




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The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy and the Rise of the Secret Societies

By R.M. Johnston

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THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE



The
Napoleonic Empire

In Southern Italy

and the

Rise of the Secret Societies

BY

R. M. JOHNSTON

AUTHOR OF 'THE ROMAN THEOCRACY AND THE REPUBLIC, 1846-1849'
'NAPOLEON: A SHORT BIOGRAPHY'

VOLUME I

London

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TO
MRS. W. B. WALKER
A KIND
AND VALUED FRIEND

PREFACE

NAPLES is one of the remote corners of Europe, but one of the most attractive, for Nature and History together have endowed it with all the fascination of the grand, extraordinary, and romantic. As one gazes from Posilipo across the lovely bay, Capri, the haunt of Tiberius, arrests the eye ; to the left Vesuvius smokes watchfully over the cities it has swallowed, while in the very corner of the gulf nestles Naples ; to the right are Misenum, Baiæ, and the desolate fields where Virgil meditated the *Æneid*. Every promontory, every island, every village, every stone suggests history ; and wherever the eye rests the azure of sea and sky frames to perfection some of the most beautiful scenes in the world. Yet it is not, as many suppose, from the remote past alone that Naples and the surrounding country derive their mellowing atmosphere of tradition ; the moderns have some claim not to be forgotten. For the history of ancient Naples can show no more brilliant or romantic figure than that of one of her modern kings, Joachim Murat ; no more momentous political issues ever turned on her possession than those evolved by the gigantic intellect of the Emperor Napoleon.

It is to trace these political issues, and some of their more immediate consequences, that this book is written. The subject has been much neglected, and is of far more importance than is generally assumed in histories of wider scope. For the southern end of the Italian peninsula was, in one sense, the strategic centre or turning-point of the great war between France and England. From 1806 to 1814 the strength of the two antagonists, eagerly watching Egypt and the route to India, balanced at the Strait of Messina. The British occupation of Sicily, the events associated with the names of Maida, Ischia, Capri, Corfu, and Malta, have been undeservedly lost to sight behind the heavier cloud of war that rose from the neighbouring peninsula of Spain.

But the irruption of the Napoleonic influence into southern Italy had a double effect, of which military affairs present only one aspect. Not only will the vicissitudes of the struggle for the Mediterranean between France and England and the tragic fortunes of King Joachim be duly chronicled, but also the fall of feudalism, the creation of a national spirit by the French conquest, and the eventual manifestation of that spirit through the agency of the secret societies in the first and most remarkable of the Italian national movements of the *Risorgimento*. It may further be observed that the date always assigned for the beginning of this period, 1815, is most arbitrary and deceptive. The *Risorgimento* was essentially Napoleonic in its origin, and its history is meaningless unless drawn from this earliest source ; indeed, when the reader has

arrived at that period he will perhaps agree that it would be more justifiable to say that the *Risorgimento* was nearly accomplished in 1813 than that it only began in 1815.

It may be urged that the scope of this history should have been extended so as to include Sicily. This has not been done for various reasons, among them these: that it would have been destructive to the unity of the book, and that for the period here dealt with a nearly indispensable source of evidence for Sicilian affairs remains closed—the dispatches of Lord William Bentinck.¹ The remarkable conflict between Bentinck and Queen Mary Caroline is the key to the central period of interest in Sicily, and when entering on the work of collecting material for this history I could not foresee that I should have the good fortune to discover a hitherto unknown manuscript narrative by Queen Mary Caroline, in which one side of this political drama is circumstantially stated. As to this MS. the reader must be referred to Appendix D; here all that need be added on the subject is that I hope to be able to make arrangements for editing and publishing this valuable document.

In the course of this book more than one new reading of history will be met with, two of which require special mention here. The portrait of Murat is so far removed from that generally presented that it may be thought the work of an apologist. Nothing could be further from the fact. On entering into the preliminary work

¹ Some of these dispatches are accessible, and have been utilized by Mr. Browning, Mons. Weil, and others. The reference is, of course, to those that have been specially held back by the British Foreign Office.

for this book, I accepted, with at most a vague mistrust, the current historical estimate of Murat. But as evidence accumulated, my views became modified, and gradually shaped into the presentment the reader will find. The facts, the evidence, the conclusions, are put forward in no spirit of laudation. It may be added that it is not on a few specific items of important evidence that I rely, but rather on an accumulation of minute indications, many of them not directly traceable in the text. Much of a man's character may insensibly filter into the historian's perception by the handling of dry official minutes in which a scrawled decision and signature in the margin,—usually nothing more than the word *Yes* or *No*,—afford the only clue. The examination of many such papers may not result in the acquirement of a single definite historical fact, yet may go far in shaping an opinion of character. There can be no doubt that both in the days of the Empire and since there has been a tendency to distort the proportion of the personages. Napoleon was undoubtedly great, and writers promptly combine to dwarf the men about him so that he may appear gigantic. But his admirers claim for him, and truly, that he was an admirable judge of men; if so, how is Murat's extraordinary career to be explained? Is not the presumption clear that he was one of the six most serviceable men in France? Except Masséna, and perhaps Davoust, he was the most trusted of Napoleon's lieutenants; even when the end was drawing near, when Napoleon suspected his brother-in-law of treason, he continued to treat him as the second man in his army. If the Emperor did this

during the last critical manœuvres of the campaign of Saxony, then surely either Napoleon was a bad judge of men, or Joachim Murat was something more than the empty-headed *beau sabreur* of the legend. The fact is, that Murat's figure has hitherto been reflected in a sort of historical concave glass; all the features have been there, and in their due place, but so completely distorted as to make the likeness undistinguishable.

The other matter to which reference must be made is that of the secret societies. The point of view I have adopted is that it was necessary, however deficient and untrustworthy the material, to attempt to place this essential aspect of the political movements of the nineteenth century in Italy on a strict historical basis. The evidence is of the most distressingly contradictory character. There is little that is really authentic for what comes before 1815; after that date the ground is slightly firmer. A confidential report of Sir Richard Church, of which the MS. is at the Biblioteca Nazionale at Naples, is the soundest piece of evidence as to the secret societies with which I am acquainted; it affords a good starting-point for the history of the Carbonari, and indirectly shows that Bertholdi's anonymous Memoirs are more accurate and valuable than has been generally supposed. Yet whatever care and judgment have been exercised in piecing together the present narrative, it is certain that here and there inaccuracies must have crept in. I have thought it was better to face this risk, believing the broad outline substantially true, than to turn away from an important aspect of the history

of this period which serious historians have hitherto refrained from touching because of the undoubtedly treacherous character of the evidence.

It is not only in the matter of the secret societies that the material for this history was of an unsatisfactory character, but generally. Few, if any, of the contemporary Italian authorities are reliable; the two most important, Pepe and Colletta, are frequently unveracious and chronically inaccurate. The documentary material for the period before 1815 is slight, fragmentary, and difficult to find, as at the Bourbon restoration nearly every trace of the French kings was effaced. Their improved system of administration was retained, but their records were destroyed and the very mention of their names was prohibited.

As to the manuscript and printed authorities I have used, the student must be referred to the notes at the end of each chapter and the critical bibliography, Appendix K.

In conclusion, I must acknowledge my debt of gratitude to the following institutions, their librarians and assistants: Archivio di Stato, Napoli; Biblioteca Nazionale, Napoli; Boston Public Library; British Museum; British Record Office; Cambridge University Library; Harvard College Library; San Martino, Napoli; Società di Storia Patria, Napoli; and the Università di Napoli. I am also indebted to the Italian Government and to the American Embassy at Rome for assistance in obtaining access to certain MSS., to Count De La Ville-sur-Yllon for some valuable suggestions, and to Miss S. C. Hart for reading proof.

POSTSCRIPT

Since the above was written more than four-fifths of the MS. of this book has been lost while out of my hands. I have, therefore, had the ungrateful task of rewriting the lost portion, and not being in a position either to recall the words of the missing MS. or to undertake a journey across the Atlantic, my work has necessarily suffered. There were in the first version passages, extracts, and notes that were taken directly from the original material, and that in this second version I have unfortunately been able to reproduce only in a form far from satisfactory to myself.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,
February 1904.

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PART I
THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE IN
SOUTHERN ITALY

K I N G D O M
O F
N A P L E S
1806.

Scale of English Miles



CHAPTER I

STATE OF NAPLES IN 1805

Situation of kingdom of Naples—Geographical—Natural resources—Origin of people—Albanians—Mountaineers—Neapolitans—Continuity of customs—Oratory—Religion—The drama—Pulcinella—The clergy—Education—S. Gennaro—Italian love for the concrete—Rise of feudalism—Miserable state of people—Low morality—Feudal law—Its origins—Università—Development of feudalism—Feudal rights and abuses—Brigandage—Lazzaroni—Commerce—Agriculture—Finance—Public debt—Fluctuation of population—Bourbon government—Justice—Foreign policy.

TOWARDS the close of 1805, the year of Trafalgar and Austerlitz, the affairs of the kingdom of Naples had reached a crisis; a remarkable series of events was soon to overtake it. The people of the southern half of the Italian peninsula were about to be absorbed into the newly-formed French Empire; they were to see Napoleon's kings succeed those of the House of Bourbon, to witness and suffer merciless wars and dramatic revolutions, to assist at the overthrow of feudalism, to participate in the benefits of improved government, to feel the growth of a new spirit—that of citizenship and nationality.

To understand the character and surroundings of the people and of the monarchy with which this

history will be concerned, something of their past and something of their mutual relations must first be made clear. This shall be the subject of the present chapter ; in it will be considered the social, economic, and political conditions of the people of Naples at the period at which this history opens.

The kingdom of Naples, the continental portion of the monarchy of the Two Sicilies, comprised about one half of the peninsular part of Italy. Its northern boundary ran from the Mediterranean to the Adriatic, from a point about midway between Rome and Naples to one not far south of Ancona. Midway between the two seas rose the lofty chain of the Apennines, at many points an impassable barrier ; it stretched the whole length of Italy, from the plains of Lombardy through the Papal States and the kingdom of Naples to the extreme point of Calabria where the rock of Scilla marked the abrupt descent of the mountains into the waters of the Strait of Messina. At the Gran Sasso, in the Abruzzi, the extreme elevation of nearly 10,000 feet is reached ; and at all points, within a few miles of Naples and among the rugged forest-clad fastnesses of Calabria, the lower summits are frequently clad with snow late in the spring and early in the autumn. It was at the extremities of the kingdom that the mountain influence was most felt ; towards the centre two considerable tracts of fertile lowland gave it a different character. The smaller of these lay along the western coast, stretching northward from Nola along the foot of Vesuvius to the mouth of the Garigliano ; the greater extended for many miles along the Adriatic, and included the rich country about Foggia, Bari, and Lecce. These districts and many of the mountain valleys were exceptionally rich in soil ; the whole kingdom was

favoured in its climate. Everywhere the vine and the olive, the lemon and the orange grew luxuriantly; in the volcanic soil about the city of Naples two, and even three crops of maize and garden produce might be obtained in the course of a year. The neighbouring seas were as rich as the land, and rewarded the efforts of many fishermen, harpooners, and divers. Coral and sponge abounded, and fish of all sorts—from the leviathan tunny to the edible sole. Forests of oak and chestnut clothed the mountains of Calabria, and might have yielded timber of the finest quality. Mineral resources were fewer, though the iron deposits of the Sila might have been easily converted into a source of wealth.

The facilities for outlet were as great as the natural resources of the kingdom. At frequent intervals along the rugged coasts, small ports, sufficient to accommodate the light barks of the Mediterranean, might be found, while larger ones were not few. Nearly without exception the important centres of population were within a few miles of the coast.

The people who dwelt in the land Nature had thus favoured were of ancient descent and presented some curious characteristics. But that descent and these characteristics differed widely in the various provinces of the kingdom. There was nothing resembling national homogeneity to be found among the subjects of the King of the Two Sicilies save the compelling bond resulting from the exertion of personal authority over ignorance and poverty. "The lively Campanian, the parsimonious Abruzzese, the boorish Pugliese, the haughty Calabrian quarrelled easily and showed the heterogeneity of the race," wrote Cantù. Not only did their temperaments differ, but also their dialects, to the point of mutual unintelligibility. Of the various

elements of the population, none showed more characteristic features than the Albanians, a race that shows, according to Virchow, the greatest cranial capacity in Europe. Their settlements were the result of the immigration that had taken place from beyond the Adriatic between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries under the pressure of Turkish conquest. The Albanians numbered about 75,000; they retained their religion, dress, and customs, and spoke an Italianized Greek dialect.¹ Several of their settlements had attained considerable importance, chief among them the large town of Catanzaro in Southern Calabria. Their principal church, situated in Naples, had been founded by Thomas Palæologus in 1518. The descendants of their famous leader Scanderbeg were large landholders in Puglia down to the nineteenth century. The Albanians were not the only extraneous elements. Passing over the waves of northern invasion that marked the close of the Roman Empire, from that of the Goths to that of the Lombards, it may be remarked that the wars of the Middle Ages, especially those between the Swabians and Angevins, added new elements to the population. Bands of mercenaries, mostly Germans and Saracens, were brought into the kingdom by the contending princes, and seasons of war and devastation were often concluded by the establishment of a colony of foreign auxiliaries in one of the abandoned towns they had lately desolated. Of these the best example was that of Lucera, for many years a purely Saracen settlement.

The hardy mountaineers of the Abruzzi and Calabria, a population of shepherds and farmers, might well pass for the descendants of the ancient Samnites, Lucanians,

¹ See a paper read by Prince Lucien Bonaparte before the Philological Society, 1890.

and Brutii whose conquest had cost Rome so many lives, for in their mountain valleys the wars and invasions of twenty-five centuries had introduced as little fresh blood as they had civilization. With them the village was but a larger family, justice the sanction of revenge, the vendetta a dearer gratification than living. As individual or clan fighters they were unsurpassed in craft, courage, ferocity, and endurance. They were the most redoubtable combatants of Europe as guerillas, the most easily demoralized as regular troops.

In the plains of Puglia were to be found the dullest and most debased among the numerous types of inhabitants; in the city of Naples, the most vivacious and interesting. There, and there alone in Italy, something of the Greek spirit had survived—nothing of the Greek virtues, much of the Greek failings. All the cities of Magna Græcia had disappeared: Kumæ, Sybaris, Croton, Pæstum were no more. Only Neapolis of the colonies of the Hellenes had survived, and, under Roman rule, had retained much of her original character. For not only had the Greek traditions of philosophy and art been adopted in the Roman world, thus aiding the preservation of this element where present, but the flow of travel from Greece to Rome, passing along the Appian Way from Brindisi to the capital, ran within a few miles of Naples, which thus became a natural link between the two civilizations. In later days the Greek Empire of the East rescued Naples from the dominion of the northern invaders; and at the time of the Norman Conquest in the eleventh century it had been for three hundred years an independent State maintaining close relations with Constantinople and Greece.

In considering the connection between the inhabitants of Southern Italy and the Ancients, the sequence of historical facts does not present the only clue. The daily customs and manner of thought of the people will afford another, equal in importance, perhaps greater in interest.

The most evident trait in which the Neapolitans revealed their Greek descent was in their mercurial, oratorical, gesticulating temperament—a temperament so completely opposite to that of the various populations about them, Sicilian, Calabrian, Abruzzian, or Roman. The democratic Greek spirit of popular government by means of market-square oratory, always latent, promptly asserted itself whenever the hand of despotism relaxed. Among them volubility was spontaneous, the use of the superlative indispensable, gesticulation second nature. Is it not thus that we picture the market-place politicians of the old Greek states? Perhaps not the few great orators whose studied eloquence was to become the model for future centuries, but the great mass of common demagogues? Their hold on the fickle crowd of citizens was won in daily open-air contests, in which only a pliable face and eloquent fingers could carry conviction and overcome the manifold difficulties of open-air speaking.¹ Did not Demosthenes, the first among them, say that in action lay the greatest virtue of the orator? No man is more imitative or quicker in his imitation than the Neapolitan, and it may be advanced that in his peculiar trick of gesticulation he is but reproducing that which his ancestors first caught in the deliberative assemblies in which oratory directed the fortunes of the Greek

¹ On the necessity of action in ancient oratory see some interesting observations by Boissier, *Promenades arch. Rome*, 68.

cities.¹ In one important phase of this history, that which deals with the origin and methods of the secret societies, this peculiar aptitude of the Neapolitans for expressing with a barely perceptible muscular contraction of eye, of face, or of hand, assent, dissent, and a hundred emotions, will be seen to be of importance. The *dumb language* of Naples, as a Swiss observer called it, was the language of the secret societies.

The attribution of the characteristic just noted to such a remote origin need cause no surprise, for it will presently be shown that the ancestry of the principal legendary hero of the Neapolitans may be traced back to a civilization anterior even to that of the Greeks. In the religion and superstition of the people there had indeed been little but superficial alteration since the days of the prosperity of the Roman Empire. Names had been changed, but not ways of thought and belief. Both the inner religious sentiment and its outward ceremonial presentment had remained very nearly what they were before Jove was displaced by Jehovah. The religious revolution of the fourth century was more significant in its political than in its theological aspect, nor will those who are acquainted with the southern Italians of the present day believe that their ancestors were capable of a sudden transition in their beliefs as the effect of an imperial decree. Before the edicts of Constantine and Constans the religion of the Neapolitan had for centuries centred in his own worldly interests; his deities won his allegiance so far as they affected his good fortune in

¹ It would be out of place to elaborate this point. It may, however, be pointed out, firstly, that a sharp distinction may be drawn between the constant and wonderfully varied gesticulation of the Neapolitan and that of any other Italian; secondly, that the Marseillais, who also represents a direct and continuous Greek tradition, may be distinguished by precisely the same trait. Gesticulation is not, as generally supposed, a southern characteristic. The Spaniard, the Sicilian, the Arab will gesticulate little more than the most impassive Northerner.

the affairs of life, and no farther. After the edicts that imposed Christianity his religion took a new name, incorporated new theories, attempted to assimilate a decentralizing and humanizing political movement ; but as for his inmost belief he remained inalterably convinced that the new Gods could and did affect his daily and worldly interests, exactly like the old ones, and they secured his allegiance to the extent that he imagined they would continue to bring him temporal, but not spiritual, good fortune. Even in outward aspects the change was of the most superficial character, and the masses accepted with unanimous unconcern the substitution of the Jah of the Hebrews for the Jove of the Cretans, on the implied condition that their ceremonies, festivals, and manners of thought were left practically untouched. How largely this was the case may still, at a distance of sixteen centuries, be traced. The intercessions addressed to God for rain were the reproduction of those that had been addressed to Jupiter. In the numberless priests and monks, ministers of ignorance, fed from the fruits of lucrative superstition, might be seen the transformed priests of an earlier and no less usefully employed religion. In the tonsure of the Christian monks might be recognised the distinctive mark of the priests of Isis ; in the dress of the nuns, the costume of the Vestal Virgins ;¹ in the churches might be viewed the columns and marbles, sometimes even the complete structure of the temples devoted to the earlier rite. The statues of Christian saints were the no longer popular images of the gods of Olympus ; the toe of Peter in the Vatican was worn away by the devout salutations of later generations, just

¹ In the *Athenæum* (1902, 305) Signor Lanciani notes an interesting link between the Vestal Virgins and the nuns of the Catholic Church.

as the mouth and chin of Hercules at Agrigentum had succumbed to those of their forefathers ; when Raphael painted Jonah in the form of Antinous he conformed to the tradition of earlier Christians who, while adopting the official Jonah, had carefully retained every appearance of their earlier divinity. Illustrations might be repeated indefinitely. The saints of the Church were merely the transfigured gods of Olympus, subject to all their far from heavenly passions. An altar at Viterbo dedicated to Santa Rosa was inscribed with the following verses :—

Quis tamen laudes recolat, quis hujus
 Virginis dotes, sibi quam pudicis
 Nuptiis junctam voluit superni
 Numen Olympi ?¹

To find Santa Rosa compared to Diana when wooed by Endymion is no more remarkable than to find Dante invoking Apollo and his most sublime vision of Almighty God in the same breath. The chief cult of the Italians at the time of the transformation had been the goddess Cybele ; she was promptly metamorphosed into the Virgin Mary. The *lares viales* at the intersection of cross-roads were converted into her shrines ; the ancient ceremonies were uninterrupted ; garlands and wreaths were still suspended ; the new deity was invoked to avert mischance and bring good fortune, and to this day the *zampognari* of the Abruzzi devotionally tune their rude bagpipes in honour of Mary, at the self-same spot, at the self-same shrine where their forefathers sounded the tibia in honour of Cybele. At Naples itself Diana appears to have been the goddess most in favour, and traces of her worship may still be found in

¹ Who shall tell the praise, the virtues of this virgin, whom the ruler of high Olympus desired in chaste espousal ?

the *cimaruta*, the most common amulet of the Neapolitans. An acute observer has even traced in the sermon of a Dominican monk of the present day some vestiges of the formulas used in the worship of the Diana Tifatina of Capua fifteen centuries ago.¹ At the time of the French Revolution, and it may be much later, the women of Naples when expecting childbirth were accustomed to hang about their necks small bags containing relics of St. Come. These relics were in reality small Priapi, and recalled one of the favourite cults of pagan days, and a primitive rite of very great antiquity that still survives in certain parts of India.

If Juvenal was justified in complaining that the gods had become so numerous as to overburden Atlas, Christianity certainly brought no relief. The extraordinary profusion of temples and ceremonies of the earlier was equalled, if not surpassed, by that of the later rite. Begging, once restricted to the priests of Cybele, extended from those of Mary to a whole population, and became, as it remains to this day, a national misfortune. The emasculated singers who chanted the praises of the Mother of the Gods were succeeded by equally barbarously used choristers whose dulcet notes proclaimed the glory of the Mother of Christ.² The festival of Hilaria, dedicated to the older, became that of Lady day, sacred to the younger deity.

The Neapolitan was as deeply attached to the stage as he was to religion. In the fourth century the literary skill, or the political persuasion, of Gregory Nazianzen

¹ Rolfe, *Naples in 1833*, 120, 121.

² For the practice of artificially producing these voices at Naples, see Gorani, *Mems.* i. 165. It was made illegal in 1806 under Joseph Bonaparte.

succeeded in supplanting the pagan influence of the Greek drama; for the immortal works of Æschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes were substituted the devotional compositions of Gregory on themes such as "Moses in Egypt," the "Murder of the Innocents," or the "Sacrifice of Abraham." These had, after an unvaried course of representations lasting for many centuries, become a part of the daily life of the people, and perhaps the most important factor in the formation of their theological conceptions. From the religious dramas they drew the symbolic rites of their societies, and appropriate images to express their joys and their sorrows.

But if the Greek drama succumbed to the irresistible efforts of Gregory Nazianzen, an even older manifestation of man's histrionic propensity managed to survive—not only to survive, but to supply Naples with its national hero, Pulcinella. The booths in which his performances took place were generally crowded, and loud laughter greeted his buffooneries and evanescent witticisms. This character and his antics had come down from the ancient Oscan comedies, known as *fabulæ Atellanæ*,¹ which the Greek drama and the Aristophanic comedies never succeeded in entirely supplanting. When Taine thought that the wildness of imagination shown in these Pulcinella farces recalled the buffooneries of Aristophanes, he was perhaps only noting a degeneration suffered by the *ludi Osci* from contact with the decadent Greek spirit. Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, when the comedian Fiorillo elaborated the part into its modern aspect, Pulcinella had become the sole important personage of these plays and the comic prototype of the Neapolitan.

¹ Atella was a small town on the site of the modern Aversa, midway between Naples and Caserta.

He was a long-nosed, inane, irresponsible booby, a pursuer of women, a sceptic, easily gulled, never opening his mouth but to utter a stupidity or worse. He held nothing sacred—save superstition alone; and incongruity never disconcerted him. His carved figure might be seen supporting the lamp before an image of the Virgin, and his theatre might be found established in the same building as a nunnery!

The traditions of the past were in nothing more faithfully respected than in the immense number of that class of the population that lived on the superstitions of the vulgar. At the opening of the nineteenth century about 100,000 priests, monks, and nuns ministered to the spiritual needs of the kingdom of Naples.¹ Yet notwithstanding the credulity and docility of the people, the handsome revenues of the princes of the Church, the constant benefactions received, the enormous estates held, notwithstanding an annual revenue of some 9,000,000 ducats, the position of the greater part of the clergy was miserable. Generally coming from the lower class, poor, ignorant, and vicious, they resorted to a variety of means for supporting life, of which beggary was generally the most dignified and honest. In Calabria small villages were furnished with large churches, and correspondingly large chapters, of which the canons, dressed in rags and dirty linen, had not one hundred francs to divide among themselves in the course of a whole year. From a Cardinal-Archbishop of Naples, or an Abbot of Monte Cassini, feudal lord of twenty-two villages, to a barefooted, unkempt, mendicant friar the distance was great. Yet that dis-

¹ Serristori, a good authority, gives 47,000 priests, 25,000 monks, and 26,000 nuns; Roederer, who was well placed for knowing, the high figure of 64,000 for monks and nuns alone, *Œuvres*, iv. 62; Gorani, in the year 1794, gives a total of 87,000; Bianchini says 100,000.

tance, however great, was not an impossible one to conquer, and the man of low birth found in the Church the only avenue open for advancement. To this, as well as to their superstition, was the attachment of the people for the Church to be ascribed; it represented, in a curious form, the embryo of democratic institutions. Between the great mass of the clergy and of the people there was a perfect similarity of views, and if the people were generally ignorant, vicious, and criminal, so were their spiritual leaders. In the province of Puglia in the year 1817 one-fourth of the clergy was found to be unutterably bad, and mixed up with every crime and outrage. Priests were not unfrequently captains of bands of brigands. In the city of Naples were no less than 170 monasteries and convents; the churches, as the official almanac for 1806 ingenuously states, were so to speak "innumerable." Abject poverty contentedly feasted its eyes on the gorgeous decorations of the churches, and rubbed shoulders with sleek ecclesiastical dignitaries. Free distributions of bread, once an imperial prerogative, attached to each cleric some five supporting beggars; and thus by means of this most ancient and honoured of political methods a strong body of what might be made to appear public opinion was constantly at the command of Religion.

Nor was there any enlightenment or education to check the gross deceptions of the priesthood, the obscurantism of Authority. The Ignorantelli and other fraternities made some show of pursuing the vocation of teaching, but the results were meagre. Even in the highest classes knowledge of reading and writing was far from universal. De Dedem speaks of a daughter of the Duchess of Cassano who, on leaving the convent where she had been educated,

could neither read nor write ; while Roederer goes further, and states that ladies belonging to noble families took pains not to learn the art of writing lest they might be mistaken for *bourgeoises*. One of the greatest noblemen of the kingdom, the Prince of Paterno, carried ignorance so far as to be unable to say where his Sicilian estates were situated. If such was the aristocracy, the brutish condition of the mass of the people may be imagined. Of the inhabitants of the capital one-third were paupers ; they mostly slept in the open under conditions little removed from those of animals. Is it surprising that they accepted the crudest impostures of the priests ? Is it surprising that when stirred to civil faction they should have displayed brutal and hideous ferocity ? And yet the inmost components of their nature were amiable, social, and docile ! “Of Christianity they have nothing but superstition and fear,” said Taine ; and it is only too true that not the people so much as the terrible conditions under which they had suffered for many centuries were responsible for all this misery and degradation.

The ignorance and superstition of Naples were well illustrated by the cult of its patron saint or city god, Gennaro. Januarius, or Gennaro, a Christian martyr under the persecution of Diocletian, was worshipped in the fine Gothic cathedral of Naples, displacing Apollo, until then venerated at the same shrine.¹ S. Gennaro was held in great awe and reverence by the Neapolitans ; he requited their affection, and demonstrated his con-

¹ The conversion of Buddha into Saint Josaphat, as traced by the late Professor Max Müller, suggests the possibility that the less startling transition from Apollo to Gennaro may some day be worked out. The cathedral is merely the ancient temple transformed, and it may be that the miracle is merely the lineal representative of a form of divination similar to that which Horace left the Jew Apella to make the most of.

tinued and lively interest in their welfare by periodic miraculous manifestations. On the High Altar, near to which the faithful crowded, the solidified blood of the decapitated saint was exposed in a phial. In answer to the shouts of encouragement, or abuse, of his devotees, Gennaro caused its contents gradually to liquefy before the eyes of his worshippers, and, by nicely calculating the time of this operation, rendered more or less favourable auguries. Thrice in every year was this solemn manifestation repeated ; thrice in every year a devout crowd of men and women wailed and supplicated at Gennaro's altar-rail, went into hysterical tears and raised rapturous shouts at the saint's response to their prayers, deposited their alms for the benefit of those whose pious ministrations he so profitably requited. Even at this day the traveller from the prosaic West may witness, at the cost of a modest fee, a miracle performed for every one of the long series of kings and conquerors recorded in the annals of Naples. Gennaro's blood will liquefy with as ready response for him as it did for Charles VIII. of France, for Gonsalvo de Cordova, for General Championnet and his atheistic grenadiers, for Ferdinand of Bourbon, for Joseph Bonaparte, for Victor Emmanuel, and for Garibaldi.¹

The miracle of S. Gennaro strikingly illustrates a marked characteristic of the Italian people—the constant desire for the concrete presentment of an idea. If the worship of Peter was intended, his toe must be produced ; if that of Januarius, his blood ; if that of Mary, her carved image festooned with ornaments ; if that of Christ, the sacred heart in realistic painting ; if that of the Cross, its tangible presentment for the

¹ A description of the miracle, given by Count Miot de Melito, will be found in Appendix A, vol. ii.

worshipper to press or to meet with moist salutations. In Italy an idea must be embodied or symbolized ; hence it may be just to pronounce the Neapolitan Vico, if not the greatest, yet the most typical of her philosophers, for the whole of his system of philosophy turns on the interpretation of the complicated symbolic device that adorns the front page of the *Scienza Nuova*. The symbolism that had centred about the pagan Pantheon had been largely lost in the Christian metamorphosis, and found a temporary refuge in Neoplatonism. The great centuries of Italian thought and art resuscitated symbolism, and were in many ways a reversion to the spirit of the past. When the love of the concrete and symbolic animates the genius of a people during an age that produced such men as Dante, Giotto, Botticelli, Macchiavelli, Michael Angelo, Palestrina, or Raphael, criticism is disarmed by admiration and wonder. Of a people, of a spirit that could produce such men what shall be said ? At Naples less than elsewhere in Italy did genius make its presence felt ; yet the quality of mind was essentially the same, and in the varied gradations of intellect that may be traced between the philosophy of Vico or the jurisprudential work of Delfico, Filangieri, Zurlo, Briganti, and Giannone, to the burning rhapsodies of the *improvisatore* Rossetti, it is impossible not to recognise a breath of an intellectual quality second to that of no other people. What, then, is wanting ? Why does such a fertile field remain so long fallow ? Perhaps a little more sincerity is the need, a little more precision of thought, a little more freedom from the distorting inheritance of the dark ages ; all the rest is there.

Greatest of all the afflictions suffered by Naples, inseparably bound up with all others, material, ever-

present, immediate and brutalizing, was feudalism. Its effects were to be traced in every aspect of the social system. The misery to which it had reduced the people was terrible, and in a northern climate could not have been endured. Even in the city of Naples, one of the largest capitals of the world, boasting in the Toledo a street unsurpassed in Europe, displaying the extremes of aristocratic show and magnificence, beggars walked naked. "One may see quite usually," wrote King Joseph, "men lying in the streets, naked as my hand, dying of hunger; women and children also." Another writer comments on the calmness and indifference with which the passers-by regarded the last agony of a woman dying in the roadway; the sight was too commonplace to arouse the emotions. Alongside of this hideous poverty was invincible indolence. Roederer in his correspondence reverts again and again to this apparently incurable malady of the Neapolitans with something like despair. Even in the agricultural districts labour aroused little enthusiasm. A traveller who visited Puglia in 1810 described the state of the peasantry as one of misery flanked by indolence. If anything in that unhappy country merited the name of national, it was that not infrequent companion of indolence, the vice of gambling. In the streets idle men, women, children, and beggars played with the hucklebones dear to the Romans, or thrust out fingers in the classic game of *mora*. Among the aristocracy more advanced methods of controlling the exchange of coin obtained. The publicist Kotzebue states that the principal gambling-house of Naples was kept by Prince Rufando, and of the 162 other princes and 279 dukes of the Neapolitan aristocracy more were likely to envy than to condemn his lucrative eminence.

Generally speaking, morality was at the lowest possible, both among men and women, and the character of the inhabitants of the city of Naples had but few redeeming traits. The expressions of a contemporary were perhaps not extravagant when he said: "If loyalty, honour, firmness, fidelity to institutions, devotion to country, decency and morality, social virtues, and great traditions are the real constituents of a national character, one may well say that the Neapolitans have no national character."¹ Neapolitans agreed with foreigners as to their own unfitness. Filangieri, whose personal bravery was exceptional even among those who followed the fortunes of the Emperor Napoleon, wrote to his son: "Believe me, for a man who has a particle of honour and of blood in his veins, it is a thousandfold calamity to be born a Neapolitan."

In one intellectual distinction, and in one alone, Naples was pre-eminent among the cities of Italy; this was in the unrivalled doctrine of her lawyers in matters feudal. So intricate were the laws, so numerous the tribunals, so litigious the contestants and so learned their advocates, that actions frequently exceeded the ordinary span of life, and occasionally extended over a number of centuries. For the possession of about half a square mile of grazing land the villages of Acerno and Montecorvino had fattened the lawyers for over 200 years. Nearly as determined, and far more learned a contest was waged to decide the tenure of a plot of land, the question to be resolved being whether Duke Ruggiero the Norman had intended a pious gift or a grant in *emphyteusis*. Similar instances could be multiplied.

To realize the origin of the afflictions and miseries

¹ Laurenze, *Essai sur Naples*, 97.

caused by the feudal system at Naples at the beginning of the nineteenth century, some of the antecedents of an institution so terrible in its later effects must first be traced. For the present purpose the view will be adopted that the introduction of feudalism into southern Italy was not the work of the Lombards, but of Robert Guiscard and the handful of Norman knights who conquered the country in the eleventh century.

To understand the manner in which the Normans established themselves and grafted their institutions on those they found in existence, to appreciate how it was that the system they founded remained in vigour for so long a period, it is first necessary to consider a physical characteristic of the country together with the mode of settlement of its inhabitants.

The people of Italy, unlike those of the north, had lost all nomadic proclivity long before the Christian era. Their instinct was for town life. In Græco-Roman days this tendency, variously strengthened by the concentration of civilization and wealth and the pressure of warfare, drew the population into towns and villages of which a protective wall was an invariable feature. The peaceful era that marked the early days of the Empire might, if continued, have resulted in a more even distribution of the population; but the fourth century marked the beginning of a period of disintegration, and during the fourteen hundred years that followed, the conditions of the country were far too unsettled to encourage any change of system. During the whole of this period the people of southern Italy were misgoverned, suffered frequent and violent changes of rulers, perpetually endured the ravages of conquest from without and of spoliation from within.

Brigands and outlaws were the only part of the community that did not seek the nightly shelter of a fortified wall. As timid sheep will huddle together on the approach of danger, so the south Italians sought what shelter was to be found from the pirates of sea and land by nestling together in their villages. These were sometimes buried in the recesses of some forest-clad valley, or more generally perched on a lofty hill or cliff that added the defences of Nature to those of art. In the valleys or plain at the foot of the village stretched the land that produced the necessary food. This land was generally uninclosed and used in common; and in common the villagers held most of their property, laboured, fought, lived, and suffered. The affairs of the village or town were regulated by an elected body of what might be termed elders, or, to use the proper terms, by a syndic, *giurati* or councillors, and *giudici* or judges. These received a salary of a few *carlins* per annum from the common funds.¹

In practice it was generally the syndic who directed the affairs of the community, and that in a manner profitable to himself. The governing body, together with the village or town it represented, was known as the *Università*; despite this imposing title and the ancient tradition it represented, these communities had little real power, and were mostly plunged in abject penury. Their lands were not those fertile plains bordering the sea where the inhabitants of Croton, Pæstum, or Sybaris planted fruitful farms and delightful gardens; these tracts had long since been made uninhabitable by the ravages of Saracen pirates, and had become, what they still are, useless and malaria-infected swamps. It was among the hills and valleys of the

¹ For *carlins*, and all Neapolitan measures, money, etc., see Appendix B, vol. ii.

Apennines that the inhabitants sought refuge and a precarious existence.

This peculiarity in the conditions of life of the population was a great advantage to the Normans and to the development of the feudal system. The towns and villages were singly too weak to resist the conquerors, and quickly passed under their yoke. When they were not seized by force they were occupied at the request of the people, who, of two evils, preferred a protector to a spoiler. The existing fortification was generally strengthened by the erection of a baronial castle, and the inhabitants, whether willingly or not, and by various methods of absorption, became the Baron's feudal dependents. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries most of the large cities, too often scourged, had become deserted; the smaller ones, finding no support in the royal government, called in powerful Barons as their only possible safeguard. In the fifteenth century, of 1500 *Università* in the kingdom, only about 100 had escaped feudal ownership. A century later the figures were little changed; but in the year 1786 very few of the free *Università* survived, and out of a total of some 2000, 384 belonged to the Crown, the rest to the Barons.¹

The legal and constitutional system established by the Normans in southern Italy may be regarded as a fairly uniform superimposition of the feudal law on the great variety of local laws, some of Roman, some of Greek, some of Lombard, some of Eastern, some of local origin. In this confusion the decrees of a conqueror prevailed, and gave some sort of harmony to the whole. From the end of the twelfth century, when

¹ Moles, quoted by Bianchini; the latter, somewhat contradictorily, gives a total of 150 *casali* or hamlets free from feudal tenure in Puglia alone in the year 1586.

Ugolino da Porta Ravignano added his *Decima Collozazione* to the Justinian Code, feudal law may be said to have prevailed officially. As in other parts of Europe so in Naples, it rapidly ran through its period of usefulness, rapidly developed its inherent vices. The property of the Università, the services personal and in kind of the people, soon depended on the Barons. They in turn yielded service and paid dues to the King ; but their greater intelligence and strength, together with their corporate feeling, made them equally able to resist the demands of the Crown and to impose their commands on the people. The helpless inhabitants of the Università saw their every property, their every right disappear into the bottomless pit of feudal proprietorship.

Among the early rulers of the kingdom of Naples, or of Puglia, as it was at first called, the great legislators were Ruggiero of the Norman kings, and Frederick II. of the Swabians. By them it was established that the Baron's fief was inalienable ; that is, that the Baron's land could not pass out of his hands in any other way than by reversion to the Crown. So rigorous did the construction of this all-important rule become, that Pecchia, commenting on Frederick the Second's *constitutio divæ memoriæ*, states that the inability to alienate must be held to extend to every contract of whatsoever kind that might tend to lower the value of the fief.¹ Although the *constitutio divæ memoriæ* did not remain in force until the nineteenth century, an outcome of it did, of which the effect was nearly equal. This was the system of *fideicomessi*, or trusts on property, of endless effect, generally intended to favour the rights of

¹ Frederick's better-known constitution, *quæ sint regaliæ*, need not be noticed in this necessarily limited view of the subject.

primogeniture.¹ The Courts, imbued with the traditions of feudalism and the spirit of casuistry, generally construed these trusts in the spirit in which they were framed. Thus a testamentary disposition would be readily enforced that directed the devolution of property for certain uses for the duration of the world, or of the Holy Sacrament, or of bread and wine. To such a point had the system been carried, so inextricable was the maze of legal complications that had grown up, that money was unobtainable for any transaction involving the transfer or guarantee of immovables, for there was no certainty that a binding contract could be framed. The tendency was therefore for a constant transference of land from the weak to the strong, while the law stepped in to prevent the breaking up of domains once acquired, or their reversion by natural channels into the hands of those who might have turned them to use.

In addition to their tenure of the land, the Barons had acquired vast rights from the kings. Under Robert the Norman they had extorted the so-called *quattro lettere arbitrarie*: the right to moderate or alter the ordinary law, to torture, to proceed *ex officio* without previous accusation, and to increase legal penalties. While such extraordinary privileges were wrung from the early kings, no less extraordinary rights were forcibly acquired over the people and their property. For every reason that brutal selfishness and ignorant greed could dictate, spoliation in every shape was wreaked on the towns and villages of Naples. On every occupation or interest of life, on every hour and on every

¹ This is merely a rough summary of the matter with a view to explain what the position was at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It must not be taken as a history of feudal law.

necessity, on every right of proprietorship, of enjoyment, of old-established law and custom, even on what they made but a burden, on existence itself, the feudal proprietors levied their tolls. The history of the accumulation and mutations of these tolls need not be entered into ; suffice it to say that at the beginning of the nineteenth century more than 1400 feudal rights were in existence and exercise. In theory the feudal system had come to an end a few years before the period at which this history opens ; in reality the burden had not been appreciably lightened by Bourbon legislation.

Feudal oppression probably reached its height under the Angevin kings. In the fifteenth century the evils of the system were so crying as to suggest reform. In 1482 Ferdinand I. of Arragon decreed that his subjects should be free to let their houses or lodgings, to carry on any honest business, to keep taverns, to use wood and water, to buy and sell wine and oil. This decree proved too radical, too revolutionary. The good intentions of the monarch were fruitless. After the long period of wars that ushered in the eighteenth century, and resulted in the establishment of the younger branch of the Spanish Bourbons on the throne of the Two Sicilies, it appeared for a short time as though better days were in store. Charles III., a successful and not unintelligent ruler, gave promise of improvement. Bianchini believes that a great change was effected during his reign. The change in reality was more of detail, more administrative, than of principle. It might in a distant way be compared to that effected in France half a century earlier under Louis XIV. Charles III. issued edicts curtailing several baronial rights, among others that of pardon. He appears to

have exercised discrimination in appointments to judicial office ; he compelled the Barons to reside at the capital instead of on their estates, and generally strengthened his authority at their expense. Yet the oppression of the people was not sensibly lightened. How mediæval the spirit of the age remained may be judged when its chief philosopher, the admirable Vico, expressly states that on questions of trespass arising between two Barons the duel was the proper mode of trial.

Under Ferdinand, the successor of Charles, whose long reign spanned a period of great political change (1759-1825), the prospect of reform appeared even better. In various directions improvements were introduced, though they largely remained a dead letter. But the direction of the government was unintelligent, and had there been a real desire to free the kingdom from the evils of feudalism the means were ready to hand. It was evident that, as a feudal possession was not alienable, the tenure must sooner or later fail, and the property eventually revert to the Crown. These reversions were frequent ; yet as they did not form a regular part of the income of the Crown, resales might well have been effected, free from the feudal rights, and with some consideration for the advantage of the peasantry. Such a system pursued for a century would have cost the Crown nothing, freed a part of the kingdom, and improved its conditions. If it had been supported by legislation facilitating redemption from feudal tenure, and if the Crown had shown a good example with respect to the 300 or 400 *Università* of which the King was the direct feudal superior, Ferdinand might have won the praise of posterity, increased his resources, and benefited a large number of his subjects. But political wisdom was a difficult

end for a Bourbon to achieve ; a totally opposite policy to that indicated by reason, by interest, and by humanity prevailed. Even in cases where villages belonged to the royal domain, with the privilege of never being sold out of it, even in cases where the Università had found the means of purchasing itself back from its Baron, the cash offer of a greedy purchaser would prove too much for the cupidity of Monarch or Ministers, and the unfortunate populations would be barbarously resold into slavery. In the early days of the French Revolution a Neapolitan jurist of honoured memory, Melchiorre Delfico, had the boldness to call public attention to the question of the resale of feudal estates by the Crown, not without salutary effect (*Riflessioni sulla vendita de' feudi devoluti*). In the course of the next few years several estates were disposed of under an allodial or freehold tenure, as Delfico had advocated, instead of under feudal tenure. But even then the change proved more nominal than real, for though the feudal designation was dropped, the feudal rights were enforced in their entirety.¹ The purchasers of land no longer cared for the empty forms of feudalism, but they were as firmly attached to the income the feudal rights represented as ever their ancestors had been. When finally, under pressure of the great popular reaction heralded by the French Revolution, the abolition of feudalism was decreed, only a name was destroyed ; facts were left practically untouched. These feudal facts, as they existed at the period this history opens, must now be set out.

Feudal tenures of some fifty different varieties involved services in person, payments in kind and in

¹ A few Università were successful in redeeming themselves at this period. Thus Montesantangelo freed itself from feudalism in 1802 at a cost of 243,000 ducats.

money, under more than 1400 specified heads. This does not signify that at every village of the kingdom some 1400 taxes were exacted, for many were local in their application, and a few were enforced only in solitary or very rare cases. The landowners were few, and generally non-resident; their interests were confided to rapacious agents and lawyers. Zurlo, in his masterly report on the condition of the royal domain of the forest of Sila in 1791, laid stress on this aspect of the question. He courageously stated his opinion that the infinite number of rights claimed against the peasantry was of no use to any one save the infamous class of men who lived on this state of things. The conditions of life of the peasantry were perhaps at their worst in this district, notwithstanding its iron mines and wealth of timber; yet it was bad enough at the very gates and in the streets of Naples.

It was from the necessaries of daily existence that baronial extortion derived the largest revenue. Mills and baking ovens were variously taxed, and to such an extent that, bread not being obtainable, "the people were compelled to cook cakes under the embers and to eat them for bread. And it happened not unfrequently that the Barons instituted proceedings to prevent the exercise of this miserable privilege which even the most barbarous people enjoy."¹ Not only were mills taxed, but the exclusive right to erect them was occasionally claimed. At Cervinara the Università paid 60 ducats yearly for the privilege of making macaroni; and in 1809 no less than forty-eight villages petitioned the Feudal Commission for freedom to collect acorns. There was a tithe on hens, a tax for keeping them within doors, a tax for selling them, for killing them, on

¹ Bianchini, 296.

their eggs ; in some baronies it was forbidden to dispose of them ; in another, the right of taking as many of them as the Baron required was asserted. On fish there were some thirty different taxes, about ten more than on mills. For the right of sending out fishing-vessels the village of Scilla, on the Strait of Messina, paid 250 ducats annually ; while such ancient taxes as the *Sessantino*, dating back to the Norman period, were still in force, as at the little village of Castignano. No article of food escaped seigniorial rapacity. Chestnuts were taxed ; so were melons, wine, grapes, figs, honey, cheese, nuts, and grass. On every animal alive, on every animal sold, on every animal transported, on every animal taken to water, on every animal's increase, on every carcase, the Baron claimed his due. At Caselnuovo Monterotaro the Università built a cattle trough to avoid that of the Baron, for the use of which a heavy toll was exacted ; no sooner was the trough completed than the Baron forbid its use. Fuel was taxed as thoroughly as food : hearths paid toll, while even pine cones and dead leaves did not escape exaction. Every impediment that ingenuity could devise was thrown in the way of husbandry and agriculture. Rain water, perhaps owing to its proceeding, like the Baron's right, from heaven, was his exclusive property. His was the sole right of erecting barns, his horses alone could be employed in hauling such merchandise as was adventured along the tracks that did duty for roads. In some localities the taxes on occupied buildings were so accumulated as to make them uninhabitable. Galanti states that at S. Germano the whole population of some 10,000 people abandoned their houses to the baronial agents, and sought an abode with their cattle in the fields under rudely constructed shelters. The right of

pasturing on the common land was taxed, and also that of using a spade or a hoe ; while every harvester paid his due to the Baron's chest, and even the seed reserved for the next year's crop did not escape imposition. Winspeare, whose authority on this subject is indisputable, furnishes the additional detail that this abuse was worse in its application, and that in the division of the seed the Baron and his agents would make no allowance for a bad yield or damaged crops.

The tithes could be so called only by euphemism, for they were generally extended to a third, a fourth, or even a half, as is eloquently testified by the names of such taxes as the *mezzapietra*, *mezzasemenza*, *mezzagallina*, and others. At Christmastide the Baron, anxious to celebrate this festival in a truly religious spirit, imposed additional taxation ; on the occasion of his marriage, or of the birth of an heir, for the maintenance of his dogs, or for that of his agent, again the poor man had to pay. The Baron had an exclusive right to snow, to the dung dropped in the market-place ; on every sale at a fair he levied a percentage ; every ladder, every tree, every balcony, every wall, every garden, was made a source of income. At Tufara the peasant was made to pay for the notable privilege of throwing the *immondezze* of the household out of his windows into the street, while at Conversano the cause of sanitation was dissimilarly advanced by the Baron, who exacted payment for the privilege of constructing a drain. To such a system there could only be one limit worthy of serious attention, that of the resources and long-suffering of the people. No consideration of law, of justice, or of humanity could be said to be operative when a Baron imposed a fresh tax for

what he chose to describe as family reasons—*ragione di famiglia*, or even, as in the case of the Università of Poggiardo, for reasons feelingly described as unknown.

One class of feudal imposition has not yet, however, been dealt with, that relating to personal services. In this respect there had been considerable improvement since the days of the Roman Empire and since the mediæval period; yet things were bad enough. In many of the Università the peasantry were still in a state little removed from serfage. In theory the nature of their services to the Baron might vary according to their standing as *angarii* or *perangarii*. In the first case the services were rendered at the expense of the Baron, in the latter at the expense of the peasant. Ducange, however, convincingly gives the following definition: “Engaraire, c’est à saver qu’ils laboreront continuellement.” Whether *angarii* or *perangarii*, few who have examined the records of King Joachim’s Feudal Commission will doubt that the unfortunate bondsmen of feudalism laboured continuously and profited nothing. If the Baron had an exclusive right to snow, he also exercised that of compelling his peasantry to convey it to his cellars; when the olive or the grape was ripe, the Baron’s crop must be gratuitously picked while the peasant’s waited and sometimes spoiled. A pleasantly named right was that to the *Giornata d’amore*, but when this day’s free labour was extended to four days out of the seven, its agreeable description hardly sufficed to conceal the appearance of actual slavery. In one case, of which the record still exists, four men had been worked continuously for twelve months, and had received nothing. It must, however, be said that the most odious form of personal service, the right of

cunnatico or *feminarum*, had everywhere fallen into desuetude or been compounded for money.¹

With the feudal burdens such as they have just been described, it was not remarkable that lawlessness was universal. For centuries brigandage had flourished. From the time when the piratical brigands from Normandy had assigned to themselves the Crown and the baronies of the kingdom, robbery by force of arms had been an all-engrossing, all but honoured avocation. It was the only lucrative one open to the man of enterprise, save only the law and the church. In all three an equal lack of conscience was essential for success, but brigandage called for one manly virtue, courage; the other two professions did not. It will, therefore, hardly be an exaggeration to say that it engaged the attention of the best element in the population.

In the reign of Philip II. so formidable and so well organized had the brigands become, that one of their leaders was known as King Marcone; at Cotrone he inflicted a signal defeat on the Spanish infantry, then the first in Europe. A little later an illustrious and reverend brigand, the Abate Cesare Riccardo, attained a wide celebrity. He supplied an admiring world with his autobiography under the following irresistible title: *Nuova istoria del famosissimo e foribondo bandito Abate Cesare Riccardo, in cui si racconta in ottava rima la vita e morte, occasioni, ricatti, bravure e tutte le imprese e scaramucce fatte con la Corte, e suo testamento.*²

¹ Bianchini, 225; Winspeare is less decisive: "I diritti sulla pudicizia delle donne erano, per lo più, trasmutati in altrettante capitazioni."—*Abusi feudali*, 38. For a Sicilian comparison see Leckie, *Historical Survey*. Yet the delicacy of feudalism did not go far when money advantages might be secured, and in the sixteenth century every *meretrice* of Naples paid a monthly tax of two *carlins*,—with an additional fifteen *grana* at Christmas and Eastertide!

² "A new history of the most illustrious and furious bandit Abate Cesare Riccardo,

Under the Spanish viceregal government the brigands, or *malandrini*, were at their worst. The Government was frequently compelled to treat with them, and the Barons constantly employed them as a convenient militia. Under the Bourbons they began to decline, although more than one, among them the famous Fra Diavolo and the Reverend Ciro Annichiarico, played a conspicuous part in the events that will later be narrated. Such roads as existed about the year 1800 were infested with footpads, and the inevitable preliminary of a journey from the provinces to the capital was the drawing up of a will. Even the protection of bodies of armed retainers was insufficient against robbery, murder, and outrage. Homicide was the more prevalent owing to the legal subterfuges and judicial corruption that rendered escape from its consequences easy. Its prevalence and influence may be judged from an official report from the provincial prison of Montefusco. At that one place there were, in May 1806, 163 prisoners charged with homicide; some of them had more than one crime to account for, parricide and other atrocious misdeeds being frequently entered. The whole constitutes a frightful catalogue of crime, and sheds a most instructive light on the social conditions of the country.

The lawlessness and brigandage of the provinces was represented in the capital by the turbulence and criminality of the *lazzaroni*. They were the fishermen, street hawkers, beggars, and thieves of Naples, and recalled in a vague way the Roman *plebs* and the crowd of the agora whence they might trace their

in which his life and death, adventures, escapes, deeds of daring and his attempts and skirmishes with the Government are recounted in verse, together with his last will and testament."

descent. The system on which they were governed had not varied much since the days of the Cæsars. As the Roman Emperors humoured them by the judicious ministration of bread and the games of the circus, so Ferdinand of Bourbon declared that to rule them three things were necessary : *festas, forza e farina*—holidays, scaffolds, and bread ; the method had not greatly changed in twenty centuries. The *lazzaroni* were not an organized corps, though possessed of a wonderful corporate instinct or power of rapidly acting in masses. Superstition, laziness, and dirt equally commanded their allegiance ; they observed no law save under compulsion ; they lived free from the conventional trammels of society. Many of them had neither family nor name ; one out of three answered to that of *Sposeto*. This word was derived from the *esposti*, or foundlings, who were numerous, and were cared for in one of the largest charitable institutions of Naples. The food of the *lazzaroni* was chiefly bread, macaroni, and fish ; their usual habitations by night were baskets made of osiers ; their favourite haunts were along the sea front, between the port and the Mercato, or at the foot of the Pizzofalcone along the beach of Santa Lucia. As for their clothing it was generally of the poorest and scantiest, relieved by some gaudy scarf, handkerchief, or cap. Travellers from the north remarked on the contrast presented by the fashionable Toledo, where, amidst all the luxury and display of wealth, *lazzaroni* might be seen lying devoid of clothing by the entrances of shops, begging for bread.

Despite their abject condition and ignorance, the *lazzaroni* were a power in the State. Their numbers were formidable, perhaps 150,000 before 1799. On more than one occasion they had asserted their in-

fluence in no uncertain manner. In the seventeenth century, at a time when the misery and terrible conditions of the poor were even more grievous than usual, the imposition of an extra tax on fruit hawkers led to an insurrection. Under the famous Masaniello they obtained control of the city, and for some time carried on a republican form of government with the assistance of the French under the Duc de Guise. Their most remarkable exploits were performed two centuries later. In 1799, under the inspiration of the clergy, they rose and opposed the entrance of the army of the French Republic into the city. General Championnet's force was small but finely led and composed of veteran battalions, yet the *lazzaroni* for several days made victory uncertain. At the Porta Capuana they died in thousands, and thrice drove out the redoubtable grenadiers of the Revolution; it was only after a slaughter such as General Thiébault declared he never saw equalled in all the Napoleonic campaigns, that their desperate resistance was overcome. If their defence of the city had been creditable, the horrors they perpetrated a few months later, on the retirement of the French from Naples and the fall of the democratic government they had instituted, have perhaps not been surpassed in modern European history. To the atrocities of the Spaniards in the Netherlands, to those of the *Septembriseurs* and Terrorists in France, must those of the *lazzaroni* of Naples be compared. The catalogue of their misdeeds is fortunately not entitled to find a place here.

Such being the condition of the mass of the population of town and country, it will require little effort to realize that the state of commerce, of industry, of agriculture, and of the general finances was bad.

The only road in the kingdom that could be accounted better than a mule track was that leading from Naples northwards to Rome. Between the inland towns and villages there was but little intercourse. Their generally inaccessible situation, the absence of trade, the violence of the torrents that rush down from the Apennines, the infrequency of bridges, the insecurity from brigands, the innumerable and uncertain obstacles presented by the baronial dues, all tended to keep the villager near his abode, to concentrate his attention on his patch of maize or herd of goats. In Calabria, wrote King Joseph to Napoleon, there were neither roads nor justice. Mountain streams converted groves of olive and orange trees into swamps; rich forests had disappeared, destroyed by temporary beneficiaries. Puglia, once famed for its wealth of timber, could now afford its inhabitants little better fuel than dung; by its application to this use the land correspondingly suffered. The spade, hand scythe, and wooden plough were the only implements of agriculture employed; hoes were rare, saws and scissors unknown. In Puglia, the most important of the agricultural provinces, there was no more land under cultivation in the year 1800 than there had been in the middle of the sixteenth century. In the same period the cattle had diminished from about three million head to less than one and a quarter. Industry was all but non-existent, the exportation of wheat prohibited, public works were neglected and taxes imposed for roads that were never begun. Commerce was restricted by import and export duties; silk spinning had once been a profitable occupation, but declined under the Bourbons. At Lauria and in several other places it was prohibited by the feudal lord; at Molano the Baron exercised the right of

taking over the whole production at a price fixed by himself. Under such conditions the industry not unnaturally languished.

The revenue of the State was not flourishing, nor did the multitude of taxes result in a correspondingly overflowing treasury. There were more than one hundred direct taxes, and a large number of indirect ones. The supreme financial authority was vested in the Regia Camera, a body of auditors who exercised no real control. The municipalities levied the taxes, of which they paid an arbitrarily fixed proportion to the Government, applying the surplus, by ancient privilege, for the benefit of the feudal lord. Of the total revenue one quarter went to the nobility and as much to the clergy, monastic orders, and charitable foundations. The only general principle that guided the raising of the revenue was that of making the poorer man pay for the enjoyment of the richer. On salt the tax was 3 ducats and 3 *grana* per *tomolo*, and its consumption was compulsory. The Università was obliged to take a yearly quantity fixed on the basis of population. Nearly every other article of food was taxed, the collection being contracted out to a farmer of the revenue; imposts thus raised were known as the *arrendamenti*. A tax of one *once* on each hearth may be noticed, and also a curious one that well illustrates the arbitrary nature of the system, that known as the *nave bruciata*. This had been first levied many years before as a special contribution to replace a royal vessel that had been burnt; the vessel had never been rebuilt, but the tax continued to be levied annually. Under this inconsequent and crude system it was as simple to decree a new tax as it was difficult to discover a profitable source of revenue. The Barons paid but a

small proportion towards the expenses of the State, the ancient feudal taxes such as the *adoa*, *rilevio*, *cavallo montato*, and others producing little. The incidence of taxation as between the baronial proprietor and the peasant is well shown in the estimate of revenue for the year 1790 given by Bianchini. Out of a total of 16,700,000 ducats the Università paid in direct taxes 2,100,000, the *arrendamenti* yielded 3,000,000, the *gabella* 2,900,000; the people further paid in various feudal taxes 1,600,000, and in support of the church 3,000,000. The Barons, on the other hand, paid as *adoa* 248,579 ducats, and under less important heads an insignificant sum. It is no exaggeration to say, therefore, that the poor practically supported State, Crown, and aristocracy. It is not possible to advance what the public debt was, for no one appears to have known; according to Bianchini, whose opinion carries weight, it probably represented in 1806 not less than 130,000,000 ducats.

The total of the population thus burdened had risen from about one and a half millions under the Angevin kings to five millions under Ferdinand of Bourbon. But it was subject to great and violent fluctuations, owing to the heavy mortality attending the political and economic accidents of the period. Thus in 1803 and 1804 deaths greatly exceeded births in the city of Naples, and in the year 1799 the *lazzaroni* are said to have been diminished by no less than 100,000.

Inseparably bound up with the hideous system of feudalism that afflicted this unfortunate kingdom was the ignorant, brutish selfishness and rapacity of those who had for so many centuries governed it. The Swabian kings may have been better than the Angevins, the Bourbons may have been less greedy than the

Spanish viceroys, yet in the year 1805 it might well be thought that this cup of human misery was full ; that the iniquities, by which the millions of Naples were herded together without education, without national or civic sentiments, without any of the rights that breed self-respect, honour, courage, and virtue, had transgressed the bounds appointed by nature.

But relief was at hand, for Ferdinand of Bourbon was soon to be driven from the kingdom. Something of the spirit of his reign has already been seen in connection with the feudal question. The chief reform effected was perhaps that in judicial procedure whereby judges were required to state the reasons for their decisions in writing. Its effects could not be far-reaching ; judicial office was sold, the profit being a royal perquisite ; the law was chaotic ; the decrees of twelve conflicting jurisdictions filled a hundred volumes, while the criminal law was buried below a mass of precedents and customs. The confusion of Roman, canon, and feudal law, of Norman and Swabian constitutions, Spanish pragmatic decrees, private statutes of the city of Naples, and precedents of the *Sommaria*, *Vicaria*, and other tribunals, would have been inextricable had not the sovereign's prerogative made his decision more important than that of any or all of his judges. Royal interference was constant, exceptional laws and specially constituted tribunals were favourite remedies, while before the opening of any trial that interested the King or his Ministers the sentence was dictated to those whose theoretical duty it was to expound the law and dispense justice.

The state of criminal was even worse than that of civil law. Trials were conducted in secret, and although torture was no longer employed, chains, semi-starvation, and the manifold horrors of the prisons were but

one degree removed from it. Proofs of guilt were paid for, and so full were the prisons, so rapidly were the galley slaves worked to death, that trial by *truglio* was invented to empty the tenants of the cells on to the rowing bench with convenient expedition. The *truglio* disposed of batches of twenty and more prisoners at one sentence; this was settled before trial between the judge and the advocate who was officially appointed to conduct the defence. Its double advantage was that it economized judicial time and manned the royal galleys.

The early part of Ferdinand's reign passed quietly enough, and his policy developed on normal Bourbon lines.¹ With the king of Spain, his brother Charles IV., he maintained intimate relations. To Austria he bound himself by the close tie of marriage, the Archduchess Mary Caroline, most energetic and domineering of the daughters of Maria Theresa, becoming his wife in 1768.² With France, where reigned the head of the House of Bourbon, first Louis XV. and later Louis XVI., his relations were too close to lead to serious difficulty. So everything appeared to prosper. A few Neapolitan lawyers and noblemen were carelessly permitted to talk of reform and to discuss Rousseau's *Contrat Social*. Mary Caroline herself, following the lead of her brother the Emperor Joseph, turned liberal, and even instituted a lodge of female freemasons. But the time for the Queen's political sentimentalism was not well chosen; the day of popular reaction against the iniquities of divine right had come. In 1789 began

¹ In Appendix C will be found a table giving the relations of the French, Spanish, and Neapolitan Bourbons.

² It is curious that English usage names the Empress and her daughters Maria, Mary, and Marie. It would be pedantic to speak of *Marie* Caroline, or of *Maria* Antoinette, or of *Mary* Theresa!

the French Revolution, which sounded the knell of Bourbonism and sent Mary Caroline's sister and brother-in-law to the scaffold. The detestation of the Sicilian Court for the new government of France was not exceeded in vehemence in any quarter of Europe. Finally, in 1799, the army of Ferdinand and of the First Republic met, with disastrous results for the King of the Two Sicilies. Championnet occupied Naples, the Court sought refuge in Sicily, and a few Neapolitan liberals boldly proclaimed the Parthenopean Republic.

But the country was not ripe for such a form of government; and although the men who conducted it showed more capacity, moderation, and courage than might have been expected under such remarkable conditions, the Republic could not survive the withdrawal of the French army to northern Italy. The Parthenopean Republic lived but a few months, and sank in rivers of blood. Defenceless men, women, and children were butchered in hundreds by the *lazzaroni* and by the provincial levies of Cardinal Ruffo, and Ferdinand and Mary Caroline were re-established on their throne.

The horrors of the royalist reaction were soon to be atoned for. France was now in stronger hands than when her troops had been forced out of Italy by Suvaroff. Only a few weeks after the capture of Naples by Ruffo and Nelson, General Bonaparte returned from his expedition to Egypt, turned out the Directoire, and established the Consular Government. As First Consul he soon returned to the scene of his great exploits, and having won the victory of Marengo, concluded a peace that left France preponderant once more in northern Italy. During the five years that followed, he remodelled the administrative system and the army,

forging a weapon fit to carve out his fortune. During this period the government of Naples was constantly menaced; the sword trembled threateningly, its blow held ever suspended. That blow was at last to descend as a consequence of the first campaign of the Emperor Napoleon.

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CHAPTER II

NAPOLEON AND NAPLES

Ferdinand I.—Mary Caroline—Acton—World politics—Taranto and the East—Napoleon, King of Italy—Coerces Naples—Elliot and Tatitcheff—Gallo's warnings—Lacy at Naples—Treaty of neutrality—The Anglo-Russians at Naples—Trafalgar and Austerlitz—Position in Italy—Retreat of Anglo-Russians—Mary Caroline's negotiations—Craig and Sicily—Schoenbrunn proclamation.

IN a kingdom ruled as was that of Naples, the character and prejudices of the monarch exercised a disproportioned influence. The relations of the Two Sicilies with France and the other Powers of Europe were more largely affected by the temperaments of Ferdinand and Mary Caroline than by the crying necessities of their subjects.

Ferdinand of Bourbon was fourth of his name among the kings of Naples, third among those of Sicily; towards the close of his reign he changed his style to Ferdinand, first of the Two Sicilies, and under that designation he will henceforth appear in these pages. Ferdinand came to the throne at the early age of eight, and his education was totally neglected. Probably the councillors who administered the kingdom during his minority thought it to their interest that the young King's inclinations and abilities should

develop along lines that rendered unlikely the eventual curtailment of their power. The boy accordingly grew up in ignorance. He read with difficulty, and could barely write. But in the killing of all sorts of game, in riding and breaking horses, in the capture of fish, and especially in harpooning the tunny, he acquired and displayed a robust body, a boorish and crafty intellect.¹

He found the associates of his early years among grooms, gamekeepers, and men of low birth, with whom he cultivated and acquired a truly Neapolitan vulgarity of speech and manner. During his whole life Ferdinand retained the use of the dialect and tricks early caught, and few of his habits gave more delight to his faithful subjects than that of having macaroni served in his box at the opera and lapping it up with all the grimaces and antics of a *lazzaro*. An even more popular custom of the King took him several times in the year to the market-place, the famous Mercato, the scene of so many tragedies, the spot where in his reign so many died,—Manthone, Eleonora Pimentel, Marchese Palmieri, the Duchess of Sanfelice, Fra Diavolo, and so many others. To the Mercato Ferdinand would proceed when laden with some particularly good haul of fish from his lakes at Fusaro or Patria. Surrounded by a shouting mob of market men, loafers and lazzaroni, he would sell his catch to the highest bidder, meeting the coarse jokes of the crowd with ready and vigorous repartee. Ferdinand's wit and manners were gross; from his long nose, which with his lanky figure gave him a striking resemblance

¹ The King's brother, Charles IV. of Spain, had similar tastes, of which an interesting account may be read in Beausset. In Goja's fine portrait at Capo di Monte, the Spanish king is shown in hunting dress. One may easily imagine that this picture was a favourite one with Ferdinand.

to the national Pulcinella, the people christened him *Nasone* ; between the two the utmost mutual appreciation and good humour existed.

That the small section of the community engaged in commerce and in intellectual pursuits should have viewed Ferdinand with less favour is perhaps not remarkable. Yet even among the thinking classes it was generally admitted that the King was good-natured, and that below his ignorance and his prejudices he was not absolutely devoid of all sense of justice and humanity. Unfortunately that ignorance and those prejudices were so great that it was at times difficult to keep sight of the King's good side through the veil of crime committed under his authority. Chief among his prejudices was that covering the royal dignity, such as it was. To do anything which the King forbade, or to leave undone anything that he commanded, constituted an offence that shook Ferdinand's nature to its utmost depths. Palmieri relates an anecdote that amusingly illustrates this side of his character. Before 1789 wigs and smooth faces had been the universal mark of a man of sufficient rank to be admitted to Court. But the French Revolution was nothing if not thorough ; ardent patriots cut their queues and wore a *chevelure à la Brutus* ; tonsorial fashions became political badges, portents of deep significance. At a Court ball held at Palermo a young nobleman named Ruffo, a staunch royalist, and related to the famous cardinal of the same name, made his appearance duly presentable in every respect save for a recently fostered growth of whiskers that adorned his cheeks. When Ferdinand caught sight of him he was seized with violent emotion ; he rushed up to the astonished Ruffo, tightly grasped the offending whiskers

in his hand and fiercely shook him, crying out loudly the while, "*Porco! briccone!*"¹ It was only with great difficulty that Ruffo was safely extricated from the hands of the infuriated Ferdinand. After the King's return from Palermo to Naples in 1815, he was persuaded by the Duchess of Florida to follow the then prevalent fashion and to cut his queue. The royal example proved irresistible, and was immediately followed by the Neapolitan nobility.²

Although he married young, Ferdinand maintained the Bourbon standard of immorality. Fortunately this side of his character had no influence in shaping political events, and need therefore not detain us. For matters of State he had little taste, only deep-rooted prejudices on the subject of the royal prerogative. His mind was engrossed in his pastimes, and he showed all the *insouciance* proverbial in his family. When the Court fled from Naples in 1798, one of the royal princes died on the British flagship midway to Palermo; yet no sooner had Ferdinand set foot on land than he set about organizing a hunting party. Twenty years later, when his brother, Charles IV. of Spain, died at Naples, a similar incident occurred.

¹ "Pig, rascal."

² In 1799 the Neapolitan republicans, imitating in this as in other things the example of their French supporters, cut their queues and wore their hair short in the latest patriotic fashion. When the royalist reaction came, many paid with their head for its tailless condition. Recourse was had to false queues. In this the populace found a new amusement, and for several weeks no one could walk down the Toledo without having his head violently jerked more than once. If the jerk had no result he was safe. The following amusing quatrain went the rounds:—

Vuoi conoscere il Giacobino
E tu tirali il codino,
Se la coda ti viene in mano
Questo è vero Republicano.

