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A European
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Perspective
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Mario Telò

Foreword by R.O. Keohane

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

*For the Institute for European Studies (ULB) students
and colleagues who have taught me.*

*For the global epistemic network who helped bridging
European Studies and International Relations.*

*And for Alessandro and Andrea,
European citizens for a world of openness and peace.*

International Relations: A European Perspective

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ASHGATE

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Contents

<i>Foreword – Robert O. Keohane</i>	<i>vii</i>
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	<i>ix</i>
Introduction	
International Relations Theory: A European Perspective?	1
1 Origins of the International Relations Theories and the Emerging Realist Paradigm	13
2 Systemic Approaches in the United States	39
3 International Political Economy	55
4 The Influence of K. Marx on International Relations	63
5 Beyond Realism and Neo-realism	73
6 Institutional Theories	91
7 A Post-sovereign World?	107
8 Constructivist Approaches	117
9 Foreign Policy Analysis and the Impact of Domestic Factors	125
10 The Contribution of European Studies to the Renewal of International Relations Theory	139
Conclusions	169
Appendix – Regional, Interregional and Global Arrangements and Organizations <i>Sebastian Santander</i>	175
<i>Planisphères</i>	<i>207</i>
<i>Index</i>	<i>211</i>

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Foreword

Robert O. Keohane

As this volume by Mario Telò shows, theoretical analysis of international relations, for the past decades, has centered on contestation among various schools of thought, the most prominent of which have been neo-Realism, institutionalism and constructivism. These schools emphasize different features of world politics and their proponents typically have different expectations about predominant patterns of behavior. In particular, the sources of power and interests, the significant institutions, and the importance of socialization and persuasion are contested among adherents of the various schools.

The debate among these schools has succeeded in identifying key points of difference and in problematizing concepts such as those of “interests” and “power” that may in earlier decades have been taken for granted. Interests are not always rooted in material factors; they can be oriented toward the short-term or the long-term; they can be highly conflictual (“zero-sum”) or assume the benefits of cooperation; they can be altered by institutional context; and they can be changed by ideas about values or about causality. Power can be seen as a resource pertaining to actors or as referring to the quality of a relationship between actors; it can be “hard” or “soft” in Joseph Nye’s terms – depending on force and economic resources, on the one hand, or emulation and persuasion on the other; it can be viewed in zero-sum terms as the ability of one actor to control another or seen as the ability to act collectively, which implies the possibility that the overall amount of power in a system can be a variable.

Despite the value of the debate among schools, it also contains three dangers, which have been apparent in the field of international relations in the United States. First, these approaches are sometimes regarded as “theories”, but none of them is really a well-developed theory, with clear and consistent assumptions and the logical derivation of testable conclusions. Different specific theories can exist within each approach – for instance, about war and alliances and the offensive or defensive orientations of states, in neo-Realism; about the role of objective vs. subjective conceptions of interest in institutional theory; or about the importance of persuasion in constructivist views.

Second, these three schools of international relations are often seen as contradictory – that is, as alternatives to one another. But in fact, each of them only emphasizes aspects of the complex reality of world politics – power and security, institutions, norms and beliefs. Anyone observing world politics should come to understand rather quickly that all of these factors play some role in state behavior

and in the outcomes of action, along with other factors such as the interests and capabilities of non-state actors. The three schools all contain insights that can be applied to real problems of world politics, but they are not antithetical to one another, nor do they constitute alternatives. They indeed emphasize different factors and their adherents may come to different conclusions, but the basic intellectual task is to synthesize them creatively to understand real situations, rather than to set them up as competitors in a race run against one another. It is notable that university-based American students of world politics – neo-Realists, institutionalists and constructivists – were almost all opposed to the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003. There are commonalities that transcend scholarly differences.

Third, the existence of these approaches seems to some students of the subject to suggest that international relations theory is a self-regarding subject: that it should be studied for its own sake. But international relations theory is not intrinsically beautiful or elegant. It is only valuable if it *does work* – that is, if it helps to understand the rapidly changing world of our times. The test of a theory is not the novelty of its terms or its lineage from famous thinkers, but how well it illuminates real problems. Does it help us to understand Chinese strategies as a rising power; how multilateral institutions operate; or the activities of transnational social movements? In the end, worthwhile studies of world politics are problem-oriented. The value of theory depends on whether it provides us with effective tools to understand these problems.

According to Mario Telò and a large international literature, the European construction and regional integration in general, represent more than a mere case study: an example of institutionalization of interstate relations, a multidimensional transnational networking, a supranational political system in the making, addressing relevant challenges to political sciences and international relations theories (regarding the concepts of power, sovereignty, legitimacy, democracy). This laboratory of new ideas is regarded with respect and interest not only in Europe but also elsewhere in the world and namely within the American research community.

To have a sophisticated understanding of contemporary world politics, one needs to have a grasp of the schools of thought discussed in this volume. They provide important concepts, critiques, and questions that can illuminate a variety of issues. I therefore applaud the appearance of this volume and hope it has a wide readership. But as I have emphasized, I also hope that readers will keep in mind that for these approaches to be worthwhile, they need to be used to understand important problems. If theory is treated an ornament to be admired for its own sake, it will be worse than useless – indeed, a distraction. If it is employed creatively to understand major problems, it may help human beings, as a species, to figure out how to survive.

Acknowledgements

This book focuses on International Relations theories from a European perspective. By underlining this distinctive approach, I refer not only to my particular European point of view about international relations, but also to broad theoretical implications of the European Union experiment as institutionalized peaceful cooperation between previous enemies, consolidated democracy within states and deepening community between states and civil societies.

This work in progress would have been unthinkable without three prerequisites: critical understanding of the legacy and current debates in IR theory, conceptual clarity and empirical knowledge of international and European union political life from inside.

For this reason, I would first like to pay tribute to the theoretical dialogue between European and US scholars that has nourished the extraordinary development of international relations in the USA and Anglo-Saxon world, particularly since the Second World War. However, the present work also focuses on ongoing change and innovation, taking stock of a large and pluralistic body of international research. I'm aware that the search for a new European approach goes largely against conventional wisdom in International Relations theory, and must be underpinned by a broad community of scholars.

Some individual colleagues were particularly proactive in providing me with critical feedback regarding certain chapters and made the first results of my work in progress possible: I would like to express my thanks to A. Gamble (Cambridge), K. Nicolaidis (Oxford), K. Smith (LSE), Richard Higgott (University of Warwick), J. Ikenberry (Princeton University), F. Cerutti (University of Florence), J.-L. Quermonne (University de Grenoble) and V. Schmidt (Boston University). My special thanks are particularly due to Bob Keohane who, between 2003 and 2008 was kind enough to spend time commenting on my previous books and stimulating many of the book's main conceptual guidelines through his invaluable theoretical input.

Regarding the empirical praxis of international relations, I would like to thank the high level civil servants and policy-makers of the three main EU institutions (EU Commission, Council and Parliament) as well as ASEAN, Saarc, Mercosur, Andean Community, UN, WTO, OCDE representatives, national Ambassadors with whom I have partnered in many policy-oriented seminars regarding topics related to the EU and regional associations in the world. I would like to express a special thanks to the DG research, the DG Relex, DG Culture of the European Commission and the presidency of the EU Council, and particularly to Maria Joao Rodrigues, the driving force of the EU "Lisbon Strategy" for a knowledge society.

During the past decade, I have had the opportunity to participate in high level dialogues with outstanding partners abroad – CASS, Beijing; Fudan University, Shanghai; Tokyo and Chuo Universities; IPEA and the University of Sao Paolo, Brazil; J. Nehru University, Delhi and the Indian Institute of advanced studies; the MGIMO and the University of Moscow – where I have held lectures and seminars that introduced several of this book's chapters, or at least some of its main issues. The experience of an evolving practice of international relations was an essential source of empirical knowledge for me.

Thirdly, regarding clarity of presentation of a complex discipline, this book would not exist in its present textbook form without the input of many hundreds of students and scholars who, first at the Brussels Free University (ULB), but also in many other European, American and Asian universities, offered me the unique opportunity to present a relatively new discipline, or some of its chapters. A special thanks to the many dozens of alumni who have attended the international Garnet PhD school seminars, since 2004, from the best universities worldwide and to the Garnet staff and leading group, including L. Van Langehove, F. Ponjaert and other colleagues and Academic Council members. This discipline provides not only useful tools for understanding world politics to master and PhD students – but also conscious and committed citizens, aware of the historical relevance of international change occurring since 1989/91 and of the unprecedented global and regional challenges currently faced by human kind.

Last but not least, I would like to thank the team who have aided in construction of this book. This volume is a revised, updated and expanded version of the French language edition. S. Santander, Liege University and ULB, is the author of Chapter 3 and of the very useful Appendix that provides evidence and details regarding the high degree of multilevel institutionalization in multilateral organizations. Two anonymous Ashgate reviewers kindly provided very useful suggestions for improvements that the book might be both more comprehensive and clearer on its distinctive approach to International Relations. Laura Rose Barr, a brilliant American former student of the Brussels IEE, is responsible for the translation of most chapters. The research council of the IEE–ULB and Mrs M. Mat of the Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles supported this enterprise, in both French and English versions, from the beginning; and of course, K. Howgate of Ashgate, who is a precious and patient partner of more than ten years of my publications in English.

Mario Telò

Introduction

International Relations Theory: A European Perspective?

International Relations theory has been an independent discipline for nearly a century: the first Chair was conferred to Alfred Zimmern in 1919, by the University College of Wales, Aberystwith.¹ The discipline has European origins and a universal vocation, but it is the United States who (due to its unique place in the world after 1945) largely determined its recent academic development. The first objective of this book is to construct a critical panorama of the knowledge and theories accumulated in international relations.

This analytic reconstruction of the discipline's development is accompanied by special consideration of the European perspective. This is without any sense of Eurocentrism – misplaced in a world where Europe's relative place has changed after two self-destructive world wars and the irreversible repositioning of the globalized economy's center of gravity towards the Pacific. Not only is Europe no longer the center of the world as it once was during the age of geographic discovery and empires, but the twenty-first century multi-polar world undermines the classical conceptions of world order based on European centrality.²

Rather, considering the European perspective signifies gleaning deeper understanding of the future of the five-centuries-old and European-born modern state on the one hand and, on the other, of regional cooperation between neighboring states: the success story of European integration and unification over the past 60 years with its pooled and shared sovereignty among member states challenges political science and international relations theory indeed, which are still all too dominated by the state-centric Westphalian paradigm. Furthermore, the European perspective suggests a reading of historic political thought and international relations according to a pluralist but coherent guideline: reexamining the exclusive role of the state and critical interpretations of national interest and the concept of power, from the classics, Kant and Grotius to European reflection on civilizing a "society of states" since the nineteenth century; from numerous references to the EC and EU within American international relations literature to the new neo-institutionalist and constructivist approaches.

1 Alfred Zimmern (1879–1957) served in the foreign office and is the author of *The Greek Commonwealth* (1911) and *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918–35* (1936).

2 See G.W.F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, according to which Asia was the beginning of history and Europe is the end.

Despite the rejection of Eurocentrism, it is still important to understand whether the European Union experience is only an interesting but fragile and provisional case study that does nothing more than confirm the theories that preceded it. Obviously historic events are not always relevant to either long-term historic evolution or theory development. Scientists' geopolitical situation and cultural and historical constellation – for example, in East Asia, the US or Western Europe – should neither exclusively nor deterministically influence the evolution of theoretical approaches. Nonetheless, in each of these three research poles, particularly the United States and Western Europe, the dynamics among European states and citizens over the last 60 years have been addressed by a large part of the scientific community.

Despite its oscillations, limitations and setbacks, European integration is an accomplished and irreversible fact, a long-term historic change that goes beyond the incidents, treaties and referendums that garnished its history. Does this accomplishment entail relevant theoretical implications? Sixty years after the “Schuman declaration” (9.5.1950), does the European Union not represent a kind of Hegelian “philosophical event”, i.e. an invitation to tackle changes at the theoretical level? The “philosophical event” is not only the EU success story in terms of deepening engagements (eight successive treaties between 1950 and 2007) and enlargements (from six to 27 states), but also the lessons learned from several failures: the European defense community in 1954; the Werner plan in 1971; the French and Dutch referendums on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005; the Irish referendums, etc. Both success and setbacks confirm limits and strengths of European cooperation and integration dynamics. Despite oscillations and crises, this new still partially unidentified political phenomenon still moves on, and by its very existence as such, it continues to challenge the political theory and International Relations.

The right question is: precisely because the early idea of the Europe's founding fathers to build up a European federal state, the institutional process of interstate and supranational institution making didn't simply copy the historic process that led to the United States of America and is following an alternative path. The US by constructing the first federal Republic of modern times has changed the history of political ideas and international relations. It is precisely the failure of the “United States of Europe” model, and yet continuation of European integration process, that is of major interest for theoretical innovation.

Does this ongoing theoretical innovation entail paradigm change? A common thread that runs through this book is the analysis of whether European construction indicates not only the first signs of a new practice and theoretical concept of sovereignty but also of a new paradigm in International Relations.³ This question

3 Th. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1970. According to Kuhn, “paradigms” are scientific constructions: by this he means universally recognized scientific conquests that, for a certain time, provide a model for understanding problems and solutions that is generally accepted by scholars and

is all the more important in consideration of changes the international order has experienced, particularly in 1947 and 1989 with the beginning and end of the bipolar system:⁴ the Westphalian paradigm has allowed for several different international systems, so a new type of Westphalian system – albeit profoundly revised – cannot be ruled out. But could it be that the very fundamentals of the Westphalian paradigm are in question in the twenty-first century world and that contemporary Europe is the prequel to a broader revisionist tendency?

Never before in world history have a number of sovereign states, of which some were formerly mortal enemies, freely decided to collaborate within new institutions that are both supranational and intergovernmental, and to jointly exercise their sovereignty through a interstate and transnational process rooted in their civil spheres; this cooperation goes beyond a simple international regime and beyond traditional multilateral cooperation towards a common public space, common market, single currency, a political system and a global actor in the making.

Secondly, European Studies are connected to international relations theories via comparative research on regional, interregional and global cooperation. These connections illustrate that the European phenomenon is not isolated in the twenty-first century world, where globalization is accompanied by the development

practitioners in a certain area of research (*Preface*, pp. 11–12). A new theoretical paradigm can only be born from the conjunction of entirely new objective problems and subjective modes of thought. I use the term “Westphalian Paradigm” to highlight the fact that although the break between the preceding international system (Medieval Empire) and the state-centered Westphalian paradigm is clear, the change from historic Westphalian system created in 1648 to the bipolar system did not compromise state sovereignty as the main regulatory principle of the Westphalian paradigm. Thus it is important not to confuse the historic Westphalian system with the Westphalian paradigm. Conflating the Westphalian paradigm with the concrete Westphalian system also indicates Eurocentrism: prior to 1914, there were sovereign states in the world that did not belong to the European Westphalian system, nor to the ideology of post-decolonialized states, such as Edo’s Japan, Imperial China and the nineteenth century United States. As to the concept of “paradigm” it has a linguistic origin and is defined by *Merriam-Webster* as “an example of a conjugation or declension showing a word in all its inflectional forms”. The “Westphalian paradigm” is thus a conceptual example that can be equally conjugated with the Westphalian system (established in 1648 and definitively dissolved in 1914–1939), the transition phase (1914–1947), the bipolar system (1947–1991) and, at least according to neo-realist theory, the post-bipolar international order as well (1991–?).

4 The concept of “system” and international system is more thoroughly addressed in the second chapter on the emergence of systemic theories in international relations. Nonetheless, as a preliminary definition: numerous historical examples presented throughout this book illustrate the notion of system, which implies both an intellectual construction and an ensemble of interconnected practices. A system is generally defined as a group of individual units linked by a group of interactions such that a change in one unit or its relations produce change in the other units.

of regional cooperation between neighboring states and the reinforcement of institutionalized cooperation at the global level.

The nascent transnational European public space presents a challenge to essential concepts in political science and International Relations (sovereignty, power, citizenship, legitimacy, democracy, government, etc.). According to several theorists, the unprecedented deepening, widening and institutionalizing of multilateral cooperation requires an evolution of International Relations theory.

This evolution is taking place on a path accompanied by a new “age of Enlightenment” in the history of internationalist ideas – particularly thanks to the merge of various important new critiques of the realist theory that has dominated International Relations for centuries and today remains the leading paradigm in the United States and emerging countries, such as the East Asian giants. This book pays a special attention to the multiple tendencies toward a paradigm innovation, both in the US and in Europe.

Contrary to their first stage, European studies are increasingly opened to the comparative and global dimension. Even the Eurocentric stage of EU as a normative model for regional cooperation abroad is largely over, within the scientific community at least. The starting point which cannot be denied is that a simultaneously intergovernmental, post-national and transnational polity (the EU) is consolidated in Europe, in parallel with several pan-European organizations (OSCE, Council of Europe, etc.). This network has not only proven capable of surviving both internal crises due to successive enlargements interplaying with legitimacy problems and mutations of the international environment due to economic globalization and the end of the bipolar world (1989–1991), but it also constitutes a major actor in international relations – grown to the second world power today.

As stated above, this experience is not isolated in the partially globalized twenty-first century world. Despite several obstacles, parallel tendencies – towards regional and global cooperation and the voluntary limitation, or civilization, of state sovereignty via cooperation between neighboring states – are developing on every continent, from the Americas to Asia and Africa to Oceania. Within the heterogeneous post-Cold War transitional system, new forms of regional governance, transformations of the state and new ways of global and systemic governance, including institutionalization and shared sovereignty are emerging. This book argues in favor of mutual enrichment between European studies and theories of International Relations.

Theoretical Stakes

International Relations theory facilitates a bottom-up inter-disciplinarity through the convergence of multidisciplinary research agendas. The epistemological paradigm that established it as an independent discipline originally unfolded in the context of dependence on diplomatic history and international law. However,

the new discipline has gradually grown thanks to an interdisciplinary dialogue with sociology, international economy, law, history, political philosophy and the history of ideas.

The discipline has normative and pacifist historic origins, as illustrated by A. Zimmern's 1919 work in reaction to the massacres of the First World War, and aiming at eliminating war through international cooperation and the new Society of Nations. The great realist tradition quickly came on the scene: E. Carr in 1938 and H. Morgenthau in 1947 returned power relations among states and the permanent threat of international war (from Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes – the primary references of the realist paradigm) to the center of internationalist study. But this dichotomy between the utopia of peaceful world government and the perenniality of war oversimplifies the complexity of twentieth and early twenty-first century international relations: both long-term tendencies that present major theoretical implications and self-critical reflection within the discipline itself make eventually possible to surpass such duality.

The term “International Relations” is somewhat reductive for the discipline and is a reversion from R. Aron's idea, “sociology of international relations”. I prefer the term International Relations theory, to highlight that the revision of Aron's approach is not towards a uniquely empirical or descriptive discipline – neither a mere list of facts, nor their classification alone – but also encompasses the major challenges confronted by internationalist research (which are the challenges at stake for humanity as well!); that is, the study of causes and effects, regularities and interactions, in order to produce a “middle range theory,” between the purely empirical research and the nineteenth–twentieth century grand unifying theories, currently in decline (Liberalism, Marxism, etc.).

Three epistemological questions that underpin the development of international relations and interplay with European integration studies remain open-ended at the dawning of the twenty-first century:

1. The question of “levels of analysis” ties international relations theory to the history of political thought. Is Hobbes' original “domestic analogy” that supported the theory of international anarchy still valid in a context such as the European Union, where peace between former enemies is accomplished fact? In other words, are the three explanations of war – anthropologic (based on human nature), state-centric and systemic – still relevant today? Or have 60 years of European integration led to a level of stability at which it is possible (under certain conditions) to overcome inter-state political conflicts, or at least their descent into violence, via cooperation? Is the “security dilemma” still of general relevance? Does the behavior of states, as unitary and rational actors, still constitute an absolutely central research priority? Or are states conditioned, whatever their intentions, by bottom-up transnational, social and economic factors and from the top-down by the binding impact of the regional and global system?

2. The relationship between the study of international facts, their objective nature and subjective narration is especially important on a continent where the unification process has been conditioned by ideas, the perception of external threats and the collective memory of a tragic history (Holocaust and two world wars). This question goes far beyond international relations and concerns the ensemble of social sciences. Several theorists present it in terms of positivism v. post-positivism, but this dichotomy does not explain the complex epistemological debate of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For example, the latter is better understood when taking into account the great classical debate between objectivity and “intersubjectivity”.⁵ Furthermore, instead of positivism v. historicism, Max Weber made the relationship between values and objective knowledge the center of his paradigm.⁶

This constructivist debate offers unique features in terms of international relations when combined with EU studies. On the one hand, the study of structures in the international system – i.e. the regularities and laws of international, inter-state and transnational relations – could develop independent of actors’ wills, ideas and perceptions. On the other hand, the 1990s were characterized by growing importance of “constructivist” approaches, which analyze international relations as a “social construction”,⁷ pose the question of ideas and norms’ importance to the international system in a different manner, highlight the role of ideas in major events and challenges of our time (e.g. the end of the Cold War, the G.W. Bush particular synthesis of internationalism and realism,⁸ the rise of Muslim extremism, the vast quarrel on “humanitarian intervention”, etc.).

The emergence of EU identity and legitimacy debate proves that the EU is a stimulating workshop for constructivist research. The accumulation of multiform

5 G.W.F. Hegel (Stuttgart, 1770–Berlin, 1831), *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807); *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (1822); *The Science of Logic* (1811–1816).

6 M. Weber, *Economy and Society* (1922).

7 The relation between objectivity and values, subjectivity and structure is essential to the epistemology of social sciences: it is thus that the importance of the British Empire’s needs of empirical knowledge is largely recognized in the development of ethnological and cultural anthropology studies of Morgan, Frazer, Boas, etc. The same is true for International Relations: the emergence of the bipolar world was the context of the development of American systemic neo-realism. Furthermore an anti-colonial view of International Relations based on perceptions of the global periphery could be opposed to the point of view based on dominating countries of the North. Gender studies are another relevant example of the impact of the subjective lens on International Relations. In the same way, it is possible to witness the gradual emergence of a European community of international studies and of European views, despite its current shortcomings.

8 P. Hassner and J. Vaïsse, *Washington et le monde*, Paris, Autrement, 2003; and *La terre et l’empire*, Paris, Seuil, 2003. But it is also important to note that the American neoconservative school is criticized by both realists and institutionalists.

subjectivity in Europe – enriched by centuries of history and by collective self-criticism in terms of the tragedies provoked by aggressive nationalism – has had two consequences: it has nourished the process of institutionalization and “reconciliation” between former enemies (which cannot, according to J. Habermas, be overestimated); and it has enriched research on the idea of Europe in the world – its special responsibility for peace within its neighboring and distant entourage, its international identity.

More generally, it is important to understand to what extent relations between agents and structure in the international system escape from neo-realist determinism, and are instead dialectic in nature.

3. A third area for innovating research is the growing binding impact of institutions on states’ behavior and their relations with new non-state actors, as well as the increasingly fundamental question of legitimacy in supranational governance.⁹ A number of authors have highlighted the differences between neo-institutionalism (since the end of the 1970s) and traditional institutionalism (1950s), which focused on formal government institutions (and was inevitably eclipsed by the study of real political behaviors). The origins of neo-institutionalist approaches include the English school’s work on institutionalization of international rules; S. Hoffmann’s multidimensional analysis of legal codification of international relations; S. Krasner and R.O. Keohane’s theory of international regimes; J.S. Nye and R.O. Keohane’s concept of world politics that called into question the “international” and “state-centric” paradigm; and the established link between domestic transformation and international change. Advances in neo-institutionalism would not have been so relevant without the success of European construction, although other forms of global (United Nations, WTO, etc.) and regional (Mercosur, OSCE, OECD, regional banks and arrangements etc.) institutionalization in international relations have also strongly contributed.

In light of these issues, an extraordinary pluralist renewal of conceptual instruments is on the agenda for international relations, and European construction is central to this laboratory of ideas. U. Beck¹⁰ (among others) posed a fundamental issue: how can a new horizon of theoretical questions that go beyond the classical state paradigm be addressed within a traditional disciplinary framework that was born and developed against a nation-state and state-centric international politics background? It is clear that international relations for the early twenty-first century requires special efforts for critical clarity and notably openness to broad pluralism in terms of research strategies and theoretical innovation. But there can be no

9 R.O. Keohane, *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984.

10 U. Beck, *L’Europe cosmopolite*, Paris, 2007.

innovation without a comprehensive understanding of the history of “International Relations” debates and controversies; nor without considering the relevance of various regional points of view (e.g. European, American and Asian) to theories’ evolution.

Revising the Westphalian Paradigm

Although it is conceptually challenging to characterize the current international system since the Soviet Union collapse in 1991, this is not the case for the two systems that dominated preceding centuries. Historically, the Westphalian paradigm originated with the decline of the Habsburg Empire (defender of Roman-Catholic tradition), and the birth of sovereign states on the impetus of France, the Netherlands, and newly emerging countries.¹¹ Fundamentally, it was the replacement of the Middle Ages international system based on supra-nationality – the *Res publica Christiania* united around two “suns”, church and empire (according to Dante Alighieri) – by a state-centric system based on internal (territorial control, administrative, fiscal and public order centralization) and external state sovereignty and their mutual relations.

The “Westphalian paradigm” emerged from the Treaties of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years War (1618–1648) and laid out a society of territorially sovereign and politically independent states. This historical systemic change took the form of a true paradigmatic change which has organized world politics for centuries, in various bipolar and multipolar forms. Of course, in certain cases, state sovereignty had replaced Middle Ages practices prior to 1648, but for International Relations theory it is important to establish a symbolic origin for the paradigm based on the birth of a society of states. Its first form, the multipolar “balance of power” system, was distinguished from its preceding paradigm (the heritage of the Middle Ages) by several fundamental traits that states mutually recognized:

- a. *Rex est imperator in regno suo*: there is no (imperial or whatever) authority superior to state sovereign, that is, at that time, independent kings, who are on equal footing with other kings (or sovereign powers).

11 A. Blin, *1648, la paix de Westphalie ou la naissance de l'Europe politique moderne*, Bruxelles, Complexe, 2006; and Bely, *Les relations internationales en Europe*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1992. The Thirty Years War was the last attempt to unify Europe around a supranational principle, the Holy Roman Empire. This heritage of the Middle Ages, combining imperial rule with catholic unification of Europe, was assured by the Habsburg family, who dominated Austria, Hungary, part of Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and today’s Belgium, and tried to enforce Catholic law in Bohemia. France, allied with Sweden, the Netherlands and the Protestant powers opposed them in the name of the modern sovereign state, a partially preexisting reality, which was codified in the Treaty of Westphalia and thus created the inter-state system in Europe.

- b. *Cuius regio eius religio*: the state authority (the king) establishes the religion of his kingdom, which entails the corollary principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state (domestic jurisdiction, the principles of territorial unity and borders).
- c. Balance of power: the principle that seeks to prevent the international dominance of a single state power across changes through time.

To understand the strength of this paradigm, one must consider the theoretical foundations laid for a century and a half by great thinkers such as Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes and even Grotius. These philosophers' established new ideas associated with Western modernity, including the modern secular state that is internally and externally sovereign, centralized and hierarchical, as well as the notion of international law (*jus publicum Europeanum*). Several different state-forms existed throughout the history of the Westphalian paradigm, including the constitutional one, but they were all compatible with the Westphalian system. The period from 1792–1815 broke from the three principles indicated: however it was a parenthesis of revolutionary discontinuity, which certainly impacted the future political development of domestic politics, but eventually without changing the major international paradigmatic trends of the European state system.

The Westphalian paradigm includes several periods: the first period from 1648 to 1914 or 1939 was a balance of power system in which a shifting constellation of five or six major powers were dominant; the second period, following 1945 or 1947 was dominated by only two superpowers. For centuries, there were always a limited number of major state actors that ruled the European and international system.¹² Whereas the dominant powers in the first system changed with time, the international system that followed the end of multipolarism relied on two fixed and ideologically opposed superpowers – the US and USSR – which is why it is called the bipolar system.

Historians are divided as to how bipolarity modified the originally multipolar Westphalian paradigm. Its unexpected consequences were peace between the two nuclear superpowers and their blocs of alliance and decades of systemic stability. The sovereignty of small and medium-sized allied and unaligned powers was *de facto* limited by nuclear military technology, drastic hierarchy among states (superpowers and others), total opposition between the two blocs and dominance of the reciprocal nuclear threat and universalist ideologies of the two rivals. Global ecological problems, international financial exchange, unprecedented migratory flux and complex interdependence between governments raised further doubts as to the territorial sovereign state's staying power and ability to manage such issues – at least in terms of *de facto* sovereignty.

12 The European principle of non-intervention was not applied to the rest of the world, particularly Islam: and the end of the nineteenth century, for example, the European powers also imposed “unequal treaties” on China and Japan.

However *de jure* sovereignty is a very different question: despite major mutations throughout the second half of the twentieth century, on the global level states did *not* really experience:

- Revisions to the legal principle of state sovereignty (recognized by Article 2 of the United Nations Charter),¹³ the supremacy of sovereign independence, the principle of non-interference or the insignificance of domestic regimes.
- Revisions to their international legal equality: the right to conclude international treaties and agreements; the right to conduct diplomatic relations and engage responsibilities with other states; the right to participate in international organizations; immunity from outside jurisdiction or execution; reciprocal respect for sovereignty.¹⁴

In this context the revival of neo-sovereignist practices of several states was also possible: De Gaulle's France, post-war Great Britain from Attlee to Thatcher, Mao's China, Tito's Yugoslavia, etc. paradoxically well illustrate various forms of "irony of sovereignty", precisely when the *de facto* sovereignty was declining. Moreover liberation movements revived the principle of sovereignty in their fight against colonialism, neo-colonialism and empires and there were several waves of growth in the number and assertiveness of sovereign states in the world, even after 1991.¹⁵

The question whether and when the Westphalian paradigm's declined after 1991 is highly controversial. The end of European centrality (and Eurocentrism) eventually served to universalize the state-centric model of international relations by exporting it to Asia, Africa and the Americas. On the one hand, the accelerated economic globalization, its multilevel institutionalization and the multiplication of actors and levels of global governance fundamentally challenged the Westphalian legacy system. On the other hand, according to some observers, the end of the bipolar world in 1989–1991 did not radically destabilize the Westphalian paradigm that has conversely been strengthened by new unipolar and multipolar tendencies. We think that the world today is in a stage of transition and heterogeneity that implies

13 See, for example, Kofi Annan's speech to the United Nation's Millennium Conference in 2005, *Responsibility to protect*, on humanitarian intervention of the international community and in spite of the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs. On problems with this approach, see J.L. Holgreffe and R.O. Keohane, *Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

14 On this subject, see J.-J. Roche, *Relations Internationales*, Paris, LGDJ, 2005; P. de Senarclens, *Mondialisation, souveraineté et théories des relations internationales*, Paris, Colin, 1988.

15 Notably, the large wave of decolonization in Africa and Asia during the 1960s and the Communist Bloc's fall in 1991, with the independence of European and central Asian countries that formerly composed the USSR.

multiple and contradictory tendencies. Although the classical balance of power was succeeded by the bipolar system, it is not clear what type of new global system will take its place. This is why International Relations today faces a blossoming of theories that try to conceptualize the current system: international society, unipolar theories, theories of empire and hegemonic stability, multipolarism, conflict of civilizations, anarchy and fragmentation, neo-medievalism, the end of history, hyperglobalism, post-modernity and post-sovereignty, neo-regionalism, neo-multilateralism, etc.

This book offers a new compass for navigating the complex theoretical labyrinth: a critical reconstruction of evolutions in International Relations theory that draws attention to the Westphalian paradigm in crisis due to several changes, including increasing cooperation and, notably, the European construction – a transnational integration processes between states and societies occurring precisely where two world wars exploded and devastated the world.

The common thread throughout this book, the main guideline is precisely the study of the practical and theoretical weakening of state-centric fundamentals of the Westphalian paradigm, from a European point of view, without forgetting to compare it with different ones, for example North American or East Asian perspectives. It discusses the scope (the gradual revision of state sovereignty theory) but also the limits of this major change: the experience of pooled and shared sovereignty does *not* constitute a *tabula rasa*, an end to sovereignty, a post-state or post-national entity in Europe, an imperial or cosmopolitan European super state in the making, nor does it imply generalizing these tendencies to a global scale in a trivial and Eurocentric way.

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Chapter 1

Origins of the International Relations Theories and the Emerging Realist Paradigm

1. From Antiquity to the Middle Ages

During the Twentieth Century, the discipline of International Relations was largely dominated by the realist paradigm. This school was behind the publication of a number of very important texts in both Europe and the United States. Two major elements explain the importance of the realist paradigm: first, the history of twentieth century international relations (two World Wars and innumerable local wars) weighed considerably on the development of political philosophy; second, the realist approach resonated with post-1945 systemic theory, particularly in the United States, and responded to a need to explain the bipolar world and the new global role of American power. Nonetheless, the second half of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of several post-realist theories whose roots can be traced through the history of ancient and modern political thought. Their development was fuelled by the need to explain new phenomena such as complex global economic interdependence, the proliferation of organizations that promote peaceful cooperation among nations, the emergence of transnational society and public opinion, and the success of the European Union as the most advanced regional grouping of neighboring states.

Early debates on international relations can be traced to antiquity both in Europe and Asia. The Greek historian Thucydides, an Athenian general from the fifth century BC, used the “eternal wisdom” of realism (according to the recent interpretations by R. Gilpin and B. Buzan) to explain the Peloponnesian war between Sparta and Athens. According to the great historian, international action could only be explained by a people’s will, anchored in human nature, to conduct an unrelenting struggle for power¹ with a very limited role for peace and justice. Two centuries later, Aristotle (384–302 BC) countered in *The Politics* that the best and most stable political system was not that which emphasized warring amongst neighbors, but that which guaranteed peace by encouraging the virtues of justice and temperance.

A similar theoretical debate developed in China during the time of Warrior Kingdoms (fourth and third centuries BC), backdrop to the emergence of the Hundred Schools of Thought: in 390 BC Shang Tzi (390–338 BC) published *The Necessity of War*, in which he emphasized the importance of war for the education

1 Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*.

and cohesion of a people; whereas Mencius (390–305 BC) developed Confucian ideology to critique the injustice of war. In the following century, Han Fei-Tzi (290–233 BC) and his “legalist” school argued that a nation’s domestic order was a precondition to victory abroad, within a theoretical context in which warfare was inevitable.² Between these two extremes, Mo Zi proposed around the fifth century a pragmatic and utilitarian pacifism, including the condemnation of aggressive warfare by large nations against small nations.

Christian philosophy also offers a contribution to the history of international relations theory: while Augustine’s *City of God* (fourth century) was limited to a reiteration of Aristotle’s position, eight centuries later Thomas Aquinas’s (1228–1274) *Summa Theologiae* formulated the conditions of “just war”: it must be declared by a legitimate authority, for a just cause (restoring a right unjustly violated, punishing a misdeed or punishing a state for having failed to remedy an inappropriate action) and with just intentions (to be verified above and beyond the subjective declarations of the sovereign). Erasmus, in *The Search for Peace* (1517), was confronted by wars between several Christian sovereigns who all claim to appeal to just war ideology: he argued that in reality, it is passion, “ambition and foolishness” that efface the pacific nature of man.

Even if openly discussed, realism prevailed everywhere and for many centuries.

2. European Modernity and its Controversies

The modern realist tradition dates from the development of the nation state in the sixteenth century and the European state system in seventeenth. This school of thought was inspired in part by Machiavelli (1469–1527) and most explicitly by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) in the context of reflections on the modern sovereign state. Modern states (absolute states) first appeared in Europe at the early years of the millennium (Portugal and Sweden). However their consolidation in the heart of Europe took place in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the state system emerged in the seventeenth century with the treaties of Westphalia and Munster (1648).

Machiavelli’s realist philosophy was more ambiguous than that of Hobbes. His conception of the state included a strong executive power whose actions must be considered in the context of “effective reality”, and not by comparing reality to some ideal. However, Machiavelli, like Guicciardini, seemed to envisage a policy of equilibrium between the small Italian Renaissance states, thus foreshadowing the next European *balance of power*: the possibility to civilize and mitigate the willpower of states by balance and diplomacy. Hobbes too considered that the state is characterized by the will to power. But he also held that a state’s need to

² A. Waley, *Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1939.

maintain or increase its power to the detriment of other states remains a constant: the state of international war is structural and permanent.

Since Hobbes, realists have made a methodological appeal to the school of natural law, namely the “domestic analogy” – the attempt to transpose the domestic (intra-state) oppositions between state of nature and state of reason, disorder and order, anarchy and stable peace to the level of international (inter-state) order. In other words, the question posed by political philosophers from Hobbes to Kant, from Rousseau to Fichte and Hegel regarding the future of international relations is: can a state’s domestic mechanisms bringing to peace though a social contract among the individuals be compared to what happens at the international level among states, in order to create order from anarchy? Can a contract, association pact, or government pact between states be created at the inter-state or international level that surpasses the state of nature (understood as the state of potential war) and lead to an international order devoid of “the war of all against all”? Well, according to Hobbes, this latter domestic analogy is no working.

Hobbes believed that the same conceptual instruments used to understand anarchy within a state could explain international disorder, as the same anarchy exists at both the domestic and international levels. Although Hobbes allowed for the possibility of establishing peace at the domestic level via the social contract and creation of the state (through the stabilizing intervention of the Leviathan), he considered lasting peace at the international level impossible. He reasoned that a “Leviathan” on the international scale – i.e. a central authority to stabilize eventual association pacts between states – does not, and could not, exist. An association pact without an accompanying governmental pact, including a central authority and an enforcement threat for states who disregard their contractual engagements, could not last: it would be as precarious as the most basic international treaties. International agreements are weakened by the tensions, ambitions, respective interests and will to power of states. Hobbes’s merit is the methodological transposition of the domestic analogy to conceptualize international order, but he found it impossible to envisage a contract between states that could terminate the international state of war.

In parallel with this modern version of political realism (from Machiavelli to Hobbes), another European school developed a complex and varied courant of internationalist thought focused on states’ responsibilities. This paradigm encompassed both Francisco de Vitoria’s³ Spanish Dominican School and the Dutchman H. Grotius,⁴ one of the founders of international law.

3 F. de Vitoria (1483–1546) was a Spanish theologian who taught at the Universities of Valladolid and Salamanca. He is the author of, among others: *La Relictio: De Jure Belli* (1959); and *De Indis* (1532, published posthumously in 1557). He had numerous followers who could collectively be called the Salamanca School.

4 Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) was a Dutch jurist and philosopher, professor at the University of Leiden, and he is considered one of the founding fathers of international law. He led a hectic life, including counseling the moderate leader Oldenbarnevelt, for

As mentioned above, just war theory originated in the Middle Age. The theologians and jurists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries attempted to establish further guidelines to govern the conduct of national governments based on natural law. In his book *De Indis* (inspired by indignation against the injustices committed in the Americas by the conquistadores) de Vitoria asserted the concept of natural rights for each individual, including indigenous peoples. Despite condemnation by Emperor Charles Quint, Vitoria continued to defend the rights of the Indians and their property, and to condemn Spain and the Church who claimed to justify their coercion based on the “heresy” of indigenous populations: the consequence of defending rights is the limitation of power.

There is no just war against individuals who have done nothing wrong, nor in order to conquer a territory. Just war, a long controversial subject in international law, implies the prerequisite of a just cause and a just objective. De Vitoria proposed examples of this: avenging an injustice and punishing those responsible, reclaiming the property of a state and, also, defending the subjects of another state who suffer injustice or who revolt against their government.

The secularized lawyer Grotius followed largely in the same vein, supporting a state’s right to conduct war defensively, but he also considered war to prevent an offense or menace against a people or its property justified. According to this conception, war conducted to expand or increase power is still reprehensible, except when the opposing party has a manifest intention of attacking another state. Adherence to treaties (“*pacta sunt servanda*”) and respect for commercial and travel liberty (freedom to travel) would also become important aspects of legal regulation limiting states’ power. Grotius’s work has thus had a good deal of influence on international relations.

A further anti-realist philosopher during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is the German Christian Wolff – counselor to Frederik the Great and author of *The Law of Nations* (1749) – according to whom the duty of governments to strive for civility is accompanied by a reciprocal obligation between states. This poses a problem to the fundamental concept of sovereignty: each state has the right to prohibit other states from interference of any sort with its government; each state maintains the *jus ad bellum* and the right to warfare. However, references to natural law led to an arduously growing conviction in Europe that a society of nations is possible, that ties exist necessarily between states, that no state is completely self-sufficient.

which he was imprisoned by militant Calvinists, only to escape with the help of his wife. His celebrity gained him welcome in France and Sweden, and he ultimately became the Swedish ambassador to France. He published several works on international law, of which his masterpiece is *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (1625).

3. European Schools of thought from the Eighteenth to the Nineteenth Century

European modern history witnessed an agitated and contradictory phase from the sixteenth to the first half of the twentieth century: Europe's world domination, as both imperial power and trade center, emerged as a component of modernity and reached its peak before the First World War. The two world wars were the death knell of this ambition as world history turned another way. Theories of International Relations are enmeshed with this tragic process: both in the power politics that expressed the most destructive aspect of Hobbesian anarchic tendency in an aggressive and bellicose nationalism; and, conversely, in the pacifist and Europeanist trends whose philosophical framework took shape as an alive and growing political cosmopolitan minority. Between these two extremes, a third historical movement arose: towards a gradual evolution of the state system and international relations, towards a European society of states.

Emmanuel Kant and the Pacifist Traditions

The enlightenment philosopher Emmanuel Kant⁵ was the precursor of a new tradition in international political philosophy – dubbed by some as the Idealist School or, more accurately, the Rationalist School. He shared not only the conceptual framework of natural law, but also the domestic analogy methodology with Hobbes. But his response to the question posed by Hobbesian methodology was not the same; Kant considered lasting international peace based on the rule of law to be possible, under certain conditions.

In *Toward Perpetual Peace* (1795), as well as several essays of the decade of his famous *Critiques*,⁶ Kant specified three necessary conditions (i.e. the three “definitive” articles) for international peace.

1. The first condition concerns national public law. Kant called this “republicanism”: each state must be a republic (i.e. a constitutional state under the rule of law, based on the division of powers). Taking stock of some suggestions by J.J. Rousseau, Kant based the creation of external peace on the evolution of participant states' domestic political regimes, i.e. creation of constitutional peace within a state. Whereas Rousseau and Fichte reversed priorities, attributing the state of international warfare to

5 E. Kant (Königsberg, East Prussia, 1724–1804) is the greatest German enlightenment philosopher. He authored, among others, *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788); and *Fundamentals of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785).

6 E. Kant, *Towards Perpetual Peace*, 1795. For this interpretation, placing the 1795 treatise within the context of his other essays of that decade, see also M. Telò, “Introduction” to N. Bobbio, *L'Etat de la démocratie internationale*, ed. M. Telò, Bruxelles, Complexe, 1999.

the predominance of fear and advocating a defensive reaction by individual free nations – namely the economic protectionism and political dissociation. Kant merged the evolution of relations between states and peoples with the constitutionalization of domestic political regimes.

2. The second condition concerns international law: Kant specified that the interstate organization to be created is a “federation”, within which the member states must have egalitarian relations, i.e. one state must not be dominant over the others. The principal danger to the international life is “universal monarchy”, an oppressive super-state. Federation it is not a government pact, but a voluntary association pact between sovereign and free states: this is not a *Bundesstaat* (a federal state according to the model seen in the United States), but a *Staten-Bund*, a federation of states that keep their individual liberty. Other philosophers (with reference to the American Civil War) call this type of organization a “confederation”, as there is no transfer of sovereignty from Member States to the federation (at least at the beginning of the process). But Kantian philosophy is more complex because the third condition, which surpasses the classical conception of state sovereignty, envisages an international and transnational peaceful organization that is neither wholly a federation nor a confederation.
3. The third condition concerns a gradual formation of a transnational community, beyond national borders. The actors concerned are not states, but citizens: every citizen of a state is also a citizen of the world; every citizen should thus have the right to move freely between states, and to establish cultural, social, economic and commercial ties internationally, so long as this right does not facilitate exploitation or colonialism. Kant called this third condition of peace “cosmopolitanism”. The German philosopher is thus behind the twentieth century American free trade trend: he inspired the creation of pacifistic international organizations and international cooperation networks and the initiation of themes such as the protection of human rights and democratization to the international agenda. He has influenced the League of Nations, the United Nations, and particularly the European Union, etc.

It is important to not confuse the rational philosophy of Kant with the utopist tradition. The idealist school is characterized by the interplay of several influences: the utopists and the “counselors to princes” (e.g. Erasmus, Sully or *Abbé de Saint-Pierre*) propose the evolution of sovereigns’ behavior or state politics, or the creation of European diets – all of which are based on the good will of sovereign rulers. Between the nineteenth and early twentieth century, rationalist projects for European or world order also began to appear:

- a. Economic pacifism based on economic liberalism. It was mainly the British R. Cobden who led a series of conferences for peace based on the direct link between free trade and international peace, during the second half of

the nineteenth century. This liberal trend attributes the cause of wars to the state's economic, commercial and military power; its importance to the first theories and praxes of multilateralism merits further examination (see next paragraph 3).

- b. The jurist-centric tradition, i.e. the tradition of Bentham, focused on the formation of a European or global court of justice to arbitrate disputes between states and enforce international law. The court evidently would not exercise a power of coercion, but instead what is today called "soft law". The freedom of the national press would ensure the necessary pressures of public opinion, a new actor in the evolving public sphere, were in favor of the enforcement of court decisions. Legal cosmopolitanism emerged during the period between the two world wars, notably in the philosophy of Hans Kelsen.
- c. The Kantian idea of rule of law based pacifism, i.e. a federation of equal and independent states, accompanied by growing transnational cosmopolitanism and evolution of the domestic political system towards antiauthoritarian republics. In this vein, a growing distinction has emerged throughout the twentieth century between world peace and the more limited goal of European regional order, i.e. between Europeanism and global cosmopolitanism.
- d. Leftist, socialist and communist pacifism, in the tradition of the Workers' International: the first movement in 1848 included Marx, Bakunin and Mazzini, and the second is the rise of the international social-democracy. The main idea here is that there will never be true peace among nations without a drastic improvement (revolutionary or reformist, according to different and opposed strains) in the socio-economic inequalities that underlie all conflicts, domestic and international.
- e. Religious pacifism, and all the schools of thoughts that focus on human nature as the cause of national and international violence. Religious pacifism generally espoused reforming imperfect human nature, although Erasmus also recommended a change in governmental conduct, and William Penn, the seventeenth century English Quaker (*Essays towards the present and future peace of Europe*, 1693) advocated interstate institutions dedicated to resolving disputes. According to this school, peace can only be achieved through a preliminary evolution of individual conscience. Modern psychology has reinforced this school, and group psychology has made important contributions to twentieth century International Relations theory (aggressiveness, projection of insecurity, etc.).

Multipolarity, Balance of Power and Multilateralism

The influence of rationalist pacifism and European unity went largely marginal in the history of political ideas of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Throughout the successive periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the Westphalian

sovereignist paradigm was adjusted but not reformed and rule of law based pacifism did not have any real historic impact prior to 1945. However, the vast literature on the modern sovereign state and power politics within the framework of international anarchy⁷ largely ignored an important aspect of Westphalian Europe: this paradigm underwent major adaptations under multipolarity that were both anticipated and complemented by several important theorists. Balance of power at the time of the Concert of Europe did not guarantee peace, but established a framework for stability, including confrontations and limited wars between the main powers, as well as their bilateral and multilateral collaboration. Its principle aim was to prevent the rise of one dominant state in Europe, but this “mature anarchy” or “Lockean anarchy”⁸ went hand in hand with what Hedley Bull calls the three types of rules: the constitutional principle, the rules of coexistence and the rules governing cooperation.⁹

The idea that balance and diplomatic relations would characterize states’ foreign powers has early historic roots. In the fifteenth century, Guicciardini and Machiavelli considered the balance between Sforzan Milan, Florence, the Republic of Venice, the Kingdom of Naples and the States of the Church: this was the first period of stability based on the principle of balance of power. In the *Storia d’Italia* (1561), Guicciardini developed his central concept: the “state of equilibrium”. The contemporary historian Federico Chabod observed that in the context of the crisis of the *res publica christiana* and the end of the Middle Ages – the advent of secularized Europe where religion became a political instrument in the hands of independent national sovereigns – this innovation quickly grew to European scale. This was the birth of modern diplomacy, though reciprocal treaty and border recognition and the newly emerging custom of choosing a third party to act as an arbitrator or guarantor of bilateral treaties.

Under Henry VIII, balance of power politics became a “conscious aim of British policy”: his relations, for example with François I and Charles Quint precipitated what would become the longstanding core of European power balance in forming alliances. A system of rules emerged, which H. Grotius would defend in the middle of the Thirty Years War (1618–1648). The theologian Fenelon, counselor to Louis XIV, envisaged the emergence of a “society of states”, distinct from the states themselves (*L’examen de la conscience sur les devoirs de la royauté*, 1700). He thus laid out the basic principle of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648): if one state becomes too strong, the others can exercise an “undeniable right” to join together and bring it back into balance.

7 C. Schmitt, *Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus publicum Europeum*, ...: O. Hinze, *Staat und Verfassung*, Göttingen, Ruprecht, 1962 (State viewed as a military structure, preparing for war); L. Dehio, *Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie*, Krefeld, 1948; C. von Clausewitz, *Politik und Krieg*, Berlin, 1920; and *Von Kriege*, Bonn, 1952.

8 Expression used by A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

9 H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, London, Macmillan, 1977.

Based on the reconstructions of long-term European history from Greco-Roman antiquity throughout the sixteenth century, David Hume highlighted states' choice and defended a sort of doctrine of prudence, between national short-term interest – which could push states towards the strongest alliances – and long-term interest – which favors balance and common interest for stability (*Treaty on Human Nature*, 1742, Essay VII).

Of course stability does not necessarily mean peace: on the contrary, war was an endemic phenomenon of the Westphalian system. For a century and a half, war was – in a certain manner – controlled, confined and regulated, but remained a structural element of the international system. With the exception of a 26-year period between the French Revolution and the Treaty of Vienna, the balance of power was universally respected. Certain new states also managed to have their independence recognized, including Belgium, Italy and Prussia/Germany (but not Poland, which was sacrificed).

This system of European states became a real cooperation framework based on common objectives, and relatively independent of the individual large states. Although the comments of the Swiss jurist Emerich de Vattel (*Droit des Gens*, 1758) appear exaggerated, the Hobbesian state of international warfare was outmoded:

Europe forms a political system, an integrated body, tightly interconnected by the interests and relations of its member nations. It is no longer a confused ensemble of parceled pieces, each disinterested in the destiny of the others ... The continual attention of sovereigns to continental events, the presence of permanent Ambassadors, the process of continual negotiations almost create a European Republic, in which independent members tied by common interest unite in hopes of maintaining order and liberty. It is thus the renowned model of political equilibrium, of the balance of power is born, according to which no one power can dominate absolutely nor dictate law to the others.

This idea of an understated European unity is relevant: unity achieved by the evolving behavior of states, despite the absence of Kant's three conditions, excepting the insistence of a decentralized, egalitarian system to prevent a super-state or universal monarchy. Although able to resist the hegemonic tendencies of France and Germany, this multipolar system was always characterized by hierarchies that favored large powers. It nonetheless gave rise to the beginnings of institutionalized multilateral cooperation: the International Telegraph Union (1865) was the first of a series of multilateral agreements.¹⁰ In addition to the pound (Gold

¹⁰ Universal Postal Union (1865); International office of weights and measures (1875); International meteorological organization (1878); International agriculture office (1907); International public hygiene office (1907); International statistics office (1913). D. Mitrany gives much consideration to these agreements in his work, *A Working Peace System* (1943).

Standard) and commercial liberalization, multilateralism was a fundament of the *pax britannica*¹¹ in the nineteenth century, and up until its final collapse in August 1931 (even through the Washington Treaty and the Versailles Treaty attempts to restore the order before the First World War).¹²

Great Britain was not a super-state in the sense that Kant feared, and multilateralism was certainly not the only feature of international relations during the era of the Concert of Europe. Even at the commercial level, the process leading up to the German *Zollverein* (1834) and the Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1860 were in fact based on bilateral agreements, which were to achieve, by a sort of domino effect, more general commercial liberalization.¹³ Despite conflict with the protectionism of several countries, British liberal multilateralism successfully stabilized or adjusted the balance of power system for decades (even if it failed to frame the emergence of Germany). The most successful phase of British multilateralism (the second half of the nineteenth century) was also characterized by several bottom-up tendencies: among them, the codification of restrictive norms at the national level overflowed to the international level.¹⁴

Origins of British hegemony can also be found in the great internationalist and liberal cosmopolitan tradition from Richard Cobden to Sir Louis Mallet, and in the historic British drive to conquer the global market, with both its strength and ambiguities.¹⁵

11 Ch. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression 1929–1939*, Berkeley, University of California, 1973; and P. O’Brien and A. Clesse (eds) *Two Hegemonies*, London, Ashgate, 2002.

12 K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, 1944.

13 W. Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

14 Ch. Reus-Smit, “The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions”, *International Organization*, 4, 1997, pp. 555–589.

15 The British desire to conquer the global markets dates from the eighteenth century. The first commercial agreement between France and England was signed in 1786 by King Louis XVI. Of course, free trade was at the heart of nineteenth century British politics, from the Corn Laws of 1846 (R. Peel) to the 1860 trade agreement with France, and up through Gladstone and Disraeli. The cosmopolitanism of free trade can be traced to the Enlightenment, notable in Bentham’s Protestantism, as well as Ricardo and Smith’s conception of economic progress without the limitation of nations. On one hand it represents a long-term vision of British national interest, i.e. comparative advantage (internationalism encouraged), in conflict with the imperialist vision, based on protectionism (the imperial preference) and customs unions, accompanied by military force, especially the British Royal Navy (which can be considered the “nuclear weapon” of the time period). On the other hand, R. Cobden himself understood that the generalization of free trade could lead to an unshared American supremacy. His action was not merely for the idea of Europe but for a globalized world where Europe could play a part; Great Britain would maintain a comparative advantage even if the US would assume hegemonic status, in the broadest sense. It is important to note the anticipatory character of this debate and this contradiction: one of these courants contributed to “civilizing the Concert of Europe” and to the balance

The limits of the British hegemony were clear: the UK did not manage to create an international commercial system comparable to the future GATT, nor a global monetary system between 1870 and 1880, despite the end of the “imperial preference” and the domestic pressure towards increased consumption. However, the nascent multilateral system did contribute to refining the Concert of Europe: the Cobden school addressed the entire European continent and supported a pacifist movement (conferences for peace) in favor of European unity,¹⁶ (though rhetorically critical of the Concert of Europe, which it termed a “chimera”). Its influence endured well into the next century, notably to the interwar period, e.g. the “Cobdenist” French statesman Edouard Herriot revived the term “United States of Europe” in 1930, as did the English federalist group, under the economist Lionel Robbins in the same years.

There were both domestic and international causes underpinning the weakness of British multilateralism. A main weakness was the ambiguous, and not merely conflicting, relationship between burgeoning multilateralism and the imperialist tradition, reflecting domestic ideological contradiction. There are controversial interpretations of this relationship in the literature regarding the period between 1875 and the end of British hegemony in 1931 (according to K. Polanyi¹⁷): for example, Kindleberger focused on multilateral hegemony,¹⁸ whereas E. Hobsbawm highlighted the emergence of the “Age of Empires”.¹⁹ This was, in fact, a qualitative divergence regarding the relations between Great Britain, Europe, and the world.

Eric Hobsbawm emphasized the importance of both the imperialist school of thought and policies to the UK’s political evolution at that time: between 1875 and 1915, colonies were no longer considered a burden, but had become important resources to satisfy the growing internal needs²⁰ of European capitalism in economic crisis. Consequently around a quarter of the earth’s surface was redistributed amongst half a dozen European states (Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Portugal) and Japan. Both directly and indirectly (through its colonies) Great Britain controlled about one third of the global economy.

