000: 2). He believes that a civilization provides a cultural ideal-type of society which takes on various institutional manifestations in affiliated national societies and that it provides national communities with a *meta-cultural context* through which they are connected by their more or less similar visions of the universe and the good life.

An Example of a Dialogue among Civilizations: China and the West

Huntington divides the world into eight civilizations: "Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization" (1993: 25). According to Huntington, the balance of power among nation-states is shifting away from Western civilization and towards other civilizations. This section introduces the dialogue between Chinese and the Western civilizations as an example of an open moral dialogue about the meaning of the good life.

It is important to note that Huntington's thesis of the *clash of civilizations* assumes that cultural values are deemed to be non-negotiable. In this sense, the thesis involves cultural relativism. As Joseph Thompson reminds us, "Cultural relativism denies the possibility of objective or universal standards by which cross-cultural ethical and normative conclusions could be drawn. … Cultural relativism, crudely put, says that no one culture can claim its values or views are better than that of another culture" (2005: 38). If we accept such an epistemological position, the thesis of the clash of civilizations would be an inevitable consequence. Civilizations of peoples are unable to solve their moral disputes about the good life; thus, they would always be involved in a global war of all against all. In this sense, the Hobbesian doctrine of the war of all against all would be the political result of the thesis of the clash of civilizations.

The origin of the idea of a clash of civilizations may be found in justificational epistemology. Since civilizations of peoples cannot justify their moral beliefs, they must admit that their values are only valid for themselves and

not for others. If civilizations cannot justify their moral claims, they should regard moral beliefs as relative values. In their article titled *Huntington's Dangerous Paradigm*, Mohsen Milani and Michael Gibbons recognize the relativist foundation of the thesis of the clash of civilizations:

> This civilisational and cultural revival is complicated by the fact that on Huntington's account these competing civilisations are largely incommensurable. Although they may share some values and ideas, such as prohibitions against taking innocent life, the particular interpretation of those ideas and their relation to other ideas and values peculiar or unique to each society outweigh whatever commonality they may provide. …
>
> Huntington's tendency is to see cultures as largely coherent, internally consistent and intellectually separable from one another. Given this tendency, there are two alternatives available to him. The first is that one culture can represent universal values that all cultures embody or aspire to. This is the old idea of Western universalism, and Huntington thinks it has little or no future. The only option left to him, then, is the idea of cultural relativism, with each culture representing whatever its core values are.
>
> (2001: 3, 6)

If, however, we shift from justification to criticism, no such moral relativism is required. Hence, the clash of civilizations is avoidable. It is noteworthy that Popper's *irrational faith in reason* prevents us from defining a rational foundation for moral dialogue among civilizations because it assumes that competing value systems cannot solve their moral disputes through rational argument. On the contrary, critical rationalism, as theorized by Bartley, enables us to argue that a rational (open to criticism) dialogue among civilizations is possible because our moral faith in reason is a rational, not an irrational faith, which means that reason can be used to overcome intercivilizational moral disputes.

In order to show how such a rational dialogue among civilizations could take place, I will examine the worldviews of the Chinese and Western civilizations with respect to the meaning of the good life. A critical-rationalist model of dialogue among opposing interpretations of the good life implies that each civilization can learn from the other in order to check the objectivity of its own moral beliefs about the good life. By saying to each other that one's own understanding of the good life may be wrong and that the other civilization's understanding may be right, all people enter into a rational dialogue about the ultimate values of the good life which can take them closer to a global understanding of the good life. This would be a normative solution for creating a peaceful and just global society. In a sense, Popper's model of science could be used by all people to discover the meaning of the good life through an open dialogue among civilizations.

The Meaning of the Good Life in the Confucian Worldview

Confucianism has often been considered to be the main contributor to the cultural identity of the Chinese civilization in its formative age, although the roles of Taoism and Buddhism in shaping its cultural identity should not be underestimated. "Given the crucial role of Confucian thought in the construction and diffusion of Chinese culture, it was tempting to define the whole civilizational framework as Confucian" (Arnason 2003: 14). In *What is Chinese about Chinese Civilization?*, Xiaoming Huang reminds us that "Chinese civilization, dominated by Confucian tradition, is a moral approach to the human order problem" (Mozaffari 2002: 218). The question must be asked how the Confucian worldview leads to such a moral approach to the good life.

The Confucian worldview refers to "an organic world of primary forces (yang and yin) and the five phases (metal, wood, water, fire, and earth) constantly shifting in recurrent cycles. Within this cosmos there is no prime mover, no high God, no lawgiver. … [Yet] there is a pattern to existence and that there is a unique way (tao) for all things" (Huff 1993: 252). In Chinese cosmological thought, the explanation of the pattern of existence is to be sought in the structure of the organic unity of the whole world. This interpretation of cosmos emphasizes the harmonious unity of natural and human worlds. If so, any act contrary to this unity in human society, which damages the harmony of heaven and earth, could lead to a social disorder.

Confucian moral philosophy is characterized by the harmony of natural and human patterns. From a Confucian perspective, "Sincerity is the Way of Heaven. To think how to be sincere is the way of man. He who is sincere is one who *hits upon what is right without effort and apprehends without thinking*. He is naturally and easily in harmony with the Way [Tao]. Such a man is a sage. He who tries to be sincere is one who chooses the good and holds fast to it" (Hansen 1972: 176, emphasis in the original). Chad Hansen argues that according to Confucianism moral action is a natural behavior which reflects the harmony between heaven and earth. Confucianism grounds morality and value on man himself. Confucian ethics contains a moral doctrine which defines the common good within the context of social codes for the right behavior according to which "the good life is harmonious life" (Ching 1978: 167).

In the *Analects*, Confucius introduces the concept of *tao* as the way of all things, leading to a harmonious life in the natural and social worlds. As Arthur Wright observes in *Confucianism and Chinese Civilization*, for Confucius, "society can be harmonized and set in order only when men who have approached the ideal of self-realization are in public office" (1964: 5). Confucius believed that only the wise sages of the past had attained true wisdom and that it was therefore the duty of the aspiring scholar to emulate the mental state of the ancient sage.

In *Confucian Moral Thinking*, Karyn Lai states, "The well-governed polity is, at the same time, the well-ordered society because the members each understand their roles and accordingly fulfill what is required of them. … This idea of acting appropriately—say, as wife, son, or younger brother—was a theme so deeply entrenched in Confucian philosophy" (Lai 1995: 253). The ideal of community is built upon a family-type structure. If the father governs the family, then the ruler ought to govern society. For Confucianism, "The well-regulated society is one in which people carry out their responsibilities appropriately according to their particular places in the social structure; it is only with the cooperation of each individual within the community that the common good can be attained" (ibid.). As such, individuals should pursue the good life in a harmonious social order.

The concept of *li* in Confucian moral philosophy refers to moral codes of behavior which inform individuals of the proper conduct in society. "*Li* as norms of appropriateness governing social behavior involve discipline in individual action according to what counts as normative within the context of the community. … *Li* function as the catalyst for transmitting the *jen* in each person as the basis for harmony in the community. … Such social harmony can only be realized if the members of a community recognize and act in a morally responsible manner in their response to others" (Lai 1995: 255, 258). Similarly to Kantian moral philosophy, this leads us to the moral solution of Confucian moral philosophy for a peaceful social order.

Huang reminds us that "Confucianism-centered Chinese civilization is a moral approach to the problem of human order. Certainly, a moral approach is more 'civilized' than one of coercive power. … Chinese civilization as a moral approach is ineffective in meeting the challenge of modern conditions" (Mozaffari 2002: 237). According to Huang, Western civilization finds an institutional solution (i.e., the constitutional state) for the Hobbesian problem of war of all against all, whereas Confucianism awards unlimited political power to a sage-king, assuming that he can control his egoistic behavior through moral self-cultivation.

Huang argues that "It was the failure of Confucianism as a moral solution to the challenge of organizing society and production in the modern times that led to the rise of Western learning and the decline of Confucianism" (Mozaffari 2002: 232). We can now understand why the Chinese civilization of today is no longer the one of pure Confucianism. According to Huang, "not only Confucianism has undergone fundamental changes over time; China itself has already gone beyond the system in search of more effective forms of production, distribution and social organization" (ibid.: 238). It means that China has already been involved in dialogue with the West.

The Meaning of the Good Life from the Western Worldview

Chapter 5 introduced a sociological analysis of the transition from a traditional society to a liberal society in the modern West as a set of profound

ontological and moral changes reflected in the social institutions of liberal democracy and the capitalist market. I use the insights of such analyses to briefly discuss the meaning of the good life from the Western worldview.

The meaning of the good life in Western civilization can be distinguished from that in Eastern civilization on the basis of the central role that the West devotes to human reason in discovering the nature of the human being and the universe, whereas it is the wisdom of the past that provides the main input for conceptualizing the good life in the Confucianism-centered Chinese civilization.

The Greek heritage of intellectual thought, particularly its commitment to rational dialogue, is recognized as the origin of Western civilization. In his dialogue with the sophists, Socrates attempted to establish his moral philosophy on an anti-relativist epistemology. It was a notable step towards exploring the key function of human reason in defining the good life in Western civilization. Socrates' epistemology, which emphasized the growth of our imperfect rationality through critical dialogue, paved the way for a new worldview through which individuals' access to reason enables them to get closer to the truth.