If you want to know a Jacobin—pull at his wig—if the queue comes away in your hand—he is a real Republican.

When in 1814 Queen Mary Caroline died, he allowed but a scandalously short interval to elapse before re-marrying ; his second wife was the Princess Partanna, better known as the Duchess of Florida. Such was this truly Neapolitan monarch ! So slight was his sense of responsibility, so great his impatience of business, so inapt his fingers for clerical labour, that he appended his signature to papers presented by his Ministers by means of an engraved stamp. This stamp Ferdinand always carried with him and jealously guarded ; he viewed it with religious respect, as the priceless concrete manifestation of all those solemn and mysterious doctrines that made of him the autocrat and possessor of five millions of men.

The King's intense dislike for affairs of State, and his incompetence for performing the merely routine work of royalty, made Queen Mary Caroline's opportunity. From the Empress Maria Theresa, her mother, she had inherited a marked though ill-balanced talent for government. The age was one in which many women played prominent parts in the affairs of nations : Elizabeth and Catherine in Russia, Maria Theresa in Austria, the beautiful Louise in Prussia, Marie Antoinette and even plain Madame Roland in France. For nearly half a century Mary Caroline was the directing political force of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and, in her last years, its evil genius. After her death she found no defenders, not among her subjects, not among her English friends, not among her kindred ; and when she died at Vienna in 1814 her nephew, the Emperor Francis, declined to order Court mourning. Of recent years she has been more fortunate ; and one of her apologists has brought

forward views that certainly merit attention.¹ But admitting that Mary Caroline's pernicious influence was much exaggerated by contemporary report, there yet remains, after all deductions made, enough to warrant her condemnation. It was true in her case, as may be observed so frequently in the study of human nature, that the good and the bad qualities were both well marked and inextricably confused. Hence the facility with which detractors or apologists, emphasizing the lights on one side of the picture or the other, have painted her a crowned monster or a deeply wronged woman. The truth is that Mary Caroline was not so much a monster as a woman of nervous temperament, whose activity of mind bordered on derangement. She possessed some good traits, but, politically speaking, the judgment of posterity cannot be less severe than that of those who suffered at her hands. The Queen of Naples, following the fashion of her age, was much addicted to sensibility; her private affections, for so long as they lasted, were generally strong and attended by circumstances of generosity and even prodigality. To her numerous children she was passionately devoted, and in their company displayed the most pleasing and amiable aspect of her character.²

In stronger and purely intellectual characteristics there was also much in her to praise. The Prince de Ligne, who knew the Austrian Court so well, declared that she was

¹ Baron Helfert himself describes his *Maria Karolina* as an "Ehrenrettung." It is unfortunately too much of a set defence not to be considerably weakened; yet the character, judgment, and learning of the writer place it on a totally different plane from the work of other apologists.

² The love of children and sensibility, so prominent among the qualities of Mary Caroline, have been put forward by the most vehement and least convincing of her apologists as an argument for rebutting every unfavourable allegation. The argument hardly appears to require serious answer. Did not Murat, known to his soldiers as the "butcher," boast that he had never killed a man? Did not Robespierre declare that he could not bear the sight of blood?

the only one of Maria Theresa's children who resembled her ; a British minister at her Court said that she was the only spirited character at Naples. She could take interest in the minute details of administration, had "nerves stronger than her principles," address, and spirit. But what intellectual endowments Mary Caroline possessed were neutralized by her complete lack of judgment. Her proud, vindictive, imperious, scheming character had early given her ascendancy in the councils of the kingdom ; Ferdinand's supineness soon enabled her to convert this into all but absolute control. The Queen's decisions in matters of State were rarely fortunate. Energy with her turned to violence, and the reasons that swayed her were not based on the considerations that appeal to a statesman. What influenced her were those petty considerations of vanity, of immediate interest, of ambition, of pride, of hatred, of friendship, and of revenge that sacrifice to paltry and individual selfishness the interests of nations, and make the happiness and the lives of thousands depend on what is often nothing more than momentary caprice.¹

Yet, however pernicious her influence, however great her responsibility, it would be unjust to ascribe the calamities of Naples to the Queen alone ; Ferdinand, below her in courage and talent, was her equal in falsehood and treachery. That he sometimes disapproved of the Queen's policy, that he often acquiesced in it from ignorance or lassitude, cannot clear his responsibility. Lord Collingwood, a man of cool

¹ Since the above was set up, the valuable *Diary* of Sir John Moore has appeared, from which the following extract concerning Mary Caroline may be added : "In private life she would have been a clever, entertaining woman, violent in her passions, but, upon the whole, kind and good. As Queen, directing a government, her weaknesses, which in private might have passed unobserved, resolve themselves into crimes, and she becomes violent, absurd, cruel, unjust. . . ."—ii. 192.

judgment, wrote of them as follows: "The King has much the appearance and manners of a worthy, honest country gentleman. . . . The Queen . . . would be thought a deep politician, . . . she broods over what is impracticable, . . . and frets herself continually that others are not as dim-sighted as herself. Her lot . . . has been cast awry, or . . . so loose a morality and such depravity of manners would never have been found perched upon a throne."¹ This judgment was severe, but not unmerited. The Queen was as undignified as she was proud, and in the prolixity of her correspondence and memoirs reveals the habitual confusion and vehemence of thought that inspired her most notable acts. Her nature was passionate, and her personal inclinations played far too large a part in the political arrangements of the kingdom. One of her favourites and ministers, Acton, extended his power and fortune to the point of concentrating the patronage and emoluments of nearly every department of State into his hands. Generally inclined to temperate and commodious courses, it may be said of him that the direction he gave to affairs was occasionally beneficial; but it cannot be said that he was either a virtuous or capable minister, that he was such a minister as the needs of Naples cried for, or that any other influence than that of the Queen could possibly have kept him in power.

The relations between Mary Caroline and Ferdinand were not altogether inharmonious; on one ground their views completely coincided, that was on the assertion of the prerogatives and dignity of the Crown. Apart from this, the King's strongest sentiment with regard to the Queen appears to have been that she had the evil eye or *jettatura*, and that if he played cards her presence

¹ *Correspondence*, ii. 315.

was certain to be fatal to his success! But the sentiments of her subjects towards her were very different, and far stronger. To her they were accustomed to ascribe the whole action of the political machine; to her they charged the excesses of 1799, the massacre of the upper and middle classes of Naples by Cardinal Ruffo's Sanfedisti *masse* and the *lazzaroni*, their decimation by the butcher tribunal of Speziale. This may have been not altogether unjust; the fury of the Queen's cry for revenge had wide effects, and it cannot be doubted that the extraordinary passion that impelled Nelson and the Hamiltons was even stronger in their inspirer. It is not just, however, that Ferdinand should have escaped his share of responsibility for the events of those unhappy days. His personal popularity with many of his subjects blinded them to his faults, yet one of the most iniquitous deeds of the royalist reaction, the execution of the Duchess of Sanfelice, was one for which the King was beyond all doubt entirely and solely responsible.

The Duchess of Sanfelice was young, lovely, newly married, and not given to politics. Her husband joined the republican movement, and she unwillingly became the agent through whom a royalist conspiracy was discovered. On the entry of the royal troops she succeeded in escaping the massacres, but was soon discovered, arrested, imprisoned, tried, and condemned to death. Friends at Court succeeded in obtaining a respite on the ground that she was expecting childbirth. To substantiate this she was conveyed to Palermo, where she remained in prison many months, her case being now apparently forgotten. But on the Princess Royal giving birth to a son, she was persuaded to claim from the King the pardon of the Duchess. It was an ancient privilege and custom that such a request, on the birth

of a male child in the direct line of succession, could not be refused. Ferdinand did refuse it, however, and with great brutality ; he also issued immediate orders for the carrying out of the sentence. The unfortunate Duchess was placed on board ship, chains at her wrists and ankles, and thus taken back to Naples. Nearly twelve months after her first imprisonment her head was struck off on the Piazza del Mercato.

To apportion political responsibility and blame between the two sovereigns is not only impossible but unnecessary ; to say that they were equally censurable cannot be unjust to either. Yet from the time of the fall of the Parthenopean Republic until the day of her death, the reputation of Mary Caroline, made more terrible by the magnifying atmosphere of Naples, hung like a cloud of gloom over the city. The fear lest the insensate Queen should return once more, and once more let loose on Naples the lazzaroni and the free companies of Calabria or the Abruzzi, lest once more their property should be destroyed, their wives and children plundered, tortured, or outraged, became the political nightmare of the citizens.¹ Such was Queen Mary Caroline, and such her reputation with the best class of her subjects.

Outside of her dominions the Queen was viewed much in the same light, accentuated or tempered by political considerations : in England as a woman of excitable and ill-balanced judgment, but a necessary ally ; in France as an ogress and monster, on whom the sword of Providence must sooner or later descend. Mary Caroline was to suffer equally from both in the great struggle between these two Powers, of which the control of the Mediterranean was long the chief object.

¹ See especially the frequent entries in Nicola's *Diario* ; also numerous passages in King Joseph's Correspondence, and the contemporaries generally.

The conflict was to balance evenly where the two great divisions of that kingdom meet, where a river-like stretch of sea runs between the famous rocks of Scilla and Charybdis and divides Sicily from the mainland. At that point the fortunes of the two great empires were long to fluctuate uncertainly ; British and French sentries were to observe one another across the intervening waters. No nearer Egypt and the East could the great land empire stretch ; no farther back towards the Alps could the mighty sea empire drive back her formidable foe.

In the early years of the great cycle of wars between Great Britain and France, Mary Caroline had been firm in her friendship and alliance with the former Power, firm in her hostility to the latter. These sentiments reached their climax in the last years of the eighteenth century at the time of the extravagant demonstrations made on Nelson's triumphant return from his victory of the Nile. For the next few years the Queen's English proclivities continued strong, though the removal of Nelson and the Hamiltons to other scenes made the hold of their Government on the Sicilian alliance far less secure ; in 1805 British influence began to decline rapidly.

From the time when Bonaparte seized for his profit the government of the Republic, France had been the preponderating power in Italy. After Marengo her army occupied the northern portion of the peninsula undisturbed, and the kingdom of the Two Sicilies was in imminent danger of attack. General Murat, then acting Commander-in-chief, dictated the terms on which invasion and the occupation of Naples might be avoided. To these Ferdinand and the temperate Acton persuaded Mary Caroline that acquiescence was necessary ; the principal clause of the treaty signed was

aimed directly at Great Britain, and provided for the temporary military occupation of the Adriatic provinces of the kingdom by French troops. To understand the significance of this move it will be necessary to glance at a map of the Mediterranean, and even of the eastern hemisphere.

The last wars of the defunct Bourbon monarchy of France against Great Britain had seen the latter Power acquire two great colonial empires at the expense of her rival : Canada and India. The last conflict of all, terminated by the treaty of Paris in 1763, had resulted in the humiliation and defeat of Great Britain. Yet she retained Canada and India, and while France sank rapidly towards bankruptcy, the finances of England showed extraordinary vitality, her prosperity rising within a few months of the acknowledgment of her defeat to a point never before reached. The impression widely produced on the Continent, and particularly in France, was that this British triumph was chiefly due to the possession of India and other colonies. If Great Britain had retained her prosperity after a long war that had seen her defeated in America and for several weeks defied on her own coasts by a French and Spanish fleet, it appeared to many that, failing direct invasion, the most effective blow that could be struck at her was through her commerce and her eastern empire. This theory was eventually adopted by Napoleon Bonaparte.

To reach India there were three routes. One was wholly by sea, around the Cape of Good Hope ; another wholly by land, from various starting-points, through Asiatic Turkey and Persia ; a third, the quickest, partly by sea, partly by land, through the Mediterranean and Egypt. The first of these routes required undisputed

control of the ocean ; the second necessitated the concurrence of Russia and the co-operation or conquest of Turkey ; the third presented a somewhat complex problem.

For Great Britain to utilize the Mediterranean it was essential that she should be able to maintain a fleet there, or, in other words, that she should possess naval bases. Without fortified harbours of refuge, without depots of shot and gunpowder, of cordage, yarn, and sailcloth, of tar and timber and hundreds of naval necessaries, her fleets in the Mediterranean could never have been kept in a condition ready to meet those of France and Spain sailing directly from their arsenals. Her first and unconscious step towards acquiring a route to India through the Mediterranean was taken in 1704, when Gibraltar was captured. It was the second step, taken nearly a century later, that occasioned the movement of French troops into the kingdom of Naples.

The Mediterranean is about 2500 miles in length, which, in days of sailing vessels, represented under adverse circumstances a navigation of many weeks, and even months. At about midway between Gibraltar and Egypt a geological formation, a continuation of the Italian Apennines, narrows the distance between Europe and Africa to a narrow strait ; in the midst of this strait lies the island of Malta. From Gibraltar, the naval base of Great Britain, from Toulon, the naval base of France, the way to Egypt lay past Malta, and as long as there was no great disproportion in the naval strength of the two Powers, the possession of this naturally strong position was certain to carry preponderance with it. When General Bonaparte sailed on his expedition to Egypt in 1798, he turned the Knights of Malta out of possession and established a

garrison in their stronghold, thus giving France a great strategic advantage for future operations in the East. That advantage was temporarily neutralized by the destruction of the French fleet off the Nile by Lord Nelson, and by Great Britain's alliance with the Two Sicilies, whereby she was enabled to repair her vessels at Naples and in the ports of Sicily. So great was the danger of the French occupation of Malta felt to be, that the island was promptly attacked by an Anglo-Sicilian force under General Pigot. Two years after its capture by France, at about the same time as the battle of Marengo was fought, Malta passed into the possession of Great Britain.

The sequel of Marengo was the treaty of Lunéville, pacifying the Continent, and the sequel of the treaty of Lunéville was the treaty of Amiens between Great Britain and France. The British Cabinet and people were weary of war, and Bonaparte, whose aim probably went no further than obtaining an advantageous truce, persuaded the new-formed administration of Lord Addington into ceding nearly all the colonial possessions lost by France, and into agreeing to evacuate Malta in favour of a neutral holder. The treaty also stipulated that the French troops should be withdrawn from the occupied Neapolitan provinces. The question of Malta and Naples was the all-important one, and in a few months it appeared that the treaty had not solved it. Great Britain would not withdraw her garrison from Malta, nor France hers from Puglia. Lord Hawkesbury, the English Foreign Secretary, and Lord Whitworth, his special envoy to Paris, were convinced that Bonaparte's chief project of foreign policy turned on the occupation of Egypt. Every effort of the First Consul to get the evacuation of Malta carried

out revealed the importance he attached to it and confirmed their suspicions.

The British statesmen were now fully persuaded that in agreeing to abandon Malta, the watch-tower of Egypt, as Whitworth called it, they had committed a grave blunder or made an unwarranted sacrifice. There appeared no other way of repairing this mistake than by evading the engagement, and no diplomatic skill could avert war as the consequence. There can be no doubt that the British statesmen were correct in their views as to the nature of the First Consul's political projects; the events of the years that followed amply proved it. Apart from General Sebastiani's mission in the East, which need not be discussed here, the occupation of Puglia by French troops, as an avowed counterpoise to the occupation of Malta by those of Great Britain, could have but one signification.

The province of Puglia borders the Adriatic where Italy approaches most nearly to the shores of Turkey; at one point the distance is but fifty miles. In this province were several small ports facing the Turkish coast—Bari, Barletta, Brindisi, Otranto; and one of first-rate importance, Taranto. There the erection of modern fortifications and the accumulation of stores would form an excellent naval base, and one somewhat nearer Egypt than Malta. On the other hand, Taranto lost much of its value from the presence of a British fortress on its line of communications by sea with France. But it was not with a view to purely naval operations that Taranto was an important position; for the peculiar conditions of the Mediterranean rendered possible another mode of approach to Egypt in which sea operations were only called on to play

a subsidiary part. In the days when vessels were propelled by sails only, the influence of sea-power was greater on large than on small expanses of water. Between two far-distant points a victorious fleet might check all hostile movements ; between two points close to one another the largest fleet might be neutralized during a few hours by an unfavourable slant of wind, and those few hours might suffice to carry an inferior fleet from the one point to the other. Precisely this condition existed in the channel of Otranto ; British cruisers might patrol it for days, and yet a strong north-westerly wind blowing through one night would suffice to carry them down towards the Greek coast and to carry vessels from the Italian to the Turkish shore, or to the island of Corfu, free from molestation. This was an unsatisfactory method of operating, but a perfectly feasible one, as was shown later. The conditions existing at Taranto were also to be found further east ; at Constantinople, at the Dardanelles, from Greece to Crete, from the Archipelago to Asia Minor.

Taranto, though an outlying and in many ways disadvantageous base, was, in fact, directly connected with the territory of France. An accord between France and the Powers of north-eastern Europe was all that was necessary to clear the way for the concentration there of as large an army as might be thought necessary for the conquest of Salonika, Constantinople, or Athens. However wide the mark, however nebulous or romantic the object may appear, it must yet be said that the diplomatic and political difficulties were greater than the military in this first great step toward the Orient that so fascinated the mind of Napoleon. From the earliest days of his greatness his dream had been to

effect some great revolution in the East, nor did the failure of the expedition to Egypt shake his faith. As will be seen in a later chapter, when he reached the height of his glory and power between the interviews of Tilsit and Erfurt, the means for the realization of the next great step from Taranto eastward took a prominent part in his negotiations and measures.

In the treaty which Murat signed with the Neapolitan Court, the one point of importance therefore was to secure Taranto, the counterpoise of Malta. "That is the point destined to play the biggest part one day," wrote Napoleon to his brother a few years later; and again, . . . "You will be of the greatest assistance in making me master of the Mediterranean, the principal and constant object of my policy."

In France the feeling against the Neapolitan Court was strong, especially in military circles, but the policy of Bonaparte was influenced less by motives of revenge than of expediency. So long as his larger naval plans for the invasion of England remained operative, so long as the great Powers of the north-east remained in a state of veiled hostility, he thought it inexpedient to detach a considerable force for the conquest of such a remote kingdom as that of Naples. What the First Consul wanted, therefore, was, by a judicious employment of cajolery and threats, to maintain the existing government of the Two Sicilies and to make it serve his present purposes. But the dictation of a Napoleon was enough to turn an even less proud spirit than Mary Caroline's. Hardly were the French troops established in Puglia than the Sicilian Government was peremptorily called on to assume an attitude of hostile neutrality towards Great Britain, and to furnish heavy guns, munitions of war, and artificers for the works with which the French

military engineers were rapidly transforming Taranto into a first-class fortress.

In the city of Naples itself circumstances little likely to soothe the Queen's susceptibilities attended the resumption of peaceful relations with France. The newly appointed Minister of the Republic was Alquier, one of the members of the Convention that had sent Louis XVI. to the guillotine. At first Mary Caroline expressed insurmountable aversion to seeing him; later she became reconciled to his presence, and finally exchanged jokes with him. Towards Bonaparte her dislike was tempered by extreme curiosity; and in the course of a conversation with the French Minister in the year 1804 she said to him, laughingly: "You know that I detest your country. Yet I would willingly travel 200 leagues to see the First Consul. He loves glory and so do I. . . ." ¹

After the peace of Amiens Ferdinand's momentarily interrupted diplomatic relations with Great Britain were resumed, Hugh Elliot being sent out to fill the arduous post Sir William Hamilton had held so conspicuously. Elliot proved unfortunate in meeting with difficult circumstances and failed to earn diplomatic reputation. Through the new British Envoy and the other Ministers resident at Naples, Mary Caroline was kept well informed of the political movement of Europe against France during the period that followed the treaties of Lunéville and Amiens. Hostilities between Great Britain and France broke out again in the summer of 1803, and from that moment the former Power directed all her efforts to bring Austria and Russia to her assistance. Austria was not reconciled to her loss of northern Italy, Russia to the crushing defeats that had

¹ Boulay de la Meurthe, *Quelques lettres de Marie Caroline.*

annihilated the long-triumphant army of Suvaroff. Both of these two great empires, jealous of Bonaparte's rapid increase of strength, of his stride from Consular to Imperial dignity, were making ready to challenge his fortune. To their help Mary Caroline anxiously looked for relief from the hated incubus of French occupation and dictation. When in the spring of 1805 Napoleon, following up his proclamation as Emperor at Paris, proceeded to Milan to be crowned King of Italy, the alarm of the Sicilian Court rose to fever heat. This turned into panic when it became known that the Emperor had received the Neapolitan Envoy, Prince Cardito, with harsh and threatening expressions.

Napoleon's gigantic plans against Great Britain were now rapidly maturing, and it was essential that, whether by threats or persuasion, the lower end of the Italian peninsula should for the moment be kept at rest. The maintenance of his relations with the kingdom of the Two Sicilies on precisely that footing he had chosen, meant the employment of the least possible number of his troops in that distant quarter, made safe the right flank of the army that would soon have to face Austria in northern Italy, and retained for future eventualities his advanced post towards the East. With the plans for the invasion of England on the point of execution, with the inevitable campaign against the north-eastern Powers already shaping in his mind, he had no desire to trifle in war with Mary Caroline. In January 1805 he tried the effect of a direct appeal and wrote to the Queen a remarkable and characteristic letter. He told her, in bald, unambiguous phraseology, precisely what course it would be to her interest to take: let her dismiss the British Minister, let her firmly resolve to follow the lead of France, and

all would be well with her. Why should she not cease from her intriguing and perceive her real interests ?

But the Queen was too proud, too hopeful of the fast-forming European coalition, to follow Napoleon's advice. She declined to order Elliot to leave her Court, and it was in answer to this that the Emperor had uttered his threats to Prince Cardito at Milan. The Queen of Naples, in her fear and distress, took a further step towards open hostility by repeatedly pressing her nephew, the Emperor Francis, for positive assurances of his armed support against France.

The weight of the French occupation of Puglia was becoming more and more oppressive. Early in the year the commanding general, St. Cyr, summoned the Sicilian Government to dismiss from its service Count Roger de Damas, a French *émigré* and a capable officer. This claim was evaded by transferring the Count from Naples to Palermo. The even more embarrassing demand of the French Government for the dismissal of Elliot caused greater difficulty ; eventually the intervention of the Austrian Envoy, Count Kaunitz, resulted in the British Minister remaining.

By the end of February 1805, if not earlier, Mary Caroline had determined to brave France at the first favourable opportunity. The Powers received assurances of Sicilian co-operation, and when, on the 11th of April, Great Britain and Russia signed a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, an article was agreed to providing for the security of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. By this treaty, to which Austria nearly immediately acceded, it was provided that the alliance against France should become effective, in other words that hostilities should be opened, within four months. Great Britain was thus securing her great object of

effecting a military diversion that would draw off into the heart of Europe the army that threatened her coasts.

Her diplomacy at Naples strove for a precisely similar object as at St. Petersburg and Vienna. To create a diversion was the constant effort of Elliot. He diligently played on the Queen's hatred and fear of France, he insisted on the advantage that would accrue to the general cause were Great Britain able to strike a blow at her enemy in the Mediterranean; finally he presented a request that British troops should be permitted to occupy certain points in Sicily to counter-balance the French occupation of Puglia. From this injudicious diplomatic step may be traced Mary Caroline's suspicion and dislike of the British alliance, a suspicion that was to develop in a rapid and remarkable manner. Nothing could have been more ill judged than to ask a Sovereign whose friendship had been constant and inspired by her material interests to permit a military occupation entirely to the profit of her ally and as entirely to her own disadvantage. For whatever arguments a British or French apologist might put forward for the military occupation of Brindisi or Taranto, of Messina or Syracuse, however speciously the one might argue that the voluntary surrender of Puglia was compensated by the retention of Naples, or the other that the friendly presence of British troops was more a protection than a disadvantage, the fact remained that in both cases the real power of the Sicilian Crown passed into the hands of a foreign government. Mary Caroline did not nicely balance whether the British occupation might be somewhat more friendly and less burdensome than that of the French; she merely saw in it a further abrogation of her sovereign rights, an increase in the number of the

devourers of her kingdom. She met Elliot's proposal with much coolness, rejected his request, and from that day showed him far less favour and confidence. The influence of the British Minister received another equally severe check nearly immediately after by the arrival of the newly appointed Russian Minister Tatitcheff.

The Courts of St. Petersburg and Naples had been on cordial terms for some years. In 1799 a detachment of Russian troops had assisted Cardinal Ruffo in his capture of Naples, and since that time the Czar had maintained troops and a squadron at Corfu. There was nothing in Russian policy that could give umbrage to the Court of Naples, for its aspirations were openly fixed on the Balkan and not on the Italian peninsula. There was therefore nothing to tell against Tatitcheff, while his high favour with the Czar, his personal qualities, his loudly proclaimed Gallophobe sentiments and his pushing address quickly won him Mary Caroline's ear. There was no political reason why Elliot and Tatitcheff should not have worked together, but personal rivalry asserted itself, and the Russian proved successful in securing the royal favour. The British Minister had attempted to drive Naples into war, to obtain military possession of the most important fortresses of Sicily : these were points which the Czar's representative did not fail to show to the Queen under the most unfavourable light. He compared the service which Russia and Great Britain might render, the one disinterested, the other not ; he pointed out that subjection to British could be only one degree less hateful than to French dictation.

Not long after Tatitcheff's arrival at Naples, in July, the European situation became more openly

threatening. The great Powers had already engaged in those preliminary military and diplomatic passes that herald an approaching conflict. The memorable cruise of Villeneuve had brought the French fleet near the bare headlands of Spain, off which the greatest naval battle of modern times was soon to be fought. Already Napoleon's projected invasion of England appeared foiled; in his mind another gigantic and unexpected stroke was fast maturing. From Paris Ferdinand's Minister, the astute Di Gallo, sent repeated warnings of danger. The storm might burst at any moment, and prudence alone could save Naples. At Vienna Paget, and at St. Petersburg Leveson-Gower, urged on the declaration of hostilities under threat of suspending the payments of the British subsidies. Through the height of the summer that was to have witnessed the invasion of England, but only saw Villeneuve's feeble retreat to Cadiz, the strain was intense. War was evidently coming, but how and when none could exactly foresee. On the 4th of August the Emperor directed Talleyrand to give Alquier a free hand to break off relations with Naples; this discretion the French Minister, however, did not exercise. At the same time St. Cyr received instructions to use force, should he think it advisable, for the purpose of dispelling any muster of militia made in the provinces occupied by the French troops; his corps was quietly reinforced, bringing his total up to about 17,000 men with 37 guns; finally he was warned that political complications might lead to his being ordered to occupy the city of Naples by the 15th of September.

This menacing attitude of Napoleon had been caused by the increasingly hostile course of the Sicilian Government. Tatitcheff had been quickly followed by Lacy,

an experienced Russian general, who was in command of the considerable force now collected at Corfu. Mary Caroline was aware that the Austrian and Russian armies would soon open hostilities, was anxious to concert military measures to protect her kingdom and to assist the Allies. As a result of numerous conferences, it was decided to form an army on the Neapolitan frontier, consisting of a body of Russian troops from Corfu, of another of British troops from Malta, together with the forces of the Sicilian Crown. The whole was to be under the supreme command of Lacy, whom his English descent, experience, and tact well qualified for the task.¹

The diplomats of Russia, Great Britain, and Austria had many difficulties to surmount before carrying through the arrangements preliminary to placing the projected army in the field. The Court of Naples appeared unable to arrive at a definite decision; two parties, two policies struggled for supremacy. Acton was still in favour of a prudent course. He realized that Naples was not an effective factor in the conflict, and that the events of Central Europe would decide the fate of the monarchy. He was for assenting to the French demands, for trusting to the military success of the Allies for relief, but not for affording the Allies assistance, thereby giving France an excuse for absorbing the kingdom. Acton was supported by Ferdinand, who in this crisis showed more interest in affairs of State than was usual with him. On the other hand, Mary Caroline was for war, for the impetuous course that would relieve her over-

¹ The British officers appear to have been fairly satisfied with Lacy. Bunbury's somewhat adverse opinion seems to have been unduly influenced by the fact that the Russian commander brought his nightcap to councils of war.

strung nerves. Acton was old, she had tired of him, he no longer possessed his former influence over her. She was fully informed of the formidable preparations of Austria and Russia ; the middle of August had been the term at first fixed for the opening of hostilities ; she longed for revenge, and evoked in spirit visions of glorious triumphs over her detested enemies. The Queen was unable to resist the arguments and persuasion of Tatitcheff, Lacy, and Elliot ; she overcame the resistance of Ferdinand and Acton, decided to face every risk, and to call the Russian and British troops to Naples.

At the very moment when Mary Caroline's policy triumphed at Naples and an irrevocable step was being taken, that of Ferdinand and Acton asserted itself at Paris. Alarmed at the intentions of France, supported by his instructions from his Government, anxious to meet the views of Talleyrand and Napoleon, Gallo offered to enter into a treaty whereby Naples would undertake, under certain conditions, to maintain neutrality. This Neapolitan diplomat had come within the orbit of Napoleon as early as the year of Campo Formio, 1797, when he had witnessed the famous meeting between the commander of the army of Italy and Count Cobenzl. From that moment he became deeply impressed with a sense of the power of the future dominator of Europe, whose fortune he was so long to follow. Gallo had been Ferdinand's Minister at Paris during the Consulate, and had witnessed the proclamation of the Empire. His early admiration for Napoleon had increased with years, and this, together with his unconquerable greed for pecuniary benefits, makes it probable that at the period now in question he might fairly be regarded nearly as much the tool of

Napoleon as the agent of Ferdinand. He at all events responded, for one reason or another, to every suggestion of Talleyrand, and relying on the necessities of the case for the sanction of his Government, signed the treaty of neutrality. Its terms were not unfavourable; they provided that the Sicilian Government should maintain neutrality towards France, that it should not permit the landing of foreign troops in any part of the two kingdoms, and that it should dismiss from its service all foreign officers; in return the French troops were immediately to be withdrawn from the occupied provinces. Talleyrand and Gallo signed this treaty on the 21st of September; the Emperor immediately ratified it; on the 23rd Marshal Berthier sent orders to St. Cyr in which he notified him of the terms of the treaty, and gave him alternative instructions to march on Lombardy or on Naples, in the event of the Sicilian Government ratifying or refusing to ratify the treaty.

On the 3rd of October the treaty of neutrality arrived at Naples; Alquier gave the Government twenty-four hours in which to decide whether it would ratify or not, and, after a momentary hesitation, the necessary signatures were given.¹ At the same time a protest was drawn up and handed to Lacy, in which it was stated that the treaty of neutrality was only signed under compulsion. Thus the Sicilian Court adopted a deliberately deceptive policy, and entered on courses which Elliot, the Minister of one of its allies, bluntly declared were "as disgusting as they were disgraceful."

Mary Caroline had been content to rid herself of

¹ In her manuscript memoirs the Queen makes the curious assertion that Elliot counselled compliance with the French demands. A dispatch of Kaunitz, dated October 4, may throw light on the real state of the case; in this he writes: . . . "le ministre d'Angleterre paraît très piqué."—Helfert, *Königin Karolina*, 182.

St. Cyr's presence at the cost of ratification ; she was none the less firmly resolved on bringing the Anglo-Russians to Naples. Even had she wished to, she had now gone too far to recede. For a month already military action had been agreed on in principle, only matters of detail remaining over for diplomatic adjustment.

As soon as St. Cyr was informed of the ratification of the treaty of neutrality he broke up his cantonments. He rapidly marched northwards to join the army with which Marshal Masséna was preparing to face the Archduke Charles in the passes of the Tyrol. No sooner were the French columns well advanced along the Adriatic coast than the long-delayed summons was dispatched calling the Russian and British fleets to the Bay of Naples.¹

Whatever opinion the generals and diplomatists of Russia and Great Britain might privately entertain of the political conduct of the Sicilian Court, their instructions, and the interests of their countries, could leave them no ground for hesitation in seizing the opportunity now presented. Sir James Craig, the very able commander of the British force assembled at Malta, described the ratification of the treaty of neutrality as an "act of perfidy," and appears to have felt a momentary embarrassment in taking advantage of it. Yet on the 3rd of November he embarked with 7500 good troops. A few days later, off the coast of Sicily, his fleet met that conveying some 14,500 Russians from Corfu ; the two, proceeding together, reached the Bay of Naples on the 19th of November. On the same day Alquier hauled down the French flag and left the capital.

In the meanwhile greater events than these were

¹ Apparently on the 16th of October.—Bunbury, 201.

taking place. After weeks of inaction the combined fleet of France and Spain left Cadiz, and on the 21st of October, off Cape Trafalgar, met with irretrievable disaster. Britain's greatest victory resulted in the assertion of her superiority over the combined navies of France and Spain; it also ended in the glorious death of an inspired naval leader whose presence appeared to charm victory, of a personal friend and beloved hero of the Queen of the Two Sicilies, whose influence for good or evil was never more to be felt in the Mediterranean.

One day before Trafalgar the army of the newly formed French Empire brought to a successful close the first of its remarkable operations. As a result of one of the greatest and most skilful marches recorded in military history, the French army had been moved from its positions along the Channel and German Ocean, over the Rhine, through the heart of the Black Forest and the Swabian Alps. Unexpectedly and swiftly it emerged on the line of communications of the Austrian army, destroyed its isolated divisions, drove Mack into Ulm, and on the 20th of October received his surrender. Wasting not an instant, the Emperor continued his march on Vienna, but without receiving peaceful overtures. The Allies, though momentarily disheartened by the destruction of Mack, determined to continue the struggle. The Austrians assembled new divisions and fell back on the large Russian army that was advancing on Vienna. While the military struggle still promised to be severe the diplomatic position looked menacing for Napoleon. Prussia's hatred of the new-born military power of France was bringing her into line with the Allies, and threatened to place her large army between the Emperor and the Rhine. The procrastination of Prussia in the

field of diplomacy, the impetuosity of Alexander in the field of war, relieved Napoleon from a position of the utmost difficulty, and enabled him to retain supremacy by winning the brilliant victory of Austerlitz on the 2nd of December.

The sudden assault of the hill of Pratzen in frozen Moravia by the corps of Soult and Bernadotte sealed the fate of the Anglo-Russian army at the southern end of the Italian peninsula, 700 miles away. Between the disembarkation of Lacy's and Craig's troops and the arrival of the news of Austerlitz only a month passed. In that space of time nothing of moment took place ; yet for the sake of an idle military demonstration Mary Caroline had deliberately violated a not unfavourable treaty and had jeopardized her throne. The position she had now taken up was past all equivocation, nor could the Court of Naples return to the sheath the cumbrous sword it had ventured to brandish at the dominator of Europe. Even had the French Minister desired to avoid a breach of diplomatic relations, the flagrantly hostile nature of the step taken left him no option. But his intimate knowledge of all that passed in the Court circle had certainly prepared him for an aggressive move. Neither Alquier, nor St. Cyr, nor yet Napoleon could have felt much doubt as to what would result from the march of the French troops from Puglia to the Quadrilateral, nor can it reasonably be supposed that the Emperor was guided by any but military reasons in his negotiations with Naples. The presence of St. Cyr in northern Italy was an imperative necessity, for Austria had mistakenly concentrated her strongest army under her best general in the Tyrol and Masséna was outnumbered. The Austrian Government had stipulated with its allies that the operations of the

Archduke Charles should be supported by the march northwards of Lacy's army. It was intended that the Austrians and the Anglo-Russians should effect their junction in the plains of Lombardy. But these diplomatic arrangements presupposed success, and that the generals of the Allies were not for the moment in a position to command.

For a few days events proceeded smoothly for the Anglo-Russians. The first dismay caused by Mack's capitulation was over; the fortune of war appeared once more to balance; the intervention of Prussia, the advent of the Czar were eagerly expected; and while the allied generals prepared their transport and mounted their cavalry, they were cheered with the news of the victory of Trafalgar. It had never entered into the calculations of Lacy or Craig that their 20,000 men should advance up the whole length of the Italian peninsula unsupported. They anticipated the assistance of a large body of Neapolitan troops. Much to the chagrin of Sir James Craig, it was now discovered that material assistance could not be expected. The royal army was too small, too disorganized, to place any considerable corps in the field at short notice.

Under these circumstances Lacy and Craig agreed that the best course was to begin by occupying defensive positions on the frontier, leaving further movements to be guided by events. Accordingly the British took up a line extending from the Mediterranean along the Garigliano towards the mountains of the Abruzzi. Their left was in touch with the fortress of Gaëta, garrisoned by royal troops under the Prince of Hesse Philipstahl, their right with the Russians, who from San Germano stretched their detachments through the passes of the Apennines. A small body of Neapolitan troops

under Count Roger de Damas completed the line on the Adriatic coast, and were placed under the direct orders of the Russian Commander-in-chief.

On the 4th of December the Government issued a decree designed to remedy the weakness of the army by ordering a levy *en masse* of all able-bodied men between the ages of twenty and forty. By means of a generous application of the *truglio* and a general emptying of the prisons, the gaps in the ranks were to a certain extent reduced. But among the people at large the demands of the Government met with far from ready response. This call of a whole population to arms was, most modestly, expected to produce 30,000 soldiers; in fact it produced but 6000, and of these a large number were bent on desertion at the first opportunity. So great was the feeling against military service that many preferred self-mutilation.

Through the first half of December the operations of the Allies in Naples, though purely defensive, proceeded smoothly. The Neapolitan battalions gradually grew larger, and a Russian reinforcement of some 6000 men was landed in Puglia and helped to swell Lacy's army to respectable proportions. But any hope of an eventual advance was crushed before Christmas by the news of the defeat of the Austrian and Russian Emperors at Austerlitz. So profound was the sensation caused by this intelligence that on the very day of its circulation the report spread through Naples that the Court would take refuge at Palermo.¹

There was ample reason for alarm. The Neapolitan Court had deliberately challenged Napoleon, and now that his armies were triumphant, but one result could

¹ The news reached Naples on the 22nd of December, though the official dispatches were much later.

follow. Neither help nor sympathy was to be expected ; and even its agents could find nothing to say in palliation of such political blunders and duplicity. At first Gallo attempted to keep up the pretence that friendly relations still continued between the two Governments ; he protested that he knew of no infraction of the treaty of neutrality, and that the presence of the Anglo-Russians at Naples was contrary to the wishes of his Court. This position was not long tenable, and he finally, and far more intelligibly, declared that, in any event, he desired not to leave Paris, where he would be content to be permitted to live and die. In a private letter to Prince Joseph Bonaparte he expressed in unmeasured terms his condemnation of the Queen's policy, and earnestly begged for the personal favour of the Emperor.

In her own resources Mary Caroline could not confide. At Paris nothing could be done. At Vienna alone was there hope of succour. To the Emperor Francis, her nephew and her ally, the Queen wrote letters entreating that he should secure the inclusion of the Two Sicilies in any armistice or treaty concluded with France. But the Austrian Emperor had too difficult a situation to face to concern himself about the fate of Naples, nor would Napoleon have listened to proposals on the subject. Russia alone remained in the field, but the Czar hesitated whether or not to continue the war. His army was shattered, and one of his first steps after Austerlitz was to provide for the safe withdrawal of the body of troops he had ventured in far-away Naples. Lacy was first instructed to obtain an armistice, and afterwards to transport his army back to Corfu.

The Russian immediately informed the British Commander of the instructions he had received,

and Craig, to whose judgment his Government had wisely given great latitude, decided that he could not undertake the defence of Naples unassisted, and must therefore evacuate simultaneously with the Russians. Mary Caroline opposed her vehement entreaties to the retirement of the Anglo-Russians. Convinced now of her political errors, prepared for the most bitter sacrifices, she sent Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo to Rome on the 7th of January with instructions to attempt negotiations through the intermediary of the Pope and Cardinal Fesch. He was given powers to make the most ample concessions. To give this negotiation proper support it was necessary, the Queen argued, to keep up an appearance of material strength ; it was necessary that the allied army should retain its positions, and thereby induce some compromise from the enemy. Tatitcheff strenuously supported this not unreasonable contention. He urged Lacy to delay his movement ; Elliot, gained to the same view, made similar representations to Craig.

The Russian general, although he had received instructions to retire to Corfu, at first showed some inclination to interpret his orders widely, and to afford the Queen's negotiations support by delaying his departure. After some discussion with Craig, with whom he had remained on good terms from the beginning of their co-operation, he proposed to the Court that the allied army should retreat to Calabria, and there take up a strong defensive position. This proposal was rejected, and in terms so violent and insulting, that Lacy refused to accept their communication.¹ He now decided that further discussion would be useless, and proceeded to carry out his original

¹ Craig to Castlereagh, Feb. 10, 1806, *War Off. Orig. Corr.* 170, “. . . terms of indiscreet invective . . .” is Craig's expression.

intention. Craig's conduct conformed to that of his colleague. The Russian and British Ministers were greatly angered at the decision of the generals; Mary Caroline was in despair at a departure which her own violence had hastened. To Elliot the Queen expressed herself in these remarkable terms: "Degradation and injury will be the price we shall have to pay for the short and expensive Anglo-Russian visit. We are sick at heart; nothing could have surpassed our good faith and dignity."¹

But Craig, though deaf to Elliot's persuasion, though determined not to risk his small corps unsupported against a French army of invasion, was at the same time anxious to secure for his Government such military positions as were both advantageous and defensible. Craig's instructions did not urge him to secure Sicilian but British interests; a possible conflict between the two was even anticipated, and his orders were that, in case of necessity, he was to occupy Sicily, and even "to take possession of it without the concurrence of His Sicilian Majesty."² The rights of Ferdinand and Mary Caroline were no more sacred to the British Government and its commander than they were to Napoleon and St. Cyr.

Craig's first idea appears to have been to occupy and defend Gaëta, but the suggestion that British troops should enter the fortress was instantly repelled by the Prince of Hesse. Failing this, Sir James Craig decided that the next best point at which he could check a French invasion was on the Strait of Messina. Proceeding on military considerations and in the spirit of his instructions, he firmly resolved to place his force at

¹ Minto, 391.

² Craig to Elliot, Jan. 27, 1806, *War Off. Orig. Corr.* 170.

that point, notwithstanding the strong opposition of Elliot. No sooner was the Anglo-Russian retirement decided than Craig formally applied for permission to disembark his troops at Messina. This was met by a curt refusal. So far did the resentment of the Sicilian Government go that orders were promptly sent that any attempt at landing on the part of the British was to be resisted, and, if necessary, by force of arms.¹ Under these difficult circumstances, unsupported by his country's diplomatic representative, Craig showed equal firmness, coolness, and judgment. Sailing from Castellamare on the 19th of January, he carried his troops direct to Messina. There he cast anchor, and, without attempting to land a single man, awaited circumstances that would compel Ferdinand to call for the aid of his unwelcome defender. His judgment was soon justified by events, and on the 13th of February the hostile orders were rescinded and the British troops left free to disembark.

The departure of the British and Russian armies had left Mary Caroline well-nigh defenceless. In her despair the Queen issued a multitude of orders, often contradictory, generally useless. On the 11th of January she called out the *masse* for the defence of the kingdom; they were those same free companies, midway between the *comitiva* of a brigand chief and the slightly less unruly bodies of provincial militia that had followed Cardinal Ruffo to the assault of Naples in 1799. Often enough they were but bands of outlaws attracted to the royal service by a free pardon, by the adornment of their chief with some such title as captain or colonel, and by the hope of plunder. Among their

¹ *Arch. Nap.* "Guerra," xxv. 2248, Jan. 4 and 20, 1806; also Circello to Elliot, Jan. 21, 1806, *War. Off. Orig. Corr.* 170.

leaders were such illustrious freebooters as Sciarpa and Michael Pezza, otherwise known as Fra Diavolo. So detestable did this measure appear that Count Roger de Damas refused to have them under his orders, and that Baron Rodio, who had been among the most staunch of the royalist leaders in 1799, declined to allow his name to be connected with them again.

While the Queen called out the *masse* and urged her irresponsive ministers and diplomats to futile efforts, while the King with great good humour enjoyed the pleasures of the chase at Capo di Monte and Fusaro, Napoleon resolved the fate of their kingdom. Having concluded peace with Austria, he addressed the following proclamation to his army from Schoenbrunn on the 27th of December :—

Soldiers, for ten years I have left nothing undone to save the King of Naples ; he has left nothing undone for his ruin. After the battles of Dego, of Mondovi, of Lodi he could have offered but the feeblest resistance. I listened to the promises of this Prince, and I treated him with generosity.

When the second coalition was destroyed at Marengo, the King of Naples, first to wage an unjust war, abandoned by his allies at Lunéville, remained isolated and defenceless ; he implored me, and for a second time I pardoned him.

But a few months have passed since you were at the gates of Naples ; I had good enough grounds both to suspect the treason there hatching and to avenge the insults already suffered. Again I was generous. I recognised the neutrality of Naples ; I ordered you to evacuate that kingdom, and, for the third time, the House of Naples was supported and saved.

Shall we pardon for a fourth time ? Shall we trust for a fourth time a Court without faith, without honour, without judgment ? No ! no ! the dynasty of Naples has ceased to reign ; its continued existence is incompatible with the repose of Europe and the honour of my Crown.

Soldiers, forward ! Hurl into the waves, if they should await

you, the feeble battalions of the tyrants of the seas ; show the world how we chastise perjury ; announce without delay that all Italy is subject to my laws or to those of my allies, that the most lovely land on earth is free from the yoke of the most perfidious of people, that the sanctity of treaties is avenged, and that the souls of my brave soldiers slaughtered in the ports of Sicily on their return from Egypt after escaping the dangers of shipwreck, of the desert, and of battle, are at last appeased.

Soldiers ! my brother will lead you ; he knows my plans ; he carries my authority ; he has my complete confidence ; encircle him with yours.¹

PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES CONSULTED

MSS.

BRIT. WAR OFF., *Orig. Corresp.* 169 and 170, containing a number of dispatches to and from Elliot, Craig, Castlereagh, Circello, and others concerning the British force under Craig.

ARCHIVIO DI STATO, *Guerra*, xxv. 2248, contains several documents bearing on the same question.

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¹ The generally accepted date for this proclamation is that given in the text, but it did not make its appearance in the *Moniteur* till the 1st of February. Yet its purport was known at Naples on the 25th of January, so that whether officially published or not its contents must have been revealed not much later than its ostensible date. See Napoleon, *Corr.* xi. 509 ; Schoell, *Hist. des traités*, viii. 9 ; Nicolà, ii. 188.

CHAPTER III

CONQUEST OF NAPLES

(Feb.-June 1806)

Policy of Napoleon—French finance—Napoleon and Joseph—Is offered crown of Naples—S. Teodoro's negotiations—Flight of the Court—Collapse of Neapolitan resistance—Masséna's movements—Joseph's entry into Naples—Task before the invaders—The Neapolitan forces—Régnier marches into Calabria—Campotanesi—French at Reggio—Neapolitan flight—*Corpi volanti*—Character and causes of the rising in Calabria—Military situation end of March—Insurrection of Calabria—Rodio—Joseph visits Calabria—His portrait and line of internal policy—Gaëta—Its garrison and commander—Commencement of siege—Unsuccessful bombardments—Campredon takes charge—Hesse's appeals for help—Smith at Palermo—Embarks Fra Diavolo—His history—Smith relieves Gaëta—Captures Capri—Fra Diavolo's raid and treachery—Sent to Palermo—Sorties from Gaëta—Smith's proclamations—Progress of French works—Masséna takes command.

THE enmity between the Bourbon dynasty of the Two Sicilies and the people of France had been transmitted from the events of the great Revolution; the military occupation of Puglia by the Consular Government had been intended as a compensation for the English occupation of Malta and as a move towards future operations in the eastern Mediterranean basin. These two salient

facts, and the events attending them, had been among the principal causes leading to the Schoenbrunn proclamation, but there had been others also,—military, financial, and dynastic considerations,—that went far to influence the Emperor Napoleon's decision.

He had just delivered a crushing blow at Austria, the third in less than ten years, and his military supremacy on the Continent appeared securely established. He found himself, for the moment, with but one enemy to face, that powerful, pertinacious foe, whose wealth, maritime genius, and dogged hatred were at the end to vanquish him. Already Great Britain had smirched the magnificent laurel wreath of the new-born Empire with the indelible trace of Trafalgar, and it was with a pang of jealous hatred that Napoleon now turned to strike at her. If the white cliffs of Dover were beyond his reach, he would at all events strike wherever he could find a single red-coated soldier ; if the British fleets covered the Channel he could yet move foot by foot nearer that strategic centre of the world where three continents meet, and where, he imagined, lay the key to India. From Naples, from Taranto, from Sicily, whence he would drive the British, he would stretch across the Adriatic, and his still considerable fleets would furnish him with sufficient sea power thence eventually to aim a deadly thrust at Egypt and the power of Britain.

But in the practical mind of the Emperor these plans, however vast, were made to fit in with a carefully conceived system of large armaments combined with rigid economy. For Napoleon had already embarked on his ruthless policy of making war self-supporting.¹ At a time when he was struggling to restore the finances of France from the chaos of the Revolution, when the

¹ This policy is admirably described in Fisher's *Napoleonic Statesmanship, Germany*.

market quotation of French 5 per cents was with difficulty brought up to 50 (56 in March 1803), he already declared that the day France went to war he would remit twenty millions of taxation. In 1804 and 1805 the heavy outlay caused by the war with England and by extraordinary military expenditure had resulted in heavy deficits in the French budget, and the campaign of 1805 had been fought on a financial basis that threatened disaster. Austerlitz had saved Napoleon not only politically but financially. As a result of the victory and of the heavy contributions levied from Austria, the credit of the French treasury rapidly improved. Napoleon now began to put in force on a large scale the system that eventually contributed so largely to his ruin. Though continental peace was secured, he proposed maintaining the army on a war footing and not reducing the effective strength of his battalions by one man; and so as to avoid irritating French public opinion by calling on France to meet this abnormal expenditure, he so shuffled the political cards as to quarter many corps of his army on foreign soil, and at the charge of those on whom they were quartered. The application of this system in Germany, where it was carried out on the largest scale, will not concern us, but it is necessary to point out that this policy was one of the factors that dictated the conquest of Naples. An army of fifty thousand men, detached to southern Italy at a time when its presence was not required elsewhere, would not only accomplish certain political purposes, but would be paid for by the conquered people and relieve the French finances to a corresponding extent.

One last aspect of the Neapolitan question as it presented itself to Napoleon must be dwelt on,—the

dynastic one. He was virtually in occupation of the throne of the Bourbons. He felt that his fall would be less likely to lead to a republican reaction than to a Bourbon restoration. For that House he had much of the genuine republican detestation of a true child of the Revolution. Every blow aimed at its possessions or repute was doubly gratifying to him; and in the impending fall of the Neapolitan branch of that House he saw the opportunity not only of lowering the prestige of a possible competitor, but of increasing his own. For his secret thought had long been to come to no terms with Ferdinand and Mary Caroline but to transfer their dominions and their crown to a new king of his own making. That king could be none other than Napoleon's eldest brother Joseph.

In the summer of 1805, while the diplomatic manœuvres preceding the breaking out of war with Austria and Russia were taking place, Napoleon, in the hopes of securing Austrian neutrality, had offered to separate the crowns of France and Italy. Whether he expected anything to come of this proposal or not there was certainly a report current that the Emperor would resign the crown of Lombardy in favour of Joseph Bonaparte.¹ But Austria's non-acceptance and the event of the war were to effect a change in Joseph's destination. Lombardy was to remain under the kingship of Napoleon, while his brother was to be compensated with the throne of Naples.

While the Emperor led his army into Germany, Joseph Bonaparte had remained in Paris to direct affairs of State. The correspondence of the brothers was constant and voluminous, but two dates will sufficiently

¹ Roederer, iii. 520. Miot, whose authority is doubtful, gives quite a different version, ii. 84, 107, 111.

establish the development of Napoleon's policy as it affected the question of Naples: on the 31st of December, having then left Vienna and reached Munich, he wrote appointing Joseph his Lieutenant commanding the army of Naples, with authority over the Marshals of France. Three weeks later, from Stuttgart, he formally offered his brother the crown of Naples.

If Count Miot's account is to be trusted, Joseph Bonaparte did not accept this regal gift without reluctance. The throne of Naples was in theory independent, and its occupant could not at the same time hold that of France. But Napoleon was childless, Joseph was the eldest of his brothers, and the throne of Naples appeared a poor thing when compared with that of France. So Joseph hesitated, until Napoleon intervened in his usual authoritative and decisive fashion. At the end of January, Joseph, who was now on his way to Italy, had not yet given his formal acceptance of the offer. The Emperor summoned Miot, his brother's intimate friend, and told him that in case of refusal he would make another appointment to the crown of Naples, and also adopt a successor to his own,—perhaps Eugène Beauharnais. This proved conclusive, and Joseph, fearing worse things, agreed to accept the crown of Ferdinand and Mary Caroline.

It was not remarkable that with the Emperor and his brother meditating such projects the negotiators of the Court of Naples should have met with scant success. Cardinal Ruffo's mission having resulted in nothing, the Duke of S. Teodoro was dispatched to Rome, but accomplished no more. On the 28th of January the Duke was admitted to an interview with Joseph, handed him a letter from the Hereditary Prince, and verbally

offered the abdication of Ferdinand and Mary Caroline in favour of their son, if peace could be obtained on such terms. The French Prince, adhering firmly to Napoleon's constantly reiterated instructions that he was not to listen to terms of any sort, declined to consider the Duke's proposal. S. Teodoro, a slippery personage whose allegiance was already wavering, returned to Naples, but apparently did not report the absolutely barren result of his mission. Following his deceptive assurances as to the success of his negotiations the order for the levy *en masse* was rescinded. The Queen herself gave a fanciful account of these negotiations to Elliot, while in her Memoirs she makes the curious statement that the Duke reported his negotiations at Rome to be progressing favourably, and tried to persuade her to journey to Terracina with the Hereditary Prince, there to have an interview with Joseph. Suspecting some treason of the Duke, she declined.

The complete failure of the peace overtures was, however, soon realized, and struck alarm in the hearts of the Court of Naples ; since the beginning of January valuables from the royal palaces had been removed to ships ready for conveyance to Palermo ; on the 23rd Ferdinand decided to transfer his hunting headquarters to Sicily, leaving the government to the nominal control of the Hereditary Prince, and of a Giunta composed of Naselli, Canosa, and Cianciulli. On the 11th of February Mary Caroline followed the King's example, taking with her everything of value that could be easily conveyed.¹

¹ This appears to be the reasonable view. Extreme statements are, however, easy to find, and in opposite directions see Joseph, *Corr.* ii. 14, 70 ; Helfert, *Königin Karolina*, 222 ; Ségur, ii. 502.

There was good cause for the Queen's departure, for the French columns were nearing the frontier, and they had acquired a terrifying reputation for celerity of movement. Under Marshal Masséna, perhaps the most able and vigorous of all Napoleon's generals, the French corps of invasion were rapidly concentrating. So great was the fear they inspired that even their presence appeared scarcely necessary to secure victory; early in January, when they were as yet very far distant, the Neapolitan artillery did not feel secure in conveying guns from Naples to the fortress of Capua save with lighted matches! Such soldiers as had been hastily recruited did not appear likely material to face the enemy; they came mostly from the prisons, and had merely changed the form of their service to the State by means of a sliding scale that established an equivalent between seven years at the galleys and ten years of military service. The levy of soldiers from the unconvicted section of the population was a matter of greater difficulty; rioting, disorder, and seditious placards were frequent, especially in Puglia. The withdrawal of the Russian and British troops had completely crushed all hope of successful resistance, and the royal cause, which had found so many zealous supporters in 1799, was for the moment without a defender. In the Campagna there were no enrolments, and even the flying corps only existed on paper.

There was thus practically nothing to oppose Masséna's advance but a few weak battalions of the regular army, too few in numbers to venture into the open Campagna through which lay the road to Naples. By the middle of January Masséna had 35,000 men in the Roman States, of which about 25,000 were in the first line. Early in February he could dispose of

30,000 men and twenty-four guns for actual operations, with nearly 10,000 more advancing to his support under Duhesme, and on the 8th he crossed the Garigliano. Joseph Bonaparte was with Masséna, and as the French army crossed the frontier he issued a proclamation to the people of Naples assuring them that they would receive friendly treatment, and that the aim of the invaders was merely to chastise the breach of faith of Ferdinand.

Masséna pushed directly on for the capital, meeting with no opposition save from the fortresses of Gaëta and Capua, before which detachments were left in observation. At Aversa he received the surrender of Naples from the regency, and on the 14th, six days after crossing the Garigliano, a French detachment made its entry into the city. Before their arrival the property-holders had formed a citizens' guard for protection against any excesses of the lazzaroni, and the rapidity with which Masséna moved, together with the promptitude of the provisional Giunta's surrender, prevented a repetition of the furious defence and terrible slaughter that had taken place when Championnet captured Naples for the Directoire six years before.

On the 15th of February Joseph Bonaparte made his formal entry surrounded by a brilliant staff; he took up his abode at the Royal Palace, styling himself Prince of France, Grand Elector of the Empire, and Lieutenant of the Emperor. The city acquiesced passively in the change of government, and the French were able to take possession of no less than 200 pieces of ordnance and large stores of gunpowder that had neither been removed nor destroyed.

Notwithstanding the facility with which this first

conquest had been accomplished, the French army was in reality far too small for the task set before it. Even had Napoleon transferred another 50,000 men from Germany to Masséna's command, that general would have disposed of insufficient numbers. The 80,000 men placed under his orders in Lombardy-Venetia represented but 40,000 in the Papal States, and but 25,000 in the city of Naples; while the further stretch from that point to the extremity of Calabria would mean an even greater proportionate reduction. And if the Strait of Messina was to be crossed, the effective force left available for the conquest of Sicily would be quite insignificant. But the fundamental political consideration on which the strategy of the French generals should have been based, a consideration that was indeed in Napoleon's mind, was that no conquest of Naples could be complete and final unless the Bourbon Court was driven out of Sicily as well. From this was deducible the further consequence that a rapid attack, giving no time for the elaboration of a system of defence, offered the best chance of success. As it was, Napoleon and his generals completely underestimated the total of troops necessary to enable the offensive to be carried beyond the Strait of Messina, and no provision was made for the maritime transport that would be necessary for crossing the small branch of sea that separates the island from the mainland. The result was that the French military strength just reached the strait, but there fell powerless, and that the best opportunity that was ever to present itself of completing the conquest of the whole kingdom passed away, never to be renewed.

Before Napoleon even knew that Masséna's columns were in position to cross the frontier, he urged on his

brother that he must, without a moment's delay, get 22,000 men to Reggio, whence Sicily could easily be taken in the first moment of panic. Nothing could be sounder than the considerations on which this order was based, but the means for its execution were wanting, nor had the officers to whom it was intrusted for execution that unerring discrimination between the vital and the subsidiary that so often enabled Napoleon to concentrate a sufficient amount of energy on the really decisive point.

Immediately after the occupation of the city of Naples, Joseph asserted the supreme military control given him by his brother; Masséna was placed in charge of the troops concentrated in the capital and its vicinity; the command of the detached force operating on the Adriatic side towards Puglia was given to St. Cyr, while all the troops available for an advance into Calabria were placed under the ablest of the divisional generals at Naples, Régnier. He was instructed to march to the Strait of Messina without delay.

When Régnier, at the end of February, was on the point of marching south, the forces of the Sicilian Government were divided into two bodies. The one under Marshal Rosenheim, with whom was the Hereditary Prince, was retreating before Lecchi's advance on the Adriatic side of the Apennines; the other, under the Comte de Damas, maintained a corresponding position on the western slope, observing from a distance the French in Naples. Damas had some 6000 or 7000 regulars and a certain number of Calabrese militia; Rosenheim's numbers were somewhat less.

Régnier, at the head of about 10,000 men, advanced from Naples with exemplary celerity and plunged into the mountains of Calabria, and into winter. His

advance lay along the mule track that did duty as the principal artery of communication between that remote province and the capital, and led to the town of Cassano. Towards Cassano, which lies on the Adriatic slope, lay the converging lines of retreat both of Rosenheim and of Damas. The latter, who was directly on Régnier's line of march, determined to face the French in the high mountain passes they would have to cross before they could reach that town.

On the 6th of March, at Lagonegro, the armies got into touch, and a heavy skirmish was fought between the advanced guard of the French and the rear-guard of the royal forces. This rear-guard was made up of irregulars and militia under the command of Sciarpa, one of the best-known of the leaders of the Masse in 1799. The French light infantry, manœuvring with rapidity and skill, captured four guns and drove the royalists before them with a loss of 300. Three days later Régnier came up with Damas' main body at Campotanesse and found the Sicilians occupying a formidable position in a small plateau, to which the inlet and outlet were narrow defiles. Damas had some 14,000 men, of which about one half were regulars, drawn up across the pass; his position was carefully chosen and its front was completely covered with breastworks; his two flanks were apparently protected by the mountain sides. It was a truly admirable position for defence, but had one great fault, that in case of defeat there was but a narrow outlet for retreat.

The French, with forces far inferior in numbers, far superior in quality, advanced to attack this formidable position on the morning of the 6th of March. It was cold, and a heavy fall of snow, driven by a gusty wind up the pass, blew directly into the defenders' eyes and

veiled the movements of the French. Régnier sent his light infantry up the mountain flank on his left, and placed his most dashing brigadier, General Compère, in charge of a column intended to advance on the Sicilian centre with the bayonet. The light infantry, with wonderful agility, wormed their way along the snow-beaten cliffs, turned a difficult passage in single file, and finally came out on Damas' right flank and rear. They immediately advanced in skirmishing order and opened fire; the royal troops attempted to manœuvre so as to face this unexpected attack, and in doing so fell into confusion. At this moment Compère, who had gradually edged up nearer and nearer, rushed his column forward; one or two volleys were fired, and then in a moment the Sicilian line broke and Damas was defeated. A crowd of fugitives rushed down the pass only to find the narrow egress blocked by the first-comers, and the active French troops were able to capture not only all the artillery of the defeated army but 2000 prisoners, including two generals and many officers of rank.

On through the rain, and snow, and mud, the French kept pushing behind the melting Sicilian army, and that night Régnier's headquarters were carried as far as the village of Morano. A foretaste of the horrors that were soon to fasten on Calabria was the scene in that village on the night that followed the French victory,—a scene vividly depicted by an officer of Régnier's staff who also happened to be a master of French prose, Paul Louis Courier. Outside the miserable house where the general had found shelter were rain, mud, and darkness, soldiers, desperate with fatigue and hunger, searching for provisions, some pillaging, some massacring. At the door of the house

were two naked corpses, visible by the fitful blaze of a barn set on fire by the soldiers ; on a corner of the stairs another corpse ; in the bare room above, the general dictating orders, while exhausted staff-officers lay on the floors ; the whole scene punctuated by the piercing and continuous shrieks of a woman complaining of outrage. No fire, no bread, no furniture, and the next house ablaze. Thus were the horrors of war introduced into Calabria, and thus began a campaign which a French officer described as "one of the most diabolical waged in many years."¹

On the 13th of March Régnier reached Cosenza, a difficult march of sixty miles from Campotanesè through mountainous country. Only one week later the French advanced posts were at Reggio, on the Strait of Messina. Of the army beaten at Campotanesè but few reached Sicily. The Hereditary Prince crossed the strait a few hours in advance of the French, and the British from Messina, where they were now installed, ferried over some two or three thousand in all of the troops of Rosenheim and Damas.

Régnier's extraordinary march had been if anything too rapid, for few of the flying Neapolitans had been able to keep in front of their pursuers, and most had merely dispersed on either side of the French line of march. Every village that Régnier left in his rear was soon after his passage alive with disorganized militiamen and a medley of fugitives and deserters from the Sicilian regulars. In the course of his hurried flight the Hereditary Prince had issued proclamations at every village urging the formation of *corpi volanti*, or flying corps, and the elements for forming these thus came conveniently to hand. The preparations for the

¹ Courier, i. 99, 160.

levy of irregular corps had long been made; the circumstances had now arisen that were to make them effective; and no sooner had the French column passed by than its line of communications was immediately cut.

The rising of Calabria against the French, of which these events were the immediate origin, lasted more than four years, and in the acts of ferocity that characterized it, can only be compared to the Spanish rising that occurred a few years later. The two events have often been likened, but in one most important aspect were totally dissimilar. The rising of Spain against the French was national in its scope, that of Calabria was not. The Calabrese had not reached a sufficiently advanced stage of political evolution to have any national conceptions or feelings. Their personal relations to a feudal lord, or the common prejudices and interests of a village community were the predominant factors that shaped their political sentiments. Their province was the wildest of the kingdom; the high ranges of the Silla in its centre were covered with dense forests of beech, oak, chestnut, and pine, a nearly impenetrable mass of verdure in summer, of snow and mud in winter. Roads were non-existent. The barbarous and desolate condition of this remote province was enhanced by the indelible traces it bore of a terrible earthquake that had visited it in 1783. This calamity had involved the loss of 100,000 lives. Reggio, one of the principal towns, was described as still in ruins in the year 1813. At the time of the French invasion hardly any of the churches had been rebuilt.

The Calabrese were three centuries behind their time, and might well be called the "savages of Europe."¹ Yet they were a remarkable and individual people.

¹ Rivarol, 18.

They were generally of middle stature, muscular and well-proportioned, great walkers and very frugal. One French officer thought them very like the Spaniards, while another, of Corsican birth, was strongly impressed with their resemblance both in appearance and customs to the people of his native island. They certainly had much of the Corsican spirit of vendetta; individuals, families, and even villages were constantly at open warfare with one another. Beneath the dark cloak with which they draped themselves were concealed the daggers and other arms that were their constant companions. As a sign of approaching revenge they allowed their hair and beard to grow, and when thus unkempt, with their tall conical hats adorned with images of their saints, a gun on their shoulder, knives stuck in their belts, the appearance they presented was equally suggestive of romance and of homicide. Internal feud was the normal state of Calabria.

Apart from the questions of daily life, disputes of rivalry, of love, of money, in which numerous individuals were engaged, there were contentions of a more political character. These were most marked where a foreign element of population came into play. The numerous villages whose population was Albanian were generally more prosperous and more peacefully inclined, and had occasionally to defend themselves in arms against lawless neighbours. More progressive yet was a small but important section of the community, the trading and professional circles of the principal towns, such as Monteleone, Catanzaro, and Cosenza. Here elements of education and of political thought were to be found, which turned to hatred of Bourbon rule. In 1799 this became republicanism, in 1806 it meant a

strong inclination to meet the French conquest half way.

The method adopted by the French for administering the province was to form a commission of government in each town or village, on which the responsibility of maintaining order was placed ; where there was no liberal or French party the village priest was frequently chosen to preside over this body. In many cases the new organization represented nothing more definite than the personal enemies of the pre-existing authorities, and their sole bond with the invader was that inspired by their desire of satisfying their personal vendettas.

Invasion and foreign occupation normally excite restlessness and resentment ; in the circumstances of the French invasion of Calabria there was much to intensify such sentiments. The French columns had moved free from the shackle of waggon transport, and had lived on the country. Although the army was in a good state of fighting discipline, it was otherwise demoralized for lack of administrative care. It had entered Naples in a lamentable condition, "with less than nothing," as Ségur tersely put it. It had no pay, no clothing, and no boots. Short of food, short of necessaries, and short of money, the troops naturally provided for themselves and pillaged. Joseph, who may be suspected of attenuating the truth, wrote to Napoleon that the disorder of a few soldiers, especially of the Polish legion, had filled the dearest wish of Queen Mary Caroline, and had stirred the people to revenge. The French civil officers, who quickly followed the military, and who frequently rivalled the former in their exactions, rapacity, and contempt for the feelings of the inhabitants, added to the hatred with which a large section of the people soon regarded the invaders.

No attempt will be made to adopt from either French or Italian writers a date or the name of a locality fixing the outbreak of the rising of Calabria. There was a gradual though rapid transition from a state of criminal lawlessness before the French invasion to a state of barbarous warfare after. The bands of brigands who had terrorized the country before, were transformed into patriotic free corps loyally fighting for their king and country, while the royal troops that had fled before the French were now transformed into brigands terrorizing the country. On the other hand the peaceful inhabitants from the first resented the looting propensities of the French troops and resorted to armed defence.

From a strict military point of view, however, the situation of the French appeared at first fairly satisfactory. Duhesme, with a supporting column, had followed Régnier south from Naples; the large garrison and military stores of Capua had been surrendered. Gaëta and a few inconsiderable forts alone remained unsubdued, and the strength of the army of occupation had risen to over 40,000 men. It was therefore officially announced to the inhabitants of the capital that the "comic" defence of Calabria was at an end, and the new proprietor of the kingdom of Naples prepared to pay a visit to the outlying parts of the dominions he prematurely accounted his own.¹

But already fighting more severe than any the French had yet met with at the hands of the armies of Damas and Rosenheim had taken place. At Soveria a peasant named Carmine Caligiuri headed the villagers in an attack on a French detachment which lost fourteen men. Four days later he ambuscaded

¹ *Monitore*, March 21, 1806.

a considerable French column, defeated it with the loss of a colonel and forty men killed, and captured a rich booty. His success and example inspired the neighbouring villages, and soon all that part of the country was up. Some of the chiefs were peasants, others noblemen and landowners. Some were prompted by greed, some by loyalty; all were equally embittered by the conduct of the French commanders and soldiers. That conduct was certainly not free from reproach. One of their own officers wrote, with equal candour and terseness, that of the generals those who were young pursued women, and those who were old money. The rationally soldiers looted, the Poles especially showing great lack of discipline. At Scigliano, on the march to Reggio, a detachment of fifty men was left behind. Their behaviour was disorderly, a woman was outraged, the inhabitants took arms, and the French were nearly all massacred. Such events as those at Soveria and Scigliano,—and there were many similar outbreaks,—were met by the French generals by one uniform method of retaliation,—the sacking and burning of the offending village; and every such operation naturally resulted in increasing the troops of brigands or free companies whom the French had to face.