However, this endless quest for new markets reinforced protectionist tendencies, based on the growing role of the state and preferential trade agreements, and was accompanied by domestic reforms, qualified as forms of “social imperialism”. Contrary to the Leninist thesis, on the one hand, the reformist Hobson (among

of power (in spite of its controversial relation with imperialism). The free trade theory consciously predicted a reorganization of the world in which Europe would necessarily be subordinated to the emerging American power. This orientation was to some extent shared by leftist philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell who advocated “free trade as part of the sound internationalism of the left”.

16 See J.R. Seeley, *United States of Europe*, 1871.

17 K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, 1944.

18 Ch. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression*, op. cit.

19 E. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empires*, London, 2000.

20 Regarding J.H. Hobson, see Chapter 9, point 1.

others) demonstrated that there is no automatic link between these domestic tendencies and the growth of aggressive external policies that led to the 1914–1918 war. On the other hand, Schumpeter noted that imperial policies manifested with greatly varied degrees of aggressiveness in different capitalist countries.²¹

In conclusion, it cannot be denied that the Concert system under British hegemony, a sort of “mature Lockean anarchy”, had manifest limits in regards to both international and European multilateral stability: it could prevent neither the economic conflicts nor the violent blunders of European imperialism, nor the two World Wars. But the roots of cooperation between states that would materialize in Western Europe after 1945 were also present in this British and European political culture. In the nineteenth century, after the Congress of Vienna (and of Chaumont), the system of multilateral consultation between five or six major powers had undeniable successes – e.g. Belgian independence, Greek independence, and later the emergence of Italy and Prussia. The system’s weaknesses, which were already being denounced at the time by those who hoped for a true “community of nations”,²² were considerable, notably with regards to political multilateralism:

- The system had a very low degree of institutionalization; the central authority was fragile, even if the international conferences series reinforced it during the second half of the century. Meetings were not yet held at regular intervals, and those that did occur were ill-prepared, incapable of long term conflict resolution. Furthermore, the system was unable to handle the decline of the Ottoman Empire and to manage the emergence of Germany.
- The system witnessed the role of Great Britain as an emerging leader, but the early version was that of Metternich – i.e. not only international stability, but also maintenance of the internal status quo (via repressive intervention by the Holy Alliance, as in 1821, 1830, 1848); however, following failed attempts to block the development of domestic political liberalism, it was the more flexible British approach that triumphed. The late change of hegemonic power entailed negative consequences on the system’s credibility.
- Although colonial possessions offered a margin of maneuver to limit intra-European conflicts (by conceptualizing “Europe” on a global scale, and thus allowing for compensation to be sought on other continents), this approach ended up tying European equilibrium to the structural conflicts of the Age of Empires, rather than multilateral liberalization.

To reiterate: on one hand it is important to remember that for centuries (notably in the nineteenth century) the balance of power among a limited number of similar

²¹ See *ibid.*

²² For example, M. Palmerston, “Foreign Affairs Secretary and British Prime Minister between 1830 and 1865”.

states facilitated the maturation of a “European society of states”²³ based on the idea of reciprocal balance that went beyond a simple occasional relation and marked a shift away from the state of constant potential war; this project envisioned stability that reconciled unity and diversity, a fundamental principle of European civilization (rooted in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment), as opposed to other continents or the Middle Ages. Thus this project was not merely a system of shared rules, but a principle of action carefully considered by several chiefs of state, as much during peacetime (diplomacy and multilateral agreements) as during war (*jus in bello*). This society of states, or “regulated anarchy”, was an interdependent and structured system, politically unified (despite the division between state units) by the symbolic principle of mutual recognition of respective and common interests – which constituted a sort of international European identity.²⁴ On the other hand, stability collapsed in the face of nationalist tendencies (primarily – though not exclusively – those of Germany) which ultimately brought on two World Wars for reasons that included the system’s limitations: it was not sufficiently institutionalized, its component entities were not all constitutional states and its transnational social ties were only rudimentary.

Another determinant of the continent’s drift towards total warfare was the gradual decline of Great Britain, the country that had been the “balance holder” of European equilibrium during the previous period of globalization, as Max Weber alluded as early as 1894: he remarked that “*civilized countries, after a transitory period of ostensibly peaceful competition, are approaching the point where only force will decide each nation’s share of economic control of the earth ...*”

Two main tendencies affected nineteenth and twentieth century European history: on the one hand, multilateral cooperation based on shared objectives and, on the other hand, hierarchies of power and anarchic violence, notably vis-à-vis other continents and the colonies. Balance of power and multilateral rules limited the international power struggle, albeit for a relatively short period and primarily within Europe. Ultimately, Europe was a victim of its own globalization push: the imperialist-colonialist conflicts on the global scale and domestic nationalism and fascism made Europe both the cause and one of the main sites of the worst catastrophes in human history. It is important to understand this paradox: both the practical and cultural experience of the eighteenth and nineteenth century “society of states” and the tragedy of the two World Wars factor equally into the contemporary role of Europe in the world. This argument begs the question of how adequate the first pacifist theories of the Enlightenment and free trade were and how this theoretical dialectic can evolve to accommodate a more complex peace inherent to historical reality.

23 F. Chabod, “Histoire de l’idée d’Europe”, in Y. Hersant, *Europes*, Paris, 2000; and *Idea d’Europa e politica d’equilibrio*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1995.

24 F. Chabod, *Idea d’Europa e politica d’equilibrio*, op. cit., pp. 13–14. Recently, H. Kissinger revived an “idealized picture” of the nineteenth century Concert of Europe (Speech at the Berthelsmann Foundation Forum, 2006).

4. The Interwar Crisis: Europeanism, Nationalism and Political Economy

Despite the diversity of the international system during the Concert of Europe, British multilateralism and the multipolar balance of power system collapsed at the same time: during the period between the two World Wars, in the context of the “Second Thirty Years War” (1914–1945). After the First World War and the 1929 economic crisis, the Amsterdam and London international economic conferences of 1931 and 1933 did bring evidences that Britain was no longer a viable “holder” of the balance of power and the ascending new hegemonic power, the United States, was not yet in a position to take over. Which relations between economic and political multilateralism?

American President W. Wilson’s failure at Versailles peace conference (1919), the success of Clémenceau’s vengeful policy and the weakness of the newborn League of Nations heralded the chaos of the interwar period, the collapse of the young and weak German Weimar Republic under its war debts, the crisis of 1929 and the emergence of Nazism. During the first part of the twentieth century, both the traditional realist and idealist philosophies resurfaced and were transformed into theories of International Relations. But the creators of legal pacifism imagined centralization of the global system in vain; the idealist’s failure was inevitable in context of the fragile interwar period and the powerless League of Nations. Although realist theories were dominant at the time, the first Chair in International relations was attributed to the Kantian, Alfred Zimmern, author of *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law* (1918–1935) and another idealist, Woolf, of the *Fabian Society*, revived the idea that international peace would be feasible if an international legal institution existed (*The International Government*, 1916).

After the First World War, the distinction between European peace and global order – first expressed in the nineteenth century in the “United States of Europe” concept – started becoming a structural element of conceptualizing peace. The political actuality had dramatically changed: Europe was no longer the center of the world as it had been for many centuries and at the time of Kant. When the *Briand Memorandum* for a “European federation” was presented to the League of Nations in Geneva (May 17, 1930), the three major ideological movements for European construction (federalist, functionalist and “Paneuropean”) had already – even if to different extent – distanced themselves from universal cosmopolitanism. The European idea started to represent not only a step paving the way to universal peace, but also a particular and distinctive set of geopolitical and economic interests.

The First World War both constituted an important marker of Europe’s declining place in the world order and highlighted the aberrations of national sovereignty. The Great War’s losers were the European Empires: Austro-Hungarian, Russian and German; thus an important but ambiguous element of the debate on Europe’s future was centered on Vienna, Budapest and Prague. The cultural climate emerging at the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire gave rise to profound cultural disarray; there existed both a nascent neo-nationalism of the peoples previously

dominated by empires and a fin-de-siècle ideology, referred to in Central Europe as “Spenglerism” (the decline of the West, or the end of Europe in the face of Russia and the United States).²⁵

Within this contradictory milieu, European reactions against the new world powers (the US and USSR) manifested with new vigor and coalesced in the “Paneuropean” movement, founded and led by Count Coudenhove-Kalergi.²⁶ It was at once a defensive and offensive reaction; a sort of elitist European patriotism that emphasized the specificity of the continent (in both its interests and identity) compared with other major actors in world politics. At the same time, the federalist movement materialized in several European countries (Great Britain, Italy, etc.) and revived the idea of a European federal state – in contrast with the logic of the League of Nations, this movement was critical of state sovereignty. Lionel Robbins, Lord Lothian, Luigi Einaudi, Giovanni Agnelli and others²⁷ defended European unification in the form of a United States of Europe: both a regional state and a precursor to a pyramidal global organization.²⁸ Finally, David Mitrany delineated the imminent tendency towards multilateral civil cooperation between states and the pressure of common economic interest as driving forces for functional European integration.²⁹

Thus during the interwar period, the idea of European specificity and the question of the continent’s peaceful unification (which included certain defensive traits in the face of chaotic global reorganization) – as distinct from the issue of world peace – already appeared anomalous to the former centrality of Europe, at least on a theoretical level. In a second political development, the *Briand Memorandum*,³⁰ influenced by Coudenhove-Kalergi, drew attention for the first time to the Franco-German relationship, as an indispensable “realist” motor for European multilateral construction.

In those hard times, the democratic European project didn’t manage by fostering convergence among national interests and aims during an unprecedented economic crisis and, thus, collapsed. For two decades, fascism and Nazism successfully channeled not only nationalism but also, paradoxically, the regional project, via the idea of a “new European order” that was imperial and authoritarian,

25 O. Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, Vienna, 1918.

26 R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Ausgewählte Schriften zu Europa*, Graz, NWV, 2006; and regarding this movement, A.-M. Saint-Gille, La “Paneurope”, *Un débat d’idées dans l’entre-deux-guerres*, Paris, Presses de l’univ. de la Sorbonne, 2003.

27 See G. Bossuat, *Les fondateurs de l’Europe*, Paris, Berlin SUP, 1994; E. de Reau, *L’idée d’Europe au XXe siècle*, Bruxelles, Complexe 1995; and M. Telò, *L’Etat et l’Europe*, Bruxelles, Labor, 2005.

28 See S. Pistone (ed.) *L’idea di unificazione europea dalla prima alla seconda guerra mondiale*, Turin, Fondazione Einaudi, 1975.

29 D. Mitrany, *A Working Peace System*, London, Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1943.

30 See the chapter dedicated to this subject in G. Bossuat, *Les fondateurs de l’Europe*, op. cit., pp. 51–68.

anti-multilateral and anti-multipolar.³¹ External chaos was combined with the weaknesses of internal factors: the social-democratic, Christian and liberal streams that started by favoring European construction proved incapable of proposing a solution to the interwar political and economic crisis and their reasoning appeared utopist compared to ubiquitous rising nationalisms.

The unprecedented tragedies of the second “Thirty Years War” – the civil war that rent the European peoples between 1914 and 1945 – seriously limited the opportunity to develop the internationalist and institutional philosophies associated with liberal democracy. Thus the major theoretical oeuvres from the period between the failure of the League of Nations and the emergence of the bipolar world fall within the realist tradition. The three mainstays of twentieth century realist philosophy were all influenced by Machiavelli and Hobbes: they include E.H. Carr, H. Morgenthau and Raymond Aron. On one hand, they were strongly influenced by the cultural and intellectual climate of 1930s–1940s Europe; on the other, they laid the groundwork for the great period of American neo-realism.

To understand the specificity and internal contradictions of Europe at this time of transition between multipolar and bipolar systems, J.M. Keynes and K. Polanyi’s influence must also be taken into account. Fundamental theoretical innovations, notably in terms of economic theory thanks to John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946),³² emerged within the turbulent interwar climate and profoundly impacted international relations. The Keynesian revolution was a theoretical criticism of orthodox liberalism (one of the pillars of classic British hegemony) that also had important implications for domestic and international political science. K. Polanyi’s historic research largely converged with Keynes’s economic work.³³

This deep reciprocal interplay between political science and economics would later be termed International Political Economy (see *infra*), an important sub-discipline of International Relations. Its roots can be traced to eighteenth and nineteenth century economic theory, notably in the theories of A. Smith and K. Marx: despite their opposition, both theories shared an interpretation of capitalism that emphasized its global development and the link between economy and politics. But it was within the framework of the Keynesian revolution and the great transformation of the interwar period that the role of public authorities (and particularly that of the state) in economics grew to one of central importance.

31 M. Telò (ed.) *EU and New Regionalism*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007, Introduction.

32 See the biography by R. Skydelsky, *Keynes*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. In addition to his masterpiece, *General Theory* (1936), and *Economic Consequences of Peace* (1919), see *The Treatise on Money* (1930); and *Essays in Persuasion* (1930). He participated actively in the political and economic interwar debate and was a member of the British delegation to Bretton Woods in 1944.

33 Among others, there was also the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal, who originated the Scandinavian welfare state; he further had innovative ideas regarding international redistributive justice.

In August 1931, when the Bank of England renounced the Gold Standard (the symbol of former British hegemony), the already weakened state of international economic relations plunged into chaos and suffered the effects of various nationalist responses.³⁴ With remarkable foresight, J.M. Keynes had already criticized the Concert of Europe and predicted the decline of British hegemony in his famous work of 1919³⁵ (written when he was counselor to Prime Minister Lloyd George at the Conference of Versailles) and in *The End of Laissez-Faire* (1926). Within his theory on the asymmetry of supply and demand as a structural component of market economy, Keynes proposed a double reform going beyond the state of laissez-faire and the traditional logic of multipolar hierarchy which ultimately triumphed at Versailles.

His critique of free market optimism and the liberal theory of the “invisible hand” (A. Smith) had important international implications. Moreover, Keynes’s idea that a peaceful international order could only be achieved by the winners of the Great War actively pursuing policies to assist its losers (such as Germany) – an international cooperation regime in the style of the Marshall Plan that came about only after 1947 – was not based on idealist arguments. His economic theory was opposed to a strict, short-term vision of national interest; in favor of a far-sighted, neo-multilateral, institutional vision of international cooperation. The “International Keynesianism” (i.e. loans to countries in crisis issued by multilateral public authorities) fulfilled the strategic interest of major western powers, who were concerned with guaranteeing both domestic and international political and economic stability. However it prevailed only after the Second World War.

This innovative theory was thus critical to both the mainstream trends of International Relations and even the limits of the European vision of his time. There was a conflict between opposing conceptions of multipolarism and national interests, but Keynes’s theories favoring international cooperation were equally applicable to the Soviet Union and, most importantly, to Germany. He was convinced that the French obsession with imposing unbearable reparations on and humiliating Germany would only worsen the problems for peace in Europe. History proved him right, whereas the conception of Clémenceau that succeeded at Versailles had catastrophic effects on the fragile German Weimar democracy and thus facilitated, paradoxically, the rise of Hitlerian nationalism.

Keynes supported the first theoretical criticism of the realist “security dilemma” logic and the punishment of a defeated and weakened enemy. Although this critical theory was coined by a European, it would not gain momentum until the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the United States in 1943–44, which envisaged a multilateral system very much along the lines of the Keynesian

34 The international economic conference in the Hague in 1931 fell apart when the weakness of the Washington System, the last hope of the old world, was admitted.

35 J.M. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of Peace*, 1919.

idea, i.e. the Bretton Woods system. This diffusion of Keynesian ideas is cited in the literature as an example of historical institutionalism.³⁶

The historian K. Polanyi,³⁷ like Keynes, believed that the world of classical liberalism – characterized by British hegemony, the centrality of the Pound, laissez-faire economy and free trade – was outdated. According to him, a new role for domestic and international public regulatory powers appeared inevitable after the First World War, and even more so after the crisis of 1929. Even if the end of the century brings some evidence of Keynes and Polanyi overestimating the crisis of the global free market economy, according to many observers, their forecast came back in with the economic and financial crisis of 2008–2010.

Polanyi conceptualized this major historic change as “The Great Transformation”. Disposing of the classic liberal distinction between politics and economy after decades of economic and commercial globalization would have a dual impact: first, revived state interventionism in the domestic economy in order to guarantee stable economic and social balance; secondly, the idea of international economic cooperation based on regulation and organized consultation of social partners, rather than just free trade.

Keynes did not share the European federalists’ economic liberalism at the time – e.g. that of Robbins (UK) or Einaudi (IT), who tried to reconcile free trade and budgetary and financial conservatism. Europeanism seemed to diverge from Keynesianism on this point, as it was not extricated from Cobdenist free trade ideology or liberal cosmopolitanism. That said, Keynes’s and Polanyi’s ideas on the socio-economic role of public powers are not intrinsically incompatible with the European ideal. Indeed quite the opposite has been demonstrated by many, including Lord Beveridge (designer of the English social model after 1945), J. Delors (President of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995) and a number of other economists, theorists and politicians who have worked for decades to synthesize Keynesianism and Europeanism. During the same period, even E.H. Carr who asserted a realist vision of International Relations, was open to international cooperation under certain conditions.

To reiterate: in the historic study of multilateralism and multipolarism as an evolution of sovereignty, it is false to assimilate the European idea and cosmopolitanism. In the tragic framework of interwar Europe, the first steps of theoretical revision of classic Westphalian ideology were as numerous as they were rich and nuanced.

36 P. Hall (ed.) *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations*, notably in the *Conclusions*, Princeton University Press, 1989. See also Chapter 6.2.

37 K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, 1944.

5. The Realist Paradigm

Edward H. Carr

In opposition to idealist philosophy, this important English historian and theorist³⁸ revived Machiavelli's methodological distinction between political science and morality, scientific analysis and wishful thinking. His studies focused on war and the power relations between states. According to Carr, morality and ideology are nothing more than instruments of power (for the purposes of International Relations theory). However, "raw power" will ultimately provoke revolutions, therefore international order requires "a substantial measure of general consent", which is sometimes produced by the great powers themselves. Thus (as he wrote in the second half of the 1930s) the emergence of American power was more acceptable to the world if this power was "tolerant and not oppressive, and in any case, preferable to any possible alternative", notably Germany or Japan.

Carr highlighted the League of Nations crisis and the failures of utopian global federation. The League of Nations was, in fact, a very weak organization: although it was created in 1919 under the impetus of American President W. Wilson, the United States never ratified its own membership. The USSR and Germany were not members. The League failed to face and even check the expansion of Nazi power in Central Europe, of Japanese militarism in China and of Mussolini's regime in Ethiopia. Carr attributed the League's weaknesses to the inherent structural difficulty of founding an international peace organization, an "elegant superstructure", without having laid a solid foundation. According to him, W. Wilson's much lauded principles were nothing more than the interests of the nation that launched the idea, i.e. the United States. Carr believed that, generally speaking, principles are merely an expression of international policy based on a particular representation of national interest at a given moment; as soon as abstract principles are applied to a concrete situation, they are revealed as a transparent guise for selfish interests.

Carr criticized idealist reasoning, most notably the illusion of achieving international peace via free trade and liberal cosmopolitanism. He considered the pacifist movement against the secrecy of treaties equally utopian. His theories are widespread, which explains that certain tenets distance him from pure realist ideology based on eternal international anarchy. For example, critical of traditional free trade theory, Carr was influenced by Keynesianism. He was convinced that peaceful international order would not result from spontaneous harmony of national interests, nor from Adam Smith's invisible economic hand, but would be

38 E.H. Carr (1892–1982) attended the Conference of Versailles (1919) as a member of the British Foreign Office (where he worked for 15 years). He then became professor of International Relations at the University of Aberystwith and wrote numerous works, among which a monumental reconstruction of the Russian Revolution and the first years of the Soviet power. He is the author of *The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919–1939* (1939).

the effect of sacrifices and economic reconstruction (e.g. he cites the “relief credits” model – Keynesian style loans to countries in crisis) capable of preventing a new international crisis of the type seen in 1929–1933. He shared K. Polanyi’s idea that the world had undergone a great post-liberal transformation, and that international system could no more return to the pre-1939 economic order than it could to the pre-1919 political order. In contrast, he believed that international cooperation organized around economic objectives was both possible and desirable and, in any case, more realistic than a cosmopolitan project. Reviving to some extent the great tradition of Grotius, Carr’s insights influenced the creation of the English school of international relations in the 1950s (M. Wight, H. Butterfield, H. Bull, see Chapter 6.1).

Hans Morgenthau

H. Morgenthau began by asserting the heuristic primacy of international politics over domestic politics, a tenet drawn from the classic theory of national interest; in other words, international politics explain domestic politics. This fundamental approach anticipated the emphasis on “levels of analysis” by K. Waltz (see Chapter 2.3).

In *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau revived Carr’s polemic against utopist idealism. He accused the idealists of fleeing reality and falsely imbuing their theories with moral aspirations when in fact the world is imperfect and based on forces inherent to human nature: the only way to improve the world is to “work with these forces and not against them”. Since the world is characterized by conflicts of interest, the best conceivable scenario is achieving a balance of interests, albeit relative and precarious.

The principles of the school he coined as “political realism” are:

1. The first step is to recognize long-term “objective laws” or “steel laws” of politics, as opposed to subjective opinions, prejudices and wishful thinking. A simple examination of the facts of foreign policy is not sufficient. To understand the empiric evidence, one must have a rational model that explains the plausible alternatives truly available to statesmen.
2. The “main signposts” of Morgenthau’s international realism are “interests interpreted in terms of power”. He considered international political relations to be a sphere independent of economics, ethics or religion. According to him, “the statesman thinks and acts in terms of interests, defined as power”.
3. Ideological motivation and philosophic preferences play only a negligible role. According to the concept of “unintended consequences” (rather than that of good – or bad – intentions) only concrete political action can be analyzed. Political realism does not advocate total indifference to ideological principles and policies, but clearly claims a “distinction between what is

- desirable and what is possible, what is always and everywhere desirable, and what is possible under given conditions in time and space”.
4. Political reasoning can be affected by subjective factors (errors, irrationalness, intellectual limits of leaders, the need to obtain consensus in a democracy and take account of emotional factors), but international political theory must highlight the essence of decision making, not mere contingencies.
 5. The concept of state power is based on material criteria (territory, protection of borders, population, natural resources, industrial production) but is also tied to the quality of human resources (national character, military preparation, diplomatic capacity). Morgenthau reflected on the necessary means to increase a state's power: create a force considerable enough to deter other states from starting conflicts; divide enemies; wield a compensatory system to preserve the balance between powers.
 6. The centrality of balance of power ideology to international politics. According to Morgenthau, it is the “universal instrument of foreign relations that has always been employed by all nations who desire to preserve their independence”. Citing D. Hume, he highlighted that, despite appearances, man does not really have a choice between respecting the balance of power, conquering the world or being conquered. Independent powers can only coexist because they reciprocally balance each other and possess equal (or equal enough) force to enact their respective policies.

The concept of balance of power is controversial. It is claimed to be a permanent trait of the international system, an “objective law”, at least in Westphalian systems, including multipolarism prior to 1939 and US–USSR bipolarism after 1947 (under the name “containment” proposed by G. Kennan³⁹). But Morgenthau's conception is ambiguous: it is at the same time a policy, a political action of states, an “automatic process” of the international system, an inevitable reality, regardless of the actors' awareness. Often it is unclear on which side of the balance a particular state falls; the balance also sometimes fails to guarantee stability; and above all what seems to one state to constitute equilibrium could appear to another as imbalance in need of correction.

Martin Wight,⁴⁰ head of the English school of international relations, listed nine different meanings of the concept of balance of power including, among others: the existing distribution of power, the just distribution of power, a favorable

39 G. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950*, New York, NY American Library, 1951; and *The Realities of American Foreign Policy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1954.

40 Martin Wight (1913–1972), member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, professor at several British universities, is the author of *Power Politics* (RIIA, 1946) and *Diplomatic Investigations*, London 1966, edited with H. Butterfield (see the chapter “Balance of Power” for this reference).

equilibrium, a preponderance of power, the normative principle that power should be distributed fairly, the principle of balanced reinforcement of great powers at the expense of small ones, the principle that a party should exercise some means of avoiding the danger of imbalance, an inherent tendency of international politics to undertake a just distribution of power. In *Power and International Relations*,⁴¹ Inis Claude highlights that a notion of moderation is also included in balance of power theory: “in seeking power, the statesman must avoid provoking reactions of fear and hostility and thus undermining his own projects”.

This recalls the evolutionary element of the Westphalian system in the context of the Concert of Europe mentioned above. European realism cannot relinquish a normative perspective, aimed to revise the most worrisome tendencies of the Westphalian theory of sovereignty.

Raymond Aron

While developing his approach during the three first decades of post-World War Two Europe, R. Aron espoused the existing tenets of realist theory: the centrality of the state paradigm (states remain the “final judges of what the defense of their interests or their honor necessitates”), the principle of territoriality and the compartmentalization of space, the concept of power and the explanation of war as central to international relations.

Aron enriched the traditional realist concept of power by distinguishing it from the concept of force: force is a means, whereas power is the result of a willful act, the ability to mobilize a nation and use its available means to some end. In international politics, “power is the capacity of a political unit to impose its will on other units ...; political power is not an absolute but a human relationship”. Aron stressed the traditional concept that security is the main goal of international life: “all states pursue the same objectives defined in terms of power and security, they can regulate their behavior towards one another using common instruments: diplomacy and force”, depending on the circumstances.

His skepticism towards the origins of the European Community was inevitable: “it is missing the essential, namely a common will uniting a human community aware of its originality and resolute to persist in view of other collectives”.

However, though he limited himself to the “sociology of international relations”, Aron posed a number of important questions to the Westphalian paradigm, soliciting an evolution of the theory. First, Aron initiated deepening discussion on “transnationalism”, which includes relationships between individuals who belong to different nations as opposed to the classic concept of “international” which focuses exclusively on the relationships between states. A “transnational society appears at the level of commercial cooperation, immigration flows, of shared convictions, cross-border organizations, ceremonies or competitions

41 Inis Claude, *International Relations*, New York, Random House, 1962.

open to members of different units".⁴² This transnational society was reinforced by multilateral accords before the two World Wars, but then disrupted by the wars and the rise of the iron curtain in 1947. Aron's transnationalism sometimes seems to anticipate R.Keohane and J.Nye, or even the "world society" theory of John Burton, even if his pronouncement on the EC (above) shows the limits of his theoretical conception: transnational and institutional actors are not autonomous for Aron.

Second, contrary to Morgenthau, he restored the importance of the irrational dimension of politics, which becomes a fundamental variable in explaining national interest and the calculation of costs and benefits. Aron elaborated the idea of "immaterial interests" including historic ambitions, the pursuit of prestige by power elites, the mobilizing influence of ideology – factors that necessitate a broader conception of politics that accounts for both rational and irrational factors. Even the notion of a states "general interest" must be reconsidered according to this framework, which of course weakens the realist notion of a "rational state". This ambiguity surrounding national interests provokes further ambivalence and uncertainty about the idea of state power, of a state's diplomatic and strategic conduct.

Last but not least, Aron applied the method of comparative sociology to foreign policy, borrowed from Montesquieu⁴³ (one of his favorite authors): in the same way that comparative study of political regimes gives insight to a state's future, the study of a state's social and political foundations, geography and history can explain its foreign policy. Socio-economic changes, unemployment and demographics influence diplomacy and external policy.

In conclusion, Aron's extraordinary and varied cultural experience made him a classic and important theorist, in the tradition of Montesquieu. But, working in the bipolar world, he seemed unable to follow his intuitions to their natural conclusion, i.e. to develop a theory of International Relations that went beyond his realist frame of reference.

Realist Theory: A Synthesis

The realist paradigm of International Relations, despite its European origins, gained prominence in the United States after the Second World War. It long remained the conventional frame of reference, within which even alternative approaches were developed. The various theorists who ascribe to this paradigm share several essential tenets:

1. In terms of methodology, they assert the "domestic analogy" (see Hobbes), while persist denying that a lasting international contract for stability and peace could be possible, following the example of domestic evolution from

42 R. Aron, *Theory of International Relations*, 1966.

43 R. Aron, "Historical Sociology as an Approach to International Relations", in *The Nature of Conflicts*, Unesco Publication Center, 1957.

the state of nature to the political state, from anarchy to order. Thus the international sphere is dominated by structural anarchy, the state of potential warfare and reciprocal threats. A central international political authority above the state level is not foreseeable, thus international authority is, and will remain, decentralized.

2. States are the most important international actors. The Westphalian sovereign and independent state is a central feature of what is called the realists' state-centric paradigm. States' behavior is influenced by the goal of survival or self-defense. Of course the realists do not ignore the emergence of other actors – e.g. economic, social, cultural and institutional – but these actors are not considered autonomous; rather they are subordinated to and channeled through states.
3. The context in which actors operate is characterized by international anarchy and the absence of a superior authority. One group of realists insists that this state of anarchy is perpetual, whereas another envisages *de facto* coexistence as the highest attainable level of international order; this order could only be founded on balanced power relations and would always be tenuous, under constant threat of succumbing to warfare.
4. Certain realists study the cycles of great powers and international hegemony. Actual relations between states are in fact hierarchical: some are more powerful than others; small and large powers, superpowers and hegemonies succeed one another in the course of history. The concept of hegemony and sphere of influence can sometimes explain these hierarchies between states and stability in the international system. There are both regional hegemonic states and global hegemonic powers.
5. The idea of power is the central tenet of the realist school: a state's primary objective is to maximize its power. Certain realists interpret power struggles as a defensive, survival mechanism; for others, national interest pushes states to strive to expand their power. Objective factors related to power include population, territory and capabilities – i.e. a state's human resources. The goal of foreign policy is to maintain or develop the state's power, be it in the context of equilibrium, in alliance with other states or via unilateral actions. Economics is an important issue in interstate power relations, but an issue only: it has no explanatory power in international politics.
6. Hierarchies also exist between the numerous and diverse questions on the international agenda: security is always the most important issue, "high politics" take precedence over "low politics"; international politics is about power stakes. A state's first need is security, hence the "security dilemma": if one state launches a rearmament policy, all the others are logically obliged to follow this example, according to the logic feeling of uncertainty. If a state refuses to rearm, it will be under threat from all the others and its very survival will be endangered. Thus any discussion of peace or cooperation is moot, given the existence of "malevolent" states. The "security dilemma"

is the key to understanding rearmament and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In this framework is a sub-current of twentieth century realism: “polemology”, or the study of warfare. Widespread through France⁴⁴ and Great Britain,⁴⁵ classic polemology classifies wars, studies their historic and natural causes (notably, human aggression), the relationship between war and the nature of the state, the cycles of armed conflict in the history of nations, the political and economic consequences of war and critiques the “illusions of pacifism”.

7. The realist approach stresses the foreign policy dominance over domestic policy. This primacy is mainly for explanatory purposes and relates to the hierarchy of levels of analysis. There exists a sort of shield between international relations and the conflicts inherent to domestic politics: domestic political actors, values, issues, etc. do not affect a state's representation of national interest, understood as a single and rational reality. Internal change, the domestic decision process, and partisan conflicts simply do not matter. The only relevant factor is a state's position on the international scene and its rational defense of national interest.
8. The state, a unitary actor representing national interest in the international sphere, acts according to rational choice theory. The calculation of costs and benefits is the only factor that explains foreign policy decisions, for the majority of realists. Others, such as R. Aron, accord greater importance to irrational factors, but the idea of rational choice remains primary.

Realists rigorously critique the idealist claim to moral superiority and advocate a scientific approach to international relations. Their “positivist” approach critically underlines the ideological function of political discourse: grand principles are nothing more than a dissimulation of great powers' national interests. The asserted ostensible neutrality of neo-realist theory is confirmed by the fact that it is equally espoused by conservative and revolutionary ideologies.

44 G. Bouthoul, *Essais de polémologie*, Paris, Denoël, 1976.

45 Q. Wright, *A Study of War*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1970.

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Chapter 2

Systemic Approaches in the United States

The development and application of systemic theories in International Relations can only be understood within the historically unprecedented context of the post-1945 world. The bipolar global opposition between two major non-European superpowers (the US and the USSR) fostered theoretical innovation towards more global thinking. The decline following the war forced the old continent to reconsider the previous European system of alliances and balance of power and the related theories. Systems theory was an important tool in this evolution. American intellectual elites turned to systems theory to conceptualize the new role of the US as a global hegemonic superpower and the confrontational unification of the planet around the bipolar principle. Thus, this innovative approach was primarily developed in American universities during the 1950s–1980s, both in conjunction with traditional realism and exceeding it.

Systems theories were originally used in the “hard” sciences, but their application quickly spread to the social sciences as well. The two great theorists of systemic sociology were Talcott Parsons and Robert King Merton. David Easton was the first to apply this approach to political science. Through this channel, systemic theory was quickly, directly and specifically applied to International Relations as an emergent discipline. In the United States and elsewhere, the theorists have used systems theory as an important reference point for the last six decades: its emergence was a conceptual turning point that has influenced all subsequent developments.

1. System Theory Applied to Political and Social Sciences:

D. Easton and T. Parsons

“General systems theory” was coined in the United States in the 1940s, by Ludwig Von Bartalaffy, in regards to cybernetic science and information technology (while his reference article “General System Theory” appeared in *General Systems* in 1956). Around the same time “game theory” (exploration of strategic interaction between units, based on mathematics) was developed by J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern. In the cultural climate of scientific optimism, convergence theories and “end of ideology” discussions,¹ there was a drive to create a single general theory that would be applicable to all systems in all disciplines. This cultural

1 D. Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the '50s*, New York, Free Press, 1960.

climate also had bearing on and in part explains the North American perception of the concept of international system.

Easton and Parsons' most important contribution was a methodological conceptualization of systems theory that was applicable to socio-political science and International Relations. Of course separating this domain from the influence of technology and cybernetics was not easy: the interesting methodological approach of J. David Singer (1961)² remained, for example, too attached to the technological perspective.

Moreover, this was a period of major re-conceptualization for the young discipline of International Relations as the understanding of international politics was separated from two traditional disciplines: diplomatic history, which presented global politics as the fragmentary sum of various states' foreign policies, without considering the interaction or global effects of these policies; and international law, which emphasized the normative side of external relations and states' conformity to international norms, without considering the decision process behind nor the real implementation of these policies. Systems theory focused not only on individual actors, but on the structure of their reciprocal relations. However, the "international system" does not exist as an object of empirical research; it is a concept or construction, a "hypothesis aimed to organize the knowledge in a particular research field".³

International Relations would ideally have required a distinctive epistemological basis, which was only possible through an alliance with the social and political sciences; and thus IR became the third branch of Political Science alongside Comparative Politics and Administrative Science,⁴ despite the ambiguity of early systems theory and several methodological disagreements within the political science community. Unlike Comparative Politics, which unfold within the framework of an established orders, International Relations initially develop in the absence of a central authority. In the 1950s–1960s both disciplines also shared the challenging influence of an alternative to systems theory: the study of actors' behavior, or "behaviorism". In the tradition of neo-positivism, behaviorism claimed that domestic and international political phenomena could be studied through purely empirical research, by the simple accumulation of descriptive facts.

D. Easton,⁵ on the other hand, began with the principle that human behavior is not based on chance and needs to be understood through intellectual constructions that emphasize its uniformities and constants. According to him actors' behavior

2 J.D. Singer, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations", in K. Knorr and S. Verba (eds) *The International System, Theoretical Essays*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961.

3 L. Bonante (ed.) *Il sistema delle relazioni internatzionali*, Turin, Einaudi, 1976.

4 G. Sartori, *La politica*, Milano, Sugarco, 1979.

5 David Easton, born in Canada in 1917, studied at Harvard University and taught at the University of Chicago. His major work was *The Political System* (1953); he also wrote *A System Analysis of Political Life* (New York, Wiley, 1967) among others.

and collective action can only be appreciated by rigorous study of empirical facts and variables within a theoretical framework – the necessary tools to organize experiential knowledge, as demonstrated by German sociologist Max Weber. This means that moral assessment and policy recommendation are strictly separated from the analytic process of political knowledge. It is its reference to the Weberian normative neutrality that distinguishes systems theory.⁶

A contemporary theoretical innovation was also the study of “decision-making processes”, which displays anti-systemic tendencies, but reconciles foreign and domestic policies. Fostered by Richard Snyder between 1954 and 1962, this approach focuses on researching political decisions and their complex causes,⁷ but it ignores the interplay of national foreign policies and their interactions with the international system. Within this highly controversial milieu, Easton published *The Political System* in 1953.

According to Easton, a given phenomenon is perceived individually but its true meaning:

cannot be understood without reference to the function of the whole. In my book *The ‘Political System’* I suggested the adoption of this point of view as a conscious precondition to research and the understanding of political life as a system of interconnected activities.

As opposed to empiricism and fragmented research, the center of Easton’s new approach was thus the interplay between individual parts and their connections to the whole.

To counterbalance the cybernetic, technical approach of general systems theory, twentieth century system theory in social sciences incorporated the rich and varied European tradition which also considered empiric phenomena in relation to the “system” or “totality”. Th. Hobbes referred to “systems” and “sub-systems” in the *Leviathan* (see Chapter 12), and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the idea of a global system spread throughout philosophy and the social sciences in a controversial way. On the one hand, in terms of his conceptualization of the history, G.W.F. Hegel emphasized the dialectical ties between interconnected parties and the whole: together they make up the complex system between units, developing dynamics of change. On the other hand, French sociologist E. Durkheim proposed an integrationist view of systems, based on the normative principle of internal

⁶ This means that system theory is neutral from the scientific point of view and independent from moral or ideological choices of researchers. According to Gunnar Myrdal (great Swedish economist and Nobel laureate) subjective values enter into the choice of research topics and in the use of empiric results in terms of public debate – i.e. *ante* and *post factum*. But even Myrdal contends that values do not interfere in development of the research itself.

⁷ R. Snyder, *Foreign Policy Decision Making. An Approach to the Study of International Politics*. See also Chapter 9.

balance, wherein any phenomenon that falls outside the system is considered deviant and abnormal.

Whatever their philosophic and cultural origins, the assertion of global and systemic views was facilitated by the world context of total opposition between communism and capitalism. The result of the two World Wars and the emergence of the US–USSR bipolarity was a new attention to the political life of the planet as a whole. The idea of international politics as simple sum of individual foreign policies, diplomacy and state actions was radically outdated. It was necessary to highlight the connections and interactions between individual political units, the impact of the whole or the structure on these individual units, and reciprocally, the impact of individual units on the structure: systemic theory enables this complex analysis of units. Although controversial and divided, system theory made critical contributions. System theorists consider states and international political and economic actors to be in regular reciprocal contact within the framework of complex networks of relations created by the process of interplay; individuals' actions also depend on their dialectic relation to the whole.

David Easton's model of systemic relations is sometimes criticized as mechanical or engineering-based, as a result of the language he uses to describe it. He conceived system dynamics (applicable to all systems) as having several phases which succeed and overlap one another: the system must contend with demands, or "inputs", solicitations of change coming from both internal parts of the system and external environmental factors; and the system's authorities (the decision-making bodies) try to manage these demands. How the system changes or evolves? It adapts to external input, gives feedback – including information concerning decisions and their effects – and thus tries to maintain its internal balance. The question of how systems reciprocally interplay with sub-systems and individuals remains open for research. The international system is analyzed in relation to both its internal and external environment and within the context of a dozen or more subsystems, based on different criteria, including world's geography (European, American, South-East Asian, etc.), function (energy, finance, monetary, ecology) or theme (economic, social, political).

Talcott Parsons, the founding father of American functionalist sociology, updated Max Weber's modern sociological approach, focusing on the dynamic aspect of systems (social, individual, cultural, etc.) and their shared interconnections. For Parsons, each system is a diverse aggregate of functions. There are four functions within each system: one function that maintains the original system; a second function that maintains social cohesion; a third function that allows the system to adapt to external constraints or mutations; and a fourth that allows groups within the system to obtain their objectives, which explains Parsons's "voluntaristic" approach.

Pressure on a system to evolve can come from within or without. These pressures are not necessarily mastered or neutralized by the system in order to guarantee its self-preservation. The strength of Parsons's theory is that it presents a systemic dialectic (between conservation and evolution), a dynamic system that

moves and changes; it is not simplified or fixated on the maintenance of the *status quo* or “integrated society”. For him, change is possible as systems try and might fail to absorb conflicts and contradictions.

Thus Parsons’s theory went beyond the static and mechanic framework inherited from cybernetic theory, as S. Hoffmann remarked. In his conceptual model he explained that, contrary to hard science systems (the nervous system, physics systems, information and communication systems, etc.), it is difficult to conserve a political or social system as it is. This is evident in the two international systems of the modern world – the balance of power system and the bipolar system – as well as in the open transition phase that followed the bipolar world (since 1991).

Last but not least, the latitude of systemic approaches is important. Although political scientists and International Relations specialists use system theory to reinforce the independence of their discipline, this framework also provides opportunity for interdisciplinary study with international law (Stanley Hoffmann), social science (Talcott Parsons and George Modelsky), normative studies of the global nuclear order (Günther Anders) and the history of political theory. Thus, through systems theory, International Relations theory has developed a more globalized form that can account for numerous variables.

2. System Theory Applied to International Relations: Morton Kaplan

The dialogue with systems theories has been invaluable to International Relations. It is no longer possible for researchers to study international politics without taking the changing global system into account; even for those who focus on domestic factors affecting foreign policy – they must first consider the weight of external, systemic factors in order to demonstrate the importance of internal variables. Systems theories have evolved in tandem with historical evolution, but specialists remain divided over how the system and the units and actors it contains interact.

Several factors have furthered the development and diffusion of system theories in twentieth century International Relations. Between 1920 and 1939, the end of the extraordinary global commercial boom of the “*belle époque*” that had led up to the First World War, was marked by a phase of tragic national introspection and protectionism, both economic and political. However, after 1945 the process of economic internationalization reaccelerated considerably under the influence of the United States’ multilateral global leadership. After the short “universalist” phase opened by US Presidents F.D. Roosevelt and H. Truman, who fostered and gave rise to the great new multilateral organizations (UN, IMF, World Bank, GATT) between 1944 and 1947, the bipolar confrontation with communism dominated the post-war period up until the fall of the Soviet Bloc (1989/1991). The encompassing nature of this total conflict (affecting economy, politics and ideology) contributed to the success of systemic approaches, as international relations began to be understood and explained in terms of more global theories. Theorists increasingly attempted to interpret the history of humanity, or at least

modernity, with system theory – e.g. the concept of the international system or the world system. The question logically arose as to what kind of systems had preceded and would follow the bipolar one.

The bipolar system was explicitly established in 1947 with the erection of the ‘iron curtain’, which divided Europe into opposing blocs dominated by the United States and USSR, though its roots can clearly be traced to the Soviet Revolution (1917) and the birth of the USSR (1919). These two superpowers and their relationship dominated the international system and all other actors for decades with their political, ideological and economic opposition. The bipolar system disappeared in 1989–1991 when the Soviet Bloc eventually collapsed. Since 1991, the world has entered a new transition phase that is both unstable and heterogeneous. The international scientific community is divided as to what characterizes the post-Cold War global system: unipolarism, multipolarism, anarchy, universalism? Although several theories exist, no prevailing paradigm has emerged. This theoretical uncertainty is linked to a real historic uncertainty; a chapter of this book is dedicated to the ongoing theoretical debate since 1991 and the emerging role of new global actors such as the European Union, China, India, Brazil. The debate on International Relations theory has never been so open and complex, so lively and marked by diverse approaches.

International relations theories have thus started favoring systemic approaches since the 1950s, particularly in the United States. As a superpower, the US engendered several International Relations university Chairs, some of which distinguished themselves from the traditional realist paradigm.

The first major work that presented the systemic approach to international relations was Morton Kaplan’s *System and Process in International Politics* (1957).⁸ Kaplan did not strictly adhere to the traditional realist theory. He was conscious of the methodological stakes of his scientific onslaught against “traditionalists” – as seen in his quarrel with H. Bull and the “English school” (see 6.1) – which enabled him to understand the relevant theoretical issues and possible alternatives. His work evoked historical examples to systematically and theoretically analyze international relations. He was particularly focusing on the political context of the existing bipolar world, which also explains his theories’ public and academic

8 Morton Kaplan, University of Chicago professor born in 1921, published his masterpiece through Wiley in New York. He has long argued against non-systemic or traditionalist theoretical approaches to international politics: see, for example *Macropolitics: Selected Essays in the Philosophy and Science of Politics* (1970). Two years before the publication of *System and Process* (1957), Charles McClelland (University of Southern California Professor) had already published an article on “The Application of General System Theory to International Relations” – but McClelland had a technical and pragmatic view of system theory and long refused (in both his 1955 article and his 1966 book *Theory and the International System*, New York, Macmillan) to comment on the heuristic primacy of the system in comparison with states contrary to M. Kaplan, he considered the epistemological question irrelevant.

success in the following decades. The world at the time was in a very considerable state of bipolar tension between the end of the Korean War and the advent of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

According to Kaplan, there is a certain degree of regularity in actors' behavior within the international system. This consistency reveals a level of internal coherence which allows models of the international system to be constructed. These models evolve under the influence of both internal and external factors. According to Kaplan, it is possible to make predictions regarding this evolution, but only within a previously selected model of international system.

Kaplan distinguished six theoretical international systems, two of which have already existed historically (the Westphalian system and the flexible kind of bipolar system). The four other systems are hypothetical, and could emerge from the end of bipolarism.

Westphalian Balance of Power System

This system has always featured a multipolar dynamic including (more or less) five dominant powers (states) of similar strength or capacities which maintain a shifting equilibrium. Which are the system's rules? a) Each state struggles to maintain or increase its power and, to this end, prefers negotiation over armed conflict; b) Resorting to war to increase resources is a last recourse; c) When one power attempts to dominate the others, they mobilize an alliance against it, because the rise of hegemony threatens the stability of the balance of the system: for example the anti-French and, later on, anti-Napoleonic coalitions that formed between the French Revolution and 1815 to restore absolute monarchy in France and on the European continent; d) Warfare comes to an end as soon as it threatens to destroy one of the five great powers, as the main goal is to conserve and restore the system. When one major actor suffers defeat, after a failed attempt at hegemony, the others do not exclude, but rather normalize and reintegrate the defeated state (for example, the post-Napoleonic France of Louis XVIII); e) In this system, all kinds of states are tolerable: their potential conflicts are not ideological in nature; f) Diplomatic conferences are held in accord with multilateral intergovernmental agreements (for example, the already mentioned International Postal Agreement from 1865 onwards); g) On the other hand, the five major powers try to weaken non-state actors who attempt to act independently of the diplomatic and political system or to reinforce international institutions; h) Internationalist ideologies – cosmopolitanism, economic or religious pacifism, liberalism – are discouraged, notably in the first part of the nineteenth century.

The Flexible Bipolar System

Unlike the former Westphalian system, the actors in a bipolar system are diverse as their nature and more numerous: two superpowers, universal organizations such as the UN, international public opinion, several neutral states, non-aligned states, ...

The basic structure of the system is two large opposing blocs – the Soviet Bloc, based on the Warsaw pact in Europe and Soviet alliances in Asia and on the other continents; and the Western Bloc, based on NATO and the system of American alliances throughout the world. The two blocs radically differ in terms of principles, economies and politics. They claim to represent opposite universal ideologies – communism and democratic capitalism; this implies a will to destroy the adversary, even though the competing bipolar powers never actually degenerated into total warfare.

The Concert of Europe of the nineteenth century was followed by an era of bipolar reciprocal terror after 1947, which however maintained global peace for decades despite massive nuclear armament of the two blocs and an unprecedented resolve to mutual destruction that came with the technological means to annihilate the adversary and its allies. Despite these antagonistic objectives, the two superpowers avoid any direct military confrontation because nuclear weapons enable attacks, but also create the threat of nuclear destruction via counter-attack (second strike doctrine).

As for the other actors, they exhibit diverse behaviors. International politics weigh more heavily on domestic politics than in the previous balance of power system. However, autonomous states outside the two blocs act according to their own rules: these are also European neutral actors (as Sweden, Austria, Switzerland), or belonging to the non-aligned movement, including India under J. Nehru and I. Gandhi (1950s–1970s), Indonesia, Tito’s Yugoslavia; moreover, several Arab countries under the leadership of the Egyptian nationalist Nasser. Neutral actors support the universal organizations, notably the UN. Furthermore, there is also some relevant margin for flexibility and internal autonomy within the two blocs: for example, De Gaulle’s France or Mao’s China or (to a lesser extent) Romania. The existence of autonomous states and universal organizations, as well as some flexibility within the two blocs, make this a *flexible* bipolar system. Part of the world does not (or not always) claim to take part in the system of bipolar confrontation, nor to “buy into” the logic of bipolarity.

There are nine rules that define the flexible bipolar system:

1. Each bloc aims not only to weaken but to destroy the other.
2. There is an internal hierarchy within each alliance, under the leadership of USA or USSR.
3. Though prepared for nuclear war, each block prefers negotiation and peaceful coexistence rather than direct military confrontation; and although they have the means to destroy one another, they prefer indirect confrontations through “local wars” (e.g. Korean War and, later on, Cuba crisis and Vietnam War).
4. Each bloc tries to increase its resources (economic, military, etc.), if possible at the expense of the other, but stops short of conflict that threatens of nuclear holocaust (which is confirmed by both the Korean and Cuban crises).

5. The two blocks try to instrumentalize international organizations, but will support the interests of the organization itself if they are contrary to the goals of the enemy bloc. This was the period of frequent resorts to veto rights in the UN Security Council and of the UN consequent paralysis.
6. Autonomous countries try to align their national interest with the objectives of international organizations and to incorporate these into their action strategies. They also support the interests of international organizations (by providing the UN with blue helmets, technical staff, several UN secretary generals), albeit usually they fail by convincing the two superpowers.
7. The two blocs battle one another to extend their sphere of influence to the neutral countries; but they actively support the autonomy of a state when doing so impedes or weakens the adversary (e.g. American policy vis-à-vis Tito's Yugoslavia, Soviet policy in Latin America and Africa).
8. To mitigate the risk of warfare, neutral countries (and "co-existence oriented" European political actors) try to attenuate antagonism between the two blocs; for example, their role in the so called 'Helsinki process' (CSCE) which was primarily launched largely thanks to the initiative of O. Palme (Swedish Prime Minister in 1975), with the support of German Chancellor W. Brandt's *Ostpolitik*.
9. International organizations – or universal actors – ally with the neutral and autonomous countries to check or limit potential flare-ups, such as resort to the use of force.

The Rigid Bipolar System

The rigid bipolar system is characterized by stricter internal hierarchy within each bloc than the flexible bipolar system: order and discipline are much accentuated and interdependent or autonomous positions suppressed (as in the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968). The role of neutral countries is minimal indeed: they are either marginalized or subjugated to the superpowers. The universal actors lose power or show as fully instrumental to one of the two blocs.

The Universal System

The universal system is in the same line as the rationalist project envisioned by Emmanuel Kant, but adapted to the twentieth century: it features a peacefully united international society in which political and legal stability are guaranteed by a confederate organization of states based on multilateral cooperation and equality (regardless of their strength, size, power, etc.). This system is characterized by a high level of cross-border cooperation and international organizations play an essential part in maintaining global order; new corps of public servants are created, dedicated to the international organization: they are "ambassadors of peace" during peacetime and international police if it becomes necessary to contain a "malevolent" actor on behalf of the consensual decision of the global community.

This system might allow implementing “humanitarian interventions” in defense of human rights and on behalf of the international community.

The Hierarchic or Unipolar System

In this model, one of the two blocs from the flexible bipolar system has defeated the other, or the other has somehow collapsed. Such a unipolar international order is reorganized into a political hierarchy and the cohesion of other countries is determined according to the ideology of this only remaining superpower. However, this system could be either democratic or authoritarian, depending on who wins and which role is provided to international organizations. It would be, according to Kaplan, very costly to defect.

The “Unit Veto” System

This system would result from a transformation of the flexible bipolar system into one in which not one or two but around 20 states possess nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation would be however controlled and the system might be stable enough provided several conditions. The “unit veto” system is one in which all nuclear states possess the capability to destroy one another, but all are conscious that any aggression would solicit an immediate and equally disastrous response (e.g. on the part of a third state). This theoretical model aims for stability via mutual deterrence. M. Kaplan thought that the danger of accidental war is controllable by technological development and the circulation of information in the nuclear era. Like the other systems, it is only theoretically plausible if stable and durable. In the “universal veto” system, neutral countries and universal actors play a secondary, though not completely marginalized, role: they can serve as mediators or communication channels. In this theoretical context, great powers can be tempted by isolationism.

Even though writing in hard times Morton Kaplan provides international relations with two useful research tools: a) a six systems model which entails both realist and idealist elements of explanation; b) a model which not only fits to analyze the world’s history but also to forecast actual post-Cold War scenarios.

3. The Neo-realist Theory of Kenneth Waltz

Kenneth Waltz⁹ is a benchmark author in international relations theory who successfully integrated the realist tradition with system theory. He is the primary

9 Kenneth Waltz studied at Columbia University and subsequently taught at Brandeis and Berkeley. His book *Man, State and War* was published by Columbia University Press in 1956, followed by *Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics* in 1957; and *Theory of International Politics* in 1979.

reference for neo-realist synthesis in international relations. His works, many of which are considered classics in the field, include *Man, State and War*; *Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics*; and his masterwork *Theory of International Politics*.

Man, State and War is a critique of the theories of Kant, Cobden, and Woodrow Wilson, based on the Hobbesian conception of international relations. In it, Waltz described three levels of analysis in international relations: the selfish nature of man, the behavior of states and institutions (national and international institutions) and the pressure of the international environment – i.e. factors coming from outside of the state, such as war. The methodology of this work hailed from David Singer's classic, *Levels-of-Analysis Problem* (1949), and K. Waltz addresses the question of whether to emphasize the behavioral differences between states' or the normalizing power of the system towards behavioral convergence. Waltz did argue in favor of the primacy of external, systemic variables: war cannot be eliminated simply by changing the behavior of individuals or individual states. Nonetheless, this work falls within the tradition of pre-systemic realists. During the following decade, his research underwent an important evolution.

In his 1964 article, *The Stability of the Bipolar World*, Waltz explicitly defended the rationality of the bipolar system, based on the complete opposition between the United States and the USSR: bipolarism leads to greater stability than multipolarism. Peace is guaranteed by the nuclear dissuasion of the bipolar world and the risk of accidental war is limited (given the high level of technological development and a centralized decision-making mechanism). Despite increasing nuclear armament, Waltz believed equilibrium can be preserved by the ability to deter the adversary, or any state, from starting a war. Overall, the level of vulnerability, and thus likelihood of potential crisis, is diminished within the bipolar framework by stopping interdependence between the two blocs.

In *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics*, Waltz criticized the Kantian premise that constitutionalism affects a state's foreign policy via a bottom-up dynamic. He concluded that constitutional democracy only concerns domestic political life and that no relationship between democracy and international policy is possible. Not only do democratic and constitutional values have no affect on international politics, but domestic democracy is itself limited by the international environment. For example, the bipolar world limited certain Western states' freedom of action and impelled serious restrictions to their domestic democratic functioning.

Each of these works contributed to the gradual formation of neo-realism, based on a detailed update of the essential elements of classical realism. But it is Waltz's 1979 work, *Theory of International Politics*, that is the pillar of neo-realist theory; it is not only his masterpiece, but a fundamental International Relations text that has been profusely commented by subsequent analysts.¹⁰

10 R.O. Keohane (ed.) *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986.

The first element of the work to be stressed is Waltz's methodology: by this book, he highlighted the difference between a real theory and a mere connection of empirical observations that neither explains the causes of international politics nor predicts their future evolution. He opposed empiricism in favor of methodological rapprochement between International Relations and deductive theory. According to Waltz, theory must evolve towards greater abstraction in order to understand the "laws" underpinning International Relations and thus to analyze and make predictions in the field.¹¹ This theoretical ambition has planted him at the center of the methodological debate on International Relations for three decades.