As Alasdair MacIntyre argues, whereas the sophists claimed that an ideal moral life in each society depends on what its citizens consider to be a desirable life, Socrates recognized that such moral relativism is self-contradictory and denies the role of human reason in defining the meaning of the good life (MacIntyre 1966: 14–25). According to Socrates, "No one errs willingly; that is, if men do what is wrong, it is intellectual error, not moral weakness that is the cause" (ibid.: 23). If moral beliefs concerning the good life are to be evaluated rationally, they cannot be relative in terms of what the people wish. Put differently, Socrates believed that the good life cannot be defined based on the concept of *pleasure-pain*. People's access to reason enables them to define a moral code of behavior that is independent of their personal desires and social conditions. Plato accepted Socrates' core idea regarding his critique of moral relativism. However, he tried to find a justificationist solution for a rational foundation of ethics by seeking justified true knowledge, which led him to the possibility of a good life under the governance of a philosopher-king.

Thus, we can understand why people's access to reason has been at the center of the moral debate regarding the meaning of the good life in Western civilization from its very beginning. Toby Huff, among others, posits that in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries early modern Europeans used intellectual inputs from Islamic and Chinese civilizations to reinvent their Greek legacy of a rational approach to the universe and social order. In *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation*, John Hobson (2004) goes further and discusses the rise of an oriental West. Huff observes that, "without a philosophical view of man as a rational being possessed of reason" (1993: 109), the West would not be able to give an independent role to reason in the discovery of moral truths. This epistemological shift opened the way for shaping a post-Christian worldview and ethics during the modern age of Western civilization.

As Huff reminds us, "Copernicus … and his followers thus claimed to know the composition of the universe better than the official Church hierarchy. This is a perfectly good landmark for establishing the advent of *modern science* … it is obvious that the work of Galileo directly derived from Copernicus' great hypothesis and it was he who bluntly challenged the Church on virtually all epistemological grounds claiming that there was a source of knowledge about the world other than religion and the Bible—namely natural science" (2002: 116, emphasis in the original). More importantly, such an epistemological shift paved the way for shaping a new social philosophy in post-seventeenth-century Europe on the basis of which the meaning of the good life could no longer be underpinned by the traditional Christian worldview.

It is often believed that Kantian ethics fairly represent the post-Christian ethics of Western civilization. As Sung Bum Yun points out, "Kant makes reason the foundation of his ethics … His locating in reason the source of the universal nature of ethical values is one of the great accomplishments of Western ethical thought" (1977: 14). However, as argued in Chapter 5, that which actually has occurred during the moral transition from Christian to liberal ethics has not followed Kantian ethics. Like Socrates, Kant's moral theory implies that reason, rather than passion, drives moral choice. As MacIntyre rightly observes:

> To recognize this, which Kant calls the autonomy of the moral agent, is to recognize also that external authority, even if divine, can provide no criterion for morality. To suppose that it could would be to be guilty of heteronomy, of the attempt to subject the agent to a law outside himself, alien to his nature as a rational being. But belief in a divine law as the source of morality is not the only kind of heteronomy. If we attempt to find a criterion for assessing moral precepts in the concept of happiness or of what would satisfy human wants and needs, we shall be equally wrongheaded.
>
> (1966: 195)

If Kant is right, the pursuit of happiness cannot be the criterion of a moral choice. Against this background, liberal ethics does not truly imply that reason determines moral choice. It means that the modern West has arrived at a reasonable consensus regarding liberal ethics per se: individuals should define what they mean by the good life as they *wish*. Hence, despite the moral autonomy of the individual for defining the good life, Western ethics suffer from moral relativism, as argued in Chapter 5. Nietzsche recognizes this negative side of the Western account of the good life according to which European's highest values have devaluated *their happiness*.

It is not Kantian ethics but Lockean ethics that we can identify at the core of the Western notion of the good life. Locke's moral philosophy corresponds to his particular interpretation of the argument that natural rights derive from

a moral law which we understand through reason. While reason does not determine the content of the good life for Locke, it does enable us to accept the following reasonable principle: *Each person can define his or her good life as he or she wishes.*

This moral principle implies that if we cannot justify our moral beliefs through rational argument, we should give individuals the freedom to determine their own readings of the good life. Locke's moral philosophy reflects *utilitarian* ethics, according to which "*Good* is that which causes pleasure or diminishes pain … Moral good is the conformity of our actions to a law the sanctions of which are rewards of pleasure and punishments of pain" (MacIntyre 1966: 160, emphasis in the original). This moral philosophy helps us to understand the ideal type of modern society in Western civilization.

Viewed from a Lockean perspective, Western civilization's solution for the social organization of liberal-minded individuals is the creation of a *social contract* through which individuals voluntarily transfer their rights to a constitutional state whose power is limited by the rule of law in order to protect the natural rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. While the Lockean moral solution for social organization is a reasonable one for liberal-minded people—a solution which was later developed by John Rawls' *political liberalism*—it suffers from *moral relativism* because it views the criterion of moral choice as the pursuit of happiness, rather than of reason. The meaning of the good life therefore depends upon where the passions of liberal-minded people lead. If it is passion that determines moral choice, how can that be a rational choice?

Rational Dialogue about Competing Ways of Life

In the preceding section, I briefly addressed the fundamental beliefs of the two civilizations about the meaning of the good life and the major outcomes of their ideal-types of social order. If we look at the cultural identities of Chinese and Western civilizations in terms of their moral concepts of the good life, it is not difficult to understand why the thesis of the clash of civilizations describes the existing reality in a multi-civilizational world order. This, however, does not mean that this thesis can prevent us from exploring a logical possibility for rational dialogue about competing ways of the good life, as argued in Chapter 2.

As long as world civilizations do not solve their moral dispute about the content of the good life rationally, no durable institutional solution will be found for the Hobbesian war of all against all on a global scale. Viewed from a sociological perspective, radically different concepts of the good life cannot provide the world with a moral foundation on basis of which people of the world in a global system of national societies are able to control their egoistic behavior.

Moral dialogue within an open global society must regard individuals as independent thinkers who are capable of criticizing dominant values

regardless of their personal interests and cultural identities. An individual's oversocialized image prevents them from examining the way in which people's access to critical reason enables them to engage in a rational dialogue among civilizations with the aim of making an objective assessment of moral beliefs about the good life. Put simply, we should separate the civilizational identities of individuals living in national societies from their potential access to critical reason which would enable them to discover what might be wrong with their own civilizational beliefs concerning the good life. In this sense, the possibility of such moral dialogue refers to the logical possibility of rational dialogue about competing ways of the good life, which can take place not only in a national society, but also in a global community.

A justificationist attitude can prevent civilizations from taking part in such a moral dialogue. For instance, if Western civilization claims that the pursuit of happiness is a *justified true belief* about the good life, this would leave no room for this civilization to attain moral learning of how to correct a potential mistake. Similarly, Chinese civilization should accept that its knowledge of the good life could be improved through moral learning from Western critique if it does not want to claim that it has justified its own perspective of the good life. If justification of a moral belief, such as justification of a scientific hypothesis logically involves *infinite regress*, we should use critical reason to evaluate such a moral belief in order to avoid relativism. Thus, we can rationalize our moral beliefs through learning from their imperfections, which can only take place through rational dialogue about competing ways of the good life in which the premises are questionable.

In *Orientalism* Edward Said introduces a Western image of the Orient which implies the inherent superiority of the West over the East. Such an image might be an indication of a justificationist attitude which claims that it has been proved to be the truth. While one may not fully agree with the thesis of Orientalism, it does partly reflect the reality of Western attitudes and policies towards the East, in particular over the past two centuries. Said points out that "Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and (most of the time) 'the Occident'" (1994: 2). Since the West thinks that it has justified its beliefs, it is not surprising that it has tried to impose its worldview and model of social order on Eastern civilizations by advocating its social philosophy and sciences as justified true belief.[2] It is remarkable that Bartley (1984) argues that Western philosophy has often been authoritative even in its most liberal forms.[3]

In order to explain the nature of an open dialogue among civilizations, we can begin with the assumption that each civilization tries to defend its own concept of the good life as universal values. If this is the case, the civilization should defend its moral beliefs through rational argument, rather than by force. This premise leads us to the second assumption in such an open moral dialogue: Can different theories of rationality be used to shape such a moral dialogue among civilizations? The answer is no, because the assumption that

the concept of rationality itself cannot be shared among civilizations would involve us in infinite regress. Civilizations cannot open their ultimate values to rational debate because each one's understanding of rationality is different. If they did so, their moral dispute about the meaning of the good life would not be solved by rational dialogue. Hence, the use of the force remains the only option for the management of the clash of civilizations as the cultural origin of the Hobbesian political war of all against all on a global scale.

This book uses Bartley's theory of rationality as *openness to criticism* to propose such a shared conception of rationality among civilizations. As argued in Chapter 2, although we cannot justify our moral beliefs about the meaning of the good life, we can, however, criticize such claims in order to evaluate their objectivity. From the perspective of a civilizational identity, people might be perceived as oversocialized individuals who cannot open their moral beliefs to rational discussion. However, as argued in Chapter 4, *individuals* are, at the same time, *independent thinkers* who can protest against dominant values if they are convinced that such moral beliefs are wrong. The ethics of openness to criticism enable individuals to have rational faith in reason in an inter-civilizational dialogue for creating *common global values*.