While Calabria thus balanced between acquiescence in French rule and general uprising, the other provinces of the kingdom had been overrun with little difficulty—with the exception of the blockade of Gaëta, that became eventually a memorable siege; but one incident of the military operations outside Calabria merits attention,—the capture and death of Rodio.¹

¹ A somewhat different character of Rodio from that given here may be found in Rodino's narrative, *Arch. Stor. Nap.* vi. 259. This account, however, is so markedly partisan and inaccurate that for the present purpose it has been nearly entirely rejected.

Among the leaders of the royalist reaction of 1799, few had rendered greater service to the Crown, and none had shown greater humanity, than Don Giovanni Batista, Marchese Rodio. He was a man of birth, of education, of discretion, of honour, and withal zealously attached to the Crown. After the capture of Naples he was given an important command, and did what was possible to repress the irregularities of the *capimassi*, such as Sciarpa and Fra Diavolo, who were placed under his orders.¹ When the military occupation of Puglia by the French occurred, Rodio was specially detached from his post as Preside or Governor of Calabria Citra, and deputed to represent the Sicilian Government at St. Cyr's headquarters. The task was an onerous one, and he appears to have discharged it faithfully and well. Yet a man so placed could not fail to make many enemies, and he appears to have had bitter ones both among the French and the Neapolitans.

At the beginning of the year 1806 Rodio was in the Abruzzi, which the French had evacuated three months before, strenuously maintaining the royal authority under difficult conditions. On the 13th of January he was sent to Aquila to organize flying corps, and a few weeks later, on Masséna's advance, was sent to Matera as Governor.² Towards the end of February the French columns were approaching Basilicata, and Rodio's position had become insecure. He remained faithful to his duty to the end, however, doing his utmost to organize resistance, and staying at his post so long

¹ Rodio figures as a colonel in the official calendar for 1805. Helfert states that he was promoted to general's rank in 1799,—on what authority does not appear. There is, however, a document in the Archives at Naples by which it would seem that he was promoted brigadier on Jan. 10, 1806 (*Guerra*, xxv. 2136).

² *Arch. Nap. Guerra*, xxv. 2136, Feb. 10, 1806. This date weakens Ulloa's statement, *Intorno alla Storia*, 192; at page 201 this author's remarks become so obviously extravagant as not to require refutation.

that he was finally threatened by French columns in various directions. He retreated into the valley of the Basento. The invading troops operating from Gravina and Matera drove him down that valley towards the sea, but when he reached the little town of Pisticci he found another French force under General Ottavj blocking his way at Bernalda. Here, on the 8th of March, he surrendered himself an unconditional prisoner in the hands of the French.¹

From Bernalda Rodio was sent to Naples under close guard. Two men were at that moment responsible for the action of the government under Joseph Bonaparte, Marshal Masséna and the head of the police department, Saliceti. They decided to have Rodio tried by a military commission on the truly extraordinary charges of rebellion and incitement to insurrection.² What prompted this action it is impossible to say precisely, and surmise must be offered as a substitute for verified fact. It appears certain that Masséna convened the military court at Saliceti's prompting, and that the Minister of Police was influenced partly by political, partly by personal considerations. Politically he may have felt bound to defer to the constantly renewed injunctions of the Emperor from Paris that vigorous methods and a little terrorism at the outset would eventually make for the pacification of Naples; personally there was the constant pressure of the group of Neapolitan liberals and ex-republicans who swarmed about the new Govern-

¹ Masséna, v. 177. The *Monitore* gives Pomarico, a few miles north of Pisticci, as the scene of Rodio's capture, and says that he was betrayed. The writer of the news, presumably a Neapolitan liberal, displays great rancour against the prisoner. *Monitore*, March 21 and 25, 1806.

² This was not the first military commission formed, as Greco asserts; one was assembled a week earlier, on March 18.—*Arch. Nap. Giustizia*, 1806.

ment, and especially about the chief of the police department. These men saw in Rodio a leader of the opposite camp whom they might now safely hound to death, thus avenging the execution and murder of so many of their friends and relations when Ferdinand had conquered the Parthenopean Republic in 1799.

These considerations, however, do not appear to have weighed with the military commission. It did honour to the unfortunate royal Governor, and to itself, by promptly acquitting him. Infuriated at this result, a mob of Rodio's enemies proceeded to Saliceti's and Masséna's offices with loud outcries. The result was deplorable. The Marshal and the Minister decided to order a new trial. A fresh military commission was appointed. It met at the Castel del Uovo, and during the three hours it required to work itself up to conviction point, Rodio defended himself bravely, claimed that he had surrendered as a prisoner of war, and demanded the treatment of a soldier. He received it only in the form of his sentence, for he was found guilty and condemned to be shot on the following day, the 30th of March.

Thus was judicially murdered, for doing his duty, perhaps the most worthy, most faithful, most honourable, and certainly most unfortunate of the servants of Ferdinand and Mary Caroline. What some of the French officers serving in Naples thought on the subject may be recorded. When the "deplorable news" was communicated to Ségur he described it as an "ugly stroke attributed to Saliceti." General Dumas wrote: "The execution of the Marchese Rodio, who had surrendered to General Duhesme's forces, caused the indignation of all honourable men, and the exasperation of all those who were still secretly attached to the

ancient Court.”¹ Courier was even less reserved in his comments ; speaking of Rodio he wrote : “ His death passes here as a murder. . . . Every one was horror-struck, perhaps even more the French than the Neapolitans.” Joseph is said to have been ignorant of his Minister’s proceedings, and after the event expressed regret for the course taken. It is difficult, however, after reading the correspondence between him and the Emperor, not to retain some little doubt as to whether the French Prince did not in reality merely shut his eyes to the proceedings of his Ministers.

Satisfied that the security of Naples was assured in the keeping of such men as Masséna and Saliceti, the French Prince determined to visit the province of Calabria. So local and unimportant did the disturbances in that province as yet seem, that his escort consisted of only four companies of light infantry. On the 3rd of April Joseph left Naples, accompanied by Count Miot, acting Minister of the Interior, and by General Mathieu Dumas, acting Minister of War. His object was to ascertain for himself what the state of the country was, how far he might hope to win support, in what directions he might succeed in introducing a better system of government.

Joseph’s zeal to improve the conditions of the people and to repress injustice and exaction among the soldiers and functionaries is beyond question, and among his Ministers were men well able to second him, men whose ability was equalled by their integrity, such as Dumas and Roederer. At Naples he had insisted on the shooting of French soldiers for criminal disorder, and at one of his first stops in Calabria, at

¹ Dumas, *Précis milit.* xv. 130.

Lagonegro, he ordered two commissariat officials to be handed over to a court-martial for robbing the inhabitants. Thus heralded, representing power, exciting curiosity, Joseph met with a wonderfully good reception from many of the villages on his route, and at one or two of the large towns demonstrations of welcome were organized that might nearly be described as enthusiastic. At Cosenza, the capital of Calabria, Napoleon's brother received an ovation. Ségur, who was one of his staff, has left a lively account of it. The whole population of the town and neighbourhood turned out decked in their gayest attire. They appeared enraptured, though it may be doubted whether this represented much more than their love for a *festa* and their racial mobility of intellect. Their joy appeared to Ségur as unfeigned as it was difficult to credit.

At a spot just beyond Cosenza an impressive and highly characteristic scene awaited the French Prince and his attendants. A mountain village had sent its men to greet the new ruler. The track led through dense forest, and there unexpectedly a double line of dark, swarthy, athletic figures lined the pathway on either side. Clad in their draped cloaks, tall ribboned hats, and thonged buckskins they looked picturesque,—and formidable from the pistols and daggers in their belts. Any apprehension the French might have felt was quickly allayed, for they explained the friendly nature of their errand by pointing to their guns thrown on the sward behind them.

One more scene witnessed by Joseph on his tour through Calabria must detain us,—the most curious, perhaps the most impressive of all. The way led through one of those unfortunate villages on which the

extreme sentence of war had been passed and executed by the French commanders, — *exécuté militairement* was the semi-technical, euphemistic term. Desolation reigned where the village street had once been; the church alone was left standing. What remained of the population, men, women, and children, clad in rags, their heads encircled with crowns of twisted thorns, knelt in the ashes of their homes, covering their heads with dust as the conquerors passed. Their rude and pathetic symbolism was more eloquent than the redundant platitudes with which the authorities of Cosenza had greeted Joseph, and the Prince and his escort were profoundly moved.

It was while on this journey through Calabria that Joseph received his brother's instructions to assume the royal title. Having proceeded as far as Reggio, therefore, he thence turned back towards Naples to make a solemn entry in his capacity of king.

Having thus arrived at the official beginning of Joseph's reign, it will not be improper to take advantage of such a notable occasion for giving a portrait of the new-made monarch of Naples, or of the Two Sicilies, as he chose to style himself. King Joseph bore no very striking resemblance to the brother who had crowned him. In face and feature there was some likeness; the intelligent forehead, finely cut nose, well-shaped eyes and mouth were there, but the breadth and strength of Napoleon were lacking in Joseph. He was a man of considerable intellectual ability, and showed his intelligence in nothing more than in his blind devotion and unquestioning obedience to his younger brother. In his correspondence with Napoleon Joseph's tone never attains regal independence and dignity, but remains at the level of an average pro-

vincial governor. Indeed he was little else. His docility and subservience were as noteworthy as the imperiousness of his brother's exhortations, counsels, and commands. In opinion he long continued a moderate republican, realizing and taking pride in the immense benefit conferred on his country and Europe by the great Revolution, applying the excellent qualities of his heart and head to extending the bounds of good government and justice. He had many of the attributes of a good and a wise man, but they were nearly entirely neutralized by a weakness that made of him politically little more than the docile tool of his brother, and morally little more than a supine sensualist. His convictions remained republican when his brother was already grasping the Imperial diadem; yet they failed the instant a crown was pressed on his acceptance. His conscience revolted from the exactions and robberies that disgraced so many of the French generals, yet his republican sentiments were not proof against the regal revenues that afforded him the means of gratifying his extremely regal appetites. He was just, mild almost to shyness, and bore his royal dignity with awkwardness. He was the most unwarlike of men, although he had in the early days of the Empire preferred his title of Colonel to that of Prince. In the cause of peace he came nearer asserting a personal influence than in any other, and his persistent diplomacy had nearly avoided the rupture between France and England in the year 1803.

His wife was an unpretentious young woman, Julie Clary, whose more attractive sister had been an early flame of Napoleon, later marrying Bernadotte and becoming Queen of Sweden. To Julie

Joseph wrote, shortly after his elevation to the throne, a letter that shows very clearly one side of his character :—

. . . Remind mother that at every period of my life, as an obscure citizen, as a farmer, as a legislator, I have always cheerfully sacrificed pleasure to duty. I am not one to underestimate an elevated station or to slumber in it ; for me it means, it shall always mean, *duties*, and not *rights*. . . Justice demands that I should make this people as happy as the scourge of war will permit.

The new King's tour through Calabria showed clearly how benevolent were his sentiments towards the people of Naples, and how distinctly he perceived the abuses of French rule. Thus he wrote to Napoleon that he found "the people as well disposed as possible; wherever honest commandants have been established some time, the people willingly give whatever they are asked for." But three days later he found at Barletta a precisely opposite state of affairs, dishonesty and official rapine prevalent. The civil prefect, the sub-prefect, and the general in command were all rascals, and were all dismissed from their functions.

Among the matters in which the opinions of the brothers did not exactly coincide was that of the basis on which the people of Naples should be governed. Joseph, his ears full of the adulations of Court flatterers, and of more noisy than sincere popular demonstrations, gave free rein to his instinctive sense of justice and benevolence. But to Napoleon such sentiments as these were mere moonshine. "You do not understand the people generally," he wrote, "and even less the Italian people. You attach far too much importance to the demonstrations they give you. . . ." And on another occasion: "The



SIEGE OF GAETA

The dotted lines represent the French
covered ways and trenches

Scale of 1 Mile



Neapolitans are behaving well ; there is nothing extraordinary in that ; you have spared them, and they expected worse things from a man at the head of 50,000 troops. You are mild, moderate, you have a kind disposition, and are appreciated ; but from that to a national sentiment, to a rational and interested submission, is a far cry."

Two of the new King's principal advisers, Masséna and Saliceti, were as firm believers in a policy of vigour and repression as was the Emperor, and their stroke at the unfortunate Rodio was probably largely founded on terrorist considerations. In the first days of the French occupation of the city, when soldiers were nightly assassinated in the streets by the *lazzaroni*, the Marshal had been anxious to strengthen the forts of St. Elmo and Castelnuovo, and from them to dominate and terrorize the capital ; but Joseph declined to follow this course. He was, however, quickly disillusioned, for the first few prosperous weeks were rapidly coming to a close, the real struggle for the possession of Naples was only just about to open.

The defence against the French invaders had so far done little to enhance the prestige of the dispossessed Government. The military prowess of a German soldier of fortune, Lieutenant-General the Prince of Hesse-Philipsthal, was partly to retrieve the honour of the Sicilian arms. To this officer had been intrusted the defence of the principal fortress of the kingdom, and his obstinate and nearly successful resistance to the French for a time threatened disaster to the whole enterprise of the invaders.

The name of Gaëta is venerable ; its rocky promontory has been honoured in the two great epics of the Ancients. The town, built on the site immortalized

by Homer and Virgil, contained some 8000 people, and was situated on a hilly peninsula, of which the highest point faced the mainland. A low neck of sand and rock, rather more than a quarter of a mile wide, formed the only approach, and tier after tier of fortifications rose from it towards the Tower of Orlando, that marked the highest point, 400 feet above sea-level. The batteries of Gaëta swept, raked, plunged, and converged on to this approach in a way that made the position very formidable. A further element of strength arose from the fact that the peninsula broadened immediately to a width about double that of the neck, so that half of the batteries that faced the mainland were protected by the sea, while the guns placed in them could be trained on the neck. The total development of the fortifications that faced the mainland was about 1300 yards, and most of this length was guarded by two, and in places three, lines of bastions, with numerous outworks and covered ways. Some of the works were cut out of the granite of the hill, and some were placed at a considerable height, the Breach Battery being 150 feet above sea-level, while the great Queen's Battery was even higher, and commanded everything within range. The lofty position of many of these works was, however, in one way a source of weakness, for it exposed the base of the bastions to the fire of a besieger's guns, thus rendering breaching more easy. At the back and south side of the hill on which stood the Tower of Orlando nestled the closely packed houses of the town, many of which were thus sheltered from any possible bombardment. The small port at the further extremity of the town could be just reached by batteries along the coast, but as a set-off the bay afforded excellent anchorage, and communication by

sea, though it might be made difficult, could hardly be made impossible.

Strategically the position of Gaëta was very important, for it lay just off the road that led from Naples to northern Italy through Rome, and was therefore a perpetual menace to the French line of communications. From the former city it was forty-seven miles distant, from the latter ninety.

The Prince of Hesse had plenty of men and plenty of guns to defend Gaëta, but their quality was rather doubtful. Through January he continuously received batches of recruits who could not have been much less dangerous to the fortress than the French themselves. The prison dregs sent from Naples and from Sicily to Gaëta had little other notion of military service than burning, stealing, and rioting. The 4000 men that had been assembled by the time the French crossed the frontier would have probably disbanded or become an easy prey to the enemy had it not been for the magnetic energy and courage of their commander.

The Prince of Hesse was a short man, with a red face and aquiline nose ; he was an eccentric, hard-drinking, well-trained soldier of fortune. An English officer who knew him, speaking of his influence over his wretched soldiers, said, "his familiar buffoonery and his daring example mastered their fears, their affection, and their admiration."¹ From the day on which the French first made their appearance in front of the fortress, the Prince of Hesse stationed himself at the famous Breach Battery with the determination of remaining there till the siege ended. He is then said to have gravely handed the key of a convenient cellar to the Bishop of Gaëta, whom he solemnly adjured to allow

¹ Bunbury, 234.

him but one bottle a day. Whether this temperate resolve was closely adhered to appears doubtful; for at times he behaved somewhat extravagantly; as on one occasion when the French sappers had pushed close under the walls of the fortress and the Prince ran up on to the rampart and, through a speaking-trumpet, bawled out to the enemy, "Gaëta is not Ulm! Hesse is not Mack!"

About the time that the French entered Naples, a small detachment appeared before Gaëta and demanded its surrender (February 13). This summons was answered by a cannon shot, and the invaders retired, leaving a small force in the neighbouring hills to observe the fortress. In March the siege began in earnest; Marshal Masséna personally made a reconnoissance and placed General Lacour in command of the attack. The French took possession of the little fishing village of Mola di Gaëta, and established themselves on the rising ground to the east of the neck leading to the fortress. The field artillery was strengthened by heavier pieces from Capua and Naples, batteries were hastily thrown up, and on the 21st of March Gaëta was summoned to surrender for the second time. The Prince of Hesse replied that his answer would be found in the breach; and so the besiegers' guns opened fire. They were nearly immediately silenced by the overpowering weight of metal thrown by the eighty pieces the Prince of Hesse had massed on the fortress' land front. Undaunted by their failure, the French set to work repairing the damage to their works, dug their trenches along the hill slopes nearer and nearer the neck, and brought up new guns to strengthen their batteries. On the 5th of April a new effort was made to persuade Gaëta into

surrender, and once more the besiegers' fire was promptly and completely crushed by that of the defenders.

So far the French siege operations had not been carried out on anything like the scale necessary for reducing a fortress of the first class. Men, guns, and ammunition were scarce, and all the reserves that could be disposed of were being drained by the operations in Calabria. It had been hoped, from the early experiences of the war, that a demonstration, accompanied by a warm cannonade, would suffice to reduce Gaëta. The vigour and complete success with which the fortress had repelled the two attacks delivered, immediately changed the aspect of affairs, and made it a matter of first necessity to proceed to its reduction in accordance with all the forms of the military art. General Campredon, one of the best engineers in the Imperial service, was placed in charge of the siege works ; he decided to push trenches and batteries down from the hills right on to the neck and to the base of the bastions, proceeding, if necessary, to the conclusion of battering a breach and pouring in a storming column. The proposed operations were difficult, and it was realized that they would require some time. The works of the besiegers had so far been carried along the lines of two small hills, the plateau of Atratina and the Monte Secco, the latter about 600 yards distant from the fortress. It now became necessary to work down from the Monte Secco on to the neck, where not only would the besiegers be exposed to the plunging fire of the Queen's Battery, but where the ground was of such a rocky nature that it was necessary to transport from a distance all the material for the heavy revetements of the trenches.

While the French toiled at their works and kept up a constant fire on the port from their coast batteries, the Prince of Hesse for a while suffered more apprehension from within than from without. His troops were so bad that he could not venture on sorties. He was more concerned to retain his men within the walls than to lead them without, for deserters were numerous. Of those who thus escaped from the fortress, a considerable part were returned by the French commanders to the prisons from which they had been dragged by Ferdinand to save their country.

Although communications by sea were open, it was long before the garrison of Gaëta received the supplies and munitions that its situation called for. In vain Hesse appealed to the Hereditary Prince for the means of clothing and arming his soldiers. Despairing of obtaining assistance from his own Government, he turned eagerly to the commander of a British fleet that had now arrived in Neapolitan waters, Sir Sidney Smith. Through April and May the Governor of Gaëta addressed numerous demands for food and munitions to the British Admiral, and eventually received help.

Smith, not attending very strictly to the instructions under which Lord Collingwood had dispatched him to Palermo, had fallen in with the projects of Mary Caroline. He had taken on his four men-of-war the guerilla chiefs or *capimassi* whom she wanted disembarked at various favourable points along the coast of Calabria to foster the insurrectionary movement. It was unfortunate that Sidney Smith should have fallen in with this scheme, unfortunate that the blandishments of Mary Caroline and the grant of full powers from the Sicilian Court should have led him

to act contrary to the spirit of his instructions and against the opinion of the English military officers at Messina, for he thus became closely connected with perhaps the most desperate and most atrocious of all the freebooters for which the kingdom of Naples was for so many centuries renowned, the illustrious Fra Diavolo.

Colonel Michele Pezza, as he was officially, and only officially, styled, was of humble origin; he was born at Itri, a few miles north of Gaëta, about the year 1770. His youth was criminal, and his good fortune such that however outrageous his misdeeds, however desperate his position, he always escaped capture and prison. In the popular imagination only the devil or a monk could be thus gifted, and therefore Pezza soon became known as Fra Diavolo. Under that name he rapidly acquired reputation, influence, and a large circle of followers. In 1799, under a promise of amnesty from the Government, he became an official instead of a private freebooter, and led one of the free corps that followed the flag of Cardinal Ruffo. Even in that marvellous assemblage of ruffians and cut-throats Fra Diavolo's remarkable qualities made themselves felt, and his band was pronounced by General Bourcard, who had nominal control of all the *masse*, as the most undisciplined and insubordinate, "committing the most monstrous misdeeds."¹

At the close of the troubles of the year 1799 the Government managed to get rid of the services of this brigand whom it had decorated with the title of Colonel. He withdrew, on his profits, to live in dignified retirement at his birthplace, and thence

¹ " . . . Commettendo i più enormi attentati."—Bourcard's report, *Arch. Nap. Guerra*, xxv. 602.

importuned the Government for the payment of large sums which he claimed were due to him for the subsistence of his men in the course of the campaign. In this he was unsuccessful, but during the next few years he appears to have been the terror of the country-side, and to have been engaged in more than one homicidal fray. In 1806, when Mary Caroline was looking about in despair for some means of defending the kingdom, this ruffian was once more called to the assistance of the throne, and he received instructions to form a flying corps. He apparently did not succeed in doing this, but followed the retreat of the Court to Palermo. The arrival of Sidney Smith, however, together with the necessity of giving Gaëta some assistance, appeared an opportunity for the further utilization of his services.

Sidney Smith sailed leisurely along the coast of Calabria landing *capimassi*, issuing proclamations, and communicating with and encouraging the insurgents. Fra Diavolo, his three brothers, and another well-known brigand, by name Guariglia, appear to have been landed, and to have made a short raid, although the Sicilians they commanded were very short of arms. Eventually the English squadron reached Gaëta, into which it threw provisions, four heavy ship's guns, a few English gunners, and Fra Diavolo. The British Admiral further organized a small squadron of gun vessels under the orders of Captain Richardson that contributed greatly to the defence by blockading a similar French flotilla in the mouth of the Garigliano. From Gaëta Sidney Smith sailed south once more, threatening the French at various points. At Ischia and Procida he was beaten off by the shore batteries, but he made a demonstration in the Bay of Naples with

six large and a number of small ships on the very day on which Joseph made his solemn entry as King of Naples. That night, as the city illuminated in honour of its new monarch, the British surprised the small garrison of Capri and established themselves in that commanding and threatening position.

Owing to Sidney Smith's intervention the Prince of Hesse was now prepared to meet the more formidable French attack with renewed vigour. He determined to make what use he could of the irregular leaders sent to him, and issued a proclamation offering pay at the rate of three carlins a day to all those enrolling in the free corps, together with a full amnesty for any and all crimes up to then committed by these patriotic volunteers. Fra Diavolo, at the head of a considerable body of these irregulars, was dispatched to the mouth of the Garigliano, where he succeeded in effecting a landing. He raided the country on the French lines of communication. For a few days he proceeded without interference, but later was driven back into the fortress again. Debarred from pursuing his lucrative profession outside the city, he turned his attention to what might be done profitably within its walls, and early in May proposed to the French commanders that he should, for a pecuniary consideration, place them in possession of one of the gates of the fortress. The betrayer was betrayed; the Prince of Hesse had him arrested and shipped to Palermo, where this ruffian was received with becoming sympathy,—at all events his services were very soon again requisitioned by the Sicilian Government.

Deprived for the moment of the co-operation of Colonel Pezza, the commandant of Gaëta was able to devote greater attention to the enemy outside the walls.

On the 13th of May, and again two days later, sorties were made, the latter commanded by Captain Richardson. The French were surprised, some guns were spiked, and a few prisoners were made. But towards the end of May the French troops, that had up till then never totalled more than 4000 men, began to receive considerable reinforcements, and the works progressed fast. Sidney Smith's fleet and Richardson's flotilla, however, still kept Gaëta free by sea, and the sick and wounded were now regularly removed to Sicily, fresh men being introduced to replace them.

The British Admiral did not confine his efforts to the military sphere, but tried to damage his enemy by political weapons as well. Among the numerous proclamations he issued was one in which freedom to trade with all ports in British occupation was promised to Neapolitan vessels flying Ferdinand's flag ; by others he incited the foreign troops in the French service, especially a battalion of blacks from San Domingo, to desert the Imperial colours.

In the early part of June the French trenches had been driven half across the neck, up to about 200 yards of the glacis, and over 100 heavy guns were in position ready to open fire. But though the besiegers' artillery was as yet silent, awaiting the hour for the final bombardment, that of the defenders kept up a heavy and constant fire that cost the French many lives, among others that of General Vallongue, killed while directing the work of the sappers in the most advanced parallel. Reinforcements were constantly arriving, and on the 28th of June the French force amounted to 8000 men. On that day Marshal Masséna, impatient of the delay that had for five months neutralized a considerable part of the army of

occupation, arrived to take personal charge of the operations. It was indeed time that Gaëta fell, for at that very moment a new and unexpected danger was menacing the French arms, and threatened the complete destruction of Régnier's army in distant Calabria.

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CHAPTER IV

MAIDA AND THE INSURRECTION OF CALABRIA

Results of Trafalgar—British Mediterranean policy—France, England, and Sicily—Position at Messina—Stuart's strategy—Leaves Messina—Lands in Calabria—Régnier concentrates—Battle of Maida—Régnier retreats—Humanity of Stuart—Rising of Calabria—Stuart's proclamation—Régnier at Catanzaro—Stuart motionless—De Michele assumes government—Régnier abandons Catanzaro—Papasodero and Stuart—Pane di Grano—Outrages of *masse*—Régnier sacks Strongoli—Retreats to Cassano—Verdier abandons Cosenza—Storms Cassano—Régnier's position—Siege of Gaëta—Hesse wounded—Fall of Gaëta—Masséna marches on Calabria—Smith and the *capi-massi*—Capri, Ponza, and Canosa—Fra Diavolo at Amantea—At Fort Licosa—At Sperlonga—Calabria proclaimed in state of siege—Pane di Grano defends passes—Lauria sacked—Régnier relieved—Instances of ferocity—Dispersal of *masse*—Masséna at Monteleone—Partisan warfare—Courts-martial—Disease—De Michele—Amantea attacked and taken—Death of De Michele—Fra Diavolo's last expedition—His execution.

THE defence of Gaëta by the Prince of Hesse had been possible only because England controlled the sea, and thus kept open his communications. The question of naval supremacy in the Mediterranean was indeed the all-important one, and deserves careful examination. Trafalgar had had great results, yet perhaps not so great as was generally supposed. The invasion of England was now no longer threatened, partly owing to the

failure of Villeneuve's campaign, partly owing to the enforced displacement of the French army from the shores of the Channel to the forests of Germany. So far, then, Trafalgar had been decisive; it had also affirmed the prestige and superiority of the British navy, and had resulted in a considerable loss in ships to its opponents. But strategically the naval position was little altered, and so far as the Mediterranean was concerned the two great adversaries remained much as they were. There were still French battleships at various ports awaiting the opportunity and the order that should concentrate them for some decisive purpose. Even off Cadiz, where Trafalgar had left the British nearly as much weakened as their opponents, Collingwood's fleet had but little margin of strength for the duties it had to fill. Through the six months that followed Nelson's great victory, the British Commander-in-Chief was in constant fear lest his weak squadron might be unable to prevent the French Atlantic fleets from passing into the Mediterranean.¹

Trafalgar had inspired the British Cabinet with a false sense of security and naval supremacy, and the strength of the Mediterranean fleet was allowed to run down to a perilously low point. Early in 1806, however, Sir Sidney Smith was sent out from England to co-operate with the British land force under Sir James Craig. The chief intent of the British Cabinet in dispatching this reinforcement was to prosecute operations against the French. The support of the allied Court of Sicily was a matter of subordinate, if of any, interest. Lord Collingwood gave Sir Sidney Smith the following

¹ Collingwood to Marsden, Feb. 22, 1806, *Admir. Medit.* 32; cf. also Collingwood, *Corr.* A few months later the French had 12 sail of the line at Cadiz, 6 at Cartagena, 4 at Toulon, and 6 at sea under Willaumez. Collingwood, off Cadiz, had but 9.

instructions : that the chief object of the British forces was to prevent the French from obtaining possession of Sicily, and that his ships were to be disposed accordingly ; should the Sicilian Court come to terms with France, his instructions were still to hold good, "notwithstanding any remonstrance which the King of Naples may make on the subject."¹ To Elliot he confirmed these instructions a week later, stating that "it is the intention of His Majesty that the French should not in any event be suffered to possess themselves of Sicily."

This southernmost point of Italy was now indeed the only real point of contact between the two great empires, and the position of Sicily as a stepping-stone towards the Orient urged both Powers to wrestle for the possession of what was left of King Ferdinand's dominions. Napoleon was as firm on this point as the Ministers of George III. "I would rather a ten years' war," he wrote to Joseph, "than leave your kingdom incomplete and Sicily an unsettled question."

From the moment that Régnier had reached the Strait of Messina, preparations had been made for the crossing ; but the difficulties were so great that progress was slow. The French general's force was far too small to furnish the numerous detachments and flying columns necessary to keep down Calabria and at the same time to concentrate in any strength between Reggio and Scilla. His engineers toiled to construct a passable road that should connect Naples and Reggio, while his gunners attempted with varying fortune to navigate barges full of artillery material down the coast from Taranto and other points. Yet, however slow,

¹ Collingwood to S. Smith, March 21, 1806, *Admir. Medit.* 32. "King of Naples," *i.e.* Ferdinand.

some progress was made, and the trunk road under construction promised the early transportation of the formidable siege train assembled before Gaëta as soon as that fortress should fall.

To meet the threatened invasion of Sicily, the British army, now no longer commanded by Sir James Craig but by Sir John Stuart, still retained its positions in the neighbourhood of Messina. Mary Caroline's action had proved so disastrous that Ferdinand had reinstated Acton, and was now in favour of a policy based on British friendship and support. The King and his Minister visited the camp at Messina, where the splendid discipline of the British troops, and the ready money they carried with them, had placed their relations with the inhabitants on a very amicable footing. So pleased was Ferdinand with his visit, that on the 12th of April Acton addressed a note to Elliot whereby Messina with its neighbourhood was formally confided to British protection, and an auxiliary corps of 6500 Sicilians was placed under Stuart's orders. But, as was so often the case with the measures of the Sicilian Government, this represented more on paper than in effect, for Messina was now nothing more than a British garrison, while the 6500 Sicilian troops were not to be found. There were officers in plenty, but recruits were for the most part taken from the prisons and galleys.

The British commanders attached no more importance to the military assistance of the Sicilian army than their Government did to the territorial rights of the Sicilian Court. Sir John Stuart, though not a general of much ability on the field of battle, possessed sufficient strategic insight to grasp the broad factors of the military situation.¹

¹ Bunbury's judgment of Stuart must be accepted with much caution. His own opinions as to the conduct of affairs are very far from sound.

His army was far too small to be risked in offensive operations in Italy, under even the most favourable conditions. The experience of several centuries of military history, and particularly of the last few years, had shown conclusively that the mastery of Italy was to be gained in the plains of Lombardy, and that whatever Power dominated at that point really controlled the Peninsula.

It never entered into Sir John Stuart's mind that he was in a position to embark on offensive operations, but as the French preparations on the Strait of Messina became more and more threatening, he decided, according to the soundest principles of strategy, that he could best ward off the attack on his front by striking a blow himself at the enemy's line of communications.¹ Everything appeared to favour such a project. The French were not yet strong enough to attempt any serious movement against Messina; Calabria was wholly in a state of unrest, partly in arms; Gaëta was severely pressed, and needed either direct help or a strong diversion. Under these circumstances the British general, having secured the co-operation of Sir Sidney Smith and his squadron, decided to transport his little army into Calabria, and there to strike a blow at the French, which, if successful, would raise the province and drive them from it.

Stuart had one great advantage over Régnier, that his troops, once embarked, could strike the French line at any, and perhaps the most unprotected point.² The one eventually chosen was the flattest and narrowest of lower Calabria, where the Adriatic and Mediterranean

¹ Stuart to Windham, July 2, 1806, *War Off. Orig. Corr.* 170.

² "Eight thousand men on the English vessels are worth fifty thousand here, for in eight days they may appear at eight different points." Joseph to Napoleon, Joseph, *Corr.* ii. 358.



BATTLE OF MAIDA

Scale of Miles



approach to within little more than twenty miles of one another. It was the very spot that Crassus had chosen many centuries before for the trench and wall with which he had attempted to coop Spartacus up within the peninsula of Reggio.

Just as Masséna was arriving at Gaëta to take charge of the siege, the British troops were leaving Messina. On the 1st of July Sir John Stuart disembarked his expedition, consisting of 4795 infantry with sixteen guns, on the northern shore of the Gulf of S. Eufemia, close to the little village of the same name.¹ The British general sent out detachments as far as the important town of Nicastro, and at the same time began throwing up intrenchments between the coast-line and the hill on which the village of S. Eufemia was situated. His lines faced a little east of south.

It was from the south, or from Reggio, that Sir John Stuart had danger to fear. To the north of him stretched for many miles the most dense, mountainous, and disaffected part of Calabria, where the small French garrisons and flying columns had as much as they could do to prevent a general outburst of hostilities. To the south was a considerable depression in the hills that became a plain of some extent along the coast, traversed by the little river Amato. This sluggish and swampy stream ran into the sea about ten miles to the south of S. Eufemia. Beyond the Amato the hills, on one of which the village of Maida showed conspicuous, regained something of their elevation, and were lost in the horizon of lower Calabria. It was thence that Régnier might be looked for. The French general had for

¹ *War Off. Orig. Corr.* 170; Stuart's report. This figure includes the 20th Regiment, which only landed the day of the battle. Bunbury (p. 237) says 5200, but probably includes some Calabrese under Cancellier.

some days been keeping an anxious watch on the slow movements of the British transports, and as soon as he learned that they had come to anchor in the bay of S. Eufemia he immediately sent out orders for collecting every available man.

Régnier, an officer of great ability and experience, could have come to no other decision than that which he adopted,—to attack the English at the earliest possible moment. For they were directly on his line of communications, and the slightest British success would probably raise Calabria against him. He therefore abandoned all but two or three indispensable posts in lower Calabria, drawing in every available man, and on the evening of the 3rd of July pitched his bivouac close by the little village of Maida. There on the following morning he mustered a force equal to that of the British commander : he had 5150 men, including a regiment of *chasseurs à cheval* and a battery of horse artillery. He was thus slightly inferior in infantry and artillery to Stuart, but superior in cavalry ; it will be no injustice to either side to say that they were evenly matched.

On the morning of the 4th of July, therefore, the two armies were encamped about nine miles apart, one to the north, the other to the south of the swampy lowland through which ran the Amato. Stuart's position was intrenched, and was further strengthened by the presence of Sidney Smith's ships drawn close in to shore ; but it was unsuited for long occupation, as malaria had already broken out among the men. Régnier was strongly posted on the hill of Maida in a position which Stuart apparently considered could not be successfully attacked, but the French commander thought himself insecure, as the surrounding woods might afford

shelter for the Calabrese irregulars and brigands. They were closing in on all sides to witness the fray, and already a body of 200 under Cancellier had marched into Stuart's camp. Thus neither general was anxious to remain in his position.

Stuart was first to move. Having reconnoitred the French, he ordered his little army to advance in one column directly along the beach southwards. If his intention was to tempt the French commander to attack him while thus dangerously placed, he succeeded. Régnier, seeing the British leaving their intrenchments and offering him a chance of driving them into the sea, hastened to take advantage of the opportunity. His troops were of excellent quality, and inspired him with every hope of success; he doubted not but that he would literally fulfil the injunction of Napoleon's Schoenbrunn proclamation and "hurl into the waves . . . the feeble battalions of the tyrants of the seas."

Régnier directed his march from Maida towards the mouth of the Amato, at which point he expected to strike the British advance. As the French neared the coast-line they were observed by the British, and Stuart came to a halt. The English general now faced his battalions inland and advanced towards the French. The ground on which the two armies met was immediately north of the Amato River, on a scrub-covered plain turning to sand near the sea and to swamp near the river.

The two generals adopted somewhat similar dispositions; each placed his infantry in a line of échelons, but whereas Régnier advanced with his left wing leading, Stuart adopted the opposite mode. The French left and British right were thus bound to come into contact while the French right and British left were yet far apart.

This échelon formation of the two armies appeared very favourable for the French, as their infantry was seasoned, well led, and quick in manœuvres. Had the leading French échelon either outflanked or broken through the leading English échelon it was probable that a rapid change of front would have resulted in the rolling up of the British line. But Stuart had parried against being outflanked by resting his right wing on the Amato, and by further protecting it with a detachment of riflemen on the further bank. Régnier's chance of success therefore depended on his breaking down the English right wing at the first collision. He determined to do this by a rapid advance in solid column, ending in a bayonet charge, which he intended should decide the fate of the day. He selected the 1^{er} *léger* for this duty, as fine a body of light infantry as was to be found in the French army. General Compère was placed in charge of the movement.

The British had halted to await the French onset. The ships and gunboats stood in as close to the shore as they could, though too far out to take any active share in the engagement.

It fell to Kempt's Light Infantry to meet the first shock of the battle. To the massed column of the French tacticians it opposed the long-drawn-out line retained by British usage. For some minutes nothing could be seen but a screen of cavalry pickets thrown out by Régnier to mask his movements. Then the horsemen suddenly wheeled and disappeared, and a great cloud of dust rolled up. Presently the glint of bayonets flashed through the cloud, the rapid tramp of many feet beat the earth, uniforms and men's faces appeared. A general officer rode in front ; flags were

waving ; drums were rolling. The 1^{er} *léger* was marching at a quick step straight for the British line.

Kempt's Light Infantry awaited the French advance with the extraordinary rigidity of discipline that then distinguished the British army. The muskets remained steadily at the carry until the coolly and unerringly judged words of command released a terrific volley into the French ranks. Big gaps opened in the files of the 1^{er} *léger* and the 42nd of the line following them ; Compère and two colonels fell. But the advance was not checked ; the men now broke into a charge with bayonets aligned. On they came, nearer and nearer, while the machine-like British line went through the reloading commands with the relentless precision of a machine. The French had rushed up to not much more than thirty yards when for the second time that long line of muskets was raised and discharged ; at that point-blank volley the whole front of the column melted. The ground was covered with dead and dying ; the 1^{er} *léger* was literally annihilated. A few brave men struggled on and were shot down within fifteen yards of the British line, but the attack had hopelessly failed ; the French left was destroyed, and Régnier's army was practically defeated by this one mortal blow.

Had Stuart now taken advantage of the gap in the French left and advanced rapidly, he might have crushed Régnier. But the British general and his troops understood defensive better than offensive tactics. As it was, Kempt's Light Infantry indulged in a disorderly and unprofitable pursuit of the column they had shattered, while the other British échelons remained in position. Thus Régnier was given time to reform his line ; this he did with great promptitude, skill, and determination. His centre and right were brought up

into line, and not yet despairing of success, he attempted to outflank the British left. But Régnier did not venture on charging tactics again, and the French fire did not do much execution; the dust and smoke was being blown straight into the eyes of the French by a westerly wind, and their few field-pieces were not well served. Yet they were making some progress towards circling around the British left, when just at the critical moment the 20th Regiment came up from the beach, where it had just disembarked, and covered Stuart's threatened flank.

Régnier now decided on retreat, and in defeat showed unimpaired resource and resolution. He rapidly drew off his infantry, and under cover of his cavalry and horse artillery retired in the direction of Catanzaro, carrying with him about 300 wounded. He had left between 1200 and 1500 dead and wounded on the battlefield.¹ The British loss was only 45 killed and 282 wounded. Thus ended a battle that had lasted barely one half-hour, but that had cost the defeated side one-third of its effective force in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

There was no pursuit after Maida. The English troops were exhausted after their long march and strenuous engagement under a blazing sun. Nor did their lack of cavalry and the caution of their commander counsel pursuit. The troops therefore went into camp, leaving the French to the care of the Sicilian and Calabrese irregulars. The numerous French wounded were brought in and cared for. General Compère received attentions that enabled him to recover from

¹ Stuart's official estimate was 700 killed and 1000 wounded. Régnier brought 300 wounded into Catanzaro. This would give a total of 2000, which is all but incredible. The contemporaries generally placed Régnier's loss at from 1200 to 1500.

his wounds; he was afterwards exchanged, and was eventually killed at the head of his division six years later at Borodino.

So far Sir John Stuart had met with complete success, and the immediate results of his victory were precisely what both he and his opponent had foreseen. Calabria nearly instantly blazed out into open revolt. Every church bell was set ringing, and the villages about Maida that contained nothing but spectators in the early afternoon poured bands of armed loyalists into the British camp before night. A cloud of guerillas hung on the French retreat, and the British general had all he could do to preserve his captured and wounded enemies from the murderous intents of his new-found friends. To prevent the excesses and atrocious conduct of the *masse*, Sir John Stuart offered by proclamation what was for Calabria the very large sum of ten ducats in gold for every French soldier, and fifteen ducats for every French officer brought in to his camp. Even this proclamation and the personal exertions of the British officers were not in every case sufficient to preserve from death, and often from torture, more than one unhappy fugitive.¹

In the meanwhile Régnier, finding his retreat northwards through Cosenza cut, had retired over the hills to the Adriatic side. He hoped either to hold his ground at Catanzaro or, at the worst, to make his way to Cassano by following the Adriatic coast. He was only able to collect some 4000 men all told, and his troops had been seriously demoralized by their recent defeat.

For three weeks Régnier held Catanzaro, fifteen miles

¹ It is interesting to recall that the humanity of the British was deeply appreciated by the French. An acknowledgment came in 1809 when Soult had a monument erected at Corunna to Sir John Moore, who had been prominent in the operations in Calabria.

from Maida, harassed by the *masse* but unmolested by the British. But the Calabrese were now sufficiently inspired and sufficiently numerous to contain the French force unassisted, nor did Stuart, a man of honourable and generous sentiments, feel any inclination to associate the troops under his command with those of Ferdinand and Mary Caroline's *capimassi*. It was a relief to the French that Stuart remained motionless on the bay of S. Eufemia, and the opinion appears to have been generally entertained that had he at once marched northwards Régnier must have capitulated and nothing could have stopped the British short of Naples. Even as it was, Régnier at Catanzaro was helpless to prevent the extension of the Calabrese rising north and south. At Cosenza on the 13th of July, one week after the battle, a royal governor, De Michele, was installed and a decree was issued appointing Sir John Stuart the King's Lieutenant for the Province. To the south the British commander sent detachments to reduce the small French garrisons left on the Strait of Messina at Reggio and Scilla.

Finally Régnier decided on retreat, and on the 26th of July started on his march north. He was closely followed by some 8000 Calabrese under the command of Pane di Grano and Gernaliz, whom Ferdinand had appointed to command the local militia.

These Calabrese leaders merit a short description, for it is no exaggeration to say of them that they were little better than savages ;¹ they were capable of the

¹ De Blaquièrre, i. 519. See also Fox to à Court, *War Off. Orig. Corr.* 170 ; *Annual Register*, 1806, 146 ; Bunbury, and Moore's *Diary*. Exceptionally a few chiefs of the *masse* behaved well, as Necco, who sent the French he captured at Lagonegro to the British ships (Greco, *Annali*, 70). Guariglia and Fra Diavolo also occasionally preserved their prisoners' lives, but it may be questioned whether humanity so much as commercialism was the prompting motive.

most monstrous atrocities. One of them, Papisodero, had a price placed on his head by his official ally Sir John Stuart ; the ruffian, nothing daunted, retorted by placing a similar price on that of the British general.

Don Nicola Gualtieri, more generally known as Pane di Grano, had been one of the chiefs of the *masse* in 1799, and was a major in the second regiment of the Cosenza militia at the time of the French invasion. He and his family resided at Conflenti ; they were ardent royalists, and his son Fortunato had been among those executed by the French in repression of the outbreaks at Soveria and Pedace. His hatred of the invaders was intense, and as commander-in-chief of the *masse* that attacked Régnier on his retreat he gave it full vent. He proved as ferocious a leader as Fra Diavolo himself. The *masse* were capable of all the horrors that diabolical ingenuity could devise. At Nicastro they crucified the commandant of the guard of honour that had greeted Joseph on his tour through Calabria, and gouged out his eyes. At Strongoli seventeen French soldiers were prisoners ; on each of seven consecutive days one of these unfortunate men was led out, placed on a platform, tortured and killed, to the great delectation of the inhabitants. But these savages were soon deprived of their amusement. Marching northward through Cotrone, where he had to abandon his wounded, Régnier reached Strongoli on the eighth day, the 29th of July, and rescued the ten survivors. The town was stormed, sacked, and burnt.

The fate of Strongoli was that of every village passed by the French from which the *masse* had received assistance. At Cirò the population was in arms, but had repressed disorder and not supported the insurgents ;

the French troops treated it as friendly. At Corigliano conditions were different, and a hard fight, in which the *masse* suffered heavy losses, ended in the capture and burning of the town. It was on the 1st of August that the French reached Corigliano, nearly 100 miles from Catanzaro, which testifies to the fact that Régnier had lost none of his vigour, his troops none of their celerity.

From Corigliano Régnier marched to Cassano, where he effected his junction with a small force under General Verdier, and took up a strong defensive position. The latter had been in command at Cosenza. The British victory and the subsequent rising had compelled him to concentrate all his detachments on the capital of the province, where he had assembled 600 men. Threatened by a large force under Gernaliz and being short of ammunition, he had decided to retreat. The *masse* at once occupied the town, and De Michele was installed as royal governor. Disorder followed; a number of houses were sacked and the hospitals, full of French sick and wounded, were nearly burned. In the meanwhile the *masse* had already cut off Verdier's retreat by occupying Cassano, and the French general was only able to capture this position, vital to him and to Régnier, after a desperate fight, in which he expended all his ammunition and only succeeded by the last desperate expedient of using the bayonet.

Although Régnier had thus succeeded in saving some remnant of his defeated army, he had lost the whole of lower Calabria and suffered a disastrous retreat; unless reinforcements and supplies were to reach him soon, he would be compelled to abandon even Cassano and to retreat further towards Naples, either through the defile of Campotanesse or, if that should be held in

force, excentrically towards Taranto. But the obstacle that had long prevented the Government from sending an adequate number of troops to Calabria had at last been removed, and Régnier was cheered with the news that he might now expect the reinforcements that six weeks earlier could not be spared. For the siege of Gaëta was at last at an end.

When Masséna arrived at the camp before Gaëta on the 28th of June, the Government felt how urgent it was to capture the fortress immediately and thus release the large body of troops occupied in the siege. Masséna decided to make one more attempt to frighten the defenders into surrender without waiting for the completion of the trenches. To lend a more imposing and decisive appearance to this demonstration, King Joseph proceeded to join the marshal in camp, and was present when fire was opened. It was time the besiegers' artillery spoke, for the Sicilians had already fired 120,000 shot and 22,000 shells.

The French artillery was now heavy and numerous enough to assert superiority. Fifty large guns and twenty-three mortars rained a storm of iron on the fortifications of Gaëta; but though several of the defenders' pieces were dismounted, though their defences began to break down and crumble, though a constant stream of dead and dying set in from the ramparts to the city, the Prince of Hesse showed no symptom of weakening. By the 1st of July a considerable impression had been made and the besieged had suffered the loss of three magazines through explosion. The French fire now slackened, however, while the trenches and batteries were pushed nearer to the fortress. It had become a question of fatal moment

with Masséna whether his stock of ammunition was sufficient to carry a bombardment to its fit conclusion. So uncertain did this appear that a reward of fifty centimes was offered for every unexploded shell of the enemy brought in, and, thus stimulated, the men of the battalion of coloured sappers from San Domingo freely lost their lives or enriched themselves by the reckless way in which they tore the burning fuses from the enemy's missiles.

On the 3rd of July the besieged received a reinforcement of 1500 men by sea, and on that night an attack was delivered by Captain Richardson's gunboats, of which the result was indecisive. For three days more the French toiled nearer and nearer the fortifications, and at three o'clock on the morning of the 7th they opened fire again with ninety guns and at shorter range. Their artillery was now mostly directed against the Queen's Battery, whose fire was soon reduced. But Gaëta refused to be silenced altogether, and through the 8th the four heavy ship's guns landed by Sidney Smith kept up a heavy and damaging fire, while the rapid exhaustion of the French ammunition caused the greatest anxiety to their commanders. On the 10th furious fighting took place; the French sappers were now close under the walls, and an attempt was made to establish a breaching battery quite close to the shore. The defenders rained shot and shell on the French works, while the French batteries attempted to keep down the fire of the fortress. The besiegers were finally repulsed, but not before one of their shells, bursting in the Breach Battery, struck down the Prince of Hesse, and inflicted the greatest loss on the garrison it could have suffered. No sooner was the event known in the French camp than Masséna ordered his batteries

to redouble their fire and threw a stream of shot and shell into the town.

On the following morning General Dedon, in command of the artillery, earnestly represented to Marshal Masséna that the firing must be slackened, as the ammunition could not hold out ; but Masséna, aware of the perilous position of affairs in Calabria, and boldly judging the situation, declined to listen to this officer's remonstrances. He was right in thinking that the defence of Gaëta would collapse with the loss of its brave Governor.

The Prince of Hesse's wound was thought mortal, though he eventually recovered. He was taken from the post he had so splendidly defended for five months and placed on board an English vessel, on which he was transported to Palermo. The command devolved by right of seniority on Colonel Hotz, an officer of moderate ability, but lacking prestige and the qualities of a leader. He refused, however, to capitulate when summoned to do so by Masséna on the 12th of July. On that day two breaches were just beginning to show in the fortress' walls, one at the Breach Battery, the other low down at the south-east angle of the shore defences.

Four days later, on the 16th of July, the crisis was reached. Masséna now knew that Régnier had been defeated in Calabria and cut off ; he feared even worse news might follow. The night before one of his engineer officers had waded through two feet of water from the end of the most advanced French sap to the lower breach at the corner of the sea-front, and reported that there was a possible passage for a storming party. He had now only 184,000 pounds of powder and less than 5000 shot and shell left,—a supply for two or

three days. No reinforcement was to be looked for ; on the contrary, Napoleon was drawing troops towards northern Italy and strengthening the army in Germany for the war with Prussia that was just on the point of breaking out. Reviewing this position, Masséna determined to stake all on the throw, to fire away his remaining ammunition, and then if possible carry Gaëta with the bayonet.

All through the 17th of July the breaches grew larger and larger under the constant pounding of the French guns. On the morning of the 18th it was officially given out in the camp that both were practicable, and preparations were made for storming.

One of the most obvious rules that guide a general when about to attempt the capture of fortifications is to conceal his preparations so as to deliver his attack unexpectedly. Had the Prince of Hesse still been at his post on the Breach Battery, it is probable that Masséna would have followed this rule ; with Colonel Hotz in command he was probably wise in not doing so. In the course of the morning two heavy columns were ostentatiously assembled in the trenches. That on the left, intended to move against the lower breach, was made up of chasseurs and grenadiers, and was placed under the orders of a brilliant leader, General Donzelot. That on the right, intended to attack the more difficult breach under the Queen's Battery, was made up of *voltigeurs*, and was under the orders of General Valentin. Supporting columns were brought into the trenches with some deliberation. These long-drawn-out preparations finally produced the effect Masséna had been anxiously hoping for. At 3 P.M. the white flag rose on the walls of Gaëta ; the long siege was at an end. Within three hours of the raising

of the white flag the conditions of the capitulation were agreed.

So honourable did the defence of Gaëta appear to Masséna, or so advantageous its capture, that he granted very lenient terms. The fortress, with all its guns and munitions of war, was to be surrendered, but the garrison was to be permitted to retire to Sicily on condition of not bearing arms against the French during twelve months. No sooner had hostilities ceased, however, before a large part of the royal troops took the opportunity of deserting to the French camp. The spoils of Gaëta included about 170 cannon, of which one-third were damaged. In the course of the siege the French had dug 9000 yards of trenches, and they acknowledged the loss of 1000 killed and wounded, their real loss being probably twice as great.

The instant Gaëta surrendered Masséna directed his attention to the critical situation of Régnier. On the very next morning after he obtained possession of the fortress some of the troops were started on their march towards Naples and Calabria.

It was well indeed for King Joseph that Gaëta had fallen, for the whole kingdom had been blazing with insurrection for some weeks past; only a few towns were under effective control, and for some days the situation had appeared so desperate that the complete withdrawal of the Court and army to the north had been seriously contemplated. The coasts were patrolled by British and Sicilian ships, from which bands of irregulars were disembarked without difficulty. This policy was actively supported by Sidney Smith, but the British military officers opposed it strongly, as will appear from the following extract from a dispatch written by Sir John Moore to General Fox:—

His [Sidney Smith's] interference in Calabria, where in his imagination he is directing the operations of armies, but where in reality he is only encouraging murder and rapine, and keeping up amongst that unhappy people, whom we have no intention to support, a spirit of revolt which will bring upon them the more severe vengeance of the French Government. As long as Sir Sidney had money, he distributed it profusely ; and now, with as little judgment, he is distributing arms, ammunition, and provisions . . . (Aug. 24, 1806).¹

So great was the activity of Sidney Smith and his allies that Naples itself hardly appeared secure. British ships cruised in sight of the city. From Capri they controlled the waters of the bay, and the Governor, Hudson Lowe, maintained close communication with the small chain of islands that stretched away to the north-west towards Gaëta, of which Ponza and Ventotenne were the most important. From these islands, and from Gaëta before its fall, a constant stream of conspiracy flowed into Naples. They also served as the base for the operations of Fra Diavolo, Guariglia, Ronca, and other chiefs. The principal agent of the Sicilian Government, or of Queen Mary Caroline, at Ponza was the young Prince of Canosa, an unscrupulous intriguer with all the instincts of a spy, informer, and gaoler, who was to earn an eminence, unenviable even in those unhappy times and countries, for his duplicity and vices.

In the first week of July, Sidney Smith, after conveying Stuart's transports to the Bay of S. Eufemia, had once more sailed up the coast. He had been given large powers by the Sicilian Government, and exercised the right of appointing *capimassi* and of acting as

¹ Bunbury, 436 ; cf. Moore's *Diary*. There was great tension between Sidney Smith and the generals ; but with Collingwood, Duckworth, and Martin there was always harmonious co-operation.

the King's direct representative. At Amantea, just north of Maida, he landed Fra Diavolo. The French garrison retired on Cosenza, from which place Verdier retreated soon afterwards. A royalist local administration was at once formed, and a military leader of some capacity was selected in the person of Mirabelli. From Cosenza, under the general leadership of Gernaliz, the *masse* had moved north towards Cassano, where Régnier and Verdier had effected their junction on the 3rd of August. Not daring to attack the French in the strong defensive position they occupied, the bulk of the insurgents marched to the mountain pass leading down towards Lagonegro, where Damas had been defeated a few weeks earlier. There they hoped to be able to beat back any reinforcements that might be sent from Naples to Régnier.

The fall of Gaëta made the advance of a considerable force probable, and Sidney Smith, to support the flank of the *masse*, cruised with a considerable fleet in the Gulf of Policastro. On the 14th of August the British Admiral and Fra Diavolo captured Fort Licosa, garrisoned by a small detachment of the Corsican Legion. This was the last success of the Anglo-Sicilians. The tide of war was fast turning against them.

The vigour and rapidity with which Masséna relieved his defeated lieutenant was on a level with that which had distinguished the French movements since the first invasion of Naples; on the 19th of July he entered Gaëta, on the 8th of August he had already struck a mortal blow at the *masse*, 160 miles away. Rapidly collecting all the troops that could be spared, Masséna advanced south from Naples. He issued a proclamation on the 31st of July declaring

Calabria in a state of siege, placing the French troops at the charge of the municipalities, confiscating for the public service the property of the *capimassi*, announcing the closing of every monastery assisting the royal forces, and granting pay to the municipal guards faithful to the French king. To oppose the French marshal Pane di Grano, Gernaliz, Carbone, and Mandarinini had collected some 8000 or 10,000 men, a mixture of militia, *masse*, and brigands, which included many newly landed Sicilian convicts. With these they prepared to defend the passes.

As far as Lagonegro Masséna met with little opposition. On leaving that town the French column plunged into the wildest parts of Calabria, and followed the defile that runs under the Monte del Papa. Through the thick glades might be heard clanging the church bells of the little village of Lauria ringing the alarm, announcing the approaching fight. For at this point the *masse* had decided to make their stand. When the French arrived in sight of the village they found the surrounding heights strongly held ; but Masséna attacked without a moment's hesitation.

At the beginning of the engagement one of those incidents that so often occur when regular and irregular troops are opposed, and that are sometimes properly described as treachery, happened, by which the Corsican Legion was caught in a trap and suffered heavily. The loss was avenged. Masséna manœuvred skilfully, and eventually cut off a large number of the enemy in the village ; Gardanne stormed Lauria at the point of the bayonet ; the desperate defenders kept up the struggle street by street, house by house ; no quarter was given ; fire and massacre completed the work of destruction. Of a town of 7000 people nothing but ruins remained ;

the population, men, women, and children, perished in the flames.

Lauria was nearly as decisive as Campotanesse. Masséna followed up his advantage swiftly, shooting and hanging such armed men as fell in his hands,—in one week no less than 600. He successfully effected his junction with Régnier and entered Cosenza with about 18,000 men on the 14th of August, Pane di Grano abandoning the city an hour previously.¹ The *masse* retreated southwards, Régnier being at once sent on after them, but a stand that Gernaliz attempted to make just south of Cosenza came to nothing, and he lost his life, assassinated by one of his own men. Masséna, seeing the collapse of armed resistance and judging that his ruthless march had struck terror in the hearts of the Calabrese, decided to adopt milder courses and to put into effect instructions he had received from the King. On the 17th of August he issued orders to his generals to abstain from burning villages.

But the evil was too deep-seated, the country too harried, the people too embittered, feuds had been carried too far; for many weeks Calabria remained unpacified and was swept by a wave of reckless ferocity of which the details must not be dwelt on. Yet the duty of the chronicler cannot be altogether evaded, and one of many similar incidents that will paint the miserable state of the country must be selected and presented to the reader.

At the little village of Acri, in the Sila, the retreat of the French after Maida was the signal for a royalist revolution. A small number of the inhabitants, some

¹ Joseph, *Corr.* iii. 149; Dumas, *Précis*, xv. 171; Masséna, v. 262. The discrepancy in the totals given by these authorities probably arises from including or excluding Régnier's force.

twenty in all, had sided with the French, that is to say, they had accepted at the hand of the conquerors various village functions from which their neighbours had been ousted. On the 15th of August, a sacred and auspicious day, the mob, headed by a man named Spaccapitta, deposed the French office-holders. The people naturally attributed their success not so much to their overwhelming numbers as to Mary the mother of God, and fitly to celebrate their victory and her intercession slowly roasted their prisoners alive in the public square. Spaccapitta showed himself a worthy leader of a worthy people by producing a piece of bread from his pocket which he plastered from the dissolving body of one of his victims and ate. Acri suffered further vicissitudes, but was finally reoccupied either by a detachment of French troops or of national guards from Cosenza, and Spaccapitta, with two other ring-leaders, suffered the talion's law and were, according to one account, burned, to another impaled.¹

But the heart sickens at such details, and after repeating that the incident at Acri was only typical of what was occurring at many points in Calabria, the operations of the French may once more be followed. They were now to meet with but few obstacles. The *masse* were hopelessly broken. Sir John Stuart had long since withdrawn his troops to Messina, leaving behind only a small garrison at Scilla. The principal chiefs of the *masse*, with the exception of Pane di Grano and Papisodero, fled to Sicily. On the 1st of September Lamarque, with a flying column, inflicted

¹ Greco, *Annali*, 126, 129, 155. Greco, De Angelis, Courier, and other authorities furnish considerably more matter of the same sort. The impaling incident at Lagonegro, which Colletta states he witnessed, can hardly be accepted without corroboration. A particularly dramatic anecdote is that recorded by Lamarque, ii. 142.

severe losses on the *masse* under Guariglia at Cammarata. A few days later Masséna, who had declined overtures made by the Duke of Florida, now in command for King Ferdinand, entered Monteleone. In this town, the capital of lower Calabria, the French were hailed as deliverers, the inhabitants having long been noted for their liberal and anti-Bourbon sentiments.

Here the campaign may be said to have ended. But all through the autumn and winter a fierce partisan warfare was carried on in Calabria; the small bodies of *masse* were constantly dispersed and beaten, and were as constantly renewed by fresh drafts of volunteers and of enlisted convicts shipped over from Sicily. Occasionally considerable bodies of the latter would surrender at the first summons, and the French commanders sent large batches of them to Naples. By the middle of September no less than 10,000 prisoners of this description were in the capital. The special military tribunals or courts-martial established by Masséna at Cosenza constantly replenished their numbers and assembled many firing parties, exercising a terror that was perhaps salutary.

This narrative of the conquest of the kingdom of Naples by the French cannot be completed without giving some account of two detached incidents of minor importance: the prolonged defence made by the little town of Amantea and the last expedition of Fra Diavolo.

On the approach of Masséna, De Michele abandoned Cosenza and retired to Fiumefreddo, whence he continued to issue proclamations and carry on his duties as *Preside*. He was now at the central spot of the remarkable line of coast that stretches for some 100 miles from the Gulf of Policastro to the Gulf of

S. Eufemia in one nearly unbroken line of cliffs. Here the mountains descend sheer into the depths of the sea, broken here and there by wild, precipitous ravines. Towns and villages are occasionally concealed in the depths of the mountains, occasionally perched on some commanding and inaccessible rock. Communication from north to south is practically impossible save by sea ; towards the west a few difficult mountain tracks lead to Cosenza and the valley of the Crati.

De Michele controlled the coast, for the British cruisers kept the sea free. He promptly inaugurated a royalist reign of terror along the whole coast-line ; Longobardi,¹ suspected of French sympathies, was sacked, its population was destroyed, and many other scenes of horror and outrage followed.

Of the numerous villages and towns dotted along this coast the two most important were Maratea, at the entrance of the Gulf of Policastro, and Amantea, just to the north of the Gulf of S. Eufemia ; both were strongly placed and fairly well fortified, and the French detached strong columns to reduce them at the earliest possible moment. In the middle of September Verdier marched from Cosenza to attack Amantea ; his force was small, his supplies scanty. Mirabelli showed a bold front, the French assault failed, and Verdier retreated. So overjoyed were the Sicilian troops and *masse* at their victory that they immediately started shooting the inhabitants and sacking the town they were charged to protect. Verdier's retreat through the mountains was harassed by the ferocious Parafante at the head of 3000 *masse*. For nearly three months more it was thought impossible to attempt the capture of Amantea ; finally, on

¹ Immediately south of Fiumefreddo, not the village of the same name between Monteleone and Pizzo.

the 4th of December, Verdier started from Cosenza again, this time with four battalions and four guns. Once more Mirabelli successfully repelled the French attack and forced Verdier to retreat. He was pursued by the *masse* to the very gates of Cosenza.

The situation was becoming humiliating if not dangerous for the French. The fortifications of Amantea were growing formidable, and now mounted ten guns; the garrison was flushed with success and replenished from Sicily; stores and munitions had been thrown in by sea. It was decided that a formal siege must be undertaken, and reinforcements were hurried back from Monteleone.

The third attack on Amantea began on the 3rd of January 1807. Régnier himself reconnoitred the town, and the attacking force consisted of four battalions of French troops, 2000 Calabrese national guards newly recruited at Cosenza, with several guns and howitzers. The operations took the form of a regular siege, by trenches and breaching batteries, and the town was cut off from the sea by a few well-placed guns. The first trench was quickly opened within 100 yards of the wall, and on the 14th of January a storming column was sent to the attack. After furious fighting and heavy losses it was driven back. Nothing daunted, the French went to work again with pick and shovel, dragged their guns up closer, and on the 30th of January opened fire anew. Six days of constant pounding opened a gaping hole in the walls of Amantea, and after exploding a heavy mine, once more a column was sent to the assault; this time the French succeeded in effecting a lodgment. But Mirabelli, while the French bombarded, had been building up a second line of defence and had closed up

the gorge of the threatened bastion. No sooner had the storming party gained the breach than he poured down a heavy fire on them from this inner wall, and finally drove them back beaten.

The besiegers had now lost 800 killed and wounded, and it proved fortunate for them that Mirabelli had exhausted his provisions. He offered to surrender, and received honourable terms, Verdier occupying the town on the 6th of February.

Since the end of November the other districts of Calabria had been rapidly pacified, and the French were now able to concentrate more men in the neighbourhood of Cosenza. Several attempts were made by flying columns to surprise and capture De Michele. Finally he was taken at Fiumefreddo on the 21st of January; he was promptly passed before a drum-head court-martial and shot.

While these events proceeded in Calabria, the rest of the kingdom had been suffering nearly as severely from rapine and disorder, and no part more than that stretching from Gaëta through the mountains of the Abruzzi to the Adriatic. It was in the heart of this country, the scene of his boyhood, that the spell was at last to be broken that had earned Fra Diavolo his name.

After his co-operation with Sidney Smith at Point Licoso, he had been conveyed to Sperlunga, near Gaëta, where his band was disembarked. From that point he executed several successful raids, notably at Terracina, and quickly increased his following and resources. At Itri he faced a French flying column sent to put an end to his proceedings; after a desperate fight, in which he lost 160 men, he was defeated. He then pushed further towards the Abruzzi, sacking, burning, and murdering. The whole country was now up;

brigandage and disorder became so prevalent that a band of 100 men showed themselves as near Naples as Caserta.

By the middle of September Fra Diavolo had made his way to the little town of Sora, in the heart of the Abruzzi, where he effected his junction with Sciablone, who had long harried those parts, and mustered an imposing force of 2000 men with five guns. But several French columns under General Despaigne were now converging on the brigand chief, and he was compelled to make a stand. The French took Sora by storm, the *masse* were routed, Fra Diavolo himself was severely wounded. He managed, however, to escape capture. With wonderful endurance and resource he slipped away from village to village, and finally reached the town of Avellino, to the south of Naples. Near this place, in the lofty and picturesque monastery of Monte Vergine, he found shelter. But his secret was soon betrayed; he was arrested and taken to Naples. A cartel was sent in from the vessels cruising about the bay claiming him as a superior officer of the Sicilian army and proposing his exchange. But where no mercy had been shown to Rodio, none could be expected for Fra Diavolo. He was brought before a court-martial, and on the 9th day of November was shot before a great concourse of the *lazzaroni* on the Piazza del Mercato.

Such a blow did the end of this illustrious free-booter appear to the Bourbon cause that solemn obsequies in his honour and prayers for the repose of his soul were ordered by the Court in the cathedral of Palermo.

Towards the end of the eventful year 1806 matters

were getting more settled in the much-harried kingdom of Naples, and Calabria was so far pacified that Masséna left Monteleone to return to the capital on the 21st of December.

It is now therefore time to turn from the field of war to that of peace, and to relate what the French civil administrators had found to do and had accomplished while the question of military supremacy was being decided.

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CHAPTER V

JOSEPH'S INTERNAL POLICY

Sentiments of Naples towards new Government—Changed conditions—Papal hostility—Reform and its agents—Peculation—Masséna—Return of nobility—First Ministry—Finance—Roederer—Commerce—The *fondiarìa*—Other taxes—Land registry—Farming of revenue—Forced loan—*Cedolas*—*Gran libro*—The Hope loan—Regal expenses—Pompeii—Anti-feudal legislation—Judicial commissions—Legal reform—Administrative—Council of State—Education—Military—Suppression of monastic orders—Ministry of police—Saliceti—Mary Caroline's intrigues—Plots at Naples—Bruno's correspondence intercepted—Civic patrols—Projected rising of June 1807—Police measures—Mosca's attempt—Peace of Tilsit—Sicilian policy—Acton's fall—St. Clair—Sicilian sentiments—Mary Caroline and the British—Eastern affairs—Fox declines to act in Calabria—Hesse's expedition—Battle of Mileto—Calabrian brigandage—Régnier on the Strait of Messina—Treaty of Tilsit, Ionian Islands—Gantheaume's expedition.

THE unopposed entrance of Joseph Bonaparte into Naples had been a source of great satisfaction to a large part of the citizens. The lazzaroni had been given no time to organize disorder; the French had been given no provocation for attacking the city. Thus the large class whose political affections are, not unreasonably, more guided by considerations of material interest than by sentiment, were in a sense well disposed towards the new sovereign; but before the French prince had been

in possession many weeks, this feeling began to pass, and was gradually supplanted by the apprehension lest a further revolution should bring back the old Court, and with it all the destruction and horrors that marked the restoration of 1799. Yet not a few, some inspired with confidence and a zeal for reform, others eager to obtain official station at any risk, made show of actively supporting the new Government. Among these were many of the amnestied republicans of 1799, and not a few prominent men who had hitherto proved faithful Bourbonists. Cianciulli, one of the regents who had surrendered the city, promptly decided to accept office; the Duke di Gallo threw in his lot with the conquerors before even the frontier was crossed; many other prominent men followed this example.

There were many reasons why the French conquest should be more willingly and more hopefully accepted in 1806 than it had been in 1799. The military prestige of the young Empire was even greater than that of the First Republic; its ideals of civil government appeared to avoid the extremes both of democracy and of autocracy; last and perhaps most important of all to the inhabitants of a country so firmly attached to Catholicism as Naples, France had officially been converted back from atheism to her ancient faith, so that the opposition of the clerical element was now far less unanimous, far less envenomed than formerly. Since 1799 Bourbonism had displayed its most revolting colours; Bonapartism had shown youthful vigour and healthy, constructive energy. Can it be wondered that a great part of the aristocracy and thinking class of Naples showed a disposition to accept the new order,—a disposition tempered only by a fear of the terrible

consequences that might attend the return of Ferdinand and Mary Caroline? ¹

Yet even under these circumstances Joseph's reception as he made his solemn entry into the city on assuming the royal dignity astonished his friends. But at the ceremonial service celebrated at the Church of the Spirito Santo, the clergy showed less enthusiasm; Cardinal Ruffo, Archbishop of Naples, who had been prevailed on to officiate, went so far indeed as to omit pointedly all mention of the new king. The Cardinal's omission was but a poor recompense for the magnificent collar of diamonds which Joseph had already offered at the shrine of S. Gennaro, but he only conformed to the Pope's opinion, which was that the new King of Naples was no king at all, but merely an usurper. This attitude of the higher clergy and of Pius VII. towards Joseph was one of the causes that led to the quarrel between Napoleon and the Papacy, a quarrel of which other phases will be noticed later; suffice it to say for the present that the Emperor's energetic remonstrances at Rome had no effect in shaking Pius, who clung obstinately to his opinion, and therefore Joseph had to remain an unconsecrated monarch,—a very serious defect in his title in the eyes of all true Neapolitans.