Waltz attempted to surpass Kaplan's research and create a "true" systemic theory of International Relations. He leveled several criticisms against Kaplan's theory:¹²

1. According to Waltz, Kaplan placed too much emphasis on state dynamics, i.e. on the individual units of the international system, rather than on the system itself. He criticized this "reductionism" of Kaplan and other researchers who focus on states and changes in their foreign policies. He claimed Kaplan's theory did not give adequate weight to the structure of the system: thus it is incongruous with his supposed adherence to system theory. Waltz also criticized Kaplan's conception of system dynamics: either Kaplan contended that change is generated by factors outside the system, in which case his definition of the system is too narrow; or Kaplan presumed that states themselves are the motors of change, in which case he violated the principle of systemic analysis by giving subsystems (the states) greater emphasis or importance than the system. According to Waltz, it is the system that conditions its subunits, not the inverse – internal factors cannot explain the system.
2. Waltz particularly criticized Kaplan's system of balance as embodying a contradiction between its two main rules: states' maximization of national interest through power politics and the maintenance of a fixed number of actors. He alleged that the balance of power system cannot be limited to its historical precedent; systems theory must account for all possible past and future international systems – which are structurally based on anarchy and thus each sub-unit's self-defense.

Unlike Kaplan and the realists, Waltz substantially reinforced the systemic approach by insisting on this point; the international system is characterized by "eternal structural anarchy" and systems analysis is the most important of the three levels of analysis. Each state acts according to its calculation of costs and

11 K. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Chapter 1.

12 This illustrates that Kaplan's work cannot be conflated with neo-realist theory; he was further criticized for reasons opposed by the institutionalists and researchers focused on domestic indicators of foreign policy.

benefits, but also adapts to external constraints and pressures. Waltz was aware of the existence of international interdependence, but insisted that this does not affect the inherent structural anarchy: on the contrary, interdependence aggravates states' reciprocal vulnerability and can thus engender real conflicts (commercial, economic, military, etc.). "The international system is undirected, decentralized and anarchic," and "no state has the right to give orders, no state has the obligation to obey" (Chapter 5). The use of force and the possibility that conflicts will devolve into armed conflict are ever-present. The anarchy of the international system creates insecurity for all actors and is the source of potential conflict. This structurally-generated insecurity exists independent of states' or governments' good will. Thus, unlike classical realism, neo-realism is not simply based on the centrality of states.

Waltz's theory has been called "political structuralism" – i.e. political determinism based on the anarchy of the system (this has nothing to do with the economic determinism of the Marxist school or with French structuralism). Contrary to realist theory, he claimed that it is not human selfishness or states' behavior, but the anarchic structure of the system "that conceptualizes individual units as parts of an ensemble, distinct from the simple sum of these parts".¹³ This structure has three components: its ordering principle of structural anarchy, its functional distinctness and the all-important power distribution.¹⁴

Once the nature of the system is understood, power relations between its units must be considered. In this aspect, Waltz's systemic approach rejoins classic realist theory. Power is not only exercised in terms of military force but also of economic pressures and sanctions. According to Waltz, relations between states are based on a "zero-sum game" dynamic, in which there is always a winner and a loser. As a result, no unit acts to reinforce universal principles or international institutions but only to reinforce its power. Within the framework of a zero sum game, Waltz developed the "security dilemma". No state can consider disarmament, if even one other state refuses to disarm; this is a characteristic of the systemic anarchy and the insecurity created by its decentralized structure. Rearmament of a single state creates uncertainty and necessitates the rearmament of the others, who do not really have a choice in the matter.

A state's primary goal is to strengthen its chances of survival. "Self defense is the necessary principle of action in an anarchic order" (Chapter 5). Once their security has been established, states can have "other objectives such as peace, profit and increasing capabilities". In international politics, certain issues are considered "low politics" (commerce, civil relations) and others are "high politics" (security). According to Waltz, high politics always dominate low politics, as it is the essential issue to states' survival. Even if security evolves with the existence of real or perceived threats; however, states can make autonomous choices to improve their power.

13 K. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, op. cit., p. 100.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 192.

Although the bipolar world guaranteed peace through nuclear deterrence, Waltz did not consider this an ideal. His reasoning is based on axiological neutrality – he simply noted that the world had not experienced a major war (but only local wars) since 1945 – but his analysis of international relations is devoid of any ideological or normative consideration. Moreover, in his 1979 work, he drew attention to the dangers of instability and warfare implied by the growing number of powers in the bipolar world:¹⁵ in a multipolar world, maintaining balance is more difficult, an error in calculation becomes easier, great powers run a greater risk of being drawn into conflicts with lesser ones. Waltz's reasoning is also highly conscious of the United States' rise as the primary global superpower. He contended that an "actor is powerful to the degree that it can affect others more than the others can affect it" and highlighted that the United States manages to modify other states' behavior, even against their will. The reason for this is quite simple: states whose behavior is maladjusted to the system inevitably suffer more than states that are "sensitive to the system".

Waltz's theory has been the object of several critics and certain important theoretical questions remain unanswered (even among neo-realist enthusiasts, such as J. Grieco¹⁶ and others):

- Waltz's theoretical model is too static and deterministic; it does not account for systemic change. His theory does not explain the process of evolution from one system to another. According to Waltz, the substance of international politics does not vary over time. Change is confined to the micro-level, which does not affect the system; the power relations between two states can evolve and change, but not the anarchic structure.
- Robert O. Keohane and others highlighted that Waltz's theory does not adequately explain the importance of cooperation, as states increasingly collaborate with one another. It underestimates international regimes, associations and organizations and the effects of interdependence in terms of reinforcing cooperation. Waltz and the neo-realists responded that: a) cooperation is difficult due to systemic constraints, even where states have common interests: they run the risk of being betrayed by their partners (defection); b) states risk functional division in the framework of multilateral free trade (which can impair both their security and independence): although the specialization implied by international free commerce highlights "comparative advantage," it also implies increased vulnerability; c) the advantage of cooperation is always asymmetrical. Waltz did not take into account European integration (EC), which has consolidated peace between

15 Ibid., p. 259 and 322: e.g. China or the European Community.

16 On the weak points of realism and neo-realism, see also the eminent realist theorist J.M. Grieco's analysis, "Realismo e neorealismo", in G.J. Ikenberry and V.E. Parsi (ed.) *Teorie e metodi delle relazioni internazionali*, Rome, Laterza, 2001, pp. 29–49.

Germany and its neighbors, the success of the common market and the complementary economic and political achievements.

- Stephen Krasner alleged that interdependence leads to increased possibility of constructing international regimes, thus limiting international anarchy and national sovereignty. This perspective, together with the EC, was ignored by Waltz.
- According to the “transnational” school, Waltz underestimates transnational flows. International networks that are independent of states develop in parallel with interstate relations: e.g. economic actors or transnational businesses which act outside of their national borders, independent of states’ politics. Multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, various churches, etc. are all transnational actors who operate independent of interstate relations. Waltz was convinced that “it is always states that establish the terms of relations (with non-state actors); when the critical moment arrives, it is states that change the rules allowing other actors to operate”.¹⁷
- The so-called “governance” theory, whose primary proponent is James Rosenau, emphasizes the sociological phenomena of change in global society. According to this theory, the level of decision-making is no longer that of the state alone, as non-state forms of government have multiplied: regions, private actors, NGOs, etc. participate informally in decision-making. In other words, the actors who play a role in politics have multiplied, which affects Waltz’s state-centric model.
- Theorists of international political economy dispute the purely instrumental role that Waltz attributes to the economy – i.e. economics will never be a fundamental variable, though always an issue in political conflict.
- Finally, many have criticized Waltz for not adequately considering domestic factors that complicate political rationality and compromise the unity of states. This critique is particularly made by theorists of non-systemic approaches, whereas the others are leveled by various systems theorists.

Nonetheless, Waltz’s theoretical rigor remains a milestone for the discipline, which has inspired a number of spinoff theories in both the United States and Europe: neither wishful thinking nor contingencies based on mere empirical facts can match the strength of his arguments.

17 K. Waltz, 1979. Chapter 6.

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Chapter 3

International Political Economy¹

1. The Origins of International Political Economy (IPE)

International Political Economy (IPE) is recognized today as a sub-discipline of International Relations. It is an interdisciplinary approach to international life that favors the study of both economic and political interactions on a global scale. IPE has been heavily developed especially in American, British, Canadian and European universities during the last three decades. The relatively young sub-discipline is based on the work of Robert Gilpin, Robert Keohane, Charles Kindleberger, Joseph Nye, Susan Strange and Robert Cox, whose research attempts to harmonize international economic and political relations.² It emerged in the 1970s, when new conceptual instruments were needed to explain the evolving international environment characterized by economic events with strong political implications.

At the time, the scientific community seemed to ignore the growing interrelation between international economics and politics. Until the early 1970s, political theorists tended to reduce international relations to a dialectic of war and peace among states and to exclude economic variables from their research; as for economists, excluding the Keynesian school, they rarely concerned themselves with either the political causes or impacts of economics. This is what led Susan Strange to declare that the relationship between international economics and international relations was characterized by “mutual ignorance”.³

IPE’s methodological contribution to international relations is crucial. Scholars of IPE object to the distinction between economics and politics and propose an integrated approach where power and politics are both integral parts of economy. Moreover, IPE research demonstrates that the boundary between the domestic and international levels of analysis is artificial. Finally, IPE has produced political conceptual instruments to analyze international economy and vice-versa.⁴

1 The author of this chapter is Sebastian Santander.

2 J. Frieden and D. Lake, *International Political Economy. Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth*, London, Routledge, 1995.

3 S. Strange, International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect, *International Affairs*, 46/2, 1970, pp. 304–307.

4 D. Battistella, *Theories des relations internationales*, Paris, Presses universitaires de science po, 2003, pp. 399–400; and G. Kebabdjian, *Les theories de l’economie politique internationale*, Paris, Seuil, 1999.

IPE theorists contend that globalization and the evolution of international economic and political relations that has taken place since the early 1970s have made space for a great number of new actors in the global system, including transnational companies, economic and financial institutions, regional groupings, emerging powers, financial markets, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and anti-globalization social movements. In light of this multiplication of world actors, IPE research attempts to understand who hold the power in the global political economy and what the state's new role is. IPE also addresses other questions, often intensely linked to current affairs: What power do economic and financial institutions exercise? What role does new regionalism play in global governance? What level of influence do transnational companies have? How does influence work? What values are disseminated by the power holders? Is the international system unipolar or multipolar? Is international stability the result of hegemony?

Various theoretical approaches address these multiple questions. IPE's conceptual richness testifies to the existence of a variety of interpretations at its core. Among the most important approaches is Robert Gilpin's realist inspired approach.

2. The Realist Approach to International Political Economy: Robert Gilpin

Robert Gilpin's conception of International Relations draws heavily on Kenneth Waltz's theory, considering the international system to be anarchic and state-centric. But Gilpin revised Waltz's political structuralism by addressing the question of system change. The realist approach to IPE is motivated by growing world interdependence and the resulting increase in confrontations between states and national economies. However, according to Gilpin, this globalizing trend in international relations does not affect the centrality of the state's role. Moreover he did not regard growing interdependence as the source of international pacification (as the so-called "liberal" theories contend); the more interdependence develops, the more vulnerable states become. Growing interdependence creates commercial conflicts which can ultimately lead to political or armed conflict. This conception of international relations is found in several of Gilpin's works, most notably *The Political Economy of International Relations*.

Gilpin developed several other interesting hypotheses, including war as a source of international system change and the role of great powers as stabilizers of the international system; the decline of American hegemony as the source of international instability; and the state as primary actor on the international scene.

War and Change in World Politics: Power Cycles

In his 1981 work, *War and Change in World Politics*, Gilpin addressed Waltz's major unresolved question: explaining change and evolution of the international

system.⁵ This study attempted to respond to critics of neo-realism who considered the approach too static. By accounting for systems' evolution, Gilpin breathed new life into the theory.

Gilpin identified war as the main factor of change in the international system. States and power elites are motivated by rational behavior and act in order to achieve interests. In other words, actors' behavior responds to a calculation of costs and benefits: each tries to maximize its interests at the lowest cost. As long as states face the same costs and benefits, the international status quo is maintained and the system's stability is preserved. When the cost/benefit equation becomes disadvantageous to one state, it will try to modify the international system in its favor, thus threatening to disrupt the equilibrium. Once this state has restored the balance of costs and benefits via armed conflict, it will defend the maintenance of status quo.

Great powers can be a source of stability in the international system. Gilpin described an evolutionary life cycle of great powers, composed of four main stages.

The first is a phase of expansion when the great power manages to create an economic surplus. This surplus is then mobilized to profit its foreign policy. In other words, the state tries to increase its international power via economic means and the population is willing to pay the cost.

Next is a phase of consolidation while the great power enjoys its accomplishments. During this stage, the state becomes more conservative, less innovative. Overall the population becomes more reticent to finance the state's expansion (which is considered too burdensome) and more reluctant to cover the costs of the state's dealings on the international scene.

As soon as the state must face the emergence of new powers, it enters the next step, a phase of challenge. During this third phase, other states that have benefited from the initial dynamic of expansion begin to emerge: these latecomers have managed to acquire an economic surplus and to benefit from the economic and technological accomplishments of the preceding power. The great power thus suffers from a sort of stalemate, confronted by the appearance of new actors who aim for its same objectives and status.

The third phase can give way to a fourth: decline. The shift from one great power to another can happen in two ways. Transfer of power is either achieved violently, or peacefully – such as the United States' rise as the new power after 1945 while Great Britain accepted a less important global role.

5 R. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Gilpin's Theory of Hegemonic Stability

A large part of Gilpin's work on the political economy of international relations is dedicated to the power of American hegemony.⁶ He contended that the United States' world power has been in a phase of stalemate since the 1970s and hypothesized how the international system might evolve after the decline of American hegemony. During the 1980s, this question was at the center of international relations. Gilpin postulated that the international system was structured around three dominant poles; following his reasoning, numerous academics concurred on the idea of a "triad" – a capitalist world dominated by three main commercial blocs: the United States, the European Community and Japan.

According to Gilpin, this power configuration – characterized by the decline of American dominance on the global scene and the passage of power to new actors – carried the risk of instability and conflicts in the international system. In his view, international stability, particularly the sound functioning of the free economy, necessitates a recognized hegemonic power that is capable of taking political and military responsibility at the global level. A hegemonic power internationally guarantees the rules of the game essential to liberal economic and political order.

Gilpin's theory draws from "hegemonic stability" theory, originally developed by Charles Kindleberger – an American historian and economist who demonstrated that the stock crash of 1929 and ensuing international chaos were due to the absence of a world power capable to assume the role of global hegemon.⁷ It was not until after the Second World War that the United States took the torch from Great Britain and instituted a new liberal regime through the creation of the Bretton Woods international economic institutions. According to Gilpin, the *Pax Britannica* and *Pax Americana* were the fundamentals of order and international stability. Throughout this time period the UK and the US created and enforced the rules of free trade, established and developed an international monetary system and guaranteed the security of investments. Ultimately the continual economic expansion and accelerated growth of transnational society since the 1950s went hand in hand with the establishment of a political and economic framework that favored this evolution.

A question that remains controversial among political theorists is whether an international system can survive when it loses the political support of a great power. Gilpin, like Kindleberger, did not believe so. Prior to the First Gulf War (1991) and the resurgence of American economic power in the 1990s, he highlighted that the United States had lost its strategic predominance and economic dynamism: all the more so when faced with competition from the European Community and Japan.

6 R. Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987.

7 C. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression: 1929–1939*, London, The Penguin Press, 1973.

In more recent work, he reiterated this argument, considering China to be one of the most important challengers facing the United States.⁸

According to Gilpin, the erosion of American economic power happened during the 1960s and 1970s. The consequence was American abandonment of the Bretton Woods international monetary system and major monetary and financial turbulence; the decline of American dominance ushered in the end of the system associated with it. Without a hegemonic power to exercise a “management and policing role”, wealthy nations pursue anarchic competition that renders the global economy unstable. Gilpin denied that globalization could be a factor of harmonization and peace to benefits all. He held that tensions between the United States and the emerging powers will continue to increase as each state tries to draw the greatest profit from scarce resources and the division of wealth. Gilpin called this “neomercantilism” the cause of globalization conflicts. Various powers tend to use trade to further political goals, even at the price of commercial and political conflict. Neomercantalism is a function of each actor’s cost/benefits calculation.

In light of this, Gilpin outlined a distinction between “benign” and “malignant” forms of neomercantilism. Benign neomercantilism is based on a domestic social demand for protectionism of the internal market; it responds to concern about domestic socio-political stability and the defense of citizens’ benefits (as well as those of the state or regional organization). On the contrary, malignant neomercantilism is characterized by aggressive and destabilizing motivation; powers are focused externally and sometimes desire to establish themselves as new superpowers. This can be expressed at the political or military level and conflicts can also be of a commercial nature.

State Centrality Adapted to Globalization

As mentioned above, Gilpin’s analysis gives central importance to states; despite their weakening status amid rampant globalization and the emergence of theses on state decline he insists on their centrality on the world stage. In his estimation, the reasons for which the nation-state was created centuries ago are still valid. The state remains the institutional framework that unites economic and scientific development. Moreover, Gilpin was convinced that no political structure exists that corresponds to the global market. Only the state allows for balance to be struck between the need for citizens’ representation and external effectiveness. Although the sub-national level of government is more representative, it is less effective externally; whereas the supranational level is more internationally effective, but less representative. Hence Gilpin contended that the state is the best point of balance between representation and effectiveness.

Nonetheless, supranational regional groupings, such as the European Union and regional organizations in Asia and Latin America, can be considered new

⁸ R. Gilpin, *Global Political Economy. Understanding the International Economic Order*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001.

actors in the neomercantilist scheme. Gilpin launched the school of thought that explains the emergence of regionalism according to IPE and neo-realist arguments and based the future of international relations on three elements: protectionism, regionalism and neomercantilism.

3. Susan Strange's International Political Economy: The State – One Actor Among Many?

Several international political economy theorists categorically reject the idea of a state-centric international system and consider the state to be only one actor among many. Susan Strange did not attribute the same importance to states on the global scene as Gilpin. To understand IPE, she attempted to clarify the social, economic and political structures that affect systems of production, trade and distribution. According to her definition of international political economy, the international economic system is constituted of economic, social and political “arrangements” of production, trade and distribution. It is not the result of market dynamics or chance, but rather of human decisions, rules, customs and authorities. Strange tried to pinpoint the central authorities whose decisions determine the course of events and power relations at the international level.

She distinguished two types of power:⁹

- “Relational Power” creates a type of obligation where a major power obliges a smaller power to behave a certain way; this is the most classic type of power.
- “Structural Power” is the international political economy’s power of indirect influence as the framework in which actors can act and evolve.

Strange also distinguished four types of structural capabilities: The first is security structures, which have historically been dominant, particularly during the bipolar period. The second is production structures, which, according to Strange, constitute the essential power of the IPE. Production structures respond to the question “Who produces what?” through this power alliances are formed; businesses are developed and become autonomous from states and eventually become transnational. The growing influence of transnational society disrupts the effectiveness of national political economics. Thus the state’s authority dwindles to the point where it becomes deterritorialized and loses influence over its own territory as well as its territory-based economy.¹⁰ Transnational business detracts from the great amount of financial flux necessary for the prosperity and

9 S. Strange, *States and Markets*, London, Pinter, 1988.

10 S. Strange, *The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996; *Ibid.*, “Territory, State, Authority and Economy: A New Realist Ontology of Global Political Economy”, in R. Cox (ed.) *The New*

social cohesion of states. States' authority depends on the material resources of transnational businesses that have gained a considerable roll in their domestic politics as well as in the dynamics of international relations.¹¹

Strange's third structural capability is financial structures. The ability to move capital in the space of a few seconds has changed international power relations, thus leading to further change in terms of international politics. In fact, financial deregulation has contributed to global financial actors' ability to evaluate and anticipate public authorities' decisions, to the point that it constitutes an effective but anonymous counter-authority.

The fourth and final capability is "knowledge structures". Strange draws from the vast literature on the importance of brainpower, research at the level of globalized economy and newly forming hierarchies.¹² She attributes a certain influence to the "knowledge society" – i.e. to the accumulation of scientific and technological knowledge, notably to new information technology – and highlights their enormous impact on structural capabilities. Information technology plays an important role in a business's competitiveness at the international level and in the hierarchies between actors on the international agenda. According to Strange, knowledge is a source of power. Furthermore, knowledge is created not only by states but also by other authorities: businesses, local and regional powers, supranational authorities (e.g. the EU – see the debate on the "Lisbon Strategy").

According to Strange, these last three global structures (production, finance and knowledge) call into question state centrality within the framework of "multilevel global governance". The state has become one power-holder among many in the global economy, which undermines one of the essential tenets of the realist and neo-realist approach. Some theorists categorize the system of multi-level governance as a "new middle age". State authority and political centrality has waned in favor of a centrifugal system in which authorities and loyalties overlap, sometimes chaotically and a functional logic takes precedence over territorial logic.

Realism. Perspectives on multilateralism and world order, London, Macmillan 1997, pp. 3–19.

11 J. Stoford, S. Strange, and J. Henly, *Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

12 R. Reich, *The Work of Nations*, 1991.

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Chapter 4

The Influence of K. Marx on International Relations

Several approaches focus on the international dimension of the contradiction between social classes, which, consistent with the thoughts of K. Marx, is considered as a fundamental feature of the essentially global capitalist economic system. However, they can only be accounted as systemic theories in part. For example, we have classified the economic theories of imperialism (Hobson, Bucharin, Luxemburg and Lenin) in a further chapter (see Chapter 9), among the theories stressing the relevant impact of the domestic economic structure (and internal contradictions) of the imperial countries on external relations, foreign policy and international system. Second, references to Marx thought may influence some of the authors sharing an approach focusing on the International political economy (see Chapter 3).

As far as the Marx-related systemic theories of International Relations are concerned, the authors are split into two main streams: on the one hand, the thought of Antonio Gramsci has inspired the Canadian School (R. Cox and S. Gill among others). On the other hand, the “dependence theory” of the 1960s evolved in an organic presentation of the World system, thanks to the publication of the masterpiece of I. Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*.¹

1. A. Gramsci and the Canadian School

Prior to introducing the concept of “hegemony”, it is important to note that this political science concept has nothing to do with the everyday use of “hegemony” popularized by the media. Hegemony is not synonymous with domination; on the contrary, the theory was created precisely to distinguish from mere domination. “Hegemonic stability”, as used in political science and International Relations is based on the one hand on the thought of A. Gramsci² and on the other hand on the liberal historian C. Kindleberger (see Chapter 5).

1 I. Wallerstein (b. 1930) is a long-time scholar at the Ecole pratique des hautes études en sciences sociales in Paris, and also directs the Fernand Braudel Center at the University of Binghamton. His major work appeared in English, in two volumes in 1974 and 1980.

2 Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) is one of the main Italian theoreticians of the twentieth century and was a member of the Italian Parliament (PCd'I), in 1924. When the Mussolinian régime outlawed the opposition parties in 1926, fascists arrested and

According to Gramsci, both domestic and international hegemony is based on a combination of strength and consensus, might and culture, that creates intellectual and moral leadership of the ruling social group or state. Gramsci was an Italian intellectual, strongly influenced by Marx and Hegel, who rejected both economic determinism and the Leninist theory of Imperialism (see Chapter 9) for a very relevant reason: the latter underestimates the emergent, innovative, relevant and comprehensive US power. By contrary, Gramsci highlighted the decisive influence of the organization of production (notably in the Ford factories) and consuming models, lifestyle (the American way of life), spreading of cultural models, construction of new cultural superstructures: due to the strength of its ideas, its cultural apparatus and its intellectual structures, a hegemonic superpower can obtain consensus from both its allies and subordinates. He studied “Americanism and Fordism” and predicted the emergence of American hegemony in Europe already during the inter-war period.

R. Cox, S. Gill and the Canadian School³ drew directly from Gramsci’s theory to revive the concept of hegemony in International Relations. According to their conceptualization, a hegemonic state constructs an international and transnational “historic bloc” combining material, cultural, social and political forces, strong enough to ensure the stability of its international power. This historic bloc combines the dominant power with “a transnational managerial class” and several socio-economic interests throughout the world; it exercises cultural, communicational and technological influence as a “soft power”. Economically, the hegemonic power considers not only its national interest, but also the interests of other states according to its will of expansion and external appeal; similarly to a liberal meaning of hegemony, it is ready to pay an economic price in order to consolidate its international influence.

All in all, the Canadian School looks at an application of crucial concepts of the political theory of A. Gramsci to international relations: a) the central relevance of historical analysis of hegemonic powers for the development of world capitalism,

imprisoned him from 1926 until 1937. His main work “Quaderni dal carcere” (written in fascist prison during the 1920s–1930s), was first published by Einaudi, Turin in 1948 and in English as *Prison Notebooks*, edited by J. Buttlegieg, New York, Columbia University Press. See also *The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916–1935*, edited by D. Forgacs, “Introduction” by E. Hobsbawm.

3 Robert W. Cox (1926–) has both a large experience of Researcher and Policy advisor to international organizations. He taught International Relations at the York University in Toronto and at the Columbia University New York, and was Director General of the International Labor Organization’s Program and Planning Division in Geneva. He published: *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization* (1973), with H.K. Jacobson; *Production, Power and World Order* (1987); and co-edited *Approaches to World Order* (1996); and *The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on Power, Morals, and Civilization* (2002). See also R. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, in R.O. Keohane (ed.) *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 204–253.

notably of the new transnational world order; b) according to Cox and his pupil S. Gill⁴ the hegemonic powers include on the one hand informal bodies as the “G7 nexus” and transnational ideological networks (for example the *Trilateral Commission*); c) they stress the emerging contradiction between this dominating historical bloc supporting the system stability and the antagonistic forces and transnational social actors, such as NGOs, etc., fostering systemic change. However, when missing Gramsci’s focus on possible political contradictions within the center of the system, the emphasis on an alternative social bloc looks utopian; d) the crucial role of superstructures and intellectuals, both by organizing the consensus for the hegemonic powers at global level and by structuring an alternative social bloc.

All in all, the contribution of the Canadian School is certainly less popular but probably more relevant in the context of International Relations theory than other critical approaches to US global power such as the ones developed in the framework of the alter-globalist movement by the two best sellers N. Chomsky and A. Negri.⁵ While N. Chomsky’s focus is on hard US power,⁶ Negri and Hart, with their “post-modern” (see Chapter 7) concept of empire, attempt to reconcile various metaphoric references to classic empires with a sociological analysis of the crisis of the nation-state, Foucault-style micro powers and neomedievalist literature outlining the US role as a global, eternal, borderless domination. What makes demonizing pictures of US power dated and caricatured is that such accounts, contrary to the Gramsci-school, ignore the various signs of internal fragility (economic, notably) and political internal and external contradictions (for example, between G.W. Bush and B. Obama, between US and the UN security council in 2003, etc.) which are growing with unprecedented clarity. In one word, they underestimate the limits of US power.

2. The Dependence Theory and the “World System” by Immanuel Wallerstein

In his important two volume book, entitled *The Modern World System*, Immanuel Wallerstein analyzed the evolution of the global economic system from its origins, i.e. from the origins of modern capitalism (on the “*longue durée*”) which he considered to be a quintessentially global phenomenon. He presented the development of the economic system as being on a path to globalization since the second half of the fifteenth century. According to Wallerstein, the global economy

4 A. Gramsci (S. Gill [ed.]), *Historical Materialism and International Relations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993; and *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*.

5 A. Negri and M. Hart, *Empire*, The President and fellow of Harvard College, 2000.

6 Noam Chomsky, *Failed States. The Abuse of Power and the Assault of Democracy*, New York, Metropolitan, 2006.

and its contradictions are the foundation of modern and contemporary world politics. His theories drew from three main sources:

- Systems Theory – as indicated by the title of his main work.
- The “Ecole des *Annales*”, the most innovative branch of French historiography of the twentieth century, is his primary source, particularly the works of French historian Fernand Braudel⁷ that emphasize social history and “*longue durée*” approach.
- Anti-orthodox reference to Marx’s thought, most notably in its critique of global capitalism as well as its developments within the framework of “dependence theory”; and a radical interpretation of the “events of 1968”, seen as a transnational protest against capitalism.

According to neo-realism, the international system determines the future of domestic politics. But Wallerstein contended that, far from anarchic, this global system is deeply hierarchical. Like “dependence theory” (below), Wallerstein’s analysis stresses the fundamental socioeconomic division between North and South that separates rich from poor countries and the conflict between the “center” and the “periphery” of the world capitalist system. This was confirmed by empirically-derived indicators of global inequality: a fifth of the world population lives under conditions of extreme poverty; one third of the world’s children are malnourished, which correlates to an annual child mortality rate of 12 million children under 5 years of age; 130 million children are uneducated; the amount of water available per capita has steadily decreased since 1970; in 1960, 20 percent of the world’s population earned 30 times the annual salary of the poorest 20 percent, this grew to 61 times the annual salary by 1996; the wealth of 358 billionaires was greater than the national revenue of countries comprising half the world’s population in 1996.⁸

The school of “dependence theory” (mainly comprised of Latin America and Africa specialists including T. dos Santos, H.F. Cardoso, A. Gunder Franck and S. Amin) supports the hypothesis that the center’s wealth “depends” on the ability of rich industrial manufacturing countries to structurally subordinate (in terms

7 F. Braudel is an important figure in the study of Mediterranean and capitalist history, who elaborated the well-known methodological distinction between geographic history (slow, almost imperceptible change to the international and internal environment), middle-length history that comprises social and cultural history (the effects of human structures such as capitalism, racism, etc.) and chronological, or event-based history (conventional history, tied to major events, battles, treaties, etc.). Among his many works is *La Méditerranée à l’âge de Philippe II* (Paris 1974) in which he drew attention to thematic social history and long-term social change. Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch are the other major theorists of the *Annales* School.

8 J. Baylis and S. Smith (ed.) *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 126; see also E. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes*, 1997 (Bruxelles, Complexe, 1998).

of production, commerce and finance) the economies of poor countries, which produce raw materials; this theory thus discredits all development aid as a factor strengthening dependence.

According to this theory, the North's economic exploitation of the South dominates world politics.⁹ The North–South gap can only grow with globalization. US relations with the third world can only generate increasing subordination to American multinationals and trade mechanisms established by the North. Periphery countries (the South) are limited to producing raw materials that are useful to the center countries' (the North) capitalist economies. Instead of facilitating modernization of the third world, these imbalanced relations contribute to the global South's deepening poverty.

Thus in order to escape from this cycle, third world countries should develop economic independence by disconnecting from the global market. By limiting imported goods, they can develop local and autonomous means of import-substituting production. In the 1960s and 1970s, this theory was supported in part by UN agencies in Latin America and Africa; but ultimately it was unsuccessful.

Wallerstein's reasoning draws from this theoretic precedent: in the opening of his book, he reflected why, despite apparent economic contradictions, the poor nations do not revolt against the wealthy, i.e. the periphery against the center. In other words, why does the system continue to function despite this increasing gap?

In Wallerstein's opinion, the stability of the global system is based on the fact that the system is constituted of a center, a semi-periphery and a periphery. Despite historic change, states remain divided into these three groupings. General insurrection of the periphery against the center is avoided because the system guarantees stability in several ways. The system would disintegrate without these features:

- Technological and military strength is concentrated in the center nations.
- The center's ideological hegemony compels decision-makers and elites in peripheral nations to adhere to the same values, most importantly, the system's survival as the only guarantee of the survival of all.
- There is a "middle stratum" (semi-periphery) that is composed of states linking the center to the periphery. The semi-periphery is exploited by the center, but in turn exploits the periphery.

In the tradition of Braudel, Wallerstein illustrated his interpretation of the international system by studying five centuries of the global economy and describing the conditions under which the "world economic system" developed.

⁹ For a comprehensive view of this approach, see I. Wallerstein, *Comprendre le monde. Introduction à l'analyse des systèmes-monde*, Paris, La découverte, 2004.

1450–1640: The First Phase

Whereas Kaplan and Waltz's reasoning emphasized the political system (see above), Wallerstein highlighted the economic and commercial system: he establishes the mid-fifteenth century as the beginning of commercial globalization, considered as the origins of modernity. Starting around this time, geographic discoveries financed by Spain, Portugal, Britain and the Netherlands transformed the European economy into a global economy. Economics and trade were increasingly globalized and unified due to several factors: the crisis of the feudal model; the acceleration of European unification under the Habsburgs; great demographic and geographic expansion; the decline of former economic centers (Venice, Genoa, etc.) and the emergence of new global capitalist centers: the Mediterranean and Adriatic regions' importance waned whereas Portugal, Great Britain and the Netherlands' (this was the period of the Dutch "golden age" in terms of both economics and arts) influence grew. The world capitalist economy was established.

1650–1730: Recession

This economic recession was due to commercial struggles between European states, despite the stabilization of the Westphalian system. This was the era of "mercantilism," when states tried to reinforce their national economies at the expense of competing powers. The "Thirty Years War" (before the Treaty of Westphalia) strengthened the Netherlands, whose commercial dynamism supplanted the Spanish and Portuguese throughout the world; but British hegemony ultimately grew to surpass it and assert free trade over protectionism. The United Kingdom also underwent early industrialization that guaranteed its economic supremacy, even over Louis XIV's France.

From 1789 to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century

Industrial capitalism developed during this period. France, Great Britain and, later on, Germany and the United States became the new world economic centers; each of these nations claimed dominance over the global markets. Latin America became peripheral despite its political independence. Spain was in decline. Africa was absorbed by the system as peripheral. Japan was a semi-periphery in Asia, whereas the rest of the continent joined the periphery. During this period, Russia (defeated by Japan in 1904–1905) entered a deep crisis and began transitioning to the status of semi-periphery. Wallerstein explained the disappearance of slavery during this period by the opening of "free" labor markets in Asia, Africa and South America – which were more economically attractive than slavery. Germany and the United States experienced rapid economic development which would affect their national and international politics. Relations between the four main powers were strained. Wallerstein argued that the domestic conflict between the proletariat and bourgeoisie originated in this development of the global economy. According

to his systemic theory, the establishment of the welfare state in industrialized nations (partially financed thanks to imperialism and colonialism) corresponded to an attempt to reduce social conflicts. In terms of hegemonic cycles, Wallerstein claimed that the second Thirty Years War (1789–1815) finished with the consolidation of British hegemony.

From 1917 to the End of the 1930s

The Soviet Revolution in 1917 was a reaction to the Russian Empire's decline. Ironically, this domestic conflict laid the groundwork in a sense for (bipolar) international stability, which came to fruition after the Allied powers defeated Nazism in alliance with the USSR. In Wallerstein's opinion, the USSR fundamentally stabilized the global system because it neither undermined American power (which was increasingly asserted) nor the primacy of the center's technology and production system. The third Thirty Years War (1914–1945) laid the foundation for the emergence of American hegemony (for Wallerstein, hegemony, domination, power, corruption and ideological influence are interconnected and overlapping).

From 1945 to 1970

The stability of the global economic system was further reinforced and the United States dominated singularly: for example, the Marshall Plan, US–Latin American relations, American policy in Southeast Asia, etc. Wallerstein qualifies this period as neocolonial.

From 1971 to 1989

The huge cost of American hegemony was increasingly felt following the exorbitant expenses of the Vietnam War. In 1971, and as a consequence, according to I. Wallerstein, American President Richard Nixon abandoned the Gold Standard based on the US dollar. American foreign policy was subject to domestic and international critics and the country suffered several politico-military difficulties. The *Pax Americana* entered a period of crisis, like the *Pax Britannica* and the *Pax Espagnola* before it. In the following decades, the global economy developed around four central poles: Japan, the USSR, the European Community and the United States.

Since 1989

In his more recent works, I. Wallerstein is looking at drawing some consequences of his theoretical approach for the hard task of prediction about future scenarios.

The collapse of the USSR provoked systemic instability: there is no longer the counterbalance provided by Soviet Russia in case of conflicts between the periphery and the center. According to Wallerstein, the USSR's collapse was one

cause of the crisis of the United States' global role. The world entered a new phase. The US in crisis needed to co-opt part of the third world elites and promote accelerated globalization; the costs of its system of domination were thus elevated. The world system is currently in a contradictory phase, as anticipated by the First Gulf War (1991).

The economic root of the current crisis was an interruption of the proper growth-crisis-growth cycle that Wallerstein considered to be the center of global economic development since the origins of capitalism. The system functioned for four centuries according to "Kondratieff cycles" (Kondratieff was a Russian economist who was assassinated in the Stalinist era), which alternate periods of economic growth and crisis: 1789 to 1814: growth; 1814 to 1840: crisis; 1840 to 1870: growth; 1870 to 1890: crisis; 1890 to 1929: growth; 1929 to 1940: crisis; 1940 to 1971–1978: growth; 1990 to 2020: four possible scenarios (see below).

During phases of growth, the system's center consolidates and develops its production means; salaries increase; full employment is achieved. In phases of economic crisis, salaries diminish; production is decentralized towards the third world to reduce costs; the periphery is more implicated in the system. Thus the system globalizes with crises: the decline in profits is counteracted by the geographic expansion of the system, which allows for less expensive production. To develop markets, the system is opened towards new countries and continents; the periphery is urbanized and salaries increase. To diminish the cost of production, costs are externalized: the economy tries to make states pay for the increasing external costs engendered by production. At this stage, dilemmas manifest around contradictions in the system's development (salary increase, profit decrease). If the state must cover the external costs of production, it must find new revenue, for example by augmenting direct and indirect taxes – which poses political problems and risks angering electors. But if capitalist entities pay the external costs, their profits diminish and new rounds of decentralization begin.

According to Wallerstein, the economic crises have long reinforced capitalism overall, despite the cycles of hegemonic power. He differed on this point from orthodox Marxists who see capitalist crisis as an opportunity for social dramatic change to intervene. In his recent study of the evolving world system, Wallerstein considered the future of this cycle from 1990 to 2050. He postulated four scenarios:

- a. In the first scenario, an alliance is created between the center (i.e. the United States) and its principle ally, Japan. This bloc would have the means to extend its domination over Latin America, Southeast Asia and China (which needs Japanese technology). The loser in this scenario is the European Union, which would be marginalized and reduced to the rank of a colony.
- b. The second scenario envisages the European Union as a dominant power. Two powers share the world: the EU and the US allied with Japan. The EU would annex the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, establish a free-

trade zone with Russia and reinforce its ties with Africa. The EU could also interfere in the relations between Latin America and the United States; thus creating commercial confrontations liable to lead to political confrontation. The zones of possible friction would be Latin America, Russia and China. Wallerstein characterizes this scenario as an “inter-cores struggle” (conflict within the center).

- c. The third scenario is a conflict between the planet’s North and South. A new Kondratieff-cycle engenders capitalist expansion at the global level but, in turn, provokes new conflicts. These tensions could lead to ecological destruction in the periphery. Degradation of the periphery would cause a new (and less corrupt) generation of leaders to emerge in the South in reaction (e.g. in Mexico, Indonesia, Iran, etc.) In the tradition of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Wallerstein considered that a true “global social contract” would be necessary to avoid such an explosion, i.e. a reorganization of the global system based on principles of equity and solidarity, as the only alternative to the complete domination of the center over the periphery.
- d. The fourth scenario is global chaos, anarchy and general insecurity. The center can no longer control the South and the semi-periphery ceases to act as mediator. Nonetheless, according to Wallerstein, the chaos and catastrophe could (as in the theories of the winner of the Nobel prize for physics, I. Prigogine) give way to a new just and democratic order of the global political economy, through revolution.

These scenarios are admittedly provocative thought processes, not scientific predictions; but they are not without logic or historical basis.

All in all, Wallerstein’s theory has been the subject of several critiques:

- Some consider him too deterministic: like Waltz, Wallerstein defended the idea that a unit’s position within the system (states, non-state actors) is determined by the system itself; that their behavior is conditioned by their position within the system (center, periphery, semi-periphery) and that they have very little room to maneuver (with the exception of certain countries such as Japan and Russia). This idea is criticized by those who defend states, institutions and actors’ ability to make free choices within a system.
- Unlike Waltz, I. Wallerstein falls within a form of economic determinism: the world-system theory underestimates the political dimension – which is simply determined by the global economy and its contradictions. His theory is thus a variant of International Political Economy which marginalizes political science. Wallerstein accorded too much importance to the unitary logic of the system’s center (and the system overall) whose strength plays down internal contradictions. Nonetheless, his most recent work envisaged the scenario of European power and consequently the “inter-cores struggle”.

- Wallerstein's theory is teleological or ideological: the end of history would be written before the beginning as there is only one possible outcome. Despite a solid documentary base, his approach is ideologically marked by a sort of revolutionary philosophy of history.
- Wallerstein overestimated the commercial globalization of European capitalism in the sixteenth century, which only accounted for 1 percent of exports to the Americas, Asia and Africa and a minimal fraction of imports. There is not yet global commerce at that time, no international share of labor and no center-periphery relationship.
- The concept of semi-periphery as a stabilizing factor in the global system is also contested: a number of studies prove, on the contrary, that the semi-periphery is in fact a very instable zone – e.g. the Middle East. It is also unclear that it constitutes a way out for the high salaries in the center.

Despite these criticisms, Wallerstein's merit is internationally recognized: he drew attention to the theoretical and political implications of the systemic North–South contradiction, which he defined as the center-periphery and examined its chronological and historical dimensions. He thus synthesized and surpassed the work of “dependence theory”.

Chapter 5

Beyond Realism and Neo-realism

Since the 1960s, both consolidation in the realist and neo-realist paradigms and a growing movement to develop theories that go beyond these traditional schools have occurred simultaneously. One school of researchers, particularly in the United States, continues to develop Waltz's theories (e.g. Gilpin, Greco, Jervis and Mearsheimer). But a number of theorists are more innovative and attempt to understand the important implications of relevant empirical phenomena that are underestimated by neo-realists. The theoretical debates fostered by these new schools of research can be divided into three main trends:

1. Neo-realists are critiqued by several streams of cooperation theorists, including studies on the active role of international law, transnationalism, the theories of international regimes, and the theory of complex interdependence. Individually, and in their interconnections, these theories began to subtly undermine the classical Westphalian paradigm and ultimately developed into a largely alternative paradigm: "neo-institutionalism", which highlights variables that explain the limitations and shortcomings of state sovereignty and multiple forms of cooperation between states and among social and economic actors. It is so pluralist and various that it can include previous theoretical alternatives within its framework.
2. Various theories of global governance – hyperglobalist, post-Westphalian and neo-medievalist – radically and totally question the concept of state sovereignty by new perspectives which either consider the economy paramount or follow post-modern trends.
3. Constructivist approaches try to substitute the cleavage between neo-realism and neo-institutionalism with the theoretical opposition between positivist theories (including both neo-realists and neo-institutionalists) and post-positivist theories, which focus on international relations as a social construction.

Finally, it is also important to consider how European studies interact with these three theoretical trends.

1. Stanley Hoffmann's Multi-variable Approach and International Law

S. Hoffmann's¹ critique of Kaplan opposes that of Waltz. Hoffmann contended that the realists were wrong to emphasize the search for power as a state's only goal. Power is occasionally an end in itself, but it is more often a means to obtain political objectives, which are determined by other variables (ideologies, technology, culture, individuals, etc.) and affected by the evolving historical context. He further argued that neo-realism's focus on the global political system neglected factors of change that come from domestic politics – i.e. from the sub-systemic units.

In his important 1961 work “International System and International Law”, Hoffmann examined the relation of law to the international system, a question that is critical to achieving peaceful international cooperation (as previously highlighted by Kant and Grotius). This text was the culmination of a series of scientific studies on law and the “juridification” of international relations.² His analysis of international relations was based on a sociological analysis of international law and challenged the realist thesis that international law is merely a crystallization of power relations between states. He questions to what extent international law is being used as an instrument to limit the arrogance of the strongest states and to change states' behavior.

Hoffmann's approach was based on several factors. First, he refuted Durkheim's static heritage in system theory (balance and integration as systemic norms), in favor of a multi-causal and multi-variable historical perspective on the process of system change that went beyond both Waltz's theoretical dismissal of history and Kaplan's definition of six systems. Hoffmann criticized Kaplan specifically for his mechanical explanation of international systems that underestimates the importance of domestic and transnational factors. Second, he proposed three distinct types of international law:

- International law concerning the world's political structure: establish the rules and conditions of international interaction (such as the recognition of borders) and mechanisms for resolving disagreements and discords in the international system.

1 Stanley Hoffmann was born in Vienna in 1928 and educated in France, but ultimately taught in the United States, where he became president of the Center for European Studies at Harvard University. A specialist in French and international politics, he authored several works, among which: *Organisations internationales et pouvoirs politiques des Etats*, Paris, 1954; *Contemporary Theory in International Relations*, 1960; *Gulliver Trouble*, 1968. In the field of European Studies, he edited *The New European Community* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1991) in collaboration with R.O. Keohane.

2 S. Hoffmann, “International Systems and International Law”, in K. Knorr and S. Berba (ed.) *The International System*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961; The study of international law and the theory of international relations, in *State of War*, New York, Praeger, 1965.

- International law of reciprocity: define mutual rules that regulate certain sectors of bilateral interstate relations (diplomacy, visitation rights, commercial regulations, etc.). This type of international law increases the predictability of states' behavior towards one another.
- International law as community law: concern interests that go beyond the individual policies of states and the sovereignty of the nation-state (international collaboration on scientific and technological research, environmental protection, etc.). This type of international law concerns each individual, aside from his nationality, as a member of the human race.

Laws of political structure, and of reciprocity, relate primarily to the respective size and power of states, whereas laws of community undermine the traditional concept of sovereignty.

Hoffmann also examined the existing links between states' domestic politics and the international system. He rejected neo-realist's insistence on the dominance of the international system; and argued that domestic factors do influence international politics. For Hoffmann, an international system is "a model of relations between fundamental units of world's politics that are characterized by goals and means. This model is determined by the global structure, by the resources and the culture of its units". Contrary to Waltz, he clearly accorded importance to sub-systemic units: not only do they influence the evolution of the system but also might determine the course and the phases of the history of international relations.

In his multi-variable historic approach, Hoffmann returned all the way to antiquity to interpret the history of international relations; but the history of nation states in the last five centuries received the greatest attention. Since, according to him, change in the international system is mainly a result of the changing nature and culture of its individual units, when new units pursuing new objectives appear, conditions convene for the emergence of a new system. It is thus that the Greek city-states and their system of balance was succeeded by the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire, feudalism in the Middle Ages and the supranational holy empire, sovereign states, nuclear superpowers and the bipolar system.

Technology is a critical factor for historic change as well – e.g. the importance of nuclear technology in the creation and stabilization of the bipolar system. According to Hoffmann, ideology – influential ideas, notably when asserted by charismatic leaders – is also a domestic factor that explains historic change. Accounting for the role of ideology, he marked a distinction between "stable" and "revolutionary" systems (and phases) in the history of humanity. In a "stable system", the relations between individual units are based on the moderation of means and goals. Units tend to limit potential reciprocal damages, even during wartime (despite trying to diminish the power of the other). There are both official and implicit agreements between actors to preserve the system and the rules of the game. In a "revolutionary system" the means and goals of the actors are pushed to the extreme, notably due to the weight of new ideological factors: actors try to

provoke revolution in the other units as well and to use technological change to destabilize the adversary. Every possible opportunity is taken to create problems for the other units. Change is effected by war, or via indirect channels (e.g. intervention in vital economic sectors).

Hoffmann cited historical examples to illustrate his interpretation. The international balance of power system prior to the bipolar world was characterized by relative equilibrium between several state actors, technological stability, homogeneity of the national elites of various states, and actors' moderation in their means and goals: their search for power did not push them to extreme behaviors and the means they employed were alliances between countries, not intended to eliminate one actor or another but rather to preserve the balance of these alliances. On the contrary, in a revolutionary system, the removal of these mechanisms brings about change: one actor will try to supplant the others at the expense of the system's balance, as in the Napoleonic era. A second example: technological revolutions achieved by some few actors create a gap with the others (e.g. the technological power of the United States and the USSR compared with that of Europe during the Cold War); some actors experience domestic transformations. It is important to note that emphasizing "revolutionary systems" or revolutionary phases imply a theoretical break from the Waltz's perennial structural anarchy and from the integrationist and mechanical approaches to system theory.

Hoffmann organized periods of modern history around a series of dates:

- 1648, Treaty of Westphalia: mutual recognition of European nation-states, creation of a multipolar system of balance;
- 1789, French Revolution and first crisis of the balance of power system, revolutionary phase;
- 1815, Congress of Vienna and new system of balance (the Holy Alliance);
- 1848, revolution and development of the multipolar balance of power system called "Concert of Europe";
- 1914–1939, break down of the Concert and transition phase up until the Second World War;
- After 1945, bipolar system.

Each period corresponds to an evolution of international law:

From 1648 to 1789

The treaty of Westphalia resulted from the Thirty Years War that marked the European history between 1618 and 1648 and established the mutual recognition of the primary European nation-states. European balance depended on the coexistence of these nation-states, which were numerous and strong enough to check one another's power. They had similar ideologies and institutional practices in their domestic political regimes: they were all absolute states excepting the seven republican Dutch provinces and, since 1688, Great Britain, which became

the first constitutional monarchy (however, without trying to impose its domestic political order on the others). The dominant economic and commercial principle was mercantilism. This period corresponds to the establishment of laws of reciprocity: commercial and maritime agreements flourished and diplomacy developed.

From 1789 to 1815

The French Revolution provoked a deep international systemic crisis. A “domino effect” occurred: the radical change of France’s political regime (absolute monarchy – constitutional monarchy – revolutionary republic) spread throughout Europe. The French Revolution’s consequences on the international system were firstly the rupture of France’s traditional ties with the other monarchies; subsequently, the attempted spread of revolutionary ideology and anti-French coalitions; and, finally, with the advent of Napoleon, military expansion. During the Napoleonic era, the concepts of power and war were transformed: a state’s power was based on universalized ideology (whereas before the French Revolution, power depended on strength and diplomacy) and on the concept of the nation according to the values of 1789. After the Valmy battle (1792), war was no longer the responsibility of the King and his army, but that of a people and the entire nation. War acquired an ideological dimension: the general mobilization of the population in the name of the nation. War, intended to spread revolutionary ideology beyond the borders, became a means to affirm values and ideology. Thus, the domestic political and cultural roots of international change cannot be ignored.

From 1815 to 1848

After Napoleon’s defeat, the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815) and the “Holy Alliance” were, according to Hoffmann, an ambitious attempt to establish European peace based on both the restoration of the previous international system and the establishment of rigid internal political regimes. Metternich – the diplomatic architect of the Congress of Vienna – sought not only the stability of the international system, but also the maintenance of conservative or reactionary domestic regimes. According to Metternich, anti-liberal conservatism was a fundamental condition of international stability. If a revolution broke out in one unit, the Holy Alliance’s international troops would intervene to restore the anti-liberal internal order (the reactionary version of the “right of intervention”), as in 1821, 1830 and 1848. However, this new balance of power system – maintenance of both peace and proper values – was too rigid to withstand growing domestic tendencies towards reviving the process of change; a wave of liberal revolutions in 1848 overturned this absolutist system.

From 1848 to 1914

Termed the new Concert of Europe, this period coincided with the liberalization of European political systems in various forms: republic, constitutional monarchy – more or less authoritarian or liberal. When the central figure of the European state system shifted from Austria to Great Britain, the ambition to impose a domestic system on the others and to exercise a strong right of intervention gave way to flexibility and the will to adapt. The majority of states gradually rallied to the economic principle of free trade under Britain's new leadership. During this period Europe developed an international economic society based on business relations between individuals, who become increasingly important units on the transnational level. Contrary to realist analyses, civil society – understood as separate from political society – rapidly expanded not only within nearly every state but also at the level of international economic relations.

At the same time, laws regarding international political structure and reciprocity were refined: between 1848 and 1914 international conferences multiplied – although they were based on the rule of unanimity, the sovereignty of the nation-state and the expansion of imperialism. These conferences established rules of global commerce, economic development and the resolution of disputes. The right of reciprocity was also instituted: during this entire period, international relations were established in a legal and formal manner (procedures of peace treaties, declarations of war, diplomatic relations, multilateral agreements, etc.). The Concert of Europe established a separation between politico-military and economic spheres. War was considered an aspect of political, not economic, conflict (which means also respect of private property, including that of defeated states); conventions concerning conduct in war were codified (*jus in bello*). Excepting the Crimean War of 1853–1855 and the Franco-Prussian conflict of 1870–1871, conflicts remained localized, often over the conquest of colonies and didn't fundamentally put stability in troubles. The aim of the system was stability rather than peace indeed. Within this atmosphere of relative stability, economic globalization advanced, while the Gold standard based on the British pound was the center of the first multilateral international system of free trade.

From 1914 to 1939

Certain units' development of aggressive, imperialist and militarist nationalism provoked the collapse of the balance of power system assured by the Concert of Europe. The great powers' (Germany, Italy, The Austrian-Hungarian Empire, France and Great Britain) increasingly tried to assert their national interests, to the point of undermining the system itself. Notably, the emergence of Germany as a major power dominated the international agenda. The evolving link between nationalism and imperialism entrained increasing militarism and rearmament. The great powers did not hesitate to break with the free trade policies that underpinned the system, in order to refocus their economies on national interests. After the First

World War totalitarian and destructive ideologies emerged, including fascism. The economy reverted to state control (1929-crisis; control of raw materials in the colonies, etc.). Nationalist movements (born within multinational empires) sought alliances with foreign powers, which challenged the Concert's practice of non-intervention and accentuated the instability of the system. Small states called for greater independence (in the name of national self-determination), challenging the great powers' dominance of the new born League of Nations;³ while rigid blocs of alliances formed and powers set out on a course of armament. War became all encompassing: the entirety of a state and society strength and energy was mobilized against the enemy. Up until the Second World War, the system remained in a phase of instability and only regained a new balance in 1945, after the defeat of Nazi-fascism and Japanese militarism.

After 1945

In 1945–1947, bipolarism came to replace multipolarism. Two blocs, lead by the two superpowers (US and USSR) affirmed their power based on a technological revolution (i.e. nuclear weapons). Both aimed for planetary expansion in the name of democratic capitalism or communism (respectively); confrontation, even if indirect, was inevitable and global (economic, political and ideological): the coexistence of incompatible domestic regimes created an ideological battle between the two blocs. Nonetheless, this period saw the emergence of new actors – admittedly of minor importance compared with the two superpowers – in international relations (non-aligned states, neutral states, new states born out of decolonialization, multilateral international organizations, multinational enterprise, etc.).

Within this context international organizations exhibited two tendencies: their growth towards universal membership (up to nearly 200 states represented in the United Nations in 2009; 144 in the World Trade Organization) and impaired functioning due to ideological confrontation between the two blocs. According to Hoffmann, the politicization of all issues during this period – both national and international: even problems of economic and social development were evaluated in the context of power relations between the two superpowers – caused theoretical debates in weighing the respective role of domestic and international factors in international relations.

The bipolar system practically swept away the Concert of Europe's accomplishments in terms of international law. The distinctions between domestic and international affairs, public and private sector, wartime and peacetime (neither the Korean War nor the Vietnam War were formally declared) were weakened;

3 The League of Nations was an inter-governmental organization founded in 1919. The US President W. Wilson was its main sponsor even if US did eventually reject membership. USSR and Germany were excluded. At its greatest extent (1934–1935), it had 58 members, while the UN expanded from 50 (1945) to 192 members (2009).

everything was subjected to the logic of ideological confrontation between the two blocs. The neutrality of a state was practically illusory, as it depended on the “good will” of one of the two blocs. The rule against aiding domestic insurrection in another state was frequently ignored. Bipolar hurdles to international cooperation caused the failure of several attempts to regulate international nuclear proliferation. The legal recognition of certain states was subject to ideological considerations (e.g. China’s problems with recognition).

International law was weakened to the point of being obsolete, while international issues and needs – those of citizens above all – required new forms of law and protection (defense of human rights, protection of the global environment, other global goals regarding poverty, diseases, etc.), which the East–West confrontation prevented from being credibly established and implemented.