Taking into account the example of Chinese and Western civilizations with Confucians and Westerners respecting their own values does not mean that these civilizations cannot learn from each other by opening the first principles of their ultimate values to inter-subjective criticism. A Confucian argument, for instance, that the pursuit of happiness cannot provide a rational base for defining the good life does not present any logical obstacle to prevent a Westerner from learning from such rational criticism. Similarly, a Western argument that Confucians should have the moral autonomy to determine their ultimate values is not a logical obstacle to accepting this critical comment. Acceptance by Westerners and Confucians of the evaluation of their ultimate values through rational argument would open their respective values to mutual criticism. This can lead to a system of *revisable global values* rather than *untrue values*. As Etzioni argues:

> Rather than muting the cross-cultural moral voice, as the cultural relativists do, all societies should *respect the rights of others to lay moral claims on them just as they are entitled to lay claims on others*. Thus, the West should realize that it is well within its legitimate role of world-community building when it criticizes China for its violation of human rights. And China should be viewed as equally legitimate when it criticizes US society for its neglect of filial duties.
>
> (1997: 185, emphasis in the original)

Etzioni's statement actually offers a critical-rationalist style of moral dialogue between Chinese and Western civilizations. One potential outcome of such open dialogue would be that neither the pursuit of happiness nor the wisdom of the past could enable us to define a universal meaning of the good life.

Thus, mutual criticism teaches us to search for a third option in order to find a concept of the good life which is not known to be wrong through an inter-subjective test.

We can now understand why the Popper's *irrational* faith in reason *cannot* lead to rational dialogue among civilizations. According to Popper's moral attitude, individuals who are not willing to accept rational criticism from others can provide irrational excuses, as argued by Bartley. Popper's irrational faith in reason does not let a Confucian or a Westerner accept rational critique of their interpretation of the good life because it allows them to claim that their respective faith in Confucian ethics or the liberal pursuit of the happiness is actually irrational faith and hence, by definition, cannot be subjected to rational argument. Bartley's rational faith in reason, on the contrary, provides understanding that individuals who do not want to contradict themselves are unable to bear such irrational excuses. This is reason why, from a logical perspective, rational dialogue among civilizations is possible.

The central epistemological thesis of this book is that the faculty of reason works through *conjecture and refutation*. If this thesis is correct, the rise of global ethics of openness to criticism might be a major moral achievement in a dialogue of civilizations. Given these ethics of openness, an expected core value of such a global dialogue would be that *each person should pursue the meaning of the good life which he or she has not previously recognized due to mistaken accounts and depictions.*

The global ethics of openness to criticism are a normative device for transforming moral relativism in the existing global order into an objective ethics upon which individual members of national societies employ mutual criticism to define their conceptions of the good life. In this way, a truly global layer of cultural identity throughout the world could be imagined, with each civilization making its own critical contribution.

The Meaning of the Good Life and the Law of Humanity

This section argues that the moral equality of all individuals must be protected by a new global legal system: the law of humanity. For this, the philosophy of critical rationalism is applied to develop the moral reasoning behind the law of humanity. This section concludes that the law of humanity could be a legal solution for the Hobbesian problem of social order on a global scale. In short, the law of humanity aims to protect the people of the world from egoistic behavior which prevents from the rise of a peaceful global order.

Critical Rationalism and Moral Philosophy of the Law of Humanity

Critical rationalism leads us to a new *philosophy of law* which can be used to introduce the law of humanity. If legal codes of behavior are defined to organize social relations for the realization of the good life, the law cannot be separated from the moral right to self-definition of the good life. In a sense,

the moral equality of all individuals—*in terms of their equal right to use their critical reason to test their moral beliefs about the good life through conjecture and refutation* —offers a moral philosophy for the law, which originates in critical rationalism. In addition, the legal system can be perceived as a man-made construction which could be subjected to rational criticism in order to detect its potential errors.

Against this background, the moral philosophy of the law of humanity implies the definition of a set of universal human rights to legalize people's moral rights to use their critical reason in order to test the reasonability of the global law itself.

Critical rationalism helps us to define the law of humanity as a basic universal human right which people give themselves in order to realize the good life which they have defined for themselves through an inter-civilizational dialogue. For a critical rationalist, the faculty of reason works through trial and error. Thus, the moral equality of rational beings should be understood in terms of such an interpretation of the function of human reason. On this premise, the law of humanity must not only protect the equal moral right to self-definition of the good life, but also be open to rational criticism itself.

While inter-state law is mainly concerned with the legal organization of inter-state relations, the law of humanity is preoccupied with the moral equality of individauls. As Richard Falk argues, inter-state law presumes the autonomy of the territorial state. The law of humanity, however, puts the individual's autonomy at the center of its legal enterprise. It is true that inter-state law, or international law, includes what might be regarded as universal human rights. However, there is no worldwide moral consensus regarding the content of human rights (Falk 1995: 15). Bryan Turner argues that while "human rights have been, since their formal proclamation in 1948, promoted as universal right" (2006: 41), there is tension within national interpretations of human rights in terms of the social rights of national citizens and the universal rights contained within the Declaration of Human Rights, which implies that "Human rights may be defined as the entitlements of individuals qua human beings to life, security and well-being" (ibid.: 45). Yet the question arises of whether there is a global consensus on such a Western-oriented notion of human rights.

According to Falk, "*The Law of Humanity already Contained in Interstate Law, but not yet Actualized.* … Article 28 [of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that] 'Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.' That is, there already exists in interstate law lip service to the basic ethical demands of the law of humanity (treating each person on earth as a sacred subject)" (1995: 18). Nevertheless, as Etzioni diagnoses, the absence of a worldwide consensus about the meaning of moral equality of persons has created a significant challenge for defining the content of universal human rights (1997: 182). Hence, Etzioni argues that the Universal Declaration does not originate in a worldwide moral consensus on the moral

equality of persons. For him, "notions of global human rights do not provide a reliable exit from [moral] relativism, although they add a source of moral judgment across cultures" (ibid.). In order to progress from inter-state law to the law of humanity, we need a new moral philosophy for universal human rights which takes into account man's access to critical reason. The philosophy of critical rationalism suggests that such a moral philosophy might emerge from the rational dialogue among world civilizations.

The Content of the Law of Humanity

If we define the moral philosophy of law according to the function of law in the realization of the good life, then we can establish that the content of the law of humanity is based on critical rationalism. People organize their societies through the use of law in order to protect their natural right to define the good life. The philosophy of critical rationalism enters into the content of the law of humanity via the natural right to the good life. Natural reason is defined according to the notion of rationality as openness to criticism.

Similarly, Allan Buchanan (2004) has formulated a *moral theory of international law*. He suggests that the international legal order should not only be a society of equal sovereign states governed by laws grounded in the consent of state, but should also be a legal system that helps to ensure that all people have access to institutions which protect basic human rights. Buchanan believes that it is not the consent of states which legitimizes the international legal order. He states that "the state's posture toward international law should be shaped by a commitment to protecting the basic human rights of all persons" (2004: 8). However, the question remains what we mean by the term *basic human rights* and whether or not they require worldwide moral consensus. Buchanan defines basic human rights as "those most important for the capacity to live a decent human life" (ibid.: 129). The meaning of a *decent life*, however, differs from one worldview to another.

Buchanan argues that basic human rights include "the right to life ... the right to security of the person ... the right not to be subject to arbitrary arrest ... the right to resource for subsistence... the right to freedom of expression ..." (2004: 129). If, however, there were a worldwide moral agreement on such human rights, we would already have established the law of humanity. The main challenge for the law of humanity is how different worldviews and moral philosophies could arrive at such a worldwide consensus on the actual content of human rights. To this end, we must agree on the meaning of a decent life before seeking moral reasoning for international law. If Buchanan can claim that civilizations have similar understandings of a decent life, he might define basic human rights as above.

The central content of the law of humanity originates from a meta-civilizational consensus on the meaning of the good life. If people could arrive at such a moral consensus, they would overcome the existing legal disputes about the content of human rights. A truly global content for human rights emerges

from a dialogue of cultures around the globe about competing definitions of the good life. As long as all people do not share a global consensus on the ultimate goals of a decent life, universal human rights do not have *real* meaning.

John Rawls introduces *The Law of Peoples* to show "how a world Society of liberal and decent Peoples might be possible" (2001: 6). He argues that a society of peoples is possible because reasonable people who regard each other as individuals who deserve equal moral respect can agree upon the law of peoples as a *global social contract*. According to Rawls, "The unity of a reasonable Society of Peoples does not require religious unity. The Law of Peoples provides a content of public reason for the Society of Peoples parallel to the principles of justice in a democratic society" (ibid.: 18). He argues that although a liberal society strives for neutrality regarding alternative conceptions of the good life, it is underpinned by a value consensus on the moral equality of its citizens as free and equal persons. However, a World Society of Peoples contains nonliberal societies which do not share the moral ideal of free and equal persons held by liberal societies. Nevertheless, nonliberal people are perceived as *decent* societies which employ their own moral ideals of a just society to shape a law-governed pattern of social cooperation that differs from a scheme of commands imposed by force.

Rawls' World Society of Peoples is underpinned by the following central thesis: if a liberal society recognizes moral pluralism, it must also respect decent nonliberal societies which organize their individual members on the basis of the nonliberal ideal of a just society (2001: 59). It seems that Rawls is right in arguing that a liberal society *can* live with a nonliberal society under the law of peoples because a world society of liberal and nonliberal people does not contradict the moral pluralism of liberal ethics. Rawls errs, however, when he claims that a nonliberal society *would* also be reasonable enough to respect the law of peoples although its moral ideal of a just society does not rest on the ethic of tolerance of difference. A nonliberal society which has defined its ideal of a just society on the basis of moral pluralism has already become a liberal society.

The key moral difference between a liberal and nonliberal society is that moral pluralism is not the basis for the ethics of a nonliberal society. Hence, liberal and nonliberal societies are unable to agree upon the law of peoples prior to normative convergence around the principle of moral pluralism. As Andrew Kuper asks, "Why should every decent nonliberal people accept a liberal law of peoples?" (2000: 643). From his perspective "principles for respecting persons as free and equal citizens" (ibid.), are missing from Rawls's law of peoples. If Rawls wants to apply liberal ethics consistently on a global scale, he should base the law of peoples on the universal principle of respecting individuals as free and equal citizens. He cannot do this, however, because he has already defined the law of peoples as being based on moral pluralism, which stands in opposition to the universality of a moral principle.