If he could not obtain sanction of religion, and thus gain the superstitious reverence of his subjects, Joseph was yet very firmly resolved to win their personal affection by conferring on them improved and decent methods of administration.

The task of introducing reform at Naples was one

¹ How deep-seated that fear was can only be realized by a perusal of the contemporaries. Nowhere is it more frequently or more vividly painted than in Nicolà's *Diario*.

that would have discouraged any but the men who had breathed the fortifying atmosphere of the great Revolution. It was fortunate for Joseph that he had several men attached to his service who had learnt their statecraft at that wonderful school. For Joseph was a king more by his weak points than his good. As a monarch he took his pleasures royally, and was apt to forget that as a man he ardently believed in the beneficent duty of rulers, in education, progress, and civil liberty. The work of reform was made possible by the goodwill of the King and by the fine abilities, hard work, and drastic methods of such men as Roederer, Dumas, Miot, and Saliceti. The King himself took no small interest and part in their labours, and if we could take his own statements literally, laboured scarcely less than the great Frederick himself at affairs of State.

Unfortunately there came into Naples, alongside of the men of real ability whose talents were necessary to the country, a swarm of French officials, military and civil, distinguished for little else than rapacity and insolence. To them Naples was a conquered country out of which a fortune was to be made in the shortest possible time. Unfortunately the most conspicuous and most unscrupulous of them all was the great soldier who commanded the French army,—Marshal Masséna. Notwithstanding the eminence and fame he had attained, he could not discard the methods of his younger days when his occupations had been those of the merchant and the smuggler. With Masséna victories always resolved into financial profits, and of late years his private fortune had been growing by leaps and bounds. One of his chief sources of revenue had been the granting of so-called licences whereby

cargoes of English goods were surreptitiously introduced and sold at ports occupied by the French forces. The immense sums made by Masséna and his chief of staff in northern Italy had led to serious difficulties between him and the Emperor.¹ But Napoleon had not felt able to make an example of his ablest lieutenant, and the marshal continued in command of the troops in the kingdom of Naples, and continued to set the most evil of all examples to his subordinates. Fortunately an honest man, Mathieu Dumas, was appointed Minister of War; it taxed all his energies to keep under some sort of control the robberies and exactions of his military commandants.

One of the first objects of the new Government was to rally to its support the nobility of the kingdom, and a ready means of securing their acquiescence, if not their sympathy, was quickly found. Many members of the aristocracy had followed Ferdinand in his flight to Sicily, but a decree confiscating the landed property of all absent proprietors soon had the effect of bringing the exiles to terms and of thinning the ranks of the Court circle at Palermo. The return of many members of the aristocracy to Naples helped to restore its normal appearance to the capital. There had in fact been little break, for the administrative departments of the Government had continued active, and it was speedily announced that although reforms were to be effected no sudden change would be introduced.

The names of the King's principal French advisers have already been given, and will soon and frequently recur; they were helped by Neapolitans from the beginning, and Joseph's first ministry included the

¹ Amusing accounts of how Masséna was made to disgorge his millions may be read in Lamarque and Marbot.

Duke di Gallo, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Marquis Cianciulli, and afterwards Count Ricciardi, Ministers of Justice.¹

The first and most pressing question that King Joseph's Ministers were called on to solve was that of finance. Neapolitan credit was bad enough before the war; it had now fallen to vanishing point. Gold was not to be found. The invaders were penniless, and Napoleon expected the conquest of Naples to earn money. All available gold and silver had been removed when Mary Caroline left the capital, and the English merchandise, which the French hoped to seize, had all been safely disposed of before their arrival. Yet it was imperative to find immediately $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions of francs monthly for military expenditure alone. Joseph pleaded hard for assistance from his brother, but met with an unwavering negative for more than a year. There was only one thing Napoleon would give him, and that was advice. He repeatedly enjoined on him to levy a war contribution of 30,000,000 francs on Naples; but Joseph, whose disposition was all for milder and more popular courses, could not bring himself to such heroic remedies. He called to his aid instead his intimate friend of republican days, the publicist Roederer, who became Minister of Finance in November 1806. He was eminently the man for the task, for though lacking the polish of manner necessary for the pursuit of diplomacy, he had the strong intelligence, inflexible rectitude, ability in administrative and drafting work that go to the making of a practical financier. He was not only

¹ There were numerous changes in the first few months not of sufficient importance to be noted. Other Neapolitans who held ministerial office were the Prince of Bisignano, Com. Pignatelli, Duke of Cassano, Duke of Campochiaro, and Duke of Laurenzano.

above speculation, but during the term of his ministry at Naples even refused the increase of his salary that the King pressed on him, and that, in the estimation of all but himself, his services merited.

The problem that faced this capable administrator was doubly difficult, because the French conquest had brought with it a state of maritime war and a consequent closing up of normal trade channels. Exportation of wine and oil had fallen to nothing, and to make matters worse, the first harvest reaped under the new Government fetched only one-third of the price obtained in the preceding year, and in March 1807 Puglia was so full of wheat that it was practically unsaleable. From 1806 to 1808 olive oil accumulated to such an extent that in the latter year some 80 or 100 million francs' worth was waiting for a purchaser that could not be found. In the meanwhile British merchants looked for new sources of supply, and Sicily profited to the extent that Naples lost.

Yet so great were the administrative improvements introduced that they probably compensated for the lost trade, while the incidence of taxation was very greatly altered in favour of the poorer class. Instead of the numerous taxes on agriculture and produce, a single new tax was levied, based on the taxpayers' estimated revenue from land and other sources; this was known as the *fondiarìa*. For the purposes of assessing the *fondiarìa* a cadastral survey of the kingdom was projected, which was soon afterwards commenced, and was completed after the Bourbon restoration in 1818. In addition to the *fondiarìa* three principal sources of revenue were established,—the Customs, the royal domain, and the consolidated taxes, among which the lottery, tobacco, and stamps were the principal. The

farming of the revenue was stopped, and some of the taxes that had borne most heavily on the poor were lightened, as for instance that on salt, which was reduced by 5 *grana* per *rotolo*.

But finance on these lines, even if an improvement on the past and promising for the future, was quite useless to meet the crying necessities of the immediate present. Ready money was urgently needed. The credit of the new Government was not yet equal to raising a loan from bankers, nor would Napoleon help his brother even to the extent of paying the French troops employed in the kingdom. Joseph would not impose the contribution of war of thirty millions the Emperor constantly urged; he had recourse instead to a forced loan of 1,200,000 ducats (July 1806). The acknowledgment given to the unwilling creditors of the State was in the form of a 4 per cent *cedola*, or bond, secured on freehold land belonging to the Government. Property of this description was about the only asset with which the Government was well furnished. This was largely owing to the operation of the decree against absent landlords already noticed. It was, therefore, further decided to offer some of this property for sale in small holdings, the price being payable one quarter in cash and three quarters in *cedolas*. This tended to establish a real open market value for the new bonds. *Cedolas* were also issued in satisfaction of the claims of the farmers of the *arrendamenti*, whose contracts were terminated; amongst these ecclesiastical corporations figured largely. The holders of the *cedolas* were registered on a "Gran libro de' Creditori dello Stato," instituted by Roederer, in which was also specified the State property on which each *cedola* was secured. The first debit entry or specification of State property set

aside for the creditors in the year 1806 represented an official valuation of 10,000,000 ducats.

For many months the financial struggle was severe, but the position slowly improved, and in the early part of 1807 Napoleon was at length persuaded to come to his brother's assistance, in the first instance by granting him a personal allowance of half a million francs a month. Towards the middle of 1807 the finances of the new Government were beginning to present a satisfactory aspect, and as at this precise moment a state of peace had been re-established on the Continent it became at last possible to negotiate a loan. This, curiously enough, was obtained, after roundabout negotiations through Lisbon and Amsterdam, from the well-known Anglo-Dutch house of Hope. The nominal amount of the loan was 3,000,000 florins.¹

Notwithstanding Roederer's efforts Joseph complained that he had never been so poor; he would have been more correct had he said that he had never had so much to spend. His regal state rivalled and even outshone that of the Bourbons. At the palace he employed no less than 800 servants at salaries of twelve ducats a month or less, and his Court was proportionately large and expensive. Twenty-one generals and colonels received gifts representing annual incomes of from 2000 to 10,000 ducats, while the ladies of his court, both married and unmarried, had no ground to complain of lack of attention or of lack of generosity. Madame de Blaniac and Mlle. Miot each received dotations of nearly 6000 ducats a year, and the capitalized value of such gifts rose to a grand total

¹ A lengthy file of documents, covering the negotiations with the intermediaries employed by the Hopes, may be consulted in the *Neapolitan Archives*, xxx. 224.

of over 2,000,000 ducats. It was not remarkable that recourse to the Hopes had been necessary.

Joseph rewarded those Neapolitan noblemen who paid him their court no less than his French officers. He instituted an order of knighthood, of the Two Sicilies, the star of which bore the legend "Renovata patria." He coined money also as king of the Two Sicilies; Ferdinand at Palermo, with rather more justification, doing the same. In general he displayed a pomp and luxury that conciliated some men, indisposed others, but did not succeed in making his awkward figure and affected manner kingly, or even in imposing on the keen perceptions of the populace. Yet the contrast between the old court and the new was not altogether to the disadvantage of the latter. Fashions had changed as well as men during the great upheaval of the last twenty years. Ruffles and lace, flounces and true lovers' knots, hoops and rigid corsets, complicated head-dresses and delicate Watteau tints, had disappeared with the great ladies they had adorned. The son of a lawyer and the daughter of a merchant now sat on the throne of Naples,—and how changed was the scene in the apartments of the Royal Palace! Women dressed in too low-cut and too clinging draperies of classic form and unrelieved colour, their ornaments suggestive of the buried cities of the Campagna that so dearly interested the King, their looks alternately bold and languishing, and as a background the straight lines of mural decoration and rigid furniture, the brilliant and often extravagant uniforms of soldiers, bold men and loud-voiced, barrack-room parvenus, but brave and efficient on the battlefield. Perhaps the atmosphere suggested vulgarity and pushful struggle, yet the Court centred about a sovereign whose fore-

head and whose surroundings proclaimed intelligence and power. Could as much be said of Ferdinand *Nasone*?

Joseph not only supported the classical revival as a matter of fashion, but, being a good latinist, supported it intelligently. He purchased the ground covering the lost city of Pompeii, and took an active and understanding interest in the work of excavating its treasures. He liberally encouraged education, art, and music. But we have dwelt long enough on the financial and personal aspects of the assumption of the Neapolitan crown by Joseph Bonaparte; matters of administration and of law must now be dealt with, and especially those relating to the feudal system.

The declared policy of the Government and the personal inclination of the King were to sweep away without mercy every vestige of feudalism. Feudal tenures were immediately abolished on the private domains of the Crown, and the peasantry was relieved from vexatious restrictions and encouraged in agricultural pursuits. So firmly were the old feudal ideas rooted, however, so little was it understood what the advent of a Napoleonic government meant, that no sooner had Joseph arrived in Naples than he received various petitions from barons who had been deprived of some of their privileges after the troubles of 1799, praying for the restitution of their feudal rights of jurisdiction. Such misconceptions did not long continue. By decree of the 2nd of August 1806 all baronial jurisdiction, all rights to personal services, and all water rights were abolished. A month later a decree was issued providing for the division of feudal land among actual occupiers. Land situated near a village, not actually in the use of the feudal owner, but occupied, and especially if improved by the occupier,

was to be assigned in freehold to the Università at a compensation to be fixed by the council of the chief civil functionary of the province. Another decree (September 1806), following the precedent set by the Neapolitan Republic in 1799, declared *majorati* and *fideicommissi* illegal; it aimed, in other words, at removing the fetters of inalienability that was the chief cause of the stagnation of Neapolitan property and capital.

Much of this legislation, however, remained ineffective save that it prepared the way for the more drastic measures that were to follow and finally rid Naples of feudalism. Yet a number of Università endeavoured to obtain what advantage they could from the new laws and from the favourable spirit of the new Government. Hence a great mass of litigation was started or revived. This only made matters worse, and to clear the legal congestion and cut through to a reasonable working basis it was finally decreed, in November 1807, that a special court should be assembled in the course of the year 1808 to try all cases turning on contested feudal rights between the Università and the barons. The notable proceedings of that court shall receive notice in due course; here they can find no place, as they belong to the events of another reign and not to that of Joseph Bonaparte.

With the kingdom in such a state of criminal, political, and military disorder as it was during the period immediately following the invasion, it was found necessary to have recourse to extraordinary and summary judicial processes. Alongside of the courts-martial, four exceptional judicial commissions were constituted. In four months they disposed of 5000 prisoners. In August 1806 these commissions were converted into regular tribunals dealing with matters of brigandage,

high police, and treason. In the meanwhile preparations were being made for codifying Neapolitan law on the model of the *Code Napoléon*. The Emperor repeatedly urged on his brother the introduction of the imperial legislation, and the chief features of the French system were gradually brought in. Trial by jury was not established, and it may be doubted whether it would have been politic to do so. A great step forward, however, was marked by the introduction of publicity of debates, and the people of Naples quickly availed themselves of this beneficial innovation by thronging the courts of justice. So great was the popular impression made by this reform that a contemporary historian of Naples remarked of it: "The law which . . . had been only an instrument to preserve tranquillity . . . became for the future an instrument of political rights."¹

Matters of administration as of law were recast on the French model. The ancient territorial divisions of the kingdom were reframed. The Università were given a local government body of ten to thirty landholders styled *decurionato*, who elected their syndic and sent a representative to a provincial council. The syndic was checked by the *sotto intendente* of each district, and he in turn by the *intendente* of the province, who depended directly on the Minister of the Interior, and whose functions might be described as including matters of administration, of taxation, and of high police. The municipal and provincial councils of landowners were merely consultative, and as they were for the most part made up of men who were partisans of the Government and unversed in matters of administration, they did little to modify the rule of the

¹ Colletta, *Storia*, ii. 65.

Minister of the Interior and the hierarchy of Government functionaries. A hasty judgment might indeed lead to the opinion that the whole system was little more than a sham,—a tax-collecting and administrative machine ostentatiously swathed in popular and representative forms. Yet this judgment would be more rightly applied to the system as exemplified in France under the Empire than in Naples under the French kings. For in France the centralized bureaucracy of Napoleon was a retrogression, but on the contrary in Naples the system introduced by Joseph Bonaparte was a great political advance. In the opinion of many educated and liberal Neapolitans it was quite as great an advance as the country was ready for. And it might further be pointed out that these reforms were sincerely intended as steps towards a more liberal and better system of government by Roederer, by the King, and especially by such Neapolitan administrators as Zurlo, Ricciardi, and Winspeare.¹ Another step forward was marked in the formation of a Council of State of thirty-six members, whose functions were to debate and consult on every measure.

In matters of education the Government took even greater steps towards progress than in civil administration. It was decreed that every Università should be endowed with a free school for both sexes, and every province with a college. A Royal Academy was also founded devoted to the encouragement of history, literature, science, and art. Schools for the deaf mute were founded and the prisons were reformed.

The militia of the kingdom was maintained under

¹ Roederer in an official report to Joseph shows clearly the line of future progress aimed at when he says: “. . . in establishing the provincial general councils your Majesty has laid the foundations of a national representation.”—*Rapporto*, 1806, 15.

a slightly modified form, and steps were soon taken to reconstitute a native army. Brigands and Sicilian recruits were obtained in large numbers, and from this unpromising material four regiments were formed under French discipline and supervision. Neapolitan officers were attached to the King's staff, among others the dashing Filangieri and D' Ambrosio, who both rose to high rank later. A regular conscription was decreed that took one man per thousand for military service in 1807, and that afterwards rose to three per thousand in 1808, and five per thousand in 1809. The navy was reorganized on similar lines. Many gunboats were built, and at the close of 1807 there were eighty ships ready for action.

The most dangerous of all the reforming measures of the new Government was that of suppressing religious corporations. The clergy, and especially the monks, were hostile to the French. It was at a monastery that Fra Diavolo had obtained shelter at Avellino; that monastery the Government suppressed as a punishment. Its large estates were duly confiscated, and were inscribed in the *Gran Libro* as a security for the holders of *cedolas*.

The closing of this monastery proved so simple, so satisfactory, and so lucrative an operation that the Government's appetite was whetted. Precedents were not wanting; Joseph's two predecessors, Charles III. and Ferdinand, had profited not a little from the expulsion of the Augustinian, Jesuit, and other Orders, and where they had led the way the French Prince could not hesitate to follow. The suppression of the monasteries was purely and simply a measure of spoliation dictated by lack of money; nothing shows this better than the form of Joseph's announcement of

the fact to Napoleon: "I have just suppressed all the rich Orders." The monasteries whose property was thus confiscated numbered 213; their value was estimated at about 150 millions of ducats; they belonged to Orders following the rule of S. Bernard and S. Benedict, which included the Cassinesi, Olivetani, Celestini, Verginiani, Certosini, Camaldolesi, Cisterciani, and Bernardoni. It was provided that their property, now devolving on the Crown, should be applied to the benefit of the creditors of the State. Each monk received a life pension of from 60 to 120 ducats per annum; and 100 were specially excepted for the special purpose of caring for the valuable libraries and archives of Monte Cassino, La Cava, and Monte Vergine. The preamble of the decree of confiscation was drawn up in the most soothing terms, but that could not alter the fact that every one of the dispossessed monks at once became a focus of dissatisfaction and sedition to the new Government.

Sedition was in truth the most serious of all the difficulties the Government had to cope with, and the duty of facing it was especially intrusted to the most astute and capable of all King Joseph's Ministers. On the 7th of March 1806 the *Monitore* contained a decree instituting a Ministry of Police, and placing Cristoforo Saliceti at its head.

Saliceti was a remarkable man. Of Genoese parentage, though a French citizen, he had been a member of the Convention, had sat with the Mountain, had voted the death of Louis XVI., and had himself narrowly escaped the guillotine a little later. Yet Saliceti was one of the most capable of the violent republicans. He had great administrative and executive talents, was indefatigable, ardent, and courageous to

the point of audacity. Napoleon had known him through their mutual friend Madame Permon, and had formed a just estimate of his exceptional ability. During the campaign of Italy, in 1796, Saliceti had been attached to the young general's headquarters as *représentant du peuple*; in this capacity he obtained Murat's promotion to the rank of general, and, early recognising the extraordinary genius of Napoleon, he adopted the policy of following his fortune and accepting his superiority. Between him and the future Emperor there appears to have been neither love nor esteem, only that mutual respect and understanding that one high intelligence feels for another. When Napoleon attained power he declined to employ Saliceti in France; he once declared to Dumas that the Minister of Police was doing fine work in Naples, and that there he might stop; his return to France could not be permitted, for it was not possible for him to protect "les misérables qui ont voté la mort de Louis XVI." Yet he did not scruple to employ Fouché!

Saliceti had followed the French armies at a time when peculation was at its worst, and it has never been suggested that he set his face against it. Napoleon, in fact, openly accused him of it in connection with some English merchandise confiscated at Leghorn, and Miot, who shared his labours at Naples, recorded the following dubious opinion, that, "without perhaps seeking to increase his own fortune, he allowed those about him to make theirs."¹

The methods of the Neapolitan police and the army of spies and informers with which its head was soon surrounded, created an atmosphere where honesty and

¹ Miot, ii. 181.

truth stood every chance of being stifled. The vendetta, interested denunciations, and imaginary plots made up a large part of the work of this department of State. But alongside of much that was personally vindictive, much that was purely imaginative, there were also grains of real conspiracy constantly sown by the emissaries of the Court of Palermo. For it will hardly be too much to say that Saliceti's tenure of office was one long secret duel with Mary Caroline.

From Palermo the defeated Queen urged every step that might restore her stolen throne. Among the refugees who returned to Naples at the threatened confiscation of their estates were many of her spies. Her *capimassi* and agents were landed at every point of the coast. From Ponza Canosa worked a vast network of secret correspondence, that stretched from Naples all over the kingdom. At Leghorn and Florence she had private agents who received instructions and advice from her own hand, often in writing rendered invisible by the use of lemon juice. From Palermo to Capri and from Capri to Leghorn cruised small feluccas conveying her emissaries and correspondence; this cost her large sums, and was eventually of far more profit to her chief agent, Castrone, than to herself, as she afterwards discovered. For several years the Queen spent from one to one and a half million ducats a year on spies, informers, and pensioned Neapolitans.

Mary Caroline's firm belief was that all Naples was for the Bourbons except the lawyers and the aristocracy, and, making allowance for the large neutral mass that had little prejudice except against violent change, the Queen was perhaps not so far wrong. Among the *lazzaroni* and the lower classes at all events there was much unrest, dissatisfaction, and hope for the return of

Ferdinand. The working of the well-organised police under Saliceti's energetic superintendence was an innovation that was far from relished. Crime was sternly repressed ; the streets of Naples were lighted ; large batches of convicts were shipped to Toulon to work at the new docks ; military commissions ordered numerous executions for treasonable offences.

For the executions there was absolute necessity if the French dominion was to be maintained. Already, in June 1806, while the tide of the invaders' first success was yet flowing, there was a conspiracy and attempted rising in Naples. The Sicilian red cockade was shown, but the police was warned, and the trouble was not allowed to come to a head. The date chosen for the outbreak was the 14th of June, anniversary of the capture of Naples by the royalists seven years before, and the whole current of public sympathies, opinions, hopes, and fears recalled the period of the fall of the Parthenopean Republic. But for a time the energies of Mary Caroline and the Sicilian Court were diverted to the insurrection of Calabria, which, fanned into flame by the French defeat at Maida, offered for many weeks some hopes of success for the royal cause. As these hopes declined, conspiracy and agitation were renewed at Naples, and through the winter of 1806 the police was kept vigorously at work.

In the spring of 1807 the royalist intrigues culminated ; but Saliceti held the threads in his hands. In December 1806 a letter had come into the possession of the police addressed by Bruno, who commanded the Sicilian flotilla at Capri, to a royalist partisan named Agostino Jiovine. The letter was answered by the police in the name of Jiovine, and a regular correspondence was carried on for several months, whereby the plans of the Court

became completely known to Saliceti. Mary Caroline's design was apparently to invade Calabria and, on the dispatch of French reinforcements from Naples to the threatened point, to raise an insurrection in the city. The military part of this plan was intrusted to the Prince of Hesse, now recovered from his wounds, and for the present all that need be said of it is that it proved a complete failure. At Naples the danger run by the Government was far greater.

The public mind had been much agitated by distorted rumours on the subject of the winter campaign fought between the French and Russians in eastern Prussia,—so long with undecisive results.¹ The lazzaroni were full of the idea that the time had now come when the French would have to retreat to the north and Ferdinand might reascend the throne; the fear and dismay of the middle and upper class was scarcely less than it had been in 1799. The civic guard anxiously patrolled the city at night. The excitement and rumours increased until at last, when the Government knew that Hesse's expedition was on the point of sailing from Sicily for Calabria, the blow fell. The first week in June had been fixed as the date for the revolt, and it was reported that the burning of the Palazzo Satriano was to be the signal for the approach of Bruno's Sicilian flotilla, and perhaps also of the British vessels off Capri. All this was well known to the police. On the 22nd of May a great number of arrests were ordered, and a perfect reign of terror ensued. A number of the principal royalist leaders were immediately tried, and numerous executions followed, notably those of the Duke di Filomarino and the Marquis Palmieri. On the Piazza del Castello, at one of these executions, the crowd became somewhat

¹ Pultusk, Dec. 25, 1806; Eylau, Feb. 8, 1807; Friedland, June 14, 1807.

disorderly. This proved a sufficient incentive to the civic guards to charge the lazzaroni and to clear the square and adjoining streets, with considerable consequent mortality. The city was seething with excitement, but the resolute bearing of the Government carried the day. For six weeks Naples lived under Saliceti's new reign of terror, of which the culmination was marked by Mosca's attempt.

Agostino Mosca was a leader of free corps of much the same general character as Fra Diavolo ; Ferdinand had granted him the rank of colonel, and when arrested in the woods near Castellamare, just south of Naples, he was attired in the scarlet uniform of the Sicilian army. The part he was intended to fill in the conspiracy was that of assassinating King Joseph, and to attain that object he was heavily armed, though it does not appear precisely in what manner he intended to carry out the deed.

Mosca had been landed through the agency of the Prince of Canosa ; and on him was found, among other things, a bracelet woven from a woman's hair, which he admitted to be that of the Queen's, and to have been given to him by Canosa. Various letters were also found on him ; several from Canosa and the Marchesa di Villa Tranfo, one of Mary Caroline's ladies, inciting him to murder Joseph. One letter in the Queen's own writing, addressed to Mosca, was produced at the trial, and was in the following terms :—

Agostino Mosca, perform zealously and energetically that which you have promised to do for the good service of the king ; if successful, you may rely on my protection. 28th of February 1807. CAROLINA.

The evidence was damning against Mosca, if not against

Mary Caroline. He was tried, found guilty, and duly executed in the Piazza del Mercato, where he died somewhat ungracefully, clad in his scarlet uniform, reeling from too copious potations, and whiningly confessing his crime.¹

For several weeks the police, Saliceti, and terror ruled Naples, and then, in the middle of July, came the news that Napoleon's great victory at Friedland had been followed by a peace signed at Tilsit. All danger of revolt was by this time crushed out, all fear for the stability of the French Empire was removed, and Joseph immediately decreed rejoicings in honour of peace, and proclaimed a general amnesty for political offences (23rd of July 1807).

Thus was foiled the last serious attempt made by the Court of Palermo to unseat King Joseph, and that chiefly owing to the acuteness and remorseless energy of Saliceti. One episode of that attempt that has so far only been briefly alluded to must now be dealt with,—the Prince of Hesse's expedition to Calabria. For the better understanding of events it will now be necessary to return to the course of military affairs in the southern province, and to trace the operations of the French and British for the control of the eastern Mediterranean.

The struggle between the two parties in the Sicilian Court had continued after its arrival at Palermo. Acton, strong in the support of the King and in the failure that had attended Mary Caroline's policy, promptly recovered power. His object, one in which Ferdinand concurred,

¹ Doubts have been thrown on the reality of Mosca's attempt, but there is nothing in the evidence given at the trial that appears at all improbable. As nothing definite has ever been put forward to rebut that evidence one must accept it, though guardedly. In the account here given, the official report has been generally followed. See Saliceti, *Rapporto*; Nicolà, *Diario*; Joseph, *Corr.*

was more to preserve Sicily than to reconquer Naples, and to secure that end he was prepared to place his conduct completely under British guidance. The Queen, at first unduly depressed, soon recovered spirits and influence; she turned openly against her old friend Acton, established the amiable St. Clair as her declared favourite, showed her dislike to the British, and to Elliot in particular, more plainly than before, and entered on a course of which some of the results in Calabria have already been noted. Before the end of 1806 Ferdinand had virtually resigned the direction of affairs once more to his wife, and Acton was honourably sent into retirement. But the Queen's policy remained largely a personal one; St. Clair, who was no politician, counted for nothing.

Among the Sicilians were several parties, but none favourable to the Queen. A few hoped for a French invasion; others derived British sympathies from the increased trade and prosperity of the island; others again dreamed of Sicilian progress and constitutional autonomy; only the band of pensioned Neapolitans and of salaried spies supported the policy of blind vindictiveness pursued by the Queen.

The British generals without exception, — Craig, Stuart, Fox, and Moore, — detested the Queen and her policy. They had witnessed the horrors committed by the *masse* in Calabria, and preferred leaving the British arms unstained by association with them to attempting military operations with their help. After Stuart's return to Messina he had been superseded by Fox, and the latter was soon after succeeded by his second in command, Sir John Moore. The British troops were largely reinforced, and for a time it looked as though the British Cabinet meditated a strong military diversion

against Napoleon in Italy. Russia urged this course, and the failure to effect this diversion was eventually put forward by Russia as an excuse for the signing of a separate peace with France at Tilsit.

But the thought of offensive action in Italy, for a moment flattered by the brilliant stroke at Maida, soon gave way to more pressing considerations. Danger now threatened England at a point much closer to Egypt. By a great diplomatic victory Napoleon had succeeded in detaching Turkey from the ranks of his enemies. British influence no longer predominated at Constantinople; the communications of Russia with the Mediterranean were cut off, and England viewed with misgiving a change in the political arrangements in the East, of which the next development might prove of an even more threatening nature. The Cabinet resolved to attack the Turk vigorously by sea and land, and to make sure of the possession of Egypt. Admiral Duckworth was sent to bombard Constantinople, and Moore received orders to detach 5000 men from Messina for the capture of Alexandria (November 1806).

Just at the time when the British army in Sicily was thus reduced Mary Caroline began meditating the plan for the recovery of the kingdom, of which the projected insurrection of Naples and the assassination of King Joseph were parts. She was anxious to secure the co-operation of the British forces in an invasion of Calabria. Drummond, who had succeeded Fox as British Minister, concurred in Mary Caroline's views, and attempted to persuade Moore into compliance, but in vain. The English general would not co-operate with the Queen on any terms, and Sir John Moore went so far as openly to advocate that she should be removed from the throne.

This refusal only increased Mary Caroline's jealousy and hatred of the British. Her determination to strike her great blow was not shaken. She decided that if British assistance could not be obtained the Sicilian army alone should invade Calabria, and she chose the Prince of Hesse for the chief command.

The Sicilian general selected as his point of disembarkation the extremity of the peninsula. The French had as yet but small detachments south of Monteleone, and had not even attacked the British garrisons left behind by Sir John Stuart after Maida at Reggio and Scilla. He had with him some 5000 Sicilian troops, and advanced directly on Monteleone. A number of *capimassi* accompanied him, including Pane di Grano, Cancellier, Neco, and Carbone. On the evening of the 27th of May he reached Mileto, where he took up a strong position. Régnier had collected a small force at Monteleone, six miles away, to repel the Sicilian invasion. On the night that the Prince of Hesse arrived at Mileto the French general left Monteleone, and at 4.30 of the following morning attacked the invaders' positions in three columns. The action was short and decisive. One Sicilian regiment under a capable officer, Colonel Nunziante, made an honourable defence, the rest fled at the sight of the French bayonets. The *masse* looked on, and so soon as the Sicilians were defeated successfully plundered their baggage train. Hesse lost in the action 1633 men and 6 guns, and only about 1000 of his army returned to Sicily.

The battle of Mileto may serve to mark the end of regular warfare in Calabria. From this time the French generals only had to operate against brigands, and of their doings only the incident connected with the name

of Manhès will require specific mention. It will suffice to say that for the remainder of Joseph's reign brigandage was rife in Calabria, but gradually decreased, and became more and more clearly criminal and non-political. Treachery, barbarity, the burning of villages did not come to a sudden end, nor did the brigands fail on occasion to raise the cry of "Vivano i Borboni!" In February 1808 it was still necessary to detail a whole battalion to escort the army mail in the passes near Lagonegro, but in the spring of that year a very decided improvement set in.

Régnier followed up his success at Mileto by establishing himself firmly on the Strait of Messina. In January 1808 he besieged the Sicilian garrison at Reggio and the British at Scilla, and soon captured these posts. By the middle of February 1808 everything was at last ready for the long-deferred invasion of Sicily; the French general could dispose of 9000 or 10,000 men on the strait, and as many more could be moved up from Naples on short notice. At this moment a difference of opinion between the King and Régnier led that general to leave his command, in which he was replaced by General Cavaignac.

The treaty of Tilsit between Russia and France, signed on the 7th of July 1807, had profoundly modified the European situation, and had enabled Napoleon to turn from the contests of the North towards his cherished schemes for securing supremacy in the Mediterranean. By the terms of that treaty, terms that were intended to be kept secret, the Ionian islands were abandoned to Napoleon by the Czar; the French Emperor lost no time in securing this new stepping-stone towards the East. Troops were at once

dispatched from Taranto and Brindisi to occupy Corfu and other islands. Large shipments of food-stuffs were sent over as the wind favoured escape from the British cruisers, and in November an officer in whom the Emperor placed great reliance, General Donzelot, took command at Corfu after narrowly escaping being captured by an English frigate.

But the provisioning and supplying of Corfu from the ports of Puglia was a slow and expensive process, and Napoleon determined to mark his occupation of this new possession by a considerable naval operation. A plan that Napoleon had prepared a year before, and that Collingwood had always foreseen and feared, was now slightly modified and put into execution.

Early in January 1808 the Emperor decided that the Rochefort fleet should sail around into the Mediterranean, operate its junction with the Toulon fleet, and proceed to Naples. There 9000 men were to be embarked under Marshal Jourdan, and this force co-operating with Régnier's was to effect the crossing of the Strait of Messina. The naval part of this programme was dangerous, but by no means impossible, as was soon proved. From a military point of view the time was well chosen, as a large reduction in the British forces at Messina had just been made, Sir John Moore having been ordered to Gibraltar with some 8000 men. But the Emperor was at heart more anxious about the Ionian islands and Turkey than he was about Sicily, and it was not to Naples but to Corfu that he finally ordered his fleet.¹

On the 10th of February Gantheaume sailed from Toulon with two three-deckers, eight 80- and 74-gun

¹ "Corfu is of so much importance to me that its loss would deal a fatal blow to my plans. . . ."—Napoleon to Joseph, Feb. 7, 1808, Joseph, *Corr.* iv. 128.

ships, several frigates, four transports, and some smaller vessels, and shaped a course due south, for the Tunisian coast. A storm dispersed the fleet, but after a rapid passage Gantheaume and his subordinate Cosmao anchored, the one at Corfu on the 23rd of February, the other at Taranto two days later. The French admirals soon joined forces, poured a large supply of food and munitions of war into Corfu, and set sail for Toulon again, which they reached unmolested. So elated was Napoleon at the complete success of this naval expedition that he wrote to congratulate Gantheaume on his success in warm terms, and announced the increase of the French navy and preparations for the early convoy of 20,000 men and 800 horses to an important point.

Just as when Napoleon had sailed the length of the Mediterranean to Egypt in 1798, so now again ten years later the British fleet had been unable to find the enemy and engage. Collingwood had hurried into the Mediterranean in the wake of the Rochefort fleet, anxious to protect the British army in Sicily. On the 6th of December the British admiral was cruising off Syracuse when he was informed that the Toulon fleet was at sea. The news was premature, but Collingwood sailed towards Corfu, where he awaited the French till the first week in January. Getting no further information, however, he returned to Sicily. He then slowly cruised around the island, reaching its north-western point just at the time when Gantheaume was leaving Toulon and running down the Sardinian coast towards Africa. But Collingwood could get no tidings of the French, and, while Gantheaume was circling to the south, cruised within call of Messina and Palermo. Finally he made his way slowly northwards up the

Italian coast, but not until Gantheaume had accomplished his mission and was heading for Toulon once more.

Collingwood's mortification at having failed to find the French fleet was extreme, and this failure served to show that, notwithstanding the great British victories, there was yet sufficient strength in her adversary and a sufficient element of uncertainty in naval warfare to make possible a vital blow at Great Britain's maritime ascendancy. If, instead of sailing to Corfu while the British were at Palermo, Gantheaume had conveyed 10,000 men to Palermo while the British were at Corfu, it appears far from improbable that Sicily would have changed masters. At all events, though little enough was ever to come from it, Napoleon's maritime blow was successfully struck. Corfu was victualled and supplied with munitions; and another effect was gained, for Gantheaume's success produced a deeper impression on the sea-depending Neapolitans than any four such distant Napoleonic triumphs as Austerlitz or Friedland.

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CHAPTER VI

BAYONNE—MURAT, KING OF NAPLES

Attempt on Saliceti—Finance—Army—Legislation—Napoleon's policy—Imperial succession—Joseph, Eugène, and Italy—Venice interview—Spanish affairs—British policy—Fox—Abdication of Charles IV.—Constitutional statute—Murat, King of Naples, his life, marriage, and character—Style adopted—Entry into Naples—Impression produced—Capri taken—Amnesty—Napoleon, Joachim, and Caroline—Fouché—Metternich intrigue—Disgrace of Talleyrand—Coolness between Joachim and Napoleon.

THE last few months of Joseph Bonaparte's short reign as King of Naples were marked by only one striking incident, an after effect of the projected revolt crushed by Saliceti in June 1807. The lazzaroni, though cowed, were still firmly convinced that Ferdinand's return would not be long delayed. Royalist agents still found plenty of listeners and helpers. If a revolution appeared for the moment out of the question, it might be possible to be at least revenged against the Government's chief agent of repression.

Saliceti inhabited the Palazzo Maresca on the Riviera di Chiaja with his daughter and her husband, the Neapolitan Duke di Lavello. The building was of three stories, and had its ground floor let off as shops with separate entrances on the street. The chief

apartments of the house were immediately over these shops. At one o'clock in the morning of the 31st of January 1808 Saliceti was driven home. He was just ascending the stairs of the palace when a terrific explosion occurred and he was thrown to his feet. A great hole had been blown through more than twenty rooms of the Palazzo Maresca, and a great mass of débris had crashed down into the courtyard. Everything was plunged in darkness and in a moment the whole neighbourhood was panic-stricken.

Saliceti, by a miraculous chance, escaped. He had been thrown down, badly bruised, and cut, but save for an ugly gash in his left cheek, he was not seriously wounded. The Duke and Duchess of Lavello had been hurled from the room where they were sleeping into a mass of wreckage that filled the courtyard of the palace; they were soon extricated, and were found to have suffered nothing more serious than bruises and lacerations. One servant was killed, however, and several were dangerously wounded. The police were soon on the spot and busy. In the course of the morning numerous arrests were made; and a technical inquiry conducted by Generals Campredon and Dedon showed conclusively that the explosion had been caused by an infernal machine. Before many hours had passed, several of the assassins were in the hands of the police.

The trial revealed the following facts. One of the shops under the Palazzo Maresca was let to an apothecary, Don Onofrio Viscardi, who was, though not in any very zealous or prominent way, a Bourbonist. On the night of the 28th of January his two sons, Domenico and Pasquale, with three other men, entered his shop. They had just arrived in Naples, having come from Palermo by way of Ponza in a small sailing vessel.

They told the apothecary that they were acting under instructions from the Prince of Canosa, who had been appointed Viceroy of Naples, and that their mission was to make away with Saliceti. The old apothecary reluctantly allowed himself to be persuaded to give up the key to a small store-room at the back of his shop, and here the conspirators placed a shell containing about 100 lbs. of gunpowder. It was this engine that wrought the destruction.

The manner in which the trial was conducted and the official report cannot inspire much confidence. Onofrio Viscardi saved his life by giving evidence, and it is not difficult to believe that he stated whatever the police suggested to him. The public prosecutor put his case forward as follows: "The ex-Queen, Canosa, Pasquale Viscardi and his companions are the authors and the executors of this attempt." A correspondence carried on with high-placed personages at Palermo was put in and proved by Viscardi, in which the King and Queen were constantly referred to, though not in a way directly implicating them. On the whole it cannot be said that anything very material was proved beyond the facts of the explosion and the agency of the Viscardis. The Court, however, fully accepted the contentions of the public prosecutor, and condemned Domenico Viscardi and one of his accomplices to death; Pasquale Viscardi had not been caught, and so escaped the death penalty. Several other accomplices received lesser sentences.¹

Although the Sicilians had not succeeded in killing Saliceti, they had shaken him severely, for it was nearly

¹ *Processo per l' esplosione, passim*; the evidence of Onofrio Viscardi is of such doubtful value that in this particular instance it would appear best to accept Helfert's vindication of Mary Caroline. But one may adopt the Austrian historian's conclusion without entirely sharing his confidence.

two months before he was again seen in public; but, fortunately, his presence was not now so essential to the conduct of affairs as it had been a few months earlier. How far matters had progressed towards a normal course can be judged from a rapid glance at the affairs of the various departments of State.

The treasury receipts that amounted to 900,000 ducats per month in October 1807, reached 1,000,000 in February 1808, and at that figure balanced expenditure. The Neapolitan army had rapidly grown. In the summer of 1807, when Napoleon was trying to recover from the heavy losses inflicted on him by Bennigsen in Poland, three Neapolitan regiments, some 4000 men, had been sent to northern Italy. In March 1808 the Neapolitan native army mustered 21,600 men. In the field of legislation various decrees issued in the early months of 1808, bearing chiefly on criminal law, paved the way for the introduction of a code.¹ Martial law was not yet, however, entirely dispensed with, and it was enacted (May 12, 1808) that all enemies landing, not forming part of the regular army or drawn from the galleys, should be court-martialled and shot. Brigandage, except in some parts of Calabria, had fallen to normal proportions, and was being actively dealt with by the civil and military authorities. As a general rule the brigands acted in small bands and for the purpose of robbery. Murders were not infrequent, but atrocities quite exceptional. The finances of the State were now in a position to afford some relief to the sufferers from lawlessness, and in the last few months of Joseph's reign the grants of money to victims

¹ *Bulletino delle Leggi*, 1808, 209 (decree on judicial organization); 230 (procedure before justices of peace and tribunals); 299 (operative); 301 (criminal law and penalties); 429 (operative).

of brigandage were frequent, in one case 1,000,000 ducats being allocated from the proceeds of sale of monastic lands for this purpose.

The time was now fast approaching when might be expected the cessation of the evils that had attended the change of dynasty at Naples, and the fruition of the great reforms introduced ; but just at this moment it was fated that Joseph should resign his Italian throne. He was only a piece in the world-wide game of chess in which Napoleon had made kings his pawns, and a new phase of the game now required Joseph's presence on another square.

The twelve months that elapsed between Tilsit and Bayonne mark the central point of the history of the French Empire. Before this was the struggle to obtain mastery, afterwards the struggle to retain it. All questions of external policy seem to go up to or come down from that culminating point, and it is time to see what relation the affairs of Naples bore to the other great questions then revolved by Napoleon. After Austerlitz his fortune had appeared firmly established. The Empire was crowned by victory ; public confidence and financial stability were both assured. Napoleon returned to Paris an appreciably changed and older man physically, and no less so politically. The eighth day of Nivôse of the year XIV. had marked the end of a period, the 1st day of January 1806 ushered in a new one. From this date the Empire might be viewed as an established institution, and the question of how it was to be carried on as an institution, that is, apart from the life of one man, rapidly made headway as one of vital moment. The question of his succession was indirectly involved in the Italian policy of the Emperor.

Joseph Bonaparte, as the eldest and as the most docile of the Emperor's brothers, had some pretensions. The decree by which he was appointed King of Naples, although it precluded the joining of the French and Neapolitan crowns, had not excluded Joseph from his brother's succession. In northern Italy a similarly ambiguous state of affairs prevailed. In the designation of what had formerly been the Cisalpine Republic, and in his declarations to the Lombard representatives at Lyons, Napoleon had indicated the possibility of Italian nationality. In a note of Champagny to Cardinal Caprara he had declared that "all Italy, Rome, Naples, and Milan form an offensive and defensive league."¹ In his offers of renouncing the crown of Italy in 1805, in his acquiescence in the generally expressed view that his stepson, the Viceroy Eugène Beauharnais, might soon wear a crown, Napoleon left vague and dangerously unsettled not only the question of Italian nationality but that of the succession to the French throne.

Although for a time it appeared as if the Emperor would direct that succession through the line of his brother Louis, whom he had made King of Holland, yet it was clear to thinking minds that if Napoleon's life was cut short,—and it was menaced from many sides,—none but a man of conspicuous ability and character could possibly hope to succeed him. One of the Emperor's faults,—a fault without which he would not have reached the eminence he did,—was the tenacity with which he clung to power. He could not bear to surrender one iota of his authority, and in that respect had well chosen his two Italian subordinates: Eugène, who always obeyed orders with military punctiliousness; Joseph, who, playing the king to his subjects, played

¹ Schoell, *Recueil*, i. 136.

the subject to Napoleon. The Emperor was well pleased with Joseph, whose subservience contrasted favourably with the independence of Louis and Lucien, and in the first week of December 1807 a very cordial interview between the two brothers took place at Venice. At this meeting the affairs of Naples, of Sicily, and of the East were discussed, and it appears probable that Napoleon also touched on the probability of a French intervention in Spain.

During the early weeks of 1808 the attention of the Emperor appeared centred on Turkey and the East, and he supported Ganteaume's expedition to Corfu by diplomatic negotiations, of which the object was a partition of Turkey between France, Austria, and Russia. But these negotiations were not easy to conduct, and by the month of March Napoleon was seriously considering another move that appeared easier of accomplishment. Under pretext of the difficulties between France and Portugal a number of French corps had been sent south of the Pyrenees, ostensibly as allies of Spain. Napoleon now appointed his brother-in-law Joachim Murat, Grand Duke of Berg, commander-in-chief, and gave him instructions to occupy Madrid. The events that followed belong more properly to the history of Napoleon than to that of Naples. Suffice it to say that the Emperor probably anticipated that he could conquer Spain as easily as he had Portugal a few months before. But before going further the development of Napoleonic aggression in the direction of Spain must be viewed more closely in connection with the relations between France and Great Britain.

In 1806, with Fox as Prime Minister, peace had been for a moment in sight. Fox was the only statesman whose inclination and whose influence could have

made peace. Napoleon had a genuine regard for the Whig leader, and appears for a time to have negotiated in expectation of a settlement. In June 1806 he had written to Joseph that only the question of Sicily still divided Talleyrand and Lord Yarmouth. An indemnity to King Ferdinand for the abandonment of Sicily was finally discussed, and the recognition of Joseph as King of the Two Sicilies was virtually accepted by the British Cabinet. The compensation to the Bourbon king was to be the Balearic Islands, together with some American possessions.¹ The death of Fox in September of the same year brought these negotiations to nothing, and removed the last chance of an understanding between the two great rivals.

The Tory Cabinet that succeeded Fox pursued a less conciliatory policy towards France, a less inconsiderate policy towards Sicily. On the 30th of March 1807 Drummond, the British Minister at Palermo, concluded with the Marquis of Circello, Minister for Foreign Affairs, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive. It was provided by this treaty that neither party should come to a separate peace, that an annual subsidy of three hundred thousand pounds sterling should be paid by England to Sicily for military purposes, and that England should defend Messina and Augusta with 10,000 men.

England's failure in her double attack on Turkey and Egypt shortly before this treaty was signed had resulted in the return of her troops to Sicily, and that island had now come to be looked on as the indispensable basis of her operations in the Mediterranean. Had not Napoleon at this period attempted the conquest of the Spanish peninsula it appears probable that

¹ Undated memorandum, *Foreign Off. Sicily*, 30; cf. Napoleon, *Corr.* xiii. 41.

England would soon have attempted military operations on a large scale against Naples. As it was, Junot's march on Lisbon was promptly answered by sending Sir John Moore, with 8000 men, from Messina to Portugal, where he was, a few months later, to fight the campaign that terminated at Corunna. From this beginning arose that famous and obstinate war of the Peninsula that raged for six years, and the fluctuations of which will have more than once to be taken into account when relating the history of southern Italy for the same period.

At the end of March 1808 Murat occupied Madrid at the head of a large army. A few weeks later Napoleon proceeded to Bayonne. There he saw Charles IV. of Spain and his son Ferdinand. On the 5th of May the Emperor obtained from the Spanish sovereign a renunciation of the throne, and on the 11th he dispatched what was practically an order to Joseph to assume the Spanish crown. "You will receive this letter on the 19th," he wrote, "you will leave on the 20th, and you will arrive here on the 1st of June." Such was the military precision with which Napoleon manœuvred his vassal sovereigns.

Joseph was well trained. He received his brother's orders on the 21st of May, and left Naples on the 23rd, virtually intrusting the government to Marshal Jourdan and Saliceti; they were well fitted to exercise dictatorial power during an interregnum. The object of the King's sudden journey was not given out to the public. The announcement was not, however, long delayed. Within a few days of his arrival at Bayonne Joseph wrote a letter to Roederer, in which he informed him of his change of crowns, and expressed regret at leaving

Naples just when the results of their labours might be looked for. He added that it was his intention, with the Emperor's sanction, to issue a constitutional decree as his parting benefaction to his subjects.

A few days later Joseph's accession to the throne of Spain and his constitutional concession were officially announced in the following extremely characteristic proclamation :—

BAYONNE, *June 23, 1808.*

JOSEPH NAPOLEON, KING OF NAPLES AND SICILY

PEOPLE OF THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES—

Providence, whose designs are inscrutable, having called us to the throne of Spain and the Indies, we have been placed under the cruel necessity of leaving a people we have had such good cause to love, whose happiness was the dearest care of our heart, the one object of our ambition. He alone who reads in the hearts of men can judge of the sincerity of our sentiments, notwithstanding which we have obeyed another call, have accepted another burden, imposed on us by the concession of rights over the crown of Spain acquired by our august brother H.M. the Emperor of the French and King of Italy.

In these solemn circumstances, convinced that institutions alone are permanent, we have perceived with some grief that your social organization, undertaken by us, was not yet complete, and we have thought that, inasmuch as we were going far from you, all the more was the obligation incumbent on us to secure in every way possible your present and future happiness. We have therefore put the finishing touch to our work by completing the Constitutional Statute of the Kingdom on the lines already partly laid down, and in the way best adapted for the necessities of our times, for our relations with neighbouring states, for the national character, a knowledge of which we have striven to acquire from the moment at which we assumed the responsibility of power, to the best advantage possible under the circumstances in which we were placed.

The principal objects aimed at in this document will be :—

1. The preservation of our Sacred Religion.
2. The creation of a public Treasury distinct from the Crown revenues.
3. The creation of an intermediate body and of a national Parliament, capable of enlightening the Sovereign, and of rendering him useful services, as well as to the Nation.
4. A judicial organization that shall leave the judges independent of the Sovereign, and that shall treat all citizens as equals before the law.
5. A municipal organization that shall be monopolized by no one, but aid all.
6. The protection of those institutions which we have founded, by means of which the creditors of the State may be paid, and, it is to be hoped, the debts which we found so burdensome on our assumption of the Crown may before long be liquidated.

As the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, our august brother, desires to interpose his authoritative and potent guarantee in this act which lies so near our heart, we feel confident that our hopes for the welfare of our deeply-beloved people of the Kingdom of Naples will not be deluded, reposing as they do on the stainless arch of his immense glory.

JOSEPH.

The constitutional statute was published at the same date as Joseph's farewell proclamation ; it was constitutional more in name than in fact. The only serious step it contained towards popular government was a provision for an assembly pompously and misleadingly described as a *Parlamento nazionale* (Tit. viii.). This assembly, which was never convened, was to be made up of five orders,—clergy, nobility, landowners, men of learning, and merchants,—each sending twenty delegates. All these delegates were to be nominated by the Crown with the sole exception of the twenty landowners, who

were to be annually chosen by selected voters named by the Crown. From the tenor of this, by far the most important concession of the statute, may be judged the spirit in which it was granted by Joseph, or rather by Napoleon. And if this so-called constitution never came into effect it was more owing to its uselessness than to its liberality. The reality was that, proceeding from Joseph, it meant nothing, proceeding from Napoleon it meant only this: that he wanted to reconcile the people of Spain to his usurpation by demonstrating that his rule was synonymous with benevolence and liberalism.

Having now for the second time removed an occupant of the throne of Naples, it became necessary for Napoleon once more to provide a King. This time his choice fell on a soldier, a companion-in-arms, the brilliancy of whose military career and the closeness of whose connection with the Emperor made it impossible for him to be overlooked,—the Grand Duke of Berg, Great Admiral of the Empire, and Commander-in-Chief of the French armies in Spain.

Joachim Murat had not risen so high as Napoleon, but he had risen nearly as much, for his start had been humbler. He was only the son of a postmaster, and was born at La Bastide Fortunière, near Cahors, in Gascony, on the 25th of March 1771. His father's walk of life determined Murat's great love and understanding of horses; and although his earliest education was for the church, a youthful escapade very naturally landed him in the ranks of a cavalry regiment. He proved as fractious to military as to theological discipline, and before many months had passed was dismissed from the army for insubordination. But on the break-

ing out of the Revolution he became an ardent patriot, and once more tried the trade of arms. In 1791 he received his first promotion, the first of many that were to follow, and thus naively recorded the matter in a letter to his brother: "I am working hard to get promotion and shall succeed. I shall soon be made corporal."¹ A year later he wrote again: "At last I am a sub-lieutenant, from which my family will gather that I have not had to show too much patience."² Four years later he was Colonel of the 21st Dragoons, and attached to the first army that Bonaparte commanded. At the battle of Mondovi, the *représentant du peuple*, Saliceti, noticed his brilliant conduct, and got him promoted to the rank of general.

Had Murat's military career been in the old army and under Bourbon auspices, it is extremely improbable that his name would ever have emerged from the obscurity of the ranks; his low birth and his impetuosity would equally have told against him. But his remarkable military aptitude, his fiery, undisciplined temperament and patriotic fervour brought him opportunity, recognition, and rapid promotion in the loosely organized and democratic armies of the First Republic. The Revolution had transformed the art of war, as it had transformed so many institutions and habits. The system of evolutions founded on the traditions of Frederic, but no longer vivified by his genius, had degenerated into an artificial and largely unsound method of tactics, allied with a vicious theory of a war of positions. To keep every company of a regiment in solid line had come to be looked on as of greater importance than to seize house, wood, or hill by means of skirmishers; to capture a fortress according to the

¹ Murat, *Corr.* i. 5.

² *Ibid.* i. 6.

rules of Vauban of more importance than to overrun a fertile but unfortified province ; to maintain winter quarters for a regularly established number of months of more importance than to strike a decisive, but theoretically irregular, blow. The volunteers of the Revolution and their improvised generals shattered these military ideals. To the machine-like manœuvres of the Duke of Brunswick's Prussians, Dumouriez answered triumphantly with his ragged and half-armed lines chanting the *Marseillaise* in world-resounding cadence ; at Jemmappes the Austrian commanders were as completely shocked as they were defeated by Belliard galloping over their intrenchments at the head of a regiment of hussars. Brune captured men-of-war in the frozen Zuyder Zee with cavalry. The brilliant young generals of the Revolution soon evolved from their apparent deficiencies, and from their experience of victory, a new system of warfare. Rapidity of movement, paid for at nearly any price ; complete disregard for obstacles, seasons, and the accepted maxims of war ; irregular tactics in which the soldiers' intelligence and initiative were employed ; a large use of skirmishers ; more confused, more rapid, and more headlong attack ; a prosecution of victory by every means possible to horsemen, and at all risks, without consideration for the formation of the parade ground ;— these became the fundamental articles of the creed of the great school of soldiers whose most skilful and most methodical master was Napoleon.

In such a school Murat could not fail to reach a high rank. His exceptional ability as a leader of horse was quickly recognised by Napoleon. For he had an unerring judgment in manœuvring any number of horsemen, a perfect eye for country and for pace, to which he added

lightning-like decision, and a courage with just the proportion of recklessness that makes a great leader of cavalry. The man who would lead horsemen must take risks, must ride in front, in plain view; Murat's striking person was soon familiar to every trooper of the French army. With only a switch in his hand, gorgeously attired, his hat surmounted with tufts of feathers clasped with diamonds and rubies, long lines of glittering horsemen galloping behind him, the extraordinary, flaming figure of Joachim Murat soon fed the legends of every camp fire. His was the brilliant apparition that the Austrian, Prussian, or Russian most dreaded to see bursting from the whirling dust-cloud that swept across the battle-field. Ever foremost in battle, and riding into his opponents' ranks, he never made use of sword or pistol, and prided himself on never having killed a man. So exceptional was his courage, so picturesque his personality, that the Czar Alexander is reported to have issued orders that no Russian soldier was to fire at him; yet so irresistible was his instinct for charging any and every force of the enemy he might meet, that the French troopers had nicknamed him "le boucher de l'armée," while the Empress Joséphine once declared that he positively reeked of gunpowder, and would have sabred the Eternal Father himself. The Maréchal de Castellane, at one time attached to his staff, has left the following account of Murat and of one of the extraordinary costumes he loved to appear in :—

A braver man than the King of Naples is not to be found; he faces greater dangers than his troopers. Wherever a shot is fired, there he will certainly be found, dressed in some such way as this—a wide hat trimmed with heavy gold braid, over that a white plume surmounted by a long white egrette surrounded

with other feathers ; his hair long and curled ; a cloak of green velvet trimmed with gold braid, under that a sky-blue frogged tunic, also braided with gold . . . ; crimson breeches of Polish fashion, braided with gold ; and yellow boots.

Murat's personal appearance was as striking as his manner of attiring himself. His heavy lips and mouth, his large blue eyes, and masses of curling black hair, gave him a somewhat coarse and sensual appearance that was only redeemed by the strength marked by the line of the nose and brow, and by the affability proclaimed by the winning smile that rarely left him.

From the opening of the Italian campaign of 1796, Murat's rise was rapid. Notwithstanding a personal incident in which both he and Joséphine Bonaparte showed some little indiscretion, he became one of his commander's most trusted subordinates. He followed him to Egypt, and there proved himself a horseman worthy to cross sabres with the Mameluk cavalry. He was one of the few selected to return to France with Bonaparte, and the choice turned out fortunate, for on the 18th of Brumaire, when the would-be dictator faltered before the storm of Republican anger that greeted him in the Council of Five Hundred, it was Murat's arm that supported and sheltered him from their fury ; it was Murat who brought his grenadiers into the Hall ; it was Murat who at that doubtful moment rent the existing Constitution with his bayonets, saved Napoleon from Cæsar's fate, and made possible the Consulate and the Empire.

His services, though not proclaimed from the house-tops, were fittingly rewarded. He was made Commander-in-Chief of the French troops in Italy, and there began to show that his mind was not entirely given up to military matters. He successfully cultivated

the good graces of the Pope, who showed him great marks of esteem. He also made a flying visit to Naples, acting on Napoleon's prophetic prompting, "Ce sont des connaissances locales qu'on ne se repent jamais d'avoir."¹ At Naples, where he only stayed a few days, his striking presence, affability, and open-handed generosity created a favourable impression. King Ferdinand, more from fear than any other sentiment, offered him the Orders of the Kingdom. How little could he foresee that but seven years later the strange-looking, low-born republican general whom he secretly viewed with contempt, would be sitting with greater magnificence and greater prestige than his own on the throne from which he now condescended to honour him!

In the early campaigns of the Empire, Murat held supreme command of the cavalry, and took a brilliant part, especially in the destruction of the Prussian army after Jena. He became Grand Duke of Berg, a considerable principality on the borders of Holland, and entered the Confederation of the Rhine. In 1808, when it came to Spain's turn to enjoy the benefits of French invasion, it was to the Grand Duke that was given the supreme command of the large army collected for the purpose. It was in the early part of May, while his headquarters were at Madrid, that Murat received his greatest and, as it proved, final promotion. Napoleon offered him his choice between the thrones of Portugal and Naples. There may have been a moment's hesitation; there may have been disappointment that the apparently richer prize of Spain was not destined for him. But Murat's mind did not balance long on the alternative offered for his consideration,

¹ "One never regrets this sort of local knowledge."—Napoleon to Murat, July 27, 1801.

and his choice prudently fell on the crown just vacated by Joseph Bonaparte.

An important factor in the rise of Murat had been his marriage. Shortly after Brumaire Maria Annunziata, afterwards named Caroline, youngest sister of the First Consul, became his wife. Caroline Bonaparte had all the traits of beauty usual in her family; good features, fine eyes, a perfect skin, delicately modelled hands and feet. She resembled Napoleon in character more closely perhaps than did any other of his brothers or sisters. Napoleon said that in her was "much stuff, much character, and unbounded ambition"; he might with equal justice have said it of himself. In Caroline ambition was, in truth, the master passion, and made her dominate other failings, and to a certain extent preserve appearances which her sisters were far too apt to neglect.

The marriage of Joachim Murat and Caroline Bonaparte was a love match. General Thiébault has left in his Memoirs a delightful glimpse of them in the early days:—

I had breakfast with General Murat. . . . It would not have been easy to be more simple than was Murat, more unaffected than was the future Queen of Naples . . . she as lovely as an angel, he superb in figure, in strength, in features . . . covered with laurels gathered in Italy, in Germany, in Egypt,—was there anything lacking to complete their happiness and their hopes? . . . After an excellent breakfast served on handsome china, a coarse earthenware pot was brought in containing some *raisiné*: "This is one of our provincial titbits," said Murat; "my mother makes it and sends it me."¹

The early affection of the Murats unfortunately

¹ Thiébault, *Mems.* iii. 141; *raisiné* is a preserve into which pears, grapes, and other ingredients enter.

dwindled, though some show of fondness and an official pretence of correct conjugal relations was maintained. Before long Caroline's ambition began to play a large part in the life of husband and wife. Murat required little enough pushing on the road on which his wife was urging him, and on this subject complete harmony long subsisted between them. However far the unreasonable exigencies of Napoleonic warfare might lead him, Murat always had at Paris a scheming, plotting, bold and unscrupulous agent, in whose hands his interests were constantly being pushed. Right and left Caroline made friends, and at any cost. No one could predict the future—and what could be more possible than that the Emperor might be killed in battle? Foreseeing that possibility and others, Caroline cultivated with success the friendship of Junot, military Governor of Paris. She also made a friend, who later stood her in good stead, in the person of the Austrian Ambassador, Count Metternich.

The grant of the crown of Naples to Joachim and Caroline satisfied an ambition they had long felt. Caroline was now the equal in rank of her brothers Louis and Joseph, and Joachim satisfied a desire that had arisen as early as 1806, when he already aspired to become monarch of a resuscitated kingdom of Poland.

With Murat now a king the question must be asked : what were his qualifications for that exalted position ? As a corporal he had deserved promotion at his colonel's hands ; as a colonel, the *représentant du peuple* Saliceti had commended him ; as a general, Napoleon had made him his Master of the Horse ; was he likely to win equal success as a king ? Without any question he possessed that most conspicuous of all kingly qualities, military courage. His ability

as a leader of cavalry has already been noticed, but it must be added that as a commander-in-chief he could not be placed in the first rank of the generals of his day,—in the same rank as Masséna or Wellington. Murat could lead troops, but he was often far too impetuous ; he did not excel in organizing, was a bad disciplinarian, and had no eye for the selection of subordinates. When he became King of Naples, men of no military capacity rose from captains to generals in a few years, while in France officers of the finest abilities, Régnier, Belliard, St. Cyr and so many others, could barely earn a step by long and extraordinary services.

Murat's open-handed bountifulness perhaps became a kingly part, perhaps helped to make his striking personality popular, but it demoralized the Neapolitan army. His bearing was dignified, his demeanour affable, his smile engaging, a military brusqueness covered with a becoming veil lapses into the language or behaviour of the camp. He was by no means deficient in ability and political instinct, but he always remained thoroughly Gascon in his suspiciousness and jealousy of control. Murat spoke Italian well, and was always able to hold his own in the discussions of his Ministers. If his qualities proved not sufficient to retain the difficult crown he was called on to wear, yet it might fairly be said of him, as an old German diplomat once told Cavaignac, that there was no other king in Europe better fitted for the part he had to play. In political ability he was the equal of most of the European sovereigns, in goodness of heart he excelled most, in the military virtues he was the superior of all.

One more trait must be added to complete the portrait of the new King of Naples, one the importance of which has been somewhat exaggerated. He was

very given to exhibitions of what was known as sensibility, a fashionable habit of emotional exaggeration then prevalent. This habit frequently threw him into paroxysms of tears, and together with a hasty temper led to many scenes in which Caroline generally played the more dignified and not least successful part. It will be seen that when Murat reached the great crisis of his life, his hastiness and sensibility became matters of considerable political importance.

On the 28th of June the *Monitore* announced the elevation of Joseph to the crown of Spain, and on the 2nd of August it published the decrees proclaiming the accession to the throne of Naples of Joachim Murat and his guarantee of the constitutional statute. The style adopted by the new king in these decrees ran as follows: "Gioacchino Napoleone, per la grazia di Dio e per la costituzione dello Stato Re delle Due Sicilie."

On the 6th of September King Joachim made his formal entry into his capital. He rode through the streets attired in one of his most brilliant uniforms, and followed by a large and glittering staff. At the Cathedral of San Gennaro a solemn service was held, and illuminations followed. The people appeared greatly pleased with their new monarch's splendid and martial appearance, with his radiant and smiling face, and gave him a good welcome. The general satisfaction was increased by the fact that there had been a widespread fear lest Joseph's removal might result in the incorporation of Naples with the French Empire. Two weeks later Caroline arrived; her handsome presence and bearing producing a favourable impression.

Murat, with characteristic impetuosity, lost not a moment in giving to his reign the military impulse it could

not fail to have. His bearing and affability made an instantaneous and profound impression on the Neapolitan officers who were received by him ; he expressed the utmost confidence in them, and promised them victory, glory, and promotion. They were completely dazzled, and saw in him a second Charles XII.

From the windows and terrace of the Palazzo Reale, that Joachim Murat now occupied, may be seen one of the most lovely and majestic views in the world. The Bay of Naples stretches its dancing blue waters across from the busy arsenal towards the long, curving sweep of coast over which the lofty cone of Vesuvius rears its smoking crest. Along the distant cliffs of Sorrento, whence white villas flash back the rays of the descending sun, the coast curves further and further towards the open mouth, where the long rocky back of Capri, like a slumbering dragon of the waters, guards the entrance to the bay. This is the culminating point of the landscape ; it was the point that, in the year 1808, drew the soldier's and the sovereign's eye. Was he the master, was he the lord of that wonderful country, or was that Power whose hostile flag waved on the topmost summit of the island ? For several days after he took possession of the palace, Joachim paced the terrace, often stopping and gazing at Capri through a telescope, and finally he resolved on its capture.

The operation on which the King now directed all his energies was one of extreme difficulty,—foolhardy, as a British officer described it. The island of Capri is about three miles long from east to west by half as wide. It is entirely mountainous, and presents a nearly unbroken line of cliff. The landing-places are two small open roadsteads,—one to the north, the other to the south ; between them the island is narrower and

lower than at its eastern and western points. On the crest between the landing-places was perched the little town of Capri, the fortifications of which and of the whole island had been much strengthened by the Governor, Major Hudson Lowe. Five forts and numerous breastworks made doubly strong this natural fortress, and had earned for it the name of the "little Gibraltar." Sir John Stuart had recently added to Hudson Lowe's garrison, which consisted of an excellent battalion of Corsican Rangers, a battalion of recently recruited Maltese riflemen, of rather poor quality.

The Neapolitan preparations were quickly made and with great secrecy. A considerable number of small gun vessels were got ready, including twenty-five equipped and presented to the King on his accession by the merchants of Naples; this flotilla was placed under the command of the brave and dashing Captain Bausan, a Neapolitan officer trained in the British navy. Detachments were carefully picked from the regiments quartered at Naples, and early in the morning of the 4th of October 1500 grenadiers and chasseurs left Naples for Capri in sixty boats. A similar detachment of 400 men started from Salerno at the same time. Lamarque was in command and d'Hautpoul was in charge of the engineers. One frigate, one corvette, and twenty-six gun vessels convoyed the troops.

Joachim, with Régnier and Saliceti, and attended by his staff, took up his position at the nearest point of the mainland, the Punta di Campanella, and followed the operations through a telescope. The flotilla divided into three sections, and at about 3 P.M. the leading one got close in under the cliffs at the south-eastern corner of the island, and the men scrambled from the boats

on to the rocks and began to work their way up the cliffs.

At Anacapri, towards the south-west of the island, the French equally made good a lodgment, and by means of ladders and ropes began clambering up towards the plateau. It was now discovered that the precipitous nature of the ascent was more of an advantage than a difficulty to the assailants, for the Maltese riflemen posted on the edge of the plateau above could find no mark they could hit so directly below them. The fact that the defenders were raw recruits, the attackers picked veterans, decided this curious combat in favour of the French. Well led by Lamarque and a number of experienced officers, the grenadiers and voltigeurs, in groups and singly, worked their way up the cliffs, took shelter, and opened fire as opportunity offered, and although in some places parties had to pass the whole night in exposed positions midway up the cliffs, yet by the following morning the plateau of Anacapri with many prisoners had fallen into the hands of the French; this gave them complete control of the western half of the island.

The situation that followed was curious. Hudson Lowe withdrew his forces into the town of Capri and the French overran the two high ends of the island, got a foothold at the northern landing-place, and there managed to land one or two small guns to attack the garrison. But the French seemed no more able to carry the town than the British to drive them from the island. A deadlock ensued that lasted for two weeks, and that Murat watched with the utmost impatience from the Punta di Campanella. During this time high winds and storms cut off Lamarque from communications, drove some British cruisers from the neighbour-

hood of the island, and compelled General Macfarlane, who had embarked three regiments at Messina for Lowe's relief, to return to port. Finally, on the 18th of October, having reached the end of his supplies and munitions, the British Governor surrendered with 780 men. The terms of capitulation provided that they should be prisoners of war for one year on parole. Thus King Joachim, within six weeks of ascending the throne, accomplished the brilliant feat of removing the British colours from the all but impregnable rock whence they menaced the security of his capital.¹ So delighted was the King at this auspicious beginning of his reign, or so beneficial did he judge the impression produced by his victory, that he immediately proclaimed an amnesty for all political offences.

With Joseph on the throne, the relations of Naples with France had always been on a clear and well-defined basis, for his pliancy and subservience to his brother were beyond all possibility of question. But with the new king a totally new position immediately arose.