However – and this is more than a wishful thinking concluding Hoffmann’s book – from the 1950s–1960s, a series of popular movements, political parties and countries began to campaign in favor of creating a new international legal order based on objectives that are shared by the whole human community. A popular democratic demand was expressed to go beyond the East–West confrontation, via an international legal system, in order to define new goals for mankind. Hoffmann envisaged international law based on normative reasoning, which would correspond to the international laws of political structure, reciprocity and community; one that could transcend the two blocs, despite the major unresolved challenge of the limitations of national sovereignty.

2. Cooperation Theories: International Regimes

Why do states cooperate? This fundamental questioning is shared by both realist and post-realist thinkers and we start by mentioning the contribution provided by one of the cooperation theorists who is more linked to the realist approach. According to Arthur Stein, states have the choice between cooperation and conflict – both economic/commercial and military. Stein appeals to the respective importance of historic circumstance, states’ rational choice, and constraints imposed by the international system to answer this question. The choice to cooperate (or not) can vary because the evolution of national interest differs according to time and circumstance – contrary to traditional realist convictions. Several lines of cultural reasoning and several methodologies have led to the conclusion that cooperation is more convenient than competition; which explains at least the utilitarian background of a diffusion of various inter-state cooperation practices.

Whether one accepts Stein’s game theory methodology (i.e. the study of strategic interaction between independent actors, based on mathematics) or takes other variables into account, there is no denying that international cooperation has enormously progressed since the end of the Second World War, and particularly since the end of the bipolar world. According to Stein, cooperation provides a

solution to the famous “prisoner’s dilemma”:⁴ a large number of seemingly irrational facts in international relations can be explained by simplifying situations to the extreme and examining actors’ rational choice between cooperation and competition. As a result, cooperation proves more advantageous than conflict.

A slightly different view is the analogy between international anarchy and a “pure” economic market (without any central regulation). Like as in the case of an unregulated market, producing “international public goods” (such as financial stability or global environmental protection) increasingly necessitates collective action, because balanced growth is impossible based solely on anarchy or so as on the sole market neither (Adam Smith’s invisible hand).

In a recent essay, that looks beyond the limits of typical twentieth century multilateral cooperation, R.O. Keohane noted: “In a world of high economic and security interdependence, international cooperation is essential to avoid disastrous conflicts and systematic international cooperation is greatly facilitated by multilateral institutions with established rules and practices”.⁵ International cooperation that includes more than two countries is multilateral;⁶ multilateralism promotes stability and peace. Multilateral cooperation takes diverse forms, depending on the levels and degrees of institutionalization: between the lowest level – conclusion of agreements – and the highest level of institutionalization – establishment of an actual organization (with a headquarters, personnel, etc.) – is the intermediary “international regimes”.

The debate on international regimes was launched in a well-known issue of *International Organization* and in a 1983 volume edited by S. Krasner.⁷ In general, an international regime is defined as “an ensemble of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a certain area of international relations”.⁸ Principles refer to positive values or limits, such as the respect for national sovereignty; norms refer either to normative objectives such as decreasing global warming, or to constraints such as non-interference; rules are those applicable to a specific domain; and procedures can

4 A.A. Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate? Circumstances and Choice in International Relations*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1990, p. 33 and Chapter 2. Drawing on V. Pareto’s “optimum” (the optimal equilibrium among players), the “prisoner’s dilemma” demonstrates to all actors that there is no rational alternative to cooperation. See also K. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*, 1968; and R. Axelrod, *The Complexity of Cooperation*, Princeton 1997, explaining cooperation by taking into account actors identities, beyond the rational choice approach and the assumption of exogenous preferences.

5 R.O. Keohane, *The Contingent Legitimacy of Multilateralism*, Garnet Network of Excellence, Working Paper No. 09/06, September 2006, p. 12.

6 J. Ruggie and R.O. Keohane have debated on this subject: see J. Ruggie, *Multilateralism Matters*, pp. 3–47.

7 *International Organization*, 1982; and S. Krasner (ed.) *International Regimes*, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 1983.

8 S. Krasner (ed.) *International Regimes*; and J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds) *The Globalization of World Politics*, cited, p. 245.

be voting and executive procedures, regular follow up monitoring. Furthermore, each regime is limited to a single sub-field of international relations.

International regimes are numerous and increasingly expanding in today's world. Thousands of international regimes characterize twenty-first century international life. For example: human rights protection; disarmament; nuclear non-proliferation; environmentalism and combating climate change;⁹ more generally, the multitude of multilateral agreements and regimes concerning standardization of products, combating fraud, etc.

International regimes theory presents a forum for dialogue between realist, post-realist and constructivist schools of thought. In this context, several key International Relations issues have been discussed:

- a. Is the development of international regimes compatible with realist analysis? If it is, then regimes must be considered fragile and temporary, even if they constitute a useful instrument for states. In the same vein, an international regime is much more difficult to construct when there is generally an international zero-sum game, as in the field of security. Regimes constitute an intermediary between the pure and simple respect of states' sovereignty, and its voluntary limitation by members of a regime.
- b. An international regime can be created on the initiative of a hegemonic superpower, such as Great Britain or the United States (historically), or the European Union or China in the future. This state provides the support (notably financial and at level of ideas) to sustain the international common good, which is provided to all via the international regime – e.g. monetary stability that the Bretton Woods guaranteed from 1944–1971 by stabilizing exchange rates: one ounce of gold was worth 35 dollars. This being the case, can an international regime survive changes to the historical conditions that inspired its construction? For example, can the regime survive the decline of the hegemonic power that created it?¹⁰
- c. An international regime can result from shared values and principles (such as the protection of human rights or fight against global warming); thus a normative international regime implies the existence and implementation of universal values.
- d. An international regime can result from scientific advances in a given domain and, consequently, can result in convergence between scientific and cultural elites, as well as influence on policies (for example epistemic community is playing a major role by anti-global warming regime setting).¹¹

9 A recent example is the Kyoto Protocol. For general information on this question, see O. Young, *International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment*, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 1989.

10 R.O. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 1984, cited: this question is central to this work.

11 P. Haas, "Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination", *International Organization*, 46/1, Winter 1992.

- e. A new debate between political science and international law has developed. International regimes are a prime example of “soft law”, because they are not associated with legal sanctions, but rather with political enforcement measures (“naming and shaming”, diplomatic severance, etc.). As such, are they ineffective? Is a supporting evolution of international law conceivable? (see Hoffmann).

An overarching question is: are international regimes an epiphenomenon, or can they themselves modify state behavior? International regimes can modify state behavior to the degree that they are institutionalized – they constitute a step in the institutionalization of international relations. In fact, insofar as their institutionalization goes beyond simple discussion forums or episodic meetings and summits, international regimes:

- Reduce uncertainty and risk in international relations as states inform one another that they favor collaboration to competition; thus more international regimes lead to greater predictability of states’ behavior. By participating in a regime, one state offers other information that renders its behavior, which is subject to commonly established rules, more predictable.
- Establish a coordinated framework of reciprocal expectations and shared decision-making.
- Establish a stable framework for cooperation and coordination within given domains, where international public goods can be provided.¹²
- Offer a forum for dialogue, allowing states to tackle new situations, new areas of cooperation, etc.

The European Union is considered by some expert as the most successful example of these trends. A. Moravcsick defined the EU as a “set of international regimes”.¹³ Reducing the EU to a set of international regimes focuses only on its intergovernmental, multilateral dimension, but the definition has some truth to it. Cooperation in international regimes is based entirely on states and for the most part remains fixed within the state-centric paradigm. States determine the forms, degrees and domestic consequences of their interdependence. Nonetheless, the dynamics of international regimes are often related to parallel transformations in contemporary international relations that go beyond the state-centric paradigm: namely transnationalism and complex interdependence.

12 By “Public goods” we mean: a) goods which can be produced only by a joint institutional decision and not by the market itself; b) as the access to public goods, nobody, not even the enemies, can be prevented from the benefits of a public good.

13 A. Moravcsick, *The Choice for Europe*, op. cit.

3. Transnationalism and Complex Interdependence:

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye

R.O. Keohane¹⁴ and J.S. Nye,¹⁵ authors of *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (1977) and *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (1977) are the founders of the most coherent theoretical critique of the realist school and Waltz's neo-realism. Keohane has also contributed to international regimes theory and the revision of the theory of hegemony. He is the leading theorist of neo-institutionalism (see below), as applied to international relations.

The foundations of this innovative school are readily identified: Kant was the first to highlight the importance of ties between individuals and the transnational contacts and flux that are independent of inter-state relations. A. Zimmern on the one hand and, on the other hand, functionalists such as D. Mitrany and E. Haas, each revived this tradition in his own way. But Keohane and Nye's originality was incorporating this point of view within the framework of systems theory and, notably, within the critique of neo-realist theory. They drew attention to the growing importance of transnational phenomena – economic, financial, cultural, communications, associations, interest groups, and etc. – in the 1960–1970. In the United States, J.H. Hertz's work, *International Politics in the Atomic Age*, highlighted that these phenomena also concern security and that the Westphalian notion of the state's "hard shell" was surpassed in the nuclear era. In Europe, Raymond Aron drew attention to the transnational society that already developed prior to the First World War in terms of the commercial globalization process (the first example of multilateralism), migratory flows, ideologies, relations between individuals and the changes produced by the bipolar world.

Transnational Relations and World Politics considered the burgeoning of formal and informal relations between states (transgovernmentalism), companies and economies and the multiplication of actors involved in international relations. Keohane and Nye anticipated this phenomenon, which has progressed exponentially in the subsequent decades. Whereas international relations concern states, transnational relations include sub-state and extra-state actors and create "complex interdependence" at the global system level. Within the framework of

14 R.O. Keohane (1941–) studied at Harvard with S. Hoffmann and has taught at Stanford, Duke and Princeton Universities. Former president of the American Association of Political Science, he is a central figure in the renewal of International Relations theory. With Nye, he also edited a special issue of *International Organization* (1970) dedicated to transnationalism. Keohane has further published, among others, *After Hegemony* (1984); *Neorealism and its Critics* (1985).

15 J.S. Nye (1937–) studied at Princeton, Oxford and Harvard, where he taught. He served as Deputy Secretary of State in the Carter administration and counselor to the American Democrat Party during the Clinton presidency. Among his recent works are *The Paradox of American Power* (2002); *Soft Power* (2004); *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York, Basic Books, 1990).

interdependence, international institutions' impact on state prerogatives grows. Complex interdependence thus entails three important elements that challenge the inter-state paradigm:

- a. The multiplication of formal and informal ties between governmental and non-governmental elites and transnational actors, including private multinational companies, NGOs, etc.
- b. A challenge to traditional hierarchies between the issues included on (or excluded from) the international agenda.
- c. As complex interdependence consolidates, military force loses importance to international relations (at least in a given region); although the positive effects of this on cooperation and peace are not corollary.

Complex interdependence emphasizes relations of mutual dependence, characterized by reciprocal influence between states and non-state actors of various nationalities. Interdependence does not only concern reciprocal benefits. On the contrary, it often reveals different national "sensitivities" to relevant issues (how much do disruptions in one country affect socio-economic costs in another) and states' various external "vulnerabilities" (state passiveness in regards to changes abroad varies); this illustrates the controversial effects of interdependence on international power relations.¹⁶

But in contrast to Waltz and Gilpin's theories, Keohane and Nye argued that the negative effects of interdependence are not the only ones to consider. Interdependence based on one actor's interest in the wellbeing of other actors can be purely instrumental; it can also result from a situation that creates a co-interest, and thus a degree of solidarity between actors; finally, it can be "empathetic interdependence", which is not based on short-term material interests. Keohane and Nye diverge from the realist and neo-realist paradigms on several points:

1. Transnationalism has a profound impact on the system. Neo-realist theory does not ignore transnational relations but considers these to be developed through state channels and under the control of states; a state actor will always triumph when its interests come into conflict with those of a non-state actor. Realism considers transnational relations to be secondary to security considerations and "high politics" generally. If transnational relations begin to affect military power relations, states will assert their dominance to intervene. Whereas for Aron, transnational society exists but does not affect high politics, for Keohane and Nye, the transnational relations condition state behavior. States have begun to take account of

16 It is not by chance that Keohane and Nye's celebrated 1977 book highlights the connection between interdependence and power. On "imperfect reciprocity" and "unequal interdependence", see also P. Hassner, "Intégration et coopération ou inégalité et dépendance?", *Revue française des sciences politiques*, Décembre 1974, pp. 1261–1268.

transnational ties, to change their behavior and expand their available options. Transnational phenomena and interdependence are not simply observational facts or political slogans: they have real implications for International Relations theory. Thus the concept of “world politics” is gaining prominence over “international politics” (which focus on interstate relations); a revision of traditional theory is called for.

2. International life is not necessarily a zero-sum game. It is vague to try to determine winners and losers in international relations. The world can also evolve towards a positive-sum game, contrary to realist belief. Transnational relations established in areas such as commerce, culture, environment, etc. lay the foundation for “win-win” situations. Asymmetric power relations still exist, but there is a growing dynamic of possible change.
3. The issue hierarchy on the international agenda is not necessarily dominated by security questions. With the rise of complex interdependence, international relations incorporate an increasingly diverse number of topics. In this context, war has become too costly and national, multinational, sub-national and transnational actors’ economic interests increasingly overlap. States are less and less likely to resort to war in the “partially globalized” world of complex interdependence. Certain states have established so many multidimensional ties that war amongst them has become impossible: Western Europe and the widened EU are the most important (but not the only) example of this trend.
4. International organizations reduce the degree of unilateralism in international relations and provide an alternative option for interstate relations: cooperation rather than the use of force. The system of international cooperation is based on negotiation and precludes resort to military force. Multiple international organizations have developed during the 60 years following the Second World War to address new challenges in financial markets, economics, technology, nutrition, environment, epidemics, local armed conflicts, etc. The impact of these challenges goes beyond nation-state borders and, according to Keohane and Nye, can only be dealt with via increased institutionalization of international relations. It is important to note that the theory of complex interdependence is not related to liberal theories of harmony via the “invisible hand”: there is no predetermined or automatic accord among interests. Harmony is apolitical, whereas cooperation is highly political. Conflicts and discord arise regularly due to the world’s anarchic structure and the unequal distribution of power. But, according to complex interdependence, conflicts do not necessarily escalate to military confrontation: cooperation, agreements, regimes, international organizations, information-sharing, mediation and negotiation can often control, prevent and politically mitigate military option.
5. In the late twentieth century, it is no longer possible to mark a clear distinction between “high politics” and “low politics”. According to Keohane and Nye, there is no great barrier between international civil

and security questions. Economic, commercial, cultural and technological relations can have important implications for major issues of international politics. In the modern world, negotiations take place between state and private actors who address questions related to both high politics and low politics.

6. Keohane and Nye also reconsidered the distinction between domestic and foreign policy domains, as domestic interest and politics, transnational flows, networks, private and public interests affect the development of multiple international relations. Complex interdependence impacts various global societies and, indirectly, states and the state system. Transnational flows and information exchange nurture a growing pluralism of interests and opinions. The actions of transnational actors, multinational companies, business, churches, tourism, etc. affect societies and state policies and undermine the validity of the Westphalian inter-state paradigm.

Keohane and Nye concluded that neo-realist theory – which is too state-centric and security focused – could be surpassed by both empirical research and the development of a new scientific paradigm. The realist school should however not be forgotten or categorically rejected, because the challenge posed by realism and neo-realism remains fundamental to International Relations; but neither is it adapted to complexity of the twenty-first century globalized world. The study of complex interdependence, conversely, leads to a better understanding of contemporary global political evolution and contributes to a newly emerging international relations theory: neo-institutionalism.

4. Hegemonic Stability: A Critical Approach

The concept of hegemonic stability has been referred to regarding Great Britain's role of "balance of power holder" during the last phase of the Concert of Europe (see Chapter 1) and as a theoretical concept both in the context of R. Gilpin's work (Chapter 3) and as a key element of the Gramsci and Canadian school's revision of the classical narrow notion of power identified to political and military primacy (Chapter 4). Gilpin clearly denies that an international system can survive the decline of the major power who was its driving motor and stability guarantor for a certain period. This same question is at the heart of Keohane's 1984 work, devoted to the future of American power, however with alternative conclusions.¹⁷

Hegemonic stability theory was further developed in the liberal context of the 1970s by C. Kindleberger, an American international economy historian, who (like Gramsci) studied international relations during the inter-war period.¹⁸ His

17 R.O. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, cited.

18 C. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929–1939*, Berkeley, California University Press, 1986, pp. 204–253.

“hegemonic stability theory” accentuated the expansive and liberal character of hegemonic powers: he highlighted the influential role of Great Britain and the pound in the expansion of free-trade economics up to 1931.¹⁹ This is an essentially economic interpretation of hegemony: according to Kindleberger the 1929 economic crisis could not find an international solution without a new hegemonic power, or “stabilizer”, which only was possible with the Second World War.

Contrary to common interpretations, it is not only the possession of material resources (raw materials, capital, market access, financial strength, etc.) that make a power hegemonic, but also the ability and benevolent impetus to sustain the costs of stabilizing the international system. Peaceful leadership requires capability to provide “international public goods”²⁰ to the global system, as well as international monetary stability, standards for global commercial exchange and an “international economic infrastructure” (e.g. multilateral regulation agreements and regimes). Other states more or less voluntarily accept these arrangements and their systematic consensus prevents war – contrary to Gilpin’s predictions of “hegemonic wars”. Of course no hegemonic power (Britain, the US or otherwise) is motivated by philanthropy: the dominant role brings relative commercial and political advantages; but neither is gravitation towards imperialism inevitable.

In the new context following the President Nixon’s decision to abandon the Gold standard in 1971, Kindleberger’s theory fueled an international debate on “American decline”, with the emergence of Japan and the European Community. Paul Kennedy’s work *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (1985) illustrates this perspective (see Chapter 10). Keohane’s 1984 fundamental book, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* fell within the framework of International Political Economy, but developed a new approach that would eventually evolve into institutionalism. Its main hypothesis is that international cooperation can continue despite the decline of American hegemony, which had driven the system since the 1940s. His reasoning was based on a functional interpretation of regimes theory (regimes respond to states’ needs and condition their behavior in terms of rational calculation of national interests), the growing importance of transnational actors and the influence exerted by the institutionalization of transnational life (notably of commerce, petrol, monetary cooperation).

In the 2004 new edition of this work, Keohane criticized his own state-centric limitations (paradoxical for the author of *Transnational Relations and World Politics*), but maintained that international cooperation continues to advance, despite

19 At which time the Bank of England declared it was no longer able stabilize the pound according to the gold standard. The pound’s devaluation, long anticipated by Keynes, pushed the British economy out of the crisis and was followed by competitive devaluation of the majority of European currencies (see Chapter 1).

20 International public goods are available to all; by definition, a state or private actor cannot be excluded from the benefits of a “public good”, even one’s enemies (e.g. the USSR during the Cold War).

unpredictable historic upheavals in 1989 and 2001. Of course, in the era of the end of American hegemony American military superpower and economic strength persist. Despite Keohane's resolve to surpass realism, he did not ignore international conflicts, distributive conflicts in international organizations, or the enforcement problems with international agreements and policies. But he cited Kyoto Protocol on global warming and other examples as proof that institutionalized cooperation is alive and well, despite G.W. Bush presidency's choice for unilateralism and distancing from the ensemble of multilateral organizations.

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Chapter 6

Institutionalist Theories

The study of the institutionalization process of international relations is deeply rooted in the history of the discipline. The empirical description of international organizations belongs to the very origins, immediately after the First World War and the foundation of the League of Nations. However, focusing on the theoretical issues linked to the relationship between state-sovereignty and international institutionalization as a broad process took some time. This chapter examines both early theoretical trends after the Second World War and more recent developments of institutionalist approaches to international relations: firstly, two relevant schools of thought which were particularly developed in Europe and in the US after the Second World War and, secondly, the theoretical neo institutionalist debate taking place since the 1980s and 1990s.

1. The Institutional Insights of the “English School”

A critical and pluralist review of contributions to institutionalism in contemporary International Relations would not be complete without taking into account the early institutionalist side of the “English School” and particularly of the work provided by Hedley Bull.¹ Inspired by the theories of E.H. Carr and desiring independence from the emerging American intellectual International Relations hegemony, the members of the “British school” engaged in a dual methodological debate during the 1960s and 1970s: they both opposed the cybernetic and mechanic visions of system theory and challenged the empirical, purely quantitative, research of American behaviorism, thus identifying themselves with “traditionalists”. However, despite his quarrel with Morton Kaplan himself and “Scientifics”, Bull’s “traditionalism” did not go so far as to reject systems theory altogether. Rather, he rooted systems theory in an historic and sociological interpretation: the international system is made up of an ensemble of actors whose interactions are sufficiently regular that “the behavior of each one is a necessary factor in calculations determining the behavior of all the others”.

1 H. Bull (1932–1985) Australian political scientist, taught at the National University of Canberra before moving to the UK to teach at the London School of Economics and Oxford University. He authored, among others, *The Anarchical Society* (Macmillan, 1977) and *Intervention in World Politics* (1983). H. Butterfield, Martin Wight, T. Dunne, B. Buzan, A. Linklater and H. Suganami are other members of this school of “British institutionalists”.

Bull's precocious contribution to institutionalism – particularly to the neo-institutionalist schools that go beyond rational choice (see below) – is evident, as well as crucial proto-constructivist aspects of his reasoning (see the chapter on constructivism). His primary work is paradoxically titled *The Anarchical Society*: the international anarchical society itself implies a certain level of order and thus the gradual overcoming of anarchy (anarchy being, by definition, the absence of a central political power). Bull's study focused on the complex process of gradual international institutionalization in the broadest and softest sense.

His method was to compare the international system with a primitive society lacking any central authority. He thus contended that, even in the absence of any coercive power, the international system develops a means of coexistence similar to that of the traditional primitive society: inertia, habits, some rules. International society provides more than a balance of power, such as possible forms of common interest and institutional structures. According to Bull, the development of reciprocal rules in Europe – i.e. the progressive transformation from anarchy into a “society of states” – can be traced back to the sixteenth century Treaties of Westphalia (see Chapter 1). By “society of states”, he means a group of states who, aware of certain common interests and values, consider themselves bound by a set of common rules in their mutual relations and participate in the proper functioning of common institutions. Bull's search for “common interests” results from his critical analysis that the realist conception of national interest is “empty ... unspecific and vague”: it is necessary to understand the aim and objectives of the state (economic, security, ideology), how leaders perceive and pursue national interest, the perception of sectoral interests and allies and other subjective factors.

This research and its originality – “mature anarchy”, “international society”, “common interest” – were not only a critique of Waltz and the neo-realists' notion of Hobbesian anarchy; they broadened and enriched institutionalist research overall. There are effectively three types of rules in a multilateral society of states (be it legal, moral, customary, operational, etc. and shifts are possible from the first one to the last one):

1. Fundamental or constitutional rules: these normative principles mark the difference from other alternative models such as Hobbesian anarchy or cosmopolitanism; they designate responsibility for effective implementation of laws and legal obligations, and rules generally, to states, excluding sectoral and supranational organs.
2. Coexistence rules: these restrain the use of force at the international level, defend states' monopoly of legitimate use of force, regulate war, limit justifications for force and establish rules of proportionality. It also includes rules regarding states' behavior (*pacta sunt servanda*), sustainability and adaptability of agreements and reciprocal respect of sovereignty.

3. Rules for collaboration between states – be it economic, political, social, communicational, environmental or strategic – to realize common objectives beyond simple coexistence.

Such a step by step institutionalization process facilitates transition from “the vague perception of a common interest to a clear conception of what this implies in terms of required conduct”. Bull underlines the importance of both multipolarism and multilateralism in the pre-bipolar era (see also Chapter 1 of this book). Even the Cold War era implied agreements on certain rules such as armament control negotiated by the two superpowers.²

Bull believed that states still play an important role in international society, contrary to colleagues such as J. Burton who launched the transnationalist concept of a “world society”. He was also skeptical of “neo-medievalism” (critical definition proposed by him) while criticizing those intellectual strains that describe a post-sovereign world in which authority and loyalty overlap as in the Middle Ages.

In 1980 Bull launched an important debate with Duchêne and others who conceived of Europe as a “civilian power”, which he considered a “contradiction in terms”.³ In the midst of the Cold War between two nuclear conflicting alliances, he deemed “civilian power” misguided in terms of international power stakes and called for a common foreign policy in the highest tradition of Europe (see Chapter 10).

H. Bull influenced many subsequent scholars, including Barry Buzan⁴ and Harvard’s *International Security* review. Without resorting to mere critiques of American realism and neo-realism, Bull arrived at conclusions that converge with institutionalism: motivated by the desire for European intellectual autonomy, he enriched the vast program of institutionalist research that lies between neo-realism and post-modern theories.

2. From Functionalism to Neo-functionalism

Neo-functionalism shares the liberal inspiration (in the American sense – critique of orthodox realism and neo-realism) of the institutionalist approaches and a series of theoretical conclusions with complex interdependence and transnationalism. Its cultural origins include references to technocratic/elitist streams, whose roots can be traced, among others, to the French thinker of the nineteenth century Saint-Simon, as well as in the economic liberalism and planning theories of

2 H. Bull, *The Control of Arms Race*, 1961.

3 H. Bull, *Europe, a Civilian Power: A Contradiction in Terms*, 1980. See M. Telò, *Europe: A Civilian Power?* London, Palgrave, 2005.

4 B. Buzan and O. Waever, *Regions and Power. The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

the 1930s which offered the context for the first functionalist formulations. The pacifist bent of this school of cooperation studies can be explained in part by both the reference to R. Cobden (international peace via economic and commercial cooperation, accompanied by a negative notion of the state, see Chapter 1) and the European origins of several of its prominent early representatives, who reacted to the European political tragedies—e.g. the failure of many European states and European politics of the first half of twentieth century.

Beginning in 1943, the Rumanian scholar David Mitrany⁵ (see also Chapter 1) studied sectoral multilateral cooperation achieved between the mid-nineteenth century and the Second World War. Regarding the United Nations, he was more interested in the role of technical agencies than in the organization itself. In his opinion, creating peace does not depend on inter-state treaties, formal agreements or organized structures; rather it is necessary to advance pragmatic cooperation based on economic and social needs, limited to specific aspects and tasks of civil life: transport, hygiene, public health, unemployment, workers' rights, etc. The economic causes of war can be limited as the emergence of shared interests between nations gradually launches a growing and deepening cooperation process. According to a broad conception of "institutionalization" (such as Keohane and Ruggie's), the agencies described by Mitrany are effectively international institutions, despite their sectoral, functional, non-legal, non-political nature. Mitrany postulated a form of gradual institutionalization of functional cooperation.

By his pioneering work, founding a school of thought on the West Coast, Ernst Haas⁶ also highlighted the "spillover effect" of information sharing within functional agencies and the interest's convergence created between nations; he further emphasized the importance of "bottom-up" pressure from sub-state and transnational socio-economic interests. He argued for the depoliticization of issues and neutralization of conflicts via functional cooperation. The role of experts and elites is very important: shared scientific and technical knowledge, day-to-day cooperation and the establishment of practical links consolidate cooperation and create transnational and supranational elites who promote it. This description is only apparently similar to an international regime focused on a single issue and the technical knowledge it requires. For functionalists, it is the goal, the interest or the project that comes before the institution (and not the reverse). Ideologies contribute to actors' functional contributions but are not autonomous variables.

5 D. Mitrany (1888–1975) was born in Romania but educated in Great Britain and worked for much of his life as consultant for Unilever. He is the author of *A Working Peace System*, London, Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1943.

6 E. Haas (1924–2000) was born in Germany and taught at Columbia University and University College Berkeley. He was the leader of the functionalist school and of application of functionalism to regions. His numerous works include: *The Uniting of Europe*, 1958; *Beyond the Nation State. Functionalism and International Organization*, Stanford University Press, 1964; *The Web of Interdependence. The US and International Organizations*, 1970.

Finally, states are not the main driving actor within the process but change their behavior due to bottom-up pressures.

Haas studied the International Labor Organization, the European Community, regional cooperation in Latin America and various organizations in which the US participates. Functionalism is characterized by a great deal of flexibility as to both the number of participants (the agency can be regional, sectoral) and the area of cooperation. Nonetheless, certain functionalists, such as Etzioni, envision a pyramidal project in which regional functional communities will lead to eventual global unification.⁷

Karl Deutsch acknowledged the functionalists failure during the Cold War in terms of security issues, but also emphasized the contradictory emergence of “security communities” (in which war is inconceivable) at the regional level – notably in Western Europe and the North Atlantic region:⁸ against economic determinism, he highlighted spillover effects, the impact of improved communications, linguistic unity and common external military threats. He observed that where security communities form (be they “amalgamated security communities” based on legal, policing and federal instruments or the more simple “pluralistic security communities”) further integration is facilitated, around a small nucleus of states and in a certain number of cooperation areas. A developing sense of common belonging, or shared identity – “a feeling of reciprocal sympathy and loyalty” based on common interest – is indicative of an evolution towards neo-functional convergences.

Neo-functionalism (Schmitter, Lindberg and others) constitutes a more politicized version of the theory, applied to EU studies: in order to overcome sovereign state’s resistance and other obstacles to integration, functional spillover is accompanied by political spillover; this theory is more sensitive to the institutional dimension of the functional process. Moreover, to explain European integration, several 1970s–1980s neo-functionalists highlighted the complementariness of federalist and functionalist approaches to regional integration and created the “functional-federalist model” (synthesis drawing from the contributions of Monnet, Schuman, De Gasperi, Adenauer, Spinelli).

Subsequently, Schmitter tried to address new challenges presented to the neo-functional integration model in the 1990s following systematic changes and increased globalization.⁹ He highlighted three problems:

7 A. Etzioni, *Political Unification*, New York, Holt, 1965 and *From Empire to Community*, London, Palgrave, 2004.

8 K.W. Deutsch (1912–1992) was born in Prague and taught at Yale and Harvard Universities. He is a major communications and political integration theorist. His works include: *The Analysis of International Relations*, Eaglewood Cliff, New Jersey, 1968; and *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton University Press, 1957.

9 P. Schmitter, Examining the Present Euro-Polity with the help of past theories, in P. Schmitter et al., *Governance in the European Union*, cited, pp. 1–15; and “Alternatives for

1. The spontaneous and substantial legitimacy of supranational functional integration from its origins is challenged by the politicization of issues within national political systems; “input legitimacy” is lacking, political identity stagnates and loyalty cannot be transferred upward.
2. If cooperation affects areas tied to modernization and welfare, institutional power issues take priority.
3. Securitization of the global agenda undermines functional entities in international relations. Not only does the optimistic pyramidal vision of the relationship between the regional and global level become problematic, but the broad theme of political cooperation seems to gain relevance.

To sum up, the world is not simply evolving “beyond the state” as predicted in the 1950s–1960s. Either functionalism is evolving towards neo-medievalist conceptions of “multi-level governance” (Rosenau) or “world society”, or it must admit the fact that states remain incontrovertibly relevant actors in cooperation, despite being, firstly seriously transformed and, secondly, joined by many other emerging actors. In the latter case, convergence with the institutionalist research and methodological debate (above) is increasingly necessary for neo-functionalists.

3. The Neo-institutionalist Revival

The institutionalist revival taking place since the 1980s and 1990s would not have been so successful without the precedent achievements of the critiques of neo-realism, so as discussed above. Complex interdependence and transnationalism challenged the purely anarchic and inter-state vision of international relations and highlighted the emergence of important new actors and informal relations. International regimes also condition states’ behavior when their degree of institutionalization develops beyond simple forums and initial arrangements. “Neo-institutionalism” highlights the importance of institutionalization as a variable affecting change within international relations and tries to explain its origins, functions, variations and consequences.¹⁰

Institutionalization in International Relations does not only refer to international organizations (United Nations, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, European Union, etc.). This superior level of international relations institutionalization, with a permanent headquarters and staff, goes hand in hand with the “multilevel” dimension of institutionalization, which includes international

the Future European Polity: Is Federalism the Only Answer?”, in M. Telò (ed.) *Democracy and European Construction*, cited, pp. 349–61.

10 As briefly mentioned, it seems logical to drop the modifier from the American expression “liberal institutionalism” due to the very different meanings of “liberal” in the US and Europe, particularly in France where liberalism refers specifically to economics – i.e. the “invisible hand”, a point of contention for institutionalists.

regimes as well as agreements, establishment of cooperation and coexistence rules, functional agencies and other various forms of initially institutionalized cooperation between states. Secondly, besides intergovernmental relations (the institutionalization of negotiation, information exchange, etc.) institutionalists also study a broader process that incorporates various networking of social, economic, political and other actors.

Two main factors have contributed to the newly burgeoning of institutionalism since the 1980s. First, in political science generally, the behaviorist opposition between state's and individual's empirical behavior focused on individuals and neglected both collective action and the study of institutions;¹¹ second, in terms of planetary evolution, international cooperation has stabilized, progressed, spread and deepened considerably following the turning-point of 1989–1991. The GATT has transformed into the WTO and the United Nations has experienced unprecedented quantitative and qualitative development since the end of the bipolar world.¹² The European Community transformed firstly into the Single Market during the 1980s and then into the European Union (including Political and Monetary Union) in the early 1990s. Circumstances were ripe for previous critiques of neo-realism to attain a new level of theoretical synthesis.

Classical multilateralism is not the only area that has drawn research attention; the same is true for developing institutionalization in the larger sense – at multiple levels and in multiple forms. New international regimes have appeared (e.g. Kyoto Protocol), as well as functional cooperation and the diffusion of regional cooperation organizations to other continents (MERCOSUR, ASEAN, see the appendix). Furthermore, in the 15 years following the fall of the Berlin Wall, there has been an important “pooling and sharing” of states’ sovereignty first in Western Europe and subsequently on most of the continent.

Several different approaches have created conceptual frameworks to apprehend institutionalism and contributed to an ongoing methodological debate. Keohane drew attention the fact that “institutionalists” are spread among several sub-schools from which the “sociological” and “rationalist” (based on rational

11 James March and Johan Olsen's 1989 work, *Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics*, had a profound methodological impact on political science, as did their innovative 1984 article, The New Institutionalism. Organizing Factors in Public Life, *American Political Science Review*, 78, pp. 734–49.

12 On the WTO, see C. Deblock, *L'Organisation mondiale du commerce*, Quebec, Fides, 2002. On the UN, see S. Daws and P. Taylor, *The United Nations*, 2 vol., Aldershot, Ashgate, 1999. The end of the Cold War, and consequently the constraining veto wars in the Security Council are not without consequences (see R.O. Keohane, The Contingent Legitimacy of Multilateralism, *Garnet*, 2006): 93 percent of the Security Council resolutions based on Chapter VII (binding measures on a member state) that were adopted between 1946 and 2002 were adopted after the end of the Cold War. Between 1991 and 1993 nearly as many peace-keeping missions (15) were launched as in the preceding half century (17).

choice) approaches have emerged.¹³ To these add P. Hall and R. Taylor's "historic" institutionalism and V. Schmidt's independent "discourse" approach.¹⁴ Many scholars have evolved the English School of International Relations towards a version of emerging rules that institutionalize international life. Finally, according to several theorists such as P. Schmitter neo-functionalism draws attention to the institutional dimension of international cooperation.

Institutionalist and neo-institutionalist approaches agree on the emergence of "mature anarchy" (according to H. Bull) rich in transnational networks, regimes, cooperation agreements, organizations and the development of common rules and shared functions via institutionalized cooperation. In general, seven functions are attributed to international institutions:

- Institutions reduce uncertainty in international life and mitigate the security dilemma.
- Institutions give credibility to contractual engagements.
- Institutions facilitate negotiations between actors.
- Institutions increase coherent implementation of agreements (negative implications of defection in terms of lost current and future advantages, reputation damage, diminished reciprocal trust, etc.).
- Institutions offer members opportunities for reciprocal socialization and learning; thus they also often lead to new agreements in other issue areas of international and social life.
- Institutions decrease transaction costs¹⁵ via the sharing of information concerning the preferences and options of other members.
- Institutions contribute to the formation of collective identities.

According to certain analysts, once established, institutions provoke inertial dynamics. To a certain degree they take on a life of their own and become political actors in their own right.¹⁶ These dynamics can entail the replacement of existing organizations by stronger new ones (GATT – WTO; CSCE – OSCE); or as in the case of the EC, institutions can generate "spillover" dynamics that

13 R.O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches", in R. Beck, A. Arend and R. Lugt (eds) *International Rules*, pp. 187–204.

14 P. Hall and R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms", *Political Studies*, 1996, pp. 952–73; and V. Schmidt, "Comparative Institutional Analysis", in T. Landman and N. Robinson (eds) *Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Sage, 2008.

15 According to D. North's classic definition, transaction costs are "all the costs incurred in exchange, including the costs of acquiring information, bargaining and enforcement, as well as the opportunity cost of the time allocated to these activities". Reducing transaction costs is important to explaining institutionalized multilateral cooperation. See D.C. North, "Transaction Costs, Institutions and Economic History", *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 140, 1984, pp. 7–17.

16 R.O. Keohane et al. (ed.) *After the Cold War. International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe*, Boston, Harvard University Press, 1993.

favor growing convergence between member states and often institutional reinforcement or, provided particular conditions, even “fusion” (i.e. the Central European Bank).¹⁷

These seven factors reduce obstacles to cooperation between states not only as transaction costs and uncertainty about the other’s intentions, and facilitate implementation of concluded agreements (decreased risk of defection). But despite these shared principles and multiple similarities, a debate has arisen among institutionalists as to which theoretical aspects and variables cope best with evolving international relations.

4. Rational Choice Institutionalism

Rationalist institutionalism (“rational choice” theory) has drawn from neo-realist arguments since the 1980s, but refocused elements of this background on analyzing states’ action within institutions. Contrary to the classical realists, this school considers cooperation between states an incontrovertibly important area of research.

States are considered the principle actors in international relations, who act according to the “logic of costs/benefits calculation” within international institutions, conceived as “incentives structures”. State preferences are a fixed given (domestic politics are not considered an important source of inputs) that can adapt to changing external conditions. Contrary to realist presumptions, shared interests among states exist; thus it is possible for all parties to simultaneously gain. Institutional context is of utmost importance: it is the very existence of international institutions that can transform selfish calculation of costs and benefits, advantages and disadvantages, and thus modify the strategic framework within which actors behave – by offering them opportunities or determining their constraints. States’ behavior can change in light of the multilateral institutional framework in which they operate.

This utilitarian and instrumental explanation of international regimes based on interest calculation is applied to international institutions in general. The concept of reducing transaction costs is a very important criterion in this economics-influenced theory. Game theory is applied to dilemmas of collective action in which states are considered rational actors with fixed preferences within institutions¹⁸. Rational choice institutionalism represents a relatively easy tool for empirical research indeed. Secondly, it is perhaps superior to other institutionalist theories in terms of abstract and deductive theoretical clarity, though it sometimes appears oversimplified and excludes too many empirical phenomena from consideration:

17 W. Wessels and D. Roemesch, *EU and Member States*, Manchester U.P., 1995.

18 Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, New York, Basic, 1984, focusing on the application of game theory to cooperation. For a critique see R.O. Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations”, in *International Organizations*, 40, 1, Winter 1986.

actors' motivations that go beyond selfish interest, historical change of institutional dynamics and states preferences, critical analysis of institutions, etc.

Neo-realists such as J. Grieco¹⁹ have criticized rational choice institutionalism for opposite reasons: neglecting the effects of cooperation in terms of unequal power distribution and multiple imaginable balances of interests (negotiation theories). Rationalist institutionalism has also been challenged to demonstrate real impact of international institutions, their effectiveness relative to obstacles blocking the development of cooperation (impact studies).

Another interesting critique addresses the relative indifference of rationalist institutionalism to domestic politics – the point that illustrates this theory's proximity to neo-realism. On this line, Robert Putnam²⁰ and Helen Milner²¹ developed the “two-level game” approach that incorporates a double constraint: each national government must simultaneously negotiate with a constellation of domestic actors and lobbies (who affect the ratification of international agreements) and with other governments. These two games can interact in several ways. A. Moravcsick applied this approach to European negotiation.²²

5. Historical Institutionalism

Other institutionalist strains consider historical, sociological and inter-subjective factors. First, states' preferences are neither given nor fixed: in the same way as material structures, preferences are subject to different interpretations in function of subjective contexts. Second, states are not the only players in the international arena: sub national and transnational actors, and the institutions and organizations themselves, constitute essential elements of international institutional dynamics.

The first of these theories is historical institutionalism:²³ an approach that highlights institutions' development and the historical uniqueness of their origins, goals and consequences. This research is based on the individuality of a state's history – in terms of both its domestic structure and relations to the global system. Katzenstein focused both on Germany/Japan and on small states, whereas Hall studied France and Great Britain. Historic phases of political change explain the

19 J. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation”, in D. Baldwin (ed.) *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 116–140.

20 P. Evans, H. Jakobson and R. Putnam (eds) *Double-edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, Berkeley, University of California, 1993.

21 H. Milner, *Interests, Institutions and Information. Domestic Politics and International Relations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997.

22 A. Moravcsick, “Negotiating the Single European Act”, *International Organization*, 45/1, 1991, pp. 19–56.

23 T. Skocpol, *States and Revolutions*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1979; P. Hall and R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”, *Political Studies*, 1996, pp. 952–73.

standardization of practices, as well as unintended consequences, i.e. outcomes that do not result from a rational calculation. The concept of “path dependency” underscores these unforeseeable, rationally ineffective aspects of institutional development. Obviously, this school’s insistence on historical uniqueness limits the universal applicability of its conclusions, which are only good for a very limited number of comparable countries. Nonetheless, historic institutionalism draws attention to long-term historic processes and structures, rather than charismatic leaders or isolated events.²⁴ Thus the concept of path dependency has been accused of “continuism” and historic determinism.

For example, certain moments in twentieth century history radically altered international institutional development. The changes in 1929, 1945 and in 1989–1991 gave a certain allure to historic institutionalism and the idea of path dependency. For example, since 1945 “idealist” foreign policies have appeared: Germany, Italy, Japan and other states espouse “civilian power” policies that favor international cooperation, and are based on self-critical reflection on nationalism achieved after the Second World War. A sort of cathartic process of radical change from fascism to pacifism took place. The strong resemblance between certain articles in these nations’ constitutions (Article 9 in Japan, Article 11 in Italy, etc.) and their marked support of the United Nations and international organizations draws attention to their common historic origins. Similar foreign policies are, however, evident elsewhere in nations marked by completely different histories, such as Canada, Scandinavia, Brazil, etc.

A question which could be addressed, as far as the origins of the EC/EU institutional construction is concerned, is why this historical change concerned not only defeated countries but also the winners of the Second World War as UK, Belgium, the Netherlands and France. The answer could be that even the latter made the experience of withdrawing as great powers in the form of decline of their past colonial empires, which might explain their replacement – commitment to European construction. Of course these “commonalities of losers” as a shared background for future common institutional developments demand further comparative research.

Furthermore, after 1989 nations long oppressed by the Soviet Union simultaneously rediscovered liberty and national sovereignty. Certainly, post-communist foreign policies could be explained on a costs/benefits basis²⁵ or in terms of external obligations, but as in the previous cases, some major and common historic events structured their respective origin.

24 P. Pierson (*Politics in Time. History, Institutions and Social Analysis*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004) suggested a historical correction to the rational choice approach.

25 “For example, multilateral arrangements may generate net benefits at aggregate level or at least – Pareto superior – one participant is better off and no one is worse than the status quo” (A. Prakash and J. Hart [eds] *Globalization and Governance*, London, Routledge, 1999).

The widening EU includes, on one hand, countries with the background of military defeat of aggressive and fascist nationalism and, on the other, the rediscovery of national sovereignty after decades of submission to the “imperialist” Soviet power and its bloody practice of “limited sovereignty” (1956, 1968).

Historic institutionalism, or path dependency, highlights the importance of major historic ruptures. Nonetheless, the contributions this theory has made to describe the weight of historic change on institutional developments do not disguise its explanatory shortcomings. Consciousness of these limits has simultaneously produced new research, such as theories of “incremental change”²⁶ and attempts to synthesize this strain of thought with rational choice institutionalism.²⁷

6. Sociological Institutionalism

Sociological institutionalism considers the socio-cultural context of international institutions. The institution is not just a forum for rational exchanges; its very existence is conditioned by its culture, context and the practical functioning of its organization.²⁸ Institutions are normative cognitive structures: they express shared values. Actors conduct themselves according to standards of “appropriateness”, i.e. they adapt to the institutional and social context. Contrary to the rationalists, Ruggie and Wendt did view interests as social constructions resulting from institutions and their culture.²⁹ Katzenstein established a link between states’ interests, perceptions of security and identity.³⁰

Sociological institutionalism has, among others, functionalist origins. From the early 1980s, eminent American sociological functionalist Ernst Haas affirmed that an international regime’s creation fundamentally depends on the way a question or objective is formulated and this specifically depends on scientific knowledge and shared values and understandings.³¹ Other scholars have highlighted the

26 K. Thelen, *How Institutions Evolve*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

27 I. Katznelson and B. Weingast, *Preferences and Situations. Points of Intersection between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism*, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 2005.

28 J. March and J. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics*, New York, Free Press, 1989 – reference point for both historical and sociological institutionalists.

29 J. Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity. Essays in International Institutionalization*, London, Routledge, 1998; and A. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”, *International Organization*, 41, 1987, pp. 335–70.

30 P. Katzenstein (ed.) *Between Power and Plenty*, University of Wisconsin Press, 1978; and *The Culture of National Sovereignty. Norms and Identity in World Politics*, Columbia University Press, 1996.

31 E.B. Haas, “Words Can Hurt You: Or Who Said What to Whom About Regimes”, in S. Krasner (ed.) *International Regimes*, cited, pp. 23–59.

importance of norms and principles as fundamentals of international cooperation: Ruggie contended that the multilateral institutions created between 1944 and 1947 were consensually oriented in favor of participating countries' domestic stability (Keohane and Ruggie's "embedded capitalism" of the 1940s–1970s³²) and that the importance of international obligations reinforce the normative dimensions of regimes.

Similar critiques have been leveled against the historic and sociological approaches: first that they privilege cultural, normative and social specificities of an institutional dynamic, which drastically limits the scope of application of their scientific conclusions, but favors relativism; and second, their institutional analysis is too static.

7. Discursive Institutionalism

Discourse institutionalism conceives political reality as consisting of two elements. It is primarily based on communications and the importance of shared knowledge; the ideas and discourse that "actors employ to project, deliberate or legitimize their political action within an institutional context". Secondly, discourse institutionalism focuses on the "how" – i.e. the "institutional context in which and through which ideas are communicated".³³

This school attempts to both complement and synthesize the three preceding approaches. This approach however clearly criticizes three key elements of rational institutionalism: the strict separation between states' objectives and subjective ideas concerning interests, the *a priori* vision of institutions (whether positive or negative) and the abstract idea that institutions are neutral – in fact they carry ideas, collective memories and identities. As opposed to historical institutionalism, discourse institutionalism considers ideas more important than structures in explaining change, even if the latter break with tradition. In comparison with sociological institutionalism, the differentiation is less obvious as ideas play a central role in both schools. Discourse institutionalism is less static: it emphasizes that ideas, values and norms determine the re-conceptualization of interests favoring change and their legitimation to the public. International networks or epistemic communities are behind the development of shared knowledge which can influence international regimes and organizations by coordinated discourse (P. Haas).³⁴ In terms of communications, it is important to consider public political

32 J. Ruggie, *Multilateralism Matters*, cited and R.O. Keohane, "The World Economic and Political System and the Crisis of the Embedded Capitalism", in J. Golthorpe (ed.) *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984.

33 V.A. Schmidt, cited, p. 2 and 8; and "Institutionalism and the State", in C. Hay et al. (ed.) *The State: Theories and Issues*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2005.

34 P. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination", *International Organization*, 46, 1992, pp. 1–35.

persuasion (J. Habermas)³⁵ and the institutional context in which communication takes place. These features are more easily identified at the level of domestic state structures; nonetheless, F. Kratochwil and others have emphasized the importance of communication dynamics within international institutions.³⁶

In conclusion, whether alternative or complementary to one another (this epistemological question remains open), these four strains of institutionalist research have produced a considerable number of high-quality, innovative studies: their goals and logics vary considerably in function of determinant variables used to explain institutions. The neo-institutionalist schools mark a turning point in the long history of realist and neo-realist dominance. It is no longer possible to study twenty-first century international relations without taking institutional variables into account – whether this includes the many cases of international civil cooperation or primarily security questions. Both strengths and limits of neo-institutionalist contributions are clear: it is a “work in progress” and the institutional future of regional and global organizations are fundamental references for ongoing studies.

1. “Impact studies” are so far insufficient: what domestic and external factors explain the success or failure of regimes and institutions? While the origins of international institutions are understood, their consequences remain ambiguous. From this perspective, empirical studies comparing European organizations and other regional and global organizations could advance theoretical knowledge.
2. How do domestic and transnational actors (their identities and interests) interact with one another and with international institutions? What is the future of internal and external dimensions of state sovereignty? For example, why and how do certain international institutions (such as the EU) manifest a tendency to evolve towards political systems, while showing constitutional or cosmopolitan trends?
3. During the second half of the twentieth century, the legitimacy of the multilateral institutional network was based on “output legitimacy” – i.e. effectiveness.³⁷ This type of legitimacy has nothing to do with democracy and often raises communication and representation questions. Some authors, out of any utopias, are addressing the democratic legitimacy of

35 J. Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms: Contribution to a Discourse Theory*, London, Polity Press, 1996.

36 F. Kratochwil and J. Ruggie, “International Organization. A State of the Art and an Art of the State”, *International Organization*, 4, 1986, pp. 753–55; and in O.R. Young (ed.) *The International Political Economy and International Institutions*, Brookfield VT, Elgar, 1996, pp. 307–329.

37 For this concept, see F.W. Scharpf, *Governing in Europe*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999.

international governance institutions³⁸ and thus opening a new avenue of research on the cutting edge of comparative and normative studies.

4. Is it possible a single conceptual framework that can reconcile the current fragmentation between the multiple “beyond realism” research strategies represented by Hoffmann on international law, Keohane and Nye on transnationalism and complex interdependence, as well as the regimes theory and the cited institutionalist schools? Despite the efforts to elaborate a broader version of the concept of institutionalization in international relations, an overall framework including all the multilateral international institutions – both existing and in construction, regional and global, formalized or informal, based on hard or soft law, functioning via unanimity or majority procedures – and accounting for their dynamic and multiple deficits, is still a work in progress.

38 R.O. Keohane, *The Contingent Legitimacy of Multilateralism*, cited; A. Moravcsick, R.O. Keohane and S. Macedo, “Democracy-enhancing Multilateralism”, in *International Organization*, 63, Winter 2009, pp. 1–31.

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Chapter 7

A Post-sovereign World?

The optimistic environment of the 1990s, with the end of the bipolar era and the rise of “globalization to benefit all”, strongly affected International Relations theory. The concept of “global governance”, first coined in the 1980s, gained prominence throughout the following decade primarily within international organizations and civil society. This concept is often vague, but generally makes reference to good administration, both private (corporate governance in the case of business) and public (fight against corruption and budgetary rigor) according to the standards set by international lenders (IMF and World Bank); it has gradually appeared in the discourse of nearly all private and public economic actors against the backdrop of contemporary globalization, including the European Union.

In 1995, the United Nations Commission on Global Governance published a report¹ that more or less formalized this concept in international decision-making. It defined global governance as:

The sum of measures by which individuals and public and private institutions manage their common affairs. It is a continual process of cooperation and compromise between diverse and conflicting interests. It includes official institutions and regimes endowed with executive power, as well as informal arrangements on which peoples and institutions agree when they perceive them to be useful.²

The various levels of regulation, the absence of central hierarchy and the process of continual negotiation between public and private actors that characterize the European Union – i.e. the EU’s complexity and difference from the state model – are an essential reference point in the literature on global governance.³ This theory falls within the body of theoretical critiques of neo-realism; its origins and direction are clear, but any predictive outcome remains vague.

1 Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 2. In Paris, the Conseil d’analyse économique addressed the same question in 2002.

3 P. Schmitter, F.W. Scharpf, G. Marks and W. Streeck, *Governance in the EU*, op. cit., 1995.

1. J. Rosenau and the Concept of Global Governance: World Society and New Medievalism

It is primarily J.N. Rosenau⁴ who has studied the concept of global governance within the academic framework of International Relations. This innovative researcher, with ties to the functionalist school and systems theory, has greatly contributed to the development of International relations theory in the United States. In the 1960s–1970s he worked primarily on US foreign policy and analyzed the interplay between the global and national systems. In the 1980s his thought surpassed the theory of complex interdependence, moving closer to post-modern theories. For Rosenau, five main elements have modified the international system so that relations between individuals and societies increasingly replace the traditional inter-state dimension, and “transnational” relations (beyond Keohane and Nye) are a substitute, not a complement, to international relations. Rosenau’s five elements all affect the centrality of the state in international relations:

1. Globalization as global integration, which generates as many losers as winners.
2. Identity fragmentation as a reactive phenomenon to globalization.

These first two phenomena reinforce one another and to describe the outcome, Rosenau coined the concept of “framegration” (synthesis of fragmentation and integration). Important social changes simultaneously develop and impact the global system: some very universal, others based on distinctive identities. Some processes reinforce convergence towards the center, or the dominant model; others multiply the differences and individual feedback.

3. A drastic reduction in territorial differences as a result of distance-killing information technologies.
4. The burgeoning of global interdependence and the breakthrough of “transnational issues”: issues that surpass the framework of state governance (global warming, environmental protection, poverty, peace, criminality, drug trafficking, water and food shortage, etc.).
5. The continual growth of citizens’ technical skills, which reinforces the role of individuals as the center of international society (concept of “skillful

4 J.N. Rosenau (1924–) studied at Princeton University and has taught at the Universities of Southern California, Ohio, and Georgetown (Washington, DC). He has primarily worked on foreign policy and transnationalism. He authored *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, 1967; *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (with K. Knorr), Princeton, 1969; *Linkage Politics*, Macmillan, Free Press, 1969; *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, New York, 1971; and with K.O. Czempiel (ed.) *Governance without Government? Order and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

individual”). The role of individuals further implies the role of civil society: women, youths, networks, human rights, etc.

To describe how these processes are regulated, Rosenau used the concept of global governance – which originated at the practical, not theoretical level of globalization – as a research tool. His work, which highlighted the distinction between “government” and “governance”, is the main reference point in global governance theory.⁵ Government refers to formalized and institutionalized process such as state regulation via legislation, whereas governance is more comprehensive and encompassing: it refers to institutional and formalized processes, but also public and private informal processes (at the sub-national and supranational levels), which are increasingly spreading and deepening. Governance takes account of institutions, but also of private and public actors and networks – be they transnational, multinational, technocratic or sub-national. According to Rosenau, today’s world faces a change of state centrality, which is not only decreasing, but also a secondary, marginal level of “governance”. He included within his encompassing concept of global governance authority, regulation and decision-making at every level along a continuum from family to neighborhood, from business to religion, from the state to the regional and global level.

But can the model of decentralized multilevel governance provide adequate alternative for the Westphalian paradigm? Since 1989, the world is in a transitional phase and the concept of governance has all the descriptive force and theoretical weakness of any transitional tool. According to a number of theorists, elaboration on at least three key points is lacking; Rosenau himself has nuanced his tenets to respond to realist and institutionalist critiques, particularly after September 11, 2001.