In order to create a world society of free and equal individuals, nonliberal and liberal societies require a moral convergence on the equality of individuals, regardless of their nationality, which could take place via an open dialogue among civilizations. From the perspective of critical rationalism, we should assume that people living in liberal and nonliberal societies are not oversocialized individuals who are incapable of changing their national ideals of a just society in favor of a global ideal, but rather that they are independent thinkers capable of changing their liberal and nonliberal moral beliefs when they discover that their beliefs might be wrong.

If this is the case, there is no need to claim that nonliberal and liberal societies cannot achieve an overlapping moral consensus on the moral equality of individuals. From a sociological perspective, liberal and nonliberal people who open their moral ideals of a just society to mutual criticism can create the common values necessary for the creation of an ideal global society. The law of humanity legalizes a worldwide moral consensus on the equal right for every person to define the meaning of the good life through rational dialogue. In addition, the law of humanity itself is open to criticism so that it can learn from its own imperfections.

The Law of Humanity and the Hobbesian War of All against All

The traditional Realist concept of international relations refers to a Hobbesian state of nature in which there is no global sovereign, no supreme arbiter of conflict capable of enforcing the laws of a peaceful social order. National societies pursue their own interests, whenever there are no common values to control their egoistic behavior. From a Lockean perspective, the transition from the global state of war to a state of civil life calls for a social contract which translates worldwide moral consensus on the decent life into the law of humanity. In this sense, such a global law operates as a legal solution for the Hobbesian war which is a political manifestation of the cultural clash over the meaning of the good life.

From our sociological perspective, the absence of common values is the ultimate source of global social crises, whereby the formation of the law of humanity provides all people with a legal institution to control egoistic behavior and promote global peace and justice. The emergence of the law of humanity should be regarded as the *legal aspect* of global learning for transition from the existing global order to an open global society. Put simply, the moral dialogue of civilizations represents metaphysical and ethical dimensions of the aforementioned transition, while the rise of the law of humanity reflects the legal aspect.

The legal meaning of global justice in an open global society can be identified on the basis of the central content of the law of humanity. When individuals are treated as equal holders of the right to know competing meanings of the good life, then the ground will be prepared for attaining

the decent life. From this perspective, the law of humanity provides all people with global justice in terms of an equal opportunity to enjoy the decent life by enabling them to test their accounts of the good life through an inter-subjective dialogue. Unlike Rawls, we can argue for the core conception of justice among civilizations if people use their critical reason to open their own first principles about the meaning of the good life to criticism. The transition from inter-state law to the law of humanity is an unfulfilled project which can be realized if people are viewed as independent thinkers capable of changing their national interpretations of a just law into the global law of humanity.

The Law of Humanity and Democratic Global Government

The legal transition from inter-state law to the law of humanity prepares the ground for a political transition from the balance of power to a global constitutional state. Once all people have overcome their moral disputes about the meaning of the good life through dialogue and establish the law of humanity in order to protect their good life legally, the monopoly of using political force must be given to the legitimate global state in order to enable it to enforce the global law. In order to address the political aspect of the societal transition from a global system of national societies to an open global society, we should understand how critical rationalism contributes to the political philosophy of the state. This, in turn, points us towards the concept of *global democracy* in an open global society.

Critical Rationalism and the Democratic State

The philosophy of critical rationalism enables us to conceptualize democracy as an *open political system*, which employs the monopoly of force to realize the equal legal right of people to pursue the good life. A democratic state is therefore defined as a constitutional state which can legitimately use the monopoly of force to protect individuals' equal right to the good life. A democratic state and the law of humanity are two important social institutions of an open society based on the ethics of openness to criticism. Such a democratic state reflects the sovereignty of the people and acts as the peacekeeper of social order whose power is limited by the law of humanity and is removable by the majority of the people. Since people can use their critical reason to revise the legal order of the open society to improve their lives, the democratic government of the open society can be advanced via the development of its political legitimacy in terms of how sovereignty of the people might better be realized. Not only does the democratic state rely on majority rule, it also requires a free media and an independent system of justice.

Popper's political philosophy of the state is inspired by critical rationalism, but the sociological theory of an open society defines the democratic state

differently and views human society as a complex of shared values and social institutions. In its ideal-type of human society, shared values provide moral foundations for social institutions, such as the institution of the state. Thus, the democratic government of the open society is defined according to its origin in the law of humanity and the ethics of openness to criticism. Viewed through the sociological theory of open society, the main question for the theory of a democratic state is: "Who should use the monopoly of power to enforce the people's equal moral right to define and pursue the good life?" The answer is that it is the representatives of the people who should use the monopoly of force through majority rule, with their power limited by law and the possibility that they can be replaced peacefully. In addition, a free press and independent courts must monitor their political performance in order to uncover any political mistakes. In short, the political system of an open society works as an *error-correcting device* to reveal any ruler's mistakes.

Popper, however, argues in *The Open Society and the Democratic State* (1963) that an open society is a "form of social life, and the values which are traditionally cherished in this social life" Moreover, he defines the democratic state as a set of political institutions, "a constitution, a civil and criminal law, legislative and executive organs, such as the government and the rules by which it is elected" (Shearmur and Turner 2008: 240). Popper defines the main question of a theory of democratic state not as 'Who should rule?, but as "How can we design our political institutions so that unwise or bad rulers do not obtain too much power and cannot do too much damage?" Popper regards democracy as "the check and balance of a popular vote," which is "the best of all the known institutions for solving our problem. … But [for Popper] the institution of the majority vote does not constitute the rule of the people. … All that people can do is to *vote*: they can vote a government into power and, much more important, they can vote a government— or a party— *out of power*" (ibid.: 243, emphasis in the original). Given this question, Popper does not regard the theory of democratic state as a solution for the problem of a legitimate state. Hence, he does not connect the political order of an open society with its legal system originating, in turn, in the ethics of an open society.

To address this question, Popper introduces the distinctive feature of a democratic state by separating it from *tyranny* which makes it impossible for people to get rid of bad government without bloodshed. Popper accepts that it is the values of an open society that determine its democratic state. However, it is not clear how can we show that the political legitimacy of such a state originates from ethics of openness to criticism when we separate the democratic state from the open society. Hence, our sociological theory of open society, which recognizes such a link, should be used to connect the legitimacy of a global democratic state, through the law of humanity, with a worldwide moral consensus on the meaning of the good life.

The Democratic Global State and the Sovereignty of the World's Peoples

Existing global political system, which is based on the principle of the balance of power, suffer from a lack of legitimacy due to its use of the logics of power, rather than rational consensus to impose its power. It is noteworthy that "An institution is legitimate in the sociological sense when it is widely *believed* to have the right to rule" (Buchanan and Keohane 2006: 405, emphasis in the original). However, the institution of the balance of power was established by great powers at the end of World War II. From a Lockean perspective, the leadership of the great powers imposed a state of war on all people. As Locke might argue, such a state of war gives the people of the world the right to protest against illegitimate management on the part of the great powers. Similarly, Locke might argue that, in order to transform the state of war into a state of civil life, all people must transfer their political rights to a global constitutional state through a social contract. By criticizing management by the great powers, people demonstrate that they recognize the need for a global democratic state. If individuals across the globe have already arrived at a moral consensus on universal human rights to the good life, they would be willing to transfer such universal rights to the democratic global state conditionally, so that it could use the monopoly of force in a legitimate manner. It is not a surprising conclusion that the transition from the existing global order to an open global society requires a profound political change: *the monopoly of using force on a global scale must be transferred from the great powers to a global constitutional state.*

If such a global state is to realize the sovereignty of the world's people, it must be reelected periodically by the majority of the world population to make its monopoly of force legitimate. In this sense, the transition from the existing global order of national societies to an open global society is impossible without the political collapse of the nation-state system. For an open global society, global democracy means that the sovereignty of the people of the world could only be realized if a legitimate global state uses the monopoly force to achieve global peace and justice. Yet the law of humanity must be careful to limit the political power of such a global state, and a *world parliament* is needed to monitor the functions of such a global state.

While management by the great powers is not regarded as a legitimate body of politics, a democratic global state has been alleged to be a utopian and unfeasible alternative. However, a sociological analysis of the open global society leads us to understand that if we want to overcome the Hobbesian war of all against all, we require a global social contract to transfer the people's sovereignty to their elected representatives. In his moral critique of global politics, Peter Singer states that:

> There can be no justification today for giving special status to states that were great powers in 1945, but are no longer so today. Why should

France or the United Kingdom have veto rights, and not Germany, or for that matter, Brazil? Why should China be a permanent member, and not India or Japan? Why should four of the five permanent members be European states, or states of European origin … Is it desirable, if indeed we are facing a possible 'clash of civilizations,' that four of the five permanent members are states with roots in Christianity, and none of them is an Islamic state?

(2002: 145)

If the management by the great powers is clearly illegitimate, the question is why should a global democratic state not serve as an alternative for realizing the sovereignty of the people? Buchanan and Keohane believe that the obvious difficulty with global democracy is that "the social and political conditions for democracy are not met at the global level and there is no reason to think that they will be in the foreseeable future. … there is at present no global public—no worldwide political community constituted by a broad consensus recognizing a common domain as the proper subject of global collective decision-making" (2006: 416). However, does the absence of such a global consensus make the status quo an acceptable situation? More importantly, why should we claim that the unfulfilled capacity for global democracy might not be achieved in future?