Joachim Murat was too much a man of action, too successful, too self-reliant, tamely to submit to any encroachment on what he considered his due. At the time when Napoleon had made him Grand Duke of Berg he had already, perhaps rather ridiculously, asserted his rights as against the Emperor. Napoleon asked

¹ A few well-known incidents of the capture of Capri have been purposely omitted as being of slight importance. One of these is the retreat of Church's company from Anacapri, another is that of Colletta's reconnaissance of the island. The Neapolitan historian's account of this last matter is clearly apocryphal in part; to discuss how many grains of truth his account contains appeared unnecessary and uninteresting. As to Colletta's credibility see Quintavalle, Pignatelli-Strongoli, *Discorsi*; Borrelli, *Appendice*. On Colletta's own showing, d'Hautpoul rejected his proffered advice.

him to give up the fortress of Wesel to the Empire, for which he offered in exchange the duchy of Nassau, and the principality of Dissemburg ; the Grand Duke flatly declined, and talked, in loud, Gascon fashion, of shutting himself up in Wesel and defending it to the last cartridge. Finally, it became necessary to send a detachment of French troops to occupy the fortress without the Grand Duke's consent. This was only a foretaste of what was soon to come.

From the moment of the arrival of Caroline at Naples there was an atmosphere of intrigue about the Court, and the King and Queen were soon at the head of two opposed parties. Caroline, strong in her abilities and ambition, in her relationship and influence with the great dispenser of royal dignities, in the special reversion created for her to the crown of Naples in the event of Joachim's predeceasing her, aspired to rule in the field of politics, leaving to her husband the more congenial pursuit of war. She began by reposing her policy on her brother's support, and secured an important ally in the person of his Minister to the Neapolitan Court, d'Aubusson Lafeuillade. Between Napoleon and Joachim there was still some little coolness subsisting from the Wesel incident and others, so that what with his wife and his Imperial brother-in-law, the new king found the throne of Naples not altogether a comfortable one to occupy.

Napoleon, though making a great pretence of distributing thrones, could not bear to surrender one iota of authority, nor to see another making show of climbing the same ladder of which he had himself reached the topmost rung. The Emperor evidently anticipated from the first that Joachim would make a very different sort of provincial governor from Joseph, and he appears

to have decided to keep him under strict subordination. Napoleon, among his first assertions of authority, issued instructions that, in his capacity of commander of the French troops stationed in the kingdom, the King of Naples should draw up official reports in due form for Clarke, the Minister of War. The Emperor's communications to the King were pointedly framed in a crisp, commanding style, and he did not hesitate to express trenchant opinions and often commands on the most minute details of the affairs of Naples. When Joachim, conforming to the custom of centuries, a custom still officially recognised at our day, paid his devotion to the miraculous performance of S. Gennaro, Napoleon, more tersely than politely, wrote: "J'apprends avec peine que vous avez fait des singeries pour St. Janvier."¹ When the Emperor was informed that a change was contemplated in the Neapolitan Code, with a view to meeting the strong religious prejudices of the Neapolitans on the question of divorce, he ordered that the change should not be made in the same imperative form that he would have used for ordering the movement of an army corps.

Not long afterwards occurred an incident that very much increased the latent antagonism between the two brothers-in-law. The treaty of Tilsit had closed the first cycle of the wars of the Empire, and had left it at its height of glory, prestige, and power. Yet even at that moment the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, the shrewdest of European diplomatists, Count Metternich, foresaw nothing but anarchy in the event of the Emperor's death, and wrote: "It is in truth curious that Napoleon . . . has never taken one single step

¹ "It pains me to hear you have played monkey tricks in honour of S. Gennaro." Napoleon to Murat, Nov. 14, 1808. Napoleon, *Corr.* (Brotonne), 151.

tending to ensure the existence of his successors."¹ The fact probably was that Napoleon neither knew where, nor cared, to look for a successor. His brothers and sisters, with the possible exception of Joseph, had proved more troublesome than helpful, and among them not one was fit to hold the Empire together. The once-contemplated succession of the eldest son of his brother Louis and of Hortense had only excited the ill-will of the other members of his family. There were in reality but three persons to be found among the members of the Imperial family who could reasonably hope to hold the throne after Napoleon: Joseph Bonaparte, Eugène Beauharnais, and Joachim Murat. The first had the best claim as head of the Bonaparte family, as already a king, as the staunch and unswerving executor of Napoleon's behests; but he was weak, and inspired few men either with attachment or respect. The Viceroy of Italy was strong in the Emperor's adoption, in his undoubted political and military ability, in his mother's great solicitude and constant endeavour to further his interests; but he was very young, and had not proved his mettle as he did later. Murat was pre-eminent in the favour of a great part of the army, in the precedence he had long held over other marshals, in the unscrupulous ambition and intriguing power of his wife.

For the many who believed that a change of government must turn on the opinion of the army, the support of the most conspicuous and not least popular figure in that army, the support of a brother-in-law of the Emperor, appeared desirable if not indispensable. How Caroline, competing with the Empress Joséphine, had secured the benevolent regard of Junot, Governor of Paris, has been related. Nothing came of this intrigue,

¹ Metternich to Stadion, July 26, 1807, Metternich, *Mems.* ii. 145.

for the eventuality on which it hinged did not arise. But when, in 1808, the Emperor, after barely a year's repose, plunged once more into warfare, shrewd men began to view with misgiving his growing abuse of military genius and power, and wondered whether a Spanish bullet or knife might not touch the charmed life that had so often braved unscathed the Austrians, Prussians, and Russians. At this moment, in December 1808, while Napoleon was toiling through the snow-clad passes of revolted Spain after Sir John Moore, Talleyrand and Fouché, long enemies, became reconciled. "These two political personages made their entrance at a fashionable reception arm in arm, and ostentatiously promenaded their alliance before the astonished guests. It was a little thing and yet it was a great one; for Talleyrand and Fouché were the two most delicate political weathercocks in France, and if they both veered together it was safe to conclude there was something in the wind."¹ The political circles of Paris were astonished and alarmed at this move, and suddenly realized possibilities that the triumphs of Napoleon had momentarily obliterated.

It was evident that at any moment might arise a political situation in which Napoleon would not be a factor; when it did arise, Talleyrand and Fouché were prepared to solve it. The contemporary authorities, however, are pretty well agreed that this intrigue did not go very far, and it is only from events that took place a year later that it might be inferred that Murat took an active part in it. Yet it seems clear that it was on him that the two politicians looked as the future occupant of the Imperial throne, and that it was in this sense that the Emperor himself understood the situation.

¹ Johnston, *Napoleon*, 161.

This at all events may be taken as the starting-point of an antagonism that finally became an open breach.

Napoleon suddenly left his army in Spain, reached Paris late in January 1809, and vindicated his authority by disgracing and earning the undying hatred of Talleyrand, the astute statesman who had for so many years and with so much dexterity managed the foreign relations of France. His brother-in-law, however, the Emperor could not touch; all he could do was to keep him at a distance, and when, a few weeks later, the French armies were once more set in motion towards the frontiers of Austria, they lacked the inspiring presence of their great cavalry leader, whom the Emperor, doubtless to the regret of Caroline, informed that his presence would be of greater value at Naples than with the army.

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CHAPTER VII

MURAT'S REFORMS

Military preparations—Militia—War with Austria—Anglo-Sicilian armaments—Eckmühl and Essling—Stuart sails—Takes Ischia—Alarm at Naples—Naval action—Preparations for retreat—Saliceti—Stuart's position—Wagram—Brigandage—Ionian Islands—Reforms—Finance—Continental blockade—Seizure of American vessels—Educational and judicial reform—Feudal Commission—Zurlo—Police department—Maghella—Saliceti—Annexation of Papal States—Death of Saliceti—Court parties—Neapolitan nationalists and Joachim—Constitutionalism—Electoral colleges—Public apathy—Results of Wagram—Metternich—Napoleon's marriage—Napoleon and Murat.

THE capture of Capri was not followed by any further military success. Although in the early months of the new reign it was freely rumoured that the conquest of Sicily would soon be undertaken, although new regiments were raised and the army total increased to 23,000 French and 27,000 Neapolitan troops, yet events passing on a larger scene than that of Naples proved of preponderating importance. So far from undertaking offensive operations, Joachim for several months of the year 1809 had as severe a struggle to retain his crown as his predecessor had when pressed by Sir John Stuart and the Prince of Hesse.

Whether the conquest of Sicily or the defence of Naples was uppermost, it was equally necessary to

strengthen the army. A premium was put on things military at Court, and the provincial militia was organized on an effective basis. The militiamen were drawn from the middle class, citizens paying the *fondiaría* to the extent of not less than five ducats annually; each district furnished a battalion, each province a legion. Home service was unremunerated, save for one picked company per battalion that received the same pay as regulars.

The military character of the new reign received its official sanction in a grand national festival and review held on the 26th of March 1809. The King with much martial pomp and circumstance watched 12,000 Neapolitan troops march past, and presented flags, rewards, and decorations. But at the very time when the new-formed Neapolitan troops were parading on the Chiaja, events were shaping that were to put their discipline and their loyalty to King Joachim to a severe test.

Napoleon's hasty journey from Galicia to Paris in January 1809 had been partly caused by the political demonstration of Talleyrand and Fouché, partly by impending danger of a new conflict with Austria.¹ War appeared to be on the point of breaking out in Germany once more, and the Imperial Guard was ordered to follow close on the Emperor's footsteps and march towards the Rhine and Bavaria. In the early weeks of 1809 military preparations became even more marked. French and Neapolitan troops were steadily drained from the south, and sent either to the Austrian frontier or

¹ The argument of General Maurice (*Moore's Diary*) that his return was caused by Moore's movement and the consequent disarrangement of his plans in Spain does not appear well founded.

to Spain ; and as Naples became weaker, so the hope of any offensive movement against Sicily rapidly dwindled. Soon it was reported that Naples itself would be attacked. The British Government was anxious to effect a diversion to assist Austria in the coming struggle, and it was known that a large Anglo-Sicilian expedition was being fitted out at Messina and Palermo.

Hostilities between the French and Austrians began in the middle of April, and events followed much the same course as they had in 1805. On the 22nd of April the Archduke Charles was defeated at Eckmühl in Bavaria ; on the 12th of May Napoleon once more occupied Vienna. Ten days later the Emperor attempted to cross the Danube but was met by the Archduke Charles, who drove him back from Aspern and Essling on the northern bank into the island of Lobau, where the French army found a precarious refuge and intrenched itself.

A few days after the news of this great check to the French arms arrived at Naples, other news, equally or even more threatening, came from the opposite direction. On the 11th of June the Anglo-Sicilian fleet sailed from Messina and other ports ; it carried 14,000 soldiers, of which more than half were British, the whole being under the command of Sir John Stuart. The British force was imposing. The hopes of Mary Caroline had once more risen to a high pitch. Her second son, Prince Leopold, accompanied the expedition as a volunteer, Sir John Stuart having declined his assistance in any other capacity. Yet the expedition was weak in the extreme caution of its commander-in-chief, in his strong aversion for his Sicilian allies and for the methods of revolution,

proscription, and bloodshed, which he and his officers believed would follow a Bourbon restoration at Naples.

Slowly the great fleet, 250 British and Sicilian ships, sailed along the Calabrian coast northwards, occasionally landing small parties. The end of June had come when it reached the Bay of Naples, and after destroying a number of Neapolitan gunboats, landed troops on the island of Ischia, of which the principal town and fortress were besieged and reduced on the last day of the month.

The presence of so large an hostile army within a few miles of the capital caused alarm and almost consternation at Naples. The available military force had just been still further reduced by a detachment of 6000 men sent to Rome, which Napoleon had annexed to the Empire by a decree issued on his reaching Vienna. All the troops that Joachim could collect amounted to no more than 11,000 men; he therefore decided to concentrate and to bring closer to the capital the division in Calabria. Partouneaux, who had succeeded Cavaignac in the command of that province, was accordingly ordered to get his troops together and prepare to march towards Naples. Scilla was blown up; 4000 men were concentrated at Monteleone, and 1600 at Lagonegro.

Not only did Joachim decide to hasten to the defence of his threatened capital all his available military strength, but also such ships as he possessed. Orders were sent to Bausan to bring from Gaëta a frigate, a corvette, and some gunboats stationed there. He started at night, and reached the channel between Procida and the mainland in the early morning. The wind was light, but Bausan was already well to windward of most of the British ships in the waters of Ischia. The frigate *Cyane* and a brig, however,

managed to draw up to the Neapolitan flotilla. After doubling Cape Miseno most of the gunboats turned towards Baia and Pozzuoli, several of them being destroyed by the British or run ashore. Bausan, however, fought his way across the bay, made the point of Posilipo, and then steered for the Arsenal. The *Cyane* clung closely to the Neapolitan, but Bausan kept up a running fight; when at last he reached the mole the British frigate was beaten off by a heavy fire from the harbour defences that turned her decks into shambles. Joachim who, with all Naples, had been a spectator of this naval duel, immediately went on board Bausan's vessel and congratulated her captain and crew on their notable engagement.

In the meanwhile the greatest excitement reigned in the capital, and many a Bourbon supporter thought a restoration was imminent. The weakness of the French was known, the strength of the Anglo-Sicilians was exaggerated, while the reports from Vienna made it appear as though Napoleon's career of victory had closed. Preparations for evacuating Naples were made. Troops were echeloned towards the frontier, valuables from the Royal Palace were packed ready for transportation, and Marshal Pérignon openly advocated the abandonment of Naples. At this critical juncture Saliceti arrived from Rome, where he had been absent on a mission that will presently be noticed. His unflinching courage and statesmanlike advice restored confidence. With admirable insight he accurately gauged the spirit of the British generals and declared: "They are even more undecided than we are; that will save us."¹

Saliceti was right; Sir John Stuart at Ischia appeared

¹ De Dedem, 177; Savelli, 166.

content to await events, just as after Maida he made his operations turn on the strategic consideration that the control of Naples really depended on that of northern Italy. He apparently determined to await the result of the operations on the Danube and to make the further prosecution of his enterprise turn on the success or non-success of the Austrians. He was far from satisfied with his position at Ischia. Collingwood, who was blockading Toulon, was not reassuring. He wrote to Stuart that his move was good only as a diversion, that Ischia was a bad position to remain in, and that to invade Naples was useless unless there was a popular movement. There was the further danger that should a strong north-west wind arise, the British fleet would lose touch with Toulon and the French might slip out and sail into the Bay of Naples before the British admiral could know that they had left their anchorage. This dispatch of Collingwood reached Stuart at a decisive moment, for the news had just become known at Naples that on the 6th of July Napoleon had extricated himself from all his difficulties by the brilliant victory of Wagram.

The receipt of this news decided the result of the Anglo-Sicilian expedition. Ischia was abandoned. The troops were re-embarked and ingloriously returned whence they had come, while Joachim hastily dispatched orders to Calabria for his army to re-occupy the positions they had for a moment abandoned.

Unfortunately even the short space of time during which the French weakness had lasted had sufficed to replunge Calabria into a state of anarchy. From the ships of the fleet or from small vessels sent out from Sicily numerous parties of freebooters were landed at every point of the peninsula. For the Adriatic was as

much under British control as was the Mediterranean, and a small expedition had even reduced the French islands of Zante, Cephalonia, Ithaca, and Cerigo, while the British cruisers and Sicilian corsairs flying the Union Jack cut off the food supplies of Corfu and reduced Donzelot and his garrison to great distress.¹ Right up the Adriatic coast *capimassi* landed and carried their devastations. One in Puglia gave himself out as Prince Francis of Bourbon, and levied taxes in all due form. But it is needless to catalogue the details of a state of brigandage precisely similar to those already described. It will be enough to say that Calabria and many districts of other provinces were soon in as bad a state as they were three years before, suffered the same horrors, the same devastation, and the same punishments. An official report gave the number of criminal offences classed under the head of brigandage for the year 1809 as 33,000; it must be added that this figure appears almost incredible even for Naples.

After the abandonment of Ischia by Sir John Stuart and his return to Sicily the situation rapidly improved. Reinforcements of French troops arrived from the north; soon the Neapolitan army reached a total of 30,000 men. Every position formerly held on the Strait of Messina was re-occupied; and, greatest relief of all, the Prince of Canosa left Ponza. It only now remained to allay and pacify the internal inflammation of the kingdom, to carry out, extend, and make fruitful the reforms begun by Joseph. This work was at once taken in hand, and it is curious to reflect in this connection that it was in the lawgiving attributes of

¹ The excesses of many of the Sicilian privateers that sheltered under the Union Jack was a source of great distress to the British army officers. A number of interesting papers concerning a particularly odious case of this sort at Cotrone, in the summer of 1807, are preserved in the Archives at Naples.

kingship, and not in the military, that Joachim Murat has earned the larger title to the consideration and esteem of posterity.

It may be said fairly, and in no spirit of depreciation, that the reforms initiated by Joseph had remained largely on paper and of no effect. The administrative machine, the police, and to a certain extent the work of legislation, had been established; but the mass of the people still moved according to their ancient customs and viewed with indifference or with contempt the work of innovation. But if the two years of Joseph's reign showed very little real result, the first two of Joachim's did bring some very real changes into the existence of the Neapolitans.

When Joseph left Naples, Roederer followed him, and it had not proved easy to fill the vacant post of Minister of Finance. A Neapolitan, Pignatelli, assumed the charge, but with little success, and was soon relieved by Agar de Mosbourg. The new Minister was a French administrator of some ability who had been attached to Murat when Grand Duke of Berg, very much in the same way as Roederer had been to Joseph. Under his rule financial matters continued to mend, though very slowly. The credit of the State at the close of 1809 was certainly better than it had been three years before, yet it was far from good. *Cedolas* representing 100,000,000 ducats had been issued, and covered the whole public debt; their current quotation was 20, that is a depreciation of 80 per cent from the face value. Making allowance for the exceptional events of 1809, the revenue continued to gain steadily. In the early part of 1808 it had balanced expenditure, as already related. In 1810 the budget showed an income of 13,367,000 lire, with a surplus of 1,353,000 lire, and in 1811 it had further



Standard Geographical Edition

CENTRAL EUROPE

AFTER WAGRAM,

1809.

French Empire in Red.

Dependencies of French Empire in Pink.

Scale of English Miles



risen to 15,687,000 lire, with a surplus of 2,147,000. This expansion of the revenue was largely obtained by a gradual increase of the *rendite patrimonialii* bearing on the rich, accompanied by a decrease in the *dazii di consumo* bearing on the poor. Thus in 1810 it might be said that the Neapolitan finances were progressing rapidly in the direction of prosperity, and only needed political stability. In that year a useful financial step was taken by fixing a limit of 2,000,000 ducats for the annual increase of the Gran Libro indebtedness ; *cedolas* quickly rose to 25.

The great source of weakness of the State finances was the stoppage of commerce that arose from the hostilities between France and Great Britain. Something of the evils arising from this cause has already been noticed ; a wider view of the subject may now with advantage be taken.

Already before the period of the French Revolution the extensive maritime trade of Great Britain and her insular invulnerability had given a gradually more and more pronounced commercial character to wars in which she had been engaged. If England could not be invaded, the colonies whence she obtained her food and her wealth might be ; the vessels that conveyed her food and her wealth could be seized. She could be despoiled of her possessions and of her ships, ruined and starved. Such was the theory of those who could see no way of invading her. The French Republic, with robust faith but far from adequate resources, attempted to reduce this theory of warfare to practice, and not content with striking at British merchandise carried under the British flag, issued decrees whereby a neutral flag should not avail to protect British goods from seizure.

This system was ended when Bonaparte became

First Consul, and the peace signed at Amiens gave for a time promise of better things. The two countries were, however, soon at war again, and Napoleon, with the splendid army he had built up out of the soldiers and the spirit of the Revolution, determined to settle the long-standing quarrel between France and Great Britain in the only decisive way, by marching to London at the head of his troops. But the *Grande Armée* was called away from the sands of Boulogne to face the Powers of the north-east; Villeneuve's fleet fell victim to Nelson, and the projected invasion of England was soon relegated to a very uncertain future. Foiled in his attempt to deliver his great blow at England's heart, the baffled Emperor fell back on the only other policy of attack he was in a position to use, and set to work to follow the direction and to extend the scope of the *Directoire's* operations against British commerce.

The first of the decrees marking the policy of the Continental blockade was issued at Berlin on the 21st of November 1806. It declared the British Isles in a state of blockade and cut off from all intercourse; it further decreed that all British subjects were liable to capture as prisoners of war and to seizure of their property. No neutral ship having touched at any point in England was to be admitted to port, and a false declaration as to this was to entail seizure.

The policy thus announced must here be viewed in its application to the affairs of the kingdom of Naples; yet, even from that restricted standpoint, a few observations of a general character should first be made. In his insatiable thirst for domination and in his blind confidence in his genius, Napoleon had set up an absolutely retrograde ideal of warfare. He apparently aimed at destroying Britain as Sparta had Athens, or

Rome Carthage ; in avowing that aim he proclaimed himself not a child of the Revolution, not a man with views ahead of his times, but an enemy of progress and civilization. He had set up his will and his appetite to override the consensus of informed and educated opinion that, in the mutual intercourse of states even when that intercourse took the form of hostilities, certain conventions of mutual consideration, of international obligation, of civilized duty, must be observed. He failed to perceive that his individual will and power, however much it might surpass that of other individuals and rulers, could not surpass that of a century, or, at least, could only do so on the one condition of following the same current and outstripping it. In the political calculations on which the Emperor based his policy of the Continental blockade he ascribed far too large an effectiveness to his decrees, far too slight an effectiveness to economic conditions and public opinion. English ships supplied the Continent with cotton and wool, sugar and coffee, paper and cutlery, every necessary and every luxury of life. Could one man prevent unanimous millions from purchasing the food they were used to, the delicacies they relished, the clothes in which wives and daughters looked their best ? Could one man compel undying hatred to the enterprising suppliers of these things ? Napoleon would ask no such questions. He struck at Great Britain with all his strength ; he succeeded in dealing a damaging, but not a vital blow to her commerce, and injured himself far more severely by the recoil.

Every one conspired to defeat the Imperial policy. Marshal Masséna was not the only functionary who made a fortune out of the licences issued for the bringing in of English goods, and even in the

immediate circle of the Emperor the lucrative practice was carried on. From the Baltic to the Adriatic English merchandise filtered in through every port, though with difficulty, and King Joachim himself never went without English manufactured goods. But exportation was a matter of far greater difficulty, and the valuable produce of Naples could find no outlet.

Great Britain did not fail to return blow for blow. The retaliatory measures of the British Cabinet made matters worse, and the Orders in Council of January and November 1807 declaring neutral ships lawful prizes unless trading through a British port, placed such ships in an impossible dilemma. In the Mediterranean the neutral vessels carrying foreign trade were largely American, and President Jefferson declared to Congress in October 1807: "Under this new law of the ocean our trade in the Mediterranean has been swept away by seizures and condemnations, and that in other seas is threatened by the same fate."¹ So completely was trade for a while annihilated that when Collingwood was cruising in search of Gantheaume in the winter of 1807-1808, he found the utmost difficulty in getting information, for, as he wrote to Castlereagh, there was not "a ship of any nation to be met with on the sea."

The policy of Naples followed closely that of France in the matter of the Continental blockade. After the interview at Venice and the Milan decrees in the winter of 1807-1808, it was enacted that no cotton goods should be introduced into Naples except on the production of a certificate of origin giving France or the kingdom of Italy as the place of manufacture; at the same time

¹ Message of Oct. 27, 1807.

vessels trading with England were declared denationalized. Early in 1808 Napoleon wrote as follows to Joseph: "Be vigilant, and see that all my blockading measures are carried out. Every American ship calling at one of your ports comes from England: take that as your guiding principle."¹ Yet American traders, attracted by the prospect of large profits, attempted to carry on trade with Naples in spite of the decrees. In 1809, when the schooner *Rait* of Baltimore was seized, the remonstrance of the Consular agent of the United States resulted in the Duke di Gallo's consent to her release as she had sailed direct from Baltimore without touching at an English port. The success of this ship encouraged others, but with less good fortune, for towards the end of the same year several American vessels were seized. The cargoes were confiscated and sold, which was only a judicial farce for putting money into the pockets of the various officials concerned; in one instance a bankrupt French speculator named Bastide was assigned a cargo of nankeen, and cleared 100 per cent on an immediate turnover. The American Consular agent made strong representations, and after some months elicited the worse than diplomatic reply that the seizure of the cargoes was founded on the Act of Congress interdicting commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France and their dependencies.

It will be convenient to dispose of this question of the American ships finally at this point. Redress for these seizures was never obtained from King Joachim's Government. Later, in 1818, Mr. Pinckney was sent to Naples on a special mission, but failed; it was not till 1832 that the claim was recognised and

¹ Joseph, *Corr.* iv. 226.

damages to the extent of over 2,000,000 ducats were paid.¹

The Continental blockade was the chief cause that prevented Naples from entering on an era of prosperity which her improved political system would otherwise undoubtedly have given her. Though everything was done to promote a coasting trade with France, though internal commerce was encouraged by the establishment of fairs and markets, by the building of roads, by the abolishment of feudal taxes and impediments, nothing could serve to draw out of the kingdom that rich stream of natural produce that should have sent back in its stead a returning flow of wealth and prosperity.

Although not altogether successful in promoting trade, the Government of Naples accomplished excellent results in the field of education. The system decreed by Joseph was now put into practice, and his other undertakings were generally pursued and placed on a basis of practical utility. The reforms that evoked most opposition were those of a judicial nature, such as the compulsory registration of mortgages. Many of the provisions of the Napoleonic Code, especially that by which a civil ceremony as well as a religious was necessary to validate a marriage, encountered bitter hostility. One legal measure of the Government, however, met with warm approval and appreciation, the institution of the Feudal Commission. The various decrees of Joseph's reign dealing with and restricting the application of feudal rights had led to a vast amount of litigation that seemed to make matters even worse and more complicated than before. It was decided that a special tribunal must be formed to determine these questions, and the

¹ *Arch. Nap. Confische dei legni Americani*; Martens, *Recueil*, iv. 359; *Papers laid before Congress*, Feb. 28, 1818.

Feudal Commission came into existence by decree of the 3rd of December 1808.

The statesman to whose charge it fell to direct the proceedings of the Feudal Commission was Giuseppe Zurlo, Minister of the Interior, the most eminent administrator that Naples produced in those troublous times. Intelligent, active, public-minded, liberal yet temperate, and, above all, honest, Zurlo might, in better days, have earned the reputation of a great statesman. He had already risen to important positions under the Bourbons. His reports on the royal domains in the Sila were more truthful than palatable, yet his ability and utility had raised him from the rank and file of the public servants. In 1799, although zealous for reform, he had enough fidelity to Ferdinand, or distrust of the Parthenopean Republic, not to join the revolutionary government. He held aloof, and soon after the return of Ferdinand was placed by Acton in the difficult position of director of the finances of the kingdom. In 1803 he was disgraced, more from the fault of the system than his own, but his integrity remained above suspicion. Unappreciated by a government the depths of whose ineptitude he had sounded more deeply than most men, he had been among the first who had thrown in their lot with the new order. Under Joseph and Joachim he had been intrusted with high charges; he was now to superintend a work which his special knowledge, temperate spirit, and honest statesmanship was to do much to bring to a good end, a work that deserves to be honourably recorded in the pages of history, and with which his name, as well as that of his sovereign, must be for ever associated.

The Feudal Commission was presided over by

Dragonetti, and among its subordinate officials were Pasquale Borrelli and D. Winspeare, who as a provincial commissioner and the intimate and confidant of Zurlo was of large assistance. In a little more than a year this court disposed of no less than 5000 cases. The work that this commission undertook has been already indicated in the first chapter, and details there given cannot now be repeated. The principal objects of the Feudal Commission were to pronounce final sentence in all litigation pending between the Università and the Barons, to effect the distribution of domanial land to communities and individual occupiers and assess the compensation to be paid, to enforce the abolishment of such personal and feudal rights as had been abrogated by the decrees of Joseph. The distribution of the domanial land was to be concluded by the end of 1809, but it cannot be thought inexpedient that it was two years later before this great labour was completed.

Among the feudal rights abolished may be mentioned that of free transport, which was nearly the only personal service that had not been transformed into a money payment; this was effected by a decree of the 9th of October 1806. The abolition of the right of free pasture by Joachim was of great and immediate benefit to agriculture, especially in Calabria. In that province the Barons, so as to enjoy their privilege of pasturage, prevented the ploughing and sowing of land, and turned many fertile tracts into uncultivated wilds.¹

But it is impossible to carry the reader through the catalogue of 1400 feudal rights abolished by the French

¹ Zurlo, *Rapporto*, 1808, 1809, 28. The Barons appear to have struggled hard to retain this privilege. As late as 1813 Zurlo was giving directions to enforce the law against them; *Supplimento del Bollettino*, xxxii. 169.

kings. The ground those rights covered has already been indicated. The records of the Feudal Commission are voluminous; they are to be found in ninety-six printed volumes and about 5000 bundles of documents now stored at the Archivio di Stato at Naples. The work of reducing this great mass of litigation to order, of giving a final decision in every case, of compensating proprietors, of distributing land to small holders, of abolishing unrighteous privileges, of maintaining just rights, and, most arduous of all, of cutting through legal obstacles to a quick but equitable judgment, all this in the ultimate resort fell on Zurlo. And what was perhaps most noteworthy in his conduct of this essentially revolutionary work was that he never allowed his zeal for reform and for improving the lot of the peasantry to outstrip his sense of justice and equity. He knew how to refuse the tenant an unjust release as well as how to compel the Baron to contribute his due to the prosperity of the community. Thus the Ministry of the Interior was one of the busiest and most beneficent departments of State during the first years of Joachim's reign.

The police department also continued to be of great importance. Its policy was founded on an elaborate system of spying and delation, a close inquisition into the acts of individuals, a constant intercepting and opening of letters and even on occasion of diplomatic dispatches. Popular demonstrations were led and organized by paid agents, and when the King visited the opera, 500 free seats were distributed to selected persons, resulting in gratifying demonstrations of loyal enthusiasm. Although the severity of the police had been somewhat relaxed in the early months of the reign, it had been reasserted with great vigour during

the troubles of 1809, and not a little of the efficacy of its measures of repression had been due to Saliceti's chief subordinate, the Genoese Maghella.

Maghella was an advanced liberal, a subtle and strong politician, a compatriot of Saliceti and, in a way, of Bonaparte. He was given to secret and devious ways that were perhaps suitable in a police official, but that in a private capacity would probably have led him into trouble. He was one of a small but important group of Italians who saw in the existing political conditions of Naples a transitional stage that was to be turned to profit, that was to lead to more liberal institutions, that was to result perhaps in a republic, perhaps in the establishment of an Italian state, at all events, of one in which Italians should have the decisive voice. Such sentiments could hardly be avowed in public. But in private, under the strict pledge of secrecy, under the veil of that thin allegory and delicate allusiveness which the Italian imagination so rapidly invents and pierces, such ideas were gradually permeating the minds of the Italian functionaries, civil and military, that stood about the throne of their French monarch.

Saliceti was more wary, even more difficult to connect with any disloyal intent, than Maghella. To his clear eye it must have appeared certain that the time was not yet ripe. His influence among liberal Italians was great; yet he was very guarded, a man of few words, and it is not probable that he went far in encouraging the rising group of Italian nationalists. One of his contemporaries at Naples said of Saliceti: "Although he had accepted the 18th of Brumaire and wore the colours of the new dynasty, he could not but think his surroundings paltry as to the men, debased as

to their object. I do not say he was still a republican ; but the period of that monumental period, of the titanic *Comité de Salut Public*, still lived in him and lent to his attitude in his new functions and towards his new colleagues a shade of disdain that pierced through his usual reserve."¹ Yet so prudently did he guard his inmost thoughts, so actively and well did he perform the functions intrusted to him, that on his death not only did the citizens of Naples regret his loss, but Napoleon declared that of all his Ministers he had served him best.

When, just before his check at Essling, Napoleon determined to despoil the Pope and to annex the Papal States to the Empire, he specially deputed Saliceti to perform this delicate mission. Six thousand Neapolitan troops marched to Rome to carry out the Emperor's measures.

The annexation of the territory proved a simple enough matter, but when the news of Essling reached Rome, Pius, doubtless believing that God had interposed to save his Vice-Regent, attempted to second the Austrian arms by pronouncing sentence of excommunication against the great spoiler. With the Imperial army hemmed in to the island of Lobau by the Archduke Charles, with Sir John Stuart at the gates of Naples, and with the head of the Catholic Church rattling his pontifical thunders, the situation was so alarming that many men even of tried ability would have faltered. But Saliceti had studied politics at a vigorous school, and was not to be intimidated. He promptly arrested Pius, sent him under guard to France, placed Rome under martial law, and then hurried back to Naples, where he arrived in time to

¹ Cavaignac, 259.

give fresh heart to Joachim's Ministers, and to prevent the abandonment of the capital.

Saliceti was not long to survive the invaluable services he rendered to Napoleon and to Joachim in the summer of 1809. He had been in failing health for some time and liable to gastric trouble. In December of the same year he was taken suddenly ill at the theatre one evening after dining with Maghella; a few days later he died.¹ He was succeeded by Maghella, whose appointment was much resented by the Queen.

It has already been related that from the first advent of the new King and Queen to Naples the Court had divided into two parties. Saliceti had for a time inclined to side with Caroline, knowing her qualities and her influence with the Emperor. But the Queen's circle was, unfortunately, largely composed of young men, pleasure-lovers, dashing officers like Lavauguyon, Livron, and Montrond. To participate in the ambitions and counsels of these young "godelureaux," as he called them, was impossible for a man of Saliceti's calibre and character. He appears to have then turned towards another and important party that soon began to gain influence in the entourage of the King.

Joachim's character invited the exercise of those arts of cajolery and flattery in which the Italians are adepts, and that constitute their favourite means of attaining their ends. Among the Neapolitans who formed a part of the Court circle, those whose views went beyond mere personal advancement saw in Joachim a vain, good-hearted soldier, unfit to govern, but fit to be led. Concessions might be gradually coaxed from him; his

¹ The theory that Saliceti was poisoned, whether by Maghella or not, appears to repose on nothing solid; Cavaignac, 260; Radowsky, 120; Savelli, 176; but cf. Romeo, 13; Ulloa, *Intorno alla Storia*, 256; Colletta, *Storia*, ii. 109; De Dedem, chap. ii. and Nicolà, 510.

French entourage, little by little, might be alienated ; Italian functionaries and methods might in time entirely prevail. A few ardent spirits, deluded by an imaginative interpretation of the scope of the constitutional statute of Bayonne, already saw a constitutional monarchy, with a representative chamber, as the form of government of their country.

The statute of Bayonne never came into effect, yet it is not true, as many writers have asserted on an authority that is often deliberately false,¹ that it remained totally unacted on. The people of Naples were unfit for and undesirous of representative institutions, yet King Joachim's Ministers attempted by gradual steps to bring these conditions nearer. The year 1809 was too unsettled to permit of the introduction of such measures as might be thought the natural outcome of the Bayonne statute, but several decrees, preparing the ground for the future, were issued. By these electoral districts were marked out ; arrangements for the assembling of conventions of merchants and landowners in various cities were made ; and the incompatibility of functions between a member of the Parliament and a Councillor of State was laid down. In all these decrees the King's title was referred to as proceeding from the grace of God and the Constitution. In 1810 a further step in advance was made by ordering the convocation of the electoral colleges of merchants and of landed proprietors. From many subordinate officials came expressions of gratitude and appreciation for these measures of the Government. The *Intendente* of Basilicata wrote to Count Zurlo, Minister of the Interior, that the electoral college of landed proprietors viewed their convocation as the final accomplishment of the political regeneration

¹ Colletta.

of their country, and that they looked forward to appointing delegates to proceed to Naples to place their desires before the Government. The historian Colletta, then a provincial governor, joined the chorus of approval, and so did Giuseppe Poerio, another Government official. The *Intendente* of Teramo wrote to Zurlo that the articles of the decree would be executed, "bearing in mind the provisions of the constitutional act of the kingdom." Yet, as a whole, it must be said that the response to this measure of the Government was extremely disappointing. Sheaves of excuses and refusals to act on the electoral colleges were received, and if the decrees proved as a whole non-effective, it must be pronounced to have been the fault neither of the Government nor of its officials, but entirely that of the people. Their supineness or fear rendered abortive what was perhaps not a liberal measure, but certainly was, and was intended as, a step towards representative institutions.

Wagram and the peace that followed had great results. The shattered fortunes of the Austrian Empire were intrusted to a great statesman who was destined to retrieve them, Count Metternich. The Emperor Napoleon, his mind fixed on that quarter of the political horizon to which Talleyrand and Fouché had so ominously pointed a few months before, decided on a stroke that was to set at rest the ambitions of those that stood nearest his throne. Shortly after the Emperor's return from Vienna a family council was called, to which the King and Queen of Naples were summoned.

Joachim reached Paris about the end of November. He passed through Rome on the way, where he reviewed the French and Neapolitan troops of the garrison, but

was received with scant courtesy by such of the cardinals as had remained there after the departure of Pius. When the family council met it was found that Napoleon had resolved to divorce Joséphine and marry again, so as to provide an heir for the Empire. The details of this matter do not concern us ; it will suffice to say that the announcement did not prove equally agreeable to all the members of the council. There was opposition. But the Emperor could not be shaken, and the only question worth discussing was as to the choice of the new Empress. Joachim upheld the policy of the Russian alliance, but for many reasons it was the Austrian Archduchess Maria Louisa who was chosen. It was a great diplomatic victory for Metternich, a great disillusion for the ambitions of Joachim Murat.

In March 1810, one month before the marriage of Napoleon, the King of Naples was once more in disagreement with his imperial brother-in-law, this time because the best soldiers of the French regiments at Naples were being drafted into Joachim's guard. Napoleon threatened to send a French general to take the command of his troops at Naples unless these men were at once sent back to their regiments, and the King had, as usual, to comply. A month later Joachim assisted at the great function at Notre Dame, and saw, with mixed feelings, his wife, the Queen of Naples, helping to carry the imperial mantle of the new Empress of the French.

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CHAPTER VIII

SICILIAN INTRIGUES AND DEMONSTRATIONS

Invasion of Sicily—Mary Caroline and the British—Her secret communications—Castrone—D' Amitia—Donop—Moliterno's expedition—Marriage of Maria Louisa—Fears of British—Napoleon's intentions—Relief of Corfu—Affairs of Spain—Cadiz letter—British feeling—Mary Caroline's disclaimer—Joachim arrives at Scilla—His command and forces—Military operations—Expedition abandoned—Feelings of Joachim—Napoleon's recriminations—King of Rome—Anti-French decree—Quarrel between Joachim and Napoleon—Caroline proceeds to Paris—State of Calabria—Manhès—His system—The brigands—Manhès at Serra—Capobianco and the Carbonari—Manhès' character.

WHEN the *dynasty of Naples had ceased to reign*, when Joseph Bonaparte, Lieutenant of the Emperor, and Marshal Masséna had appropriated to the uses of Napoleon the continental portion of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, it had been intended that the French army should not pause in its march until after the Strait of Messina had been crossed, until the tricolour had been planted on the ramparts of Palermo. How that design failed has been recorded. But through all the vicissitudes that attended the policy of France and of Naples the conquest of Sicily had always taken rank as an object of the first importance. It was not, however, until the year 1810 that circumstances appeared

to make it possible. France was once more at peace with the north-eastern Powers, only England and Spain for the moment engrossed the Emperor's attention. However great the force required to maintain the doubtful hold of France on the southern peninsula, it was now possible to move considerable detachments down from Lombardy to Naples.

Accordingly, numerous bodies of French troops, together with many of the battalions recruited by Joachim, were slowly moved more and more threateningly near the Strait of Messina. But to get a clearer view of the curious situation that shortly arose at that point, it will be necessary for a moment to consider the position on the further side of the Strait, and to see what were the relations existing between Great Britain, Sicily, France, and Naples. For behind all the hostile demonstrations was a network of political intrigue, and it is by no means certain either that Napoleon had any design whatever on Sicily, or that if the French troops had effected a landing, the Court of Palermo would not have received them with open arms.

The rapid development of Mary Caroline's hostility to the British has already been noted. So early as May 1807 an Englishman residing in Sicily wrote of her that whenever she saw one of his compatriots "she feels the guillotine on her neck."¹ The Queen's sentiments were repaid in kind by the great majority of the officials sent to Sicily by the British Government, and, to counterbalance the Queen's influence, they supported a party of Sicilian noblemen led by the Prince of Belmonte who were hostile to the Queen and in favour of a reforming and liberal policy. A Sicilian Parliament

¹ Leckie, 98.

assembled, and questions of supply decided against the Queen's wishes accentuated the ill feeling between Belmonte's party and Mary Caroline.

The disputes with her Sicilian subjects, her helplessness against the British generals at Messina, constant ill success, and the disappointing failure of the Archduke Charles and of Sir John Stuart in 1809, had further impaired the Queen's already doubtful health, bodily and mental. Rage and dejection alternately seized her on the return of the Anglo-Sicilian fleet in the autumn of 1809. She reviled her son Prince Leopold for his inglorious expedition, and in a letter to a friend at Vienna, Canon Boehme, she complained that affairs were in a lamentable position, and admitted that she constantly took opium to soothe her overstrung nerves. Yet she continued intriguing with all the restless folly of a diseased imagination. She had no right to wield regal authority in a direct way, and all her schemes depended on the exercise of personal influence and the employment of secret methods. As early as 1807 Lord Collingwood had discovered that communications were passing between the Queen and Marseilles, but it seems probable that in this there was nothing of more importance than the smuggling of the latest Paris fashions.¹ Whether the Queen's explanation of the fact be true or not, it is certain that the British authorities viewed her with such dislike and suspicion that her every step was construed as far as possible to her disfavour. Nothing tended to increase this British prejudice more than the network of spying that the Queen had thrown from Palermo over Naples and Messina

¹ Probably through Vacaro, a Palermitan dealer in Parisian fashions patronized by the Queen.—*Mary Caroline Memoirs*. Cf. also Sir John Moore's *Diary* for similar reports, possibly with the same origin.

and the Tyrrhenian Sea. Doubtful go-betweens passed from place to place, as often as not paid by both sides and lying to both. At the head of the passport department at Palermo was a low police agent, Castrone by name, who dispatched all the Queen's emissaries and letters and chartered her vessels. After employing him for five years Mary Caroline finally concluded that he cost much and effected little, that he lived in scandalous luxury and was an endless cause of vexation.

There was a not altogether unjustified predisposition, arising from this system of Mary Caroline, to believe that behind it were intrigues of the most discreditable kind. The terror her name inspired at Naples, the affair of Mosca, the explosion at the Palazzo Maresca, the doings of the *capimassi*, were placed to her discredit ; and her hatred for her enforced allies at Messina was undisguised. Just at the moment when the French at last really threatened the invasion of Sicily, the coincidence of two or three curious incidents created a belief, not yet altogether dispelled, that Mary Caroline was secretly in league with the French, that she had made terms with Napoleon through the good offices of her grand-daughter the Empress Maria Louisa, and that she had agreed to raise Sicily against the British and execute a second Sicilian Vespers.

Undoubtedly at this period secret communications did pass between Mary Caroline and France. A Sicilian officer named D' Amitia was landed in Illyria in January 1810 from a Sicilian armed brig ; he saw Marshal Marmont, the governor, claimed that he was charged to negotiate a *rapprochement*, was sent to Paris, and was there imprisoned by order of the Emperor. Careful research has failed to throw any further light on the incident, or to trace D' Amitia beyond the fortress of

Vincennes. In the following month a French officer, F. Donop by name, who was then a prisoner in Sicilian hands, was released and dispatched by Castrone to Trieste. The secrecy in which his departure was shrouded, his destination, and the fact that he was supplied with money, all go to show that his mission was probably of the same general nature as that of D' Amitia.¹

At the very moment when the Queen was sending these emissaries to France, the Sicilian Government was making great show of preparations for an expedition against Naples. Many boats were collected, together with a force of some 1200 or 1500 men under the Prince of Moliterno. These preparations could hardly be taken as representing a serious attempt against King Joachim. They were viewed with great suspicion by Admiral Martin, who had succeeded Collingwood. Moliterno was not a man who inspired confidence. Although a republican in 1799, he was now an agent of the Queen, in receipt of secret service money, and had lately passed through Paris and London.

Martin and the British Minister Amherst paid an official visit to the Queen to protest against Moliterno's expedition. They obtained the assurances they asked for, but Mary Caroline, though prepared to make every concession necessary, also plainly showed that in her opinion Great Britain had no intention of reconquering Naples or even of restoring Sicily to her lawful sovereigns. Not only was Moliterno's expedition abandoned, but the hope of reconquering Naples was soon changed to alarm at the threatening concentration of troops in Calabria and at the preparations going on

¹ *Arch. Nap. Guerra*, xxv. 2061. Castelli's MS., *Cronaca di Sicilia*, quoted by Bianco, apparently confirms this point.

in the small ports close to the Strait of Messina. On the 10th of March 1810 Mary Caroline wrote to Vienna: "I hope to God that Murat's enterprise will not prosper, that would be a terrible misfortune; in that event I am resolved not to go to England to beg the bread of necessity, but to await here the fate of the Duc d'Enghien."¹

A few days later news of the utmost importance was received; an event had taken place that appeared to have as confusing an effect on the policy of the Court of Palermo as on that of Naples. A Neapolitan gazette arrived announcing the marriage of Napoleon and Maria Louisa. Mary Caroline's first movement was one of horror and indignation at the thought of her progeny being allied to the greatest man of his age; but soon other thoughts arose, and before long the Neapolitans of her entourage were in high spirits, and busy building hopes that this event portended peace and the restoration of the Bourbons to Naples. Soon the Queen, on slight enough grounds, was in a triumphant mood; and Amherst, who believed her to be in secret communication with Vienna on the subject, was indignant and was pacified only with great difficulty.

The avowed hostility of the Queen to the British made their position very difficult, if not dangerous. The force that Murat was mustering appeared formidable. So critical did the situation appear that on the 10th of May Lord Amherst recorded his opinion, that "in the present insufficient means of defence of this island, the landing of an hostile army, even of no very considerable magnitude, would probably be followed by the subjugation of the kingdom."² The alarm

¹ Helfert, *Königin Karolina*, 396.

² Amherst to Wellesley, May 10, 1810, *Foreign Off. Sicily*, 39.

reflected in this dispatch of Lord Amherst was in all probability precisely the result aimed at by Napoleon. Otherwise the slowness with which his army concentrated on the Strait of Messina and the unguarded way in which their objective was publicly advertised must be pronounced contrary to his usual methods. The conclusion appears warranted, when viewing the events of 1810 as a whole, that Napoleon did not intend to attack Sicily, and it is possible that towards the middle of the year, June or July, Mary Caroline received some secret intelligence or authoritative hint that she had nothing to fear from the French army gathered in sight of Messina. But if Napoleon did not intend to invade Sicily, he certainly intended his movements on the Strait to be productive of results. One of these was duly accomplished, for the British naval strength being drawn to Messina, Corfu was relieved from the blockade and had large stores of supplies thrown into it from Brindisi and Taranto, thus, for once, affording to the farmers of Puglia the opportunity of selling their grain. Another result aimed at was to prevent the British Government from dispatching reinforcements to Spain, where the Emperor had concentrated a large army under Masséna with which he intended to crush Wellington and terminate the Peninsular War.¹

On the 29th of May the *Cadiz Gazette* published two French intercepted dispatches, one of which purported to be written by Napoleon to Mary Caroline. It alluded to the possibility of an arrangement based on the Queen's driving the British out of Sicily. This

¹ It may be recalled that in the summer of 1810 Wellington, heavily outnumbered, operated a long retreat before Masséna, fought a defensive action at Busaco, and finally fell back on the lines of Torres Vedras in front of Lisbon, which he held; only his fine generalship and foresight saved the British army and compensated for the reinforcements that he needed, but did not receive.

supposed communication between the Emperor and the Queen may now be easily perceived to have been a clumsy forgery, very probably a police device, intended to make its way into British hands, or perhaps the lucubration of a journalist whose methods anticipated those of a more anxiously competitive age. Yet at the first moment the genuineness of this communication was largely believed, and, curiously enough, by Mary Caroline herself. In Sicily, at the time when this supposed letter from the Emperor to Mary Caroline was published in Spain, the feeling of hostility between the British and the Queen and the sense of insecurity were hourly increasing. The British Minister's dispatches are full of the "strange incredulity" of the Palermo Court as to the French invasion. The inactivity and jealousy of the Sicilians are complained of. The fear is expressed that the British will have to face not only a French attack, but a defection in their rear. Finally, Amherst recommended the course advocated by Sir John Moore more than two years before, the deposition of the Queen. "I further think it absolutely necessary," he wrote to Wellesley, "that the Queen should cease to take the lead in public affairs."¹

From the Neapolitan side these fears of the British were assiduously fostered, and just as the news of the Cadiz letter arrived in Palermo from Spain, a proclamation reached it from Naples in which Joachim announced to his troops that the Sicilians were ready to co-operate with them and to rise against the British. On the 15th of July Mary Caroline sent for Lord Amherst. She had just received a copy of the Cadiz *Gazette*, and was in a state of some excitement. She read to the British Minister Napoleon's supposed letter, and then

¹ Amherst to Wellesley, June 11 and 19, 1810, *Foreign Off. Sicily*, 39.

declared that she thoroughly believed in its genuineness, but that for herself she was unswerving in her devotion to the British alliance. Her view that the letter was genuine was soon modified, however, for a few weeks later, at the request of the Sicilian *chargé d'affaires* at Cadiz, it was officially announced that the letter was a forgery by the Spanish Council of Regency.

It is now time that we recrossed the Strait to follow the operations of Napoleon and Joachim. The King of Naples arrived at Scilla on the 3rd of June, saluted by the ringing of bells and by salvos of artillery that were re-echoed, but with solid shot, by the British batteries on the further side. The Strait of Messina at this point appears little more than a river winding between hilly and picturesque banks. It gradually widens from about two miles across at the Faro to eight or nine miles at Messina. The troops of both armies were mostly encamped at the narrowest point, and so slight was the distance between them that from the lofty rock of Scilla, 550 feet above the sea, nearly all the British camps and intrenchments could be discovered. From the further side the view was no less remarkable and clear, and one English traveller claimed to have distinguished and recognised from the Faro through a telescope the person of the King of Naples.

The command of the French and Neapolitan army was nominally in the hands of the King, with General Grenier as his chief of staff. But the latter was in direct communication with Paris, and was responsible to the Minister of War for the movements of the French troops. These amounted to no less than 18,000 men on the 16th of July, while the Neapolitans at the same date numbered 17,000.¹

¹ *Arch. Nap. Guerra*, xxv. 1050 (*états de situation*); Colletta gives the total as

Along the winding shore that runs from Palmi southward to Reggio hundreds of small vessels, including sixty gunboats, were drawn up ready to embark the expedition. From the other side of the Strait they appeared like a "wood of masts."

To oppose the French Sir John Stuart mustered north and south of Messina 14,000 men in British pay, of which about one-half were Germans and other auxiliaries, together with some 7000 or 8000 Sicilians of very doubtful value. In one respect Stuart was much stronger than his opponents, for a large British and Sicilian fleet held complete command of the Strait. A number of English cruisers had been collected from the Mediterranean and Adriatic, together with three battleships, and were supported by about 100 gunboats each mounting one 18- or 24-pounder.

In view of the preponderance of the Anglo-Sicilians at sea, it was evident that the crossing could only be attempted above or below Messina, at some time when a favourable slant of wind should drive the opposing ships out of reach of the French transports. The town itself, well fortified and protected by forts, could not be attacked from seaward with the slightest hope of success. But the heavy British ships were generally kept cruising just outside, to the north of the Strait, while the harbour of Messina afforded a convenient shelter for several frigates, so that, however the wind blew, there was always a British naval force ready to protect the coast-line between Messina and the Faro. It was therefore only to the south of Messina, and with the wind blowing about south, that

16,000, Pepe as 22,000. It is quite possible that the official estimate was inflated as part of the scheme for alarming the British, yet Colletta and Pepe are so absolutely unreliable that on the whole it appears better to reject them even in favour of official figures.

a chance of a successful landing existed. In consequence of this the Neapolitan vessels and transports were gradually concentrated at Reggio and Pentemele, while only small detachments of them were left about Scilla and Palmi.

On the 30th of June a grand rehearsal of the invasion of Sicily took place. The whole of the French and Neapolitan troops were embarked at 11 P.M., remaining on board two hours, after which they were sent back to their quarters. This embarkation may have also been intended to alarm the defenders of Messina, for it took place precisely at the time when by proclamations, and devious ways untraceable by the historian, the dangerous position of the British army in Sicily had been tenfold magnified. Day and night skirmishes occurred along the Strait. One of these affrays was graced by the presence of King Ferdinand himself, who, attended by a group of British officers, watched a naval encounter from one of their batteries "with childish eagerness; at every shot he laughed aloud, threw out his long bony limbs in strange gesticulations, and poured volleys of buffoonery in the lazzaroni dialect."¹ Shots from the British batteries occasionally carried as far as the magnificent marquee of King Joachim that stood a conspicuous mark on the hill of Piale; on one occasion three fell in quick succession in a tent occupied by some of his Neapolitan staff officers.

As the summer weeks passed and no decisive movement took place, dissensions arose in the French camp; before long it was rumoured and believed that differences had arisen between the King and Grenier. It was reported that the French general held orders direct from Paris that his troops were not on any

¹ Bunbury, 224.

account to cross the Strait. Between French and Neapolitans a certain amount of feeling also arose, especially among the officers of the two nations who served on Joachim's staff. Rumours and jealousies of the most opposite kinds were thus current in the two camps, and although skirmishing proceeded daily, though many Neapolitan boats and an English brig were destroyed, yet matters of real importance seemed indefinitely at a deadlock.

Finally, after some heavy gunboat engagements, the King gave the order for the troops to be embarked. It was the night of the 18th of September, the wind was blowing lightly from the east, and Cavaignac's division was carried across, landing near Scaletta, 18 miles south of Messina, in the early hours of the morning. This movement, however, remained unsupported by the rest of the army; it may be that Grenier refused to move, either in execution of orders from Paris or for the perfectly comprehensible military reason that the movement was too wide to be safe. At all events, Cavaignac's division, quickly attacked by superior forces, was compelled to re-embark, and returned to Reggio, having lost a battalion of Corsican infantry of 1000 men who were cut off and taken prisoners. The *Monitore* ascribed the failure of the rest of the army to cross to the lack of wind, but it may be remarked that it was to the lack of wind alone that Cavaignac owed the return of his boats without damage from the British cruisers.

This proved the end of the projected invasion of Sicily. Eleven days later, on the 29th of September, the royal standard was hauled down, the camps were broken up, and Joachim returned to Naples. The stormy autumn season was approaching, yet as that

had not deterred Joachim from his difficult enterprise against Capri, it does not appear a sufficient reason for the abandonment of the Sicilian undertaking. The real reasons were written large on the face of events. Whatever may have been the King of Naples' precise policy during the summer, it was plain that neither the British nor yet the Emperor had been discomfited ; but he certainly had been. By many the King's precipitate abandonment of his enterprise was ascribed to his firm conviction that some sort of understanding had been arrived at between Napoleon and Mary Caroline.

The Emperor, however, whether playing a part or legitimately displeased at his lieutenant's precipitate retreat, complained strongly of his conduct. Anxious at the approaching crisis at Lisbon, news of the occupation of which he was awaiting from Masséna, he complained to Joachim that his retreat from the Strait of Messina might well result in the reinforcement of the British in Portugal with troops that would otherwise have been dispatched to Sicily. A little later the Emperor, still far from sympathising with the King's discomfiture, reproached him for the bad management that had failed to carry the whole army across the Strait and had resulted in the loss of the Corsican battalion ; not content with this he blamed Joachim for the bad management of his finances, and for mustering an army of 40,000 Neapolitans, when 20,000 would be just as useful, as everything in reality depended on the French troops.

Truly Napoleon was a hard master to obey and to please ; in these letters he revealed his insincerity so openly that the King of Naples was exasperated to a dangerous point. The fear lest the kingdom of Naples

should suffer the same fate as that of Holland,¹ the discovery of Napoleon's deception and bad faith, turned his thoughts to bitterness and resentment. In the opinion of an officer of rank it "paved the way for the future defection of a prince who was absolutely determined to be an independent king."² The feeling of hostility between Joachim and the Emperor was marked through the winter of 1810-1811; it increased perceptibly in the early spring.

On the 19th of March 1811 occurred an event on which many hopes and ambitions depended. The new Empress of the French gave birth to a son, and he was immediately announced to the world as the King of Rome. The title was a suggestive one, and might be thought to raise for the future both the question of Italian nationality and that of the possible dispossession of Joachim.

The King of Naples, who had proceeded to Paris for this solemn occasion, suddenly left without awaiting the splendid ceremonies appointed to mark the birth of the heir to the Empire. Immediately on arriving at his capital he issued a decree whereby no civil or military appointment in his kingdom could be held by any but a native-born or naturalized Neapolitan. The step was hasty, premature, and ineffective; even among the Neapolitans men of sense, like Zurlo, disapproved of the King's rash measure. It is difficult to state precisely the reasons that induced Joachim to make such a move. It appears equally probable that irritation with the Emperor, a desire to assert his independence by appealing to Neapolitan nationalism, and jealousy on

¹ Difficulties between the Emperor and King Louis led the latter to abdicate in favour of his son in the summer of 1810. On this Napoleon, by decree, annexed the kingdom to the Empire.

² De Dedem, 183.

account of an intrigue of the Queen with a high-placed French official, denounced by Maghella, entered into them.

Napoleon's reply to the decree of the King of Naples was instant and crushing. The *Moniteur* announced that it was unnecessary for the French comrades of Joachim Murat, by whose aid he had ascended the throne, to become naturalized in order to hold civil and military offices in the kingdom of Naples. Joachim's rage at the Emperor's conclusive retort was unbounded. He tore from his breast the Legion of Honour, and vowed he would wear that decoration no longer ; so violently was he moved, indeed, that he fell ill.

To make the quarrel between the brothers-in-law even more serious, it was just at this time that a secret correspondence of Joachim with Paris was discovered by the police. This correspondence revealed that Joachim kept in close touch with Fouché and the small party of intriguers who would have welcomed, in certain eventualities, his succession to the Imperial throne. General Aymé, of the Neapolitan army, was arrested and imprisoned at Vincennes, while Lavauguyon, one of Joachim's equerries, was sent out of Paris. Napoleon further ordered instructions to be forwarded to the Governor of Rome, General Miollis, to sequestrate the famous Farnese Palace and collections belonging to the Neapolitan crown.

Things had gone far. One more step would have marked an irreparable breach. At this crisis of their fortunes, when it appeared as though their throne might at any moment be taken from them, Joachim and Caroline agreed for a while to sink their differences. The tension between Paris and Naples immediately

relaxed. Marshal Pérignon, Governor of Naples, officially announced to the King that he had instructions to declare that the Emperor had no intention of annexing Naples to the Empire; such an annexation was unnecessary, as Naples in reality was but a portion of the Greater Empire; it was agreeable to the Emperor that Joachim should be King of Naples, but it was not to be forgotten that Napoleon was none the less Emperor there.

In Court circles at Naples and among the diplomats an open breach was freely talked of. Even the possibility of an armed conflict was discussed, and in one of his dispatches the Austrian Minister, Count Mier, thought it worth while to express the opinion that Joachim, in such an eventuality, could not rely on the French and foreign officers in the Neapolitan army. Three weeks later he wrote as follows:—

This incertitude as to the continued existence of the kingdom not only impedes the operations of government, but greatly affects private affairs; no one dares enter into contracts and bargains but from day to day; and the government has stopped all public works so as not to spend what money is in hand, and this economy is specially with a view to having specie ready in case of trouble.¹

Towards the end of October it was thought advisable that the Queen should proceed to Paris to placate her brother. The step proved in a measure successful. Caroline's influence was effective, and tangible proofs of Napoleon's lessened resentment were soon afforded by the restoration of the Farnese property and the release of Aymé.

Caroline remained in Paris through the winter of 1811-1812, while Joachim stayed at Naples not only

¹ Mier to Metternich, Oct. 11, 1811, Helfert, *Murat*, 128.

in conjugal but in political isolation. All correspondence between him and the Emperor ceased ; and the separation did not tend to improve the long-shaken relations between the King and Queen. The prevailing impression in the spring of 1812 was still that any pretext would suffice to cause the annexation of Naples to the Empire, when the threatened outburst of the greatest and most terrible of the Napoleonic wars served to divert the Emperor's attention to other matters, served to give price once more to the invaluable services of the great cavalry leader of the Empire. His presence had been too much missed in 1809 to make him less than indispensable to the gigantic army mustering for the great plunge into the steppes of Russia.

While Joachim's relations with the French Empire thus progressed, there had been plenty to engage his attention within the boundaries of the kingdom. The reforms, finance, and legislation of this period have already received notice, but some of the consequences of the expedition to the Strait of Messina have not yet been related, and must now find place. So often had Calabria been officially declared pacified, so often had regal generosity amnestied the province, that from these two facts alone it might fairly be concluded that the state of lawlessness had been uninterrupted. Insurrection turned to brigandage, and brigandage to insurrection with the same rapidity with which a peaceful, slumbering peasant would dart up and unsheathe his knife from its hidden resting-place, or with which a red-coated Sicilian colonel would exchange his regulation sword and theoretical civilization for a blunderbuss and the military ethics of a North-

American Indian. The summer of 1806 had been very bad, that of 1807 a little, and of 1808 much better ; in 1809 there had been another outbreak, which even the presence of the large army collected in the province in 1810 hardly brought within bounds. Convoys for the camps along the Strait of Messina were frequently cut off, and in the very outskirts of the King's headquarters at Piale murders by brigands were frequent.

The system of civic guards had proved so far of little effect in restraining and punishing excesses, but the chief fault had undoubtedly been the constant variation of policy. Brigands who laughed at their pursuers were grandiloquently amnestied by a magnanimous prince, but were promptly hanged in spite of all amnesties if by any chance taken prisoner. There was neither rigour, nor clemency, nor consistency about the system pursued, until, after the break-up of the camp at Reggio, General Manhès was appointed military governor of Calabria, with unlimited powers to act in the King's name.

Manhès was a young, dashing cavalry officer of Joachim's staff, who had followed him to Naples with advantage to himself. For, only a lieutenant at Austerlitz, he had four years later received the rank of general in the Neapolitan service. He had held various commands in the Abruzzi and Calabria, and had shown energy and capacity. Daure, Minister of the Interior, prepared a lengthy report recommending a series of administrative measures to pacify the province, which the King at first was inclined to adopt. But finally he appears to have concluded that only military rule and vigorous measures could effect a cure, and fixed on Manhès to carry them out. After some persuasion

from Zurlo, Mosbourg, and Pignatelli, he accepted the charge.

Manhès arrived at Monteleone on the 9th of November 1810. He had already issued a proclamation announcing that he was invested with full powers for pacifying the province, that former measures had been unsuccessful, and that in the future no more amnesties would be granted. For a few weeks the new governor did nothing, apparently inactive and powerless. But he had worked out a plan based on a principle that made this delay necessary. At last, when the first winter snows made their appearance on the mountain tops, he issued his decrees. The plan of Manhès turned on two fundamental facts: that the inhabitants of Calabria were nowhere a scattered population, but lived entirely in village communities, and that the brigands could not remain in the mountain fastnesses without obtaining food from the villages. He therefore decreed that every one of the rank and file of the brigands who surrendered immediately should be pardoned, and receive pay at the rate of one *carlin* per day. The chiefs, however, were not included, and had a price put on their heads. Every village was to live under military guard, the cattle were to be kept under watch by day, within the walls at night. No food of any sort, not even in the most minute quantities, was to be taken beyond the walls of the towns or villages under penalty of death. The same penalty was to be awarded to any one holding any communication with the brigands.

These drastic, but not illogical, measures were announced by every parish priest of Calabria; they proved largely successful, because they were executed to the letter. That they inflicted hardship is true, but

that milder steps would have succeeded is not probable ; and it cannot be thought that the war of extermination against the brigands was unjustified. A staunch Bourbonist described their excesses as more worthy of cannibals than men, and his judgment was far from an exaggerated one. How useless was the civic guard system had just been demonstrated by Parafante who, near Cosenza, routed a whole battalion of them in pitched battle. For four years he had harried the country between Cosenza, Amantea, and the Sila, but the measures of Manhès brought him to bay at last. His men could find no food on the mountains. The decrees of the French governor were followed up with cruel vigour. At Stilo some women and boys who took bread with them as they went out into the fields to pick olives, were shot. At Cosenza a father was shot for supplying food to his son. At Nicastro a woman who received and tended a new-born babe given to her by a girl who followed the brigands, was shot. Millers who had sold flour to the outlaws were shot. In every village lists of brigands who were to be shot at sight were posted, and all the while every particle of food was kept within walls. For the capture or head of Parafante, Manhès offered everything that could be given, money, honours, promotion. This atrocious murderer and mutilator was finally reduced to a following of five men, and with these he was shot down in the forest of Nicastro in the month of February 1811.

Among the most prominent of the brigand chiefs who came to a similar end only Benincasa and Taccone need be mentioned. The former was one of the *capi-massi* who followed Cardinal Ruffo in '99. Like Parafante he had harried the country since 1806, and was chiefly known for the hundreds of men whose noses

had been slit by his orders. He was finally killed not far from Maida in March 1811.¹

Taccone had a period of success, and, posing as a political personage, characteristically ordered solemn processions and a service in the cathedral at Potenza, for a while in his possession. Equally characteristically, with the same unswerving zeal for the cause he represented, he ordered the burning of women whose views did not happen to coincide with his. The civic guards of Potenza finally captured this atrocious ruffian, and he was happily executed.

But a more pleasing aspect of those few ferocious months during which Manhès reigned over Calabria must also be noted. At the little village of Serra, in the wildest part of the Calabrian mountains, the Syndic and French captain in command were enticed into a house, treacherously attacked, and murdered. On the news reaching Monteleone, Manhès instantly started in person at the head of sixty lancers. He arrived at Serra late at night, and on the following morning ordered the people to be collected in the public square. As soon as they had assembled, he addressed them in terms that may be shortly rendered thus :—

You have committed a brutal outrage. There is not a foot of this country you have not drenched in innocent blood. I declare you unworthy of making part of a civilized community ; you are wild beasts, sanguinary, ferocious, respecters neither of divine nor of human law. I now command your interdiction and exclusion from all authority, spiritual and temporal ; I command that the doors of the churches of Serra be nailed up ; and I enjoin on the neighbouring villages that every path

¹ *Copia delle lettere*, 5 ; as an example of his outrages and cruelties the following short passage may be quoted : “Dodici infelici del Reggimento 29 di linea Francese furono da lui inchiodati agli alberi del Bosco di S. Eufemia, e furono trovati . . . col membre virilo reciso, ed indi posto nella loro bocca.”—*Notizia sulle Vite*, 14.

leading to Serra be watched, preventing all communication, and shooting down all who would approach as wild beasts suffering from hydrophobia.

The inhabitants were seized with consternation, which increased as they saw the threatened measures being carried into execution and their priests being removed from the village. Soon they agreed to hunt down the murderers, and before long satisfied justice. A month later Manhès remitted his sentence against the village. That part of the country was permanently pacified.

One of the numerous persons executed at this time was Capobianco, who has sometimes been called the first martyr of the Carbonari. The rise and origin of this secret society will engage our attention a little later; all that need be said for the present is that in 1808, when Calabria was fairly peaceful, and a great mustering of soldiers and militia had been urged by Joachim, Briot, *intendente* of the province, had largely made use of freemasonry as a means of getting together local bodies. Shortly afterwards Napoleon's anti-papal policy had turned the Calabrian clergy more strongly against the new order, and secret associations on more or less masonic lines were employed against the Government in several places, a certain Canon Le Piane being a specially active agent. Some such association, with a combination of other exciting causes, led a farrier named Capobianco, Grand Master of a lodge, and who had before this had some difficulties with the Government, to head an armed movement that Manhès very courageously and adroitly mastered. Capobianco was arrested, tried by court-martial, and hanged.¹

¹ Manhès' letter to the Paris *Moniteur* (Dec. 5, 1835) makes Colletta's account valueless.

His treatment of Serra reveals a side of Manhès' character that shows him not to have been the monster that Calabrian legend has made him. He was a haughty man, somewhat spoiled by good fortune and the King's favour, who made more enemies than friends, yet honest, just according to his own lights, indefatigable and tenacious. With the English governor of Messina he maintained courteous, nearly friendly, relations. To his subordinates he nearly as frequently inculcated strict observance of legal forms as the constant pursuit of malefactors. He did not extirpate brigandage from Calabria, because even if swept from the mountain sides it could not be eradicated from the hearts of the people, yet after a few months of his rule Calabria . . . "assumed the appearance of civilization and public safety," and this was undoubtedly a great step forward.¹ So highly were his services esteemed that the King created him a count, and promoted him to the rank of lieutenant-general, while the city of Castrovillari presented him with a sword of honour, and that of Cosenza elected him a free burgess.

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¹ Colletta, *Storia*, ii. 119.

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CHAPTER IX

THE DEFECTION OF MURAT

Joachim joins *Grande Armée*—Events in Russia—Commands in chief—Abandons army—Negotiations between Austria and Naples—Position of Metternich—Of Joachim—Course of Sicilian events since 1810—Bentinck—Negotiates at Ponza—Joachim returns to army—Napoleon's position—Joachim and Italy—Dresden interview—Entreaties of Joachim—Negotiations of Joachim and Metternich—Joachim returns to Naples—Hesitating policy—Italian unity—Fouché's mission—Colletta at Bologna—Nugent at Ravenna—Diplomatic negotiations—Neipperg at Naples—His letter to Caroline—Austro-Neapolitan alliance—Bentinck at Naples—Anglo-Neapolitan armistice.