Firstly, the political crisis of the state under globalization might trigger a return to anarchy. By contrary, according to Rosenau, precisely the existence of informal “governance” allows system change to take over. Whereas anarchy is the total absence of common rules, the international system continues to hold and function. However, what about the interplay between informal forms of regulation and international regimes? According to Rosenau, international regimes are part of governance, but the essential difference is that they are characterized by the convergence of states on a specific issue – thus they apply only to a certain part of international relations and are of an essentially inter-state nature. Governance is a more universal concept that includes international regimes, but goes beyond them. International regimes concern a limited number of civil and governmental sectors, whereas governance covers every aspect of social life. Governance allows

5 J.N. Rosenau, *Global Governance*, 1999. See also *ibid.*, “A Transformed Observer in a Transforming World”, *Studia Diplomatica*, 1–2, 1999 (C. Roosens, M. Telò and P. Vercauteren [eds]), pp. 5–15. Also please note the creation of global governance and the publication of Young Oran’s *Governance in World Affairs*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1999.

informal relations to be understood even where no international regime exists. Is that enough? Many scholars assert that more research is needed regarding the controversial interconnection between the levels and forms of informal governance and the interstate cooperation.

A second question increasingly appears in the study of global governance: is multilevel global governance more or less democratic than state government based on territorial democracy? Can legitimacy and accountability exist without democracy? There are a growing number of studies on the relations between global governance and democratic legitimacy. For K.O. Czempiel (who worked with Rosenau on the fundamental 1992 book⁶) governance is more democratic than government because of the decentralization, citizen consensus, deep social roots and increased legitimacy and effectiveness that it implies. But for others, this vision is typical of the excessive optimism of the early 1990s. Some consider that rather than losing importance, state power is still a more legitimate form, better controlled by citizens, more able of mitigating internal and international inequalities, notably between the global North and South, or the asymmetries and power hierarchies between states and their economies.⁷

Finally, how do the issues of security and use of force fit within Rosenau's conceptual framework? After September 11, this change has been rhetorically emphasized. However, there is no doubt that security didn't disappear from international life. Does it necessitate a renewed importance of state centrality, e.g. in decisions regarding war and peace? Rosenau's answer remains theoretically bitter: he describes a "bifurcation" of the international system. On the one hand a decentralized transnational system is emerging that deals informally with the majority of international issues – global governance at various levels. On the other hand, the inter-state security system, in which decision-making continues to depend on states' capabilities, and particularly on great powers, escapes this evolution. According to Rosenau the current international system does not completely correspond to one or the other, but rather one must consider the systemic duality to understand global governance.⁸ The idea of a double international system has appeared previously under various formulations,⁹ but the question remains as to how the two systems interrelate.

The most enduring part of Rosenau's paradigm is the levels-of-analysis evolution from states and inter-state relations towards the transnational, societal

6 J.N. Rosenau and K.O. Czempiel (ed.) *Governance without Government? Order and Change in World Politics*, cited.

7 J.-L. Quermonne, *Le système politique de l'UE*, Paris, Montchrestien, 2005; J.F. Bayard, *Le Gouvernement du monde. Une Critique politique de la globalisation*, Paris, Fayard, 2004.

8 J.N. Rosenau, in R. Cox (ed.) *New Realism*, United Nations, 1997.

9 N. Bobbio distinguished between a legitimate system (the UN) and an effective system (the Westphalian system): see N. Bobbio, in M. Telò (ed.) *L'Etat et la démocratie internationale*, Bruxelles, Complexe, 1999.

and sub-state levels. In the last few years, transnationalist research has revived what Burton termed “world society” in the 1960s.¹⁰ His research focused on relations at the global system level between individuals and social actors (exchanges, transactions, interactions beyond borders) and considered the state system as secondary. As in Rosenau’s concept of governance, transnational relations were considered legitimate and consensus-based, whereas relations of power and coercion were not. Theories that Bull critically referred to as “neo-medievalist” (see Chapter 6) followed the same line of reasoning.

In general, these are interesting, but often fragile and provisional theories that are well adapted to a phase of theoretical and historical transition. However, the neo-realist approach that has blossomed in the United States and focused on the immutable centrality of the inter-state system has also revealed its limitations. Nonetheless, any serious alternative must cope with the challenges posed by neo-realism. The role of the even transformed an adjusted state in international relations has returned in force during the security and economic crises of the decade 2000–2010 and exposed the weak points in the empirically important, but theoretically fragile concept of global governance.

2. Critical and Post-modern International Relations Theories

The great Western philosophical debate on the limits of modern reason,¹¹ combined with the contradictions of “globalization beneficial to all” and the shocking collapse of the USSR has had important implications for International Relations:

- The multiplication of paradigms trying to disprove the dominant theories of previous decades which failed to anticipate late twentieth century change and upheaval: notably the realist school which, despite its scientific ambitions, could neither predict nor explain the collapse of the USSR and the bipolar system. However, though they could not predict the timing of the Soviet collapse, both neo-realism and institutionalism displayed a degree of foresight in their analysis of trends leading to a post-bipolar world; thus the contemporary debate should more accurately address the new equilibrium between continuity and discontinuity.
- The radical deconstruction of the Westphalian paradigm as typical of “modernity (and of the rational state as the opposite of anarchy, tradition and chaos) in favor of a new interpretive path characterized by two guidelines: critical post-positivist approaches and post-modernist ideology.

10 J. Burton, *World Society*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972. Australian professor at the University of London, Burton was a member of the English school. World Society is different than International Society of Bull’s society of states.

11 See the works of J. Derrida, F. Lyotard and M. Foucault.

How did the critical theory of society and of the positivist idea of science's start? Its origins include the Frankfurt school,¹² young K. Marx and A. Gramsci. Its target was the ambition of modern scientific thought to study the contradictions of modern society without sociologically analyzing scientific reasoning itself. The cultural Western climate favored the break with established approaches, condemned as "positivist".¹³ During the 1980s–1990s, Western nations experienced a revival of critical theory based around three main ideas:

6. The opposition between international civil society on the one hand and, on the other hand, the system of states and the centrality of inter-state relations.¹⁴
7. The search for dialogue with anti-globalization ideologies and movements as a new form of engagement; this is opposed to the axiological neutrality expected of International Relations theories, which are interpreted as conservative towards the established order.
8. The multiplication of perspectives and approaches, most notably the development of gender studies in International Relations.¹⁵

3. Gender Studies and International Relations

Feminist scholarship appeared in International Relations theory relatively late, in the context of the recent post-modern debate on paradigm crisis. After early feminist objections to the 1970s internationalist studies as overlooking the gender dimension, Cynthia Enloe opened a Pandora's box in 1989 by raising a general issue: "Where are the women?", not as rare individual leaders, but as a social group representing half of humankind.¹⁶ In the following years, several gender

12 Founded in the 1930s Weimar Republic round the "Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung" review, the Frankfurt School brought together intellectuals such as T.W. Adorno, M. Horkheimer, H. Marcuse, E. Fromm, A. Mitscherlich and W. Benjamin. They immigrated to the US after Hitler's rise to power in 1933, and returned to Frankfurt after the Second World War. They produced vast critical and antipositivist social sciences literature. The main work was T.W. Adorno and M. Horkheimer's *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, Frankfurt, M.S. Verlag, 1947. J. Habermas is considered the heir of this School. Regarding the young Marx critics of the legacy of Hegel, see his *1844 Manuscripts*. Regarding Gramsci, see his *Prison Notebooks* (1937), cited in Chapter 4.

13 R. Cox, Gramsci. "Hegemony and International Relations", an essay in method, *Millennium*, XII/2, pp. 162–75.

14 M. Finnemore, La società civile globale, in G.J. Ikenberry and V.E. Parsi (eds) *Manuale di relazioni Internazionali*, Rome, Laterza, 2001.

15 On gender studies and international relations, see for example, C. Sylvester, *Feminist International Relations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001.

16 C. Enloe, *Bananas, Bases and Beaches: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*, London, Pinter, 1989.

issues have come into focus for the first time, and a new generation of authors has developed general feminist critiques of traditional IR theories from the gendering point of view.

With the help of the empirical Index of Gender Development (looking at standards of living, education and life expectancy) and Gender Empowerment (economic power and political representation), comparative research has proved that gender disparities are increasing a consequence of globalization and global/regional crises, which affect women's interests and identities in distinctive ways (less in Europe than in the USA, Latin America, East Asia and the third world). For example, researchers have focused on gender poverty and migration, education and working conditions, specific violence and military rape, gender health emergencies, notably in Africa and the third world, international traffic of women, etc. Women's visibility in world politics can be even lower than in national politics, which fosters comparative analysis: research shows an exception in Scandinavian countries, which, to a certain extent, represent an alternative European model, as compared with both developed countries such as US/Japan and developing/emergent countries such as China/India/Brazil.

The input of gender issues on global governance and international relations is very deeply linked to post-realist approaches, such as transnationalism and interdependence theories: research focuses on transnational women's movements and networks linked to the problems of development, population, women's rights, notably health and reproduction rights. Second, in a context where many states are proving incapable of defending women's rights, international regimes, conferences and arrangements devoted to this purpose exist at the supranational level (both regional and global), notably in the EU and within the UN system.¹⁷

Finally, gender studies entail several theoretical implications, generally considered a critical approach to the main pillars of realist theory of State and nationalism, security and power, and the international system.¹⁸ However, it is possible to draw a critical analysis as well as the liberal understanding of human rights from theories of gender difference.¹⁹ Universalism can be challenged on feminist grounds as privileging patriarchy: the idea of absolute and universal standards is under threat and a kind of relativism is asserted instead. However, despite several problems with gender relativism, many wrongs have been noted,

17 1946: The Commission on the status of Woman; 1975: International Women's year and Mexico Women Conference as a starting point for the UN Decade for Women; 1979: UN Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women; 1980: Copenhagen Women's Conference; 1985: Nairobi Women's Conference; 1993: UN General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women; 1995: Beijing Women's Conference.

18 A. Ticker, *Gender in International Relations*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1992.

19 J.J. Pettman, *Worlding Women. A Feminist International Politics*, London, Routledge, 1996.

(e.g. female genital mutilation in the sense that the dignity of person is not respected) without falling in a traditional kind of western cultural imperialism. In some scientific milieus, the border between cultural pluralism and paradigm fragmentation is a thin and vaguely drawn line.

4. Post-modernist Theories of IR: A Synthesis

Post-modernist theory has had radical but not always very effective implications for International Relations:

- In terms of the theory of knowledge: the critique of modern reason, progress and universal ideas. Concepts like international anarchy and sovereignty have become subject to revision. This position sometimes leads to absolute relativism, other times to reconsideration of the purpose of science itself, including International Relations.²⁰
- Epistemological opposition between weak reasoning and strong theories, such as Realism and Institutionalism which, according to critical theories, do share a positivistic and rational choice approach.²¹ However, this opposition could introduce multicultural fragmentation of research and rampant multiplication of cognitive models.

Although increasing opposition to the modernist paradigm and the rational state is clear, the outcome of this critical process remains obscure. There is a risk that “deconstruction” could lead to undermining the discipline itself, or even scientific knowledge in International Relations as such.²²

On the other hand, more moderate versions of the post-modern critique contribute a relativist and self-critical nuance to the epistemological and theoretical debate – in particular the new phenomena of the late twentieth century – and call attention to the importance of ideas and beliefs in the globalized world.²³ Critical and post-

20 R. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neo-realism”, in R.O. Keohane (ed.) *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 255–300.

21 P. Rosenau, *Post-modernism and the Social Sciences. Insights, Inroads and Intrusions*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992.

22 See François Lyotard and M. Foucault.

23 S. Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters. Postmodernity and Intellectuals*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987; A. Touraine, *Critique de la modernité*, Paris, Fayard, 1992; Y. Lapid, “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in the Post-positivist Era”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 3, 1989, pp. 235–54; J. George, “International Relations and the Search of a Thinking Space”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 3, 1989, pp. 269–79; S. Smith, K. Booth and M. Zalesky (ed.) *International Theory. Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996; G. Carnevali, “La teoria critica e le teorie postmoderne”, in G.J. Ikenberry and V.E. Parsi, op. cit., pp. 95–113; A. Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998.

modern theories are based on the controversial climate of 1990s globalization: the rational state and the Westphalian paradigm were not only reconsidered, but radically overcome by two extra-state or anti-state realities (in the terminology of the main Italian philosopher of the late twentieth century, N. Bobbio²⁴): the globalized economy – a major factor in world unification – and the world of ideas, identities, religions and beliefs (at the origins of nationalism, ethnocentric identity movements, anti-politics fragmentation, Islamic extremism, etc.).

These often opposing trends have one point in common in terms of international relations: they agree on the end of states as territorial, secularized, sovereign entities:

- On one hand, increasingly determinist economic optimism appears, notably in “hyperglobalist” theories based not only on the end of the territorial state within the new framework of the globalized world market and the triumph of the “invisible hand”, but also on the end of “politics” as such – of any form of public regulation governing economic and social development.²⁵
- On the other, theories highlighting “cultural” resistance to global convergence have manifested; the return of irrationality, identity and ethnocentric revolt against the pressure of globalization, rejection of the “westernization of the world”. These “leftist” schools should not be confused with the theory regarding the undeniable emergence of the “conflict of civilizations” (mainly between the West and Islam) that replaces historic international anarchy with a new “cultural” divide.²⁶

Therefore, not only the traditional paradigm of the Westphalian state but also its revisions by the neo-institutionalist approaches seem to maintain no role for a development of knowledge. However, the extreme aspects of these two postmodern trends, whether for or against global convergence, paradoxically demonstrate that theoretical research is in need of a renewed pluralist scientific framework, framing a new chapter of the debate within International Relations theory.²⁷

24 N. Bobbio in M. Telò (eds) *L'Etat et la démocratie internationale*, Bruxelles, Complexe, 1999.

25 K. Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State, the Rise of Regional Economies*, New York, HarperCollins, 1995; see also the critique of this approach by A. Gamble in M. Telò (eds) *EU and New Regionalism*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007. It's largely what French journalists refer to as “singular thought”.

26 S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996; see also the critique by T. Meyer in M. Telò (ed.) *EU and New Regionalism*, op. cit.

27 On this notion of scientific pluralism, see also L. Holsti, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Which Bare the Fairest Theories at All?”, in *International Studies Quarterly*, 3, 1989, pp. 255–61.

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Chapter 8

Constructivist Approaches

1. Philosophical Background

While looking at a superficial glance as a new intellectual movement in social sciences, and International Relations specifically, constructivism has deep roots in the history of Western thought. In fact, this innovative, rich and varied trend is deeply rooted in the great European epistemological debate since Georg W.F. Hegel, Emil Durkheim and Max Weber. According to even its most eminent scholars, this is not an International Relations “theory” in the strictest sense, but rather a vast cultural movement that groups together several approaches and touches on several disciplines.¹ Constructivism, often defined as ‘reflectivism’ at that time, fits squarely within the 1980s–1990s general renewal of social theory and is comparable in this regard both with opposed intellectual movements such as positivism, utilitarianism and with partially similar cultural approaches so as post-modernism.

In recent years, constructivism has been increasingly employed in International Relations, in order to analyze the causes and implications of remarkable and unpredicted events: the collapse of the Soviet empire, the role of the US in the post-bipolar context, pressing global challenges that favor a new global order based on shared norms and principles, particularly the rash of new identity questions.

Although constructivist approaches vary greatly, their overall philosophy generally revives the major themes of nineteenth century German idealism: the evolution of society, particularly international society, is not essentially determined by material interests (as, according to constructivists, both the realists and rational institutionalists would claim), but by ideas, subjective perceptions and the meanings given to these interests by man. No international reality (nation, war, bipolarity, European construction, environmental protection, etc.) can exist without first having been formulated in terms of ideas and collective intention: ideas influence and determine reality and are not just passive reflections of it. This dialectic echoes the Hegelian concept of “inter-subjectivity (as distinct from “objectivity”) but falls somewhere in between positivist objectivism and post-modern subjectivism: for example the concepts of “social fact”² or “social

1 J.G. Ruggie, an important constructivist author, does not pretend that constructivism is an International Relations theory of the same fundamental rigor as realism: see J.G. Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity*, London/New York, Routledge, p. 34.

2 J. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality*, New York, Free Press, 1995. Remember the role of H. Bull in laying the groundwork for constructivism’s development (*The*

construction”³³ applied to politics, the state, democracy, power, etc. It can also be demonstrated in controversial historic and contemporary examples: slavery and humanitarian intervention. As to state sovereignty, it only exists insofar as a number of domestic and external actors recognize it. Both “social facts” (as opposed to stark empirical facts) and actors are nothing but social constructions, resulting from “collective intentionality”.

American constructivist J.G. Ruggie classifies three principle trends:

1. Neo-classical constructivism, rooted in the work of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber (Ernst B. Haas, Peter J. Katzenstein, Martha Finnemore, Friedrich V. Kratochwil and John Ruggie himself).
2. Post-modern constructivism, based on the philosophical works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida (Richard Ashley, David Campbell and R.B.J. Walker, who advocated the study of subjective linguistic construction as opposed to “hegemonic discourse”, which reinforces an established regime).
3. The strain developed by Alexander Wendt, which is more tied to social science. For Wendt, “actors act based on the meanings that objects have for them and these meanings are social constructions”. He thus argued for consideration of the background of social theory and the international system.

Among his philosophical influences, Ruggie also cites Habermas’s theory of communicative action, referring to acts of persuasion, deliberation, and sharing of strategic concepts; i.e. every issue that is irreconcilable with the utilitarian and positivist paradigms. Furthermore, some of the representatives of the English school inspired constructivist approaches in addition to institutional ones: notably in the work of Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, Headley Bull, Barry Buzan and Anthony Giddens.

However it was the American J. Searle who developed the radical basis for modern constructivism in International Relations. He critiqued not only Waltz’s concept of international anarchy, but also institutionalism, which he considered too close to neo-realism in terms of the utilitarian approach to International Relations.

2. A. Wendt: Structure, Agent, Norms

The debate on relationships between structure and agent in International Relations is very important according to constructivist approaches, particularly in the work

Anarchical Society, cited); and N. Onuf who introduced constructivism to international relations (*World of Our Making*, Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

3 A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

of A. Wendt. What does his “holistic approach” mean?⁴ In contrast to the realists, who consider the state-actor central to international relations, constructivists emphasize “structure” as a constitutive factor of reality⁵ – an argument revived from systems theory. But contrary to systems theory, constructivists consider reciprocal interaction between structure and agents to be essential. Moreover, they consider “structure” to be primarily immaterial and ideological (social context and inter-subjectivity, notably identities, norms, expectations, values, shared ideas, knowledge) and only secondarily material (economy and armaments) as practical. Thus, for instance, even the Cold War was a social structure for nearly 50 years: it determined the respective roles of the two protagonists/antagonists. Whenever several actors (for example, the administrations of O. Palme and W. Brandt in the 1960s or M. Gorbachev after 1985) changed their way of thinking, then even their interests and roles within the structure, and consequently their behaviors were modified and the structure itself was changed. Why are the complex relations between agent and structure very important in this research approach? The “agent” (its identity and interests, for example the “national interest”) does not exist independent of the structure, and is not a predetermined given. The “structure”, on the other hand, is neither natural nor immutable: it is dominated by the dialectic of ideas, norms, scientific knowledge and culture – not by material underpinnings as the Marxists and positivists believe.

Wendt aimed to reconcile his conception of idealism and scientific realism with the holistic conceptual framework of constructivism. According to Wendt there are three key elements to analyzing structure: “capacities”, or material resources, whose significance is not naturally occurring but rather attributed by actors; “practices”, which constitute the bridge between agents and structure; and “shared understandings”, based in the social and cultural context. Furthermore, he identified four factors of international structural change: interdependence, homogenization, common destiny and capacity of “self-restraint”.

How do international norms emerge within this agent-structure dialectic? Spontaneously, as social practices? Following states’ instrumental initiatives? As a subject of negotiations? Following the initiative of a hegemonic power, and according to its values? And above all: are norms dependent (on actors particularly) or independent variables? What is the relationship between international norm-setting actors (such as the EU or the US) and others? Are norms capable of constructing or are they themselves mere social constructions? Beyond instrumentalism, spontaneity and negotiation, two types of response to these

4 A. Wendt, “The Structure-agent Problem in International Relations Theory”, *International Organization*, 41/3, p. 335–70.

5 A. Giddens’s structuring theory argues for reciprocal determination between agents and structure (*The Constitution of Society*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1984). He cites the example of language: we imitate the structure of language but can also modify it. Constructivism takes an intermediary path: it is neither entirely structuralist nor totally focused on actors.

questions are present in the work of A. Wendt, A. Wiener⁶ and other constructivist theorists:

- On one hand, norms come from an international entity, which has an identity and conditions the behavior of other actors (“smooth governance” describes this functional modality); this interpretation also supports the case of the EU – but in the same manner as nation-states’ identities. In the context of asymmetric power relations, normative entities (state or international organization) exercise means and solicitations designed to modify partner states’ behavior (e.g. conditionality or promise of future membership in the case of EU).
- On the other, constructivists emphasize contradictions, obstacles and difficulties resulting from the interaction between entities and their external environment – i.e. other actors. It is reciprocal interaction that is relevant and gives norms their real meaning. This second interpretation appears more promising for future development (see below).

3. Examples and Open Questions

In International Relations, constructivism explicitly undermines several key concepts of the realist tradition:

- The first is the relation between anarchy and international cooperation: constructivists oppose Waltz’s conception of eternal anarchy in favor of a dynamic vision of several possible types of international anarchy, drawn from Hobbes, Kant, and Locke. Wendt highlighted the idea that states determine their reciprocal relations in function of actors’ intentions and interactions and historic context.⁷ From the famous British liberal constitutionalist John Locke he drew the idea that states are neither friends nor enemies, but rivals. Ruggie’s theoretical studies on multilateralism and the US example from 1944 to 1971 reference the same idea, and also recall the deep link between constructivism and institutionalism. According to Ruggie, international regimes must necessarily include “principles, norms, rules and decision procedures on which the participants agree”.⁸ Norms play an essential constituent role in international regimes and organizations.

6 A. Wiener, “The Dual Quality of Norms and Governance Beyond the State”, *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 10/1, 2007.

7 A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, *International Organization*, 46/2, 1992, pp. 391–426.

8 J.G. Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity. Essays in International Institutionalization*, London/New York, Routledge, 1998, p. 107.

- An interesting *ante-litteram* area of constructionist research pushed constructivists to present the dynamic notion of possible “security communities” as opposed to the classical “security dilemma” based on the law of states’ self-defense according to Waltz (see Wendt and Katzenstein, based on the studies of K. Deutsch).⁹
- Another example of the normative dimension’s importance: the collapse of the USSR. If domestic political regimes are based solely on force, they are inevitably condemned to collapse. According to Ruggie, a society can only exist on an institutional basis – it must have “constitutional”, or founding rules and values.
- A fourth example is particularly interesting for European studies: if more importance is attributed to variables like ideas, values and knowledge, the classical understanding of power itself is revisited. Persuasion via “soft power”,¹⁰ “structural power”¹¹ and “civilian power”¹² has become central to elites’ discourse, and also in determining international policies. This opens a dialogue with other theoretical approaches. A related question is the place of empirical impact studies, which often are missing within constructivist context. Independent of subjective preferences in terms of values, it is possible for example, to imagine a zero-sum game in the medium and long term between the growth of unit’s civilian power (e.g. the European Union) and another’s diminishing hard power (e.g. the United States).

Finally constructivism has made complex contributions to institutionalism and, conversely, the development of constructivist approaches has benefited from the institutionalists’ work. Transnationalism and the theory of interdependence laid part of the groundwork for constructivism, whereas the constructivist approach had an important influence on sociological and discourse institutionalism (see Chapter 6). The iconoclastic discourse of certain constructivists that casts aside both realist and institutionalist theories does not take account of this complementary heritage.

For example, Ruggie, Finnemore¹³ and others reproach institutionalism for not truly challenging the realist thesis that interests are fixed from the outset for once and for all, and that static, rationalist and individualist costs/benefits calculation is the foundation of international cooperation. Secondly, even if the institutionalists accept that actors’ ideas and preferences contribute to explaining interaction,

9 P. Katzenstein (ed.) *The Culture of National Security*, Columbia University Press, 1996. See also M.C. Smouts et al., *Dictionnaire des relations internationales*, cited, p. 74; and A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it ...”, cited.

10 J.S. Nye, *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, 2004.

11 S. Strange, *The Retreat of the State, The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

12 M. Telò, *Europe: A Civilian Power?* cited.

13 M. Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1996.

they reject the converse.¹⁴ Knowledge and international norms as independent variables can make states change their behavior: for example the European idea of “knowledge society”, central to the EU’s 2000–2010 “Lisbon Strategy” for modernization, interplayed with the national and regional agenda of several actors by fostering convergences towards socio-economic models of sustainable development: China and Brazil firstly, but also, India, Japan, MERCOSUR, etc.

In fact, neither sociological nor discourse institutionalism falls under this critique. According to many researchers, there is an apparent complementarity that deserves further study between the most interesting constructivist research – concerning the interactive meaning of norms – and the institutional question of ways and paths, notably the framework within interaction between “norm-setting” entities and “norm-receiving” entities develops (bilateral, unilateral, multilateral, imperial, etc.).

In conclusion, constructivist’s research agenda is very ambitious. Not without a frequent interplay with critical and post-modern theories, it aims for a true break with the traditional social sciences paradigm, including that of International Relations: a simultaneously trans-theoretical and transdisciplinary approach that has effectively produced an impassioned international debate in the 1990s. Constructivists claim to have the means to resolve three ancient divides: between realists and idealists (in the 1920s–1940s, see Chapter 1), between traditionalists and behaviorists (in the 1960s–1970s (see H. Bull) between historians and scientists (K. Waltz and the emergence of system theory)) – by absorbing the most innovative elements of each theory within their conceptual framework (i.e. “concept-picking”).

On the other hand, this approach is weak from three sides, according to the constructivists themselves. Firstly, in terms of empirical research: in this important area, constructivist’s work on international relations remains inferior to realism and institutionalism. Secondly, Wiener remarked that normative constructivism is weakened by its Eurocentrism and inability to confront a multicultural world where Western norms are far from unanimous. Deep cultural roots constitute both strength and weakness in the twenty-first century world, where China, India, Latin America and Africa are emerging with new interests and values. Third, the complex relations between norms, actors and institutions remain an open question in terms of both methodology and studies on how norms can and should affect the twenty-first century political world.¹⁵

Since 1989, R.O. Keohane has called for methodological pluralism:¹⁶ none of these approaches is entirely false nor invalid, and the freedom of research

14 A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer and V. Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes*, Cambridge University Press, 1997. A. Caffarena also emphasized this difference in “Il costruttivismo”, in G.J. Ikenberry and V.E. Parsi, cited, p. 71–90.

15 A. Weiner, cited article.

16 R.O. Keohane, president of the American Association of Political Science, is the author of “International Institutions: Two Approaches”, in R. Beck, A. Arend and R. Vander

benefits the accumulation of knowledge for each theoretical framework. K. Holsti emphasizes that there has never been a Copernican revolution (as in physics) in International Relations.¹⁷ It is uncertain whether we have truly surpassed the 1980s–1990s phase of creative chaos.

Aside from epistemological anarchy, it is important to remember J. Habermas's advice: to respect critical sciences (in addition to empirical and historical science, of course) as components of the new research in social science and International Relations.¹⁸ There has been not yet “the great turning point” beyond the traditional utilitarian scientific paradigm; such a change would necessitate an even slow and gradual transformation of the paradigm of Westphalian modernity.

Lugt, *International Rules. Approaches from International Law and International Relations*, New York/Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 187–205.

17 K. Holsti, “Mirror Mirror on the Wall, Which are the Fairest Theories of All?”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 3, 1989, pp. 255–61.

18 J. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1968.

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Chapter 9

Foreign Policy Analysis and the Impact of Domestic Factors

Before systemic approaches to IR consolidated throughout the second half of the twentieth century, a number of internationalist studies developed that drew attention to domestic factors affecting national foreign policies and the way that these interact with external factors. Some of these approaches are largely pre-systemic or a-systemic and many of them are not completely formulated theories but rather partial lines of researching. Secondly, as argued above, some system theorists – notably critics of realism and neo-realism – have also highlighted the importance of domestic politics to International Relations. Thirdly, comparative studies on both sides of the Atlantic have also considered the contextualization of political and economic, rational and irrational, individual, collective and institutional domestic factors, as well as ideational, normative and historical aspects of states' foreign policies. These approaches are an important facet of the richly pluralistic background of contemporary international relations.¹

The theories in this chapter are mostly not based on a systemic approach. According to Waltz's systemic analysis, they are "reductionist", as the level of analysis is sub-systemic and focuses on units or individuals. They are in fact based on in-depth study of economic, social and political dynamics within the units of international politics – i.e. within states. The hypotheses shared by all of them is that international politics and foreign policy cannot be explained without taking domestic factors into account – e.g. political regime, national economy, social and individual actors and, in particular, domestic politics.

1 In English, see C. Herman and J.N. Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, New York, Random House, 1961; J.N. Rosenau et al. (eds) *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, Boston, Allen & Unwin, 1987. In French, see M. Merle, *La politique étrangère*, Paris, PUF, 1984; C. Roosens, V. Rosoux and T. De Wilde d'Estamel (eds) *La politique étrangère. Le modèle classique à l'épreuve*, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2004; S. Smith, A. Hadfield, T. Dunne, *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, Oxford University Press, 2007; Glenn Palmer and T. Clifton Morgan, *A Theory of Foreign Policy*, Princeton University Press, 2006; M. Clarke, 'The Foreign Policy System: A Framework for Analysis', in M. Clarke and B. White (eds) *Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach*, Cheltenham, Elgar, 1989; and the International Journal *Foreign Policy Analysis*, published on behalf of the International Studies Association.

1. Economic and Political Imperialism

As mentioned above in the presentation of Britain's nineteenth–twentieth century international role, imperialism originated within the nations that practiced it. Several theorists have studied the economic and political mechanisms that induce imperialist foreign policies. The first explanations were primarily economic and focused on a similar center-periphery approach as International Political Economy and Wallerstein's world-system theory; however, their methodology differs from these in that systemic approaches were not developed by the early twentieth century. Theories of imperialism were based on the primacy of domestic factors to explaining international relations and they analyzed the relationship between a state's external economic expansion and its politico-military projection. Some highlighted the importance of political causes of imperialism, while others emphasized economic factors.

The first theorist to highlight imperialism was the radical English economist J. Hobson² – a member of the cultural reformist movement, the Fabian Society. His main work was *Imperialism. A Study*, in which he studied the commercial and tariff wars that divided European powers. He postulated that nations try to conquer the global market due to a domestic economic mechanism: a capitalist national economy creates overproduction relative to domestic demand. According to the same reasoning later employed by Keynes, Hobson denounced the inherent contradiction of market economy: domestic markets fail to develop rapidly enough to keep up with continuously growing rates of production. To resolve this imbalance, states seek external outlets and create imperialist policies in the hope that new markets will absorb the production excess and rebalance the domestic economy. Hobson also wondered how to oppose British imperialism from a progressive viewpoint. He believed it was possible to check the development of imperialist policies and to limit the bellicose tendency of modern capitalism by reinforcing national markets, i.e. increasing domestic consumption. In other words, by improving the quality of life of the working masses in imperialist countries the problems of overproduction, and consequently imperialism, could be eliminated. The root of imperialism is the domestic economy; the solution is a change in domestic policy.

Marxist scholars of imperialism were inspired by Hobson's analysis but did not share his reformist conclusions. V.I. Lenin, R. Luxembourg and N. Bukharin

2 J.A. Hobson (1858–1940) published *Imperialism. A Study* with Allen & Unwin in London, 1902. Thirty years later, J.M. Keynes acknowledged his indebtedness to Hobson's work. In his book *Towards International Government*, Hobson argued for a supranational political power at the beginning of the First World War (London, Allen & Unwin, 1915). With his friend H.N. Brailsford, author of *A League of Nations* (1917), he influenced American President W. Wilson's campaign for a permanent peaceful organization.

each published studies on imperialism.³ They resumed Hobson's analysis that domestic economic contradictions lead to imperialist external policies. But unlike Hobson, they argued that the growing gap between production and consumption was impossible to correct within capitalist society. These theories predicted the First World War on this basis: commercial conflicts between states could only degenerate into military conflict. However, in their estimation, war would be a preliminary to global revolution – i.e. the war would have a revolutionary outcome. It is imperialism – the “highest stage of capitalism” according to Lenin – that provokes world revolution. For the Marxist-Leninists, and for L. Trotsky, the 1917 Russian Revolution was only the first step towards global revolution. Their analytical mistake and their under-estimation of Western capitalism's extraordinary capacity for development led to the creation of the Communist International in 1919 and its development for the next decades (the Comintern ideology was the so called “theory of a general capitalist crisis”).

On the other hand, for political theorists of imperialism, the state (not the economy) is responsible for imperialist policies. In his important 1919 work, *Sociology of Imperialism*, J. Schumpeter⁴ challenged Hobson and the Marxists' analyses. For Schumpeter, imperialism is a pre-capitalist phenomenon, rooted in the authoritarian heritage of the pre-constitutional state; imperialism results from the authoritarian political structure typical of absolutist states. National authoritarianism, excessive bureaucracy and militarism (as in Germany and Japan) lead to imperialist policies. Capitalism is not synonymous with imperialism; on the contrary it can be a factor in reducing imperialist tendencies (see also Cobden's economic pacifism). Rather, it is precisely insufficient capitalist development that provokes aggressive imperialist policies: once capitalism comes to full fruition, international politics will be more peaceful. The roots of imperialist aggression can be found in domestic political – not economic – structures; the solution can also be found domestically, in the most dynamic and innovative economic forces. Schumpeter's analysis was both a condemnation of old Europe and a glorification of the new, dynamic capitalism in the United States.

3 V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, published in Russia, 1917; R. Luxembourg, *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals*, Berlin, 1913; N. Boukarine, *Der Imperialismus und die Akkumulation des Kapitals*, Berlin-Wien, 1926 (1917 in Russia). See R. Owen and B. Sutcliffe, *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*, London, Longman, 1972; and G. Lichtheim, *Imperialism*, London, Penguin Press, 1971. For a critical approach, M. Barratt-Brown, *After Imperialism*, London, Heineman, 1973. See also H.U. Wehler, *Bismark und der Imperialismus*, Koln-Berlin, 1969; J. Stengers, *Conto, Myths and Realities*, Brussels, Racine, 2005; G. Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1969.

4 J.A. Schumpeter (1883–1950), Austrian economist and sociologist was an immigrant to the United States. His interests were technological innovation; the central role of the entrepreneur and domestic and international aspects of modernization. His works include *Sociology of Imperialism* (1919); and *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (1943).

For the American scholar T. Veblen as well,⁵ imperialism and militarism were the prerogative of old European states that are dynastic, aristocratic and anti-democratic: the vestige of imperialism can be explained by the feudal past of European states (unlike the US). Veblen also applied his theory to Japan. Imperialism can be overcome by technological modernization, free trade, and the development of a new collective consciousness that encourages enterprise and peaceful international cooperation. Finally, according to German sociologist Werner Sombart, the modern state has a dual nature: a liberal side – rule of law and democracy – and a side that remains tied to the traditional pre-capitalist heritage of absolutist states – power politics, military power, the army. Sombart argued that imperialism is a product of this second facet.

The concepts of “Empire” and “Imperialism” are still relevant in several today’s media and political and ideological discourses. However, none of the above mentioned scientific theories of imperialism has been recently confirmed. On the systems level, the above mentioned “Dependence theory”⁶ of the ‘60s revived the economic theory of imperialism. Is it relevant to understand modern global capitalism? On the one hand, neither USA nor Europe are any longer challenged by problems of overproduction and lacking domestic markets; furthermore, not only in the “golden age” between the Second World War and the 1970s but also during the years between 1989 and 2008, capitalism and international commerce were flourishing in both the United States and Europe. On the other hand, the wars in Vietnam, Iraq, the dark sides of the globalization and the economic crisis of 2008/9 etc. prove that there is no automatic correlation between mature and global capitalism and peaceful international cooperation underpinning global peace.

All in all, the question whether the concepts of empire or imperialism are still fit to cope with the increasingly globalized, multipolar and heterogeneous world’s system of the twenty-first century can hardly be positively answered so far.

2. Theories of Insecurity

Another set of theories that use domestic factors to explain foreign policy is the interdisciplinary studies from the inter-war period that combined international relations and social psychology. H. Lasswell’s⁷ analysis was based on the feeling of insecurity as a factor affecting international policy, according to crowd

5 T. Veblen, an American known for his liberal battle against 1930s monopolies and trusts was the author of *Imperial Germany and Industrial Revolution* (1915) and a 1935 survey on the nature of peace.

6 See Chapter 4.2.

7 H. Lasswell (1902–1960), American professor at the University of Chicago, studied the relationship between psychology and politics. He authored *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935) as well as *Psychopathology and Politics* (1930) and *The Analysis of Political Behavior* (1947).

psychology. The literature dedicated to this analysis profoundly influenced International Relations, notably the mentioned fundamental issue of “level of analysis”. This approach not only ignores the relevance of the global systemic level, but also the level of states. War and foreign policy are explained in terms of the individual’s natural aggressiveness, frustrations and anxieties – typical aspects of industrialized society according to crowd psychology, taking stock among others of S. Freud’s psychoanalysis studies. Ordinary twentieth-century individuals living in modern cities feel unsafe and seek outlets for their aggressiveness. It is possible to push governments to the brink of war by encouraging suspicion and hostility towards foreigners and foreign states. It is thus through political leaders ability of manipulating people’s emotions that rage can be channeled into aggressive foreign policies.

Lasswell drew attention to the feeling of insecurity, emotional instability and destructive will of ordinary modern man. A large part of the population fears foreign threats, possible foreign aggression linked to immigration of international politics. Political manipulators can try to capitalize on international political threats, can influence electorates which are often conditioned by fears of external attacks, whether a justifiable or imagined threat. The populace expresses its main individual and collective uncertainties by supporting leaders that ensure security and demands that government elites channel its fears through international political violence. In 1934–1935, Lasswell’s work foresaw what will be soon defined the “authoritarian personality”. This way of mobilizing the population, as in the case of Hitlerism was also analyzed by M. Horkheimer, E. Fromm and T.W. Adorno’s “Frankfort School”: by Nazi supporters, this personality is a product of sadomasochistic psychology, weak with the authority while aggressive against the weak.

It cannot be denied that several movements and ideological trends are born from the fear of foreigners: identity-based, religious, political or cultural hyper-nationalist movements. These collective forces call for not only security policies, but also aggressive state politics to address their anxieties. Cynical state leaders can exploit the masses’ need for security: sometimes foreign threats are exaggerated to win over a greater part of public opinion. By exaggerating the specter of a foreign menace, leaders can conduct aggressive foreign policies that both assuage the popular feeling of insecurity and, moreover, direct attention away from domestic problems towards foreign policy. Exaggerating foreign threats is also a means to limit the scope and the political impact of national crisis. Certain states’ international policies are based on external threats (real or false) that hang over individuals. Recent history has offered several examples of these extremes. The modern side of these early theories is confirmed by constructivist approaches.

Nonetheless, it is not necessarily true that the individual’s nature, anxieties and personal aggressiveness can explain foreign policy without holding the political structures of the state responsible; it is also necessary to study these structures. Several theorists have criticized, or at least limited the scope of Lasswell’s

insecurity theory. For example, Wilckenfeldt's⁸ approach (in his work *Conflict Behavior and International Politics*) drastically limited the possibility of exploiting mass psychology to develop aggressive international policy to totalitarian states. In a totalitarian regime, public opinion is easily manipulated, whereas political mediation, dialogue, free public opinion and the democratic channeling of social conflicts mitigate irrational consequences in foreign policy of democratic states.

Arthur Stein authored, among others, *The Nation at War*.⁹ In this work, he analyzed the influence of crowd psychology on four American wars of the twentieth century: the First World War, the Second World War, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. According to Stein, popular feelings of insecurity do not systematically impact a nation's foreign policy: a case-by-case study must be made. In some cases, war can facilitate a favorable domestic consensus; the enemy becomes the object of mobilization, according to crowd psychology that feels a threat to individual existence (for example, Americans after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941). Several elements must be present for this to be the case: the external threat must affect the entire population, each individual must feel himself to be concerned, and war must not imply excessive sacrifices.

According to Stein, these conditions were only fulfilled during the Second World War: the Nazi and Japanese threat was felt by all and the costs of war were judged proportional to the need for it. After the First World War, by contrast, Americans turned to isolationism and disavowed President W. Wilson, who had to withdraw from his Society of Nations proposals. Despite the support of the United Nations, the population was divided over the Korean War. Finally, the Vietnam War generated increasing disapproval in American public opinion. There was no national consensus on American intervention because the majority of the population did not perceive a sufficient threat and many Americans resented the unbearable economic and human costs of the war. The conclusion is that in a democratic country, it is more difficult to manipulate external threats than in a dictatorship. However, theories of insecurity can also be applied to commercial conflicts.

3. Political Regime Theories

What is particularly relevant for IR theory is the study of the impact of domestic institutional evolution on a state's foreign policy. Since the origins of domestic constitutionalization, in Great Britain, US and France during the seventeenth–eighteenth centuries, several theorists have considered the link between internal democratization and international relations, or simply whether the nature of domestic political regimes determines states' foreign policies.

8 See J. Wilckenfeldt (ed.) *Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics*, New York, David McKay, 1973; esp. *Domestic and Foreign Conflict*, pp. 107–123.

9 A. Stein, *The Nation at War*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, 1980.

This question was first addressed by eighteenth century political philosophers. J.J. Rousseau¹⁰ and Kant (as previously discussed) highlighted the link between international peace and constitutional domestic regimes. Although Rousseau emphasized radical domestic democratization (even at the price of international isolationism), whereas Kant promoted liberalism, transnationalism and a legal international organization, the two agree on the impossibility of creating international peace while tyranny and absolutism persist within states. Domestic constitutional change is essential to creating external peace and a break from the state of international warfare. Any attempt at perpetual peace not based on this principle is naïve and illusory. The negative implications of a sovereign's solitary decision-making power regarding war and peace, without any transparency, couched in politico-diplomatic secrecy underscore this political philosophy. In the eighteenth century, confidence in progress propelled enlightenment philosophers to theorize that peoples, elected parliaments and free and liberal public opinion were more pacifistic than tyrants and absolute sovereigns. However, highlighting the importance of domestic political regime change did not imply absolute confidence in democratic foreign policies; there is no indication that democracies do not also enact bellicose foreign policies. The evolution of domestic political regimes towards democratic constitutionalization is a necessary but not sufficient condition for peaceful foreign policy.

Moreover, when this philosophy is pushed to its extreme (contrary to Kant), reversed priorities – first domestic social contract and second international peace – easily lead to the hesitations found in Rousseau or later Fichte¹¹ regarding multiple republican forms of nationalism. In other words, it can lead to sovereignist and republican nationalism, nationalist revolutionary ideologies, corollary state socialism and the closed commercial state,¹² and in the framework of 1920s–1930s communism, the ideology of “socialism in a single country”. More recently, within dependence theory, S. Amin theorized the “disconnection” of countries in socialist transition from the globalized economy and exterior world, as a necessary context for liberal and egalitarian domestic social contract.

Based on the solid background offered by the Montesquieu conceptualization, the American grounding fathers and notably the authors of the “Federalist papers” (Madison, Jay and Hamilton) focused on the so called “republican dilemma” during the first decades of the history of the US. The institutional set, notably the federal Constitution (with its check and balances) is the best framework of combining liberty and external security, by sharing power and limiting unbound sovereignty (“*jus ad bellum*”). Against the temptations of both isolationism and

10 J.J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract in the Complete Works*, t.III, Paris, La Pléiade, 1964. See also S. Hoffmann and D. Fedler, *Rousseau and the International Relations*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1991.

11 G. Fichte, *The Closed Commercial State*, first edition, Tubingen, Cotta, 1800.

12 See G. Fichtes's influence on German state socialism, particularly on F. Lassalle and protectionist models of developing nations.

international expansionism (loss of liberty), the federative idea, and the practice of a trading nation are conceived as a de facto revision of the European traditional Westphalian system as a combination of anarchy and hierarchy.¹³

In the nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville, one of the most important modern democracy theorists, developed a liberal interpretation of the link between domestic democratic participation and peace by providing a pessimist assessment.¹⁴ He analyzed the implications of participative democracy on foreign policy. Since foreign policy requires prudence, technical knowledge, discretion and competence, democracies are inevitably less coherent in their external policies and more exposed to the influence of irrationality than authoritarian regimes. Though a proponent of democracy himself, de Tocqueville realistically observed that democracies encounter problems in maintaining rational foreign policy because, by virtue of the need for domestic consensus, they are bound by public opinion and a large portion of the population does not comprehend the complex technical workings of international politics. De Tocqueville postulated that democracies, subject to the constraints of public opinion, are not capable of conducting rational foreign policy. Authoritarian regimes, on the contrary, can define foreign policies independent of the citizens' will and under diplomatic secrecy – for de Tocqueville, this is a necessary prerogative of international politics.

The question posed by de Tocqueville – whether democracy positively influences foreign policy – is still relevant today. Democratic pacifists, such as the Norwegian J. Galtung, emphasize the formidable progress accomplished by public opinion in terms of information and conscious participation in major foreign policy issues. Contemporary opinion polls reveal a growing citizens' interest in foreign policy issues and globalization, thanks to new information and communication technologies. Due to the organization, education and development of media, political parties and civil society movements, today's citizens have more access than ever before to information on international relations.

Other theorists have highlighted that comparing the coherence of foreign policies implemented by totalitarian versus democratic regimes demonstrates that the latter allow for greater adjustment to erroneous choices in foreign policy. Democracy is more flexible, whereas dictatorships are rigid in their foreign policy. A democracy allows for the recognition of errors; political elites can correct themselves under the pressure of public opinion and parliamentary opposition.

13 D. Deudney, *Binding Power. Republican, Security Theories from the Polis to the Global Village*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007; G.S. Wood, *The American Revolution. A History*, London, Phoenix, 2005; K. Long, "Security and Liberty: The Republican Dilemma in the Early American Republic", PhD thesis, Université Libre de Bruxelles, May 2009.

14 De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*: "Foreign policy does not necessitate the use of almost any native qualities of democracy and demands on the contrary the development of nearly all the qualities it lacks. Foreign policy ought to be conducted outside of the direct and journalistic influence of the people".

Decisions can be more easily revised, whereas authoritarian regimes cannot allow themselves to appear weak. Political authoritarianism thus leads to errors and greater irrationality in foreign policy.

Democracy and Foreign Policy

These political philosophy questions have been translated corresponding contemporary International Relations theories. European and American analysis has concentrated on Western democracies, the respective roles of individual preferences, public opinion, partisan and parliamentary systems, etc.¹⁵ C. Friedrich,¹⁶ among others, has studied the relationship between national democratic political systems and international politics. He highlighted that foreign policy depends on three institutional levels:

1. The technical and bureaucratic level (diplomacy and government in foreign relations): this is the day-to-day foreign policy of a state, its ministries' various relationships with foreign states.
2. The political party and lobbying level: democratic political debate on a nation's international options.
3. The emotional and public opinion level: this is rarely mobilized on foreign policy issues, except in the case of pressing matters that directly relate to peace, war, economic crises, famine, etc. These types of issues can influence the stakes and decisions of the first two levels.

Along the theories of both Lasswell and de Toqueville, Friedrich did not believe in rational mobilization of the population for a just and pacifist foreign policy. Although the population's emotional involvement can be sincere, the national elites are able of instrumentalizing and manipulating it to resolve domestic political problems.

Bipartisanship and Foreign Policy

A number of other theorists who comparatively study Western democracies have emphasized the impact of domestic partisan systems on international politics. As the majority of Western democracies are evolving towards a model of confrontation between two major political parties (or party coalitions), a fundamental question is to what extent governmental alternation influences a country's international policy.

15 See C. Roosens et al. (ed.) *La politique étrangère*, cited; and notably the contributions of C. Roosens, V. Legrand and T. de Wilde D'Estmael; see also F. Charillon (ed.) *Politique étrangère. Nouveaux regards*, Paris, Presses de Sc. Po, 2002.

16 C. Friedrich, "International Politics and Foreign Policy in Developed Western Systems", in R. Farrell (ed.) *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1966, pp. 97–119.

Several American authors evoke the phenomenon of “bipartisanship” – i.e. the convergence between the two main political parties (or coalitions) on foreign policy issues, rather than domestic divergences. The question is whether and why a certain level of coherence, or an inertial continuity exists in a state’s foreign policy, independent of changes to the governing majority. The traditional realist explanation for this relies on geopolitical interests, or a pre-existing “national interest”. Proponents of bipartisanship propose an alternative, more sociological explanation. In many countries, when the political majority changes, there is no discontinuity in foreign policy because the political system is centripetal: centrist electors (i.e. voters whose beliefs fall in the center of the political spectrum) make or break national elections and they prefer continuity in foreign policy issues. In other words, the competition between parties to gain votes in the political center forces the two opposing blocs to avoid major disruptions and extreme positions in international policy and thus to respect a certain level of moderation and continuity.

Nearly every state shows centripetal tendencies of both parties aiming at conquering centrist voters. Consequently, candidates and newly elected officials often declare a wish to diminish change in terms of a nation’s international commitments and foreign policy. Bipartisanship can thus manifest in both an explicit (agreements between two dominant parties) or implicit manner.

Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies

Comparative studies show that domestic institutional structure is also an important variable: how do the foreign policies of parliamentary and presidential democracies differ? National political regimes have evolved towards a stronger presidency when a country wants to increase its international influence. Presidential democracy looks more internationally effective than parliamentary democracy, because the decision process is more concentrated. Centralized decisions in foreign policy are a function of the country’s international importance and the need for quick decision-making.

Historians who have studied the evolution of the American national regime from its origins until the twenty-first century have noticed a trend beyond the initial Republican dilemma towards what that they call the “imperial presidency” or “imperial republic”, from T. Roosevelt to G.W. Bush.¹⁷ Keohane recently noted the ironies of sovereignty: i.e. that the United States, a country of shared and decentralized constitutional power structure, demonstrates an extreme concentration of decision-making power in foreign policy and security issues; whereas in the European Union, fountainhead of state sovereignty according to Bodin, Hobbes and Machiavelli, national foreign policy decisions are shared and decentralized at several levels. However, in Europe, the noted exception is France

17 A. Schlesinger, *The Imperial Presidency*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1973; and J.G. Wilson, *The Imperial Republic*, London, Ashgate, 2002.

where, under de Gaulle's fifth Republic (starting in 1958), foreign policy became the domain of the president.

The "Double State"

Some of the comparative literature on democracies has also analyzed the importance of non-elected state officials: the secret service, some defense agencies, the army, etc. These unelected agencies establish international cooperation ties and engage in "autonomous" international activity; they create their own networks, often conduct foreign policy outside of any democratic control and have means to influence national foreign policy and international politics. This poses a theoretical problem, addressed by German sociologists Sombart¹⁸ and Fraenkel¹⁹ as the "double state": the modern democratic state has two distinct facets – a liberal side and a side based on the authoritarian notion of state power or the heritage of absolutism. The democratic liberal regime prevails in domestic politics. Conversely, in foreign policy and external relations, a state's action is conditioned by the ancient tradition of state power. Sombart and Fraenkel highlighted the contradiction between these two principles of modern democracies. In many democracies, agency characterized by transparency and democratic controls coexist with decision-making areas cloaked in secrecy and characterized by a lack of transparency. The tensions between these two types of institutional structures and practices affect international relations: also those that escape democratic controls can develop their own networks, foreign policies, often in secret and undermine peace policy.

4. Decision-making Theories

Decision-making theories undermine the concept of state as a rational and unified actor in international relations: they are based on research in organizational sociology and domestic political sociology that shows the complexity of a state's decision-making process in general and, notably, in external relations. When the multitude of actors and internal interests and lobbying that influence decisions is considered, it is evident that these decisions are no longer made by a centralized and sovereign state with a coherent and unitary will (as in the early centuries of the modern European state) but rather are the outcome of negotiations (more complex than a simple left/right political debate) between multiple domestic actors and interest representations.

G. Allison²⁰ studied the influence of the complex decision process on international decision-making in the United States, which is the most centralized

18 W. Sombart, *Der Moderner Kapitalismus*, Berlin, Dunker and Humblot, 1916.

19 E. Fraenkel, *Der Doppelstaat*, Frankfurt am Main, EVA, 1974.

20 G. Allison, *Essence of Decision*, Boston, Little Brown, 1971; R. Snyder et al. (eds) *Foreign Policy Decision Making*, New York, Free Press, 1963.

democratic power in terms of foreign policy and security. Decisions are the result of strict negotiations between several actors: the President, the Secretary of State, the Pentagon, other concerned ministers, advisors and state bureaucracy in the affected policy fields. Negotiations affect the policy implementation process as well.

Research conducted in Europe has gone even further. In several federal European states, sub-state regions develop their own “para-diplomacy” – according to their interests and priorities – that sometimes contradicts the central authority of the state. These multilevel and multi-actor external relations are also the characteristic of the European Union. Decisions evolve in function of the respective competence and relevance of various institutions and actors who contribute to their elaboration and implementation. All contribute to the “external relations system”.

The complexity of decision processes in modern democracies undermines the classic state paradigm outlined by Machiavelli, Hobbes, Bodin, etc, which largely influenced realist theories. Faced with this new complexity, states sometimes attempt to establish rationalizing and centralizing measures, such as reforms to direct this manifold governance and establish a hierarchy reinforcing the center. M. Weber analyzed the influence a charismatic leader can have on the legitimation of decisions. Thus, several democratic regimes have tried to reinforce the weight of the central level of government by universally electing the president of the Republic (USA, France, Brazil and Argentina).

Functionalist sociology explains that the centralized state has suffered profound changes to its internal unity and rationality over the centuries. Like theories emphasizing the multiplicity of institutional actors in decisions, “issue theory” further undermines the state as a rational actor in international relations by including the dimension of private lobbying. Issue theory also considers foreign policy decisions to be the result of negotiations, but negotiations primarily conducted by economic and social interest groups. This theory emphasizes the importance of lobbies, private national (or transnational) companies and networks on political changes, in function of issue relevancy. T. Lowi²¹ classified a country’s (the US) external policy choices according to their degree of coherence:

Fragmentation Model

Internal demands are scattered in various directions as affected interest groups who want to influence decisions are numerous and competing. Pressure on decision-makers comes from all sides and does not concentrate on the same objectives: the decisions taken do not respond to a need for coherence and consistency, but to a

21 T. Lowi, “Ame-The Least Important Issues are Decided According to the Fragmentation Model: This Governs Rican Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory”, *World Politics*, 16, 1964, pp. 677–715; and “Making Democracy Safe for the World”, in J.N. Rosenau (ed.) *Democratic Sources of Foreign Policy*, New York, Free Press, 1967, pp. 295–331.

higher degree of fragmentation; they oscillate over time, according to the shifting demands of various interest groups and changing interest's coalitions.

Polyarchic Model

According to the concept of the famous political scientist R. Dahl,²² there are several centers of institutionalized or structured economic power. Unlike the fragmentation model interest groups have merged to some extent and thus increased their relative importance. Negotiations are a bit more structured and polycentric (nearing a neo-corporatist system of interest representation), but remain necessary between the representatives of different groupings. There are losers and winners according to the matters at hand and the groups' power relations.

Elitist Model

Political and economic elites agree on precise strategic issues according to shared objectives. The most coherent decisions are made according to this model. Wright-Mills described this unity among elites in the United States. Lowy further proposed a classification of international relations issues:

- Day to day business of a country's external relations: Fragmented model.
- The most important issues follow the Elitist model: these are the exception, not the rule. The consensus necessary for coherent decisions only forms around questions that threaten important national interests or, above all, present strategic implications for state security.
- The Polyarchic model regulates other issues, of intermediary strategic sensitivity.
- As an example, Lowy classified the famous Marshall Plan of American economic aid to Europe (1947–1957) within the polyarchic model, although this international policy decision – blocking the spread of Soviet communism – should have been made according to the elitist model. But strategic political priorities did not manage to overcome the strength of divergent economic interests and various national economic lobbies: the Marshall Plan was negotiated between American political authorities and domestic economic pressure groups. However, from 1950 (start of the Korean War), this plan was subject to the political and security priorities of the Cold War. The number of involved actors diminished as the stakes grew more important; it became to a large extent “high politics”. The elitist model must be applied then to fully understand the dynamics of this decision.