As long as individuals continue to examine their human rights and concepts of the good life from radically different worldviews, it is understandable that they are unable to see the political criticism concerning the illegitimacy of management by the great powers. However, we should not limit our perception of individuals to that of oversocialized persons unable to change their interpretation of human rights. Once all people open their moral values to mutual criticism, they will be prepared to accept their universal right to the good life, calling for global democracy as a legitimate way for attaining such rights.

David Held is a global thinker who defends cosmopolitan democracy.[4] However, he is not overly concerned with the cultural prerequisites of global democracy. Held argues for "a democratic public law—establishing the accountability of power systems—entrenched within and across borders. … For Kant, the foremost interpreter of the idea of a cosmopolitan law … [is] a 'necessary complement' to the unwritten code of existing national and international law, and a means to transform the latter into a public law of humanity" (1995a: 422). However, neither Kant nor Held argues how the transition from international law to the law of humanity might be achieved. Through our critique of Kant's moral philosophy in Chapter 4, we recall that Kantian ethics regard the existing values as a moral standard against which our actions should be judged. However, the present moral base for international legal order should be criticized in order to justify the need for the law of humanity. Against this background, Held claims that:

> More importantly, a cosmopolitan community … does not require political and cultural integration in the form of a consensus about a wide range of beliefs, values and norms. For part of the appeal of democracy lies in its refusal to accept in principle any conception of the political good other than that generated by people themselves. Democracy is the only grand or 'meta-narrative' which can legitimately frame and delimit the competing 'narratives' of the good. … Nevertheless, what clearly is required is a 'precommitment' to democracy, for without this there can be no sustained dialogue, and democracy cannot function as a decision-making process.
>
> (1995b: 115–116)

However, such a precommitment requires the dialogue of civilizations because the notion of refusing any concept of the good other than that generated by people does not enjoy worldwide moral consensus. Thus, prior to a global recognition of democracy, civilizations must open their competing ideal-types of legitimate body politics to mutual criticism. If all people could reach a normative consensus on democracy as the only means through which to achieve the legitimate political organization, then they would show such precommitment for moral respect of democracy.

The Hobbesian problem of war of all against all finds a political solution in the establishment of a democratic global state. By granting the monopoly of force to one global power limited by the law of humanity, people remove the main source of potential wars between national sites of power. A democratic global state would then act as a *global peacekeeper* with power required for overcoming political disputes around the globe. Our sociological analysis of an open global society enables us to understand that a democratic global state is necessary for peaceful global order owing to its attribution of the ultimate origin of such a global state to common global values through the law of humanity.

Viewed from a political interpretation of global justice, the democratic global state is a accurate expression of people's equal rights to self-determination. If justice is not only a matter of the equal application of law, but also a matter of the fairness of law itself, a democratic global state underpinned by the law of humanity meets the requirements for global justice. An open global society can be a world society of free and equal individuals when its citizens possess rights and duties which are defined by the law of humanity and are protected by the global democratic state (Linklater 2002: 318).

Global Democracy for an Open Global Economy

Global democracy is essential not only for peaceful global order, but also for shaping a just and free global economy. In this section, I situate the contribution of critical rationalism to the philosophy of an open economy within the context of my sociological theory of open global society. Thus, global

democracy will be concluded to pave the way for shaping the open global economy required for the just allocation of global resources to serve the needs of the world's population.

Critical Rationalism and an Open Economy

As a theory of rationality, critical rationalism provides us with a new model of rational choice on the basis of which a theory of an open economy can be formulated. The economic problem of an open society is *how to allocate scarce resources to meet people's diverse needs, given the meaning of the good life, the legal equality of individuals, and the democratic state*. In order to allocate economic resources fairly, each *economic agent* has to make rational decisions about production and consumption. If producers used their economic knowledge to mobilize their resources properly for the manufacture of goods and assignment of services and if consumers employed their economic knowledge to rationalize their preferences, this would result in equilibrating tendencies securing a rational allocation of available resources.

If rational choices by economic agents (producers and consumers) drive the equilibrating processes, we can employ critical rationalism to address the question of how such rational choices actually take place. Critical rationalism, as a theory of rational choice, implies that economic agents apply the method of conjecture and refutation to obtain the economic knowledge they require for the rationalization of their economic decisions. If so, it is not only the consumers who learn from their previous errors how better to define their personal preferences, but also producers who learn through this method how better to mobilize their resources.

Open-minded consumers and producers create an open economic order through inter-subjective learning. Rational choices made by open-minded economic agents lead to mutual self-correction of economic choices. This economic learning process creates the equilibrating tendencies for the allocation of scarce resources for individual needs. The mechanism of *relative price* plays the main role in enabling economic agents to learn from their mutually recognized errors. The meaning of an open economy can be sought in producers' and consumers' openness to economic refutation. Relative price acts as the mechanism for the spontaneous ordering of open-minded economic agents who use the method of trial and error to learn how to use *price signals* in order to adapt production to preferences.

In the literature of economic theory, the Austrian School—in particular von Hayek and von Mises—leads us to a similar analysis of market economy. As Israel Kirzner points out, "From Mises the modern Austrians learned to see the market as an *entrepreneurially* driven *process*. From Hayek they learned to appreciate the role of knowledge and its enhancement through market interaction, for the equilibrative process" (1997: 67, emphasis in the original). Hayek, in *The Use of Knowledge in Society*, states: "The various ways in which the knowledge on which people base their plans is

communicated to them is the crucial problem for any theory explaining the economic process" (1945: 520).

According to Hayek's theory of market, "the equilibrating process is thus one during which market participants acquire better mutual information concerning the plans being made by fellow market participants" (Kirzner 1997: 68). Hayek introduces relative price as a spontaneous mechanism for enabling market participants to acquire increasingly accurate and complete mutual knowledge of potential demand and supply attitudes (Kirzner 2000: 222–238). We can now understand why an economic theory that seeks to address the question of how scarce resources should be allocated to individuals' diverse needs must use a theory of knowledge to show how consumers and producers obtain the knowledge required for the rationalization of their economic decisions. The philosophy of critical rationalism provides the economy theory of market with this kind of theory of knowledge, suggesting that economic agents should rationalize their economic decisions through learning from errors.

However, if the rational choices of such open-minded economic agents depend on the mechanism of relative price—which reflects mutually recognized economic errors—how can the emergence of relative price itself in an open economy be addressed? While open-minded economic agents reinforce the function of relative price through rational choices, this does not create the mechanism. This question directs us to an understanding of the reasons for which the economic problems of an open society can only be solved if the ethical, legal and political institutions of the open society are taken into account. This could result in an understanding of the meaning of an open economy in terms of efficiency and fairness.

Neoclassical economics defines *perfect competition* as perfect elasticity in the supply/demand curves faced by potential buyers/sellers, with an absence of any traces of rivalry. According to the Austrian School, the competitive character of the market economy "is made possible by the freedom of entrepreneurs to enter markets in which they see opportunities for profit" (Kirzner 1997: 73). Austrian economists view market competition as a discovery process in which all entrepreneurs are legally allowed to explore profit opportunities by means of relative prices.

Viewed from a critical rationalist perspective, *economic openness*, in terms of the rise of relative prices by means of which open-minded producers and consumers rationalize their economic choices, depends upon the existence of a democratic state to enforce the equal rights of producers and consumers to achieve what they perceive as the good life. Put differently, if producers and consumers are meant to learn through their errors how to rationalize their economic choices by means of relative prices, they ought primarily to be regarded as *equal economic agents* in the moral and legal sense. Insufficient moral freedom for consumers to choose their personal preferences and insufficient legal freedom for producers to employ their resources result in a lack of

relative prices because the economic agents cannot use their *economic rationality* to contribute to the function of relative prices.

Against this background, we can understand why ethics of openness to criticism, the law of humanity, and the democratic state are the necessary social institutions for the satisfactory functioning of the market economy. Kirzner argues that "[market] forces can only be relied upon provided a widely shared ethic already exists which firmly recognizes the 'rightness' of the property rights system and the corresponding 'wrongness' of theft and fraud" (2000: 85). However, the ethics of an open economy protects not only the property rights of owners, but also the employment rights of workers. It protects not only equal rights for producers, but also equal rights for consumers. Hence, the democratic state in the open society should protect equal rights for all economic agents in order to make the open economy competitive as well as just. It is noteworthy that critical rationalism leads us to explore the potential contribution made by a democratic welfare state to competitive markets, in terms of providing *public goods* which the private sector has no incentive to produce.

The Democratic Global State and Equal Opportunities for Competition

The ideal-type of an open economy in which market competition and the role of the welfare state are defined within the context of the social institution of an open society enables us to question why the existing economy is not a rational form of resource allocation on a global scale. In other words, the discrepancy between the existing economy and the ideal type of a free and just global economy is just as serious as its lack of any rational mechanism for allocating global resources to satisfy the world's needs.

I posit that the absence of a democratic global state and the existence of nation-state-based global politics systematically prevent the formation of an open global economy capable of providing equal opportunities for producers and consumers to be involved in fair competition and to satisfy their needs.

As argued in Chapter 6, Paul Hirst and colleagues (1997, 2009) help us to understand that the existing world economy is not actually a global economy. In *The Global Economy: Myths and Realities*, he reminds us that "the picture of a recently developed and virtually ungovernable global economy based on supranational markets and footloose transnational companies is a false one. …far from being truly global, the world economy remains dominated by the three major blocs of wealth and power: the Triad of Europe, Japan and North America. Outside the Triad, industrial and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows are concentrated in a limited number of successful but relatively small developing countries" (1997: 410). Adding that other major players in the world economy, such as China and India, have also been engaged in economic globalization does not alter Hirst's main argument, which implies that the world economy is not truly global. However, what might be the role of the nation-state system in preventing the formation of an open global economy in

which all producers and consumers have equal opportunities to improve their well-being?