FOR the three years that passed between 1812 and 1815 the fortunes of the kingdom of Naples depended so intimately on the movements and decisions of one man, that the centre of interest of its history must be transferred to the vast scene of war and politics that was stretched between the Kremlin at Moscow and the Palace at Fontainebleau. During that period, while the great events that marked the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire were passing, every reasonable man at Naples felt that the future of the kingdom would be decided far from its boundaries. Yet few foresaw the magnitude of the revolution that was coming about.

King Joachim, after considerable hesitation, decided to accept the command of the cavalry of the *Grande Armée* which Napoleon had offered him. One of Caroline's dearest wishes was now gratified, for when in April the King proceeded to Germany she was installed as Regent of the kingdom.

The march of Napoleon into Russia was so obviously hazardous, that even before the French army crossed the frontier, Paris was full of apprehension; long before Moscow was reached the *Grande Armée* was seriously disorganized, demoralized, and reduced. Even before the victorious carnage of Borodino (September 7, 1812), Napoleon's marshals clearly showed that prosperity, or common sense, had wearied them of war, and that they judged the enterprise on which their master had embarked foolhardy. The spirit of criticism that had been checked by the wave of success of the opening years of the Empire was now alive once more. The leader who had formerly been their companion, and later their divinity, had appeared to many observers weak and ineffective at the battle of Borodino, where Davout, or the King of Naples, if supported, might have turned the Russian defeat into a disaster.

In September and October no man in the army was more profoundly depressed and dissatisfied than the King of Naples. In command of a detached corps, mostly made up of cavalry, he was hard put to it to keep the Cossacks at a distance from Moscow. He was sick of his work and of semi-starvation, and foresaw the ensuing disaster. Together with his disgust with fruitless skirmishing in a half-desert country, Joachim was irritated by constant disagreement with the policy of Caroline and the Neapolitan Ministers,

whose action he vainly attempted to direct from his headquarters.

On the retreat from Moscow the King of Naples, leader of a horseless command, did nothing of note. He was not one of the few, among whom Ney and Prince Eugène were most conspicuous, whose fortitude shone brightly through the clouds of adversity. He followed the footsteps of Napoleon wearily and moodily through burning Smolensk and across the corpse-laden Berezina. One of the last incidents of the retreat was of special importance to Joachim, and must therefore be mentioned. Two regiments of light horse of the King's Guard had just arrived from the south. They joined the army at Osmiana, and were detailed to escort the Emperor to Wilna, two days' march; so intense was the cold that less than a hundred of them arrived at the journey's end.

On the 5th of December Napoleon left what remained of his great army. Before departing he signed a decree appointing the King of Naples to the command, much to the chagrin of Prince Eugène. The appointment was dictated by political rather than by military considerations, for at this crisis in the Emperor's fortunes he considered it advisable to give himself all the apparent strength he could by presenting the King as his chief subordinate. He probably also thought that his interests at Naples would be safer in Caroline's than in Joachim's hands. That he really trusted the King is not possible, for there had been little direct intercourse between them during the campaign, and Napoleon had shown an extreme and unreasonable jealousy at the frequent and not unfriendly intercourse that Joachim held with the Russians when in command of the outposts.

At a council of war which Joachim held nearly immediately after assuming command, he is reported to have inveighed bitterly against Napoleon's insensate ambition, to which he ascribed all the disasters of the army. His remarks were more conformable to common sense than to military discipline, and several of the marshals raised their voices in protest. The retreat was continued to Königsberg, whence Joachim, writing to his wounded chief of staff, Belliard, declared: "Everybody wants to leave the army. I am really indignant at the general demoralization. If this state of affairs continues, it is impossible to say how far it will go."¹ Only a few days later he himself did what he had thus reprobated in others. On the march from Marienswerder to Posen he received a courier from Naples. The news contained in the dispatches handed to him appeared to agitate him greatly. A few hours later he resigned the command of the army to Prince Eugène, and took the road for Naples with the same precipitancy that he had shown in the year 1811. The return of the King to Naples was marked by a coolness between him and the Queen and by the disgrace of a prominent courtier, in which facts, rather than in any sudden political calculation, is to be sought the explanation of the King's abandonment of his charge.

Napoleon was indignant when he heard of the desertion of his command by the King of Naples. He immediately wrote to Prince Eugène that were it not for the critical state of affairs he would have court-martialled the King. When he met the Duke of Carignano, Neapolitan Minister at Paris, he pointedly inquired after the health of the Queen; the King he

¹ Belliard, i. 114.

passed over in silence. The *Moniteur* announced to the world the change in command of the French army on the Russian frontier with the insulting comment that Prince Eugène's talents were better suited for the duties which the absence of the King had devolved on him. When this number of the official paper reached Naples, Joachim was wounded to the quick. He wrote to Belliard strongly complaining of the treatment he was subjected to, vowing unalterable fidelity to the Emperor, and expressing the hope that he would soon meet his old chief of staff once more at the head of his troops.

Nearly immediately after this an exchange of views took place between Prince Cariati, the Neapolitan Minister at Vienna, and Count Metternich, and between Count Mier, Austrian Minister at Naples, and Joachim. Mier was a trusted diplomatist, whose part at Naples had been for two years a very passive one, but who was now to use to some purpose the personal influence he had established with the sovereigns to whom he was accredited. The precise position of Austria at this moment was that she was still nominally the ally of the French Empire. Yet every one knew that alliance to be one of necessity, that would be broken at the first favourable opportunity. No sooner had the first intimations of the catastrophe of Russia reached Vienna than Austrian diplomacy began to stir. If the great game of politics was to turn against Napoleon, Metternich was anxious to obtain his share in the division of the spoils. As yet few men realized the extent of the disaster that had overtaken the French arms, and no man could foresee what the future would bring. Yet every day that passed showed the position of Napoleon under a more threatening aspect.

As the hold of the French army on north-eastern Germany gradually relaxed, the sentiment grew in Vienna, as it did elsewhere, that the time had now come when it had become possible to check the extravagance of Napoleon's policy, that a time had arrived when he might be persuaded to see reason, or if not persuaded, then compelled to see it.

The views held in Vienna during the early weeks of 1813 were in reality not very far removed from those professed quite widely in Paris; they were even closer to those of the King of Naples. So great was Joachim's anxiety for a general settlement and for peaceful possession of his throne, that a whisper of the Emperor's intention of uniting Naples to the Greater Empire, once more circulated in the spring of 1813, sufficed to make him seek in Vienna that stable support he had never found in Paris.¹ Knowing as he did how complete had been the destruction of the *Grande Armée*, he probably based his whole political calculation on the supposition that the Austrian army must prove a factor of such weight that it would force Napoleon to a settlement. Joachim had not yet gauged the super-human resourcefulness and inflexibility of that extraordinary man.

In April the first diplomatic pourparlers took place at Naples. They were carried on without the knowledge of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Duke di Gallo, for he was too strong a supporter of Napoleon to be trusted. The overtures came from the Neapolitan side, and Mier was able to report to his court that Joachim's mind was set on one thing only,—the guarantee of his actual possessions and independence. If he

¹ Helfert, *Königin Karolina*, 514. In the absence of any other authority than Mier one may venture the supposition that this rumour was of diplomatic origin.

could only obtain this he was prepared to follow the Austrian lead, and if necessary to join in the mediation which Metternich then contemplated as a means of obtaining a settlement.

Although Austria seemed the most important factor in the diplomatic situation for Naples, Great Britain appeared most threatening of the actual belligerents. To conciliate her was at least as necessary as to conciliate Austria, and this Joachim, on finding Count Mier in a friendly disposition, prepared to do. The turn that Anglo-Neapolitan relations now took will be more clearly understood if a brief retrospect of events that had taken place on the further side of the Strait of Messina since 1810 be first attempted.

The persistent circulation of the reports of secret correspondence between Napoleon and Mary Caroline had the double effect of alienating the King of Naples from the Emperor and the British from the Queen of Sicily. The British generals were strong in their denunciations of the Queen; her spies were caught and tried by court-martial, and, on more than one occasion, shot. An exchange of letters between the Queen and Lucien Bonaparte was jealously watched. A trap was successfully set on various Sicilian officers who declared their readiness to fight against the British. It had now become a burning question whether Mary Caroline or the representative of Great Britain was to rule Sicily.

It was at this period that the British Cabinet decided to send to Sicily Lord William Bentinck, who in the dual capacity of diplomatic representative and Commander-in-Chief was virtually intrusted with dictatorial power. Bentinck was a complex personality, of which the two most salient features were inflexible resolution

and bluntness of manner. Mary Caroline, after her first interview with him, described him to the Court circle as a "boorish corporal," and Bentinck at once demonstrated his lack of diplomatic qualifications by manifesting open resentment.¹ His political aims were liberal, inspired by a genuine aspiration for improvement, but tintured, so far as an Italian policy was concerned, by a violent anti-French sentiment that brought him for a time nearer the views of Castlereagh than those of the late leader of his own party, Fox. By profession he was a soldier. In India he had proved his determination, or obstinacy, to the point of arousing revolt; at Marengo, with Melas, he had witnessed one of the greatest of French victories; in Germany, and later in Spain, he had been in the field against them, though with but ill success. As director of British policy in the Mediterranean he aimed at dealing a blow at the French power in Italy. From the first he appears to have thought that in a national revolt of the Italian people lay the hope, not only of overturning the throne of Naples, but of effecting some radical improvement, some step towards the nationalization and liberalization of the peninsula.

For some months after Bentinck's arrival at Palermo there arose no opportunity for undertaking any of the schemes he revolved. Until the summer of 1812 Spain remained the only scene of active operations, and the British Government was more disposed to utilize what strength it could dispose of in the Mediterranean for assisting Wellington than for any new and problematic movement in Italy. But even had Bentinck disposed of the means, he would have lacked the leisure to invade Naples, for he was fully occupied during two years

¹ *Mary Caroline Memoirs.*

settling the political conditions of Sicily, or, in other words, depriving Mary Caroline of political power.

The complicated threads of the political intrigues of those two years, the history of the English-made constitution presented to the Sicilians by Bentinck, cannot be traced here. It will suffice to say that by the beginning of 1813 the affairs of Sicily had reached the following position. The Queen was virtually a State prisoner in British custody, and under engagement to leave the island. The King was engaged in his favourite occupation of hunting, and no longer resided at Palermo. The Hereditary Prince, Francis, Duke of Calabria, held the regency confided to him by his father. He and a Sicilian Parliament ostensibly, Lord William Bentinck in reality, ruled Sicily. The British agent's declared policy was the maintenance of the Bourbon rights as stipulated in the treaty of alliance, and the freeing of Italy for the benefit of the Italians who should be left at liberty to declare for whatever form of constitution they preferred. In the first respect his views accorded with those of the British Cabinet ; in the second they did not.

In a military way Bentinck had not as yet effected much. To form Sicilian troops was a difficult task, for such recruits as could be obtained deserted, and the officers were so poor that they were not above begging for charity in the streets. In 1812 an expedition sent to Catalonia effected little, but preparations were made for another and larger one in 1813.

The destruction of the French army in Russia, and the apparent inclination of the King of Naples for peace, gave Bentinck an opportunity for detaching him from the fortunes of Napoleon. Having in the early weeks of 1813 completed all preparations for his pro-

jected expedition to Spain, and also for the removal of Mary Caroline from Sicily, he sailed for the small island of Ponza late in May. There he had interviews with some secret agents of Joachim, the English merchant Jones, and a subordinate of the Neapolitan Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They were not able to persuade him into offering better terms than these: that the King should immediately join the Allies with all his troops; that he should renounce the throne of Naples; in return Joachim should be provided with an equivalent compensation, and, until such compensation was provided, retain Naples.

These proposals of Bentinck were not accepted, for the whole object of Joachim's policy was the retention of Naples. Yet the mere fact that he had opened negotiations with Austria and Great Britain, in which his taking sides against Napoleon was proposed, marked a big step forward. As Wellington wrote to Bentinck:—

Your late discussions with Murat's agents have entirely altered the appearance of affairs in Italy. . . . It is very difficult to form an opinion of Murat's sincerity, but I am quite certain he will do nothing unless the Emperor of Austria should take a line with the Allies.¹

At the very moment that Bentinck was at Ponza the aspect of affairs in France and in northern Europe was rapidly changing, and Joachim was once more drawn back towards Napoleon. The attitude of the King had caused alarm at Paris. On the 3rd of June the French Minister at Naples, Durand, addressed a note to Gallo complaining of the negotiations proceeding between Vienna and Naples. At the same time Joachim received from Paris private letters urging him

¹ Wellington, *Disps.* x. 482.

to join the army in Germany and not to leave his old comrades to fight without him. For some weeks he wavered, though had Bentinck agreed to guarantee him Naples he would doubtless have joined the Allies.

These entreaties, the unsatisfactory proposals of Bentinck, and the rapid advance of Napoleon's new army on Berlin all served to check the King's movement towards the Allies. Yet when pressed by the Emperor to detach troops to reinforce Prince Eugène in northern Italy he wrote to him that, although he was prepared to march north with 30,000 men, it was only on condition that he should hold supreme command south of the Alps. On other terms he would not move a single soldier.

Metternich had now advanced so far towards open hostilities with France that the reserve he had shown towards the Neapolitan advances in April had become impatience in July. If Austria was once more to take the field against Napoleon it was of desperate importance that every possible assistance should be promptly secured. He urged Mier in the strongest terms to obtain the accession of the King to the Allies, and when he signed the treaty whereby Austria entered the coalition he added a clause providing for the entry and indemnification of the King of Naples.

On the 2nd of May Napoleon won the battle of Lutzen, and on the 21st the battle of Bautzen. For these victories Joachim ordered *Te Deums* to be sung, and finally, on the 2nd of August, on receiving a letter from Napoleon inviting him to Dresden, he suddenly decided to leave Naples and join the French army. He appears to have been prompted to this resolve by various motives; among them was the belief that he could successfully interpose and, by his personal

influence, mediate a peace between the Emperor and the Allies. But Joachim, however independent at a distance, was in the presence of Napoleon little more than a "poule mouillée," as Rapp said. Although he arrived at headquarters at a moment when negotiations for a settlement were proceeding actively, yet once face to face with Napoleon, he was able to play no part, and sank back at once into his accustomed rôle of a mere military subordinate.

The position of Napoleon at this moment was an extraordinary one. He was attempting to browbeat a league of every Power of Europe with an army but half as large as that he had led into Russia, of which but one-third was French, and in which conscripts took the place of veterans, criticism and lassitude the place of enthusiasm and confidence. Every sacrifice had been made in order to collect troops in Germany. Grenier, with three seasoned divisions, was ordered north from Naples, Italy was denuded of French and German troops, and between February and November 1,000,000 conscripts were taken from their homes. After Lutzen Napoleon intrusted the defence of northern Italy to Prince Eugène, and ordered the King of Naples to detach 20,000 men to serve under the Viceroy's orders. This Joachim declined to do, though had the Emperor promptly and ungrudgingly given him the supreme command of everything south of the Alps, it appears probable that a great part of the Neapolitan army would have marched north, and that the policy of Joachim would have taken a different turn.

Joachim reached headquarters at Dresden just as the armistice concluded after Bautzen was coming to a close. That armistice had been marked by negotiations during

which Austria had interposed her armed mediation, and Metternich was at Dresden submitting to the Emperor the terms on which peace might yet be concluded. For seven hours did Metternich's interview with Napoleon last, for seven hours did the King of Naples and several of the marshals anxiously await the result in an ante-room. The Austrian negotiator failed. Napoleon could not bring himself to sacrifice what was required of him. "Your sovereigns born to the throne may be beaten twenty times," he said to Metternich, "and still go back to their palaces; that cannot I, the child of fortune. . . ." ¹ Yet the French army was crying aloud for peace. To the expostulations of his marshals and of his most trusty advisers the Emperor turned a deaf ear. Caulaincourt, Berthier, Belliard pleaded with him in vain. Duroc, a few days before his death, declared that things had gone too far. Ney and the King of Naples earnestly remonstrated against eternal warfare, and on Napoleon calling Joachim a traitor, the latter put his hand on his sword. At Dresden both the King and Caulaincourt actually went on their knees begging the Emperor to conclude peace. It was all of no avail. The strongest declarations could not move him, and when Joachim came out from Napoleon's study he said to Belliard: "Ah, wretched man! he will sacrifice France and the army, and kill you all. . . . Caulaincourt told him some very strong, even harsh, truths. He listened to everything with perfect composure." ²

On the 10th of August the armistice came to an end. Two hundred thousand Austrians now joined the Allies, and military operations were resumed. Joachim took command of the French cavalry, though by a strange fiction the kingdom of Naples continued normal

¹ Metternich, i. 186.

² Belliard, i. 119, 124.

diplomatic relations with Austria, and the King's presence with the French army was declared to be merely in the capacity of a volunteer. That one volunteer proved a host in himself so long as fortune remained favourable. At the battle of Dresden a circling movement of several divisions of cavalry unerringly led by Joachim brought victory once more to the Imperial eagles.

After Dresden came much marching and counter-marching. The Emperor divided his army in two, marched in person towards Berlin against Blucher, and left Joachim to hold Schwarzenberg in check. At last the French and allied armies gradually closed on the town of Leipzig, and in the terrific battle that was there fought the fortunes of Napoleon suffered an irretrievable blow. The French army began its retreat from Leipzig on the night of the 18th of October, but already a month earlier Metternich had resumed his efforts to detach Joachim from the Emperor. He had told the King, with the consent of Lord Aberdeen, British Ambassador to Vienna, that "Austria was in a position to make communications of the greatest importance on behalf of England and of the Prince Regent of Sicily. . . ." ¹

The fact was that the instructions given to Lord Aberdeen, on his leaving London for Vienna in August, were completely in accord with the policy adopted by Bentinck in the Ponza negotiations, and directed him that the British Cabinet was not prepared to sacrifice the claim of King Ferdinand to Naples, but was prepared to consider the compensation of Joachim with a "liberal establishment" in central Italy.² Joachim was not, however, acquainted with the tenor of Lord Aber-

¹ *Foreign Off. Austria*, 102, undated, but presumably not later than Sept. 25.

² Rose, ii. 301.

deen's instructions, and it is indeed doubtful whether any of Metternich's communications actually reached him between Dresden and Leipzig.¹ But after that battle, whether any communication from Metternich reached him or not, he appears to have decided that to go on longer would be folly. If the Emperor, if his old companion-in-arms was determined to continue pouring out these endless libations of blood against the opinion of Europe, of France, and even of his most trusted lieutenants, why should he participate longer in such folly? Why should one insane will prevail against the common-sense of mankind? Was he, Joachim Murat, to be drawn against his wish into the vortex of destruction into which Napoleon Bonaparte was straightway plunging? Was it wrong to compel the war-mad Emperor to desist, and that, if necessary, by force of arms? How could Napoleon refuse longer to sign that peace which the world called for aloud if his old friend, his brother-in-law, the Master of the Imperial Horse, the possible successor to the French throne, the most brilliant soldier of his army, came to him with his sword drawn and said: "Sire, what you seek is beyond nature; it has turned your own children against you; in the name of reason, in the name of France, you must accept peace." Thus probably reasoned the unhappy Joachim to himself on that mournful march southwards from Leipzig through Weimar and Erfurt, through the scenes of the brilliant triumphs of former years.

After leaving Erfurt, where he saw Napoleon for the last time of his life, information reached Joachim that

¹ From the letter of the King of Bavaria to Prince Eugène, Oct. 8, 1813, the inference may fairly be drawn that no satisfactory assurances were given by Joachim. —Planat de la Faye, *Prince Eugène*, 2.

he might yet count on the goodwill of Metternich, and negotiate with Austria on the basis of his retaining the throne of Naples. Possibly a communication reached him through the Austrian lines at Ollendorf on the 22nd of October.¹ On the following day the Duke of Rocca Romana joined him at Eisenach with dispatches from Naples, and that night Murat left the army and started as fast as post-horses could gallop for Italy. On learning of the King's abandonment of the army Napoleon was greatly enraged, and issued orders for his arrest if he should pass on French soil.

The arrival of Joachim in his capital was immediately marked by a step that unmistakably proclaimed a complete reversal of policy. The King arrived on the 4th of November; on the 11th a decree was issued throwing the trade of Naples open to neutral vessels. Yet Joachim's intentions were in reality far from fixed. The very next day after the issue of this decree he wrote to Napoleon offering to march into Lombardy at the head of 40,000 men, but asking in return that the Emperor should proclaim the independence of Italy. He was, in fact, open to the first good offer, and was faced by this difficulty that on the one hand Napoleon was not accommodating, and that on the other he had to deal not with one but with several parties, one of which alone, so far, had shown signs of meeting him. Metternich was ready to enter into a treaty, but was that of real value if Great Britain was not prepared to concur in it? Neither Castlereagh at the Foreign Office nor Bentinck at Palermo showed signs of a friendly disposition, though

¹ The supposed interview between Murat and Mier has been conclusively demonstrated to be apocryphal by M. Weil in his *Prince Eugène et Murat*; yet it appears more than probable that some communication from the Austrian lines reached Murat at this point, perhaps accompanied by a passport to enable him to pass through southern Germany.

Lord Aberdeen appeared disposed to concur in the Austrian policy. But the British Ambassador to Vienna was young and had yet much to learn in politics and diplomacy. His uncertain grasp of the whole question may be judged from the following extract from one of his dispatches to Castlereagh: "The grand thing, in the first instance, is to precipitate his (Murat's) acts of hostility against Bonaparte without committing ourselves by any engagement or precise understanding."¹

A few days before offering his assistance, for a price, to Napoleon, Joachim had made a similar offer to Metternich. Writing in cypher to Prince Cariati at Vienna, he expressed himself strongly against the Emperor's folly, stating that he was prepared to march at the head of 80,000 men, and hoping that the Allies would treat him not less favourably than they had treated Bernadotte and Sweden. This dispatch was written on the journey between Eisenach and Naples.²

Since his return from Russia in the early weeks of 1813 a vast political scheme had been growing in Joachim's mind, until it had now become the central idea about which all his plans revolved. If the French Empire was falling to pieces, if France was to be driven back to her natural frontiers of the Rhine and the Alps, why should not an Italian State be constituted, and why should not he, Joachim Murat, be its ruler? The whole peninsula, though nominally under three governments, was under similar laws and administration. Whether as inhabitants of Naples, of the French departments, or of the kingdom of Italy, Italians had fought side by side. Did the break-up of the Empire portend the break-up of this outline of an Italian nationality as

¹ Aberdeen to Castlereagh, Nov. 10, 1813, *Foreign Off. Austria*, 102.

² *Ibid.*

well? The constitution of Italy as a national unit was no new conception; men of capacity like Saliceti, Maghella, and Bentinck had realized its possibility; Napoleon had announced his faith in it by creating Lombardy the kingdom of Italy and his son the King of Rome. Many believed the time ripe and the means found. King Joachim's understanding was convinced, his ambition was inflamed; he embarked on a scheme full of dangers, and for the carrying out of which he had few qualifications to succeed.

Yet had Napoleon been willing to benefit Italy, to sacrifice his personal pride to the interests of a people, had he at this precise moment decreed the unification of Lombardy, the French departments and Naples under Joachim, he would have covered one frontier of France and might have concluded an honourable peace. But such a policy could not commend itself to the combative and selfish genius of Napoleon. His anxiety at the position of affairs south of the Alps, and especially at Joachim's attitude, was great, but the only measure he would take was to dispatch Fouché to estimate the possibilities of the position and to persuade the King to return to his military obedience.

As the ex-Minister of Police started on his journey south the King of Naples was pressing on military preparations and his troops were marching northwards. Soon Joachim informed Napoleon that his army was in motion for northern Italy. An engineer officer, General Colletta, was sent to Bologna with instructions to reconnoitre the country along the south of the Po, and to cultivate friendly relations with Fouché and with General Pino of the Italian army, commandant of the important fortress of Ferrara. At Bologna Colletta met Pino, Lavauguyon, and Fouché, and the latter, perhaps

with a view to piercing the King's intentions, made the conversation turn on the independence of Italy. This was indeed the one subject of political discussion in the peninsula, especially among all classes of military and civil officials.

From Bologna Fouché proceeded to Naples, where he had several interviews with the King. Joachim assured him that he was faithful to the Emperor and intended to support him, but that the danger of an attack from the British made it necessary that he should dissemble the object of the march of his troops towards the north. But the conferences of Fouché and the King were useless and could lead to nothing. Behind the theatrical magnificence and gallantry of the Court of Naples, behind the specious conversational parries with which the King met Fouché's probably not very sincere attacks, Joachim was insensibly slipping down a fatal plane. His mind was dazzled with the idea that he could create a nation and seat himself on a throne greater than that of Naples.

Facts quickly came to dispel these dreams. Early in December a small Austrian force opened operations for the Allies close to the mouth of the Po. From Ravenna, on the 10th of December, the commander of that force, Count Nugent, addressed a proclamation to the Italian people, declaring that Austria came to liberate them from the yoke of France, and that now they were "destined to become an independent nation."¹ This proclamation aroused Joachim to fury, and for a moment he appeared likely to turn against Austria. He wrote to the commander of his most advanced corps, General Pignatelli-Strongoli, to tell General Pino, in command of the

¹ Chodzko, *Traité*s, xiii. In 1809 the Archduke John had issued a very similar appeal to the Italians.

French garrison of Ferrara, that he must hold out against the Austrians to the last extremity, that the Neapolitan army would promptly relieve him, and that the King would start for the front in person.¹ To Napoleon he wrote once more in the most urgent terms, stating that he had 35,000 men and 50 guns within a few days' march of Florence and Bologna, and pressing him for a declaration of the independence of Italy.

Time passes (he wrote), the enemy gains in strength, I am reduced to silence, and the moment cannot be delayed long when I shall in turn be compelled to explain myself to my people and to the enemy. A longer silence on my part, the consequence of yours, would lose me the opinion of the public, and that opinion is my sole strength; once that is lost I can do nothing either for you or for myself. Answer, answer positively. . . .

And in a postscript he added:—

Sire, in the name of all you hold most dear in this world, in the name of your glory, do not remain obstinate longer. Make peace, and at any price; gain time and you will have gained all; your genius and time will do the rest. If you refuse to listen to the entreaties of your subjects, of your friends, you are lost, and so will be all your friends. . . . Believe me for once. Put to one side your pretensions, your passions; it is still time to save Italy, but explain yourself.²

This letter shows very clearly the double current of thought coursing through Joachim's mind,—on the one hand, a perception far more clear than Napoleon's of the impending ruin, and a desire for peace and settlement at any cost; on the other, the ambitions that obscured such plain considerations as those of the soldier's point of honour. The letter remained unanswered. At the same time as Joachim wrote this letter to the

¹ Murat to Pignatelli-Strongoli, Dec. 19, 1813, San Martino, Murat MS.

² Murat to Napoleon, Dec. 25 (wrongly given 28), 1813, Weil, iii. 291.

Emperor, Fouché supported it with another, written two days later from Rome. In this he used every argument that made for Napoleon's proclaiming the independence of Italy, and stated clearly that the King of Naples was negotiating with the Allies, and was in hopes of getting favourable news from Vienna very shortly.

It was true that Joachim was negotiating, and not only Fouché, whose motives might be suspected, but Caulaincourt, Napoleon's best and most faithful adviser, pressed on him the policy of liberating Italy. Caulaincourt was for the middle course of giving to Joachim what lay south and to Eugène what lay north of the Po; but on the 27th of December, when he drew up his report on the question for the Emperor, he already thought the time was past when such a measure could be effective. A week later Napoleon wrote to Caulaincourt accepting this policy; it was already too late.¹

It was true, as Fouché had reported, that Joachim was negotiating; but it was unfortunately the case that the reason for his continued offers to join Napoleon, on terms, was partly because no information was reaching him from the allied headquarters, while from Sicily and Bentinck his reports were altogether discouraging. In the course of the first week of January, however, the situation was largely cleared.

It was the fatal weakness of Joachim's position that his negotiations with Austria were of practically no value so long as Great Britain did not concur in them. It was Great Britain and not Austria whose fleet patrolled the coast-line of Naples; it was Great Britain and not Austria whose army might at any moment and without warning appear at the gates of his capital.

¹ For these two dispatches see Weil, iii. 302, 345.

When Joachim decided, after Leipzig, to trust fortune in basing his policy on Metternich's overtures, he may have taken the best step possible under the circumstances, but more than that cannot be said. It was now imperative that he should come to some arrangement with Great Britain, and on the 19th of November he sent to Sicily a secret agent, Schinina by name, to sound Lord William Bentinck. They met at Syracuse on the 12th of December.

“Schinina asked Bentinck to sign an armistice on the ground that a treaty of alliance was about to be concluded between Austria and Naples, and that Joachim could not move his troops north in support of the Austrians unless assured that he had no attack to fear from the Anglo-Sicilians. As evidence of the Austrian attitude he produced dispatches showing that on the 7th of October Metternich had offered Murat recognition at the price of an alliance. But Bentinck was not satisfied as to the sincerity of these overtures, and pointed to the fact that since the date of Metternich's proposals the King of Naples had taken part in the battle of Leipzig. He could see no reason to assume that Metternich would be prepared to repeat an offer made before an event of such magnitude, and on that ground declined to negotiate. This was a pretext, though not a bad one; Bentinck's real motives for refusing to negotiate were probably somewhat mixed. He appears for one thing to have been jealous of Austrian influence. He wanted Italy to become free, and England to help her on the way to freedom. He thought the most effective military weapon against Napoleon would be a national insurrection similar to that which had enabled the British arms to win such signal triumphs in Spain. Perhaps he dreamed of

becoming the Wellington of Italy. These views were somewhat insecurely founded, but Bentinck made no mistake when he considered Murat's position at Naples very precarious, and it is difficult to see that he committed an error of judgment in declining to enter into negotiations of which the first result would have been to enable Murat to move 30,000 men to the valley of the Po."¹

His mission having thus failed, Schinina returned to Naples, and it is not difficult to establish the coincidence between his return empty-handed and the last attempts of Joachim to persuade Napoleon into his policy of Italian nationalization. But although Bentinck held out no hope of British complaisance, better news soon reached the King from another quarter.

Early in December Metternich decided to conclude a treaty with Naples on the terms which he knew Joachim considered indispensable,—the retention of his crown. He prepared instructions for Count Neipperg, whom he charged with the negotiations, and submitted these instructions to Lord Aberdeen. There was unfortunately a fundamental difference between the positions of Austria and Great Britain in the question of Naples which the British Ambassador failed to seize. Austria had recognised and maintained diplomatic relations with Joachim for some years, and she had no treaty with Ferdinand. Great Britain, on the contrary, had never recognised Joachim, had been and still was at war with him, and was bound by a treaty of alliance to maintain Ferdinand's rights to Naples. Oblivious of these facts, falling completely under the influence of Metternich, Aberdeen, on the 12th of December, handed him a note in which he stated that he had taken

¹ Johnston, Lord William Bentinck and Murat, *Eng. Hist. Rev.* xix.

cognizance of the instructions given by Metternich to Count Neipperg for negotiating an alliance with the King of Naples ; that he saw nothing in these instructions contrary to the views of the British Government ; that he must, however, declare formally that the British Government would not become party to a treaty guaranteeing Naples to Murat without providing a just compensation for the King of Sicily. To this Metternich replied that the indemnification of King Ferdinand, in case he should renounce his rights to Naples, was an essential part of the views of the Austrian Court, and would be provided for by the treaty it was proposed to conclude.¹ In this exchange of notes it is clear that Aberdeen completely lost sight of the essential difference between compensating Ferdinand for not returning to Naples and compensating Joachim for giving it up.

Neipperg arrived at Naples on the 31st of December 1813. He was a dashing cavalry officer, and intended to negotiate as briskly as he would lead a charge. Metternich's terms were to be taken or refused, and in no event was Joachim to be allowed to assume a neutral attitude. Either he was with the Allies or against them. Neipperg was bearer of a letter from Metternich to the Queen, in which the Austrian Minister stated that Napoleon was on the point of coming to terms, that he was prepared to let the Allies dispose of Italy, that through the influence of the King of Bavaria something might be done in favour of the Viceroy, and that it was important, therefore, that Naples should come to terms immediately.

Thus pressed, assured by Neipperg that Bentinck would fall into line with Aberdeen, and further, that

¹ Weil, iii. 227, 228 ; Johnston, Bentinck and Murat, *Eng. Hist. Rev.* xix.

Austria would if necessary use force to compel Ferdinand's renunciation of Naples, Joachim signed the treaty that turned him against his old flag. Yet one fact must be remembered, that at this moment neither he nor Caroline anticipated that their action was contributing to the dethroning of Napoleon. Few if any foresaw such an event; to compel him to make peace was the common aim; even such an active Bourbon agent as de Vitrolles admitted that no one then believed in a royalist restoration.

The treaty between Austria and Naples, signed on the 11th of January 1814, was one of amity and of alliance for the joint prosecution of the war. Peace was not to be made by either party independently of the other. Austria guaranteed the actual possessions of the King, and agreed to use her good offices to procure the accession of her allies to this guarantee. On his part Joachim renounced all pretensions to Sicily. Austria undertook to place 60,000 men and Naples 30,000 in the field. By several secret clauses it was further stipulated that Austria would use her good offices to procure from Ferdinand a renunciation of his claims to Naples; that Joachim should not be expected to act until reassured as to Great Britain's intentions; and that, at a general peace, Austria would support the King's claim to an increase of territory out of the Papal States with a population of 400,000 souls.

Neipperg had opened communications with Bentinck immediately on arriving at Naples. He communicated the terms of the treaty and tried to persuade the British agent into concurrence. Bentinck, however, was without direct instructions from Castlereagh and declined to follow Aberdeen's lead. In that he proved well advised, for when he heard from the Foreign Office he

was instructed that the policy of the British Cabinet was not correctly represented by Lord Aberdeen, and was unmodified as to the claims of Ferdinand and Joachim. Under those circumstances he acted in complete accordance with the intentions of his Government in refusing to sign anything more than a suspension of hostilities. This he negotiated in person at Naples and signed on the 3rd of February; it merely provided that hostilities between Great Britain and Naples should be suspended subject to resumption at three months' notice, and that commercial relations should be resumed.

On the 3rd of January, when on the point of signing the treaty with Austria, Joachim wrote as follows to Napoleon :—

Sire, I have reached the most unhappy day of my life, I am the prey of the most painful emotions that have ever stirred me. I must choose. And I see on one side the inevitable loss of my states, of my family, of my glory even; on the other an engagement contrary to my eternal attachment for Your Majesty, to my unalterable devotion to France. Since four days an Austrian plenipotentiary is here. . . .

What can I do, menaced on all sides, and with no help to look for? If I commanded a French army I would risk all. . . . But, Sire, do you imagine I can do so with Neapolitan troops? Do you imagine that I could lead them across the Alps? Do you imagine that, however great their attachment for me, they would not desert a sovereign who deserted their country?

Such circumstances may well make it my duty to take sides against my most constant affections. Should this happen, may Your Majesty pity me! I shall have made for the sake of my subjects, my children, my crown, the most painful sacrifice that could be torn from me.

But perhaps even now it is not too late! Ah, if it be so, prevent the effect of these cruel circumstances.

I implore you again, for the sake of all you hold dear, for

the sake of France, for the sake of all Europe, and by all the griefs that torment me at this terrible moment, I implore you make peace! Deign to recall that this was what I intreated before the battle of Dresden, after that battle, before leaving Your Majesty in Germany, that this I have never ceased to repeat since your return to Paris. I repeat it to-day with all the more insistence because I am on the eve of being cut off from communication with Your Majesty. . . .

Sire, if a harsh necessity compels me, as I fear, into relations apparently hostile to your interests, but that may perhaps be useful to Your Majesty and to France in the negotiations for peace, I dare hope that you will judge me with calm, with impartiality, with reasons of State, and with the feeling that I have done all that was possible to prevent such a misfortune. . . .¹

PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES CONSULTED

MSS.

BRIT. FOREIGN OFF., *Austria*, 102 : Aberdeen's dispatches with a few useful inclosures and copies.

BRIT. FOREIGN OFF., *Sicily*, 39 : Amherst's dispatches ; 92 : Bentinck's dispatches.

MARY CAROLINE MEMOIRS, for the struggle between the Queen and Bentinck.

S. MARTINO, a Murat letter.

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¹ Weil, iii. 336.

CHAPTER X

MURAT'S INCERTITUDES

Armistice—British attitude—French at Naples—Neapolitan army—Generals—Rome occupied—Advance north—Joachim at Bologna—Tuscany occupied—Eugène's position—Correspondence—Decides to defend Italy—Concentrates on Quadrilateral—St. Dizier—Battle of Mincio—Hesitation of Joachim—British policy—Bentinck's instructions—Armistice between Naples and Great Britain—Nugent's advance—Joachim writes to Eugène and Princess Baccocchi—Champaubert—Napoleon to Caroline—Joachim to Napoleon—Negotiations with Eugène—Joachim's excuses to Bellegarde—Nugent active—Occupies Casalmaggiore—Grenier at Piacenza—Takes Parma—Releases Neapolitan prisoners—Effects retreat to Borgoforte—Joachim decide on hostilities—Fight at Reggio—Neapolitan generals unsettled—Pepe and a constitution—Petition shelved—Bentinck at Naples—Sicilian proclamations—Bentinck's to the people of Italy—Joachim attempts to propitiate him—Bentinck's harsh attitude—Intrigue of Neapolitan generals—Joachim thinks himself sacrificed—His letter to Fouché—Napoleon negotiates with Joachim—Conferences at S. Giacomo—Alarm of Austrians—Bentinck's note to Gallo—Allies adhere to Austrian policy—Balatscheff's mission—Castlereagh quiets Bentinck—Conference at Rovere—Release of Pope—Arrives at Neapolitan outposts—Meets Joachim—Nugent crosses Taro—Fighting at Piacenza—News of fall of Empire—Joachim's position—Convention of Schiarino Rizzeno.

THE treaty of alliance between Austria and Naples marked a period in the history of Joachim, but it did not mark the end of his incertitudes or hesitations.

The treaty was not, could not be, a satisfactory arrangement. It did not completely safeguard Joachim against the claim of Ferdinand, which the British would not abandon; it did not gratify the ambition, that his Neapolitan advisers ardently fostered, to make of Naples the nucleus of Italian independence; it plunged him into a worse than equivocal position with regard to Napoleon and all French citizens. The French, who made up a large part of the Court circle, the French military officers in the Neapolitan service, the French civil functionaries and soldiers, soon gave Joachim cause for anxiety, if not repentance.

Pérignon, military governor of Naples, presented himself at the Palace, and requested a formal audience. The King received him in presence of the Queen, and listened to his remonstrances. Failing to move Joachim, the old Marshal turned to Caroline; but she met his reproaches unperturbed. The Queen merely smiled mockingly, bowed her head towards her husband, and said: "Monsieur le Maréchal, you must be aware that a wife's duty is obedience."¹

The feeling of indignation was especially strong among the French officers, and nearly all of them declined to serve longer under Joachim. At Nola, where the Corsican Legion was quartered, a remarkable scene occurred. At the café where the officers were accustomed to meet in the evening, they protested against the King's policy by raising loud and continued shouts of "Vive l'Empereur!" Joachim's treason was denounced, and from the colonel to the youngest lieutenant all declared they would never bear arms against their old comrades. They eventually had to be shipped to France.

¹ Cavaignac, 262.

In the Corsicans Joachim lost one of the best regiments in his service, one he could ill afford to spare, for the army he was placing in the field was far less well composed than numerous. From 29,000 men, exclusive of French troops in the kingdom, which it numbered in July 1812, it had risen to 35,000 in October, and to 46,000 a year later. Every effort was made to increase it further. At Court a premium was set on all things military; promotions and decorations were lavished; the Neapolitan officers who had served in Germany or Spain had rewards showered on them. But it was impossible that such large bodies of troops, raised at short notice from a population that had no military tradition, and was wholly impatient of discipline, could be good. The rapid promotion of officers by Court favour and the injudicious leniency of the King did not tend to improve them.

Most of the commanding generals had ranked as lieutenants or captains when Joachim ascended the throne, and few, if any, had military talents. Carascosa and D'Ambrosio had enough tactics to manœuvre a brigade; Lecchi had great experience but was past active warfare; Filangieri's courage and dash were unsurpassed; Florestano Pepe was the only general officer of real ability and value, and he was with Rapp besieged in Dantzig. Of the other generals none but Guglielmo Pepe and Colletta possessed other military virtues save courage, and one or two no better recommendation than Court favour. The indiscipline of the generals was as great as that of their men; the Neapolitan soldiers, marauders, deserters, thieves, had been for some years the affliction of their country; they were now to become the plague of northern Italy.




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MAP TO
ILLUSTRATE CAMPAIGNS
OF 1814 AND 1815.

Scale of English Miles



As early as December the Neapolitans had entered Rome. The French governor, General Miollis, could only dispose of a few hundred men, and was not in a position to defend the city. He affected to accept the protestations of friendship of the Neapolitans, but shut himself up in the castle of S. Angelo, where he awaited developments.

So exhausted were the resources of the Empire by the campaigns of Russia and Germany, that south of the Po there were not more than 2000 French troops in all. These slowly withdrew as the Neapolitans advanced, leaving behind them small garrisons in Rome, Civita Vecchia, and Ancona. Yet the movement of the Neapolitan columns northwards during December and January was slow, and their occupation of the French departments was made to appear by the King's functionaries not as a hostile move, but as a normal and friendly transference of authority.

On the 23rd of January Joachim joined the headquarters of his army in the neighbourhood of Ancona, and thence directed his columns towards the Po. As the Neapolitan generals advanced they addressed proclamations of a nationalist character to the inhabitants, calling on them to rise for the independence of Italy.

Marching through Cesena and Imola on Bologna, the capital city of Romagna, the King came into contact on his right with Nugent and an Austrian column of about 8000 men advancing in the same direction through Ravenna and Commachio. In the evening of the 31st of January, preceded by a detachment of the cavalry of the Guard, and surrounded by his generals and a large staff, Joachim made his entry into Bologna. There was a little enthusiasm. Many a handkerchief fluttered as the brilliant cavalcade passed

by ; and in the piazza a crowd assembled that greeted the King with shouts of "Viva il gran Gioacchino ! Viva il re d' Italia !" These acclamations were re-echoed by the soldiers, but probably did not represent much more than a judicious expenditure on the part of the Neapolitan secret agents.

On the day following his arrival the King visited the city, and entered among other places the Court of Appeal. There he made a speech to the assembled judges, in which he declared that his heart and aspirations were, and had always been, for the Emperor and for France. But as Napoleon had failed to support him, he had been compelled against his wish to accede to the proposals of Austria, and to become the ally of the Emperor Francis.

While Joachim with the main body thus occupied Bologna, detachments of his army marched into Tuscany, the French officials and such small bodies of troops as were with them everywhere retiring. Elise Bonaparte and her husband, Prince and Princess Bacciocchi, abandoned Florence, and soon a large part, nearly one half, of the Italian peninsula was in the actual occupation of the Neapolitan troops. The remainder, the part that lies about a line drawn from Genoa through Milan to Venice, was now to be contended for by the Neapolitans, by the Austrians, by the British, and by the French. In that most curious and complicated struggle nearly all the honours, military, diplomatic, and of personal conduct, were to remain with the Viceroy of Italy, Prince Eugène Beauharnais.

Notwithstanding his treaty with Austria, notwithstanding his military occupation of so many cities and departments that had formed part of the French Empire, there had been so far no open hostility between Joachim

and the French. It was perfectly conceivable and widely believed that the King's ambition to become head of a great Italian state might in some way be reconciled with a support of the French arms against the Allies. So did the Viceroy of Italy think and hope until the end of December. On the 14th of January, being in ignorance of the treaty signed three days earlier, he wrote to Joachim urging him not to turn against the French arms, pointing out that the conferences in progress between Napoleon and the Allies would probably lead to peace, and that the King would make a mistake in committing himself under such circumstances. He closed with protestations of undiminished personal friendship, and by asking that, should the worst happen, he might at all events receive full warning of Joachim's intentions. A few days later he sent to Naples one of his most trusted staff officers, General Giffenga, whose mission was to discover what course Joachim was likely to adopt.

A decision of vital importance depended on the result of these inquiries of the Viceroy; for he had immediately before making them received orders from the Emperor that he was to abandon Lombardy and retreat to the Alps on being officially informed that Joachim had declared in favour of the Allies. But it so happened that the King was not prepared to make such a declaration to the Viceroy, notwithstanding his treaty of alliance with Austria. To the Viceroy's communication he replied that he could not move his troops to assist the French arms north of the Po, for not only had the Emperor made no request that they should be thus employed, but he had also left the question of their supreme command unsettled. Yet the movement of his army, he claimed, had been of great assistance to the

Emperor. If he had abstained from attacking the Austrians, it was owing to the peace conferences in progress and to the presence of an Austrian negotiator at Naples. Should he, however, to his deep regret, eventually be compelled to separate his policy from that of France, he undertook to give the Viceroy the warning he asked for before attacking him. For the present his instructions to his generals were not to engage in hostilities with the French (Jan. 21, 1814).

On receiving this dissembling letter, on considering the uncertainty of the political horizon, and the inevitable necessity, as it seemed, that Napoleon should soon accept the terms proposed to him by the Allies, the Viceroy decided, however small his resources, to maintain his position in Lombardy for the present rather than retreat. His intention was to prevent the Neapolitans from crossing the Po by holding the line of that river from the bridge of Borgoforte, just south of Mantua, to Piacenza, and at the same time to prevent the Austrians' advance from the north and east by contesting with them the lines of the Adige and Mincio and the fortresses of the Quadrilateral,—Peschiera, Verona, Mantua, and Legnago. This position, one of the most famous in military history, was immensely strong, and commanded the northern half of the valley of the Po, blocking the two great roads that come down into Italy, one from the Tyrol along the Adige, the other from Austria through Vicenza. Yet the Quadrilateral had the weakness of so many elaborately planned military positions: it required a large body of troops to occupy all its fortifications and to cover the passages of the rivers. Prince Eugène was short of men, and he would have with inferior numbers to face a large Austrian army coming from

the east and a smaller Neapolitan army coming from the south. Yet he resolved to attempt the defence of the line of the Mincio, making Mantua the pivot of his operations.

Under these circumstances he was naturally anxious to profit by the conduct of the King of Naples, however much he might secretly despise it. He therefore sent notice to the Neapolitan headquarters that the crossing of the Taro, a small affluent of the Po between Parma and Piacenza, would be construed an act of hostility ; he then withdrew every available man from that quarter, leaving at Piacenza a small garrison of about 3000, and, in the first days of February, concentrated on the Quadrilateral nearly the whole of his army, in all 40,000 men, of whom but 1200 were French by birth. So bad did he judge his position that had Murat continued his march and advanced from Bologna to Piacenza the Viceroy would immediately have abandoned Lombardy.

In reality Prince Eugène had little cause for anxiety as to his flank. Just at the moment when he was concentrating his troops on the Quadrilateral to face the Austrians under Marshal Bellegarde, the soldiers were inspirited with the news of Napoleon's victory over Blücher at St. Dizier, the first battle of the campaign of France. Coinciding with this came a further letter from the King of Naples reiterating his assurances that he would not act before giving the Viceroy warning. In a postscript he added : " Be good enough, my dear Eugène, to recall my name to the Emperor, and to tell him of my sorrow ; I weep as I write you these few words."

On the 3rd and 4th of February the Viceroy abandoned the line of the Adige and the fortress of Verona ; his army was too small to cover so extended

a line and so large a fortress. He fell back to a new position on a much shorter front behind the Mincio, his left resting on Peschiera, his right on Mantua. The latter place covered the passage of the Po at Borgoforte, where a bridge of boats had been established, and formed the pivot or hinge of the Viceroy's position ; it was intrusted to the care of General Zucchi.

On the 5th of February, Bellegarde crossed the Adige and advanced on the line of the Mincio. He issued at the same time a proclamation to the Italian people announcing, not, as was usual, that the era of liberty was about to dawn, but, as was more honest, that the ancient governments were about to be re-established. He also wrote a letter to Joachim in which he ascribed the Viceroy's abandonment of the line of the Adige to the arrival of the Neapolitan army at Bologna.

The Viceroy had decided to take advantage of the respite given him by the King of Naples to deal a hard blow at the Austrians, and thus make good his hold on the line of the Mincio. After demonstrating as though he intended continuing his retreat from the Mincio back to Piacenza, he rapidly concentrated the bulk of his troops on Mantua, and issuing from that fortress on the morning of the 8th, fell on the Austrian flank near Valeggio. There he fought a long, confused battle with Bellegarde, of which the result was, on the whole, more favourable to the French than to the Austrian arms. The Viceroy was entitled to claim a success, for he was on the defensive and he had stopped the Austrian advance. He reported to the Emperor that had he completely defeated Bellegarde he would immediately have crossed the Po at Borgoforte and marched against the Neapolitans. From this it is clear that whatever the Viceroy thought it advisable to write to

the King, he would have had no hesitation in attacking him had he been strong enough to do so.

In the meanwhile what was King Joachim's position? He was still at Bologna with his army, profoundly uncertain what to do. The efforts of Napoleon in France and of Prince Eugène in Italy had for a moment made the success of the Allies appear doubtful. The Austrian guarantee of his throne appeared well-nigh useless while Great Britain continued to support King Ferdinand. The treaty of alliance called for modification in some of its details, and was not yet ratified by the Emperor Francis. Bentinck, though he had signed the armistice, was so openly unfriendly that Joachim viewed the British agent as a barely disguised enemy awaiting the first favourable opportunity of attacking him from behind.

Bentinck's dream was that Italy should be freed from the French, not for the benefit of Joachim, nor of Ferdinand, nor of Austria, nor of any of the dispossessed princes, but for that of the people, under a national and constitutional form of government. His views were plainly expressed; they were well known to the liberal circles and the police agents of Naples. The British Cabinet had had too much cause to be satisfied with the way in which Bentinck had reduced Sicily to order and removed Mary Caroline from the political scene to feel any disposition to recall such a valuable servant; yet no Tory Cabinet could possibly sympathize with his views as to Italian emancipation. It might suit them as a matter of convenience to see a popular insurrection drive the French beyond the Alps, but nothing more. Just at the time when Bentinck was negotiating the armistice with Naples he received instructions from the War Office to prepare an expedition

which he was to direct against northern Italy, thus co-operating with the converging movements of the Allies on France. Lord Bathurst's dispatch did not contain much to encourage Bentinck in his liberalizing views. His principal objective was to be Genoa, and his instructions ran: ". . . provided it be clearly with the entire concurrence of the inhabitants, you may take possession of Genoa in the name and on behalf of his Sardinian Majesty." This plainly showed the trend of British policy, how far it was from supporting Bentinck's views, how anxious it was to conform with the political sentiments that permeated the views of the Continental Powers and that shortly after became embodied in the decrees of the Congress of Vienna. The British Cabinet under the guidance of Liverpool and Castlereagh was already virtually in accord with Austrian policy.

Lord Castlereagh, the Foreign Secretary, had proceeded in person to the headquarters of the Allies, where British interests were not sufficiently safe in the hands of Lord Aberdeen. One of his first acts had been to protest against the terms of the treaty of alliance between Austria and Naples. He felt, however, that as the treaty had been signed, some concession must be made. He saw that the smaller objects must be made subservient to the greater, and agreed to help secure the military co-operation of King Joachim by so far departing from his original position as to abandon all idea of continuing the war against him, provided only Ferdinand might be persuaded to accept some equivalent compensation for the throne of Naples. Bentinck was therefore instructed by Castlereagh to offer explanations to the Court of Palermo, and to make clear that the interests of Sicily must be subordinated to the general

cause. A little later he received a dispatch, an extract from which will serve to illustrate the position of Great Britain more clearly. Speaking of the treaty between Austria and Naples, Castlereagh wrote :—

The British Government never liked the measure, but being taken they are perfectly ready to act up to the spirit of the Austrian treaty, and to acknowledge Murat upon a peace, on two conditions : 1, that he exerts himself honourably in the war ; and 2, that a reasonable indemnity . . . be found for the King of Sicily.¹

The propriety and soundness of the position taken up by Castlereagh appear unquestionable ; yet however favourable to him British policy might be in reality, Joachim had no certain information to this effect, and justifiably viewed Bentinck as directly hostile. The position he was now in at Bologna was a distressing one ;—not knowing whether to attack his old comrades or his old enemies ; not knowing whether to keep faith with Napoleon or with Metternich ; not knowing whether the Viceroy from Borgoforte, the Sicilians from Palermo, the British from the sea, or the Austrians from Venetia would first attack him ; surrounded by incompetent and intriguing officers ; aspiring to be King of Italy, yet fearing he should not long be King of Naples. He made his position even worse by falling into an error not common with him, but not extraordinary under the circumstances, that of indecision. He accepted the Viceroy's far from disinterested advice, and determined that his best course would be not to commit himself to either party too soon.

Count Mier and Marshal Bellegarde acted consistently as though there were no question as to the

¹ Castlereagh to Bentinck, February 21st, 1814, *Brit. State Papers*, 1814-1815, ii. 236.

long-delayed ratification of the Austro-Neapolitan treaty of alliance. Nugent, who commanded the small Austrian corps south of the Po, was placed nominally under the orders of the King. But this general, an impetuous, resourceful, and indefatigable officer, viewed the King of Naples with as much suspicion and dislike as did Bentinck. It was not long before difficulties arose between him and Joachim. Nugent's military sense made him perceive plainly what the Viceroy well knew was his weak point. He determined, however small in numbers, to push up the south bank of the Po and to attack Piacenza. A diversion would compel Prince Eugène to weaken the line of the Mincio and would give Bellegarde a better opportunity for crossing.

On the 8th of February, the day on which the battle of the Mincio was fought, Nugent reached the Enza, a little stream midway between Reggio and Parma, along which Carascosa's Neapolitan division had already placed a line of outposts. On the approach of the Austrians the Neapolitan general at once issued confidential orders that they were not to be allowed to proceed beyond the river. He also wrote to the chief of the general staff, General Millet de Villeneuve, stating that Stahremberg with his brigade intended marching on Parma, and asking whether it was intended that he should prevent this movement by force of arms.¹ Nugent, however, did not heed Carascosa's opposition, and did not await the arrival of instructions from Joachim's headquarters. He continued his march and occupied Modena on the 9th, where he proclaimed a provisional government in the name of the Grand Duke Francis. Thence he pushed on towards Piacenza, but after some inconclusive skirmishing was compelled to

¹ *Arch. Nap. Guerra*, xxv. 1057.

fall back. Nugent now took up an attitude of observation, reported the presence of a large body of troops in the fortress, and called on Carascosa to support him, which the latter showed little inclination to do.

So indisposed was Joachim for co-operating with the Austrians, that during this time he had secretly continued in close correspondence with the Viceroy. Immediately after Bellegarde's check on the Mincio he sent an officer to the French lines with overtures for an arrangement. At the same time and with the same object he wrote to Elise Bonaparte, Princess Baciocchi; she immediately informed the Emperor of this in the following terms :—

I have received several letters from him [Murat] that contrast strangely with the movements of his troops. The King is in a state of great mental excitement, and expresses astonishment that the Viceroy should have abandoned the line of the Adige, and that I should have withdrawn from Tuscany with the idea that he could be the enemy of your Majesty and France. . . . I am told that in his communications with the Viceroy the King's speeches and behaviour are the same. . . .¹

To the few French officers who had followed his fortunes,—Millet de Villeneuve, Livron, and others,—Joachim repeatedly declared that he would soon turn and side once more with his former brothers-in-arms.

But suddenly the scene changed again. On the 14th of February General Pignatelli-Strongoli arrived at Joachim's headquarters from France, where he had been sent on a mission to the allied sovereigns. He brought with him dispatches that reassured the King as to the attitude of the Emperor Francis, and, which was probably even more effective, news of the battle of La Rothière, fought on the 1st of February, in which,

¹ Elise to Napoleon, Feb. 14, 1814, *Brit. State Papers*, 1814-1815, ii. 300.

as it appeared, Schwarzenberg had defeated Napoleon completely. Joachim then immediately resolved to take the decisive step, and formally notified the Viceroy that he would open hostilities. But, by another sudden change of fortune, forty-eight hours later he repented, for Prince Eugène was firing triumphant salvos along the banks of the Mincio to celebrate Napoleon's brilliant victories over Blücher at Champaubert and Montmirail.

Joachim, now once more plunged into incertitude, could see no other solution of his difficulties than that of siding with whichever party remained uppermost. Fortune appeared to smile on Napoleon again, and again the Neapolitan generals were instructed to hold their troops back.

Towards the middle of February it appeared as though Napoleon's gigantic efforts to stem the tide of invasion might be rewarded. The Russians, Prussians, and Austrians were in retreat, and success might even at this eleventh hour be attained. On or about the 27th of that month he at last decided on making a direct appeal to his rebellious lieutenant, and he wrote to Joachim in the following terms :—

I shall not allude to my displeasure at your conduct, which has been contrary to your duty. This comes from your weakness of character. You are a good soldier on the battlefield, but otherwise have no decision, no character. Turn to profit an act of treason, which I attribute to fear, so as to serve me by a mutual understanding. I rely on you, on your contrition, on your promises. I imagine you are not one of those who think the lion is dead. If that is your idea, it is mistaken. You have done me every injury possible since Wilna, but we will not speak of that. The title of King has turned your head; if your desire is to retain it, act well and keep your word. . . .¹

¹ For the date and authenticity of this letter see Appendix E, vol. ii.

These, and probably other similar communications, reached Joachim towards the end of February and beginning of March, while it was still supposed in Italy that Napoleon was pursuing a course of unchecked victories. At some time in the first week of March Joachim wrote in turn, probably in direct reply to the dispatch just quoted :—

SIRE—Your Majesty is in danger, the capital of France is menaced, and neither can I defend nor can I die for you, and your Majesty's most loving friend appears his enemy !

Sire, pronounce but one word, and I will sacrifice my family, my subjects, I will lose all, but I shall have served you, shall have continued to prove that I have always been your most devoted friend. That is all I ask. . . . I trust the Viceroy has informed you of all I have done—tears prevent my continuing my letter. I am here alone in the midst of strangers. I have to conceal all, even my tears ! This letter, Sire, makes you wholly master of my fate ; my life is yours ; my honour is already pledged to die for your Majesty. If you could see me, if you could realize what I have suffered these two months, you would pity me. Always love me ; I was never more worthy of your kindness. 'Till death your friend,

JOACHIM NAPOLEON.¹

In these untutored words who can fail to recognise that strong blend of the good and bad side of human nature that was so conspicuous in Joachim Murat ? Moved to tears by generous sentiments ; yet acting the ungenerous part ; crying *enough*, yet hankering for more ; confiding, yet dealing doubly ; deceiving others, and himself a great deal more.

But while Joachim negotiated and remained inactive,

¹ Planat de la Faye, *Eugène*, 79. Mons. Weil fixes the 4th of March as the date of this letter, but it would appear better on the whole to place it just before the 3rd, at which date Murat received the letter whereby the Emperor Francis ratified the Austro-Neapolitan treaty of alliance. Schoell, whose text differs in several particulars, places the date one day later than Weil.

the Viceroy pursued an opposite course. He responded to every overture that came from the Neapolitan camp, but without any faith in an agreement being reached and without any relaxation of his utmost military endeavour. On the 27th of February he wrote to the Princess Augusta :—

In two days I shall finally know whether the King of Naples will really join us.

Two days later :—

I send you herewith a short statement of the conditions the King of Naples has had the impudence to put forward, proposing on these conditions to declare against the Austrians. He has, however, sent me a verbal promise not to engage his troops. Of this I am taking advantage, though not altogether pinning my faith to it.

The Viceroy had already gained considerable advantage from his negotiations with the King, for Bellegarde was now in a state of complete check on the Mincio. On the 10th of February he had made an attempt to cross at Valleggio, but had been vigorously repulsed by the Viceroy. The Austrian Field-Marshal had since been content to maintain an expectant attitude, for not only had he no certainty of defeating the Viceroy, but he could not tell but that the Neapolitan army might at any moment appear on his flank. To Bellegarde's and Nugent's reiterated demands that the Neapolitan army should advance on Piacenza, the plausible reply was reiterated by Joachim that an advance on Piacenza would leave his line of communications open to an attack from the Viceroy debouching from Borgoforte. That this reason was hardly sound in view of the great numerical inferiority of the Viceroy was amply demonstrated by the eventual

course of operations, and by the bold and not altogether fruitless course pursued by Nugent.

This commander was determined, at whatever cost, whether supported by the Neapolitans or not, to effect a diversion on the southern bank of the Po that should in some way facilitate the operations of Bellegarde on the northern bank. After his repulse in front of Piacenza early in the month, he had fallen back on the line occupied by the Neapolitans along the river Enza. King Joachim's headquarters were at Reggio, midway between the Enza and Modena, and Nugent established himself on the right of Carascosa's division towards Guastalla. On the 21st he crossed the Enza, marched through Sacca, and after throwing a bridge of boats across the Po, occupied Casalmaggiore on the further bank.

A movement of this sort, carried out by a small corps, was more alarming than dangerous for the Viceroy, nor could Joachim be expected to take such a risk as to follow it with his whole army. So little importance did he attach to the movement that he placed a detachment of Neapolitans under Nugent's orders, and these, notably the sailors of the Royal Guard, were commended by the Austrian general for their behaviour in the skirmishing that took place, and for the skill with which they carried out the necessary bridging operations.

Nugent, still trying to drive the Neapolitans into activity, requested Carascosa to support his demonstration by moving his division towards Borgoforte. Had he done so it is conceivable that the Viceroy might have felt compelled to weaken his hold on the Mincio in response to this double threat, thus affording Bellegarde an opportunity for resuming the offensive; but

Carascosa merely referred the matter to headquarters and remained passive.¹

Nugent's restless activity determined Prince Eugène to strike a blow across the Po, as he had already struck a blow across the Mincio. The Viceroy was inspired by a very clear understanding of that first principle of the military art that makes an offensive movement the soundest form of defence ;² he showed a keen intuition of what risks his position, that of the Empire, and his adversaries' abilities, called on him to take.

Prince Eugène made great show of activity along Bellegarde's front, at Borgoforte and towards Casalmaggiore, but he directed these movements in such a way as to facilitate the rapid concentration of some 20,000 men at Piacenza under the command of Grenier, one of the most capable generals in the Imperial service.³ Grenier's orders were to strike quickly and hard at the Austrian division south of the Po, but, as far as possible, to avoid engaging the Neapolitans ; these orders he carried out vigorously and well.⁴

On the 2nd of March Grenier, driving Nugent's detachments before him, occupied Parma, where he took some 2000 prisoners. Among them were 60 Neapolitans, and these the French commander ordered to be released and sent back to the King. On the following day the Viceroy wrote to Joachim informing him that any of his troops that happened to be taken would be released, and that Grenier had orders to march to Borgoforte, to which movement he hoped the

¹ Carascosa to Millet, Feb. 23, 1814, *Arch. Nap. Guerra*, xxv. 1057.

² Sir John Stuart's Maida expedition is another excellent illustration of precisely the same principle.

³ Zucchi, 71 ; *Brit. State Papers*, ii. 251-262 ; Du Casse, *Eugène*, x. 197. Carascosa estimated Grenier's force at not more than 12,000, *Arch. Nap.* xxv. 1057.

⁴ Eugène to Joachim, March 3, 1814, Du Casse, *Eugène*, x. 200.

King would offer no opposition. It is difficult to say precisely what this extraordinary communication meant. It was in one sense the logical outcome of the negotiations that had been proceeding between the Viceroy and Joachim, yet the Prince's move and intentions were now all but openly hostile ; he was quite ready to deal the Neapolitans a decisive blow if the opportunity should offer, and it seems probable therefore that his object was that this dispatch should fall into Austrian hands, or at all events that the current of events should sow irreparable mistrust between his two opponents.

Nugent was quite unable to withstand Grenier's advance, for the Austrians were greatly outnumbered and Carascosa would not help them. On the day after capturing Parma the French general pushed one of his divisions, under Severoli, to Reggio, Carascosa and Nugent falling back before him. With his two remaining divisions he turned off to his left and marched to Guastalla. There he effected his junction with the Viceroy, who had assembled a considerable force at Borgoforte to protect his lieutenant's march, and at the same time to threaten Bellegarde should he attempt a forward movement. On the morning of the 4th the success of Prince Eugène's operations south of the Po was assured, and late that same night he was back again at Volta, the central point of the line of the Mincio, prepared to face Bellegarde in full force.

Grenier's march was a hazardous but brilliantly conceived operation ; it must be realized that its success depended on Grenier's retreat being not back to Piacenza but forward to Borgoforte. Had Grenier been met on the Enza by the whole Neapolitan army his retreat must have been by Piacenza, and Bellegarde would have had ample warning and time to strike at the line of

the Mincio before the Viceroy's detached three divisions could have marched back again by Piacenza and Cremona. As it was, Prince Eugène's movements at Borgoforte and Guastalla threatened the line of the Enza and at the same time opened his lieutenant's retreat to the point where his presence was immediately required, that is to the line of the Mincio. It was a very bold but masterly movement, and entirely successful.

Grenier's march had been executed only just in time to avoid Neapolitan resistance, for on the 3rd of March an incident occurred that brought Joachim to a strong resolution. On that day he received an autograph letter from the Emperor of Austria that contained the long-delayed, long-hoped-for ratification of the Austro-Neapolitan treaty of alliance. He at once decided, for the second time, to open hostilities in earnest, and on the 5th of March he wrote to the Viceroy announcing that his troops would enter on active operations.

Grenier, having joined Prince Eugène with the bulk of his troops, had left Severoli with a weak division at Reggio. In front of him was a considerable force, comprising Nugent's, Carascosa's, and D' Ambrosio's divisions, covering Modena. It was not long before Nugent discovered that Grenier with the main body of the enemy was no longer in front of him. He promptly decided to resume the offensive and attack Reggio.

On the morning of the 7th of March Nugent got into action, a Neapolitan brigade under G. Pepe supporting him. From the headquarters at Modena, fifteen miles away, Joachim sent orders to the Austrian general not to engage; he followed in person. When the King

arrived in front of Reggio, he found not only that his orders had been disregarded, but that his generals had been gradually drawn into supporting Nugent's movements. The Franco-Italians, heavily outnumbered, had been forced from their outlying positions and were now surrounded and at a great disadvantage, owing to Severoli's having been dangerously wounded. An hour's truce was agreed on, and the King, taking advantage of this, arranged that the Imperial troops should surrender Reggio, but be free to retreat wherever they liked. It was the universal opinion in both armies that only Joachim's arrival saved the French division from capture or destruction. In the engagement the Austrians had suffered about 300 casualties, the Neapolitans had 36 killed and 85 wounded.

Joachim now established his headquarters at Reggio once more, and the Austro-Neapolitan outposts were pushed out towards Piacenza, gradually reoccupying the ground from which Grenier had driven them.

The extraordinary fluctuations and uncertainty of the King's policy, the anomaly whereby the Italian generals and soldiers alongside of whom they had been used to fight were now their opponents and the detested Austrians their friends, the contradictory orders so often received, the indubitable fact that Joachim's conduct was as dangerous as it was deceitful, had shaken the confidence of his generals. Their long and trying inaction in front of the enemy had given them an opportunity for indulging in the most irrepressible of the sins to which Neapolitan flesh is heir to—that of intriguing. Several of them, chief of whom was G. Pepe, were ardent nationalists; many had vague aspirations for a united Italy; nearly all were animated with jealousy towards the few French officers

whom the King had retained in his employment ; with scarcely an exception they were ready and anxious for any change that might result in personal advantage. They therefore started an intrigue. The plot had for its object the forcing of a constitution from the King, and it is possible, if Pepe's own statements on the subject are accepted at face value, that he was the only one of the generals who was thoroughly sincere in the idea and prepared to carry it out at all costs. From early boyhood he had been an ardent republican. With his brother Florestano he had participated in the revolution of 1799, and had later been engaged in intrigues against the Bourbons and suffered imprisonment. He now became particularly active in promoting an address to the King calling on him to grant Naples a constitution.

But Pepe was not yet sufficiently influential in the army to carry matters his own way. The generals hung back, as yet, from extreme courses ; the King received their petition and promised to consider it. Instead of granting a constitution, however, he won over the two most influential of the intriguing officers by conferring on them personal favours. They probably appreciated these no less than they would have prized the public advantages which the King showed no inclination for. Carascosa and Pignatelli-Strongoli received various benefits from the King, grand crosses of the Order of the Two Sicilies, a command in the Royal Guards, and such-like matters, and Pepe, finding support weakening, had, for a while, to subside.

But if Joachim's hand could not yet be forced in the matter of a constitution, there was another matter that equally, and with perhaps greater propriety, exercised his generals, and to which they now turned their attention,—that of the conduct of the campaign. Foiled

in their constitutional endeavours, they petitioned Joachim to call a council of war, and the King, either from good-nature or from necessity, endured this flagrant breach of discipline, though he did not accede to their wishes. This occurred, in all probability, immediately before the engagement at Reggio; a few days later a new turn was given to the situation by the arrival at headquarters of Lord William Bentinck.

The representative of Great Britain in the Mediterranean had remained in Naples for several days at the time of the conclusion of the armistice, and it is instructive to note what his impressions then were; for Bentinck, whatever his limitations and failings, was a man whose honesty of purpose made him incapable of stating that which he did not believe. From Joachim's capital he wrote to Castlereagh on the 6th of February setting forth his views on various aspects of the Italian question. As to Sicily he was under no illusion, and recognised that the constitution of the island would not last longer than the British protectorate. However hostile to Joachim Bentinck might be, he was strongly impressed with the universal dismay felt at Naples at the thought of a return of the Bourbons, and frankly wrote to Castlereagh: "It is not easy to conceive the terror universally felt at the unforgiving temper of their Majesties." His hope appears to have been that the Bourbon government in Sicily, which, under British protection, had become a constitutional state, might be ". . . not only the model but the instrument of Italian independence."¹

Those words, the train of thought they reveal, the political propaganda that had been pushed among certain masonic and other circles at Naples, all these were

¹ Castlereagh, *Corr.* ix. 239.

influences that were plain to Joachim, as they were plain to all who knew what was passing behind the scenes. Bentinck's character was far too direct to conceal his sympathies and sentiments, and it is small wonder if his official friendship alarmed the King of Naples scarcely less than his old-time hostility. The Anglo-Sicilian expedition now starting for northern Italy to assist in the campaign against the Viceroy proved a consistent sequel to the whole of Bentinck's policy.