22 R. Dahl, *Polyarchy*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971.

Taking stock of the R. Putnam's²³ school of "two-level game" theory, American political scientist Helen Milner analyzed the articulation of domestic and international policies (notably in terms of commercial negotiations within the GATT and WTO, where agreements must be ratified at the national level) by applying the institutionalist rational choice approach.²⁴ Milner incorporated some of the results of the research by Stein, Allison and Lowy – highlighted within her more systematic theory – focused on reciprocal interactions within a domestic/international two-level game. While irrational factors such as fear or perception are hardly taken into account, the impact of history and of information on "players'" choices and preferences is considered as very relevant. Milner drew attention on the difficulty of creating internal consensus on an international agreement and the weight of organized interests and domestic institutional mechanisms. However, this "rational choice approach" is not fostering a synthesis with realism: the very choice to analyze domestic factors undermines the rigid focus of realists on interstate relations, the unitary state actor and the defense of "national interest".²⁵

23 R. Putnam, H. Jacobson and P. Evans (eds) *Double-Edge Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993.

24 H. Milner, *Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997; and "Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American and Comparative Politics", *International Organization*, 52/4, 1998, pp. 119–146.

25 H. Milner, *Interests, Institutions and Information*, cited, p. 261: "Indeed, many realists reject the lessons counseled here. For them, domestic politics should be ignored, because it interferes with the pursuit of realistic principles of foreign policy ... For some realists, then, domestic politics needs to be overlooked because it should not interfere with the statesman's pursuit of the national interest. But this seems a utopian dream".

Chapter 10

The Contribution of European Studies to the Renewal of International Relations Theory

1. After the Cold War:

The New Idealists–Realists Debate and the Nature of US Supremacy

The fundamental historic events of 1989–1991¹ have affected International Relations theory in numerous ways. It is difficult to sum up such historic change and its fallout with a single theoretical approach, as the transition from bipolarity to a new stable world's system begun in 1989 is still not finished and “theories” are often embroiled with “ideologies” – in the pejorative sense, as ways to justify particular interests and biased visions of the world.

Several analysts have affirmed the relevance of systems theory because the historic phase, since 1991, has been dominated by change in the systemic variable: i.e. the end of the US–USSR nuclear confrontation as the dominant variable in international relations. But the causes of this historical change are contested: according to some literature, it could never have taken place without intensified nuclear bipolar competition (after deployment of SS20 Soviet missiles) with missiles and the installation of American Pershing and Cruise missiles in the 1980s, under the Reagan presidency. According to other theorists, the impact of complex interdependence (economic, cultural, media, communication, etc.) on the peoples of Eastern European countries sparked irresistible internal reform movements. In fact, the East–West cooperation regimes and structures (such as the “Helsinki Process”, launched in 1975, and the CSCE – today OSCE) partially explain the birth or growth of opposition movements under the communist regimes – Vaclav Havel’s “Charter 77”, Walesa’s “Solidarnosc” in Poland, etc. (importance of domestic factors, changes within the units as relevant causes of systemic change).

The consequences of systemic change are even more controversial: there has been both a boom of liberal and idealist theories and a revival of several forms

1 In 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall and democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe were followed by the end of European communist regimes; the breakdown of the USSR and, consequently the bipolar system in August 1991. The consequences in Europe were on the one hand, German reunification in 1990 and, in December 1991, the preliminary agreement to the Maastricht treaty (February 1992) that transformed the EC into the EU, including political and monetary union. Finally, the European Council of Copenhagen, in 1993, paved the way to Eastern enlargement and to the wider Europe of 27 and beyond.

of realism. The period immediately following the end of the bipolar world was marked by initial euphoria over the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new era of peace. Francis Fukuyama, a naturalized American author of Japanese origin, wrote *The End of History and the Last Man*,² signaling the climax of this euphoria. In his very ideological work, Fukuyama asserted that the end of the East–West confrontation would lead to the end of warfare and conflicts as milestones of history: following the triumph of liberal democratic values and market economics over fascism and communism, ideological, political and economic conflicts would be swept away. Austrian economist Von Hayek converged with this euphoria while emphasizing its economic aspects as free market capitalism achieved global influence. For Von Hayek, the end of bipolar world signified the victory of market economics over all other forms of alternative economic organization: 1989 was the end of economic history. This type of analysis, an attempt to harmonize economic and political philosophy around free market economy and western democracy was critically popularized in France as “pensée unique” and raised numerous theoretical quarrels.

In parallel, the neo-realist school returned in several forms to the foreground of International Relations after 1989. J. Mearsheimer was the first to propose an updated version of neo-realism after the fall of the Berlin Wall.³ A student of K. Waltz, Mearsheimer contended that the world and Europe in particular, would revert back to its tragic history – i.e. to the pre-Cold War conflicts, of the 1920s and 1930s and beyond. He thus predicted a return to the pre-bipolar system: for example, international wars in the post-communist part of Europe in tandem with civil wars based on ethnocentric and micro-nationalist outbreaks resulting from Soviet empire fragmentation and the break up of pseudo-federal states, such as Russia and Yugoslavia; finally, rising tensions within Russia and with its neighbors. According to Mearsheimer, US–USSR bipolarity facilitated for five decades the containment of local conflicts, whereas the United States’ inevitable retreat from Europe following the end of Cold War, would be accompanied by the disintegration of NATO, and also of the European Community and all international organizations created during and for the purposes of the Cold War. When this happened, Western European countries would revert to conflicts based on spheres of influence, nationalism and micro-nationalism.

It is a matter of facts that the idealist euphoria and the functionalist climate was about to marginalize the question of the nations “place” in relation to citizens and international relations. The break of the Soviet empire gave birth to several new states, nationalism and even micro-nationalism in Eastern Europe, which included the cost of Balkan and Caucasus civil and international wars of the Nineties. That’s why it is important not to confuse Mearsheimer’s outdated extreme ideological interpretation with the contemporary scientific debate on the impact of nationalism

2 F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 1992.

3 J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future”, *International Security*, 15/1, Summer 1990.

in Central and Eastern Europe and inward looking policies and feed backs in some regions and countries of Western Europe.⁴

Considering the first two decades since 1989, the revival of neo-realist theories has undergone two phases. The first, immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, focused on the European Continent. The Balkan and Caucasus tragedies apparently reinforced the relevance of realist theories, as mentioned above. The German unification and revived sovereignty fostered an interesting international debate among historians. Among other the British historian T. Garton Ash addressed the great historical question of the place of new Germany in Europe: in the framework of the *Deutsche Sonderweg* debate (German single way) controversy focused on the possible return of Europe's old demons from history – nationalism, spheres of influence, the end of institutionalized cooperation – and the emergence of a new German Reich in the heart of Europe.⁵

From a related perspective reviving historic continuity, the collapse of the bipolar system and nuclear menace revived the old European “geopolitical” school, characterized by a strict and direct link between political issues and geography. Contrary to systems theories and analyses based on globalization and complex interdependence, geopolitical theories consider geographic proximity and the recurrence of related territorial, border and ethnic disputes, geo-economic interest (understood from a neo-mercantilist perspective) to be the sole explanatory factors of international and geo-strategic conflicts in a fragmented world. Focusing on the territorial dimension of international relations is also to explain as a reaction to functionalist globalization ideologies; however, these approaches are rooted in the old “balance of power” nineteenth century European intellectual framework and the European tradition of state power.⁶ Empirical research based on geography is appealing indeed, even though it leads to theories of national interest and international anarchy and fragmentation.

But a number of analysts questioned these hypotheses and ideologies. For example, several scholars, among them, Ralph Dahrendorf and Stanley Hoffmann considered that the 1989 events in Eastern Europe were not limited at all to the narrow

4 On this debate, see E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1983; E. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, London, 1990; A.D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1986; B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London, Verso, 1983; J. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, London, Macmillan, 1991; J. Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

5 Ibid.; T. Garton-Ash, *In Europe's Name*, London, Random House, 1993.

6 The roots are in fact various: German (F. Ratzel, *La géographie politique*, Paris, Fayard, 1923, English (H. MacKinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, *Strategique*, 55, 1992), American (A. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Boston, Little Brown, 1890; N. Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace*, New York, Harcourt, 1944; and more recently, S. Brezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, New York, Basic Books, 1997). The French review *Hérodote*, edited by Y. Lacoste, and the Italian review *Limes* revived this approach.

circle of leaders and elites but included large people's movements and revolutions. By 1989, democracy was reinforced as well as important developments in both civil society participation and transnational movements and networks. Hoffmann contended that the more democracy develops, the less aggressive foreign policies become. Countries of Central and Eastern Europe such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are currently essentially democratized and peaceful. The EC/EU largely contributed to Eastern stabilization and created a framework to manage and prevent conflicts: the Slovaks and Hungarians arrived at a bilateral entente agreement on Hungarian minorities; the same was true of Hungary and Romania. This democratic upsurge, associated with the mentioned external factors, induced changes in Europe – both within states and in terms of international relations. The history of the following decade included multiple conflicts and crises; however a gradual pacification of the European continent was largely achieved within 20 years of the fall of bipolar Europe, thanks to reinforced cooperation and institutionalization of inter-state and transnational relations – which shows the weaknesses of both the preceding interpretations.

A second source of the neo-realist revival was the new global backdrop of “international disorder”, according to historian E. Hobsbawm.⁷ A dual debate developed: on one side, the return of classical “balance of power” and “containment” doctrines, particularly anti-Chinese; on the other, a new vision of realism focused on inter-cultural conflicts that, *prima facie*, characterized the post-Cold War period and new century. This latter approach was widely talked about in the media, as it coincided with the emerging debate on new Islamist menaces. According to the famous American political scientist S. Huntington,⁸ the world entered into a new phase with the end of the Cold War where conflicts are no longer between states. His analysis, based on a new form of realism, argued that post-bipolar conflicts are between civilizations. In the contemporary world, he categorized 15 civilizations, or groups of states that share the same cultural values. Of these, five civilizations run the highest risk of conflict: on the one hand the Western civilization, and on the other, Islam, Orthodox Christianity of the Slavic world, Chinese Confucianism and Hindu civilization.

According to S. Huntington these civilizations could unite states sharing their culture and religion, and provoke potential conflicts, notably with the Western one, coveted for its technical, technological, economic and military supremacy. In a world increasingly confronted by a kind of globalization perceived as “Westernization”, there are both winners and losers: a union of states sharing the same cultural values and taking refuge in religious fundamentalism may form wherever there are losers from modernization. Intermediary countries straddling two civilizations,

7 E. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century (1914–1991)*, London, Abacus, 1994.

8 S.P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations”, *Foreign Affairs*, 72, 1993, pp. 22–49; and *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996.

such as Russia, Turkey, Mexico, etc. can be particularly devastated by conflict between civilizations. Huntington thus recommended that American and Western politicians prepare for hard conflict, particularly with Islam.

This work was heavily criticized by the international scientific community for combining scientific analysis with predictions and “ideological” recommendations for decision-makers. Cultural sociologists provided some of the most marked criticisms of Huntington’s theory. For instance, the German sociologist T. Meyer conducted analysis based on a Lijpart survey on several countries belonging to diverse civilizations:⁹ Huntington’s conception of cultures is typical of German nineteenth century romanticism, e.g. Herder. He presented them as monolithic entities, devoid of internal nuances and contradictions. He ignored the inter-cultural interdependence that has developed via media, immigration and globalized economics during recent decades. Cultures identified merely according to languages and religions no longer exist. Sociological differences in terms of values and behavior are often more important within a single “culture” than between two or more. Rigid separation between cultures precludes understanding the dynamics of cross-border ties and intercultural interplay. Several real phenomena escape notice under Huntington’s catastrophic thesis: e.g., Westerners’ defense of Bosnian and Kosovar Muslims in former Yugoslavia even against Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croates; of the ability of the Indian Congress Party of democratically maintaining a multi-religious India against extremist terrorism.

However, the rise of communist China and of Chinese nationalism – China’s supposedly peaceful power, but whose growth and economic strength outstrip all predictions – the emergence of India despite the conflict with Pakistan (a potentially nuclear conflict since 1998), repeat crises in the Balkans and Caucasus, the apparently powerless international nuclear non-proliferation regime, the multiplication of weakened states, etc. have all reinforced realist diagnoses based on anarchical fragmentation of the international system. Security threats seem to take precedence over analysis of global humanitarian challenges such as poverty, contagious diseases, environmental decline and human rights violations (as denounced by Kofi Annan in his famous United Nations speech about the “Millennium goals” of 2000). Gradually increasing domination of security issues on the international agenda – after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the G.W. Bush “declaration of war” against informal Islamic terrorism and three states identified as the “axis of evil”, Iraq, Iran, North – clearly indicated changing international agenda and cultural climate. However, it is important to note that neither K. Waltz and the neo-realists, nor other major American theorists supported the Bush administration’s choices in terms of the war on terror, including in Iraq – a war based on an unprecedented mix of the perceived national interest with a kind of Wilsonian discourse on the US’s imperial democratic mission, which had not

9 T. Meyer, “Cultural Difference, Globalization and Regionalization”, in M. Telò (ed.) *EU and New Regionalism*, cited, pp. 55–73.

very much to do with the realist and neo-realist school (but rather was based on the lobby of neo-conservative ideologists).

What happened in the international post-Cold War agenda, beyond the limits of the ideological and political controversies of the G.W. Bush era? Uncertainties prevail as both political and economic disorder is concerned. Both address the question of the nature of US leadership in the twenty-first century. On one hand, a large body of literature, including Keohane and Habermas among others, focuses on the dramatic issue of “humanitarian intervention” as a common challenge for the international community protecting human rights against malevolent and beyond the classical Westphalian concept of sovereignty. On the other hand, the three post-bipolar wars – the 1991 Gulf War to liberate Kuwait from the invasion of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the March 1999 war led by NATO to protect the Kosovar population from Serbia/Yugoslavia, and the 2003 Iraq war of a “coalition of the willing” led by the United States – look and were very different in terms of international legitimacy, scope and actors. A convergent scientific debate has arisen on the effectiveness of multilateral economic sanctions against dictators violating human rights.¹⁰

Secondly, a still open debate was fostered by the emerging dark side of globalization, notably its only partial benefits and the critical consequences of 30 years of uncontrolled deregulation. The huge problems met by the WTO Doha Development Agenda and new international economic chaos have aggravated trade and economic disputes between powers and regional blocs: on the one hand, the European Union and the United States were openly and successfully contested for the first time in Cancun (WTO, 2003) by emerging economic powers. On the other hand, they differ on a number of commercial issues: the three main commercial poles – US, Europe and East Asia – are in competition in several areas. Emerging economies are accused of dumping and their exports are behind protectionist movements in European, American and Japanese public opinion.

In this context, two factors have revived the debate on the nature and scope of American power between the end of the twentieth and the early twenty-first century. The central importance of the US’s “New Economy” during the Clinton administration in the 1990s, against the backdrop of globalization and the American military breakaway during the first decade of the twenty-first century (according to SIPRI ranking of national military spending, the United States’ military budget alone is larger than the combined budgets of the next 10 countries, that is 50 percent of the global military expenditure). This has led to the US’s qualification as the only remaining super-power and fostered a very pluralist debate on “American empire”, including both supporting arguments and hard criticism. The risk during the Bush administration was, however, to exaggerate American power, neglecting

10 L. Martin, *Coercive Cooperation. Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992; R. Pape, “Why International Sanctions Do No Work?”, *International Security*, 2, 1997, pp. 90–136; R. Haas (ed.) *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1998.

both its internal flaws and external limits and failures, by comparing it to historic empires such as the Roman or British, or with the golden age of US hegemony between the Second World War and the 1970s.¹¹

We have to remind that during the 1980s the opposite exaggeration was prevalent, underestimating the US might and focusing on US decline. The first part of this debate was opened by Paul Kennedy's work, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*¹² in which he addressed the decline of American power in relation to the European Community and Japan. Keohane had elsewhere launched this debate in his work, *After Hegemony*: in fact, in the mid 1980s the United States was both politically and economically losing steam. Since August 1971 (under the Nixon administration), the US could no longer maintain gold to dollar parity due to the elevated cost of the Vietnam War (thus, the end of the Gold Standard). Beginning in the 1980s, Japan and the European Community provided new competition in capitalist economy. The EC launched the Single European Act in 1985–1986 and the US perceived it as a "Fortress Europe", that is an emerging threat. These types of fears continued to grow. The P. Kennedy's question was: would European and Japanese economic power lead to competitive politico-military strength?

With the aim to underpin his prediction of US decline, P. Kennedy's work encompassed a comparative study of the five last centuries of world history, focused on the development of certain powers and stagnation of others, which facilitated his analysis of international power's economic basis. The book rapidly became an International Relations classic because it addressed the ties between economic modernization and politico-military power. Kennedy first tried to understand the path that the West followed as a whole to become the center of the industrialized world today. In his study of the sixteenth century, Kennedy targeted six potential candidates for global hegemony (that he, at least formally, considered equal): the Ming Empire in China, the Ottoman Empire, the Mughal Empire (in India), the Moscow Principality and the Habsburgs' Europe. Five centuries later, the West had risen to power (the distinction between Europe and the United States did not become a factor until the late twentieth century) thanks to its economy, technology, individualist values, liberty and capacity for innovation.¹³ The United

11 See P. Bender, *Weltmacht Amerika. Das Neue Rom*, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 2003; U. Spec and N. Sznajder (eds) *Empire Amerika. Perspektiven einer neuen Weltordnung*, Munich, DVA, 2003 with contributions from J.S. Nye, Ch. Meyer, N. Ferguson and neo-conservative authors such as M. Boot. For a critical analysis of these works, see P. Hassner, *La terreur et l'empire*, Paris, Seuil, 2003, 2 vol. See also N. Ferguson, *The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power*, London, Basic Books, 2003. For a critique of "empire", see A. Negri and P. Hardt, *Empire*, Boston, Harvard College, 2001 (see Chapter 4, p. 65).

12 P. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*, Washington, Random House, 1987.

13 This complex process is explained by technological superiority, but also by a psychological trait characteristic of the West: the modern Western individual who wants to travel, discover, learn and conquer. Kennedy thus explains the basis for world discovery and conquest: curiosity, Western openness and technology rendered them possible.

States embodied these values in the twentieth century. However, he noted that domestic economic modernization is more important than military supremacy. According to Kennedy, Europe and Japan would gradually become better armed to face the future due to their economic and technological strength, whereas the United States was doomed to decline, unless the end of Soviet Union in 1989 could strengthen the United States. In effect, since the fall of the Berlin wall and collapse of the USSR, Japan and Europe, with the new Germany at its center, have grown stronger; the EC/EU has become the “second global player”.

However, P. Kennedy was too quick in his assertive conclusions. There is no longer the evident decline of American power that was experienced during the 1970s and 1980s. The US has still prevailed in terms of technology, military and economy. The American economy experienced a cycle of rising growth between 1990 and 2008. Before the hard crisis of 2008–2009, American unemployment reached a low of 4 percent, while it rose to 10 percent in Europe during the 1990s and Japan’s economy stagnated for ten years. Europe lagged behind US as the ICT’s and their application to an innovative knowledge society are concerned. The political-military power under the G.W. Bush administration took a quantum leap forward, including the tripling of the defense budget.

All in all, American primacy does not equal the American hegemony of the 1940s–1970s: today’s world is characterized by great heterogeneity, where unipolar trends exist but are accompanied by contradictory, multipolar, multilateral and fragmentary tendencies. For both domestic (popular refusal to support the costs) and external (the emergence of new challenging powers) reasons, the United States’ international role has profoundly changed, regardless of the various administrations at any time. Rather than hegemony on the international scene, it is more accurate to characterize the US as an international leader with economic and military supremacy, but also subject to the several limits to American power proscribed by J.S. Nye.¹⁴ The United States has neither managed to stabilize the global economy (as it successfully did from 1944 to 1971 contrary to the first decade of the twenty-first century), nor to militarily manage the world’s political challenges; nor has it succeeded in attaining its own objectives (such as peace and stable democracy in Iraq) and it is often perceived by external partners as responsible for deficits of financial, economic and political governance. For all of these reasons, it is no longer possible to seriously speak of an American hegemony in the scientific sense of the concept (see Chapter 5, point 4), nor of American Empire, save in metaphoric and journalistic comparisons.

A large literature is differing from these two extreme positions (US decline or US empire). For example, Keohane’s work *After the Cold War*¹⁵ and the already

14 J.S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power. Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone*, New York, 2002.

15 R.O. Keohane, J.S. Nye and S. Hoffmann (eds) *After the Cold War. International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe. 1989–1991*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1993.

mentioned *After Hegemony* constituted two important milestones. By his 1992 book, he demonstrated that, contrary to the realist predictions, European states' choice in favor of cooperation structured the period after the Cold War, most notably the choice of Germany, the state most strengthened since the upheaval of 1989–1991. Forty-five years after its Second World War defeat, the new “Berlin Republic” chose to share its recovered sovereignty with other members of the new European political and monetary union as it finally achieved reunification. Germany's choice revived the institutionalist studies discussed above.¹⁶ The reinforcement (both widening and deepening) of European cooperation institutions – via the February 1992 European Union treaty (the Maastricht treaty) and single currency, the Amsterdam Treaty in June 1997, the Nice Treaty in December 2000, the next constitutional debate; and the pan-European level, of OSCE, Council of Europe, etc – does not respond to a pure cost-benefits calculation by states, but also to trends in historical responsibility, ideas, institutional dynamics, that favored these state choices, based on domestic dynamics and transnational networks.

On the global level, Keohane, in his new Preface to his 1984 book, adopted his approach to the challenges of a new controversial international system: although global organizations continued to strengthen during the 1990s, since September 11, 2001, the United States has exercised its political and military power outside of international multilateral institutions like never before. Military superpower minimized the G.W. Bush administration's perceived need for cooperation. Then, the United States has often distanced itself from multilateral organizations in whose very creation it played a decisive role after the Second World War (the UN and Bretton Woods organizations, occasionally the WTO).

In reaction, the main European allies, notably France, Germany and the EU institutions, have tried to resist the exercise of unilateral American power and the world no longer waited for the United States to advance multilateral cooperation (e.g. the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court). Between 2002–2005, transatlantic disagreements and rifts have grown to a level without precedent since the Second World War.¹⁷ Keohane argued that the rules of the global game decided from necessity without the United States will be different than they would have been with collaboration by the great American power.

However, the unilateralist approach's failure became a powerful argument in favor of multilateralism in the Obama's US starting in 2009, which is opening a new era in transatlantic cooperation. Multilateral organizations are increasingly in demand from national and transnational public opinion to insure financial and economic stability, maintain peace, fight against poverty, develop welfare and act against capital punishment and in favor of human rights and international law.

16 P. Katzenstein (ed.) *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1997; A. Moravcsick, *The Choice for Europe*, cited.

17 R.O. Keohane, new “Preface” to *After Hegemony*, second ed. 2004, cited.

2. EU Studies and Comparative Studies on Regional Cooperation

Comparative studies are bridging between European Union studies and International Relations and are showing that the EU is not at all to be considered as an isolated “case study” within the emerging multipolar world.

There are two systemic variables to consider in analyzing the nascent twenty-first century world: the above-mentioned emerging multipolar heterogeneous world and the controversial globalization. Globalization is a many faceted phenomenon: technological (“distance-killing” technologies or ICT’s), financial (unification of a highly deregulated global financial market, major increases in liberalizing direct foreign investment), commercial (weakening of protectionism and global commercial liberalization), but also social (migratory flux), communicational (internet and global media) and cultural (the “global village”). But the spade of globalization in the 1990s, and the reinforced external constraints on and opportunities for national economies that resulted, interplayed with neo-regionalism, the new wave of regional cooperation between neighboring states that is underway on every continent. However, we need to stress two distinctions.

Without neglecting this systemic link between regional associations of states on the one hand and on the other, globalization, it is important to distinguish the concepts of “regionalization” and “neo-regionalism”. “Regionalization” refers to an economic process and is a direct side of globalization. The Marrakesh agreement (signed April 15, 1994 and enacted January 1, 1995) established the World Trade Organization and, in article XXIV, officially recognized the regional dimension of globalization. The idea that came out of this article (in continuity with the previous GATT, 1947) was that regional arrangements favoring liberalization constitute a step in the right direction, i.e. liberalization on a global scale. On the contrary, the concept of “neo-regionalism” refers to a more complex, political, multidimensional and “bottom-up” phenomenon that has expanded in the post-Cold War and even in the post hegemonic era. It generates common policies and strategies among public authorities in participating neighboring states. It responds to technical globalization, but also political globalization of great powers and the globalist policies conducted by the United States, among others.

Second, how is “neo” regionalism opposed to old regionalism? Three types of regionalism appeared in twentieth century international relations history:

1. The first was states’ authoritarian response to the 1930s economic crisis: militarist Japanese imperialism, which began by expending to Manchuria in the 1930s, before spreading throughout the Asia-Pacific region, from Indochina to Indonesia, from New Guinea to the borders of India in 1941–1945; Nazi regionalism that would occupy and reorganize all of Europe in the early 1940s (except Great Britain; and by special arrangements with fascist Spain and Portugal and neutral Sweden) according to a single authoritarian principle aiming to impose a new fascist European economic and political order.

2. Starting in 1944–1947, within a new framework established by the global multilateral Bretton Woods institutions (IMF, GATT, World Bank), the first regional organizations and alliances were created under the support and the political and security hegemony of the United States: this was the case in Latin America, South-East Asia with SEATO and Western Europe, with the founding treaties of the European Economic Community (1952 and 1957). A multilateral commercial project was set in place with the GATT, sensitive to member states' need for domestic consensus, and also quite tolerant of some national and regional protectionism.¹⁸
3. “Neo-regionalism” appeared in the 1980s and 1990s:¹⁹ the United States no longer wielded the hegemonic capability to sustain the international liberal economic system alone. Thus appeared a post-hegemonic – and sometimes defensive (as illustrated by the European decision to create a zone of regional market and a regional monetary stability) – new form of regionalism. The systemic change of 1989–91 strengthened this tendency in a remarkable way, by providing regional cooperation with new room of maneuver. A new balance between the United States, Japan and the European Union was constructed, in favor of the EU (transformed into the single market in 1987 and political and monetary union in 1992). Other examples of neo-regional integration include:
 - MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) that groups Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Venezuela, Uruguay and two associated states, Bolivia and Chile.
 - NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) that associates Canada, the United States and Mexico.
 - SADC (Southern African Development Community) including South Africa, Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
 - ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) that groups Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Cape Verde, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

18 After 1945, Central and Eastern Europe also experienced a second authoritarian, anti-liberal and anti-multilateral regionalism: COMECON. The Soviet project based on state control to plan the communist allies' economies was an illusory form of authoritarian regional response to economic development issues. This regionalism was based on central organization of imports and exports, and with the Warsaw pact, on limited sovereignty that gave the USSR the right to interfere with its allies when it deemed necessary.

19 See B. Hettne et al. (ed.) *The Global Politics of New Regionalism*, 2005; M. Telò, *Europe and New Regionalism*, cited, “Introduction”.

- SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional cooperation) including Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
- ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) that groups Brunei, Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
- CER (Closer Economic Relationship) between Australia and New Zealand.
- Andean Community, including Bolivia, Columbia, Equator and Peru.

This list is far from exhaustive.²⁰

These organizations are multidimensional and multiform, in function of internal, historical, geographic and economic variables. But several common features exist among these models of regional cooperation. Both internal and systemic causes, endogenous and exogenous factors, have favored the emergence of regional arrangements. There are four important domestic causes of regionalism: pressure from national and transnational business communities, demands from domestic social movements, decisions made by states (primarily the larger states) and the domino effect (emulation of or reaction to other regional entities of the world).

Business community networks, the functional dynamics of lobbying and the convergence of sectoral interests create strong internal pressure indeed. Relevant economic groups desire the benefits of a larger regional market, without running the risks of global competition: they see regional market as a welcome intermediary step. Furthermore, for the poorest countries of a region, regional cooperation is a means to catch up to regional averages: indicators of regional convergence are important in this respect. Regionalism proved effective by conflict prevention.

However, in every regional organization there is internal asymmetry that benefits one principle state: the US in NAFTA, Brazil in MERCOSUR, South Africa in SADC, India in SAARC, Indonesia in ASEAN and Nigeria in ECOWAS. Regional integration is also a means for the most important state to reinforce its influence on the international scene and to recover part of its sovereignty that is threatened by globalization. Realists underline that regional arrangements could legally formalize the role of the region's dominant state. But smaller countries also benefit from regional integration, which gives them access to a larger market and often provide them with a power surpassing their size.

Institutional systems vary greatly. Generally these organizations feature multilateral intergovernmental institutions, embodying new "multilevel governance". Each association is based on treaties signed by its member states who remain the dominant players. The degree of institutional elaboration varies from one arrangement to another, but intergovernmental regime building remains the dominant rule. The dynamic of regional organization is proportional to states' political will and impetus, notably in matters of commerce and shared policies.

20 See Appendix, providing details as the structure and objectives of each grouping.

Regional organizations are often based on measures that increase political mutual trust between the two most important states and prevent military conflicts (by surpassing the security dilemma and state of international anarchy): this is true of Franco-German relations, Argentine-Brazilian relations (with an eye to successful denuclearization) and relations between South Africa and its neighbors. It is not the case in SAARC where the two most important states (India and Pakistan) are in open military conflict over Kashmir. In ASEAN, old and more recent conflicts between Indonesia and Malaysia, or Vietnam and its neighbors have mostly decreased. ASEAN gave birth to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which discusses regional security issues together with China, Japan, the US, the EU and India. Although very informal, ARF has become a sort of cooperation institution for the most sensitive security issues. MERCOSUR gave birth in 2004 to a larger process bringing to UNASUR a security cooperation arrangement among all the South American states, which could be able to regionalize peace keeping missions as the one in Haiti.

The “domino effect” manifests when regional cooperation is a response to (or emulation of) other regional organizations’ development throughout the world. For example, NAFTA, formed in 1994, was the American response to fears of “Fortress Europe”, as a result of the 1987 Single European Act. In creating NAFTA, the US managed to shield Mexican markets from Europe. ASEAN was also created in a climate where both the domino effect and imitation played a role. The domino effect constitutes an intersection between internal and external factors.

As to external causes, globalization has developed at regular intervals since the 1980s, with peaks of international economic instability: for example, the obstacles that cropped up during the multilateral negotiations of the Uruguay Round (1990–1995) and the “Millennium Round” in Seattle (WTO summit failure in December 1999), Cancun (2003) and in the next phase of the Doha Development Agenda, strengthened regional cooperation as an alternative to a global agreement. These failures created the conviction in certain states, including the EU and other regional groupings, that stronger regional integration is necessary not as a fully alternative path, but in order to increase their negotiating power for future multilateral negotiations, or to look for a way out of hard economic crises.

The end of the Cold War is another systemic factor that has facilitated the development of neo-regionalism on several continents; for example, ASEAN’s revival, MERCOSUR, the development of SADC – originally an anti-apartheid alliance that transformed to a regional organization including South Africa as a principle country. Of course, the European unification was underpinned by the American allies throughout the Cold War as a strategic partner against the Soviet nuclear threat; since this threat dissolved, Europe has inevitably gained greater autonomy and room for maneuver. In general, the end of the Cold War is a systemic factor that created conditions favorable to both nationalist and ethnocentric fragmentation and to the emergence of new national and regional actors and, in particular, to multilateral cooperation processes at multiple levels – i.e. “bottom up” regional cooperation in the absence of American hegemony.

Last but not least, interregional cooperation between Europe and other continents has also developed. Interregional agreements link regional or national partners belonging to different continents. EU has founded four interregional processes of cooperation. ASEM with East-Asia since 1996, the “Rio Process” with Latin America (not only MERCOSUR and the Andean Community, but also with Mexico, Chile and Central American/Caribbean states since 1999), the “ACP Process” with 78 of the world’s poorest nations, mainly African; finally, the “Barcelona process” with the southern rim of the Mediterranean. Interregionalism used to be a distinctive EU contribution to global governance. However other global players as the US and China are about to build their interregional ties. US unsuccessfully tried to build up an interregional arrangement with Latin America (FTAA) and a large free trade area of the Pacific (APEC). In parallel (and in light of difficulties within WTO negotiations) South-South relations have been reinforced within the G20, and new cooperations are manifest between Brazil, Russia, India and China; India, Brazil and South Africa; Brazil and Arab nations. Bilateral arrangements are spreading up as trade liberalization is concerned: Theorists have qualified this system of complex relations as “multilevel governance”, or more negatively “a spaghetti bowl”: the post-hegemonic world could be devoid of not only a center and hierarchies, but of any form of order. Two major questions are the present focus of comparative research on neo-regionalism.

First, what impact do regional organizations have on their member states? Does regional integration weaken or strengthen the state? There is no single answer to this question; it requires differentiated analysis. Two schools of thought have addressed this subject, especially in the European case. According to the first, in line with functionalism and neo-medievalism, regional organizations weaken states and redistribute authority elsewhere – above, beside or infra the state level. According to this approach, regional integration diminishes national sovereignty and strengthens the regional authority above all as an economic entity. The state is weakened both internally due to reinforced sub-state or sub-national entities and externally with the increasing power of supranational, international, transnational and multinational authorities. The second school, including English historian Alan Milward (*European Rescue of the Nation State*) and American political scientist Andrew Moravcsik (*The Choice for Europe*), maintains that regional organizations strengthen states. The European unity allowed for the restoration and reconstruction of member states after the Second World War and has been instrumentalized to increase states’ authority and legitimacy. Moravcsik estimated that the EU has created international regimes that reinforce state sovereignty because states remain the main players in the regional game; for example, France is often cited as instrumentalizing regional cooperation (in terms of Common Agricultural Policy, African Policy, etc.). The overall issue is broader, however, and pertains to the role played by larger states within all regional organizations (Brazil in MERCOSUR, Indonesia in ASEAN, South Africa in SADC, India in SAARC, etc.).

In reality, both interpretations are partially true and partially wrong. It can be concluded that the state is transformed within the framework of regional

cooperation, particularly (but not only) if the institutionalization process is advanced and deep. The state can no longer act without regional cooperation and state preferences are modified by intergovernmental regimes and regional networks: these transform states' domestic and external competence, force states to adapt their structures and functions to the new regional and global backdrop. State preferences are positively conditioned. Conversely, states' weakening and even collapse in other parts of the world (as in Somalia, Afghanistan, Colombia, etc.) compromises the creation or development of regional cooperation. Weak states generate weak regional organizations.

Second open debate which deeply links European studies regionalist studies and international relations: what is regionalism's impact on globalization? Here again there are two opposing schools. The first claims that regional cooperation among states is a defensive reaction against globalization: it constitutes protectionism motivated by fear, to avoid being marginalized or crushed by global competition. In fact, regional associations are sometimes conflict with global multilateralism. Moreover, some theorists as J. Bhagwati contend that regionalism limits and jeopardizes globalization.²¹ Others support the opposite hypothesis. According to Larry Summers, former US Treasury Secretary and Harvard university president, regional agreements and globalization go hand in hand: regional organization is an excellent forerunner to globalization because states deregulate at the regional level and thus prepare for global liberalization.²²

In actuality, no doubts that regional cooperation diverts commerce to its functional partners and geographical neighbors via "preferential trade agreements", in opposition to the principles and universal rationale of global free trade. But, studied with a multidisciplinary approach, especially if combined with a European point of view, the outbreak of regional cooperation in the current partially globalized world appears incontrovertible. And this for both economic and non-economic reasons of which Europe is the primary (but not the only) example: e.g. Asian and Latin American financial crises in 1998–1999 pushed member states of ASEAN and MERCOSUR to develop deeper ties through regional organizations on the two continents. The IMF – the very symbol of globalization – wanted to oblige countries to enforce structural adjustments, which provoked serious critiques and regionalist reactions. Moreover, global constraints, especially those dictated by the IMF, are easier to negotiate for a regional cooperation association than for a single state. Regionalism has proved pertinent in both top-down and bottom-up processes and has proved capable of managing social, political, cultural and regional identity demands, conflict prevention and management and the manifold needs of common belonging between neighboring nations.

To resume, regionalism is a multilateral, multidimensional and structural component of the emergent multilevel global governance, notably since the

21 J. Bhagwati, *Free Trade Today*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002.

22 L. Summers, "Regionalism in the World Trading System", in R. Garnaut and P. Drysdale (eds) *Asia Pacific Regionalism*, Pymble, Harper, 1991.

end of the Cold War; it is a fundamental political (transforming states) and economic (transforming commercial flows) phenomenon, although its causes and consequences can be quite diverse according to the various context.

3. EU, as a Blueprint of New Regionalism and Multilateralism

Regionalist comparative studies are bridging two separate research fields in an innovative way: EU studies and International relations. Between the 1950s and 1980, research about European construction used to be compared only with federalist studies, according to the hypothesis that the European integration process essentially was a federal state in the making, a replication of the US constitutional process. By contrary, understanding EU as a regionalist “model” (in Weber meaning: an ideal-type, a reference) is making the communication with other continent regional cooperation possible. This new approach is influencing International Relations theory in three ways:

- Spreading of regionalism reinforces international cooperation and limits anarchy; furthermore it goes beyond a simple intergovernmental regime because of its multidimensional characters (commercial, economic, social, political and cultural).
- It results in both institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation and transnational networks based on bottom-up social and cultural demands and convergence of transnational interests emanating from the business community (despite the fact that the degree and forms of institutionalization vary greatly, even on the same continent).
- In addition to its endogenous causes research focus on exogenous economic and political pressures that are systemic (globalization and international instability).

However, the concept of EU as a model could be a misleading one. The European Union is not the uncontested model of regional integration and cooperation: comparative research has shown that each regional association follows its own path, contrary to B. Balassa’s 1961 evolutionary schema, according which all regional integration processes would follow the same steps and itinerary, that is the European path.²³ However the EU is recognized by the comparative studies as a laboratory, notably the most advanced experiment in terms of highly institutionalized forms of regional integration and cooperation. Of course, Europe’s tragic twentieth century common history provided a unique background as unification factor. But the EC/EU experience is nonetheless a very important example of sophisticated solutions,

23 B. Balassa, *The Theory of Economic Integration*, London, Greenwood, 1961; for a critique, see R. Higgott, “Alternative Models of Regional Integration”, in M. Telò (ed.) *EU and New Regionalism*, cited, pp. 75–105.

complex forms of shared sovereignty, common policies, post-national democracy, post-national citizenship, etc., which rise some interest outside Europe too.

The EU not only constitutes a reference point for other regional associations, sometimes generating imitative or competitive reactions. Moreover, the EU conducts proactive external policies to diffuse regional cooperation practices throughout the world. So as mentioned above, the EU promotes regionalism by fostering interregional agreements with other regional groupings or regional leaders in Latin America, Africa and Asia. This is a deliberate policy that has experienced both success (such as MERCOSUR–EU relations and ASEM) and failures: the “Barcelona process” did not result in the anticipated free trade zone and EU regional cooperation with both the Southern Mediterranean and the Arab world remains very fragile.

The EU also tries to promote regionalism through development cooperation, as illustrated by the most recent reform to the Lomé Convention (Cotonou, 2000), which groups 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). The ACP states have a special relationship with the EU via preferential trade agreements and development aid. The most recent version of this agreement favors regional cooperation between neighboring states (for example in Africa) and enacts the concept of “conditionality”. Certain types of European aid to ACP countries are conditionally tied to the level of progress achieved in terms of regional integration by these countries, further illustrating the EU’s conscious policy of regionalization in the world. European Commission functionaries travel to export EU know-how, and regional policies are supported by subsidies. Some experts criticize what is perceived as Europe’s “counter-hegemony” that tries to balance US international power or as a “hub and spokes” model undermining global governance.

These processes are very important for theories of International Relations. If regionalization continues to develop and strengthen neo-regionalism as a political phenomenon, both the anarchy of the international system and hierarchical/unipolar trends are subject to revision, as a pluri-centric world, with multilateral cooperation on multiple levels (regional, interregional and global) increasingly develops. The question is whether the post-Cold War world could move towards multilevel global governance, or a multilateralization of multipolarism.

What is the EU understanding and practice of multilateralism? Europe, the birthplace of multilateral cooperation since the nineteenth century under British hegemony (see Chapter 1) is a case of successful internal multilateralism after 1950. On one hand, EU intergovernmental institutions, the European Council and the Council of Ministers are evolved forms of traditional diplomatic practices. On the other, the EC/EU constitutes a special, regional and in-depth form of multilateralism.

“Multilateralism” is not a simple tool of foreign policy among others: it is understood as a very relevant example of international relations institutionalization: an “institutionalized collective action by an inclusively determined set of independent states” and a “persistent set of rules that constrain activity, shape

expectations and prescribe roles”²⁴; and, “an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct ...”²⁵

According to this definition, consistent with the EU internal practice, the size of an association does not affect its multilateral nature. Furthermore, multilateralism is an institutionalized form of cooperation between states based on two principles:

1. The principle of non-discrimination in terms of costs and benefits (not necessarily synonymous with universal membership) which implies “generalized principles of conduct” rather than differentiated rules and norms à la carte, or case by case.
2. The principle of “diffuse reciprocity”, according to which actors expect advantages in the short, medium and long terms, which can manifest in several different domains. This implies a certain level of reciprocal trust between partners, contrary to specific bilateral reciprocity.²⁶ However, there is a possible link between specific reciprocity and diffuse reciprocity.

All regional associations are multilateral organizations, with personnel, headquarters and a budget. Several multilateral organizations were created in Europe since 1945: the OEEC (created in 1947 with 16 member states: membership was required to benefit from the Marshall Plan), the Council of Europe (founded in The Hague in 1948 and pan-European since 1989/90), the ECSC (1952) and six-member EEC (Rome Treaty, 1957), the alternative model of EFTA (1960, nearly expired), CSCE (or Helsinki process since the 1975 conference, transformed into the OSCE in 1990 after the fall of the Berlin Wall) and finally the European Union. Is the European multilateral set isolated or a driving force innovating the various levels and forms of extra-European and global governance?

24 R.O. Keohane, *The Contingent Legitimacy of Multilateralism*, cited.

25 J. Ruggie, “The Anatomy of an Institution”, in J. Ruggie (ed.) *Multilateralism Matters*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 3–49. This implies that regional groupings in the form of preferential trade areas that create a certain degree of trade discrimination between “insiders” and “outsiders” can also be considered multilateral. The same is true for NATO, which meets the indicated conditions. See also E. Newman, R. Thakur and J. Tirman (ed.) *Multilateralism under Challenge?*, Tokyo, UN University Press, 2006.

26 J. Caporaso, “International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations”, in J. Ruggie (ed.) *Multilateralism Matters*, cited, pp. 51–90.

4. Sovereignty in Question: The EU Political System as an Innovative Model

The European Union institutional system features relevant originalities in terms of sovereignty: on the one hand, member states launched the process of European integration and remain the rulers of the European treaties, which continue to succeed one another for nearly 60 years and demand unanimous democratic ratification;²⁷ but the member states do not entirely control the system by their intergovernmental multilateral regime building as the European institutions have a partially autonomous dynamic:

1. Multilateral intergovernmental institutions (the Council of Ministers and the European Council) are part of a system that also includes supranational institutions: the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice.
2. The European judicial system is supranational, based on two principles that go beyond international law: “direct effect” (for member states, but also for EU citizens) and “primacy” of European law in case of conflict with national law.
3. According to EU treaties, the Council of Ministers itself decides an increasing number of issues according to qualified majority voting procedure (QMV) rather than by unanimous vote or consensus.
4. The EU is based on dual legitimacy, emanating from both its member states (Council) and its citizens (see the still unique case of the European parliament as a regional democratic assembly directly elected by citizens). This aspect, closely related to the issue of European citizenship, gives a special role to citizens’ national and transnational participation.

Some argue that these specificities define the EU as a *sui generis* multilateral regional organization because they imply “pooling and sharing” of national sovereignty in several policy areas where supranational policies and procedures limit national sovereignty – at least in areas of exclusive EU competence (e.g. monetary policy, commercial policy, competition policy) and shared competences.²⁸ Member states do not give up their sovereignty, but agree to delegate it to the EU multilateral bodies. However, they maintain exclusive competence for the most part of social policy,

27 The ECSC treat signed in 1950, the Rome Treaties (TEC and Euratom Treaties, signed in 1957), the Single European Act (1986), the Maastricht Treaty (TEU, 1992), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the Nice Treaty (2000), the Lisbon Treaty (TEU and treaty on EU functioning, signed by 27 member states in 2007), following the failed Constitutional Treaty (signed by 27 member states in 2004, but rejected by two via referendum in 2005).

28 M. Telò, *L'Etat et l'Europe*, Brussels, Labor, 2005; W. Wallace, H. Wallace and M. Pollack, *Policy Making in the EU*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005.

fiscal policy, education, cultural policy, foreign policy and defense. In these areas, the EU is limited to supporting measures and coordinating national policies.

This dual nature of the EU institutional system underpins the theoretical debate that has divided functionalists and intergovernmentalists for decades. However some convergence is emerging. Functionalists revived the early E. Haas's theory, but accord greater importance to institutional dimension in the convergence of transnational socio-economic interests.²⁹ Intergovernmentalists apply rational choice institutionalism (see Chapter 6.4) and intergovernmental costs-benefits calculation (both by their respective "choice for Europe" and in the following permanent negotiations process) to EU analysis; however, they also consider the relevance of EU institutional dynamics and community agencies' partial independence from member states.³⁰ Judicial studies³¹ on the legally constrictive force of European convergence have also contributed to this new phase of European studies.

Beyond the very early debate between federalists and confederalists (which imported US-centered cleavages) the EU system implies not only a more and more complex multilevel governance, but also several modalities of regulation (from the community method³² to monetary centralization, from regulation by social dialogue to intergovernmental cooperation and the more recent Open method of coordination) according to how much competence member states afford the EU – both in the treaties and in the practice – according to the principle of "subsidiarity".³³

Common institutions and share of competences between the states and the Union thus are increasingly central to debate on both the evolving European states and the nature of the EU system with its specific model of shared sovereignty.³⁴ This is not the first historic example of shared sovereignty between multiple levels of authority. From Bodin to Hobbes and Rousseau, the various state sovereignty

29 P. Schmitter, W. Streeck, F.W. Scharpf and G. Marks, *Governance in the EU*, London, Sage, 1985.

30 A. Moravcsick, *The Choice for Europe*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1998.

31 J.V. Louis, "La Constitution de l'Union européenne", in M. Telò (ed.) *Démocratie et construction européenne*, Brussels, University of Brussels Press, 1995; J. Weiler, *The Constitution of Europe*, New York, 1999.

32 After J. Monnet, "community method" means: Commission monopoly of initiative; qualified majority vote in the Council, European Parliament co-decision; EC Court of Justice Competence.

33 According to the principle of "Subsidiarity", the upper level of governance is of application only in case the lower level is non appropriate and inefficient. W. Wallace, H. Wallace and M. Pollack (eds) *Policy-Making in the EU*, cited; P. Magnette, *What is the EU? Nature and Prospects*, London, Palgrave, 2005.

34 This also explains the multiplication of EU definitions: a "federation of nation-states" according to O. Beaud, an "intergovernmental federalism" according to J.L. Quermonne (*Le système politique de l'UE*, Paris, Montchrestien, 2001), a "mixed government, including democratic, technocratic and intergovernmental dimensions" according to M. Telò (*EU: A Civilian Power?* cited, Chapter 5).

classics have judged this principle intolerable. But Montesquieu, Althusius and other theorists of federalism or of “mixed government” have envisaged multiple forms of shared sovereignty. Comparing the EU to federal states is thus legitimate, notably to the United States whose constitution provided the first example of modern Republic sharing national sovereignty between the central government and states for over two centuries. Important policies, such as monetary policy, remained decentralized to member states for over a century after the creation of the US. It was not until the end of American Civil War in 1865 and the victory of the A. Lincoln’s Union that federal thinking won out over confederate tradition (represented among others by John Caldwell Calhoun, 1782–1850, US vice president). The classical Republican dilemma framed and conditioned the US emergence as an international power for some decades; however, it must also be noted that the United States centralized foreign and security policy at the federal level from the beginning, whereas in Europe these remain the hard core of member states’ competence.

Contrary to the federalists and functionalists’ teleological expectations, the wish expressed in the European Community’s Rome Treaty (see Preamble, 1957) “to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”, did not result in the construction of a United States of Europe or an explicitly federal constitutional system. Despite successive treaty revisions, at the dawning of the twenty-first century federal aspects coexist within the EU with typical multilateral regional intergovernmental features, although it is an in depth multilateralism. This status and originality which limit comparison with federal states, and necessitate consideration of the great body of comparative literature on regional organizations in the world, call for innovative thought in International Relations.

Other reasons further nuance similarities between the EU and federal states. The EU budget is in 2009 only 1 percent of member states’ GDP, compared with 20 percent in the US. European citizenship is a form of second degree citizenship (it can only be obtained by citizens of member states) and the European Parliament, despite its continuous strengthening, does not enjoy anywhere near the powers of a national parliament electing a national government. The complexity of its decision process and its decentralization, particularly in foreign policy, the mixed legislative and executive powers, distances the EU system from state models, even federal states.

Nonetheless, the conclusion can be drawn that Westphalian sovereignty is no longer in force within the EU system and a new balance between states’ and European institutions’ powers, between unity and national diversity is being created.³⁵ This balance or “new European model” of shared power is not characteristic of federal states. According to a number of analysts, and not merely functionalists, the process of European integration remains open-ended; others maintain that despite the theoretical importance of the European example, a viable

35 P. Magnette and E. Remacle (ed.) *Le nouveau modèle européen*, Brussels, University of Brussels Press, 2000.

and achieved alternative to the Westphalian model has not yet emerged.³⁶ Changes to European state sovereignty are nonetheless irreversible; they affect member states' national sovereignty but also their structures, functions and competences. The limits of unification have also become clearer with the successful, but nonetheless challenging EU enlargement towards the East and the South; an enlargement that is almost multiplying the number of Member States by three compared with the Maastricht treaty and has accentuated Europe's internal diversity.

This "new European model", including both internal settlement and external policies, is not a marginal issue at stake for International Relations theorists. Why is Europe undergoing the most important transformation of the sovereign state³⁷ since its origins and the origin of the Westphalian paradigm?³⁸ In short – and at least at a first glance, in a paradoxical way – even the strongest and most euro-skeptic states, behaving according to an instrumental view of the EU (rational choice institutionalism), need the European Union in order to recuperate part of their sovereignty that has been lost *de facto*³⁹ (due to globalization); and also to reinforce their legitimacy to citizens by improving their economic and commercial performance, even at the price of ultimately diminishing their sovereignty (freely delegating it via the treaties). Furthermore, as mentioned, history matters: the ideas and unique historical context determined by Europe's tragic past, as well as the challenges of the international environment, including challenges to identity, weigh heavily in the dynamics of unification.

Thus it can be concluded that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the innovative process begun in Europe and its new forms of power constitute a challenge for International Relations theory (and that they are important for European comparative studies with other continents), whereas the birth of a European federal state, a United States of Europe – prior to 1989 (with a clear transfer of member states' sovereignty to the federal state) would have been of limited scientific interest and communicational force.

5. Beyond the Classical Inside–Outside Distinction

One of the main challenges that European integration presents for the classical conception of state sovereignty is the end of rigid separation between internal and external spheres of policy – i.e. between domestic and international politics. This is principally for two reasons:

36 H. Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and its Competitors*, cited, Chapter 9.

37 S. Leibfried and M. Zürn (eds) *Transformations of the State?* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

38 J. Bartelson, *A Generation of Sovereignty*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995. Bartelson draws attention to the impact of the state sovereignty crisis on our image and understanding of it.

39 This does not imply the end of *de jure* sovereignty (see the Introduction).

First, within the EU itself: initially European policy was directed by member states' foreign affairs ministries; later Prime Ministers became directly engaged in the European Council (1974) and this body has been increasingly institutionalized until in the 2004 Constitutional Treaty (and the 2007 Lisbon Treaty) it became a full-fledged part of the EU institutional system. In addition, with time nearly all national ministers have come to consider their participation in the Council both routine and decisive for the elaboration of national policy: after 60 years of integration, a significant part of national legislation depends on the European level. Furthermore, the shared European political sphere, fuelled by transnational networks (business, cultural, partisan, social and religious associations, unions, lobbying, etc.) though depending on national public spheres, conditions member states policies and domestic politics. The German philosopher J. Habermas proposed the expression "domestic foreign policy" to describe this fundamental transformation.⁴⁰

Second, European policies have a significant impact on an international scale, both for neighboring countries and for global governance. EU internal policies (competition, common market, agriculture, the third pillar, etc.) are the EU's primary factor of international influence – even if no longer as an economic giant opposed to a political dwarf – which substantially modifies the conception of external policies in favor of broader, more civilian view and practice. Moreover, the decision process in foreign policy is very decentralized and prevents the EU from competing with classic states in terms of security, defense and *stricto sensu* foreign policy. But the EU's impact on the international environment is nonetheless broad and profound, both where its objective capabilities generate *de facto* influence (European GDP is equal to or greater than that of the US, around 12 billion Euros in 2006, the same for its commercial strength, around 20 percent of the global market; also due to the size of the EU internal market, etc.) and where it exercises conscious influence through unified policy: common commercial policy, monetary policy, competition policy, cooperation with developing countries, humanitarian aid.⁴¹

The small early European Community was inevitably an introverted regional project limited by the Cold War backdrop, even though its founding fathers – P.H. Spaak, J. Monnet, R. Schuman, K. Adenauer and A. De Gasperi – already aimed at a political union. To define its external influence, Swedish sociologist

40 J. Habermas, *After the Nation-State. A New Political Constellation*, Paris, Fayard, 1998. On the innovative character of the EU experience, see also F.H. Hinsley, *In Sovereignty*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985.

41 For a deeper analysis of both the influence of the EU as such and the impact of the EU external policies, see M. Telò (ed.) *The EU and Global Governance*, London, Routledge, 2009.

G. Therborn suggested Europe was the “World’s Scandinavia”⁴² – i.e. an original civil laboratory, legal area and socio-economic example compared with the United States and Japan. But these limits were exceeded after 1989–1991.

Since the end of the Cold War, the EC/EU is situated within an increasingly globalizing world, and it has managed to show the way towards a more regulated humanized and institutionalized form of globalization. The EU’s eastern enlargement to include ten Central European states (2004–2007, plus two Mediterranean states) is part of the process of opening to the challenge of globalization. According to J. Delors – EU Commission president during the crucial years between 1985 (Single European Act) and 1995 (Maastricht treaty implementation and enlargement overture) – the very existence of the EC/EU as such and its capability to regulate a nearly continent-wide area already constitute decisive contributions, an example bottom-up, to global governance, especially as this goes hand in hand with the influence of Europe’s socio-economic and democratic model. But since the end of the 1990s, both policy-makers and the scientific community have begun to recognize that the EU’s responsibilities, interests and ideology constitute a “new deal” in foreign policy, requiring greater coherence and external weight in both domestic policy and foreign impact.⁴³ A broader and richer conception of Europe’s global role is emerging that is better adapted to the collapsed distinction between internal and external spheres.

6. Civilian Power and Structural Foreign Policy

The EU’s new political reality as second global actor further calls into question the traditional notion of international power. Hobbes’s absolute conception of power was first challenged by a European relative conception of power: power is the ability to change another’s behavior. Power only exists in terms of relations with another actor; simple possessing capabilities is not sufficient. In addition, the idea that economic power prevails on the cultural; second, that and politico-military power dominates the economic power is also contested by the EU practice. Beyond the case of the EU, is this hierarchy well adapted to the globalized twenty-first century world? According to a large part of the literature of International Relations analyzed above, nothing is less sure: both in terms of its means and its ends, power is a growing subject of international debate.