As shown in Chapter 6, the end of World War II and the collapse of the Cold War paved the way for the emergence of a more open world economy. Led by the USA, the powerful Western economies played the main role in designing the architecture for the world economy by establishing the Bretton Woods institutions. As a result, the post-World War II political infrastructure facilitated the opening of national borders to global trade and investment, rendering the world economy more open. However, this level of economic openness has been largely limited to the economic relations of the three aforementioned major blocs of wealth and power. If we consider the political infrastructure of the world economy during the post-World War II period, we can understand why the world economy has been relatively open for the three major blocs of wealth and power but not for the rest of the world, as demanded by the ideal of an open global economy.

Nation-state-based global politics still pervades our world and systematically prevents the emergence of an open global economy. The nation-state system implies that equal rights for producers and consumers to use economic opportunities in order to secure their well-being should be defined on the basis of national legal systems originating in national views of the moral action. Therefore each national economy is allowed to open its borders to the world economy only to the extent permitted by its legal system and moral beliefs. While an open global economy is underpinned by a moral understanding of global producers and consumers whose equal rights for participation in global competition is enforced by the democratic global state, the nation-state-based global polity does not recognize such equal rights. Hence, within the political context of the nation-state system, there is no political will to use the monopoly of power to enforce the equal rights for economic agents that are necessary for relative prices to function. Thus, it is not surprising that global resources have not been allocated according to the needs of the world's population and that the world economy does not benefit from the mechanism of relative prices.

The economic dimension of the transition from the existing global order to an open global society refers to the question of how the existing world economy could be transformed into an open global economy through the democratic global state whose main role is to enforce the law of humanity. Put differently, the nation-state political organization of the world is the main obstacle to the emergence of an open global economy. For this reason, any misallocation of global economic resources to the major blocs of wealth originates in the political domination of such blocs of power. As long as the rights of economic agents are defined in the context of national citizenships, such agents are not actually equal competitors in the world economy. Hence, it is not surprising that they cannot benefit fairly from the outcome of economic globalization. Global democracy is thus a necessary precondition for making the world economy a truly open one, while, in turn, a worldwide

moral consensus on the moral equality of individuals is required in regard to their access to critical reason. We can define the roles of a global welfare state from a similar perspective because a nation-state-based global polity cannot assume the role of a national welfare state on a global scale without such responsibilities and incentives, hence, without global democracy, global public goods cannot be produced.

The oligopolistic nature of the world economy is echoed through various examples of the misallocation of global resources to meet people's needs. National economies which are allowed to define the rights and duties of their economic agents according to their legal and moral systems create radically different levels of economic openness in terms of trade tariffs and capital accounts in the existing world economy. The degree to which national economies allow international producers to pay less in trade tariffs determines the extent of the use of their products in their respective national economies. By the same token, the extent to which national economies allow international financiers to invest in their economies reflects the increase in economic growth which they benefit from through direct foreign investment. National consumers allowed to use foreign products would profit from greater diversity and an improved quality of goods and services in their consumption patterns. All of this, however, depends upon national economies' legal systems, which are constructed in accordance with the principle of national sovereignty. Hence, national sovereignty prevents the emergence of an open global economy.

Assuming the premise that the existing world economy is actually dominated by the triad of Europe, Japan, and North America, the reason for this oligopolistic economy is that these economic zones have opened their trade traffic and capital accounts to each other's economies while protecting their own from the rest of the world economy. As Stephan Gill rightly observes, "The current phase of economic globalization has come to be characterized increasingly not be free competition as idealized in neo-classical theory, but by *oligopolistic neoliberalism*: oligopoly and protection for the strong and a socialization of their risks, market discipline for the weak" (Hovden and Keene 2002: 129). Since the poorest countries do not play a notable role in the architecture of the world economy, it is not surprising that they are prevented from making fair use of global capital mobility to improve their economic welfare. A global welfare state is necessary to enable the global poor to exploit such capital mobility. In a world economy, in which national economies are still the main units of economic activity, there is no institutional stimulus to force the richest countries to solve the problem of global poverty.

It is noteworthy that "The World Trade Organization's (WTO) role in international trade looms large. Ninety-seven percent of all international trade is governed by the three main treaties that the WTO administers" (Brock and Moellendorf 2005: 8). If this is the case, should we not be concerned about the extent to which the developing world is affected by the content of such trade treaties? If the developed countries determine the set of rules for the world economy, why should they want to give equal

opportunities for economic competition to the developing world? As Charles Beitz observes, "Of many possible examples, consider the intellectual property agreement (TRIPS) of 1994 and rules of the world trade regime allowing the rich countries to maintain restrictive agricultural trade preferences which effectively deny access to their domestic markets to cheaper-cost providers in poor countries" (ibid.: 25).

Thomas Pogge argues that global poverty originates in the nation-state system which recognizes corrupt leaders as sovereign powers. Thus, such corrupt leaders can sell their countries' resources to buy the means for internal repression (Brock and Moellendorf 2005: 47). Corrupt leaders responsible for national poverty and nation-state-based global politics which recognize such leaders reflect the lack of global democracy and can be a primary cause of global poverty. Pogge states: "In the WTO negotiations, the affluent countries insisted on continued and asymmetrical protections of their markets through tariff, quotas, anti-dumping duties, export credits, and subsidies to domestic producers, greatly impairing the export opportunities of even the very poorest countries. These protections cost developing countries hundreds of billions of dollars in lost export revenues" (ibid.: 50). In the absence of a democratic global state, it is not surprising that the affluent countries determine the set of rules for the world economy, with global poverty as an unavoidable consequence.

In order to create a proper mechanism for resource allocation on a global scale, the people of the world should first create a moral foundation for it: all economic agents must be regarded as equals morally. This moral base implies that economic agents' rights and duties should no longer be defined on the basis of their national citizenship, because a global democratic state enforces universal rights for equal economic agents.

According to Luis Cabrera, moral cosmopolitans should also be strong institutional cosmopolitans. He uses the example of the European Union to defend the kind of integration he believes can best institutionalize moral cosmopolitism in the long run, implying that individuals should have access to adequate opportunities and resources, irrespective of their birth-country (Brook and Moellendorf 2005: 171–199). A transition from the existing world economy to an open global economy is possible, provided that through a profound change in the nation-state system it can be transformed into a constitutional global government. In short, the problem of uneven development within the world economy must be tackled at the level of an open global society in general, not at the level of an emerging free global market that does not provide equal rights to self-determination of preferences and capacities, as recommended by neoliberal advocates of economic globalization.

Dialogue among Civilizations and Global Civil Society

It is important to recognize that the existing global order has put itself in a state of war against the people of the world. From a Lockean perspective,

people have the right to struggle against such an illegitimate global order and to claim their rights to power.

This section aims to show that global civil society could act as an emancipatory social space through which a capacity for self-critique of the existing social order could be activated in order to transform the imposed state of global war into a state of civil life. Due to their access to critical reason, global civil society actors (such as thinkers, social movements and the masses) can work together to achieve such self-criticism and use the philosophy of critical rationalism to address the potential role of global civil society in the transition from the Hobbesian war of all against all to an open global society of free and equal individuals.

Critical Rationalism and Civil Society

The philosophy of critical rationalism has not yet been used to formulate a theory of civil society which aims to show that how people (thinkers, movements, and the masses) can activate their critical reason to form a normative protest against the dominant social order during the transition from a closed to an open society. Inspired by the sociological theory of open society, we can argue that the opening of a closed society to an open one originates in the moral critique of dominant values by open-minded individuals struggling for a just and free society.

One possibility for a theory of civil society to address the essence of civil society is to refer to a capacity for the self-critique of society which could be activated by social forces, such as thinkers, social movements, and the masses in order to open a closed society. In this sense, civil society would express the capacity for self-critique of the existing society which originates in people's critical reason. In order to act as agents for social change, people must first criticize the unacceptable values on the basis of which existing social institutions have been built. Civil society provides social forces with a *learning framework* for their self-critique of the society's moral deficiencies.

In order to understand why civil society should be given such an emancipatory role in social change, an analysis of civil society should take place within the context of civil society literature. It is worth mentioning for the purpose of our argument that civil society was regarded as a legitimate component of the state, but was later viewed as a space between the individual and the state. The role of human agency in shaping the distinct essence of civil society and its capacity for self-critique, however, has not yet been properly understood. Social forces, whether social movements or the masses, are viewed as oversocialized agents unable to question dominant values and social institutions. Meanwhile, it is actually the independent civil society actors who take on the responsibility of self-critique of society, regardless of their social conditions and personal interests. This point enables us to define a key moral role for civil society in emancipatory social change based on the

philosophy of critical rationalism: the essence of a concept of civil society can be defined in terms of the moral critique of illegitimate social institutions.

As Mary Kaldor argues, "The renaissance of the concept in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was inextricably linked to theories of individual rights and the idea of a social contract" (2003: 6). The ideal of civil society as a legitimate form of the state has its origins in Lockean social philosophy. According to Locke, civil society emerges from individuals coming together to make a social contract upon which the rule of law limits the power of the state and aims to protect the natural right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, i.e., making no distinction between civil society and the state. Since such a civilized society enables individuals to pursue their moral ideal of happiness, civil society contains the private sphere of pursuing personal interests. Scottish enlightenment thinkers, such as Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith, broadened the concept of civil society with their emphasis on the market as the condition for individualism and the existence of civil society. Yet they considered civil society to be a rule-governed society based on individual consent.