That expedition, comprising some 14,000 Anglo-Sicilian troops, left Palermo for Leghorn at the end of February and beginning of March. Both before the departure of this expedition and after its landing, proclamations were addressed to the Sicilian troops by the Hereditary Prince in which they were reminded that the Bourbon claim to the throne of Naples was not abandoned, and that the Neapolitans were their brethren. This was the more provocative for two reasons, one that the chief command was being directly exercised by Bentinck, the other that Leghorn, where the Anglo-Sicilians disembarked on the 13th of March, was no longer under the French flag, but in peaceful possession of the Neapolitans. As though to show that not only Sicily but also Great Britain was hostile to the avowed policy of Joachim, Bentinck himself issued a proclamation at Leghorn in the following terms :—

ITALIANS—Great Britain has landed her troops on your coasts ; she offers you her assistance in order to rescue you from the iron yoke of Bonaparte. . . .

After reviewing the national uprisings of Europe he continued :—

. . . Is then Italy alone to remain under the yoke ? Shall

Italians alone contend against Italians in favour of a Tyrant, and for the thralldom of their country? Italians, hesitate no longer; be Italians and let Italy in arms be convinced that the great cause of the country is in her hands.

Warriors of Italy! you are not invited to join us; but you are invited to vindicate your own rights and to be free.

Only call and we will hasten to your relief; and then Italy by our united efforts will become what she was in her most prosperous periods, and what Spain now is. BENTINCK.¹

Thus the Anglo-Sicilian expedition, which was intended to co-operate with the allied Austrian and Neapolitan armies by virtue of a treaty with the one Power and an armistice with the other, arrived on the scene heralded by declarations that openly avowed claims hostile to those of the King of Naples, and contrary to those of the Emperor of Austria. Nor did Bentinck's unconciliatory attitude contrast favourably with that of Joachim.

The King of Naples was anxious to propitiate Great Britain, and however much it cost him to have the Anglo-Sicilians disembark on territory his troops already occupied, he declared to Count Mier that on Bentinck's arrival at Leghorn it would not be his fault if everything in dispute between them was not settled amicably. But an amicable settlement depends on a friendly spirit being displayed by both parties, and Bentinck was far from showing himself ready to meet the King half-way. He was irritated at finding the Neapolitan flag flying throughout Tuscany, and at the idea that perhaps Joachim would succeed in his ambition of forming an Italian State. At all events he left Leghorn on the 13th of March, and arrived at Reggio two days later, and by the course he adopted there, he very nearly

¹ *Morning Chronicle*, Feb. 12, 1815.

succeeded in driving Joachim back into the arms of Napoleon.

The King of Naples received the British envoy with every outward show of courtesy, nay more, went out of his way to please him.¹ Pepe's brigade was passed in review in his honour, and every compliment and attention shown him. But Bentinck now knew that communications had passed between Joachim and the Viceroy, while Nugent and the Austrian officers indignantly told him of the reiterated refusals of the Neapolitans to march against the French, of Grenier's release of his Neapolitan prisoners, of Severoli's escape from Reggio. Although the nature of Joachim's communications with Prince Eugène was unknown, it was sufficiently evident that they could not be inspired by a desire to promote the interests of the Allies.

Unmoved by the blandishments of the King, Bentinck took up an attitude blunt in his presence, all but openly hostile out of it. He frankly avowed his detestation of Joachim to all who cared to listen, and openly described him as a counterpart of Bernadotte. To Bellegarde he wrote that Joachim was not fulfilling his obligations :—

. . . Is it not the language of all his officers and of himself that all Italy should be united, and that he should be the chief of Italian independence? . . . Is there any man in Italy, is there any man or officer in the Austrian army south of the Po, has your Excellency, or have I myself, any confidence whatever in his sincerity? Do not all believe that his sole object is to gain time? ²

Two questions were the chief object of discussion between Joachim and Bentinck: that of the occupation

¹ “. . . se mit en coquetterie pour lui plaire.” Mier to Metternich, Helfert, *Königin Karolina*, 574.

² *Brit. State Papers*, 1814-1815, ii. 237.

of Tuscany and that of the King's military action. The King offered to evacuate Tuscany in favour of the Anglo-Sicilians, but demanded in return that Bentinck should sign a treaty with him similar to the Austrian treaty. Bentinck declined, and insisted that the Neapolitan troops must be immediately withdrawn from Tuscany, threatening, in case of refusal, to drive them out and to invade Naples in the name of King Ferdinand. Bentinck, in fact, completely lost sight of the point that the chief object of his negotiation should have been to secure the Neapolitan co-operation against the Viceroy, instead of which he was assuming an attitude that could not but alarm Joachim and make him hang back even more than he had hitherto. So far did he carry his disregard for Joachim's susceptibilities that he avoided addressing him in the forms usual with royalty and wore the Sicilian red cockade in his hat.

The untactful attitude of Bentinck made a profound impression on the King's uneasy conscience and suspicious temperament; he came to the conclusion that he was "already sacrificed."¹ In despair, and notwithstanding the news of the reverses that were now overtaking the Emperor in France, he turned once more to the Viceroy for help.

On the 20th of March Bentinck left Reggio for Verona, where he intended to confer with Bellegarde; he had accomplished less than nothing, for at the very time he was leaving the Neapolitan headquarters, clandestine negotiations with the French camp were resumed by Joachim. It so happened that his renewed desire to treat coincided with the arrival of a dispatch from Napoleon to the Viceroy in which the Prince was ordered to reopen negotiations. This dispatch had

¹ Mier to Metternich, March 20, 1814, Helfert, *Murat*, 151.

been written by Napoleon three days after his defeat at Laon, and shortly after receiving Joachim's letter of the 1st or 2nd of March already given. The Emperor wrote as follows :—

MY SON—I send you copy of a most extraordinary letter I have received from the King of Naples. . . . Send an agent to this extraordinary traitor, and make a treaty with him in my name. Don't touch either Piedmont or Genoa. . . . Later we shall do what we choose, for, in the face of such ingratitude and such circumstances, nothing can be binding.¹

The Viceroy received this letter on the 19th of March, and at the very same time one from Joachim dated the 18th,—that is two days before Bentinck left Reggio,—in which the King hinted clearly that he was open to negotiate. Under these circumstances the Viceroy acted at once. He wrote to Joachim that he had just received full powers from the Emperor and was prepared to conclude a treaty ; he demanded that in the meanwhile hostilities should be suspended. He had no other intention than to amuse Joachim and gain time.

These negotiations led to no more result than those of a month earlier. General Zucchi, Commandant of Mantua, made the necessary arrangements, and an interview between him and General Carascosa took place. This was followed by one between the Viceroy, accompanied by Zucchi, and Livron, representing Joachim. This last interview took place on the 28th or 29th of March, when Joachim's relations with the Austrians and British were already entering a new phase. As had happened before, the sincerity of the two parties was so slight, their views and ambitions so

¹ Napoleon to Eugène, March 12, 1814, Du Casse, *Eugène*, x. 215.

divergent, that nothing came of the interviews save a certain amount of intriguing among the Neapolitan and Italian generals.

The chief effect of Joachim's negotiations with Prince Eugène during the last ten days of March was unpremeditated; they greatly alarmed Bellegarde, whose army was in a deplorable condition through sickness, and induced him to make a strong effort to maintain amicable relations. Count Mier had deeply resented Bentinck's gruff intrusion on his diplomatic labours; Bellegarde was aghast at the prospect of having to face a joint attack from the Viceroy and the King. Queen Caroline, too, feared lest at the last minute, just when the cause of the Allies appeared more certain than ever to triumph, Joachim would impetuously plunge into some fatal course; she sent S. Teodoro and Mosbourg from Naples to press her advice on him.

Mier's efforts at Joachim's headquarters to keep the King in a friendly disposition were supported from Verona, where Bentinck had joined Bellegarde. "There he discussed matters with the Austrian commander and the British officer on his staff, Sir Robert Wilson, who was as distinguished for his charm of manner as Bentinck was for his bluntness. In every quarter opinion was against Bentinck. It was not very material to the Austrians whether the Neapolitans or the British momentarily controlled Tuscany; what they wanted in the first place was that Murat should be persuaded by some means or other to march his army on Piacenza. That done, the line of the Mincio must fall, and Prince Eugène must retreat to the Alps. The Austrian view was entirely supported by Sir Robert Wilson at Verona, and Castlereagh was writing dispatches from France to Bentinck enjoining on him a conciliatory attitude

towards Murat and the subordination of his operations to Bellegarde's.

“Bentinck was profoundly displeased at the situation; he was angered at finding that Prince Eugène with his small army of conscripts was successfully holding Lombardy against the much larger forces of the Allies. He ascribed the failure to the adoption of the Austrian policy, instead of that on which he had set his heart. Yet the unanimity of opinion against him, the representations of Bellegarde and Wilson, the tenor of his instructions, all warned him that he had gone very far. He appears to have realized that he was no longer acting in the spirit of his instructions, and on returning to the Neapolitan headquarters, now at Bologna, he took Wilson with him.

“All felt that an understanding of some sort must be come to. Murat now put forward a new proposal: he offered to evacuate Tuscany if Great Britain would sign peace; this was immediately rejected by Wilson. On the 2nd of April a note was drawn up by Bentinck and presented to Gallo. In this document are clear indications that the British agent felt that he must abandon the position he had taken up at Reggio, though it can hardly be described as conciliatory. He formally declared that Great Britain approved the Austro-Neapolitan treaty, and that the signature of a treaty of peace was declined merely out of consideration for the just claims of the allied Sicilian Government. He invited the Neapolitan Government to consider the question of compensation to King Ferdinand, with a view to arriving at a settlement. But in addition to these official views, Bentinck stated a personal opinion. He complained that the Neapolitan Government had not participated in the military operations, and that

suspicious negotiations had taken place with the French camp ; he also protested against the apparent project of permanent occupation of the territory overrun by the Neapolitan army. He concluded by recommending, not demanding, the cession of part of Tuscany to facilitate the British operations, a prompt co-operation with the Austrians, and the renunciation of all projects of political aggrandizement."¹

This note represented a considerable change in Bentinck's attitude, yet it was far from satisfactory to Joachim. The Duke di Gallo politely parried it by referring to negotiations that had taken place between Prince Cariati and Lord Castlereagh at Chalons. On this Bentinck decided to rejoin his troops and operate in the direction of Genoa, leaving to the Austrians and Sir Robert Wilson the charge of all further arrangements with the King of Naples.

Every courier from France now brought news that reassured Joachim as to the intentions of the Allies, that strengthened the conviction that Napoleon's was a lost cause. The statesmen of the Allies assembled at Chaumont had decided that in view of existing circumstances it was better that the Austrian treaty with Naples should be indorsed with the formal adhesion of the Powers. Metternich was prepared to admit that the long-delayed ratification of the treaty by the Emperor Francis constituted a partial excuse for the non-activity of Joachim ; yet now that every guarantee was offered by the Powers, the time had arrived when further hesitation would not be tolerated. To remove some of the King's apprehensions, the Czar sent General Balatscheff to Joachim's headquarters with full powers to concur in the Austro-Neapolitan

¹ Johnston, *Bentinck and Murat*, *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, xix. 277.

treaty, and Castlereagh, doubtless in accord with Metternich, wrote to Bentinck in somewhat severe terms instructing him to subordinate himself, especially in matters concerning relations with the Allied Powers, to Field-Marshal Bellegarde. He thought that it might be best for the Anglo-Sicilian force to be incorporated with the Neapolitans, and added, "It is in vain to hope for any useful concert from Murat whilst a system of menace prevails . . . with respect to his title at Naples. . . ." ¹

As a result of the clearly expressed intentions of the Allied Powers a conference was held on the 7th of April at Rovere on the Po, just east of Mantua. This was attended by Field-Marshal Bellegarde, the King of Naples, Count Mier, and Sir R. Wilson. Joachim was now reassured as to the intentions of Austria and Great Britain; he also knew that Schwarzenberg had beaten Napoleon at Arcis-sur-Aube and was marching on Paris. Under these circumstances he was prepared to accede to any reasonable proposal. It was therefore decided that the Anglo-Sicilians should evacuate Tuscany and confine their operations to the Genoese territory, and that the Neapolitan army should at once advance on Piacenza. These decisions were put into immediate execution.

After the engagement at Reggio the Austro-Neapolitan outposts had been pushed as far as the line of the Taro, beyond which they had not ventured. Here Nugent, always as near to the enemy as he could get, fixed his quarters, and here, towards the end of March, a curious incident occurred that must now be related.

In his struggle against the toils that the Allies were fast closing about him, Napoleon, though never abandon-

¹ Castlereagh to Bentinck, April 3, 1814, *Brit. State Papers*, 1814-1815, 315.

ing sufficient to obtain peace, had yet, one by one, surrendered most of the objects of his ambitions. Driven from Spain, he had released Ferdinand VII., nearly driven from Italy, his pretensions as the successor of Charlemagne vanished, and he released the Pope. "To embarrass him [the King of Naples] I have given orders that the Pope should be sent to the outposts by way of Piacenza and Parma," he wrote to the Viceroy.¹

This sudden appearance of a new factor in Italian politics was a very real embarrassment to the King. The Pope was, within certain bounds, the greatest power in Italy; Neapolitans who would at a word change their allegiance from Ferdinand to Joachim or from Joachim to Ferdinand were unswerving in their devotion to the Head of the Church; Pius was the chief priest of a religion that was blindly obeyed by Joachim's subjects, and that had never consecrated his tenure of the throne; he claimed temporal as well as spiritual dominion over a great part of the territory now occupied by the Neapolitan army,—territory annexed to the French Empire, but that on its fall was claimed in reversion by its former owner.

On the unexpected news reaching him that Pius VII. had set out from Piacenza for the Neapolitan outposts Joachim sent orders to Nugent to detain him on the further side of the Taro. The Austrian general did precisely the contrary of what the King ordered; he received the Pope with full military honours, treated him with the utmost respect, provided him with a suitable escort, and promptly sent him on his way towards Parma. Then the King sent Carascosa from Bologna, where headquarters then were, to stop the Pope from

¹ Napoleon to Eugène, March 12, 1814, Du Casse, *Eugène*, x. 216.

proceeding beyond Reggio. The Neapolitan general informed Pius that he must break his journey at that city, as there were no post-horses obtainable; but strong in the rectitude of his cause, strong in the attraction of Rome that called him, strong in the crowds that knelt at his passage and invoked his blessing, the Pope replied: "Then I will pursue my way on foot, and God will give me strength."¹

There was no stopping so resolute a traveller, and if Napoleon had ventured to arrest Pius, that was an enterprise his lieutenant might not safely contemplate. The Pope continued his journey in spite of Carascosa's efforts, and at his next stopping-place, Modena, was met by another emissary of the King, the Duke di Gallo. The King of Naples' Minister for Foreign Affairs had mission to discuss with the Pope certain political questions that his return involved; he met with no better success than Carascosa, however, for Pius firmly declined all discussion until such time as he should be restored to his capital, his throne, and his government, and be able to speak and act as became him.

Failing in these attempts at negotiation, Joachim took perhaps the best middle course that safety and ambition might jointly dictate, and addressed a letter to Pius, in which, after assuring him of his personal devotion, he stated that he would immediately take every step to place him in possession of the dominions of which he had been deprived when he left Rome. This meant the capital and two adjoining departments; it left entirely out of account Romagna and the Marches with the two important cities of Bologna and Ancona, actually in the possession of the Neapolitans.

¹ Colletta, *Storia*, ii. 183; Du Casse, *Eugène*, x. 233.

At Bologna the Pope and King met. Both must have recalled their earliest relations twelve years before, when Joachim was General Murat, Commander-in-Chief of the army of the French Republic. Extraordinary events, in which both had played great parts, had filled the pages of history since then, and as they met, covering their antagonism with a formal veil of courtesy, each must have felt that the end of that extraordinary cycle of events was not yet reached.

This interview was immediately followed by the conference at Rovere, already related, of which the result was the adjustment of the differences between Neapolitans, British, and Austrians, and the arrangement that the King of Naples should march on Piacenza.

That advance accordingly took place, though not without some further slight delay. On the 13th of April Nugent took the lead and crossed the Taro, supported by Pepe's brigade, and followed by the whole army. There was fighting during the whole day, especially at S. Donino, the French falling back steadily towards Piacenza. The Austrians bore the brunt of the fighting, but Pepe's brigade was in action, and its commander earned commendation. Early on the morning of the 15th the advance continued, and the French were driven into Piacenza, Nugent capturing the monastery of San Lazaro after some heavy fighting.

Joachim, though present with the army, had so far not taken a very active part in the operations. He now ordered headquarters forward to a small house close under the walls of the city, Piacenza was a fortress he had attacked once before,—in the year 1800, when the divisions of the Army of Reserve had swept down into Italy from the Great St. Bernard, and the First Consul had marched to the fields of Marengo. He had found

the task easier to perform than with French cavalry than it now appeared to be with Austrian infantry.

The King's advance on Piacenza had coincided with news of defeat and disaster to the Imperial arms, though for the last few days information from France had totally failed. Where the armies of the Allies, where that of the Emperor had vanished, was wrapped in mystery.¹ As Joachim paced the garden of the house where he had taken up his quarters, conferring with an engineer officer, General Colletta, dispatches were brought to him. He took them in person from the staff officer, opened and read them. Those present watched him, and saw him grow pale. He then turned quickly away, walking in an agitated and nervous manner. At last he called up his staff, and in a disheartened way told them what had happened—that Paris was in the hands of the Allies, and that Napoleon had abdicated. He was utterly dejected, and remained in that state for several days.

As so often happens in the affairs of life, Joachim, now brought face to face with the termination of the struggle, found himself quite differently placed from what he had anticipated. "I am here alone in the midst of strangers, I have to conceal all, even my tears!" he had written to the Emperor six weeks earlier; but now, how much greater was his isolation! What friendship, what sympathy could he look for in any direction? What had been his political conduct to friends, to allies, to enemies? What had been the military achievements of the brilliant Joachim Murat? He had been dragged into action at the heels of an

¹ A dispatch of Castlereagh was written from Dijon on April 3rd in evidently complete ignorance of the fact that the allied armies were already comfortably quartered in Paris.

Austrian brigadier ; he had incurred the well-founded distrust of Austria and Great Britain ; he had earned the hatred and contempt of France and of Napoleon ; he had forfeited such esteem as his own Neapolitans felt for him ; and what had he gained ? He had kept his throne,—a precarious possession compounded of anxieties and remorse, the only tottering pinnacle that remained of the vast edifice of Napoleon.

The Viceroy and Marshal Bellegarde, without referring to the King of Naples, signed a military convention at Schiarino Rizzeno on the 16th of April that put an end to military operations in northern Italy. To its terms the King subsequently acceded.

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CHAPTER XI

CONGRESS OF VIENNA

Bourbon restoration—Reaction in Italy—Neapolitans evacuate—Their misconduct—Clerical agitation—Insubordination of generals—Carbonaro revolt—Joachim returns to Naples—State of kingdom—Armaments—Generals' intrigue with Bentinck—Petition Joachim—Pepe arrested—Feeling against Joachim—Bentinck and Castlereagh—Court festivities at Naples—Resettlement of Europe—Congress decided—Austria and Naples—Talleyrand and Joachim—Death of Mary Caroline—The Czar and a Bourbon restoration—Talleyrand opposes Naples—Neuville's mission—Fagan recalled from Naples—Wellington's attitude—Congress opens—Naples excluded—Joachim's excitement—Metternich intervenes—Joachim appeals to England—Saxon question—The Marches—Hostility of clerics—Joachim offers the Marches for recognition—Talleyrand's obstinacy—Polignac's mission—Joachim challenges France—Metternich's note—Elba—Napoleon's position—Correspondence with Naples—Countess Walewska—Madame Mère and Joachim—British at Naples—Princess of Wales—Oxford arrested—Napoleon leaves Elba—News at Naples—Joachim's assurances—Change of attitude—Joachim joins the army.

FEW had foreseen that Napoleon would prolong his desperate contest with combined Europe to a point that would involve his descent from the throne. His fall meant not only more than his defeat, but something fundamentally different. Till past the middle of March, Metternich, whose influence in such a crisis

would have been decisive, was prepared to come to terms with the Emperor, and it was but barely two weeks before Napoleon's abdication that a Bourbon restoration appeared within the bounds of political probabilities.¹ But the idea, once planted, grew phenomenally fast. The statesmen of the Allied Powers were not slow to realize the full significance of this new development, and perceived that they had accomplished more than the defeat of Napoleon. Not only had they pulled down the restless conqueror who had carried fire and sword to every corner of Europe, but also such of the principles of civil equality and of political freedom that had survived the Republic and been carried on by the Empire. It was immediately felt that the restoration of the Bourbons meant a step back towards the past.

In Italy all hopes of nationalization vanished with as much rapidity as might have the smoke from the funeral pyres of the eloquent proclamations,—Austrian, British, and Neapolitan,—in which the Italians were called on to rise against the French tyranny and win their freedom. Lombardy, where more than once an independent and constitutional state under Eugène Beauharnais appeared about to come into existence, was occupied by Austria; Piedmont, with the addition of Genoa, fell to the King of Sardinia; Tuscany to the Grand Duke. Joachim unostentatiously withdrew his troops from the greater part of the country he had occupied. On the 28th of April he concluded a military convention with Bellegarde, whereby it was agreed that the Austrians should be left in occupation of the Duchies and legations, while the Neapolitans were to retain possession

¹ De Vitrolles, i. 128.

of the Marches, including Ancona, Macerata, and Fermo.

Early in May the Neapolitan evacuation was carried out, much to the relief of the inhabitants. The occupied departments had been denuded of money, of provisions, of forage by the successive visitations of French, Austrians, and Neapolitans, and had been thrown into a state of great ferment. This had been especially menacing at the time of the passage of the Pope, by many, if not by most of the inhabitants, considered their legitimate sovereign, temporal and spiritual. The Neapolitans in particular had shown disgracefully bad discipline. Deserters were numerous, at one time several hundreds passing one point in a few days. Murder and pillage were frequent, and some regiments were indeed little better than criminal associations. The garrison of Rome gave their general much cause for anxiety. Lavauguyon reported to the King that the behaviour of his soldiers was ferocious, undisciplined, and frightful.

Of all the provinces he had overrun, Joachim only retained possession of the strip of Adriatic coastline that ran from the Neapolitan border to the proximity of Bologna. It included the port and fortress of Ancona, and it gave him a military outlet into the valley of the Po. He had a specious claim to it, for he had conquered it from the French Empire; he had by his treaty of alliance with Austria been assured of an increase of territory, and his military convention with Bellegarde explicitly assented to his present occupation. But the population of the province was not content, and the Papal Government claimed a restoration of the temporal power within the boundaries first diminished by the treaty of Tolentino in 1797.

Clerical influence soon began to assert itself, and was at no pains to disguise its hostility to the intruding government. From the Marches the agitation spread into the Abruzzi. On the 3rd of May, at Borrano, a small village near Civitella del Tronto, a hermit named Fra Agostino, of the suppressed order of the Minori, attended a religious solemnity and inflamed the people by seditious rumours, making them shout: "Viva Ferdinando! Mora Gioacchino!" At Compli near by, two days later, the parish priest gave out that Napoleon was dead and that Joachim soon would be, to the great agitation of his congregation. These disturbances were promptly allayed by the arrest of their authors, but served to show the sensitive state of public opinion.

That there was no reliance to be placed in Neapolitan popular support had, indeed, been amply demonstrated in the course of the war. A revolution had nearly been organized among the secret societies that had recently become so popular. The system of making a masonic or other lodge the cementing bond of the provincial militia had extended widely since its introduction in Calabria during the reign of King Joseph; it had in fact infected both the army and militia. Lodges of all sorts were now numerous, especially those of the Carbonari. Their meetings became the focus of political discussion—it might in a limited sense be said of national regeneration. In 1812-1813 a considerable immigration had set in from Sicily to Naples, and exaggerated reports of the constitutional system introduced into that island by Bentinck became the principal subject of discussion of the lodges. The agitation took on a liberal and nationalistic aspect, and the Sicilian influence was exerted to turn it as far as possible into an instrument

for the overthrow of Joachim. In this Bentinck and the Sicilians were not altogether successful.

The Carbonari first caused anxiety to the Government while the King was with the *Grande Armée* in Russia ; Caroline supported Maghella in an attempt to put down their lodges, but could not altogether suppress them. On the return of Joachim, the Minister of Police, who was himself in close touch with Italian nationalism and masonic circles, appears to have shifted his position. He seems to have judged the constitutional and national spirit strong enough for success, and advised the King, as did other prominent officials and courtiers, to declare frankly for Italian independence. The advice was bold, yet it must be said that the course Maghella suggested was perhaps not less promising than that actually taken by the King in 1814 and 1815. The result of this advice was unfortunate for Maghella ; the Imperial police became duly informed of his attitude ; Napoleon arranged that Maghella should be sent to Paris on an ostensible mission, and on his arrival promptly had him arrested and placed in prison.

Having decided not to make use of this secret agitation, yet unable to suppress it, the Government tried to control and direct it. An attempt was made, following the model of the Napoleonic policy, to capture the Masonic Grand Lodges. The lodge *la Concorde* had as its Grand Master Marshal Jourdan (in 1813), while its members comprised many civil functionaries. Its secretary was the famous improvisatore Gabriele Rossetti, later to become perhaps the most ardent of all Neapolitan liberals. But now, in 1813, the lodges, although filled with police agents, began to show symptoms of revolt, that of *Giuseppina* taking a prominent part. Through 1813 the agitation

increased, and spread into every rank of the army ; in the early part of 1814 it had become dangerous. At a review held just before the troops marched to the north, a salute with blank cartridges was ordered, but a bullet was fired by a Carbonaro that nearly hit the King. Joachim at once rode up to the line, commanded the reloading of the muskets, and, facing the men, ordered a second volley. It passed harmlessly over his head.

Coincident with the King's departure for the army and the intriguing of his generals at Reggio, constitutional agitation became more active at Naples, and early in February of 1814 a Grand Lodge according to the Scotch Rite was formed in the city of Naples that attempted to assume control of the Carbonaro and other influences at work against the Government. But the only movement that took place was in the provinces. In the last week of March an armed insurrection broke out in the Abruzzi ; in the space of a few hours nearly the whole province rose in arms. The suddenness and unanimity with which the local militia organizations came out was no less remarkable than the extraordinarily divergent aims announced by the suddenly revealed leaders of the insurrection. They represented no less than four distinct political ideals. Some leaders declared for Ferdinand, others for a Republic, others for a constitutional and independent government, others for the Holy Faith. The whole province of Teramo was controlled by the insurgents ; and it looked as though the Abruzzi might be lost. Manhès, who as a French officer had resigned his official position at Naples, declined the mission of subduing the province, but General Montigny restored order promptly, though not without the exercise of considerable severity. In

Calabria, where the Carbonari had been in close relation with Sicilian emissaries since the days of Capobianco, an insurrection occurred at Polistena, south of Monteleone. There in a few days several thousand armed militiamen assembled, their banners inscribed *Indipendenza d' Italia* ; but General Desvernois, in command of the province, speedily dispersed them and restored order.

On his return from the army to his capital, therefore, Joachim found matters only superficially quiet. Yet the kingdom was undoubtedly more prosperous than at any former period of its history, showing, after several years of comparative quiet, the effects of the vast transformation and improved administrative methods introduced by the French. For the first time in its history the kingdom of Naples possessed a semblance of national institutions : an army, a system of education, uniform laws and administration. For three years a scheme of commercial accounts had been in thorough working order, and the State finances, notwithstanding the exceptional military expenditure, were steadily improving. *Cedolas* had risen to 35. Industry and agriculture were encouraged. Cotton-growing was showing good results in quantity and quality, as also the beet-sugar industry. But unfortunately for Naples, industry and commerce had to be subordinated to political and military considerations. The army was still being rapidly increased,—to 70,000 men in July,—and the money expended in this way and in Court pageants necessitated larger budgets. The tax-payer resented this the more owing to the severity meted out to him, and to the indulgence shown to a soldiery whose thieving and pillaging propensities were too often unpleasantly demonstrated to his cost.

The bad conduct and insubordination of the

Neapolitan generals was no less than that of the men. After the close of the campaign, Carascosa had been left in command by the King ; he soon called a meeting of the generals at his headquarters of S. Donino. Now was the time, they thought, for securing a constitution for Naples. Carascosa and D' Ambrosio were for obtaining the support of Bentinck, and Filangieri was deputed to wait on him with the proposal that the generals should be furnished with fifty thousand pounds sterling, the pay of the army for two months, to enable them to march on Naples and proclaim a constitution. This proposition Bentinck rejected.¹

Feeling unable to carry the army without money, the generals then fell back on a less drastic policy : they drew up a petition for the grant of a constitution and the dismissal of all the French in the employ of the Government. This petition was signed by Carascosa, Filangieri, D' Ambrosio, F. Pepe, G. Pepe, Pignatelli-Strongoli, Pignatelli-Cerchiara, Arcovito, Medici, Petrinelli, D' Aquino, and Colletta. This comparatively mild form of insubordination did not, however, satisfy the more ardent spirits. On the army's taking up quarters in the Marches, G. Pepe with his brigade was stationed at Pesaro. He opened communications with his Carbonaro friends in the Abruzzi with a view to a new rising, and tried to induce the other generals stationed about Ancona to participate. But this time the plot was denounced ; Pepe was promptly placed under arrest and sent to Naples.

Joachim did not treat his refractory general with the severity that might have proved most salutary. For Pepe, in his unmilitary, insubordinate fashion,

¹ à Court to Castlereagh, July 10, 1820, *Foreign Off. Sicily*, 90 ; Pepe, *Relation, Pamphleteer*, xxiii. 314 ; Pepe, *Mems.* ii. 2, 3.

unfortunately represented that embryo of public opinion that the French rule had created in Naples, and without the support of which Joachim could not hope to survive. That public opinion, even though nationalist and constitutional in character, was all that Joachim had to lean on. He thought, and doubtless correctly, that he could neither afford to punish Pepe nor yet to trust him out of his sight. He therefore reproached him for his conduct, explained to him that it was quite impossible, in view of the reactionary course on which the Allies were embarking, that he should openly defy them by proclaiming a constitution, and, for the rest, kept the general dancing attendance on the Court and safely away from his troops.

Joachim had certainly good reason for wishing to secure the goodwill of his army, for it was evident that, should the full details of his intrigues with the Viceroy and Fouché become known to the Allies, he might well have to fight for his throne. Prince Eugène, Napoleon, Fouché, Carascosa, Zucchi, numerous staff officers might easily reveal a part or the whole of a secret that was already well-nigh pierced.¹

The feeling against him was so bitter that at the close of military operations, on his sending the Grand Cross of the Order of the Two Sicilies to Field-Marshal Bellegarde, the Austrian general returned it. And if he was viewed with such disfavour by Austrians, he stood even worse with others. It was in fact only Austrian protection, only Metternich's determination to abide by his treaty, that saved Naples

¹ It is remarkable that so little of the proceedings of Joachim became known. It was not till many years later that the publication of the correspondence of Prince Eugène by Du Casse gave the first substantial historical basis of these events.

from immediate attack. So hostile to Joachim was the attitude of Great Britain, that before the end of May Metternich was compelled to address a strongly worded note to Castlereagh, in which the British statesman was reminded that Great Britain had acceded to the treaty of Prague (July 27, 1813), whereby it was stipulated, among other things, that Austria should have full power to conclude a treaty guaranteeing possession of the throne of Naples to Joachim and to promise him an indemnity in return for his assistance; and, further (Art. 30), that Austria should have a free hand in the resettlement of Italy.¹

Castlereagh and the British Cabinet were convinced of Joachim's treachery, and could see no reason for not putting a forcible end to his tenure of the throne of Naples. Yet the attitude of the Opposition, the widespread criticisms of Lord William Bentinck's conduct, and Metternich's firmness in adhering to his engagements, made a temporary acquiescence in the existing situation the most convenient course. Bentinck had clearly gone to the length of disobeying positive instructions, as in certain proceedings of his at Genoa, and in not sending one of his officers to serve on Joachim's staff. He was now entirely out of favour, and the attitude of the Ministers towards him will appear from an extract of a letter from Castlereagh to Liverpool:—

If Bonaparte had been enabled to maintain himself in the field in France, between Murat's rascality and Bellegarde's timidity, and Lord William Bentinck's impracticability and Whiggism, which seems to follow him everywhere, we should have been in danger of a serious disappointment in that quarter.²

¹ Metternich to Castlereagh, May 26, 1814; Bianchi, i. 333.

² Castlereagh, *Corr.* ix. 509.

It was probably with a sense of relief that Castlereagh received, early in May, an application for leave of absence from Bentinck. The request was immediately acceded to.

Yet the removal of Joachim's greatest enemy from the scene hardly served to make Great Britain less hostile than before. Her diplomatic representative at Palermo, à Court, consistently referred to Joachim as an usurper; the *Quarterly Review* and other publications demanded the King's instant removal from his throne; Joachim's agent in England, Ancillotti, could not obtain a hearing; and no other representative save a consular agent named Fagan was sent to represent Great Britain at Naples. It will soon appear that his functions were not intended to be anything more than commercial.

Joachim and Caroline resolved to put the best face on this threatening position. Never had Naples seen a more festive Court. In the halls and along the terraces of Capodimonte, among the princely villas that crown the crest from the Vomero to Posilipo, dancing, dining, singing, and merry-making went gaily on,—brocades, cloth of gold, embroideries, rouge, feathers, and jewels, deceived the eyes of those who could not perceive that the hearts beneath were stricken with anguish at the thought of the political volcano rumbling below their feet. Light feet and heavy hearts, sweet smiles and double thoughts, glittering gems and ruin stalking near,—and now what is there left of all the pageant? under a glass case at the Museum of San Martino a few worn tufts of light-blue plumes, a velvet cloak embroidered with golden bees, once worn by Joachim; and on the wall facing them the death-like waxen mask of Ferdinand vacantly staring at the few surviving relics of his great

competitor. Pepe, an unwilling participator in these revels, has left some record of them, has narrated with mournful indignation how at the villa occupied by Pauline Bonaparte on the Vomero, his talents, panting for nationalism, constitutionalism, and such matters, had to comply with the Princess' decrees and turn to the degrading occupation of playing *petits paquets* with the ladies of her suite.

Besides holding court pageants, hunts, balls, and reviews, Joachim made more serious bids for popularity. Trade was encouraged, the tax on *cabotage* was removed, and, as a partial concession to the nationalists, it was decreed that to hold office under the Government, Neapolitan birth or naturalization was essential.

While Joachim thus displayed his regal splendour and increased his military strength, the statesmen of the four great Powers that had conquered France turned their attention to the resettlement of the affairs of Europe. Much readjustment had taken place spontaneously on the retreat of the French armies. Thus in Italy, notwithstanding the proclamations and avowed policy of Bentinck and other British agents, Lombardy reverted to Austria, as in 1796, and Piedmont to Sardinia. But other territorial matters remained unsettled. Austria and Naples were both in actual possession of territory once the Pope's; the duchy of Parma, assigned to the Empress Maria Louisa by the treaty of Fontainebleau, the city of Genoa, and other points, gave rise to conflicting claims. As in Italy, so in other parts of Europe, notably in Saxony and in Poland, difficult questions of possession and right arose that could not be settled without prolonged discussion. The Powers therefore

decided, when signing peace with the new government of France, that a Congress should assemble in the autumn at Vienna to dispose of all debated territorial questions. Now it was evident that this so-called European Congress was something different from what it professed to be. It was in reality a conference held for the purpose of parcelling out among the conquerors of Napoleon the profits of their victory, and it appeared probable that the Congress would do little else than register the decrees of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, with due propitiation of Great Britain and Bourbon France. The attention of every monarch and people of Europe was soon concentrated on the diplomatic proceedings at Vienna, and none more than Joachim's and his subjects'.

The King of Naples' best guarantee that his interests would be protected at the Congress was the goodwill of Austria. With that Power he had a treaty of amity and alliance. With Prince Metternich, Queen Caroline retained some relations of friendship and some influence. To strengthen this position against the hostility of Great Britain and the intrigues of the Bourbon Powers and of Queen Mary Caroline, now residing at the Castle of Hetzendorf near Vienna, Joachim sought the support of one who had formerly been his friend, Talleyrand, now chief director of the foreign policy of his most Christian Majesty Louis XVIII. Secret agents passed between the two, though the nature of the communications is unknown. It appears probable, however, that financial proposals were made to Talleyrand in connection with his Neapolitan principality of Benevento, and with his possible services at the approaching Congress at which he was to represent France. Perhaps some pecuniary transactions did in

fact take place, but it is certain that however much Talleyrand may have profited by it, Joachim did not, for the representative of France proved his most bitter and venomous enemy for the whole duration of the Congress.

Immediately before the opening of the conferences occurred an incident not unconnected with this history, the death of Queen Mary Caroline. Expelled from Sicily by Lord William Bentinck, she had travelled by way of the Black Sea to Austria. Her nephew, the Emperor Francis, appointed for her residence the small Castle of Hetzendorf, immediately adjoining Schönbrunn. There the aged Queen, physically spent, intellectually weakening, politically dead, found enough fire in her hatred of Bentinck to prepare against him a statement the publication of which was to expose his misdeeds to the statesmen and people of Europe. She completed her work, but it never saw the light, for a few weeks later the Queen's life came to an end. She died suddenly on the night of the 7th of September 1814, apparently from apoplexy. Thus ended a princess whose misfortunes and misdeeds were equally conspicuous, whose immorality was not greater than that of her age and station, whose over-active intelligence, guided by a shallow and selfish judgment, produced great calamities at a time of trouble and revolution, whose love for children and friends was balanced by a rancorous hatred of those she chose for enemies that made her name a threat of affliction to the city of Naples for many years. Her death was not mourned. Though a daughter of Maria Theresa, though a queen, though in misfortune, the Emperor neither attended her obsequies nor assumed mourning. "The Queen of Naples is little missed," wrote Talleyrand; "her death

appears to have relieved Metternich.”¹ None took notice of the event, and a few weeks after her death Ferdinand married anew. But when the news reached the Royal Palace of Naples in the midst of a State ball, Joachim immediately withdrew and ordered the evening’s entertainment to be concluded.

Joachim had serious cause to regret the death of Mary Caroline. For the fact that to dispossess the French occupant of the throne of Naples meant the restoration of Ferdinand and his queen was a serious embarrassment to those statesmen who, founding their political aims on the plausible basis of *legitimacy* and pre-established rights, derived from these theories the conclusion that Joachim must be removed from the throne of Naples. But the Bourbon restoration of 1799 was not forgotten; the stains of blood were not yet effaced. The Czar Alexander announced in unequivocal terms that he was opposed to the restoration of the “butcher king” to the throne of Naples; and the Emperor Francis and Metternich, though strongly dissatisfied with Joachim’s conduct, declared that Austria would not act in the matter. But now that Mary Caroline was dead a great obstacle to the Bourbon restoration was removed.

On the 30th of September a diplomatic conference was held, preliminary to the actual meeting of the Congress. At this conference both France and Spain were represented, as well as the four great Allies, and the question of Naples, the only unrecovered Bourbon possession, was immediately raised by them. Labrador, representing Spain, declared himself strongly against the retention by Joachim of the throne of Naples, and Talleyrand, with sublime disregard for the past, stated

¹ Talleyrand, *Corr. inéd.* 4.

his opinion that no guarantee of his throne should ever have been given to Joachim, and that in no event could France treat such a guarantee as binding.

This pronouncement of the restored Bourbon monarchs in favour of the youngest branch of their House was the more threatening because closely accompanied by steps that portended military action. Colonel Hyde de Neuville, a staunch Bourbonist proscribed under the Empire, was sent to Turin on a secret mission by the French Court. He arrived there early in November ; his object was to secure the co-operation of Sardinia with France, Spain, and Sicily in an expedition having the dethronement of Joachim for its object. The Sardinian Government appears to have referred the matter for the advice of Metternich, who declared that he would not permit French troops to operate in those parts of central Italy occupied by Austria. Metternich thereupon formally notified the French and Neapolitan Governments that no military movements on either part would be permitted, and with this Hyde de Neuville's mission came to an end.

The hopes of the Sicilian Court, foiled in this first attempt, now turned on England, whose hostility to Joachim was only too evident. Fagan, the British Consul, attempting to encroach on the diplomatic field, had entered into a correspondence with Gallo in the course of which he expressed "his desire to consolidate the good understanding existing between the British Government and that of his Neapolitan Majesty" ; whereupon à Court at once recalled him to Palermo, leaving a subordinate official in charge of the consular office at Naples. Even more hostile and far more influential than à Court was Wellington. He proposed to Castlereagh in September that Great

Britain should proceed against Joachim by force of arms, but that statesman, in view of the relations of Great Britain with Austria, was hardly prepared to go to such lengths. His position was fairly stated when he declared to Campochiaro, the Neapolitan envoy at Vienna, that as Joachim had not fulfilled his obligations to the Allies the question of Naples must be considered open for the deliberation of the Congress. To Talleyrand Castlereagh promised his general support, though not without some reservation as to the attitude of Parliament. He probably hoped, as did Wellington, that with such a concentration of diplomatic talent as there was in Vienna some method of separating Joachim from the throne of Naples would be discovered.

On the 1st of November the Congress formally opened, one of its earliest decisions being that the representatives of the King of Naples should not be admitted to the deliberations. Talleyrand followed this up by claiming once more that the question of Naples should be discussed. Metternich wished on the contrary to postpone it, and was in a measure successful, for the Congress decided to turn its attention to the territorial readjustment of northern Europe before approaching the affairs of Italy.

Joachim was represented at Vienna by Campochiaro and Cariati, together with certain unofficial personages, such as Roccaromana and Filangieri. The exclusion of his accredited representatives from the Congress, and the cool and even hostile reception they met with in every quarter greatly alarmed him. The King became very excited, made parade to the Austrian Minister of his large military resources, and threatened to invade the Papal States, until Mier had to declare that any movement of the Neapolitan troops towards the

interior of Italy would be viewed by Austria as a *casus belli*. To moderate the irritation of the King, however, Metternich instructed Mier to explain that the position of Campochiaro was no different from that of other delegates, such as those of Sardinia or Bavaria, while Filangieri was intrusted with an autograph letter from the Emperor to the King. On receipt of this letter Joachim at once saw Mier, and protested to him his fidelity to the Austrian alliance. At the same time Metternich insisted on the self-evident truth that on Austrian support alone could Joachim rely, that all Europe was against him, and that the slightest imprudence on his part might be fatal.

“The existence of the King,” wrote Metternich to Mier, “excites opposition in all Europe ; if we abandon him, he will fall. . . . Any efforts we might make to persuade the Bourbon Courts to recognise the King would be in vain ; but strong in our support, in direct relations with our other allies, the King of Naples may hope for the best if he is wise enough to conduct himself calmly and prudently ; but one imprudent act may lose all. . . .”¹

For Joachim to gain the goodwill of Great Britain and the Bourbon Courts appeared impossible, though even that was not left unattempted. A secret agent, Saint Elie, made fruitless overtures in Paris. From Naples Gallo forwarded to Lord Liverpool an autograph letter from Joachim to the Prince Regent, making an appeal for recognition, while at Vienna Campochiaro and Cariati presented a formal note to Castlereagh. In this, after referring to the formal concurrence of Great Britain in the Austrian policy, and to the treaty between Austria and Naples, the British Cabinet was invited to enter into a treaty of peace. The

¹ Metternich to Mier, Nov. 29, 1814 ; Helfert, *Murat*, 167.

move was ineffective. Joachim's letter remained unanswered; yet Castlereagh, notwithstanding Talleyrand's pressing invitation that Great Britain should recognise Ferdinand, clung fast to his policy of not breaking with Austria on the Neapolitan question. This was now the more essential as the Congress had revealed wide divergencies of views between the Powers. The partition of Saxony and Poland and other minor points had led to estrangement, and Great Britain, Austria, and France, on the 3rd of January 1815, secretly signed a treaty of alliance covering the eventuality of a war in which those three Powers should find themselves face to face with Prussia and Russia.

The conflict of interest between the Powers became more and more acute and appeared to give Joachim some chance of profit. When the Congress towards the end of December began to settle north Italian questions, Gallo protested to Mier that, according to the terms of the treaty of Prague, Austria, and Austria alone, was entitled to interfere in Italian affairs. To have Austria alone adjudicate on Italian matters would have been convenient for the King of Naples, as the Congress was now approaching the question of the Papal territory.

Rome and Naples were not on good terms, nor was the military occupation of the Marches the only grievance of the Papal Court. The Neapolitan agent at Rome, Cavaliere Zuccari, was a Carbonaro and in close touch with the liberal element in the city. Between him and the Government trouble was constantly arising. While Pius, through his representative at Vienna, Cardinal Consalvi, exerted his influence against Joachim, the clergy of the Marches circulated petitions against the Neapolitan Government intended to strengthen the

Papal case at the Congress. Metternich was disposed to abandon Bologna and the Legations to the Pope, and he thought that Joachim's best policy would be to admit the Papal claim to the Marches. This course was suggested to the King by Mier and by Campochiaro, but did not commend itself. There was indeed an attempt at negotiating with Rome, but neither party was really prepared to concede what the other required and there was no result. Joachim thought he could not give up his position in the Marches unless in return he secured complete recognition from the Pope. To let the Papal State extend to the Adriatic was not only to deprive him of a possession he thought himself entitled to by treaty, it was also to consent to being shut off from all access to the north, to accept being hemmed in to the extremity of Italy, with the Papacy to the north, Bourbonism to the south, and the fleets of Great Britain to the east and west.

The Pope, though at heart unfriendly, was prepared, on terms, to adopt a neutral attitude towards Naples; but the Bourbon States were openly and uncompromisingly hostile. By the first article of the treaty of the 30th of May 1814, the new French Government had entered into relations of peace and amity with the Emperor of Austria "and his allies." Metternich, anxious to arrange the Italian question on the basis of Joachim's recognition, and so to strengthen his position against an attack then threatening on the part of Russia and Prussia, now urged Talleyrand to agree to the due execution of this article of the treaty. But the latter evaded all engagements and took refuge in the plea that at the time of the signature of the treaty the French Government had no official knowledge of

the alliance between Austria and Naples. Urged by Campochiaro and Cariati, Metternich thereupon officially brought to the notice of the French plenipotentiary the treaty of the 11th of January 1814, but failed to get anything more definite from him than that he was prepared to allow the state of peace then existing to continue.

Notwithstanding the continued ill-success of his diplomacy, Joachim, following Metternich's advice, had well-nigh resolved to withdraw from the Marches, with the exception of the fortress of Ancona which he intended to retain until the close of the Congress, when the French Court sent Jules de Polignac to Rome on a mission hostile to the King. This move showed such an unswerving current of hostility, the tendency of events was so persistently contrary to his interests, that finally Joachim, yielding to an impulse not unnatural in an impetuous soldier, determined to arrive at some end by directly challenging the French Government.

The moment appeared opportune, for the tension between the two northern Powers and Austria had reached an acute stage. In a great European war the Neapolitan army might be accounted a useful factor, and already Russia gave indications of contemplating overtures to Joachim, while the Prussian Minister, Hardenberg, showed signs of a more favourable disposition to the Neapolitan envoys. A crisis appeared to be rapidly approaching, and in this Joachim probably hoped to find the circumstances that should force his recognition from the Powers. Of the three governments arrayed against Prussia and Russia, Austria was friendly, France hostile, and Great Britain might reasonably be expected to follow the lead of the other

two. At all events, neither Lord Castlereagh nor Lord Liverpool had committed themselves further than by declaring that the question of Naples was one for discussion. Metternich resolutely maintained his position under the treaty of the 11th of January 1814; "Lord Castlereagh every time [the question of Naples] was presented to him seemed to be walking on hot coals; he would not declare for or against. . . ."¹

Under these circumstances to place a pistol at the head of France appeared to Joachim the most satisfactory course to pursue. Campochiaro received instructions on the 24th of February to deliver a note to Talleyrand categorically asking for the immediate recognition of Joachim by France. Unfortunately for him this note reached the envoy of the King of Naples at a most inopportune moment. A new turn in the wheel of diplomacy had just taken place and the Saxon question, over which the Powers had so nearly plunged into war, had been settled to the satisfaction of every country, save Saxony. Campochiaro saw the danger, but could not altogether disregard his instructions. He decided, therefore, to address his note, not to Talleyrand, but to Metternich. This course appeared milder to him, but resulted in a disastrous check, as Metternich answered it immediately by a note in which he declared that Austria would tolerate no military movements in Italy, and this he backed up by threatening to concentrate 150,000 men and 200 guns on the Po. The Austrian Minister addressed a similar note, though not worded in the same menacing form, to Talleyrand, which was at once accepted.

The news of this diplomatic defeat was at once dispatched to Naples by Campochiaro; it reached Joachim

¹ Gentz, *Memorandum*; Metternich, *Mems.* ii. 583.

on the 7th of March. But at that date a new and startling political development had revolutionized European politics, to understand which it will be necessary to consider the position occupied in relation to these events by the dethroned Emperor of the French.

By the treaty of Fontainebleau Napoleon had secured for himself the island of Elba alone out of all his vast dominions. Of this little island off the coast of Tuscany the Powers agreed to recognise him as the independent sovereign. There he retained a few hundred of his old soldiers and a semblance of sovereignty. But no sooner had this last treaty of all been signed with their mighty enemy than the Powers quickly repented having left him so much as that small Mediterranean island. The frame in which Napoleon was now placed was so evidently undersized that it was universally feared it could not long hold him. Nor were the perfectly moderate, reasonable, and not onerous conditions of the treaty carried out in their fulness; and in this and other ways the Emperor was needlessly irritated. By the time the sovereigns and diplomats of Europe had assembled at Vienna the question of Elba had become nearly as burning a one as that of France had been before the fall of the Empire. On the 2nd of November the King of Sardinia wrote to his Ambassador at Vienna: "We are entirely of Prince Metternich's opinion on the necessity of getting rid (*eloigner*) of Napoleon. . . . Italy will never be completely at rest as long as that man remains so near it."¹ Even earlier than this Talleyrand had been able to report to Louis XVIII. that a general disposition existed to remove Napoleon from Elba. "No one has yet

¹ Victor Emmanuel to St. Marsan, Nov. 2, 1814; Bianchi, i. 388.

any precise idea as to where to put him," he wrote. "I have suggested one of the Azores."¹

As the sittings of the Congress continued, this feeling became more marked; yet it cannot be said that Napoleon's conduct excused it, for he gave no sign, merely observing with keen eye that political horizon the danger signals of which he was so skilled in interpreting. With the continent of Italy, and with Naples in particular, he entertained but little correspondence. Pauline Bonaparte Princess Borghese, unswervingly staunch to her brother in his adversity, had visited him at Elba and thence passed to Naples, where she occupied a villa on the Vomero. While at Elba she received communications for Napoleon from Joachim, in which the King professed vague sentiments of devotion to the Emperor. She doubtless carried with her to Naples some verbal or other message from the Emperor to his sister Caroline, and perhaps a letter of some sort from Napoleon to Joachim.² A little later the Countess Walewska, a great favourite of Napoleon's, with her child, afterwards Minister of Foreign Affairs to Napoleon III., visited Elba and thence proceeded to Naples, this being the possible and sure vehicle of any message that the Emperor might have wished to send. Even more direct communications between Elba and Naples passed. For Elba possessed a number of small vessels flying the flag of its sovereign,³ and these were not infrequently seen along the Neapolitan coasts; while direct evidence exists that dispatches were sent from Elba to Naples on Neapolitan vessels. Yet on the whole it does not appear probable that Napoleon concerted any political

¹ *Corr. inéd.* 43.

² Pacca to Consalvi, Dec. 3, 1814; Consalvi, *Corr.* 175.

³ White and red stripe with three golden bees.

scheme with Joachim during his sojourn at Elba, or entered into direct communication with him until just as he was making ready to leave the island.¹

It would not perhaps be unfair to see Napoleon's feelings towards Joachim reflected in the conduct of his mother. For when Madame Mère went to take up her abode at Rome, Joachim sent her a present of eight carriage horses, which Letizia Bonaparte at once returned to the donor. Yet Napoleon's feelings towards the King of Naples were certainly tempered by political considerations, and it was evident to most observers that the attitude adopted by the Powers towards Joachim was one that could not fail to make him regret the past, regret the fall of the Empire, regret that he had no longer the powerful arm of Napoleon to lean upon.

While Napoleon thus sombrely watched from Elba Europe rapidly drifting towards new wars and France rapidly drifting to an anti-Bourbon revolution, at Naples the appearance of gaiety and festivity was bravely maintained. Had a stranger guiltless of political knowledge harboured in the city he would have thought that a Court more happy, more light-hearted, more devoted to pleasure and to festivity had never been. Naples was full of visitors, among whom the English showed conspicuously. The pacification of the Continent after the long cycle of wars had resulted in a general exodus of the long-pent-up British aristocracy. Among those soon conspicuous at Naples, and received with evident favour at Court, were the Duke of

¹ Napoleon's own statements in his correspondence and the *Mémorial* are here preferred to Pepe's vague assertion and to Méneval's remarks, which, apparently, refer to Colonna's mission. In any case Méneval was actually at Vienna, and his information must be judged by the light of that fact.—Méneval, iii. 409; Pepe, *Mems.* ii. *passim*; Helfert, *Murat*, 34.

Bedford, Lord Holland, Lord Oxford, Lord Sligo, Lord Llandaff, and General Matthews, all members of the Whig Opposition. The Englishmen viewed Joachim from the strict standpoint of party politics, and their admiration of him grew in proportion as the Tory Cabinet discovered its hostility. The King, on his side, unversed in the nature of parliamentary opinions, did not stop to consider the strength of Lord Liverpool's position, nor the evil that might result from associating with an impotent Opposition, and showered favours on his English admirers. Worst of all, the Princess of Wales, wife of the Prince Regent, also arrived at Naples during the winter and showed an extreme of admiration for the King that may have been perfectly genuine, but was certainly neither decorous nor advantageous to either party.¹

What a positive disadvantage his friendship with the British Opposition was to Joachim may be judged from the following incident. In December Lord Oxford was returning to England. Joachim intrusted him with dispatches for his secret agent at Paris, St. Elie. By some means or other the French police got wind of this, and on the road to Paris, Oxford was arrested and all his papers were seized. Castlereagh, so far from showing indignation at this violent proceeding against an English traveller, expressed himself to Talleyrand as charmed at what had happened.

Had there been no Elba and no Napoleon, it is not difficult to forecast what the result of all the diplomatic and political manœuvring of the winter of 1814-1815

¹ “. . . Her conduct is ridiculous, extraordinary, and unbecoming. . . . She has conceived a fine passion for the King, and makes no pretence of concealment.”
—Mier to Metternich, March 5, 1815; Helfert, *Murat*, 30.

would have eventually meant for Joachim ; but at the very moment when Campochiaro was delivering his note to Metternich, six small vessels flying the red and white flag with the golden bees were speeding across the waters of the Gulf of Genoa from Elba to France, and the face of Europe was once more changed. When the news reached Vienna, it was at first not realized that Napoleon was bound for France. His men and Campbell, the British Commissioner, both thought their destination was southern Italy ; but the Emperor had no such intention ; he was, as usual, aiming his blow at the vital point.

Immediately before Napoleon's departure from Elba some communication passed between him and Joachim, though probably it did not enlighten the King as to the Emperor's exact project. It was on the 4th of March that Joachim first got news of Napoleon's departure from Elba ; it produced complete confusion in the King's councils. It was not clear for one thing how the enterprise embarked on by Napoleon would terminate. Besides this the dissension between the Allies, together with the King's diplomatic step for obtaining recognition from France, held out hope of good news arriving from Vienna. Joachim therefore kept the information from Elba quiet as long as possible, and, when the news finally transpired, sent for Mier. Not without some excitement, the King informed him that he held firmly by his engagements with Austria and that he had instructed Campochiaro in the same sense. Towards Great Britain the same course was pursued. After a Cabinet meeting held on the 6th of March, Gallo sent for the British consular agent, Walker, and declared to him the King's "firm and most decided resolution to cultivate

and preserve the friendship of Great Britain.”¹ At the same time assurances of the same general character were transmitted to Prince Castelcicala to give to the British Cabinet.

On the 6th of March the official *Monitore* published an article commenting on a recent number of the London *Morning Chronicle*, in which Joachim's conduct during the campaign of 1814 was severely criticized. The Neapolitan journal put forward the following explanation of Joachim's conduct. Napoleon had been willing to give Joachim supreme command of the army in Italy, had, in fact, drawn up the necessary decree; to this the King had only been prepared to accede as a preliminary to a general pacification. That condition was not met and the negotiations came to nothing.

On the following day, the 7th of March, the attitude of the King of Naples completely changed. On that day he received from Campochiaro the news of the ill-success of his last move at Vienna, and the ominous information that Austria was preparing to concentrate 150,000 men and 200 guns on the Po.

From this moment the King's protestations of fidelity to the Austrian treaty became weaker. About him there was a party, in which the Duke di Gallo was perhaps most influential, strong in its support of Napoleon. That party now rapidly regained its ascendant. On the 12th of March Joachim spoke of the Bourbons publicly before the Court circle and declared: "I am their enemy, as they are mine." Considerable movements of troops towards the frontier were taking place, arising doubtless from the course which the Neapolitan Government had decided to adopt towards France; Mier asked for explanations as to these

¹ Walker to Castlereagh, March 7, 1815, *Brit. State Papers, 1814-1815*, ii. 281.

movements. The King assured him that he was faithful to the Austrian alliance, but showed his sympathies without disguise by declaring that the news from Napoleon was good, and that the chances of his success were excellent. To Mier's demands Gallo formally replied on the 14th, but in purely evasive terms. On the following day information of Napoleon's triumphant entry into Grenoble reached Naples, and on the 15th Gallo had an interview with Mier. He complained of the coolness of Austria to Naples, declared it was evident that it was intended to sacrifice the King's interests, and complained of the way in which Campochiaro's note had been received.

No diplomat could mistake what these declarations portended. Joachim had given way to a strong reaction of sentiment and had now practically decided on his course. The events of the spring of 1814, the precarious recompense, the bitter sorrow they had brought had profoundly affected him. Before the Emperor left Elba Joachim was preparing to fight for his throne; now that the tricolour was once more the national flag of France, he believed that his opportunity had come for ridding himself of the burden of shame he had borne for twelve long months, and for striking a far more effective blow for his own interests than appeared possible but a few days before. Not only this, but the vision of Italian independence was once more evoked, and the national movement of France against the Bourbons suggested the possibility of a similar Italian movement against the Austrians and the restored governments. This time Joachim was not in a hesitating mood; he was determined never again to be led into the vacilla-

tion and half measures which he had been drawn into the preceding year. Before Napoleon had reached Paris, Joachim left Naples to join his army. The *Monitore*, however, merely announced that the King had left for the Abruzzi on a tour of inspection, and might be absent several weeks.

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CHAPTER XII

MURAT'S LAST CAMPAIGN

Joachim prepares for war—The army—Hostilities begin—Diplomatic relations broken—Council held—Joachim's plans—His effective strength—Movement in two columns—Advance from Ancona—Bologna occupied—Proclamation of Rimini—Italian national convention—Public apathy—Fight on the Panaro—Attack on Occhiobello—March of the Guard—Austrian movements—Carascosa at Modena—Carpi—Bianchi at Modena—Joachim retreats—Council of war—Guard in Tuscany—Retreat—Frimont at Bologna—Council of war—Bianchi at Florence—Joachim on the Ronco—Demoralization of Neapolitans—Bianchi's march—Carascosa faces Neipperg—Fight at Monte Milone—Battle of Tolentino—Defeat and retreat—Belliard joins Joachim—Policy of Great Britain—Bentinck warns Joachim—Castlereagh's letters produced to Parliament—Dissatisfaction at Naples—The clergy—National party—Constitution—Bourbon restoration decided—Caroline's measures—Joachim arrives at Naples—Caroline negotiates with Campbell—Her courage—Convention of Casa Lanza—Scenes of last days—Escape of Joachim—Caroline goes on board the *Tremendous*—Prince Leopold enters Naples.

ALTHOUGH Joachim was now resolved to trust his fortunes to the ordeal of the sword, he was not willing to declare himself prematurely. On leaving Naples to join his army he sent the Count de Bauffremont to Napoleon to inform him that he might rely on his assistance, but it was not till the end of March that

he heard of the Emperor's triumphant entry into the capital on the 20th and that Napoleon wrote to the King announcing his success and assuring him of his support. Yet as early as the 12th of March, Maghella, who had returned from Paris a few months before, was placed in charge of the police department, and on the 17th Manhès was appointed military governor of the city of Naples. Both these appointments suggested that the Government had serious work on hand. Mier's endeavours to maintain the alliance, perhaps supported by the influence of Caroline, were powerless against the influence of the Bonaparte party, headed by the Princess Borghese and the ex-King of Westphalia.

The numbers of the Neapolitan army had risen from 70,000 in July 1814 to 85,000 at the end of that year, and at that figure had remained about stationary. Recruiting had been especially active on the frontier, where the generals received orders not to give up Austrian deserters and to secure as many soldiers as possible from that source and from the disbanded army of the ex-kingdom of Italy. In the Marches, provincial legions had been organized. Maghella was sent on a secret mission to stir up sentiments favourable to Joachim at Ancona, and favours, titles, and decorations were showered on all whose influence could be secured for the Government.

As early as January Neapolitan troops were being concentrated on the Roman border, and when in March a sudden crisis arose, the Neapolitan army was already in position and as fit for war as was possible under the circumstances. On the 13th of March Joachim secretly issued orders for mobilization and by the end of the month he knew that Napoleon was in full possession of the government of France. Joachim now dropped

the mask, and without waiting to hear whether the Emperor intended war or peace, whether his co-operation would be more useful at any other time or in any other manner, he straightway ordered his columns across the frontier.

The warlike steps of the King of Naples were explained according to the formulas of diplomacy by Campochiaro to Metternich. He stated, as is usual in such passes, that Naples was still as anxious as formerly to maintain peace and to carry out all her engagements. But the Austrian note announcing the concentration of 150,000 men on the Po was of so threatening a nature, and so contrary to Austria's engagements, that the King in order to protect his interests felt bound to reoccupy those positions south of the Po which he had held the year before. The answer of Metternich to this barely veiled declaration of war was immediate and categorical. He addressed a note to the Neapolitan Minister, in which he shortly covered the diplomatic ground and finished by stating that the crossing of the frontier by King Joachim's troops was an act of hostility, in consequence of which he inclosed the passports of the Neapolitan plenipotentiaries. At the same time Count Mier received a note from the Queen announcing that hostilities had begun and that his passports would be sent. This was on the 3rd of April.

Viewed narrowly there was little apparent cause for a war between Naples and Austria. To many it came as a surprise, and it did not respond to any real demand of public opinion. Shortly before the King left Naples for the army he held a council. He declared to his assembled Neapolitan and French councillors that he could place 80,000 men in the field besides twelve legions of provincial militia, and that Italy both north

and south of the Po was ready to rise for independence. But his arguments in favour of war met with little response. His French advisers urged delay so as not to embarrass the policy of France, the Neapolitans were anxious not to put their fortunes to such a risk as that necessarily entailed by a war with Austria.

On leaving the council, Joachim met General Manhès, and so excited was he that, without stopping to take a hat, he took the general with him and drove in his carriage along the sea towards Posilipo in heated conversation. The King's chief idea in hastening on hostilities was not altogether unsound. If he stood any chance whatever of arousing northern Italy and defeating Austria, it was only by some such means as he appears to have contemplated. A sudden irruption into Lombardy, attended by some military success before Austrian reinforcements could appear, might lead to a rising in Milan and place him in a position to balance between France and Austria and so proceed to a favourable settlement. The Austrians had enrolled many officers and men from the old Italian army, and these elements might prove unreliable; besides this, Milan had been the scene of much active intriguing since the Austrian occupation, notwithstanding the politic and tactful methods of the military governor, General Sommariva. Secret societies such as the Carbonari and the Spilla Nera had been very active in keeping up nationalistic and anti-German sentiment. The latter society was largely made up of old Napoleonic officers, and had attempted to open communications with the Emperor while at Elba. Joachim's political plans turned on these and similar considerations, and so did his military projects. Above all things, he was firmly resolved that hesitation should not mark his conduct; he was determined to

show as much celerity of movement in 1814 as he had dilatoriness in 1815.

The Austrian strength in Italy was about 60,000 men in the Quadrilateral and some 34,000 more distributed between Lombardy, Tuscany, and Romagna. Joachim might therefore hope by prompt action to overpower any force opposed to him in the last-named province. His plan was to effect this and then to possess himself of the passages across the Po at Occhiobello, near Ferrara, and at Borgoforte. His flank thus secured, he could continue his march on Piacenza, straight in the direction of Milan, straight in the direction of France. The plan was intelligible, but bold, and it appears probable that it was undertaken by too small a force in presence of too large a one. For notwithstanding his heavy muster-rolls and imposing statements, it was not a very large army that Joachim was able to place actually in the field; its effective strength was about 35,000 men, 5000 horse, and 60 guns. Of these the guards (some 4000 or 5000 in number) were picked men, largely foreign, and good troops; their generals, however, Pignatelli-Strongoli and Livron, were incapable. The four divisions of the line were under Carascosa, D' Ambrosio, Lecchi, and Rossetti. Millet de Villeneuve was chief of staff; Pedrinelli commanded the artillery, Colletta the engineers. The army was short of light infantry and of heavy cavalry, while the artillery officers were ill trained.

The King's first intention had been to concentrate the whole of this force at Ancona and thence lead it in one body straight into Romagna,¹ but political considera-

¹ Orders were issued from Solmona on the 18th of March for the Royal Guard to march on Ancona.—*Arch. di Stato, Guerra*, xxv. 1059.

tions, so often the soldier's bane, dictated a change at the last moment. If the Neapolitan army was concentrated wholly to the east of the Apennines, the Austrians would be able to gather force on the west coast from the Papal and Tuscan governments and to threaten not only the King's flank but perhaps even Naples itself. If, on the other hand, a portion of the Neapolitan troops marched to the Po through the Papal States and Tuscany, a certain amount of strength that Austria might gain would be diverted to Naples instead. For this reason Joachim decided to make a detached command of the Royal Guard, and to move it to the valley of the Po through Rome and Florence.

Under Pignatelli-Strongoli and Livron this column, about 7000 strong, marched into Papal territory; the generals' orders were to observe a friendly attitude to the inhabitants, to leave Rome at their left hand, and, marching through Foligno and Arezzo, to reach Florence on the 3rd of April. Joachim announced the approach of his troops to the Grand Duke in a letter, assuring him, somewhat paradoxically, that his territory would be respected.

While Pignatelli-Strongoli marched through Papal territory, Joachim with the rest of the army advanced from Ancona northwards. On the 28th of March he published a decree annexing Urbino, Pesaro, and Gubbio. On the 29th six Neapolitan gunboats were ordered to sail up the coast from Ancona to Rimini, a frigate following them; they were intended to operate in conjunction with the army as it advanced up the coast.

South of Bologna the Austrians had but few troops, merely outposts; they withdrew before Joachim's rapid advance, and the only shots exchanged were in a slight

skirmish at Cesena. After this affair Joachim had a number of his officers to dine with him, and, probably to animate them with a breath of his own ardent spirit, talked, much to the surprise of his hearers, of the valour and excellence of the army and of the conquests that lay before them. On the 2nd of April Joachim reached Bologna, which the Austrians abandoned at his approach. So rapidly had the Neapolitan columns been hurried along the Emilian road that Lecchi's division alone had 600 laggards. The King's reception from the Bolognese was not so warm as it had been the year before, yet a number of women could not resist the desire of waving a handkerchief at the striking figure of the first horseman of Europe, and caused him to turn smilingly back to his staff with the remark: "Well, you see, the ladies are all for us!"¹

The Neapolitan army had been preceded by a number of emissaries whose business it was to stir up nationalist movements. At Rimini, on the 30th of March, a proclamation was issued in which the Italians were informed, with all due emphasis and not for the first time, that Providence destined them for independence, that the hour in which this high fortune was to be accomplished had at last arrived, and that the King of Naples with 80,000 men was marching for the liberation of the Peninsula.² But this proclamation produced no perceptible effect; nor did another issued by Joachim from Bologna a little later convoking an Italian national convention to assemble at Rome on the 8th of May. Nowhere was there any semblance of a movement; the energy of Italy had been expended in

¹ Pepe, *Mems.* ii. 44.

² This proclamation is attributed to Pellegrino Rossi (afterwards the ill-fated Prime Minister of Pius IX.) by Sig. Lemmi, though on somewhat inconclusive grounds.—*Arch. Stor. Napoli*, xxvi. 192.

the wars of Napoleon ; her faith had been shattered by the selfish ambitions of the princes who had so frequently invoked the vision of a nationalism that was always the more magniloquently proclaimed as it more nearly coincided with their own immediate interests. Joachim's efforts were fruitless ; Italy was not ripe for revolution but yearning for repose, and even from among the old soldiers of Napoleon, who were not a few among the population, he only succeeded in raising a corps of some 400 men under Colonel Negri.

At Bologna the King of Naples scarcely paused in his headlong march ; he dispatched thence several columns in various directions to carry out the next part of his plan of operations. D' Ambrosio with his division was detached to Ferrara. He was to occupy that town, capture the citadel, and secure the passages of the Po just beyond at Lagoscuro and Occhiobello. Joachim himself with Carascosa's division pushed straight along the great Emilian road towards Modena.