In the American context, J.S. Nye invented the concept of “soft power”, based on imitation (i.e. setting an example) and persuasion, as compared with “hard”, material (economic and military) power.⁴⁴ He noted more than 20 forms of soft

42 G. Therborn, “EU: World’s Scandinavia ...?”, in *EU and New Regionalism*, cited, pp. 277–93.

43 See Chapter 3 in M. Teld, *EU: A Civilian Power?*, cited; and “The Lisbon Strategy: Reaching Beyond Europe”, *Estrategia*, 22/23, 2007.

44 J.S. Nye, *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, 2004.

power, including culture, ideas, scientific exchange, cinema, private foundations, the spontaneous influence of American values, Nobel Prizes, etc. Nye did not elaborate the distinction between power and influence. But the question arises whether this American concept is fit for the EU: in the United States, soft power is only the second facet of a political authority that possesses economic and military hard power, that is coercive material power that stems from the American might or from the tradition of the “Imperial Republic”.⁴⁵ It is generally recognized that the EU is very far from possessing comparable military hard power. The European Union thus requires a new theoretical concept, better adapted to its status as an unprecedented international actor in terms of external action – such as “civilian power”.

The concept of civilian power must first be differentiated from normative ambiguity and confusion with ideas such as “gentle” power or “normative” power that arose during the 2003–2004 political debate on the “US/Mars” vs. “EU/Venus”. In International Relations theory, “power” has neither positive nor negative value implications. It is in reaction to these idealist ambiguities that several analysts emphasized the “imperial” power of the EU – the number two international actor with commercial, monetary and economic force comparable to the US.⁴⁶ From this perspective, “civilian power” is better adapted to the small and modest EC of the past than to the contemporary actuality of the EU (despite H. Bull’s warning against overestimating the EC power in its first decades).⁴⁷

The concept of “civilian power” should also not be confused with the ideas of “civilizing power” – spreading the Western “good word”, originally a Eurocentric concept (“good vs. evil” from the old colonizing ideology). This normative understanding is, to some extent, similar to various American missionary visions from W. Wilson to G.W. Bush.⁴⁸ Even confusion with the concept of “post-modern power is theoretically misleading”.⁴⁹ The idea that Europe is a laboratory for new visions of international relations cannot be based on either a unilateral affirmation of the supremacy of European values, or on the unrealistic opposition between the post-modern continent and the Westphalian outside world.

45 J.G. Wilson, *The Imperial Republic*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2002.

46 It’s the continuation of Galtung’s old EU criticism, *Superpower in the Making*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1973; Scandinavian scholars are very sensitive to this argument, see F. Soderbaum and B. Hettne, “Civilian power or soft imperialism?”, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 10, 2005, pp. 535–52. In the tradition of economic liberalism, the EC is accused of commercial imperialism via preferential trade agreements with a number of countries on five continents. See J. Bhagwati, *Free Trade Today*, Princeton University Press, 2002.

47 H. Bull, “Civilian Power Europe. A Contradiction in Terms,” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1/2, 1982, pp. 149–64.

48 K. Postel-Vinay, *L’Occident et sa bonne parole*, Paris, Flammarion, 2005.

49 R. Cooper, *The Postmodern State*, London, Demos, 1997; also in the negative sense, R. Kagan, *Paradise and Power: Europe and American in the New World Order*, London, Atlantic Books, 2003 (including the famous metaphor “US/Mars” vs. “EU/Venus”).

A more comprehensive and concrete concept of civilian power should entail not only civilian international values and objectives – peace and cooperation rather than increased relative power and domination – but civilian means and an encompassing analysis of its numerous roots in European history, institutional system, socio-economic model and practices of external influence:

- First, according to a constructivist approach, historical memory and self perception matter; and discursive institutionalism emphasizes their institutional impact. The self-critical aim to break with the European history of *Realpolitik*, and notably with aggressive nationalism, which provoked two world wars and the Holocaust is rooted in all the member states. Of course, it is particularly strong in the consciousness and constitutions of the Second World War's losers (Germany, Austria, Italy), however shared with a number of small countries and pacifist traditions (Benelux and the Scandinavian states) and former dictatorships (Spain, Portugal, Greece, parts of Central and Eastern Europe) and (not without difficulties) speaks even to the former great powers, France and Great Britain. Europe plays for the two latter also the role of a substitutive channel for global ambitions, notably after the decline following the decolonization process. A relevant question for research is how to balance discontinuity and continuity in the Continental history, in other words how to combine the analysis of the 30 years of the dark Europe (nationalist and fascist) and the long term process of civilization of the European society of states, including the European experiments in multilateralism under the Concert of Europe.⁵⁰ However, the theoretical consequence is that history and its perception to some extent explains the European responsible foreign policy, identified with the values of peace and democracy and beyond mere power politics.
- Values are interplaying with intergovernmental regime building in a more profound way than elsewhere in the world. The legal bases for national policy convergence are in part bilateral (Elysee Treaty of 1963 and the fundamental Franco-German reconciliation) and in part multilateral treaties: the declaration of values in the Rome EEC Treaty and the objectives of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty establish a special link between the EU and the values of the United Nations and International Law. These elements have allowed for several interpretations: emphasis on the legal dimension of European integration, Habermas's research on European "constitutional patriotism", the definition of the EU as a "normative power", i.e. a power that contributes to establishing norms and rules of global governance: democracy and the protection of human rights, opposition to capital punishment, battling

50 See Chapter 1.

climate change and poverty, etc. This normative dimension conditions the EU's international identity and external expectations,⁵¹ at least in part.

- However, the institutional system is also an argument in favor of EU as a civilian power by default (and not by choice). The decentralized decision making system, far from any state model, is conditioning the European way of external acting and is a major reason to re-conceptualize Europe in the world. As stated, there are many reasons the EU is not and never will be a classical political and military power: its complex decision-making system above all, its deep and complex internal multilateralism and inability to declare of war (*jus ad bellum*) – the supreme act of political sovereignty where power decides citizens' life and death. This symbolic act of Westphalian sovereign power is and will remain off-limits to the EU, regardless of its institutional reforms and degree of military cooperation.
- The means of EU power as a counter-model to realist and Westphalian thought. As mentioned, the EU also has distinctive power capabilities, while the politico-military dimension is only a marginal aspect of its role in the world. The soul and the hard core of its international influence is Europe's internal socio-economic reality; this is rooted in its common policies (competition, common market, agriculture, commercial, etc.) and the way it relates to its neighboring and distant partners via multiple cooperation agreements. This version of foreign policy has been called "structural foreign policy", to highlight that it focuses on long term, not short term goals – i.e. to gradually change the conditions of others' action; it is based on civilian and not military means; its objective is to reinforce cooperation, agreements, international regimes and the diffusion of multilateralism on every level. This policy does not exclude the coercive dimension: "conditionality" in terms of benefit deprivation; while not based on military means, it can still effectively change the comportment of other actors (private or state). Offering access to the rich European market or imposing customs tariffs on a third country can radically change the partner's economic and social conditions.

Critical observers note that the strength of EU military resources has increased since the Maastricht and Nice Treaties, particularly with the decision to create a Rapid reaction force (1999), the development of ESDP and geometrically variable cooperation between states, progress towards a European Armaments Agency, the clause of solidarity in case of attacks, and the multiplication of global missions implicating European troops or police forces. According to some analysts, the

51 I. Manneters and S. Lucarelli (eds) *Values and Principles in European Foreign Policy*, London, Routledge, 2006; see also A. Sapir's interesting work, *Fragmented Power*, Brussels, Bruegel, 2007. On the identity question, see F. Cerutti and E. Rudolph (eds) *A Soul for Europe*, Leuven, Peters, 2002, 2 vol.

nature of European power is slowly changing with the expansion of its military means toward a “normal power”. However, structural foreign policy remains largely dominant and most agree that military support only goes so far as to bolster the credibility of European civilian power, as in the case of “Petersberg Missions” the legal framework limiting every EU external intervention.⁵² Thus the EU is becoming an unprecedented type of power, rendered merely more reliable by ESDP.⁵³ In further evidence of this trend, national defense budgets have clearly continued to diminish since the end of the Cold War, particularly in Germany, and states’ defense expenditures are often irrational (double employment, lack of programming and appropriateness to threats, etc.). Last but not least, democratic domestic legitimacy matters as confirmed by the proven impossibility for any national or European leader to substantially increase the amount of military expenditures, with a corollary reduction of budgets related to the Welfare State and redistributive policies.

- Inside-Outside: the weight of the social model for the international profile. Thus, regardless of the possible rationalization of military expenditures and the size and number of external missions, there is long-term, factually repeated limit to EU hard power. Rather, the European social model – above all as compared with the inverted proportional percentages of social and military expenditures in the United States – is the main explanation for the civilian nature of European power and international identity.⁵⁴

Is this change of the nature of international power exceptional and isolated? As noted above, Susan Strange already drew attention to the changing nature of international power,⁵⁵ and B. Badie commented on the proven impotence of classic power resources, even the most modern and technologically sophisticated such as those employed by the United States since the Cold War.⁵⁶ The classic understanding of power and traditional wars have come and gone. Even new forms of terrorist violence are dispersed in informal and non-territorial networks – simply employment of classic military means cannot contain them.

“Structural foreign policy” also means cooperation policies, or “cooperative power”⁵⁷: this is a type of power that does not consider antagonism between actors inevitable and acts to reduce international anarchy or the hierarchies and inequalities of resources. Changing the way power is exercised can result in a

52 Humanitarian missions, peacekeeping and establishment, included since Amsterdam (1997) in the Treaty on European Union, articles 11 and 17.

53 J. Howorth, *The ESDP*, London, Palgrave, 2007.

54 See M. Telò, *Europe: A Civilian Power?* cited; Chapter 3 – reference to a dialogue with Habermas on this subject.

55 See Chapter 3.

56 B. Badie, *L’impuissance de la puissance*, Paris, Fayard, 2004.

57 See Chapters 4–5.

reduction of conflicts. This is true for the EU because power is exercised (at least in part) conjointly and multilaterally by all member states and its primary objective is to reinforce international multilateral cooperation on both a regional and global scale. As stated by Keohane in the Preface, “Power can be seen as a resource pertaining to actors or as referring to the quality of a relationship between actors; it can be ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ in Joseph Nye’s terms – depending on force and economic resources, on the one hand, or emulation and persuasion on the other; it can be viewed in zero-sum terms as the ability of one actor to control another or seen as the ability to act collectively, which implies the possibility that the overall amount of power in a system can be a variable”. However, the development of “cooperative power”, particularly European civilian power, could lead to a decrease in hard (politico-military) power of other world actors, including the US, China and Russia. It proves that the modern world is not post-Westphalian, but rather in transition. The growth of the EU (and of new regional actors) is part of a gigantic worldwide redistribution of power.

The legitimation of EU foreign policy and external relations is also typical of the nature of its power. The current phase is one of transition: in the EU, the demand for democratic controls on external relations by NGOs, political parties, unions, associations, social movements, national and European Parliaments is the strongest and most permanent in the world (specialized commissions, information sharing, public debate, etc.). On the other hand, the limits to European foreign policy legitimacy are clear: the EU has neither a charismatic legitimacy (due to the decentralized decision process) nor a traditional legitimacy (as a new type of power) and the treaties’ legal basis for legitimizing international action is quite modest: the limited power of the European Parliament on CFSP questions indicate how strongly external relations are relegated to classic diplomacy. Although analysts and *Eurobarometer* indicators have shown that citizens desire greater EU responsibility on an international level, and external expectations demand a more proactive EU role in the world, the EU’s international collective identity is not comparable to national identities (i.e. justifiable to give one’s life for one’s country): this undermines the substantive legitimacy of its external actions.

In addition, the limits, oscillations, contradictions and incoherence of EU international policy,⁵⁸ the absence of a regional and global strategy⁵⁹ and the open-endedness of its institutional reform and enlargement policies necessitate theoretical prudence: the concept of “incipient civilian power” – a new power *in the making* – is more realistic and better adapted to describing the EU today.

58 Rooted in the diversity of national traditions and interests. See C. Hill (ed.) *The Actors in European Foreign Policy*, London, Routledge, 1996, underlining the multiplicity of actors and levels of European foreign policy: for example the very different national policies of Great Britain, France and Germany on UN Security Council reform.

59 A preliminary step in this direction is the European Council’s strategic Solana document, *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*, December 2003.

Last but not least, a new type of international actor can only emerge if the external conditions, i.e. the international system, is ready. Systemic conditions did not permit it during the Cold War, which is why H. Bull criticized F. Duchene's conception during the 1970s–1980s.⁶⁰ Since the collapse of the USSR nuclear threat, Europe is no longer locked in a subordinate alliance with the United States, but nonetheless the EU absolutely cannot develop in isolation from the international system: it exists as a non-state actor among other heterogeneous actors, many of whom still practice classical state sovereignty. American impact, exercised unilaterally or through the Atlantic alliance, remains fundamental and asymmetric, even if its influence on European autonomy has diminished. On the other hand, China and India are emerging as new regional and global actors blending “*realpolitik*” and multilateralism, nationalism and cooperation, force and partner consensus. In Asia, the Westphalian world is far from obsolete, despite the EU's contributions (refusal of “containment” agenda in favor of vast cooperation policy) to its multilateral evolution.

In conclusion, from a European perspective, the main challenge for contemporary regional studies and International Relations research actors is deepening multilateralism within the multipolar and/or unipolar post-Cold War world. The question is whether the EU and other actors' interests and values are marginal if the world order cannot evolve past the Westphalian paradigm. But this requires a new systemic background and a new, more effective multilateralism that is more open to third world and regional actors and more sensitive to normative democratic and human rights criteria. Although Europe is no longer the center of the world, the EU's destiny is still a captivating part of the evolving international order, which cannot advance without some reference to the institutional laboratory represented by the European perspective.

60 F. Duchene, Europe's role in world peace, in R. Mayne (ed.) *Europe Tomorrow*, London, Fontana, 1972; see also H. Bull's critique, Civilian power europe. A contradiction in terms, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, cited.

Conclusions

1. The European Perspective

The European perspective in International Relations implies both continuity and discontinuity with the achievements of the past and with research abroad. As to continuity with the past: the foremost objective of this book is to offer a clear and critical presentation of the rich pluralist history of research in International Relations. It lays out the discipline's epistemological complexity of debates that have revolved throughout previous decades and highlights its profound connection with major issues that humanity continues to confront today: peace and stability, international justice and reducing poverty, advancing democracy and human rights within the states and among the states. It is, in my opinion, essential for European and global publics to understand these trends and controversies of contemporary political science, even though after first being addressed in Europe they were mostly developed in the United States after the Second World War (due to the US's central role in the global system after 1945).

The common thread throughout this work, for the most part discreet and indirect, is the question of whether a distinct European perspective on International Relations exists and is relevant to the discipline's progress and problem solving research. Every scholar defends a point of view, whether explicitly or implicitly. In his work on scientific methodology (*Objectivity in Social Research*, Random House, 1969), Nobel Prize winner Gunnar Myrdal recommended that each author openly declare the values and subjective factors that inevitably influence his work. In the case of European authors, nationality and personal history, as well as the tragic history of the old continent, necessarily affect theoretical priorities, surveys of existing literature and the critical approach. Even if, as in my case, teaching and research experience on other continents distance one from Eurocentrism, every European author is unavoidably marked by Europe's long common history and perception of current challenges: from antiquity and the Roman Empire, with its ability to project Greco-Roman culture on a quasi-continental scale to the fundamental invention of capitalism, trade and banks at the end of the Middle Ages; the Renaissance Enlightenment and Age of Empires; the short and contradictory twentieth century – the most violent in European history during the first half, but most peaceful in European history after 1945, with the success of European integration.

The European background and context are unlike international relations history and issues on any other continent, even in the United States which was created from a projection of European civilization but has lived a very different history since its independence and development as a global superpower. The dynamics

of East Asia are certainly foreign, where vestiges of the Cold War remain and balance of power thinking dominates security systems in the Northeast (Korea, China, Japan), Southeast (China, ASEAN) and South (India, China, Pakistan). To a certain extent, these contextual differences explain the various accents and perspectives present in debates on International Relations theory. Systemic and unipolar approaches, neo-realist or neoconservative in nature, are more rooted in American universities and the US public sphere than in Europe.¹ “Back to the future” approaches, based on the concept of eternal multipolar balance of military power, have been revived in the Far East and India and explain a number of joint misunderstandings.²

2. Distinctive European Contribution to the International Research Agenda

What about discontinuity? This book argues that European integration studies entail an innovative research agenda for International Relations. I suggest is both a distinction and a bridge for European studies and International Relations. On one hand, it is necessary to move beyond introverted understanding of European integration studies and previous emphases on the uniqueness of the EU experiment. However, the risk is to paradoxically converge with classical realist thought – notably the US neo-realism – and render deepening intra-European multilateral relations a simple case study, irrelevant for other continents or the global scale of governance. On the other hand, it is stressed in every chapter that when internal EU cooperation is assessed from an outward-looking approach, European integration and cooperation studies are by far the best confirmation of three general trends:

1. Possible cross fertilization between various schools of thought, from realism to functionalism, from constructivism to institutionalism.
2. The fecund bridging between European integration studies, comparative research on regional cooperation in the world and International Relations – evidence that the EU’s regional multidimensional arrangement is not isolated, but an advanced workshop of the general trend towards regional cooperation among neighboring states.
3. Increasing focus on the institutionalization of transnational and international cooperation, regime building and state sovereignty pooling, that European studies underpin.

1 A. Verdun, “An American/European Divide in European Integration Studies”, in *Journal of European Public Policy*, 10, February 1, 2003, pp. 84–101.

2 H. Kubo and T. Kimura (eds) *The Future of European Studies in Asia*, Kansai, ASEF 2008. See articles by Professor Dai Bin Gran and Professor R. Jain respectively about China and India.

My conclusions regarding the innovative impact of EU studies on International Relations are positive but not pretentious. Effectively, the European perspective can only create a discrete and indirect undercurrent, like a new form of the Kant's eighteenth century idea of progress. Within the international community of scientific research, an idealistic plea for Europe and its role in the world would be just as misguided as a Eurocentric vision of International Relations that ignores the enormous historic change of the last few decades and the shifting of the global center towards the Pacific. As a research agenda, what is understood by "European perspective" can be outlined in three concluding hypotheses:

1. I've laid out a balanced and pluralistic interpretation of various schools of thought. Without any form of eclecticism, I consider there to be no incompatibility or radical opposition between the realist, institutionalist, constructivist, etc. schools presented here. Rather, they are complementary and only serve to highlight different aspects of reality, like an early twentieth century cubist painting. In Europe, these various theories are generally manifest and expressed in less extreme forms than in the United States. It was thus that E. Carr and R. Aron developed a rich and open-ended research agenda that surpassed the conventional image of realism. Constructivism is also of European origin, and European integration studies have confirmed its relevance and complementariness with other schools of thought. Institutionalism is European in both its Kantian roots and national avatars (notably English), and its focus on multiple organized forms of in-depth cooperation between states and transnational actors. Neo-institutionalist research has also increasingly engaged the other schools, as variants within a common theoretical framework, in recent work to go beyond simplified international anarchy.
2. The European perspective is also evidenced by the typically European manner of using the historic facts and cultural optics of successful regional cooperation to relate to issues on a global scale. For many economists, regionalism can be summed up in trade relations; but the EU is more than that – it is a model of multi-dimensional regional integration between neighboring states for 60 years. This evidence inevitably undermines essential concepts of political science including national sovereignty, its limits and joint exercise. And even more importantly, it compromises the theoretical adequacy of the Westphalian paradigm, which has dominated International Relations for three centuries through multipolar and bipolar systems. In light of their specific history, Europeans can hardly fail to establish a direct link between their internal multilateral experience of pacification and democracy-consolidation and the current difficult and contradictory global multilateral renewal. But I am guarded against rhetorical flights of fancy on "postmodern" or "cosmopolitan" or norm-setting Europe – a new version of Eurocentrism. On the contrary, states remain the primary actors in Asia and the Americas; and even in Europe

they have been transformed, but not surpassed by the EU. Violence is by no means disappearing from international relations. Rather, it is singularly true of Europe that the unique background created by the Second World War and its consequences allow J. Monnet's "community method" (supranational integration procedures) to be created and to flourish to the extent that there has been not only a constitutionalization process implicit in European treaties since the founding "Schuman declaration" of 1950, but also a realized ambition to expand the European project to a nearly continental scale.

Born during the Cold War, European integration has experienced widening and deepening since 1989–1991 and notably after 2004; it has also taken on new dynamics in terms of regional response to globalization. Nonetheless, a single case does not justify a new generalized theory, even less so as several states in the last two decades (notably the US and the newly emerging states) do not take distance from unipolar or multipolar perspectives based on classical models of power. The essential question thus becomes the European Union's place and role within the international system in transition. The EU will have its place only if the outside world gradually evolves – even if gradually and by alternative ways – in a post-Westphalian direction towards peaceful cooperation compatible with the civilization of international relations, i.e. the limitation of risks linked to exaggerated nation-state sovereignty (N. Elias). In this case, the European perspective would easily amend existing theories and contribute to the development of new approaches.

3. Thirdly, this is why the European perspective in International Relations draws attention to advancing international cooperation, negotiation, regimes, compromise between respective interests and the importance of shared values to relations between states and individuals. At the dawning of the twenty-first century, the impetus to surpass simple fragmentation or hierarchies in international relations is not a uniquely European phenomenon. The annex to this book illustrates the empirical basis of important trends towards cooperation, multiplied organizations, associations and agreements between states (30 before 1914; 70 in 1939; 1,000 before the end of the Cold War; several thousands after 1989–1991). Throughout the world, at both regional and global levels, multilateral cooperation is advancing; this forcefully raises theoretical and practical questions about the limits of sovereignty, and its restrained and responsible exercise through reinforced cooperation between states, transnational actors, individuals and civil society. Thus Europe is nothing more or less than the most advanced case of a wide-spread and complex tendency. The debate between rationalist, historic, sociological and discursive schools of institutionalism seems to most accurately represent this reality, even with all its problems and unanswered questions. International and civil society

cooperation also represents hope for a planet increasingly confronted by global challenges and dramatic emergencies.

Finally, debate between systemic theories that focus on international issues is enriched by foreign policy theories that draw attention to domestic factors of international politics. In fact, studying the actors, ideas and internal processes of the EU system (democracy, decision-making, values, transnational networks, etc.) confirms the evolving character and innovative uniqueness of the European institutional regime, which is currently transforming the EU into a new type of international actor: it calls into question the classical notions of sovereignty, representation, citizenship, foreign policy, internal vs. external domains and power. This is not a new European federal state in formation, but rather a case of greater scientific interest and innovative potential that has developed over the last several decades.

In conclusion, 60 years of analysis of European integration is enough that these hypotheses can be extended beyond the old continent and legitimately impact global governance. Of course, a new post-Westphalian paradigm has not yet been achieved: Europe is not the center of the world and other continents – the US and Latin America, Africa and Asia, particularly East Asia – are far from developing the same extent of practical and theoretical criticism towards the Westphalian paradigm. Rather, Europe is situated within an international context where, after progress and setbacks, several Westphalian characteristics have returned in force, particularly since 2001; and contrary to functionalist, hyper-globalist and postmodern theories, even the European state is far from outdated. However, it is the conclusion of this book that in the complex, contradictory and heterogeneous post-Cold War world, a gradual and partial revision of the Westphalian paradigm is underway, of which Europe is the most advanced spearhead and institutional laboratory. In and of itself, this constitutes a veritable revolution and major challenge for International Relations theories.

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Appendix

Regional, Interregional and Global Arrangements and Organizations

Sebastian Santander

1. Regional arrangements

The organizations listed below are grouped by geographical area (Africa, Americas, Arab World, Asia, Europe and Oceania) and listed within each area in alphabetical order.

1.1 Africa

AU: African Union, 2001

Purposes

The historical foundations of the African Union originated in the Union of African States, an early confederation established in the 1960s, as well as subsequent attempts to unite Africa, including the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was established in 1963, and the African Economic Community in 1981. Critics argued that the OAU in particular did little to protect the rights and liberties of African citizens from their own political leaders. The idea of creating the AU was revived in the mid-1990s as a result of the efforts of the African Unification Front. The heads of state and government of the OAU issued the Sirte Declaration on September 9, 1999, calling for the establishment of an African Union. The Declaration was followed by summits at Lomé in 2000, when the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted, and at Lusaka in 2001, when the plan for the implementation of the African Union was adopted. The African Union was launched in Durban on July 9, 2002, by its first president, South African Thabo Mbeki, at the first session of the Assembly of the African Union. Its Constitutive Act declares that it shall “invite and encourage the full participation of the African diaspora as an important part of our Continent, in the building of the African Union”. The African Union Government has defined the African diaspora as consisting of people of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union. The African Union also aims to have a single currency and a single integrated defense force, as well as other institutions

of state, including a cabinet for the AU Head of State. The purpose of the union is to help secure Africa's democracy, human rights, especially by bringing an end to intra-African conflict and creating an effective common market. It also aims to create a sustainable economy. In order to reach the latter purpose the AU launched the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). <<http://www.africa-union.org/root/ua/index/index.htm>>.

Members

Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Western Sahara (SADR), São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

CEUCA: Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa, 1966

Purposes

CEUCA, in French *Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique Centrale* (UDEAC) is a free trade area and a customs union with a common external tariff for imports from other countries. It aims to establish an ever-closer union among member states so as to reinforce sub-regional solidarity, to promote the gradual and progressive establishment of a Central African common market and, subsequently, through establishment of this sub-regional grouping, to participate in the creation of a true African common market and the consolidation of African unity. CEUCA signed a treaty for the establishment of an Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) to promote the entire process of sub-regional integration through the forming of monetary union with the Central Africa CFA franc as a common currency. <<http://www.cemac.cf/>>.

Members

Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Chad, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon.

COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 1994

Purposes

Successor to Preferential Trade Area of Southern African States which was established on December 22, 1981. The aims of COMESA are the following: attain sustainable growth and development of member states by promoting a more balanced and harmonious development of production and marketing structures; promote joint development in all fields of economic activity and the joint adoption

of macro-economic policies and programs in order to raise the standard of living of the peoples in and to foster closer relations among, member states; cooperate in the creation of an enabling environment for foreign, cross-border and domestic investment, including joint promotion of research and adaptation of science and technology for development; cooperate in the promotion of peace, security and stability among member states in order to enhance the economic development of the region, cooperate in strengthening the relations between the Common Market and the rest of the world and adopt common positions in international forums, contribute towards the establishment, progress and the realization of the objectives of the African Economic Community.

Nine of the member states formed a free trade area in 2000, with Rwanda and Burundi joining the FTA in 2004 and the Comoros and Libya in 2006. COMESA is one of the pillars of the African Economic Community. <<http://www.comesa.int/index.php>>.

Members

Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Botswana and South Africa are under conditions stipulated by the members.

Former Members

Lesotho (quit in 1997), Mozambique (quit in 1997), Tanzania (quit on September 2, 2000), Namibia (quit in May 2004).

EAC: East African Community, 2001

Purpose

The EAC is a customs union in East Africa, originally founded in 1967. It was disbanded in 1977. In January 2001 the EAC was revived. The new EAC treaty paved the way for an economic and, ultimately, political union of the three countries. A further treaty signed in March 2004 set up a customs union, which commenced on January 1, 2005. Under the terms of the treaty, Kenya, the richest of the three countries, will pay duty on its goods entering Uganda and Tanzania until 2010. A common system of tariffs will apply to other countries supplying the three countries with goods. EAC is one of the pillars of the African Economic Community. <<http://www.eac.int>>.

Members

Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

*ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States, 1983**Purposes*

ECCAS, in French *Communauté Économique des États d'Afrique Centrale* (CEEAC), is an organization for promotion of regional economic co-operation in Central Africa. It “aims to achieve collective autonomy, raise the standard of living of its populations and maintain economic stability through harmonious cooperation”. ECCAS was established on by the CEUCA and ECGLC members (see below). Angola became member on 1999. It started functioning in 1985, but was inactive for several years because of financial difficulties and the conflict in the Great Lakes area. The war in the DR Congo was particularly divisive, as Rwanda and Angola fought on opposing sides. ECCAS has been designated a pillar of the African Economic Community, but formal contact between the AEC and ECCAS was only established in October 1999 due to the inactivity of ECCAS since 1992. The AEC again confirmed the importance of ECCAS as the major economic community in Central Africa at the third preparatory meeting of its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in June 1999. The headquarters of the ECCAS are situated in Livreville, Gabon. The working languages of the Community are French, Spanish and Portuguese. <[http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/recs/eccas htm](http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/recs/eccas.htm)>.

Members

Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe.

*ECGLC: Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries, 1976**Purposes*

ECGLC, in French *Communauté Économique des Pays de Grands Lacs* (CEPGL), is a sub-regional organisation. It aims to establish a customs union. It got a series of specialized agencies for common development: in the banking, energy, agronomy and animal technology sectors. <<http://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/Commun+aute+Economique+Des+Pays+Des+Grands+Lacs>>.

Members

Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda.

*ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States (CEDEAO in French), 1975**Purposes*

To become a common market. To promote cooperation and development in economic activity, particularly in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, natural resources, trade, monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural matters, for the purpose of raising the standard of living, of increasing and

maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African continent. The ECOWAS Secretariat and the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development are its two main institutions to implement policies. The ECOWAS Fund was transformed into the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development in 2001. ECOWAS is one of the pillars of the African Economic Community. <<http://www.ecowas.int/>>.

Members

Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Green Cape, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

Former Members

Mauritania (quit in 2002).

MRU: Mano River Union, 1973

Purposes

The MRU is an international association established 1973 between Liberia and Sierra Leone. In 1980, Guinea joined the Union. It aim to establish a customs union, to expand trade, encourage productive capacity and progressively develop a common policy and cooperation as regards harmonization of tariffs and regulations related to customs, qualifications and postal services. It also aims to promote joint development projects (hydroelectric construction, telecommunications, maritime activities) and to secure a fair distribution of the benefits from economic cooperation.

Due to conflicts involving the countries (Sierra Leone civil war and Liberian civil war) the objectives of the Union could not be achieved. However, on May 20, 2004, the Union was reactivated during a presidential top. <<http://manoriverwomen.afrikart.net/index.htm>>.

Members

Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone.

SACU: Southern Africa Customs Union, 1969

Purposes

SACU is a customs union among the countries of South Africa. It is the oldest Customs Union in the world. It entered into force in 1970 replacing the Customs Union Agreement of 1910. Its aim is to maintain the free interchange of goods between member countries. It provides for a common external tariff and a common excise tariff to this common customs area. SACU is developing external relations: by late 2004 it was negotiating a Free Trade deal with the United States. <<http://www.sacu.int/>>.

Members

Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.

SADC: Southern African Development Community, 1992

Purposes

Replaced the SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference) which was established in 1980. The main purposes of this customs union are: deeper economic cooperation and integration, on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefits, providing for cross-border investment and trade and freer movement of factors of production, goods and services across national borders; common economic, political and social values and systems, enhancing enterprise and competitiveness, democracy and good governance, respect for the rule of law and the guarantee of human rights, popular participation and alleviation of poverty; strengthened regional solidarity, peace and security, in order for the people of the region to live and work together in peace and harmony. Particular concerns: human resources, science and technology, food security, natural resources and environment, infrastructure and services, finance, investment and trade, popular participation, solidarity, peace and security. <<http://www.sadc.int/>>.

Members

Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia et Zimbabwe.

Former Members

Seychelles left on July 1, 2004. On December 2005, however, it appeared that the Seychelles would rejoin some time in 2006.

WAEMU: West African Economic and Monetary Union, 1994

Purposes

The WAEMU, in French the *Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine* (UEMOA), replaced WAMU (West African Monetary Union), which was established in 1959. The WAEMU is a customs union and monetary union between some of the members of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The WAEMU aims to make the economic and financial activities of Member States more competitive in the context of an open market based upon free competition, to set up a multilateral surveillance procedure to harmonize national legislations (particularly fiscal) and coordinate economic policies. To set up a common market and a common external tariff. <<http://www.uemoa.int/>>.

Members

Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.

1.2 Americas (The)

ALADI: Latin American Association for Development and Integration, 1980

Purposes

The ALADI (by the English acronym LAIA) replaced the ALALC (Latin American Association of Free Trade). The Montevideo Treaty signed on August 12, 1980, is the global legal framework that establishes and governs ALADI. It is preferential trade area based in Montevideo. Its main purpose is to become a common market. The ALADI has contributed to transforming economic structures and creating the conditions for integration in countries where they were less favorable. It has contributed to establishing bilateral and multilateral relations among member states. ALADI is open to all Latin American countries and regional integrations as well as to other developing countries or their respective integration areas outside Latin America. <<http://www.aladi.org/>>.

Members

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Observers

China, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Italy, Nicaragua, Panama, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Switzerland.

ALBA: The Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our America, 2006

The ALBA, in Spanish: *Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América*, was established in December 2004 by Cuba and Venezuela in order to exchange medical resources and petroleum between both nations. Seven more states have joined ALBA, which represents an attempt to establish a regional economic integration based primarily on a vision of social welfare and mutual economic aid. The Summit of Head of State and government of ALBA held in December 2008 approve the technical details of the introduction of the new currency named SUCRE (Unique System for Regional Compensation).

Members

Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Venezuela.

CAN: Andean Community of Nations, 1969 (previously Andean Pact)

Purposes

The CAN, in Spanish *Comunidad Andina*, was established in 1969 with the Cartagena Agreement. The CAN established the conditions for a common market

within ALALC–ALADI (see below). Since 1995, the member states have been working on a customs union. From January 1, 2005, the citizens of the member states can enter the other Andean Community member countries without the requirement of visa. The passengers should present the authorities their national ID cards. The CAN together with MERCOSUR comprises the two main trading blocs of South America. In 1999 these regional organizations began negotiating a merger with a view to creating a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA). On December 8, 2004 it signed a cooperation agreement with MERCOSUR and they published a joint letter of intention for future negotiations towards integrating all of South America in the context of the South American Community of Nations. <<http://www.comunidadandina.org/endex.htm>>.

Members

Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Chile who was a founder member, withdrew in 1976. Venezuela who joined the CAN in 1973, announced in 2006 its withdrawal, claiming the FTA agreements signed by Colombia and Peru with the USA caused irreparable damage to the community.

Observer Members

Chile, Mexico and Panama.

CACM: Central American Common Market, 1960

Purposes

The CACM, in Spanish *Mercado Común Centroamericano* (MCCA), is a regional trade organization which collapsed in 1969 with the “Football War” between Honduras and El Salvador. The CACM was reinstated in 1991. Its main purpose is to establish a customs union and a political integration as a federation of Central American states. However, it has not achieved the goals yet. With the proposal of the Free Trade Area of the Americas, it is possible that this new organization will replace the CACM (or make it redundant). Further, the implementation of the DR-CAFTA which is planned for 2006, may render this common market redundant <<http://www.mcca.com/>>.

Members

Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua.

CARICOM: Caribbean Community, 1973

Purposes

The CARICOM was established by the Treaty of Chaguaramas and replaced the 1965–1972 CARIFTA (Caribbean Free Trade Association), which had been organized to provide a continued economic linkage between the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean following the dissolution of the West Indies Federation

(1958–1962). The CARICOM has established a common external tariff and common market. A Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the Caribbean Community including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) was signed by the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community on July 5, 2001. Part of the revised treaty includes the establishment and implementation of the Caribbean Court of Justice. <<http://www.caricom.org/>>.

Members

Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas (member of the Community but not of the common market), Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago.

Associate members

Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and Turku and Caicos Islands.

Observers

Aruba, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Dutch Antilles, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Venezuela.

DR-CAFTA: Dominican Republic–Central American Free Trade Agreement, 2005

Purpose

Originally, the agreement encompassed the United States and the Central American countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, and was called CAFTA. In 2004, the Dominican Republic joined the negotiations and the agreement was renamed DR-CAFTA. The goal of DR-CAFTA is the creation of a free trade zone, similar to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which currently encompasses the US, Canada, and Mexico. DR-CAFTA is a stepping stone towards the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). <http://ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/Section_Index.html>.

Members

Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic.

Grupo de los Tres: The Group of Three, 1995

Purposes

The G3 is a free trade agreement that came into force in 1995. The agreement aims to liberalize goods, investment and services, and to facilitate public purchase. Venezuela decided in May 2006 to quit the trade bloc due to differences with its two partners. <<http://portal2.edomex.gob.mx/edomex/inicio/index.htm>>.

Members

Colombia and Mexico.

Former Members

Venezuela.

*MERCOSUR: Southern Common Market, 1991**Purposes*

The MERCOSUR, in Spanish *Mercado Común del Sur* and in Portuguese *Mercado Comum do Sul*, was established with the Treaty of Asunción signed on March 26, 1991. Before the establishment of MERCOSUR, the biggest member states, Argentina and Brazil, passed through two important stages. The PICE (Integration and Cooperation Program, 1986) established the first link between them in pursuit of further economic integration. In 1989 the two countries reached a new agreement: the PICAB (Integration, Cooperation and Development Treaty), which aimed to abolish tariffs barriers and coordinate policy in some specific areas (customs, science, technology) as well as macroeconomic policy. In 1990 new modifications were introduced with the *Acta de Buenos Aires* (Buenos Aires Act), which aimed to facilitate the setting up of the common market in 1994. One year later the Treaty of Asunción extended the Buenos Aires Act to Paraguay and Uruguay established MERCOSUR. The former was later amended and updated by the 1994 Treaty of Ouro Preto which created new institutions and gave it to it a legal status in international law. MERCOSUR came into force on January 1, 1995. Its aims are both political and economic: to stabilize democracy, to develop the economies in the region, to provide global insertion of national economies and to reinforce the power of the members in the international system. An important aim of MERCOSUR is to be a mechanism for “open integration”. The development of MERCOSUR was arguably weakened by the devaluation of the Brazilian currency on January 1999 following by the collapse of the Argentine economy in 2002. It has still seen internal conflicts over trade policy. It has not achieved two important goals yet. The free trade area and the customs union are still unachieved. In spite of internal problems, MERCOSUR has been enlarged: Venezuela signed its membership agreement on June 17, 2006. However, in order to be a full member of MERCOSUR, the entry of Venezuela still needs to be ratified by the Paraguayan and the Brazilian parliaments. The organization has a South and Andean American integration vocation. In December 2004 it signed a cooperation agreement with the Andean Community and they published a joint letter of intention for future negotiations towards integrating all of South America. MERCOSUR has developed interregional trade links with the EU; contacts in the field of trade have been made with, China, India and APEC; member states signed a free trade agreement with Israel in December 2007 and are taking part to the negotiations of a Free Trade Area of the Americas and are also planning a South American Free Trade Area (ALCSA or SAFTA). The main institutions

of MERCOSUR are the following: the Common Market Council (CMC), the Common Market Group (GMC), the Parliament of MERCOSUR, the Commission for Permanent Representatives (CRPM), the Trade Commission (CCM) and the Permanent Court of Justice (TPRM). <<http://www.mercosur.int>>.

Members

Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Associated members

Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.

Observers

Mexico.

NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement, 1994

Purposes

NAFTA, in Spanish *Tratado de Libre Comercio de America del Norte* (TLCAN) and in French *Accord de libre-échange nord-américain* (ALENA), is more than a simple free trade agreement of goods. It aims to liberalize movement of goods, capital and services. It aims to abolish more than 20,000 barriers to trade by 2010; to promote conditions of fair competition and increase investment opportunities; to provide adequate provision for intellectual property rights and environmental protection; to establish effective procedures for implementing and applying the Agreement and for resolution of disputes; to encourage further trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation. Unlike other free trade agreements in the world, NAFTA is more comprehensive in its scope. It also was complemented by the North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). While different groups advocate for a further integration into a North American Community, sensitive issues have hindered that process. The three countries have pursued different trade policies with non-members making the possibility of creating a customs union hard to attain. Security issues and sovereignty are also a controversial topic. Nonetheless the three countries have complemented NAFTA with the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP). The latter was born on March 23, 2005, in order to take new steps to address the threat of terrorism and to enhance the security, competitiveness and quality of life of their countries' citizens. <<http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org>>.

Members

Canada, Mexico, United States.

*Rio Group, 1986**Purposes*

Forum dealing with political and development problems of external relations and issues of regional integration. <http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grupo_de_R%C3%ADo>.

Members

Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Caricom, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.

*SELA: Latin American Economic System, 1975**Purposes*

Established by the governments of Latin America with the main purpose of reinforcing the region's capacity in international economic negotiations and contributing to the full development of the member states. <<http://www.sela.org/sela/>>.

Members

Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.

*UNASUR/UNASUL: Union of South American Nations, 2008**Purposes*

The UNASUR Constitutive Treaty was signed on May 23, 2008, at the Third South American Summit of Heads of State, held in Brasília, Brazil. UNASUR, in Spanish *Union Sudamericana de Naciones* and in Portuguese *União de Nações Sul-Americanas* (UNASUL) aims to unite two existing regional organizations (MERCOSUR and the Andean Community) with the participation of other South American countries (Guyana, Suriname and Chile) in order to create a free trade area. The latter will eliminate tariffs for *non-sensitive products* by 2014 and *sensitive products* by 2019. UNASUR aims to develop a couple of common project in the area of infrastructure (IIRSA) and security. The South American leaders also announced their intention to model the new community after the European Union, including a common currency, parliament, passport and Bank. The latter has as main aim to finance economic development projects in order to encourage local competitiveness and to improve the scientific and technological development of the member states. According to the Constitutive Treaty, the Union's headquarters will be located in Quito (Ecuador), the Parliament in Cochabamba (Bolivia)

and the UNASUR Bank will be located in Caracas (Venezuela). <<http://www.comunidadandina.org/sudamerica.htm>>.

Members

Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru), MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela), Chile, Guyana and Suriname.

Observers

Mexico and Panama.

1.3 Arab World and Maghreb

ACM: Arab Common Market, 1964

Purposes

The Arab Common Market (ACM) has been established by the Council for Arab Economic Unity (CAEU) an organization that the Economic Council of the Arab League had founded in 1957. The ACM is not an independent organization and its implementation was overseen by the CAEU. The long-term goal of the ACM was to establish a full customs union that would abolish trade restrictions, trade quotas, and restrictions on residence, employment, and transportation. Since its founding the ACM has fallen short of this goal. The Arab world has always been divided between the wealthy oil states and the least-developed marginal states such as Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. Major political events such as the Cold War and the Gulf War (I and II), as well as differing internal institutions and external relations and policies, continue to hamper Arab economic integration. <<http://www.caeu.org.eg/English/Intro/>>.

Members

Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Mauritania, Syria, and Yemen.

ACC: Arab Cooperation Council, 1989

Purposes

To be a more efficient forum for economic cooperation and integration among Arab countries; to promote among member states the coordination and harmonization of major economic policies in areas such as finance, customs and trade, industry and agriculture; to form an Arab common market. It is open to all Arab countries. The aim is eventually to bring together countries represented by organizations with more limited geographical coverage.

Members

Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Yemen.

AMU/UMA: Arab Maghreb Union, 1989

Purposes

The goals of the AMU are to safeguard Maghrebian economic interests; to foster and promote economic and cultural cooperation among member states; to intensify mutual commercial exchanges as a necessary precursor to integration; and the creation of a Maghreb Economic Space (a free market in energy products; free movement of citizens within the region; joint transport undertakings, including a joint airline, road and railway improvements; formation of a Maghreb union of textile and leather industries; creation of a customs union). <<http://www.maghrebarabe.org/>>.

Members

Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia.

CAEU: Council for Arab Economic Unity, 1957

Purposes

To provide a flexible framework for achieving economic integration in stages. To undertake research into the economic conditions and outlook of the member states, to collect and to distribute the information and to offer consulting services; to prepare the way for a customs union; to develop industry and agriculture. <<http://www.caeu.org.eg/English/Intro/>>.

Members

Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Palestine Authority, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.

CCASG: Council of Cooperation between Arab States of the Gulf, 1947

Purposes

The organization's main purpose is to pursue coordination, integration and cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields. <<http://www.gcc-sg.org/>>.

Members

Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates.

*LAS: League of Arab States, 1945**Purposes*

The main purposes of this association are to reinforce the links between member states. The League's charter states that the League shall co-ordinate economic affairs, including commercial relations; communications; cultural affairs; nationality, passports and visas; social affairs; and health affairs. In recent years, some have questioned the efficacy of the Arab League's ability to fulfill its mission and ensure better conditions for Arab countries as political repression and poverty are still rampant throughout the Arab world; some, even within the Arab world, have called for it to be disbanded. <<http://www.al-bab.com/>>.

Members

Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros (1993), Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Oman, Palestine Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.

Observers

Eritrea (January 2003) and Venezuela (July 2006) joined the Arab League as an observer.

1.4 Asia*ASEAN: Association of South-East Asian Nations, 1967**Purposes*

According to its founding Bangkok Declaration, the objectives of the Association are: to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations: to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter; to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields; to provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres; to collaborate more effectively for the greater use of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communications facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples; to promote Southeast Asian studies; to maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional

organizations with similar aims and purposes and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves.

The aims of ASEAN economic cooperation in the post-Cold War period include the following: to develop the region into a global base for the manufacture of value-added and technologically sophisticated products geared towards servicing regional and world markets; to enhance the industrial efficiency of the region through exploiting complementary location advantages based on the principles of market sharing and resource pooling; to enhance the attractiveness of the region for investment and as a tourist destination; to cooperate in enhancing greater infrastructural development which will contribute towards a more efficient business environment; to ensure that the rich resources (mineral, energy, forestry and others) of the region are exploited effectively and efficiently. It also aims to create a free trade area. <<http://www.aseansec.org/>>.

Members

Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.

Observers

Papua New Guinea.

CACO: Central Asian Cooperation Organization, 1994

Purposes

The Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) is an international organization, composed of five member-states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Russia. Observer status has been given to Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine. The objective of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization is to enhance “the development of the economic integration in the region, the perfection of the forms and mechanisms of expansion of the political, social, scientific-technical, cultural and educational relations” among its members. The Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) was first initiated by all five Central Asian nations in 1991 as the Central Asian Commonwealth. Later Turkmenistan followed a policy of isolation, withdrawing from participation in all regional forums. It continued in 1994 under the name of Central Asian Economic Union or CAEU and included Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as members. In 1998 it was then renamed Central Asian Economic Cooperation with the entry of Tajikistan. In 2002 it was renamed yet again to its current name, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization or CACO. In 2004, Russia joined the organization. In the end of 2005 it was decided between the member states that Uzbekistan will join the Eurasian Economic Community and that the organizations will merge. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Asian_Cooperation_Organization>.

Members

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Russia.

Observers

Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine.

SAARC: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, 1985

Purposes

To promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and improve their quality of life; to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and give all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and realize their full potential; to promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia; to contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problems; to promote collaboration and mutual assistance in economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields; to strengthen cooperation with other developing countries; to strengthen cooperation among members in international forums or matters of common interest; to cooperate with international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes. In 1993, SAARC countries signed an agreement to gradually lower tariffs within the region. Nine years later, at the twelfth SAARC summit at Islamabad, SAARC countries devised the South Asia Free Trade Agreement which created a framework for the establishment of a free trade zone covering 1.4 billion people. This agreement went into force on January 1, 2006. <<http://www.saarc-sec.org/main.php>>.

Members

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

Observers

Australia, China, European Union, Iran, Japan, Mauritius, Myanmar, South Korea and United States.

1.5 Europe

*Benelux, 1947**Purposes*

Benelux is an economic union in Western Europe. The treaty establishing the Benelux Customs Union was signed in 1944 by the governments in exile of the three countries in London, and entered into force in 1947. It ceased to exist in 1960, when it was replaced by the Benelux Economic Union. It was preceded by the (still extant) Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, established in 1921. Its

founding contributed to the founding of the European Economic Community in 1957. <<http://www.benelux.be/>>.

Members

Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands.

BSECS: The Black Sea Economic Cooperation, 1992

Purposes

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Scheme (BSEC) has been established by 11 countries of the region during the summit meeting held in Istanbul on 25 June 1992. It is based on two documents, the “Summit Declaration on Black Sea Economic Cooperation” and the “Bosporus Statement”. The principles governing the BSEC are based on those of the Helsinki Final Act, the CSCE follow-up documents, the Paris Charter for a New Europe (1990). Since then (on May 1, 1999) with the entry into force of its charter, it has gained legal identity.

Its main purposes are: to achieve closer cooperation among the member states (and any other interested country) through the signing of bilateral and multilateral agreements, in order to “foster their economic, technological and social progress, and to encourage free enterprise”; to ensure that the Black Sea becomes a sea of peace, stability and prosperity, striving to promote friendly and good-neighborly relations; to ensure economic cooperation to help implementing “a Europe-wide economic area, as well as reaching a higher degree of integration of the Participating States into the world economy”. <<http://www.bsec-organization.org/>>.

Members

Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.

Observers

Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Tunisia and the United States.

CEFTA: Central European Free Trade Agreement, 1992

Purposes

Through CEFTA, participating countries hoped to mobilize efforts to integrate Western European institutions and through this, to join European political, economic, security and legal systems, thereby consolidating democracy and free-market economics. <<http://www.cefta.org/>>.

Members

CEFTA is a trade agreement between Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and the Republic of Macedonia. Former members are Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia.

*CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991**Purposes*

It is an economic union which has been initiated by the leaders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (8 December, 1991). They announced that the new alliance will be open to all republics of the former Soviet Union. However, between 2003 and 2005, the leaderships of three CIS member states were overthrown in a series of “color revolutions”: in Georgia, in Ukraine and, lastly, in Kyrgyzstan. The new government in Ukraine has taken an especially clear pro-Western stance, in contrast to their predecessors’ close relationship with the Kremlin. The new government of Georgia has likewise taken a pro-Western and anti-Kremlin stance. Moldova also seems to be quietly drifting toward the West, away from the CIS. <<http://www.cisstat.com/eng/cis.htm>>.

Members

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldavia, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan, withdrew in 2005 and became an associate member since then.

*EC/EU: European Community/European Union, 1957**Purposes*

The European integration process has passed through several stages. In 1985 the European Economic Community (EEC) set up in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome was modified by the Single European Act, which brought together the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The EEC became the European Community and then, in 1992, with the signature of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union. The EU today has a three-pillar structure: (1) the Community activities pillar, managed by mainly supranational procedures; (2) the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar, managed by an intergovernmental Council; and (3) the justice and home affairs pillar also based on intergovernmental cooperation. The Union currently has a customs union, a common single market, a single currency managed by the European Central Bank, a Common Agricultural Policy, a common Trade Policy and a Common Fisheries Policy. The Schengen Agreement abolished passport control and customs checks were also abolished at many of the EU’s internal borders, creating a single space of mobility for EU citizens to live, travel, work and invest. According to Article 2 of the Treaty of EU (Maastricht Treaty), the Union sets itself the following objectives: to promote economic and social

progress which is balanced and sustainable, in particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion, and through the establishment of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single currency in accordance with the provisions of the treaty; to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a CFSP including the framing of a defense policy cooperation; to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its member states through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union; to develop close cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs; to maintain in full the *acquis communautaire* ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions of the Community. The objectives of the Union should be achieved as provided in the treaty and in accordance with the condition of the schedule set out therein while respecting the principle of subsidiarity. Article C indicates that the Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), which superseded the Maastricht Treaty, incorporated a number of changes: to sweep away the last remaining obstacles to freedom of movement and to strengthen internal security; to give Europe a stronger voice in world affairs. The Treaty of Nice (2000) had the main task to adopt the Union's institutional structure and to enable the Union to enlarge to new member states. On October 29, 2004, EU member state heads of government and state signed the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. This has been ratified by 13 member states and is currently awaiting ratification by the other states. However, this process faltered on May 29, 2005 when the majority of French voters rejected the constitution in a referendum by 54.7 percent. The French rejection was followed three days later by a Dutch one on June 1 when in the Netherlands 61.6 percent of voters refused the constitution as well. In order to solve the EU crisis caused by the rejection of the Treaty aiming to establish a Constitution for Europe, the European leaders decided to negotiate a new treaty known as the Treaty of Lisbon or as the Reform Treaty. The latter was signed in December 2007. If the Treaty comes into force it would introduce prominent changes: more qualified majority voting in the EU Council, increased involvement of the European Parliament in the legislative process through extended co-decision with the EU Council, eliminating the pillar system and the creation of a President of the European Union and a High Representative for Foreign Affairs to present a united position on EU policies. <http://europa.eu/index_fr.htm>.

Members

Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Finland, Hungary, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands, United Kingdom. Any European state may apply to the Council to become a member of the Union, which acts unanimously after consulting the

Commission and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament; ratification by each member state is requested.

Candidate countries

Croatia, Turkey, FYR Macedonia.

EEA: European Economic Area, 1994

Purposes

Free trade area. <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/index_en.htm>.

Members

EU and EFTA, minus Switzerland which rejected the EEA in a referendum.

EFTA: European Free Trade Association, 1960

Purposes

To promote in the area of the Association and in each member state a sustained expansion of economic activity, full employment, increased productivity and the rational use of resources, financial stability and continuous improvement in living standards; to secure conditions of fair competition in trade between member states; to avoid significant disparity between member states in the conditions of supply of raw materials produced within the area of the Association; to contribute to harmonious development and expansion of world trade and to progressive removal of barriers to this; to create a single market in western Europe. <<http://www.efta.int/>>.

Members

EFTA brought together the countries which did not want to join the Treaty of Rome in 1957: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. Today it consists of just four countries: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.

Visegrád, 1991

Purposes

The Visegrád Group created a free trade area between for Eastern countries in order to further the process of European integration. All four members of the Visegrád group entered the European Union on May 1, 2004. <<http://www.visegradgroup.eu/>>.

Members

Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia.

1.6 Oceania

ANZCERTA (CER: Closer Economic Relationship, 1983)

Purposes

Established in 1983 as a successor to the New Zealand–Australia Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which had been set up in 1966. The Antipodean NAFTA applied only to certain products (excluding agriculture) and was therefore not a full free trade agreement. CER involved a stronger commitment to the establishment of free trade between the two countries, with trade in merchandise becoming fully free by 1990. There is also a commitment to economic integration in relation to services and the labor market. Integration has not been achieved in investment and currency matters; Australia unilaterally abrogated an agreement on a common aviation market in October 1994. <<http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/>>.

Members

Australia, New Zealand.

SPC: South Pacific Commission, 1947

Purposes

The Commission was established by the governments of Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. It became an NGO providing the member states with technical assistance, scientific knowledge and economic assistance for development. On 1 January 1996 the United Kingdom decided to leave the Commission. <<http://www.spc.int/>>.

Members

Australia, Cook Islands, Guam, Eastern Samoa, Fiji, France, French Polynesia, Futuna, Kiribati, Marianne Island (North), Marshall Island, Micronesia, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Guinea, New Zealand, New Island, Palau, Papuaia, Pitcairn Islands, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States, Vanuatu, Wallis, Western Samoa.

2. Interregional Organizations

EU-ACP relations: EU + Countries of Africa, Caribbean and Pacific, 1975

Purposes

Established by the EU through the Lomé Convention (Togo), replacing the Yaoundé Convention and the Arusha agreements. Its purpose is to establish cooperation for development among its member countries, some of which are former European colonies. The Lomé Agreement was succeeded by the Cotonou Agreement signed

in Benin in June 2000. One of the major differences with the Lomé convention is that the partnership aims to reinforce ACP regionalism in order to conclude interregional arrangements with each regional group. Another difference with the Lomé Convention, is that the Cotonou Agreement is extended to new actors like civil society, private sector, trade unions, local authorities, etc. These will be involved in consultations and planning of national development strategies, provided with access to financial resources and involved in the implementation of programs. <<http://www.acpsec.org/>>.

Members

The 27 Member States of the European Union and Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Cook Island, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, East Timor, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Green Cape, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Eastern Samoa, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Marshal Island, Mauritius, Mauritania, Micronesia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sao Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa.

APEC: Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation, 1989

Purposes

To serve as a forum for regular discussion on regional trade questions and cooperation; to sustain the growth and development of the region for the common good of its peoples and contribute to the growth and development of the world economy; to enhance positive gains, both for the region and the world economy, resulting from increasing economic interdependence, to include encouraging the flow of goods, services, capital and technology, developing and strengthening the open multilateral trading system in the interest of Asia-Pacific and all other economies; to reduce barriers to trade in goods and services among participants in a manner consistent with WTO principles where applicable and without detriment to other economies. The main purpose is to set up a free trade area by 2020. <<http://www.apec.org/>>.