Viewed from a different social philosophy, Marx argues that a civil society which reflects a market society makes the state become its subordinate. Ignoring moral consensus in a market society, Marx defines civil society as the private sphere of a selfish bourgeoisie who pursue their material interests as dictated by the capitalist division of labor. From this point of view, Marx's civil society, *as an expression of capitalism*, cannot be perceived as having the capacity for the self-critique of society to overcome its own moral deficiencies.

As explained by A. S. Walton (1984: 244–261), Hegel's theory of civil society defines a middle ground between liberalism and Marxism. Hegel argues that the pursuit of happiness cannot be the moral base of a civilized society, yet he does not accept that the liberal ethics of market society, as a moral critique of the traditional Christian ethics, were the result of openness to criticism. According to Hegel, although individuals do not merely pursue their personal interests (as per utilitarian liberalism), nor are they individuals who merely adhere to the dictum of the capitalist economy (as per Marxism). Hegel attributes moral agency to human beings, and it is this that enables them to live in a rule-governed society. As Walton states, "Utilitarian individualism is transcended by the mediation of attitudes and values which give expression to the individual's social being. Groups are integral to the growth of a social medium adequate to the rational pursuit of personal goals. … In a rational civil society men pursue their own goals and projects, but in a manner mediated by shared values adequate to their essentially social being" (Pelczynski 1984: 258). Hegel defines civil society as a component of ethical life which provides the middle ground between the family and the state (Kumar 1993: 378). However, Hegel recognizes civil society's capacity for self-critique. According to Alejandro Colás, "Hegel's concept of civil society acknowledged the centrality of conscious, reflexive individuals in the construction of modern civil society" (2003: 262). In short, Hegel's theory enables

us to recognize the moral agency of civil society, while still not explaining how actors in civil society employ critical reason to protest against the moral deficiencies in existing society.

In *Civil Society and the Political Public Sphere,* Habermas states: "Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and movements … The core of civil society comprises a network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres" (1997: 367). To overcome such societal problems, civil society actors employ discursive ethics. Using the same line of reasoning, Arato and Cohen suggest "the construction of a new type of civil society delimited by a partially new set of rights with communicative rather than property rights at their core. As such, the autonomy of civil society from state and economy could be reestablished… but only a civil society capable of influencing the state and economy can help to maintain the structure of right" (1988: 59). All of these interpretations of civil society point us towards attribution of the capacity of self-critique of civil society actors with access to critical reason. No actors viewed as oversocialized individuals could be independent of their own personal interests and social conditions; oversocialized individuals would thus be unable to develop moral critique against dominant values and social institutions.

In *The Civil Sphere*, Jeffery Alexander suggests a similar moral approach to civil society. According to Alexander, "civil society should be conceived as a solidary sphere, in which a certain kind of universalizing community comes to be culturally defined and to some degree institutionally enforced. … To identify civil society with capitalism … is to degrade its universalizing moral implications and the capacity for criticism and repair that the existence of a relatively independent solidary community implies" (2006: 31, 33). Robert Cox recognizes this issue similarly: "'civil society' has become the comprehensive term for various ways in which people express collective wills independently of (and often in opposition to) established power, both economic and political" (1999: 10). If the actors in civil society are capable of using their critical reason to shape the moral critique of existing institutions, the contribution of the philosophy of critical rationalism to the theory of civil society will be understood and civil society actors perceived as individuals independent of their own social conditions and personal interests who can protest against dominant values in order to achieve a desirable social order.

It is important to define the political function of social movements in the context of moral agency in civil society. Social movements base their protests on the normative input provided by open-minded thinkers. Independent thinkers introduce ideals of social order on which basis social movements criticize the existing social order. As argued by Alexander, social movements are political translations of moral protest demonstrated to the dominant powers by the oppressed. "Behind social movements there is reference to a highly idealized community, one that demands that the universal become concrete.

Demands for a concrete universal are made against the backdrop of a utopian notion of community, according to which rational actors spontaneously forge ties that are at once self-regulating, solidaristic, and emancipatory" (2006: 230). By the same token, the moral ideal of an open society could play the key role in the self-critique of civil society during the transition from a closed to an open society.

Moral Dialogue and Global Social Movements

In *Global Civil Society*, Jan Scholte states: "Our conception of global civil society is … inseparable from our notion of 'global-ness'" (Robertson and White 2003b: 283). From the perspective of critical rationalism, we should attach a *moral essence* to such a *global-ness* of civil society. It is note-worthy that global civil society has not yet developed a truly moral essence despite its emergence in a set of transnational associations and political movements.

It is often argued that the emergence of global civil society dates back to the end of the Cold War, thus reflecting its political nature. In particular, it should be mentioned too that global civil society has been defined by some scholars to include a wide range of civil associations and non-governmental organizations. Ironically, the political origin of global civil society and its wide range of civil actors do not provide us with the especial focus required in a critical rationalist philosophy of civil society: *the self-critique of the moral foundation of the global system of national societies.*

Scholte argues that global civil society has grown in part due to the attempt by citizens to obtain a greater voice in post-sovereign global governance (1999: 15). Similarly, Kaldor points out that "there were indeed new ideas in the revolution of 1989 and they can be summed up in the concept of global civil society. What was new about the concept …was both the demand for a radical extension of both political and personal rights … and the global content of the concept. … To achieve these demands, the new civil society actors found it necessary and possible to make alliances across borders and to address not just the state but international institutions as well (2003: 76–77). While the role of the collapse of the Cold War in shaping global civil society is undeniable, this explanation does not show how global civil society actors might arrive at a moral consensus on universal human rights.

According to Cordon Christenson, "World civil society is made up of individuals and groups in voluntary association without regard to their iden-tities as citizens of any particular country, and outside the political and public domination of the community of nations. The voluntary associations of this world civil society include religious organizations, private business organiza-tions, the information and news media, educational and research organizations, and non-governmental organizations" (1997: 731). However, Christenson does not include global social movements in his wide range of world civil society actors. Similarly, John Keane defines the term global civil society as

"*a dynamic non-governmental system of interconnected socio-economic institutions that straddle the whole earth, and thus have complex effects that are felt in its four corners*" (2003: 8, emphasis in the original). In contrast, Colás pays particular attention to global social movements as the key actors in global civil society and uses the term *international civil society* in a narrower sense "referring mainly to that type of social and political movements which organises around universal notions of social and political transformation" (Robertson and White 2003b: 260). From the viewpoint of critical rationalism, global thinkers, global movements and global citizens are the most important actors in global civil society. In the context of a dialogue of civilizations, global thinkers can provide global movements with the moral inputs they require for their political protests against the existing global system by elaborating on the moral ideal of an open global society.

Inspired by the philosophy of critical rationalism, the transition from the existing global order to an open global society requires common global values to provide the moral base of global institutions such as the law of humanity, global democracy, and an open global economy. Now we can understand that global civil society can be the global agent of an open global society because it provides civil society actors with the moral and institutional frameworks to create such common values and institutions.

We have argued that civil society could act as a *problem-solving mechanism* on a global scale. The societal problem of war of all against all enters into the main debate on global civil society as a key global problem, calling for a moral solution. The actors in global civil society, in particular global thinkers, global movements, and global citizens, should elaborate on a normative solution for the social problem of global order. Bearing in mind the method of conjecture and refutation, global thinkers can make use of the moral capacity of global civil society to initiate an open moral dialogue among civilizations. If moral beliefs about the meaning of the good life are opened to rational criticism, people could learn from one another's moral critique and get closer to the truth of the good life. In this way, the capacity for the self-critique of global civil society will be activated by the opening of moral beliefs to criticism within the context of a dialogue among civilizations. Such a dialogue among civilizations requires the involvement of all people in the moral dialogue about the meaning of the good life.

Given a meta-civilizational moral consensus on the good life, global social movements may utilize the normative power of common global values to claim the need for establishing the law of humanity. For this, the support of global citizens is essential. If the moral dialogue among civilizations is to lead to worldwide moral consensus, the ground must be prepared for ordinary people to lend political support to global social movements in their protests against the existing global order. As Jackie Smith reminds us in *Social Movements for Global Democracy*, "social change efforts typically begin when social movements mobilize people around ideas of the necessity and possibility for change" (2008: 19). The ideal of an open global society enables global

movements to defend the necessity for reforming the societal deficiencies in the existing global order and the possibility of creating a just global society.

Smith argues that there is a struggle between the concept of a world economy based on economic competition in which people are organized within national societies and the idea of global society as "a community of citizens and states organized around a shared human identity and common norms that promote cooperation and social cohesion. … while advocators of global society seek to socialize states and other actors in ways that place human rights norms at the center of polity. Those advocating a world economy want to subordinate societies and state to market force" (2008: 4–5). If Smith is right, an important challenge for global movements is to make it clear that a competitive global economy requires a worldwide moral consensus on equal rights for economic agents, which is not possible within the context of a global system of national societies.

The transition from the national society-based global system to a democratic global state could take place if global social movements are able to persuade all people to solve the Hobbesian problem of the war of all against all by establishing a global social contract to give the monopoly of force to a constitutional global state. Once such a global government has been established, economic agents, regardless their national citizenship, could enjoy equal rights to the self-determination of the needs and abilities necessary for the creation of an open global economy.

As Barry Gills rightly observes, "We cannot therefore consider 'practising dialogue' to be 'mere talking' for the sake of finding understanding and tolerance, though these are of course necessary and useful. The true usefulness of dialogue comes from the use of dialogic understanding to identify common values and common purpose and, above all, to transform these perceptions into meaningful, urgent global action to solve the most harmful global crises" (2006: 425–426). Critical rationalism provides us with a concept of rational dialogue which enables us to recognize the true usefulness of dialogue in terms of its function to lead us to a moral base for a just and free global society.