The Austrian commander Bianchi, who had so far felt obliged to retire before the superior forces in front of him, now thought himself in sufficient strength to make a stand. To protect Modena he took up a position where the Emilian road crosses the Panaro. He appears to have expected to defend this position successfully, for he neglected the obvious military precaution of destroying the long bridge of Sant' Ambrogio on which the road is carried across the river. Bianchi had some 5000 men and 9 guns. On the 4th of April the King of Naples attacked the Austrians ; he had with him Carascosa's division, one regiment of cavalry, and two batteries, in all more than 7000 men. The Neapolitans deployed along the river banks, above and

below the bridge. In several places they managed to wade across the channels and wide sandy bed of the river ; at one spot a whole battalion reached the further side, but, unwilling to face the Austrian fire, took refuge under the bank and eventually surrendered. Close to the bridge no progress was made, the Austrian field-pieces sending their fire straight down the long causeway to where Joachim and his staff watched the undecided firing proceeding. Then an act of fine military courage turned the fortunes of the day. Joachim called on General Filangieri to carry the bridge. That brave officer immediately placed himself at the head of a small squadron of lancers, and, followed by twenty or thirty of the bravest of them, galloped the whole length of the bridge, successfully driving the Austrians from their position at the further end. Filangieri fell covered with wounds, but his bold dash was promptly supported by the King, the Neapolitan infantry soon made good a lodgment on the further bank of the Panaro, and Bianchi, seeing his centre thus pierced, retreated in good order on Modena. The Austrians had lost 69 killed, 316 wounded, and 66 missing ; the Neapolitans 26 killed, 95 wounded, and 542 missing.

Carascosa pressed on after the retiring Austrians and occupied Modena, whence he threw outposts in the direction of Reggio and of Borgoforte. Joachim did not continue with this division, however, but turned back, for he was not in sufficient strength to push beyond Modena for the present. Until his right flank and rear had been secured by D' Ambrosio's operations near Ferrara he could not safely advance further towards Piacenza.

D' Ambrosio had marched through Ferrara, where the small Austrian garrison took refuge in the citadel,

to Occhiobello, where he found a strongly fortified bridge-head sufficiently garrisoned, and was brought to a standstill. Joachim hurried back from his successful engagement on the Panaro to the help of D' Ambrosio. The King arrived at Ferrara on the 6th, but found the citadel too strong for a *coup-de-main*. The next day with D' Aquino's brigade he captured the Austrian positions at the bridge of Lagoscuro and marched thence to Occhiobello, where he effected his junction with D' Ambrosio on the night of the 7th. On the 8th the King directed a strong attack on the Austrian fortifications, now defended by nearly 3000 men. That attack, like all those previously made by D' Ambrosio, failed, and with it failed the whole plan of campaign. Six days did the Neapolitans remain in front of the bridge-head at Occhiobello in the hope of driving out the Austrians, but the attack of the 8th of April when Joachim in person led them proved to be the turning-point. Each day after that the Neapolitan attack became more feeble and the Austrian defenders received reinforcements from the north.

It was perhaps in the operations at Occhiobello that the absence of the Royal Guard from the main army was most felt, for had the heads of column been a little more resolute the positions would probably have been carried. Pignatelli-Strongoli and Livron had not equalled the King in the celerity of their march. Instead of arriving at Florence on the 3rd of April, which should have enabled them to get into touch with Carascosa at Modena on the 6th, they did not reach the capital of Tuscany till the 8th. Although now five days late, they lost even more time, for they remained inactive at Florence for three days with 5400 infantry, 1900 cavalry, and 16 guns, a force more valuable

than the whole of the rest of the Neapolitan army. But the 8th, the day on which Pignatelli-Strongoli reached Florence, and the day on which he ought to have effected his junction with Carascosa at Modena, was precisely the day on which Joachim failed to carry the bridge-head of Occhiobello. Had his Guard been one week earlier in the field and resolutely led, he might still have retained the offensive ; as it was, it passed to his opponents.

The Austrians had been completely taken by surprise by Joachim's sudden irruption into Romagna. On the 25th of March Prince Schwarzenberg, who had intrusted the command in Italy to Frimont, was completely in the dark as to the King of Naples' intentions. So rapidly did Joachim rush his army forward from Ancona, that the action on the Panaro was fought before Metternich had handed their passports to Campochiaro and Cariati. One day later, at the same time as diplomatic relations were broken off, Schwarzenberg wrote to Frimont instructing him that the King of Naples was marching north in two columns, that his plan might be to strike into Lombardy between Piacenza and Alessandria, that it was necessary to dispose of the Neapolitans before thinking of operations against France, and that he should therefore assume a strong offensive and endeavour to bring the King to a decisive engagement as near to the Po as possible.

These instructions the Austrian commander rapidly carried out. Reinforcements were promptly sent from the Quadrilateral and Lombardy to Borgoforte and Occhiobello. The latter position was saved as we have seen. At the same time Austrian reinforcements were steadily crossing the bridge of boats at Borgoforte, and the day after Joachim failed at Occhiobello

Bianchi was ready to assume the offensive towards Modena.

Joachim still hoped that Pignatelli-Strongoli would effect his junction with the main army somewhere in Romagna. Carascosa had received orders to send out reconnaissances along the road to Pistoja, where Nugent with a small Austrian detachment was attempting to arrest the passage of the Neapolitan Guard. In other directions, too, Carascosa had detachments, and at Carpi, eight miles on the road to Borgoforte, he had stationed Pepe's brigade. Further than this the Neapolitans had not ventured, and at this point they had been in close touch with the enemy ever since the action on the Panaro, for Bianchi had retired no further than was necessary.

At Carpi the Neapolitans and Austrians remained in touch from the 6th to the 10th of April. Joachim hoped that Bianchi would be able to attempt nothing until he had brought the operations at Ferrara to a successful issue and joined Carascosa with D'Ambrosio's division, which, with the advent of Pignatelli-Strongoli and the Guards, would have concentrated a considerable army and enabled the Neapolitans to resume the offensive. These hopes were dispelled by Bianchi, who advanced on the morning of the 10th, and after some heavy skirmishing in which the Neapolitans were much outnumbered, drove Pepe from Carpi. The Neapolitan general retired with such promptitude that his killed and wounded were few, though in prisoners he lost several hundreds.

Bianchi's attack at Carpi had only been intended as a demonstration to relieve the pressure on Occhiobello, but so feeble was the Neapolitan resistance, so large the number of deserters, so patent the signs of

demoralization, that the Austrian general decided to continue his advance and pursued Pepe towards Modena. On the following day Carascosa retreated from Modena to the Panaro, where he took up a defensive position and was joined by the King. On the same day Mohr made a sortie from the bridge-head at Occhiobello, and handled D' Ambrosio so severely that he ordered his division to fall back on Bologna. Mohr cautiously followed him.

The Austrians now had several divisions in motion south of the Po; under such competent officers as Gober, Neipperg, Merville, and Mohr; Frimont hoped that with these he would be able to defeat Joachim in a battle for the possession of Bologna. But the position of Joachim's various divisions was too scattered to afford him any hope of success before concentrating his army, and Bologna was the only point at which the troops from Modena, from Cento, and from Ferrara could be brought together. To this point accordingly the Neapolitan retreat was continued, while Carascosa's division screened the movement by holding the banks of the Panaro.

On the 13th the King called a council of war at Bologna. At this the opinion of the generals coincided with his own, that the only hope of success lay in defeating the Austrians in battle. To effect this the first object was to meet them under the most favourable circumstances, and the King neither liking the positions that the neighbourhood of Bologna afforded, nor satisfied to fight a decisive battle without the Royal Guard, decided to continue his retreat.

Two lines were open for retreating from Bologna to the kingdom of Naples, the one by Ancona, the other by Florence, the one east, the other west of the Apen-

nines. Their length was approximately equal. The King chose the former because it offered more and better defensive positions, because his magazines were at Ancona, and because along that line reinforcements and supplies were being continuously pushed up from Naples. A retreat by way of Florence only offered one inducement, that it would have had the effect of uniting the Royal Guard to the army at the earliest possible moment.¹ Joachim accordingly issued orders for the baggage train of the army to be moved to Ancona, took what measures he could to retard the Austrians in their advance towards Bologna, and sent instructions to Pignatelli-Strongoli to rejoin the main army in the Marches, moving through Arezzo and S. Sepolcro. This order to retreat Pignatelli-Strongoli and Livron responded to with a promptitude and alacrity they had not hitherto shown.

The operations of the Royal Guard in Tuscany had been far from glorious. Fair discipline was observed on the march, though a great deal of desertion took place, and that mostly among the men of northern origin, veterans of the Spanish and German wars. Rome was not entered, though as a measure of precaution the Pope saw fit to abandon his capital. On the 8th of April, as we have already seen, Pignatelli-Strongoli occupied Florence. The only force in Tuscany was a small Austrian detachment with some Tuscan levies; but the impetuous Nugent was their commander. How weak he was in numbers may be clearly inferred from

¹ Colletta in his *Memoria militare*, following D' Ambrosio, whose MS. he appears to have largely copied, gives a long dissertation on what he terms Joachim's excentric retreat, somewhat superfluously dragging in Bulow and Jomini. The whole discussion, like so many of Colletta's disquisitions, is quite pointless, because between the route *via* Florence and that *via* Ancona there is practically no difference in mileage. The line of retreat chosen was obvious and necessary.

the fact that he abandoned Florence and for once felt himself compelled to fall back without firing a shot. As usual with him, however, he judged clearly of the military exigencies of the situation and what risks they demanded that he should run. He therefore took up his position at Pistoja, a few miles north-west of Florence, and there made show of awaiting the Neapolitan advance. Nugent was well placed in the lower Apennines, midway between Florence and Modena, and fully understood how important it was that Pignatelli-Strongoli and Carascosa should not effect their junction. His mere presence had a result that his military resources could not have secured, for the Neapolitan generals were so terrified of their Austrian opponent that with vastly superior numbers and better troops they failed ignominiously.

On the 11th of April the Guard marched out of Florence towards Pistoja; the movement might have had considerable results five days earlier; it was now quite useless. Pignatelli-Strongoli and Livron were both afraid of Nugent; they reconnoitred but could discern no Austrians; a fog came on, and it was reported that cavalry was in movement on their flanks; and thereupon they resolved to retreat. At the same time orders were on their way from Joachim enjoining caution, directing that the Royal Guard must be kept intact, and lastly, as already noted, commanding a retreat *via* Arezzo and S. Sepolcro. No order could have pleased the generals more. So efficiently did they carry it out that on the 16th Pignatelli-Strongoli and Livron, doubtless to the amazement of Nugent, had already reached Cortona, more than fifty miles south of Florence.

While Pignatelli-Strongoli was hurrying to Cortona,

the King's positions covering Bologna were being forced. On the 15th Bianchi surprised a Neapolitan detachment at Spilimberto and forced the passage of the Panaro at that point. Carascosa retired. A skirmish was fought on the outskirts of Bologna, but on the night of the 15th the Neapolitans abandoned the city, and on the 16th fixed their headquarters at Imola.

On the 16th the Austrians occupied Bologna, and a council of war was held to determine the course of future operations. Frimont could dispose of nearly 45,000 men to carry on the campaign against the King of Naples, and these he distributed as follows. Neipperg, with 17,000 men, was ordered to follow the King's line of retreat. Bianchi, with 14,000, was ordered to march *via* Florence, Arezzo, and Perugia, and thence to strike across at the Neapolitan line of communications in the neighbourhood of Ancona. Nugent, with some 5000, was ordered to push on towards Rome; while 8000 more were to act as a reserve. This last body did not, as it happened, take any active part in the campaign.

It is difficult to reconcile the plan of the Austrian commander with the accepted principles of strategy. It can only be defended on the grounds that the Neapolitan army was considered so demoralized as not to be capable of effective resistance, and that the urgent need of placing troops on the French frontier made a risk worth running that gave a greater probability of a decisive engagement being fought at the earliest possible moment. Otherwise the splitting up of the Austrian army into two nearly equal wings, with a range of mountains between them, was offering the Neapolitans the best possible chance of concentrating against each wing in turn, and thus gaining an immense advantage

of numbers. It was true enough that the Neapolitan rank and file was greatly demoralized, but, as was subsequently proved, Frimont greatly underrated the fighting quality of the Royal Guard as well as the considerable personal factor represented by King Joachim.

The part that Neipperg's corps was intended to play was not to engage the Neapolitans, but by his demonstrations to delude them into the belief that the whole Austrian army was on their immediate line of retreat. His advance was to be slow so as not to press them, and thus to gain time for Bianchi to march around their flank towards Ancona. This plan nearly succeeded. Bianchi, leaving Bologna on the 17th, got to Florence in three days, and in three more to Arezzo; that is a march of 115 miles in six days,—a wonderful feat. At the same time Neipperg was advancing in far more leisurely fashion along the Emilian road. Joachim's headquarters had remained at Imola on the 17th, and on the three following days had been in turn transferred to Faenza, Forli, and Cesena. At the last-named city Joachim received the first intimation that might lead him to suspect that his line of retreat was threatened. A message reached him from Pignatelli-Strongoli, which he refused to believe, that an Austrian column was operating west of the Apennines.¹

So far Neipperg had made no show of energy in following up the retreating army, and this probably encouraged the King to reconnoitre a fine defensive position just north of Cesena, along the banks of the river Ronco, where he might await the arrival of the Royal Guard and the attack of the Austrians. Intrench-

¹ Pignatelli-Strongoli, *Discorsi*, i. 27; ii. 32. This probably did not refer to Bianchi's corps, which only reached Florence on the day Joachim is said to have received this dispatch. Either Pignatelli-Strongoli has got his date wrong, which is not in the least unlikely, or his dispatch refers not to Bianchi but to Nugent.

ments were thrown up, and the army was extended in position. Joachim was now as anxious to waste time as three weeks before he had been anxious to gain it. His offensive movement having failed, and Italy having received his political overtures with unmistakable apathy, it was plain that now his best hope lay in some general scheme of pacification that might possibly be negotiated between Napoleon and the Powers. The hope was doubtless a slender one, yet there seemed to be no better course than to defer a crisis until Napoleon's influence could make itself felt. For this or similar reasons, Joachim now attempted to negotiate. He sent Colonel Carafa into the Austrian lines, and offered to conclude an armistice with a view to sending plenipotentiaries to Vienna. Neipperg delayed replying for two days, and then sent an evasive answer. On the 21st and 22nd there were demonstrations and skirmishes along the line of the Ronco, and in the evening of the latter day Joachim decided to fall back to some position nearer to Ancona. Bianchi, although the King was unaware of the fact, was already within a day's march of Arezzo.

From the day on which the line of the Ronco was abandoned, the Neapolitan army showed greater signs of demoralization than before. Near Cesena an officer of the rank of major went over to the enemy; desertion was epidemic in the rank and file; through Cesena and down the Emilian road Neipperg's hussars and Tyrolian Jägers hung on to the skirts of the retreating army and constantly picked up prisoners and demoralized the rear-guard. Food and forage were scarce along the line of retreat, for even before the campaign opened Carascosa had warned the Government that the resources of the country were exhausted.

Now the distress of the soldiers was terrible ; the commissariat broke down ; hunger led to pillage ; pillage to excess. General Lecchi, in command of the Third Division, had given up all hope of success, and made no scruples of telling his subordinates so.

Leaving the details of the march in charge of the divisional commanders, Joachim now went on to Ancona, in the neighbourhood of which fortress the Royal Guard effected its junction with the army. On the 30th he proceeded to Macerata, where he met Pignatelli-Strongoli, between whom and the King a violent scene of recrimination took place. On that day news came from the outposts that the Austrians were showing in force in the direction of Tolentino. Bianchi was already descending from the Apennines.

The Austrian general had continued his march with great rapidity. At Florence on the 20th, at Arezzo on the 23rd, he had reached Camerino on the 29th. Thence he had extended to his left, towards Jesi, at which point he hoped to get into touch with Neipperg, and slowly advanced towards Tolentino and Macerata.


As soon as Joachim realized that the Austrian army was in two wings, and that these two wings were rapidly drawing together, he decided to attack them at once, and, if possible, beat them in detail. Bianchi's army was the more threatening to his line of communications, and he rightly decided to direct his main attack against it. Carascosa was left in front of Neipperg, with orders to delay the Austrian advance and to fall back as slowly as possible towards Ancona. On the 30th he took up a good position at Sinigaglia, and, supported by the gunboats that caused the Austrians much annoyance, fought a brief engagement that momentarily delayed Neipperg. Meanwhile Joachim



BATTLE OF TOLENTINO

- Neapolitan Infantry
- ▀ „ Cavalry
- Austrian Infantry
- ▨ „ Cavalry
- ⚑ „ „ (Neipperg's Outposts)
- ††† Artillery

Geographical Miles



was concentrating his remaining divisions as rapidly as possible on Macerata. On the 1st of May Bianchi occupied Tolentino, and pushed detachments down the valley of the Chieti. They soon got into contact with the Neapolitans. Joachim, who now had a considerable part of his army in Macerata and the immediate neighbourhood, decided to attempt a reconnaissance in force towards Tolentino on the following day.

On the 2nd of May Joachim advanced up the valley of the Chieti and along the range of hills on its northern bank, with D' Ambrosio's division and the cavalry of the Guard under Livron. Bianchi also advanced and sent a considerable detachment of infantry to occupy one of the highest points between Macerata and Tolentino, the Monte Milone. The Neapolitan lancers in the valley of the Chieti first came into contact with the Austrian patrols, which they drove before them. The King, having reconnoitred the Monte Milone, decided to get possession of it if possible, and ordered D' Ambrosio to deploy and attack the position. The troops went forward, but as soon as the leading regiment, the 3rd Light Infantry, got under fire, it broke up in confusion. Joachim galloped up, dismounted, threw himself among the men, rallied them, and led them forward again in person. But the attack was unsuccessful; the King was repulsed and General D' Ambrosio was severely wounded. Then Joachim attempted a flanking movement, this time with better success, and finally the Austrians withdrew, leaving the Monte Milone with a number of prisoners in the King's hands. That night D' Ambrosio's division, the command of which had now devolved on D' Aquino, camped on the Monte Milone.

Bianchi had fallen back to a position just in front of Tolentino, where he was able that night to concentrate

his whole force. He was prepared to accept battle if necessary on the following day, yet he was by no means reassured as to his position, for he had not yet got into touch with Neipperg, and he realized that he would probably have to fight unassisted against the whole of the Neapolitan army. He made his dispositions for defence in the following manner. A detachment was placed to the south of the Chieti. The main Austrian line was drawn up to the north of and at right angles to that stream and across the range of hills that runs parallel to it. In the centre an advanced position was held in the village of Cassone. Further to the left the Austrians faced the Monte Milone, and on the extreme flank, where the slopes ran down into flatter country, Bianchi placed a regiment of Tuscan dragoons. He had about 11,000 men in line.

Joachim moved the Royal Guard up the valley of the Chieti in the early morning of the 3rd of May. It was intended to fill the space between the river and D' Aquino's division on the Monte Milone. Lecchi had orders to march from Macerata and take up his position on D' Aquino's right. The King's intention was to attack Cassone with the Guard, and when that had sufficiently drawn the Austrian forces, to move forward from the Monte Milone and swing Lecchi's division, pivoting on D' Aquino's, right around Bianchi's left flank. Had his orders been carried out he would have had some 15,000 men in the field; as it was he had not, and his forces actually present probably did not exceed those of the Austrians.

The chief cause of the failure of Joachim's plans was the breakdown of the commissariat department. The men of D' Aquino's division had scattered from their bivouac on the Monte Milone in search of food.

The Royal Guard had only obtained the scantiest of rations by plundering the houses of Macerata. Lecchi's division had fared and behaved worst of all. His men had arrived near Macerata late at night after a heavy march and had not been able to find any food whatever. They dispersed through the country searching for subsistence, and in the early morning, when the division should have marched to the front, it was impossible to collect a single battalion. When at about nine o'clock Pignatelli-Strongoli was deploying between Monte Milone and the Chieti, D' Aquino's division was not yet under arms, while Lecchi was writing to the chief of staff that he would be unable to march from Macerata until his men had obtained food.

The position was a distressing one for Joachim, yet it might have been remedied in the course of a few hours, for Bianchi showed no sign of taking the offensive and the day was only just beginning; but the folly and indiscipline of Pignatelli-Strongoli threw away what chance of success yet remained. The commander of the infantry of the Guard was probably smarting under the reproaches addressed to him by the King for the manner in which he had acquitted himself in Tuscany. Whether for this reason, or from mere wrongheadedness, he no sooner had his troops deployed than he ordered them to advance and attack the Austrian position at Cassone. Joachim galloped up as rapidly as he could to the point where firing had now broken out. He arrived too late to disengage the troops, and found he could do nothing but attempt to direct the fighting as well as circumstances would permit. His infantry fought well, and after some heavy firing carried Cassone at the point of the bayonet. But Bianchi had some artillery well placed beyond the

village, and the Guard appeared unable to make further headway. It was urgent that pressure should be applied at some other point of the Austrian line. D' Aquino's division had now been in part assembled and formed under cover of the woods about the Monte Milone, and Joachim ordered it to advance against the Austrian left. D' Aquino disposed his troops *en échelon*, right flank forward, each echelon made up of one battalion formed in square. This formation in squares, an ineffective and clumsy one for attack, was judged necessary by D' Aquino as his right flank was not covered, owing to the non-arrival of Lecchi, and he feared a possible charge from Bianchi's dragoons.

On the ridge along his centre Joachim had massed his guns and was directing their fire across a hollow towards the Austrian left. Bianchi, now feeling secure of his right flank, had taken up his position at the menaced point, and transferred a couple of battalions of Jägers to strengthen his line. He relied greatly on their good rifle practice, for he was very weak in artillery. D' Aquino's division slowly emerged from the woods, moved down into the hollow, and marched towards the Austrian position; its leading echelon was composed of the 3rd Light Infantry, the regiment that had behaved so badly the day before in the attack on the Monte Milone. When within firing distance the Jägers and Austrian field-pieces sent a plunging fire down the hillside into the Neapolitans, and nearly immediately they broke. The second square, seeing the first disbanding, wavered. At this moment the Tuscan dragoons charged on the Neapolitan flank, while the Austrian infantry advanced, and in a few minutes D' Aquino's division was routed.

But the Neapolitan guns from the ridge redoubled

their fire, and the Austrians soon stopped, unwilling as yet to risk an offensive movement. The King, followed by his staff, did his utmost to re-form the troops. He exposed himself to the hottest fire. Many of the officers were killed and wounded by his side, but all in vain, for the Neapolitan army was rapidly nearing defeat. As Joachim was attempting to re-form his broken troops under cover of the artillery, a staff officer rode up with a dispatch from the Abruzzi. It announced that Nugent with a small force had just reached Aquila, within the frontiers of the kingdom, and nearly on the King's line of communications. Joachim had now no choice but to retreat, and not only to retreat but to do so rapidly enough to reach Naples before any detached Austrian corps could cut him off. Orders were at once issued for the troops to fall back on Macerata.

To point the moral of Joachim's defeat is superfluous, and no deduction can be drawn here that the intelligent reader could fail to draw for himself. It may, however, be said that this last appearance on a battlefield of one of the finest soldiers of his day was by no means entirely discreditable. His courage and spirit were never more conspicuous, and rarely has the unaided example of one man done more to inspire a bad army to effort. Even his strategy was not entirely faulty, for the battle was not fought on the lines that he intended; indeed Joachim might have said with some show of justification that Pignatelli-Strongoli's disobedience and bad conduct had lost him the battle. Yet on the other hand the King's greatest fault as a soldier was never more clearly shown than when he failed to relieve that general of his command and merely reproached him with his ill-behaviour. So well had the Royal Guard and many of Joachim's officers

fought that Bianchi declared that the Neapolitans had shown great courage. The Austrian loss was over 800 in killed, wounded, and missing ; the Neapolitan 1720 killed and wounded, and over 2000 prisoners.

Pignatelli-Strongoli had continued to show insubordination during the progress of the battle, and an example in which he was so well qualified to lead the way spread rapidly in the hour of misfortune. No sooner had the retreat begun than the Neapolitan generals, nearly without exception, abandoned their commands and rode into Macerata. There an informal consultation at the King's headquarters degenerated into a scene of undignified recrimination and reproach. D' Aquino had the hardihood to call on the King to abdicate, and was immediately relieved of his command. Generals and men were starving and clamoured for food. In the course of the ensuing night the remnant of D' Aquino's division dispersed, scouring fields and villages for the means of preserving life ; they mostly fell an easy prey to Bianchi's cavalry and Jägers.

Joachim's retreat from Macerata was even more disastrous than the battle of Tolentino. His army literally melted away. Heavy rains turned the Adriatic road into a quagmire. The day after the battle it was only after some skirmishing with the Austrians and the greatest difficulty with his subordinates that the King was able to effect a junction with Carascosa and get the army started on the road to Naples. Bianchi and Neipperg together could now dispose of 22,000 men, and they hastened on in pursuit of the King.¹ By a rapid advance they hoped to complete the demoralization of the Neapolitans and also to forestall any possible

¹ Neipperg had been weakened by having to send 8000 men under Best back from Rimini to take part in the operations against France.

move of the British against Naples by sea. Between the Chieti and the Tronto Joachim's army lost three-quarters of its numbers. Many of the soldiers of the Royal Guard deserted; the Neapolitans mutinied or went home. In six days Joachim arrived at Castel di Sangro, in the heart of the Abruzzi, and there, with what feelings it is difficult to realize, he found a traveller from Naples come to meet him, his old companion in arms, his chief of staff when he commanded the cavalry of the *Grande Armée*, Count Belliard. This capable and influential officer had been sent on a special mission to the King by Napoleon, who, not at fault, viewed with complete mistrust the generals and staff of the Neapolitan army. Belliard was intended to advise and guide Joachim, but had arrived when no counsel could avail.

Belliard reached Naples on the morning of the 9th of May. Before proceeding to join the King he was received by the Queen, and she declared to him that her utmost endeavour had been used to dissuade Joachim from war, and that neither she, nor Mosbourg, nor Gallo had succeeded in moving him. But a few days later Belliard noted that the King's version of matters was precisely the reverse, and that he ascribed the war entirely to the urgent solicitations of Caroline.

On the same day that Belliard reached Castel di Sangro, what was left of the Neapolitan army passed through it, not retreating, but "fleeing," as the French general recorded. There was a short skirmish with the Austrian advanced guard, and the retreat was continued to Venafro. For a few days after this the King maintained some semblance of taking military measures to reorganize the army and defend the kingdom, but before coming to his final retreat to Naples it will be necessary

to review other events lost to sight during the relation of the campaign of Tolentino.

One of the chief reasons that had dictated to Joachim as the basis of his policy a rapid and unexpected stroke at northern Italy was the danger that for some years had constantly menaced Naples, the danger from sea, from Great Britain. Although he had not succeeded in obtaining a treaty of peace from that Power, yet by the terms of the armistice signed by Bentinck a year before, it was necessary that each government should give the other three months' notice before resuming hostilities. The King, therefore, chose to assume that no attack need be feared from Great Britain so long as the armistice was not denounced.

This attitude availed nothing, for Bentinck, now once more in Genoa, as alert and prompt as usual, demanded explanations of the military preparations of the Neapolitan Government as early as the 22nd of March; while on the 5th of April he declared in a formal note that the alliance of Great Britain with Austria made every act of hostility against the latter Power one against the former as well, and that the instant he was notified by the Austrian Government that hostilities had occurred, he should consider the armistice between Great Britain and Naples at an end. Bentinck's position was supported by the British Cabinet, and it was quickly arranged that an Anglo-Sicilian expedition should once more be sent against Naples.¹

¹ Stewart to Wellington, April 25, 1815, Wellington, *Sup. Disps.* x. 128. That Bentinck's action affected the King of Naples' military operations in the valley of the Po, as is generally related, cannot be believed. If those operations are closely dated and followed they will all appear to depend on purely military reasons that left no sound alternative course up to the 14th of April. After that date it might possibly be said that Joachim could have concentrated on the Reno covering Bologna, and there accepted battle. But there were plenty of reasons—military, political, and of expediency—against that course, nor can the fear of a British attack on

The population of Naples had quite as sensitive a political instinct for the danger that menaced them from the sea, from Great Britain and Sicily, as their King. Besides this, the anti-Napoleonic feeling that had coursed through the Continent from Moscow to Madrid had its counterpart at Naples. Unmilitary in their instincts, the Neapolitans were weary of the conscription, of being marched to distant lands for the pleasure of the French Emperor; they resented the weight of taxation that kept up an army they detested and the pomp of a court that did not represent them. As is usual in matters of government, no balance of gain was struck, the benefits that had been secured were forgotten in what gave opportunity for present criticism. The death of Mary Caroline had removed one great cause of dislike to the Bourbons, and in the general feeling of unrest and desire for settlement, nothing of Ferdinand was so well remembered as his paternal methods, his truly Neapolitan manners, his easy-going simplicity. The pomp of Joachim's Court was maintained from a well-administered revenue, while the old-fashioned ceremonial of Ferdinand represented unintelligent, wasteful, and burdensome finance. But sentiment, not reason, guides popular criticism; and sentiment at Naples now apprehended more change, more revolution, and pined for Bourbonism as the only possible permanent settlement.¹ The merchants of Naples were dissatisfied. The trade of the port, that had sprung up once more under the armistice after an interruption of so many years, had been cut off again by the events that had followed Napoleon's departure from Elba;

Naples be thought to have borne on the choice between the Reno and the Ronco as a position for offering battle. The supposition rests on nothing but vague assertion, and must be dismissed.

¹ Malet, *Voyage en Italie*, 166.

English cruisers once more patrolled the coast ; gold was becoming scarce ; and to supply his wants during the campaign, Joachim had raised a forced loan of 2,000,000 francs. Strongest of all the influences against the King was that of the Church. He had never been directly recognised by the Pope, never been through the rite of coronation, a ceremony of such immense import to a Catholic people. Between the uncrowned King in possession and the duly anointed monarch not far away, the great mass of the people made a choice that was kept profoundly secret. The antagonism of the Pope, roused by the occupation of part of his territory by the Neapolitan troops, and carefully fanned by the French and Spanish Bourbons, rendered even more hostile the attitude of the Neapolitan clergy towards the King. Largely as a consequence of that attitude the people were cold, and all efforts to organize a general levy were fruitless.

It was not wrongly that Joachim had judged that the constitutional, or national, or Italian party was the only one that could help him. And it is not impossible that his constant reluctance to follow them on the extreme courses they were constantly advocating stood for a political wisdom that discerned fully how weak in numbers that party really was. How did the constitutional question stand ? In a campaign fought with the clear object of forming a large Italian state the risk taken was so great, his crown was so clearly staked, that it appears now as though he should not have hesitated to place his every means in the scale, as though he should have clearly announced that the war was more than one of ambition and aggrandisement, and was for the furtherance of the civil liberties of the Italian people. The plausible reason

that had tied his hands the year before was now wanting. He could no longer say that his alliance with Austria made it impolitic for him to give his subjects a constitution. Joachim had proved less bold, and even less successful in a political than in a military sense. On arriving at Ancona to take command of the army he said to Pepe : . . . " We will talk shortly of giving a constitution to the kingdom. . . ." But he paltered with a question that ought to have been finally settled, if at all, before he left Naples for the front. Only when all was lost, as a useless and ungracious sop to exhausted fortune, did Joachim proclaim what might, two years earlier, have crowned the great political work of the French in Italy. On the 12th of May, when the Neapolitan army had fled nearly to the gates of the capital, a decree was issued granting Naples a constitution ; it was ante-dated Rimini the 30th of March.

It was far too late now for Joachim to attempt by any means, political or military, to retrieve his broken fortunes. His rupture with Austria had immediately crystallized into unanimity the hitherto divided opinions of the Congress of Vienna, and the war in which he had engaged was immediately accepted as one of which the only conclusion could be a Bourbon restoration. Before the battle of Tolentino was fought the Neapolitan camps were flooded with proclamations announcing the return of Ferdinand. Metternich was not prepared to compromise, and when he heard from Neipperg that Joachim was willing to treat, he instructed him that the only terms he could offer to the King were an annual revenue of 1,000,000 florins in a private station in return for his resignation of the throne. On receipt of these instructions, a week after Tolentino, Neipperg and Bianchi conferred and agreed not to act on them, for

they considered Joachim's position now so hopeless that nothing could prevent the Austrian troops from marching into Naples. Nor were the Austrian generals mistaken.

On receipt of the news of the disaster at Tolentino, Queen Caroline called a council, and urged the Ministers to devise measures that might yet save the kingdom. Manhès was sent to take command of a small division on the frontier beyond S. Germano. He was soon recalled, however, as the Government hardly knew whether to fear the Austrians or the Neapolitans the more, and Caroline was firmly resolved that if unable to resist the former, she would at all events maintain her own subjects in order.

For a few days more Joachim attempted to collect an army on the Liri, and assembled at Capua some 5000 men, a force substantial in numbers but far more anxious to surrender than to fight. On the night of the 16th D'Aspre surprised a division of 4000 Neapolitans at Mignano, totally dispersing them; this marked the end of military operations. Two days later Joachim, accompanied by Belliard and a few staff officers, rode into Naples and proceeded to the Royal Palace. On the walls were pasted proclamations that he heeded little, announcing to all who cared to believe that the kingdom of Naples had now become a constitutional monarchy. Outside the gates of the Palace a small crowd, groups of liberal enthusiasts, had collected, and perhaps for the first time since he had worn the crown Joachim Murat, the defeated king, met with a really warm popular reception.

Within doors Joachim and Caroline met, not without recrimination and tears. Napoleon's sister had foreseen the completeness of the disaster from the day when the fatal news from Tolentino reached her, and had

straightway prepared for the worst. She had immediately sent off to Paris all the members of the Bonaparte family at Naples, Madame Mère, Princess Borghese, and Cardinal Fesch. On the 10th of May a British ship, probably the *Tremendous*, that had been hovering off the coast for some days, opened communication, and in the course of the next few days Caroline agreed terms with Commodore Campbell for her personal surrender.

While these negotiations were proceeding the people of Naples were kept as much in the dark as possible. The *Monitore*, as a general rule, abstained from giving any news at all, and what information it did contain was totally misleading. The engagement at Monte Milone on the 2nd of May figured as a great Neapolitan victory, the complete defeat of the following day as an insignificant skirmish. Yet the people of Naples felt that the end was approaching, and grew correspondingly restless.

It was on the 13th of May, five days before Joachim's return, that Caroline concluded her arrangement with Campbell for being taken on board the *Tremendous*. But the British commodore could not dispose of a sufficient force to occupy Naples, and the Queen therefore determined to remain at her post and to repress the possible disorder, perhaps even insurrection, that the approaching Bourbon restoration might excite among the lazzaroni. On the 15th the population showed great signs of restlessness, and threatening groups began to form in the neighbourhood of the Palace. Caroline ordered out her state carriage, and, drawn by six horses, drove slowly and with a serene face through the crowded streets of the city. Later in the day she attired herself in a military coat and mounting a charger, passed the civic guards in review. This show of determination and courage well became a Princess of the

House of Bonaparte. It allayed the excitement of the impressionable Neapolitans and perhaps saved Naples from a repetition of the scenes of horror that had accompanied the last Bourbon restoration.

Joachim also had attempted to negotiate, but with less good fortune than Caroline. He sent Gallo to Bianchi's headquarters, only to discover that the Austrians would grant him no terms of any sort. He then appears to have momentarily thought of entering Gaëta and defending that fortress, but Austrian cavalry patrols were already between that point and the capital, so, abandoning this idea, he instructed Carascosa and Colletta to enter into a military convention on behalf of the army for terminating hostilities. They were instructed to make the best conditions they could for the country and themselves, and to leave the King out of consideration. At Casa Lanza, three miles from Capua, on the 20th of May, the Neapolitan generals met Bianchi, Neipperg, and Lord Burghersh, and signed a convention that recognised Ferdinand as King and put an end to hostilities; its provisions will be noticed later.

The last hours of King Joachim's reign had come. On the 18th of May the *Monitore* maintained an ominous reserve on the political situation; it diplomatically devoted the greater part of its space to a far from burning topic,—an imaginary conversation between Pericles and Anaxagoras. On the following day it appeared for the last time, announcing the return of Joachim to his capital and the warm reception he had met with.¹ Late in the afternoon of the 19th of May King Joachim rode out from his palace of Naples

¹ Nearly as curious as the dialogue between Pericles and Anaxagoras in the expiring *Monitore* is the playbill of the theatres. On the last night of Joachim's reign the Fiorentini gave *Gli accidenti della vita*; the Fenice, *L' inferno ad arte*; while the Teatro della Sorte announced *Con la burla s' incomincia*!

accompanied by his Master of the Horse, the Duke of Roccaromana, and by a few officers of his staff. He had discarded uniform and wore plain clothes. He pushed rapidly through the crowded streets that lead up to the Pizzofalcone, along the Riviera di Chiaja, and to the entrance of the grotto of Posilipo, whence he saw for the last time that wonderful city that had during seven eventful years been his capital. On through the long tunnel of the Romans he rode, out into the wild and romantic region beyond, where the red and white houses of Pozzuoli and Baia give life and give depth to a wonderful scene, where the mighty relics of a past civilization and the mightier remains of upheaved nature might well arouse chastening reflections in the mind of the dethroned monarch. At the loveliest hour of the day, when the sun rushes down to the ocean, the fugitive king urged his horse up the slopes that lead from Lake Averno to the Arco Felice. If he then gazed backwards he might have seen once more in all its sunset glory that enchanted region, the capes and islands, the hills, the blue bays, and the purple cone of Vesuvius watchful over all; all his,—and now all sinking into night. And riding but a few paces more along the road the Ancients built, through the arch that crowns the Monte Grillo, he could watch the sun descend to the blue Mediterranean that had so often threatened him, fall beyond the islands whence his enemies had so long struggled to overthrow him, disappear towards Corsica whence the maker of his fortune had come. As he urged his horse down towards the coast-line through the ruins of ancient Kumæ, the sky was darkening and the curving white fringed shore that fades into the haze of the horizon towards Gaëta gradually became dim. In the darkness the little group of horsemen finally rode up to a

fisherman's hut, and after a little bargaining hired two small vessels that lay there hauled up on the sand.

Launched on the vast Mediterranean in a small boat there was but little Murat could attempt. Once more the idea appears to have occurred to him to enter Gaëta, where the commandant, General Begani, could be relied on. But in the bay of Gaëta British cruisers were already hovering, and on the following morning the fugitives found their way barred, and had to turn back and seek refuge in the island of Ischia. There, close to the principal town of the island, Joachim remained in extreme peril for twenty-four hours. From the cottage where he and his party had taken refuge a small xebec was perceived on the morning of the 21st slowly making its way with sweeps along the channel that divides Ischia from Procida. By a nearly miraculous chance the xebec turned out to be the *Santa Caterina*, chartered by and conveying General Manhès and his party to France. She was the only vessel to which Admiral Lord Exmouth, who had arrived in the bay on the 20th, had given a permit to leave Naples. Manhès welcomed Murat and his followers on board, and the *Santa Caterina*, after one or two adventures with British cruisers, brought her passengers safely to Cannes, where they landed on the 30th of May.

In the meanwhile the throne of Naples had been reoccupied by the Bourbons. On the 21st of May Prince Leopold, the King's second son and special representative, joined Bianchi's headquarters at Teano. On the same day Caroline Bonaparte issued her last commands as Regent. She ordered General Florestano Pepe and the commandants of the forts of Naples to facilitate the landing of British sailors that would take place that night. Her message was worded with the

same firmness and dignity that had marked her whole conduct, and that imparted to her descent from the throne a quality of nobility that had not always been present during her tenure of it.

Three hundred British sailors were landed that night at the Arsenal, immediately at the back of the Royal Palace, and Caroline immediately embarked on one of their boats and was rowed to H.M.S. *Tremendous*. At two o'clock in the morning of the 22nd of May, Count Neipperg, at the head of two weary regiments of cavalry, marched into the city. Late on the 23rd Prince Leopold and Bianchi rode into Naples, and were received with loud acclamations and demonstrations of joy; the *Tremendous* and the other British ships were dressed with bunting and fired a welcoming salute. But Caroline's courage did not desert her. She witnessed these proceedings from Campbell's quarter-deck, and haughtily declared to those who stood about her that her brother would replace her on the throne of Naples within four months.

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CHAPTER XIII

THE TRAGEDY OF PIZZO

Murat in Provence—Waterloo—Royalist reaction—Murat pursued—Escapes to Corsica—Franceschetti—State of Corsica—Gordon visits Murat—Decides on expedition to Naples—Marches to Ajaccio—Carabelli's mission—Arrest of Otello—Correspondence of Murat with Naples—The *guetapens* theory—Macirone—Bastard at Bastia—Macirone and Carabelli at Ajaccio—Murat sails—His plans—Lands at Pizzo—Situation of town—Coolness of inhabitants—Trentacapilli—Murat's arrest—Nunziante sends troops—The news at Naples—Orders sent to Nunziante—Court-martial—Execution of Murat.

CAROLINE BONAPARTE'S courageous assertion that in four months her brother would replace her on the throne was not destined to come true. When but little more than that time had elapsed, the Emperor of the French had become the helpless prisoner of St. Helena, and King Joachim had come to an even more merciful cessation of his labours.¹

Once before had Joachim Murat landed on the southern coast of France after successfully escaping the British cruisers patrolling the Mediterranean. Then the ill success of Egypt lay behind: now that of Naples; then his arm was ready to support the fortunes of Napoleon:

¹ "The Calabrese have been more humane, more generous, than those who sent me here," said Napoleon to Las Cases when informed of Murat's end.

now it was equally ready, equally useful, but rejected and powerless. The last of the Imperial armies was rapidly being concentrated on the Belgian frontier at the very moment when Murat landed on French soil, and his first thought was to fly to that station which strung to its highest tension every fibre of his nature, the front of the Emperor's cavalry. But the feeling of the army against their old comrade was so strong that even had Napoleon been willing he could hardly have utilized his services. To his demand for permission to return to Paris he received a curt reply, the Emperor propounding the cutting and unanswerable question: "What treaty of peace has been concluded between France and Naples since 1814?"¹

Murat thus unwillingly found himself compelled to settle down near Toulon and await events, taking up his residence at a villa belonging to Admiral Lallemand. There he lived unostentatiously with a small suite, treated respectfully by the authorities and inhabitants. A Mr. de Baudus was sent to reside with Murat by the Emperor as his representative.

On this footing matters remained some three weeks, and then came news of the disaster at Waterloo, followed by the second abdication, the flight of Napoleon, and the second restoration. The news of the final overthrow of the Empire at once raised a royalist agitation in the south, and Murat was immediately placed in a position of great anxiety. The royalist mob soon broke out into excesses. Marshal Brune was barbarously murdered at Avignon. A few days later a reward of 8000 francs was offered for Murat's capture. He separated from his followers and went into hiding. He wandered for many days alone, half starved, in constant

¹ Macirone, 36.

fear of capture and assassination. On one occasion, from behind some shrubs in a garden, he watched a party of his pursuers search the house where but a few minutes before he had been hospitably received and entertained. Yet through all his wanderings he found a few faithful friends, and sufficient resources in his own energy and abilities to escape capture. He had made an offer of submission to Louis XVIII. and implored his magnanimity immediately after the downfall of Napoleon ; he had also applied for passports and permission to take refuge in England, but could get no tidings from his agents.

In despair at not hearing from Paris, and hopeless of saving his life from the numerous bands of royalists searching for him, Murat decided to make an attempt to escape from the south of France by boat. His first intention appears to have been to sail around Spain to Havre, and Roccaromana, with whom he remained in communication, succeeded in securing a small vessel for the journey. But Joachim was so closely pursued that he was only able to reach the little cove where he was to have been taken off, in time to see the vessel's sails disappear on the horizon. Finally, after hiding among vineyards for several days, he succeeded in getting out to sea in a small rowing boat with three companions, —Langlade, Blancard, and Donadieu, ex-officers in the Imperial navy.

It was on the 22nd of August that Murat and his three companions embarked. They steered for Corsica. Thirty-six hours after starting they were overtaken by a gale and came near sinking. Whether they would ever have reached port appears doubtful had not a vessel then crossed their course and rescued them ; she proved to be the regular packet plying from Toulon to Bastia.

Murat was recognised on board, and doubtless found sympathisers and helpers, for although unprovided with a passport he succeeded in passing the police officers on landing in Corsica; his three companions, however, were not so fortunate, and were all arrested. Hearing that Franceschetti, a general whose rank he had himself conferred, lived near Bastia, at the little village of Vescovado, Murat at once set out for his house. He arrived there alone and on foot on the 25th of August; but would Franceschetti recognise the brilliant King Joachim in the ragged wayfarer who stood before his door? He was footsore and weary, his face hidden by a thick matted beard, his head covered with a sailor's bonnet, his body draped in a long black cape. For fifteen days he had not slept in a bed and had lived as a hunted outcast and vagrant.

Franceschetti had made good his escape from Naples¹ at the time of the entry of the Austrians, and, fortunately for Murat, was now at home once more; he received his former sovereign with every sign of affection and deference and the warmest Corsican hospitality. The principal landowner of Vescovado was the mayor Ceccaldi, into whose family Franceschetti had married; the two were on friendly and intimate terms.

Ceccaldi, with most of the inhabitants of Vescovado, as indeed of Corsica, was a strong Bonapartist, yet he felt obliged, in view of his official position, to report Murat's presence to the authorities at Bastia. A detachment of gendarmerie was at once dispatched by the Prefect to arrest the ex-King of Naples; but the relatives and friends of Ceccaldi and Franceschetti,

¹ It will be seen in the next chapter that the French officers were not included in the Convention of Casa Lanza, and were treated as prisoners of war.

among whom were more than one old soldier of the wars of the Empire, immediately armed and declared that Murat was under the protection of their hospitality and could not be touched. The lieutenant in command, after an apparently amicable conversation with Murat, returned to Bastia empty-handed.

The island of Corsica was at this time in a curious state. The white flag of the Bourbons was everywhere flying ; but as it represented the fifth change of government that the islanders had suffered in less than fifty years, it is not matter for surprise that it aroused no particular sentiment of loyalty. In reality there were two factions in the island, representing the wars of the second half of the eighteenth century, British and French ; and the latter faction was now strongly in the ascendant and ardently Bonapartist. There were not 1000 troops in the island, and the whole population was armed. Under these circumstances Murat was for the moment safe ; the old Napoleonic and Muratist soldiers in the island were sufficiently numerous to make any attempt at arresting him futile until the Government could collect a considerable body of troops. Even then the island was so vast and so wild, and the hospitality of the Corsicans was so staunch, that he might reasonably hope to evade capture for many months to come.

But in truth Murat was now weary of wandering, exasperated with the new part Fortune called on him to play, imbittered with the humiliations of the outlaw, desperate at the silence of his agents, apprehensive of the worst fate. For as the Powers of Europe at the Congress of Vienna had declared Napoleon a public enemy and liable to public vengeance, might not Joachim have to fear some similar decree ? He could get no

word from Paris, and probably not many days after reaching Franceschetti's house he began meditating a desperate scheme that should clear a way through all his troubles.

On the 11th of September, a little more than two weeks after Murat's arrival at Vescovado, a Colonel Gordon made his way there from Bastia. He was a British political agent, and had been landed by the British frigate *Meander*. To him Murat declared that his presence in Corsica was due to the fear lest staying longer in the south of France he should have been assassinated; he asserted, and doubtless sincerely, that he had no intention whatever of creating any disturbance in Corsica; one thing only he asked for, passports for any destination the Powers approved save only St. Helena.

These passports neither Colonel Gordon nor any other authority appeared prepared to produce, and so ominous and suggestive did this appear that in the course of the next few days Murat suddenly resolved on a new line of action and came to a fatal determination.¹ Franceschetti was a man of the adventurer type, and heavily in debt. The political revolution just accomplished had apparently closed all future prospects for him; the presence and circumstances of Joachim suggested the possibility of an enterprise in which, whether in one way or in another, profitable opportunities might arise. Franceschetti and Murat together decided to organize an armed force for the purpose of an expedition to Naples to replace Joachim on the throne. The example of Napoleon's successful return from Elba six months before, doubtless helped to inspire this resolve.

In his flight Murat had succeeded in concealing and

¹ But cf. the doubtful assertion of Galvani (p. 16).

saving a sum of 4000 napoleons in gold, with two epaulettes and a hat loop of diamonds worth about three times as much more. In addition to these resources he had money in a private account at his bankers in Paris on which he could draw. He was therefore in a position to fit out an expedition and recruit adherents. No sooner was it known that volunteers were wanted than many old soldiers presented themselves, mostly men who had fought in the Corsican legions in the French and Neapolitan services. Several experienced officers also joined Murat, among them General Ottavj and Colonel Natali. In a very few days a force of two to three hundred men was assembled.

On the 20th of September Murat and Franceschetti with their followers marched out of Vescovado on their way to Ajaccio, the principal port of Corsica, the home of the Bonapartes, the birthplace of Napoleon. At nearly all the villages they passed, the population turned out and gave them an enthusiastic greeting; Murat was deeply touched. At Ajaccio, where he arrived on the 23rd of September, his reception was warmer than elsewhere, and appears to have inspired Joachim, and to have persuaded him that even at Naples his chance of a good welcome would not be slight.¹ The civil authorities of Ajaccio abandoned the town on Murat's approach; Colonel Laforet, the military commandant, whose small body of soldiers was far more likely to fraternize with the invaders than to oppose them, shut himself up in the citadel.

¹ Franceschetti's statement that this welcome persuaded Murat into the expedition in spite of his advice to the contrary clearly bears the stamp of bad faith. Murat in a communication to Governor Verrières from Vescovado on the 17th was already assuming the royal title. It is as nearly certain as possible that the practical decision was taken between the 11th and the 17th, between the dates of Gordon's visit and the letter to Verrières, and therefore at Franceschetti's house.

The Powers and the new Government of Naples were now beginning to get anxious at Murat's presence in Corsica. As soon as King Ferdinand's Ministers learned of the ex-King's arrival at Bastia, they sent a secret agent, Carabelli by name, to watch Murat and inform the Government as to his plans; leaving Naples on the 11th of September, he reached Bastia on the 24th. Carabelli had been one of the officers of the Corsican legion that took part in the first military operations in Calabria. He had soon taken to administrative duties and had been in close touch with Saliceti. He had given up military for civilian employment, being appointed Secretary-general of Calabria, and later Intendente of Capitanata. He was now anxious to retain his occupation under the new Government, and prepared to ingratiate himself by performing any task required of him. His acquaintance with the Corsicans, among whom Murat might find sympathizers, probably led to his selection for the duty he was now called on to perform.

Immediately before Carabelli's departure from Naples the Government had arrested a Moor of the classic name of Otello, who, under the preceding reign, had been one of the most conspicuous characters in Naples. He was a personal servant of Murat, and had accompanied him in his flight to France. Later, on his master's second flight, he made his way back to Naples, where his presence appears to have been prompted by no more criminal intent than one of conjugal affection. Yet the police chose to recognise in Otello a secret emissary of Murat and to arrest him. At about the same time, whether brought in by Otello or otherwise, several letters written by Murat to a few of his past subjects, among which was possibly one to General

Colletta, were handed by their recipients to the Government, and caused apprehension.¹ Precautionary measures were at once taken. A patrol of gunboats was established along the Mediterranean coast of the kingdom, the forts of Naples were provisioned, the garrison of Gaëta was reinforced with Sicilian troops, and Carabelli was sent on his secret mission to Corsica.²

Another traveller arrived at Bastia within a few hours of Carabelli; this was a naturalised British subject, Neapolitan by birth, named Macirone. He had been at one time in the Neapolitan military service, had later become connected with Fouché, and had acted as a secret intermediary between him and Wellington after Waterloo. He had also remained in touch with Murat until he went into hiding. Macirone had arrived in Corsica with dispatches for Murat, and with the passport that contained the guarantee of safety the ex-King of Naples had so long been kept waiting for. At Bastia was the British frigate *Meander*, Captain Bastard. This

¹ Pignatelli-Strongoli, *Poche osservazioni*, 3; Radowsky, 123; Medici's report in Helfert, *Murat*, 211; Carabelli, 21; Colletta, ii. 267.

² Medici's report, Helfert, *Murat*, 211. This report bears every mark of strongly exaggerating what little the police knew of Murat's movements. The controversy on which the facts just narrated bear will require no discussion here, as Mons. Dufourcq's and Baron Lumbroso's criticisms of the Marquis de Sassenay's arguments are conclusive. These criticisms might have been made even stronger by a close comparison of dates. Murat reached Vescovado on the 25th of August; it is probable that his plan for returning to Naples was not made before the 11th of September. Carabelli left Naples on the 14th of September, reached Bastia on the 24th, and witnessed Joachim's departure from Ajaccio on the 28th. How could the alleged plot of the Bourbon Government have been hatched within these dates? A recent article by Signor Lemmi proves nothing more than that a rumour was current that the Neapolitan police had laid a trap for Murat. The fact that such a rumour existed is past question; and this second- or third-hand evidence of the existence of the rumour adds nothing to the controversy. As to Otello, it may further be pointed out that as he did not follow Murat to Corsica, any letters he carried must have come from France, that is, before Murat had formed his plan.

officer had in vain sent messages to Vescovado summoning Murat to surrender to him. He remained helpless at Bastia awaiting some opportunity that should favour the accomplishment of his hopes. Macirone saw him, explained the object of his mission, and asked for his assistance. Bastard promised to await the result of Macirone's efforts.

Early in the morning of the 28th of September Carabelli and Macirone arrived together at Ajaccio. Murat had been busy for some days fitting out some small vessels and occupied one of the principal houses of the town on which his standard was displayed and in front of which sentries paced. Carabelli was the first to present himself for an audience. Murat, whose preparations were complete and mind apparently made up, made no attempt to disguise his project, offered Carabelli promotion if he would join him, which the Corsican prudently declined. He then, according to Carabelli's account of what passed, became somewhat excited and, speaking of Naples, declared more than once: "I will not give up my kingdom!" "I have only to show myself to succeed!" "At the worst I shall die as a king!"¹

His interview with Murat told Carabelli all he wished to know, and he employed the remainder of the day in persuading his compatriot General Ottavj to give up the enterprise, and in this succeeded.

With Macirone Murat spent several hours in long and earnest conference. Macirone first handed him a letter inclosing an offer from Metternich to provide him with a passport to Trieste. That passport was in Macirone's possession, and was viséd by Stewart, the British ambassador at Paris; in it Joachim was referred

¹ Carabelli, 33; Galvani, 74.

to by the title of Duke of Lipona.¹ Macirone furthermore declared that Captain Bastard held his ship, the *Meander*, at his disposal, ready to convey Murat to Trieste under the terms of this arrangement, and added his entreaties to the documents he produced. But it was now too late to turn Murat from his plan. The die was cast, he said, this offer of security came too late. For three months he had awaited the decision of the Allies in vain, and now he was determined to risk all to regain his kingdom. At the worst he would meet death, and that had no fears for him. Besides that, three hundred brave men had now compromised themselves in his cause, and was he to draw back at the last minute and abandon them?

Yet the passport was too precious a safeguard to neglect. Murat without much difficulty persuaded Macirone to hand it to him, and in return gave him a letter in which he said:—

“Mr. Macirone, Envoy of the Allied Powers to King Joachim, I have made myself acquainted with the documents in your charge. I accept the passport intrusted to you for me, and intend using it for the purpose of reaching the destination therein specified. . . .” The letter went on to decline a British ship for his conveyance, and concluded by stating that he would be prepared to discuss matters with the Allies after having joined his family.

His interviews with the emissaries from Paris and Naples not having disclosed any matter affecting the decision he had already taken, Murat prepared immediately to set sail. He had found a useful officer for the naval side of his enterprise in Barbara, who

¹ Lipona, anagram of Napoli, was the title assumed by Caroline on leaving Naples.

had ranked as a captain in the Neapolitan navy, and who had rendered skilled and useful service at the taking of Capri.¹ Under the supervision of Barbara, Murat had chartered seven feluccas that were now lying in the port. They were small vessels of from 15 to 20 tons, single masted, and rigged with a lateen sail. On this little flotilla Murat and his men embarked late on the night of the 28th of September. Before going on board he promoted Natali to be a general, and gave similar encouragement and promises of reward to his followers. Then with some 250 or 300 men all told he put to sea. The governor of the citadel, which overlooks the port, ordered his soldiers to their posts and fired several rounds at the expedition, but the gunners appeared unable to aim straight and the shots all flew harmlessly very wide of their mark.

What Murat's plan was it is impossible to say. There is nothing to show, nor is it probable, that he had concerted measures with any adherents in Naples. If he had a definite plan it appears clear that he did precisely what his circumstances required—kept it secret from every one. The destination of the expedition was perhaps Salerno, where a considerable number of soldiers forming part of the old army had been stationed. Could these be won over by a sudden appeal,—it was but two short marches to Naples,—Murat might hope by rapidity and surprise to inspire panic in a government never distinguished for resource or courage, and thus to seize the capital.

But the elements, and not its leader, chose the land-fall of the expedition. For the better part of a week light head winds baffled the feluccas; they had about

¹ Barbara is generally described as somewhat akin to a pirate, which is possible. Colletta states that Murat created him a baron (*Storia di Napoli*, ii. 268).

reached the latitude of Naples when one of the sudden and violent storms usual in those seas at that period of the year overtook them. Murat's frail vessels were instantly dispersed. The one on which he, Franceschetti, Barbara, and some thirty followers had embarked was, with one other, blown right down the coast. On the night of the 7th of October, the weather having now moderated, they sighted land in the bay of S. Eufemia, near the spot whence Sidney Smith's fleet had watched the battle of Maida, nine years before.

What course could now be taken? Franceschetti relates that he urged Murat to abandon an enterprise which, with the handful of supporters he was now reduced to, could only be viewed as madness. He held a passport for Trieste, and the wisest course would be to give up all idea of landing, and to proceed to that port directly. But a cruise of nine days had exhausted the feluccas' water and provisions; Barbara represented the absolute necessity of landing for this reason, and Murat, if he had hesitated for a moment, was now persuaded to carry out his original purpose at all risks.

On the following morning, the 8th of October, the two feluccas drew close to the little town of Pizzo. Joachim attired himself in full uniform, his hat crowned, as was his custom, with feathers and a diamond clasp. At eleven o'clock the boats were manned and rowed in from the feluccas to the shore, where the invaders, numbering eighty in all, landed.

Pizzo was not a locality where Murat could hope for a good reception. It had in former years been quite a thriving little port, but had seen its trade ruined under the French kings by the blockade of the coasts. A French officer who knew it, recorded that

its inhabitants "were reduced to a state of great misery . . . and were ever ready to manifest their discontent."¹ In addition to this, the great freeholder of the district was the Duke of Infantado, a Spanish grandee, whose feelings had been strongly against Murat ever since the occupation of Madrid in 1808. The Duke's steward, Alcalà by name, possessed great influence among the people.

Pizzo was largely situated on a hill, or cliff, projecting into the sea; at the extremity of this cliff was a small mediæval castle, used as a coastguard station. Back of the castle was the public square; at the foot of the hill were the beach and landing-place. Murat and his followers marched up from the landing-place into the town without a moment's delay.

Murat was leading. It was a Sunday morning, and in the market-place a large number of people were assembled in their holiday clothes. As he passed them he began calling out: "I am Joachim; I am your King; you ought to recognise me." But so far from this producing any favourable effect it immediately alarmed the hearers, who began to leave the market-place and to enter their houses.

At the further end of the market-place, in front of the castle, a few soldiers of the coastguard artillery there stationed were parading; their uniform was as yet unchanged. Joachim went up to them, and, addressing the sergeant in command, said: "Haven't they changed your uniforms yet?" He then told him that he promoted him captain, and ordered him to have the drum beaten and to follow him. But the drummer would not obey. Murat passed behind the ranks to inspect the men, but no sooner had he done so than they

¹ Duret de Tavel, 110.

quickly broke from their alignment and dispersed. The market-place was now nearly empty. It was manifest that Pizzo was far from any feeling of enthusiasm at the presence of its late king.

A hasty consultation was now held between Murat and his principal followers, and it was decided at once to take the road that led from Pizzo to Monteleone, five miles away. The latter was an important town, and its civic guard had always been strong in its anti-Bourbon sentiments and its support of the French rule. Here, if anywhere, a favourable spirit might be met with; here, if anywhere, the proclamations Joachim carried announcing the coming into effect of his constitution on the ensuing 1st of January might lead to some result.

On this decision being come to, the party marched out from the market-place on to the Monteleone road. No sooner had they departed than windows began to open and balconies to fill; in a few moments the square was once more animated. Among those who now came out of the houses was a man named Gregorio Trentacapilli; he was a zealous Bourbonist, a lieutenant of police and government agent before the French conquest, later a *capomassi*, and now once more in favour and exercising police functions in the district. On coming into the market-place, finding Murat gone and the townspeople excited and showing decided signs of hostility to the invaders, he promptly took command of the movement. Followed by a number of men who had armed themselves he took the road to Monteleone, on which Murat had preceded him by a few minutes.

About a quarter of a mile along that road Murat had stopped to enable one of his followers to get him a saddle horse, and there Trentacapilli, and the mob following,

came up with him. A confused scene, in which gesticulation and shouting played the chief part, then took place. Murat turned to the crowd and declared that all was a misunderstanding, that he was travelling to Trieste and was provided with a passport all in due order. Trentacapilli,—every brigand's and policeman's instinct in his frame vibrating at the sight of the brilliantly adorned prize only just out of reach of his fingers,—pushed and edged gradually closer and closer, calling loudly on Murat to surrender himself a prisoner. Franceschetti, with a few others, attempted to screen their leader, and at last in the scuffling a pistol shot was fired.

This pistol shot, harmless enough in itself, broke up the crowd. The Corsicans took to their heels and scattered right and left through the fields. Murat, Franceschetti, and one follower, Captain Pernice, fled along the road to Monteleone for a short distance; then, at a place where the road crosses a stream, they turned down towards the sea. By hard running they succeeded in putting a good distance between their pursuers and themselves, and as they rushed down towards the beach they were not without good hope of escaping. But when at last they reached the sand they found their boats gone and Barbara's two feluccas a mile or more away.¹

At this moment, when all seemed lost, the fugitives espied a means of escape, a fisherman's boat hauled high up on the sand. To this the three flew, and they struggled desperately to drag it to the water. As they did so the first of their pursuers were appearing

¹ M. Dufourcq is strongly of opinion that Barbara did not betray Murat, and as evidence that he did is totally wanting, there is no reason for not agreeing with him.

at the edge of the beach. Their efforts became more strenuous, but of no avail ; before the line of safety could be reached, the crowd was on them, forming a wide half-circle. Then they began to close in. Murat and his two companions now drew swords and pistols, and as the crowd edged in closer and closer, Pernice fired. His shot was at once returned, and he fell dead. Then ensued a scene of wild confusion ; a rush was made in which the two survivors were carried off their feet and rolled on to the sand. For a whole hour they were in the hands of the mob, many of them women, and it was miraculous that they were not killed or seriously wounded. The pen rebels at narrating the indignities that Murat then suffered : he was pulled from hand to hand in the midst of the howling crowd, his arms, ornaments, and clothes wrenched from him, his face and body begrimed with blood and sand, his face spat upon, his hair torn from his head in handfuls.

This miserable scene could not continue long. Trentacapilli, in his expert way, managed to secure Murat's diamond buckle and his papers, and being so far satisfied, he succeeded in restoring order, marched the prisoners up to the castle and sent word to Monteleone, the administrative and military headquarters of lower Calabria, of what had happened. The general in command there was Don Vito Nunziante, whom we have already met bravely fighting against Régnier at Mileto some eight years before ; he was a good officer and an honourable and humane man. Immediately on hearing of Murat's arrest Nunziante sent the news to Naples by semaphore, ordered a *Te Deum* to be sung, hurried some troops off to Pizzo, and prepared to follow in person.

Captain Stratti with a detachment of forty men arrived at Pizzo late in the afternoon, and immediately took charge of the castle and its inmates. All of Joachim's followers had been arrested, making a total of seventy-nine prisoners. Some of them were wounded, all were hungry and exhausted, and they were penned together in a small room barely sufficient to hold them. Captain Stratti at once separated Murat,—for whom he showed great respect and humanity,—from the other prisoners, and did what he could to alleviate their distress. The steward of the Duke of Infantado, Alcalà by name, brought clothes and other necessaries for Murat, and sent a doctor to attend him. On the following day Nunziantè arrived. He approved the action of Stratti and Alcalà, visited Murat and treated him with the same respect and consideration that his subordinate had shown.

In the meantime the line of semaphores along the coast had transmitted the news to Naples. There it was already known on the 6th, through Austrian channels, that Murat had sailed with an expedition from Ajaccio. Anxiety was great during the next three days, until on the evening of the 9th, while Ferdinand was at the San Carlo witnessing the opera, he heard, with mixed terror and delight, as Colletta reports, that Murat was a prisoner. Immediately a council was called to determine what was to be done, and, perhaps owing to the fact that Murat was furnished with what amounted to a joint Austrian and British safe-conduct, the Ministers of those two Powers were sounded as to their views.

Prince Jablonowsky, the Austrian representative, was too profound a diplomat to deal plainly with such a painfully direct question as what was to be done with

a Prince with whom his Court had entertained such close relations. He accordingly found a diplomatic excuse for absenting himself from Naples for a few days. What a Court advised the Ministers of King Ferdinand to do with their prisoner cannot be said, for apparently no record has survived; but it will not be doing him an injustice to infer from dispatches of his that have been preserved, from his well-known feeling against Murat, and from the reports current at the time, that, knowing the inclinations of Ferdinand and his Ministers, he did nothing to turn them towards a more merciful course.

As a result of deliberations that took place that night orders were sent to Nunziante early on the morning of the 10th. He was instructed to assemble a council of war, to try Murat as a public enemy, and to proceed to the execution of the sentence within fifteen minutes of passing judgment. This order arrived at Pizzo late on the night of the 12th.

On the following morning Nunziante in person informed Murat that he was immediately to be tried by court-martial. Up to this moment he had kept some hope. He had attempted to maintain the fiction that he was merely travelling to Trieste, and that stress of weather and lack of provisions had been the sole causes of his landing at Pizzo. He had retained a cheerful demeanour, and on dining the day before with Nunziante and Captain Robinson, commander of some Neapolitan gunboats that had been sent for, he appeared cheerful and not as a man in peril of his life. With Stratti he had discussed on the 12th the probability of his being sent on to Trieste, but when that officer saw him on the next day, after Nunziante's announcement had been made, Murat at once said to him: "Ah, my

dear Stratti, I am a lost man, the order for my trial is a sentence of death !”

The court-martial was duly assembled ; it was composed of three colonels and four junior officers, every one of whom had served in Murat’s army ; yet not one of those selected declined the task set before him. They proceeded to carry out certain forms of judicial appearance ; listened to the perfunctory remarks of the officer appointed to conduct the defence ; found *il generale francese*, as they described their late King, a public enemy ; and sentenced him to be shot immediately in the courtyard of the castle.

Murat played his appointed part in these necessary formalities with calm and dignity. After the court had pronounced its sentence he retired to the small room where he was lodged, and there received the visit of the Vicar of Pizzo, Canon Masdea. Five years before, at the time when his tent had been pitched in the midst of a formidable army on the hill of Piale, whence he could watch the British camps he longed to attack in Sicily, he had paid a visit to the village of Pizzo, and Masdea had then received from the King’s hands a large sum from his private purse to reconstruct the tower of his church ; it was now Joachim’s turn to receive from the hands of the humble parish priest a different offering, that of the last ministrations appointed by the Catholic Church for those about to die.

It was now four o’clock in the afternoon. A parting letter to his wife and children written, the priest’s absolution received, Murat was more fully prepared than he had been often enough in his life to meet death. An officer stood waiting at the door, and as he rose from his knees he said to the priest : “ Let us go and accomplish the will of God.”

Outside was a dark passage, and nearly immediately to the left, three steps down. At the foot of the steps a chair was placed, and in a narrow little area in front of it stood the firing party. So cramped was the space that the twelve men who composed it had to be placed in three ranks.

Murat came down and faced them. The chair he refused. The front rank was so close to him that their muskets nearly touched his breast. In his left hand Joachim held a miniature of his wife and children ; of all those present he was the most calm and self-controlled. Deliberately and clearly he ordered the soldiers to present arms and to go through the necessary manœuvres, but the men were so moved that the line of muskets came up very unsteady and ill-directed. He then said : "Spare my face ; aim at the heart," and, trying with his right hand to draw in the muskets towards his breast, gave the word to fire.

The triggers were pulled, the little space filled with sound and smoke. Murat's body remained erect for a moment, then sank down ; his forehead as it fell struck the door of the cell where his comrades were imprisoned. Nunziante was outside in the courtyard waiting, holding his head between his hands and leaning on the castle walls, and when the dull rumble of the volley told him that the brave soldier within had ceased to live, he burst into tears.

Thus came to an inglorious end Joachim Murat, for whom, whether as a king, as a general, or as a man, it is no easy matter to draw up a just epitaph. For in him the good and bad qualities were equally conspicuous. As a soldier his boldness often became rashness. As a king his liberality often became indiscriminate generosity. As a man his keen sense for

personal advancement often became craftiness and deceit. Yet he was one of the most notable soldiers of an age great in military achievement, one of the most notable kings in an age of political transformation, one of the most human characters produced by the Revolution. He was a man of the people, a man of his time, and its representative in some of its most hopeful aspects. Unlike that great intellectual accident of the period, Napoleon, Murat did not lose on the throne all his democratic affinities. Unlike his master, he retained his popular sympathies, and yet displayed qualities of mind, of heart, and of courage that might serve as an example to kings born of an older race. His evil star drew him from obscurity, gave him Napoleon for a leader, and from the day when he became King of Naples heaped difficulties on him that would have overburdened most men. And when we remember that his successor on the throne of Naples was Ferdinand of Bourbon, we cannot refrain from a pang of regret for the tragic fate of that misguided soldier, Joachim Murat.

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