Members

Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Peru, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, United States, Vietnam.

*ASEM: Asia–Europe Meeting, 1994**Purposes*

In 1994 the European Commission proposed a “New Strategy for Asia” and the ASEAN member states approved the “Singapore Project”. From both these initiatives emerged the principle of the Asia–Europe Meeting, with the main purpose of bringing the two continents closer. Launched in Bangkok in 1996 between the 15 member countries of the European Union, the European Commission and 10 Asian countries, the ASEM process has developed a global agenda and a new dynamic between two strategic partners, Asia and Europe. ASEM Summits have taken place every two years, alternating between Asia and Europe. ASEM potentially covers all issues of common interest to Europe and Asia. ASEM has a comprehensive approach, addressing the political, the economic, and the cultural and people-to-people dimensions of Asia’s relations and partnership with Europe. <<http://www.aseminfoboard.org/>>.

Members

The 27 Member States of the European Union and the European Commission; the seven member states of ASEAN; China, South Korea and Japan.

*Barcelona Process, 1995**Purposes*

After 20 years of increasingly intensive bilateral trade and development cooperation between the EU and 12 Mediterranean partners, the Conference of EU and Southern Mediterranean Foreign Ministers in Barcelona (November 27–28, 1995) marked the start of a new “partnership” phase including bilateral, multilateral and regional cooperation. The conference was a first step towards a “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” (hence called “Barcelona Process”). The Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Conference expresses the partners’ intention to: establish a common Euro-Mediterranean area for peace and stability based on fundamental principles including respect for human rights and democracy (political and security partnership); create an area of shared prosperity through the progressive establishment of a free-trade area between the EU and its partners and among the Mediterranean partners themselves, accompanied by substantial EU financial support for economic transition and for the social and economic consequences of this reform process (economic and financial partnership); develop human resources, promote understanding between cultures and bring peoples closer together in the Euro-Mediterranean region, as well as develop free and flourishing civil societies (social, cultural and human partnership). <<http://www.euromedheritage.net/>>.

Members

The 27 EU Member States, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey. Observer: Libya.

*FTAA: Free Trade Area of the Americas, 1994**Purposes*

The project of the Initiatives of the Americas (1990) is at the root of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA, in Spanish: *Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas* (ALCA), in French: *Zone de libre-échange des Amériques* (ZLEA) and in Portuguese: *Área de Livre Comércio das Américas* (ALCA)). The latter has as main aim to liberalize goods, services and investments. The negotiations were launched by US President Clinton on December 11, 1994 at the Miami summit conference of 34 American countries. However, the FTAA came to public attention during the Quebec City Summit of the Americas in 2001, a meeting targeted by massive anti-corporatization and alter-globalization protests. The Miami negotiations in 2003 met similar protests, though perhaps not as large. The summit at Mar del Plata, Argentina (I, 2005), confirmed that the FTAA missed the targeted deadline of 2005. A summit took place on April 2009 in Trinidad and Tobago. The summit succeeded in bringing the new Administration of B. Obama closer to the Latin American and Caribbean governments. <<http://www.ftaa-alca.org/>>.

Members

All the countries of the Americas except Cuba: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, El Salvador, Ecuador, the United States, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haïti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, St Lucia, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

*NTA: The New Transatlantic Agenda, 1995**Purposes*

On December 3, 1995 at the EU–US Summit in Madrid, European Commission President Santer, Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez, as President of the European Council, and US President Clinton signed the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA). The agenda is essentially a political gesture. The US and EU have agreed a NTA for making swifter and more effective progress towards the political, economic and security goals they first set for themselves in the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990. The Agenda drawn from a more detailed Action Plan identifies a joint work program in four areas: promoting peace, development and democracy around the world; responding to global challenges such as international crime, the environment and disease; contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer

economic relations; building bridges across the Atlantic. <<http://www.eurunion.org/partner/euusrelations/AgendasDialoguesSummits.htm>>.

Members

United States of America and the 27 Member States of the European Union.

Rio de Janeiro Process, 1999

Purpose

The 'Rio de Janeiro Process' started in June 1999 in Brazil with the Euro-Latin American summit. The main purpose of this initiative is to bring the two continents closer, creating a strategic partnership. The objective of the Rio Summit was to strengthen the political, economic and cultural understanding between the two regions in order to encourage the development of a strategic partnership, establishing a set of priorities for future joint action in the political and economic fields. A second EU-LAC Summit was held in Madrid on May 17–18, 2002 <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/lac/index_en.htm>. This summit assessed progress made in the framework of the strategic partnership established at Rio, emphasising progress in the three main pillars of the relationship: political dialogue, economic and financial relations including trade and capital, and co-operation in a number of areas. On this occasion, new proposals were made for the further strengthening of this bi-regional partnership. The third EU-LAC Summit took place in Guadalajara (Mexico) on May 28, 2004. It achieved a great deal finding a common policy line to the 58 participating countries: 33 LAC + 27 EU states. Strong and concrete commitments were taken in three main domains: Social cohesion, Multilateralism and Regional Integration. The fourth EU-LAC Summit took place in Vienna <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/lac/index_en.htm> (Austria) on May 12–13, 2006. Heads of State decided in particular, to launch negotiations for an Association Agreement between the EU and Central America. The fifth EU-LAC Summit took place in Lima (Peru) on May 2008. Major topics discussed at the Lima summit were free trade, food prices and poverty and sustainable development. The next Summit of Head of State and government is scheduled in Madrid on May 18, 2010. <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/la/index.htm>.

Members

The 27 member states plus the European Commission and all the countries of the Americas including Cuba and except Canada and the USA: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, El Salvador, Ecuador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haïti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, St Lucia, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

*OSCE: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1975**Purpose*

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe succeeded to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe started on 3 July 1975, and originated the so-called “Helsinki Process”. The basic act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was signed on 1 August 1975 in Helsinki, by Heads of States or governments of 35 states.

Institutionalized as a permanent body on November 21, 1990 (Charter of Paris for a New Europe), the OSCE has been enlarged and further delineated by the Helsinki Document (July 1992). The current title has finally been adopted at the pan-European summit of Budapest, December 5–6, 1994, to be effective from 1 January 1995.

The OSCE is a security forum and its 55 participating States span the geographical area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. In this region, it is an important instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The OSCE includes three baskets: a) a comprehensive and co-operative approach to pan-European security; b) human rights and elections monitoring; c) economic and environmental co-operation. *Members* Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. <<http://www.osce.org/>>.

*TEP: The Transatlantic Economic Partnership, 1998**Purpose*

Announced at the Birmingham summit of the TEP is economic pillar of the New Transatlantic Agenda, to be achieved by “progressively reducing or eliminating barriers that hinder the flow of goods, services and capital”. A new private sector group, the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), was established to define and promote the specific trade and investment agenda needed to bring the marketplace to fruition. Thanks in large part to the TABD, Washington and Brussels reached agreement in 1997 – after years of effort – on a package of mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) eliminating duplicative testing and certification in six sectors. The US government estimates that this package, which covers about \$47 billion worth of trade, eliminates costs equivalent to two or three percentage points of tariffs. In the meantime, other problems arose that soured the prospects for

broader transatlantic economic cooperation. <<http://www.eurunion.org/partner/euusrelations/AgendasDialoguesSummits htm>>.

Members

United States of America and the 27 Member States of the European Union.

3. Global Multilateral Institutions

3.1 The United Nations, 1945

The United Nations (UN) is an international organization established in 1945 and was founded to replace the League of Nations. Its headquarters is located in New York. There are currently 192 member states. The UN aims to facilitate cooperation among nations and to guarantee international peace and security. It also has as main aim to facilitate international cooperation in other issues like economic development, social progress and human rights. The UN does not represent a global government. However, its resolutions give legitimacy to States interventions. It does not have a military force but can ask to its member states to provide soldiers in order to set up peace keeping forces (blue beret). The UN is divided into institutional bodies:

- the General Assembly represent the main deliberative assembly of the UN;
- the Security Council represent the decisional body. It is one of the principal organs of the UN. It adopts resolutions for peace and security. The Security Council is made up of 15 member states, consisting of five permanent members (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States) and 10 non-permanent members. The five permanent members hold veto power;
- the Economic and Social Council assists in promoting international economic and social cooperation and development;
- the Secretariat provides studies, information and facilities needed by the UN;
- the International Court of Justice represent the primary judicial institution.

There are about 15 additional bodies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). The UN also has funds and programs such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). <<http://www.un.org/english/>>.

3.2 Organizations belonging to the UN

ECFA: Economic Commission for Africa, 1958

Purposes

United Nations initiative. To facilitate economic development and relations between member states. <<http://www.uneca.org/>>.

Members

Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Green Cape, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Mauritius, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

ECLA: Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL in Spanish), 1948

Purposes

United Nations initiative. It has been working in the field of industrial development. <<http://www.eclac.org/>>.

Members

Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, The Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and Grenadines, Spain, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.

ESCAP: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 1947

Purposes

United Nations initiative (today ECAFE). The main purpose of ESCAP is to encourage economic and social development in Asia and the Pacific. It acts as a regional center of the United Nations and constitutes the only intergovernmental forum for all Asia and the Pacific. It implements a whole series of development programs through technical assistance, services for governmental cooperation, research, training and information. <<http://www.unescap.org/>>.

Members

Afghanistan, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Eastern Samoa, Fiji, France, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Island, Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, North Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, The Netherlands, Philippines, Russia, Solomon Islands, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, United States, Vanuatu, Vietnam.

ESCWA: Economic and Social Commission for West Asia, 1974

Purposes

United Nations initiative. To undertake or to support studies on economic and social perspectives in the region, to collect and to diffuse the information, and to offer consulting services. The main work of the ESCWA is being led in collaboration with other members of the UN. <<http://www.escwa.org.lb/>>.

Members

Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.

3.3 Bretton Woods institutions

The Bretton Woods Agreements were reached in July 1944 and had as main aim to set up a system of rules, institutions, and procedures to regulate the international monetary system. The 44 nations, which took part the Bretton Woods Conference, established the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These organizations became operational in 1945. The main focus of the World Bank's work in the early post-World War II was the reconstruction of Europe. A couple of years later the Bank's mission became to support developing countries and their inhabitants to achieve development and the reduction of poverty. The IMF is an organization formed to stabilize international exchange rates and facilitate development. The WB and IMF headquarters are located in Washington, DC, USA.

The chief features of the Bretton Woods system were an obligation for each country to adopt a monetary policy that maintained the exchange rate of its currency within a fixed value in terms of gold and the ability of the IMF to bridge temporary imbalances of payments. The system collapsed in 1971, after the United States unilaterally terminated convertibility of the dollars to gold.


Today the WB is a source of financial and technical assistance to developing countries. It has 185 member countries. The IMF is an organization of 185 countries working to foster "global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability and

facilitate international trade”. <<http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm>> <<http://www.worldbank.org/>>.


A third institution was established in the aftermath of the Bretton Woods Conference: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1947). On 1 January 1995 a new institution was created: the World Trade Organization (WTO). The latter is the successor to the GATT. The WTO is an international organization designed to supervise and liberalize international trade. It is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. The WTO has 153 members. It represents more than 95 percent of total world trade. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to support producers of goods and services, exporters and importers conduct their business. <<http://www.wto.int/>>.

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
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Main regional arrangements



Main interregional arrangements including EU



Main interregional arrangements including US

Index

References such as “138–9” indicate (not necessarily continuous) discussion of a topic across a range of pages. Wherever possible in the case of topics with many references, these have either been divided into sub-topics or only the most significant discussions of the topic are listed. Because the entire volume is about “international relations” and the “European perspective”, the use of these terms (and certain others occurring throughout the work) as entry points has been minimized. Information will be found under the corresponding detailed topics.

- ACC (Arab Cooperation Council) 187
ACM (Arab Common Market) 187
Afghanistan 153, 191, 204
Africa 10, 68, 71–2, 113, 155, 173
 regional arrangements 175–80
African Economic Community 175, 177–9
African Union (AU) 175–6
agriculture 161, 165, 187–9, 196
ALADI (Latin American Association for
 Development and Integration) 181
ALBA (Bolivarian Alternative for the
 People of Our America) 181
Albania 192, 201
Algeria 176, 188–9, 199, 203
alliances 9, 20–1, 25, 39–40, 45–6, 76, 79
American hegemony 56, 58–9, 69, 88–9,
 146, 151, *see also* United States
American power 13, 23, 31, 69, 87, 144–7,
 see also United States
Americas 4, 10, 16, 72, 132, 199–200
 regional arrangements 181–7
AMU/UMA 188
anarchy 11, 15, 36, 50–1, 92, 109, 120–1
 Hobbesian 92
 international 5, 20, 36, 81, 114, 118, 120
 structural 36, 51, 76
Andean Community of Nations (CAN)
 150, 152, 181–2, 184, 186–7
Angola 149, 176–8, 180, 203
Antigua and Barbuda 183, 197, 199–200,
 203
ANZCERTA 196
APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic
 Cooperation) 152, 184, 197
Arab Common Market, *see* ACM
Arab Cooperation Council, *see* ACC
Arab Maghreb Union, *see* AMU/UMA
Arab world 46, 155
 regional arrangements 187–9
ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) 151
Argentina 136, 181, 184–7, 199–200, 203
armed conflict 37, 45, 51, 56–7, *see also*
 wars
Armenia 192–3, 201
Aron, R. 34–5, 37, 85, 171
ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian
 Nations) 97, 150–3, 170, 189–90, 198
ASEAN Regional Forum, *see* ARF
ASEM (Asia–Europe Meeting) 152, 198
Asia 1, 4, 10, 13, 68, 198, 203
 regional arrangements 189–91
Asia–Europe Meeting, *see* ASEM
Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation, *see*
 APEC
Association of South-East Asian Nations,
 see ASEAN
asymmetric power relations 86, 120
AU, *see* African Union
Australia 191, 196–7, 204
Austria 46, 164, 194–5, 200–1
authoritarian regimes 132–3
Azerbaijan 192–3, 201, 204
Bahamas 183, 197, 199–200, 203
Bahrain 188–9, 204

- balance of power 9, 19–26, 33, 45, 87, 141–2
 system 8–9, 11, 22, 43, 45–6, 50, 76
- Bangladesh 150, 191, 204
- Barbados 183, 186, 197, 199–200, 203
- Barcelona Process 198
- Beck, U. 7, 98, 122
- Belarus 192–3, 201
- Belgium 8, 21, 23, 101, 192, 194, 201
- Belize 183, 186, 197, 199–200, 203
- Benelux 164, 191–2
- Benin 176, 179–80, 197, 203
- Berlin Wall 97, 139–41, 156
- Bermuda 183
- Bhutan 150, 191
- bipartisanship and foreign policy 133–4
- bipolar systems 3, 9, 11, 28, 43–5, 75–6
 flexible 45–8
 rigid 47
- bipolar world 4, 6, 10, 43–4, 49, 52, 139–40
- Black Sea Economic Cooperation, *see* BSECS
- Bobbio, N. 17, 110, 115
- Bodin, J. 9, 134, 136, 159
- Bolivarian Alternative for the People of
 Our America, *see* ALBA
- Bolivia 149–50, 181–2, 185–7, 199–200, 203
- Botswana 149, 176, 180, 197, 203
- Brazil 44, 101, 122, 149–50, 152, 184–7,
 199–200
- Bretton Woods system 30, 59, 204–5
- British hegemony 22–4, 29–30, 68–9, 155
- British multilateralism 22–3, 26
- Brunei 150, 190, 197, 204
- BSECS (Black Sea Economic
 Cooperation) 192
- Bulgaria 192–4, 201
- Bull, H. 20, 32, 44, 91–3, 98, 111, 117
- Burkina Faso 149, 176, 179–80, 197, 203
- Burton, J. 91, 93, 111
- Burundi 176–8, 197, 203
- Bush administration 144, 146–7
- CACM (Central American Common
 Market) 182
- CACO (Central Asian Cooperation
 Organization) 190
- CAEU (Council for Arab Economic Unity)
 187–8, 190
- Cambodia 150, 190, 204
- Cameroon 176, 178, 197, 203
- CAN, *see* Andean Community of Nations
 (CAN)
- Canada 40, 101, 183, 185, 197, 199–201, 203
- Canadian School 63–5
- Cape Verde 149, 176
- capitalism 28, 42, 66, 70, 127–8, 169
 embedded 103
 European 23, 72
- Caribbean Community, *see* CARICOM
- CARICOM (Caribbean Community) 182–3
- CARICOM Single Market and Economy
 183
- Carr, E.H. 5, 28, 30–2, 91, 171
- CCASG (Council of Cooperation between
 Arab States of the Gulf) 188
- CEFTA (Central European Free Trade
 Agreement) 192–3
- CEMAC (Economic and Monetary
 Community of Central Africa) 176
- Central African Republic 176, 178, 197,
 203
- Central American Common Market, *see*
 CACM
- Central Asian Cooperation Organization,
see CACO
- Central European Free Trade Agreement,
see CEFTA
- CER (Closer Economic Relationship) 150,
 196
- CEUCA (Customs and Economic Union of
 Central Africa) 176
- CFSP (Common Foreign and Security
 Policy) 164, 193–4
- Chad 176, 178, 197, 203
- change and wars 56–7
- Chile 152, 181–2, 185–7, 197, 199–200, 203
- China 9, 13, 122, 151–2, 167–8, 170, 197–8
- CIS (Commonwealth of Independent
 States) 193
- citizens 2, 18, 59, 80, 132, 157, 159–60
- citizenship 4, 173, 175, 194
 European 157, 159
- civil society 78, 107, 109, 112, 172, 197–8
- civil wars 28, 140, 159, 179
- civilian power 93, 101, 121, 158
 European 166–7
 and structural foreign policy 162–8

- Closer Economic Relationship, *see* CER
 CMC (Common Market Council) 185
 coercive power 92, 163
 coexistence 20, 76, 79, 83, 92–3
 Cold War 93, 97–8, 139–40, 146–7, 151–2, 161–2, 166
 collective identities 98, 167
 Colombia 153, 181–7, 199–200, 203
 colonies 23, 25, 70, 78–9
 COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) 176–7
 Common Foreign and Security Policy, *see* CFSP
 common interests 21, 25, 52, 92–3, 95, 189, 191
 Common Market Council, *see* CMC
 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, *see* COMESA
 common markets 3, 53, 161, 165, 176–8, 180–4
 Arab 187
 Commonwealth of Independent States, *see* CIS
 communism 42–3, 46, 79, 131, 140
 Comoros 176–7, 189, 197, 203
 comparative studies on regional
 cooperation 125, 134, 148–54, 160
 complex interdependence 9, 93, 96, 105, 139, 141
 and transnationalism 84–7
 Concert of Europe 20, 22–3, 25–6, 29, 34, 46, 78–9
 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 201
 conflicts 22, 32–3, 51–2, 58–9, 71, 85–6, 142–3
 confrontation, ideological 79–80
 Congo, *see* Democratic Republic of the Congo
 Congress of Vienna 24, 76–7
 constitutional monarchy 77–8
 construction, European 2, 7, 11, 26, 28, 101, 117
 constructivist approaches 1, 6, 73, 92, 117–23, 164, 170–1
 examples and open questions 120–3
 philosophical background 117–18
 structure, agent, norms 118–20
 Wendt, A. 118–20
 constructivists 117, 119–22, 171
 contradictions 22, 43, 50, 65–6, 70–1, 111–12, 167–8
 convergence 4, 27, 82, 96, 108–9, 122, 158
 Cook Islands 196–7
 cooperation
 economic 30, 179–80, 187, 190, 192, 202
 functional 94, 97
 institutionalized 4, 89, 97–8, 141
 multilateral 4, 25, 47, 81, 147, 155, 167
 peaceful 13, 74, 128, 172
 theories 80–3
 cooperative power 166–7
 Costa Rica 182–3, 186, 199–200, 203
 costs 57, 69–70, 88, 98–9, 130, 140, 146
 Côte d'Ivoire, *see* Ivory Coast
 Cotonou Agreement 196–7
 Council for Arab Economic Unity, *see* CAEU
 Council of Cooperation between Arab States of the Gulf, *see* CCASG
 Council of Europe 4, 147, 156
 Cox, R. 60, 63–4, 110, 112
 crises 2, 11, 20, 26, 29–30, 68–70, 142–3
 economic 23, 26, 28, 70, 88, 111, 128
 Croatia 192–3, 195, 201
 CSME, *see* CARICOM Single Market and Economy
 Cuba 181, 186, 197, 199–200, 203
 culture 64, 74–5, 86, 102, 119, 142–3, 163
 Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa, *see* CEUCA
 customs unions 22, 176–80, 182, 184–5, 187–8, 193
 cybernetics 40–1, 91
 Cyprus 194, 199, 201
 Czech Republic 142, 192–5, 201

 de facto sovereignty 9–10
 de Tocqueville, A. 132
 de Vitoria, F. 15–16
 decision-making theories 135–8
 elitist model 137–8
 fragmentation model 136–7
 polyarchic model 137

- democracies, parliamentary and presidential 134–5
- democracy 4, 25, 127–8, 131–5, 142, 164, 198–9
- Democratic Republic of the Congo 176–8, 197, 203
- Denmark 194–5, 201
- dependence theory 63, 65–72, 128, 131
 1450–1640 68
 1650–1730 68
 1789 to beginning of twentieth century 68–9
 1917 to end of 1930s 69
 1945–1970 69
 1971–1989 69
 1989 onwards 69–72
- diplomacy 14, 25, 34, 42, 75, 77, 133
- discontinuity 111, 134, 169–70
- discursive institutionalism 103–5, 121–2
- distribution of power 33–4, 100
- diversity 25–6, 167
- Djibouti 176–7, 189, 197, 203
- domestic factors and foreign policy analysis 125–38
- domestic politics 9, 32, 48–9, 74–5, 99–100, 125, 138
- dominant powers 9, 45, 64, 70
- domination 17, 63, 69–70, 164, *see also* hegemony
- Dominica 181, 183, 197, 199–200, 203
- Dominican Republic 181, 183, 186, 199–200, 203
- Dominican Republic–Central American Free Trade Agreement, *see* DR-CAFTA
- domino effect 22, 77, 150–1
- “double state” 135
- DR-CAFTA (Dominican Republic–Central American Free Trade Agreement) 183
- dynamics, institutional 100, 147, 158
- EAC (East African Community) 177
- East African Community, *see* EAC
- Eastern Europe 70, 139–42, 149, 164
- Eastern Samoa 196–7, 204
- Easton, D. 39–43
- EC (European Community), *see* EU (European Union)
- ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States) 178
- ECFA (Economic Commission for Africa) 203
- ECGLC (Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries) 178
- ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America) 203
- economic actors 42, 53, 73
- Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, *see* CEMAC
- Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, *see* ESCAP
- Economic and Social Commission for West Asia, *see* ESCWA
- Economic and Social Council, *see* ECOSOC
- Economic Commission for Africa, *see* ECFA
- Economic Commission for Latin America, *see* ECLA
- Economic Community, European, *see* EEC (European Economic Community)
- Economic Community of Central African States, *see* ECCAS
- Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries, *see* ECGLC
- Economic Community of West African States, *see* ECOWAS
- economic cooperation 30, 179–80, 187, 190, 192, 202
- economic crises 23, 26, 28, 70, 88, 111, 128
- economic imperialism 126–8
- economic integration 154, 184, 187–8, 190, 196
- economic power 113, 137, 144–5, 162
- economic theory 28–9, 63, 128
- economic union 176, 191, 193
- economies, national 30, 56, 68, 125–6, 148, 184
- ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council) 178, 202
- ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) 149, 178–80
- ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) 156–7, 193
- Ecuador 181–2, 185–7, 199–200, 203
- education 13, 113, 132, 158

- EEA (European Economic Area) 195
 EEC (European Economic Community)
 149, 192–3, *see also* EU (European Union)
 effectiveness 59–60, 100, 104, 110, 144, 194
 EFTA (European Free Trade Association)
 156, 195
 Egypt 176–7, 187–9, 199, 203–4
 El Salvador 181–3, 186, 199–200, 203
 elitist model 137–8
 empires 8, 10–11, 23–4, 26–7, 65, 128,
 145–6, *see also* imperialism
 English School 91–3
 Equatorial Guinea 176, 178, 197, 203
 equilibrium 14, 33–4, 36, 57, 111
 European 24–5
 Erasmus 14, 18–19
 Eritrea 176, 189, 197, 203
 ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission
 for Asia and the Pacific) 203
 ESCWA (Economic and Social
 Commission for West Asia) 204
 Ethiopia 31, 176–7, 197, 203
 EU–ACP relations 196
 EU (European Union) 70–1, 119–22, 151–2,
 154–68, 170–3, 193–6, 198–200
 system 158–9, 173
 Euratom (European Atomic Energy
 Community) 157, 193
 Eurocentrism 1–3, 10, 122, 169, 171
 Europe
 regional arrangements 191–5
 European Atomic Energy Community, *see*
 Euratom
 European citizenship 157, 159
 European Coal and Steel Community, *see*
 ECSC
 European Community
 see EU 34, 52, 58, 69, 74, 145, 193
 European construction 2, 7, 11, 26, 28,
 101, 117
 European Council 139, 155, 157, 161, 199
 European Economic Area, *see* EEA
 European Economic Community, *see* EEC
 European equilibrium 24–5
 European federal state 2, 26–7, 160, 173
 European Free Trade Association, *see*
 EFTA
 European integration 1–2, 5, 52, 95,
 159–60, 169–70, 172–3
 functional 27
 European Parliament 157–9, 167, 194–5
 European perspective 169–70
 European Schools of thought
 eighteenth-nineteenth centuries 17–25
 European modernity 14–16
 European studies 3–4, 74, 121, 158, 170
 civilian power and structural foreign
 policy 162–8
 EU as blueprint/model 154–60
 EU studies and comparative studies on
 regional cooperation 148–54
 idealists-realists debate 139–47
 and inside-outside distinction 160–2
 nature of US supremacy 139–47
 and renewal of international relations
 theory 139–68
 sovereignty in question 157–60
 European Union, *see* EU
 Europeanism 17, 19, 26–30
 executive powers 14, 107, 159
 external policies 35, 127, 132, 160–1
 federal states 18, 154, 159–60
 European 2, 27, 160, 173
 federalists 26, 30, 95, 158–9
 Fichte, G. 15, 17, 131
 Fiji 196–7, 204
 finance 42, 57, 61, 67, 180, 186–7
 First World War 5, 17, 22, 26, 30, 43,
 126–7
 flexible bipolar system 45–8
 foreign policy 35–6, 49–50, 101, 108,
 161–2
 aggressive 129, 142
 analysis and impact of domestic factors
 125–38
 European 164, 167
 national 41, 125, 135
 Fortress Europe 145, 151
 fragmentation 11, 105, 108, 141, 172
 model 136–7
 France 8, 16, 21–3, 37, 68, 196, 201–4
 free trade 18, 22–3, 30–1, 58, 68, 78, 153
 agreements 183–5, 196

- areas 176–7, 182–4, 186, 190, 195, 197, 199, *see also* common markets
- Free Trade Area of the Americas, *see* FTAA
- French Revolution 21, 45, 76–7
- FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) 152, 182–4, 199
- functional cooperation 94, 97
- functional integration 27, 96
- functionalism 152, 170
 - and neo-functionalism 93–6
- functionalists 26, 84, 94–5, 108, 158–9, 173
- Gabon 176, 178, 197, 203
- Gambia 149, 176, 179, 197, 203
- games theory 99
- GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 23, 43, 97–8, 138, 148–9, 205
- gender studies 6, 112–14
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, *see* GATT
- Georgia 190–3, 201
- Germany 8, 29, 31, 68, 78–9, 146–7, 166–7
- Ghana 149, 176, 179, 197, 203
- Gill, S. 63–5
- Gilpin, R. 13, 55–60, 73, 87
- global actors 3, 44, 162, 168
- global economy 23, 59, 65, 67–9, 71, 146
- global governance 10, 56, 73, 108–11, 113, 155–6, 161–2
- global markets 22, 59, 67–8, 126, 161
- global system 5, 11, 26, 41, 56, 66–7, 71–2
- globalization 108–9, 115, 141–4, 148, 150–1, 153–4
 - and state centrality 59–60
- gold standard 78, 82, 88, 145, 204
- governance 95, 101, 120, 158, 170, 180
 - global 10, 56, 73, 108–11, 113, 155–6, 161–2
- Gramsci, A. 63–5, 87, 112
- Great Britain 22–5, 27, 37, 57–8, 68, 76, 82, *see also* British hegemony; British multilateralism; United Kingdom
- great powers 31, 34, 36–7, 45, 56–8, 78–9, 145
- Greece 164, 192, 194, 201
- Grenada 183, 186, 197, 199–200, 203
- Grotius, H. 1, 9, 15, 20, 32, 74
- Grupo de los Tres* 183
- Guatemala 181–3, 186, 199–200, 203
- Guinea 149, 176, 179, 197, 203
 - Equatorial 176, 178, 197, 203
- Guinea-Bissau 149, 176, 179–80, 197, 203
- Guyana 183, 186–7, 197, 199–200, 203
- Haas, P. 82, 84, 94–5, 102–3, 118, 144
- Habermas, J. 7, 104, 112, 123, 144, 161, 166
- Haiti 151, 183, 186, 197, 199–200, 203
- hard power 121, 163, 166
- hegemonic powers 26, 58–9, 64–5, 70, 82, 88, 119
- hegemonic stability
 - critical approach 87–9
 - theory 11, 58–9, 63, 87–8
- hegemony 7, 36, 45, 63–4, 84, 87–8, 145–7
 - American 56, 58, 69, 88–9, 146, 151
 - British 22–4, 29–30, 68–9, 155
 - international 36, 64
- hierarchical/unipolar system 48
- hierarchies 9, 21, 36–7, 61, 86, 107, 132
 - internal 46–7
- high politics 36, 51, 85–7, 137
- historical institutionalism 30, 98, 100–2
- history of international systems
 - 1450–1640 68
 - 1648–1789 76–7
 - 1650–1730 68
 - 1789–1815 77
 - 1789 to beginning of twentieth century 68–9
 - 1815–1848 77
 - 1848–1914 78
 - 1914–1939 78–9
 - 1917 to end of 1930s 69
 - 1945 onwards 79–80
 - 1945–1970 69
 - 1979–1989 69
 - 1989 onwards 69–72
 - and international law 74–80
- Hobbes, Thomas 5, 9, 14–15, 17, 28, 35, 41
- Hobsbawm, E. 23, 64, 66, 141–2
- Hobson, J. 23, 63, 126–7
- Hoffmann, S. 43, 74–80, 83–4, 105, 131, 142, 146
- Holy Alliance 24, 76–7

- Honduras 181–3, 186, 199–200, 203
 human nature 5, 13, 19, 21, 32
 human rights 109, 113, 144, 147, 169, 176,
 201–2
 protection of 18, 82, 164
 humanitarian intervention 6, 10, 48, 118, 144
 Hungary 8, 142, 193–5, 201
 Huntington, S. 115, 142–3
- idealists–realists debate 139–47
 identities 27, 102–4, 113, 115, 119–20,
 160, 194
 collective 98, 167
 ideological confrontation 79–80
 ideologies 3, 31, 35, 37, 39, 43, 74–7
 imbalance 33–4, 126
 IMF (International Monetary Fund) 43, 56,
 96, 149, 153, 204
 imperial presidency 134
 imperial republic 134, 163
 imperialism 24, 63–4, 69, 78, 88, 102, 126–8
 India 44, 46, 122, 143, 145, 150–2, 170
 Indonesia 46, 71, 148, 150–2, 190, 197, 204
 information technology 39, 61
 injustice 14, 16
 insecurity 19, 51, 71
 theories 128–30
 inside–outside distinction 160–2
 instability 52, 58, 79
 institutional actors 35, 136
 institutional context 99, 103–4
 institutional dynamics 100, 147, 158
 institutional systems 150, 158, 161, 164–5
 institutionalism 88, 91–3, 97, 111, 114,
 120–2, 170–2
 discursive 103–5, 121–2
 historical 30, 98, 100–2
 rational choice 99–100, 102, 158, 160
 sociological 102–3
 institutionalist theories 91–105
 British School 91–3
 discursive institutionalism 103–5
 functionalism to neo-functionalism 93–6
 historical institutionalism 100–2
 neo-functional revival 96–9
 rational choice institutionalism 99–100
 sociological institutionalism 102–3
 institutionalists 6, 50, 96–9, 121, 138, 171
 institutionalization 4, 7, 24, 81, 83, 88, 96–7
 international 91, 102, 120
 institutionalized cooperation 4, 89, 97–8, 141
 institutions 3, 7, 97–100, 102–4, 138, 184,
 204–5
 integration 74, 95, 108, 161, 180–1, 184–5,
 187–8
 economic 154, 184, 187–8, 190, 196
 European 1–2, 5, 52, 95, 159–60,
 169–70, 172–3
 regional 22, 95, 150–2, 154–5, 181,
 186, 200
 intentions 5, 14, 32, 99, 120, 186, 198
 interdependence 10, 49, 51–3, 56, 83–6,
 94, 119
 complex 9, 83–7, 93, 96, 105, 139, 141
 intergovernmentalists 158
 internal hierarchies 46–7
 international agenda 18, 36, 61, 78, 85–6, 143
 international anarchy 5, 20, 36, 81, 114,
 118, 120
 international cooperation 5, 29, 32, 80–2,
 88, 97–8, 120–1
 peaceful 74, 128
 international hegemony 36, 64
 international institutionalization 91, 102, 120
 international institutions 45, 49, 51, 85, 94,
 98–100, 104
 international law 4, 6, 9, 15–16, 18–19,
 73–5, 79–80
 evolution of 76, 83
 International Monetary Fund, *see* IMF
 international organizations 10, 47–8, 64,
 86, 89, 91, 94
 international peace 17–18, 26, 31, 94, 131
 international political economy 55–61
 Gilpin, R. 56–60
 origins 55–6
 realist approach 56–60
 state as one actor among many 60–1
 Strange, S. 60–1
 international politics 32–4, 36, 40–4,
 48–52, 86–7, 125, 132–3
 international power 25, 57, 64, 85, 93, 145,
 166
 international regimes 3, 7, 52, 73, 80–3,
 109–10, 120
 theory 7, 82, 84

- International Relations
 institutionalization of 83, 96, 155
 sociology of 5, 34
 theories 3–4
 Antiquity to the Middle Ages 13–14
 balance of power 19–25
 eighteenth-nineteenth centuries
 17–25
 European modernity 14–16
 Europeanism 26–30
 interwar crisis 26–30
 Kant, E. 17–19
 multilateralism 19–25
 multipolarity 19–25
 nationalism 26–30
 origins 13–37
 pacifist traditions 17–19
 and political economy 26–30
 realist paradigm 31–7
 international society 11, 22, 92–3, 108,
 117, 121, 141
 international stability 24, 56, 58, 69, 77
 international system 3, 8–9, 40–1, 43–5,
 50–1, 56–8, 74–5
 international wars/warfare 5, 15, 17, 21,
 131, 140
 interregional arrangements 209–10
 interregional organizations 196–202
 interwar crisis 26–30
 IPE (International Political Economy)
 55–7, 59–61, 63, 71, 88
 Iran 71, 143, 191, 204
 Iraq 128, 143, 146, 187–9, 204
 Ireland 194, 201
 irrationality 115, 132–3
 Islam 9, 115, 142–3
 isolationism 48, 130–1
 Israel 184, 192, 199
 Italy 8, 21, 23–4, 27, 78, 101, 164
 Ivory Coast 149, 176, 179–80, 197, 203

 Jamaica 183, 186, 197, 199–200, 203
 Japan 9, 23, 31, 68–71, 101, 127–8, 145–6
 Jordan 187–9, 199, 204
 justice 13, 19, 157, 183, 185, 189, 193–4

 Kant, E. 1, 15, 21–2, 26, 49, 131
 and pacifist traditions 17–19

 Kaplan, M. 43–8, 50, 68, 74, 91
 Katzenstein, P. 100, 102, 121, 147
 Kazakhstan 190–1, 193, 201
 Kennedy, P. 145–6
 Kenya 176–7, 197, 203
 Keohane, R.O. 7, 81–2, 84–9, 97–8, 103–5,
 122, 144–7
 Keynes, J.M. 28–30, 88, 126
 Keynesianism 28, 30–1
 Kindleberger, C. 22–3, 58, 63, 87–8
 Kiribati 196–7, 204
 knowledge 1, 40, 61, 94, 103, 114–15, 121–3
 Korean War 45–6, 79, 130, 137
 Krasner, S. 7, 81, 83, 102
 Kuwait 188–9, 204
 Kyrgyzstan 190–1, 193, 201

 Laos 150, 190, 204
 LAS (League of Arab States) 189
 Lasswell, H. 128–9, 133
 Latin America 68, 70–1, 95, 113, 149, 152,
 155
 Latin American Association for
 Development and Integration, *see*
 ALADI
 Latin American Economic System, *see*
 SELA
 League of Arab States, *see* LAS
 League of Nations 1, 18, 26–8, 31, 79, 91, 126
 Lebanon 189, 199, 204
 legitimacy 4, 7, 96, 104, 110, 152, 160
 Lenin 63, 126–7
 Lesotho 176–7, 180, 197, 203
 liberalization 22, 78, 148
 Liberia 176, 179, 197, 203
 liberty 16, 18, 21, 131–2, 145, 175
 Libya 176–7, 187–9, 199, 203
 Lomé Convention 155, 196–7
 low politics 36, 51, 86–7
 loyalty 61, 93, 95–6
 Luxembourg 192, 194, 201

 Maastricht Treaty 157, 164, 193–4
 Machiavelli 5, 9, 14–15, 20, 28, 134, 136
 Madagascar 176–7, 197, 203
 Maghreb, regional arrangements 187–9
 Malawi 149, 176–7, 180, 197, 203
 Malaysia 150–1, 190, 197, 204

- Maldives 150, 191, 204
Mali 149, 176, 179–80, 197, 203
Malta 194, 199, 201
Mano River Union, *see* MRU
Marshall Plan 29, 69, 137, 156
Marx, K. 19, 28, 63–72, 112
Mauritania 149, 179, 187–9, 197, 203
Mauritius 176–7, 191, 197, 203
Mearsheimer, J. 73, 140
MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market)
 97, 122, 149–53, 182, 184–7
Metternich 24, 77
Mexico 71, 113, 143, 149, 152, 181–7,
 199–200
Meyer, T. 115, 143, 145
Micronesia 196–7, 204
Middle Ages 8, 13, 16, 20, 25, 75, 93
militarism 127–8
military power 19, 85, 128, 142, 146–7,
 165, 170
Mitrany, D. 21, 27, 84, 94
mixed government 158–9
models 2, 9, 18, 45, 48, 75, 154
moderation 34, 75–6, 134
Moldova 192–3, 201
monetary policy 157, 159, 161, 204
monetary union 97, 139, 147, 149, 176,
 180, 194
Moravcsick, A. 83, 100, 147, 158
Morgenthau, H. 5, 28, 32–5
Morocco 188–9, 199, 203
Mozambique 149, 176–7, 180, 197, 203
MRU (Mano River Union) 179
multilateral cooperation 4, 25, 47, 81, 147,
 155, 167
multilateral organizations 89, 147, 156
multilateralism 19–25, 30, 81, 153–6,
 164–5, 168
 British 22–3, 26
 EU as blueprint/model 154–6
multipolarism 9, 11, 20, 29–30, 33, 44, 49
multipolarity 19–25
Myanmar 150, 190–1, 204
- NAFTA (North American Free Trade
 Agreement) 149–51, 183, 185, 196
Namibia 176–7, 180, 197, 203
Napoleonic era 76–7
 nation-states 7, 59, 65, 75–6, 78, 120
 national economies 30, 56, 68, 125–6, 148,
 184
 national interests 1, 29, 31–2, 37, 78, 92,
 137–8
 national sovereignty 26, 53, 80–1, 101–2,
 152, 157, 160
 nationalism 26–30, 78, 101, 113, 115, 131,
 140–1
 natural resources 33, 82, 178, 180
 negotiations 29, 45–6, 86–7, 97–8, 119,
 135–7, 182–4
 neighboring states 1, 4, 13, 53, 140, 151,
 170–1
 neo-functionalism
 and functionalism 93–6
 revival 96–9
 neo-institutionalism 7, 73, 87
 neo-mercantilism 59
 neo-realism 49, 51–2, 57, 93, 96–7, 111
 going beyond 73–89
 neo-realist theory 3, 37, 48–53, 84–5, 87, 141
 neo-realists 52, 73, 92, 100, 143, 170
 neo-regionalism 11, 148–9, 151–2
 Nepal 150, 191, 204
 Netherlands 8, 68, 101, 192, 194, 196, 203–4
 New Guinea 148, 196
 new medievalism 108–11
 New Transatlantic Agenda, *see* NTA
 New Zealand 196–7, 204
 NGOs (non-governmental organizations)
 53, 56, 65, 85, 167, 196
 Nicaragua 181–3, 186, 199–200, 203
 Niger 149, 176, 179–80, 197, 203
 Nigeria 149, 176, 179, 197, 203
 non-governmental organizations, *see* NGOs
 non-intervention 9–10, 79, 81
 non-state actors 7, 45, 53, 71, 85, 168
 normative power 163–4
 North American Free Trade Agreement, *see*
 NAFTA
 Norway 195, 201
 NTA (New Transatlantic Agenda) 199, 201
 Nye, J.S. 7, 55, 84–7, 105, 108, 145–6,
 162–3
- OAU (Organization of African Unity) 175
objectivity 6, 117

- Oman 188–9, 204
- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, *see* OSCE
- Organization of African Unity, *see* OAU
- origins of international relations theories, *see* theories, origins
- OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) 4, 7, 98, 139, 147, 156, 201
- overproduction 126, 128
- pacifism 5, 23, 25–6, 31, 37, 45
and Kant, E. 17–20
- Pakistan 143, 150–1, 170, 191, 204
- Palau 196–7
- Palestine Authority 188–9, 204
- Panama 181–2, 186–7, 199–200, 203
- Papua New Guinea 190, 197, 204
- Paraguay 149, 181, 185–7, 199–200, 203
- parliamentary democracies 134–5
- Parsons, T. 39–43
- peace 13–15, 18–19, 29, 35–6, 77–8, 131–3, 180
international 17–18, 26, 31, 94, 131
- peaceful cooperation 13, 74, 128, 172
- perceptions 6, 93, 102, 138, 164, 169
- periphery 66–71
- persuasion 28, 104, 118, 121, 162, 167
- Peru 181–2, 185–7, 197, 200, 203
- Philippines 150, 190, 197, 204
- Poland 21, 139, 142, 192–5, 201
- Polanyi, K. 22–3, 28, 30
- political economy 26–30
international, *see* international political economy
- political imperialism 126–8
- political parties 80, 132–4, 167
- political realism 15, 32
- political regime theories 130–5
bipartisanship and foreign policy 133–4
decision-making theories 135–8
democracy and foreign policy 133
“double state” 135
parliamentary and presidential democracies 134–5
- political science 4, 28, 31, 39–40, 63, 83–4, 97–8
- political systems 3, 13, 19, 21, 40–2, 103–4, 133–4
- politico-military power 145–6, 162
- politics 32, 35, 43–4, 53, 55, 101–2, 128
high 36, 51, 85–7, 137
low 36, 51, 86–7
power 17, 20, 33, 50, 120, 128, 164
- polyarchic model 137
- Portugal 14, 23, 68, 148, 164, 181, 194–5
- positivism 6, 37, 73, 112, 114, 117–19
- post-modern theories 111–12
- post-modernism 73, 93, 108, 111, 117, 122
synthesis of theories 114–15
- post-sovereign world 107–15
critical theories 111–12
gender studies 112–14
global governance 108–11
new medievalism 108–11
post-modern theories 111–12
post-modernist theories 114–15
world society 108–11
- poverty 67, 80, 108, 143, 147, 165, 180
- power 13–17, 19–21, 31–4, 55–61, 64–5, 74–9, 162–7
balance of, *see* balance of power
civilian 93, 101, 121, 158, 162–7
coercive 92, 163
cooperative 166–7
cycles 56–7
distribution of 33–4
economic 113, 137, 144–5, 162
executive 14, 107, 159
hard 121, 163, 166
international 25, 57, 64, 85, 93, 145, 166
military 19, 128, 147, 165, 170
normative 163–4
politico-military 145–6, 162
politics 17, 20, 33, 50, 120, 128, 164
relations 31, 51–2, 60, 74, 79, 137
asymmetric 86, 120
balanced 36
soft 64, 84, 121, 162–3
- presidential democracies 134–5
- private actors 53, 87–8, 107
- production 60–1, 64, 67, 69–70, 126–7, 176, 180
- progress, social 189, 191–2, 194, 202
- protectionism 22, 43, 59–60, 68, 148, 153

- public goods 81, 89
public opinion 13, 19, 45, 129–30, 132–3, 147
- Qatar 188–9, 204
- rational actors 5, 99, 136
rational choice 37, 80–1, 92, 99, 101, 114, 138
 institutionalism 99–100, 102, 158, 160
realism 6, 13–14, 52, 61, 138–9, 142, 170–1
 going beyond 73–89
 and international political economy
 56–60
 political 15, 32
realist paradigm 31–7
 Aron, R. 34–5
 Carr, E.H. 31–2
 Morgenthau, H. 32–4
realist theories 4, 26, 34–5, 51, 113, 141
realists 6, 15, 29, 36–7, 73–4, 121–2, 138
reciprocity 75, 77–8, 80, 156
referendums 2, 157, 194–5
regional actors 151, 167–8
regional arrangements 175–96, 208
 Africa 175–80
 Americas 181–7
 Arab world and Maghreb 187–9
 Asia 189–91
 Europe 191–5
 Oceania 196
regional associations 148, 153–6
regional cooperation 1, 4, 95, 170–1, 191,
 198
 comparative studies on 148–54
regional groupings 56, 59, 151, 155–6, *see*
 also regional arrangements
regional integration 22, 95, 150–2, 154–5,
 181, 186, 200
regional markets 149–50
regional organizations 59, 149–53, 159,
 182, 186, 191
regionalism 60, 148–50, 171
 EU as blueprint/model 154–6
regulation 30, 81, 107, 109, 158, 179
religions 9, 20, 32, 109, 115, 142–3
Republic of the Congo 176
research agenda, European contribution
 170–3
resources 23, 45–6, 75, 166–7, 190, 195
 natural 33, 82, 178, 180
revolutionary systems 75–6
revolutions 71, 76–7, 100, 142
Rio de Janeiro Process 200
Rio Group 186
Romania 46, 94, 142, 181, 192–4, 201
Rome Treaties 156–7, 159, 193, 195
Rosenau, J.N. 96, 108–11, 125, 136
Rousseau, J.J. 15, 17, 131
Ruggie, J. 81, 94, 102–4, 117–18, 120–1, 156
rule of law 17, 19–20, 128, 180, 189
Russia 27, 68, 71, 127, 140, 143, 190–3
Rwanda 176–8, 197, 203
- SAARC (South Asian Association for
 Regional Cooperation) 150–2, 191
SACU (Southern Africa Customs Union)
 179
SADC (Southern African Development
 Community) 149, 151, 180
SAFTA (South American Free Trade Area)
 182, 184
St Lucia 183, 197, 199–200, 203
St Vincent and the Grenadines 183, 197,
 199–200, 203
Samoa, Eastern 196–7, 204
São Tomé and Príncipe 176, 178
Saudi Arabia 188–9, 204
Schmitter, P. 95, 107, 158
scientific community 2, 4, 44, 55, 143, 162
Second World War 35, 58, 76, 79–80, 91,
 101, 147
security 34, 36, 51–2, 110–11, 129, 180,
 201–2
 dilemma 36–7, 51, 98, 121, 151
 questions 86–7, 104
SELA (Latin American Economic System)
 186
semi-periphery 67–8, 71–2
Senegal 149, 176, 179–80, 197, 203
Seychelles 176–7, 180, 197, 203
shared sovereignty 1, 4, 11, 155, 158–9
shared values 82, 102, 172
Sierra Leone 176, 179, 197, 203
Singapore 150, 190, 197, 204
single currency 3, 147, 175, 193–4
Single European Act 100, 145, 151, 157,
 162, 193

- Slovakia 192–5
- Slovenia 193–4, 201
- Smith, A. 28–9, 141
- social actors 65, 111
- social constructions 6, 73, 102, 118–19
- social contract 15, 131
- social progress 189, 191–2, 194, 202
- society 5–6, 8, 11, 16, 25, 87, 108
 - civil 78, 107, 109, 112, 172, 197–8
 - international 11, 22, 92–3, 108, 117, 121, 141
 - of states 1, 20, 25, 92
- sociological institutionalism 102–3
- sociology of international relations 5, 34
- soft power 64, 84, 121, 162–3
- Solomon Islands 196–7, 204
- Somalia 153, 176, 187–9, 197, 203
- South Africa 149–52, 176–7, 179–80, 197, 203
- South American Free Trade Area, *see* SAFTA
- South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, *see* SAARC
- South Korea 191, 197–8, 204
- South Pacific Commission, *see* SPC
- Southern Africa Customs Union, *see* SACU
- Southern African Development Community, *see* SADC
- Southern Common Market, *see* MERCOSUR
- sovereignty 2–4, 9–11, 16, 75, 157, 160–1, 172–3, *see also* post-sovereign world
 - de facto 9–10
 - EU as innovative model 157–60
 - national 26, 53, 80–1, 101–2, 152, 157, 160
 - shared 1, 4, 11, 155, 158–9
 - state 3–4, 8, 10, 27, 73, 134–5, 160
- Soviet Bloc 43–4, 46
- Soviet Union 8–10, 31, 69, 79, 111, 146, 193
- Spain 8, 16, 68, 164, 181, 194, 201
- SPC (South Pacific Commission) 196
- spillover effects 94–5
- Sri Lanka 150, 191, 204
- stability 5, 20–1, 25, 35–6, 48–9, 67, 77–8
 - international 24, 56, 58, 69, 77
- state centrality
 - and globalization 59–60
 - state power 9, 33, 35–6, 77, 110, 135, 141
 - state sovereignty 3–4, 8, 10, 27, 73, 134–5, 160
- Stein, A.A. 80–1, 130, 138
- Strange, S. 60–1
- structural anarchy 36, 51, 76
- structural capabilities 60–1
- structural foreign policy and civilian power 162–8
- structural power 60, 121
- structure, agent, norms 118–20
- subjectivity 6–7, 33, 92, 169
- subsidiarity 158, 194
- Sudan 176–7, 187–9, 197, 203
- superpowers 9, 36, 44–8, 59, 79, 93, 146
 - hegemonic 64, 82
- Surinam 183, 186–7, 197, 199–200, 203
- Swaziland 176–7, 180, 197, 203
- Sweden 8, 14, 16, 46, 194–5, 201
- Switzerland 46, 181, 195, 201
- Syria 187–9, 199, 204
- system theory 66, 74, 76, 84, 91, 108, 119,
 - see also* systemic theories
 - applied to international relations 43–8
 - applied to political and social sciences 39–43
 - and balance of power 45
 - Easton, D. 39–43
 - flexible bipolar system 45–7
 - hierarchic/unipolar system 48
 - Kaplan, M. 43–8
 - neo-realist theory 48–53
 - Parsons, T. 39–43
 - rigid bipolar system 47
 - “unit veto” system 48
 - universal system 47–8
 - Waltz, K. 48–53
- systemic approaches 39–53, 125–6
- systemic change 8, 52, 65, 139, 149
- systemic theories 3, 13, 39, 42, 50, 63, 69,
 - see also* system theory
- systemic variables 49, 139, 148
- Tajikistan 190–1, 193, 201, 204
- Tanzania 149, 176–7, 180, 197, 203
- tariffs 177, 179, 186, 201, 205
- technical assistance 196, 203–4

- technological development 48–9, 186
 technology 40, 74–5, 86, 145–6, 148, 177, 180
 TEP (Transatlantic Economic Partnership) 201
 Thailand 150, 190, 197
 theories
 decision-making, *see* decision-making theories
 dependence, *see* dependence theory
 economic, *see* economic theory
 hegemonic stability, *see* hegemonic stability, theory
 insecurity, *see* insecurity, theories
 institutionalist, *see* institutionalist theories
 neo-realist, *see* neo-realist theory
 origins
 Antiquity to the Middle Ages 13–14
 eighteenth–nineteenth centuries 17–25
 European modernity 14–16
 Europeanism 26–30
 nationalism 26–30
 realist paradigm 31–7
 political regime, *see* political regime theories
 realist, *see* realist theories
 system, *see* system theory
 systemic, *see* systemic theories
 threats 36, 46, 113, 129–30, 145, 151, 166
 external 6, 129–30
 Tobago, *see* Trinidad and Tobago
 Togo 176, 180, 196–7, 203
 Tonga 196–7, 204
 trade 59–60, 68, 178–80, 184–5, 195–7, 200–1, 205
 transaction costs 98–9
 Transatlantic Economic Partnership, *see* TEP
 transnational actors 53, 85–8, 100, 104, 171–2
 transnational society 13, 34–5, 58, 84–5
 transnationalism 34, 73, 93, 96, 105, 108
 and complex interdependence 84–7
 transparency 131, 135
 Trinidad and Tobago 183, 186, 197, 199–200, 203
 Tunisia 176, 188–9, 192, 199, 203
 Turkey 143, 190–2, 195, 199, 201
 Uganda 176–7, 197, 203
 Ukraine 190–3, 201
 UN (United Nations) 7, 18, 43, 45–7, 96–7, 110, 202
 organizations belonging to 203–4
 UNASUR/UNASUL (Union of South American Nations) 186
 uncertainty 35–6, 51, 83, 98–9
 Union of South American Nations, *see* UNASUR/UNASUL
 unipolar system, *see* hierarchic/unipolar system
 “unit veto” system 48
 United Arab Emirates 188–9, 204
 United Kingdom 29, 68, 194–6, 201–4, *see also* British hegemony; British multilateralism; Great Britain
 United Nations, *see* UN
 United States 57–9, 68–71, 134–7, 148–9, 199–204
 hegemony, *see* American hegemony
 power, *see* American power
 supremacy, nature of 139–47
 systemic approaches 39–53
 United States of Europe 23, 27, 159–60
 universal system 47–8
 Uruguay 149, 181, 185–7, 199–200, 203
 USA, *see* United States
 USSR, *see* Soviet Union
 Uzbekistan 190–1, 193, 201

 values 6, 37, 77, 119, 121–2, 164–5, 168–9
 shared 82, 102, 172
 Venezuela 149, 181–7, 189, 199–200, 203
 Vietnam 128, 150–1, 190, 197, 204
 War 69, 79, 130, 145
 Visegrád Group 195

 WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union) 180
 Wallerstein, I. 63, 65–72
 Waltz, K. 32, 48–53, 71, 73–5, 85, 92, 121–2
 wars 13–16, 19–21, 34–7, 47–9, 76–9, 127–31
 and change 56–7

- civil 28, 140, 179
- Weber, M. 6, 25, 117–18, 136, 154
- Wendt, A. 102, 118–21
- West African Economic and Monetary Union, *see* WAEMU
- Western Sahara 176
- Westphalia, Treaty of 8, 14, 20, 68, 76, 92
- Westphalian paradigm 3, 34, 109, 111, 115, 173
 - revision 8–11
- Westphalian system 3, 9, 21, 33–4, 45, 68, 110
- Wight, M. 32–3, 91, 118
- Wilson, W. 31, 79, 130, 134, 163
- world politics 7, 27, 56–7, 66–7, 81, 84, 86
- world society 108–11
- “world system” and dependence theory 65–72
- World Trade Organization, *see* WTO
- world wars, *see* First World War; Second World War
- WTO (World Trade Organization) 7, 56, 79, 96–8, 138, 147–8, 205
- Yemen 187–9, 204
- Zambia 149, 176–7, 180, 197, 203
- Zimbabwe 149, 176–7, 180, 197, 203