Critical Rationalism and Global Sociology: A Concluding Remark

Drawing on the philosophy of critical rationalism, this book has attempted to introduce a new sociology of globalization which could be situated at the center of global sociology. Sociologists argue that national society is no longer the only subject matter of sociology and that the emerging global social order should be given due consideration in the formulation of sociological theories. Since the process of globalization gives social order global dimension, a social theory of globalization merits a central place in global sociology.

In conclusion, my intention is to remind the reader about the way in which book has used the philosophy of critical rationalism to formulate a critical sociology of globalization. Viewed from the perspective of critical rationalist,

each theory is a *conjecture* which uses a certain premise to deduce an argument as a *refutable* solution for an identified problem. Critical rationalism has been applied to express a normative solution for the Hobbesian problem of a *peaceful global order*. If individuals and national societies pursue their own interests, how can globalization create a peaceful social order on a global scale? This formulation of the central problem of the sociology of globalization enables us to search for empirical as well as normative dimensions of globalization. On the one hand, it is a question of how the existing global order has emerged through the processes of globalization and, on the other, it considers the desirability of the existing global order.

The book argues that, in order to employ the philosophy of critical rationalism to address the Hobbesian social problem of a peaceful global order, we must first understand how modern sociology has tried to solve the Hobbesian problem at a domestic level. An attempt has been made to develop a sociology of globalization on the basis of the legacies of modern sociology, one of the most important of which refers to an innovative solution to the Hobbesian problem of a peaceful social order.

Using the insights of classical sociologists such as Weber and Durkheim, modern sociologists, in particular Parsons, have argued that a sociological answer to the Hobbesian problem of *how a peaceful social order is possible if individuals pursue their self-interests* is that the pursuit of one's own concerns does not lead to social disorder when common values control egoistic behavior, because common values organize self-interested actions towards social order. Thus, modern sociology provides a normative solution for its social problem of a peaceful social order. Nonetheless, this book employs the philosophy of critical rationalism to make use of this fundamental legacy of modern sociology for addressing the question of how globalization can shape a peaceful global order.

It is argued in this book that a social theory of globalization requires a significant change in the micro-foundation of modern sociology if the sociological problem of global order is to be tackled. Critical rationalism is employed to show what such a change could be like. It is not surprising that the notion has been applied here to demonstrate how people's access to critical reason must be connected in the some way with the common values upon which a peaceful social order would actually be possible.

Jeffery Alexander has criticized the Parsonian sociology of social order because its emphasis on the existing social order prevents it from addressing the key issue of social change. An analysis of social change is, however, fundamental for the transition from the existing unsatisfactory social order to a desirable one. This book has argued that modern sociology is unable to approach the question of social change properly due to its micro-foundations, i.e., the theory of human action, which does not adequately explain the role of human agency in the creation of social order. Sociological theory which views human agency in terms of individuals' voluntarily orientation towards the existing values as the main source of peaceful social order does not permit

human actors to be the agents of moral critique of the social order in order to introduce a new set of moral values and social institutions.

In this book the philosophy of critical rationalism is applied to introduce a new model of human action according to which individuals utilize their reason to question prevailing values. Individuals are thus regarded as agents of a social transformation from the existing closed social order to an ideal open society. The internalization of the philosophy of critical rationalism in sociology of social change presented here has paved the ground for the extension of the general theory of an open society on a global scale.

Individuals who, regardless of their social conditions and personal interests, are capable of opening their moral beliefs to rational criticism, may change existing social institutions so that they achieve a moral base of parallel openness. In this book, sociological analysis of a transition from a closed to an open society has then been applied to formulate a solution to the social problem of the transition from the state of war to the state of civil life. Such sociological analysis has led to a social theory of globalization with the aim of addressing the transition from the existing global order to an open global society.

Keeping in mind the social theory of open society, this book has defined globalization as the emergence of a global system of national societies. It has been argued that the emergence of such a global system originates in the liberal ethics of modernity which have led to a system of the nation-state-based social institutions on a global scale, although globalization has not created a global society in terms of shared values and social institutions. In a critical sociology of globalization, this book has argued that the emergence of the Westphalia nation-state system in seventeenth-century Europe made a major contribution to the formation of a global order of national societies due to its secular solution to thirty years of political war in Europe. However, the main phase of globalization began with the ending of World War II and reached a critical stage following the conclusion of the Cold War.

Viewed from the philosophy of critical rationalism, national societies which have been able to solve their moral disputes through an open dialogue among societies have established more productive global institutions for overcoming the Hobbesian war of all against all. The post-war global order has made the world a more secure and freer place under the modern ethics and the management of the great powers. However, globalization suffers from deep societal deficiencies because it does not organize the people of the world through worldwide moral consensus and democratic global institutions.

This book suggests a moral dialogue for creating an open global society to show how moral deficiencies in the existing form of globalization could be overcome. Using the micro-foundations of modern sociology of social change, this book has argued that civilizations of peoples who are potential independent agents capable of thinking regardless of their social conditions and personal interests could shape an open moral dialogue among civilizations regarding the meaning of the good life which may bring them nearer to the

ultimate values on which a global society might be built. Thus, an open moral dialogue among civilizations in regard to ultimate values as a normative solution for creation of a just and free global society has been introduced here.

Against this background, I would like to highlight the following key points regarding the contribution made by the philosophy of critical rationalism to the sociology of open global society:

- The sociology of open global society emphasizes the role of common global values in solving global social problems, common values which could be shaped through a moral dialogue among civilizations. A *socio-logical pathology* of the existing global order has been introduced in discussing the proposition that the lack of global values is the ultimate source of global disorder.
- While globalization theories highlight the role played by the economic and political driving forces of globalization in undermining the functions of the nation-state, the sociology of open global society has argued that a real institutional change in national society-based global order calls for the law of humanity, a democratic global state and an open global economy which are not possible without the moral critique of relativist ethics which is embedded in the principle of national sovereignty.
- The sociology of open global society has advocated a radical institutional change for creation of a just and free global society: the establishment of the law of humanity and a global democratic state. In other words, the ultimate global values of the good life for all people will be achieved only if such institutional change occurs.
- Viewed from the sociological analysis in this book, existing skepticism concerning the feasibility of a democratic global state can be overcome by the recognition that the self-critique capacity of human actors enables them to understand the reason why nationally defined legal rights to self-determination cannot provide them with the political sovereignty required for their good life.
- The micro-foundations of the sociology of an open global society enables us to criticize the oversocialized image of human actors by recognizing them as independent thinkers whose access to critical reason make them capable of protesting against unacceptable values and institutions. In this sense, the philosophy of critical rationalism has enabled the sociology of open global society to argue that all people are capable of opening their moral beliefs to rational criticism and creating the common values necessary for the law of humanity and global democracy.
- The sociology of open global society has led us to understand why the transition from the existing global order to an ideal global society requires not only a *value revolution*, but also an *institutional revolution* on a global scale.
- The book has highlighted the key role of global thinkers in clarifying the ideal of an open global society and the significant role of global social

movements in the translation of such a moral ideal into a social protest against the dominant institutions of the existing global order. The role of citizens supporting such social protests aimed at creating a just and free world for all has been emphasized.

Finally, an important message for global sociology from the philosophy of critical rationalism is that we require much more knowledge about the way in which different civilizations and societies think about the universe, the nature of human beings, and an ideal social order if we wish to secure the worldwide moral consensus which is necessary for the creation of a peaceful and just world. Moral dialogue for an open global society means opening our minds in order to understand what others think about our values and institutions.

Notes

1 In *Globalization and Civilizations*, Robert Cox recognizes the connection between epistemology and a dialogue among civilizations, as well as its implications for world order. He states: "*If different civilizations do coexist, the problem of mutual comprehension becomes paramount for the maintenance of world order.* This arises in an epistemological context far different from the game theoretic and rational choice notions popular during the Cold War which assumed a single shared rationality. An ability to enter into the mental framework of the Other becomes an essential ingredient in peaceful coexistence" (Mozaffari 2002: 15, emphasis in the original). The aim of this chapter is to show that by opening their beliefs to mutual criticism, people living in different parts of the world can create an epistemological context not only for understanding each other, but also for achieving a set of common values necessary for their peaceful coexistence.

2 Edward Said connects Orientalism with European civilization in the following way: "The Orient is an integral part of European *material* civilization and culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles" (2003: 2, emphasis in the original). It is not unreasonable to say that the cultural aspect of Orientalism originates in European civilization's perception of itself as a standard of civilization that the Orient should follow in terms of its values and model of social order.

3 In order to introduce his philosophy of critical rationalism, William Bartley criticizes Western philosophy thus: "*The Western philosophical tradition is authoritarian in structure, even in its most liberal forms. ...* In fact, modern philosophy is the story of the rebellion of one authority against another authority, and the clash between competing authorities. Far from repudiating the appeal to authority as such, modern philosophy has entertained only one alternative to the practice of basing opinions on traditional and perhaps *irrational* authority: namely, that of basing them on a rational *authority*" (1984: 109, emphasis in the original).

4 David Held highlights an important issue by implying that there is "a fundamental lack of ownership of global problems at the global level" (Held and McGrew 2007: 247). One of the aims of this chapter is to show that, within the context of a global system of national society, ownership of global problems cannot be addressed because each national society uses sovereignty as an excuse to pursue its own interests. By contrast, in an open global society a democratic global government can take responsibility for dealing with global problems on behalf of all people.

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